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Sample records for bmf-96 safety analysis

  1. MODEL 9977 B(M)F-96 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR PACKAGING

    SciTech Connect

    Abramczyk, G; Paul Blanton, P; Kurt Eberl, K

    2006-05-18

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) documents the analysis and testing performed on and for the 9977 Shipping Package, referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Package (GPFP). The performance evaluation presented in this SARP documents the compliance of the 9977 package with the regulatory safety requirements for Type B packages. Per 10 CFR 71.59, for the 9977 packages evaluated in this SARP, the value of ''N'' is 50, and the Transport Index based on nuclear criticality control is 1.0. The 9977 package is designed with a high degree of single containment. The 9977 complies with 10 CFR 71 (2002), Department of Energy (DOE) Order 460.1B, DOE Order 460.2, and 10 CFR 20 (2003) for As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principles. The 9977 also satisfies the requirements of the Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material--1996 Edition (Revised)--Requirements. IAEA Safety Standards, Safety Series No. TS-R-1 (ST-1, Rev.), International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Austria (2000). The 9977 package is designed, analyzed and fabricated in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, 1992 edition.

  2. Safety analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Knight, John C.

    1995-01-01

    We are engaged in a research program in safety-critical computing that is based on two case studies. We use these case studies to provide application-specific details of the various research issues, and as targets for evaluation of research ideas. The first case study is the Magnetic Stereotaxis System (MSS), an investigational device for performing human neurosurgery being developed in a joint effort between the Department of Physics at the University of Virginia and the Department of Neurosurgery at the University of Iowa. The system operates by manipulating a small permanent magnet (known as a 'seed') within the brain using an externally applied magnetic field. By varying the magnitude and gradient of the external magnetic field, the seed can be moved along a non-linear path and positioned at a site requiring therapy, e.g., a tumor. The magnetic field required for movement through brain tissue is extremely high, and is generated by a set of six superconducting magnets located in a housing surrounding the patient's head. The system uses two X-ray cameras positioned at right angles to detect in real time the locations of the seed and of X-ray opaque markers affixed to the patient's skull. the X-ray images are used to locate the objects of interest in a canonical frame of reference. the second case study is the University of Virginia Research Nuclear Reactor (UVAR). It is a 2 MW thermal, concrete-walled pool reactor. The system operates using 20 to 25 plate-type fuel assemblies placed on a rectangular grid plate. There are three scramable safety rods, and one non-scramable regulating rod that can be put in automatic mode. It was originally constructed in 1959 as a 1 MW system, and it was upgraded to 2 MW in 1973. Though only a research reactor rather than a power reactor, the issues raised are significant and can be related to the problems faced by full-scale reactor systems.

  3. Technical Review Report for the Model 9977 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Addendum 1 Justification for DNDO Contents

    SciTech Connect

    West, M H

    2008-12-17

    The Model 9977 Package is currently certified for Content Envelope C.1, {sup 238}Pu Heat Sources, either in Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG), or in Food-Pack Can configurations, under Certificate of Compliance (CoC) Certificate Number 9977 and Package Identification Number USA/9977/B(M)F-96 (DOE). Addendum 1, Justification for DNDO Contents,--the Submittal--supplements Revision 2 of the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging for the Model 9977 Package. The Submittal adds five new contents to the Model 9977 Package, Content Envelopes, AC.1 through AC.5. The Content Envelopes are neptunium metal, the beryllium-reflected plutonium ball (BeRP Ball), plutonium/uranium metal, plutonium/uranium metal with enhanced wt% {sup 240}Pu (to 50 wt%), and uranium metal. The last three Content Envelopes are stabilized to DOE-STD-3013. These Content Envelopes will be shipped to the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), where they will reside, and, hence, to off-site locations in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The new certificate will apply to a limited number of Model 9977 Packages. At the same time, the Submittal requests an extension of the periodic maintenance requirements from one (1) year to up to five (5) years using Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) temperature-monitoring systems to measure the ambient storage temperature in order to ensure that the temperature of the Viton{reg_sign} O-rings for the 6-inch Containment Vessel (6CV) remain less than 200 F. The RFIDs have been developed by Argonne National Laboratory. An on-going surveillance program at the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS) facility at the Savannah River Site, and an on-going examination of Viton{reg_sign} O-rings from mock Primary Containment Vessels (PCVs) at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) provide the technical justification for the extension of the periodic maintenance interval. Where extended

  4. K Basin safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Porten, D.R.; Crowe, R.D.

    1994-12-16

    The purpose of this accident safety analysis is to document in detail, analyses whose results were reported in summary form in the K Basins Safety Analysis Report WHC-SD-SNF-SAR-001. The safety analysis addressed the potential for release of radioactive and non-radioactive hazardous material located in the K Basins and their supporting facilities. The safety analysis covers the hazards associated with normal K Basin fuel storage and handling operations, fuel encapsulation, sludge encapsulation, and canister clean-up and disposal. After a review of the Criticality Safety Evaluation of the K Basin activities, the following postulated events were evaluated: Crane failure and casks dropped into loadout pit; Design basis earthquake; Hypothetical loss of basin water accident analysis; Combustion of uranium fuel following dryout; Crane failure and cask dropped onto floor of transfer area; Spent ion exchange shipment for burial; Hydrogen deflagration in ion exchange modules and filters; Release of Chlorine; Power availability and reliability; and Ashfall.

  5. Technical Review Report for the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging Model 9977 S-SARP-G-00001 Revision 2

    SciTech Connect

    DiSabatino, A; Hafner, R; West, M

    2007-10-04

    This Technical Review Report (TRR) summarizes the review findings for the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) for the Model 9977 B(M)F-96 shipping container. The content analyzed for this submittal is Content Envelope C.1, Heat Sources, in assemblies of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators or food-pack cans. The SARP under review, i.e., S-SARP-G-00001, Revision 2 (August 2007), was originally referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Material Package. The review presented in this TRR was performed using the methods outlined in Revision 3 of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Packaging Review Guide (PRG) for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages. The format of the SARP follows that specified in Revision 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's, Regulatory Guide 7.9, i.e., Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material. Although the two documents are similar in their content, they are not identical. Formatting differences have been noted in this TRR, where appropriate. The Model 9977 Package is a 35-gallon drum package design that has evolved from a family of packages designed by DOE contractors at the Savannah River Site. The Model 9977 Package design includes a single, 6-inch diameter, stainless steel pressure vessel containment system (i.e., the 6CV) that was designed and fabricated in accordance with Section III, Subsection NB, of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code. The earlier package designs, i.e., the Model 9965, 9966, 9967 and 9968 Packages, were originally designed and certified in the 1980s. In the 1990s, updated package designs that incorporated design features consistent with new safety requirements, based on International Atomic Energy Agency guidelines, were proposed. The updated package designs were the Model 9972, 9973, 9974 and 9975 Packages, respectively. The Model 9975 Package was certified by the Packaging Certification Program, under

  6. Technical Review Report for the Model 9978-96 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (S-SARP-G-00002, Revision 1, March 2009)

    SciTech Connect

    West, M

    2009-03-06

    This Technical Review Report (TRR) documents the review, performed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Staff, at the request of the Department of Energy (DOE), on the 'Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Model 9978 B(M)F-96', Revision 1, March 2009 (S-SARP-G-00002). The Model 9978 Package complies with 10 CFR 71, and with 'Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material-1996 Edition (As Amended, 2000)-Safety Requirements', International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Standards Series No. TS-R-1. The Model 9978 Packaging is designed, analyzed, fabricated, and tested in accordance with Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME B&PVC). The review presented in this TRR was performed using the methods outlined in Revision 3 of the DOE's 'Packaging Review Guide (PRG) for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packages'. The format of the SARP follows that specified in Revision 2 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 7.9, i.e., 'Standard Format and Content of Part 71 Applications for Approval of Packages for Radioactive Material'. Although the two documents are similar in their content, they are not identical. Formatting differences have been noted in this TRR, where appropriate. The Model 9978 Packaging is a single containment package, using a 5-inch containment vessel (5CV). It uses a nominal 35-gallon drum package design. In comparison, the Model 9977 Packaging uses a 6-inch containment vessel (6CV). The Model 9977 and Model 9978 Packagings were developed concurrently, and they were referred to as the General Purpose Fissile Material Package, Version 1 (GPFP). Both packagings use General Plastics FR-3716 polyurethane foam as insulation and as impact limiters. The 5CV is used as the Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) in the Model 9975-96 Packaging. The Model 9975-96 Packaging also has the 6CV as its Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV). In comparison, the Model 9975

  7. CONVEYOR SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect

    M. Salem

    1995-06-23

    The purpose and objective of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) surface and subsurface conveyor system (for a list of conveyor subsystems see section 3). This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety Analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the conveyor structures/systems/components in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the structure/system/component (S/S/C) design, (2) add safety devices and capabilities to the designs that reduce risk, (3) provide devices that detect and warn personnel of hazardous conditions, and (4) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions. The scope of this analysis is limited to the hazards related to the design of conveyor structures/systems/components (S/S/Cs) that occur during normal operation. Hazards occurring during assembly, test and maintenance or ''off normal'' operations have not been included in this analysis. Construction related work activities are specifically excluded per DOE Order 5481.1B section 4. c.

  8. Integrated Safety Analysis Tiers

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Shackelford, Carla; McNairy, Lisa; Wetherholt, Jon

    2009-01-01

    Commercial partnerships and organizational constraints, combined with complex systems, may lead to division of hazard analysis across organizations. This division could cause important hazards to be overlooked, causes to be missed, controls for a hazard to be incomplete, or verifications to be inefficient. Each organization s team must understand at least one level beyond the interface sufficiently enough to comprehend integrated hazards. This paper will discuss various ways to properly divide analysis among organizations. The Ares I launch vehicle integrated safety analyses effort will be utilized to illustrate an approach that addresses the key issues and concerns arising from multiple analysis responsibilities.

  9. Integrated Safety Analysis Teams

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Wetherholt, Jonathan C.

    2008-01-01

    Today's complex systems require understanding beyond one person s capability to comprehend. Each system requires a team to divide the system into understandable subsystems which can then be analyzed with an Integrated Hazard Analysis. The team must have both specific experiences and diversity of experience. Safety experience and system understanding are not always manifested in one individual. Group dynamics make the difference between success and failure as well as the difference between a difficult task and a rewarding experience. There are examples in the news which demonstrate the need to connect the pieces of a system into a complete picture. The Columbia disaster is now a standard example of a low consequence hazard in one part of the system; the External Tank is a catastrophic hazard cause for a companion subsystem, the Space Shuttle Orbiter. The interaction between the hardware, the manufacturing process, the handling, and the operations contributed to the problem. Each of these had analysis performed, but who constituted the team which integrated this analysis together? This paper will explore some of the methods used for dividing up a complex system; and how one integration team has analyzed the parts. How this analysis has been documented in one particular launch space vehicle case will also be discussed.

  10. Model-Based Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Joshi, Anjali; Heimdahl, Mats P. E.; Miller, Steven P.; Whalen, Mike W.

    2006-01-01

    System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.

  11. System safety engineering analysis handbook

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Ijams, T. E.

    1972-01-01

    The basic requirements and guidelines for the preparation of System Safety Engineering Analysis are presented. The philosophy of System Safety and the various analytic methods available to the engineering profession are discussed. A text-book description of each of the methods is included.

  12. SEISMIC ANALYSIS FOR PRECLOSURE SAFETY

    SciTech Connect

    E.N. Lindner

    2004-12-03

    The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismically-initiated event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion (DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs to the following: (1) A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences; (2) An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence; and (3) A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that are credited in this analysis. The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically to ensure that seismic hazards are properly

  13. Adapting safety requirements analysis to intrusion detection

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Lutz, R.

    2001-01-01

    Several requirements analysis techniques widely used in safety-critical systems are being adapted to support the analysis of secure systems. Perhaps the most relevant system safety techique for Intrusion Detection Systems is hazard analysis.

  14. Safety study application guide. Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-07-01

    Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., (Energy Systems) is committed to performing and documenting safety analyses for facilities it manages for the Department of Energy (DOE). Included are analyses of existing facilities done under the aegis of the Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program, and analyses of new and modified facilities. A graded approach is used wherein the level of analysis and documentation for each facility is commensurate with the magnitude of the hazard(s), the complexity of the facility and the stage of the facility life cycle. Safety analysis reports (SARs) for hazard Category 1 and 2 facilities are usually detailed and extensive because these categories are associated with public health and safety risk. SARs for Category 3 are normally much less extensive because the risk to public health and safety is slight. At Energy Systems, safety studies are the name given to SARs for Category 3 (formerly {open_quotes}low{close_quotes}) facilities. Safety studies are the appropriate instrument when on-site risks are limited to irreversible consequences to a few people, and off-site consequences are limited to reversible consequences to a few people. This application guide provides detailed instructions for performing safety studies that meet the requirements of DOE Orders 5480.22, {open_quotes}Technical Safety Requirements,{close_quotes} and 5480.23, {open_quotes}Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.{close_quotes} A seven-chapter format has been adopted for safety studies. This format allows for discussion of all the items required by DOE Order 5480.23 and for the discussions to be readily traceable to the listing in the order. The chapter titles are: (1) Introduction and Summary, (2) Site, (3) Facility Description, (4) Safety Basis, (5) Hazardous Material Management, (6) Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions, and (7) Accident Analysis.

  15. 14 CFR 35.15 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    .... (4) A fatigue assessment. (f) If applicable, the safety analysis must include, but not be limited to... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safety analysis. 35.15 Section 35.15... STANDARDS: PROPELLERS Design and Construction § 35.15 Safety analysis. (a)(1) The applicant must analyze...

  16. System Safety Common Cause Analysis

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (ESTSC)

    1992-03-10

    The COMCAN fault tree analysis codes are designed to analyze complex systems such as nuclear plants for common causes of failure. A common cause event, or common mode failure, is a secondary cause that could contribute to the failure of more than one component and violates the assumption of independence. Analysis of such events is an integral part of system reliability and safety analysis. A significant common cause event is a secondary cause common tomore » all basic events in one or more minimal cut sets. Minimal cut sets containing events from components sharing a common location or a common link are called common cause candidates. Components share a common location if no barrier insulates any one of them from the secondary cause. A common link is a dependency among components which cannot be removed by a physical barrier (e.g.,a common energy source or common maintenance instructions).« less

  17. Solid waste burial grounds interim safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Saito, G.H.

    1994-10-01

    This Interim Safety Analysis document supports the authorization basis for the interim operation and restrictions on interim operations for the near-surface land disposal of solid waste in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. The Solid Waste Burial Grounds Interim Safety Basis supports the upgrade progress for the safety analysis report and the technical safety requirements for the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds. Accident safety analysis scenarios have been analyzed based on the significant events identified in the preliminary hazards analysis. The interim safety analysis provides an evaluation of the operations in the Solid Waste Burial Grounds to determine if the radiological and hazardous material exposures will be acceptable from an overall health and safety standpoint to the worker, the onsite personnel, the public, and the environment.

  18. Radiological Safety Analysis Code System.

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (ESTSC)

    2009-12-22

    Version 03 RSAC-6.2 can be used to model complex accidents and radiological consequences to individuals from the release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. A user can generate a fission product inventory; decay and ingrow the inventory during transport through processes, facilities, and the environment; model the downwind dispersion of the activity; and calculate doses to downwind individuals. Doses are calculated through the inhalation, immersion, ground surface and ingestion pathways. New to RSAC-6.2 are the abilitiesmore » to calculate inhalation from release to a room, inhalation from resuspension of activities, and a new model for dry deposition. Doses can now be calculated as close as 10 meters from the release point. RSAC-6.2 has been subjected to extensive independent verification and validation for use in performing safety-related dose calculations to support safety analysis reports. WinRP 2.0, a windows based overlay to RSAC-6.2, assists users in creating and running RSAC-6.2 input files. RSAC-6, Rev. 6.2 (03/11/02) corrects an earlier issue with RSAC-6, compiled with F77L-EM/32 Fortran 77 Version 5.10, which would not allow the executable to run with XP or VISTA Windows operating systems. Because this version is still in use at some facilities, it is being released through RSICC in addition to the new RSAC 7 (CCC-761).« less

  19. Automation for System Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Malin, Jane T.; Fleming, Land; Throop, David; Thronesbery, Carroll; Flores, Joshua; Bennett, Ted; Wennberg, Paul

    2009-01-01

    This presentation describes work to integrate a set of tools to support early model-based analysis of failures and hazards due to system-software interactions. The tools perform and assist analysts in the following tasks: 1) extract model parts from text for architecture and safety/hazard models; 2) combine the parts with library information to develop the models for visualization and analysis; 3) perform graph analysis and simulation to identify and evaluate possible paths from hazard sources to vulnerable entities and functions, in nominal and anomalous system-software configurations and scenarios; and 4) identify resulting candidate scenarios for software integration testing. There has been significant technical progress in model extraction from Orion program text sources, architecture model derivation (components and connections) and documentation of extraction sources. Models have been derived from Internal Interface Requirements Documents (IIRDs) and FMEA documents. Linguistic text processing is used to extract model parts and relationships, and the Aerospace Ontology also aids automated model development from the extracted information. Visualizations of these models assist analysts in requirements overview and in checking consistency and completeness.

  20. Radiation safety content guide for safety analysis reports

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1989-08-01

    US Department of Energy-Savannah River Operations Office (DOE-SR) facilities develop Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) to permit evaluation of potential hazards to the health and safety of the public and employees and potential hazards to government property and the environment. The SAR is the primary vehicle by which the Operating Contractor provides information to demonstrate that the facility can be operated safely. The Savannah River Operations Office independently reviews SARs to determine their technical integrity and completeness. In order to make the review process most efficient, SARs must be prepared in a consistent manner and contain all required information. This document provides guidance on the content of the radiation safety information to be included in SARs. It is not within the scope of this guide to address the entire Safety Analysis Report. 53 refs.

  1. 14 CFR 35.15 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety analysis. 35.15 Section 35.15... STANDARDS: PROPELLERS Design and Construction § 35.15 Safety analysis. (a)(1) The applicant must analyze the.... This analysis will take into account, if applicable: (i) The propeller system in a typical...

  2. 14 CFR 33.75 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety analysis. 33.75 Section 33.75... STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES Design and Construction; Turbine Aircraft Engines § 33.75 Safety analysis. (a... consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. This analysis will take into account,...

  3. 14 CFR 33.75 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety analysis. 33.75 Section 33.75... STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES Design and Construction; Turbine Aircraft Engines § 33.75 Safety analysis. (a... consequences of all failures that can reasonably be expected to occur. This analysis will take into account,...

  4. 14 CFR 35.15 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety analysis. 35.15 Section 35.15... STANDARDS: PROPELLERS Design and Construction § 35.15 Safety analysis. (a)(1) The applicant must analyze the.... This analysis will take into account, if applicable: (i) The propeller system in a typical...

  5. 14 CFR 35.15 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safety analysis. 35.15 Section 35.15... STANDARDS: PROPELLERS Design and Construction § 35.15 Safety analysis. (a)(1) The applicant must analyze the.... This analysis will take into account, if applicable: (i) The propeller system in a typical...

  6. 14 CFR 35.15 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safety analysis. 35.15 Section 35.15... STANDARDS: PROPELLERS Design and Construction § 35.15 Safety analysis. (a)(1) The applicant must analyze the.... This analysis will take into account, if applicable: (i) The propeller system in a typical...

  7. Task D: Hydrogen safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Swain, M.R.; Sievert, B.G.; Swain, M.N.

    1996-10-01

    This report covers two topics. The first is a review of codes, standards, regulations, recommendations, certifications, and pamphlets which address safety of gaseous fuels. The second is an experimental investigation of hydrogen flame impingement. Four areas of concern in the conversion of natural gas safety publications to hydrogen safety publications are delineated. Two suggested design criteria for hydrogen vehicle fuel systems are proposed. It is concluded from the experimental work that light weight, low cost, firewalls to resist hydrogen flame impingement are feasible.

  8. Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis Status Report

    SciTech Connect

    D. Gwyn

    2001-04-01

    This report provides the status of the potential Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) Integrated Safety Analysis (EA) by identifying the initial work scope scheduled for completion during the ISA development period, the schedules associated with the tasks identified, safety analysis issues encountered, and a summary of accomplishments during the reporting period. This status covers the period from October 1, 2000 through March 30, 2001.

  9. 14 CFR 33.75 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safety analysis. 33.75 Section 33.75 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES Design and Construction; Turbine Aircraft Engines § 33.75 Safety analysis....

  10. 14 CFR 33.75 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safety analysis. 33.75 Section 33.75 Aeronautics and Space FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES Design and Construction; Turbine Aircraft Engines § 33.75 Safety analysis....

  11. Hot Cell Facility (HCF) Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect

    MITCHELL,GERRY W.; LONGLEY,SUSAN W.; PHILBIN,JEFFREY S.; MAHN,JEFFREY A.; BERRY,DONALD T.; SCHWERS,NORMAN F.; VANDERBEEK,THOMAS E.; NAEGELI,ROBERT E.

    2000-11-01

    This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is prepared in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, and has been written to the format and content guide of DOE-STD-3009-94 Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. The Hot Cell Facility is a Hazard Category 2 nonreactor nuclear facility, and is operated by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Energy. This SAR provides a description of the HCF and its operations, an assessment of the hazards and potential accidents which may occur in the facility. The potential consequences and likelihood of these accidents are analyzed and described. Using the process and criteria described in DOE-STD-3009-94, safety-related structures, systems and components are identified, and the important safety functions of each SSC are described. Additionally, information which describes the safety management programs at SNL are described in ancillary chapters of the SAR.

  12. Infusing Reliability Techniques into Software Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Shi, Ying

    2015-01-01

    Software safety analysis for a large software intensive system is always a challenge. Software safety practitioners need to ensure that software related hazards are completely identified, controlled, and tracked. This paper discusses in detail how to incorporate the traditional reliability techniques into the entire software safety analysis process. In addition, this paper addresses how information can be effectively shared between the various practitioners involved in the software safety analyses. The author has successfully applied the approach to several aerospace applications. Examples are provided to illustrate the key steps of the proposed approach.

  13. 49 CFR 229.307 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Safety analysis. 229.307 Section 229.307 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARDS Locomotive Electronics § 229.307...

  14. 49 CFR 229.307 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Safety analysis. 229.307 Section 229.307 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARDS Locomotive Electronics § 229.307...

  15. 49 CFR 229.307 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 4 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Safety analysis. 229.307 Section 229.307 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD LOCOMOTIVE SAFETY STANDARDS Locomotive Electronics § 229.307...

  16. Autoclave nuclear criticality safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    D`Aquila, D.M.; Tayloe, R.W. Jr.

    1991-12-31

    Steam-heated autoclaves are used in gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plants to heat large cylinders of UF{sub 6}. Nuclear criticality safety for these autoclaves is evaluated. To enhance criticality safety, systems are incorporated into the design of autoclaves to limit the amount of water present. These safety systems also increase the likelihood that any UF{sub 6} inadvertently released from a cylinder into an autoclave is not released to the environment. Up to 140 pounds of water can be held up in large autoclaves. This mass of water is sufficient to support a nuclear criticality when optimally combined with 125 pounds of UF{sub 6} enriched to 5 percent U{sup 235}. However, water in autoclaves is widely dispersed as condensed droplets and vapor, and is extremely unlikely to form a critical configuration with released UF{sub 6}.

  17. HANFORD SAFETY ANALYSIS & RISK ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (SARAH)

    SciTech Connect

    EVANS, C B

    2004-12-21

    The purpose of the Hanford Safety Analysis and Risk Assessment Handbook (SARAH) is to support the development of safety basis documentation for Hazard Category 2 and 3 (HC-2 and 3) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 830, ''Nuclear Safety Management''. Subpart B, ''Safety Basis Requirements.'' Consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, ''Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses'' (STD-3009), and DOE-STD-3011-2002, ''Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents'' (STD-3011), the Hanford SARAH describes methodology for performing a safety analysis leading to development of a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and derivation of Technical Safety Requirements (TSR), and provides the information necessary to ensure a consistently rigorous approach that meets DOE expectations. The DSA and TSR documents, together with the DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report (SER), are the basic components of facility safety basis documentation. For HC-2 or 3 nuclear facilities in long-term surveillance and maintenance (S&M), for decommissioning activities, where source term has been eliminated to the point that only low-level, residual fixed contamination is present, or for environmental remediation activities outside of a facility structure, DOE-STD-1120-98, ''Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities'' (STD-1120), may serve as the basis for the DSA. HC-2 and 3 environmental remediation sites also are subject to the hazard analysis methodologies of this standard.

  18. A Synthetic Vision Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Hemm, Robert; Houser, Scott

    2001-01-01

    This report documents efforts to analyze a sample of aviation safety programs, using the LMI-developed integrated safety analysis tool to determine the change in system risk resulting from Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) technology implementation. Specifically, we have worked to modify existing system safety tools to address the safety impact of synthetic vision (SV) technology. Safety metrics include reliability, availability, and resultant hazard. This analysis of SV technology is intended to be part of a larger effort to develop a model that is capable of "providing further support to the product design and development team as additional information becomes available". The reliability analysis portion of the effort is complete and is fully documented in this report. The simulation analysis is still underway; it will be documented in a subsequent report. The specific goal of this effort is to apply the integrated safety analysis to SV technology. This report also contains a brief discussion of data necessary to expand the human performance capability of the model, as well as a discussion of human behavior and its implications for system risk assessment in this modeling environment.

  19. 14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.213 Flight safety limits analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must identify the location of populated or other...

  20. 14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.213 Flight safety limits analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must identify the location of populated or other...

  1. 14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.213 Flight safety limits analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must identify the location of populated or other...

  2. 14 CFR 417.213 - Flight safety limits analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Flight safety limits analysis. 417.213..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.213 Flight safety limits analysis. (a) General. A flight safety analysis must identify the location of populated or other...

  3. Using Addenda in Documented Safety Analysis Reports

    SciTech Connect

    Douglas S. Swanson; Michael A. Thieme

    2003-06-01

    This paper discusses the use of addenda to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Addenda were prepared for several systems and processes at the facility that lacked adequate descriptive information and hazard analysis in the DSA. They were also prepared for several new activities involving unreviewed safety questions (USQs). Ten addenda to the RWMC DSA have been prepared since the last annual update.

  4. Using Addenda in Documented Safety Analysis Reports

    SciTech Connect

    Swanson, D.S.; Thieme, M.A.

    2003-06-16

    This paper discusses the use of addenda to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) located at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). Addenda were prepared for several systems and processes at the facility that lacked adequate descriptive information and hazard analysis in the DSA. They were also prepared for several new activities involving unreviewed safety questions (USQs). Ten addenda to the RWMC DSA have been prepared since the last annual update.

  5. Overview of Energy Systems` safety analysis report programs. Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-03-01

    The primary purpose of an Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is to provide a basis for judging the adequacy of a facility`s safety. The SAR documents the safety analyses that systematically identify the hazards posed by the facility, analyze the consequences and risk of potential accidents, and describe hazard control measures that protect the health and safety of the public and employees. In addition, some SARs document, as Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs, which include Technical Specifications and Operational Safety Requirements), technical and administrative requirements that ensure the facility is operated within prescribed safety limits. SARs also provide conveniently summarized information that may be used to support procedure development, training, inspections, and other activities necessary to facility operation. This ``Overview of Energy Systems Safety Analysis Report Programs`` Provides an introduction to the programs and processes used in the development and maintenance of the SARs. It also summarizes some of the uses of the SARs within Energy Systems and DOE.

  6. 10 CFR 70.62 - Safety program and integrated safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety program and integrated safety analysis. 70.62... Nuclear Material § 70.62 Safety program and integrated safety analysis. (a) Safety program. (1) Each... are graded commensurate with the reduction of the risk attributable to that item. Three elements...

  7. Uncertainty analysis for Ulysses safety evaluation report

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Frank, Michael V.

    1991-01-01

    As part of the effort to review the Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report and to understand the risk of plutonium release from the Ulysses spacecraft General Purpose Heat Source-Radioisotope Thermal Generator, the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) performed an integrated, quantitative analysis of the uncertainties of the calculated risk of plutonium release from Ulysses. Using state-of-art probabilistic risk assessment technology, the uncertainty analysis accounted for both variability and uncertainty of the key parameters of the risk analysis. The results show that INSRP had high confidence that risk of fatal cancers from potential plutonium release associated with calculated launch and deployment accident scenarios is low.

  8. 10 CFR 830.204 - Documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Documented safety analysis. 830.204 Section 830.204 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Safety Basis Requirements § 830.204 Documented safety analysis... approval from DOE for the methodology used to prepare the documented safety analysis for the...

  9. 14 CFR 417.405 - Ground safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Ground safety analysis. 417.405 Section 417... OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Ground Safety § 417.405 Ground safety analysis. (a) A launch operator must perform a ground safety analysis for launch vehicle hardware, ground...

  10. 10 CFR 830.204 - Documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Documented safety analysis. 830.204 Section 830.204 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Safety Basis Requirements § 830.204 Documented safety analysis... approval from DOE for the methodology used to prepare the documented safety analysis for the...

  11. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTEGRATION WITH SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect

    Hearn, J; James Lightner, J

    2007-04-13

    The objective of this paper is to share the Savannah River Site lessons learned on Safeguards and Security (S&S) program integration with K-Area Complex (KAC) safety basis. The KAC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), is managed by the Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC), and the S&S program, managed by Wackenhut Services, Incorporated--Savannah River Site (WSI-SRS). WSRC and WSI-SRS developed a contractual arrangement to recognize WSI-SRS requirements in the KAC safety analysis. Design Basis Threat 2003 (DBT03) security upgrades required physical modifications and operational changes which included the availability of weapons which could potentially impact the facility safety analysis. The KAC DSA did not previously require explicit linkage to the S&S program to satisfy the safety analysis. WSI-SRS have contractual requirements with the Department of Energy (DOE) which are separate from WSRC contract requirements. The lessons learned will include a discussion on planning, analysis, approval of the controls and implementation issues.

  12. Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect

    1995-11-01

    The following provides a summary of the specific issues addressed in this FY-95 Annual Update as they relate to the CH TRU safety bases: Executive Summary; Site Characteristics; Principal Design and Safety Criteria; Facility Design and Operation; Hazards and Accident Analysis; Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements; Radiological and Hazardous Material Protection; Institutional Programs; Quality Assurance; and Decontamination and Decommissioning. The System Design Descriptions`` (SDDS) for the WIPP were reviewed and incorporated into Chapter 3, Principal Design and Safety Criteria and Chapter 4, Facility Design and Operation. This provides the most currently available final engineering design information on waste emplacement operations throughout the disposal phase up to the point of permanent closure. Also, the criteria which define the TRU waste to be accepted for disposal at the WIPP facility were summarized in Chapter 3 based on the WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.`` This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety analyses that develop and evaluate the adequacy of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact-Handled Transuranic Wastes (WIPP CH TRU) safety bases necessary to ensure the safety of workers, the public and the environment from the hazards posed by WIPP waste handling and emplacement operations during the disposal phase and hazards associated with the decommissioning and decontamination phase. The analyses of the hazards associated with the long-term (10,000 year) disposal of TRU and TRU mixed waste, and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 191, Subpart B and 40 CFR 268.6 will be addressed in detail in the WIPP Final Certification Application scheduled for submittal in October 1996 (40 CFR 191) and the No-Migration Variance Petition (40 CFR 268.6) scheduled for submittal in June 1996. Section 5.4, Long-Term Waste Isolation Assessment summarizes the current status of the assessment.

  13. DESIGN PACKAGE 1D SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect

    L.R. Eisler

    1995-02-02

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) Design Package 1D, Surface Facilities, (for a list of design items included in the package 1D system safety analysis see section 3). This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the Design Package 1D structures/systems/components in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the structure/system/component (S/S/C) design, (2) add safety devices and capabilities to the designs that reduce risk, (3) provide devices that detect and warn personnel of hazardous conditions, and (4) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions. The scope of this analysis is limited to the Design Package 1D structures/systems/components (S/S/Cs) during normal operations excluding hazards occurring during maintenance and ''off normal'' operations.

  14. K West integrated water treatment system subproject safety analysis document

    SciTech Connect

    SEMMENS, L.S.

    1999-02-24

    This Accident Analysis evaluates unmitigated accident scenarios, and identifies Safety Significant and Safety Class structures, systems, and components for the K West Integrated Water Treatment System.

  15. 14 CFR 33.75 - Safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... STANDARDS: AIRCRAFT ENGINES Design and Construction; Turbine Aircraft Engines § 33.75 Safety analysis. (a... judgment and previous experience combined with sound design and test philosophies. (4) The applicant must... systems; (4) Refrigerant injection systems; (5) Gas temperature control systems; (6) Engine speed,...

  16. DESIGN PACKAGE 1E SYSTEM SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect

    M. Salem

    1995-06-23

    The purpose of this analysis is to systematically identify and evaluate hazards related to the Yucca Mountain Project Exploratory Studies Facility (ESF) Design Package 1E, Surface Facilities, (for a list of design items included in the package 1E system safety analysis see section 3). This process is an integral part of the systems engineering process; whereby safety is considered during planning, design, testing, and construction. A largely qualitative approach was used since a radiological System Safety Analysis is not required. The risk assessment in this analysis characterizes the accident scenarios associated with the Design Package 1E structures/systems/components(S/S/Cs) in terms of relative risk and includes recommendations for mitigating all identified risks. The priority for recommending and implementing mitigation control features is: (1) Incorporate measures to reduce risks and hazards into the structure/system/component design, (2) add safety devices and capabilities to the designs that reduce risk, (3) provide devices that detect and warn personnel of hazardous conditions, and (4) develop procedures and conduct training to increase worker awareness of potential hazards, on methods to reduce exposure to hazards, and on the actions required to avoid accidents or correct hazardous conditions.

  17. SYNTHESIS OF SAFETY ANALYSIS AND FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODOLOGIES

    SciTech Connect

    Coutts, D

    2007-04-17

    Successful implementation of both the nuclear safety program and fire protection program is best accomplished using a coordinated process that relies on sound technical approaches. When systematically prepared, the documented safety analysis (DSA) and fire hazard analysis (FHA) can present a consistent technical basis that streamlines implementation. If not coordinated, the DSA and FHA can present inconsistent conclusions, which can create unnecessary confusion and can promulgate a negative safety perception. This paper will compare the scope, purpose, and analysis techniques for DSAs and FHAs. It will also consolidate several lessons-learned papers on this topic, which were prepared in the 1990s.

  18. Uncertainty analysis for Ulysses safety evaluation report

    SciTech Connect

    Frank, M.V. )

    1991-01-01

    As part of the effort to review the Ulysses Final Safety Analysis Report and to understand the risk of plutonium release from the Ulysses spacecraft General Purpose Heat Source---Radioisotope Thermal Generator (GPHS-RTG), the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) and the author performed an integrated, quantitative analysis of the uncertainties of the calculated risk of plutonium release from Ulysses. Using state-of-art probabilistic risk assessment technology, the uncertainty analysis accounted for both variability and uncertainty of the key parameters of the risk analysis. The results show that INSRP had high confidence that risk of fatal cancers from potential plutonium release associated with calculated launch and deployment accident scenarios is low.

  19. Relationships between psychological safety climate facets and safety behavior in the rail industry: a dominance analysis.

    PubMed

    Morrow, Stephanie L; McGonagle, Alyssa K; Dove-Steinkamp, Megan L; Walker, Curtis T; Marmet, Matthew; Barnes-Farrell, Janet L

    2010-09-01

    The goals of this study were twofold: (1) to confirm a relationship between employee perceptions of psychological safety climate and safety behavior for a sample of workers in the rail industry and (2) to explore the relative strengths of relationships between specific facets of safety climate and safety behavior. Non-management rail maintenance workers employed by a large North American railroad completed a survey (n=421) regarding workplace safety perceptions and behaviors. Three facets of safety climate (management safety, coworker safety, and work-safety tension) were assessed as relating to individual workers' reported safety behavior. All three facets were significantly associated with safety behavior. Dominance analysis was used to assess the relative importance of each facet as related to the outcome, and work-safety tension evidenced the strongest relationship with safety behavior. PMID:20538102

  20. 10 CFR 830.206 - Preliminary documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Preliminary documented safety analysis. 830.206 Section 830.206 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NUCLEAR SAFETY MANAGEMENT Safety Basis Requirements § 830.206 Preliminary documented safety analysis. If construction begins after December 11, 2000, the...

  1. COLD-SAT feasibility study safety analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Mchenry, Steven T.; Yost, James M.

    1991-01-01

    The Cryogenic On-orbit Liquid Depot-Storage, Acquisition, and Transfer (COLD-SAT) satellite presents some unique safety issues. The feasibility study conducted at NASA-Lewis desired a systems safety program that would be involved from the initial design in order to eliminate and/or control the inherent hazards. Because of this, a hazards analysis method was needed that: (1) identified issues that needed to be addressed for a feasibility assessment; and (2) identified all potential hazards that would need to be controlled and/or eliminated during the detailed design phases. The developed analysis method is presented as well as the results generated for the COLD-SAT system.

  2. 10 CFR 830.206 - Preliminary documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Preliminary documented safety analysis. 830.206 Section... Preliminary documented safety analysis. If construction begins after December 11, 2000, the contractor... category 1, 2, or 3 DOE nuclear facility must: (a) Prepare a preliminary documented safety analysis for...

  3. 10 CFR 72.70 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety analysis report updating. 72.70 Section 72.70..., Reports, Inspections, and Enforcement § 72.70 Safety analysis report updating. (a) Each specific licensee..., the final safety analysis report (FSAR) to assure that the information included in the report...

  4. 10 CFR 72.248 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety analysis report updating. 72.248 Section 72.248... Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks § 72.248 Safety analysis report updating. (a) Each certificate holder... section, the final safety analysis report (FSAR) to assure that the information included in the...

  5. FFTF Final Safety Analysis Report Amendment 82

    SciTech Connect

    DAUTEL, W.A.

    2003-03-01

    This is the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 82 for incorporation into the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) FSAR set assigned to you. This page change amendment incorporates changes previously approved by the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office. This amendment provides updates to the FSAR to facilitate FFTF shutdown and deactivation. Among the changes are the following: Chapter 11 is updated to describe upgrades to the Solid Waste Cask. Additional fuel handling accidents are added to Chapter 15. Appendix G is revised to clearly identify systems and their safety functions. Appendix H is revised to remove the discussion of material that has been removed from the Interim Storage Area. Appendix I is revised to provide a general description of liquid metal removal from FFTF. Other changes include minor technical updates from the FSAR annual review and editorial and procedure references.

  6. Lunar lava tube radiation safety analysis.

    PubMed

    De Angelis, Giovanni; Wilson, J W; Clowdsley, M S; Nealy, J E; Humes, D H; Clem, J M

    2002-12-01

    For many years it has been suggested that lava tubes on the Moon could provide an ideal location for a manned lunar base, by providing shelter from various natural hazards, such as cosmic radiation, meteorites, micrometeoroids, and impact crater ejecta, and also providing a natural environmental control, with a nearly constant temperature, unlike that of the lunar surface showing extreme variation in its diurnal cycle. An analysis of radiation safety issues on lunar lava tubes has been performed by considering radiation from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and Solar Particle Events (SPE) interacting with the lunar surface, modeled as a regolith layer and rock. The chemical composition has been chosen as typical of the lunar regions where the largest number of lava tube candidates are found. Particles have been transported all through the regolith and the rock, and received particles flux and doses have been calculated. The radiation safety of lunar lava tubes environments has been demonstrated. PMID:12793728

  7. Lunar lava tube radiation safety analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    De Angelis, Giovanni; Wilson, J. W.; Clowdsley, M. S.; Nealy, J. E.; Humes, D. H.; Clem, J. M.

    2002-01-01

    For many years it has been suggested that lava tubes on the Moon could provide an ideal location for a manned lunar base, by providing shelter from various natural hazards, such as cosmic radiation, meteorites, micrometeoroids, and impact crater ejecta, and also providing a natural environmental control, with a nearly constant temperature, unlike that of the lunar surface showing extreme variation in its diurnal cycle. An analysis of radiation safety issues on lunar lava tubes has been performed by considering radiation from galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and Solar Particle Events (SPE) interacting with the lunar surface, modeled as a regolith layer and rock. The chemical composition has been chosen as typical of the lunar regions where the largest number of lava tube candidates are found. Particles have been transported all through the regolith and the rock, and received particles flux and doses have been calculated. The radiation safety of lunar lava tubes environments has been demonstrated.

  8. 14 CFR 417.309 - Flight safety system analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... demonstrates that the flight termination of any stage, at any time during flight, will not sever... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Flight safety system analysis. 417.309..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.309 Flight safety...

  9. 14 CFR 417.309 - Flight safety system analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... demonstrates that the flight termination of any stage, at any time during flight, will not sever... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Flight safety system analysis. 417.309..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.309 Flight safety...

  10. 14 CFR 417.309 - Flight safety system analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... demonstrates that the flight termination of any stage, at any time during flight, will not sever... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Flight safety system analysis. 417.309..., DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety System § 417.309 Flight safety...

  11. 10 CFR 830.204 - Documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... criticality, define a criticality safety program that: (i) Ensures that operations with fissionable material... criticality safety standards, and (iii) Describes how the program meets applicable nuclear criticality safety... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Documented safety analysis. 830.204 Section 830.204...

  12. 10 CFR 830.204 - Documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... criticality, define a criticality safety program that: (i) Ensures that operations with fissionable material... criticality safety standards, and (iii) Describes how the program meets applicable nuclear criticality safety... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Documented safety analysis. 830.204 Section 830.204...

  13. 10 CFR 830.204 - Documented safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... criticality, define a criticality safety program that: (i) Ensures that operations with fissionable material... criticality safety standards, and (iii) Describes how the program meets applicable nuclear criticality safety... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Documented safety analysis. 830.204 Section 830.204...

  14. Rankine bottoming cycle safety analysis. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Lewandowski, G.A.

    1980-02-01

    Vector Engineering Inc. conducted a safety and hazards analysis of three Rankine Bottoming Cycle Systems in public utility applications: a Thermo Electron system using Fluorinal-85 (a mixture of 85 mole % trifluoroethanol and 15 mole % water) as the working fluid; a Sundstrand system using toluene as the working fluid; and a Mechanical Technology system using steam and Freon-II as the working fluids. The properties of the working fluids considered are flammability, toxicity, and degradation, and the risks to both plant workers and the community at large are analyzed.

  15. Mechanistic facility safety and source term analysis

    SciTech Connect

    PLYS, M.G.

    1999-06-09

    A PC-based computer program was created for facility safety and source term analysis at Hanford The program has been successfully applied to mechanistic prediction of source terms from chemical reactions in underground storage tanks, hydrogen combustion in double contained receiver tanks, and proccss evaluation including the potential for runaway reactions in spent nuclear fuel processing. Model features include user-defined facility room, flow path geometry, and heat conductors, user-defined non-ideal vapor and aerosol species, pressure- and density-driven gas flows, aerosol transport and deposition, and structure to accommodate facility-specific source terms. Example applications are presented here.

  16. ESSAA: Embedded system safety analysis assistant

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Wallace, Peter; Holzer, Joseph; Guarro, Sergio; Hyatt, Larry

    1987-01-01

    The Embedded System Safety Analysis Assistant (ESSAA) is a knowledge-based tool that can assist in identifying disaster scenarios. Imbedded software issues hazardous control commands to the surrounding hardware. ESSAA is intended to work from outputs to inputs, as a complement to simulation and verification methods. Rather than treating the software in isolation, it examines the context in which the software is to be deployed. Given a specified disasterous outcome, ESSAA works from a qualitative, abstract model of the complete system to infer sets of environmental conditions and/or failures that could cause a disasterous outcome. The scenarios can then be examined in depth for plausibility using existing techniques.

  17. Safety analysis report for packaging upgrade plan

    SciTech Connect

    KELLY, D.L.

    1998-11-18

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Upgrade Plan reflects a revised SARP upgrade schedule based on the most current program needs. A Project Hanford Management Contract (PHMC) Performance Expectation exists to update, revise, and/or cancel seven onsite SARPS during FY 1999. It is the U.S. Department of Energy's desire that 100% of the SARPs (which existed at the beginning of the PHMC Contract) be upgraded, revised, and/or canceled by the end of the five year contract. This plan is a ''living'' document and is used as a management tool.

  18. Natural circulation reactor design safety analysis

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zheng, Dong

    2001-07-01

    This thesis study covers both global performance and local phenomena analyses focusing on natural circulation reactor design safety. Four important topics are included: the global SBWR design safety assessment, important local phenomena investigation, steady and transient natural circulation process study, and two-phase instability analysis. The conceptual design of the SBWR-200 is introduced in this thesis and the global performance of a natural circulation reactor is then assessed using PUMA integral test data and RELAP5 simulations. A safety assessment methodology is developed to evaluate the PUMA integral test data extrapolation and code scalability. The RELAP5 code simulation capability in low-pressure low-flow conditions is also validated. The study shows that the code is capable of predicting the global accident scenario in natural circulation reactors with reasonable accuracy, while failing to reproduce some safety related local phenomena. The natural circulation process is investigated in detail using PUMA separate effect natural circulation tests. The natural circulation flow rate and heat transfer rate have been modeled analytically and numerically. The work indicates that two-phase natural circulation has enough capability to remove decay power. However, the flow instability observed in two-phase natural circulation cases seriously challenges the feasibility of natural circulation reactor design. The instability is classified as a type of density wave instability induced by flashing. A detailed stability study is performed focusing on flashing induced instability under natural circulation condition. Various flashing phenomena have been studied and a mechanistic flashing model has been proposed and improved using a relaxation method. The developed relaxation flashing model can be applied to general two-phase non-equilibrium phenomena.

  19. 10 CFR 70.62 - Safety program and integrated safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safety program and integrated safety analysis. 70.62 Section 70.62 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material § 70.62 Safety program...

  20. Multilevel analysis in road safety research.

    PubMed

    Dupont, Emmanuelle; Papadimitriou, Eleonora; Martensen, Heike; Yannis, George

    2013-11-01

    Hierarchical structures in road safety data are receiving increasing attention in the literature and multilevel (ML) models are proposed for appropriately handling the resulting dependences among the observations. However, so far no empirical synthesis exists of the actual added value of ML modelling techniques as compared to other modelling approaches. This paper summarizes the statistical and conceptual background and motivations for multilevel analyses in road safety research. It then provides a review of several ML analyses applied to aggregate and disaggregate (accident) data. In each case, the relevance of ML modelling techniques is assessed by examining whether ML model formulations (i) allow improving the fit of the model to the data, (ii) allow identifying and explaining random variation at specific levels of the hierarchy considered, and (iii) yield different (more correct) conclusions than single-level model formulations with respect to the significance of the parameter estimates. The evidence reviewed offers different conclusions depending on whether the analysis concerns aggregate data or disaggregate data. In the first case, the application of ML analysis techniques appears straightforward and relevant. The studies based on disaggregate accident data, on the other hand, offer mixed findings: computational problems can be encountered, and ML applications are not systematically necessary. The general recommendation concerning disaggregate accident data is to proceed to a preliminary investigation of the necessity of ML analyses and of the additional information to be expected from their application. PMID:23769622

  1. Short course on system safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Sudmann, R.H.

    1992-06-01

    This course provides and introduction to methods generally used in safety analysis and accident investigation. It is a non-mathematical approach, directed toward a casual user. The participant will learn techniques allowing them to dissect a system or incident in order identify real or potential safety problems. These techniques will be applied to analyze events which have occurred within DOE facilities. As a manager or staff person with general oversight responsibilities, the participant should gain an awareness of the big picture and not just ``dig for facts.`` This can be accomplished by being alert and responsive to the atmosphere and condition of the plant; mood and impression of the worker and the behavioral climate. The techniques taught in the course can be used to identify critical areas or indicators. These indicators will signal problems before the ``facts`` will. Analysis techniques taught are used to gauge the breadth of the ``forest`` and not necessarily to identify the trees. For this course includes a technical background with experience in a chemical processing operations and a knowledge of basic chemistry and engineering is desirable. The course should help in a present or future assignment in an oversight role.

  2. Short course on system safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Sudmann, R.H.

    1992-01-01

    This course provides and introduction to methods generally used in safety analysis and accident investigation. It is a non-mathematical approach, directed toward a casual user. The participant will learn techniques allowing them to dissect a system or incident in order identify real or potential safety problems. These techniques will be applied to analyze events which have occurred within DOE facilities. As a manager or staff person with general oversight responsibilities, the participant should gain an awareness of the big picture and not just dig for facts.'' This can be accomplished by being alert and responsive to the atmosphere and condition of the plant; mood and impression of the worker and the behavioral climate. The techniques taught in the course can be used to identify critical areas or indicators. These indicators will signal problems before the facts'' will. Analysis techniques taught are used to gauge the breadth of the forest'' and not necessarily to identify the trees. For this course includes a technical background with experience in a chemical processing operations and a knowledge of basic chemistry and engineering is desirable. The course should help in a present or future assignment in an oversight role.

  3. 242-A evaporator safety analysis report

    SciTech Connect

    CAMPBELL, T.A.

    1999-05-17

    This report provides a revised safety analysis for the upgraded 242-A Evaporator (the Evaporator). This safety analysis report (SAR) supports the operation of the Evaporator following life extension upgrades and other facility and operations upgrades (e.g., Project B-534) that were undertaken to enhance the capabilities of the Evaporator. The Evaporator has been classified as a moderate-hazard facility (Johnson 1990). The information contained in this SAR is based on information provided by 242-A Evaporator Operations, Westinghouse Hanford Company, site maintenance and operations contractor from June 1987 to October 1996, and the existing operating contractor, Waste Management Hanford (WMH) policies. Where appropriate, a discussion address the US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders applicable to a topic is provided. Operation of the facility will be compared to the operating contractor procedures using appropriate audits and appraisals. The following subsections provide introductory and background information, including a general description of the Evaporator facility and process, a description of the scope of this SAR revision,a nd a description of the basic changes made to the original SAR.

  4. Targeted maximum likelihood estimation in safety analysis

    PubMed Central

    Lendle, Samuel D.; Fireman, Bruce; van der Laan, Mark J.

    2013-01-01

    Objectives To compare the performance of a targeted maximum likelihood estimator (TMLE) and a collaborative TMLE (CTMLE) to other estimators in a drug safety analysis, including a regression-based estimator, propensity score (PS)–based estimators, and an alternate doubly robust (DR) estimator in a real example and simulations. Study Design and Setting The real data set is a subset of observational data from Kaiser Permanente Northern California formatted for use in active drug safety surveillance. Both the real and simulated data sets include potential confounders, a treatment variable indicating use of one of two antidiabetic treatments and an outcome variable indicating occurrence of an acute myocardial infarction (AMI). Results In the real data example, there is no difference in AMI rates between treatments. In simulations, the double robustness property is demonstrated: DR estimators are consistent if either the initial outcome regression or PS estimator is consistent, whereas other estimators are inconsistent if the initial estimator is not consistent. In simulations with near-positivity violations, CTMLE performs well relative to other estimators by adaptively estimating the PS. Conclusion Each of the DR estimators was consistent, and TMLE and CTMLE had the smallest mean squared error in simulations. PMID:23849159

  5. Safety analysis of surface haulage accidents

    SciTech Connect

    Randolph, R.F.; Boldt, C.M.K.

    1996-12-31

    Research on improving haulage truck safety, started by the U.S. Bureau of Mines, is being continued by its successors. This paper reports the orientation of the renewed research efforts, beginning with an update on accident data analysis, the role of multiple causes in these accidents, and the search for practical methods for addressing the most important causes. Fatal haulage accidents most often involve loss of control or collisions caused by a variety of factors. Lost-time injuries most often involve sprains or strains to the back or multiple body areas, which can often be attributed to rough roads and the shocks of loading and unloading. Research to reduce these accidents includes improved warning systems, shock isolation for drivers, encouraging seatbelt usage, and general improvements to system and task design.

  6. Modeling Controller Tasks for Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Brown, Molly; Leveson, Nancy G.

    1998-01-01

    As control systems become more complex, the use of automated control has increased. At the same time, the role of the human operator has changed from primary system controller to supervisor or monitor. Safe design of the human computer interaction becomes more difficult. In this paper, we present a visual task modeling language that can be used by system designers to model human-computer interactions. The visual models can be translated into SpecTRM-RL, a blackbox specification language for modeling the automated portion of the control system. The SpecTRM-RL suite of analysis tools allow the designer to perform formal and informal safety analyses on the task model in isolation or integrated with the rest of the modeled system.

  7. Overview of Energy Systems' safety analysis report programs

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-03-01

    The primary purpose of an Safety Analysis Report (SAR) is to provide a basis for judging the adequacy of a facility's safety. The SAR documents the safety analyses that systematically identify the hazards posed by the facility, analyze the consequences and risk of potential accidents, and describe hazard control measures that protect the health and safety of the public and employees. In addition, some SARs document, as Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs, which include Technical Specifications and Operational Safety Requirements), technical and administrative requirements that ensure the facility is operated within prescribed safety limits. SARs also provide conveniently summarized information that may be used to support procedure development, training, inspections, and other activities necessary to facility operation. This Overview of Energy Systems Safety Analysis Report Programs'' Provides an introduction to the programs and processes used in the development and maintenance of the SARs. It also summarizes some of the uses of the SARs within Energy Systems and DOE.

  8. Information Services at the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Simard, Ronald

    This paper describes the operations of the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. Established soon after an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, its efforts were initially directed towards a detailed analysis of the accident. Continuing functions include: (1) the analysis of generic nuclear safety issues,…

  9. Issues affecting advanced passive light-water reactor safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Beelman, R.J.; Fletcher, C.D.; Modro, S.M.

    1992-08-01

    Next generation commercial reactor designs emphasize enhanced safety through improved safety system reliability and performance by means of system simplification and reliance on immutable natural forces for system operation. Simulating the performance of these safety systems will be central to analytical safety evaluation of advanced passive reactor designs. Yet the characteristically small driving forces of these safety systems pose challenging computational problems to current thermal-hydraulic systems analysis codes. Additionally, the safety systems generally interact closely with one another, requiring accurate, integrated simulation of the nuclear steam supply system, engineered safeguards and containment. Furthermore, numerical safety analysis of these advanced passive reactor designs wig necessitate simulation of long-duration, slowly-developing transients compared with current reactor designs. The composite effects of small computational inaccuracies on induced system interactions and perturbations over long periods may well lead to predicted results which are significantly different than would otherwise be expected or might actually occur. Comparisons between the engineered safety features of competing US advanced light water reactor designs and analogous present day reactor designs are examined relative to the adequacy of existing thermal-hydraulic safety codes in predicting the mechanisms of passive safety. Areas where existing codes might require modification, extension or assessment relative to passive safety designs are identified. Conclusions concerning the applicability of these codes to advanced passive light water reactor safety analysis are presented.

  10. Issues affecting advanced passive light-water reactor safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Beelman, R.J.; Fletcher, C.D.; Modro, S.M.

    1992-01-01

    Next generation commercial reactor designs emphasize enhanced safety through improved safety system reliability and performance by means of system simplification and reliance on immutable natural forces for system operation. Simulating the performance of these safety systems will be central to analytical safety evaluation of advanced passive reactor designs. Yet the characteristically small driving forces of these safety systems pose challenging computational problems to current thermal-hydraulic systems analysis codes. Additionally, the safety systems generally interact closely with one another, requiring accurate, integrated simulation of the nuclear steam supply system, engineered safeguards and containment. Furthermore, numerical safety analysis of these advanced passive reactor designs wig necessitate simulation of long-duration, slowly-developing transients compared with current reactor designs. The composite effects of small computational inaccuracies on induced system interactions and perturbations over long periods may well lead to predicted results which are significantly different than would otherwise be expected or might actually occur. Comparisons between the engineered safety features of competing US advanced light water reactor designs and analogous present day reactor designs are examined relative to the adequacy of existing thermal-hydraulic safety codes in predicting the mechanisms of passive safety. Areas where existing codes might require modification, extension or assessment relative to passive safety designs are identified. Conclusions concerning the applicability of these codes to advanced passive light water reactor safety analysis are presented.

  11. Biosensors for functional food safety and analysis.

    PubMed

    Lavecchia, Teresa; Tibuzzi, Arianna; Giardi, Maria Teresa

    2010-01-01

    The importance of safety and functionality analysis of foodstuffs and raw materials is supported by national legislations and European Union (EU) directives concerning not only the amount of residues of pollutants and pathogens but also the activity and content of food additives and the health claims stated on their labels. In addition, consumers' awareness of the impact of functional foods' on their well-being and their desire for daily healthcare without the intake pharmaceuticals has immensely in recent years. Within this picture, the availability of fast, reliable, low cost control systems to measure the content and the quality of food additives and nutrients with health claims becomes mandatory, to be used by producers, consumers and the governmental bodies in charge of the legal supervision of such matters. This review aims at describing the most important methods and tools used for food analysis, starting with the classical methods (e.g., gas-chromatography GC, high performance liquid chromatography HPLC) and moving to the use of biosensors-novel biological material-based equipments. Four types of bio-sensors, among others, the novel photosynthetic proteins-based devices which are more promising and common in food analysis applications, are reviewed. A particular highlight on biosensors for the emerging market of functional foods is given and the most widely applied functional components are reviewed with a comprehensive analysis of papers published in the last three years; this report discusses recent trends for sensitive, fast, repeatable and cheap measurements, focused on the detection of vitamins, folate (folic acid), zinc (Zn), iron (Fe), calcium (Ca), fatty acids (in particular Omega 3), phytosterols and phytochemicals. A final market overview emphasizes some practical aspects ofbiosensor applications. PMID:21520718

  12. Safety Evaluation Report of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact Handled (CH) Waste Documented Safety Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Washington TRU Solutions LLC

    2005-09-01

    This Safety Evaluation Report (SER) documents the Department of Energy’s (DOE's) review of Revision 9 of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Contact Handled (CH) Waste Documented Safety Analysis, DOE/WIPP-95-2065 (WIPP CH DSA), and provides the DOE Approval Authority with the basis for approving the document. It concludes that the safety basis documented in the WIPP CH DSA is comprehensive, correct, and commensurate with hazards associated with CH waste disposal operations. The WIPP CH DSA and associated technical safety requirements (TSRs) were developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, and DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.

  13. Analysis of Safety Requirements for Large Offshore Units Evacuation Systems. LSA safety function

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Abramowicz-Gerigk, Teresa; Burciu, Zbigniew

    2012-12-01

    The paper presents the problems related to the effectiveness of evacuation systems for large offshore installations. The analysis of safety requirements related to the complex evacuation, escape and rescue (EER) system elements has been carried out on the basis of the reports from the accidents of offshore drilling and production platforms. The safety function developed for life saving appliances (LSA) - the 6, 10 and 20 persons liferafts is presented as an example of a method for life saving appliances safety assessment.

  14. Lunar mission safety and rescue: Hazards analysis and safety requirements

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    1971-01-01

    The results are presented of the hazards analysis which was concerned only with hazards to personnel and not with loss of equipment or property. Hazards characterization includes the definition of a hazard, the hazard levels, and the hazard groups. The analysis methodology is described in detail. The methodology was used to prepare the top level functional flow diagrams, to perform the first level hazards assessment, and to develop a list of conditions and situations requiring individual hazard studies. The 39 individual hazard study results are presented in total.

  15. 10 CFR 72.248 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safety analysis report updating. 72.248 Section 72.248 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF... Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks § 72.248 Safety analysis report updating. (a) Each certificate...

  16. Analysis of US child care safety regulations.

    PubMed Central

    Runyan, C W; Gray, D E; Kotch, J B; Kreuter, M W

    1991-01-01

    BACKGROUND: With 1.9 million US children cared for in organized group child care, the safety of these children is a public health concern. In the absence of federal policy, each state has developed its own day care safety regulations. METHODS: After creating a set of 36 criteria from three sets of national guidelines, we assessed the safety regulations of 45 states. With a mailed survey of state day care regulatory personnel, we examined the processes of formulating and implementing safety policy in 47 states. RESULTS: For 24 of the 36 items, more than half the states' regulations were below the criteria or failed to mention the topic. Most notable is the inattention to playground safety, choking hazards, and firearms. CONCLUSION: The uneven quality of regulations may be a reflection of a regulatory process that is fragmented, with many different groups sharing authority and with limited involvement of injury prevention specialists. PMID:1854015

  17. TA-55 Final Safety Analysis Report Comparison Document and DOE Safety Evaluation Report Requirements

    SciTech Connect

    Alan Bond

    2001-04-01

    This document provides an overview of changes to the currently approved TA-55 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) that are included in the upgraded FSAR. The DOE Safety Evaluation Report (SER) requirements that are incorporated into the upgraded FSAR are briefly discussed to provide the starting point in the FSAR with respect to the SER requirements.

  18. 10 CFR 70.62 - Safety program and integrated safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safety program and integrated safety analysis. 70.62 Section 70.62 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess a Critical Mass of...

  19. 10 CFR 70.62 - Safety program and integrated safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safety program and integrated safety analysis. 70.62 Section 70.62 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess a Critical Mass of...

  20. 10 CFR 70.62 - Safety program and integrated safety analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safety program and integrated safety analysis. 70.62 Section 70.62 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess a Critical Mass of...

  1. Preliminary Safety Analysis of the Gorleben Site: Overview - 13298

    SciTech Connect

    Bracke, G.; Fischer-Appelt, K.; Baltes, B.

    2013-07-01

    The project preliminary safety analysis of the Gorleben site started in 2010 and is based on the safety requirements for heat generating radioactive waste released from the German Federal Ministry for Environment, natural conservation and nuclear safety. The project consists of several tasks: the database defining the geology of Gorleben and the composition of the waste to be disposed of, the safety and demonstration concept, the repository concepts, the scenario analysis, the system analysis with long-term safety assessment and the synthesis. The overall synthesis indicates presently the compatibility of a repository in Gorleben with the safety requirements. The application of the method for a site selection process is still under evaluation. (authors)

  2. Application of Factor Restructuring Analysis in Enterprise Safety Culture Evaluation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Yihong; Xia, Liming; Pan, Jinshuang; Zong, Hengheng

    The enterprise safety culture index system, which mainly consists of enterprise decision-making level, management level, implementation level, and external environmental factor, is constructed based on human errors theory. Then, a corresponding enterprise safety culture evaluation model adapting to the characteristics of this index system is presented with consideration of the constraint condition of data and by taking full use of the advantages of factor system restructuring analysis and principal component analysis in data processing; The model provides an operable way for evaluating the enterprise safety culture. Further, the model is to make up for the gaps of enterprise safety culture evaluation.

  3. Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Tokamak Physics Experiment

    SciTech Connect

    Motloch, C.G.; Bonney, R.F.; Levine, J.D.; McKenzie-Carter, M.A.; Masson, L.S.; Commander, J.C.

    1995-04-01

    This Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), includes an indication of the magnitude of facility hazards, complexity of facility operations, and the stage of the facility life-cycle. It presents the results of safety analyses, safety assurance programs, identified vulnerabilities, compensatory measures, and, in general, the rationale describing why the Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX) can be safely operated. It discusses application of the graded approach to the TPX safety analysis, including the basis for using Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23 and DOE-STD-3009-94 in the development of the PSAR.

  4. Safety analysis report 231-Z Building

    SciTech Connect

    Powers, C.S.

    1989-03-01

    This report provides an intensive review of the nuclear safety of the operation of the 231-Z Building. For background information complete descriptions of the floor plan, building services, alarm systems, and glove box systems are included in this report. In addition, references are included to The Plutonium Laboratory Radiation Work Procedures, Safety Guides, 231-Z Operating Procedures Manual and Nuclear Materials accountability Procedures. Engineered and administrative features contribute to the overall safety of personnel, the building, and environs. The consequences of credible incidents were considered and are discussed.

  5. The quality/safety medical index: implementation and analysis.

    PubMed

    Reiner, Bruce I

    2015-02-01

    Medical analytics relating to quality and safety measures have become particularly timely and of high importance in contemporary medical practice. In medical imaging, the dynamic relationship between medical imaging quality and radiation safety creates challenges in quantifying quality or safety independently. By creating a standardized measurement which simultaneously accounts for quality and safety measures (i.e., quality safety index), one can in theory create a standardized method for combined quality and safety analysis, which in turn can be analyzed in the context of individual patient, exam, and clinical profiles. The derived index measures can be entered into a centralized database, which in turn can be used for comparative performance of individual and institutional service providers. In addition, data analytics can be used to create customizable educational resources for providers and patients, clinical decision support tools, technology performance analysis, and clinical/economic outcomes research. PMID:25416467

  6. System code requirements for safety analysis of SBWR

    SciTech Connect

    Andersen, J.G.M.; Shiralkar, B.S.

    1994-12-31

    The simplified boiling water reactor (SBWR) being developed by General Electric Nuclear Energy is an advanced boiling water reactor relying on natural circulation during normal operation and passive safety features. The major elements of the passive safety features are the automatic depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) through safety/relief valves and depressurization valves, the gravity-driven coolant system (GDCS), and the passive containment cooling system (PCCS) for residual heat removal. These passive safety systems, although based on existing technology, have generated new requirements for the computer codes used in safety and design analysis. TRACG is the computer code used for safety and design analysis for the SBWR.

  7. Analysis of microgravity space experiments Space Shuttle programmatic safety requirements

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Terlep, Judith A.

    1996-01-01

    This report documents the results of an analysis of microgravity space experiments space shuttle programmatic safety requirements and recommends the creation of a Safety Compliance Data Package (SCDP) Template for both flight and ground processes. These templates detail the programmatic requirements necessary to produce a complete SCDP. The templates were developed from various NASA centers' requirement documents, previously written guidelines on safety data packages, and from personal experiences. The templates are included in the back as part of this report.

  8. SNF fuel retrieval sub project safety analysis document

    SciTech Connect

    BERGMANN, D.W.

    1999-02-24

    This safety analysis is for the SNF Fuel Retrieval (FRS) Sub Project. The FRS equipment will be added to K West and K East Basins to facilitate retrieval, cleaning and repackaging the spent nuclear fuel into Multi-Canister Overpack baskets. The document includes a hazard evaluation, identifies bounding accidents, documents analyses of the accidents and establishes safety class or safety significant equipment to mitigate accidents as needed.

  9. Safety analysis report for the Waste Storage Facility. Revision 2

    SciTech Connect

    Bengston, S.J.

    1994-05-01

    This safety analysis report outlines the safety concerns associated with the Waste Storage Facility located in the Radioactive Waste Management Complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The three main objectives of the report are: define and document a safety basis for the Waste Storage Facility activities; demonstrate how the activities will be carried out to adequately protect the workers, public, and environment; and provide a basis for review and acceptance of the identified risk that the managers, operators, and owners will assume.

  10. Systems Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program: Final Report

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Jones, Sharon M.; Reveley, Mary S.; Withrow, Colleen A.; Evans, Joni K.; Barr, Lawrence; Leone, Karen

    2013-01-01

    A three-month study (February to April 2010) of the NASA Aviation Safety (AvSafe) program was conducted. This study comprised three components: (1) a statistical analysis of currently available civilian subsonic aircraft data from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system to identify any significant or overlooked aviation safety issues; (2) a high-level qualitative identification of future safety risks, with an assessment of the potential impact of the NASA AvSafe research on the National Airspace System (NAS) based on these risks; and (3) a detailed, top-down analysis of the NASA AvSafe program using an established and peer-reviewed systems analysis methodology. The statistical analysis identified the top aviation "tall poles" based on NTSB accident and FAA incident data from 1997 to 2006. A separate examination of medical helicopter accidents in the United States was also conducted. Multiple external sources were used to develop a compilation of ten "tall poles" in future safety issues/risks. The top-down analysis of the AvSafe was conducted by using a modification of the Gibson methodology. Of the 17 challenging safety issues that were identified, 11 were directly addressed by the AvSafe program research portfolio.

  11. Applying MORT maintenance safety analysis in Finnish industry

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ruuhilehto, Kaarin; Virolainen, Kimmo

    1992-02-01

    A safety analysis method based on MORT (Management Oversight and Risk Tree) method, especially on the version developed for safety considerations in the evaluation of maintenance programs, is presented. The MORT maintenance safety analysis is intended especially for the use maintenance safety management. The analysis helps managers evaluate the goals of their safety work and measures taken to reach them. The analysis is done by a team or teams. The team ought to have expert knowledge of the organization both vertically and horizontally in order to be able to identify factors that may contribute to accidents or other interruptions in the maintenance work. Identification is made by using the MORT maintenance key question set as a check list. The questions check the way safety matters are connnected with the maintenance planning and managing, as well as the safety management itself. In the second stage, means to eliminate the factors causing problems are developed. New practices are established to improve safety of maintenance planning and managing in the enterprise.

  12. A guide for performing system safety analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Brush, J. M.; Douglass, R. W., III.; Williamson, F. R.; Dorman, M. C. (Editor)

    1974-01-01

    A general guide is presented for performing system safety analyses of hardware, software, operations and human elements of an aerospace program. The guide describes a progression of activities that can be effectively applied to identify hazards to personnel and equipment during all periods of system development. The general process of performing safety analyses is described; setting forth in a logical order the information and data requirements, the analytical steps, and the results. These analyses are the technical basis of a system safety program. Although the guidance established by this document cannot replace human experience and judgement, it does provide a methodical approach to the identification of hazards and evaluation of risks to the system.

  13. 14 CFR 417.309 - Flight safety system analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Flight safety system analysis. 417.309... analysis. (a) General. (1) Each flight termination system and command control system, including each of their components, must satisfy the analysis requirements of this section. (2) Each analysis must...

  14. F-Canyon Suspension and Deactivation Safety Analysis Reports

    SciTech Connect

    LOW, JM

    2004-04-30

    This paper describes Savannah River Site's compliance with the Department of Energy (DOE) direction to suspend current operations, transition to accommodate revised facility missions, and initiate operations to deactivate F-Canyon using a suspension and deactivation safety basis. This paper integrates multiple Workshop theme topics - Lessons Learned from the Safety Analysis Process, Improvements in Documenting Hazard and Accident Analysis, and Closure Issues - Decontamination and Decommissioning. The paper describes the process used to develop safety documentation to support suspension and deactivation activities for F-Canyon. Embodied are descriptive efforts that include development of intermediate and final ''end states'' (e.g., transitional operations), preparation of safety bases documents to support transition, performance of suspension and deactivation activities (e.g. solvent washing, tank/sump flushing, and laboratory waste processing), and downgrade of Safety Class and Safety Significant equipment. The reduction and/or removal of hazards in the facility result in significant risk (frequency times consequence) reduction to the public, site workers, and the environment. Risk reduction then allows the downgrade of safety class and safety significant systems (e.g., ventilation system) and elimination of associated surveillances. The downgrade of safety systems results in significant cost savings.

  15. Using Qualitative Hazard Analysis to Guide Quantitative Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Shortle, J. F.; Allocco, M.

    2005-01-01

    Quantitative methods can be beneficial in many types of safety investigations. However, there are many difficulties in using quantitative m ethods. Far example, there may be little relevant data available. This paper proposes a framework for using quantitative hazard analysis to prioritize hazard scenarios most suitable for quantitative mziysis. The framework first categorizes hazard scenarios by severity and likelihood. We then propose another metric "modeling difficulty" that desc ribes the complexity in modeling a given hazard scenario quantitatively. The combined metrics of severity, likelihood, and modeling difficu lty help to prioritize hazard scenarios for which quantitative analys is should be applied. We have applied this methodology to proposed concepts of operations for reduced wake separation for airplane operatio ns at closely spaced parallel runways.

  16. Preliminary Results Obtained in Integrated Safety Analysis of NASA Aviation Safety Program Technologies

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Reveley, Mary S.

    2003-01-01

    The goal of the NASA Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) is to develop and demonstrate technologies that contribute to a reduction in the aviation fatal accident rate by a factor of 5 by the year 2007 and by a factor of 10 by the year 2022. Integrated safety analysis of day-to-day operations and risks within those operations will provide an understanding of the Aviation Safety Program portfolio. Safety benefits analyses are currently being conducted. Preliminary results for the Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS) and Weather Accident Prevention (WxAP) projects of the AvSP have been completed by the Logistics Management Institute under a contract with the NASA Glenn Research Center. These analyses include both a reliability analysis and a computer simulation model. The integrated safety analysis method comprises two principal components: a reliability model and a simulation model. In the reliability model, the results indicate how different technologies and systems will perform in normal, degraded, and failed modes of operation. In the simulation, an operational scenario is modeled. The primary purpose of the SVS project is to improve safety by providing visual-flightlike situation awareness during instrument conditions. The current analyses are an estimate of the benefits of SVS in avoiding controlled flight into terrain. The scenario modeled has an aircraft flying directly toward a terrain feature. When the flight crew determines that the aircraft is headed toward an obstruction, the aircraft executes a level turn at speed. The simulation is ended when the aircraft completes the turn.

  17. Computational methods for criticality safety analysis within the scale system

    SciTech Connect

    Parks, C.V.; Petrie, L.M.; Landers, N.F.; Bucholz, J.A.

    1986-01-01

    The criticality safety analysis capabilities within the SCALE system are centered around the Monte Carlo codes KENO IV and KENO V.a, which are both included in SCALE as functional modules. The XSDRNPM-S module is also an important tool within SCALE for obtaining multiplication factors for one-dimensional system models. This paper reviews the features and modeling capabilities of these codes along with their implementation within the Criticality Safety Analysis Sequences (CSAS) of SCALE. The CSAS modules provide automated cross-section processing and user-friendly input that allow criticality safety analyses to be done in an efficient and accurate manner. 14 refs., 2 figs., 3 tabs.

  18. Recent Progresses in Nanobiosensing for Food Safety Analysis.

    PubMed

    Yang, Tao; Huang, Huifen; Zhu, Fang; Lin, Qinlu; Zhang, Lin; Liu, Junwen

    2016-01-01

    With increasing adulteration, food safety analysis has become an important research field. Nanomaterials-based biosensing holds great potential in designing highly sensitive and selective detection strategies necessary for food safety analysis. This review summarizes various function types of nanomaterials, the methods of functionalization of nanomaterials, and recent (2014-present) progress in the design and development of nanobiosensing for the detection of food contaminants including pathogens, toxins, pesticides, antibiotics, metal contaminants, and other analytes, which are sub-classified according to various recognition methods of each analyte. The existing shortcomings and future perspectives of the rapidly growing field of nanobiosensing addressing food safety issues are also discussed briefly. PMID:27447636

  19. Recent Progresses in Nanobiosensing for Food Safety Analysis

    PubMed Central

    Yang, Tao; Huang, Huifen; Zhu, Fang; Lin, Qinlu; Zhang, Lin; Liu, Junwen

    2016-01-01

    With increasing adulteration, food safety analysis has become an important research field. Nanomaterials-based biosensing holds great potential in designing highly sensitive and selective detection strategies necessary for food safety analysis. This review summarizes various function types of nanomaterials, the methods of functionalization of nanomaterials, and recent (2014–present) progress in the design and development of nanobiosensing for the detection of food contaminants including pathogens, toxins, pesticides, antibiotics, metal contaminants, and other analytes, which are sub-classified according to various recognition methods of each analyte. The existing shortcomings and future perspectives of the rapidly growing field of nanobiosensing addressing food safety issues are also discussed briefly. PMID:27447636

  20. Safety analysis approaches or mixed transuranic waste.

    SciTech Connect

    Courtney, J. C.; Dwight, C. C.; Forrester, R. J.; Lehto, M. A.; Pan, Y. C.

    1999-02-10

    Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) has completed a survey of assumptions and techniques used for safety analyses at seven sites that handle or store mixed transuranic (TRU) waste operated by contractors for the US Department of Energy (DOE). While approaches to estimating on-site and off-site consequences of hypothetical accidents differ, there are commonalities in all of the safety studies. This paper identifies key parameters and methods used to estimate the radiological consequences associated with release of waste forms under abnormal conditions. Specific facilities are identified by letters with their safety studies listed in a bibliography rather than as specific references so that similarities and differences are emphasized in a nonjudgmental manner. References are provided for specific parameters used to project consequences associated with compromise of barriers and dispersion of potentially hazardous materials. For all of the accidents and sites, estimated dose commitments are well below guidelines even using highly conservative assumptions. Some of the studies quantified the airborne concentrations of toxic materials; this paper only addresses these analyses briefly, as an entire paper could be dedicated to this subject.

  1. Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Leveson, Nancy; Alfaro, Liliana; Alvarado, Christine; Brown, Molly; Hunt, Earl B.; Jaffe, Matt; Joslyn, Susan; Pinnell, Denise; Reese, Jon; Samarziya, Jeffrey; Sandys, Sean; Shaw, Alan; Zabinsky, Zelda

    1997-01-01

    For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

  2. Business analysis in occupational health and safety consultations.

    PubMed

    Snyder, T B; Himmelstein, J; Pransky, G; Beavers, J D

    1991-10-01

    We present a method for incorporating business analysis into comprehensive health and safety consultations using as an example a plant with an elevated incidence of cumulative trauma disorders. Business information, including product and management history, short- and long-term corporate goals, functional analysis, profit history, organizational structure with respect to health and safety, and personnel and labor-management relationships are evaluated simultaneously with traditional ergonomic factors. The additional business data allow consultants to identify the full scope of etiologies and make practical, credible recommendations that are more likely to be adopted by management and labor. We propose that techniques of "business analysis" be routinely incorporated into occupational health and safety consultations. However, because collection and interpretation of these data require business skills outside the occupational safety and health expert's usual repertoire, the consulting team must include participants with business expertise. We have found that occupational health medical personnel with an understanding of business analysis concepts can be very effective advocates for changes in health and safety practices. We strongly recommend incorporating methods of business analysis into the occupational health and safety curriculum. PMID:1753300

  3. Westinghouse Hanford Company safety analysis reports and technical safety requirements upgrade program

    SciTech Connect

    Busche, D.M.

    1995-09-01

    During Fiscal Year 1992, the US Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) separately transmitted the following US Department of Energy (DOE) Orders to Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) for compliance: DOE 5480.21, ``Unreviewed Safety Questions,`` DOE 5480.22, ``Technical Safety Requirements,`` and DOE 5480.23, ``Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports.`` WHC has proceeded with its impact assessment and implementation process for the Orders. The Orders are closely-related and contain some requirements that are either identical, similar, or logically-related. Consequently, WHC has developed a strategy calling for an integrated implementation of the three Orders. The strategy is comprised of three primary objectives, namely: Obtain DOE approval of a single list of DOE-owned and WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities, Establish and/or upgrade the ``Safety Basis`` for each Nuclear Facility, and Establish a functional Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process to govern the management and preservation of the Safety Basis for each Nuclear Facility. WHC has developed policy-revision and facility-specific implementation plans to accomplish near-term tasks associated with the above strategic objectives. This plan, which as originally submitted in August 1993 and approved, provided an interpretation of the new DOE Nuclear Facility definition and an initial list of WHC-managed Nuclear Facilities. For each current existing Nuclear Facility, existing Safety Basis documents are identified and the plan/status is provided for the ISB. Plans for upgrading SARs and developing TSRs will be provided after issuance of the corresponding Rules.

  4. Lessons learned from commercial reactor safety analysis

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fragola, J. R.

    1992-07-01

    As design concepts involving nuclear power are developed for space missions, prudence requires a consideration of the historical perspective provided by the commerical nuclear power generating station industry. This would allow the aerospace industry to take advantage of relevant historical experience, drawing from the best features and avoiding the pitfalls which appear to have stifled the growth of the commercial nuclear industry as a whole despite its comparatively admirable safety performance record. This paper provides some history of the development of commercial nuclear plant designs, and discusses the lessons which have been learned and how they apply to the space nuclear propulsion situation.

  5. Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis of Synthetic Vision Conducted

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Reveley, Mary S.

    2002-01-01

    The goal of the NASA Aviation Safety Program is to develop and demonstrate technologies that could help reduce the aviation fatal accident rate by a factor of 5 by the year 2007 and by a factor of 10 by the year 2022. Integrated safety analysis of day-to-day operations and risks within those operations will provide an understanding of the Aviation Safety Program portfolio beyond what is now available. Synthetic vision is the first of the Aviation Safety Program technologies that has been analyzed by the Logistics Management Institute under a contract with the NASA Glenn Research Center. These synthetic vision analyses include both a reliability analysis and a computer simulation model.

  6. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) steel drum

    SciTech Connect

    McCormick, W.A.

    1998-09-29

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluations necessary to demonstrate that the steel drum packaging system meets the transportation safety requirements of HNF-PRO-154, Responsibilities and Procedures for all Hazardous Material Shipments, for an onsite packaging containing Type B quantities of solid and liquid radioactive materials. The basic component of the steel drum packaging system is the 208 L (55-gal) steel drum.

  7. Hybrid Safety Analysis Using Functional and Risk Decompositions

    SciTech Connect

    COOPER,J. ARLIN; JOHNSON,ALICE J.; WERNER,PAUL W.

    2000-07-15

    Safety analysis of complex systems depends on decomposing the systems into manageable subsystems, from which analysis can be rolled back up to the system level. The authors have found that there is no single best way to decompose; in fact hybrid combinations of decompositions are generally necessary to achieve optimum results. They are currently using two backbone coordinated decompositions--functional and risk, supplemented by other types, such as organizational. An objective is to derive metrics that can be used to efficiently and accurately aggregate information through analysis, to contribute toward assessing system safety, and to contribute information necessary for defensible decisions.

  8. Software Safety Analysis of a Flight Guidance System

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Butler, Ricky W. (Technical Monitor); Tribble, Alan C.; Miller, Steven P.; Lempia, David L.

    2004-01-01

    This document summarizes the safety analysis performed on a Flight Guidance System (FGS) requirements model. In particular, the safety properties desired of the FGS model are identified and the presence of the safety properties in the model is formally verified. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the entire project, while Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the problem domain, the nature of accidents, model based development, and the four-variable model. Chapter 3 outlines the approach. Chapter 4 presents the results of the traditional safety analysis techniques and illustrates how the hazardous conditions associated with the system trace into specific safety properties. Chapter 5 presents the results of the formal methods analysis technique model checking that was used to verify the presence of the safety properties in the requirements model. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the study, first and foremost that model checking is a very effective verification technique to use on discrete models with reasonable state spaces. Additional supporting details are provided in the appendices.

  9. 10 CFR 63.112 - Requirements for preclosure safety analysis of the geologic repository operations area.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Requirements for preclosure safety analysis of the... Criteria Preclosure Safety Analysis § 63.112 Requirements for preclosure safety analysis of the geologic repository operations area. The preclosure safety analysis of the geologic repository operations area...

  10. 10 CFR 63.112 - Requirements for preclosure safety analysis of the geologic repository operations area.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Requirements for preclosure safety analysis of the... Criteria Preclosure Safety Analysis § 63.112 Requirements for preclosure safety analysis of the geologic repository operations area. The preclosure safety analysis of the geologic repository operations area...

  11. Safety analysis of the existing 851 Firing Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-06-05

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 851 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but two of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exceptions were the linear accelerator and explosives, which were classified as moderate hazards per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public.

  12. Safety analysis of the existing 850 Firing Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-06-05

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 850 Firing Facility at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, personnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operations and credible accidents that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequences were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives, which was classified as a moderate hazard per the requirements given in DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at this facility will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public.

  13. System safety analysis of an autonomous mobile robot

    SciTech Connect

    Bartos, R.J.

    1994-08-01

    Analysis of the safety of operating and maintaining the Stored Waste Autonomous Mobile Inspector (SWAMI) II in a hazardous environment at the Fernald Environmental Management Project (FEMP) was completed. The SWAMI II is a version of a commercial robot, the HelpMate{trademark} robot produced by the Transitions Research Corporation, which is being updated to incorporate the systems required for inspecting mixed toxic chemical and radioactive waste drums at the FEMP. It also has modified obstacle detection and collision avoidance subsystems. The robot will autonomously travel down the aisles in storage warehouses to record images of containers and collect other data which are transmitted to an inspector at a remote computer terminal. A previous study showed the SWAMI II has economic feasibility. The SWAMI II will more accurately locate radioactive contamination than human inspectors. This thesis includes a System Safety Hazard Analysis and a quantitative Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The objectives of the analyses are to prevent potentially serious events and to derive a comprehensive set of safety requirements from which the safety of the SWAMI II and other autonomous mobile robots can be evaluated. The Computer-Aided Fault Tree Analysis (CAFTA{copyright}) software is utilized for the FTA. The FTA shows that more than 99% of the safety risk occurs during maintenance, and that when the derived safety requirements are implemented the rate of serious events is reduced to below one event per million operating hours. Training and procedures in SWAMI II operation and maintenance provide an added safety margin. This study will promote the safe use of the SWAMI II and other autonomous mobile robots in the emerging technology of mobile robotic inspection.

  14. Safety analysis of SISL process module

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1983-05-01

    This report provides an assessment of various postulated accidental occurrences within an experimental process module which is part of a Special Isotope Separation Laboratory (SISL) currently under construction at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The process module will contain large amounts of molten uranium and various water-cooled structures within a vacuum vessel. Special emphasis is therefore given to potential accidental interactions of molten uranium with water leading to explosive and/or rapid steam formation, as well as uranium oxidation and the potential for combustion. Considerations are also given to the potential for vessel melt-through. Evaluations include mechanical and thermal interactions and design implications both in terms of design basis as well as once-in-a-lifetime accident scenarios. These scenarios include both single- and multiple-failure modes leading to various contact modes and locations within the process module for possible thermal interactions. The evaluations show that a vacuum vessel design based upon nominal operating conditions would appear sufficient to meet safety requirements in connection with both design basis as well as once-in-a-lifetime accidents. Controlled venting requirements for removal of steam and hydrogen in order to avoid possible long-term pressurization events are recommended. Depending upon the resulting accident conditions, the vacuum system (i.e., the roughing system) could also serve this purpose. Finally, based upon accident evaluations of this study, immediate shut-off of all coolant water following an incident leak is not recommended, as such action may have adverse effects in terms of cool-down requirements for the melt crucibles etc. These requirements have not been assessed as part of this study.

  15. FFTF Final Safety Analysis Report Amendment 81 [SEC 1 & 2

    SciTech Connect

    DAUTEL, W.A.

    2002-01-10

    Since the last reactor operation of FFTF in March of 1992, the FFTF has either been in a programmatic status of Standby or Shutdown. The facility hazards have decreased markedly. Rather than making extensive Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) changes, Appendix G was prepared to reflect the design and operation during Standby or Shutdown. Appendix G describes the application of the entire FSAR for the current configuration, accounting for the natural reduction in hazards and new system configurations associated with Standby/Shutdown. The technical system chapters and the safety analysis chapter of the FSAR describe how the design and operation fulfilled the requirements necessary to support reactor operation; this information is retained for design basis and historical information. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is submitted per the requirements of Paragraph 014, Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) Manual Chapter 0540, ''Safety of ERDA-Owned Reactors.'' This FSAR and its supporting documentation provide a complete description and safety evaluation of the site, plant design, normal and emergency operations, potential accidents and predicted consequences of such accidents, and the means that will prevent such accidents and/or reduce their consequences to an acceptable level.

  16. Integrated safety analysis based on spatial kinetics

    SciTech Connect

    Finnemann, H.; Drescher, G.

    1994-12-31

    The continuing progress in computer technology, characterized by the ever-increasing calculational speed of various computer architectures, enables the direct coupling of up to recently separate code systems. As a consequence different areas of analysis like reactor physics, core thermal hydraulics, and plant dynamics can be integrated to increase the accuracy of simulation over that obtained from imposing conservative boundary conditions at the interfaces. The coupling of thermal-hydraulic subchannel analysis with nodal space-time kinetics calculations is an important step toward an even more extensive integration of complex code systems. In this paper we present some results of a transient departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) calculation integrated in the nodal kinetics code PANBOX.

  17. An Empirical Analysis of Human Performance and Nuclear Safety Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Jeffrey Joe; Larry G. Blackwood

    2006-06-01

    The purpose of this analysis, which was conducted for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), was to test whether an empirical connection exists between human performance and nuclear power plant safety culture. This was accomplished through analyzing the relationship between a measure of human performance and a plant’s Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). SCWE is an important component of safety culture the NRC has developed, but it is not synonymous with it. SCWE is an environment in which employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns both to their own management and to the NRC without fear of harassment, intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination. Because the relationship between human performance and allegations is intuitively reciprocal and both relationship directions need exploration, two series of analyses were performed. First, human performance data could be indicative of safety culture, so regression analyses were performed using human performance data to predict SCWE. It also is likely that safety culture contributes to human performance issues at a plant, so a second set of regressions were performed using allegations to predict HFIS results.

  18. 75 FR 69648 - Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-15

    ... SAFETY BOARD Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers... TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining Adequate Protection for the... safety analysis, or DSA, is to be prepared for every DOE nuclear facility. This DSA, once approved by...

  19. 10 CFR 72.248 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks § 72.248 Safety analysis report updating. (a) Each certificate holder for a spent fuel storage cask design shall update periodically, as provided in paragraph (b) of this... Commission, in accordance with § 72.4, within 90 days after the spent fuel storage cask design has...

  20. 10 CFR 72.248 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks § 72.248 Safety analysis report updating. (a) Each certificate holder for a spent fuel storage cask design shall update periodically, as provided in paragraph (b) of this... Commission, in accordance with § 72.4, within 90 days after the spent fuel storage cask design has...

  1. 10 CFR 72.248 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... Approval of Spent Fuel Storage Casks § 72.248 Safety analysis report updating. (a) Each certificate holder for a spent fuel storage cask design shall update periodically, as provided in paragraph (b) of this... Commission, in accordance with § 72.4, within 90 days after the spent fuel storage cask design has...

  2. Implementation of the Generic Safety Analysis Report - Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Blanchard, A.

    1999-06-02

    The Savannah River Site has completed the development, review and approval process for the Generic Safety Analysis Report (GSAR) and implemented this information in facility SARs and BIOs. This includes the yearly revision of the GSAR and the facility-specific SARs. The process has provided us with several lessons learned.

  3. Safety Analysis for Packaging Steel Banded Wooden Shipping Containers

    SciTech Connect

    FERRELL, P.C.

    2000-12-05

    This safety analysis report for packaging describes the steel banded wooden shipping containers, which are certified as Type AF packagings. The authorized payload for these containers is unirradiated, slightly enriched, uranium ingots, billets, extrusions, and scrap materials. The amount of uranium in the containers will not exceed the LSA-II material requirements as defined in 49 CFR 173.403.

  4. 14 CFR 417.309 - Flight safety system analysis.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Flight safety system analysis. 417.309 Section 417.309 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION... procedural or human errors; (7) Account for any single failure point on another system that could disable...

  5. 10 CFR 72.70 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safety analysis report updating. 72.70 Section 72.70 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE Records, Reports, Inspections, and Enforcement §...

  6. 10 CFR 72.70 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safety analysis report updating. 72.70 Section 72.70 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE...

  7. 10 CFR 72.70 - Safety analysis report updating.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safety analysis report updating. 72.70 Section 72.70 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, AND REACTOR-RELATED GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE...

  8. Safety analysis of irradiated nuclear fuel transportation container

    SciTech Connect

    Uspuras, E.; Rimkevicius, S.

    2007-07-01

    Ignalina NPP comprises two Units with RBMK-1500 reactors. After the Unit 1 of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was shut down in 2004, approximately 1000 fuel assemblies from Unit were available for further reuse in Unit 2. The fuel-transportation container, vehicle, protection shaft and other necessary equipment were designed in order to implement the process for on-site transportation of Unit 1 fuel for reuse in the Unit 2. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was developed to demonstrate that the proposed set of equipment performs all functions and assures the required level of safety for both normal operation and accident conditions. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the content and main results of SAR, focusing attention on the container used to transport spent fuel assemblies from Unit I on Unit 2. In the SAR, the structural integrity, thermal, radiological and nuclear safety calculations are performed to assess the acceptance of the proposed set of equipment. The safety analysis demonstrated that the proposed nuclear fuel transportation container and other equipment are in compliance with functional, design and regulatory requirements and assure the required safety level. (authors)

  9. Safety analysis of optically ignited explosive and pyrotechnic devices

    SciTech Connect

    Merson, J.A.; Salas, F.J.; Holswade, S.

    1994-05-01

    The future of optical ordnance depends on the acceptance, validation and verification of the stated safety enhancement claims of optical ordnance over existing electrical explosive devices (EED`s). Sandia has been pursuing the development of optical ordnance, with the primary motivation of this effort being the enhancement of explosive safety by specifically reducing the potential of premature detonation that can occur with low energy electrically ignited explosive devices. By using semiconductor laser diodes for igniting these devices, safety improvements can be made without being detrimental to current system concerns since the inputs required for these devices are similar to electrical systems. Laser Diode Ignition (LDI) of the energetic material provides the opportunity to remove the bridgewire and electrically conductive pins from the charge cavity, creating a Faraday cage and thus isolating the explosive or pyrotechnic materials from stray electrical ignition sources. Recent results from our continued study of safety enhancements are presented. The areas of investigation which are presented include: (1) unintended optical source analysis, specifically lightning insensitivity, (2) electromagnetic radiation (EMR) and electrostatic discharge (ESD) insensitivity analysis, and (3) powder safety.

  10. [Safety analysis for astronaut and the personal protective equipment].

    PubMed

    Chen, J D; Sun, J B; Shi, H P; Sun, H L

    1999-12-01

    Objective. To analyze and study astronaut and his personal equipment safety. Method. Three of the most widely used approaches, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA) and system hazards analysis (SHA) were used. Result. It was demonstrated that astronaut and the personal equipment are subjected to various potential hazards, such as human errors, astronaut illness, fire or space suit emergency decompression, etc. Their causes, mechanisms, possible effects and criticality of some critical potential hazards were analyzed and identified in more details with considerations of the historic accidents of manned spaceflight. And the compensating provisions and preventive measures for each hazard were discussed. Conclusion. The analysis study may be helpful in enhancing the safety of the astronaut and its personal protective equipment. PMID:12434807

  11. PAT-1 safety analysis report addendum.

    SciTech Connect

    Weiner, Ruth F.; Schmale, David T.; Kalan, Robert J.; Akin, Lili A.; Miller, David Russell; Knorovsky, Gerald Albert; Yoshimura, Richard Hiroyuki; Lopez, Carlos; Harding, David Cameron; Jones, Perry L.; Morrow, Charles W.

    2010-09-01

    The Plutonium Air Transportable Package, Model PAT-1, is certified under Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations Part 71 by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) per Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/0361B(U)F-96 (currently Revision 9). The purpose of this SAR Addendum is to incorporate plutonium (Pu) metal as a new payload for the PAT-1 package. The Pu metal is packed in an inner container (designated the T-Ampoule) that replaces the PC-1 inner container. The documentation and results from analysis contained in this addendum demonstrate that the replacement of the PC-1 and associated packaging material with the T-Ampoule and associated packaging with the addition of the plutonium metal content are not significant with respect to the design, operating characteristics, or safe performance of the containment system and prevention of criticality when the package is subjected to the tests specified in 10 CFR 71.71, 71.73 and 71.74.

  12. Safety risk analysis of an innovative environmental technology.

    PubMed

    Parnell, G S; Frimpon, M; Barnes, J; Kloeber, J M; Deckro, R E; Jackson, J A

    2001-02-01

    The authors describe a decision and risk analysis performed for the cleanup of a large Department of Energy mixed-waste subsurface disposal area governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). In a previous study, the authors worked with the site decision makers, state regulators, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regional regulators to develop a CERCLA-based multiobjective decision analysis value model and used the model to perform a screening analysis of 28 remedial alternatives. The analysis results identified an innovative technology, in situ vitrification, with high effectiveness versus cost. Since this technology had not been used on this scale before, the major uncertainties were contaminant migration and pressure buildup. Pressure buildup was a safety concern due to the potential risks to worker safety. With the help of environmental technology experts remedial alternative changes were identified to mitigate the concerns about contaminant migration and pressure buildup. The analysis results showed that the probability of an event with a risk to worker safety had been significantly reduced. Based on these results, site decision makers have refocused their test program to examine in situ vitrification and have continued the use of the CERCLA-based decision analysis methodology to analyze remedial alternatives. PMID:11332543

  13. PBMR nuclear design and safety analysis: An overview

    SciTech Connect

    Stoker, C.

    2006-07-01

    PBMR is a high-temperature helium-cooled graphite-moderated continuous-fuelled pebble bed reactor. The power conversion unit is directly coupled to the reactor and the power turbines are driven through a direct closed-circuit helium cycle. An overview is presented on the nuclear engineering analyses used for the design and safety assessment for the PBMR. Topics addressed are the PBMR design, safety and licensing requirements, nuclear engineering analysis results, software verification and validation, and advances in software development. (authors)

  14. Fuel Storage Facility Final Safety Analysis Report. Revision 1

    SciTech Connect

    Linderoth, C.E.

    1984-03-01

    The Fuel Storage Facility (FSF) is an integral part of the Fast Flux Test Facility. Its purpose is to provide long-term storage (20-year design life) for spent fuel core elements used to provide the fast flux environment in FFTF, and for test fuel pins, components and subassemblies that have been irradiated in the fast flux environment. This Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and its supporting documentation provides a complete description and safety evaluation of the site, the plant design, operations, and potential accidents.

  15. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) multicanister overpack cask

    SciTech Connect

    Edwards, W.S.

    1997-07-14

    This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) documents the safety of shipments of irradiated fuel elements in the MUlticanister Overpack (MCO) and MCO Cask for a highway route controlled quantity, Type B fissile package. This SARP evaluates the package during transfers of (1) water-filled MCOs from the K Basins to the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and (2) sealed and cold vacuum dried MCOs from the CVDF in the 100 K Area to the Canister Storage Building in the 200 East Area.

  16. Worker Safety and Health and Nuclear Safety Quarterly Performance Analysis (January - March 2008)

    SciTech Connect

    Kerr, C E

    2009-10-07

    The DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to 'implement comprehensive management and independent assessments that are effective in identifying deficiencies and broader problems in safety and security programs, as well as opportunities for continuous improvement within the organization' and to 'regularly perform assessments to evaluate implementation of the contractor's processes for screening and internal reporting.' LLNL has a self-assessment program, described in ES&H Manual Document 4.1, that includes line, management and independent assessments. LLNL also has in place a process to identify and report deficiencies of nuclear, worker safety and health and security requirements. In addition, the DOE Office of Enforcement expects LLNL to evaluate 'issues management databases to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions' (page 14, DOE Enforcement Process Overview, December 2007). LLNL requires that all worker safety and health and nuclear safety noncompliances be tracked as 'deficiencies' in the LLNL Issues Tracking System (ITS). Data from the ITS are analyzed for worker safety and health (WSH) and nuclear safety noncompliances that may meet the threshold for reporting to the DOE Noncompliance Tracking System (NTS). This report meets the expectations defined by the DOE Office of Enforcement to review the assessments conducted by LLNL, analyze the issues and noncompliances found in these assessments, and evaluate the data in the ITS database to identify adverse trends, dominant problem areas, and potential repetitive events or conditions. The report attempts to answer three questions: (1) Is LLNL evaluating its programs and state of compliance? (2) What is LLNL finding? (3) Is LLNL appropriately managing what it finds? The analysis in this report focuses on data from the first quarter of 2008 (January through March). This quarter is analyzed within the context of information identified in previous quarters to

  17. Software safety analysis activities during software development phases of the Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS)

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Shaw, Hui-Yin; Sherif, Joseph S.

    2004-01-01

    This paper describes the MLS software safety analysis activities and documents the SSA results. The scope of this software safety effort is consistent with the MLS system safety definition and is concentrated on the software faults and hazards that may have impact on the personnel safety and the environment safety.

  18. Style, content and format guide for writing safety analysis documents. Volume 1, Safety analysis reports for DOE nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1994-06-01

    The purpose of Volume 1 of this 4-volume style guide is to furnish guidelines on writing and publishing Safety Analysis Reports (SARs) for DOE nuclear facilities at Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of Volume 1 encompasses not only the general guidelines for writing and publishing, but also the prescribed topics/appendices contents along with examples from typical SARs for DOE nuclear facilities.

  19. SCALE 6: Comprehensive Nuclear Safety Analysis Code System

    SciTech Connect

    Bowman, Stephen M

    2011-01-01

    Version 6 of the Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) computer software system developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, released in February 2009, contains significant new capabilities and data for nuclear safety analysis and marks an important update for this software package, which is used worldwide. This paper highlights the capabilities of the SCALE system, including continuous-energy flux calculations for processing multigroup problem-dependent cross sections, ENDF/B-VII continuous-energy and multigroup nuclear cross-section data, continuous-energy Monte Carlo criticality safety calculations, Monte Carlo radiation shielding analyses with automated three-dimensional variance reduction techniques, one- and three-dimensional sensitivity and uncertainty analyses for criticality safety evaluations, two- and three-dimensional lattice physics depletion analyses, fast and accurate source terms and decay heat calculations, automated burnup credit analyses with loading curve search, and integrated three-dimensional criticality accident alarm system analyses using coupled Monte Carlo criticality and shielding calculations.

  20. Evolution of Safety Analysis to Support New Exploration Missions

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Thrasher, Chard W.

    2008-01-01

    NASA is currently developing the Ares I launch vehicle as a key component of the Constellation program which will provide safe and reliable transportation to the International Space Station, back to the moon, and later to Mars. The risks and costs of the Ares I must be significantly lowered, as compared to other manned launch vehicles, to enable the continuation of space exploration. It is essential that safety be significantly improved, and cost-effectively incorporated into the design process. This paper justifies early and effective safety analysis of complex space systems. Interactions and dependences between design, logistics, modeling, reliability, and safety engineers will be discussed to illustrate methods to lower cost, reduce design cycles and lessen the likelihood of catastrophic events.

  1. Ares I-X Range Safety Flight Envelope Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Starr, Brett R.; Olds, Aaron D.; Craig, Anthony S.

    2011-01-01

    Ares I-X was the first test flight of NASA's Constellation Program's Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle designed to provide manned access to low Earth orbit. As a one-time test flight, the Air Force's 45th Space Wing required a series of Range Safety analysis data products to be developed for the specified launch date and mission trajectory prior to granting flight approval on the Eastern Range. The range safety data package is required to ensure that the public, launch area, and launch complex personnel and resources are provided with an acceptable level of safety and that all aspects of prelaunch and launch operations adhere to applicable public laws. The analysis data products, defined in the Air Force Space Command Manual 91-710, Volume 2, consisted of a nominal trajectory, three sigma trajectory envelopes, stage impact footprints, acoustic intensity contours, trajectory turn angles resulting from potential vehicle malfunctions (including flight software failures), characterization of potential debris, and debris impact footprints. These data products were developed under the auspices of the Constellation's Program Launch Constellation Range Safety Panel and its Range Safety Trajectory Working Group with the intent of beginning the framework for the operational vehicle data products and providing programmatic review and oversight. A multi-center NASA team in conjunction with the 45th Space Wing, collaborated within the Trajectory Working Group forum to define the data product development processes, performed the analyses necessary to generate the data products, and performed independent verification and validation of the data products. This paper outlines the Range Safety data requirements and provides an overview of the processes established to develop both the data products and the individual analyses used to develop the data products, and it summarizes the results of the analyses required for the Ares I-X launch.

  2. Applicability of trends in nuclear safety analysis to space nuclear power systems

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, R.A.

    1992-10-01

    A survey is presented of some current trends in nuclear safety analysis that may be relevant to space nuclear power systems. This includes: lessons learned from operating power reactor safety and licensing; approaches to the safety design of advanced and novel reactors and facilities; the roles of risk assessment, extremely unlikely accidents, safety goals/targets; and risk-benefit analysis and communication.

  3. 14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Ground Safety Analysis Report J Appendix J... Analysis Report J417.1General (a) This appendix provides the content and format requirements for a ground safety analysis report. A launch operator must perform a ground safety analysis as required by subpart...

  4. 14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Ground Safety Analysis Report J Appendix J... Analysis Report J417.1General (a) This appendix provides the content and format requirements for a ground safety analysis report. A launch operator must perform a ground safety analysis as required by subpart...

  5. 14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Ground Safety Analysis Report J Appendix J... Analysis Report J417.1General (a) This appendix provides the content and format requirements for a ground safety analysis report. A launch operator must perform a ground safety analysis as required by subpart...

  6. Fire hazard analyses and safety analysis reports relationship

    SciTech Connect

    Olson, W.W., Westinghouse Hanford

    1996-05-30

    DOE Order 5480.7A requires that Fire Hazard Analyses (FHA) be performed for new facilities, for facilities requiring a DOE 5480.23 Safety Analysis, or as directed by the DOE Program Secretarial Officer. DOE Order 5480.23 requires that a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) be prepared for DOE nuclear facilities. Both the FHA and SAR `documents provide important information and direction for facility design and operation. Each of the two documents address the effects of postulated fire scenarios, and both have common or at least consistent bases, and have overlapping elements. However, some of the objectives of the required analyses are distinctly different. These differences have historically resulted in variations in the interpretation and Understanding of the DOE Orders and associated guidance by organizations and individuals within the Westinghouse Hanford Company.

  7. Evaluation of safety assessment methodologies in Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide (1985) and Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report (1987)

    SciTech Connect

    Walsh, B.; Fisher, C.; Zigler, G.; Clark, R.A.

    1990-11-09

    FSARs. Rockwell International, as operating contractor at the Rocky Flats plant, conducted a safety analysis program during the 1980s. That effort resulted in Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) for several buildings, one of them being the Building 707 Final Safety Analysis Report, June 87 (707FSAR) and a Plant Safety Analysis Report. Rocky Flats Risk Assessment Guide, March 1985 (RFRAG85) documents the methodologies that were used for those FSARs. Resources available for preparation of those Rocky Flats FSARs were very limited. After addressing the more pressing safety issues, some of which are described below, the present contractor (EG&G) intends to conduct a program of upgrading the FSARs. This report presents the results of a review of the methodologies described in RFRAG85 and 707FSAR and contains suggestions that might be incorporated into the methodology for the FSAR upgrade effort.

  8. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) sample pig transport system

    SciTech Connect

    MCCOY, J.C.

    1999-03-16

    This Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) provides a technical evaluation of the Sample Pig Transport System as compared to the requirements of the U.S. Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office (RL) Order 5480.1, Change 1, Chapter III. The evaluation concludes that the package is acceptable for the onsite transport of Type B, fissile excepted radioactive materials when used in accordance with this document.

  9. Safety analysis, risk assessment, and risk acceptance criteria

    SciTech Connect

    Jamali, K.; Stack, D.W.; Sullivan, L.H.; Sanzo, D.L.

    1997-08-01

    This paper discusses a number of topics that relate safety analysis as documented in the Department of Energy (DOE) safety analysis reports (SARs), probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) as characterized primarily in the context of the techniques that have assumed some level of formality in commercial nuclear power plant applications, and risk acceptance criteria as an outgrowth of PRA applications. DOE SARs of interest are those that are prepared for DOE facilities under DOE Order 5480.23 and the implementing guidance in DOE STD-3009-94. It must be noted that the primary area of application for DOE STD-3009 is existing DOE facilities and that certain modifications of the STD-3009 approach are necessary in SARs for new facilities. Moreover, it is the hazard analysis (HA) and accident analysis (AA) portions of these SARs that are relevant to the present discussions. Although PRAs can be qualitative in nature, PRA as used in this paper refers more generally to all quantitative risk assessments and their underlying methods. HA as used in this paper refers more generally to all qualitative risk assessments and their underlying methods that have been in use in hazardous facilities other than nuclear power plants. This discussion includes both quantitative and qualitative risk assessment methods. PRA has been used, improved, developed, and refined since the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) was published in 1975 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Much debate has ensued since WASH-1400 on exactly what the role of PRA should be in plant design, reactor licensing, `ensuring` plant and process safety, and a large number of other decisions that must be made for potentially hazardous activities. Of particular interest in this area is whether the risks quantified using PRA should be compared with numerical risk acceptance criteria (RACs) to determine whether a facility is `safe.` Use of RACs requires quantitative estimates of consequence frequency and magnitude.

  10. IAEA Activities in the Area of Safety Analysis and Accident Management

    SciTech Connect

    Lee, S.; El-Shanawany, M.

    2006-07-01

    Safety analysis is a means of demonstrating how critical safety functions, the integrity of barriers against the release of radioactive materials, and various other safety requirements are fulfilled for a broad range of operating conditions and initiating events. Accordingly, performing safety analysis for a nuclear power plant is one of the most important safety principles. Thermal-hydraulic computer codes are extensively used worldwide for safety analysis by utilities, regulatory authorities, power plant designers and vendors, nuclear fuel companies, research organizations, and technical support organizations. Safety analysis methodology and computer codes have seen a significant development over the last two decades. This fact is also reflected in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that aims at increasing the quality and international harmonization of the approaches used in safety analysis. The paper provides an overview of activities and of examples of results obtained recently or planned in the near future in the IAEA's Division of Nuclear Installation Safety in the field of safety analysis for both design basis accidents and beyond design basis accidents as well as accident management. In this paper, specific technical guidance on the safety assessments in the IAEA Safety Standards such as safety analysis methodologies, probabilistic safety assessment, and development of accident management programmes are described. Future trends and related activities in safety analysis and accident management are also introduced. (authors)

  11. Safety analysis of the existing 804 and 845 firing facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Odell, B.N.

    1986-06-05

    A safety analysis was performed to determine if normal operations and/or potential accidents at the 804 and 845 Firing Facilities at Site 300 could present undue hazards to the general public, peronnel at Site 300, or have an adverse effect on the environment. The normal operation and credible accident that might have an effect on these facilities or have off-site consequence were considered. It was determined by this analysis that all but one of the hazards were either low or of the type or magnitude routinely encountered and/or accepted by the public. The exception was explosives. Since this hazard has the potential for causing significant on-site and minimum off-site consequences, Bunkers 804 and 845 have been classified as moderate hazard facilties per DOE Order 5481.1A. This safety analysis concluded that the operation at these facilities will present no undue risk to the health and safety of LLNL employees or the public.

  12. Safety culture and accident analysis--a socio-management approach based on organizational safety social capital.

    PubMed

    Rao, Suman

    2007-04-11

    One of the biggest challenges for organizations in today's competitive business environment is to create and preserve a self-sustaining safety culture. Typically, the key drivers of safety culture in many organizations are regulation, audits, safety training, various types of employee exhortations to comply with safety norms, etc. However, less evident factors like networking relationships and social trust amongst employees, as also extended networking relationships and social trust of organizations with external stakeholders like government, suppliers, regulators, etc., which constitute the safety social capital in the Organization--seem to also influence the sustenance of organizational safety culture. Can erosion in safety social capital cause deterioration in safety culture and contribute to accidents? If so, how does it contribute? As existing accident analysis models do not provide answers to these questions, CAMSoC (Curtailing Accidents by Managing Social Capital), an accident analysis model, is proposed. As an illustration, five accidents: Bhopal (India), Hyatt Regency (USA), Tenerife (Canary Islands), Westray (Canada) and Exxon Valdez (USA) have been analyzed using CAMSoC. This limited cross-industry analysis provides two key socio-management insights: the biggest source of motivation that causes deviant behavior leading to accidents is 'Faulty Value Systems'. The second biggest source is 'Enforceable Trust'. From a management control perspective, deterioration in safety culture and resultant accidents is more due to the 'action controls' rather than explicit 'cultural controls'. Future research directions to enhance the model's utility through layering are addressed briefly. PMID:16911855

  13. Management implementation plan for a safety analysis and review system

    SciTech Connect

    Hulburt, D.A.; Berkey, B.D.

    1981-04-01

    The US Department of Energy has issued an Order, DOE 5481.1, which establishes uniform requirements for the preparation and review of Safety Analysis for DOE Operations. The Management Implementation Plan specified herein establishes the administrative procedures and technical requirements for implementing DOE 5481.1 to Operations under the cognizance of the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. This Implementation Plan is applicable to all present and future Operations under the cognizance of PETC. The Plan identifies those Operations for which DOE 5481.1 is applicable and those Operations for which no further analysis is required because the initial determination and review has concluded that DOE 5481.1 does not apply.

  14. Qualitative safety analysis of proposed material relocation options

    SciTech Connect

    Cathey, N.G.; Foppe, T.L.

    1993-10-01

    This paper presents the methodology used to perform a qualitative safety analysis of various options proposed for the relocation of Special Nuclear Material from its present locations to other areas of the Rocky Flats Plant. This analysis determined the relative risk ranking of various proposed relocation options considering the probability and consequences of accidents associated with the material handling, transportation, and storage locations. Of of the five options, two grouping of results were concluded to be significantly different, allowing the decision makers to balance risk issues with their other requirements (e.g., security, schedule, etc.).

  15. Deconvolution of variability and uncertainty in the Cassini safety analysis

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kampas, Frank J.; Loughin, Stephen

    1998-01-01

    The standard method for propagation of uncertainty in a risk analysis requires rerunning the risk calculation numerous times with model parameters chosen from their uncertainty distributions. This was not practical for the Cassini nuclear safety analysis, due to the computationally intense nature of the risk calculation. A less computationally intense procedure was developed which requires only two calculations for each accident case. The first of these is the standard ``best-estimate'' calculation. In the second calculation, variables and parameters change simultaneously. The mathematical technique of deconvolution is then used to separate out an uncertainty multiplier distribution, which can be used to calculate distribution functions at various levels of confidence.

  16. 78 FR 4477 - Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Introduction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-22

    ... COMMISSION Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, Introduction AGENCY: Nuclear... subsection to NUREG-0800, ``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power..., Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants:...

  17. Thermohydraulic and Safety Analysis for CARR Under Station Blackout Accident

    SciTech Connect

    Wenxi Tian; Suizheng Qiu; Guanghui Su; Dounan Jia; Xingmin Liu - China Institute of Atomic Energy

    2006-07-01

    A thermohydraulic and safety analysis code (TSACC) has been developed using Fortran 90 language to evaluate the transient thermohydraulic behaviors and safety characteristics of the China Advanced Research Reactor(CARR) under Station Blackout Accident(SBA). For the development of TSACC, a series of corresponding mathematical and physical models were considered. Point reactor neutron kinetics model was adopted for solving reactor power. All possible flow and heat transfer conditions under station blackout accident were considered and the optional models were supplied. The usual Finite Difference Method (FDM) was abandoned and a new model was adopted to evaluate the temperature field of core plate type fuel element. A new simple and convenient equation was proposed for the resolution of the transient behaviors of the main pump instead of the complicated four-quadrant model. Gear method and Adams method were adopted alternately for a better solution to the stiff differential equations describing the dynamic behaviors of the CARR. The computational result of TSACC showed the enough safety margin of CARR under SBA. For the purpose of Verification and Validation (V and V), the simulated results of TSACC were compared with those of Relap5/Mdo3. The V and V result indicated a good agreement between the results by the two codes. Because of the adoption of modular programming techniques, this analysis code is expected to be applied to other reactors by easily modifying the corresponding function modules. (authors)

  18. Safety analysis, 200 Area, Savannah River Plant: Separations area operations

    SciTech Connect

    Perkins, W.C.; Lee, R.; Allen, P.M.; Gouge, A.P.

    1991-07-01

    The nev HB-Line, located on the fifth and sixth levels of Building 221-H, is designed to replace the aging existing HB-Line production facility. The nev HB-Line consists of three separate facilities: the Scrap Recovery Facility, the Neptunium Oxide Facility, and the Plutonium Oxide Facility. There are three separate safety analyses for the nev HB-Line, one for each of the three facilities. These are issued as supplements to the 200-Area Safety Analysis (DPSTSA-200-10). These supplements are numbered as Sup 2A, Scrap Recovery Facility, Sup 2B, Neptunium Oxide Facility, Sup 2C, Plutonium Oxide Facility. The subject of this safety analysis, the, Plutonium Oxide Facility, will convert nitrate solutions of {sup 238}Pu to plutonium oxide (PuO{sub 2}) powder. All these new facilities incorporate improvements in: (1) engineered barriers to contain contamination, (2) barriers to minimize personnel exposure to airborne contamination, (3) shielding and remote operations to decrease radiation exposure, and (4) equipment and ventilation design to provide flexibility and improved process performance.

  19. Safety.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Education in Science, 1996

    1996-01-01

    Discusses safety issues in science, including: allergic reactions to peanuts used in experiments; explosions in lead/acid batteries; and inspection of pressure vessels, such as pressure cookers or model steam engines. (MKR)

  20. Risk assessment and its application to flight safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Keese, D.L.; Barton, W.R.

    1989-12-01

    Potentially hazardous test activities have historically been a part of Sandia National Labs mission to design, develop, and test new weapons systems. These test activities include high speed air drops for parachute development, sled tests for component and system level studies, multiple stage rocket experiments, and artillery firings of various projectiles. Due to the nature of Sandia's test programs, the risk associated with these activities can never be totally eliminated. However, a consistent set of policies should be available to provide guidance into the level of risk that is acceptable in these areas. This report presents a general set of guidelines for addressing safety issues related to rocket flight operations at Sandia National Laboratories. Even though the majority of this report deals primarily with rocket flight safety, these same principles could be applied to other hazardous test activities. The basic concepts of risk analysis have a wide range of applications into many of Sandia's current operations. 14 refs., 1 tab.

  1. Safety Analysis of ITER EDA Design by GEMSAFE

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Arika, Mitsuhiro; Saito, Masaki; Sawada, Tetsuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    1997-06-01

    General Methodology of Safety Analysis and Evaluation for Fusion Systems (GEMSAFE) was applied to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) design in the stage of Engineering Design Activities (EDA) to identify Design Basis Events (DBEs) and the related safety features, which were compared with those of the ITER design in the stage of Conceptual Design Activities (CDA). As a result, 18 DBEs for the EDA design were selected in comparison with 25 DBEs for the CDA design. DBEs related to the fuel area were categorized in higher event category than those of the CDA design due to the increase of the mobile tritium contained in some components. It was necessary to reduce the inventory of the tritium absorbed in the tokamak dust in the EDA design as well as in the CDA design. Some measures were recommended to reduce mobile tritium dissolved in the coolant in the single cooling loop due to the increase of this estimated inventory.

  2. System safety analysis of well-control equipment

    SciTech Connect

    Fowler, J.H.; Roche, J.R.

    1994-09-01

    In the wake of recent disasters in the oil and gas E and P and petrochemical industries, the importance of system safety analysis is becoming recognized. Reliability assessment techniques, which were developed in the nuclear-power-generation and defense industries, are potentially valuable tools for engineers in the offshore oil and gas business. BOP's and their control systems used on offshore rigs are typically made up of several subsystems. Hydraulic, pneumatic, and electronic modules are interfaced to provide functional control and monitoring of the mechanical BOP's and valves. Two techniques are used for reliability analysis of a blowout preventer (BOP) and a hydraulic control system. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) examines each part and the consequences of its malfunction. Fault tree analysis (FTA) traces undesired events to their causes. Reliability calculations and data sources are addressed.

  3. Requirements analysis for safety-critical systems: A chemical batch processing example

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Delemos, R.; Saeed, A.; Anderson, T.

    1994-01-01

    An essential basis for the development of software for safety-critical systems is to establish high-quality requirements specifications. In the paper the authors present a methodology for requirements analysis that consists of: a framework which facilitates the systematic analysis of the safety requirements, a graph which records the safety specifications and their relationships, and a set of procedures for the quality analysis of the safety specifications. To illustrate the approach a case study, based on chemical batch processing, is presented.

  4. Reactor Accident Analysis Methodology for the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility Documented Safety Analysis Upgrade

    SciTech Connect

    Gregg L. Sharp; R. T. McCracken

    2003-06-01

    The regulatory requirement to develop an upgraded safety basis for a DOE nuclear facility was realized in January 2001 by issuance of a revision to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 830 (10 CFR 830).1 Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, “Safety Basis Requirements,” requires a contractor responsible for a DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility to either submit by April 9, 2001 the existing safety basis which already meets the requirements of Subpart B, or to submit by April 10, 2003 an upgraded facility safety basis that meets the revised requirements.1 10 CFR 830 identifies Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.70, “Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants”2 as a safe harbor methodology for preparation of a DOE reactor documented safety analysis (DSA). The regulation also allows for use of a graded approach. This report presents the methodology that was developed for preparing the reactor accident analysis portion of the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATRC) upgraded DSA. The methodology was approved by DOE for developing the ATRC safety basis as an appropriate application of a graded approach to the requirements of 10 CFR 830.

  5. Reactor Accident Analysis Methodology for the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility Documented Safety Analysis Upgrade

    SciTech Connect

    Sharp, G.L.; McCracken, R.T.

    2003-05-13

    The regulatory requirement to develop an upgraded safety basis for a DOE Nuclear Facility was realized in January 2001 by issuance of a revision to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 830 (10 CFR 830). Subpart B of 10 CFR 830, ''Safety Basis Requirements,'' requires a contractor responsible for a DOE Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facility to either submit by April 9, 2001 the existing safety basis which already meets the requirements of Subpart B, or to submit by April 10, 2003 an upgraded facility safety basis that meets the revised requirements. 10 CFR 830 identifies Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.70, ''Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants'' as a safe harbor methodology for preparation of a DOE reactor documented safety analysis (DSA). The regulation also allows for use of a graded approach. This report presents the methodology that was developed for preparing the reactor accident analysis portion of the Advanced Test Reactor Critical Facility (ATRC) upgraded DSA. The methodology was approved by DOE for developing the ATRC safety basis as an appropriate application of a graded approach to the requirements of 10 CFR 830.

  6. Adverse drug reactions and safety considerations of NSAIDs: clinical analysis.

    PubMed

    Bahadur, Shiv; Keshri, Lav; Pathak, Kamla

    2011-11-01

    NSAIDs are the most frequently used drugs for treatment, in Europe and the United States, accounting for approximately 5% of all prescriptions. Moreover, the use of NSAIDs is increasing because these constitute the first-line drug therapy for a wide range of rheumatic conditions. This increase is in part the result of the increasing population of elderly patients, who constitute the group of patients with greatest demand for these agents. There are many types of NSAIDs that vary in potency, action and potential side effects. Thus various efforts have been made to determine the safety considerations including adverse drug effects, duration of drug therapy, drug interactions, precautions and other drugs applied to reduce side effects. Researchers have introduced some novel techniques to diagnose NSAIDs related adverse effects on the gastrointestinal mucosa. The researchers dealing with the development of drug delivery system for these drugs should aim at designing a therapeutically efficacious dosage form with reduced side/adverse effects. Thus an effort has been made in this review to deal with the safety parameters of various NSAIDs with a special emphasis on preclinical and clinical safety analysis and various attempts to minimize the side effects by structural modification or by drug delivery system. PMID:22424538

  7. Safety Analysis of Soybean Processing for Advanced Life Support

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Hentges, Dawn L.

    1999-01-01

    Soybeans (cv. Hoyt) is one of the crops planned for food production within the Advanced Life Support System Integration Testbed (ALSSIT), a proposed habitat simulation for long duration lunar/Mars missions. Soybeans may be processed into a variety of food products, including soymilk, tofu, and tempeh. Due to the closed environmental system and importance of crew health maintenance, food safety is a primary concern on long duration space missions. Identification of the food safety hazards and critical control points associated with the closed ALSSIT system is essential for the development of safe food processing techniques and equipment. A Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) model was developed to reflect proposed production and processing protocols for ALSSIT soybeans. Soybean processing was placed in the type III risk category. During the processing of ALSSIT-grown soybeans, critical control points were identified to control microbiological hazards, particularly mycotoxins, and chemical hazards from antinutrients. Critical limits were suggested at each CCP. Food safety recommendations regarding the hazards and risks associated with growing, harvesting, and processing soybeans; biomass management; and use of multifunctional equipment were made in consideration of the limitations and restraints of the closed ALSSIT.

  8. Fault Tree Analysis Application for Safety and Reliability

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Wallace, Dolores R.

    2003-01-01

    Many commercial software tools exist for fault tree analysis (FTA), an accepted method for mitigating risk in systems. The method embedded in the tools identifies a root as use in system components, but when software is identified as a root cause, it does not build trees into the software component. No commercial software tools have been built specifically for development and analysis of software fault trees. Research indicates that the methods of FTA could be applied to software, but the method is not practical without automated tool support. With appropriate automated tool support, software fault tree analysis (SFTA) may be a practical technique for identifying the underlying cause of software faults that may lead to critical system failures. We strive to demonstrate that existing commercial tools for FTA can be adapted for use with SFTA, and that applied to a safety-critical system, SFTA can be used to identify serious potential problems long before integrator and system testing.

  9. Ares I-X Malfunction Turn Range Safety Analysis

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Beaty, J. R.

    2011-01-01

    Ares I-X was the designation given to the flight test version of the Ares I rocket which was developed by NASA (also known as the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) component of the Constellation Program). The Ares I-X flight test vehicle achieved a successful flight test on October 28, 2009, from Pad LC-39B at Kennedy Space Center, Florida (KSC). As part of the flight plan approval for the test vehicle, a range safety malfunction turn analysis was performed to support the risk assessment and vehicle destruct criteria development processes. Several vehicle failure scenarios were identified which could have caused the vehicle trajectory to deviate from its normal flight path. The effects of these failures were evaluated with an Ares I-X 6 degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) digital simulation, using the Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories Version II (POST2) simulation tool. The Ares I-X simulation analysis provided output files containing vehicle trajectory state information. These were used by other risk assessment and vehicle debris trajectory simulation tools to determine the risk to personnel and facilities in the vicinity of the launch area at KSC, and to develop the vehicle destruct criteria used by the flight test range safety officer in the event of a flight test anomaly of the vehicle. The simulation analysis approach used for this study is described, including descriptions of the failure modes which were considered and the underlying assumptions and ground rules of the study.

  10. Safety analysis reports for multiple hazard category facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Geeting, M.W.; Gerrard, P.B.

    1995-12-31

    The Savannah River Site contains many nuclear facilities for which safety analysis reports (SARs) are required. The current requirements with which the SARs must comply are given in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 5480.23. This order requires use of the graded approach. The graded approach demands a more thoroughly documented assessment of complex, higher hazard facilities than simple, lower hazard facilities because grading is a function of both hazard potential and complexity. The treatment of different hazard category facilities in the development of the SAR for the Central Laboratory Facility at the Savannah River Site is described here.

  11. Fast Flux Test Facility final safety analysis report. Amendment 73

    SciTech Connect

    Gantt, D.A.

    1993-08-01

    This report provides Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 73 for incorporation into the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTR) FSAR set. This page change incorporates Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) issued subsequent to Amendment 72 and approved for incorparoration before May 6, 1993. These changes include: Chapter 3, design criteria structures, equipment, and systems; chapter 5B, reactor coolant system; chapter 7, instrumentation and control systems; chapter 9, auxiliary systems; chapter 11, reactor refueling system; chapter 12, radiation protection and waste management; chapter 13, conduct of operations; chapter 17, technical specifications; chapter 20, FFTF criticality specifications; appendix C, local fuel failure events; and appendix Fl, operation at 680{degrees}F inlet temperature.

  12. PWR systems transient analysis: a reactor-safety perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Kennedy, M.F.; Abramson, P.B.; McDonald, T.A.

    1982-01-01

    In the simulation of transient events in large PWR reactor systems for reactor safety studies, the plant model is quite detailed and must include most of the plant components and control systems to adequately analyze the range of transients. The results discussed were calculated with the RELAP4/MOD6 code and reveal the need for the analysis to carefully review and understand the results to assure that they are not being adversely affected by the improper solution techniques or changes in models during the calculation.

  13. NUSAR: N Reactor Updated Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 21

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, G L

    1989-12-01

    The enclosed pages are Amendment 21 of the N Reactor Updated Safety Analysis Report (NUSAR). NUSAR, formerly UNI-M-90, was revised by 18 amendments that were issued by UNC Nuclear Industries, the contractor previously responsible for N Reactor operations. As of June 1987, Westinghouse Hanford Company (WHC) acquired the operations and engineering contract for N Reactor and other facilities at Hanford. The document number for NUSAR then became WHC-SP-0297. The first revision was issued by WHC as Amendment 19, prepared originally by UNC. Summaries of each of the amendments are included in NUSAR Section 1.1.

  14. 14 CFR Appendix J to Part 417 - Ground Safety Analysis Report

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Ground Safety Analysis Report J Appendix J to Part 417 Aeronautics and Space COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION LICENSING LAUNCH SAFETY Pt. 417, App. J Appendix J to Part 417—Ground Safety Analysis Report J417.1General (a)...

  15. 41 CFR 102-80.130 - Who must perform the equivalent level of safety analysis?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ...-SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT Accident and Fire Prevention Equivalent Level of Safety Analysis... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Who must perform the equivalent level of safety analysis? 102-80.130 Section 102-80.130 Public Contracts and Property...

  16. 41 CFR 102-80.130 - Who must perform the equivalent level of safety analysis?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...-SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT Accident and Fire Prevention Equivalent Level of Safety Analysis... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Who must perform the equivalent level of safety analysis? 102-80.130 Section 102-80.130 Public Contracts and Property...

  17. Adjoint-based sensitivity analysis for reactor safety applications

    SciTech Connect

    Parks, C.V.

    1986-08-01

    The application and usefulness of an adjoint-based methodology for performing sensitivity analysis on reactor safety computer codes is investigated. The adjoint-based methodology, referred to as differential sensitivity theory (DST), provides first-order derivatives of the calculated quantities of interest (responses) with respect to the input parameters. The basic theoretical development of DST is presented along with the needed general extensions for consideration of model discontinuities and a variety of useful response definitions. A simple analytic problem is used to highlight the general DST procedures. finally, DST procedures presented in this work are applied to two highly nonlinear reactor accident analysis codes: (1) FASTGAS, a relatively small code for analysis of a loss-of-decay-heat-removal accident in a gas-cooled fast reactor, and (2) an existing code called VENUS-II which has been employed for analyzing the core disassembly phase of a hypothetical fast reactor accident. The two codes are different both in terms of complexity and in terms of the facets of DST which can be illustrated. Sensitivity results from the adjoint codes ADJGAS and VENUS-ADJ are verified with direct recalcualtions using perturbed input parameters. The effectiveness of the DST results for parameter ranking, prediction of response changes, and uncertainty analysis are illustrated. The conclusion drawn from this study is that DST is a viable, cost-effective methodology for accurate sensitivity analysis. In addition, a useful sensitivity tool for use in the fast reactor safety area has been developed in VENUS-ADJ. Future work needs to concentrate on combining the accurate first-order derivatives/results from DST with existing methods (based solely on direct recalculations) for higher-order response surfaces.

  18. Mixed Waste Management Facility Preliminary Safety Analysis Report. Chapters 1 to 20

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1994-09-01

    This document provides information on waste management practices, occupational safety, and a site characterization of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. A facility description, safety engineering analysis, mixed waste processing techniques, and auxiliary support systems are included.

  19. Safety analysis and review system. Phase I. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Browne, E.T.

    1981-03-01

    This report summarizes work completed in support of the implementation of the DOE Safety Analysis and Review System (SARS). It is intended to describe and summarize critical items identified during the course of this study and discussed in previous reports completed for other subtasks under this contract. The following were among the issues identified as requiring further overview, assessment, and action by DOE: (1) there needs to be firm guidance from DOE Headquarters (HQ) in regard to SARS-related responsibilities and requirements of the DOE field offices; (2) a system must be established to track the applicability and progress of SARS for individual DOE operations. Currently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to identify projects with SARS requirements in their contracts. Thus, it is difficult to set accurate schedules for safety analysis reviews; (3) a decision must be made by DOE officials as to whether review authority for moderate risk projects will be delegated to the field. As part of this, a detailed assessment of resources available for reviews, both at the field and HQ levels, needs to be accomplished; and (4) to be implemented effectively, SARS needs to be incorporated into the overall DOE project management system.

  20. Canister storage building (CSB) safety analysis report phase 3: Safety analysis documentation supporting CSB construction

    SciTech Connect

    Garvin, L.J.

    1997-04-28

    The Canister Storage Building (CSB) will be constructed in the 200 East Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site. The CSB will be used to stage and store spent nuclear fuel (SNF) removed from the Hanford Site K Basins. The objective of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of the site on which the CSB will be located. This description will support the hazard analysis and accident analyses in Chapter 3.0. The purpose of this report is to provide an evaluation of the CSB design criteria, the design's compliance with the applicable criteria, and the basis for authorization to proceed with construction of the CSB.

  1. Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Di Maio, Francesco; Zio, Enrico; Smith, Curtis; Rychkov, Valentin

    2015-07-06

    The present special issue contains an overview of the research in the field of Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Traditionally, safety regulation for NPPs design and operation has been based on Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA) methods to verify criteria that assure plant safety in a number of postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) scenarios. Referring to such criteria, it is also possible to identify those plant Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) and activities that are most important for safety within those postulated scenarios. Then, the design, operation, and maintenance of these “safety-related” SSCs andmore » activities are controlled through regulatory requirements and supported by Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).« less

  2. Integrated deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis for safety assessment of nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect

    Di Maio, Francesco; Zio, Enrico; Smith, Curtis; Rychkov, Valentin

    2015-07-06

    The present special issue contains an overview of the research in the field of Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (IDPSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Traditionally, safety regulation for NPPs design and operation has been based on Deterministic Safety Assessment (DSA) methods to verify criteria that assure plant safety in a number of postulated Design Basis Accident (DBA) scenarios. Referring to such criteria, it is also possible to identify those plant Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) and activities that are most important for safety within those postulated scenarios. Then, the design, operation, and maintenance of these “safety-related” SSCs and activities are controlled through regulatory requirements and supported by Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).

  3. Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

    SciTech Connect

    Laycak, D

    2008-09-11

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, or {sup 3}H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building systems

  4. Adjoint-based sensitivity analysis for reactor-safety applications

    SciTech Connect

    Parks, C.V.

    1985-01-01

    The application and usefulness of an adjoint-based methodology for performing sensitivity analysis on reactor safety computer codes is investigated. The adjoint-based methodology, referred to as differential sensitivity theory (DST), provides first-order derivatives of the calculated quantities of interest (responses) with respect to the input parameters. The basic theoretical development of DST is presented along with the needed general extensions for consideration of model discontinuities and a variety of useful response definitions. A simple analytic problem is used to highlight the general DST procedures. Finally, DST procedures presented in this work are applied to two highly nonlinear reactor accident analysis codes: (1) FASTGAS, a relatively small code for analysis of loss-of-decay-heat-removal accident in a gas-cooled fast reactor, and (2) an existing code called VENUS-II which is typically employed for analyzing the core disassembly phase of a hypothetical fast reactor accident. The two codes are different both in terms of complexity and in terms of the facets of DST which can be illustrated. Sensitivity results from the adjoint codes ADJGAS and VENUS-ADJ are verified with direct recalculations using perturbed input parameters. The effectiveness of the DST results for parameter ranking, prediction of response changes, and uncertainty analysis are illustrated. The conclusion drawn from this study is that DST is a viable, cost-effective methodology for accurate sensitivity analysis.

  5. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) Environmental Restoration Program (ERP), Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF). Revision 1

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1994-06-20

    This document was prepared to take the place of a Safety Evaluation Report since the Baseline Safety Analysis File (BSAF)and associated Baseline Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) File do not meet the requirements of a complete safety analysis documentation. Its purpose is to present in summary form the background of how the BSAF and Baseline TSR originated and a description of the process by which it was produced and approved for use in the Environmental Restoration Program.The BSAF is a facility safety reference document for INEL environmental restoration activities including environmental remediation of inactive waste sites and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of surplus facilities. The BSAF contains safety bases common to environmental restoration activities and guidelines for performing and documenting safety analysis. The common safety bases can be incorporated by reference into the safety analysis documentation prepared for individual environmental restoration activities with justification and any necessary revisions. The safety analysis guidelines in BSAF provide an accepted method for hazard analysis; analysis of normal, abnormal, and accident conditions; human factors analysis; and derivation of TSRS. The BSAF safety bases and guidelines are graded for environmental restoration activities.

  6. Survey of systems safety analysis methods and their application to nuclear waste management systems

    SciTech Connect

    Pelto, P.J.; Winegardner, W.K.; Gallucci, R.H.V.

    1981-11-01

    This report reviews system safety analysis methods and examines their application to nuclear waste management systems. The safety analysis methods examined include expert opinion, maximum credible accident approach, design basis accidents approach, hazard indices, preliminary hazards analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, fault trees, event trees, cause-consequence diagrams, G0 methodology, Markov modeling, and a general category of consequence analysis models. Previous and ongoing studies on the safety of waste management systems are discussed along with their limitations and potential improvements. The major safety methods and waste management safety related studies are surveyed. This survey provides information on what safety methods are available, what waste management safety areas have been analyzed, and what are potential areas for future study.

  7. Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated With the Technical Challenges of the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology Project

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Withrow, Colleen A.; Reveley, Mary S.

    2014-01-01

    This analysis was conducted to support the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) Project of the Aviation Safety Program (AVsP) milestone VSST4.2.1.01, "Identification of VSST-Related Trends." In particular, this is a review of incident data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The following three VSST-related technical challenges (TCs) were the focus of the incidents searched in the ASRS database: (1) Vechicle health assurance, (2) Effective crew-system interactions and decisions in all conditions; and (3) Aircraft loss of control prevention, mitigation, and recovery.

  8. Limited-scope probabilistic safety analysis for the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF)

    SciTech Connect

    Sharirli, M.; Rand, J.L.; Sasser, M.K.; Gallegos, F.R.

    1992-01-01

    The reliability of instrumentation and safety systems is a major issue in the operation of accelerator facilities. A probabilistic safety analysis was performed or the key safety and instrumentation systems at the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LAMPF). in Phase I of this unique study, the Personnel Safety System (PSS) and the Current Limiters (XLs) were analyzed through the use of the fault tree analyses, failure modes and effects analysis, and criticality analysis. Phase II of the program was done to update and reevaluate the safety systems after the Phase I recommendations were implemented. This paper provides a brief review of the studies involved in Phases I and II of the program.

  9. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Laycak, D

    2008-06-16

    This documented safety analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements', and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  10. Documented Safety Analysis for the Waste Storage Facilities March 2010

    SciTech Connect

    Laycak, D T

    2010-03-05

    This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for the Waste Storage Facilities was developed in accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, 'Safety Basis Requirements,' and utilizes the methodology outlined in DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 3. The Waste Storage Facilities consist of Area 625 (A625) and the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) Storage Area portion of the DWTF complex. These two areas are combined into a single DSA, as their functions as storage for radioactive and hazardous waste are essentially identical. The B695 Segment of DWTF is addressed under a separate DSA. This DSA provides a description of the Waste Storage Facilities and the operations conducted therein; identification of hazards; analyses of the hazards, including inventories, bounding releases, consequences, and conclusions; and programmatic elements that describe the current capacity for safe operations. The mission of the Waste Storage Facilities is to safely handle, store, and treat hazardous waste, transuranic (TRU) waste, low-level waste (LLW), mixed waste, combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL (as well as small amounts from other DOE facilities).

  11. An Analysis of Excavation Support Safety Based on Experimental Studies

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gorska, Karolina; Wyjadłowski, Marek

    2015-09-01

    The article presents the results of inclinometric measurements and numerical analyses of soldier-pile wall displacements. The excavation under investigation was made in cohesive soils. The measurements were conducted at points located at the edge of the cantilever excavation support system. The displacements of the excavation support observed over the period of three years demonstrated the pattern of steady growth over the first two months, followed by a gradual levelling out to a final plateau. The numerical analyses were conducted based on 3D FEM models. The numerical analysis of the problem comprise calculations of the global structural safety factor depending on the displacement of the chosen points in the lagging and conducted by means of the φ/c reduction procedure. The adopted graphical method of safety estimation is very conservative in the sense that it recognizes stability loss quite early, when one could further load the medium or weaken it by further strength reduction. The values of the Msf factor are relatively high. This is caused by the fact that the structure was designed for excavation twice as deep. Nevertheless, the structure is treated as a temporary one.

  12. Hazard screening application guide. Safety Analysis Report Update Program

    SciTech Connect

    1992-06-01

    The basic purpose of hazard screening is to group precesses, facilities, and proposed modifications according to the magnitude of their hazards so as to determine the need for and extent of follow on safety analysis. A hazard is defined as a material, energy source, or operation that has the potential to cause injury or illness in human beings. The purpose of this document is to give guidance and provide standard methods for performing hazard screening. Hazard screening is applied to new and existing facilities and processes as well as to proposed modifications to existing facilities and processes. The hazard screening process evaluates an identified hazards in terms of the effects on people, both on-site and off-site. The process uses bounding analyses with no credit given for mitigation of an accident with the exception of certain containers meeting DOT specifications. The process is restricted to human safety issues only. Environmental effects are addressed by the environmental program. Interfaces with environmental organizations will be established in order to share information.

  13. A Study on Urban Road Traffic Safety Based on Matter Element Analysis

    PubMed Central

    Hu, Qizhou; Zhou, Zhuping; Sun, Xu

    2014-01-01

    This paper examines a new evaluation of urban road traffic safety based on a matter element analysis, avoiding the difficulties found in other traffic safety evaluations. The issue of urban road traffic safety has been investigated through the matter element analysis theory. The chief aim of the present work is to investigate the features of urban road traffic safety. Emphasis was placed on the construction of a criterion function by which traffic safety achieved a hierarchical system of objectives to be evaluated. The matter element analysis theory was used to create the comprehensive appraisal model of urban road traffic safety. The technique was used to employ a newly developed and versatile matter element analysis algorithm. The matter element matrix solves the uncertainty and incompatibility of the evaluated factors used to assess urban road traffic safety. The application results showed the superiority of the evaluation model and a didactic example was included to illustrate the computational procedure. PMID:25587267

  14. A study on urban road traffic safety based on matter element analysis.

    PubMed

    Hu, Qizhou; Zhou, Zhuping; Sun, Xu

    2014-01-01

    This paper examines a new evaluation of urban road traffic safety based on a matter element analysis, avoiding the difficulties found in other traffic safety evaluations. The issue of urban road traffic safety has been investigated through the matter element analysis theory. The chief aim of the present work is to investigate the features of urban road traffic safety. Emphasis was placed on the construction of a criterion function by which traffic safety achieved a hierarchical system of objectives to be evaluated. The matter element analysis theory was used to create the comprehensive appraisal model of urban road traffic safety. The technique was used to employ a newly developed and versatile matter element analysis algorithm. The matter element matrix solves the uncertainty and incompatibility of the evaluated factors used to assess urban road traffic safety. The application results showed the superiority of the evaluation model and a didactic example was included to illustrate the computational procedure. PMID:25587267

  15. New Mathematical Derivations Applicable to Safety and Reliability Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Cooper, J.A.; Ferson, S.

    1999-04-19

    Boolean logic expressions are often derived in safety and reliability analysis. Since the values of the operands are rarely exact, accounting for uncertainty with the tightest justifiable bounds is important. Accurate determination of result bounds is difficult when the inputs have constraints. One example of a constraint is that an uncertain variable that appears multiple times in a Boolean expression must always have the same value, although the value cannot be exactly specified. A solution for this repeated variable problem is demonstrated for two Boolean classes. The classes, termed functions with unate variables (including, but not limited to unate functions), and exclusive-or functions, frequently appear in Boolean equations for uncertain outcomes portrayed by logic trees (event trees and fault trees).

  16. Issues related to criticality safety analysis for burnup credit applications

    SciTech Connect

    DeHart, M.D.; Parks, C.V.

    1995-12-01

    Spent fuel transportation and storage cask designs based on a burnup credit approach must consider issues that are not relevant in casks designed under a fresh fuel loading assumption. Parametric analyses are required to characterize the importance of fuel assembly and fuel cycle parameters on spent fuel composition and reactivity. Numerical models are evaluated to determine the sensitivity of criticality safety calculations to modeling assumptions. This paper discusses the results of studies to determine the effect of two important modeling assumptions on the criticality analysis of pressurized-water reactor (PWR) spent fuel: (1) the effect of assumed burnup history (i.e., specific power during and time-dependent variations in operational power) during depletion calculations, and (2) the effect of axial burnup distributions on the neutron multiplication factor calculated for a three-dimensional (3-D) conceptual cask design.

  17. Safety analysis report for packaging (onsite) doorstop samplecarrier system

    SciTech Connect

    Obrien, J.H.

    1997-02-24

    The Doorstop Sample Carrier System consists of a Type B certified N-55 overpack, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) specification or performance-oriented 208-L (55-gal) drum (DOT 208-L drum), and Doorstop containers. The purpose of the Doorstop Sample Carrier System is to transport samples onsite for characterization. This safety analysis report for packaging (SARP) provides the analyses and evaluation necessary to demonstrate that the Doorstop Sample Carrier System meets the requirements and acceptance criteria for both Hanford Site normal transport conditions and accident condition events for a Type B package. This SARP also establishes operational, acceptance, maintenance, and quality assurance (QA) guidelines to ensure that the method of transport for the Doorstop Sample Carrier System is performed safely in accordance with WHC-CM-2-14, Hazardous Material Packaging and Shipping.

  18. Numerical Analysis for Structural Safety Evaluation of Butterfly Valves

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Shin, Myung-Seob; Yoon, Joon-Yong; Park, Han-Yung

    2010-06-01

    Butterfly valves are widely used in current industry to control the fluid flow. They are used for both on-off and throttling applications involving large flows at relatively low operating pressure especially in large size pipelines. For the industrial application of butterfly valves, it must be ensured that the valve could be used safety under the fatigue life and the deformations produced by the pressure of the fluid. In this study, we carried out the structure analysis of the body and the valve disc of the butterfly valve and the numerical simulation was performed by using ANSYS v11.0. The reliability of valve is evaluated under the investigation of the deformation, the leak test and the durability of the valve.

  19. Planning Document for an NBSR Conversion Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect

    Diamond D. J.; Baek J.; Hanson, A.L.; Cheng, L-Y.; Brown, N.; Cuadra, A.

    2013-09-25

    The NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) is a reactor-laboratory complex providing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the nation with a world-class facility for the performance of neutron-based research. The heart of this facility is the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR). The NBSR is a heavy water moderated and cooled reactor operating at 20 MW. It is fueled with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements. A Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program is underway to convert the reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This program includes the qualification of the proposed fuel, uranium and molybdenum alloy foil clad in an aluminum alloy, and the development of the fabrication techniques. This report is a planning document for the conversion Safety Analysis Report (SAR) that would be submitted to, and approved by, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) before the reactor could be converted.This report follows the recommended format and content from the NRC codified in NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-power Reactors,” Chapter 18, “Highly Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium Conversions.” The emphasis herein is on the SAR chapters that require significant changes as a result of conversion, primarily Chapter 4, Reactor Description, and Chapter 13, Safety Analysis. The document provides information on the proposed design for the LEU fuel elements and identifies what information is still missing. This document is intended to assist ongoing fuel development efforts, and to provide a platform for the development of the final conversion SAR. This report contributes directly to the reactor conversion pillar of the GTRI program, but also acts as a boundary condition for the fuel development and fuel fabrication pillars.

  20. Conversion Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the NIST Research Reactor

    SciTech Connect

    Diamond, D. J.; Baek, J. S.; Hanson, A. L.; Cheng, L-Y; Brown, N.; Cuadra, A.

    2015-01-30

    The NIST Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) is a reactor-laboratory complex providing the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the nation with a world-class facility for the performance of neutron-based research. The heart of this facility is the NIST research reactor (aka NBSR); a heavy water moderated and cooled reactor operating at 20 MW. It is fueled with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel elements. A Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program is underway to convert the reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. This program includes the qualification of the proposed fuel, uranium and molybdenum alloy foil clad in an aluminum alloy, and the development of the fabrication techniques. This report is a preliminary version of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) that would be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for approval prior to conversion. The report follows the recommended format and content from the NRC codified in NUREG-1537, “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-power Reactors,” Chapter 18, “Highly Enriched to Low-Enriched Uranium Conversions.” The emphasis in any conversion SAR is to explain the differences between the LEU and HEU cores and to show the acceptability of the new design; there is no need to repeat information regarding the current reactor that will not change upon conversion. Hence, as seen in the report, the bulk of the SAR is devoted to Chapter 4, Reactor Description, and Chapter 13, Safety Analysis.

  1. Safety analysis of the 700-horsepower combustion test facility

    SciTech Connect

    Berkey, B.D.

    1981-05-01

    The objective of the program reported herein was to provide a Safety Analysis of the 700 h.p. Combustion Test Facility located in Building 93 at the Pittsburgh Energy Technology Center. Extensive safety related measures have been incorporated into the design, construction, and operation of the Combustion Test Facility. These include: nitrogen addition to the coal storage bin, slurry hopper, roller mill and pulverizer baghouse, use of low oxygen content combustion gas for coal conveying, an oxygen analyzer for the combustion gas, insulation on hot surfaces, proper classification of electrical equipment, process monitoring instrumentation and a planned remote television monitoring system. Analysis of the system considering these factors has resulted in the determination of overall probabilities of occurrence of hazards as shown in Table I. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will reduce these probabilities as indicated. The identified hazards include coal dust ignition by hot ductwork and equipment, loss of inerting within the coal conveying system leading to a coal dust fire, and ignition of hydrocarbon vapors or spilled oil, or slurry. The possibility of self-heating of coal was investigated. Implementation of the recommendations in this report will reduce the ignition probability to no more than 1 x 10/sup -6/ per event. In addition to fire and explosion hazards, there are potential exposures to materials which have been identified as hazardous to personal health, such as carbon monoxide, coal dust, hydrocarbon vapors, and oxygen deficient atmosphere, but past monitoring experience has not revealed any problem areas. The major environmental hazard is an oil spill. The facility has a comprehensive spill control plan.

  2. Analysis of School Food Safety Programs Based on HACCP Principles

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Roberts, Kevin R.; Sauer, Kevin; Sneed, Jeannie; Kwon, Junehee; Olds, David; Cole, Kerri; Shanklin, Carol

    2014-01-01

    Purpose/Objectives: The purpose of this study was to determine how school districts have implemented food safety programs based on HACCP principles. Specific objectives included: (1) Evaluate how schools are implementing components of food safety programs; and (2) Determine foodservice employees food-handling practices related to food safety.…

  3. Safety analysis forseismic motion of control rods accounting for rod misalignment

    SciTech Connect

    Osmin, W.L.; Paik, I.K.

    1992-01-01

    The purpose of this report is to provide a summary of the results of three safety analyses performed by the SRL Safety Analysis Group (SAG) to assess the safety impact of control rod motion induced by a Design Basis Earthquake (DBE).

  4. Safety analysis of natural gas vehicles transiting highway tunnel

    SciTech Connect

    Shaaban, S.H.; Zuzovsky, M.; Anigstein, R.

    1989-01-01

    A safety analysis was performed to assess the relative hazard of compressed natural gas (CNG) fueled vehicles traveling on various tunnels and bridges in New York City. The study considered those hazards arising from the release of fuel from CNG vehicles ranging in size from a passenger sedan to a full size 53 passenger bus. The approach used was to compare the fuel hazard of CNG vehicles to the fuel hazard of gasoline vehicles. The risk was assessed by estimating the frequency of occurrence and the severity of the hazard. The methodology was a combination of analyzing accident data, performing a diffusion analysis of the gas released in the tunnel and determining the consequences of ignition. Diffusion analysis was performed using the TEMPEST code for various accident scenarios resulting in CNG release inside the Holland Tunnel. The study concluded that the overall hazard of CNG vehicles transiting a ventilated tunnel is less than the hazard from a comparable gasoline fueled vehicle. 134 refs., 23 figs., 24 tabs.

  5. Improved Flow Modeling in Transient Reactor Safety Analysis Computer Codes

    SciTech Connect

    Holowach, M.J.; Hochreiter, L.E.; Cheung, F.B.

    2002-07-01

    A method of accounting for fluid-to-fluid shear in between calculational cells over a wide range of flow conditions envisioned in reactor safety studies has been developed such that it may be easily implemented into a computer code such as COBRA-TF for more detailed subchannel analysis. At a given nodal height in the calculational model, equivalent hydraulic diameters are determined for each specific calculational cell using either laminar or turbulent velocity profiles. The velocity profile may be determined from a separate CFD (Computational Fluid Dynamics) analysis, experimental data, or existing semi-empirical relationships. The equivalent hydraulic diameter is then applied to the wall drag force calculation so as to determine the appropriate equivalent fluid-to-fluid shear caused by the wall for each cell based on the input velocity profile. This means of assigning the shear to a specific cell is independent of the actual wetted perimeter and flow area for the calculational cell. The use of this equivalent hydraulic diameter for each cell within a calculational subchannel results in a representative velocity profile which can further increase the accuracy and detail of heat transfer and fluid flow modeling within the subchannel when utilizing a thermal hydraulics systems analysis computer code such as COBRA-TF. Utilizing COBRA-TF with the flow modeling enhancement results in increased accuracy for a coarse-mesh model without the significantly greater computational and time requirements of a full-scale 3D (three-dimensional) transient CFD calculation. (authors)

  6. Safety Analysis of FMS/CTAS Interactions During Aircraft Arrivals

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Leveson, Nancy G.

    1998-01-01

    This grant funded research on human-computer interaction design and analysis techniques, using future ATC environments as a testbed. The basic approach was to model the nominal behavior of both the automated and human procedures and then to apply safety analysis techniques to these models. Our previous modeling language, RSML, had been used to specify the system requirements for TCAS II for the FAA. Using the lessons learned from this experience, we designed a new modeling language that (among other things) incorporates features to assist in designing less error-prone human-computer interactions and interfaces and in detecting potential HCI problems, such as mode confusion. The new language, SpecTRM-RL, uses "intent" abstractions, based on Rasmussen's abstraction hierarchy, and includes both informal (English and graphical) specifications and formal, executable models for specifying various aspects of the system. One of the goals for our language was to highlight the system modes and mode changes to assist in identifying the potential for mode confusion. Three published papers resulted from this research. The first builds on the work of Degani on mode confusion to identify aspects of the system design that could lead to potential hazards. We defined and modeled modes differently than Degani and also defined design criteria for SpecTRM-RL models. Our design criteria include the Degani criteria but extend them to include more potential problems. In a second paper, Leveson and Palmer showed how the criteria for indirect mode transitions could be applied to a mode confusion problem found in several ASRS reports for the MD-88. In addition, we defined a visual task modeling language that can be used by system designers to model human-computer interaction. The visual models can be translated into SpecTRM-RL models, and then the SpecTRM-RL suite of analysis tools can be used to perform formal and informal safety analyses on the task model in isolation or integrated with

  7. Safety review of the design, operation, and radiation sections of the General Electric Morris Operation Consolidated Safety Analysis Report

    SciTech Connect

    McBride, J.P.

    1981-01-30

    A safety review was made of Sections 4 through 9 of the Consolidated Safety Analysis Report (CSAR) for the GE Morris Operation spent-fuel storage facility. The sections reviewed include Design Criteria and Compliance, Facility Design and Description, Radiation Protection, Accident Analysis, and Conduct of Operations. The safety review was performed in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 72, ''Licensing Requirements for the Storage of Spent Fuel in an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation'' and contains independent estimations of source terms and dose-commitments from postulated accidents in the storage facility and a structural analysis of the Morris Operation cranes as an appendix. The review confirms that the features of the facility as described in Sections 4 through 9 of the CSAR fulfilled the safety requirements of 10 CFR 72, and it is concluded that spent-fuel handling and storage at the Morris Operation do not present significant risks to public health and safety. 15 refs., 3 tabs.

  8. Interface design of VSOP'94 computer code for safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Natsir, Khairina Andiwijayakusuma, D.; Wahanani, Nursinta Adi; Yazid, Putranto Ilham

    2014-09-30

    Today, most software applications, also in the nuclear field, come with a graphical user interface. VSOP'94 (Very Superior Old Program), was designed to simplify the process of performing reactor simulation. VSOP is a integrated code system to simulate the life history of a nuclear reactor that is devoted in education and research. One advantage of VSOP program is its ability to calculate the neutron spectrum estimation, fuel cycle, 2-D diffusion, resonance integral, estimation of reactors fuel costs, and integrated thermal hydraulics. VSOP also can be used to comparative studies and simulation of reactor safety. However, existing VSOP is a conventional program, which was developed using Fortran 65 and have several problems in using it, for example, it is only operated on Dec Alpha mainframe platforms and provide text-based output, difficult to use, especially in data preparation and interpretation of results. We develop a GUI-VSOP, which is an interface program to facilitate the preparation of data, run the VSOP code and read the results in a more user friendly way and useable on the Personal 'Computer (PC). Modifications include the development of interfaces on preprocessing, processing and postprocessing. GUI-based interface for preprocessing aims to provide a convenience way in preparing data. Processing interface is intended to provide convenience in configuring input files and libraries and do compiling VSOP code. Postprocessing interface designed to visualized the VSOP output in table and graphic forms. GUI-VSOP expected to be useful to simplify and speed up the process and analysis of safety aspects.

  9. Interface design of VSOP'94 computer code for safety analysis

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Natsir, Khairina; Yazid, Putranto Ilham; Andiwijayakusuma, D.; Wahanani, Nursinta Adi

    2014-09-01

    Today, most software applications, also in the nuclear field, come with a graphical user interface. VSOP'94 (Very Superior Old Program), was designed to simplify the process of performing reactor simulation. VSOP is a integrated code system to simulate the life history of a nuclear reactor that is devoted in education and research. One advantage of VSOP program is its ability to calculate the neutron spectrum estimation, fuel cycle, 2-D diffusion, resonance integral, estimation of reactors fuel costs, and integrated thermal hydraulics. VSOP also can be used to comparative studies and simulation of reactor safety. However, existing VSOP is a conventional program, which was developed using Fortran 65 and have several problems in using it, for example, it is only operated on Dec Alpha mainframe platforms and provide text-based output, difficult to use, especially in data preparation and interpretation of results. We develop a GUI-VSOP, which is an interface program to facilitate the preparation of data, run the VSOP code and read the results in a more user friendly way and useable on the Personal 'Computer (PC). Modifications include the development of interfaces on preprocessing, processing and postprocessing. GUI-based interface for preprocessing aims to provide a convenience way in preparing data. Processing interface is intended to provide convenience in configuring input files and libraries and do compiling VSOP code. Postprocessing interface designed to visualized the VSOP output in table and graphic forms. GUI-VSOP expected to be useful to simplify and speed up the process and analysis of safety aspects.

  10. HPLC analysis and safety assessment of coumarin in foods.

    PubMed

    Sproll, Constanze; Ruge, Winfried; Andlauer, Claudia; Godelmann, Rolf; Lachenmeier, Dirk W

    2008-07-15

    Coumarin is a component of natural flavourings including cassia, which is widely used in foods and pastries. The toxicity of coumarin has raised some concerns and food safety authorities have set a maximum limit of 2mg/kg for foods and beverages in general, and a maximum level of 10mg/l for alcoholic beverages. An efficient method for routine analysis of coumarin is liquid chromatography with diode array detection. The optimal sample preparation for foods containing cinnamon was investigated and found to be cold extraction of 15g sample with 50mL of methanol (80%, v/v) for 30min using magnetic stirring. In the foods under investigation, appreciable amounts of coumarin were found in bakery products and breakfast cereals (mean 9mg/kg) with the highest concentrations up to 88mg/kg in certain cookies flavoured with cinnamon. Other foods such as liqueurs, vodka, mulled wine, and milk products did not have coumarin concentrations above the maximum level. The safety assessment of coumarin containing foods, in the context of governmental food controls, is complicated as a toxicological basis for the maximum limits appears to be missing. The limits were derived at a time when a genotoxic mechanism was assumed. However, this has since been disproven in more recent studies. Our exposure data on coumarin in bakery products show that there is still a need for a continued regulation of coumarin in foods. A toxicological re-evaluation of coumarin with the aim to derive scientifically founded maximum limits should be conducted with priority. PMID:26003373

  11. A probabilistic safety analysis of incidents in nuclear research reactors.

    PubMed

    Lopes, Valdir Maciel; Agostinho Angelo Sordi, Gian Maria; Moralles, Mauricio; Filho, Tufic Madi

    2012-06-01

    This work aims to evaluate the potential risks of incidents in nuclear research reactors. For its development, two databases of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were used: the Research Reactor Data Base (RRDB) and the Incident Report System for Research Reactor (IRSRR). For this study, the probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) was used. To obtain the result of the probability calculations for PSA, the theory and equations in the paper IAEA TECDOC-636 were used. A specific program to analyse the probabilities was developed within the main program, Scilab 5.1.1. for two distributions, Fischer and chi-square, both with the confidence level of 90 %. Using Sordi equations, the maximum admissible doses to compare with the risk limits established by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) were obtained. All results achieved with this probability analysis led to the conclusion that the incidents which occurred had radiation doses within the stochastic effects reference interval established by the ICRP-64. PMID:22021060

  12. Criticality safety analysis on fissile materials in Fukushima reactor cores

    SciTech Connect

    Liu, Xudong; Lemaitre-Xavier, E.; Ahn, Joonhong; Hirano, Fumio

    2013-07-01

    The present study focuses on the criticality analysis for geological disposal of damaged fuels from Fukushima reactor cores. Starting from the basic understanding of behaviors of plutonium and uranium, a scenario sequence for criticality event is considered. Due to the different mobility of plutonium and uranium in geological formations, the criticality safety is considered in two parts: (1) near-field plutonium system and (2) far-field low enriched uranium (LEU) system. For the near-field plutonium system, a mathematical analysis for pure-solute transport was given, assuming a particular buffer material and waste form configuration. With the transport and decay of plutonium accounted, the critical mass of plutonium was compared with the initial load of a single canister. Our calculation leads us to the conclusion that our system with the initial loading being the average mass of plutonium in an assembly just before the accident is very unlikely to become critical over time. For the far-field LEU system, due to the uncertainties in the geological and geochemical conditions, calculations were made in a parametric space that covers the variation of material compositions and different geometries. Results show that the LEU system could not remain sub-critical within the entire parameter space assumed, although in the iron-rich rock, the neutron multiplicity is significantly reduced.

  13. Safety and performance analysis of a commercial photovoltaic installation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hamzavy, Babak T.; Bradley, Alexander Z.

    2013-09-01

    Continuing to better understand the performance of PV systems and changes in performance with the system life is vital to the sustainable growth of solar. A systematic understanding of degradation mechanisms that are induced as a result of variables such as the service environment, installation, module/material design, weather, operation and maintenance, and manufacturing is required for reliable operation throughout a system's lifetime. We wish to report the results from an analysis of a commercial c-Si PV array owned and operated by DuPont. We assessed the electrical performance of the modules by comparing the original manufacturers' performance data with the measurements obtained using a solar simulator to determine the degradation rate. This evaluation provides valuable PV system field experience and document key issues regarding safety and performance. A review of the nondestructive and destructive analytical methods and characterization strategies we have found useful for system, module, and subsequent material component evaluations are presented. We provide an overview of our inspection protocol and subsequent control process to mitigate risk. The objective is to explore and develop best practice protocols regarding PV asset optimization and provide a rationale to reduce risk based on the analysis of our own commercial installations.

  14. 41 CFR 102-80.105 - What information must be included in an equivalent level of safety analysis?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... included in an equivalent level of safety analysis? 102-80.105 Section 102-80.105 Public Contracts and... of Safety Analysis § 102-80.105 What information must be included in an equivalent level of safety analysis? The equivalent level of life safety evaluation is to be performed by a qualified fire...

  15. 41 CFR 102-80.105 - What information must be included in an equivalent level of safety analysis?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... included in an equivalent level of safety analysis? 102-80.105 Section 102-80.105 Public Contracts and... of Safety Analysis § 102-80.105 What information must be included in an equivalent level of safety analysis? The equivalent level of life safety evaluation is to be performed by a qualified fire...

  16. Accident analysis and control options in support of the sludge water system safety analysis

    SciTech Connect

    HEY, B.E.

    2003-01-16

    A hazards analysis was initiated for the SWS in July 2001 (SNF-8626, K Basin Sludge and Water System Preliminary Hazard Analysis) and updated in December 2001 (SNF-10020 Rev. 0, Hazard Evaluation for KE Sludge and Water System - Project A16) based on conceptual design information for the Sludge Retrieval System (SRS) and 60% design information for the cask and container. SNF-10020 was again revised in September 2002 to incorporate new hazards identified from final design information and from a What-if/Checklist evaluation of operational steps. The process hazards, controls, and qualitative consequence and frequency estimates taken from these efforts have been incorporated into Revision 5 of HNF-3960, K Basins Hazards Analysis. The hazards identification process documented in the above referenced reports utilized standard industrial safety techniques (AIChE 1992, Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures) to systematically guide several interdisciplinary teams through the system using a pre-established set of process parameters (e.g., flow, temperature, pressure) and guide words (e.g., high, low, more, less). The teams generally included representation from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), K Basins Nuclear Safety, T Plant Nuclear Safety, K Basin Industrial Safety, fire protection, project engineering, operations, and facility engineering.

  17. Providing Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis Education through Benchmark Experiment Evaluation

    SciTech Connect

    John D. Bess; J. Blair Briggs; David W. Nigg

    2009-11-01

    One of the challenges that today's new workforce of nuclear criticality safety engineers face is the opportunity to provide assessment of nuclear systems and establish safety guidelines without having received significant experience or hands-on training prior to graduation. Participation in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) and/or the International Reactor Physics Experiment Evaluation Project (IRPhEP) provides students and young professionals the opportunity to gain experience and enhance critical engineering skills.

  18. Packaging Review Guide for Reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings

    SciTech Connect

    DiSabatino, A; Biswas, D; DeMicco, M; Fisher, L E; Hafner, R; Haslam, J; Mok, G; Patel, C; Russell, E

    2007-04-12

    This Packaging Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for Department of Energy (DOE) review and approval of packagings to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE Order 460.1B for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs). This PRG is intended for use by the Headquarters Certifying Official and his or her review staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for DOE packaging approval. This PRG is generally organized at the section level in a format similar to that recommended in Regulatory Guide 7.9 (RG 7.9). One notable exception is the addition of Section 9 (Quality Assurance), which is not included as a separate chapter in RG 7.9. Within each section, this PRG addresses the technical and regulatory bases for the review, the manner in which the review is accomplished, and findings that are generally applicable for a package that meets the approval standards. This Packaging Review Guide (PRG) provides guidance for DOE review and approval of packagings to transport fissile and Type B quantities of radioactive material. It fulfills, in part, the requirements of DOE O 460.1B for the Headquarters Certifying Official to establish standards and to provide guidance for the preparation of Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings (SARPs). This PRG is intended for use by the Headquarters Certifying Official and his review staff, DOE Secretarial offices, operations/field offices, and applicants for DOE packaging approval. The primary objectives of this PRG are to: (1) Summarize the regulatory requirements for package approval; (2) Describe the technical review procedures by which DOE determines that these requirements have been satisfied; (3) Establish and maintain the quality and uniformity of reviews; (4) Define the base from which to evaluate proposed changes in scope

  19. School Safety, Severe Disciplinary Actions, and School Characteristics: A Secondary Analysis of the School Survey on Crime and Safety

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Han, Seunghee; Akiba, Motoko

    2011-01-01

    On the basis of a secondary analysis of survey data collected from 1,872 secondary school principals in the 2005-2006 School Survey on Crime and Safety, we examined the frequency of and reasons for severe disciplinary actions and the relationship between school characteristics and severe disciplinary actions. We found that severe disciplinary…

  20. Fault tree synthesis for software design analysis of PLC based safety-critical systems

    SciTech Connect

    Koo, S. R.; Cho, C. H.; Seong, P. H.

    2006-07-01

    As a software verification and validation should be performed for the development of PLC based safety-critical systems, a software safety analysis is also considered in line with entire software life cycle. In this paper, we propose a technique of software safety analysis in the design phase. Among various software hazard analysis techniques, fault tree analysis is most widely used for the safety analysis of nuclear power plant systems. Fault tree analysis also has the most intuitive notation and makes both qualitative and quantitative analyses possible. To analyze the design phase more effectively, we propose a technique of fault tree synthesis, along with a universal fault tree template for the architecture modules of nuclear software. Consequently, we can analyze the safety of software on the basis of fault tree synthesis. (authors)

  1. A risk-informed approach to safety margins analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Curtis Smith; Diego Mandelli

    2013-07-01

    The Risk Informed Safety Margins Characterization (RISMC) Pathway is a systematic approach developed to characterize and quantify safety margins of nuclear power plant structures, systems and components. The model has been tested on the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Lab.

  2. Soft Mathematical Aggregation in Safety Assessment and Decision Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Cooper, J. Arlin

    1999-06-10

    This paper improves on some of the limitations of conventional safety assessment and decision analysis methods. It develops a top-down mathematical method for expressing imprecise individual metrics as possibilistic or fuzzy numbers and shows how they may be combined (aggregated) into an overall metric, also portraying the inherent uncertainty. Both positively contributing and negatively contributing factors are included. Metrics are weighted according to significance of the attribute and evaluated as to contribution toward the attribute. Aggregation is performed using exponential combination of the metrics, since the accumulating effect of such factors responds less and less to additional factors. This is termed soft mathematical aggregation. Dependence among the contributing factors is accounted for by incorporating subjective metrics on overlap of the factors and by correspondingly reducing the overall contribution of these combinations to the overall aggregation. Decisions corresponding to the meaningfulness of the results are facilitated in several ways. First, the results are compared to a soft threshold provided by a sigmoid function. Second, information is provided on input ''Importance'' and ''Sensitivity,'' in order to know where to place emphasis on controls that may be necessary. Third, trends in inputs and outputs are tracked in order to add important information to the decision process. The methodology has been implemented in software.

  3. Root Cause Analysis: Learning from Adverse Safety Events.

    PubMed

    Brook, Olga R; Kruskal, Jonathan B; Eisenberg, Ronald L; Larson, David B

    2015-10-01

    Serious adverse events continue to occur in clinical practice, despite our best preventive efforts. It is essential that radiologists, both as individuals and as a part of organizations, learn from such events and make appropriate changes to decrease the likelihood that such events will recur. Root cause analysis (RCA) is a process to (a) identify factors that underlie variation in performance or that predispose an event toward undesired outcomes and (b) allow for development of effective strategies to decrease the likelihood of similar adverse events occurring in the future. An RCA process should be performed within the environment of a culture of safety, focusing on underlying system contributors and, in a confidential manner, taking into account the emotional effects on the staff involved. The Joint Commission now requires that a credible RCA be performed within 45 days for all sentinel or major adverse events, emphasizing the need for all radiologists to understand the processes with which an effective RCA can be performed. Several RCA-related tools that have been found to be useful in the radiology setting include the "five whys" approach to determine causation; cause-and-effect, or Ishikawa, diagrams; causal tree mapping; affinity diagrams; and Pareto charts. PMID:26466177

  4. Fast Flux Test Facility final safety analysis report. Amendment 72

    SciTech Connect

    Gantt, D. A.

    1992-08-01

    This document provides the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Amendment 72 for incorporation into the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) FSAR set. This amendment change incorporates Engineering Change Notices issued subsequent to Amendment 71 and approved for incorporation before June 24, 1992. These include changes in: Chapter 2, Site Characteristics; Chapter 3, Design Criteria Structures, Equipment, and Systems; Chapter 5B, Reactor Coolant System; Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Control Systems; Chapter 8, Electrical Systems - The description of the Class 1E, 125 Vdc systems is updated for the higher capacity of the newly installed, replacement batteries; Chapter 9, Auxiliary Systems - The description of the inert cell NASA systems is corrected to list the correct number of spare sample points; Chapter 11, Reactor Refueling System; Chapter 12, Radiation Protection and Waste Management; Chapter 13, Conduct of Operations; Chapter 16, Quality Assurance; Chapter 17, Technical Specifications; Chapter 19, FFTF Fire Specifications for Fire Detection, Alarm, and Protection Systems; Chapter 20, FFTF Criticality Specifications; and Appendix B, Primary Piping Integrity Evaluation.

  5. Safety culture evaluation and asset root cause analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Okrent, D.; Xiong, Y.

    1995-12-31

    This paper examines the role of organizational and management factors in nuclear power plant safety through the use of operating experiences. The ASSET (Assessment of Safety Significant Events Team) reports of thirteen plants (total thirty events) have been analyzed in term of twenty organizational dimensions (factors) identified by Brookhaven National Laboratory and Pennsylvania State University. For three plants detailed results are reported in this paper. The results of thirteen plants are summarized in the form of a table. The study tends to confirm that organizational and management factors play an important role in plant safety. The twenty organizational dimensions and their definitions, in general, were adequate in this study. Formalization, Safety Culture, Technical Knowledge, Training, Roles-Responsibilities and Problem Identification appear to be key organizational factors which influence the safety of nuclear power plants studied.

  6. Nuclear criticality safety calculational analysis for small-diameter containers

    SciTech Connect

    LeTellier, M.S.; Smallwood, D.J.; Henkel, J.A.

    1995-11-01

    This report documents calculations performed to establish a technical basis for the nuclear criticality safety of favorable geometry containers, sometimes referred to as 5-inch containers, in use at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. A list of containers currently used in the plant is shown in Table 1.0-1. These containers are currently used throughout the plant with no mass limits. The use of containers with geometries or material types other than those addressed in this evaluation must be bounded by this analysis or have an additional analysis performed. The following five basic container geometries were modeled and bound all container geometries in Table 1.0-1: (1) 4.32-inch-diameter by 50-inch-high polyethylene bottle; (2) 5.0-inch-diameter by 24-inch-high polyethylene bottle; (3) 5.25-inch-diameter by 24-inch-high steel can ({open_quotes}F-can{close_quotes}); (4) 5.25-inch-diameter by 15-inch-high steel can ({open_quotes}Z-can{close_quotes}); and (5) 5.0-inch-diameter by 9-inch-high polybottle ({open_quotes}CO-4{close_quotes}). Each container type is evaluated using five basic reflection and interaction models that include single containers and multiple containers in normal and in credible abnormal conditions. The uranium materials evaluated are UO{sub 2}F{sub 2}+H{sub 2}O and UF{sub 4}+oil materials at 100% and 10% enrichments and U{sub 3}O{sub 8}, and H{sub 2}O at 100% enrichment. The design basis safe criticality limit for the Portsmouth facility is k{sub eff} + 2{sigma} < 0.95. The KENO study results may be used as the basis for evaluating general use of these containers in the plant.

  7. Analysis of key safety metrics of thorium utilization in LWRs

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Ade, Brian J.; Bowman, Stephen M.; Worrall, Andrew; Powers, Jeffrey

    2016-04-08

    Here, thorium has great potential to stretch nuclear fuel reserves because of its natural abundance and because it is possible to breed the 232Th isotope into a fissile fuel (233U). Various scenarios exist for utilization of thorium in the nuclear fuel cycle, including use in different nuclear reactor types (e.g., light water, high-temperature gas-cooled, fast spectrum sodium, and molten salt reactors), along with use in advanced accelerator-driven systems and even in fission-fusion hybrid systems. The most likely near-term application of thorium in the United States is in currently operating light water reactors (LWRs). This use is primarily based on conceptsmore » that mix thorium with uranium (UO2 + ThO2) or that add fertile thorium (ThO2) fuel pins to typical LWR fuel assemblies. Utilization of mixed fuel assemblies (PuO2 + ThO2) is also possible. The addition of thorium to currently operating LWRs would result in a number of different phenomenological impacts to the nuclear fuel. Thorium and its irradiation products have different nuclear characteristics from those of uranium and its irradiation products. ThO2, alone or mixed with UO2 fuel, leads to different chemical and physical properties of the fuel. These key reactor safety–related issues have been studied at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and documented in “Safety and Regulatory Issues of the Thorium Fuel Cycle” (NUREG/CR-7176, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2014). Various reactor analyses were performed using the SCALE code system for comparison of key performance parameters of both ThO2 + UO2 and ThO2 + PuO2 against those of UO2 and typical UO2 + PuO2 mixed oxide fuels, including reactivity coefficients and power sharing between surrounding UO2 assemblies and the assembly of interest. The decay heat and radiological source terms for spent fuel after its discharge from the reactor are also presented. Based on this evaluation, potential impacts on safety requirements and identification of

  8. Automated validation of patient safety clinical incident classification: macro analysis.

    PubMed

    Gupta, Jaiprakash; Patrick, Jon

    2013-01-01

    Patient safety is the buzz word in healthcare. Incident Information Management System (IIMS) is electronic software that stores clinical mishaps narratives in places where patients are treated. It is estimated that in one state alone over one million electronic text documents are available in IIMS. In this paper we investigate the data density available in the fields entered to notify an incident and the validity of the built in classification used by clinician to categories the incidents. Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) software was used to test the classes. Four statistical classifier based on J48, Naïve Bayes (NB), Naïve Bayes Multinominal (NBM) and Support Vector Machine using radial basis function (SVM_RBF) algorithms were used to validate the classes. The data pool was 10,000 clinical incidents drawn from 7 hospitals in one state in Australia. In first part of the study 1000 clinical incidents were selected to determine type and number of fields worth investigating and in the second part another 5448 clinical incidents were randomly selected to validate 13 clinical incident types. Result shows 74.6% of the cells were empty and only 23 fields had content over 70% of the time. The percentage correctly classified classes on four algorithms using categorical dataset ranged from 42 to 49%, using free-text datasets from 65% to 77% and using both datasets from 72% to 79%. Kappa statistic ranged from 0.36 to 0.4. for categorical data, from 0.61 to 0.74. for free-text and from 0.67 to 0.77 for both datasets. Similar increases in performance in the 3 experiments was noted on true positive rate, precision, F-measure and area under curve (AUC) of receiver operating characteristics (ROC) scores. The study demonstrates only 14 of 73 fields in IIMS have data that is usable for machine learning experiments. Irrespective of the type of algorithms used when all datasets are used performance was better. Classifier NBM showed best performance. We think the

  9. 14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.233 Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle...

  10. 14 CFR 417.233 - Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. 417.233 Section 417.233 Aeronautics and Space... LAUNCH SAFETY Flight Safety Analysis § 417.233 Analysis for an unguided suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system. For each launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle...