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Sample records for enhancing nuclear safeguards

  1. A new approach to nuclear fuel safeguard enhancement through radionuclide profiling

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peterson, Aaron Dawon

    The United States has led the effort to promote peaceful use of nuclear power amongst states actively utilizing it as well as those looking to deploy the technology in the near future. With the attraction being demonstrated by various countries towards nuclear power comes the concern that a nation may have military aspirations for the use of nuclear energy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established nuclear safeguard protocols and procedures to mitigate nuclear proliferation. The work herein proposed a strategy to further enhance existing safeguard protocols by considering safeguard in nuclear fuel design. The strategy involved the use of radionuclides to profile nuclear fuels. Six radionuclides were selected as identifier materials. The decay and transmutation of these radionuclides were analyzed in reactor operation environment. MCNPX was used to simulate a reactor core. The perturbation in reactivity of the core due to the loading of the radionuclides was insignificant. The maximum positive and negative reactivity change induced was at day 1900 with a value of 0.00185 +/- 0.00256 and at day 2000 with -0.00441 +/- 0.00249, respectively. The mass of the radionuclides were practically unaffected by transmutation in the core; the change in radionuclide inventory was dominated by natural decay. The maximum material lost due to transmutation was 1.17% in Eu154. Extraneous signals from fission products identical to the radionuclide compromised the identifier signals. Eu154 saw a maximum intensity change at EOC and 30 days post-irradiation of 1260% and 4545%, respectively. Cs137 saw a minimum change of 12% and 89%, respectively. Mitigation of the extraneous signals is cardinal to the success of the proposed strategy. The predictability of natural decay provides a basis for the characterization of the signals from the radionuclide.

  2. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS).

    SciTech Connect

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-08-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework.

  3. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system

  4. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  5. Video imaging for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bradley, J.N.; Brislawn, C.M.; Brown, J.E.; Rodriguez, C.A.; Stoltz, L.A.

    1994-04-01

    The field of Nuclear Safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world`s nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and usage of these materials as reported by states that have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nuclear Safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and nondestructive analysis of product materials and process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards. In this presentation we will introduce digital video image processing and analysis systems that have been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for application to the nuclear safeguards problem. Of specific interest to this audience is the detector-activated predictive wavelet transform image coding used to reduce drastically the data storage requirements for these unattended, remote safeguards systems.

  6. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  7. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  8. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  9. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  10. Safeguards and Nuclear Materials Management: A view from the DOE Chicago Operations Office

    SciTech Connect

    Healy, F.E.; Ahlberg, C.G.

    1994-07-01

    Nuclear Materials Safeguards (also known as Material Control and Accountability or MC&A) and Nuclear Materials Management as practiced within the US Department of Energy (DOE) are separate, but related disciplines with differing goals and objectives. Safeguards and Nuclear Materials Management are closely related through the common use of transaction and inventory reporting data from the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Adherence to Nuclear Materials management principals may enhance Nuclear Materials Safeguards, and has the potential to result in savings for both program and safeguards costs. Both the Safeguards and Nuclear Materials Management Programs for the Chicago Operations Office are administered by the Safeguards and Security Division, Safeguards Branch. This paper discusses Safeguards and Materials Management issues within the Chicago Operations Office, some of which relate to problems faced by the DOE complex as a whole.

  11. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-09-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world`s nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards.

  12. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  13. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  14. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Humberto Garcia; William Desmond; Scott Demuth

    2010-11-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  15. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    SciTech Connect

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE`s Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL.

  16. Redefining Interrelationship between Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Irie, Kazutomo

    Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having “aggressors” as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests “SSN” which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called “SSST” in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards.

  17. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  18. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  19. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  20. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  1. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  2. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  3. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Donald N; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

    2009-01-01

    Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of

  4. Radiation imaging technology for nuclear materials safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Prettyman, T.H.; Russo, P.A.; Cheung, C.C.; Christianson, A.D.; Feldman, W.C.; Gavron, A.

    1997-12-01

    Gamma-ray and neutron imaging technology is emerging as a useful tool for nuclear materials safeguards. Principal applications include improvement in accuracy for nondestructive assay of heterogeneous material (e.g., residues) and wide-area imaging of nuclear material in facilities (e.g., holdup). Portable gamma cameras with gamma-ray spectroscopy are available commercially and are being applied to holdup measurements. The technology has the potential to significantly reduce effort and exposure in holdup campaigns; and, with imaging, some of the limiting assumptions required for conventional holdup analysis can be relaxed, resulting in a more general analysis. Methods to analyze spectroscopic-imaging data to assay plutonium and uranium in processing equipment are being development. Results of holdup measurements using a commercial, portable gamma-cameras are presented. The authors are also developing fast neutron imaging techniques for NDA, search, and holdup. Fast neutron imaging provides a direct measurement of the source of neutrons and is relatively insensitive to surroundings when compared to thermal or epithermal neutron imaging. The technology is well-suited for in-process inventory measurements and verification of materials in interim storage, for which gamma-ray measurements may be inadequate due to self-shielding. Results of numerical simulations to predict the performance of fast-neutron telescopes for safeguards applications are presented.

  5. Robot speeds assays and enhances safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Phelan, P.F.; Powell, W.D.; Blankenship, R.W.

    1990-01-01

    At the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility, a robotics system utilizing a gantry robot and an automated inventory system operates five calorimeters and two gamma isotopic assay instruments. This system has significantly improved safeguards, because the opportunity for diversion has been greatly reduced. Not only is the accountability much more timely because throughput has doubled but the special nuclear material has been made physically more secure in several ways. First, items awaiting assay are kept in the inventory system, whose doors remain locked whenever the robot is unattended. An alarm sounds if the doors are unlocked without authorization. Second, light curtains surround the robot's work envelope and pressure-sensitive pads cover the floor to detect entry into the assay area. Third, the robot weighs each item whenever it is moved, and the result is compared with the weight that was measured when the item was first put into inventory. 2 refs., 3 figs.

  6. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  7. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  8. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  9. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    in the future. Consequently, the NNSA Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243) sponsored a team of U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratory nuclear safeguards experts and technologists to conduct a workshop on methods and technologies for improving this activity, under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Approaches Project. The workshop focused on reviewing and discussing the fundamental safeguards needs, and presented technology and/or methods that could potentially address those needs more effectively and efficiently. Conclusions and Recommendations for technology to enhance the performance of DIV inspections are presented by the workshop team.

  10. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  11. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  12. Ultraviolet digital imaging for nuclear safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Attas, E. Michael; Burton, G. R.; Chen, J. Dennis; Hildingsson, Lars; Nilsson, A.; Trepte, O.; Young, Gary J.

    1996-03-01

    An ultraviolet-sensitive scientific CCD camera has been tested at a power reactor facility to image the faint Cerenkov light from irradiated nuclear fuel. The instrument mates custom optical components (lens, UV-pass filter) to a commercial scientific camera (Astrocam 4100) with a coated frame-transfer CCD chip (EEV 37-10) to produce 12-bit images of 512 X 512 pixels at a near-real-time frame rate. A 250-mm f/2.6 catadioptric lens has been designed with transmissive optics optimized for this application, incorporating color correction for viewing through 10 m of water. The filter has an average transmission of 80% from 280 to 320 nm, with visible-light transmission of less than 0.01% to block artificial lighting in the fuel bay. Measurements were made with this instrument at the Ringhals Nuclear Power Plant, Varobacka, Sweden. Both fuel and non-fuel assemblies of boiling-water reactor type were studied. Performance is superior to that of the earlier Cerenkov viewing devices based on image intensifier tubes. Increased sensitivity extends the range of the Cerenkov verification technique to fuel with older discharge dates. Increased resolution allows fine details of the fuel to be examined for higher-confidence safeguards verification. Sample digital images are presented, and the advantages to irradiated-fuel verification of image quantitation, storage, transmission, and processing are discussed.

  13. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian D

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  14. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  15. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations. [Aggregated Systems Model (ASM)

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments.

  16. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.; Krass, A.; Kratzer, M.; Sanborn, J.; Ward, B.; Wulf, N. A.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

  17. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for.

  18. The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-01

    For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

  19. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  20. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  1. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  2. A GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM IN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY.

    SciTech Connect

    FISHBONE, L.; SISKIND, B.; PEPPER, S.

    2005-07-10

    While there are a number of university graduate-education programs that address non-proliferation and safeguards policy issues; there are none in the United States that train students in the specific technical aspects of nuclear safeguards. Formal education of this kind is necessary to sustain the flow of technically trained individuals to diverse programs in safeguards, nonproliferation, and national security. In response to this need, the University of Missouri-Columbia, with assistance from Brookhaven National Laboratory, is initiating a Graduate Certificate Program in Nuclear Safeguards Technology: Students seeking advanced degrees in a variety of technical areas will complete a required sequence of courses in order to receive the certification. Required course work covers topics such as Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), Physical Protection (PP); nuclear measurements, and a variety of other relevant subjects. Laboratory-based instruction will be included which will utilize the University of Missouri Research Reactor(MURR). MURR is the largest university-based research reactor and has extensive laboratory resources including a Canberra Aquila MPC&A Operational Monitoring demonstration system.

  3. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-05-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  4. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  5. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  6. Enhanced portability of safeguards measurements tools

    SciTech Connect

    Swinth, K.L.; Brackenbush, L.W.; Braby, L.A.; Eschbach, P.A.

    1994-03-01

    In recent years, computers have decreased in size from cubic meter volumes to units that can fit in the palm of the hand. At the same time, the capability of the computers has increased due to both faster electronics and improvements in software. Similar changes have occurred in other electronic devices, primarily because of the decrease in size of the electronics and the incorporation of smart electronics (microprocessors). Similar decreases in the size of the detectors used in radiation detection, however, have not yet occurred. Reduction in detector size requires advances in materials to provide higher efficiency in a smaller volume. Improved intrinsic efficiency of detectors does not always meet safeguards needs because resolution of individual photopeaks may be more important than efficiency. Recent advances at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory have led to smaller multichannel analyzers and more compact detector electronics. In related studies, the performance of the new scintillation detectors has been explored.

  7. Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

    1982-07-01

    Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States.

  8. Strengthening IAEA safeguards in an era of nuclear cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Hooper, R.

    1995-11-01

    Since the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed a remarkable series of events demonstrating that universal adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are no longer utopian dreams. The author reviews the actions of various countries to terminate or reduce nuclear weapons programs and those that are resisting the non-proliferation efforts. The author addresses efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard declared nuclear material more cost-effectively and deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities.

  9. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Education at Russian Universities

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2008-05-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is assisting key Russian universities in developing safeguards and security degree programs to prepare the next generation of specialists who will be responsible for protecting nuclear material from illicit use. These programs include course and laboratory work in nuclear material measurements, vulnerability analysis, exterior and interior sensors, and legal aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) has graduated nine classes of master’s students, most of who are working in government agencies, research organizations, or pursuing their PhD. With DOE support, MEPhI has also established a 5½-year engineering degree program in safeguards and security. This is a hands-on degree that more closely meets the needs of nuclear facilities. The first class graduated in February 2007, marking a major milestone in Russian nonproliferation education. A second engineering degree program has been established at Tomsk Polytechnic University and is designed to reach those students east of the Ural Mountains, where many nuclear facilities are located. The first class will graduate in February 2009. This paper describes current development of these education programs, new initiatives, and sustainability efforts to ensure their continued viability after DOE support ends. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical safeguards and security education programs.

  10. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-09-20

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications.

  11. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security and safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Beeley, Phillip A.; Boyle, David R.; Williams, Adam David; Mohagheghi, Amir Hossein

    2010-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

  12. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute : an integrated approach to safety, security & safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, Adam David

    2010-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI) at Texas A&M University are working with Middle East regional partners to set up a nuclear energy safety, safeguards, and security educational institute in the Gulf region. SNL and NSSPI, partnered with the Khalifa University of Science, Technology, and Research (KUSTAR), with suppot from its key nuclear stakeholders, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), plan to jointly establish the institute in Abu Dhabi. The Gulf Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Institute (GNEII) will be a KUSTAR-associated, credit-granting regional education program providing both classroom instruction and hands-on experience. The ultimate objective is for GNEII to be autonomous - regionally funded and staffed with personnel capable of teaching all GNEII courses five years after its inauguration. This is a strategic effort to indigenize a responsible nuclear energy culture - a culture shaped by an integrated understanding of nuclear safety, safeguards and security - in regional nuclear energy programs. GNEII also promotes international interests in developing a nuclear energy security and safety culture, increases collaboration between the nuclear energy security and safety communities, and helps to enhance global standards for nuclear energy technology in the Middle East.

  13. Microscopic studies of spherical particles for nuclear safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Donohue, D.; Ciurapinski, A.; Cliff, J., III; Rüdenauer, F.; Kuno, T.; Poths, J.

    2008-12-01

    A combination of micro-analytical techniques was used for the characterization of spherical particles in the size range 9-12 μm as a part of nuclear safeguards verification activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The particles were removed from cotton swipe samples taken in a nuclear facility under safeguards and examined first by scanning electron microscopy combined with energy-dispersive X-ray spectrometry (SEM-EDX). Particles of interest were then relocated under an optical microscope and manipulated. One such particle was subjected to destructive analysis by secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS) in order to determine if uranium was present in the core of the particle. A second particle was examined using focused ion beam (FIB) etching to allow an examination of the interior by SEM-EDX. The particle manipulation and relocation techniques presented here allow the sequential examination of a single particle of interest by a combination of analytical techniques, thus yielding surface morphological, elemental, isotopic and depth-profiling information. The objective of these investigations is to provide assurance of the absence of clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities in States coming under comprehensive safeguards obligations.

  14. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Aspinall, M.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Peranteau, D.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Vaccaro, S.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A. -L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  15. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  16. Conceptual baseline document for the nuclear materials safeguards system

    SciTech Connect

    Nelson, R.A.

    1995-08-01

    This document defines the baseline scope, schedule, and cost requirements of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards System (NMSS) replacement for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The Nuclear Material Safeguards System (NMSS), operating in PFP, comprises data from several site safeguards systems that have been merged since 1987. NMSS was designed and implemented to the state of computer technology for the mid 1970`s. Since implementation, the hardware vendor has stopped producing computer systems and the availability of personnel trained and willing to work with the technology has diminished. Maintenance has become expensive and `reliability is a serious concern. -This effort provides a replacement in kind of the NMSS, using modern, scalable, upgradable hardware and software to the same standards used for the Hanford Local Area Network (HLAN) system. The NMSS Replacement is a Client/Server architecture designed on a Personal Computer based local area network (LAN) platform. The LAN is provided through an ethernet interface running the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). This architecture conforms to the HLAN standard, including the End System Operating Environment (ESOE). The Server runs the Microsoft Windows NT` Server operating system, Microsoft SQL Server2 database management system, and application tools. Clients run Microsoft Windows` and application software provided as part of the system. The interface between the clients and the database is through Microsoft ODBC4.

  17. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  18. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. 1.42 Section 1.42 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL INFORMATION Headquarters Program Offices § 1.42 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. (a) The Office of...

  19. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. 1.42 Section 1.42 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL INFORMATION Headquarters Program Offices § 1.42 Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. (a) The Office of...

  20. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.V.; DeLand, S.M.; Whiteson, R.; Anzelon, G.

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  1. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    SciTech Connect

    Hayes, Timothy; Nelson, Roger

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an over

  2. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next

  3. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Required for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP)

    SciTech Connect

    Dr. Mark Schanfein; Philip Casey Durst

    2012-07-01

    The Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) is a Very High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (VHTR) to be constructed near Idaho Falls, Idaho The NGNP is intrinsically safer than current reactors and is planned for startup ca. 2021 Safety is more prominent in the minds of the Public and Governing Officials following the nuclear reactor meltdown accidents in Fukushima, Japan The authors propose that the NGNP should be designed with International (IAEA) Safeguards in mind to support export to Non-Nuclear-Weapons States There are two variants of the NGNP design; one using integral Prismatic-shaped fuel assemblies in a fixed core; and one using recirculating fuel balls (or Pebbles) The following presents the infrastructure required to safeguard the NGNP This infrastructure is required to safeguard the Prismatic and Pebble-fueled NGNP (and other HTGR/VHTR) The infrastructure is based on current Safeguards Requirements and Practices implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for similar reactors The authors of this presentation have worked for decades in the area of International Nuclear Safeguards and are recognized experts in this field Presentation for INMM conference in July 2012.

  4. Control of information as an element of nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Green, J.N.

    1982-03-01

    Control of information as an element of physical protection has a long history in the field of national security. The nuclear industry is familiar with the constraints on proprietary information; and, with an effective date of October 1, 1980 for Parts 25 and 95 in Title 10 of the code of Federal Regulations, certain activities had to cope with rules for safeguarding of classified information. In applying the rules it is important to understand the differences between national security information and restricted data, and how guidance is promulgated both by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and by the Department of Energy. More recently, with a fully effective date of January 20, 1982, the NRC published rules for the protection of unclassified safeguards information. The scope is much broader than for the classified information. For example, the rules are applicable to power reactors. In this paper the directives which provide the details for compliance with all these rules are identified, and their application is discussed. NRC inspectors will be checking for compliance with the rules. Once problems of compliance are resolved, the more difficult question of evaluating the impact of information control procedures on the effectiveness of a physical protection system can be addressed.

  5. Graded safeguards: Determination of attractiveness levels for special nuclear material

    SciTech Connect

    Wilkey, D.D.; Crawford, D.W.

    1994-08-01

    The DOE graded safeguards approach--as described in DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials, and its guide--requires the determination of category levels of nuclear material locations to establish protection requirements for these locations. A critical parameter related to category determination is knowledge of the attractiveness level of the nuclear material with respect to use in a nuclear explosive device. DOE Order 5633.3A and its guide provide the policy basis for determining the attractiveness level of various forms and types of special nuclear material (SNM); however, these requirements and guidance are necessarily general and sometimes based on arbitrary criteria. Currently, there are large quantities of nuclear material on inventory within the DOE that need attractiveness determinations to ensure appropriate protection controls. Specific forms of these materials include materials in matrices requiring special processing, irradiated SNM that does not meet criteria for self-protecting, low concentration SNM, SNM as numerous small items, and bulk non-portable SNM items. This paper discusses the technical basis for applying material concentration limits for solids and liquids that can influence the various factors and criteria affecting the attractiveness level of SNM. Holdup and rollup considerations for determining category levels will be discussed as well.

  6. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  7. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    methodology can be adapted for evaluating and assessing the safeguardability of nuclear facilities – both existing, as well as those still on the drawing board. The advantages of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis is that it would not only give the facility designer an analytical method for evaluating and assessing the safeguards measures and approaches for the prospective facility, but also the ability to optimize the design of the facility process for enhancing facility safeguardability. The following report explains the need for Facility Safeguardability Analysis and explains how it could be used in the Safeguards-by-Design, in support of the design and construction of nuclear facilities.

  8. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Michael Holzemer; Alan Carvo

    2012-04-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S&S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  9. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Bates, Cameron Russell

    2015-03-11

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  10. Development of Metallic Magnetic Calorimeters for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bates, Cameron Russell

    Many nuclear safeguards applications could benefit from high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy achievable with metallic magnetic calorimeters. This dissertation covers the development of a system for these applications based on gamma-ray detectors developed at the University of Heidelberg. It demonstrates new calorimeters of this type, which achieved an energy resolution of 45.5 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV, roughly ten times better than current state of the art high purity germanium detectors. This is the best energy resolution achieved with a gamma-ray metallic magnetic calorimeter at this energy to date. In addition to demonstrating a new benchmark in energy resolution, an experimental system for measuring samples with metallic magnetic calorimeters was constructed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This system achieved an energy resolution of 91.3 eV full-width at half-maximum at 59.54 keV under optimal conditions. Using this system it was possible to characterize the linearity of the response, the count-rate limitations, and the energy resolution as a function of temperature of the new calorimeter. With this characterization it was determined that it would be feasible to measure 242Pu in a mixed isotope plutonium sample. A measurement of a mixed isotope plutonium sample was performed over the course of 12 days with a single two-pixel metallic magnetic calorimeter. The relative concentration of 242Pu in comparison to other plutonium isotopes was determined by direct measurement to less than half a percent accuracy. This is comparable with the accuracy of the best-case scenario using traditional indirect methods. The ability to directly measure the relative concentration of 242Pu in a sample could enable more accurate accounting and detection of indications of undeclared activities in nuclear safeguards, a better constraint on source material in forensic samples containing plutonium, and improvements in verification in a future plutonium

  11. Interactive Simulation of Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (ESTSC)

    1994-03-14

    THIEF is an interactive computer simulation or computer game of the safeguards and security (S&S) systems of a nuclear facility. The user is placed in the role of a non-violent insider attempting to remove special nuclear material from the facility. All portions of the S&S system that are relevant to the non-violent insider threat are included. The computer operates the S&S systems and attempts to detect the loss of the nuclear material. Both the physicalmore » protection system and the materials control and accounting system are modeled. The description of the facility and its S&S systems are defined by the user with the aid of an input module. All aspects of the facility description are provided by the user. The program has a custom graphical user interface to facilitate its use by people with limited computer experience. The custom interface also allows it to run on relatively small computer systems.« less

  12. Nuclear material safeguards surveillance and accountancy by isotope correlation techniques

    SciTech Connect

    Persiani, P.J.; Goleb, J.A.; Kroc, T.K.

    1981-11-01

    The purpose of this study is to investigate the applicability of isotope correlation techniques (ICT) to the Light Water Reactor (LWR) and the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) fuel cycles for nuclear material accountancy and safeguards surveillance. The isotopic measurement of the inventory input to the reprocessing phase of the fuel cycle is the primary direct determination that an anomaly may exist in the fuel management of nuclear material. The nuclear materials accountancy gap which exists between the fabrication plant output and the input to the reprocessing plant can be minimized by using ICT at the dissolver stage of the reprocessing plant. The ICT allows a level of verification of the fabricator's fuel content specifications, the irradiation history, the fuel and blanket assemblies management and scheduling within the reactor, and the subsequent spent fuel assembly flows to the reprocessing plant. The investigation indicates that there exist relationships between isotopic concentration which have predictable, functional behavior over a range of burnup. Several cross-correlations serve to establish the initial core assembly-averaged composition. The selection of the more effective functionals will depend not only on the level of reliability of ICT for verification, but also on the capability, accuracy and difficulty of developing measurement methods. The propagation of measurement errors on the correlation functions and respective sensitivities to isotopic compositional changes have been examined and found to be consistent with current measurement methods.

  13. The new geospatial tools: global transparency enhancing safeguards verification

    SciTech Connect

    Pabian, Frank Vincent

    2010-09-16

    This paper focuses on the importance and potential role of the new, freely available, geospatial tools for enhancing IAEA safeguards and how, together with commercial satellite imagery, they can be used to promote 'all-source synergy'. As additional 'open sources', these new geospatial tools have heralded a new era of 'global transparency' and they can be used to substantially augment existing information-driven safeguards gathering techniques, procedures, and analyses in the remote detection of undeclared facilities, as well as support ongoing monitoring and verification of various treaty (e.g., NPT, FMCT) relevant activities and programs. As an illustration of how these new geospatial tools may be applied, an original exemplar case study provides how it is possible to derive value-added follow-up information on some recent public media reporting of a former clandestine underground plutonium production complex (now being converted to a 'Tourist Attraction' given the site's abandonment by China in the early 1980s). That open source media reporting, when combined with subsequent commentary found in various Internet-based Blogs and Wikis, led to independent verification of the reporting with additional ground truth via 'crowdsourcing' (tourist photos as found on 'social networking' venues like Google Earth's Panoramio layer and Twitter). Confirmation of the precise geospatial location of the site (along with a more complete facility characterization incorporating 3-D Modeling and visualization) was only made possible following the acquisition of higher resolution commercial satellite imagery that could be correlated with the reporting, ground photos, and an interior diagram, through original imagery analysis of the overhead imagery.

  14. Evaluation of a Business Case for Safeguards by Design in Nuclear Power Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Wood, Thomas W.; Seward, Amy M.; Lewis, Valerie A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-12-01

    Safeguards by Design (SbD) is a well-known paradigm for consideration and incorporation of safeguards approaches and associated design features early in the nuclear facility development process. This paradigm has been developed as part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and has been accepted as beneficial in many discussions and papers on NGSI or specific technologies under development within NGSI. The Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to examine the business case justification of SbD for nuclear power reactors. Ultimately, the implementation of SbD will rely on the designers of nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is important to assess the incentives which will lead designers to adopt SbD as a standard practice for nuclear facility design. This report details the extent to which designers will have compelling economic incentives to adopt SbD.

  15. Enhanced AFCI Sampling, Analysis, and Safeguards Technology Review

    SciTech Connect

    John Svoboda

    2009-09-01

    The focus of this study includes the investigation of sampling technologies used in industry and their potential application to nuclear fuel processing. The goal is to identify innovative sampling methods using state of the art techniques that could evolve into the next generation sampling and analysis system for metallic elements. Sampling and analysis of nuclear fuel recycling plant processes is required both to monitor the operations and ensure Safeguards and Security goals are met. In addition, environmental regulations lead to additional samples and analysis to meet licensing requirements. The volume of samples taken by conventional means, can restrain productivity while results samples are analyzed, require process holding tanks that are sized to meet analytical issues rather than process issues (and that create a larger facility footprint), or, in some cases, simply overwhelm analytical laboratory capabilities. These issues only grow when process flowsheets propose new separations systems and new byproduct material for transmutation purposes. Novel means of streamlining both sampling and analysis are being evaluated to increase the efficiency while meeting all requirements for information. This report addresses just a part of the effort to develop and study novel methods by focusing on the sampling and analysis of aqueous samples for metallic elements. It presents an overview of the sampling requirements, including frequency, sensitivity, accuracy, and programmatic drivers, to demonstrate the magnitude of the task. The sampling and analysis system needed for metallic element measurements is then discussed, and novel options being applied to other industrial analytical needs are presented. Inductively coupled mass spectrometry instruments are the most versatile for metallic element analyses and are thus chosen as the focus for the study. Candidate novel means of process sampling, as well as modifications that are necessary to couple such instruments to

  16. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1993-09-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. We compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and we examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well.

  17. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future

    SciTech Connect

    Markin, J.T.; Augustson, R.H.; Eccleston, G.W.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards from the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s it evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations. 15 refs.

  18. Beyond integrated safeguards: performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls.

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W.

    2001-01-01

    In the future, iE the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a fissile materials cutoff treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future.

  19. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-06-23

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  20. NNSA Signs Memorandum with Kuwait to Increase Cooperation on Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    ScienceCinema

    Thomas D'Agostino

    2010-09-01

    On June 23, 2010, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on nuclear safeguards and other nonproliferation topics with the Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC). NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino and KNNEC's Secretary General, Dr. Ahmad Bishara, signed the memorandum at a ceremony at U.S. Department of Energy headquarters in Washington.

  1. Applications of a portable MCA in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, F.; Cameron, R.A.

    1986-02-01

    In 1981 a small, battery-operated multichannel analyzer (MCA) prototype developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory was delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The intent was to produce an instrument for inspector (nonscientist) use. Automated measurement programs were built into the MCA. An enhanced, commercially produced MCA is now available, which was patterned after and is software compatible with the prototype. After an extensive review of the hardware and software of the available portable MCAs, the IAEA has chosen this MCA to be used by IAEA inspectors throughout the world. Inspectors from the EURATOM Directorate of Safeguards are also using these MCAs in inspections throughout Europe. While this MCA's portability and programmability make it ideally suited for infield applications, its powerful built-in intelligence and communications protocol make it a strong candidate for distributed data acquisition and control systems. The user-instrument interface philosophy is so easy to use that in domestic and international training schools, the operators manual is not used.

  2. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  3. Framework for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear-safeguards systems. [Aggregated Systems Model (ASM)

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.

    1981-10-20

    This paper describes an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards that protect special nuclear material (SNM). The tool quantifies the effectiveness using several measures, including probabilities and expected times to detect and respond to malevolent attempts against the facility. These measures are computed for a spectrum of threats involving outsiders, insiders, collusion, falsification, and deceit. Overall system effectiveness is judged using performance indices aggregated over all threats. These indices can be used by designers and regulators when comparing costs and benefits of various safeguards. The framework is demonstrated with an example in which we assess vulnerabilities of a safeguards system and identify cost-effective design modifications.

  4. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  5. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. 1.42 Section 1.42 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL INFORMATION... radioactive materials regulated under the Atomic Energy Act. NMSS ensures safety and security by...

  6. Applications of virtual reality to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1996-12-31

    This paper presents several applications of virtual reality relevant to the areas of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. Each of these applications was developed to the prototype stage at Sandia National Laboratories` Virtual Reality and Intelligent Simulation laboratory. These applications include the use of virtual reality for facility visualization, training of inspection personnel, and security and monitoring of nuclear facilities.

  7. DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

  8. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  9. Advanced Nuclear Measurements - Sensitivity Analysis Emerging Safeguards, Problems and Proliferation Risk

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, J.S.

    1999-07-15

    During the past year this component of the Advanced Nuclear Measurements LDRD-DR has focused on emerging safeguards problems and proliferation risk by investigating problems in two domains. The first is related to the analysis, quantification, and characterization of existing inventories of fissile materials, in particular, the minor actinides (MA) formed in the commercial fuel cycle. Understanding material forms and quantities helps identify and define future measurement problems, instrument requirements, and assists in prioritizing safeguards technology development. The second problem (dissertation research) has focused on the development of a theoretical foundation for sensor array anomaly detection. Remote and unattended monitoring or verification of safeguards activities is becoming a necessity due to domestic and international budgetary constraints. However, the ability to assess the trustworthiness of a sensor array has not been investigated. This research is developing an anomaly detection methodology to assess the sensor array.

  10. Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program nuclear materials measurement data: Phase 1: Final report, 1985 through 1986

    SciTech Connect

    Cacic, C.G.

    1988-08-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory has been tasked by the US Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security to assess and evaluate the adequacy of measurement technology as applied to materials accounting in US Department of Energy nuclear facilities. The Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program was developed as a means to monitor and evaluate the quality and effectiveness of accounting measurements by site, material balance area, or unit process. Phase 1 of the Safeguards Measurement Evaluation Program, initiated during 1985, involved evaluation of the primary accountability measurement methods at six US Department of Energy Defense Programs facilities. Resulting data are presented and evaluated as indicators of current state-of-the-practice accountability measurement methodology, deficiencies in materials accounting practices, and areas for possible assistance in upgrading measurement capabilities. 22 figs., 5 tabs.

  11. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  12. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  13. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  14. Plutonium measurements with a fast-neutron multiplicity counter for nuclear safeguards applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dolan, Jennifer L.; Flaska, Marek; Poitrasson-Riviere, Alexis; Enqvist, Andreas; Peerani, Paolo; Chichester, David L.; Pozzi, Sara A.

    2014-11-01

    Measurements were performed at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy to field test a fast-neutron multiplicity counter developed at the University of Michigan. The measurements allowed the assessment of the system's photon discrimination abilities, efficiency when measuring neutron multiplicity, ability to characterize 240Pueff mass, and performance relative to a currently deployed neutron coincidence counter. This work is motivated by the need to replace and improve upon 3He neutron detection systems for nuclear safeguards applications.

  15. Plutonium Measurements with a Fast-Neutron Multiplicity Counter for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Jennifer L. Dolan; Marek Flaska; Alexis Poitrasson-Riviere; Andreas Enqvist; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2014-11-01

    Measurements were performed at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra, Italy to field test a fast-neutron multiplicity counter developed at the University of Michigan. The measurements allowed the illustration of the system’s photon discrimination abilities, efficiency when measuring neutron multiplicity, ability to characterize 240Pueff mass, and performance relative to a currently deployed neutron coincidence counter. This work is motivated by the need to replace and improve upon 3He neutron detection systems for nuclear safeguards applications.

  16. Active Interrogation Using Electronic Neutron Generators for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chichester, D. L.; Seabury, E. H.

    2009-03-01

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron generator as the probe radiation source. Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors. A review of literature in this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear nonproliferation measurements. Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and assaying nuclear fuel reprocessing facility waste streams to detect and quantify fissile material. This paper discusses the historical use of this technique and examines its context within the scope and challenges of next-generation nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

  17. Active Interrogation Using Electronic Neutron Generators for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    David L. Chichester; Edward H. Seabury

    2008-08-01

    Active interrogation, a measurement technique which uses a radiation source to probe materials and generate unique signatures useful for characterizing those materials, is a powerful tool for assaying special nuclear material. The most commonly used technique for performing active interrogation is to use an electronic neutron generator as the probe radiation source. Exploiting the unique operating characteristics of these devices, including their monoenergetic neutron emissions and their ability to operate in pulsed modes, presents a number of options for performing prompt and delayed signature analyses using both photon and neutron sensors. A review of literature in this area shows multiple applications of the active neutron interrogation technique for performing nuclear nonproliferation measurements. Some examples include measuring the plutonium content of spent fuel, assaying plutonium residue in spent fuel hull claddings, assaying plutonium in aqueous fuel reprocessing process streams, and assaying nuclear fuel reprocessing facility waste streams to detect and quantify fissile material. This paper discusses the historical use of this technique and examines its context within the scope and challenges of next-generation nuclear fuel cycles and advanced concept nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

  18. Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Don N.; Stewart, Scott; Erickson, Alexa R.; Ford, Kerrie D.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-15

    There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or

  19. Certified reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security.

    PubMed

    Jakopič, R; Sturm, M; Kraiem, M; Richter, S; Aregbe, Y

    2013-11-01

    Confidence in comparability and reliability of measurement results in nuclear material and environmental sample analysis are established via certified reference materials (CRMs), reference measurements, and inter-laboratory comparisons (ILCs). Increased needs for quality control tools in proliferation resistance, environmental sample analysis, development of measurement capabilities over the years and progress in modern analytical techniques are the main reasons for the development of new reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security. The Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) prepares and certifices large quantities of the so-called "large-sized dried" (LSD) spikes for accurate measurement of the uranium and plutonium content in dissolved nuclear fuel solutions by isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and also develops particle reference materials applied for the detection of nuclear signatures in environmental samples. IRMM is currently replacing some of its exhausted stocks of CRMs with new ones whose specifications are up-to-date and tailored for the demands of modern analytical techniques. Some of the existing materials will be re-measured to improve the uncertainties associated with their certified values, and to enable laboratories to reduce their combined measurement uncertainty. Safeguards involve the quantitative verification by independent measurements so that no nuclear material is diverted from its intended peaceful use. Safeguards authorities pay particular attention to plutonium and the uranium isotope (235)U, indicating the so-called 'enrichment', in nuclear material and in environmental samples. In addition to the verification of the major ratios, n((235)U)/n((238)U) and n((240)Pu)/n((239)Pu), the minor ratios of the less abundant uranium and plutonium isotopes contain valuable information about the origin and the 'history' of material used for commercial or possibly clandestine purposes, and

  20. Monitoring nuclear reactors for safeguards purposes using anti-neutrinos

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Carroll, J.; Coleman, J.; Lockwood, M.; Metelko, C.; Murdoch, M.; Touramanis, C.; Davies, G.; Roberts, A.

    2015-04-01

    Preventing nuclear proliferation is a high priority for the international community. Monitoring of nuclear facilities to detect unauthorised removal of fissile materials from operational cores is central to this. Neutrino detection devices can be used to remotely monitor the core of operating reactors in a safe, reliable manner. Technology developed for the T2K experiment can be adapted to make a small footprint, reliable, anti-neutrino detector. Through, characterisation of the anti-neutrino spectrum there is a possibility to provide core material accountancy. A prototype of such a device has been developed and demonstrated at the University of Liverpool. Based on the design of the T2K Near Detector Calorimeter, the device will detect anti-neutrinos through the distinctive delayed coincidence signal of inverse beta decay interactions. This poster presented data from detector commissioning. The detector is currently deployed at Wylfa power station, UK for field testing.

  1. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Measurements on ^237Np for Security and Safeguards Applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Angell, C. T.; Joshi, T.; Yee, Ryan; Norman, E. B.; Kulp, W. D.; Warren, G. A.; Korbly, S.; Klimenko, A.; Wilson, C.; Copping, R.; Shuh, D. K.

    2009-10-01

    The smuggling of nuclear material and the diversion of fissile material for covert weapon programs both present grave risks to world security. Methods are needed to detect nuclear material smuggled in cargo, and for proper material accountability in civilian fuel re-processing facilities. Nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) is a technique that can address both needs. It is a non-destructive active interrogation method that provides isotope-specific information. It works by using a γ-ray beam to resonantly excite levels in a nucleus and observing the γ-rays emitted whose energy and intensity are characteristic of that isotope. ^237Np presents significant safeguard challenges; it is fissile yet currently has fewer safeguard restrictions. NRF measurements on ^237Np will expand the nuclear database and will permit designing interrogation and assay systems. Measurements were made using the bremsstrahlung beam at the HVRL at MIT on a 7 g target of ^237Np with two incident electron energies of 2.8 and 3.1 MeV. Results will be presented with discussion of the relevant nuclear structure necessary to predict levels in other actinides.

  2. Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

    SciTech Connect

    Gibbs, Philip; Hasty, Tim; Johns, Rissell; Baum, Gregory

    2014-08-31

    This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

  3. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rabin, Michael W

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  4. National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rabin, Michael W.

    2009-12-01

    As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  5. Hybrid statistical testing for nuclear material accounting data and/or process monitoring data in nuclear safeguards

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Burr, Tom; Hamada, Michael S.; Ticknor, Larry; Sprinkle, James

    2015-01-01

    The aim of nuclear safeguards is to ensure that special nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes. Historically, nuclear material accounting (NMA) has provided the quantitative basis for monitoring for nuclear material loss or diversion, and process monitoring (PM) data is collected by the operator to monitor the process. PM data typically support NMA in various ways, often by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-process nuclear material inventory. We develop options for combining PM residuals and NMA residuals (residual = measurement - prediction), using a hybrid of period-driven and data-driven hypothesis testing. The modified statistical tests canmore » be used on time series of NMA residuals (the NMA residual is the familiar material balance), or on a combination of PM and NMA residuals. The PM residuals can be generated on a fixed time schedule or as events occur.« less

  6. Hybrid statistical testing for nuclear material accounting data and/or process monitoring data in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Tom; Hamada, Michael S.; Ticknor, Larry; Sprinkle, James

    2015-01-01

    The aim of nuclear safeguards is to ensure that special nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes. Historically, nuclear material accounting (NMA) has provided the quantitative basis for monitoring for nuclear material loss or diversion, and process monitoring (PM) data is collected by the operator to monitor the process. PM data typically support NMA in various ways, often by providing a basis to estimate some of the in-process nuclear material inventory. We develop options for combining PM residuals and NMA residuals (residual = measurement - prediction), using a hybrid of period-driven and data-driven hypothesis testing. The modified statistical tests can be used on time series of NMA residuals (the NMA residual is the familiar material balance), or on a combination of PM and NMA residuals. The PM residuals can be generated on a fixed time schedule or as events occur.

  7. Taxonomy of potential international safeguards regimes

    SciTech Connect

    Lemley, J.R.; Allentuck, J.

    1994-08-01

    Since the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) search for the components of Iraq`s nuclear weapons program under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, a consensus for enhancing, strengthening or expanding the scope of international safeguards has developed. Some of the enhanced safeguards concepts which have been suggested include the following: short-notice, challenge, and random inspections; effluent monitoring in onsite, near site, and fly-by modes; local and wide-area environmental monitoring; and utilization of data from space-platform sensors. Potential safeguards regimes can be classified according to the functional and technical criteria which would be necessary for implementation of various enhanced safeguards concepts. While the nature of the regime which will emerge cannot be predicted, the classification of possible regimes according to major characteristics can be useful for identifying functional criteria and implementation challenges, focusing development efforts on the functional criteria, and planning for efficient use of safeguards resources. Precedents established in previously negotiated treaties -- the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, START, and Open Skies -- are examined with regard to enhancement of the international safeguards regime for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Bilateral, multilateral and regional integration of enhanced safeguards elements is considered.

  8. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  9. Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, T.L.

    1994-04-01

    This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance.

  10. Protecting Vulnerable Research Subjects in Critical Care Trials: Enhancing the Informed Consent Process and Recommendations for Safeguards

    PubMed Central

    2011-01-01

    Although critically ill patients represent a vulnerable group of individuals, guidelines in research ethics assert that ethically acceptable research may proceed with such vulnerable subjects if additional safeguards are in place to minimize the risk of harm and exploitation. Such safeguards include the proper obtainment of informed consent that avoids the presence of the therapeutic misconception and the assessment of decisional capacity in critically ill patients recruited for research. Also discussed in this review are additional safeguards for such vulnerable subjects, as well as the issues involved with proxy consent. Heightened awareness to principles of ethics and provision of additional safeguards to enhance protections of vulnerable subjects would help to maintain the public trust in the research endeavor. PMID:21906335

  11. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  12. Experimental evaluation of a boron-lined parallel plate proportional counter for use in nuclear safeguards coincidence counting

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Henzlova, D.; Evans, L. G.; Menlove, H. O.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Marlow, J. B.

    2013-01-01

    Boron-lined proportional technologies are increasingly being considered as a viable option for the near-term replacement of 3He-based technologies for use in international nuclear safeguards neutron detection and coincidence counting applications. In order to determine the applicability and feasibility of any replacement technology for international safeguards, it must be evaluated against performance parameters specific to nuclear safeguards applications. In this paper, we present an experimental evaluation of a boron-lined parallel plate proportional counter developed by Precision Data Technology, Inc. (PDT). The counter performance was evaluated using a high-rate 252Cf spontaneous fission neutron source and a set of 137Cs gamma-ray sources with a dose rate of 450 mR/h at the detector face. The performance data were subsequently compared with an equivalent 3He-based system defined using the Monte Carlo N-particle eXtended (MCNPX) radiation transport code.

  13. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  14. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  15. The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for Next Generation Safeguards Specialists--Maximizing Potential and Minimizing the Risks

    SciTech Connect

    Eipeldauer, Mary D

    2009-01-01

    This document is intended to provide an overview of the workshop entitled 'The Coming Nuclear Renaissance for the Next Generation Safeguards Experts-Maximizing Benefits While Minimizing Proliferation Risks', conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in partnership with the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). This document presents workshop objectives; lists the numerous participant universities and individuals, the nuclear nonproliferation lecture topics covered, and the facilities tours taken as part of the workshop; and discusses the university partnership sessions and proposed areas for collaboration between the universities and ORNL for 2009. Appendix A contains the agenda for the workshop; Appendix B lists the workshop attendees and presenters with contact information; Appendix C contains graphics of the evaluation form results and survey areas; and Appendix D summarizes the responses to the workshop evaluation form. The workshop was an opportunity for ORNL, Y-12, and SRNL staff with more than 30 years combined experience in nuclear nonproliferation to provide a comprehensive overview of their expertise for the university professors and their students. The overall goal of the workshop was to emphasize nonproliferation aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and to identify specific areas where the universities and experts from operations and national laboratories could collaborate.

  16. Enhancing professionalism at GPU Nuclear

    SciTech Connect

    Coe, R.P. )

    1992-01-01

    Late in 1988, GPU Nuclear embarked on a major program aimed at enhancing professionalism at its Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island nuclear generating stations. The program was also to include its corporate headquarters in Parsippany, New Jersey. The overall program was to take several directions, including on-site degree programs, a sabbatical leave-type program for personnel to finish college degrees, advanced technical training for licensed staff, career progression for senior reactor operators, and expanded teamwork and leadership training for control room crew. The largest portion of this initiative was the development and delivery of professionalism training to the nearly 2,000 people at both nuclear generating sites.

  17. Building safeguards infrastructure

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mcclelland - Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  18. VISA-2 - a general, vulnerability-oriented method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards/security systems at nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Harris, L.; Owel, W.R.

    1981-01-01

    This paper discusses the VISA (Vulnerability of Integrated Safeguards Analysis) method, developed in 1976-77 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and which has been adapted more recently to a broader range of uses. The performance of VISA systems is evaluated in terms of how they perform as an integrated safeguards/security system. The resulting method has been designated VISA-2. 7 refs.

  19. Safeguards Implementation: Establishment of Indonesian Safeguards Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Shipwash, Jacqueline L; Geist, William H.; Smith, Steven E; Solodov, Alexander A; Suharyanta, Suharyanta; Sunaryadi, Dedi

    2011-01-01

    Under the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), U.S. National Laboratories support the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ''collaborate with international partners to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development.'' This engagement in safeguards implementation cooperation is the basis for the security and safeguards arrangement with the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BAPETEN) and includes strengthening of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). There are many components in a robust SSAC. While INSEP carries on its program in a holistic approach, it is more effective and efficient to address individual components, rather than the entire system at one time, with the objective of strengthening the system as a whole. Nuclear material accountancy is one of these components. Nuclear material accountancy necessitates that a State periodically take an inventory of its material and record changes. To better perform these activities, BAPETEN requested assistance with establishing a safeguards laboratory where its staff could perform independent material characterization, maintain nondestructive assay equipment, and facilitate hands-on training of BAPETEN safeguards inspectors. In compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines and safety series documents, INSEP and BAPETEN opened the BAPETEN Safeguards Laboratory in February 2010 to provide these competencies. BAPETEN showcased these new capabilities in July 2010 at the IAEA-sponsored Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities where hands-on activities were held at BAPETEN's Headquarters in Jakarta using the equipment supplied by INSEP. Discussions have begun on the establishment of a security and safeguards laboratory at the BAPETEN Training Center located in Cisarua. This paper describes the many steps

  20. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Rogers,E.; deBoer,G.; Crawford, C.; De Castro, K.; Landers, J.

    2009-10-19

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former "Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security" at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that "good security is 20% equipment and 80% people." Although eliminating the "human factor" is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

  1. Some possible applications of measurements on mu mesons to nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation, and arms control activities

    SciTech Connect

    Kane, W.R.; Vanier, P.E.

    1997-10-01

    In the nuclear safeguards and arms control areas, well-developed methodologies exist for determining the properties of nuclear materials via measurements of the gamma rays and neutrons emitted from these materials, or in the arms control area, by the use of radiography. In certain favorable instances, it may by feasible to perform comparable measurements with the use of a ubiquitous, naturally-occurring radiation--cosmic ray mu mesons (muons). At the earth`s surface these charged particles have a broad energy distribution peaking at about 500 MeV with a flux of approximately 10{sup {minus}2}/cm{sup 2}-sec-steradian. In traversing matter, muons lose energy at a rate of approximately 2 MeV/gram almost independent of atomic number. Muons can readily be detected by either plastic scintillators or wire planes. While the flux is small, a scintillator of one meter area, for example, will register about 20,000 events/min. these particles should have utility in the detection and imaging of objects with sectional densities of a few hundred grams/cm{sup 2}. The degree of intrusiveness of the imaging can be controlled through the detector configuration. Some possible applications include: (1) mass measurements on large UF{sub 6} cylinders, (2) determination of the size of treaty-limited objects, e.g., missiles, in rail cars or other containment; (3) verification of single or multiple warheads or components; (4) the detection of concealed, underground cavities. Examples will be presented.

  2. Applications of boron-loaded scintillating fibers as NDA tools for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Mayo, Douglas R.; Ensslin, Norbert; Mercer, David J.; Miller, Michael C.; Russo, Phyllis A.; Sweet, Martin R.; Heger, A. Sharif

    1998-11-01

    Nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation rely on nondestructive analytical tools for prompt and noninvasive detection, verification, and quantitative analysis of nuclear materials in demanding environments. A new tool based on the detection of correlated neutrons in narrow time windows is being investigated to fill the niche created by the current limitations of the existing methods based on polyethylene moderated {sup 3}He gas proportional tubes. Commercially produced Boron-loaded ({sup 10}B) plastic scintillating fibers are one such technology under consideration. The fibers can be configured in a system to have high efficiency, short neutron die-away, pulse height sensitivity, and mechanical flexibility. Various configurations of the fibers with high density polyethylene have been considered which calculationally result in high efficiency detectors with short die-away times. A discussion of the design considerations and calculations of the detector efficiency, die-away time, and simulated pulse height spectra along with preliminary test results are presented. {copyright} {ital 1998 American Institute of Physics.}

  3. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect

    Kadner, S.P.; Reisman, A.; Turpen, E.

    1996-10-01

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  4. State Regulatory Authority (SRA) Coordination of Safety, Security, and Safeguards of Nuclear Facilities: A Framework for Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.; Martikka, Elina; Hack, Tapani; Wiander, Timo

    2013-05-30

    This paper will explore the development of a framework for conducting an assessment of safety-security-safeguards integration within a State. The goal is to examine State regulatory structures to identify conflicts and gaps that hinder management of the three disciplines at nuclear facilities. Such an analysis could be performed by a State Regulatory Authority (SRA) to provide a self-assessment or as part of technical cooperation with either a newcomer State, or to a State with a fully developed SRA.

  5. Performance evaluation of a commercially available heat flow calorimeter and applicability assessment for safeguarding special nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Bracken, D.S.; Biddle, R.; Rudy, C.

    1998-12-31

    The performance characteristics of a commercially available heat-flow calorimeter will be presented. The heat-flow sensors within the calorimeter are based on thermopile technology with a vendor-quoted sensitivity of 150 {micro}V/mW. The calorimeter is a full-twin design to compensate for ambient temperature fluctuations. The efficacy of temperature fluctuation compensations will also be detailed. Finally, an assessment of design applicability to special nuclear materials control and accountability and safeguarding will be presented.

  6. Results in Developing an Engineering Degree Program in Safeguards and Security of Nuclear Materials at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

    SciTech Connect

    Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolay I.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2007-07-01

    The world’s first master’s degree program in nuclear safeguards and security, established at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), has now graduated nine classes of students. Most of the graduates have gone on to work at government agencies, research organizations, or obtain their PhD. In order to meet the demand for safeguards and security specialists at nuclear facilities, MEPhI established a 5½ year engineering degree program that provides more hands-on training desired by facilities. In February 2004, the first students began their studies in the new discipline Nuclear Material Safeguards and Nonproliferation. This class, as well as other subsequent classes, included students who started the program in their third year of studies, as the first 2½ years consists of general engineering curriculum. Fourteen students made up the first graduating class, receiving their engineering degrees in February 2007. The topics addressed in this paper include specific features of the program caused by peculiarities of Russian education legislation and government quality control of academic education. This paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken by MEPhI and the US National Laboratories in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Energy, to develop the engineering degree program. Also discussed are the program’s specific training requirements, student internships, and job placement. The paper concludes with recommendations from a recent international seminar on nonproliferation education and training.

  7. Modeling of UF6 enrichment with gas centrifuges for nuclear safeguards activities

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mercurio, G.; Peerani, P.; Richir, P.; Janssens, W.; Eklund, G.

    2012-09-01

    The physical modeling of uranium isotopes (235U, 238U) separation process by centrifugation of is a key aspect for predicting the nuclear fuel enrichment plant performances under surveillance by the Nuclear Safeguards Authorities. In this paper are illustrated some aspects of the modeling of fast centrifuges for UF6 gas enrichment and of a typical cascade enrichment plant with the Theoretical Centrifuge and Cascade Simulator (TCCS). The background theory for reproducing the flow field characteristics of a centrifuge is derived from the work of Cohen [1] where the separation parameters are calculated using the solution of a differential enrichment equation. In our case we chose to solve the hydrodynamic equations for the motion of a compressible fluid in a centrifugal field using the Berman - Olander vertical velocity radial distribution [2] and the solution was obtained using the Matlab software tool [3]. The importance of a correct estimation of the centrifuge separation parameters at different flow regimes, lies in the possibility to estimate in a reliable way the U enrichment plant performances, once the separation external parameters are set (feed flow rate and feed, product and tails assays)[4]. Using the separation parameters of a single centrifuge allow to determine the performances of an entire cascade and, for this purpose; the software Simulink [3] was used. The outputs of the calculation are the concentrations (assays) and the flow rates of the enriched (product) and depleted (tails) gas mixture. These models represent a valid additional tool, in order to verify the compliance of the U enrichment plant operator declarations with the "on site" inspectors' measurements.

  8. The Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation Safeguards and Separations Reprocessing Plant Toolkit

    SciTech Connect

    McCaskey, Alex; Billings, Jay Jay; de Almeida, Valmor F

    2011-08-01

    This report details the progress made in the development of the Reprocessing Plant Toolkit (RPTk) for the DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program. RPTk is an ongoing development effort intended to provide users with an extensible, integrated, and scalable software framework for the modeling and simulation of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants by enabling the insertion and coupling of user-developed physicochemical modules of variable fidelity. The NEAMS Safeguards and Separations IPSC (SafeSeps) and the Enabling Computational Technologies (ECT) supporting program element have partnered to release an initial version of the RPTk with a focus on software usability and utility. RPTk implements a data flow architecture that is the source of the system's extensibility and scalability. Data flows through physicochemical modules sequentially, with each module importing data, evolving it, and exporting the updated data to the next downstream module. This is accomplished through various architectural abstractions designed to give RPTk true plug-and-play capabilities. A simple application of this architecture, as well as RPTk data flow and evolution, is demonstrated in Section 6 with an application consisting of two coupled physicochemical modules. The remaining sections describe this ongoing work in full, from system vision and design inception to full implementation. Section 3 describes the relevant software development processes used by the RPTk development team. These processes allow the team to manage system complexity and ensure stakeholder satisfaction. This section also details the work done on the RPTk ``black box'' and ``white box'' models, with a special focus on the separation of concerns between the RPTk user interface and application runtime. Section 4 and 5 discuss that application runtime component in more detail, and describe the dependencies, behavior, and rigorous testing of its constituent components.

  9. Modeling of UF{sub 6} enrichment with gas centrifuges for nuclear safeguards activities

    SciTech Connect

    Mercurio, G.; Peerani, P.; Richir, P.; Janssens, W.; Eklund, G.

    2012-09-26

    The physical modeling of uranium isotopes ({sup 235}U, {sup 238}U) separation process by centrifugation of is a key aspect for predicting the nuclear fuel enrichment plant performances under surveillance by the Nuclear Safeguards Authorities. In this paper are illustrated some aspects of the modeling of fast centrifuges for UF{sub 6} gas enrichment and of a typical cascade enrichment plant with the Theoretical Centrifuge and Cascade Simulator (TCCS). The background theory for reproducing the flow field characteristics of a centrifuge is derived from the work of Cohen where the separation parameters are calculated using the solution of a differential enrichment equation. In our case we chose to solve the hydrodynamic equations for the motion of a compressible fluid in a centrifugal field using the Berman - Olander vertical velocity radial distribution and the solution was obtained using the Matlab software tool. The importance of a correct estimation of the centrifuge separation parameters at different flow regimes, lies in the possibility to estimate in a reliable way the U enrichment plant performances, once the separation external parameters are set (feed flow rate and feed, product and tails assays). Using the separation parameters of a single centrifuge allow to determine the performances of an entire cascade and, for this purpose; the software Simulink was used. The outputs of the calculation are the concentrations (assays) and the flow rates of the enriched (product) and depleted (tails) gas mixture. These models represent a valid additional tool, in order to verify the compliance of the U enrichment plant operator declarations with the 'on site' inspectors' measurements.

  10. Development of Superconducting High-Resolution Gamma-Ray Spectrometers for Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dreyer, Jonathan Glen

    Superconducting high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers based on molybdenum/ copper transition edge sensors (TES) with tin absorbers have been developed for nuclear safeguard applications. This dissertation focuses on plutonium analysis, specifically the direct measurement of the 242Pu gamma-ray signature at 44.915 keV. As existing nondestructive analysis methods cannot directly measure this or any other 242Pu signature, the feasibility of making such a measurement using a TES based system is presented. Analysis from of Monte Carlo simulations and analytical noise models shows that the direct detection of this gamma-ray line of is possible and can be quantified in the presence of a 240Pu gamma-ray line with a line separation of 324 eV, even if the emission from the 240Pu is several orders of magnitude stronger. Spectroscopic measurements conducted in a liquid cryogen system offered an energy resolution of 180 eV, adequate for the measurement of 242Pu; however, TES operation in a liquid-cryogen-free pulse tube refrigerator degraded sensor performance such that this measurement was no longer possible. The numerical noise model indicates that the energy resolution of this device is adequate to demonstrate a direct measurement of 242Pu if the noise pickup from the mechanical cooler can be suppressed. This work shows that the precise measurement of low-intensity gamma-ray signatures, such as the 44.915 keV gamma ray from 242Pu, will require arrays of low-noise TES sensors and that such a system would offer invaluable information in the analysis of plutonium bearing materials.

  11. Spectroscopic methods of process monitoring for safeguards of used nuclear fuel separations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Warburton, Jamie Lee

    To support the demonstration of a more proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel processing plant, techniques and instrumentation to allow the real-time, online determination of special nuclear material concentrations in-process must be developed. An ideal materials accountability technique for proliferation resistance should provide nondestructive, realtime, on-line information of metal and ligand concentrations in separations streams without perturbing the process. UV-Visible spectroscopy can be adapted for this precise purpose in solvent extraction-based separations. The primary goal of this project is to understand fundamental URanium EXtraction (UREX) and Plutonium-URanium EXtraction (PUREX) reprocessing chemistry and corresponding UV-Visible spectroscopy for application in process monitoring for safeguards. By evaluating the impact of process conditions, such as acid concentration, metal concentration and flow rate, on the sensitivity of the UV-Visible detection system, the process-monitoring concept is developed from an advanced application of fundamental spectroscopy. Systematic benchtop-scale studies investigated the system relevant to UREX or PUREX type reprocessing systems, encompassing 0.01-1.26 M U and 0.01-8 M HNO3. A laboratory-scale TRansUranic Extraction (TRUEX) demonstration was performed and used both to analyze for potential online monitoring opportunities in the TRUEX process, and to provide the foundation for building and demonstrating a laboratory-scale UREX demonstration. The secondary goal of the project is to simulate a diversion scenario in UREX and successfully detect changes in metal concentration and solution chemistry in a counter current contactor system with a UV-Visible spectroscopic process monitor. UREX uses the same basic solvent extraction flowsheet as PUREX, but has a lower acid concentration throughout and adds acetohydroxamic acid (AHA) as a complexant/reductant to the feed solution to prevent the extraction of Pu. By examining

  12. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    SciTech Connect

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-06-23

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information.

  13. Spectroscopic On-Line Monitoring for Process Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Casella, Amanda J.; Peterson, James M.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Lines, Amanda M.; Thomas, Elizabeth M.

    2011-03-01

    The current book chapter presents preliminary work toward the use of spectroscopic on-line monitoring for process control and safeguarding of radiochemical streams. Raman spectroscopy was demonstrated as a method for determining U(VI), nitrate, and nitric acid, while visible-near-infrared (vis-NIR) spectroscopy was demonstrated as a method for determining Pu(IV), Np(V), U(VI) and Nd(III). This method has been established using fuel reprocessing solution stimulants under dynamic flow conditions and on commercial spent nuclear fuel samples. Partial least squares (PLS) models for each analyte were prepared, and the fits of the data presented. A brief review of literature relevant to the use of vibrational spectroscopy and physicochemical measurements for process monitoring of nuclear fuel solutions is reported.

  14. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Menlove, Howard O; Hori, Masato; Kawakubo, Yoko; Mcclelland - Kerr, J

    2009-01-01

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  15. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  16. An expanded safeguards role for the DOE safeguards analytical laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Bingham, C.D.

    1986-01-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is a Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) laboratory, with the mission to provide and maintain a nuclear material measurements and standards laboratory. The functional responsibilities of NBL serve as a technical response to the statutory responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE) to assure the safeguarding of nuclear materials. In the execution of its mission, NBL carries out activities in six safeguards-related programs: measurement development, measurement evaluation, measurement services, safeguards assessment, reference and calibration materials and site-specific assistance. These program activities have been implemented by NBL for many years; their relative emphases, however, have been changed recently to address the priorities defined by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Defense Programs (OSS/DP). As a consequence, NBL operations are in the ''mainstream'' of domestic safeguards activities. This expanded safeguards role for NBL is discussed in this paper.

  17. Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect

    Moses, David Lewis; Ehinger, Michael H

    2010-05-01

    Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant

  18. Emergency preparedness source term development for the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards-Licensed Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Sutter, S.L.; Mishima, J.; Ballinger, M.Y.; Lindsey, C.G.

    1984-08-01

    In order to establish requirements for emergency preparedness plans at facilities licensed by the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) needs to develop source terms (the amount of material made airborne) in accidents. These source terms are used to estimate the potential public doses from the events, which, in turn, will be used to judge whether emergency preparedness plans are needed for a particular type of facility. Pacific Northwest Laboratory is providing the NRC with source terms by developing several accident scenarios for eleven types of fuel cycle and by-product operations. Several scenarios are developed for each operation, leading to the identification of the maximum release considered for emergency preparedness planning (MREPP) scenario. The MREPP scenarios postulated were of three types: fire, tornado, and criticality. Fire was significant at oxide fuel fabrication, UF/sub 6/ production, radiopharmaceutical manufacturing, radiopharmacy, sealed source manufacturing, waste warehousing, and university research and development facilities. Tornadoes were MREPP events for uranium mills and plutonium contaminated facilities, and criticalities were significant at nonoxide fuel fabrication and nuclear research and development facilities. Techniques for adjusting the MREPP release to different facilities are also described.

  19. Ultra-high-resolution alpha spectrometry for nuclear forensics and safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Bacrania, Minesh K; Croce, Mark; Bond, Evelyn; Dry, Donald; Moody, W. Allen; Lamont, Stephen; Rabin, Michael; Rim, Jung; Smith, Audrey; Beall, James; Bennett, Douglas; Kotsubo, Vincent; Horansky, Robert; Hilton, Gene; Schmidt, Daniel; Ullom, Joel; Cantor, Robin

    2010-01-01

    We will present our work on the development of ultra-high-resolution detectors for alpha particle spectrometry. These detectors, based on superconducting transition-edge sensors, offer energy resolution that is five to ten times better than conventional silicon detectors. Using these microcalorimeter detectors, the isotopic composition of mixed-actinide samples can be determined rapidly without the need for actinide separation chemistry to isolate each element, or mass spectrometry to separate isotopic signatures that can not be resolved using traditional alpha spectrometry (e.g. Pu-239/Pu-240, or Pu-238/Am-241). This paper will cover the detector and measurement system, actinide source preparation, and the quantitative isotopic analysis of a number of forensics- and safeguards-relevant radioactive sources.

  20. Considerations for Possible Light Impact of Spent Nuclear Fuel for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    Brian K. Castle; Kelly D. Ellis

    2012-09-01

    This effort is designed to be a preliminary study to determine the appropriateness of lightly contacting SNF with zirconium-based cladding, in wet storage, for the purpose of taking safeguards measurements. Contact will likely consist of an initial impact followed by a light tensile load on the exterior surface of the SNF cladding. In the past, concerns have been raised that contacting SNF cladding could result in a loss of long-term mechanical integrity due to crack initiation, uncontrolled crack propagation, and a mechanical exfoliation of the protective oxide layer. The mechanical integrity concerns are addressed with an analytic model that evaluates the threshold impact limits for degraded, but undamaged SNF cladding. Aqueous corrosion concerns, associated with exfoliation of the protective oxide layer, are addressed with a qualitative argument, focusing on the possible corrosion mechanisms of zirconium-based cladding.

  1. IAEA safeguards in perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Eklund, S.

    1987-07-01

    A review of the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency from President Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace proposal through development of the IAEA safeguards approach in the official documents (The Statute, INFCIRC/66 and 153), and related initiators, such as the Nuclear Supplier State Agreement (INFCE/254), The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (1977-79), The Committee on Assurance and Supply, and the proposed International Plutonium Storage Regime. The accomplishments of IAEA safeguards are recognized as well as the continuing need for development and support.

  2. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of... area, vital area, or unauthorized barrier penetration (vehicle or personnel); tampering, bomb...

  3. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of... penetration (vehicle or personnel); tampering, bomb threats, or other threat warnings—either verbal, such...

  4. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of... penetration (vehicle or personnel); tampering, bomb threats, or other threat warnings—either verbal, such...

  5. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of... area, vital area, or unauthorized barrier penetration (vehicle or personnel); tampering, bomb...

  6. 10 CFR Appendix C to Part 73 - Nuclear Power Plant Safeguards Contingency Plans

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (The statement contained in 10 CFR 73.55(a) or subsequent... sabotage relating to special nuclear material or nuclear facilities licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of... penetration (vehicle or personnel); tampering, bomb threats, or other threat warnings—either verbal, such...

  7. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Crawford, Cary E.; de Boer, Gloria; De Castro, Kara; Landers, John; Rogers, Erin

    2010-10-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the “human factor.” Gen. Eugene Habiger, a former “Assistant Secretary for Safeguards and Security” at the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear-weapons complex and a former commander of U.S. strategic nuclear forces, has observed that “good security is 20% equipment and 80% people.”1 Although eliminating the “human factor” is not possible, accounting for and mitigating the risk of the insider threat is an essential element in establishing an effective nuclear security culture. This paper will consider the organizational role in mitigating the risk associated with the malicious insider through monitoring and enhancing human reliability and motivation as well as enhancing the nuclear security culture.

  8. Research and Development for Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Inman, Guy M.

    This report summarizes the results of unclassified research and development contracts in the field of peaceful use safeguards regarding the use of nuclear material. These summaries indicate there is really no sharp line of demarcation between research for safeguards and research for many other purposes. It includes areas of research effort and…

  9. Evaluation of MC&A Effectiveness and Its Contribution to the Safeguarding Of Nuclear Material with Assurance Assessments

    SciTech Connect

    Schlegel, Steven C.

    2007-07-10

    Safeguards and Security within the DOE complex has struggled with integrating MC&A and Physical Security together in a single model. Attempts were made to incorporate MC&A elements that provide detection into vulnerability assessments. While this approach has met with some success, it does not fully address the different contributions that each make to nuclear material protection. Protection measures that rely on the lack of alarms to imply all nuclear material is still present, in the correct location, and intended use are limited due to their passive nature. A highly effective system may provide confidence that all nuclear material is still present, but it does not provide assurance that it is there. MC&A, through active measures that confirm or verify the actual presence of nuclear material, provides assurance that all of the nuclear material is controlled and accounted for. This paper presents a model that combines the detection and assessment functions from vulnerability assessments with assurance activities provided by MC&A to provide an integrated model that can be used for evaluation of current systems, evaluation of system changes, and monitoring assurance in real time based upon operational activities. 1.0 OVERVIEW Material control and accounting (MC&A) and physical security provide complementary measures that can effectively protect nuclear material against the threats of theft, diversion, and sabotage. Tools have been introduced to evaluate and quantify the effectiveness of different protective measures and schemes, but the ability to fully model the contribution of MC&A to protection effectiveness has been limited. This is due, in part, by not fully recognizing that the two areas contribute differently, but not independently, to protection effectiveness. Physical protection provides detection, assessment, interruption, neutralization, and deterrence against a threat. Except for deterrence, mathematical models have been developed to quantify the

  10. NanoSIMS and Micro-Raman Spectroscopy applied to the Analysis of Uranium Oxyfluoride Particles for Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kips, R.; Kristo, M.; Crowhurst, J.; Stefaniak, E.; Hutcheon, I. D.

    2010-12-01

    Environmental swipe sampling is used by safeguards organizations to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Particulate material collected in environmental swipe samples is typically analyzed for its uranium isotopic composition. At enrichment facilities, these swipe samples often contain UO2F2 particles formed from the hydrolysis of uranium hexafluoride gas. Since UO2F2 particulate material has been found to be unstable with respect to the loss of fluorine (J.A. Carter et al. Task A.200.3 K/NSP-777, 1998) the measurement of the residual amount of fluorine has the potential of placing boundaries on the particle’s age and exposure history. To investigate the decomposition of UO2F2 and its potential applications in nuclear safeguards and nuclear forensics, a suite of micro-analytical tools was applied to a set of lab-synthesized UO2F2 particles. Samples were either stored in an inert atmosphere or exposed to different levels of humidity, temperature and light to identify those environmental conditions that accelerate the decomposition of UO2F2. Given the small size of the particles, secondary ion mass spectrometry with nanometer-scale spatial resolution (NanoSIMS) was used to measure the relative amount of fluorine. The elemental data from the NanoSIMS was complemented with micro-Raman spectroscopy for molecular fingerprinting. These measurements showed that even though the decomposition of UO2F2 generally happens very slowly, subtle differences can be distinguished depending on the environmental conditions to which they were exposed. The exposure to humidity was identified as the main factor accelerating the loss of fluorine in UO2F2 particles. Particles exposed to 30 % relative humidity and higher showed a decrease in the relative amount of fluorine and a shift of the UO22+ symmetric stretching frequency towards lower frequencies. These changes were attributed to an increase in hydration of the UO2F2 particles. This work was performed under the

  11. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect

    Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  12. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges,” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, “The Further Evolution of Safeguards,” noted: “It is clear that ‘safeguards culture

  13. Application of Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry to the determination of uranium isotope ratios in individual particles for nuclear safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhang, Xiao Zhi; Esaka, Fumitaka; Esaka, Konomi T.; Magara, Masaaki; Sakurai, Satoshi; Usuda, Shigekazu; Watanabe, Kazuo

    2007-10-01

    The capability of inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) for the determination of uranium isotope ratios in individual particles was determined. For this purpose, we developed an experimental procedure including single particle transfer with a manipulator, chemical dissolution and isotope ratio analysis, and applied to the analysis of individual uranium particles in certified reference materials (NBL CRM U050 and U350). As the result, the 235U/ 238U isotope ratio for the particle with the diameter between 0.5 and 3.9 μm was successfully determined with the deviation from the certified ratio within 1.8%. The relative standard deviation (R.S.D.) of the 235U/ 238U isotope ratio was within 4.2%. Although the analysis of 234U/ 238U and 236U/ 238U isotope ratios gave the results with inferior precision, the R.S.D. within 20% was possible for the measurement of the particle with the diameter more than 2.1 μm. The developed procedure was successfully applied to the analysis of a simulated environmental sample prepared from a mixture of indoor dust (NIST SRM 2583) and uranium particles (NBL CRM U050, U350 and U950a). From the results, the proposed procedure was found to be an alternative analytical tool for nuclear safeguards.

  14. Integration of Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development with UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Context and Challenges

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Essner, J

    2008-11-03

    On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), obliging States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. This mandate was extended an additional two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006) and an additional three years with the adoption of Resolution 1810 (2008). UNSCR 1540 is a key nonproliferation and counterterrorism tool that needs to be implemented well. Its obligations are a core part of nuclear infrastructure development.

  15. FURTHER ASSESSMENTS OF THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF MATERIALS IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES FROM A SAFEGUARDS PERSPECTIVE

    SciTech Connect

    Bathke, C. G.; Jarvinen, G. D.; Wallace, R. K.; Ireland, J. R.; Johnson, M. W.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Ebbinghaus, B. B.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2008-10-01

    This paper summarizes the results of an extension to an earlier study [ ] that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the PUREX, UREX+, and COEX reprocessing schemes. This study focuses on the materials associated with the UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study also examines what is required to render plutonium as “unattractive.” Furthermore, combining the results of this study with those from the earlier study permits a comparison of the uranium and thorium based fuel cycles on the basis of the attractiveness of the SNM associated with each fuel cycle. Both studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of “attractiveness levels” that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [ ]. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed.

  16. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... responsible for regulation and licensing of recycling technologies intended to reduce the amount of waste to... an appropriate regulatory framework, in recycling during development, demonstration, and deployment of new advanced recycling technologies that recycle nuclear fuel in a manner which does not...

  17. 10 CFR 1.42 - Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... responsible for regulation and licensing of recycling technologies intended to reduce the amount of waste to... an appropriate regulatory framework, in recycling during development, demonstration, and deployment of new advanced recycling technologies that recycle nuclear fuel in a manner which does not...

  18. A potential alternative/complement to the traditional thermal neutron based counting in Nuclear Safeguards and Security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chernikova, Dina; Naeem, Syed F.; Axell, Kåre; Trnjanin, Nermin; Nordlund, Anders

    2016-02-01

    A new concept for thermal neutron based correlation and multiplicity measurements is proposed in this paper. The main idea of the concept consists of using 2.223 MeV gammas (or 1.201 MeV, DE) originating in the 1 H (n , γ) 2 D-reaction instead of using traditional thermal neutron counting. Results of investigations presented in this paper indicate that gammas from thermal neutron capture reactions preserve the information about the correlation characteristics of thermal (fast) neutrons in the same time scale. Therefore, instead of thermal neutron detectors (or as a complement) one may use traditional and inexpensive gamma detectors, such as NaI, BGO, CdZnTe or any other gamma detector. In this work we used D8×8 cm2 NaI scintillator to test the concept. Thus, the new approach helps to address the problem of replacement of 3He-counters and problems related to the specific measurements of spent nuclear fuel directly in the spent fuel pool. It has a particular importance for Nuclear Safeguards and Security. Overall, this work represents the proof of concept study and reports on the experimental and numerical evidence that thermal neutron capture gammas may be used in the context of correlation and multiplicity measurements. Investigations were performed using a 252Cf-correlated neutron source and an 241Am-Be-random neutron source. The related idea of the Gamma Differential Die-Away approach is investigated numerically in this paper as well, and will be tested experimentally in future work.

  19. Developments in the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Engineering Degree Program at Tomsk Polytechnic University

    SciTech Connect

    Boiko, Vladimir I.; Demyanyuk, Dmitry G.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.

    2009-10-06

    Over the last six years, Tomsk Polytechnic University (TPU) has developed a 5½ year engineering degree program in the field of Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A). In 2009 the first students graduated with this new degree. There were 25 job offers from nuclear fuel cycle enterprises of Russia and Kazakhstan for 17 graduates of the program. Due to the rather wide selection of workplaces, all graduates have obtained positions at nuclear enterprises. The program was developed within the Applied Physics and Engineering Department (APED). The laboratory and methodological base has been created taking into consideration the experience of the similar program at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI). However, the TPU program has some distinguishing features such as the inclusion of special courses pertaining to fuel enrichment and reprocessing. During the last two years, three MPC&A laboratories have been established at APED. This was made possible due to several factors such as establishment of the State innovative educational program at TPU, assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy through Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the financial support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority and some Russian private companies. All three of the MPC&A laboratories are part of the Innovative Educational Center “Nuclear Technologies and Non-Proliferation,” which deals with many topics including research activities, development of new curricula for experts training and retraining, and training of master’s students. In 2008, TPU developed a relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which was familiarized with APED’s current resources and activities. The IAEA has shown interest in creation of a master’s degree educational program in the field of nuclear security at TPU. A future objective is to acquaint nuclear fuel cycle enterprises with new APED capabilities and involve the

  20. Approach for enhancing nuclear materials tracking and reporting in waste

    SciTech Connect

    Longmire, V. L.; Seitz, S. L.; Sinkule, B. J.

    2001-06-01

    Recent policy from the Department of Energy/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has identified the need to report nuclear materials in waste in a manner that is consistent with the Department of Energy's Nuclear Materials Information System (NMIS), which uses Form 471 as its official record. NMIS is used to track nuclear material inventories while they are subject to safeguards. This requirement necessitates the reevaluation of existing business practices that are used to track and report these nuclear materials. This paper provides a methodology for applying a systems approach to the evaluation of the flow of nuclear waste materials from a generating facility through to permanent disposal. This methodology can be used to integrate existing systems and leverage data already gathered that support both the waste reporting requirements and the NMIS requirements. In order to consider an active waste reporting system that covers waste management through to final disposal, the requirements for characterization, certification, and transportation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are used as an example. These requirements are found in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WIPP/WAC) and associated requirement documents. This approach will prevent inconsistencies in reported data and address current and future needs. For example, spent fuel (which the U.S. intends to dispose of as high-level waste) has not been viewed as particularly attractive in terms of proliferation in comparison to materials associated with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, collecting high-level waste (or some types of defense waste) in one location where it will be left for hundreds or thousands of years presents proliferation and safeguards issues that need to be considered as part of a systems evaluation. This paper brings together information on domestic and international safeguards practices and considers the current system of documentation used by the U

  1. Measurement of the 19F(α,n)22Na Cross Section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lowe, Marcus; Smith, M. S.; Pain, S.; Febbraro, M.; Pittman, S.; Chipps, K. A.; Thompson, S. J.; Grinder, M.; Grzywacz, R.; Smith, K.; Thornsberry, C.; Thompson, P.; Peters, W. A.; Waddell, D.; Blanchard, R.; Carls, A.; Shadrick, S.; Engelhardt, A.; Hertz-Kintish, D.; Allen, N.; Sims, H.

    2015-10-01

    Enriched uranium is commonly stored in fluoride matrices such as UF6. Alpha decays of uranium in UF6 will create neutrons via the 19F(α,n)22Na reaction. An improved cross section for this reaction will enable improved nondestructive assays of uranium content in storage cylinders at material enrichment facilities. To determine this reaction cross section, we have performed experiments using both forward and inverse kinematic techniques at the University of Notre Dame (forward) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (inverse). Both experiments utilized the Versatile Array of Neutron Detectors at Low Energy (VANDLE) for neutron detection. The ORNL experiment also used a new ionization chamber for 22Na particle identification. Gating on the 22Na nuclei detected drastically reduced the background counts in the neutron time-of-flight spectra. The latest analysis and results will be presented for 19F beam energies ranging from 20-37 MeV. This work is funded in part by the DOE Office of Nuclear Physics, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, and the NSF.

  2. Measured 19F(α,n) with VANDLE for Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peters, William; Clement, R. C. C.; Smith, M. S.; Pain, S.; Febbraro, M.; Pittman, S.; Thomspon, S.; Grinder, M.; Cizewski, J. A.; Reingold, C.; Manning, B.; Burcher, S.; Bardayan, D. W.; Tan, W.-P.; Stech, E.; Smith, M. K.; Avetisyan, R.; Gyurjinyan, A.; Lowe, M.; Ilyushkin, S.; Grzywacz, R.; Madurga, M.; Paulauskas, S. V.; Taylor, S. Z.; Smith, K.

    2015-10-01

    One of the most promising non-destructive assay (NDA) methods to monitor UF6 canisters consists of measuring gross neutron rates induced by uranium-decay alpha particles reacting with the fluorine and emitting a neutron. This method currently lacks reliable nuclear data on the 19F(α,n) reaction cross section to determine an accurate neutron yield rate for a given sample of UF6. We have measured the cross section and coincident neutron spectrum for the alpha-decay energy range using the VANDLE system. This experiment had two parts: first at Notre Dame with a LaF3 target and and a pulsed alpha-particle beam, and second at ORNL with a windowless He-gas target and a 19F beam. The motivation for this measurement and cross section results will be presented. This work is funded in part by the DOE Office of Science, the National Nuclear Security Administration SSAA and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, and the NSF.

  3. Active neutron methods for nuclear safeguards applications using Helium-4 gas scintillation detectors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lewis, Jason M.

    Active neutron methods use a neutron source to interrogate fissionable material. In this work a 4He gas scintillation fast neutron detection system is used to measure neutrons created by the interrogation. Three new applications of this method are developed: spent nuclear fuel assay, fission rate measurement, and special nuclear material detection. Three active neutron methods are included in this thesis. First a non-destructive plutonium assay technique called Multispectral Active Neutron Interrogation Analysis is developed. It is based on interrogating fuel with neutrons at several different energies. The induced fission rates at each interrogation energy are compared with results from a neutron transport model of the irradiation geometry in a system of equations to iteratively solve the inverse problem for isotopic composition. The model is shown to converge on the correct composition for a material with 3 different fissionable components, a representative neutron absorber, and any neutron transparent material such as oxygen in a variety of geometries. Next an experimental fission rate measurement technique is developed using 4He gas scintillation fast neutron detector. Several unique features of this detector allow it to detect and provide energy information on fast neutrons with excellent gamma discrimination efficiency. The detector can measure induced fission rate by energetically differentiating between interrogation neutrons and higher energy fission neutrons. The detector response to a mono-energetic deuterium-deuterium fusion neutron generator and a 252Cf source are compared to examine the difference in detected energy range. Finally we demonstrate a special nuclear material detection technique by detecting an unambiguous fission neutron signal produced in natural uranium during active neutron interrogation using a deuterium-deuterium neutron generator and a high pressure 4He gas fast neutron scintillation detector. Energy histograms resulting from this

  4. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  5. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-09-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future.

  6. Stretchable Polyurethane Sponge Scaffold Strengthened Shear Stiffening Polymer and Its Enhanced Safeguarding Performance.

    PubMed

    Wang, Sheng; Xuan, Shouhu; Wang, Yunpeng; Xu, Chenhui; Mao, Ya; Liu, Mei; Bai, Linfeng; Jiang, Wanquan; Gong, Xinglong

    2016-02-01

    A simple and scalable "dip and dry" method was developed for fabricating stretchable polyurethane sponge-based polymer composite with excellent shear stiffening effect, creep resisting and adhesion property. The stiffness of the composite was tunable, the storage modulus (G') could automatically increase 3 orders of magnitude with the increasing of shear frequency, and the G'max could reach to as high as 1.55 MPa. Importantly, the composite with ideal damping capacity reduced the impact force by 2 orders of magnitude even under 26 cycles of consecutive dynamic impact loading with no obvious mechanical degradation. Moreover, an enhancing mechanism was proposed and it was found the "B-O cross bond" and the entanglement of polymer chains were attributed to the shear stiffening characteristic. Finally, the excellent adhesion ability and hydrophobicity guarantee the composite with reliable mechanical performance and longer lifespan. PMID:26835703

  7. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  8. Measuring 19F(α,n) with VANDLE for Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peters, William; Clement, R. C. C.; Smith, M. S.; Pain, S. D.; Thompson, S.; Cizewski, J. A.; Reingold, C.; Manning, B.; Burcher, S.; Bardayan, D. W.; Tan, W.-P.; Stech, E.; Smith, M. K.; Smith, K.; Avetisyan, R.; Long, A.; Battaglia, A.; Marley, S.; Gyurjinyan, A.; Ilyushkin, S.; O'Malley, P. D.; Madurga, M.; Paulauskas, S. V.; Taylor, S.; Febbraro, M.

    2014-09-01

    UF6 is used in many parts of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, and various techniques are used by nonproliferation agencies to monitor and account for the material. One of the most promising non-destructive assay (NDA) methods consists of measuring gross neutron rates induced by uranium-decay alpha particles reacting with the fluorine and emitting a neutron. This method, however, currently lacks reliable nuclear data on the 19F(α,n) reaction cross section to determine an accurate neutron yield rate for a given sample of UF6. We have used the Versatile Array of Neutron Detectors at Low Energy (VANDLE) to measure the cross section and coincident neutron spectrum over an energy range pertinent to NDA in a two part experiment: First at Notre Dame with a LaF3 target and a pulsed alpha-particle beam, and second at ORNL with a windowless He-gas target and a 19F beam. The motivation for this measurement and preliminary results will be presented. UF6 is used in many parts of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, and various techniques are used by nonproliferation agencies to monitor and account for the material. One of the most promising non-destructive assay (NDA) methods consists of measuring gross neutron rates induced by uranium-decay alpha particles reacting with the fluorine and emitting a neutron. This method, however, currently lacks reliable nuclear data on the 19F(α,n) reaction cross section to determine an accurate neutron yield rate for a given sample of UF6. We have used the Versatile Array of Neutron Detectors at Low Energy (VANDLE) to measure the cross section and coincident neutron spectrum over an energy range pertinent to NDA in a two part experiment: First at Notre Dame with a LaF3 target and a pulsed alpha-particle beam, and second at ORNL with a windowless He-gas target and a 19F beam. The motivation for this measurement and preliminary results will be presented. This work is funded in part by NSF Grant 1068192, DOE Office of Science, and the NNSA Office of Defense Nuclear

  9. Development of uranium reference particles for nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation control

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kips, Ruth

    In the oversight of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and as part of the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency, environmental sampling has become an important tool for the detection of non-declared nuclear activities. One extensively developed technique in environmental sampling (ES) makes use of pieces of cotton cloth called swipes to wipe surfaces in and around a nuclear facility. The dust collected on these swipes typically contains micrometer-sized uranium particles with an isotopic composition characteristic for the processes at the inspected facility. Since its implementation in the 1990s, ES has proven to be a very effective tool in the detection of clandestine activities owing to a number of highly sensitive and selective techniques, including secondary ion mass spectrometry and thermal ionisation mass spectrometry. However, considering the potential consequences of the analyses, these measurements need to be subjected to a rigorous quality management system. In a continuous effort to improve the accuracy and detection efficiency of the uranium isotope ratio measurements, uranium particle reference materials are being developed by different research groups. It was concluded however, that the existing methods for the production of particulate reference materials generally do not reproduce the particles recovered from swipe samples. For this reason, we developed the aerosol deposition chamber at the Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements for the production of reference uranium particles that are representative of the particles collected at enrichment facilities. This method is based on the controlled hydrolysis of milligram amounts of uranium hexafluoride with a certified uranium isotopic composition. After optimization of the experimental set-up, the particles produced by the aerosol deposition chamber were characterized by scanning electron microscopy, transmission electron microscopy, micro-Raman spectroscopy and

  10. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N; Boyer, Brian D; Leitch, Rosalyn M

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  11. SAFEGUARDS CULTURE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT MATTER?

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-11-01

    The concepts of safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the authors have attempted a rigorous analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, with the goal of determining its value to the international safeguards community, and to provide recommendations as to whether the concept deserves further development. As part of this analysis, the authors explore the distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance. The authors also discuss synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture.

  12. Overview of enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.; Wheeler, L.E.

    1982-01-01

    The relationship of enrichment plant safeguards to US nonproliferation objectives and to the operation and management of enrichment facilities is reviewed. During the review, the major components of both domestic and international safeguards systems for enrichment plants are discussed. In discussing domestic safeguards systems, examples of the technology currently in use to support nuclear materials accountability are described including the measurement methods, procedures and equipment used for weighing, sampling, chemical and isotopic analyses and nondestructive assay techniques. Also discussed is how the information obtained as part of the nuclear material accountancy task is useful to enrichment plant operations. International material accountancy verification and containment/surveillance concepts for enrichment plants are discussed, and the technologies presently being developed for international safeguards in enrichment plants are identified and the current development status is reported.

  13. Preliminary Study of the Efficacy of Using Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence with Quasi-Monoenergetic Gamma-Ray Sources for Nuclear Safeguards Assay

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M S; McNabb, D P; Hall, J M; Gonzalez, J J

    2011-02-17

    We have studied the efficacy of using nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF)-based techniques to assay spent nuclear fuel for Pu content using quasi-monoenergetic sources. We have developed two techniques to precisely determine the Pu content in a fuel rod/pin. One of our approaches is virtually free of systematic uncertainties. Using analytical models, we have determined the amount of time required to measure the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel rods and spent fuel assemblies to within 1% precision. We note that Pu content can be determined in a fuel assembly about as fast as in a single fuel pin. The performance of NRF-based assay techniques with improved photon sources, which are currently under development, will also estimated. For follow-on research we propose to: (1) Construct research prototype detection systems for both of the NRF-based assay systems proposed in this paper and measure their calibration curves; (2) Determine the systematic errors associated with both assay methods, explore ways to reduce the errors and fold the results into future performance calculations; (3) Develop an algorithm to assay a fuel assembly; (4) Perform validation measurements using a single pin and scaled assemblies; (5) Research and develop current-mode detection and/or threshold detection techniques to improve assay times; (6) Characterize the flux of newly constructed sources and fold the results into the calculations presented here to determine the feasibility of a variety of proposed sources; and (7) Collaborate with others in the safeguards community to build a prototype system and perform an NRF-based assay demonstration on spent fuel.

  14. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  15. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  16. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  17. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, James W

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  18. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bates, Bruce E; Chesser, Joel B; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J Michael

    2009-12-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant

  19. Polyatomic interferences on high precision uranium isotope ratio measurements by MC-ICP-MS: Applications to environmental sampling for nuclear safeguards

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Pollington, Anthony D.; Kinman, William S.; Hanson, Susan K.; Steiner, Robert E.

    2015-09-04

    Modern mass spectrometry and separation techniques have made measurement of major uranium isotope ratios a routine task; however accurate and precise measurement of the minor uranium isotopes remains a challenge as sample size decreases. One particular challenge is the presence of isobaric interferences and their impact on the accuracy of minor isotope 234U and 236U measurements. Furthermore, we present techniques used for routine U isotopic analysis of environmental nuclear safeguards samples and evaluate polyatomic interferences that negatively impact accuracy as well as methods to mitigate their impacts.

  20. Polyatomic interferences on high precision uranium isotope ratio measurements by MC-ICP-MS: Applications to environmental sampling for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pollington, Anthony D.; Kinman, William S.; Hanson, Susan K.; Steiner, Robert E.

    2015-09-04

    Modern mass spectrometry and separation techniques have made measurement of major uranium isotope ratios a routine task; however accurate and precise measurement of the minor uranium isotopes remains a challenge as sample size decreases. One particular challenge is the presence of isobaric interferences and their impact on the accuracy of minor isotope 234U and 236U measurements. Furthermore, we present techniques used for routine U isotopic analysis of environmental nuclear safeguards samples and evaluate polyatomic interferences that negatively impact accuracy as well as methods to mitigate their impacts.

  1. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; David Hebditch; Jim Morgan; Bruce Meppen; Scott DeMuth; Michael Ehinger; John Hockert

    2008-07-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into

  2. Annual Report FY2013-- A Kinematically Complete, Interdisciplinary, and Co-Institutional Measurement of the 19F(α,n) Cross-section for Nuclear Safeguards Science

    SciTech Connect

    Peters, William A; Smith, Michael Scott; Clement, Ryan; Tan, Wanpeng; Stech, Ed; Cizewski, J A; Febbraro, Michael; Madurga Flores, Miguel

    2013-10-01

    The goal of this proposal is to enable neutron detection for precision Non-Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. Neutrons are continuously generated from a UFx matrix in a container or sample as a result of the interaction of alpha particles from uranium-decay α particles with fluorine nuclei in the matrix. Neutrons from 19F(α,n)22Na were once considered a poorly characterized background for assays of UFx samples via 238U spontaneous fission neutron detection [SMI2010B]. However, the yield of decay-α-driven neutrons is critical for 234,235U LEU and HEU assays, as it can used to determine both the total amount of uranium and the enrichment [BER2010]. This approach can be extremely valuable in a variety of safeguard applications, such as cylinder monitoring in underground uranium storage facilities, nuclear criticality safety studies, nuclear materials accounting, and other nonproliferation applications. The success of neutron-based assays critically depends on an accurate knowledge of the cross section of the (α,n) reaction that generates the neutrons. The 40% uncertainty in the 19F(α,n)22Na cross section currently limits the precision of such assays, and has been identified as a key factor in preventing accurate enrichment determinations [CRO2003]. The need for higher quality cross section data for (α,n) reactions has been a recurring conclusion in reviews of the nuclear data needs to support safeguards. The overarching goal of this project is to enable neutron detection to be used for precision Non- Destructive Assays (NDAs) of actinide-fluoride samples. This will significantly advance safeguards verification at existing declared facilities, nuclear materials accounting, process control, nuclear criticality safety monitoring, and a variety of other nonproliferation applications. To reach this goal, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Rutgers University (RU), and the University of Notre

  3. The origin of international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The evolution of international safeguards from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1946 through implementation of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in the 1970's with attention to the political considerations and evolving nuclear activities which influenced this development. Specific steps discussed include: the U.S. proposal for an International Atomic Energy Authority, presented by Bernard Baruch in 1946, President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal in 1953, discussions leading to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, adopted in 1957, and the formal definitions of IAEA safeguards in the documents INFCIRC/26, 66 and 153 in 1962, 1966, and 1970, respectively.

  4. The Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. A discussion of the Safeguards Evaluation Method is presented in this paper.

  5. Progress and goals for INMM ASC N15 consensus standard ""Administrative practices for the determination and reporting of results of non-destructive assay measurements of nuclear material in situ for safeguards nuclear criticality safety and other purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Bracken, David S; Lamb, Frank W

    2009-01-01

    This paper will discuss the goals and progress to date on the development of INMM Accredited Standard Committee (ASC) N15 consensus standard Administrative Practices for the Determination and Reporting of Results of Non-Destructive Assay Measurements of Nuclear Material in situ for Safeguards, Nuclear Criticality Safety, and Other Purposes. This standard will define administrative practices in the areas of data generation and reporting of NDA assay of holdup deposits with consideration of the stakeholders of the reported results. These stakeholders may include nuclear material accounting and safeguards, nuclear criticality safety, waste management, health physics, facility characterization, authorization basis, radiation safety, and site licensing authorities. Stakeholder input will be solicited from interested parties and incorporated during the development of the document. Currently only one consensus standard exists that explicitly deals with NDA holdup measurements: ASTM C1455 Standard Test Method for Nondestructive Assay of Special Nuclear Material Holdup Using Gamma-Ray Spectroscopic Methods. The ASTM International standard emphasizes the activities involved in actually making measurements, and was developed by safeguards and NDA experts. This new INMM ASC N15 standard will complement the existing ASTM international standard. One of the largest driving factors for writing this new standard was the recent emphasis on in situ NDA measurements by the safeguards community due to the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB) recommendation 2007-1 on in situ NDA measurements. Specifically, DNFSB recommendation 2007-1 referenced the lack of programmatic requirements for accurate in situ measurements and the use of measurement results for compliance with safety based requirements. That being the case, this paper will also discuss the progress made on the Implementation Plan for Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1 Safety-Related In Situ

  6. 10 CFR 1.13 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 1.13 Section 1.13 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL INFORMATION Headquarters Panels, Boards, and Committees § 1.13 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) was...

  7. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  8. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Austrailian perceptions

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.; Carlson, J.; Hill, J.

    1994-12-31

    Iraq`s nuclear weapons development program used facilities and nuclear material separate from its safeguarded activities. To detect such a strategy the IAEA`s safeguards inspectors need access to locations and information beyond that foreseen in NPT safeguards agreements. But the IAEA is short of money. And detecting undeclared activities could be expensive. If the IAEA can establish a capability to detect undeclared activities, then it might be able to save on regular safeguards. But it`s important not to put the cart before the horse - effective safeguards must come first, savings second.

  9. Operational experience of ultrasonic sealing bolts for safeguard containment of multi-element bottles in British Nuclear Fuel`s THORP spent fuel storage ponds

    SciTech Connect

    Hatt, C.D.; Reynolds, A.F.; Jeffrey, A.; DeTourbet, P.; D`Agraives, B.; Toornvliet, J.; Wilt, B.

    1995-12-31

    Following verification of the presence of Light Water Reactor fuel stored in multi-element bottles (MEBs), in British Nuclear Fuel`s (BNFL), Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) fuel storage pond by Euratom and the IAEA, one lid bolt is replaced by an Ultrasonic Sealing Bolt. This safeguards seal, developed by Euratom`s Joint Research Centre at Ispra, Italy, has been field tested at Sellafield over several years and applied.in volume since 1994. The use of sealing bolts and video surveillance provides dual containment/surveillance on the THORP storage ponds, and brings significant savings in time and hence cost to the operator at the annual inventory verification. Time savings of up to 80% are achievable compared to fuel verification using a collimated gamma detector.

  10. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  11. Safeguarding Porpoises

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    1997-01-01

    The NetMark 1000 by the Dukane Corporation, used to safeguard porpoises from net entanglement, employs technology developed in the late 1960s by NASA engineers at the Langley Research Center. It is based on an underwater location aid, able to withstand high impact, then emit multidirectional signals for hours on end, originally used in the retrieval of NASA payloads following watery touch-downs on Earth. Dukane and Burnett Electronics later obtained a license from NASA, further improving on the beacon design. In a large scale experiment off the coast of New Hampshire in autumn of 1994, it was found that the use of acoustic alarms appears to hold considerable promise in reducing the number of harbor porpoises killed in the sink gill nets in the Gulf of Maine. Dukane has sold well over 100,000 units. Applications of the pinger are also expanding to other animal species.

  12. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Thomas L.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  13. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    SciTech Connect

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP.

  14. U.S./Russian cooperative efforts to enhance nuclear MPC&A at VNIITF, (Chelyabinsk-70)

    SciTech Connect

    Abramson, B; Apt, K; Blasy, J; Bukin, D; Churikov, Y; Eras, A; Magda, E; Neymotin, L; Schultz, F; Slankas, T; Tsygankov, G; Zuev, V

    1998-09-01

    The All Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF) is one of the major sites in the nuclear weapons complex in Russia. The site contains a number of research facilities which use nuclear material as well as assembly, disassembly, and testing of prototypes (pilot samples) of nuclear weapons. VNIITF also has ties to the major nuclear materials production facilities in the Urals region of Russia. The objective of the U.S./Russian Materials Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) cooperative program between the US Department of Energy and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Eneryy, at VNIITF is to improve the protection and accountability of nuclear material at VNIITF. Enhanced safeguards systems have been implemented at a reactor test area called the Pulse Research Reactor Facility (PRR) in Area 20. The area contains three pulse reactors with associated storage areas. The integrated MPC&A system at the PRR was demonstrated to US and Russian audiences in May, 1998. Expansion of work into several new facilities is underway both in Area 20 and at other locations. These include processing and production facilities some of which are considered sensitive facilities, by the Russian side. Methods have been developed to assure that work is done as agreed without actually having access to the buildings. C-70 has developed an extensive computerized system which integrates the physical security alarm station with elements of the nuclear material control system. Under the MPC&A program, the existing systems have been augmented with Russian and US technologies. This paper will describe the work completed at the PRR, and the on-going activities and cooperative effort between the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Sandia, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Brookhaven US Department of Energy National Laboratories in support of VNIITF.

  15. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic features, among others. The SBD process is unlikely to be broadly applied in the absence of formal requirements to do so, or compelling evidence of its value. Neither exists today. A formal instrument to require the application of SBD is needed and would vary according to both the national and regulatory environment. Several possible approaches to implementation of the requirements within the DOE framework are explored in this report. Finally, there are numerous barriers to the implementation of SBD, including the lack of a strong safeguards culture, intellectual property concerns, the sensitive nature of safeguards information, and the potentially divergent or conflicting interests of participants in the process. In terms of SBD implementation in the United States, there are no commercial nuclear facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Efforts to institutionalize SBD must address these issues. Specific work in FY09 could focus on the following: finalizing the proposed SBD process for use by DOE and performing a pilot application on a DOE project in the planning phase; developing regulatory options for mandating SBD; further development of safeguards-related design guidance, principles and requirements; development of a specific SBD process tailored to the NRC environment; and development of an engagement strategy for the IAEA and other international partners.

  16. Gas centrifuge enrichment plants inspection frequency and remote monitoring issues for advanced safeguards implementation

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Reimold, Benjamin A; Ward, Steven L; Howell, John

    2010-09-13

    Current safeguards approaches used by the IAEA at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect high enriched uranium (BEU) production with adequate probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared cylinders of uranium hexafluoride that are used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of how possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive analysis (DA) of samples could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We have also studied a few advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation and the level of performance needed from these systems to provide more effective safeguards. The analysis also considers how short notice random inspections, unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear material when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems. We also explore the effects of system failures and operator tampering on meeting safeguards goals for quantity and timeliness and the measures needed to recover from such failures and anomalies.

  17. Improved safeguards and security of a national resource

    SciTech Connect

    Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Rinard, P.M.; Metzler, J.F.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-07-01

    Initiatives by the President and the Secretary of Energy to reduce the quantity of nuclear materials in the nation`s strategic reserve are increasing the quantity of materials to be held in long-term storage until a final disposition option is imposed. These excess materials will be available for third-party inspection and verification to provide assurance that declared materials are not being diverted for weapons production. These protection systems must be capable of detecting unauthorized attempts to gain access to or control of the materials and information. Facility designs can incorporate new concepts and techniques that will minimize impact on operations and significantly reduce lifetime operational and infrastructure costs from safeguards and security requirements. The safeguards and security systems will be coupled with other facility systems such as safety, emergency preparedness, and process control to enhance public, worker, and environmental protection; protect nuclear materials, related information, and technology; and mitigate or prevent accidents and sabotage involving the nuclear materials. This paper will discuss the application of proven, state-of-the-art safeguards, physical security, computer/information security, and materials assay systems that can be combined to provide a cost-effective, efficient means for monitoring and protecting these materials.

  18. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, N.

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  19. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  20. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  1. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper S. E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  2. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  3. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  4. Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

    SciTech Connect

    Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-20

    Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions.

  5. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  6. Evaluation of an integrated approach to safeguards regulations. Volume 1

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1981-03-01

    This study investigates advantages and disadvantages of an integrated approach to safeguards regulation. We define integrated safeguards regulation as a single, performance-oriented rule governing the performance of both the physical protection (PP) and material control and accounting (MC and A) systems at licensed nuclear fuel-cycle facilities. The study produced a systematic framework for NRC to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of an integrated approach. Within this framework, we consider the effects of integration on NRC, on licensed facilities and on the public. We present several specific examples of how integrated safeguards could be implemented at licensed facilities. Some of these examples are analyzed quantitatively using the Aggregated Systems Model (ASM) to show how safeguards performance could improve with integrated safeguards. The ASM uses an integrated approach to safeguards evaluation by ''giving credit'' for the contribution of both PP and MC and A performance in achieving safeguards goals. 12 refs., 11 figs.

  7. Neutron flux from a 14-MeV neutron generator with tungsten filter for research in NDA methods for nuclear safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Rennhofer, H.; Pedersen, B.; Crochemore, J.-M.

    2009-12-02

    The Joint Research Centre has taken into operation a new experimental device designed for research in the fields of nuclear safeguards and security applications. The research projects currently undertaken include detection of shielded contraband materials, detection of fissile materials, and mass determination of small fissile materials in shielded containers. The device, called the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA), incorporates a pulsed 14-MeV (D-T) neutron generator and a large graphite mantle surrounding the sample cavity. By pulsing the neutron generator with a frequency in the range of 10 to 150 Hz, a sample may be interrogated first by fast neutrons and a few hundred micro-seconds later by a pure thermal neutron flux. The permanent detection systems incorporated in PUNITA include {sup 3}He neutrons detectors, HPGe gamma detectors, and lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors.We have studied the effects of placing a tungsten liner around the neutron generator target. The 14-MeV neutrons induce (n, 2n) and (n, 3n) reactions. In addition the mean neutron energy emitted from generator/tungsten assembly is reduced to about 1 MeV. Both of these effects increase the thermal neutron flux in the sample cavity. The paper describes the observed advantages of the tungsten liner with respect to increase in thermal flux, and better shielding capabilities of the nearby gamma and neutron detectors.

  8. Characterization of the neutron source term and multiplicity of a spent fuel assembly in support of NSDA safeguards of spent nuclear fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Richard, Joshua G; Fensin, Michael L; Tobin, Stephen J; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Menlove, Howard O; Baciak, James

    2010-01-01

    The gross neutron signal (GNS) is being considered as part of a fingerprinting or neutron balance approach to safeguards of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Because the GNS is composed of many derivative components, understanding the time-dependent contribution of these derivative components is crucial to gauging the limitations of these approaches. The major components of the GNS are ({alpha}, n), spontaneous fission (SF), and multiplication neutrons. A methodology was developed to link MCNPX burnup output files to SOURCES4C input files for the purpose of automatically generating both the ({alpha}, n) and SF signals. Additional linking capabilities were developed to write MCNPX multiplication input files using the data obtained from the SOURCES4C output files. In this paper, the following are presented: (1) the relative contributions by source nuclide to the ({alpha}, n) signal as a function of initial enrichment/burnup/cooling time; (2) the relative contributions by source nuclide to the SF signal as a function of initial enrichment/burnup/cooling time; (3) the relative contributions by reaction type ({alpha},n vs. SF) to the GNS; and (4) the multiplication of the GNS as a function of initial enrichment/burnup/cooling time/counting environment. By developing these technologies to characterize the GNS, we can better evaluate the viability of the GNS fingerprint and neutron balance concepts for SNF.

  9. Safeguarding inheritance and enhancing the resilience of orphaned young people living in child- and youth-headed households in Tanzania and Uganda.

    PubMed

    Evans, Ruth

    2012-10-01

    This article explores the resilience of orphaned young people in safeguarding physical assets (land and property) inherited from their parents and sustaining their households without a co-resident adult relative. Drawing on the concept of resilience and the sustainable livelihoods framework, the article analyses the findings of an exploratory study conducted in 2008-2009 in Tanzania and Uganda with 15 orphaned young people heading households, 18 of their siblings, and 39 NGO workers and community members. The findings suggest that inherited land and property were key determining factors in the formation and viability of the child- and youth-headed households in both rural and urban areas. Despite experiences of stigma and marginalisation in the community, social networks were crucial in enabling the young people to protect themselves and their property, providing access to material and emotional resources, and enhancing their skills and capabilities to develop sustainable livelihoods. Support for child- and youth-headed households needs to recognise young people's agency and should adopt a holistic approach to their lives by analysing the physical assets, material resources, and human and social capital available to the household, as well as giving consideration to individual young people's wellbeing, outlook and aspirations. Alongside cash transfers and material support, youth-led collective mobilisation that is sustained over time may also help build resilience and foster supportive social environments in order to challenge property-grabbing and the stigmatisation of child- and youth-headed households. PMID:25860094

  10. Spectroscopic On-Line Monitoring for Process Control and Safeguarding of Radiochemical Streams in Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Casella, Amanda J.; Peterson, James M.; Johnsen, Amanda M.; Lines, Amanda M.; Thomas, Elizabeth M.

    2011-02-24

    There is a renewed interest worldwide to promote the use of nuclear power. The long term successful use of nuclear power is critically dependent upon adequate and safe processing and disposition of the spent nuclear fuel. Liquid-liquid extraction is a separation technique commonly employed for the processing of the dissolved spent nuclear fuel. Our approach is based on the prerequisite that real time monitoring of the solvent extraction flowsheets provides unique capability to quickly detect unwanted manipulations with fissile isotopes present in the radiochemical streams during reprocessing activities. Our ability to identify material intentionally diverted from a liquid-liquid solvent extraction contactor system was successfully tested using on-line process monitoring. A chemical diversion and detection from a solvent extraction scheme was demonstrated using a centrifugal contactor system operating with the simulant PUREX extraction system of Nd(NO3)3/nitric acid aqueous phase and TBP/dodecane organic phase. A portion of the feed from a counter-current extraction system was diverted while a continuous extraction experiment was underway; the spectroscopic on-line process monitoring system was simultaneously measuring the feed, raffinate and organic products streams. The amount observed to be diverted by on-line spectroscopic process monitoring was in excellent agreement with values based from known mass of sample directly taken (diverted) from system feed solution. We conclude that real-time spectroscopic process monitoring would be a useful tool for the IAEA to detect the diversion of nuclear material in a timely manner. This poster summarizes our methodology of on-line process monitoring and shows recent results of specific examples.

  11. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  12. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  13. Results of regulatory impact survey of industrial and medical materials licensees of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Lach, D.; Melber, B.; Brichoux, J.; Hattrup, M.; Conger, R.; Hughes, K.

    1995-06-01

    This report presents the findings of a regulatory impact survey of nuclear materials licensees of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Commissioners of the NRC directed staff to provide the Commission with first hand information from licensees that could be used to improve the overall regulatory program. A self-administered, mail-out survey questionnaire was used to collect data from a sample of licensees who had interaction with the NRC during the previous 12 months. A total of 371 respondents of the 589 who were sent questionnaires returned completed surveys, for a response rate of 63%. The body of the report presents the findings of the survey including a brief introduction to the approach used, followed by survey findings regarding regulations, policies and regulatory guidance; experience with licensing applications, renewals and amendments; inspections; reporting requirements; and enforcement actions. The appendices of the report include a copy of the survey as administered to licensees, a fuller description of the survey design and data collection methods, and detailed graphic material describing survey responses.

  14. Safeguards instrumentation: past, present, future

    SciTech Connect

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    Instruments are essential for accounting, for surveillance and for protection of nuclear materials. The development and application of such instrumentation is reviewed, with special attention to international safeguards applications. Active and passive nondestructive assay techniques are some 25 years of age. The important advances have been in learning how to use them effectively for specific applications, accompanied by major advances in radiation detectors, electronics, and, more recently, in mini-computers. The progress in seals has been disappointingly slow. Surveillance cameras have been widely used for many applications other than safeguards. The revolution in TV technology will have important implications. More sophisticated containment/surveillance equipment is being developed but has yet to be exploited. On the basis of this history, some expectations for instrumentation in the near future are presented.

  15. Safeguarding vulnerable adults.

    PubMed

    Griffith, Richard

    Nurses have a professional duty to safeguard vulnerable adults from abuse under the provisions of the Nursing and Midwifery Council's (NMC) revised Code (2015). With adult abuse continuing to increase, all members of the nursing team are well placed to identify and take action to safeguard the vulnerable. This article sets out how the Care Act 2014 seeks to improve the safeguarding of vulnerable adults and the role of nurses in that process. PMID:26153813

  16. Development of analytical techniques for ultra trace amounts of nuclear materials in environmental samples using ICP-MS for safeguards

    PubMed

    Magara; Hanzawa; Esaka; Miyamoto; Yasuda; Watanabe; Usuda; Nishimura; Adachi

    2000-07-01

    The authors have begun to develop analytical techniques for ultra trace amounts of nuclear materials and to prepare a clean chemistry laboratory for environmental sample analyses. The analytical techniques include bulk and particle analyses. For the bulk analysis, concentrations and isotopic ratios of U and/or Pu are determined by inductively-coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) and thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS). In the particle analysis, isotopic ratios of U and/or Pu in each particle will be measured by secondary ion mass spectrometry (SIMS). This paper reports on the outline for the development of analytical techniques and the current situation of the development of the bulk analysis using ICP-MS is described. PMID:10879843

  17. Violence: Safeguarding Our Children.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Our Children, 1995

    1995-01-01

    This adaptation of the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA) booklet "Safeguarding Your Children" discusses cooperative efforts of communities, schools, and homes to protect children from violence. (SM)

  18. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  19. Enhanced Nuclear Magnetism: Some Novel Features and Prospective Experiments

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Abragam, A.; Bleaney, B.

    1983-06-01

    This review of enhanced nuclear magnetism discusses a number of features not previously considered, with special reference to new experiments that use dynamic methods to produce high nuclear polarization, followed by adiabatic demagnetization in the rotating frame (a.d.r.f.) to produce nuclear ordered states that may be investigated by the scattering of beams of neutrons. Section 2. The 'enhancement' of the nuclear moment arises from the electronic magnetization M_I induced through the hyperfine interaction. It is shown that the spatial distribution of M_I is the same as that of M_H, the Van Vleck magnetization induced by an external field, provided that J is a good quantum number. The spatial distributions are not in general the same in Russell-Saunders coupling, e.g. in the 3d group. Section 3. The Bloch equations are extended to include anisotropic nuclear moments. Section 4. The 'truncated' spin Hamiltonian is derived for spin-spin interaction between enhanced moments. Section 5. A general cancellation theorem for second-order processes in spin-lattice relaxation is derived, showing that the intrinsic direct process must be of third order. The relaxation rate obeys an equation similar to that for Kramers electronic ions, but reduced as the fifth power of the resonance frequencies. The relaxation rates observed experimentally (except in very high fields) are ascribed to paramagnetic impurities, so that these can be used to produce dynamic nuclear polarization (d.n.p.). Section 6. The interactions of neutrons with the true nuclear moment μ_I, the Van Vleck moment M_H, the 'pseudonuclear' moment M_I and the 'pseudomagnetic' nuclear moment μ *_I are discussed. It is shown that the four contributions can be observed separately by measurement of the form factor for neutron scattering as a function of temperature and direction of the applied magnetic field. Precession of the neutron spin in the 'pseudomagnetic' field H* is discussed with reference to the case of Ho

  20. 10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining...

  1. 10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security...

  2. 10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining...

  3. 10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security...

  4. 10 CFR 1304.114 - Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. 1304.114 Section 1304.114 Energy NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REVIEW BOARD PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 § 1304.114 Responsibility for maintaining adequate safeguards. The Board has the responsibility for maintaining...

  5. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill; William Charlton; Robert Bean

    2008-07-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

  6. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    SciTech Connect

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  7. Evolution of Safeguards over Time: Past, Present, and Projected Facilities, Material, and Budget

    SciTech Connect

    Kollar, Lenka; Mathews, Caroline E.

    2009-07-01

    This study examines the past trends and evolution of safeguards over time and projects growth through 2030. The report documents the amount of nuclear material and facilities under safeguards from 1970 until present, along with the corresponding budget. Estimates for the future amount of facilities and material under safeguards are made according to non-nuclear-weapons states’ (NNWS) plans to build more nuclear capacity and sustain current nuclear infrastructure. Since nuclear energy is seen as a clean and economic option for base load electric power, many countries are seeking to either expand their current nuclear infrastructure, or introduce nuclear power. In order to feed new nuclear power plants and sustain existing ones, more nuclear facilities will need to be built, and thus more nuclear material will be introduced into the safeguards system. The projections in this study conclude that a zero real growth scenario for the IAEA safeguards budget will result in large resource gaps in the near future.

  8. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - Destructive Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13

    The U.S. Support Program (USSP) to IAEA Safeguards priority of destructive analysis is aimed at strengthening the IAEA's ability to use destructive analysis as a safeguards tool. IAEA inspectors bring back nuclear and environmental samples from inspections, which are first cataloged by the IAEA and then analyzed by a network of laboratories located in many Member States and the IAEA's own Safeguards Analytical Laboratory in Seibersdorf, Austria. Historically, the USSP was instrumental in introducing environmental sampling techniques to the IAEA in order to enhance its understanding of material processing activities conducted at nuclear facilities. The USSP has also worked with the IAEA to improve understanding of measurement uncertainty and measurement quality, incorporate new and improved analytical methods, and purchase analytical and computer equipment. Recent activities include a temporary increase in analysis of environmental samples using secondary ion mass spectrometry and provision of a cost-free expert to restore secondary ion mass spectroscopy laboratory functionality and to modernize the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory Information System.

  9. AN APPROACH FOR ENHANCING NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRACKING AND REPORTING IN WASTE

    SciTech Connect

    V. L. LONGMIRE; S. L. SEITZ; B. J. SINKULE

    2001-06-01

    Recent policy from the Department of Energy/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has identified the need to report nuclear materials in waste in a manner that is consistent with the Department of Energy's Nuclear Materials Information System (NMIS), which uses Form 471 as its official record. NMIS is used to track nuclear material inventories while they are subject to safeguards. This requirement necessitates the reevaluation of existing business practices that are used to track and report these nuclear materials. This paper provides a methodology for applying a systems approach to the evaluation of the flow of nuclear waste materials from a generating facility through to permanent disposal. This methodology can be used to integrate existing systems and leverage data already gathered that support both the waste reporting requirements and the NMIS requirements. In order to consider an active waste reporting system that covers waste management through to final disposal, the requirements for characterization, certification, and transportation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are used as an example. These requirements are found in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WIPP/WAC) and associated requirement documents. This approach will prevent inconsistencies in reported data and address current and future needs. For example, spent fuel (which the U.S. intends to dispose of as high-level waste) has not been viewed as particularly attractive in terms of proliferation in comparison to materials associated with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, collecting high-level waste (or some types of defense waste) in one location where it will be left for hundreds or thousands of years presents proliferation and safeguards issues that need to be considered as part of a systems evaluation. This paper brings together information on domestic and international safeguards practices and considers the current system of documentation used by the U

  10. 75 FR 65038 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-21

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings Background This notice describes...'s) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act... Federal Register Notice, care of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear...

  11. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility.

  12. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    SciTech Connect

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs.

  13. Safeguards Professional Development Opportunities

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V

    2010-01-01

    Across the international field of safeguards there has been a rising awareness of the need for development of the next generation of safeguards professionals. The 2010 International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium includes a suggested topic of 'developing safeguards professionals.' This can first be addressed by making university students and young professionals aware of safeguards and the unique career opportunities it encompasses. Then, once someone decides to go into safeguards he/she needs to be offered professional development opportunities in order to become a more effective member of the international safeguards community. This paper begins to do that by reviewing opportunities currently available. There are not many opportunities that are well advertised and this paper will serve to raise awareness of what does already exist and therefore benefit the international safeguards community. The current opportunities that will be discussed include training programs, graduate degrees, organizational outreach, professional networks, and intensive topic specific programs. The paper will also identify current needs and holes in the current offerings of professional development opportunities and suggest ways they can be filled. In the conclusion the paper addresses what types of programs are still needed.

  14. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  15. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  16. Bulk nuclear polarization enhanced at room temperature by optical pumping.

    PubMed

    Fischer, Ran; Bretschneider, Christian O; London, Paz; Budker, Dmitry; Gershoni, David; Frydman, Lucio

    2013-08-01

    Bulk (13)C polarization can be strongly enhanced in diamond at room temperature based on the optical pumping of nitrogen-vacancy color centers. This effect was confirmed by irradiating single crystals at a ~50 mT field promoting anticrossings between electronic excited-state levels, followed by shuttling of the sample into an NMR setup and by subsequent (13)C detection. A nuclear polarization of ~0.5%--equivalent to the (13)C polarization achievable by thermal polarization at room temperature at fields of ~2000 T--was measured, and its bulk nature determined based on line shape and relaxation measurements. Positive and negative enhanced polarizations were obtained, with a generally complex but predictable dependence on the magnetic field during optical pumping. Owing to its simplicity, this (13)C room temperature polarizing strategy provides a promising new addition to existing nuclear hyperpolarization techniques. PMID:23952444

  17. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  18. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    SciTech Connect

    Cartan, F O

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information.

  19. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

    SciTech Connect

    Badwan, Faris M.; Demuth, Scott Francis; Miller, Michael Conrad; Pshakin, Gennady

    2015-02-23

    Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may

  20. Nuclear enhancement of the photon yield in cosmic ray interactions

    SciTech Connect

    Kachelriess, Michael; Moskalenko, Igor V.; Ostapchenko, Sergey S.

    2014-07-10

    The concept of the nuclear enhancement factor has been used since the beginning of γ-ray astronomy. It provides a simple and convenient way to account for the contribution of nuclei (A > 1) in cosmic rays (CRs) and in the interstellar medium (ISM) to the diffuse γ-ray emission. An accurate treatment of the dominant emission process, such as hadronic interactions of CRs with the ISM, enables one to study CR acceleration processes and CR propagation in the ISM, and provides a reliable background model for searches of new phenomena. The Fermi Large Area Telescope launched in 2008 provides excellent quality data in a wide energy range 30 MeV-1 TeV where the diffuse emission accounts for the majority of photons. Exploiting its data to the fullest requires a new study of the processes of γ-ray production in hadronic interactions. In this paper we point out that several commonly used studies of the nuclear enhancement factor fail to account for the spectrally averaged energy loss fraction which ensures that the energy fraction transferred to photons is averaged properly with the spectra of CR species. We present a new calculation of the spectrally averaged energy loss fraction and the nuclear enhancement factor using the QGSJET-II-04 and EPOS-LHC interaction models.

  1. Optical assay technology for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Edelson, M.C.; Lipert, R.J.; Murray, G.M.; Schuler, R.A.; Vera, J.; Wang, Z.M.; Weeks, S.J.

    1990-10-01

    Research conducted in the Ames Laboratory Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program during the period July 1, 1990 to September 30, 1990 is reviewed; included are reprints and preprints of papers written during this quarter. The first demonstration of isotopic selectivity in Inductively Coupled Plasma -- Laser Excited Atomic Fluorescence Spectroscopy (ICP-LEAFS) is reported and the application of ICP-LEAFS to U isotopic analysis is discussed. Current work in applying optical spectroscopy to the analytical determination of gas phase metal atoms is reviewed. Program administration topics are included in a separately bound Management Supplement to this report.

  2. 10 CFR 71.11 - Protection of Safeguards Information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... applicant for a Certificate of Compliance for a transportation package for transport of irradiated reactor... public health and safety or the common defense and security, shall protect Safeguards Information against... Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE...

  3. Is it possible to enhance the nuclear Schiff moment by nuclear collective modes?

    SciTech Connect

    Auerbach, N. Dmitriev, V. F. Flambaum, V. V. Lisetskiy, A. Sen'kov, R. A. Zelevinsky, V. G.

    2007-09-15

    The nuclear Schiff moment is predicted to be enhanced in nuclei with static quadrupole and octupole deformation. The analogous suggestion of the enhanced contribution to the Schiff moment from the soft collective quadrupole and octupole vibrations in spherical nuclei is tested in the framework of the quasiparticle random phase approximation with separable quadrupole and octupole forces applied to the odd {sup 217-221}Ra and {sup 217-221}Rn isotopes. In this framework, we confirm the existence of the enhancement effect due to the soft modes, but only in the limit when the frequencies of quadrupole and octupole vibrations are close to zero.

  4. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-09-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ``full-scope`` safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ``flows`` between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ``mailbox`` declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  5. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  6. Optically enhanced nuclear cross polarization in acridine-doped fluorene

    SciTech Connect

    Oshiro, C.M.

    1982-06-01

    The objective of this work has been to create large polarizations of the dilute /sup 13/C nuclei in the solid state. The idea was to create /sup 1/H polarizations larger than Boltzmann and to use the proton enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy cross polarization technique to then transfer this large polarization to the /sup 13/C spin system. Optical Nuclear Polarization (ONP) of acridine-doped fluorene single crystals was studied. In addition, ONP of powdered samples of the acridine-doped fluorene was studied. In general, many compounds do not crystallize easily or do not form large crystals suitable for NMR experiments. Powdered, amorphous and randomly dispersed samples are generally far more readily available than single crystals. One objective of this work has been to (first) create large /sup 1/H polarizations. Although large optical proton polarizations in single crystals have been reported previously, optically generated polarizations in powdered samples have not been reported. For these reasons, ONP studies of powdered samples of the acridine-doped fluorene were also undertaken. Using ONP in combination with the proton enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy experiment, large /sup 13/C polarizations have been created in fluorene single crystals. These large /sup 13/C polarizations have permitted the determination of the seven incongruent chemical shielding tensors of the fluorene molecule. Part 2 of this thesis describes the proton enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy experiment. Part 3 describes the ONP experiment. Part 4 is a description of the experimental set-up. Part 5 describes the data analysis for the determination of the chemical shielding tensors. Part 6 presents the results of the ONP experiments performed in this work and the chemical shielding tensors determined.

  7. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bowden, N. S.

    2008-11-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore orer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several erorts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  8. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  9. Enhancement of NRC station blackout requirements for nuclear power plants

    SciTech Connect

    McConnell, M. W.

    2012-07-01

    The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) in response to Commission direction to conduct a systematic and methodical review of NRC processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction, in light of the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. The NTTF's review resulted in a set of recommendations that took a balanced approach to defense-in-depth as applied to low-likelihood, high-consequence events such as prolonged station blackout (SBO) resulting from severe natural phenomena. Part 50, Section 63, of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), 'Loss of All Alternating Current Power,' currently requires that each nuclear power plant must be able to cool the reactor core and maintain containment integrity for a specified duration of an SBO. The SBO duration and mitigation strategy for each nuclear power plant is site specific and is based on the robustness of the local transmission system and the transmission system operator's capability to restore offsite power to the nuclear power plant. With regard to SBO, the NTTF recommended that the NRC strengthen SBO mitigation capability at all operating and new reactors for design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events. The NTTF also recommended strengthening emergency preparedness for prolonged SBO and multi-unit events. These recommendations, taken together, are intended to clarify and strengthen US nuclear reactor safety regarding protection against and mitigation of the consequences of natural disasters and emergency preparedness during SBO. The focus of this paper is on the existing SBO requirements and NRC initiatives to strengthen SBO capability at all operating and new reactors to address prolonged SBO stemming from design-basis and beyond-design-basis external events. The NRC initiatives are intended to

  10. Polarization enhanced Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance with an atomic magnetometer

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Malone, Michael W.; Barrall, Geoffrey A.; Espy, Michelle A.; Monti, Mark C.; Alexson, Dimitri A.; Okamitsu, Jeffrey K.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear Quadrupole Resonance (NQR) has been demonstrated for the detection of 14-N in explosive compounds. Application of a material specific radio-frequency (RF) pulse excites a response typically detected with a wire- wound antenna. NQR is non-contact and material specific, however fields produced by NQR are typically very weak, making demonstration of practical utility challenging. For certain materials, the NQR signal can be increased by transferring polarization from hydrogen nuclei to nitrogen nuclei using external magnetic fields. This polarization enhancement (PE) can enhance the NQR signal by an order of magnitude or more. Atomic magnetometers (AM) have been shown to improve detection sensitivity beyond a conventional antenna by a similar amount. AM sensors are immune to piezo-electric effects that hamper conventional NQR, and can be combined to form a gradiometer for effective RF noise cancellation. In principle, combining polarization enhancement with atomic magnetometer detection should yield improvement in signal-to-noise ratio that is the product of the two methods, 100-fold or more over conventional NQR. However both methods are even more exotic than traditional NQR, and have never been combined due to challenges in operating a large magnetic field and ultra-sensitive magnetic field sensor in proximity. Here we present NQR with and without PE with an atomic magnetometer, demonstrating signal enhancement greater than 20-fold for ammonium nitrate. We also demonstrate PE for PETN using a traditional coil for detection with an enhancement factor of 10. Experimental methods and future applications are discussed.

  11. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  12. Evaluating alternative responses to safeguards alarms

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-04-15

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to have stolen special nuclear material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.

  13. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  14. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinjoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  15. Uranyl peroxide enhanced nuclear fuel corrosion in seawater

    PubMed Central

    Armstrong, Christopher R.; Nyman, May; Shvareva, Tatiana; Sigmon, Ginger E.; Burns, Peter C.; Navrotsky, Alexandra

    2012-01-01

    The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident brought together compromised irradiated fuel and large amounts of seawater in a high radiation field. Based on newly acquired thermochemical data for a series of uranyl peroxide compounds containing charge-balancing alkali cations, here we show that nanoscale cage clusters containing as many as 60 uranyl ions, bonded through peroxide and hydroxide bridges, are likely to form in solution or as precipitates under such conditions. These species will enhance the corrosion of the damaged fuel and, being thermodynamically stable and kinetically persistent in the absence of peroxide, they can potentially transport uranium over long distances. PMID:22308442

  16. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-08-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

  17. Self-Reliability and Motivation in a Nuclear Security Culture Enhancement Program

    SciTech Connect

    Crawford,C.; de Boer,G.; De Castro, K; Landers, Ph.D., J; Rogers, E

    2009-10-19

    The threat of nuclear terrorism has become a global concern. Many countries continue to make efforts to strengthen nuclear security by enhancing systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A). Though MPC&A systems can significantly upgrade nuclear security, they do not eliminate the "human factor." This paper will describe some of the key elements of a comprehensive, sustainable nuclear security culture enhancement program and how implementation can mitigate the insider threat.

  18. Spinodal density enhancements in nuclear collisions at the CBM experiment

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Steinheimer, J.; Koch, V.; Randrup, J.; Bleicher, M.

    2015-04-01

    We discuss a novel approach to describe the evolution of a fireball, created in a high-energy nuclear collision, experiencing spinodal instabilities due to the first-order deconfinement phase transition of quantum chromo dynamics (QCD). We show that initial density fluctuations in these collisions are enhanced in the mechanically unstable region of the QCD phase diagram. In our study we find that the most favorable energy range for observing these density enhancements is at the lower end of the SIS100 accelerator at FAIR, currently under construction. Furthermore we discuss how one can distinguish and constrain different types of QCD phase transitions, one of hadron-quark type and one of liquid-gas type, leading to strong differences in the dynamical evolution of the QCD medium.

  19. Prerequisites for an improvement of international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Weh, R.; Stein, G.

    1993-12-31

    There is reason to believe that the present NPT safeguards regime is unsatisfactory. Improvement entirely within the present framework of INFCIRC/153 seems questionable. Controlled and well-defined challenge inspection procedures patterned on the Chemical Weapons Convention coupled with inclusion of all NPT member states in the inspection regime offer a promising and universally acceptable extension which would greatly enhance credibility.

  20. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  1. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  2. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

    1981-11-01

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system.

  3. Assessing the effectiveness of safeguards at a medium-sized spent-fuel reprocessing facility

    SciTech Connect

    Higinbotham, W.; Fishbone, L.G.; Suda, S.

    1983-01-01

    In order to evaluate carefully and systematically the effectiveness of safeguards at nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency has adopted a safeguards effectiveness assessment methodology. The methodology has been applied to a well-characterized, medium-sized, spent-fuel reprocessing plant to understand how explicit safeguards inspection procedures would serve to expose conceivable nuclear materials diversion schemes, should such diversion occur.

  4. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  5. SARS: Safeguards Accounting and Reporting Software

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mohammedi, B.; Saadi, S.; Ait-Mohamed, S.

    In order to satisfy the requirements of the SSAC (State System for Accounting and Control of nuclear materials), for recording and reporting objectives; this computer program comes to bridge the gape between nuclear facilities operators and national inspection verifying records and delivering reports. The SARS maintains and generates at-facility safeguards accounting records and generates International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user at any nuclear facility. A database structure is built and BORLAND DELPHI programming language has been used. The software is designed to be user-friendly, to make extensive and flexible management of menus and graphs. SARS functions include basic physical inventory tacking, transaction histories and reporting. Access controls are made by different passwords.

  6. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect

    Beyer, Brian David; Beddingfield, David H; Durst, Philip; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  7. Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    John E. Dwight; Mark J. Schanfein; Trond A. Bjornard

    2009-07-01

    Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution

  8. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-11-09

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  9. Trial Application of the Facility Safeguardability Assessment Process to the NuScale SMR Design

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Hockert, John; Gitau, Ernest TN; Zentner, Michael D.

    2013-01-26

    FSA is a screening process intended to focus a facility designer’s attention on the aspects of their facility or process design that would most benefit from application of SBD principles and practices. The process is meant to identify the most relevant guidance within the SBD tools for enhancing the safeguardability of the design. In fiscal year (FY) 2012, NNSA sponsored PNNL to evaluate the practical application of FSA by applying it to the NuScale small modular nuclear power plant. This report documents the application of the FSA process, presenting conclusions regarding its efficiency and robustness. It describes the NuScale safeguards design concept and presents functional "infrastructure" guidelines that were developed using the FSA process.

  10. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  11. Enhancement of minority involvement in DOE nuclear physics programs

    SciTech Connect

    Zeidman, B.

    1995-08-01

    As a result of continuing efforts to interact with a large number of minority students, the Minority Program in the ANL Physics Division has succeeded in attracting many highly qualified students to apply for participation in the programs of the Physics Division and other ANL divisions. The program is directed toward the identification of institutions with relatively strong physics programs and with faculty interested in stimulating their students to pursue research activities, particularly summer programs. During visits to colleges, lectures are presented and are followed by discussion of activities in physics, at Argonne and other national laboratories, and the possibilities for graduate study, employment, etc. Additional activities included attending meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Chicanos and Native Americans in Science and of the Society of Black Physics Students. As a result of these efforts, 42 applications were received for the summer program in 1994. A total of 24 offers were made for the Summer Research Participation program in conjunction with Argonne`s Department of Educational Programs. A number of former participants are currently enrolled in graduate programs in physics; one student is working on his Ph.D. thesis in Nuclear Physics in the Physics Division. Various institutions will be visited during this year and several meetings of minority groups will be attended. These ongoing interactions are generating institutional relationships that will enrich the physics programs in minority institutions and substantially enhance minority involvement not only in nuclear physics, but in other branches of physics and science.

  12. Accelerating Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) Analysis of Soil Organic Matter with Dynamic Nuclear Polarization (DNP) Enhancement

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Normand, A. E.; Smith, A. N.; Long, J. R.; Reddy, K. R.

    2014-12-01

    13C magic angle spinning (MAS) solid state Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (ssNMR) has become an essential tool for discerning the chemical composition of soil organic matter (SOM). However, the technique is limited due to the inherent insensitivity of NMR resulting in long acquisition times, especially for low carbon (C) soil. The pursuits of higher magnetic fields or concentrating C with hydrofluoric acid are limited solutions for signal improvement. Recent advances in dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) have addressed the insensitivity of NMR. DNP utilizes the greater polarization of an unpaired electron in a given magnetic field and transfers that polarization to an NMR active nucleus of interest via microwave irradiation. Signal enhancements of up to a few orders of magnitude have been achieved for various DNP experiments. In this novel study, we conduct DNP 13C cross-polarization (CP) MAS ssNMR experiments of SOM varying in soil C content and chemical composition. DNP signal enhancements reduce the experiment run time allowing samples with low C to be analyzed in hours rather than days. We compare 13C CP MAS ssNMR of SOM with multiple magnetic field strengths, hydrofluoric acid treatment, and novel DNP approaches. We also explore DNP surface enhanced NMR Spectroscopy (SENP) to determine the surface chemistry of SOM. The presented results and future DNP MAS ssNMR advances will lead to further understanding of the nature and processes of SOM.

  13. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Records and Reports § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73.26, 73.27(c), 73.37, 73.67(e), or...

  14. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  15. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  16. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  17. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  18. 78 FR 79020 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-27

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  19. 78 FR 70597 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-26

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and...

  20. Optical assay technology for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Edelson, M.C.; Lipert, R.J.; Murray, G.M.; Schuler, R.A.; Weeks, S.J.; Zamzow, D.S.; Wang, Z.M.

    1991-06-01

    This report includes information about activities in the Ames Laboratory Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program during the period 1/1/91 to 3/31/91. The first section contains a summary of research activities, the second section contains preprints of papers submitted for publication in this period, and the last section contains a discussion of administrative matters pertaining to the program. Efforts to improve the detection limits and reliability of the Inductively Coupled Plasma -- Laser Excited Atomic Fluorescence Spectroscopy (ICP-LEAFS) analysis of uranium have centered on the evaluation of excitation and emission wavelengths. Due to the broadening of the linewidth that occurs during frequency doubling, efforts were made to find a suitable transition in the fundamental region of the laser dye.

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Hyperfine-enhanced gyromagnetic ratio of a nuclear spin in diamond

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sangtawesin, S.; McLellan, C. A.; Myers, B. A.; Bleszynski Jayich, A. C.; Awschalom, D. D.; Petta, J. R.

    2016-08-01

    The nuclear spin gyromagnetic ratio can be enhanced by hyperfine coupling to the electronic spin. Here we show wide tunability of this enhancement on a 15N nuclear spin intrinsic to a single nitrogen-vacancy center in diamond. We perform control of the nuclear spin near the ground state level anti-crossing (GSLAC), where the enhancement of the gyromagnetic ratio from the ground state hyperfine coupling is maximized. We demonstrate a two order of magnitude enhancement of the effective nuclear gyromagnetic ratio compared to the value obtained at 500 G, a typical operating field that is suitable for nuclear spin polarization. Finally, we show that with strong enhancements, the nuclear spin ultimately suffers dephasing from the inhomogeneous broadening of the NMR transition frequency at the GSLAC.

  3. Evaluating safeguard effectiveness against violent insiders

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Fortney, D.S.

    1990-07-16

    The threat posed by a violent insiders presents a major challenge to safeguards managers. These insiders, in addition to their ability to exploit their special authorities, access, and knowledge of facility operations and safeguards, could use violence to defeat safeguards components and personnel. In protecting against theft of special nuclear material, facilities have emphasized the use of perimeter protection and physical barriers to protect against attacks by an outsider adversary group. Recently emphasis has begun to shift toward the implementation of hardware and procedural measures to protect against nonviolent insiders. Approaches are also needed to help assess the effectiveness of protection against those insiders who are willing to use violence. In this paper we describe an approach we're developing for dealing with violent insiders. We begin by categorizing insiders according to whether they are active or passive, rational or irrational, and whether they are willing to use force against safeguards components or coworkers. We define characteristics of each category, and describe the extent to which each category is adequately modelled by existing evaluation tools. We also discuss several modelling issues posed by active insiders, including: entry of contraband; reluctance to use violence; neutralization of insiders; and the ability to switch modes of attack between force, stealth, and deceit. 5 refs., 2 figs.

  4. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  5. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  6. Oxamflatin Treatment Enhances Cloned Porcine Embryo Development and Nuclear Reprogramming*

    PubMed Central

    Mao, Jiude; Zhao, Ming-Tao; Whitworth, Kristin M.; Spate, Lee D.; Walters, Eric M.; O'Gorman, Chad; Lee, Kiho; Samuel, Melissa S.; Murphy, Clifton N.; Wells, Kevin; Rivera, Rocio M.

    2015-01-01

    Abstract Faulty epigenetic reprogramming of somatic nuclei is thought to be the main reason for low cloning efficiency by somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). Histone deacetylase inhibitors (HDACi), such as Scriptaid, improve developmental competence of SCNT embryos in several species. Another HDACi, Oxamflatin, is about 100 times more potent than Scriptaid in the ability to inhibit nuclear-specific HDACs. The present study determined the effects of Oxamflatin treatment on embryo development, DNA methylation, and gene expression. Oxamflatin treatment enhanced blastocyst formation of SCNT embryos in vitro. Embryo transfer produced more pigs born and fewer mummies from the Oxamflatin-treated group compared to the Scriptaid-treated positive control. Oxamflatin also decreased DNA methylation of POU5F1 regulatory elements and centromeric repeat elements in day-7 blastocysts. When compared to in vitro–fertilized (IVF) embryos, the methylation status of POU5F1, NANOG, and centromeric repeat was similar in the cloned embryos, indicating these genes were successfully reprogrammed. However, compared to the lack of methylation of XIST in day-7 IVF embryos, a higher methylation level in day-7 cloned embryos was observed, implying that X chromosomes were activated in day-7 IVF blastocysts, but were not fully activated in cloned embryos, i.e., reprogramming of XIST was delayed. A time-course analysis of XIST DNA methylation on day-13, -15, -17, and -19 in vivo embryos revealed that XIST methylation initiated at about day 13 and was not completed by day 19. The methylation of the XIST gene in day-19 control cloned embryos was delayed again when compared to in vivo embryos. However, methylation of XIST in Oxamflatin-treated embryos was comparable with in vivo embryos, which further demonstrated that Oxamflatin could accelerate the delayed reprogramming of XIST gene and thus might improve cloning efficiency. PMID:25548976

  7. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation.

  8. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  9. Nuclear Reprogramming and Mitosis – how does mitosis enhance changes in gene expression?

    PubMed Central

    Halley-Stott, Richard P

    2015-01-01

    Abstract Nuclear reprogramming changes the identity of cells by changing gene expression programmes. Two recent pieces of work have highlighted the role that mitosis plays in enhancing the success of nuclear reprogramming. This Point of View article examines this work in the context of nuclear reprogramming. PMID:25668203

  10. Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment - Enhancing a Facility-Level Model for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of a Nuclear Enegry System

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Thompson, Sandra E.

    2009-10-26

    The Utility of Social Modeling for Proliferation Assessment project (PL09-UtilSocial) investigates the use of social and cultural information to improve nuclear proliferation assessments, including nonproliferation assessments, Proliferation Resistance (PR) assessments, safeguards assessments, and other related studies. These assessments often use and create technical information about a host State and its posture towards proliferation, the vulnerability of a nuclear energy system (NES) to an undesired event, and the effectiveness of safeguards. This objective of this project is to find and integrate social and technical information by explicitly considering the role of cultural, social, and behavioral factors relevant to proliferation; and to describe and demonstrate if and how social science modeling has utility in proliferation assessment. This report describes a modeling approach and how it might be used to support a location-specific assessment of the PR assessment of a particular NES. The report demonstrates the use of social modeling to enhance an existing assessment process that relies on primarily technical factors. This effort builds on a literature review and preliminary assessment performed as the first stage of the project and compiled in PNNL-18438. [ T his report describes an effort to answer questions about whether it is possible to incorporate social modeling into a PR assessment in such a way that we can determine the effects of social factors on a primarily technical assessment. This report provides: 1. background information about relevant social factors literature; 2. background information about a particular PR assessment approach relevant to this particular demonstration; 3. a discussion of social modeling undertaken to find and characterize social factors that are relevant to the PR assessment of a nuclear facility in a specific location; 4. description of an enhancement concept that integrates social factors into an existing, technically

  11. Is solid-state NMR enhanced by dynamic nuclear polarization?

    PubMed

    Lee, Daniel; Hediger, Sabine; De Paëpe, Gaël

    2015-01-01

    The recent trend of high-field (~5-20 T), low-temperature (~100 K) ssNMR combined with dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) under magic angle spinning (MAS) conditions is analyzed. A brief overview of the current theory of hyperpolarization for so-called MAS-DNP experiments is given, along with various reasons why the DNP-enhancement, the ratio of the NMR signal intensities obtained in the presence and absence of microwave irradiation suitable for hyperpolarization, should not be used alone to gauge the value of performing MAS-DNP experiments relative to conventional ssNMR. This is demonstrated through a dissection of the current conditions required for MAS-DNP with particular attention to resulting absolute sensitivities and spectral resolution. Consequently, sample preparation methods specifically avoiding the surplus of glass-forming solvents so as to improve the absolute sensitivity and resolution are discussed, as are samples that are intrinsically pertinent for MAS-DNP studies (high surface area, amorphous, and porous). Owing to their pertinence, examples of recent applications on these types of samples where chemically-relevant information has been obtained that would have been impossible without the sensitivity increases bestowed by MAS-DNP are also detailed. Additionally, a promising further implementation for MAS-DNP is exampled, whereby the sensitivity improvements shown for (correlation) spectroscopy of nuclei at low natural isotopic abundance, facilitate internuclear distance measurements, especially for long distances (absence of dipolar truncation). Finally, we give some speculative perspectives for MAS-DNP. PMID:25779337

  12. TRAMP complex enhances RNA degradation by the nuclear exosome component Rrp6.

    PubMed

    Callahan, Kevin P; Butler, J Scott

    2010-02-01

    The RNA-processing exosome contains ribonucleases that degrade aberrant RNAs in archael and eukaryotic cells. In Saccharomyces cerevisiae, the nuclear/nucleolar 3'-5' exoribonuclease Rrp6 distinguishes the nuclear exosome from the cytoplasmic exosome. In vivo, the TRAMP complex enhances the ability of the nuclear exosome to destroy some aberrant RNAs. Previous reports showed that purified TRAMP enhanced RNA degradation by the nuclear exosome in vitro. However, the exoribonucleolytic component(s) of the nuclear exosome enhanced by TRAMP remain unidentified. We show that TRAMP does not significantly enhance RNA degradation by purified exosomes lacking Rrp6 in vitro, suggesting that TRAMP activation experiments with nuclear exosome preparations reflect, in part, effects on the activity of Rrp6. Consistent with this, we show that incubation of purified TRAMP with recombinant Rrp6 results in a 10-fold enhancement of the rate of RNA degradation. This increased activity results from enhancement of the hydrolytic activity of Rrp6 because TRAMP cannot enhance the activity of an Rrp6 mutant lacking a key amino acid side chain in its active site. We observed no ATP or polyadenylation dependence for the enhancement of Rrp6 activity by TRAMP, suggesting that neither the poly(A) polymerase activity of Trf4 nor the helicase activity of Mtr4 plays a role in the enhancement. These findings identify TRAMP as an exosome-independent enhancer of Rrp6 activity. PMID:19955569

  13. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  14. Boron-10 Based Neutron Coincidence Counter for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kouzes, Richard T.; Ely, James H.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

    2014-10-01

    The shortage of 3He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security applications, including international nuclear safeguards. Any alternative neutron detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. For nuclear safeguards, a system must perform measurements in the field with a prescribed precision in a specified time. This paper describes an effort to design, model and test an alternatives-based neutron coincidence counter for nuclear safeguards applications. The technology chosen for use in an alternatives-based uranium neutron coincidence collar was boron-lined proportional counters. Extensive modeling was performed of various system configurations and comparisons were made to measurements on a commercial prototype boron-10 based uranium neutron coincidence collar.

  15. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  16. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  17. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; FARNITANO,M.; CARELLI,J.; HAZELTINE,J.; BAILEY,D.

    2001-10-29

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process.

  18. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-07-31

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  19. 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety) based pyroprocessing facility safety evaluation plan

    SciTech Connect

    Ku, J.H.; Choung, W.M.; You, G.S.; Moon, S.I.; Park, S.H.; Kim, H.D.

    2013-07-01

    The big advantage of pyroprocessing for the management of spent fuels against the conventional reprocessing technologies lies in its proliferation resistance since the pure plutonium cannot be separated from the spent fuel. The extracted materials can be directly used as metal fuel in a fast reactor, and pyroprocessing reduces drastically the volume and heat load of the spent fuel. KAERI has implemented the SBD (Safeguards-By-Design) concept in nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The goal of SBD is to integrate international safeguards into the entire facility design process since the very beginning of the design phase. This paper presents a safety evaluation plan using a conceptual design of a reference pyroprocessing facility, in which 3S (Safeguards, Security, Safety)-By-Design (3SBD) concept is integrated from early conceptual design phase. The purpose of this paper is to establish an advanced pyroprocessing hot cell facility design concept based on 3SBD for the successful realization of pyroprocessing technology with enhanced safety and proliferation resistance.

  20. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    SciTech Connect

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-04-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity.

  1. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments.

    PubMed

    Gallagher, Ryan R; Patel, Jaymin R; Interiano, Alexander L; Rovner, Alexis J; Isaacs, Farren J

    2015-02-18

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping 'safeguards'-engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome-to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10(-12). The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  2. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  3. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  4. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application for an early...

  5. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  6. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  7. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  8. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  9. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  10. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application for an early...

  11. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  12. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  13. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  14. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  15. 10 CFR 2.809 - Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 2.809 Section 2.809 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AGENCY RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rulemaking § 2.809 Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. (a) In its...

  16. 10 CFR 52.53 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.53 Section 52.53 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  17. 10 CFR 2.809 - Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 2.809 Section 2.809 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AGENCY RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rulemaking § 2.809 Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. (a) In its...

  18. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  19. 10 CFR 2.809 - Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 2.809 Section 2.809 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULES OF PRACTICE FOR DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS Rulemaking § 2.809 Participation by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. (a) In its advisory...

  20. 10 CFR 54.25 - Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 54.25 Section 54.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) REQUIREMENTS FOR RENEWAL OF... Reactor Safeguards. Each renewal application will be referred to the Advisory Committee on...

  1. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  2. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the ACRS. The...

  3. 10 CFR 52.141 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.141 Section 52.141 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS... Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The Commission shall refer a copy of the application to the...

  4. 77 FR 30029 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Notice of Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting on June...

  5. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Mullen, Mark

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  6. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  7. Who safeguards mothers?

    PubMed

    Wickham, Sara

    2014-11-01

    While routine screening for group B streptococcus is not recommended in the UK, women are sometimes coincidentally found to be carrying these bacteria during investigations of symptoms in pregnancy. If such women decide to decline intravenous antibiotics for themselves in labour, they can seek support from midwives in appropriate roles. But once the woman's baby is born, the situation changes somewhat, as the legal context changes and the issue of safeguarding may be raised. This article considers the issues that arise in such scenarios and raises questions about who is there to support women who experience pressure to consent to their healthy newborn baby having prophylactic intravenous antibiotics. PMID:25582006

  8. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOEpatents

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  9. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-20

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  10. Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Garner, James R; Whitaker, J Michael

    2015-01-01

    In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

  11. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    SciTech Connect

    Persiani, P. J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs.

  12. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  13. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

  14. Solid-state nitrogen-14 nuclear magnetic resonance enhanced by dynamic nuclear polarization using a gyrotron.

    PubMed

    Vitzthum, Veronika; Caporini, Marc A; Bodenhausen, Geoffrey

    2010-07-01

    By combining indirect detection of 14N with dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) using a gyrotron, the signal-to-noise ratio can be dramatically improved and the recovery delay between subsequent experiments can be shortened. Spectra of glassy samples of the amino acid proline doped with the stable bi-radical TOTAPOL rotating at 15.625 kHz at 110K were obtained in a 400 MHz solid-state NMR spectrometer equipped with a gyrotron for microwave irradiation at 263 GHz. DNP enhancement factors on the order of epsilon approximately 40 were achieved. The recovery delays can be reduced from 60 s without radicals at 300 K to 6 s with radicals at 110 K. In the absence of radicals at room temperature, the proton relaxation in proline is inefficient due to the absence of rotating methyl groups and other heat sinks, thus making long recovery delays mandatory. DNP allows one to reduce the acquisition times of 13C-detected 14N spectra from several days to a few hours. PMID:20488737

  15. Lanthanum Bromide Detectors for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, J.

    2011-05-25

    Lanthanum bromide has advantages over other popular inorganic scintillator detectors. Lanthanum bromide offers superior resolution, and good efficiency when compared to sodium iodide and lanthanum chloride. It is a good alternative to high purity germanium detectors for some safeguards applications. This paper offers an initial look at lanthanum bromide detectors. Resolution of lanthanum bromide will be compared lanthanum chloride and sodium-iodide detectors through check source measurements. Relative efficiency and angular dependence will be looked at. Nuclear material spectra, to include plutonium and highly enriched uranium, will be compared between detector types.

  16. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... plan procedures in accordance with appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear...

  17. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... plan procedures in accordance with appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear...

  18. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... plan procedures in accordance with appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear...

  19. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... plan procedures in accordance with appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear...

  20. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... plan procedures in accordance with appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee shall..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear...

  1. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  2. 78 FR 70598 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-26

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office ] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor...

  3. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John; Senzaki, Masao; Hori, Masato

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  4. Thermoacoustic sensor for nuclear fuel temperaturemonitoring and heat transfer enhancement

    SciTech Connect

    James A. Smith; Dale K. Kotter; Randall A. Alli; Steven L. Garrett

    2013-05-01

    A new acoustical sensing system for the nuclear power industry has been developed at The Pennsylvania State University in collaboration with Idaho National Laboratories. This sensor uses the high temperatures of nuclear fuel to convert a nuclear fuel rod into a standing-wave thermoacoustic engine. When a standing wave is generated, the sound wave within the fuel rod will be propagated, by acoustic radiation, through the cooling fluid within the reactor or spent fuel pool and can be monitored a remote location external to the reactor. The frequency of the sound can be correlated to an effective temperature of either the fuel or the surrounding coolant. We will present results for a thermoacoustic resonator built into a Nitonic-60 (stainless steel) fuel rod that requires only one passive component and no heat exchangers.

  5. Nuclear nonproliferation and safety: Challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-09-01

    The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Govermental Affairs asked the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the safeguards and nuclear power plant safety programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This report examines (1) the effectiveness of IAEA`s safeguards program and the adequacy of program funding, (2) the management of U.S. technical assistance to the IAEA`s safeguards program, and (3) the effectiveness of IAEA`s program for advising United Nations (UN) member states about nuclear power plant safety and the adequacy of program funding. Under its statute and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA is mandated to administer safeguards to detect diversions of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses. Because of limits on budget growth and unpaid contributions, IAEA has had difficulty funding the safeguards program. IAEA also conducts inspections of facilities or locations containing declared nuclear material, and manages a program for reviewing the operational safety of designated nuclear power plants. The U.S. technical assistance program for IAEA safeguards, overseen by an interagency coordinating committee, has enhanced the agency`s inspection capabilities, however, some weaknesses still exist. Despite financial limitations, IAEA is meeting its basic safety advisory responsibilities for advising UN member states on nuclear safety and providing requested safety services. However, IAEA`s program for reviewing the operational safety of nuclear power plants has not been fully effective because the program is voluntary and UN member states have not requested IAEA`s review of all nuclear reactors with serious problems. GAO believes that IAEA should have more discretion in selecting reactors for review.

  6. Two-staged nuclear transfer can enhance the developmental ability of goat-sheep interspecies nuclear transfer embryos in vitro.

    PubMed

    Ma, Li-Bing; Cai, Lu; Li, Jia-Jia; Chen, Xiu-Li; Ji, Feng-Yu

    2011-02-01

    The technique of interspecies somatic cell nuclear transfer, in which interspecies cloned embryos can be reconstructed by using domestic animal oocytes as nuclear recipients and endangered animal or human somatic cells as nuclear donors, can afford more opportunities in endangered animal rescue and human tissue transplantation, but the application of this technique is limited by extremely low efficiency which may be attributed to donor nucleus not fully reprogrammed by xenogenic cytoplasm. In this study, goat fetal fibroblasts (GFFs) were used as nuclear donors, in vitro-matured sheep oocytes were used as nuclear recipients, and a two-stage nuclear transfer procedure was performed to improve the developmental ability of goat-sheep interspecies clone embryos. In the first stage nuclear transfer (FSNT), GFFs were injected into the ooplasm of enucleated sheep metaphase-II oocytes, then non-activated reconstructed embryos were cultured in vitro, so that the donor nucleus could be exposed to the ooplasm for a period of time. Subsequently, in the second stage nuclear transfer, FSNT-derived non-activated reconstructed embryo was centrifuged, and the donor nucleus was then transferred into another freshly enucleated sheep oocyte. Compared with the one-stage nuclear transfer, two-stage nuclear transfer could significantly enhance the blastocyst rate of goat-sheep interspecies clone embryos, and this result indicated that longtime exposure to xenogenic ooplasm benefits the donor nucleus to be reprogrammed. The two-stage nuclear transfer procedure has two advantages, one is that the donor nucleus can be exposed to the ooplasm for a long time, the other is that the problem of oocyte aging can be solved. PMID:21082282

  7. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture... Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to... the specific purpose authorized therefor. (b) Safeguards, provided by this section, may include,...

  8. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture... Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to... the specific purpose authorized therefor. (b) Safeguards, provided by this section, may include,...

  9. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  10. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  11. 76 FR 23515 - Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-04-27

    ... ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (76 FR 6087) , the draft Regulatory Guide DG-5020, ``Applying for Enhanced... Safeguards Events'' (76 FR 6085) . A 90-day comment period was provided for the proposed rule, the weapons...: On February 3, 2011 (76 FR 6200), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission)...

  12. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  13. ASME Nuclear Crane Standards for Enhanced Crane Safety and Increased Profit

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Parkhurst, Stephen N.

    2000-01-01

    The ASME NOG-1 standard, 'Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes', covers top running cranes for nuclear facilities; with the ASME NUM-1 standard, 'Rules for Construction of Cranes, Monorails, and Hoists', covering the single girder, underhung, wall and jib cranes, as well as the monorails and hoists. These two ASME nuclear crane standards provide criteria for designing, inspecting and testing overhead handling equipment with enhanced safety to meet the 'defense-in-depth' approach of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) documents NUREG 0554 and NUREG 0612. In addition to providing designs for enhanced safety, the ASME nuclear crane standards provide a basis for purchasing overhead handling equipment with standard safety features, based upon accepted engineering principles, and including performance and environmental parameters specific to nuclear facilities. The ASME NOG-1 and ASME NUM-1 standards not only provide enhanced safety for handling a critical load, but also increase profit by minimizing the possibility of load drops, by reducing cumbersome operating restrictions, and by providing the foundation for a sound licensing position. The ASME nuclear crane standards can also increase profit by providing the designs and information to help ensure that the right standard equipment is purchased. Additionally, the ASME nuclear crane standards can increase profit by providing designs and information to help address current issues, such as the qualification of nuclear plant cranes for making 'planned engineered lifts' for steam generator replacement and decommissioning.

  14. A Strong U.S. Nuclear Enterprise Enhances Global Nuclear Proliferation Management

    SciTech Connect

    Buckner, M.R.

    2001-01-29

    Nuclear policy in the U.S. has evolved over the last five decades as a result of reactions to certain defining events in the evolution of global nuclear technology. These events generally involved either safety issues or concerns about the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons. A world unthreatened by nuclear weapons proliferation is a vision that U.S. policy has strived for since the early years of the atomic age. The U.S. approach to stemming the spread of nuclear weapons has undergone three significant changes over the last fifty-plus years. The McMahon Act of 1946 proscribed dissemination of U. S. nuclear technology overseas for any purpose, whether for weapons or peaceful uses. This approach was superseded by the Atomic Energy Act, stimulated by the Atoms for Peace Initiative (1), which provided for the sharing of substantial scope of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes with countries willing to forego nuclear weapons development. In the decades that followed, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed by 187 nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was formed to monitor adherence to the Treaty and assist in technology transfer. This international initiative was instrumental in limiting the emergence of new States with nuclear weapons capabilities to a few as compared to the more than fifty that was projected in the early 50's.

  15. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1994-02-16

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA`s) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants` meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.

  16. Moving Toward a Regional Safeguards System in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Griggs, James R.

    2001-07-28

    In addressing the nuclear nonproliferation challenges of South Asia, it is useful to examine the similar past nonproliferation problems in South America. The nuclear rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil involved several developments in progression. We conclude that two developments are particularly applicable to the India/Pakistan problem: technical cooperation and a regional safeguards system. This paper reviews the history of Argentina/Brazil rapprochement, discusses application to India/Pakistan, and proposes specific actions to move South Asia toward regional stability.

  17. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  18. Enhancing international radiation/nuclear detection training opportunities

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, Thomas L.; Bersell, Bridget M.; Booker, Paul M.; Anderson, Gerald E.; Leitch, Rosalyn M.; Meagher, John B.; Siefken, Rob R.; Spracklen, James L.

    2015-09-23

    The United States has worked domestically to develop and provide radiological and nuclear detection training and education initiatives aimed at interior law enforcement, but the international community has predominantly focused efforts at border and customs officials. The interior law enforcement officials of a State play a critical role in maintaining an effective national-level nuclear detection architecture. To meet this vital need, DNDO was funded by the U.S. Department of State (DOS) to create and deliver a 1-week course at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary to inform interior law enforcement personnel of the overall mission, and to provide an understanding of how the participants can combat the threats of radiological and nuclear terrorism through detection efforts. Two courses, with approximately 20 students in each course, were delivered in fiscal year (FY) 2013, two were delivered in FY 2014 and FY 2015, and as of this report’s writing more are planned in FY 2016. However, while the ILEA courses produced measurable success, DNDO requested Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) research potential avenues to further increase the course impact.In a multi-phased approach, PNNL researched and analyzed several possible global training locations and venues, and other possible ways to increase the impact of the course using an agreed-to data-gathering format.

  19. Decreased activity and enhanced nuclear export of CCAAT-enhancer-binding protein beta during inhibition of adipogenesis by ceramide.

    PubMed Central

    Sprott, Kam M; Chumley, Michael J; Hanson, Janean M; Dobrowsky, Rick T

    2002-01-01

    To identify novel molecular mechanisms by which ceramide regulates cell differentiation, we examined its effect on adipogenesis of 3T3-L1 preadipocytes. Hormonal stimulation of 3T3-L1 preadipocytes induced formation of triacylglycerol-laden adipocytes over 7 days; in part, via the co-ordinated action of CCAAT-enhancer-binding proteins alpha, beta and delta (C/EBP-alpha, -beta and -delta) and peroxisome-proliferator-activated receptor gamma (PPARgamma). The addition of exogenous N-acetylsphingosine (C2-ceramide) or increasing endogenous ceramide levels inhibited the expression of C/EBPalpha and PPARgamma, and blocked adipocyte development. C2-ceramide did not decrease the cellular expression of C/EBPbeta, which is required for expression of C/EBPalpha and PPARgamma, but significantly blocked its transcriptional activity from a promoter construct after 24 h. The ceramide-induced decrease in the transcriptional activity of C/EBPbeta correlated with a strong decrease in its phosphorylation, DNA-binding ability and nuclear localization at 24 h. However, ceramide did not change the nuclear level of C/EBPbeta after a period of 4 or 16 h, suggesting that it was not affecting nuclear import. CRM1 (more recently named 'exportin-1') is a nuclear membrane protein that regulates protein export from the nucleus by binding to a specific nuclear export sequence. Leptomycin B is an inhibitor of CRM1/exportin-1, and reversed the ceramide-induced decrease in nuclear C/EBPbeta at 24 h. Taken together, these data support the hypothesis that ceramide may inhibit adipogenesis, at least in part, by enhancing dephosphorylation and premature nuclear export of C/EBPbeta at a time when its maximal transcriptional activity is required to drive adipogenesis. PMID:12071851

  20. Amphiphilic Block Copolymers Enhance Cellular Uptake and Nuclear Entry of Polyplex-Delivered DNA

    PubMed Central

    Yang, Zhihui; Sahay, Gaurav; Sriadibhatla, Srikanth; Kabanov, Alexander V.

    2008-01-01

    This work for the first time demonstrates that synthetic polymers enhance uptake and nuclear import of plasmid DNA (pDNA) through the activation of cellular trafficking machinery. Nonionic block copolymers of poly(ethylene oxide) and poly(propylene oxide), Pluronics, are widely used as excipients in pharmaceutics. We previously demonstrated that Pluronics increase the phosphorylation of IκB and subsequent NFκB nuclear localization as well as upregulate numerous NFκB-related genes. In this study, we show that Pluronics enhance gene transfer by pDNA/polycation complexes (“polyplexes”) in a promoter-dependent fashion. Addition of Pluronic P123 or P85 to polyethyleneimine-based polyplexes had little effect on polyplex particle size but significantly enhanced pDNA cellular uptake, nuclear translocation and gene expression in several cell lines. When added to polyplex-transfected cells after transfection, Pluronics enhanced nuclear import of pDNA containing NFκB–binding sites, but have no effect on import of pDNA without these sites. All together, our studies suggest that Pluronics rapidly activate NFκB, which binds cytosolic pDNA that possesses promoters containing NFκB binding sites and consequently increases nuclear import of pDNA through NFκB nuclear translocation. PMID:18729495

  1. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  2. Safeguards techniques in a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Leitner, E.; Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1991-01-01

    The pilot conditioning plant at Gorleben, Germany, is designed as a multi-purpose plant. Its primary task is the conditioning of spent fuel assemblies into a form suitable for final disposal. As a pilot plant, it allows furthermore for the development and testing of various conditioning techniques. In terms of international safeguards, the pilot conditioning plant is basically considered an item facility. Entire fuel assemblies enter the plant in transport casks, whereas bins filled with fuel rods or canisters containing cut fuel rods leave the facility in final disposal packages (e.g. POLLUX). Each POLLUX final disposal package content is uniquely correlated to a definite number of fuel assemblies which have entered the conditioning process. For this type of facility, containment/surveillance (C/S) should take over the major role in nuclear material safeguards. This paper discusses the safeguards at the Gorleben plant.

  3. SAFEGUARDS EXPERIENCE ON THE DUPIC FUEL CYCLE PROCESS

    SciTech Connect

    J. HONG; H. KIM; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    Safeguards have been applied to the R and D process for directly fabricating CANDU fuel with PWR spent fuel material. Safeguards issues to be resolved were identified in the areas such as international cooperation on handling foreign origin nuclear material, technology development of operator's measurement system of the bulk handling process of spent fuel material, and a built-in C/S system for independent verification of material flow. The fuel cycle concept (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel in CANDU, DUPIC) was developed in consideration of reutilization of over-flowing spent fuel resources at PWR sites and a reduction of generated high level wastes. All those safeguards issues have been finally resolved, and the first batch of PWR spent fuel material was successfully introduced in the DUPIC lab facility and has been in use for routine process development.

  4. Framework for analyzing safeguards alarms and response decisions

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-06-11

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alrms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to possess stolen Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.

  5. Nuclear Enhancement of Universal Dynamics of High Parton Densities

    SciTech Connect

    Kowalski, H.; Lappi, T.; Venugopalan, R.

    2008-01-18

    We show that the enhancement of the saturation scale in large nuclei relative to the proton is significantly influenced by the effects of quantum evolution and the impact parameter dependence of dipole cross sections in high energy QCD. We demonstrate that there is a strong A dependence in diffractive deeply inelastic scattering and discuss its sensitivity to the measurement of the recoil nucleus.

  6. Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Sorenson, R.J.; Sheely, K.B.; Brown, J.B.; Horton, R.D.; Strittmatter, R.; Manatt, D.R.

    1994-04-01

    The requirements for the management of information at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA`s conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost-effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to coordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

  7. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-07-10

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority requires judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner.

  8. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-07-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner.

  9. Nuclear material operations manual

    SciTech Connect

    Tyler, R.P.

    1981-02-01

    This manual provides a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia National Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion.

  10. Mars mission performance enhancement with hybrid nuclear propulsion

    SciTech Connect

    Dagle, J.E.; Noffsinger, K.E.; Segna, D.R.

    1992-01-01

    Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), compared with chemical and nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP), can effectively deliver the same mass to Mars using much less propellant, consequently requiring less mass delivered to Earth orbit. The lower thrust of NEP requires a spiral trajectory near planetary bodies, which significantly increases the travel time. Although the total travel time is long, the portion of the flight time spent during interplanetary transfer is shorter, because the vehicle is thrusting for much longer periods of time. This has led to the supposition that NEP, although very attractive for cargo missions, is not suitable for piloted missions to Mars. However, with the application of a hybrid application of a hybrid approach to propulsion, the benefits of NEP can be utilized while drastically reducing the overall travel time required. Development of a dual-mode system, which utilizes high-thrust NTP to propel the spacecraft from the planetary gravitational influence and low-thrust NEP to accelerate in interplanetary space, eliminates the spiral trajectory and results in a much faster transit time than could be obtained by either NEP or NTP alone. This results in a mission profile with a lower initial mass in low Earth orbit. In addition, the propulsion system would have the capability to provide electrical power for mission applications.

  11. Advanced hybrid nuclear propulsion Mars mission performance enhancement

    SciTech Connect

    Dagle, J.E.; Noffsinger, K.E.; Segna, D.R.

    1992-02-01

    Nuclear electric propulsion (NEP), compared with chemical and nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP), can effectively deliver the same mass to Mars using much less propellant, consequently requiring less mass delivered to Earth orbit. The lower thrust of NEP requires a spiral trajectory near planetary bodies, which significantly increases the travel time. Although the total travel time is long, the portion of the flight time spent during interplanetary transfer is shorter, because the vehicle is thrusting for much longer periods of time. This has led to the supposition that NEP, although very attractive for cargo missions, is not suitable for piloted missions to Mars. However, with the application of a hybrid approach to propulsion, the benefits of NEP can be utilized while drastically reducing the overall travel time required. Development of a dual-mode system, which utilizes high-thrust NTP to propel the spacecraft from the planetary gravitational influence and low-thrust NEP to accelerate in interplanetary space, eliminates the spiral trajectory and results in a much faster transit time than could be obtained by either NEP or NTP alone. This results in a mission profile with a lower initial mass in low Earth orbit. In addition, the propulsion system would have the capability to provide electrical power for mission applications.

  12. Automated Systems for Safeguarding and Accountancy of Stored Nuclear Material (for proceedings of ESARDA 21st Annual Meeting, Sevilla, Spain May 4-6, 1999

    SciTech Connect

    baldwin,k.m.; bell, z.w.; dunigan, j.j.; gaby, j.e.; hickerson, t.w.; lawson, r.l.; miller, m.a.; mooney, l.r.; pickett, c.a.; seiber, l.e.; younkin, j.r.

    1999-05-01

    Oak Ridge has developed several sensor systems that are capable of providing unattended monitoring of the physical and/or assigned attributes associated with stored nuclear materials. These systems include the Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVISTM), SmartShelfTM, and the ReflectoActive Seal System TM. Each of these systems can be implemented independently or may be integrated with existing systems through the Graphical Facility Information Center or GraFICTM software package. GraFICTM is a versatile software package designed to operate in a distributed computing environment. GraFICTM can monitor and report all item and facility activity from the various sensors and systems to an unlimited number of authorized remote clients through a common interface. The software also contains an Intelligent Facility Management (lFM) package that helps storage facility managers with space planning, records management, item location, and variety of other facility specific needs. Results and details from several system deployments will be described, along with the specific features and possible uses of each system.

  13. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  14. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Veirs, Douglas K; Browne, Mike; Lopez, Leon; Martinez, Ron; Le, Loan; Lamontagne, Stephen A

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  15. Potential opportunities for nano materials to help enable enhanced nuclear fuel performance

    SciTech Connect

    McClellan, Kenneth J.

    2012-06-06

    This presentation is an overview of the technical challenges for development of nuclear fuels with enhanced performance and accident tolerance. Key specific aspects of improved fuel performance are noted. Examples of existing nanonuclear projects and concepts are presented and areas of potential focus are suggested. The audience for this presentation includes representatives from: DOE-NE, other national laboratories, industry and academia. This audience is a mixture of nanotechnology experts and nuclear energy researchers and managers.

  16. Enhancing the interaction between nuclear experiment and theory through information and statistics

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Ireland, D. G.; Nazarewicz, W.

    2015-02-05

    This Focus Issue draws from a range of topics within nuclear physics, from studies of individual nucleons to the heaviest of nuclei. The unifying theme, however, is to illustrate the extent to which uncertainty is a key quantity, and to showcase applications of the latest computational methodologies. It is our assertion that a paradigm shift is needed in nuclear physics to enhance the coupling between theory and experiment, and we hope that this collection of articles is a good start.

  17. Microstructure of boron nitride coated on nuclear fuels by plasma enhanced chemical vapor deposition

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Durmazuçar, Hasan H.; Gündüz, Güngör; Toker, Canan

    1998-08-01

    Three nuclear fuels, pure urania, 5% and 10% gadolinia containing fuels were coated with boron nitride to improve nuclear and physical properties. Coating was done by plasma enhanced chemical vapor deposition technique by using boron trichloride and ammonia. The specimens were examined under a scanning electron microscope. Boron nitride formed a grainy structure on all fuels. Gadolinia decreased the grain size of boron nitride. The fractal dimensions of fragmentation and of area-perimeter relation were determined.

  18. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  19. 76 FR 34779 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-06-14

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on June...

  20. 76 FR 55717 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-08

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on...

  1. 77 FR 68161 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-11-15

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on December...

  2. 76 FR 55716 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-08

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials will hold a meeting on...

  3. Laser erosion diagnostics of plasma facing materials with displacement sensors and their application to safeguard monitors to protect nuclear fusion chambers

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kasuya, Koichi; Motokoshi, Shinji; Taniguchi, Seiji; Nakai, Mitsuo; Tokunaga, Kazutoshi; Mroz, Waldemar; Budner, Boguslaw; Korczyc, Barbara

    2015-02-01

    Tungsten and SiC are candidates for the structural materials of the nuclear fusion reactor walls, while CVD poly-crystal diamond is candidate for the window material under the hazardous fusion stresses. We measured the surface endurance strength of such materials with commercial displacement sensors and our recent evaluation method. The pulsed high thermal input was put into the material surfaces by UV lasers, and the surface erosions were diagnosed. With the increase of the total number of the laser shots per position, the crater depth increased gradually. The 3D and 2D pictures of the craters were gathered and compared under various experimental conditions. For example, the maximum crater depths were plotted as a function of shot accumulated numbers, from which we evaluated the threshold thermal input for the surface erosions to be induced. The simple comparison-result showed that tungsten was stronger roughly two times than SiC. Then we proposed how to monitor the surface conditions of combined samples with such diamonds coated with thin tungsten layers, when we use such samples as parts of divertor inner walls, fusion chamber first walls, and various diagnostic windows. We investigated how we might be able to measure the inner surface erosions with the same kinds of displacement sensors. We found out the measurable maximum thickness of such diamond which is useful to monitor the erosion. Additionally we showed a new scheme of fusion reactor systems with injectors for anisotropic pellets and heating lasers under the probable use of W and/or SiC.

  4. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments

    PubMed Central

    Gallagher, Ryan R.; Patel, Jaymin R.; Interiano, Alexander L.; Rovner, Alexis J.; Isaacs, Farren J.

    2015-01-01

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping ‘safeguards’—engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome—to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10−12. The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  5. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Nordquist, Heather A; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  6. 10 CFR 170.32 - Schedule of fees for health and safety, and safeguards inspections for materials licenses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule of fees for health and safety, and safeguards inspections for materials licenses. 170.32 Section 170.32 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED..., and safeguards inspections for materials licenses. Materials licensees shall pay inspection fees...

  7. 10 CFR 170.32 - Schedule of fees for health and safety, and safeguards inspections for materials licenses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule of fees for health and safety, and safeguards inspections for materials licenses. 170.32 Section 170.32 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED..., and safeguards inspections for materials licenses. Materials licensees shall pay inspection fees...

  8. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  9. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  10. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  11. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  12. 10 CFR 76.119 - Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security facility approval and safeguarding of National Security Information and Restricted Data. 76.119 Section 76.119 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) CERTIFICATION OF GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS Safeguards and Security § 76.119 Security...

  13. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  14. Conditions for observation of fade out of collective enhancement of the nuclear level density

    SciTech Connect

    Grimes, S. M.

    2008-11-15

    The results of two recent papers searching for the disappearance of collective enhancements with energy in nuclear level densities are examined. It is found that the effects of such enhancements are less than has been assumed. The reduction in the size of the effect only partially resolves the disagreement between theory and experiment. This effect also plays a role in explaining the results of an earlier experiment.

  15. Parahydrogen and Synthesis Allow Dramatically Enhanced Nuclear Alignment

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bowers, Clifford Russell

    The PASADENA effect is a method for transient high-sensitivity proton spin-labelling by molecular addition of dihydrogen. When the parahydrogen mole fraction differs from the high-temperature limit of 1/4, this population difference constitutes a form of spin order which can be converted to magnetization observable by NMR. Large NMR signals are observed, if subsequent to the hydrogen addition, the two protons experience magnetic inequivalence and spin -spin coupling and if observation is made before spin-lattice relaxation restores the equilibrium spin order. The analogous effect for D_2 is also possible. The kinetic mechanisms of the homogeneous hydrogenation catalysts which permit the realization of the PASADENA effect have been the target of the experimental applications. Rates determined in PASADENA studies pertain to the active catalytic species, since only these molecules can contribute to the enhanced signals from which all kinetic inferences are made. The sensitivity enhancement has also led to the identification of a novel intermediate in the mechanism for the Rh(DIPHOS)^+ catalyzed hydrogenation of styrene. The rate of conversion of this species into product and starting material has been studied using two -dimensional NMR. The dramatically improved sensitivity should make it possible to observe key catalytic intermediates which do not build up in sufficient quantity to allow detection by conventional NMR arising from Curie-Law magnetization. The study of surface sites which bind pairwise with H_2 is also a potentially fruitful area for future experimental work. The ambient temperature NMR spectroscopy of surfaces is not often feasible due to sensitivity limitations. Simulations have been performed using typical shift and coupling parameters in an effort to characterize the enhanced lineshapes which can be expected. The inverse of the PASADENA effect has also been proposed, whereby the spin order of a molecule containing hydrogen is probed by measuring

  16. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  17. Enhancement of nuclear polarization with frequency modulated microwaves

    SciTech Connect

    Dulya, C.

    1995-04-01

    The authors report their discovery of a gain by a factor of two in the growth rate and of a gain by {approx} 1.7 in the maximum dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) of deuteron in the large polarized targets of the Spin Muon Collaboration. These large gains resulted from a frequency modulation (FM) of the {approx} 69 GHz microwave field used for DNP; this FM had a 30 MHz amplitude and {approx} 1 KHz frequency. The target material is glassy deuterated 1-butanol doped with a paramagnetic Cr(V) complex. Measurements of the 430 MHz broad electron paramagnetic resonance (EPR) absorption spectrum in the 2.5 T field were performed by a novel differential bolometric technique. They show that FM gives rise to an additional microwave absorption which depends on the amplitude and frequency of FM and which is more pronounced in the edges of the EPR spectrum. For deuterons, polarizations of 0.46 and {minus}0.53 have been obtained. Similar although less dramatic effects were observed for protons where FM increased the polarization by less than 10% and the growth rate by {approx} 20%.

  18. Property enhancement of cast iron used for nuclear casks

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Behera, R. K.; Mahto, B. P.; Dubey, J. S.; Mishra, S. C.; Sen, S.

    2016-01-01

    Ductile iron (DI) is a preferred material for use in various structural, automotive, and engineering fields because of its excellent combination of strength, toughness, and ductility. In the current investigation, we elucidate the relationship between the morphological and mechanical properties of DI intended for use in safety applications in the nuclear industry. DI specimens with various alloying elements were subjected to annealing and austempering heat treatment processes. A faster cooling rate appeared to increase the nodule count in austempered specimens, compensating for their nodularity value and subsequently decreasing their ductility and impact strength. The ductility and impact energy values of annealed specimens increased with increasing ferrite area fraction and nodularity, whereas an increase in the amounts of Ni and Cr resulted in an increase of hardness via solid solution strengthening. Austempered specimens were observed to be stronger than annealed specimens and failed in a somewhat brittle manner characterized by a river pattern, whereas the ductile failure mode was characterized by the presence of dimples.

  19. Prescriptive concepts for advanced nuclear materials control and accountability systems

    SciTech Connect

    Whitty, W.J.; Strittmatter, R.B.; Ford, W.; Tisinger, R.M.; Meyer, T.H.

    1987-06-01

    Networking- and distributed-processing hardware and software have the potential of greatly enhancing nuclear materials control and accountability (MC and A) systems, from both safeguards and process operations perspectives, while allowing timely integrated safeguards activities and enhanced computer security at reasonable cost. A hierarchical distributed system is proposed consisting of groups of terminal and instruments in plant production and support areas connected to microprocessors that are connected to either larger microprocessors or minicomputers. These micros and/or minis are connected to a main machine, which might be either a mainframe or a super minicomputer. Data acquisition, preliminary input data validation, and transaction processing occur at the lowest level. Transaction buffering, resource sharing, and selected data processing occur at the intermediate level. The host computer maintains overall control of the data base and provides routine safeguards and security reporting and special safeguards analyses. The research described outlines the distribution of MC and A system requirements in the hierarchical system and distributed processing applied to MC and A. Implications of integrated safeguards and computer security concepts for the distributed system design are discussed. 10 refs., 4 figs.

  20. Observation of enhanced nuclear stability near the 162 neutron shell

    SciTech Connect

    Lougheed, R.W.; Moody, K.J.; Wild, J.F.; Hulet, E.K.; McQuaid, J.H.; Lazarev, Yu.A.; Lobanov, Yu.V.; Oganessian, Yu.Ts.; Utyonkov, V.K.; Abdullin, F.Sh.; Buklanov, G.V.; Gikal, B.N.; Iliev, S.; Mezentsev, A.N.; Polyakov, A.N.; Sedykh, I.M.; Shirokovsky, I.V.; Subbotin, V.G.; Sukhov, A.M.; Tsyganov, Yu.S.; Zhuchko, V.E.

    1993-09-22

    In bombardments of {sup 248}Cm with {sup 22}Ne the authors discovered two new isotopes, {sup 265}106 and {sup 266}106, by establishing genetic links between {alpha} decays of the 106 nuclides and SF or {alpha} decays of the daughter (grand-daughter) nuclides. For {sup 266}106 they measured E{sub {alpha}}=8.62{+-}0.06 MeV followed by the SF decay of {sup 262}104 for which they measured a half-life value of 1.2{sup +1.0}{sub {minus}0.5} s. For {sup 265}106 they measured E{sub {alpha}}=8.82{+-}0.06 MeV. They estimated {alpha} half-lives of 10-30 s for {sup 266}106 and 2-30 s for {sup 265}106 with SF branches of {approximately}50% or less. The decay properties of {sup 266}106 indicate a large enhancement in the SF stability of this N=160 nuclide and confirm the existence of the predicted neutron-deformed shell N=162.

  1. Safeguarding Our Health: Vaccines Protect Us All

    MedlinePlus

    ... disclaimer . Subscribe Safeguarding Our Health Vaccines Protect Us All We share more than food and culture within ... safeguarding your health. “There’s a huge benefit to all of us getting the recommended vaccines,” explains Dr. ...

  2. 16 CFR 1031.11 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... meetings policy, 16 CFR part 1012. ... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 1031.11 Section 1031... safeguards. (a) Subject to the provisions of this subpart and budgetary and time constraints,...

  3. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    SciTech Connect

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-01-01

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a Deliberate Operating'' mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a Use Every Time'' (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points.

  4. Implementation of an Enhanced Measurement Control Program for handling nuclear safety samples at WSRC

    SciTech Connect

    Boler-Melton, C.; Holland, M.K.

    1991-12-31

    In the separation and purification of nuclear material, nuclear criticality safety (NCS) is of primary concern. The primary nuclear criticality safety controls utilized by the Savannah River Site (SRS) Separations Facilities involve administrative and process equipment controls. Additional assurance of NCS is obtained by identifying key process hold points where sampling is used to independently verify the effectiveness of production control. Nuclear safety measurements of samples from these key process locations provide a high degree of assurance that processing conditions are within administrative and procedural nuclear safety controls. An enhanced procedure management system aimed at making improvements in the quality, safety, and conduct of operation was implemented for Nuclear Safety Sample (NSS) receipt, analysis, and reporting. All procedures with nuclear safety implications were reviewed for accuracy and adequate detail to perform the analytical measurements safely, efficiently, and with the utmost quality. Laboratory personnel worked in a ``Deliberate Operating`` mode (a systematic process requiring continuous expert oversight during all phases of training, testing, and implementation) to initiate the upgrades. Thus, the effort to revise and review nuclear safety sample procedures involved a team comprised of a supervisor, chemist, and two technicians for each procedure. Each NSS procedure was upgraded to a ``Use Every Time`` (UET) procedure with sign-off steps to ensure compliance with each step for every nuclear safety sample analyzed. The upgrade program met and exceeded both the long and short term customer needs by improving measurement reliability, providing objective evidence of rigid adherence to program principles and requirements, and enhancing the system for independent verification of representative sampling from designated NCS points.

  5. Phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase/Akt signaling enhances nuclear localization and transcriptional activity of BRCA1

    SciTech Connect

    Hinton, Cimona V.; Fitzgerald, Latricia D.; Thompson, Marilyn E. . E-mail: methompson@mmc.edu

    2007-05-15

    Signaling pathways involved in regulating nuclear-cytoplasmic distribution of BRCA1 have not been previously reported. Here, we provide evidence that heregulin {beta}1-induced activation of the Akt pathway increases the nuclear content of BRCA1. First, treatment of T47D breast cancer cells with heregulin {beta}1 results in a two-fold increase in nuclear BRCA1 as assessed by FACS analysis, immunoblotting and immunofluorescence. This heregulin-induced increase in nuclear BRCA1 is blocked by siRNA-mediated down-regulation of Akt. Second, mutation of threonine 509 in BRCA1, the site of Akt phosphorylation, to an alanine, attenuates the ability of heregulin to induce BRCA1 nuclear accumulation. These data suggest that Akt-catalyzed phosphorylation of BRCA1 is required for the heregulin-regulated nuclear concentration of BRCA1. Because most functions ascribed to BRCA1 occur within the nucleus, we postulated that phosphorylation-dependent nuclear accumulation of BRCA1 would result in enhanced nuclear activity, specifically transcriptional activity, of BRCA1. This postulate is affirmed by our observation that the ability of BRCA1 to transactivate GADD45 promoter constructs was enhanced in T47D cells treated with heregulin {beta}1. Furthermore, the heterologous expression of BRCA1 in HCC1937 human breast cancer cells, which have constitutively active Akt, also induces GADD45 promoter activity, whereas the expression of BRCA1 in which threonine 509 has been mutated to an alanine is able to only minimally induce promoter activity. These findings implicate Akt in upstream events leading to BRCA1 nuclear localization and function.

  6. Phosphatidylinositol 3-kinase/Akt signaling enhances nuclear localization and transcriptional activity of BRCA1

    PubMed Central

    Hinton, Cimona V.; Fitzgerald, Latricia D.; Thompson, Marilyn E.

    2007-01-01

    Signaling pathways involved in regulating nuclear-cytoplasmic distribution of BRCA1 have not been previously reported. Here, we provide evidence that heregulin β1-induced activation of the Akt pathway increases the nuclear content of BRCA1. First, treatment of T47D breast cancer cells with heregulin β1 results in a two-fold increase in nuclear BRCA1 as assessed by FACS analysis, immunoblotting and immunofluorescence. This heregulin-induced increase in nuclear BRCA1 is blocked by siRNA-mediated down-regulation of Akt. Second, mutation of threonine 509 in BRCA1, the site of Akt phosphorylation, to an alanine, attenuates the ability of heregulin to induce BRCA1 nuclear accumulation. These data suggest that Akt-catalyzed phosphorylation of BRCA1 is required for the heregulin-regulated nuclear concentration of BRCA1. Because most functions ascribed to BRCA1 occur within the nucleus, we postulated that phosphorylation-dependent nuclear accumulation of BRCA1 would result in enhanced nuclear activity, specifically transcriptional activity, of BRCA1. This postulate is affirmed by our observation that the ability of BRCA1 to transactivate GADD45 promoter constructs was enhanced in T47D cells treated with heregulin β1. Furthermore, the heterologous expression of BRCA1 in HCC1937 human breast cancer cells, which have constitutively active Akt, also induces GADD45 promoter activity, whereas the expression of BRCA1 in which threonine 509 has been mutated to an alanine is able to only minimally induce promoter activity. These findings implicate Akt in upstream events leading to BRCA1 nuclear localization and function. PMID:17428466

  7. Analysis of a Nuclear Enhanced Airbreathing Rocket for Earth to Orbit Applications

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Adams, Robert B.; Landrum, D. Brian; Brown, Norman (Technical Monitor)

    2001-01-01

    The proposed engine concept is the Nuclear Enhanced Airbreathing Rocket (NEAR). The NEAR concept uses a fission reactor to thermally heat a propellant in a rocket plenum. The rocket is shrouded, thus the exhaust mixes with ingested air to provide additional thermal energy through combustion. The combusted flow is then expanded through a nozzle to provide thrust.

  8. Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

    SciTech Connect

    Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

    2011-09-30

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

  9. SULFUR HEXAFLUORIDE TREATMENT OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL TO ENHANCE SEPARATIONS

    SciTech Connect

    Gray, J.; Torres, R.; Korinko, P.; Martinez-Rodriguez, M.; Becnel, J.; Garcia-Diaz, B.; Adams, T.

    2012-09-25

    Reactive Gas Recycling (RGR) technology development has been initiated at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), with a stretch-goal to develop a fully dry recycling technology for Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF). This approach is attractive due to the potential of targeted gas-phase treatment steps to reduce footprint and secondary waste volumes associated with separations relying primarily on traditional technologies, so long as the fluorinators employed in the reaction are recycled for use in the reactors or are optimized for conversion of fluorinator reactant. The developed fluorination via SF{sub 6}, similar to the case for other fluorinators such as NF{sub 3}, can be used to address multiple fuel forms and downstream cycles including continued processing for LWR via fluorination or incorporation into a aqueous process (e.g. modified FLUOREX) or for subsequent pyro treatment to be used in advanced gas reactor designs such metal- or gas-cooled reactors. This report details the most recent experimental results on the reaction of SF{sub 6} with various fission product surrogate materials in the form of oxides and metals, including uranium oxides using a high-temperature DTA apparatus capable of temperatures in excess of 1000{deg}C . The experimental results indicate that the majority of the fission products form stable solid fluorides and sulfides, while a subset of the fission products form volatile fluorides such as molybdenum fluoride and niobium fluoride, as predicted thermodynamically. Additional kinetic analysis has been performed on additional fission products. A key result is the verification that SF{sub 6} requires high temperatures for direct fluorination and subsequent volatilization of uranium oxides to UF{sub 6}, and thus is well positioned as a head-end treatment for other separations technologies, such as the volatilization of uranium oxide by NF{sub 3} as reported by colleagues at PNNL, advanced pyrochemical separations or traditional full recycle

  10. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture... Regulation § 947.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets...

  11. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 946.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 946.54 from...

  12. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25... Education § 15b.25 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that provides a public elementary or secondary... related services, a system of procedural safeguards that includes notice, an opportunity for the...

  13. 34 CFR 303.170 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... process procedures in 34 CFR 300.506 through 300.512; or (2) The procedures that the State has developed... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true Procedural safeguards. 303.170 Section 303.170 Education... Procedural safeguards. Each application must include procedural safeguards that— (a) Are consistent...

  14. 7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture... RIO GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 906.44 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent the handling of...

  15. 7 CFR 958.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 958.56 Section 958.56 Agriculture... COUNTIES IN IDAHO, AND MALHEUR COUNTY, OREGON Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 958.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent...

  16. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public... Secondary Education § 84.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a public elementary or... need special instruction or related services, a system of procedural safeguards that includes...

  17. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture... Regulation § 947.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets...

  18. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... procedural safeguards that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person...

  19. 7 CFR 987.59 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 987.59 Section 987.59 Agriculture... Safeguards. The Committee may prescribe, with the approval of the Secretary, such rules, regulations and safeguards as are necessary to prevent dates covered by §§ 987.55 and 987.56 from interfering with...

  20. 29 CFR 452.110 - Adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Adequate safeguards. 452.110 Section 452.110 Labor... DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 Election Procedures; Rights of Members § 452.110 Adequate safeguards. (a) In addition to the election safeguards discussed in this part, the Act contains a general mandate in section...

  1. 29 CFR 452.110 - Adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Adequate safeguards. 452.110 Section 452.110 Labor... DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 Election Procedures; Rights of Members § 452.110 Adequate safeguards. (a) In addition to the election safeguards discussed in this part, the Act contains a general mandate in section...

  2. 34 CFR 303.170 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...— (1) The due process procedures in 34 CFR 300.506 through 300.512; or (2) The procedures that the... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 303.170 Section 303.170... Requirements § 303.170 Procedural safeguards. Each application must include procedural safeguards that— (a)...

  3. 7 CFR 987.59 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 987.59 Section 987.59 Agriculture... Safeguards. The Committee may prescribe, with the approval of the Secretary, such rules, regulations and safeguards as are necessary to prevent dates covered by §§ 987.55 and 987.56 from interfering with...

  4. 30 CFR 75.1403 - Other safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Other safeguards. 75.1403 Section 75.1403... MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Hoisting and Mantrips § 75.1403 Other safeguards. Other safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the Secretary, to minimize...

  5. 7 CFR 958.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 958.56 Section 958.56 Agriculture... COUNTIES IN IDAHO, AND MALHEUR COUNTY, OREGON Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 958.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent...

  6. 30 CFR 75.1403 - Other safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Other safeguards. 75.1403 Section 75.1403... MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Hoisting and Mantrips § 75.1403 Other safeguards. Other safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the Secretary, to minimize...

  7. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture... Regulating Handling Regulation § 966.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or §...

  8. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 18... Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall implement a system of procedural safeguards with respect to...

  9. 34 CFR 300.121 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 300.121 Section 300.121... safeguards. (a) General. The State must have procedural safeguards in effect to ensure that each public agency in the State meets the requirements of §§ 300.500 through 300.536. (b) Procedural...

  10. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture... Regulating Handling Regulation § 966.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or §...

  11. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 948.24 Safeguards. (a) Each area committee, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe adequate safeguards for potatoes handled pursuant to § 948.23...

  12. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 946.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 946.54 from...

  13. 7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture... RIO GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 906.44 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent the handling of...

  14. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 948.24 Safeguards. (a) Each area committee, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe adequate safeguards for potatoes handled pursuant to § 948.23...

  15. 34 CFR 300.121 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true Procedural safeguards. 300.121 Section 300.121 Education... DISABILITIES State Eligibility Additional Eligibility Requirements § 300.121 Procedural safeguards. (a) General. The State must have procedural safeguards in effect to ensure that each public agency in the...

  16. 32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records § 154.68 Safeguarding procedures. Personnel...

  17. The Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons Connection.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Leventhal, Paul

    1990-01-01

    Explains problems enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Provides factual charts and details concerning the production of nuclear energy and arms, the processing and disposal of waste products, and outlines the nuclear fuel cycle. Discusses safeguards, the risk of nuclear terrorism, and ways to deal with these problems. (NL)

  18. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    SciTech Connect

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  19. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  20. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    SciTech Connect

    Dickman, Deborah A.

    2003-12-16

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  1. 75 FR 27841 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-18

    ... ACRS meetings were published in the Federal Register on October 14, 2009 (74 FR 58268-58269). Detailed... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials...

  2. 75 FR 58447 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-24

    ... were published in the Federal Register on October 14, 2009, (74 FR 58268-58269). Detailed meeting... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials...

  3. 75 FR 27840 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-18

    ... participation in ACRS meetings were published in the Federal Register on October 14, 2009 (74 FR 58268-58269... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials The ACRS Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Materials...

  4. 76 FR 64126 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-10-17

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings Background This notice describes procedures to be followed with respect to meetings conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Advisory Committee on...

  5. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  6. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  7. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  8. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  9. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  10. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Early Site Permits § 52.23 Referral to the Advisory...

  11. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  12. 10 CFR 52.165 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.165 Section 52.165 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Manufacturing Licenses § 52.165 Referral to the...

  13. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Early Site Permits § 52.23 Referral to the Advisory...

  14. 10 CFR 52.23 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.23 Section 52.23 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Early Site Permits § 52.23 Referral to the Advisory...

  15. 10 CFR 52.87 - Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Referral to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). 52.87 Section 52.87 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) LICENSES, CERTIFICATIONS, AND APPROVALS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Combined Licenses § 52.87 Referral to the Advisory Committee...

  16. NMR-based structural biology enhanced by dynamic nuclear polarization at high magnetic field.

    PubMed

    Koers, Eline J; van der Cruijsen, Elwin A W; Rosay, Melanie; Weingarth, Markus; Prokofyev, Alexander; Sauvée, Claire; Ouari, Olivier; van der Zwan, Johan; Pongs, Olaf; Tordo, Paul; Maas, Werner E; Baldus, Marc

    2014-11-01

    Dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) has become a powerful method to enhance spectroscopic sensitivity in the context of magnetic resonance imaging and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy. We show that, compared to DNP at lower field (400 MHz/263 GHz), high field DNP (800 MHz/527 GHz) can significantly enhance spectral resolution and allows exploitation of the paramagnetic relaxation properties of DNP polarizing agents as direct structural probes under magic angle spinning conditions. Applied to a membrane-embedded K(+) channel, this approach allowed us to refine the membrane-embedded channel structure and revealed conformational substates that are present during two different stages of the channel gating cycle. High-field DNP thus offers atomic insight into the role of molecular plasticity during the course of biomolecular function in a complex cellular environment. PMID:25284462

  17. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

  18. Feasibility of x ray fluorescence for spent fuel safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Freeman, Corey Ross; Mozin, Vladimir; Tobin, Stephen J; Fensin, Michael L; White, Julia M; Croft, Stephen; Stafford, Alissa; Charlton, William

    2010-01-01

    Quantifying the Pu content in spent nuclear fuel is necessary for many reasons, in particular to verify that diversion or other illicit activities have not occurred. Therefore, safeguarding the world's nuclear fuel is paramount to responsible nuclear regulation and public acceptance, but achieving this goal presents many difficulties from both a technical and economic perspective. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) of NA-24 is funding a large collaborative effort between multiple laboratories and universities to improve spent nuclear fuel safeguards methods and equipment. This effort involves the current work of modeling several different nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. Several are being researched, because no single NDA technique, in isolation, has the potential to properly characterize fuel assemblies and offer a robust safeguards measure. The insights gained from this research, will be used to down-select from the original set a few of the most promising techniques that complement each other. The goal is to integrate the selected instruments to create an accurate measurement system for fuel verification that is also robust enough to detect diversions. These instruments will be fabricated and tested under realistic conditions. This work examines one of the NDA techniques; the feasibility of using x ray emission peaks from Pu and U to gather information about their relative quantities in the spent fuel. X Ray Fluorescence (XRF), is unique compared to the investigated techniques in that it is the only one able to give the elemental ratio of Pu to U, allowing the possibility of a Pu gram quantity for the assembly to be calculated. XRF also presents many challenges, mainly its low penetration, since the low energy x rays of interest are effectively shielded by the first few millimeters of a fuel pin. This paper will explore the results of Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) transport code calculations of spent fuel x ray peaks. The MCNPX

  19. A new model for Overhauser enhanced nuclear magnetic resonance using nitroxide radicals

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Armstrong, Brandon D.; Han, Songi

    2007-09-01

    Nitroxide free radicals are the most commonly used source for dynamic nuclear polarization (DNP) enhanced nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) experiments and are also exclusively employed as spin labels for electron spin resonance (ESR) spectroscopy of diamagnetic molecules and materials. Nitroxide free radicals have been shown to have strong dipolar coupling to H1 in water, and thus result in large DNP enhancement of H1 NMR signal via the well known Overhauser effect. The fundamental parameter in a DNP experiment is the coupling factor, since it ultimately determines the maximum NMR signal enhancements which can be achieved. Despite their widespread use, measurements of the coupling factor of nitroxide free radicals have been inconsistent, and current models have failed to successfully explain our experimental data. We found that the inconsistency in determining the coupling factor arises from not taking into account the characteristics of the ESR transitions, which are split into three (or two) lines due to the hyperfine coupling of the electron to the N14 nuclei (or N15) of the nitric oxide radical. Both intermolecular Heisenberg spin exchange interactions as well as intramolecular nitrogen nuclear spin relaxation mix the three (or two) ESR transitions. However, neither effect has been taken into account in any experimental studies on utilizing or quantifying the Overhauser driven DNP effects. The expected effect of Heisenberg spin exchange on Overhauser enhancements has already been theoretically predicted and observed by Bates and Drozdoski [J. Chem. Phys. 67, 4038 (1977)]. Here, we present a new model for quantifying Overhauser enhancements through nitroxide free radicals that includes both effects on mixing the ESR hyperfine states. This model predicts the maximum saturation factor to be considerably higher by the effect of nitrogen nuclear spin relaxation. Because intramolecular nitrogen spin relaxation is independent of the nitroxide concentration, this

  20. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  1. Enhancing nuclear power plant performance through the use of artifical intelligence

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M.; Maren, A.; Miller, L.; Uhrig, R.; Upadhyaya, B.

    1989-06-15

    In the summer of 1988, the Department of Nuclear Engineering (NE) at the University of Tennessee (UT) in Knoxville was selected to carry out a research program in Enhancing the Operation of Nuclear Power plants through the use of Artificial Intelligence, This program is sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Energy Research under 10CFR605 for Nuclear Engineering Research. The objective of the research is to advance the state-of-the-art of nuclear power plant control, safety, management, and instrumentation systems through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, including both expert systems and neural networks. The emphasis will be placed on methods that can be implemented on a rapid or real-time basis. A second, but equally important, objective is to build a broadly based critical mass of expertise in the artificial intelligence, field that can be brought to bear on the technology of nuclear power plants. Both of these goals are being met. This overview and the attached technical reports describe the work that is being carried out. Although in some cases, the scope of the work differs somewhat from the specific tasks described in the original proposal, all activities are clearly within the overall scope of the contract.

  2. Enhancing nuclear power plant performance through the use of artifical intelligence. First annual report

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, M.; Maren, A.; Miller, L.; Uhrig, R.; Upadhyaya, B.

    1989-06-15

    In the summer of 1988, the Department of Nuclear Engineering (NE) at the University of Tennessee (UT) in Knoxville was selected to carry out a research program in ``Enhancing the Operation of Nuclear Power plants through the use of Artificial Intelligence, This program is sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Energy Research under 10CFR605 for Nuclear Engineering Research. The objective of the research is to advance the state-of-the-art of nuclear power plant control, safety, management, and instrumentation systems through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques, including both expert systems and neural networks. The emphasis will be placed on methods that can be implemented on a rapid or real-time basis. A second, but equally important, objective is to build a broadly based critical mass of expertise in the artificial intelligence, field that can be brought to bear on the technology of nuclear power plants. Both of these goals are being met. This overview and the attached technical reports describe the work that is being carried out. Although in some cases, the scope of the work differs somewhat from the specific tasks described in the original proposal, all activities are clearly within the overall scope of the contract.

  3. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    PubMed

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines. PMID:15212014

  4. Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1986-10-01

    In order to compare several nuclear-safeguards verification approaches to one another and to the conventional facility-oriented approach, we establish a framework of the classes of information routinely verifiable by IAEA safeguards inspections. For each facility type within a State nuclear fuel cycle, the classes include flow data, inventory data, and shipper and receiver data. By showing which classes of information are verified for each facility type within three fuel cycles of different complexity, we distinguish the inspection approaches from one anoter and exhibit their fuel-cycle dependence, i.e., their need for sets of safeguards inspection activities different from those required under the facility-oriented approach at similar facilities in fuel cycles of differing complexity. Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 graphically depict these relations and give a qualitative summary of the relative effectiveness and effort requirements of the approaches classified. The zone, information-correlation, diversion-assumption-change, and randomization-over-facilities approaches depend intrinsically on the complexity of the fuel cycle: their very definition implies fuel-cycle dependence. The approaches involving randomization over activities and goal relaxations do not have such dependence.

  5. Brain nuclear magnetic resonance imaging enhanced by a paramagnetic nitroxide contrast agent: preliminary report. [Dogs

    SciTech Connect

    Brasch, R.C.; Nitecki, D.E.; Brant-Zawadzki, M.; Enzmann, D.R.; Wesbey, G.E.; Tozer, T.N.; Tuck, L.D.; Cann, C.E.; Fike, J.R.; Sheldon, P.

    1983-11-01

    Contrast-enhancing agents for demonstrating abnormalities of the blood-brain barrier may extend the diagnostic utility of proton nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) imaging. TES, a nitroxide stable free radical derivative, was tested as a central nervous system contrast enhancer in dogs with experimentally induced unilateral cerebritis or radiation cerebral damage. After intravenous injection of TES, the normal brain showed no change in NMR appearance, but areas of disease demonstrated a dramatic increase (up to 45%) in spin-echo intensity and a decrease in T/sub 1/, relaxation times. The areas of disease defined by TES enhancement were either not evident on the nonenhanced NMR images or were better defined after contrast administration. In-depth tests of toxicity, stability, and metabolism of this promising NMR contrast agent are now in progress.

  6. Dependence of Enhancer-Mediated Transcription of the Immunoglobulin μ Gene on Nuclear Matrix Attachment Regions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Forrester, William C.; van Genderen, Courtney; Jenuwein, Thomas; Grosschedl, Rudolf

    1994-08-01

    Transcription of the immunoglobulin μ heavy chain locus is regulated by an intronic enhancer that is flanked on both sides by nuclear matrix attachment regions (MARs). These MARs have now been shown to be essential for transcription of a rearranged μ gene in transgenic B lymphocytes, but they were not required in stably transfected tissue culture cells. Normal rates of transcriptional initiation at a variable region promoter and the formation of an extended deoxyribonuclease I (DNase I)-sensitive chromatin domain were dependent on MARs, although DNase I hypersensitivity at the enhancer was detected in the absence of MARs. Thus, transcriptional activation of the μ gene during normal lymphoid development requires a synergistic collaboration between the enhancer and flanking MARs.

  7. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Il, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Le, Loan A; Lopez, Leon N

    2010-01-01

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements

  8. Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced NMR at 187 GHz/284 MHz using an Extended Interaction Klystron amplifier

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kemp, Thomas F.; Dannatt, Hugh R. W.; Barrow, Nathan S.; Watts, Anthony; Brown, Steven P.; Newton, Mark E.; Dupree, Ray

    2016-04-01

    A Dynamic Nuclear Polarisation (DNP) enhanced solid-state Magic Angle Spinning (MAS) NMR spectrometer which uses a 187 GHz (corresponding to 1H NMR frequency of 284 MHz) Extended Interaction Klystron (EIK) amplifier as the microwave source is briefly described. Its performance is demonstrated for a biomolecule (bacteriorhodopsin), a pharmaceutical, and surface functionalised silica. The EIK is very compact and easily incorporated into an existing spectrometer. The bandwidth of the amplifier is sufficient that it obviates the need for a sweepable magnetic field, once set, for all commonly used radicals. The variable power (CW or pulsed) output from the EIK is transmitted to the DNP-NMR probe using a quasi-optic system with a high power isolator and a corrugated waveguide which feeds the microwaves into the DNP-NMR probe. Curved mirrors inside the probe project the microwaves down the axis of the MAS rotor, giving a very efficient system such that maximum DNP enhancement is achieved with less than 3 W output from the microwave source. The DNP-NMR probe operates with a sample temperature down to 90 K whilst spinning at 8 kHz. Significant enhancements, in excess of 100 for bacteriorhodopsin in purple membrane (bR in PM), are shown along with spectra which are enhanced by ≈25 with respect to room temperature, for both the pharmaceutical furosemide and surface functionalised silica. These enhancements allow hitherto prohibitively time consuming experiments to be undertaken. The power at which the DNP enhancement in bR in PM saturates does not change significantly between 90 K and 170 K even though the enhancement drops by a factor of ≈11. As the DNP build up time decreases by a factor 3 over this temperature range, the reduction in T1n is presumably a significant contribution to the drop in enhancement.

  9. Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced NMR at 187 GHz/284 MHz using an Extended Interaction Klystron amplifier.

    PubMed

    Kemp, Thomas F; Dannatt, Hugh R W; Barrow, Nathan S; Watts, Anthony; Brown, Steven P; Newton, Mark E; Dupree, Ray

    2016-04-01

    A Dynamic Nuclear Polarisation (DNP) enhanced solid-state Magic Angle Spinning (MAS) NMR spectrometer which uses a 187 GHz (corresponding to (1)H NMR frequency of 284 MHz) Extended Interaction Klystron (EIK) amplifier as the microwave source is briefly described. Its performance is demonstrated for a biomolecule (bacteriorhodopsin), a pharmaceutical, and surface functionalised silica. The EIK is very compact and easily incorporated into an existing spectrometer. The bandwidth of the amplifier is sufficient that it obviates the need for a sweepable magnetic field, once set, for all commonly used radicals. The variable power (CW or pulsed) output from the EIK is transmitted to the DNP-NMR probe using a quasi-optic system with a high power isolator and a corrugated waveguide which feeds the microwaves into the DNP-NMR probe. Curved mirrors inside the probe project the microwaves down the axis of the MAS rotor, giving a very efficient system such that maximum DNP enhancement is achieved with less than 3 W output from the microwave source. The DNP-NMR probe operates with a sample temperature down to 90K whilst spinning at 8 kHz. Significant enhancements, in excess of 100 for bacteriorhodopsin in purple membrane (bR in PM), are shown along with spectra which are enhanced by ≈25 with respect to room temperature, for both the pharmaceutical furosemide and surface functionalised silica. These enhancements allow hitherto prohibitively time consuming experiments to be undertaken. The power at which the DNP enhancement in bR in PM saturates does not change significantly between 90K and 170 K even though the enhancement drops by a factor of ≈11. As the DNP build up time decreases by a factor 3 over this temperature range, the reduction in T1n is presumably a significant contribution to the drop in enhancement. PMID:26867091

  10. Implementation of IAEA safeguards at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

    SciTech Connect

    Giacomini, J.J.; Finleon, C.A.; Larsen, R.K.; Lucas, M.; Langner, D.

    1995-07-01

    When President Clinton spoke to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1993, he offered to place US excess defense nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, before the next Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. This set in motion a flurry of activities at three DOE facilities, including Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site). With general guidance from DOE Headquarters, the facility selected a suitable storage area, identified appropriate materials, and acquired the necessary instrumentation to implement full-scale IAEA safeguards on excess plutonium oxide.

  11. Smarter radiation monitors for safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.; Pratt, J.C.; Markin, J.T.; Scurry, T. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    Radiation monitors for nuclear safeguards and security depend on internal control circuits to determine when diversion of special nuclear materials is taking place. Early monitors depended on analog circuits for this purpose, subsequently, digital logic controllers made better monitoring methods possible. Now, versatile microprocessor systems permit new, more efficient, and more useful monitoring methods. One such method is simple stepwise monitoring, which has variable alarm levels to expedite monitoring where extended monitoring periods are required. Another method, sequential probability ratio logic, tests data as it accumulates against two hypothesis - background, or background plus a transient diversion signal - and terminates monitoring as soon as a decision can be made that meets false-alarm and detection confidence requirements. A third method, quantitative monitoring for personnel, calculates count ratios of high- to low-energy gamma-ray regions to predict whether the material detected is a small quantity of bare material or a larger quantity of shielded material. In addition, microprocessor system subprograms can assist in detector calibration and trouble-shooting. Examples of subprograms are a variance analysis technique to set bias levels in plastic scintillators and a state-of-health routine for detecting malfunctions in digital circuit components.

  12. Analyzing safeguards alarms and response decisions

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-01-01

    This report describes a quantitative model designed to help the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its licensees evaluate and respond to alarms indicating that special nuclear material (SNM) may be missing. The model is called the Alarm/Response (A/R) Model. The report demonstrates three principal uses of the A/R Model. The first is determining the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error. The second is evaluating alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to extortion threats from individuals claiming to possess SNM. For each possible alarm, the model identifies the best response, which can be used to develop contingency plans that the licensee and the NRC can carry out. The third use is to assist the NRC in setting performance standards, especially detection time requirements. In this application, the model helps to determine the value of more timely alarms produced by licensee safeguards systems. All three uses are demonstrated with hypothetical examples. A preliminary computer code produced sample results and determined the sensitivity of those results to subjective factors in the example.

  13. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... reporting discrepancies. (D) Password management (Addressable). Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords. (6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures. Implement policies and procedures...

  14. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... reporting discrepancies. (D) Password management (Addressable). Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords. (6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures. Implement policies and procedures...

  15. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  16. Safeguard monitoring of direct electrolytic reduction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jurovitzki, Abraham L.

    Nuclear power is regaining global prominence as a sustainable energy source as the world faces the consequences of depending on limited fossil based, CO2 emitting fuels. A key component to achieving this sustainability is to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Without achieving this goal, a relatively small fraction of the energy value in nuclear fuel is actually utilized. This involves recycling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)---separating fissile actinides from waste products and using them to fabricate fresh fuel. Pyroprocessing is a viable option being developed for this purpose with a host of benefits compared to other recycling options, such as PUREX. Notably, pyroprocessing is ill suited to separate pure plutonium from spent fuel and thus has non-proliferation benefits. Pyroprocessing involves high temperature electrochemical and chemical processing of SNF in a molten salt electrolyte. During this batch process, several intermediate and final streams are produced that contain radioactive material. While pyroprocessing is ineffective at separating pure plutonium, there are various process misuse scenarios that could result in diversion of impure plutonium into one or more of these streams. This is a proliferation risk that should be addressed with innovative safeguards technology. One approach to meeting this challenge is to develop real time monitoring techniques that can be implemented in the hot cells and coupled with the various unit operations involved with pyroprocessing. Current state of the art monitoring techniques involve external chemical assaying which requires sample removal from these unit operations. These methods do not meet International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) timeliness requirements. In this work, a number of monitoring techniques were assessed for their viability as online monitoring tools. A hypothetical diversion scenario for the direct electrolytic reduction process was experimentally verified (using Nd2O3 as a surrogate for PuO2

  17. Safeguards by design - industry engagement for new uranium enrichment facilities in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Grice, Thomas; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) has initiated a Safeguards by Design (SBD) effort to encourage the incorporation of international (IAEA) safeguards features early in the design phase of a new nuclear facility in order to avoid the need to redesign or retrofit the facility at a later date. The main goals of Safeguards by Design are to (1) make the implementation of international safeguards at new civil nuclear facilities more effective and efficient, (2) avoid costly and time-consuming re-design work or retrofits at such facilities and (3) design such facilities in a way that makes proliferation as technically difficult, as time-consuming, and as detectable as possible. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently hosted efforts to facilitate the use of Safeguards by Design for new uranium enrichment facilities currently being planned for construction in the U.S. While SBD is not a NRC requirement, the NRC is aiding the implementation of SBD by coordinating discussions between DOE's NA-24 and industry's facility design teams. More specifically, during their normal course of licensing discussions the NRC has offered industry the opportunity to engage with NA-24 regarding SBD.

  18. UC Berkeley Nuclear Engineering Curriculum and Research Enhancement. Final report, February 14, 1993--February 14, 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Fowler, T.K.; Peterson, P.F.

    1995-05-11

    This is a report for the 2/14/93 to 2/14/95 period of the five-year program proposed and initiated in 1992, for curriculum and research enhancement for the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. The program is designed to strengthen the departmental academic infrastructure and improve the education breadth of nuclear engineering students. The DOE funds have supported scholarships and a novel educational program which includes summer coursework at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. The summer course provides an important introduction to reactor safety and operations to students who will in the future be responsible for running many of our existing nuclear power plants. The work was funded under DOE contract DE-FG0393ER75856, with a matching gift to the Department from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E). The program described in the original grant proposal has been successful implemented with an enthusiastic response from our students and faculty. The program consisted of two parts, one for innovative additions to our curriculum funded by the DOE, and the other for distinguished lectureships and support for basic research funded by gifts from PG&E.

  19. Interactions between the nuclear matrix and an enhancer of the tryptophan oxygenase gene

    SciTech Connect

    Kaneoka, Hidenori; Miyake, Katsuhide; Iijima, Shinji

    2009-10-02

    The gene for tryptophan oxygenase (TO) is expressed in adult hepatocytes in a tissue- and differentiation-specific manner. The TO promoter has two glucocorticoid-responsive elements (GREs), and its expression is regulated by glucocorticoid hormone in the liver. We found a novel GRE in close proximity to a scaffold/matrix attachment region (S/MAR) that was located around -8.5 kb from the transcriptional start site of the TO gene by electrophoretic mobility shift and chromatin immunoprecipitation (ChIP) assays. A combination of nuclear fractionation and quantitative PCR analysis showed that the S/MAR was tethered to the nuclear matrix in both fetal and adult hepatocytes. ChIP assay showed that, in adult hepatocytes, the S/MAR-GRE and the promoter proximal regions interacted with lamin and heterogeneous nuclear ribonucleoprotein U in a dexamethasone dependent manner, but this was not the case in fetal cells, suggesting that developmental stage-specific expression of the TO gene might rely on the binding of the enhancer (the -8.5 kb S/MAR-GRE) and the promoter to the inner nuclear matrix.

  20. THz-waves channeling in a monolithic saddle-coil for Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced NMR.

    PubMed

    Macor, A; de Rijk, E; Annino, G; Alberti, S; Ansermet, J-Ph

    2011-10-01

    A saddle coil manufactured by electric discharge machining (EDM) from a solid piece of copper has recently been realized at EPFL for Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced Nuclear Magnetic Resonance experiments (DNP-NMR) at 9.4 T. The corresponding electromagnetic behavior of radio-frequency (400 MHz) and THz (263 GHz) waves were studied by numerical simulation in various measurement configurations. Moreover, we present an experimental method by which the results of the THz-wave numerical modeling are validated. On the basis of the good agreement between numerical and experimental results, we conducted by numerical simulation a systematic analysis on the influence of the coil geometry and of the sample properties on the THz-wave field, which is crucial in view of the optimization of DNP-NMR in solids. PMID:21903436

  1. Nuclear AURKA acquires kinase-independent transactivating function to enhance breast cancer stem cell phenotype

    PubMed Central

    Zheng, Feimeng; Yue, Caifeng; Li, Guohui; He, Bin; Cheng, Wei; Wang, Xi; Yan, Min; Long, Zijie; Qiu, Wanshou; Yuan, Zhongyu; Xu, Jie; Liu, Bing; Shi, Qian; Lam, Eric W.-F.; Hung, Mien-Chie; Liu, Quentin

    2016-01-01

    Centrosome-localized mitotic Aurora kinase A (AURKA) facilitates G2/M events. Here we show that AURKA translocates to the nucleus and causes distinct oncogenic properties in malignant cells by enhancing breast cancer stem cell (BCSC) phenotype. Unexpectedly, this function is independent of its kinase activity. Instead, AURKA preferentially interacts with heterogeneous nuclear ribonucleoprotein K (hnRNP K) in the nucleus and acts as a transcription factor in a complex that induces a shift in MYC promoter usage and activates the MYC promoter. Blocking AURKA nuclear localization inhibits this newly discovered transactivating function of AURKA, sensitizing resistant BCSC to kinase inhibition. These findings identify a previously unknown oncogenic property of the spatially deregulated AURKA in tumorigenesis and provide a potential therapeutic opportunity to overcome kinase inhibitor resistance. PMID:26782714

  2. THz-waves channeling in a monolithic saddle-coil for Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced NMR

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Macor, A.; de Rijk, E.; Annino, G.; Alberti, S.; Ansermet, J.-Ph.

    2011-10-01

    A saddle coil manufactured by electric discharge machining (EDM) from a solid piece of copper has recently been realized at EPFL for Dynamic Nuclear Polarization enhanced Nuclear Magnetic Resonance experiments (DNP-NMR) at 9.4 T. The corresponding electromagnetic behavior of radio-frequency (400 MHz) and THz (263 GHz) waves were studied by numerical simulation in various measurement configurations. Moreover, we present an experimental method by which the results of the THz-wave numerical modeling are validated. On the basis of the good agreement between numerical and experimental results, we conducted by numerical simulation a systematic analysis on the influence of the coil geometry and of the sample properties on the THz-wave field, which is crucial in view of the optimization of DNP-NMR in solids.

  3. Verifiable process monitoring through enhanced data authentication.

    SciTech Connect

    Goncalves, Joao G. M.; Schwalbach, Peter; Schoeneman, Barry Dale; Ross, Troy D.; Baldwin, George Thomas

    2010-09-01

    To ensure the peaceful intent for production and processing of nuclear fuel, verifiable process monitoring of the fuel production cycle is required. As part of a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EURATOM collaboration in the field of international nuclear safeguards, the DOE Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) and Directorate General-Energy (DG-ENER) developed and demonstrated a new concept in process monitoring, enabling the use of operator process information by branching a second, authenticated data stream to the Safeguards inspectorate. This information would be complementary to independent safeguards data, improving the understanding of the plant's operation. The concept is called the Enhanced Data Authentication System (EDAS). EDAS transparently captures, authenticates, and encrypts communication data that is transmitted between operator control computers and connected analytical equipment utilized in nuclear processes controls. The intent is to capture information as close to the sensor point as possible to assure the highest possible confidence in the branched data. Data must be collected transparently by the EDAS: Operator processes should not be altered or disrupted by the insertion of the EDAS as a monitoring system for safeguards. EDAS employs public key authentication providing 'jointly verifiable' data and private key encryption for confidentiality. Timestamps and data source are also added to the collected data for analysis. The core of the system hardware is in a security enclosure with both active and passive tamper indication. Further, the system has the ability to monitor seals or other security devices in close proximity. This paper will discuss the EDAS concept, recent technical developments, intended application philosophy and the planned future progression of this system.

  4. Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

    SciTech Connect

    Ivan R. Thomas; Ernest L. Laible

    2008-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper’s measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical

  5. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab.

  6. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  7. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  8. Nuclear quantum effects of hydrogen bonds probed by tip-enhanced inelastic electron tunneling.

    PubMed

    Guo, Jing; Lü, Jing-Tao; Feng, Yexin; Chen, Ji; Peng, Jinbo; Lin, Zeren; Meng, Xiangzhi; Wang, Zhichang; Li, Xin-Zheng; Wang, En-Ge; Jiang, Ying

    2016-04-15

    We report the quantitative assessment of nuclear quantum effects on the strength of a single hydrogen bond formed at a water-salt interface, using tip-enhanced inelastic electron tunneling spectroscopy based on a scanning tunneling microscope. The inelastic scattering cross section was resonantly enhanced by "gating" the frontier orbitals of water via a chlorine-terminated tip, so the hydrogen-bonding strength can be determined with high accuracy from the red shift in the oxygen-hydrogen stretching frequency of water. Isotopic substitution experiments combined with quantum simulations reveal that the anharmonic quantum fluctuations of hydrogen nuclei weaken the weak hydrogen bonds and strengthen the relatively strong ones. However, this trend can be completely reversed when a hydrogen bond is strongly coupled to the polar atomic sites of the surface. PMID:27081066

  9. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1996, Vol. 2, Rev. 5

    SciTech Connect

    1997-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 5, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, through December 31, 1996. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  10. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL), January 1, 1990--December 31, 1995

    SciTech Connect

    1996-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL), Vol. 2, Rev. 4, provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) which occurred and were reported from January 1, 1990, rough December 31, 1995. Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing and/or Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms, Radiological Sabotage, Nonradiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels.

  11. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  12. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards. 39.18 Section 39.18 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS Compliance with Core Principles § 39.18 System safeguards. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: Recovery time...

  13. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF...

  14. 7 CFR 959.54 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 959.54 Section 959.54 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... Regulating Handling Regulations § 959.54 Safeguards. The committee, with the approval of the Secretary,...

  15. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... instruction regarding the State's policies and procedures under § 300.123 and 34 CFR part 99. (d) Each... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguards. 300.623 Section 300.623 Education... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of...

  16. 7 CFR 959.54 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 959.54 Section 959.54 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... Regulating Handling Regulations § 959.54 Safeguards. The committee, with the approval of the Secretary,...

  17. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... instruction regarding the State's policies and procedures under § 300.123 and 34 CFR part 99. (d) Each... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true Safeguards. 300.623 Section 300.623 Education... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of...

  18. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  19. Pike. A nuclear gtpase that enhances PI3kinase activity and is regulated by protein 4.1N.

    PubMed

    Ye, K; Hurt, K J; Wu, F Y; Fang, M; Luo, H R; Hong, J J; Blackshaw, S; Ferris, C D; Snyder, S H

    2000-12-01

    While cytoplasmic PI3Kinase (PI3K) is well characterized, regulation of nuclear PI3K has been obscure. A novel protein, PIKE (PI3Kinase Enhancer), interacts with nuclear PI3K to stimulate its lipid kinase activity. PIKE encodes a 753 amino acid nuclear GTPase. Dominant-negative PIKE prevents the NGF enhancement of PI3K and upregulation of cyclin D1. NGF treatment also leads to PIKE interactions with 4.1N, which has translocated to the nucleus, fitting with the initial identification of PIKE based on its binding 4.1N in a yeast two-hybrid screen. Overexpression of 4.1N abolishes PIKE effects on PI3K. Activation of nuclear PI3K by PIKE is inhibited by the NGF-stimulated 4.1N translocation to the nucleus. Thus, PIKE physiologically modulates the activation by NGF of nuclear PI3K. PMID:11136977

  20. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    SciTech Connect

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.