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Sample records for international safeguards system

  1. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  2. The origin of international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The evolution of international safeguards from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1946 through implementation of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in the 1970's with attention to the political considerations and evolving nuclear activities which influenced this development. Specific steps discussed include: the U.S. proposal for an International Atomic Energy Authority, presented by Bernard Baruch in 1946, President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal in 1953, discussions leading to the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, adopted in 1957, and the formal definitions of IAEA safeguards in the documents INFCIRC/26, 66 and 153 in 1962, 1966, and 1970, respectively.

  3. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility.

  4. The role of regional systems in international non-proliferation safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Gmelin, W.

    1993-12-31

    In 1990 the IAEA spent some 80% of its safeguards resources in countries or regions where the probability of diversion, i.e. of breaching the NPT is low, or non-existent. This paper discusses possible causes for such an allocation of IAEA resources, possible changes as well as the dilemma that the political concept of Non-discrimination has adversely affected the achievement of the political objectives of Non-Proliferation, the latter comprising discriminatory elements by definition. Possible solutions to this dilemma, while observing that the diversion probabilities are unequally distributed worldwide, include the necessary measures defined to strengthen IAEA safeguards through universal reporting of nuclear materials and equipment but also the decentralization of non-proliferation responsibilities to State systems and/or Regional safeguards systems. The paper discusses, following the presentation of the well-known five criteria for the determination of the relative importance of a regional safeguards system, various arguments pro and against the taking into account of and the reliance on State systems compared with regional systems in non-proliferation safeguards.

  5. Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Sorenson, R.J.; Sheely, K.B.; Brown, J.B.; Horton, R.D.; Strittmatter, R.; Manatt, D.R.

    1994-04-01

    The requirements for the management of information at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Department of Safeguards are rapidly changing. Historically, the Department of Safeguards has had the requirement to process large volumes of conventional safeguards information. An information management system is currently in place that adequately handles the IAEA`s conventional safeguards data needs. In the post-Iraq environment, however, there is a growing need to expand the IAEA information management capability to include unconventional forms of information. These data include environmental sampling results, photographs, video film, lists of machine tools, and open-source materials such as unclassified publications. The US Department of Energy (DOE) has responded to this information management need by implementing the Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) initiative. SIMS was created by the DOE to anticipate and respond to IAEA information management needs through a multilaboratory initiative that will utilize an integrated approach to develop and deploy technology in a timely and cost-effective manner. The DOE will use the SIMS initiative to coordinate US information management activities that support the IAEA Department of Safeguards.

  6. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  7. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    SciTech Connect

    Okowita, Samantha L

    2014-01-01

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  8. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    SciTech Connect

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE`s Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL.

  9. Taxonomy of potential international safeguards regimes

    SciTech Connect

    Lemley, J.R.; Allentuck, J.

    1994-08-01

    Since the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) search for the components of Iraq`s nuclear weapons program under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, a consensus for enhancing, strengthening or expanding the scope of international safeguards has developed. Some of the enhanced safeguards concepts which have been suggested include the following: short-notice, challenge, and random inspections; effluent monitoring in onsite, near site, and fly-by modes; local and wide-area environmental monitoring; and utilization of data from space-platform sensors. Potential safeguards regimes can be classified according to the functional and technical criteria which would be necessary for implementation of various enhanced safeguards concepts. While the nature of the regime which will emerge cannot be predicted, the classification of possible regimes according to major characteristics can be useful for identifying functional criteria and implementation challenges, focusing development efforts on the functional criteria, and planning for efficient use of safeguards resources. Precedents established in previously negotiated treaties -- the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, START, and Open Skies -- are examined with regard to enhancement of the international safeguards regime for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Bilateral, multilateral and regional integration of enhanced safeguards elements is considered.

  10. Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant Safeguards System Modeling

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; O'Connell, W J; Boyer, B D

    2006-06-05

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems used in enrichment facilities. This research focuses on analyzing the effectiveness of the safeguards in protecting against the range of safeguards concerns for enrichment plants, including diversion of attractive material and unauthorized modes of use. We developed an Extend simulation model for a generic medium-sized centrifuge enrichment plant. We modeled the material flow in normal operation, plant operational upset modes, and selected diversion scenarios, for selected safeguards systems. Simulation modeling is used to analyze both authorized and unauthorized use of a plant and the flow of safeguards information. Simulation tracks the movement of materials and isotopes, identifies the signatures of unauthorized use, tracks the flow and compilation of safeguards data, and evaluates the effectiveness of the safeguards system in detecting misuse signatures. The simulation model developed could be of use to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, enabling the IAEA to observe and draw conclusions that uranium enrichment facilities are being used only within authorized limits for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will evaluate improved approaches to nonproliferation concerns, facilitating deployment of enhanced and cost-effective safeguards systems for an important part of the nuclear power fuel cycle.

  11. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  12. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  13. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  14. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-09-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future.

  15. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  16. Design Vulnerability Assessments for Safeguards Sealing Systems

    SciTech Connect

    Brockman, Linda; Johnston, Roger; Kravtchenko, Victor; Undem, Halvor A.; Wishard, Bernard

    2010-08-11

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (the "Agency") engages in a rigorous equipment authorization process prior to deploying Safeguards instrumentation, including Safeguards sealing systems, for world-wide use. A positive result from a vulnerability assessment is one of the many requirements that must be met prior to instrumentation deployment. Given the long time period in the Safeguards instrumentation development cycle, the substantial Member State investments made, and the significant Agency staff time required, a negative result for the vulnerability assessment can result in the loss of time, considerable additional expense, or even the failure to deploy an instrument or sealing system at all. First suggested in 1998 by the General Physics Institute in Moscow, an approach that incorporates a design vulnerability assessment minimizes the risk of deployment failure by teaming a public sector vulnerability assessment team with the instrument or sealing system design team in order to identify, at the earliest possible design stage, inherent vulnerabilities. Involving the vulnerability assessors early and often in the design and development process avoids many of the problems inherent in evaluating security vulnerabilities only after the design is finalized. The disadvantages include increased costs and time to deployment. An improved pressure-sensitive adhesive label seal, called the "VOID-3 seal" was developed for the Agency using this design vulnerability assessment process.

  17. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  18. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.V.; DeLand, S.M.; Whiteson, R.; Anzelon, G.

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  19. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  20. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-09-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ``full-scope`` safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ``flows`` between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ``mailbox`` declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  1. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  2. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  3. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards. 39.18 Section 39.18 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION DERIVATIVES CLEARING ORGANIZATIONS Compliance with Core Principles § 39.18 System safeguards. (a) Definitions. For purposes of this section: Recovery time...

  4. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  5. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    SciTech Connect

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  6. Prerequisites for an improvement of international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Weh, R.; Stein, G.

    1993-12-31

    There is reason to believe that the present NPT safeguards regime is unsatisfactory. Improvement entirely within the present framework of INFCIRC/153 seems questionable. Controlled and well-defined challenge inspection procedures patterned on the Chemical Weapons Convention coupled with inclusion of all NPT member states in the inspection regime offer a promising and universally acceptable extension which would greatly enhance credibility.

  7. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future

    SciTech Connect

    Markin, J.T.; Augustson, R.H.; Eccleston, G.W.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards from the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s it evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations. 15 refs.

  8. Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Doehle, Joel R.; Toomey, Christopher M.

    2014-09-30

    In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

  9. Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

    SciTech Connect

    Scheinman, L.

    1993-04-01

    The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity.

  10. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  11. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    .../Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION... Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  12. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  13. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  14. Lessons Learned from the Development of an Example Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.; Burtner, IV, E. R.; Doehle, J. R.; Hampton, S. D.; La Mothe, R. R.; Nordquist, P. L.; Zarzhitsky, D. V.

    2014-12-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is interested in increasing capabilities of IAEA safeguards inspectors to access information that would improve their situational awareness on the job. A mobile information platform could potentially provide access to information, analytics, and technical and logistical support to inspectors in the field, as well as providing regular updates to analysts at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna or at satellite offices. To demonstrate the potential capability of such a system, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) implemented a number of example capabilities within a PNNL-developed precision information environment (PIE), and using a tablet as a mobile information platform. PNNL’s safeguards proof-of-concept PIE intends to; demonstrate novel applications of mobile information platforms to international safeguards use cases; demonstrate proof-of-principle capability implementation; and provide “vision” for capabilities that could be implemented. This report documents the lessons learned from this two-year development activity for the Precision Information Environment for International Safeguards (PIE-IS), describing the developed capabilities, technical challenges, and considerations for future development, so that developers working to develop a similar system for the IAEA or other safeguards agencies might benefit from our work.

  15. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ...) Information security; (2) Business continuity—disaster recovery planning and resources; (3) Capacity and... repository that the Commission determines is critical must maintain a degree of geographic dispersal of both... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards....

  16. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... shall address each of the following categories of risk analysis and oversight: (1) Information security... repository that the Commission determines is critical must maintain a degree of geographic dispersal of both... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false System safeguards....

  17. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    SciTech Connect

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  18. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  19. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  20. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, Michael H; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-02-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  1. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  2. Evaluation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Analytical Laboratory quality assurance program

    SciTech Connect

    Pietri, C.E.; Bracey, J.T.

    1985-02-01

    Destructive analysis is used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through its Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) to verify, in part, the inventory of nuclear materials at nuclear facilities. The reliability and quality of these meassurements must be assured in a systematic manner. The Division of Safeguards Evaluation, IAEA, required assistance in developing and implementing the quality assurance measures for the analytical procedures used in the destructive analysis of these safeguards samples. To meet these needs an ISPO POTAS Task D.53 was instituted in which consultants would review with IAEA staff the procedures used (or proposed) at SAL for the destructive analysis of safeguards samples and the statistical evaluation of the resulting measurement data at Headquarters. The procedures included analytical methods, qualtiy control measures, and the treatment of data from these activities. Based on this review, modifications to the system, if required, would be recommended which would provide routine assurance to management that these procedures are functioning properly to achieve safeguards objectives. In the course of this review, the sample handling procedures, measurement control activities, analytical methods, reference materials, calibration procedures, statistical analysis of data, and data management system were studied and evaluated. The degree to which SAL (as a total system) achieved laboratory quality assurance was assessed by comparison to accepted standards of quality assurance. 22 refs., 1 fig.

  3. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  4. A Critical Element to Successful Implementation Of Future Safeguards Systems

    SciTech Connect

    Dickman, Deborah A.

    2003-12-16

    As we look to the future of nuclear materials management and safeguards systems, it is essential to place significant emphasis on creation of a strong infrastructure to support and sustain modern systems. Traditionally, safeguards infrastructure development has focused on such elements as equipment development, strengthening of the national regulatory base, creation of state-of-the-art accounting and control systems, and procedure development. Less emphasis has been placed on recognition of the 'human element' as a primary component of the necessary infrastructure and the key to successful implementation of new or existing systems. The importance of the human element can be recognized by considering the broad span of influence and control, direction, regulation and implementation of safeguards systems exhibited by a large number of professionals: diplomats, scholars, politicians, facility managers, program directors and technical specialists. These individuals provide the connectivity or 'glue' that binds together a myriad of smaller safeguards program elements and ensures a holistic approach is fostered and maintained. The education and training of our future leaders and experts must receive the highest priority. In addition, this effort must consider factors beyond development of technical capabilities. Given the rapidly evolving world climate since the end of the cold war, our safeguards leaders and experts need education and training that will provide a well-developed understanding of the broader political dimensions of current nonproliferation challenges. They need to learn how to think, rather than what to think. A sustained effort is required to highlight the importance of the human dimension of safeguards and nuclear materials management and how these systems support international nonproliferation efforts. New educational initiatives are needed to better prepare the next generation of leaders and experts. Increased regional and national cooperation in the

  5. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  6. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Nordquist, Heather A; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  7. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards after Iraq - some Austrailian perceptions

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.; Carlson, J.; Hill, J.

    1994-12-31

    Iraq`s nuclear weapons development program used facilities and nuclear material separate from its safeguarded activities. To detect such a strategy the IAEA`s safeguards inspectors need access to locations and information beyond that foreseen in NPT safeguards agreements. But the IAEA is short of money. And detecting undeclared activities could be expensive. If the IAEA can establish a capability to detect undeclared activities, then it might be able to save on regular safeguards. But it`s important not to put the cart before the horse - effective safeguards must come first, savings second.

  8. Can a safeguards accountancy system really detect an unauthorized removal

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.; Ellis, J.H.

    1981-11-01

    Theoretical investigations and system studies indicate safeguards material balance data from reprocessing plants can be used to detect unauthorized removals. Plant systems have been modeled and simulated data used to demonstrate the techniques. But how sensitive are the techniques when used with actual plant data. What is the effect of safeguards applications on plant operability. Can safeguards be acceptable to plant operators, and are there any benefits to be derived. The Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) has been devoted to answering these and other questions over the past several years. A computerized system of near-real-time accounting and in-process inventory has been implemented and demonstrated during actual plant test runs. Measured inventories and hourly material balance closures have been made to assess safeguards in an operating plant application. The tests have culminated in actual removals of material from the operating plant to investigate the response and measure the sensitivity of the safeguards and data evaluation system.

  9. Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; Lambert, H; O'Connell, W J

    2004-06-16

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems. For this goal several DOE National Laboratories are defining the characteristics of typical facilities of several size scales, and the safeguards measures and instrumentation that could be applied. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is providing systems modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, diversion path generation, and safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Safeguards indicator probabilities are based on sampling statistics and/or measurement accuracies. Scenarios are ranked based on value and quantity of material removed and the estimated probability of non-detection. Significant scenarios, especially those involving timeliness or randomly varying order of events, are transferred to simulation analysis. Simulations show the range of conditions encountered by the safeguards measurements and inspections, e.g., the quantities of intermediate materials in temporary storage and the time sequencing of material flow. Given a diversion campaign, simulations show how much the range of the same parameters observed by the safeguards system can differ from the base-case range. The combination of digraphs, fault trees, statistics and simulation constitute a method for evaluation of the estimated benefit of alternate or additional safeguards equipment or features. A generic example illustrates the method.

  10. Nexus of technologies : international safeguards, physical protection and arms control.

    SciTech Connect

    Jordan, Sabina Erteza; Blair, Dianna Sue; Smartt, Heidi Anne

    2010-09-01

    New technologies have been, and are continuing to be, developed for Safeguards, Arms Control, and Physical Protection. Application spaces and technical requirements are evolving - Overlaps are developing. Lessons learned from IAEA's extensive experience could benefit other communities. Technologies developed for other applications may benefit Safeguards - Inherent cost benefits and improvements in procurement security processes.

  11. Us-Japan cooperation on safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Menlove, Howard O; Hori, Masato; Kawakubo, Yoko; Mcclelland - Kerr, J

    2009-01-01

    There is a long history of collaborative safeguards development between the United States and Japan. Japan has built, and continues to expand, the largest civil nuclear fuel cycle under full-scope IAEA safeguards in world. This development has posed unique challenges to the international safeguards system. Safeguards developments made through the US-Japan cooperation to address these unique challenges have significantly impacted the technologies deployed for international safeguards applications around the world.

  12. Enabling International Safeguards Research and Development in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    John E. Dwight; Mark J. Schanfein; Trond A. Bjornard

    2009-07-01

    Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is the lead laboratory in nuclear energy research and development within the U.S. Department of Energy national laboratory complex. INL is tasked with the advancement of nuclear energy research and development, and leadership in the renaissance of nuclear power globally. INL scientists have been central to the assessment of needs and the integration of technical programs aimed at the world-wide growth of nuclear power. One of the grand challenges of the nuclear energy resurgence is nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation technology development is key to meeting this challenge. The needed advances in nonproliferation technologies are being made more difficult by the growing gap between increasing demands for nuclear materials to support technology development, and reduced availability of these materials. The gap is caused by the reduction, consolidation and more stringent lockdown of nuclear materials, made necessary by heightened and evolving security concerns, in the face of increased demand for materials to support technology development. Ironically, the increased demand for materials for technology development is made necessary by these same security concerns. The situation will continue to worsen if safeguards and security budgets remain limited for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and many member states, while growth in global nuclear energy becomes a reality. Effective U.S. leadership in the closing of this gap is vital to homeland security and global stability. INL has taken positive steps, described in this paper, to close this gap by reestablishing a viable base for the development, testing and demonstration of safeguards and security technologies. Key attributes of this technology development base are (1) the availability of a wide variety of special nuclear materials in forms that allow for enhanced accessibility; (2) ease of access by U.S. government, national laboratory, industry and academic institution

  13. Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) for unannounced safeguards inspections.

    SciTech Connect

    Galdoz, Erwin G. , Rio de Janeiro, Brazil); Pinkalla, Mark

    2010-09-01

    The Secure Video Surveillance System (SVSS) is a collaborative effort between the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). The joint project addresses specific requirements of redundant surveillance systems installed in two South American nuclear facilities as a tool to support unannounced inspections conducted by ABACC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The surveillance covers the critical time (as much as a few hours) between the notification of an inspection and the access of inspectors to the location in facility where surveillance equipment is installed. ABACC and the IAEA currently use the EURATOM Multiple Optical Surveillance System (EMOSS). This outdated system is no longer available or supported by the manufacturer. The current EMOSS system has met the project objective; however, the lack of available replacement parts and system support has made this system unsustainable and has increased the risk of an inoperable system. A new system that utilizes current technology and is maintainable is required to replace the aging EMOSS system. ABACC intends to replace one of the existing ABACC EMOSS systems by the Secure Video Surveillance System. SVSS utilizes commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technologies for all individual components. Sandia National Laboratories supported the system design for SVSS to meet Safeguards requirements, i.e. tamper indication, data authentication, etc. The SVSS consists of two video surveillance cameras linked securely to a data collection unit. The collection unit is capable of retaining historical surveillance data for at least three hours with picture intervals as short as 1sec. Images in .jpg format are available to inspectors using various software review tools. SNL has delivered two SVSS systems for test and evaluation at the ABACC Safeguards Laboratory. An additional 'proto-type' system remains

  14. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations. [Aggregated Systems Model (ASM)

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments.

  15. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for.

  16. Treaty on Open Skies sensor technologies with potential international safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Sandoval, M.B.

    1996-12-01

    The Treaty on Open Skies is a precedent-setting agreement that allows signatory states to fly aircraft over each other`s territory with sensor systems. The purpose of the Treaty is to improve confidence and security with respect to military activities of the signatories. This paper reviews the sensor technology that is currently allowed by the Treaty on Open Skies and potential future sensor technology. The Treaty on Open Skies does have provisions to allow for the improvement of the technology of the current sensor systems and for the proposal of new sensors after a period of time. This can occur only after the Treaty has been ratified and has entered into force. If this regime was to be used for other than Treaty on Open Skies applications some modifications to the allowed sensor technology should be examined. This paper presents some ideas on potential improvements to existing allowed sensor technology as well as some suggested new advanced sensor systems that would be useful for future potential monitoring of safeguard`s related activities. This paper addresses advanced imaging sensors and non-imaging sensors for potential use in aerial remote sensing roles that involve international data sharing.

  17. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS... Requirements § 108.506 Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to... document describing your control procedures....

  18. Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Lopez, Leon N; Le, Loan A; Veirs, D Kirk; Browne, Mike

    2010-01-01

    Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to

  19. Safeguards Implementation: Establishment of Indonesian Safeguards Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Shipwash, Jacqueline L; Geist, William H.; Smith, Steven E; Solodov, Alexander A; Suharyanta, Suharyanta; Sunaryadi, Dedi

    2011-01-01

    Under the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), U.S. National Laboratories support the Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to ''collaborate with international partners to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development.'' This engagement in safeguards implementation cooperation is the basis for the security and safeguards arrangement with the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (BAPETEN) and includes strengthening of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). There are many components in a robust SSAC. While INSEP carries on its program in a holistic approach, it is more effective and efficient to address individual components, rather than the entire system at one time, with the objective of strengthening the system as a whole. Nuclear material accountancy is one of these components. Nuclear material accountancy necessitates that a State periodically take an inventory of its material and record changes. To better perform these activities, BAPETEN requested assistance with establishing a safeguards laboratory where its staff could perform independent material characterization, maintain nondestructive assay equipment, and facilitate hands-on training of BAPETEN safeguards inspectors. In compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines and safety series documents, INSEP and BAPETEN opened the BAPETEN Safeguards Laboratory in February 2010 to provide these competencies. BAPETEN showcased these new capabilities in July 2010 at the IAEA-sponsored Regional Workshop on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control at Facilities where hands-on activities were held at BAPETEN's Headquarters in Jakarta using the equipment supplied by INSEP. Discussions have begun on the establishment of a security and safeguards laboratory at the BAPETEN Training Center located in Cisarua. This paper describes the many steps

  20. 17 CFR 37.1400 - Core Principle 14-System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Core Principle 14-System safeguards. 37.1400 Section 37.1400 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION... procedures, and automated systems, that: (1) Are reliable and secure; and (2) Have adequate scalable...

  1. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in systems of records. (a) Safeguards appropriate for a NASA system of records shall be developed by...

  2. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Safeguarding information in systems of... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in systems of records. (a) Safeguards appropriate for a NASA system of records shall be developed by...

  3. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    SciTech Connect

    Cartan, F O

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information.

  4. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES Managing the Operations of a Licensee General Requirements §...

  5. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION NEW MARKETS VENTURE CAPITAL (âNMVCâ) PROGRAM Managing the Operations of a NMVC Company...

  6. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION NEW MARKETS VENTURE CAPITAL (âNMVCâ) PROGRAM Managing the Operations of a NMVC Company...

  7. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION NEW MARKETS VENTURE CAPITAL (âNMVCâ) PROGRAM Managing the Operations of a NMVC Company...

  8. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES Managing the Operations of a Licensee General Requirements §...

  9. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES Managing the Operations of a Licensee General Requirements §...

  10. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION SMALL BUSINESS INVESTMENT COMPANIES Managing the Operations of a Licensee General Requirements §...

  11. 13 CFR 108.506 - Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding the NMVC Company's assets/Internal controls. 108.506 Section 108.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION NEW MARKETS VENTURE CAPITAL (âNMVCâ) PROGRAM Managing the Operations of a NMVC Company...

  12. Role of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards in confidence building

    SciTech Connect

    Augustson, R.H.

    1989-01-01

    In this paper, I will examine some attributes of confidence building and connect them with how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) interacts with its member states in carrying out its safeguards function. These interactions and the structure set up to define them help maintain and strengthen confidence between the IAEA and the member states and among these states. 3 refs.

  13. The impact of changes in DOE computer security on safeguards systems

    SciTech Connect

    Hunteman, W.J.; Caldwell, R.J.

    1994-08-01

    Recent changes in the Department of Energy regulations on classified computer security have introduced a number of significant requirements for automated information systems land networks. These changes are necessary because of changes in computer technology, a reduced level of clearances, and increased personnel access, such as DOE ``L`` clearances and international inspections, in the facilities. These changes will affect all computer-based systems that process, or are connected to computers that process, classified data. The additional and modified requirements are identified and described. The impact of the requirements on safeguards computer-based systems, such as instruments, database systems, and networks, is reviewed. Some simple examples of typical safeguards systems are discussed with suggestions on how the systems can comply with the requirements.

  14. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  15. 17 CFR 39.34 - System safeguards for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart C...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards for....34 Section 39.34 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION DERIVATIVES....34 System safeguards for systemically important derivatives clearing organizations and subpart...

  16. Conceptual baseline document for the nuclear materials safeguards system

    SciTech Connect

    Nelson, R.A.

    1995-08-01

    This document defines the baseline scope, schedule, and cost requirements of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards System (NMSS) replacement for the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The Nuclear Material Safeguards System (NMSS), operating in PFP, comprises data from several site safeguards systems that have been merged since 1987. NMSS was designed and implemented to the state of computer technology for the mid 1970`s. Since implementation, the hardware vendor has stopped producing computer systems and the availability of personnel trained and willing to work with the technology has diminished. Maintenance has become expensive and `reliability is a serious concern. -This effort provides a replacement in kind of the NMSS, using modern, scalable, upgradable hardware and software to the same standards used for the Hanford Local Area Network (HLAN) system. The NMSS Replacement is a Client/Server architecture designed on a Personal Computer based local area network (LAN) platform. The LAN is provided through an ethernet interface running the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). This architecture conforms to the HLAN standard, including the End System Operating Environment (ESOE). The Server runs the Microsoft Windows NT` Server operating system, Microsoft SQL Server2 database management system, and application tools. Clients run Microsoft Windows` and application software provided as part of the system. The interface between the clients and the database is through Microsoft ODBC4.

  17. CLASSIFICATION OF THE MGR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    J.A. Ziegler

    1999-08-31

    The purpose of this analysis is to document the Quality Assurance (QA) classification of the Monitored Geologic Repository (MGR) safeguards and security system structures, systems and components (SSCs) performed by the MGR Safety Assurance Department. This analysis also provides the basis for revision of YMP/90-55Q, Q-List (YMP 1998). The Q-List identifies those MGR SSCs subject to the requirements of DOE/RW-0333P, ''Quality Assurance Requirements and Description'' (QARD) (DOE 1998).

  18. The U.S./IAEA Workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation: Report to the NNSA DOE Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241)

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.; Pickett, Chris A.; Queirolo, Al; Bachner, Katherine M.; Worrall, Louise G.

    2015-04-07

    The U.S Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a workshop on Software Sustainability for Safeguards Instrumentation in Vienna, Austria, May 6-8, 2014. Safeguards instrumentation software must be sustained in a changing environment to ensure existing instruments can continue to perform as designed, with improved security. The approaches to the development and maintenance of instrument software used in the past may not be the best model for the future and, therefore, the organizers’ goal was to investigate these past approaches and to determine an optimal path forward. The purpose of this report is to provide input for the DOE NNSA Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) and other stakeholders that can be utilized when making decisions related to the development and maintenance of software used in the implementation of international nuclear safeguards. For example, this guidance can be used when determining whether to fund the development, upgrade, or replacement of a particular software product. The report identifies the challenges related to sustaining software, and makes recommendations for addressing these challenges, supported by summaries and detailed notes from the workshop discussions. In addition the authors provide a set of recommendations for institutionalizing software sustainability practices in the safeguards community. The term “software sustainability” was defined for this workshop as ensuring that safeguards instrument software and algorithm functionality can be maintained efficiently throughout the instrument lifecycle, without interruption and providing the ability to continue to improve that software as needs arise.

  19. Development of Safeguards System Simulator Composed of Multi-Functional Cores

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Ihara, Hitoshi

    Due to the large plutonium (Pu) throughput and high burn-up fuel in an advanced reprocessing facility, we are faced with the inevitable increasing burden of nuclear material accountancy (NMA) to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards criteria. A large volume of sampling analysis and inspectors' activities result in a great cost for facility operation. Therefore, it is increasingly important to evaluate a cost-effective performance for the safeguards system. In order to design an advanced safeguards system, we have initiated the development of a safeguards system simulator. The simulator is composed of several interrelated cores and a separate core is planned to develop. The NMA core is a near-real-time accounting (NRTA) code that had been originally developed more than ten years ago and has been improved on an objective-driven pre- and post-processor. A multivariate and multi-scale core based on a principle component analysis with a wavelet technique has been developed to provide an algorithm of process monitoring. The time and frequency decomposition was verified to be an effective technique to detect an abnormal event. In addition, a multiple optimization core has been developed with a fuzzy-linear-programming technique to investigate the cost-effective performance of the conceptual safeguards system. It is shown that a combination of flow-meter and non-destructive assay can be applied to the system in a cost-effective manner. In the future, a virtual design core will be developed to support a walk-through and three dimensional visible plant model.

  20. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  1. International safeguards for a modern MOX (mixed-oxide) fuel fabrication facility

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Stirpe, D.; Picard, R.R.

    1987-03-01

    Bulk-handling facilities that process plutonium for commercial fuel cycles offer considerable challenges to nuclear materials safeguards. Modern fuel fabrication facilities that handle mixed oxides of plutonium and uranium (MOX) often have large inventories of special nuclear materials in their process lines and in storage areas for feed and product materials. In addition, the remote automated processing prevalent at new MOX facilities, which is necessary to minimize radiation exposures to personnel, tends to limit access for measurements and inspections. The facility design considered in this study incorporates all these features as well as state-of-the-art measurement technologies for materials accounting. Key elements of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards for such a fuel-cycle facility have been identified in this report, and several issues of primary importance to materials accountancy and IAEA verifications have been examined. We have calculated detection sensitivities for abrupt and protracted diversions of plutonium assuming a single materials balance area for all processing areas. To help achieve optimal use of limited IAEA inspection resources, we have calculated sampling plans for attributes/variables verification. In addition, we have demonstrated the usefulness of calculating sigma/sub (MUF-D)/ and detection probabilities corresponding to specified material-loss scenarios and resource allocations. The data developed and the analyses performed during this study can assist both the facility operator and the IAEA in formulating necessary safeguards approaches and verification procedures to implement international safeguards for special nuclear materials.

  2. NNSA's next generation safeguards initiative to define an effective state system of accounting and control

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Sunshine, Alexander; Matthews, Caroline; Frazer, Sarah; Matthews, Carrie

    2010-01-01

    The International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), the international outreach component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), is a collaborative program that endeavors to strengthen international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development. One of the critical ways the program achieves this objective is through working with partners to increase the effectiveness of the State System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) - the essential elements of national, regulatory and facility safeguards competencies that work as a system to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world the full assurance of the state's adherence to its safeguards agreements. INSEP provides assistance in developing a state's SSAC in a number of areas, from developing national legislation governing the possession and use of nuclear material to working with nuclear facility operators to developing good practices in waste management. INSEP has collaborated with foreign partners in peaceful nuclear applications for over two decades, but recently, it has focused its efforts on strengthening SSACs due to the growth of nuclear power worldwide, particularly in countries with limited nuclear infrastructures. This new area of focus has prompted INSEP to develop a model of SSAC competencies that will serve not only as a structure for its engagement with partner states, but also as a means to facilitate coordination with other states that provide training and assistance, and as a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of its work in reaching its intended objectives. While this model uses as its starting point the requirements on a State that are presented in the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol, it is not, in itself, a requirements document or guidance for implementing requirements. It is rather an analysis of what capabilities will be needed in a State to be able to meet requirements and to

  3. Moving Toward a Regional Safeguards System in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Griggs, James R.

    2001-07-28

    In addressing the nuclear nonproliferation challenges of South Asia, it is useful to examine the similar past nonproliferation problems in South America. The nuclear rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil involved several developments in progression. We conclude that two developments are particularly applicable to the India/Pakistan problem: technical cooperation and a regional safeguards system. This paper reviews the history of Argentina/Brazil rapprochement, discusses application to India/Pakistan, and proposes specific actions to move South Asia toward regional stability.

  4. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  5. FEMO, A FLOW AND ENRICHMENT MONITOR FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS REQUIREMENTS AT A GAS CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT FACILITY

    SciTech Connect

    Gunning, John E; Laughter, Mark D; March-Leuba, Jose A

    2008-01-01

    A number of countries have received construction licenses or are contemplating the construction of large-capacity gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The capability to independently verify nuclear material flows is a key component of international safeguards approaches, and the IAEA does not currently have an approved method to continuously monitor the mass flow of 235U in uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas streams. Oak Ridge National Laboratory is investigating the development of a flow and enrichment monitor, or FEMO, based on an existing blend-down monitoring system (BDMS). The BDMS was designed to continuously monitor both 235U mass flow and enrichment of UF6 streams at the low pressures similar to those which exists at GCEPs. BDMSs have been installed at three sites-the first unit has operated successfully in an unattended environment for approximately 10 years. To be acceptable to GCEP operators, it is essential that the instrument be installed and maintained without interrupting operations. A means to continuously verify flow as is proposed by FEMO will likely be needed to monitor safeguards at large-capacity plants. This will enable the safeguards effectiveness that currently exists at smaller plants to be maintained at the larger facilities and also has the potential to reduce labor costs associated with inspections at current and future plants. This paper describes the FEMO design requirements, operating capabilities, and development work required before field demonstration.

  6. Extended Evaluations of the Commercial Spectrometer Systems for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Duc T. Vo

    1999-08-01

    Safeguards applications require the best of the spectrometer system with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be easy to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with five different germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscope y may become the way of future gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  7. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... may be delegated to responsible criminal justice agency personnel in the case of a satellite computer...-criminal justice maintenance or technical personnel. (3) All visitors to these computer centers must be... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The...

  8. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... may be delegated to responsible criminal justice agency personnel in the case of a satellite computer...-criminal justice maintenance or technical personnel. (3) All visitors to these computer centers must be... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The...

  9. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... may be delegated to responsible criminal justice agency personnel in the case of a satellite computer...-criminal justice maintenance or technical personnel. (3) All visitors to these computer centers must be... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The...

  10. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... may be delegated to responsible criminal justice agency personnel in the case of a satellite computer...-criminal justice maintenance or technical personnel. (3) All visitors to these computer centers must be... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The...

  11. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... may be delegated to responsible criminal justice agency personnel in the case of a satellite computer...-criminal justice maintenance or technical personnel. (3) All visitors to these computer centers must be... Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The...

  12. 17 CFR 39.18 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ...) General—(1) Program of risk analysis. Each derivatives clearing organization shall establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight with respect to its operations and automated systems to...) Elements of program. A derivatives clearing organization's program of risk analysis and oversight...

  13. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... swap data in its custody: (1) Establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight to... repository's program of risk analysis and oversight with respect to its operations and automated systems shall address each of the following categories of risk analysis and oversight: (1) Information...

  14. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  15. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

  16. Framework for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear-safeguards systems. [Aggregated Systems Model (ASM)

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.

    1981-10-20

    This paper describes an analytical tool for evaluating the effectiveness of safeguards that protect special nuclear material (SNM). The tool quantifies the effectiveness using several measures, including probabilities and expected times to detect and respond to malevolent attempts against the facility. These measures are computed for a spectrum of threats involving outsiders, insiders, collusion, falsification, and deceit. Overall system effectiveness is judged using performance indices aggregated over all threats. These indices can be used by designers and regulators when comparing costs and benefits of various safeguards. The framework is demonstrated with an example in which we assess vulnerabilities of a safeguards system and identify cost-effective design modifications.

  17. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  18. Safeguards and security considerations for automated and robotic systems

    SciTech Connect

    Jordan, S.E.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-09-01

    Within the reconfigured Nuclear Weapons Complex there will be a large number of automated and robotic (A&R) systems because of the many benefits derived from their use. To meet the overall security requirements of a facility, consideration must be given to those systems that handle and process nuclear material. Since automation and robotics is a relatively new technology, not widely applied to the Nuclear Weapons Complex, safeguards and security (S&S) issues related to these systems have not been extensively explored, and no guidance presently exists. The goal of this effort is to help integrate S&S into the design of future A&R systems. Towards this, the authors first examined existing A and R systems from a security perspective to identify areas of concern and possible solutions of these problems. They then were able to develop generalized S&S guidance and design considerations for automation and robotics.

  19. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  20. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? 1202.30 Section 1202.30 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND... Information § 1202.30 How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? (a) The system manager ensures...

  1. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? 1202.30 Section 1202.30 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND... Information § 1202.30 How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? (a) The system manager ensures...

  2. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  3. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  4. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  5. 30 CFR 75.1101-20 - Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. 75...-20 Safeguards for dry powder chemical systems. Adequate guards shall be provided along all belt conveyors in the vicinity of each dry powder chemical system to protect persons whose vision is...

  6. Precision Information Environment (PIE) for International Safeguards: Pre-Demonstration Development Use Cases

    SciTech Connect

    Gastelum, Zoe N.; Henry, Michael J.

    2013-11-13

    In FY2013, the PIE International Safeguards team demonstrated our development progress to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) staff from the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24, our client) and the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22). Following the demonstration, the team was asked by our client to complete additional development prior to a planned demonstration at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), scheduled tentatively for January or spring of 2014. The team discussed four potential areas for development (in priority order), and will develop them as time and funding permit prior to an IAEA demonstration. The four capability areas are: 1. Addition of equipment manuals to PIE-accessible files 2. Optical character recognition (OCR) of photographed text 3. Barcode reader with information look-up from a database 4. Add Facilities to Data Model 5. Geospatial capabilities with information integration Each area will be described below in a use case.

  7. International Atomic Energy Agency's advisory group meeting on safeguards related to the final disposal of waste and spent fuel, Vienna, Austria, September 12-16, 1988: Foreign trip report

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1988-10-01

    B.W. Moran traveled to Vienna, Austria, during the period of September 12--16, 1988, to serve as the technical advisor to the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) representatives to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group Meeting on ''Safeguards Related to the Final Disposal of Nuclear Material in Waste and Spent Fuel.'' The goal of the US representatives to this meeting was to ensure that the advisory group's recommendations established (1) an effective IAEA safeguards approach for all radioactive waste and spent fuel management facilities and (2) a safeguards approach that is appropriate for the US Federal Waste Management System. The principal concerns of the United States on entering the advisory group meeting were: criteria for the termination of safeguards on waste should not be established, but should be referred for further study, safeguards on spent fuel should not be terminated, and safeguards studies are required before IAEA safeguards approaches for spent fuel are established. The US representatives generally recommended that consultant meetings be convened to address the technical issues after the requisite safeguards related research and development tasks have been performed. These objectives of the US representatives were achieved, and the recommendations of the advisory group generally coincided with and extended the recommendations presented in the US position paper.

  8. Overview of enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swindle, D.W. Jr.; Wheeler, L.E.

    1982-01-01

    The relationship of enrichment plant safeguards to US nonproliferation objectives and to the operation and management of enrichment facilities is reviewed. During the review, the major components of both domestic and international safeguards systems for enrichment plants are discussed. In discussing domestic safeguards systems, examples of the technology currently in use to support nuclear materials accountability are described including the measurement methods, procedures and equipment used for weighing, sampling, chemical and isotopic analyses and nondestructive assay techniques. Also discussed is how the information obtained as part of the nuclear material accountancy task is useful to enrichment plant operations. International material accountancy verification and containment/surveillance concepts for enrichment plants are discussed, and the technologies presently being developed for international safeguards in enrichment plants are identified and the current development status is reported.

  9. The uranium cylinder assay system for enrichment plant safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Karen A; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Marlow, Johnna B; Menlove, Howard O; Rael, Carlos D; Iwamoto, Tomonori; Tamura, Takayuki; Aiuchi, Syun

    2010-01-01

    Safeguarding sensitive fuel cycle technology such as uranium enrichment is a critical component in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. A useful tool for the nuclear materials accountancy of such a plant would be an instrument that measured the uranium content of UF{sub 6} cylinders. The Uranium Cylinder Assay System (UCAS) was designed for Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) for use in the Rokkasho Enrichment Plant in Japan for this purpose. It uses total neutron counting to determine uranium mass in UF{sub 6} cylinders given a known enrichment. This paper describes the design of UCAS, which includes features to allow for unattended operation. It can be used on 30B and 48Y cylinders to measure depleted, natural, and enriched uranium. It can also be used to assess the amount of uranium in decommissioned equipment and waste containers. Experimental measurements have been carried out in the laboratory and these are in good agreement with the Monte Carlo modeling results.

  10. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? 1202.30 Section 1202.30 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL RULES REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 Collecting Information § 1202.30 How does NARA safeguard...

  11. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false How does NARA safeguard its systems of records? 1202.30 Section 1202.30 Parks, Forests, and Public Property NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GENERAL RULES REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 Collecting Information § 1202.30 How does NARA safeguard...

  12. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of records. 1212.605 Section 1212.605 Aeronautics and Space NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION... law to be released to the public need not be safeguarded or identified as Privacy Act records....

  13. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    SciTech Connect

    Persiani, P. J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs.

  14. International and national security applications of cryogenic detectors - mostly nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rabin, Michael W

    2009-01-01

    As with science, so with security - in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma ray, neutron, and alpha particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invi sible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  15. National and International Security Applications of Cryogenic Detectors—Mostly Nuclear Safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rabin, Michael W.

    2009-12-01

    As with science, so with security—in both arenas, the extraordinary sensitivity of cryogenic sensors enables high-confidence detection and high-precision measurement even of the faintest signals. Science applications are more mature, but several national and international security applications have been identified where cryogenic detectors have high potential payoff. International safeguards and nuclear forensics are areas needing new technology and methods to boost speed, sensitivity, precision and accuracy. Successfully applied, improved nuclear materials analysis will help constrain nuclear materials diversion pathways and contribute to treaty verification. Cryogenic microcalorimeter detectors for X-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, and alpha-particle spectrometry are under development with these aims in mind. In each case the unsurpassed energy resolution of microcalorimeters reveals previously invisible spectral features of nuclear materials. Preliminary results of quantitative analysis indicate substantial improvements are still possible, but significant work will be required to fully understand the ultimate performance limits.

  16. Video imaging for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bradley, J.N.; Brislawn, C.M.; Brown, J.E.; Rodriguez, C.A.; Stoltz, L.A.

    1994-04-01

    The field of Nuclear Safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world`s nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and usage of these materials as reported by states that have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Nuclear Safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and nondestructive analysis of product materials and process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards. In this presentation we will introduce digital video image processing and analysis systems that have been developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory for application to the nuclear safeguards problem. Of specific interest to this audience is the detector-activated predictive wavelet transform image coding used to reduce drastically the data storage requirements for these unattended, remote safeguards systems.

  17. EMCAS, an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-07-01

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MCandA) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities.

  18. EMCAS: An evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities. 3 figs., 5 tabs.

  19. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  20. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report to the Department of Energy Office of Safeguards and Security

    SciTech Connect

    Ruhter, W.D.; Al-Ayat, R.; Cole, C.E.; Thomas, L.L.

    1991-01-01

    The Safeguards Technology Program (STP) at Livermore supports the Technology Development Program of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) in three subprogram areas (tasks): 1. Science and Technology Base Development Intelligent Actinide Analysis System Deterioration of Pu Isotopic Analysis with Neutron Damage to HPGe Detectors 2. Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support Isotopic Analysis of Plutonium Samples Enriched in {sup 238}Pu Actinide Isotopic Analysis System for Los Alamos Plutonium-Handling Facility 3. International Safeguards MGA Workshop Transportable X-Ray Fluorescence Analysis System. The report describes the activities in Safeguards Technology and Systems studies, computer security and Advanced Laser Isotope Systems safeguards. 3 refs., 3 figs. (JF)

  1. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark; Gouveia, Fernando; Crawford, Cary E.; Pickett, Chris J.; Jay, Jeffrey

    2010-07-15

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls. Introduction The U.S. safeguards technology base got its start almost half a century ago in the nuclear weapons program of the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and their predecessors: AEC & ERDA. Due to nuclear materials’ strategic importance and value, and the risk associated with the public’s and worker’s health and the potential for theft, significant investments were made to develop techniques to measure nuclear materials using both destructive assay (DA) and non-destructive assay (NDA). Major investment within the U.S. DOE Domestic Safeguards Program continued over the next three decades, resulting in continuous improvements in the state-of-the-art of these techniques. This was particularly true in the area of NDA with its ability to use gamma rays, neutrons, and heat to identify and quantify nuclear materials without the need to take direct samples of the material. Most of these techniques were commercialized and transferred to

  2. International safeguards relevant to geologic disposal of high-level wastes and spent fuels

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1989-01-01

    Spent fuels from once-through fuel cycles placed in underground repositories have the potential to become attractive targets for diversion and/or theft because of their valuable material content and decreasing radioactivity. The first geologic repository in the US, as currently designed, will contain approximately 500 Mt of plutonium, 60,000 Mt of uranium and a host of other fissile and strategically important elements. This paper identifies some of the international safeguards issues relevant to the various proposed scenarios for disposing of the spent fuel. In the context of the US program for geologic disposal of spent fuels, this paper highlights several issues that should be addressed in the near term by US industries, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the geologic repositories for spent fuels become a reality. Based on US spent fuel discharges, an example is presented to illustrate the enormity of the problem of verifying spent fuel inventories. The geologic disposal scenario for high-level wastes originating from defense facilities produced a practicably irrecoverable'' waste form. Therefore, safeguards issues for geologic disposal of high-level waste now in the US are less pressing. 56 refs. , 2 figs.

  3. Cooperation between JRC and SNL in the field of surveillance and monitoring for international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, C.S.; Sorel, F.

    1993-08-01

    Under a Cooperative Agreement between the Commission of European Communities (CEC) and the U. S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Joint Research Centre, (JRC) ISPRA, and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have been cooperating in the development of Containment and Surveillance equipment for a number of years. With recent technology advancements, this cooperation is expanding into the areas of Data Authentication, Safeguards Data Networks, Integrated Systems, and Image Processing. This paper will describe recently expanded efforts in connecting the Integrated Monitoring System designed by SNL to the Computer Aided Video Surveillance System designed by JRC. An SNL Modular Video Authentication System was furnished to test in the video circuitry of the Computer Aided Video Surveillance System. The two systems will remain at JRC for demonstrations, training, and future development activities.

  4. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  5. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  6. Report on the US Program of Technical Assistance to Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (POTAS)

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1981-05-01

    This document summarizes the work done under the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards (POTAS), providing the US Government, IAEA, and others with a short review of the progress made in the program since its inception. Becaue of the size and complexity of the program, only major accomplishments are presented. These are grouped under the following categories: (1) equipment and standard which cover assay of irradiated and unirradiated nuclear materials, automatic data processing, and physical standards; (2) experts who are involved in technology transfer, training, system design, and safeguard information processing and analysis; (3) system studies which cover diversion hazard analysis, safeguards approaches and application, and inspection effort planning and forecasting; (4) techniques, procedures, and equipment evaluation; (5) training of IAEA inspectors and safeguards specialists from member states. The major achievement has been the provisions of safeguards equipment designed to be reliable, and tamper resistant, some of which have already been in use in the field by inspector or by IAEA staff members in Vienna. These are listed in a table. (AT)

  7. BN-350 unattended safeguards system current status and initial fuel movement data

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, Richard Brady; Browne, Michael C; Parker, Robert F; Ingegneri, Maurizio

    2009-01-01

    The Unattended and Remote Monitoring (UNARM) system at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor facility in Aktau, Kazakhstan continues to provide safeguards monitoring data as the spent fuel disposition project transitions from wet fuel storage to dry storage casks. Qualitative data from the initial cask loading procedures has been released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and is presented here for the first time. The BN-350 fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, operated as a plutonium-producing facility from 1973 W1til 1999. Kazakhstan signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1994, and shortly afterwards the IAEA began safeguarding the reactor facility and its nuclear material. Slnce the cessation of reactor operations ten years ago, the chief proliferation concern has been the spent fuel assemblies stored in the pond on-site. By 2002, all fuel assemblies in wet storage had been repackaged into proliferation-resistant canisters. From the beginning, the IAEA's safeguards campaign at the BN-350 included a constant unattended sensor presence in the form of UNARM which monitors nuclear material activities at the facility in the absence of inspector presence. The UNARM equipment at the BN-350 was designed to be modular and extensible, allowing the system to adapt as the safeguards requirements change. This has been particularly important at the BN-350 due to the prolonged wet storage phase of the project. The primary function of the BN-350 UNARM system is to provide the IAEA with an independent, radiation-centric Containment and Surveillance (C&S) layer in addition to the standard seals and video systems. The UNARM system has provided continuous Continuity of Knowledge (COK) data for the BN-350's nuclear material storage areas in order to ensure the validity of the attended measurements during the lifetime of the project. The first of these attended measurements was characterization of the spent fuel assemblies. This characterization utilized

  8. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  9. Development of a Safeguard System Using an Episomal Mammalian Artificial Chromosome for Gene and Cell Therapy.

    PubMed

    Uno, Narumi; Uno, Katsuhiro; Komoto, Shinya; Suzuki, Teruhiko; Hiratsuka, Masaharu; Osaki, Mitsuhiko; Kazuki, Yasuhiro; Oshimura, Mitsuo

    2015-01-01

    The development of a safeguard system to remove tumorigenic cells would allow safer clinical applications of stem cells for the treatment of patients with an intractable disease including genetic disorders. Such safeguard systems should not disrupt the host genome and should have long-term stability. Here, we attempted to develop a tumor-suppressing mammalian artificial chromosome containing a safeguard system that uses the immune rejection system against allogeneic tissue from the host. For proof-of-concept of the safeguard system, B16F10 mouse melanoma cells expressing the introduced H2-K(d) major histocompatibility complex (MHC class I)-allogenic haplotype were transplanted into recipient C57BL/6J mice expressing MHC H2-K(b). Subcutaneous implantation of B16F10 cells into C57BL/6J mice resulted in high tumorigenicity. The volume of tumors derived from B16F10 cells expressing allogenic MHC H2-K(d) was decreased significantly (P < 0.01). Suppression of MHC H2-K(d)-expressing tumors in C57BL/6J mice was enhanced by immunization with MHC H2-K(d)-expressing splenocytes (P < 0.01). These results suggest that the safeguard system is capable of suppressing tumor formation by the transplanted cells. PMID:26670279

  10. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; David Hebditch; Jim Morgan; Bruce Meppen; Scott DeMuth; Michael Ehinger; John Hockert

    2008-07-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing ‘nuclear security’ risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as “the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,” with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: • Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, • Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, • Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of ‘nuclear security’ considerations as “full and equal” partners in the design process, • Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and • Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards into

  11. Behavior of 241Am in fast reactor systems - a safeguards perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Beddingfield, David H; Lafleur, Adrienne M

    2009-01-01

    Advanced fuel-cycle developments around the world currently under development are exploring the possibility of disposing of {sup 241}Am from spent fuel recycle processes by burning this material in fast reactors. For safeguards practitioners, this approach could potentially complicate both fresh- and spent-fuel safeguards measurements. The increased ({alpha},n) production in oxide fuels from the {sup 241}Am increases the uncertainty in coincidence assay of Pu in MOX assemblies and will require additional information to make use of totals-based neutron assay of these assemblies. We have studied the behavior of {sup 241}Am-bearing MOX fuel in the fast reactor system and the effect on neutron and gamma-ray source-terms for safeguards measurements. In this paper, we will present the results of simulations of the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a fast breeder reactor system. Because of the increased use of MOX fuel in thermal reactors and advances in fuel-cycle designs aimed at americium disposal in fast reactors, we have undertaken a brief study of the behavior of americium in these systems to better understand the safeguards impacts of these new approaches. In this paper we will examine the behavior of {sup 241}Am in a variety of nuclear systems to provide insight into the safeguards implications of proposed Am disposition schemes.

  12. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  13. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  14. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  15. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  16. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  17. 18 CFR 3b.204 - Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... information in manual and computer-based record systems. 3b.204 Section 3b.204 Conservation of Power and Water... Collection of Records § 3b.204 Safeguarding information in manual and computer-based record systems. (a) The administrative and physical controls to protect the information in the manual and computer-based record...

  18. Remote-Reading Safety and Safeguards Surveillance System for 3013 Containers

    SciTech Connect

    Lechelt, W. M.; Skorpik, J. R.; Silvers, K. L.; Szempruch, R. W.; Douglas, D. G.; Fein, K. O.

    2002-02-26

    At Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), plutonium oxide is being loaded into stainless steel containers for long-term storage on the Hanford Site. These containers consist of two weld-sealed stainless steel cylinders nested one within the other. A third container holds the plutonium within the inner cylinder. This design meets the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) storage standard, DOE-STD- 3013-2000, which anticipates a 50-year storage lifetime. The 3013 standard also requires a container surveillance program to continuously monitor pressure and to assure safeguards are adequate. However, the configuration of the container system makes using conventional measurement and monitoring methods difficult. To better meet the 3013 monitoring requirements, a team from Fluor Hanford (who manages the PFP), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and Vista Engineering Technologies, LLC, developed a safer, cost-efficient, remote PFP 3013 container surveillance system. This new surveillance system is a combination of two successfully deployed technologies: (1) a magnetically coupled pressure gauge developed by Vista Engineering and (2) a radio frequency (RF) tagging device developed by PNNL. This system provides continuous, 100% monitoring of critical parameters with the containers in place, as well as inventory controls. The 3013 container surveillance system consists of three main elements: (1) an internal magnetic pressure sensor package, (2) an instrument pod (external electronics package), and (3) a data acquisition storage and display computer. The surveillance system described in this paper has many benefits for PFP and DOE in terms of cost savings and reduced personnel exposure. In addition, continuous safety monitoring (i.e., internal container pressure and temperature) of every container is responsible nuclear material stewardship and fully meets and exceeds DOE's Integrated Surveillance Program requirements.

  19. Surveillance Television and Recording System (STAR): Test, evaluation and implementation activities under POTAS (US Program for Technical Assistance to International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards) Tasks E. 25 and E. 54: Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Holt, R.C.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1987-01-01

    The IAEA and Sandia National Laboratories activities, following the completion of the first three Class III STAR Systems in April 1981, are described. These activities led to the IAEA order of 16 Class IV STAR Systems, with the intent to use these systems as a replacement for the Psychotronics CCTV System and for use in other selected applications.

  20. A comparison of algorithms for anomaly detection in safeguards and computer security systems using neural networks

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whiteson, R.

    1992-08-01

    Detection of anomalies in nuclear safeguards and computer security systems is a tedious and time-consuming task. It typically requires the examination of large amounts of data for unusual patterns of activity. Neural networks provide a flexible pattern-recognition capability that can easily be adapted for these purposes. In this paper, we discuss architectures for accomplishing this task.

  1. A comparison of algorithms for anomaly detection in safeguards and computer security systems using neural networks

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whiteson, R.

    1992-01-01

    Detection of anomalies in nuclear safeguards and computer security systems is a tedious and time-consuming task. It typically requires the examination of large amounts of data for unusual patterns of activity. Neural networks provide a flexible pattern-recognition capability that can easily be adapted for these purposes. In this paper, we discuss architectures for accomplishing this task.

  2. The International Safeguards Technology Base: How is the Patient Doing? An Exploration of Effective Metrics

    SciTech Connect

    Schanfein, Mark J; Gouveia, Fernando S

    2010-07-01

    The term “Technology Base” is commonly used but what does it mean? Is there a common understanding of the components that comprise a technology base? Does a formal process exist to assess the health of a given technology base? These are important questions the relevance of which is even more pressing given the USDOE/NNSA initiatives to strengthen the safeguards technology base through investments in research & development and human capital development. Accordingly, the authors will establish a high-level framework to define and understand what comprises a technology base. Potential goal-driven metrics to assess the health of a technology base will also be explored, such as linear demographics and resource availability, in the hope that they can be used to better understand and improve the health of the U.S. safeguards technology base. Finally, through the identification of such metrics, the authors will offer suggestions and highlight choices for addressing potential shortfalls.

  3. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  4. Safeguards Professional Development Opportunities

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V

    2010-01-01

    Across the international field of safeguards there has been a rising awareness of the need for development of the next generation of safeguards professionals. The 2010 International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Symposium includes a suggested topic of 'developing safeguards professionals.' This can first be addressed by making university students and young professionals aware of safeguards and the unique career opportunities it encompasses. Then, once someone decides to go into safeguards he/she needs to be offered professional development opportunities in order to become a more effective member of the international safeguards community. This paper begins to do that by reviewing opportunities currently available. There are not many opportunities that are well advertised and this paper will serve to raise awareness of what does already exist and therefore benefit the international safeguards community. The current opportunities that will be discussed include training programs, graduate degrees, organizational outreach, professional networks, and intensive topic specific programs. The paper will also identify current needs and holes in the current offerings of professional development opportunities and suggest ways they can be filled. In the conclusion the paper addresses what types of programs are still needed.

  5. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  6. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  7. Wearable system-on-a-chip radiometer for remote temperature sensing and its application to the safeguard of emergency operators.

    PubMed

    Fonte, A; Alimenti, F; Zito, D; Neri, B; De Rossi, D; Lanatà, A; Tognetti, A

    2007-01-01

    The remote sensing and the detection of events that may represent a danger for human beings have become more and more important thanks to the latest advances of the technology. A microwave radiometer is a sensor capable to detect a fire or an abnormal increase of the internal temperature of the human body (hyperthermia), or an onset of a cancer, or even meteorological phenomena (forest fires, pollution release, ice formation on road pavement). In this paper, the overview of a wearable low-cost low-power system-on-a-chip (SoaC) 13 GHz passive microwave radiometer in CMOS 90 nm technology is presented. In particular, we focused on its application to the fire detection for civil safeguard. In detail, this sensor has been thought to be inserted into the fireman jacket in order to help the fireman in the detection of a hidden fire behind a door or a wall. The simulation results obtained by Ptolemy system simulation have confirmed the feasibility of such a SoaC microwave radiometer in a low-cost standard silicon technology for temperature remote sensing and, in particular, for its application to the safeguard of emergency operators. PMID:18003310

  8. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  9. 44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... service or affecting the employee's status and service, including information on experience, education... a lockable metal filing cabinet. (2) System managers, at their discretion, may designate additional... systems of records. (a) Systems managers shall ensure that appropriate administrative, technical,...

  10. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  11. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Laughter, Mark D

    2008-10-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  12. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  13. Data requirements for an anomaly detector in an automated safeguards system using neural networks

    SciTech Connect

    Whiteson, R.; Britschgi, J.J.

    1993-08-01

    An automated safeguards system must be able to detect and identify anomalous events in a near-real-time manner. Our approach to anomaly detection is based on the demonstrated ability of neural networks to model complex, nonlinear, real-time processes. By modeling the normal behavior of processes, we can detect how a system should behave and, thereby, detect when an abnormal state or event occurs. In this paper, we explore the computational intensity of training neural networks, and we discuss the issues involved in gathering and preprocessing the safeguards data necessary to train a neural network for anomaly detection. We explore data requirements for training neural networks and evaluate how different features of the training data affect the training and operation of the networks. We use actual process data to train our previous 3-tank model and compare the results to those achieved using simulated safeguards data. Comparisons are made on the basis of required training times in addition to correctness of prediction.

  14. ASSESS (Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security) update: Current status and future developments

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A. ); Cousins, T.D. ); Hoover, E.R. )

    1990-07-15

    The Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) has been released for use by DOE field offices and their contractors. In October, 1989, we offered a prototype workshop to selected representatives of the DOE community. Based on the prototype results, we held the first training workshop at the Central Training Academy in January, 1990. Four additional workshops are scheduled for FY 1990. ASSESS is a state-of-the-art analytical tool for management to conduct integrated evaluation of safeguards systems at facilities handling facilities. Currently, ASSESS focuses on the threat of theft/diversion of special nuclear material by insiders, outsiders, and a special form of insider/outsider collusion. ASSESS also includes a neutralization module. Development of the tool is continuing. Plans are underway to expand the capabilities of ASSESS to evaluate against violent insiders, to validate the databases, to expand the neutralization module, and to assist in demonstrating compliance with DOE Material Control and Accountability (MC A) Order 5633.3. These new capabilities include the ability to: compute a weighted average for performance capability against a spectrum of insider adversaries; conduct defense-in-depth analyses; and analyze against protracted theft scenarios. As they become available, these capabilities will be incorporated in our training program. ASSESS is being developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Safeguards and Security.

  15. An adaptable modular Safeguards Control and Communications System (SCCS) operator's manual

    SciTech Connect

    Ortiz, S.

    1988-02-01

    This document provides detailed operating instructions for the Safeguards Control and Communications System (SCCS). The SCCS is an automated electronics surveillance system that uses electrical sensors and a closed-circuit television (CCTV) system to enable a central security operator to monitor site security. In order to provide a basis for the operating instructions that follow, the manual begins with a description of the system hardware, concentrating on the hardware at the SCCS operator's console. The manual then provides detailed operating instructions for both normal and emergency operating conditions. 8 figs., 2 tabs.

  16. Summary of safeguards interactions between Los Alamos and Chinese scientists

    SciTech Connect

    Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-20

    Los Alamos has been collaborating since 1984 with scientists from the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) to develop nuclear measurement instrumentation and safeguards systems technologies that will help China support implementation of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). To date, four Chinese scientists have visited Los Alamos, for periods of six months to two years, where they have studied nondestructive assay instrumentation and learned about safeguards systems and inspection techniques that are used by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Part of this collaboration involves invitations from the CIAE to US personnel to visit China and interact with a larger number of Institute staff and to provide a series of presentations on safeguards to a wider audience. Typically, CIAE scientists, Beijing Institute of Nuclear Engineering (BINE) staff, and officials from the Government Safeguards Office attend the lectures. The BINE has an important role in developing the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. BINE is designing a reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel from Chinese nuclear Power reactors. China signed the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 and is significantly expanding its safeguards expertise and activities. This paper describes the following: DOE support for US and Chinese interactions on safeguards; Chinese safeguards; impacts of US-China safeguards interactions; and possible future safeguards interactions.

  17. 44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... service or affecting the employee's status and service, including information on experience, education... lockable metal filing cabinet when not in use by an authorized person. A system manager may employ an alternative storage system providing that it furnished an equivalent degree of physical security as storage...

  18. The International System.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    East, Maurice A.

    Designed as a unit for an international relations course, this systems approach paper outlines a learning method which contributes to the student's awareness that the United States is only one of many actors in the world. It also makes the student aware that there are limitations on the U. S. individual actions because of this interdependence and…

  19. Evaluations of the commercial spectrometer systems for safeguards applications using the germanium detectors

    SciTech Connect

    Vo, D.T.

    1998-12-31

    Safeguards applications require the best spectrometer systems with excellent resolution, stability, and throughput. Instruments must perform well in all the situations and environments. Data communication to the computer should be convenient, fast, and reliable. The software should have all the necessary tools and be ease to use. Portable systems should be small in size, lightweight, and have a long battery life. Nine commercially available spectrometer systems are tested with both the planar and coaxial germanium detectors. Considering the performance of the Digital Signal Processors (DSP), digital-based spectroscopy may be the future of gamma-ray spectroscopy.

  20. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next-Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly

    2014-01-01

    In 2007, the US Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined: trends and events that have an effect on the mission of international safeguards; the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements of the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system; and, the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review’s findings and recommendations were summarized in the report International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007). The executive summary is available at the following link: http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/NGSI_Report.pdf.

  1. Cobra sealing system; From field evaluation to practical safeguards application

    SciTech Connect

    Vodrazka, P.; Cermak, L. )

    1991-01-01

    After a successful conclusion of the Cobra seal IAEA field trials, the Cobra Seal System was installed in two Canadian facilities. The seals permit on-site verification without needing to replace them in extreme weather conditions, thus allowing a substantial time reduction for inspectors as well as minimizing intrusiveness of these activities. The paper describes experiences with practical installations of almost sixty Cobra seals including the selection of environmental conduits and housing. Examples of the results of the first several inspections utilizing a new version of the Cobra seal verifier are also included. Possible future outdoor applications of Cobra seals are described and some suggested improvements are outlined.

  2. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-08-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

  3. Internal insulation system development

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Gille, J. P.

    1973-01-01

    The development of an internal insulation system for cryogenic liquids is described. The insulation system is based on a gas layer concept in which capillary or surface tension effects are used to maintain a stable gas layer within a cellular core structure between the tank wall and the contained cryogen. In this work, a 1.8 meter diameter tank was insulated and tested with liquid hydrogen. Ability to withstand cycling of the aluminum tank wall to 450 K was a design and test condition.

  4. The NINO (No Inspector, No Operator system) cask-loading safeguards system

    SciTech Connect

    Fiarman, S.

    1987-01-01

    It is, in general difficult to determine by means of camera-surveillance techniques what is loaded into spent-fuel casks being prepared for shipment from light-water reactors to other reactors, reprocessing facilities, or long-term storage. Furthermore, the expected high frequency of cask loadings in the coming years would place too great a burden on the IAEA and Euratom inspectorates if each had to be observed by an inspector. For the case of shipment to other reactors and reprocessing facilities, the casks are soon opened and, in principle, their contents could be ascertained by direct inspection. In the case of long-term-storage facilities, the casks would stay sealed for years, thereby requiring the IAEA to know positively how many spent-fuel assemblies were loaded at the reactor and to have a continuity of knowledge of the cask's contents. It has been proposed instead that the facility operator place the cask seal on the cask within the field of view of a surveillance system linked to the cask seal. This solution, however, may not provide enough credibility for acceptance by the safeguards community. This paper presents an alternative to both inspector presence at cask loading and operator assistance in applying seals; this alternative is called the No Inspector, No Operator system (NINO).

  5. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Evans, Louise G; Croft, Stephen; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Tobin, S. J.; Menlove, H. O.; Schear, M. A.; Worrall, Andrew

    2011-01-13

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/ or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  6. An improved characterization method for international accountancy measurements of fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) fuel: helping achieve continual monitoring and safeguards through the fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Evans, Louise G; Croft, Stephen; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Tobin, S. J.; Boyer, B. D.; Menlove, H. O.; Schear, M. A.; Worrall, Andrew

    2010-11-24

    Nuclear fuel accountancy measurements are conducted at several points through the nuclear fuel cycle to ensure continuity of knowledge (CofK) of special nuclear material (SNM). Non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements are performed on fresh fuel (prior to irradiation in a reactor) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) post-irradiation. We have developed a fuel assembly characterization system, based on the novel concept of 'neutron fingerprinting' with multiplicity signatures to ensure detailed CofK of nuclear fuel through the entire fuel cycle. The neutron fingerprint in this case is determined by the measurement of the various correlated neutron signatures, specific to fuel isotopic composition, and therefore offers greater sensitivity to variations in fissile content among fuel assemblies than other techniques such as gross neutron counting. This neutron fingerprint could be measured at the point of fuel dispatch (e.g. from a fuel fabrication plant prior to irradiation, or from a reactor site post-irradiation), monitored during transportation of the fuel assembly, and measured at a subsequent receiving site (e.g. at the reactor site prior to irradiation, or reprocessing facility post-irradiation); this would confirm that no unexpected changes to the fuel composition or amount have taken place during transportation and/or reactor operations. Changes may indicate an attempt to divert material for example. Here, we present the current state of the practice of fuel measurements for both fresh mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and SNF (both MOX and uranium dioxide). This is presented in the framework of international safeguards perspectives from the US and UK. We also postulate as to how the neutron fingerprinting concept could lead to improved fuel characterization (both fresh MOX and SNF) resulting in: (a) assured CofK of fuel across the nuclear fuel cycle, (b) improved detection of SNM diversion, and (c) greater confidence in safeguards of SNF transportation.

  7. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  8. Safeguards and security considerations for a modular treatment system for plutonium residue stabilization

    SciTech Connect

    Wilkey, D.D.; Zack, N.R.; Zygmunt, S.J. Jr.

    1998-12-31

    Five sites in the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear complex have significant amounts of plutonium residues. The DOE has begun programs for stabilization of these materials, but the existing facilities, infrastructure, and technical capacity are inadequate for the task. Additionally, sufficient funding is not available to enable all the facilities to meet current standards that are required for the facilities to be able to treat the residues. At the request of the DOE Office of Environmental Management, a team was assembled to study the feasibility of using modular systems to stabilize plutonium-bearing residues. This feasibility team prepared a basis document using typical residue profiles and fact sheets that documented treatment activities and operational programs that were required. From this basis document, a design team prepared a preconceptual design and a cost and schedule estimate for a stand-alone modular system to treat the residues. The modular treatment system was designed to be broken into functional units (modules) that are individually packaged and portable. These modules were designed to consider all operational phases including safeguards and security. This discussion will present the safeguards and security considerations and techniques that were identified for the modular treatment system.

  9. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  10. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  11. IAEA safeguards in perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Eklund, S.

    1987-07-01

    A review of the development of the International Atomic Energy Agency from President Eisenhower's 1953 Atoms for Peace proposal through development of the IAEA safeguards approach in the official documents (The Statute, INFCIRC/66 and 153), and related initiators, such as the Nuclear Supplier State Agreement (INFCE/254), The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (1977-79), The Committee on Assurance and Supply, and the proposed International Plutonium Storage Regime. The accomplishments of IAEA safeguards are recognized as well as the continuing need for development and support.

  12. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  13. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  14. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  15. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  16. International Space Station Power Systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Propp, Timothy William

    2001-01-01

    This viewgraph presentation gives a general overview of the International Space Station Power Systems. The topics include: 1) The Basics of Power; 2) Space Power Systems Design Constraints; 3) Solar Photovoltaic Power Systems; 4) Energy Storage for Space Power Systems; 5) Challenges of Operating Power Systems in Earth Orbit; 6) and International Space Station Electrical Power System.

  17. An overview of ASSESS-analytic system and software for evaluating safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Cousins, T.C.; Matter, J.C.

    1989-06-26

    This paper provides an overview of ASSESS, a comprehensive approach for evaluating the effectiveness of facility safeguards against a spectrum of threats: insiders, outsiders, and hand-off collusion between insider and outsider adversaries. ASSESS version 1.0, completed in March 1989, contains significant new capabilities not present in the models currently used at DOE sites: ET and SAVI. The Insider module uses a reference database of defeat methods, strategies, and detection probabilities to determine the optimal theft scenario and Probability of Detection for each insider adversary type. The Outsider module calculates Probabilities of Interruption and identifies most vulnerable paths for a threat spectrum of: terrorists, criminals, psychotics, and extremists. A Neutralization module calculates the Probability of Neutralization of violent adversaries in a small force engagement for up to 30 combatants per side and 10 events. A Hand-off Collusion module calculates probabilities of System Win against hand-off of theft material by various insiders in collusion with outsiders. This paper describes the scope of, and the relationship between, each of the six modules--Manager, Facility, Insider, Outsider, Neutralization, and Hand-off Collusion-in the integrated ASSESS package developed jointly by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories for the US department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. 11 refs., 9 figs.

  18. VISA-2 - a general, vulnerability-oriented method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards/security systems at nuclear facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Harris, L.; Owel, W.R.

    1981-01-01

    This paper discusses the VISA (Vulnerability of Integrated Safeguards Analysis) method, developed in 1976-77 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and which has been adapted more recently to a broader range of uses. The performance of VISA systems is evaluated in terms of how they perform as an integrated safeguards/security system. The resulting method has been designated VISA-2. 7 refs.

  19. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS,INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME I/III SETTING THE STAGE: 1991-1996.

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.; Anzelon, G.

    2010-01-01

    Events in Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrated that the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed to be improved. It had failed, after all, to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon program even though some of Iraq's's activities had been pursued at inspected facilities in buildings adjacent to ones being inspected by the IAEA. Although there were aspects of the implementation of safeguards where the IAEA needed to improve, the primary limitations were considered to be part of the safeguards system itself. That system was based on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970, to which Iraq was a party, and implemented on the basis of a model NPT safeguards agreement, published by the IAEA 1972 as INFCIRC/153 (corrected). The agreement calls for states to accept and for the IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear material in the state. Iraq was a party to such an agreement, but it violated the agreement by concealing nuclear material and other nuclear activities from the IAEA. Although the IAEA was inspecting in Iraq, it was hindered by aspects of the agreement that essentially limited its access to points in declared facilities and provided the IAEA with little information about nuclear activities anywhere else in Iraq. As a result, a major review of the NPT safeguards system was initiated by its Director General and Member States with the objective of finding the best means to enable the IAEA to detect both diversions from declared stocks and any undeclared nuclear material or activities in the state. Significant improvements that could be made within existing legal authority were taken quickly, most importantly a change in 1992 in how and when and what design information would be reported to the IAEA. During 1991-1996, the IAEA pursued intensive study, legal and technical analysis, and field trials and held numerous consultations with Member States. The Board of Governors discussed the issue of strengthening safeguards

  20. Study of safeguards system on dry reprocessing for fast breeder reactor

    SciTech Connect

    Li, T. K.; Burr, Tom; Menlove, Howard O.; Thomas, K. E.; Fukushima, M.; Hori, M.

    2002-01-01

    A 'Feasibility Study on the Commercialized Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) Cycle System' is underway at Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). Concepts to commercialize the FBR fuel cycle are being created together with their necessary research and development (R&D) tasks. 'Dry,' non-aqueous, processes are candidates for FBR fuel reprocessing. Dry reprocessing technology takes advantage of proliferation barriers, due to the lower decontamination factors achievable by the simple pyrochemical processes proposed. The concentration o f highly radioactive impurities and non-fissile materials in products from a dry reprocess is generally significantly larger than the normal aqueous (Purex) process. However, the safeguards of dry reprocesses have not been widely analyzed. In 2000, JNC and Los Alamos National Laboratoiy (LANL) initiated a joint research program to study the safeguards aspects of dry reprocessing. In this study, the safeguardability of the three options: metal electrorefining, oxide electrowinning, and fluoride volatility processes, are assessed. FBR spent fuels are decladded and powdered into mixed oxides (MOX) at the Head-End process either by oxidation-reduction reactions (metal electrorefining and fluoride volatility) or mechanically (oxide electrowinning). At the oxide electrowinning process, the spent MOX he1 powder is transferred to chloride in molten salt and nuclear materials are extracted onto cathode as oxides. For metal electrorefining process, on the other hand, the MOX fuel is converted to chloride in molten salt, and nuclear materials are extracted onto cathode as a metal fomi. At lhe fluoride volatility process, the MOX fuel powder is converted to U&/PuF6 (gaseous form) in a fluidized bed; plutonium and uranium fluorides are separated by volatilization properties and then are converted to oxides. Since the conceptual design of a dry reprocessing plant is incomplete, the operational mode, vessel capacities, residence times, and campaigns

  1. Initial CTBT international monitoring system security findings and recommendations

    SciTech Connect

    Craft, R.L.; Draelos, T.J.

    1996-08-01

    An initial security evaluation of the proposed International Monitoring System (IMS) suggests safeguards at various points in the IMS to provide reliable information to the user community. Modeling the IMS as a network of information processing nodes provides a suitable architecture for assessing data surety needs of the system. The recommendations in this paper include the use of public-key authentication for data from monitoring stations and for commands issued to monitoring stations. Other monitoring station safeguards include tamper protection of sensor subsystems, preservation of data (i.e. short-term archival), and limiting the station`s network services. The recommendations for NDCs focus on the need to provide a backup to the IDC for data archival and data routing. Safeguards suggested for the IDC center on issues of reliability. The production of event bulletins should employ {open_quotes}two-man{close_quotes} procedures. As long as the data maintains its integrity, event bulletins can be produced by NDCs as well. The effective use of data authentication requires a sound key management system. Key management systems must be developed for the authentication of data, commands, and event bulletins if necessary. It is recommended that the trust placed in key management be distributed among multiple parties. The recommendations found in this paper offer safeguards for identified vulnerabilities in the IMS with regard to data surety. However, several outstanding security issues still exist. These issues include the need to formalize and obtain a consensus on a threat model and a trust model for the IMS. The final outstanding security issue that requires in-depth analysis concerns the IDC as a potential single point of failure in the current IMS design.

  2. Integrated Process Monitoring based on Systems of Sensors for Enhanced Nuclear Safeguards Sensitivity and Robustness

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto E. Garcia

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) can have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). In order to infer the possible existence of proliferation-driven activities, the objective of NMA-based methods is often to statistically evaluate materials unaccounted for (MUF) computed by solving a given mass balance equation related to a material balance area (MBA) at every material balance period (MBP), a particular objective for a PM-based approach may be to statistically infer and evaluate anomalies unaccounted for (AUF) that may have occurred within a MBP. Although possibly being indicative of proliferation-driven activities, the detection and tracking of anomaly patterns is not trivial because some executed events may be unobservable or unreliably observed as others. The proposed similarity between NMA- and PM-based approaches is important as performance metrics utilized for evaluating NMA-based methods, such as detection probability (DP) and false alarm probability (FAP), can also be applied for assessing PM-based safeguards solutions. To this end, AUF count estimates can be translated into significant quantity (SQ) equivalents that may have been diverted within a given MBP. A diversion alarm is reported if this mass estimate is greater than or equal to the selected value for alarm level (AL), appropriately chosen to optimize DP and FAP based on the particular characteristics of the monitored MBA, the sensors utilized, and the data processing method employed for integrating and analyzing collected measurements. To illustrate the application of the proposed PM approach, a protracted diversion of Pu in a waste stream was selected based on incomplete fuel dissolution in a dissolver unit operation, as this diversion scenario is considered to be problematic for detection using NMA-based methods alone. Results demonstrate benefits of conducting PM under a system

  3. Internal Control Systems in the Library Environment.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Begg, Robert T.

    1985-01-01

    Examines system for safeguarding assets and guaranteeing reliability of library's financial records within context of management functions that comprise accounting controls: planning by budget or other standard of comparison; operation of effective accounting and record-keeping system; personnel management practices. Cash controls as example of…

  4. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges,” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, “The Further Evolution of Safeguards,” noted: “It is clear that ‘safeguards culture

  5. Evaluating alternative responses to safeguards alarms

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-04-15

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alarms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to have stolen special nuclear material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.

  6. Comparing International Curriculum Systems: The International Instructional Systems Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Creese, Brian; Gonzalez, Alvaro; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    This paper sets out the main findings of the International Instructional Systems Study (IISS), conducted by the UCL Institute of Education and funded by the Center on International Education Benchmarking (CIEB). The study examined the instructional systems and intended curricula of six "high performing" countries and two US states. The…

  7. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  8. Measurement and simulation of a Compton suppression system for safeguards application

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lee, Seung Kyu; Seo, Hee; Won, Byung-Hee; Lee, Chaehun; Shin, Hee-Sung; Na, Sang-Ho; Song, Dae-Yong; Kim, Ho-Dong; Park, Geun-Il; Park, Se-Hwan

    2015-11-01

    Plutonium (Pu) contents in spent nuclear fuels, recovered uranium (U) or uranium/transuranium (U/TRU) products must be measured in order to secure the safeguardability of a pyroprocessing facility. Self-induced X-Ray fluorescence (XRF) and gamma-ray spectroscopy are useful techniques for determining Pu-to-U ratios and Pu isotope ratios of spent fuel. Photon measurements of spent nuclear fuel by using high-resolution spectrometers such as high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors show a large continuum background in the low-energy region, which is due in large part to Compton scattering of energetic gamma rays. This paper proposes a Compton suppression system for reducing of the Compton continuum background. In the present study, the system was configured by using an HPGe main detector and a BGO (bismuth germanate: Bi4Ge3O12) guard detector. The system performances for gamma-ray measurement and XRF were evaluated by means of Monte Carlo simulations and measurements of the radiation source. The Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended (MCNPX) simulations were performed using the same geometry as for the experiments, and considered, for exact results, the production of secondary electrons and photons. As a performance test of the Compton suppression system, the peak-to-Compton ratio, which is a figure of merit to evaluate the gamma-ray detection, was enhanced by a factor of three or more when the Compton suppression system was used.

  9. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS).

    SciTech Connect

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-08-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework.

  10. SAFEGUARDS CULTURE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT MATTER?

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-11-01

    The concepts of safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the authors have attempted a rigorous analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, with the goal of determining its value to the international safeguards community, and to provide recommendations as to whether the concept deserves further development. As part of this analysis, the authors explore the distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance. The authors also discuss synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture.

  11. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1994-02-16

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA`s) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants` meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.

  12. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  13. The Internal Audit.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kuhn, Robert H.

    1981-01-01

    Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a school system to safeguard its assets, check the reliability of its accounting data, promote operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed policies. (Author)

  14. Development of an all-in-one gamma camera/CCD system for safeguard verification

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kim, Hyun-Il; An, Su Jung; Chung, Yong Hyun; Kwak, Sung-Woo

    2014-12-01

    For the purpose of monitoring and verifying efforts at safeguarding radioactive materials in various fields, a new all-in-one gamma camera/charged coupled device (CCD) system was developed. This combined system consists of a gamma camera, which gathers energy and position information on gamma-ray sources, and a CCD camera, which identifies the specific location in a monitored area. Therefore, 2-D image information and quantitative information regarding gamma-ray sources can be obtained using fused images. A gamma camera consists of a diverging collimator, a 22 × 22 array CsI(Na) pixelated scintillation crystal with a pixel size of 2 × 2 × 6 mm3 and Hamamatsu H8500 position-sensitive photomultiplier tube (PSPMT). The Basler scA640-70gc CCD camera, which delivers 70 frames per second at video graphics array (VGA) resolution, was employed. Performance testing was performed using a Co-57 point source 30 cm from the detector. The measured spatial resolution and sensitivity were 4.77 mm full width at half maximum (FWHM) and 7.78 cps/MBq, respectively. The energy resolution was 18% at 122 keV. These results demonstrate that the combined system has considerable potential for radiation monitoring.

  15. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    SciTech Connect

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-06-23

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information.

  16. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  17. Safeguards and security by design (SSBD) for the domestic threat - theft and sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Demuth, Scott F; Mullen, Mark

    2011-10-05

    Safeguards by Design (SBD) is receiving significant interest with respect to international safeguards objectives. However, less attention has been focused on the equally important topic of domestic Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), which addresses requirements such as those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the United States. While international safeguards are concerned with detecting State diversion of nuclear material from peaceful to nuclear explosives purposes, domestic Material Protection, Control and Accounting measures (MPC&A) are focused on non-State theft and sabotage. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has described the Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' This same concept is equally applicable to SSBD for domestic requirements. The United States Department of Energy (DOE) has initiated a project through its Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and more specifically its Fuel Cycle Research and Development (FCRD) program, to develop a domestic SSBD discipline and methodology in parallel with similar efforts sponsored by the DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) and the IAEA for international safeguards. This activity includes the participation of industry (through DOE-sponsored contracts) and DOE National Laboratories. This paper will identify the key domestic safeguards and security requirements (i.e. MC&A and physical protection) and explain how and why Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) is important and beneficial for the design of future US nuclear energy systems.

  18. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  19. Fish welfare assurance system: initial steps to set up an effective tool to safeguard and monitor farmed fish welfare at a company level.

    PubMed

    van de Vis, J W; Poelman, M; Lambooij, E; Bégout, M-L; Pilarczyk, M

    2012-02-01

    The objective was to take a first step in the development of a process-oriented quality assurance (QA) system for monitoring and safeguarding of fish welfare at a company level. A process-oriented approach is focused on preventing hazards and involves establishment of critical steps in a process that requires careful control. The seven principles of the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) concept were used as a framework to establish the QA system. HACCP is an internationally agreed approach for management of food safety, which was adapted for the purpose of safeguarding and monitoring the welfare of farmed fish. As the main focus of this QA system is farmed fish welfare assurance at a company level, it was named Fish Welfare Assurance System (FWAS). In this paper we present the initial steps of setting up FWAS for on growing of sea bass (Dicentrarchus labrax), carp (Cyprinus carpio) and European eel (Anguilla anguilla). Four major hazards were selected, which were fish species dependent. Critical Control Points (CCPs) that need to be controlled to minimize or avoid the four hazards are presented. For FWAS, monitoring of CCPs at a farm level is essential. For monitoring purposes, Operational Welfare Indicators (OWIs) are needed to establish whether critical biotic, abiotic, managerial and environmental factors are controlled. For the OWIs we present critical limits/target values. A critical limit is the maximum or minimum value to which a factor must be controlled at a critical control point to prevent, eliminate or reduce a hazard to an acceptable level. For managerial factors target levels are more appropriate than critical limits. Regarding the international trade of farmed fish products, we propose that FWAS needs to be standardized in aquaculture chains. For this standardization a consensus on the concept of fish welfare, methods to assess welfare objectively and knowledge on the needs of farmed fish are required. PMID:22278705

  20. LESSONS LEARNED IN TESTING OF SAFEGUARDS EQUIPMENT.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; FARNITANO,M.; CARELLI,J.; HAZELTINE,J.; BAILEY,D.

    2001-10-29

    The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Department of Safeguards uses complex instrumentation for the application of safeguards at nuclear facilities around the world. Often, this equipment is developed through cooperation with member state support programs because the Agency's requirements are unique and are not met by commercially available equipment. Before approving an instrument or system for routine inspection use, the IAEA subjects it to a series of tests designed to evaluate its reliability. In 2000, the IAEA began to observe operational failures in digital surveillance systems. In response to the observed failures, the IAEA worked with the equipment designer and manufacturer to determine the cause of failure. An action plan was developed to correct the performance issues and further test the systems to make sure that additional operational issues would not surface later. This paper addresses the steps taken to address operation issues related to digital image surveillance systems and the lessons learned during this process.

  1. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.; Krass, A.; Kratzer, M.; Sanborn, J.; Ward, B.; Wulf, N. A.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

  2. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25... Education § 15b.25 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that provides a public elementary or secondary... related services, a system of procedural safeguards that includes notice, an opportunity for the...

  3. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public... Secondary Education § 84.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a public elementary or... need special instruction or related services, a system of procedural safeguards that includes...

  4. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 18... Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall implement a system of procedural safeguards with respect to...

  5. Review of effectiveness-evaluation methodologies for safeguards and security systems

    SciTech Connect

    Dowdy, E.J.; Mangan, D.L.

    1982-06-01

    We discuss the factors that influence the effectiveness of safeguards and security measures and the characteristics required of effectiveness evaluation methodologies. Within this context and from a utility standpoint, we review those effectiveness evaluation methodologies that have been developed. Our principal recommendation concerns the application and concomitant validation of existing methodologies. This recommendation derives from our conclusion that there has been a gross imbalance between the effort spent on methodology development and the application of those methodologies. Only for those safeguards measures that do not seem to be covered by existing methodologies or that seem to be inadequately covered do we suggest development. 44 references.

  6. Implications of Export/Import Reporting Requirements in the United States - International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Additional Protocol

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Benjamin, Eugene L.; McNair, Gary W.

    2001-02-20

    The United States has signed but not ratified the US/IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol. If ratified, the Additional Protocol will require the US to report to the IAEA certain nuclear-related exports and imports to the IAEA. This document identifies and assesses the issues associated with the US making those reports. For example, some regulatory changes appear to be necessary. The document also attempts to predict the impact on the DOE Complex by assessing the historical flow of exports and imports that would be reportable if the Additional Protocol were in force.

  7. Computerized international geothermal information systems

    SciTech Connect

    Phillips, S.L.; Lawrence, J.D.; Lepman, S.R.

    1980-03-01

    The computerized international geothermal energy information system is reviewed. The review covers establishment of the Italy - United States linked data centers by the NATO Committee on Challenges of Modern Society, through a bilateral agreement, and up to the present time. The result of the information exchange project is given as the bibliographic and numerical data available from the data centers. Recommendations for the exchange of computerized geothermal information at the international level are discussed.

  8. REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MODEL PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT(S) BETWEEN STATE(S) AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) VOLUME II/III IAEA COMMITTEE 24, Major Issues Underlying the Model Additional Protocol (1996-1997).

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Saum-Manning, L.; Houck, F.

    2010-01-01

    Volume I of this Review traces the origins of the Model Additional Protocol. It covers the period from 1991, when events in Iraq triggered an intensive review of the safeguards system, until 1996, when the IAEA Board of Governors established Committee 24 to negotiate a new protocol to safeguards agreement. The period from 1991-1996 set the stage for this negotiation and shaped its outcome in important ways. During this 5-year period, many proposals for strengthening safeguards were suggested and reviewed. Some proposals were dropped, for example, the suggestion by the IAEA Secretariat to verify certain imports, and others were refined. A rough consensus was established about the directions in which the international community wanted to go, and this was reflected in the draft of an additional protocol that was submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors on May 6, 1996 in document GOV/2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System - Proposals For Implementation Under Complementary Legal Authority, A Report by the Director General. This document ended with a recommendation that, 'the Board, through an appropriate mechanism, finalize the required legal instrument taking as a basis the draft protocol proposed by the Secretariat and the explanation of the measures contained in this document.'

  9. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  10. 36 CFR 1202.30 - How does NARA safeguard its systems of records?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... records are protected in accordance with the Computer Security Act, OMB Circular A-11 requiring privacy... appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards are established to ensure the security and confidentiality of records. In order to protect against any threats or hazards to their security or loss...

  11. The International Celestial Reference System

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fomalont, E.

    2016-05-01

    The International Celestial Reference System (ICRS) is a set of prescriptions, conventions, observational techniques and modeling required to define an celestial inertial frame. The origin of the frame is the solar-system barycenter. The ICRS was adopted by the International Astronomical Union in 1997 as the replacement of the FK5 system. The frame is called the International Celestial Reference Frame (ICRF), and is realized (defined) by the accurate position of 295 radio sources, distributed over the sky, and the accuracy of the frame orientation is about 10 microarcsec. This review will cover: the history of the development of the ICRS; the basics of the major observational technique of Very Long Baseline Interferometry; the use of the fundamental observable, the group delay; experimental strategies to optimize the accuracy; the computational methods for analyzing the large data base; the two major error limitations; and the possible of ICRS/Gaia interactions.

  12. Evaluation of information technology impact on effective internal control in the University system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sanusi Fasilat, A.; Hassan, Haslinda

    2015-12-01

    Information Technology (IT) plays a key role in internal control system in various organizations in terms of maintaining records and other internal services. Internal control system is defined as an efficient control procedures set up by firm to safeguard resources and to assure the reliability and accuracy of both financial and non-financial records in line with applicable governance and procedure to acquire the established goal and objectives. This paper focuses on the impact of IT on internal control system in the Nigerian universities. Data are collected from three different universities via questionnaire. Descriptive statistics is used to analyze the data; Chi-square is performed to test the hypothesis. The results of the hypothesis showed that IT has a positive relationship with the effective internal control activities in the University system. It is concluded that the adoption of IT will significantly improve the effectiveness of the internal control system operations in the University in terms of quality service delivery.

  13. Evaluation of information technology impact on effective internal control in the University system

    SciTech Connect

    Sanusi Fasilat, A. Hassan, Haslinda

    2015-12-11

    Information Technology (IT) plays a key role in internal control system in various organizations in terms of maintaining records and other internal services. Internal control system is defined as an efficient control procedures set up by firm to safeguard resources and to assure the reliability and accuracy of both financial and non-financial records in line with applicable governance and procedure to acquire the established goal and objectives. This paper focuses on the impact of IT on internal control system in the Nigerian universities. Data are collected from three different universities via questionnaire. Descriptive statistics is used to analyze the data; Chi-square is performed to test the hypothesis. The results of the hypothesis showed that IT has a positive relationship with the effective internal control activities in the University system. It is concluded that the adoption of IT will significantly improve the effectiveness of the internal control system operations in the University in terms of quality service delivery.

  14. International Instructional Systems: Social Studies

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brant, Jacek; Chapman, Arthur; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    This paper reports on research conducted as part of the International Instructional System Study that explored five subject areas across nine jurisdictions in six high-performing countries. The Study's overall aim was to understand what, if anything, there is in common in the curricula and assessment arrangements among the high-performing…

  15. Value Systems in International Business.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Heiba, Farouk I.

    Every society has a system of values and seeks to achieve goals which it defines as desirable. To gain insight and a measure of understanding of another culture, international marketers can approach a country as a whole, seek out behavioral premises, obtain a theoretical knowledge of the culture, and learn the country's social heritage.…

  16. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N; Boyer, Brian D; Leitch, Rosalyn M

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  17. Potential application of LIBS to NNSA next generation safeguards initiative (NGSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Ii, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Veirs, Douglas K; Browne, Mike; Lopez, Leon; Martinez, Ron; Le, Loan; Lamontagne, Stephen A

    2009-01-01

    In a climate in which states and nations have been and perhaps currently are involved in the prol iferation of nuclear materials and technologies, advanced methodologies and improvements in current measurement techniques are needed to combat new threats and increased levels of sophistication. The Department of Energy through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has undertaken a broad review of International Safeguards. The conclusion from that review was that a comprehensive initiative to revitalize international safeguards technology and the human resource base was urgently needed to keep pace with demands and increasingly sophisticated emerging safeguards challenges. To address these challenges, NNSA launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) to develop policies, concepts, technologies, expertise, and infrastructure necessary to sustain the international safeguards system as its mission evolves for the next 25 years. NGSI is designed to revitalize and strengthen the U.S. safeguards technical base, recognizing that without a robust program the United States of America will not be in a position to exercise leadership or provide the necessary support to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). International safeguards as administrated by the IAEA are the primary vehicle for verifying compliance with the peaceful use and nonproliferation of nuclear materials and technologies. Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy or LIBS has the potential to support the goals of NGSI as follows: by providing (1) automated analysis in complex nuclear processing or reprocessing facilities in real-time or near real-time without sample preparation or removal, (2) isotopic and important elemental ratio (Cm/Pu, Cm/U, ... etc) analysis, and (3) centralized remote control, process monitoring, and analysis of nuclear materials in nuclear facilities at multiple locations within the facility. Potential application of LIBS to international safeguards as

  18. Boron-10 Based Neutron Coincidence Counter for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kouzes, Richard T.; Ely, James H.; Lintereur, Azaree T.; Siciliano, Edward R.

    2014-10-01

    The shortage of 3He has triggered the search for effective alternative neutron detection technologies for national security applications, including international nuclear safeguards. Any alternative neutron detection technology must satisfy two basic criteria: it must meet a neutron detection efficiency requirement, and it must be insensitive to gamma-ray interference at a prescribed level while still meeting the neutron detection requirement. For nuclear safeguards, a system must perform measurements in the field with a prescribed precision in a specified time. This paper describes an effort to design, model and test an alternatives-based neutron coincidence counter for nuclear safeguards applications. The technology chosen for use in an alternatives-based uranium neutron coincidence collar was boron-lined proportional counters. Extensive modeling was performed of various system configurations and comparisons were made to measurements on a commercial prototype boron-10 based uranium neutron coincidence collar.

  19. SAFEGUARDS EXPERIENCE ON THE DUPIC FUEL CYCLE PROCESS

    SciTech Connect

    J. HONG; H. KIM; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    Safeguards have been applied to the R and D process for directly fabricating CANDU fuel with PWR spent fuel material. Safeguards issues to be resolved were identified in the areas such as international cooperation on handling foreign origin nuclear material, technology development of operator's measurement system of the bulk handling process of spent fuel material, and a built-in C/S system for independent verification of material flow. The fuel cycle concept (Direct Use of PWR spent fuel in CANDU, DUPIC) was developed in consideration of reutilization of over-flowing spent fuel resources at PWR sites and a reduction of generated high level wastes. All those safeguards issues have been finally resolved, and the first batch of PWR spent fuel material was successfully introduced in the DUPIC lab facility and has been in use for routine process development.

  20. SARS: Safeguards Accounting and Reporting Software

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mohammedi, B.; Saadi, S.; Ait-Mohamed, S.

    In order to satisfy the requirements of the SSAC (State System for Accounting and Control of nuclear materials), for recording and reporting objectives; this computer program comes to bridge the gape between nuclear facilities operators and national inspection verifying records and delivering reports. The SARS maintains and generates at-facility safeguards accounting records and generates International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards reports based on accounting data input by the user at any nuclear facility. A database structure is built and BORLAND DELPHI programming language has been used. The software is designed to be user-friendly, to make extensive and flexible management of menus and graphs. SARS functions include basic physical inventory tacking, transaction histories and reporting. Access controls are made by different passwords.

  1. DOE/DHS INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY PROGRAMS: A MODEL FOR USE IN NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Anderson; Mark Schanfein; Trond Bjornard; Paul Moskowitz

    2011-07-01

    Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

  2. Video image processing for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.A.; Howell, J.A.; Menlove, H.O.; Brislawn, C.M.; Bradley, J.N.; Chare, P.; Gorten, J.

    1995-09-01

    The field of nuclear safeguards has received increasing amounts of public attention since the events of the Iraq-UN conflict over Kuwait, the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union, and more recently, the North Korean resistance to nuclear facility inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The role of nuclear safeguards in these and other events relating to the world`s nuclear material inventory is to assure safekeeping of these materials and to verify the inventory and use of nuclear materials as reported by states that have signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty throughout the world. Nuclear safeguards are measures prescribed by domestic and international regulatory bodies such as DOE, NRC, IAEA, and EURATOM and implemented by the nuclear facility or the regulatory body. These measures include destructive and non destructive analysis of product materials/process by-products for materials control and accountancy purposes, physical protection for domestic safeguards, and containment and surveillance for international safeguards.

  3. Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    SciTech Connect

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-12-31

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future.

  4. REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON NUCLEAR FACILITY DESIGN INFORMATION EXAMINATION AND VERIFICATION FOR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-10-01

    Executive Summary The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements nuclear safeguards and verifies countries are compliant with their international nuclear safeguards agreements. One of the key provisions in the safeguards agreement is the requirement that the country provide nuclear facility design and operating information to the IAEA relevant to safeguarding the facility, and at a very early stage. , This provides the opportunity for the IAEA to verify the safeguards-relevant features of the facility and to periodically ensure that those features have not changed. The national authorities (State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) provide the design information for all facilities within a country to the IAEA. The design information is conveyed using the IAEA’s Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and specifies: (1) Identification of the facility’s general character, purpose, capacity, and location; (2) Description of the facility’s layout and nuclear material form, location, and flow; (3) Description of the features relating to nuclear material accounting, containment, and surveillance; and (4) Description of existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material accounting and control, with identification of nuclear material balance areas. The DIQ is updated as required by written addendum. IAEA safeguards inspectors examine and verify this information in design information examination (DIE) and design information verification (DIV) activities to confirm that the facility has been constructed or is being operated as declared by the facility operator and national authorities, and to develop a suitable safeguards approach. Under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) Office of Non-Proliferation and International Security identified the need for more effective and efficient verification of design information by the IAEA for improving international safeguards

  5. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, James W

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  6. Key aspects of a Flemish system to safeguard public health interests in case of chemical release incidents.

    PubMed

    Smolders, Roel; Colles, Ann; Cornelis, Christa; Van Holderbeke, Mirja; Chovanova, Hana; Wildemeersch, Dirk; Mampaey, Maja; Van Campenhout, Karen

    2014-12-15

    Although well-established protocols are available for emergency services and first-responders in case of chemical release incidents, a well-developed system to monitor and safeguard public health was, until recently, lacking in Flanders. We therefore developed a decision support system (DSS) to aid public health officials in identifying the appropriate actions in case of incidents. Although the DSS includes human biomonitoring as one of its key instruments, it also goes well beyond this instrument alone. Also other, complementary, approaches that focus more on effect assessment using in vitro toxicity testing, indirect exposures through the food chain, and parallel means of data collection (e.g. through ecosurveillance or public consultation), are integrated in the Flemish approach. Even though the DSS is set up to provide a flexible and structured decision tree, the value of expert opinion is deemed essential to account for the many uncertainties associated with the early phases of technological incidents. When the DSS and the associated instruments will be fully operational, it will provide a valuable addition to the already available protocols, and will specifically safeguard public health interests. PMID:24866056

  7. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  8. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient.

  9. Framework for analyzing safeguards alarms and response decisions

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1982-06-11

    This paper describes a quantitative approach to help evaluate and respond to safeguards alarms. These alrms may be generated internally by a facility's safeguards systems or externally by individuals claiming to possess stolen Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This approach can be used to identify the most likely cause of an alarm - theft, hoax, or error - and to evaluate alternative responses to alarms. Possible responses include conducting investigations, initiating measures to recover stolen SNM, and replying to external threats. Based on the results of each alarm investigation step, the evaluation revises the likelihoods of possible causes of an alarm, and uses this information to determine the optimal sequence of further responses. The choice of an optimal sequence of responses takes into consideration the costs and benefits of successful thefts or hoaxes. These results provide an analytical basis for setting priorities and developing contingency plans for responding to safeguards alarms.

  10. Safeguarding Porpoises

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    1997-01-01

    The NetMark 1000 by the Dukane Corporation, used to safeguard porpoises from net entanglement, employs technology developed in the late 1960s by NASA engineers at the Langley Research Center. It is based on an underwater location aid, able to withstand high impact, then emit multidirectional signals for hours on end, originally used in the retrieval of NASA payloads following watery touch-downs on Earth. Dukane and Burnett Electronics later obtained a license from NASA, further improving on the beacon design. In a large scale experiment off the coast of New Hampshire in autumn of 1994, it was found that the use of acoustic alarms appears to hold considerable promise in reducing the number of harbor porpoises killed in the sink gill nets in the Gulf of Maine. Dukane has sold well over 100,000 units. Applications of the pinger are also expanding to other animal species.

  11. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) With Pebble Fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Mark Schanfein

    2012-08-01

    The following is a guidance document from a series prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), to assist facility designers and operators in implementing international Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). SBD has two main objectives: (1) to avoid costly and time consuming redesign work or retrofits of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities and (2) to make the implementation of international safeguards more effective and efficient at such facilities. In the long term, the attainment of these goals would save industry and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) time, money, and resources and be mutually beneficial. This particular safeguards guidance document focuses on pebble fuel high temperature gas reactors (HTGR). The purpose of the IAEA safeguards system is to provide credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The safeguards system consists of the IAEA’s statutory authority to establish safeguards; safeguards rights and obligations in safeguards agreements and additional protocols; and technical measures implemented pursuant to those agreements. Of foremost importance is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the IAEA, concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). According to a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors decision, countries must: notify the IAEA of a decision to construct a new nuclear facility as soon as such decision is taken; provide design information on such facilities as the designs develop; and provide detailed design information based on construction plans at least 180 days prior to the start of construction, and on "as-built" designs at least 180 days before the first receipt of nuclear material. Ultimately, the design information will be captured in an IAEA Design Information

  12. Time-Domain Reflectometry for Tamper Indication in Unattended Monitoring Systems for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tedeschi, Jonathan R.; Smith, Leon E.; Moore, David E.; Sheen, David M.; Conrad, Ryan C.

    2014-12-17

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended, remotely monitored measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) leads a collaboration that is exploring various tamper-indicating (TI) measures that could help to address some of the long-standing detector and data-transmission authentication challenges with IAEA’s unattended systems. PNNL is investigating the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s progress and preliminary findings from the first year of the study, and describes the path forward.

  13. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper S. E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  14. Strategic analysis for safeguards systems: a feasibility study. Volume 2. Appendix

    SciTech Connect

    Goldman, A J

    1984-12-01

    This appendix provides detailed information regarding game theory (strategic analysis) and its potential role in safeguards to supplement the main body of this report. In particualr, it includes an extensive, though not comprehensive review of literature on game theory and on other topics that relate to the formulation of a game-theoretic model (e.g. the payoff functions). The appendix describes the basic form and components of game theory models, and the solvability of various models. It then discusses three basic issues related to the use of strategic analysis in material accounting: (1) its understandability; (2) its viability in regulatory settings; and (3) difficulties in the use of mixed strategies. Each of the components of a game theoretic model are then discussed and related to the present context.

  15. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  16. Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Humberto Garcia; William Desmond; Scott Demuth

    2010-11-01

    International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

  17. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  18. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  19. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  20. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  1. A preliminary study on the safeguardability of a Korean advanced pyro-processing facility (KAPF)

    SciTech Connect

    Lee, S.Y.; Thomas, K.E.; Marlow, J.B.; Menlove, H.O.; Ko, W.I.; Yang, M.S.; Park, S.W.

    2007-07-01

    A preliminary study on the safeguardability of the Korean Advanced Pyro-processing Facility (KAPF) was performed. The main processes of the facility include voloxidation, electrolytic reduction, electrorefining, electrowinning, and salt recycling with a transuranic (TRU) recovery process. The subprocesses and material flow of the conceptually designed KAPF with a unit capacity of 100 tHM/year were analysed, and subsequently, the relevant material balance area (MBA) and key measurement point (KMP) were designed for material accounting. Uncertainty in material accounting was evaluated with designed MBA and KMP, together with measurement uncertainties of analytic methods identified for the KAPF. It was found that the major safeguards challenges were Pu input accountability and U/Pu inventory measurement at each subprocess. The continuous association of Pu with Cm presents measurement options in both cases. It was concluded that a safeguards system for the KAPF could be designed to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards objective. (authors)

  2. A Mock UF6 Feed and Withdrawal System for Testing Safeguards Monitoring Systems and Strategies Intended for Nuclear Fuel Enrichment and Processing Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bates, Bruce E; Chesser, Joel B; Koo, Sinsze; Whitaker, J Michael

    2009-12-01

    This report describes an engineering-scale, mock UF6 feed and withdrawal (F&W) system, its operation, and its intended uses. This system has been assembled to provide a test bed for evaluating and demonstrating new methodologies that can be used in remote, unattended, continuous monitoring of nuclear material process operations. These measures are being investigated to provide independent inspectors improved assurance that operations are being conducted within declared parameters, and to increase the overall effectiveness of safeguarding nuclear material. Testing applicable technologies on a mock F&W system, which uses water as a surrogate for UF6, enables thorough and cost-effective investigation of hardware, software, and operational strategies before their direct installation in an industrial nuclear material processing environment. Electronic scales used for continuous load-cell monitoring also are described as part of the basic mock F&W system description. Continuous monitoring components on the mock F&W system are linked to a data aggregation computer by a local network, which also is depicted. Data collection and storage systems are described only briefly in this report. The mock UF{sub 6} F&W system is economical to operate. It uses a simple process involving only a surge tank between feed tanks and product and withdrawal (or waste) tanks. The system uses water as the transfer fluid, thereby avoiding the use of hazardous UF{sub 6}. The system is not tethered to an operating industrial process involving nuclear materials, thereby allowing scenarios (e.g., material diversion) that cannot be conducted otherwise. These features facilitate conducting experiments that yield meaningful results with a minimum of expenditure and quick turnaround time. Technologies demonstrated on the engineering-scale system lead to field trials (described briefly in this report) for determining implementation issues and performance of the monitoring technologies under plant

  3. A study of a zone approach to IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards: The low-enriched-uranium zone of a light-water-reactor fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-06-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of safeguards for the individual facilities within a state. In this study it was convenient to define three zones in a state with a closed light-water-reactor nuclear fuel cycle. Each zone contains those facilities or parts thereof which use or process nuclear materials of the same safeguards significance: low-enriched uranium, radioactive spent fuel, or recovered plutonium. The possibility that each zone might be treated as an extended material balance area for safeguards purposes is under investigation. The approach includes defining the relevant features of the facilities in the three zones and listing the safeguards activities which are now practiced. This study has focussed on the fresh-fuel zone, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. There are a number of possible safeguards approaches which fall between the two extremes. The intention is to develop a rational approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the approach involving the zone as a material balance area, and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches.

  4. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION DEVICES: EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS AT GAS-CENTRIFUGE URANIUM-ENRICHMENT PLANTS.

    SciTech Connect

    JOE,J.

    2007-07-08

    Recent advances in radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) have engendered a growing interest among international safeguards experts. Potentially, RFIDs could reduce inspection work, viz. the number of inspections, number of samples, and duration of the visits, and thus improve the efficiency and effectiveness of international safeguards. This study systematically examined the applications of RFIDs for IAEA safeguards at large gas-centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). These analyses are expected to help identify the requirements and desirable properties for RFIDs, to provide insights into which vulnerabilities matter most, and help formulate the required assurance tests. This work, specifically assesses the application of RFIDs for the ''Option 4'' safeguards approach, proposed by Bruce Moran, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for large gas-centrifuge uranium-enrichment plants. The features of ''Option 4'' safeguards include placing RFIDs on all feed, product and tails (F/P/T) cylinders, along with WID readers in all FP/T stations and accountability scales. Other features of Moran's ''Option 4'' are Mailbox declarations, monitoring of load-cell-based weighing systems at the F/P/T stations and accountability scales, and continuous enrichment monitors. Relevant diversion paths were explored to evaluate how RFIDs improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards. Additionally, the analysis addresses the use of RFIDs in conjunction with video monitoring and neutron detectors in a perimeter-monitoring approach to show that RFIDs can help to detect unidentified cylinders.

  5. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOEpatents

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  6. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant. [1500 and 210 metric tons heavy metal per year

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.; Kern, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Barnes, J.W.; Scheinman, L.

    1980-04-01

    The second volume describes the requirements and functions of materials measurement and accounting systems (MMAS) and conceptual designs for an MMAS incorporating both conventional and near-real-time (dynamic) measurement and accounting techniques. Effectiveness evaluations, based on recently developed modeling, simulation, and analysis procedures, show that conventional accountability can meet IAEA goal quantities and detection times in these reference facilities only for low-enriched uranium. Dynamic materials accounting may meet IAEA goals for detecting the abrupt (1-3 weeks) diversion of 8 kg of plutonium. Current materials accounting techniques probably cannot meet the 1-y protracted-diversion goal of 8 kg for plutonium.

  7. Analysis of IAEA Environmental Samples for Plutonium and Uranium by ICP/MS in Support Of International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Farmer, Orville T.; Olsen, Khris B.; Thomas, May-Lin P.; Garofoli, Stephanie J.

    2008-05-01

    A method for the separation and determination of total and isotopic uranium and plutonium by ICP-MS was developed for IAEA samples on cellulose-based media. Preparation of the IAEA samples involved a series of redox chemistries and separations using TRU® resin (Eichrom). The sample introduction system, an APEX nebulizer (Elemental Scientific, Inc), provided enhanced nebulization for a several-fold increase in sensitivity and reduction in background. Application of mass bias (ALPHA) correction factors greatly improved the precision of the data. By combining the enhancements of chemical separation, instrumentation and data processing, detection levels for uranium and plutonium approached high attogram levels.

  8. Process monitoring for reprocessing plant safeguards: a summary review

    SciTech Connect

    Kerr, H.T.; Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.

    1986-10-01

    Process monitoring is a term typically associated with a detailed look at plant operating data to determine plant status. Process monitoring has been generally associated with operational control of plant processes. Recently, process monitoring has been given new attention for a possible role in international safeguards. International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) Task C.59 has the goal to identify specific roles for process monitoring in international safeguards. As the preliminary effort associated with this task, a review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts mentioned concepts and a few specific applications. None were comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report summarizes the basic elements that must be developed in a comprehensive process monitoring application for safeguards. It then summarizes the significant efforts that have been documented in the literature with respect to the basic elements that were addressed.

  9. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  10. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  11. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  12. Developing an Internal Processing System.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    DeFord, Diane

    1997-01-01

    The goal in Reading Recovery is to support children to develop "in the head" operations or strategies that aid them to solve problems as they read and write continuous text. To help children in organizing experience and correct any idiosyncratic or unreliable relationships, teachers must understand how children develop their internal processing…

  13. Advanced international training course on state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1981-10-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the Advanced International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material held April 27 through May 12, 1981 at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards. Major emphasis for the 1981 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, Richland, Washington.

  14. International Remote Monitoring Project Embalse Nuclear Power Station, Argentina Embalse Remote Monitoring System

    SciTech Connect

    Schneider, Sigfried L.; Glidewell, Donnie D.; Bonino, Anibal; Bosler, Gene; Mercer, David; Maxey, Curt; Vones, Jaromir; Martelle, Guy; Busse, James; Kadner, Steve; White, Mike; Rovere, Luis

    1999-07-21

    The Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear of Argentina (ARN), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ABACC, the US Department of Energy, and the US Support Program POTAS, cooperated in the development of a Remote Monitoring System for nuclear nonproliferation efforts. This system was installed at the Embalse Nuclear Power Station last year to evaluate the feasibility of using radiation sensors in monitoring the transfer of spent fuel from the spent fuel pond to dry storage. The key element in this process is to maintain continuity of knowledge throughout the entire transfer process. This project evaluated the fundamental design and implementation of the Remote Monitoring System in its application to regional and international safeguard efficiency. New technology has been developed to enhance the design of the system to include storage capability on board sensor platforms. This evaluation has led to design enhancements that will assure that no data loss will occur during loss of RF transmission of the sensors.

  15. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  16. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  17. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  18. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  19. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1986-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held June 3 through June 21, 1985, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico, and San Clemente, California. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a state system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1985 course was placed on safeguards methods used at item-control facilities, particularly nuclear power generating stations and test reactors. An introduction to safeguards methods used at bulk handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants, was also included. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Southern California Edison Company. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, San Clemente, California.

  20. The International System of Units (SI).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Page, Chester H., Ed.; Vigoureux, Paul, Ed.

    This document gives definitions and symbols for the basic units of measure, for derived units, and for supplementary units. Decimal multiples and sub-multiples of units and units outside the International System also are discussed. Appendix I reproduces the decisions made on units and on the International System by two committees (the General…

  1. Current safeguards inspection for UO sub 3 product and conceptual study of NDA system for UO sub 3 pot in Tokai Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Kashimura, T.; Watanabe, F.; Maki, A.; Sugiyama, T. )

    1991-01-01

    In Tikai Reprocessing Plan (TRP) with a capacity of 0.7 MTU/d, the separated uranium is recovered as UO3 powder which is filled in particular pots and stored in UO3 storage facilities. The total amount of UO3 products in TRP at present is approximately 430 tons, or 1950 pots (December, 1990). These UO3 products undergo safeguards inspection by IAEA once a year. AT the time of inspection IAEA measures the gross weight of pot and confirms the uranium enrichment by non-destructive assays (NDA) for the certain number of pots. This paper summarizes the current safeguards inspection for UO3 products in TRP. The results of conceptual study on an integrated NDA system for UO3 pot are also described.

  2. Safeguarding vulnerable adults.

    PubMed

    Griffith, Richard

    Nurses have a professional duty to safeguard vulnerable adults from abuse under the provisions of the Nursing and Midwifery Council's (NMC) revised Code (2015). With adult abuse continuing to increase, all members of the nursing team are well placed to identify and take action to safeguard the vulnerable. This article sets out how the Care Act 2014 seeks to improve the safeguarding of vulnerable adults and the role of nurses in that process. PMID:26153813

  3. The development of a reliable multi-camera multiplexed CCTV system for safeguards surveillance

    SciTech Connect

    Gilbert, R.S.; Chiang, K.S.

    1986-01-01

    The background, requirements and system details for a simple reliable Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) system are described. The design of the system presented allows up to 8 CCTV cameras of different makes to be multiplexed and their out-put recorded by three Time Lapse Recorders (TLRs) operating in parallel. This multiplex or MUX-CCTV system is intended to be used by the IAEA for surveillance at several nuclear facilities. The system is unique in that it allows all of the cameras to be operated asynchronously and it provides high quality video during replay. It also incorporates video event counting logic which enables IAEA inspectors to take a very quick inventory of the events which are recorded during unattended operation. This paper discusses other phases of the development for the system and it presents some speculation about future changes which may enhance performance.

  4. Creating an Internal Content Management System

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sennema, Greg

    2004-01-01

    In this article, the author talks about an internal content management system that they have created at Calvin College. It is a hybrid of CMS and intranet that organizes Web site content and a variety of internal tools to help librarians complete their daily tasks. Hobbes is a Web-based tool that uses Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts written…

  5. Building safeguards infrastructure

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mcclelland - Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  6. Violence: Safeguarding Our Children.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Our Children, 1995

    1995-01-01

    This adaptation of the National Parent Teacher Association (PTA) booklet "Safeguarding Your Children" discusses cooperative efforts of communities, schools, and homes to protect children from violence. (SM)

  7. Evaluation of an integrated approach to safeguards regulations. Volume 1

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; McCord, R.K.

    1981-03-01

    This study investigates advantages and disadvantages of an integrated approach to safeguards regulation. We define integrated safeguards regulation as a single, performance-oriented rule governing the performance of both the physical protection (PP) and material control and accounting (MC and A) systems at licensed nuclear fuel-cycle facilities. The study produced a systematic framework for NRC to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of an integrated approach. Within this framework, we consider the effects of integration on NRC, on licensed facilities and on the public. We present several specific examples of how integrated safeguards could be implemented at licensed facilities. Some of these examples are analyzed quantitatively using the Aggregated Systems Model (ASM) to show how safeguards performance could improve with integrated safeguards. The ASM uses an integrated approach to safeguards evaluation by ''giving credit'' for the contribution of both PP and MC and A performance in achieving safeguards goals. 12 refs., 11 figs.

  8. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  9. Safeguards instrumentation: past, present, future

    SciTech Connect

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1982-01-01

    Instruments are essential for accounting, for surveillance and for protection of nuclear materials. The development and application of such instrumentation is reviewed, with special attention to international safeguards applications. Active and passive nondestructive assay techniques are some 25 years of age. The important advances have been in learning how to use them effectively for specific applications, accompanied by major advances in radiation detectors, electronics, and, more recently, in mini-computers. The progress in seals has been disappointingly slow. Surveillance cameras have been widely used for many applications other than safeguards. The revolution in TV technology will have important implications. More sophisticated containment/surveillance equipment is being developed but has yet to be exploited. On the basis of this history, some expectations for instrumentation in the near future are presented.

  10. The International Space Station: Systems and Science

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Giblin, Timothy W.

    2010-01-01

    ISS Program Mission: Safely build, operate, and utilize a permanent human outpost in space through an international partnership of government, industry, and academia to advance exploration of the solar system, conduct scientific research, and enable commerce in space.

  11. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Il, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Le, Loan A; Lopez, Leon N

    2010-01-01

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements

  12. Internal coaxial cable seal system

    DOEpatents

    Hall, David R.; Sneddon, Cameron; Dahlgren, Scott Steven; Briscoe, Michael A.

    2006-07-25

    The invention is a seal system for a coaxial cable and is placed within the coaxial cable and its constituent components. A series of seal stacks including load ring components and elastomeric rings are placed on load bearing members within the coaxial cable sealing the annular space between the coaxial cable and an electrical contact passing there through. The coaxial cable is disposed within drilling components to transmit electrical signals between drilling components within a drill string. The seal system can be used in a variety of downhole components, such as sections of pipe in a drill string, drill collars, heavy weight drill pipe, and jars.

  13. Internal-flow systems for aircraft

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Rogallo, F M

    1941-01-01

    An investigation has been made to determine efficient arrangements for an internal-flow system of an aircraft when such a system operates by itself or in combination with other flow systems. The investigation included a theoretical treatment of the problem and tests in the NACA 5-foot vertical wind tunnel of inlet and outlet openings in a flat plate and in a wing.

  14. Structured Assessment Approach: a procedure for the assessment of fuel cycle safeguard systems

    SciTech Connect

    Parziale, A.A.; Patenaude, C.J.; Renard, P.A.; Sacks, I.J.

    1980-03-06

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has developed and tested for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission a procedure for the evaluation of Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) Systems at Nuclear Fuel Facilities. This procedure, called the Structured Assessment Approach, SAA, subjects the MC and A system at a facility to a series of increasingly sophisticated adversaries and strategies. A fully integrated version of the computer codes which assist the analyst in this assessment was made available in October, 1979. The concepts of the SAA and the results of the assessment of a hypothetical but typical facility are presented.

  15. Safeguards: The past present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Seaton, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The non-destructive assay techniques developed at Los Alamos have become a primary means for verification by the IAEA and most important for domestic safeguards. We must challenge our assumptions, e.g., that inventory differences are a valid measure of safeguards performance, that more money is the solution, and the threats are much exaggerated. A human reliability program will be initiated. Material control, accounting, and physical protection need further integration. A serious effort involving scholarships, internships, etc. is needed to attract and motivate young people. Increased emphasis will be placed on designing safeguards into new systems such as laser isotope separation. Finally, continuing generous support for the IAEA is most important.

  16. Criteria for internal auditing.

    PubMed

    Holder, W W; Clay, R J

    1979-01-01

    An effective, inclusive internal auditing endeavor should help assure hospital managements that (1) an adequate system of internal control exists to assure the safeguarding of assets and the reliability of data produced by the financial information system, (2) uneconomic operating practices are detected promptly so they can be remedied, and (3) program results and effectiveness levels are of sufficiently high quality to demonstrate managerial competence. PMID:102583

  17. Changing Landscapes in Safeguarding Babies and Young Children in England

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lumsden, Eunice

    2014-01-01

    The importance of safeguarding children from violence is internationally recognised. However, detecting, intervening and protecting children from abuse both within the family and in institutions is complex. This paper specifically focuses on safeguarding in England and how workforce reform in the early years offers the opportunity to forge new…

  18. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  19. 41 CFR 101-28.306-5 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Safeguards. 101-28.306-5 Section 101-28.306-5 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations...-Customer Supply Centers § 101-28.306-5 Safeguards. Agencies shall establish internal controls to...

  20. 41 CFR 101-28.306-5 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 2 2011-07-01 2007-07-01 true Safeguards. 101-28.306-5 Section 101-28.306-5 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations...-Customer Supply Centers § 101-28.306-5 Safeguards. Agencies shall establish internal controls to...

  1. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  2. Countering the livestock-targeted bioterrorism threat and responding with an animal health safeguarding system.

    PubMed

    Yeh, J-Y; Lee, J-H; Park, J-Y; Cho, Y S; Cho, I-S

    2013-08-01

    Attacks against livestock and poultry using biological agents constitute a subtype of agroterrorism. These attacks are defined as the intentional introduction of an animal infectious disease to strike fear in people, damage a nation's economy and/or threaten social stability. Livestock bioterrorism is considered attractive to terrorists because biological agents for use against livestock or poultry are more readily available and difficult to monitor than biological agents for use against humans. In addition, an attack on animal husbandry can have enormous economic consequences, even without human casualties. Animal husbandry is vulnerable to livestock-targeted bioterrorism because it is nearly impossible to secure all livestock animals, and compared with humans, livestock are less well-guarded targets. Furthermore, anti-livestock biological weapons are relatively easy to employ, and a significant effect can be produced with only a small amount of infectious material. The livestock sector is presently very vulnerable to bioterrorism as a result of large-scale husbandry methods and weaknesses in the systems used to detect disease outbreaks, which could aggravate the consequences of livestock-targeted bioterrorism. Thus, terrorism against livestock and poultry cannot be thought of as either a 'low-probability' or 'low-consequence' incident. This review provides an overview of methods to prevent livestock-targeted bioterrorism and respond to terrorism involving the deliberate introduction of a pathogen-targeting livestock and poultry. PMID:22726305

  3. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    SciTech Connect

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future.

  4. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures.

  5. International Instructional Systems: How England Measures Up

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Creese, Brian; Isaacs, Tina

    2016-01-01

    Although England was not included in the International Instructional Systems Study because it was not a high-performing jurisdiction by the Study's definition, contributors largely were England-based. Analysing the Study's nine overall aspects of instructional systems, this paper finds that England is out of step with many of the high-performing…

  6. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  7. International Systems Integration on the International Space Station

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Gerstenmaier, William H.; Ticker, Ronald L.

    2007-01-01

    Over the next few months, the International Space Station (ISS), and human spaceflight in general, will undergo momentous change. The European Columbus and Japanese Kibo Laboratories will be added to the station joining U.S. and Russian elements already on orbit. Columbus, Jules Vernes Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Kibo Control Centers will soon be joining control centers in the US and Russia in coordinating ISS operations and research. The Canadian Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM) will be performing extra vehicular activities that previously only astronauts on EVA could do, but remotely and with increased safety. This paper will address the integration of these international elements and operations into the ISS, both from hardware and human perspectives. Interoperability of on-orbit systems and ground control centers and their human operators from Europe, Japan, Canada, Russia and the U.S. pose significant and unique challenges. Coordination of logistical support and transportation of crews and cargo is also a major challenge. As we venture out into the cosmos and inhabit the Moon and other planets, it's the systems and operational experience and partnership development on ISS, humanity's orbiting outpost that is making these journeys possible.

  8. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1995-08-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  9. International collaboration in SAR ground data systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Curlander, John C.

    1993-01-01

    A set of considerations that are pertinent to future international cooperation in the area of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) ground data systems are presented. The considerations are as follows: (1) success of future spaceborne SAR missions will require multi-agency and/or multi-national collaboration; (2) ground processing is typically performed by each agency for their user base; (3) international standards are required to achieve a uniform data product independent of the processing center; (4) to reduce the aggregate cost of the ground data systems, collaboration is required in design and development; (5) effective utilization of the data by an international user community; (6) commercialization of data products; and (7) security of data systems.

  10. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  11. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    SciTech Connect

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP.

  12. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  13. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  14. Internally insulated thermal storage system development program

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Scott, O. L.

    1980-01-01

    A cost effective thermal storage system for a solar central receiver power system using molten salt stored in internally insulated carbon steel tanks is described. Factors discussed include: testing of internal insulation materials in molten salt; preliminary design of storage tanks, including insulation and liner installation; optimization of the storage configuration; and definition of a subsystem research experiment to demonstrate the system. A thermal analytical model and analysis of a thermocline tank was performed. Data from a present thermocline test tank was compared to gain confidence in the analytical approach. A computer analysis of the various storage system parameters (insulation thickness, number of tanks, tank geometry, etc.,) showed that (1) the most cost-effective configuration was a small number of large cylindrical tanks, and (2) the optimum is set by the mechanical constraints of the system, such as soil bearing strength and tank hoop stress, not by the economics.

  15. Improving the Safeguardability of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bari; D. Hebditch; P. Peterson; M. Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to reduce security risks and proliferation hazards while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency, in a world where significant expansion of nuclear energy use may occur. Correspondingly, the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) includes objectives to contribute to international efforts to develop SBD, and to apply SBD in the development of new U.S. nuclear infrastructure. Here, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical protection, and safety objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility, from initial planning through design, construction and operation. The SBD process, in its simplest form, may be applied usefully today within most national regulatory environments. Development of a mature approach to implementing SBD requires work in the areas of requirements definition, design processes, technology and methodology, and institutionalization. The U.S. efforts described in this paper are supportive of SBD work for international safeguards that has recently been initiated by the IAEA with the participation of many stakeholders including member States, the IAEA, nuclear technology suppliers, nuclear utilities, and the broader international nonproliferation community.

  16. Experimental evaluation of a boron-lined parallel plate proportional counter for use in nuclear safeguards coincidence counting

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Henzlova, D.; Evans, L. G.; Menlove, H. O.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Marlow, J. B.

    2013-01-01

    Boron-lined proportional technologies are increasingly being considered as a viable option for the near-term replacement of 3He-based technologies for use in international nuclear safeguards neutron detection and coincidence counting applications. In order to determine the applicability and feasibility of any replacement technology for international safeguards, it must be evaluated against performance parameters specific to nuclear safeguards applications. In this paper, we present an experimental evaluation of a boron-lined parallel plate proportional counter developed by Precision Data Technology, Inc. (PDT). The counter performance was evaluated using a high-rate 252Cf spontaneous fission neutron source and a set of 137Cs gamma-ray sources with a dose rate of 450 mR/h at the detector face. The performance data were subsequently compared with an equivalent 3He-based system defined using the Monte Carlo N-particle eXtended (MCNPX) radiation transport code.

  17. NFC internal: an indoor navigation system.

    PubMed

    Ozdenizci, Busra; Coskun, Vedat; Ok, Kerem

    2015-01-01

    Indoor navigation systems have recently become a popular research field due to the lack of GPS signals indoors. Several indoors navigation systems have already been proposed in order to eliminate deficiencies; however each of them has several technical and usability limitations. In this study, we propose NFC Internal, a Near Field Communication (NFC)-based indoor navigation system, which enables users to navigate through a building or a complex by enabling a simple location update, simply by touching NFC tags those are spread around and orient users to the destination. In this paper, we initially present the system requirements, give the design details and study the viability of NFC Internal with a prototype application and a case study. Moreover, we evaluate the performance of the system and compare it with existing indoor navigation systems. It is seen that NFC Internal has considerable advantages and significant contributions to existing indoor navigation systems in terms of security and privacy, cost, performance, robustness, complexity, user preference and commercial availability. PMID:25825976

  18. NFC Internal: An Indoor Navigation System

    PubMed Central

    Ozdenizci, Busra; Coskun, Vedat; Ok, Kerem

    2015-01-01

    Indoor navigation systems have recently become a popular research field due to the lack of GPS signals indoors. Several indoors navigation systems have already been proposed in order to eliminate deficiencies; however each of them has several technical and usability limitations. In this study, we propose NFC Internal, a Near Field Communication (NFC)-based indoor navigation system, which enables users to navigate through a building or a complex by enabling a simple location update, simply by touching NFC tags those are spread around and orient users to the destination. In this paper, we initially present the system requirements, give the design details and study the viability of NFC Internal with a prototype application and a case study. Moreover, we evaluate the performance of the system and compare it with existing indoor navigation systems. It is seen that NFC Internal has considerable advantages and significant contributions to existing indoor navigation systems in terms of security and privacy, cost, performance, robustness, complexity, user preference and commercial availability. PMID:25825976

  19. The ``new'' International System of Units

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Aubrecht, Gordon

    2012-04-01

    The CGPM has decided that, eventually, the ``explicit unit'' basis of the International System of Units (SI) will be replaced by the ``explicit-constant formulation,'' in which fixing certain physical constants will fix the base units exactly. How this is contemplated will be discussed in this talk.

  20. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  1. Internal-flow systems for aircraft

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Rogallo, F M

    1940-01-01

    An investigation has been made to determine efficient arrangements for an internal-flow system of an aircraft when such a system operates by itself or in combination with other flow systems. The investigation included a theoretical treatment of a problem and tests in the NACA 5-foot vertical wind tunnel of inlet and outlet openings in a flat plate and in a wing. When an internal-flow system tends to decrease the final velocity of it's wake, the results showed that it should be arranged in series with the propulsive system; the inlet opening should be located at a forward stagnation point; and the outlet opening should be so shaped and located as to recover the kinetic energy of the jet without increasing the drag of other portions of the aircraft. When an internal-flow system tends to increase the final velocity new b's wake, as does a propeller, location of the inlet opening in the boundary layer or in the wake of the wing or in the fuselage may be desirable.

  2. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bowden, N. S.

    2008-11-01

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore orer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several erorts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  3. International training course on implementation of state systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials: proceedings

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1984-06-01

    This report incorporates all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Implementation of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials held October 17 through November 4, 1983, at Santa Fe and Los Alamos, New Mexico and Richland, Washington, USA. Authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the course was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a State system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both national and international safeguards requirements. Major emphasis for the 1983 course was placed on safeguards methods used at bulk-handling facilities, particularly low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication plants. The course was conducted by the University of California's Los Alamos National Laboratory and Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. Tours and demonstrations were arranged at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, and the Exxon Nuclear fuel fabrication plant, the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Westinghouse Fast Flux Test Facility Visitor Center, and Washington Public Power System nuclear reactor facilities in Richland, Washington. Individual presentations were indexed for inclusion in the Energy Data Base.

  4. Sustaining International CBRN Centers of Excellence with a Focus on Nuclear Security and Safeguards: Initial Scoping Session London, 23-24 September 2013 SUMMARY REPORT

    SciTech Connect

    Anderson, Roger G.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-12

    This report provides a summary-level description of the key information, observations, ideas, and recommendations expressed during the subject meeting. The report is organized to correspond to the meeting agenda provided in Appendix 1 and includes references to several of the participants listed in Appendix 2 .The meeting venue was Lloyd’s Register in the City of London. Lloyd’s Register graciously accommodated the request of The Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNNL) with whom it works on various safeguards activities commissioned by NNSA. PNNL and NNSA also shared the goal of the meeting/study with the United Kingdom (UK) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change with whom they coordinated the participant list.

  5. Integrating Diverse Data Systems for International Collaboration

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fox, Peter

    2014-05-01

    International collaborations, especially ones that arise with little or no financial resources, still face challenges in opening up data collections via a wide variety of differing and often non-interoperable means. In turn, this hampers the collaborative process, slows or even prevents scientific exchange. Early efforts that proposed a centralized, and project specific data archive encountered many difficulties, ranging from little or no adoption, to the inability to provide required documentation and metadata to make the datasets findable or usable. In time, virtualized approaches appeared to gain traction, for e.g. virtual observatories. In this contribution, we report on several international collaboration case studies with distributed data systems; their needs, successes, challenges and failures and synthesize a set of suggested practices to inform future international collaboration efforts.

  6. Analysis of the effectiveness of gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinjoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril D; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-01-01

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched uranium (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using non destructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and 235U enrichment of declared UF6 containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems including process monitoring and possible on-site destructive assay (DA) of samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements. These improvements could reduce the difference between the operator's and inspector's measurements providing more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also explore how a few advanced safeguards systems could be assembled for unattended operation. The analysis will focus on how unannounced inspections (UIs), and the concept of information-driven inspections (IDS) can affect probability of detection of the diversion of nuclear materials when coupled to new GCEPs safeguards regimes augmented with unattended systems.

  7. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    PubMed

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines. PMID:15212014

  8. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Donald N; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

    2009-01-01

    Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of

  9. Safeguards and Nuclear Materials Management: A view from the DOE Chicago Operations Office

    SciTech Connect

    Healy, F.E.; Ahlberg, C.G.

    1994-07-01

    Nuclear Materials Safeguards (also known as Material Control and Accountability or MC&A) and Nuclear Materials Management as practiced within the US Department of Energy (DOE) are separate, but related disciplines with differing goals and objectives. Safeguards and Nuclear Materials Management are closely related through the common use of transaction and inventory reporting data from the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Adherence to Nuclear Materials management principals may enhance Nuclear Materials Safeguards, and has the potential to result in savings for both program and safeguards costs. Both the Safeguards and Nuclear Materials Management Programs for the Chicago Operations Office are administered by the Safeguards and Security Division, Safeguards Branch. This paper discusses Safeguards and Materials Management issues within the Chicago Operations Office, some of which relate to problems faced by the DOE complex as a whole.

  10. Data analysis for remote monitoring of safeguarded facilities

    SciTech Connect

    DeLand, S.M.

    1997-08-01

    The International Remote Monitoring Project (IRMP) sponsored by the US DOE allows DOE and its international partners to gain experience with the remote collection, transmission, and interpretation of safeguards-relevant data. This paper focuses on the interpretation of the data from these remote monitoring systems. Users of these systems need to be able to ascertain that the remote monitoring system is functioning as expected and that the events generated by the sensors are consistent with declared activity. The initial set of analytical tools being provided for IRMP installations this year include a suite of automatically generated views of user-selected data. The baseline set of tools, with illustrative examples, will be discussed. Plans for near-term enhancements will also be discussed. Finally, the applicability of more advanced analytical techniques such as expert systems will be discussed.

  11. [International standardization of laboratory information systems].

    PubMed

    Ishigami, T

    1997-06-01

    The standardization of clinical laboratory information systems is one of the most difficult but important subjects for clinical laboratory community and laboratorians. International Standard Organization (ISO) has the projects in this field (JTC1/SC7) which is the part of approach to the international laboratory standardization (ISO/TC 212). US NCCLS and European CEN/TC 251 are working under ISO/TC 212. In the United States, the National Academy for Clinical Biochemistry (NACB) and the American Association for Clinical Chemistry (AACC) had started recently to organize the international collaboration program on the subject. The Japan Society of Clinical Pathology (JSCP)'s Council of Laboratory Informatics had joined this program in 1995. NACB/AACC's Ad Hoc Committee which was organized in 1996 is now trying to collect the general opinions ("what and how") through their internet home page. The current status of the works on the standardization of clinical laboratory information systems in the U.S., Europe, and Japan is reviewed briefly in this article. HL7 electronic data exchange specification and clinical testing coding systems such as LOINC coding project and JSCP's coding project are also reviewed. PMID:9306712

  12. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab.

  13. The evolution of the international refugee system.

    PubMed

    Gallagher, D

    1989-01-01

    This article examines the evolution of the current international system for responding to refugee problems and the climate within which the legal and institutional framework has developed. It reviews the background and handling of some of the key refugee movements since World War II and traces the legal and institutional adjustments that have been made to deal with new refugee movements that have occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world. Finally, it assesses the adequacy of the present system to meet the challenges ahead. PMID:12282794

  14. New Prototype Safeguards Technology Offers Improved Confidence and Automation for Uranium Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2013-04-01

    An important requirement for the international safeguards community is the ability to determine the enrichment level of uranium in gas centrifuge enrichment plants and nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. This is essential to ensure that countries with nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as States Party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, are adhering to their obligations. However, current technologies to verify the uranium enrichment level in gas centrifuge enrichment plants or nuclear fuel fabrication facilities are technically challenging and resource-intensive. NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports the development, testing, and evaluation of future systems that will strengthen and sustain U.S. safeguards and security capabilities—in this case, by automating the monitoring of uranium enrichment in the entire inventory of a fuel fabrication facility. One such system is HEVA—hybrid enrichment verification array. This prototype was developed to provide an automated, nondestructive assay verification technology for uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders at enrichment plants.

  15. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-04-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

  16. DOE integrated safeguards and security (DISS) system a nation-wide distributed information system for personnel security

    SciTech Connect

    Block, B.

    1997-06-05

    DISS uses secure client-server and relational database technology across open networks to address the problems of security clearance request processing and tracking of security clearances for the Department of energy. The system supports the entire process from data entry by the prospective clearance holders through tracking of all DOE clearances, and use of standard DOE badges in automated access control systems throughout the DOE complex.

  17. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  18. The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards - How It Works

    SciTech Connect

    Nock,C.; Hoffheins,B.

    2008-07-13

    The U.S. Support Program to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to transfer US technology and expertise to assist the IAEA Department of Safeguards because its limited budget and scope would not allow for R&D activities and the procurement of specialized or customized equipment. Over the years, the USSP and the Department of Safeguards have worked together continuously to develop and improve processes for requesting, selecting, and managing projects that support the Safeguards verification mission. This paper will discuss the main USSP processes for accepting and processing Safeguards requests, and managing and reporting task progress.

  19. International solar system exploration - Opportunities and obstacles

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Moore, J. W.; Parks, R. J.

    1982-01-01

    A review is conducted of the exploration of the solar system carried out with the aid of various types of spacecraft during the past two decades, taking into account also space missions planned for thy next few years. A wealth of information has been obtained regarding the planets and their satellites. However, there remain many important questions concerning the solar system, and a continuation of space exploration for the solution of these questions appears highly desirable, particularly when the comparatively little cost of these missions is taken into account. However, major fiscal limitations within the U.S. economy have led to pressure to postpone any new solar system exploration projects unless there can be major reductions in their cost. A special committee has been studying the options for future low-cost solar system exploration missions, giving attention also to some options for international implementation. Various aspects of joint space projects are examined.

  20. [Anthropocentrism versus pathozentrism - On the integration of animal protection into the system of safeguarding basic democratic rights

    PubMed

    Caspar, Johannes

    1998-01-01

    Modern animal protection laws must be firmly rooted in a decisive pathocentric fundamental declaration. In accordance with this, it is not a case of protecting human interests concerning a particular way of treating animals but rather to protect animals from the exploitation interests of humans. In order to attain a balance between animal protection and the laws pertaining to animal use, the regulations governing pathocentric animal protection must rest on a legal foundation backed up by constitutional law. In the final instance, a statutory framework either in the form of an objective legal obligation - or better still - in the form of subjective-legal animal protection must be considered. The latter solution has the advantage that the law enforcement deficits of the authorities responsible for animal protection may be supplemented by the fiduciary safeguarding of animal rights by a third party. PMID:11178518

  1. Eight years of groundwater monitoring at the building site of the MOSE system for the safeguard of Venice

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Casasso, Alessandro; Sethi, Rajandrea; Di Molfetta, Antonio

    2015-04-01

    The survival of Venice is threatened by the continuous increase of frequency and intensity of tidal floods. To prevent these events, a safeguarding system known as MOSE is under construction at the inlets of the Lagoon of Venice. Four arrays of mobile barriers will be lifted in the case of exceptionally high tides (>1.10 m) to insulate the Lagoon. The prefabrication of the mobile barriers required a large construction area close to the final installation sites. Given the lack of space in the inlets of Lido and Chioggia, two basins of the future navigation locks were used for this purpose, and a system of water pumps and wells was therefore installed in each site to ensure the accessibility and safety of the construction areas. The impact of dewatering on the aquifers on the mainland in Punta Sabbioni (inlet of Lido) was monitored by means of continuous hydraulic head measurements in a network 25 piezometers, 11 screened in the phreatic aquifer and 14 in the shallowest confined aquifer. These aquifers are separated by a 5 m thick clayey aquiclude, and a 30 m thick impervious layer isolates them from the underlying confined aquifers, which were therefore not monitored. Each monitoring well was equipped with an automatic water pressure transducer and the hourly recorded hydraulic heads were compensated with the barometric pressure. The time series were compared with the natural driving forces (tides, rainfall, evapotranspiration) and the anthropogenic impact sources (dewatering pumping, slurry walls, land reclamation channels). The dynamics of seawater intrusion were also studied through monthly measurements of the vertical profiles of the electrical conductivity (EC) of groundwater. The monitoring activity was successful in assessing the impacts of the construction works. A drawdown was observed in the confined aquifer due to the dewatering pumping, with a maximum displacement of some 5 m on the mainland and an extension of some 1000 m from the dewatered basin. By

  2. Eight years of groundwater monitoring at the building site of the MOSE system for the safeguard of Venice

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Casasso, Alessandro; Sethi, Rajandrea; Di Molfetta, Antonio

    2015-04-01

    The survival of Venice is threatened by the continuous increase of frequency and intensity of tidal floods. To prevent these events, a safeguarding system known as MOSE is under construction at the inlets of the Lagoon of Venice. Four arrays of mobile barriers will be lifted in the case of exceptionally high tides (>1.10 m) to insulate the Lagoon. The prefabrication of the mobile barriers required a large construction area close to the final installation sites. Given the lack of space in the inlets of Lido and Chioggia, two basins of the future navigation locks were used for this purpose, and a system of water pumps and wells was therefore installed in each site to ensure the accessibility and safety of the construction areas. The impact of dewatering on the aquifers on the mainland in Punta Sabbioni (inlet of Lido) was monitored by means of continuous hydraulic head measurements in a network 25 piezometers, 11 screened in the phreatic aquifer and 14 in the shallowest confined aquifer. These aquifers are separated by a 5 m thick clayey aquiclude, and a 30 m thick impervious layer isolates them from the underlying confined aquifers, which were therefore not monitored. Each monitoring well was equipped with an automatic water pressure transducer and the hourly recorded hydraulic heads were compensated with the barometric pressure. The time series were compared with the natural driving forces (tides, rainfall, evapotranspiration) and the anthropogenic impact sources (dewatering pumping, slurry walls, land reclamation channels). The dynamics of seawater intrusion were also studied through monthly measurements of the vertical profiles of the electrical conductivity (EC) of groundwater. The monitoring activity was successful in assessing the impacts of the construction works. A drawdown was observed in the confined aquifer due to the dewatering pumping, with a maximum displacement of some 5 m on the mainland and an extension of some 1000 m from the dewatered basin. By

  3. The International System of Units (SI)

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Taylor, Barry N.

    1991-08-01

    The booklet is the U.S. edition of the English language translation of the 6th edition of Le Systeme International d'Unites (SI), the definitive reference on the SI published in 1991 by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) in the French language. The U.S. edition conforms in substance with the English language translation that follows the French language text in the BIPM publication. To make the booklet helpful to the broadest community of users in the U.S., it was necessary to follow current Federal policy, to recognize present U.S. practices as they are found in the literature of the authors domestic voluntary standards organizations such as ASTM and IEEE, and to use American spelling of certain words.

  4. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  5. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  6. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  7. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  8. Safeguards cut tank explosion risk during gas flaring

    SciTech Connect

    Lapp, K.; Roussakis, N. )

    1989-08-14

    Some operational and system safeguards can significantly reduce the risk of oil-storage tank explosions in gas-flaring operations. These safeguards, discussed here and based on ten different explosion investigations by Westech Industrial Ltd., Calgary, also provide protection against other potential ignition sources such as static electricity and spontaneous combustion of ferric sulfide.

  9. An Internal Coaxil Cable Seal System

    DOEpatents

    Hall, David R.; Hall, Jr., H. Tracy; Pixton, David; Dahlgren, Scott; Sneddon, Cameron; Briscoe, Michael; Fox, Joe

    2004-12-23

    The invention is a seal system for a coaxial cable more specifically an internal seal system placed within the coaxial cable and its constituent components. A series of seal stacks including flexible rigid rings and elastomeric rings are placed on load bearing members within the coaxial cable. The current invention is adapted to seal the annular space between the coaxial cable and an electrical contact passing there through. The coaxial cable is disposed within drilling components to transmit electrical signals between drilling components within a drill string. During oil and gas exploration, a drill string can see a range of pressures and temperatures thus resulting in multiple combinations of temperature and pressure and increasing the difficulty of creating a robust seal for all combinations. The seal system can be used in a plurality of downhole components, such as sections of pipe in a drill string, drill collars, heavy weight drill pipe, and jars.

  10. International remote monitoring project Argentina Nuclear Power Station Spent Fuel Transfer Remote Monitoring System

    SciTech Connect

    Schneider, S.; Lucero, R.; Glidewell, D.

    1997-08-01

    The Autoridad Regulataria Nuclear (ARN) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) are cooperating on the development of a Remote Monitoring System for nuclear nonproliferation efforts. A Remote Monitoring System for spent fuel transfer will be installed at the Argentina Nuclear Power Station in Embalse, Argentina. The system has been designed by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) providing gamma and neutron sensors. This project will test and evaluate the fundamental design and implementation of the Remote Monitoring System in its application to regional and international safeguards efficiency. This paper provides a description of the monitoring system and its functions. The Remote Monitoring System consists of gamma and neutron radiation sensors, RF systems, and video systems integrated into a coherent functioning whole. All sensor data communicate over an Echelon LonWorks Network to a single data logger. The Neumann DCM 14 video module is integrated into the Remote Monitoring System. All sensor and image data are stored on a Data Acquisition System (DAS) and archived and reviewed on a Data and Image Review Station (DIRS). Conventional phone lines are used as the telecommunications link to transmit on-site collected data and images to remote locations. The data and images are authenticated before transmission. Data review stations will be installed at ARN in Buenos Aires, Argentina, ABACC in Rio De Janeiro, IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 2 refs., 2 figs.

  11. Spark ignition systems for internal combustion engines

    SciTech Connect

    Gol, G.; Hill, W.F.

    1980-08-26

    An internal combustion engine spark ignition system is provided which ensures that sparks are inhibited if the engine temperature exceeds a maximum safe level. The ignition circuit includes an input transistor which is switched on and off by an engine shaft transducer. The input transistor controls charging and discharging of a capacitor the voltage on which determines whether switching of the input transistor causes a spark to be produced via an output amplifier and ignition coil. A temperature sensing element determines both the rate at which the capacitor can charge and the final voltage to which it can be charged.

  12. 12 CFR 917.6 - Internal control system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ...) Ensuring that an internal audit of the internal control system is performed annually and that such annual audit is reasonably designed to be effective and comprehensive; (3) Requiring that internal control... 12 Banks and Banking 8 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Internal control system. 917.6 Section...

  13. 12 CFR 917.6 - Internal control system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ...) Ensuring that an internal audit of the internal control system is performed annually and that such annual audit is reasonably designed to be effective and comprehensive; (3) Requiring that internal control... 12 Banks and Banking 8 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Internal control system. 917.6 Section...

  14. 12 CFR 917.6 - Internal control system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ...) Ensuring that an internal audit of the internal control system is performed annually and that such annual audit is reasonably designed to be effective and comprehensive; (3) Requiring that internal control... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Internal control system. 917.6 Section...

  15. 46 CFR 184.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... TONS) VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 184.602 Internal communications systems. (a) A vessel equipped with pilothouse control must have... 46 Shipping 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 184.602 Section...

  16. 41 CFR 105-64.108 - How does GSA safeguard personal information?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How does GSA safeguard... GSA safeguard personal information? (a) System managers will establish administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of records, protect the records...

  17. 41 CFR 105-64.108 - How does GSA safeguard personal information?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false How does GSA safeguard... GSA safeguard personal information? (a) System managers will establish administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to ensure the security and confidentiality of records, protect the records...

  18. A Physical Protection Systems Test Bed for International Counter-Trafficking System Development

    SciTech Connect

    Stinson, Brad J; Kuhn, Michael J; Donaldson, Terrence L; Richardson, Dave; Rowe, Nathan C; Younkin, James R; Pickett, Chris A

    2011-01-01

    Physical protection systems have a widespread impact on the nuclear industry in areas such as nuclear safeguards, arms control, and trafficking of illicit goods (e.g., nuclear materials) across international borders around the world. Many challenges must be overcome in design and deployment of foreign border security systems such as lack of infrastructure, extreme environmental conditions, limited knowledge of terrain, insider threats, and occasional cultural resistance. Successful security systems, whether it be a system designed to secure a single facility or a whole border security system, rely on the entire integrated system composed of multiple subsystems. This test bed is composed of many unique sensors and subsystems, including wireless unattended ground sensors, a buried fiber-optic acoustic sensor, a lossy coaxial distributed sensor, wireless links, pan-tilt-zoom cameras, mobile power generation systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and fiber-optic-fence intrusion detection systems. A Common Operating Picture software architecture is utilized to integrate a number of these subsystems. We are currently performance testing each system for border security and perimeter security applications by examining metrics such as probability of sense and a qualitative understanding of the sensor s vulnerability of defeat. The testing process includes different soil conditions for buried sensors (e.g., dry, wet, and frozen) and an array of different tests including walking, running, stealth detection, and vehicle detection. Also, long term sustainability of systems is tested including performance differences due to seasonal variations (e.g. summer versus winter, while raining, in foggy conditions). The capabilities of the test bed are discussed. Performance testing results, both at the individual component level and integrated into a larger system for a specific deployment (in situ), help illustrate the usefulness and need for integrated testing facilities to carry out this

  19. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-04-05

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  20. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  1. The 'INMARSAT' international maritime satellite communication system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Atserov, Iu. S.

    1982-12-01

    The history, design, operating characteristics, achievements, and prospects of INMARSAT are discussed. More than 1300 ships are presently equipped to operate within the system, and this number is expected to rise to about 5000 by 1986. The principle of operation involves single coordinating earth stations allocating telephone channels in their zones between other earth stations. The messages reach a common signalling channel with which all ship stations keep in touch. The ship stations are connected to the international telex network. The INMARSAT system enables ships in the automated mode of operation to establish telephone and telegraph comunication with any subscriber on the shore of any country. The quality of the communication is practically independent of the distance between ship and shore at any time of year and under any meteorological conditions. Estimates indicate that the use of satellite communication with ships reduces losses from accidents by 10 percent per year.

  2. Detection probabilities in fuel cycle oriented safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Canty, J.J.; Stein, G.; Avenhaus, R. )

    1987-01-01

    An intensified discussion of evaluation criteria for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards effectiveness is currently under way. Considerations basic to the establishment of such criteria are derived from the model agreement INFCIRC/153 and include threshold amounts, strategic significance, conversion times, required assurances, cost-effectiveness, and nonintrusiveness. In addition to these aspects, the extent to which fuel cycle characteristics are taken into account in safeguards implementations (Article 81c of INFCIRC/153) will be reflected in the criteria. The effectiveness of safeguards implemented under given manpower constraints is evaluated. As the significant quantity and timeliness criteria have established themselves within the safeguards community, these are taken as fixed. Detection probabilities, on the other hand, still provide a certain degree of freedom in interpretation. The problem of randomization of inspection activities across a fuel cycle, or portions thereof, is formalized as a two-person zero-sum game, the payoff function of which is the detection probability achieved by the inspectorate. It is argued, from the point of view of risk of detection, that fuel cycle-independent, minimally accepted threshold criteria for such detection probabilities cannot and should not be applied.

  3. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY... classified information....

  4. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY... classified information....

  5. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY... classified information....

  6. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY... classified information....

  7. 48 CFR 970.0404 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 970.0404 Section 970.0404 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AGENCY... classified information....

  8. 39 CFR 3055.4 - Internal measurement systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 39 Postal Service 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Internal measurement systems. 3055.4 Section 3055... SATISFACTION REPORTING Annual Reporting of Service Performance Achievements § 3055.4 Internal measurement systems. Service performance measurements obtained from internal measurement systems or hybrid...

  9. 39 CFR 3055.4 - Internal measurement systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 39 Postal Service 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Internal measurement systems. 3055.4 Section 3055... SATISFACTION REPORTING Annual Reporting of Service Performance Achievements § 3055.4 Internal measurement systems. Service performance measurements obtained from internal measurement systems or hybrid...

  10. 39 CFR 3055.4 - Internal measurement systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 39 Postal Service 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Internal measurement systems. 3055.4 Section 3055... SATISFACTION REPORTING Annual Reporting of Service Performance Achievements § 3055.4 Internal measurement systems. Service performance measurements obtained from internal measurement systems or hybrid...

  11. 12 CFR 609.940 - Internal systems and controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Internal systems and controls. 609.940 Section 609.940 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE Standards for Boards and Management § 609.940 Internal systems and controls. When applicable, internal...

  12. 46 CFR 121.602 - Internal communications systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... THAN 150 PASSENGERS OR WITH OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATIONS FOR MORE THAN 49 PASSENGERS VESSEL CONTROL AND MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT Control and Internal Communications Systems § 121.602 Internal... 46 Shipping 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Internal communications systems. 121.602 Section...

  13. Lubricating system for an internal combustion engine

    SciTech Connect

    Ishikawa, T.

    1988-12-27

    This patent describes a lubricating system for an internal combustion engine having at least one cylinder, crankcase, a crankshaft, a balancer shaft rotated by the crankshaft through gears, and an oil pump, comprising: a cover secured to the crankcase to form a part of the crankcase, the crankshaft being supported by a first bearing provided in the cover and by a second bearing provided in the crankcase; a first oil passage provided in the crankcase and cover and extending from an opening at a bottom of the crankcase to an inlet of the oil pump; a second oil passage provided in the cover and extending from an outlet of the oil pump to a first opening which opens to a journal of the crankshaft; a third oil passage provided in the crankshaft and extending from a second opening corresponding to the first opening to third openings which open to the first and second bearings and to connecting rods at crankpins of the crankshaft.

  14. The international system of units (SI)

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kovalevsky, Jean; Quinn, Terence J.

    2004-10-01

    The SI (Système international d'unités), adopted by the Conférence générale des poids et mesures in 1960, was the outcome of almost one century of progress in the establishment of a consistent system of measurement units. We present its main features with its base and derived units, which constitutes a coherent set of units related by rule of multiplication and division with no numeric factor other than one. The historical evolution and the definitions of the seven base units are presented together with a short description of how they are realised in practice. The specific case of the units in ionising radiation is discussed, and some hints of what could be the future of the SI are proposed. To cite this article: J. Kovalevsky, T.J. Quinn, C. R. Physique 5 (2004).

  15. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  16. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Safeguard clause. 26.21 Section 26.21 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT...

  17. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Safeguard clause. 26.21 Section 26.21 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS, AND CERTAIN MEDICAL DEVICE PRODUCT...

  18. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking... 45 Public Welfare 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Administrative safeguards. 164.308 Section 164.308 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATIVE DATA STANDARDS AND...

  19. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking... 45 Public Welfare 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Administrative safeguards. 164.308 Section 164.308 Public Welfare Department of Health and Human Services ADMINISTRATIVE DATA STANDARDS AND...

  20. An expanded safeguards role for the DOE safeguards analytical laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Bingham, C.D.

    1986-01-01

    The New Brunswick Laboratory (NBL) is a Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) laboratory, with the mission to provide and maintain a nuclear material measurements and standards laboratory. The functional responsibilities of NBL serve as a technical response to the statutory responsibility of the Department of Energy (DOE) to assure the safeguarding of nuclear materials. In the execution of its mission, NBL carries out activities in six safeguards-related programs: measurement development, measurement evaluation, measurement services, safeguards assessment, reference and calibration materials and site-specific assistance. These program activities have been implemented by NBL for many years; their relative emphases, however, have been changed recently to address the priorities defined by the DOE Office of Safeguards and Security, Defense Programs (OSS/DP). As a consequence, NBL operations are in the ''mainstream'' of domestic safeguards activities. This expanded safeguards role for NBL is discussed in this paper.

  1. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, Jr., James; Garner, James R; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Younkin, James R; Hooper, David A; Henkel, James J; Krichinsky, Alan M

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  2. Smarter radiation monitors for safeguards and security

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.; Pratt, J.C.; Markin, J.T.; Scurry, T. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    Radiation monitors for nuclear safeguards and security depend on internal control circuits to determine when diversion of special nuclear materials is taking place. Early monitors depended on analog circuits for this purpose, subsequently, digital logic controllers made better monitoring methods possible. Now, versatile microprocessor systems permit new, more efficient, and more useful monitoring methods. One such method is simple stepwise monitoring, which has variable alarm levels to expedite monitoring where extended monitoring periods are required. Another method, sequential probability ratio logic, tests data as it accumulates against two hypothesis - background, or background plus a transient diversion signal - and terminates monitoring as soon as a decision can be made that meets false-alarm and detection confidence requirements. A third method, quantitative monitoring for personnel, calculates count ratios of high- to low-energy gamma-ray regions to predict whether the material detected is a small quantity of bare material or a larger quantity of shielded material. In addition, microprocessor system subprograms can assist in detector calibration and trouble-shooting. Examples of subprograms are a variance analysis technique to set bias levels in plastic scintillators and a state-of-health routine for detecting malfunctions in digital circuit components.

  3. Proposed clinical internal carotid artery classification system

    PubMed Central

    Abdulrauf, Saleem I; Ashour, Ahmed M; Marvin, Eric; Coppens, Jeroen; Kang, Brian; Hsieh, Tze Yu Yeh; Nery, Breno; Penanes, Juan R; Alsahlawi, Aysha K; Moore, Shawn; Al-Shaar, Hussam Abou; Kemp, Joanna; Chawla, Kanika; Sujijantarat, Nanthiya; Najeeb, Alaa; Parkar, Nadeem; Shetty, Vilaas; Vafaie, Tina; Antisdel, Jastin; Mikulec, Tony A; Edgell, Randall; Lebovitz, Jonathan; Pierson, Matt; Pires de Aguiar, Paulo Henrique; Buchanan, Paula; Di Cosola, Angela; Stevens, George

    2016-01-01

    Introduction: Numerical classification systems for the internal carotid artery (ICA) are available, but modifications have added confusion to the numerical systems. Furthermore, previous classifications may not be applicable uniformly to microsurgical and endoscopic procedures. The purpose of this study was to develop a clinically useful classification system. Materials and Methods: We performed cadaver dissections of the ICA in 5 heads (10 sides) and evaluated 648 internal carotid arteries with computed tomography angiography. We identified specific anatomic landmarks to define the beginning and end of each ICA segment. Results: The ICA was classified into eight segments based on the cadaver and imaging findings: (1) Cervical segment; (2) cochlear segment (ascending segment of the ICA in the temporal bone) (relation of the start of this segment to the base of the styloid process: Above, 425 sides [80%]; below, 2 sides [0.4%]; at same level, 107 sides [20%]; P < 0.0001) (relation of cochlea to ICA: Posterior, 501 sides [85%]; posteromedial, 84 sides [14%]; P < 0.0001); (3) petrous segment (horizontal segment of ICA in the temporal bone) starting at the crossing of the eustachian tube superolateral to the ICA turn in all 10 samples; (4) Gasserian-Clival segment (ascending segment of ICA in the cavernous sinus) starting at the petrolingual ligament (PLL) (relation to vidian canal on imaging: At same level, 360 sides [63%]; below, 154 sides [27%]; above, 53 sides [9%]; P < 0.0001); in this segment, the ICA projected medially toward the clivus in 275 sides (52%) or parallel to the clivus with no deviation in 256 sides (48%; P < 0.0001); (5) sellar segment (medial loop of ICA in the cavernous sinus) starting at the takeoff of the meningeal hypophyseal trunk (ICA was medial into the sella in 271 cases [46%], lateral without touching the sella in 127 cases [23%], and abutting the sella in 182 cases [31%]; P < 0.0001); (6) sphenoid segment (lateral loop of ICA within the

  4. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR...

  5. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  6. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank Information Management System

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world’s crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  7. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    The mission of the GRIN-Global Project is to create a new, scalable version of the Germplasm Resource Information System (GRIN) to provide the world's crop genebanks with a powerful, flexible, easy-to-use plant genetic resource (PGR) information management system. The system will help safeguard PGR ...

  8. The development of internationally managed information systems and their prospects.

    PubMed

    East, H

    1978-12-01

    This paper reviews a selection of international collaborative efforts in the production of information services and attempts to characterize modes of cooperation. Information systems specifically discussed include: international nuclear information system (INIS); Nuclear Science Abstract (NSA); EURATOM; AGRIS; AGRINDEX; Information Retrieval Limited (IRL); IFIS (International Food Information Service); Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS); MEDLARS; and TITUS. 3 methods of international information transfer are discussed: commercial transactions; negotiated (bilateral) barter arrangements; and contribution to internationally managed systems. Technical, economic, and professional objectives support the rationale for international cooperation. It is argued that economic and political considerations, as much as improved technology or information transfer, will determine the nature of collaboration in the future. PMID:12260761

  9. Improving the Internal Accounting Controls of Educational Institutions.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Apostolou, Nicholas G.; And Others

    1986-01-01

    Accounting controls are primarily concerned with methods and procedures that safeguard an entity's assets and ensure the reliability of its financial records. This article discusses internal control objectives as applied to educational institutions, outlines specific steps necessary to develop an effective internal control system, and mentions…

  10. 12 CFR 917.6 - Internal control system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Internal control system. 917.6 Section 917.6... POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BANK BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT § 917.6 Internal control... internal control system that addresses: (i) The efficiency and effectiveness of Bank activities; (ii)...

  11. Assessing the effectiveness of safeguards at a medium-sized spent-fuel reprocessing facility

    SciTech Connect

    Higinbotham, W.; Fishbone, L.G.; Suda, S.

    1983-01-01

    In order to evaluate carefully and systematically the effectiveness of safeguards at nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency has adopted a safeguards effectiveness assessment methodology. The methodology has been applied to a well-characterized, medium-sized, spent-fuel reprocessing plant to understand how explicit safeguards inspection procedures would serve to expose conceivable nuclear materials diversion schemes, should such diversion occur.

  12. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  13. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-07-31

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  14. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  15. Tsunami Detection Systems for International Requirements

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lawson, R. A.

    2007-12-01

    Results are presented regarding the first commercially available, fully operational, tsunami detection system to have passed stringent U.S. government testing requirements and to have successfully demonstrated its ability to detect an actual tsunami at sea. Spurred by the devastation of the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami that killed more than 230,000 people, the private sector actively supported the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission's (IOC"s) efforts to develop a tsunami warning system and mitigation plan for the Indian Ocean region. As each country in the region developed its requirements, SAIC recognized that many of these underdeveloped countries would need significant technical assistance to fully execute their plans. With the original focus on data fusion, consequence assessment tools, and warning center architecture, it was quickly realized that the cornerstone of any tsunami warning system would be reliable tsunami detection buoys that could meet very stringent operational standards. Our goal was to leverage extensive experience in underwater surveillance and oceanographic sensing to produce an enhanced and reliable deep water sensor that could meet emerging international requirements. Like the NOAA Deep-ocean Assessment and Recording of Tsunamis (DART TM ) buoy, the SAIC Tsunami Buoy (STB) system consists of three subsystems: a surfaccommunications buoy subsystem, a bottom pressure recorder subsystem, and a buoy mooring subsystem. With the operational success that DART has demonstrated, SAIC decided to build and test to the same high standards. The tsunami detection buoy system measures small changes in the depth of the deep ocean caused by tsunami waves as they propagate past the sensor. This is accomplished by using an extremely sensitive bottom pressure sensor/recorder to measure very small changes in pressure as the waves move past the buoy system. The bottom pressure recorder component includes a processor with algorithms that

  16. Safeguards and security -- Developing transition technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Bruckner, D.G.

    1993-12-31

    Safeguards and Security (SAS) requirements as stipulated in current DOE Orders have provided the envelope for most Integrated Complex (IC) programs. These programs are shifting to meet changing DOE requirements and new budgetary realities. This paper describes exploring existing and developing SAS technologies as its hardware, software, and functions are integrated, transferred, and consolidated. It considers realignment of mission-driven, support, and administrative structures to optimize overall use of assets and personnel and at the same time reduce fixed and variable costs. To assure acceptance and meaningful oversight within the organization and with DOE Headquarters, the functional technologies and linkages need to adopt common fundamental objectives and methodologies. It is also necessary that the uniqueness of each site/facility be carefully factored in to meet changing operations and mission. The importance of connecting functionality with technology is that such disciplines as data/information technologies are vital to management information systems. The technologies serve multiple requirements in such areas as property protection, protective forces, access control, MC and A, operations, and personnel security. Integrated relational databases carefully developed can provide decision-making information for many SAS activities and reflect the movement toward a more industrial security approach to SAS. At the same time, it can support the needs of safety, fire protection, environmental cleansing, etc., and on the international scene arms control, verification, etc.

  17. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  18. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Thomas L.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  19. Free toplogy networks and their application in IAEA safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Gholkar, R. V.; Halbig, J. K.

    2004-01-01

    IAEA Safeguards systems must perform in challenging environments with many varied operational constraints. The ability to dynamically interconnect instruments and inspector interfaces without being thwarted by the transfer medium or physical configuration of a network is of paramount importance when implementing integrated safeguards systems. A free network topology provides the robust set of options useful to the IAEA for successful connection of common instruments and collection devices in different facilities with varying physical layout. A general set of requirements for integrated safeguards systems networks is discussed, and an example of a current implementation is given. Areas of focus include authentication/encryption, bandwidth requirements, and possible technologies that can be used to maximize the versatility of free topology networks for safeguards systems.

  20. Supercharger control system for internal combustion engines

    SciTech Connect

    Nagase, H.; Hirayama, T.

    1986-01-21

    This patent describes a supercharger control system for an internal combustion engine. The system has a throttle valve with a throttle operating lever, an engine air inlet passage, and a venturi-type carburetor. It consists of: a supercharger located in the engine air inlet passage upstream of the throttle valve, the supercharger being driven by the engine, a bypass within the engine inlet passage around the supercharger, a control valve with a control lever located within the bypass to control air flow, a diaphragm device, a first side of the diaphragm device being in communication with the engine inlet passage at the exit of the supercharger, a second side of the diaphragm being in communication with the venturi carburetor, a valve control linkage being constructed and arranged to open the control valve with increased vacuum in the first side of the diaphragm, spring means biasing the diaphragm to open the control valve, an activation lever with a stopper protrustion, the activation lever being pivotally mounted about the throttle valve, a first stop pin in the intake passage wall, a second stop pin on the throttle operating lever to selectively engage the activation lever, a regulation lever pivotally mounted about the control valve, a third stop pin on the control lever to selectively engage the regulating lever, an activation linkage connecting the activation lever and the regulating lever so as to create reciprocating motion, and spring means biasing both the regulating lever against the third stop pin when the control valve is in the fully open position and the stopper protrusion is against the first stop pin.

  1. Fuel injection system for internal combustion engine

    SciTech Connect

    Nagao, A.; Yoshioka, S.; Oda, H.; Tokushima, T.

    1988-11-22

    This patent describes a fuel injection system for an internal combustion engine having a crankshaft and a combustion chamber, the system comprising (a) an intake passage for introducing an intake gas into the combustion chamber and provided with an intake valve; (b) a fuel injection valve for injecting fuel into the intake passage in the vicinity of the combustion chamber; (c) operating condition detecting means for detecting the operating condition of the engine and outputting a signal corresponding to the thus detected operating condition; (d) fuel injection amount determining means which receives an output signal of the operating conditions detecting means, thereby determining the amount of fuel to be supplied to the combustion chamber, and outputs a signal corresponding to thus determined amount; (e) crankshaft angle detecting means for detecting the rotation angle of the crankshaft; (f) injection timing control means which receives signals from the fuel injection amount determining means and crankshaft angle detecting means, outputs a start signal for actuating the fuel injection valve and a termination signal for terminating the actuation of the fuel injection valve, and actuates the fuel injection valve for the duration between the start and termination signals, thereby supplying an amount of fuel determined by the fuel injection amount determining means; (g) the start and termination signals being set against the crankshaft angle so that the whole fuel injection from the injection valve to the intake passage under light load operation of the engine reaches the combustion chamber substantially in the latter half of the intake stroke before the intake valve is closed.

  2. Spiral Development for Safeguards Instrumentation

    SciTech Connect

    Koskelo, M.; Undem, Halvor A.; Good, Morris S.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Schanfein, Mark; Kadner, S.

    2012-10-12

    Safeguards instrumentation is highly specialized, so a common approach in the US has been to develop initial prototypes for performance, operability and security within the US National Laboratories for the IAEA and then seek one or more commercial partners. Transfer of technology from US National Laboratories is a legal requirement for products that have the potential for mass production. Other important objectives include minimizing time to deployment and lifecycle cost, and optimizing product maintainability, sustainability and manufacturability. Unfortunately, the deployment of systems developed via this model has sometimes been seriously delayed or never adopted because of the difficulty of optimizing the significant parameters of the process between the public and private sectors. The authors suggest that forming an R&D partnership between a research laboratory and a commercial company much earlier in the process would provide significant advantages. The present US practice leads to unnecessary expenditures during the early R&D phase since many decisions are made based on research needs that are counterproductive for commercialization and manufacturability. If the ultimate goal of the project is to produce a reliable and cost effective commercial product, the commercial input is needed early and often. The new “model” of developing systems in a closer collaboration with the private sector, in a spiral “Commercialization by Design” approach, should also limit the long term financial mortgages that Member States frequently experience with respect to safeguards instrumentation development using the present process. As a concrete example, the potential for incorporating Wire Integrity Verification Technology into the iCobra Reader System is discussed.

  3. The US Support Program Assistance to the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology, Collection, and Analysis 2008

    SciTech Connect

    Tackentien,J.

    2008-06-12

    One of the United States Support Program's (USSP) priorities for 2008 is to support the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) development of an integrated and efficient safeguards information infrastructure, including reliable and maintainable information systems, and effective tools and resources to collect and analyze safeguards-relevant information. The USSP has provided funding in support of this priority for the ISIS Re-engineering Project (IRP), and for human resources support to the design and definition of the enhanced information analysis architecture project (nVision). Assistance for several other information technology efforts is provided. This paper will report on the various ongoing support measures undertaken by the USSP to support the IAEA's information technology enhancements and will provide some insights into activities that the USSP may support in the future.

  4. Who safeguards mothers?

    PubMed

    Wickham, Sara

    2014-11-01

    While routine screening for group B streptococcus is not recommended in the UK, women are sometimes coincidentally found to be carrying these bacteria during investigations of symptoms in pregnancy. If such women decide to decline intravenous antibiotics for themselves in labour, they can seek support from midwives in appropriate roles. But once the woman's baby is born, the situation changes somewhat, as the legal context changes and the issue of safeguarding may be raised. This article considers the issues that arise in such scenarios and raises questions about who is there to support women who experience pressure to consent to their healthy newborn baby having prophylactic intravenous antibiotics. PMID:25582006

  5. Passive Measurement of Organic-Scintillator Neutron Signatures for Nuclear Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Jennfier L. Dolan; Eric C. Miller; Alexis C. Kaplan; Andreas Enqvist; Marek Flaska; Alice Tomanin; Paolo Peerani; David L. Chichester; Sara A. Pozzi

    2012-10-01

    At nuclear facilities, domestically and internationally, most measurement systems used for nuclear materials’ control and accountability rely on He-3 detectors. Due to resource shortages, alternatives to He-3 systems are needed. This paper presents preliminary simulation and experimental efforts to develop a fast-neutron-multiplicity counter based on liquid organic scintillators. This mission also provides the opportunity to broaden the capabilities of such safeguards measurement systems to improve current neutron-multiplicity techniques and expand the scope to encompass advanced nuclear fuels.

  6. LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

    SciTech Connect

    1995-04-03

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms.

  7. 47 CFR 90.475 - Operation of internal transmitter control systems in specially equipped systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 47 Telecommunication 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Operation of internal transmitter control... Control Internal Transmitter Control Systems § 90.475 Operation of internal transmitter control systems in specially equipped systems. (a) An internal transmitter control system need not be designed to meet...

  8. Supercharging system for an internal combustion engine

    SciTech Connect

    Bucher, J.

    1987-09-29

    This patent describes a supercharging control system for an internal combustion engine (ICE) having an exhaust gas turbine driven by exhaust gases from the ICE; a main air compressor driven by the exhaust gas turbine and providing compressed air to an inlet manifold of the ICE, an auxiliary air compressor driven by rotary power derived from the ICE to provide additional air to the main compressor; a controlled clutch drivingly connected to the auxiliary compressor and the ICE to selectively establish or disconnect rotary drive power between the ICE and the auxiliary compressor; fuel quantity sensing means for sensing quantity of fuel being supplied to the ICE and providing a fuel quantity signal; air pressure sensing means coupled to an air inlet of the ICE for sensing charging air pressure and providing an air pressure signal; and comprising; a memory and controller coupled to control, selectively, establishment and disconnection of the rotary drive power between the ICE and the auxiliary compressor, and wherein the memory and controller is coupled to receive the air pressure signal and the fuel quantity signal and storing the relationship between air supply pressure and fuel quantity for desired performance of the ICE; the memory and controller provides an output signal coupled to and controlling the controlled clutch to obtain the desired performance; and wherein the main compressor comprises a centrifugal compressor including nozzles positioned about the outer circumference of a chamber within which rotary blades of the centrifugal compressor operate. The nozzles receive compressed air from the auxiliary compressor and are oriented to apply additional drive power to the main compressor.

  9. Pegasus International, Inc. coating removal systems

    SciTech Connect

    1998-02-01

    The Pegasus Coating Removal System (PCRS) was demonstrated at Florida International University (FIU) where it was being evaluated for efficiency and cost. In conjunction with the FIU testing demonstration, a human factors assessment was conducted to assess the hazards and associated safety and health issues of concern for workers utilizing this technology. The PCRS is a chemical paste that is applied to the surface using a brush, roller, or airless sprayer. After the type of PCRS, thickness, and dwell time have been determined, a laminated backed material is placed on top of the chemical paste to slow down the drying process and to provide a mechanism to strip-off the chemical. After the dwell time is reached, the chemical substrate can be removed. Scrapers may be used to break-loose the layers as necessary or to break-loose the layers that are not removed when the laminated paper is picked up. Residue may also be cleaned off of the surface with a damp sponge with an agitating motion, absorbent sponges, or a vacuum, as needed. The paint and removal agent is then placed in drums for disposal at a later time. During the assessment sampling was conducted for organic vapors and general observational techniques were conducted for ergonomics. Recommendations for improved worker safety and health during application and removal of the PCRS include: (1) work practices that reflect avoidance of exposure or reducing the risk of exposure; (2) assuring all PPE and equipment are compatible with the chemicals being used; (3) work practices that reduce the worker`s need to walk on the slippery surface caused by the chemical or the use of special anti-slip soles; (4) careful control of overspray (if a spray application is used); and (5) the use of ergonomically designed long-handled tools to apply and remove the chemical (to alleviate some of the ergonomic concerns).

  10. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  11. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hase, Kevin R.; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather; Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-07-10

    Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

  12. Research and Development for Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Inman, Guy M.

    This report summarizes the results of unclassified research and development contracts in the field of peaceful use safeguards regarding the use of nuclear material. These summaries indicate there is really no sharp line of demarcation between research for safeguards and research for many other purposes. It includes areas of research effort and…

  13. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-12-20

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  14. Market Research Survey of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) Portable MS Systems for IAEA Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Hart, Garret L.; Hager, George J.; Barinaga, Charles J.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-02-01

    This report summarizes the results for the market research survey of mass spectrometers that are deemed pertinent to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needs and strategic objectives. The focus of the report is on MS instruments that represent currently available (or soon to be) commercial off-the shelf (COTS) technology and weigh less than 400 pounds. A compilation of all available MS instruments (36 COTS and 2 R&D) is presented, along with pertinent information regarding each instrument.

  15. 77 FR 3922 - Rules for Investigations Relating to Global and Bilateral Safeguards Actions, Market Disruption...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-01-26

    ...The United States International Trade Commission (Commission) is adopting interim rules that amend the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure to make technical amendments and to provide rules for the conduct of safeguard investigations under statutory provisions that implement bilateral safeguard provisions in free trade agreements that the United States has negotiated with Australia,......

  16. Internal Dosimetry Code System Using Biokinetics Models

    Energy Science and Technology Software Center (ESTSC)

    2003-11-12

    Version 00 InDose is an internal dosimetry code to calculate dose estimations using biokinetic models (presented in ICRP-56 to ICRP71) as well as older ones. The code uses the ICRP-66 respiratory tract model and the ICRP-30 gastrointestinal tract model as well as the new and old biokinetic models. The code was written in such a way that the user can change any parameters of any one of the models without recompiling the code. All parametersmore » are given in well annotated parameters files that the user may change. As default, these files contain the values listed in ICRP publications. The full InDose code was planned to have three parts: 1) the main part includes the uptake and systemic models and is used to calculate the activities in the body tissues and excretion as a function of time for a given intake. 2) An optimization module for automatic estimation of the intake for a specific exposure case. 3) A module to calculate the dose due to the estimated intake. Currently, the code is able to perform only it`s main task (part 1) while the other two have to be done externally using other tools. In the future, developers would like to add these modules in order to provide a complete solution. The code was tested extensively to verify accuracy of its results. The verification procedure was divided into three parts: 1) verification of the implementation of each model, 2) verification of the integrity of the whole code, and 3) usability test. The first two parts consisted of comparing results obtained with InDose to published results for the same cases. For example ICRP-78 monitoring data. The last part consisted of participating in the 3rd EIE-IDA and assessing some of the scenarios provided in this exercise. These tests where presented in a few publications. Good agreement was found between the results of InDose and published data.« less

  17. GRIN-Global: An International Project to Develop a Global Plant Genebank and Information Management System

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Many of the world's national genebanks, responsible for the safeguarding and availability of their country's Plant Genetic Resource (PGR) collections, have lacked access to high quality IT needed to document and manage their collections electronically. The Germplasm Resource Information System (GRI...

  18. The Nuclotron internal target control and data acquisition system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Isupov, A. Yu.; Krasnov, V. A.; Ladygin, V. P.; Piyadin, S. M.; Reznikov, S. G.

    2013-01-01

    The new control system of the Nuclotron (JINR, Dubna) internal target is described in both hardware and software aspects. The CAMAC hardware is based on the use of the standard CAMAC modules developed and manufactured at JINR. The internal target control and data acquisition (IntTarg CDAQ) system software is implemented using the ngdp framework under the Unix-like operating system (OS) FreeBSD to allow easy network distribution of the online data collected from internal target and accompanying detectors, as well as the internal target remote control.

  19. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  20. INTERMARS: User-controlled international management system

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Schmitt, Harrison H.

    1986-01-01

    Existing international space law as well as the best interest of all nations are consistent with the establishment of a user-based international organization, herein called INTERMARS. INTERMARS would provide access to facilities and services at a Martian base which would be of high functional potential, quality, safety, and reliability. These opportunities would be available on an open and nondiscriminatory basis to all peaceful users and investors. INTERMARS is a model organization concept tailored to provide cooperative international management of a Martian base for the benefit of its members, users, and investors. Most importantly, INTERMARS would provide such management through a sharing of both sovereignty and opportunity rather then unilateral control by any one nation or set of competing nations. Through an Assembly of Parties, a Board of Governors, a Board of Users and Investors, and a Director General, INTERMARS would meet its primary goal as it would be in the self-interest of all members, users, and investors to do so. The internal structure and philosophy of INTERMARS would provide not only for all participants to have representation in decisions affecting its activities, but also would insure effective and responsive management. Surely this is the precedent wished for, to establish for mankind at the now not-so-distant shores of the new ocean of space.

  1. Satellite Power System (SPS) international agreements

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Grove, S.

    1978-01-01

    The problems in obtaining international agreements on geostationary orbit availability, microwave frequency allocations and microwave frequency standards for satellites transmitting solar power are considered. The various U.S. policy options, strategies and time frames with respect to key issues are analyzed.

  2. International University Ranking Systems and the Idea of University Excellence

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Paul; Braddock, Richard

    2007-01-01

    We look at some of the theoretical and methodological issues underlying international university ranking systems and, in particular, their conceptual connection with the idea of excellence. We then turn to a critical examination of the two best-known international university ranking systems--the "Times Higher Education Supplement (THES)" World…

  3. Foundations of the International System of Units (SI).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Robert A.

    1981-01-01

    Traces the events leading to the creation of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM). Discusses how the units have been represented by their standards, and investigates how the original metric system evolved into the International System of Units (SI), focusing on the meter, second, kilogram, and electrical units. (SK)

  4. 12 CFR 917.6 - Internal control system.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 8 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Internal control system. 917.6 Section 917.6 Banks and Banking FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE BOARD GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BANK BOARDS OF DIRECTORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT § 917.6 Internal control system. (a) Establishment and maintenance....

  5. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  6. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture... Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to... the specific purpose authorized therefor. (b) Safeguards, provided by this section, may include,...

  7. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture... Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to... the specific purpose authorized therefor. (b) Safeguards, provided by this section, may include,...

  8. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments.

    PubMed

    Gallagher, Ryan R; Patel, Jaymin R; Interiano, Alexander L; Rovner, Alexis J; Isaacs, Farren J

    2015-02-18

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping 'safeguards'-engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome-to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10(-12). The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  9. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  10. Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards

    PubMed Central

    Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

    2016-01-01

    Introduction: A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. Methods: This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α=0.75). Results: The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. Conclusion: According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended. PMID:27046944

  11. An automated airplane detection system for the safeguard against airplane illumination from the laser guide star beacons at the MMT

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Snyder, Miguel; Lloyd-Hart, Michael

    2007-09-01

    Laser beams for guide star generation are a potential hazard for aircraft. At the MMT telescope located on Mt. Hopkins in Southern Arizona, a constellation of five Rayleigh guide stars is created with a total of 25 W of projected power at 532 nm wavelength. We report operational results from an automatic system deployed at the MMT that is designed to detect aircraft and shut down the lasers if a collision with the beams appears likely. The system, building on a previous prototype, uses a wide-angle CCD camera mounted with a minimally unobstructed view to the optical support structure at the top of the telescope. A computer program reads the camera once every two seconds and calculates the difference between adjacent image pairs. The anti-collision beacons required on all aircraft by the Federal Aviation Administration appear as streaks in the field. If an airplane is detected, it is located in the field relative to the laser beam and its path is projected. If aircraft are detected near or appear that they will approach the beam, the laser's safety shutter is closed and warning messages are sent to the laser operator. Failsafe operation is assured by a "heart beat" signal continuously sent from the detection system to the laser controller, and by the fact that the safety shutter must be energized to open. In the event of a power failure, the system must be manually reset by the Laser Safety Officer before the laser beam can again be propagated.

  12. United States Program for Technical assistance to IAEA Standards. Concept Paper: Knowledge Acquisition, Skills training for enhanced IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Morris, F.A.; Toquam, J.L.

    1993-11-01

    This concept paper explores the potential contribution of ``Knowledge Acquisition Skills`` in enhancing the effectiveness of international safeguards inspections by the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA, or Agency) and identifies types of training that could be provided to develop or improve such skills. For purposes of this concept paper, Knowledge Acquisition Skills are defined broadly to include all appropriate techniques that IAEA safeguards inspectors can use to acquire and analyze information relevant to the performance of successful safeguards inspections. These techniques include a range of cognitive, analytic, judgmental, interpersonal, and communications skills that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively.

  13. The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-01

    For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

  14. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  15. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    SciTech Connect

    Mary Alice Price

    2010-07-11

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC&A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC&A program. The MC&A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  16. A model for international border management systems.

    SciTech Connect

    Duggan, Ruth Ann

    2008-09-01

    To effectively manage the security or control of its borders, a country must understand its border management activities as a system. Using its systems engineering and security foundations as a Department of Energy National Security Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories has developed such an approach to modeling and analyzing border management systems. This paper describes the basic model and its elements developed under Laboratory Directed Research and Development project 08-684.

  17. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-07-10

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority requires judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner.

  18. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-07-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner.

  19. 39 CFR 3055.4 - Internal measurement systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 39 Postal Service 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Internal measurement systems. 3055.4 Section 3055.4 Postal Service POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION PERSONNEL SERVICE PERFORMANCE AND CUSTOMER SATISFACTION REPORTING Annual Reporting of Service Performance Achievements § 3055.4 Internal...

  20. Organizational Patterns within an International Educational System

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jackson, R.

    1975-01-01

    The organizational patterns of the European School system represent an amalgam of continental educational practices. The European School serves children from Belgium, France, Federal Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. (Author/IRT)

  1. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  2. Safeguards techniques in a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Leitner, E.; Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1991-01-01

    The pilot conditioning plant at Gorleben, Germany, is designed as a multi-purpose plant. Its primary task is the conditioning of spent fuel assemblies into a form suitable for final disposal. As a pilot plant, it allows furthermore for the development and testing of various conditioning techniques. In terms of international safeguards, the pilot conditioning plant is basically considered an item facility. Entire fuel assemblies enter the plant in transport casks, whereas bins filled with fuel rods or canisters containing cut fuel rods leave the facility in final disposal packages (e.g. POLLUX). Each POLLUX final disposal package content is uniquely correlated to a definite number of fuel assemblies which have entered the conditioning process. For this type of facility, containment/surveillance (C/S) should take over the major role in nuclear material safeguards. This paper discusses the safeguards at the Gorleben plant.

  3. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  4. International and domestic regulator issues facing the Canadian MSAT system

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Bahman, Azarbar; Langlois, Jacques R.; Frank, Christopher J.

    1988-01-01

    International and domestic regulatory issues which affect the implementation of a mobile satellite system (MSAT) over North America are addressed. WARC-MOB-87, MSAT frequency co-ordination, frequency sharing and key Canadian domestic issues are discussed.

  5. Space Station Information System - Concepts and international issues

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Williams, R. B.; Pruett, David; Hall, Dana L.

    1987-01-01

    The Space Station Information System (SSIS) is outlined in terms of its functions and probable physical facilities. The SSIS includes flight element systems as well as existing and planned institutional systems such as the NASA Communications System, the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, and the data and communications networks of the international partners. The SSIS strives to provide both a 'user friendly' environment and a software environment which will allow for software transportability and interoperability across the SSIS. International considerations are discussed as well as project management, software commonality, data communications standards, data security, documentation commonality, transaction management, data flow cross support, and key technologies.

  6. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  7. INIS: A Computer-Based International Nuclear Information System.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Balakrishnan, M. R.

    1986-01-01

    Description of the International Nuclear Information System includes its history, organizational structure, subject classification scheme, thesaurus, input standards, and various products and services generated by the system. Appendices provide a list of participating countries, subjects covered by the system, and a sample output record.…

  8. [Safeguarding herds from the animal hygiene point of view].

    PubMed

    Hartung, J

    2005-08-01

    One of the most important concepts for the protection of herd health is the implementation of structural and organisational measures to prevent infective agents and other adverse compounds from entering the farm. Safeguarding health, well-being and production efficiency is part of the overall management concept of hygiene in animal production systems. This paper presents an overview of the most important rules and recommendations to protect livestock production facilities from the intrusion of infectious pathogens, beginning with the right choice of the site for the farm and the animal housing ("safe distances" to neighbouring farm animal houses), solid fencing and control and disinfecting places at the entrance gate. The traffic of vehicles and people transporting animals, feedstuff, equipment and slurry or manure to and from the facility should be reduced to a minimum. Fallen animals should be stored in separate and safe containers until removed by specialised companies. Regular control of rodents, insects and wild birds is crucial to avoid the transfer of infectious agents from farm to farm and between herds within a farm. Equally important factors are the health status of personnel to avoid transmission of zoonotic diseases, the application of the all-in-all-out system and a strict cleaning and disinfecting regime. The internal and external organisational measures for preventing the spread of infections in animal production will gain increasing importance in the future because the farm animal producer bears the responsibility for the production of safe and healthy food at the primary segment of the food chain. Increasing restrictions on the use of veterinary drugs for food delivering animals will increase the importance of prophylaxis, prevention and protection of production units as the keys for safeguarding health, well-being and efficiency of farm animals. Only the application of strict hygiene principles in animal production will make it possible to meet

  9. High efficiency stoichiometric internal combustion engine system

    DOEpatents

    Winsor, Richard Edward; Chase, Scott Allen

    2009-06-02

    A power system including a stoichiometric compression ignition engine in which a roots blower is positioned in the air intake for the engine to control air flow. Air flow is decreased during part power conditions to maintain the air-fuel ratio in the combustion chamber of the engine at stoichiometric, thus enabling the use of inexpensive three-way catalyst to reduce oxides of nitrogen. The roots blower is connected to a motor generator so that when air flow is reduced, electrical energy is stored which is made available either to the roots blower to temporarily increase air flow or to the system electrical load and thus recapture energy that would otherwise be lost in reducing air flow.

  10. Application of Telepresence Technologies to Nuclear Material Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, M.C.; Rome, J.A.

    1999-09-20

    Implementation of remote monitoring systems has become a priority area for the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international inspection regimes. For the past three years, DOE2000 has been the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) initiative to develop innovative applications to exploit the capabilities of broadband networks and media integration. The aim is to enhance scientific collaboration by merging computing and communications technologies. These Internet-based telepresence technologies could be easily extended to provide remote monitoring and control for confidence building and transparency systems at nuclear facilities around the world. One of the original DOE2000 projects, the Materials Microcharacterization Collaboratory is an interactive virtual laboratory, linking seven DOE user facilities located across the US. At these facilities, external collaborators have access to scientists, data, and instrumentation, all of which are available to varying degrees using the Internet. Remote operation of the instruments varies between passive (observational) to active (direct control), in many cases requiring no software at the remote site beyond a Web browser. Live video streams are continuously available on the Web so that participants can see what is happening at a particular location. An X.509 certificate system provides strong authentication, The hardware and software are commercially available and are easily adaptable to safeguards applications.

  11. Exhaust system for an internal combustion engine

    SciTech Connect

    Ikenoya, Y.; Otani, J.

    1982-10-19

    An exhaust system for an engine of a motorcycle is disclosed having catalytic and silencing mufflers arranged in adjacent side -by-side series flow relationship, the catalytic muffler extending rearwardly of the motorcycle, and, adjacent its rear end, being interconnected with the silencing muffler, the silencing muffler including plural expansion chambers which are interconnected in flow reversal relationship for gases to be exhausted rearwardly of the motorcycle.

  12. Operation of International Monitoring System Network

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nikolova, Svetlana; Araujo, Fernando; Aktas, Kadircan; Malakhova, Marina; Otsuka, Riyo; Han, Dongmei; Assef, Thierry; Nava, Elisabetta; Mickevicius, Sigitas; Agrebi, Abdelouaheb

    2015-04-01

    The IMS is a globally distributed network of monitoring facilities using sensors from four technologies: seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide. It is designed to detect the seismic and acoustic waves produced by nuclear test explosions and the subsequently released radioactive isotopes. Monitoring stations transmit their data to the IDC in Vienna, Austria, over a global private network known as the GCI. Since 2013, the data availability (DA) requirements for IMS stations account for quality of the data, meaning that in calculation of data availability data should be exclude if: - there is no input from sensor (SHI technology); - the signal consists of constant values (SHI technology); Even more strict are requirements for the DA of the radionuclide (particulate and noble gas) stations - received data have to be analyzed, reviewed and categorized by IDC analysts. In order to satisfy the strict data and network availability requirements of the IMS Network, the operation of the facilities and the GCI are managed by IDC Operations. Operations has following main functions: - to ensure proper operation and functioning of the stations; - to ensure proper operation and functioning of the GCI; - to ensure efficient management of the stations in IDC; - to provide network oversight and incident management. At the core of the IMS Network operations are a series of tools for: monitoring the stations' state of health and data quality, troubleshooting incidents, communicating with internal and external stakeholders, and reporting. The new requirements for data availability increased the importance of the raw data quality monitoring. This task is addressed by development of additional tools for easy and fast identifying problems in data acquisition, regular activities to check compliance of the station parameters with acquired data by scheduled calibration of the seismic network, review of the samples by certified radionuclide laboratories. The DA for the networks of

  13. Information technology and its effect on the international system

    SciTech Connect

    Stuck, J.M.

    1981-01-01

    This dissertation defines information technology and describes its effect on the international system. The goal of the study is to evaluate the role of information technology in a rapidly changing international milieu. New technology brings about a symbiosis of information and the vehicle, i.e. technical informatin systems, which supports it. Information is increasingly less separable from its organization, its mode of storage, and its processing or dissemination. Information in its union with electronics and this new technology is called information technology. It is seen by many as the most important of all modern technologies because it amounts to the creation of synthetic brainpower. Information technology is in the process of becoming a basic resource of mankind, just as food or energy. As a global resource, information technology is reviewed in its social, economic and political aspects. The dissertation's major premise is that information technology, on the international systemic level, brings about the effects of homogenization and centralization. The study concludes that information technology's effect on the international system is ambiguous. Partially, this is because there have been few attempts to examine the overall impact of information technology on international affairs. Also, due to the relative brevity of our experience with information technology, very little is known about what its future effects on the international system will be.

  14. Safeguarding health care workers.

    PubMed

    Benton, David; Williamson, Lindsey

    2014-12-01

    Editor's note: The International Council of Nurses (ICN) is a federation of more than 130 international nursing organizations. We invited the ICN to contribute a periodic column highlighting some of its initiatives to address global nursing issues. For more information, see the ICN Web site at www.icn.ch. PMID:25423393

  15. Camshaft driving system for internal combustion engine

    SciTech Connect

    Hiroshima, K.A.

    1987-06-23

    This patent describes camshaft driving system for a double overhead camshaft engine cylinder rows extend parallel to the crankshaft of the engine. The second cylinder row is rearwardly displaced from the first cylinder row in the axial direction of the crankshaft so that vacant spaces are formed respectively behind the first cylinder row and in front of the second cylinder row. All the pistons in the cylinders of the first and second cylinder rows are connected to the crankshaft and a pair of camshafts for driving the intake and exhaust valves are provided in the cylinder head of each cylinder row to extend in the direction of the crankshaft. The camshaft driving system comprises a timing pulley provided on one of the intake and exhaust camshafts of each cylinder row to rotate together with the camshaft; A crank pulley is driven by the crankshaft; A first driving force transmission means transmits rotation of the crank pulley to the timing pulleys of the first and second cylinder rows; a second driving force transmission means transmits rotation of the timing pulley of the first cylinder row to the other of the camshafts of the first cylinder row; and a third driving force transmission means transmits rotation of the timing pulley of the second cylinder row to the other of the camshafts of the second cylinder row. The second driving force transmission means is disposed in the vacant space behind the first cylinder row and the third driving force transmission means is disposed in the vacant space in front of the second cylinder row.

  16. Global Survey of the Concepts and Understanding of the Interfaces Between Nuclear Safety, Security, and Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Kovacic, Don N.; Stewart, Scott; Erickson, Alexa R.; Ford, Kerrie D.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2015-07-15

    There is increasing global discourse on how the elements of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards can be most effectively implemented in nuclear power programs. While each element is separate and unique, they must nevertheless all be addressed in a country’s laws and implemented via regulations and in facility operations. This topic is of particular interest to countries that are currently developing the infrastructure to support nuclear power programs. These countries want to better understand what is required by these elements and how they can manage the interfaces between them and take advantages of any synergies that may exist. They need practical examples and guidance in this area in order to develop better organizational strategies and technical capacities. This could simplify their legal, regulatory, and management structures and avoid inefficient approaches and costly mistakes that may not be apparent to them at this early stage of development. From the perspective of IAEA International Safeguards, supporting Member States in exploring such interfaces and synergies provides a benefit to them because it acknowledges that domestic safeguards in a country do not exist in a vacuum. Instead, it relies on a strong State System of Accounting and Control that is in turn dependent on a capable and independent regulatory body as well as a competent operator and technical staff. These organizations must account for and control nuclear material, communicate effectively, and manage and transmit complete and correct information to the IAEA in a timely manner. This, while in most cases also being responsible for the safety and security of their facilities. Seeking efficiencies in this process benefits international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will present the results of a global survey of current and anticipated approaches and practices by countries and organizations with current or future nuclear power programs on how they are implementing, or

  17. Assessment of Critical Mass Laboratory safeguards and security upgrades

    SciTech Connect

    Merrill, B.J.; DeMyer, J.J.

    1985-05-31

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) conducted an evaluation of the safeguards and security systems at the Critical Mass Laboratory (CML) in February 1985, to identify appropriate upgrading actions necessary to ensure that effective and efficient systems consistent with DOE-RL policies, procedures, and site priorities are in place. Since that evaluation, there have been changes in Patrol contingency philosophy, response tactics, and distribution of manpower. Because of these changes, and at the request of DOE-RL, PNL has re-evaluated the safeguards and security systems in place at CML.

  18. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-05-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  19. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  20. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy. Quarter ending June 30, 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-07-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations, both within and outside DOE. This document summarizes activities conducted for OSS during this quarter. LLNL is supporting OSS in six areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security/distributed system, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology & security center. This document describes the activities in each of these six areas.

  1. Rotary valve system for internal combustion engines

    SciTech Connect

    Moore, R.G.

    1992-05-12

    This patent describes a fuel intake and exhaust system for use with a four stroke engine of a type having an engine block formed with at least one piston cavity having an upper opening in the top surface of the block, a piston having an upper surface reciprocating in the cavity toward and away from the upper opening, a crankshaft and a connecting rod secured to the piston and crankshaft. This patent describes improvement in a housing disposed over the block and having an interior chamber formed with a lower opening located directly over the upper opening and the lower opening having approximately the same dimension as the upper opening; the housing formed with fuel intake and exhaust ports; a rotor shaft rotatably received in the chamber; a triangular rotor having first second and third surfaces carried out by the shaft and movable therewith; means connecting the crankshaft to the rotor shaft for relative rotative movement therebetween; the first surface of the rotor spanning the upper opening at a particular rotative disposition of the rotor while isolating the intake and exhaust ports from the piston cavity.

  2. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  3. Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

    SciTech Connect

    Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

    2011-09-30

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

  4. Safeguarding Our Health: Vaccines Protect Us All

    MedlinePlus

    ... disclaimer . Subscribe Safeguarding Our Health Vaccines Protect Us All We share more than food and culture within ... safeguarding your health. “There’s a huge benefit to all of us getting the recommended vaccines,” explains Dr. ...

  5. 16 CFR 1031.11 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... meetings policy, 16 CFR part 1012. ... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 1031.11 Section 1031... safeguards. (a) Subject to the provisions of this subpart and budgetary and time constraints,...

  6. Kantian fractionalization predicts the conflict propensity of the international system

    PubMed Central

    Cranmer, Skyler J.; Menninga, Elizabeth J.; Mucha, Peter J.

    2015-01-01

    Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena in political science, including the study of international conflict. We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve as an early warning sign of international instability. PMID:26338977

  7. Kantian fractionalization predicts the conflict propensity of the international system.

    PubMed

    Cranmer, Skyler J; Menninga, Elizabeth J; Mucha, Peter J

    2015-09-22

    Network science has spurred a reexamination of relational phenomena in political science, including the study of international conflict. We introduce a new direction to the study of conflict by showing that the multiplex fractionalization of the international system along three key dimensions is a powerful predictor of the propensity for violent interstate conflict. Even after controlling for well-established conflict indicators, our new measure contributes more to model fit for interstate conflict than all of the previously established measures combined. Moreover, joint democracy plays little, if any, role in predicting system stability, thus challenging perhaps the major empirical finding of the international relations literature. Lastly, the temporal variability of our measure with conflict is consistent with a causal relationship. Our results have real-world policy implications as changes in our fractionalization measure substantially aid the prediction of conflict up to 10 years into the future, allowing it to serve as an early warning sign of international instability. PMID:26338977

  8. Internal Control, Auditing, and the Automated Acquisitions System.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hawks, Carol Pitts

    1990-01-01

    Discusses issues and procedures involved in auditing the automated acquisitions system at Ohio State University Libraries. The audit process is explained, internal controls within the system are identified, general control mechanisms such as limited electronic access are discussed, and application control mechanisms that relate to specific…

  9. 12 CFR 609.940 - Internal systems and controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... business plan objectives and policies and procedures requirements regarding E-commerce; and (b) Prevent and... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Internal systems and controls. 609.940 Section 609.940 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE...

  10. 76 FR 76896 - International Anti-Fouling System Certificate

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-09

    ... Security FR Federal Register IAFS International Anti-fouling System NAICS North American Industry... Anti-fouling System Certificate'' in the Federal Register (76 FR 54419). We did not receive any... Procedures for Categorical Exclusions, Notice of Final Agency Policy'' (67 FR 48243, July 23, 2002)....

  11. 12 CFR 609.940 - Internal systems and controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Internal systems and controls. 609.940 Section 609.940 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE Standards... business plan objectives and policies and procedures requirements regarding E-commerce; and (b) Prevent...

  12. Changes Coming to the International System of Units

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Aubrecht, Gordon J., II

    2012-01-01

    The International System of Units (SI) is a coherent system based originally on measurements of properties of material objects. In more recent times, the adopted definitions depend on setting values of universal constants wherever possible. The last remaining human-made material object on which a standard is based is a platinum-iridium kilogram…

  13. 12 CFR 609.940 - Internal systems and controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... business plan objectives and policies and procedures requirements regarding E-commerce; and (b) Prevent and... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Internal systems and controls. 609.940 Section 609.940 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE...

  14. 12 CFR 609.940 - Internal systems and controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... business plan objectives and policies and procedures requirements regarding E-commerce; and (b) Prevent and... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Internal systems and controls. 609.940 Section 609.940 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM ELECTRONIC COMMERCE...

  15. A sustained-arc ignition system for internal combustion engines

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Birchenough, A. G.

    1977-01-01

    A sustained-arc ignition system was developed for internal combustion engines. It produces a very-long-duration ignition pulse with an energy in the order of 100 millijoules. The ignition pulse waveform can be controlled to predetermined actual ignition requirements. The design of the sustained-arc ignition system is presented in the report.

  16. International Border Management Systems (IBMS) Program : visions and strategies.

    SciTech Connect

    McDaniel, Michael; Mohagheghi, Amir Hossein

    2011-02-01

    Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), International Border Management Systems (IBMS) Program is working to establish a long-term border security strategy with United States Central Command (CENTCOM). Efforts are being made to synthesize border security capabilities and technologies maintained at the Laboratories, and coordinate with subject matter expertise from both the New Mexico and California offices. The vision for SNL is to provide science and technology support for international projects and engagements on border security.

  17. The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-09

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

  18. A colalborative environment for information driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Scott, Mark R; Michel, Kelly D

    2010-09-15

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  19. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture... Regulation § 947.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets...

  20. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 946.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 946.54 from...

  1. 34 CFR 303.170 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... process procedures in 34 CFR 300.506 through 300.512; or (2) The procedures that the State has developed... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true Procedural safeguards. 303.170 Section 303.170 Education... Procedural safeguards. Each application must include procedural safeguards that— (a) Are consistent...

  2. 7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture... RIO GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 906.44 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent the handling of...

  3. 7 CFR 958.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 958.56 Section 958.56 Agriculture... COUNTIES IN IDAHO, AND MALHEUR COUNTY, OREGON Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 958.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent...

  4. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture... Regulation § 947.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 947.54 from entering channels of trade and other outlets...

  5. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... procedural safeguards that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person...

  6. 7 CFR 987.59 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 987.59 Section 987.59 Agriculture... Safeguards. The Committee may prescribe, with the approval of the Secretary, such rules, regulations and safeguards as are necessary to prevent dates covered by §§ 987.55 and 987.56 from interfering with...

  7. 29 CFR 452.110 - Adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Adequate safeguards. 452.110 Section 452.110 Labor... DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 Election Procedures; Rights of Members § 452.110 Adequate safeguards. (a) In addition to the election safeguards discussed in this part, the Act contains a general mandate in section...

  8. 29 CFR 452.110 - Adequate safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Adequate safeguards. 452.110 Section 452.110 Labor... DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 Election Procedures; Rights of Members § 452.110 Adequate safeguards. (a) In addition to the election safeguards discussed in this part, the Act contains a general mandate in section...

  9. 34 CFR 303.170 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...— (1) The due process procedures in 34 CFR 300.506 through 300.512; or (2) The procedures that the... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 303.170 Section 303.170... Requirements § 303.170 Procedural safeguards. Each application must include procedural safeguards that— (a)...

  10. 7 CFR 987.59 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 987.59 Section 987.59 Agriculture... Safeguards. The Committee may prescribe, with the approval of the Secretary, such rules, regulations and safeguards as are necessary to prevent dates covered by §§ 987.55 and 987.56 from interfering with...

  11. 30 CFR 75.1403 - Other safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Other safeguards. 75.1403 Section 75.1403... MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Hoisting and Mantrips § 75.1403 Other safeguards. Other safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the Secretary, to minimize...

  12. 7 CFR 958.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 958.56 Section 958.56 Agriculture... COUNTIES IN IDAHO, AND MALHEUR COUNTY, OREGON Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 958.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent...

  13. 30 CFR 75.1403 - Other safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Other safeguards. 75.1403 Section 75.1403... MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Hoisting and Mantrips § 75.1403 Other safeguards. Other safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the Secretary, to minimize...

  14. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture... Regulating Handling Regulation § 966.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or §...

  15. 34 CFR 300.121 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 300.121 Section 300.121... safeguards. (a) General. The State must have procedural safeguards in effect to ensure that each public agency in the State meets the requirements of §§ 300.500 through 300.536. (b) Procedural...

  16. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture... Regulating Handling Regulation § 966.56 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or §...

  17. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 948.24 Safeguards. (a) Each area committee, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe adequate safeguards for potatoes handled pursuant to § 948.23...

  18. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 946.55 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent shipments pursuant to § 946.54 from...

  19. 7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture... RIO GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 906.44 Safeguards. (a) The committee, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent the handling of...

  20. 7 CFR 948.24 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 948.24 Section 948.24 Agriculture... Order Regulating Handling Regulation § 948.24 Safeguards. (a) Each area committee, with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe adequate safeguards for potatoes handled pursuant to § 948.23...

  1. 34 CFR 300.121 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true Procedural safeguards. 300.121 Section 300.121 Education... DISABILITIES State Eligibility Additional Eligibility Requirements § 300.121 Procedural safeguards. (a) General. The State must have procedural safeguards in effect to ensure that each public agency in the...

  2. 32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records § 154.68 Safeguarding procedures. Personnel...

  3. Application of Complex Systems Research To Efforts of International Development

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Brunner, Hans-Peter

    Fundamental research on complex systems has shown relevance to efforts of international development. This paper canvasses some practitioner friendly approaches to international development. Development is about interventions in a highly complex system, the society. Complex systems research tells us that development interventions should not be overly planned, rather the fundamental uncertainty of a changing social system requires a diversity of interventions, and rapid learning from development success and failure. Developing economies are functioning at a low level of effectiveness and resource use. Complex systems are change resistant, and intervention requires understanding the autocatalytic nature of a process of change. International development is about the stimulation of a society's innate autocatalytic / self-organizing processes through interventions that stimulate enough to overcome change resistance, but which do not overwhelm the system. Since the size of financial interventions may in some cases be a substantial fraction of the existing economic activity, disruption is a likely outcome. Crucially, one must avoid having the socio-economic activity organized around the intervention itself, since then an undesirable dependency of the economy on the intervention arises. Stimulation of the innate modes of activity results in the development of socio-economic organization around energy, material and financial flows. The primary generator of effectiveness is an appropriate network structure of interactions and relationships. This paper summarizes traditional development efforts and their outcomes as well as a plausible description of the process of complex systems motivated interventions. Examples are given of recent approaches which aim to appropriately stimulate international development.

  4. Future challenges and DOE/NNSA-JAEA cooperation for the development of advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mc Clelland - Kerr, John; Senzaki, Masao; Hori, Masato

    2009-01-01

    The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) has been cooperating with Japan on nuclear safeguards for over thirty years. DOE/NNSA has collaborated with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and its predecessors in addressing the need for innovative solutions to nuclear transparency and verification issues in one of the world's most advanced nuclear fuel cycle states. This collaboration includes over ninety activities that have involved nearly every facility in the JAEA complex and many national laboratories in the U.S. complex. The partnership has yielded new technologies and approaches that have benefited international safeguards not only in Japan, but around the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency uses a number of safeguards solutions developed under this collaboration to improve its inspection efforts in Japan and elsewhere. Japanese facilities serve as test beds for emerging safeguards technologies and are setting the trend for new nuclear energy and fuel cycle development worldwide. The collaboration continues to be an essential component of U.S. safeguards outreach and is integral to the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative. In addition to fostering international safeguards development, the cooperation is an opportunity for U.S. scientists to work in facilities that have no analog in the United States, thus providing crucial real-life experience for and aiding development of the next generation of U.S. safeguards specialists. It is also an important element of promoting regional transparency thereby building confidence in the peaceful nature of nuclear programs in the region. The successes engendered by this partnership provide a strong basis for addressing future safeguards challenges, in Japan and elsewhere. This paper summarizes these challenges and the associated cooperative efforts that are either underway or anticipated.

  5. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  6. Internal crankcase ventilation system with easily accessible PCV valve

    SciTech Connect

    Balsley, R.L.

    1986-07-29

    A crankcase ventilation system is described having a flow limiting PCV valve and means defining and internal passage between a crankcase and a cylinder charge induction means of an engine, the system comprising an engine valve cover forming a part of the internal passage defining means and having an exterior wall, a cavity in the cover wall and forming a portion of the internal passage, the wall further including valve mounting means surrounding the passage and receiving the valve and a valve body seal in position to control flow through the mounting means and passage and an opening through the wall to the housing exterior and generally opposite the mounting means for removing and replacing a valve on the mounting means, and closure means normally closing the opening and preventing air leakage therethrough into the induction system, the closure means engaging the valve to maintain its installed position within the wall cavity and being openable to permit removal of the PCV valve.

  7. Internal ellipsoidal estimates of reachable set of impulsive control systems

    SciTech Connect

    Matviychuk, Oksana G.

    2014-11-18

    A problem of estimating reachable sets of linear impulsive control system with uncertainty in initial data is considered. The impulsive controls in the dynamical system belong to the intersection of a special cone with a generalized ellipsoid both taken in the space of functions of bounded variation. Assume that an ellipsoidal state constraints are imposed. The algorithms for constructing internal ellipsoidal estimates of reachable sets for such control systems and numerical simulation results are given.

  8. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Privacy or Security Safeguards. 52.239-1 Section 52.239-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (CONTINUED) CLAUSES AND FORMS SOLICITATION PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES Text of Provisions and Clauses...

  9. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Privacy or Security Safeguards. 52.239-1 Section 52.239-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (CONTINUED) CLAUSES AND FORMS SOLICITATION PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES Text of Provisions and Clauses 52.239-1 Privacy or Security...

  10. International banking system: the calm before the storm

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-07-04

    The success of efforts to recycle the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) surpluses during 1973-76, together with the relative absence of clear distress signals from debtor countries, has disguised the gravity of the financial crisis that faced the Western banking system after the 1979-80 price increases. The US Administration's misplaced confidence in the free market's ability to withstand the deviant economic forces unleashed by the cartel has made little effort in the US-dominated international agencies to strengthen the West's financial base and avoid a fracturing of the international banking system next year. 10 tables.

  11. Changes Coming to the International System of Units

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Aubrecht, Gordon J.

    2012-09-01

    The International System of Units (SI) is a coherent system based originally on measurements of properties of material objects. In more recent times, the adopted definitions depend on setting values of universal constants wherever possible. The last remaining humanmade material object on which a standard is based is a platinum-iridium kilogram located in Sèvres, France. The International Bureau of Weights and Measures is considering replacing this physical object as the standard and tying all base units to physical constants that are fixed. The reasons will be explicated in this paper.

  12. Solar dynamic power system on the International Space Station

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, J.M.; Wanhainen, J.S.

    1996-12-31

    The International Space Station (ISS) Program Office has requested that initial studies be conducted to assess the feasibility of using a solar dynamic (SD) power system on ISS. This effort will include analyses to determine technical and cost benefits of using solar dynamic power systems on the station. Final products from this activity will be presented to the International Space Station Program Office in 1997. This paper provides a brief description of the solar dynamic technology, ISS and project chronology of events, a description of the products and major work elements, project schedule, and a summary of up-to-date findings.

  13. International GPS (Global Positioning System) Service for Geodynamics

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Zumberge, J. F. (Editor); Liu, R. (Editor); Neilan, R. E. (Editor)

    1995-01-01

    The International GPS (Global Positioning System) Service for Geodynamics (IGS) began formal operation on January 1, 1994. This first annual report is divided into sections, which mirror different aspects of the service. Section (1) contains general information, including the history of the IGS, its organization, and the global network of GPS tracking sites; (2) contains information on the Central Bureau Information System; (3) describes the International Earth Rotation Service (IERS); (4) details collecting and distributing IGS data in Data Center reports; (6) describes how the IGS Analysis Centers generate their products; (7) contains miscellaneous contributions from other organizations that share common interests with the IGS.

  14. Safeguards-by-Design: Guidance for Independent Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations (ISFSI)

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Philip C. Durst

    2012-05-01

    This document summarizes the requirements and best practices for implementing international nuclear safeguards at independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs), also known as Away-from- Reactor (AFR) storage facilities. These installations may provide wet or dry storage of spent fuel, although the safeguards guidance herein focuses on dry storage facilities. In principle, the safeguards guidance applies to both wet and dry storage. The reason for focusing on dry independent spent fuel storage installations is that this is one of the fastest growing nuclear installations worldwide. Independent spent fuel storage installations are typically outside of the safeguards nuclear material balance area (MBA) of the reactor. They may be located on the reactor site, but are generally considered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the State Regulator/SSAC to be a separate facility. The need for this guidance is becoming increasingly urgent as more and more nuclear power plants move their spent fuel from resident spent fuel ponds to independent spent fuel storage installations. The safeguards requirements and best practices described herein are also relevant to the design and construction of regional independent spent fuel storage installations that nuclear power plant operators are starting to consider in the absence of a national long-term geological spent fuel repository. The following document has been prepared in support of two of the three foundational pillars for implementing Safeguards-by-Design (SBD). These are: i) defining the relevant safeguards requirements, and ii) defining the best practices for meeting the requirements. This document was prepared with the design of the latest independent dry spent fuel storage installations in mind and was prepared specifically as an aid for designers of commercial nuclear facilities to help them understand the relevant international requirements that follow from a country’s safeguards agreement with

  15. IMPACT OF THE U.S. SUPPORT PROGRAM SAFEGUARDS INTERNSHIP PROGRAM.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER, S.; OSIECKI, C.

    2006-07-16

    The U.S. Support Program began funding an internship program in the IAEA Department of Safeguards in 2002. Since that time, 39 U.S. citizens and permanent residents have been placed in one-year, paid internships with the IAEA. The management of the internship program was originally the responsibility of the International Safeguards Project Office but was transferred to the Office of Educational Programs at Brookhaven National Laboratory in 2004. Feedback on the internship program from the U.S. government and the IAEA has been positive. The interns have completed basic yet essential work for the Department of Safeguards and freed IAEA staff members to perform more complex tasks. The cost of an intern is low relative to other forms of human resources support. After the conclusion of their assignments, many of the interns go on to work for the U.S. government, the national laboratories, or companies in international safeguards and nonproliferation. This paper will discuss the work done by the interns for the IAEA, factors influencing the success of the internship program, and the effects the program has had on the careers of interns, in preparing the next generation to work in the nuclear industry, participation in INMM activities, and recruitment for U.S. citizens for safeguards positions.

  16. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and security quarterly progress report to the US Department of Energy quarter ending September 30, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, G.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Steele, E.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This report presents the details of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory safeguards and securities program. This program is focused on developing new technology, such as x- and gamma-ray spectrometry, for measurement of special nuclear materials. This program supports the Office of Safeguards and Securities in the following five areas; safeguards technology, safeguards and decision support, computer security, automated physical security, and automated visitor access control systems.

  17. Applications of a portable MCA in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Halbig, J.K.; Klosterbuer, F.; Cameron, R.A.

    1986-02-01

    In 1981 a small, battery-operated multichannel analyzer (MCA) prototype developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory was delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The intent was to produce an instrument for inspector (nonscientist) use. Automated measurement programs were built into the MCA. An enhanced, commercially produced MCA is now available, which was patterned after and is software compatible with the prototype. After an extensive review of the hardware and software of the available portable MCAs, the IAEA has chosen this MCA to be used by IAEA inspectors throughout the world. Inspectors from the EURATOM Directorate of Safeguards are also using these MCAs in inspections throughout Europe. While this MCA's portability and programmability make it ideally suited for infield applications, its powerful built-in intelligence and communications protocol make it a strong candidate for distributed data acquisition and control systems. The user-instrument interface philosophy is so easy to use that in domestic and international training schools, the operators manual is not used.

  18. Enabling Exploration Through the International Docking System Standard

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Hatfield, Caris A.

    2011-01-01

    Human exploration missions beyond low earth orbit will likely require international cooperation in order to leverage limited resources. International standards can help enable cooperative missions by providing well understood, predefined interfaces allowing compatibility between unique spacecraft and systems. The International Space Station (ISS) partnership has developed a publically available International Docking System Standard (IDSS) that provides a solution to one of these key interfaces by defining a common docking interface. The docking interface provides a way for even dissimilar spacecraft to dock for exchange of crew and cargo, as well as enabling the assembly of large space systems. This paper provides an overview of the key attributes of the IDSS, an overview of the NASA Docking System (NDS), and the plans for updating the ISS with IDSS compatible interfaces. The NDS provides a state of the art, low impact docking system that will initially be made available to commercial crew and cargo providers. The ISS will be used to demonstrate the operational utility of the IDSS interface as a foundational technology for cooperative exploration.

  19. Fair Water Allocation in Complex International River Systems

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Beck, L.; Bernauer, T.

    2011-12-01

    Conflicts over water allocation in international freshwater systems are recurring phenomena, and climatic changes are likely to make existing problems worse in many parts of the world. Science-based proposals for water allocation frequently focus on allocating water to the economically most efficient purposes. In reality, allocation outcomes are often shaped by political and economic power, rather than considerations of economic efficiency. This paper develops a new approach to fair international water allocation in complex international freshwater systems. This approach covers both needs-based criteria - if acute water scarcity is present - and criteria for fair water allocation pertaining to relative gains in water-abundant situations. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated with a case study on the Zambezi River Basin (ZRB). Based on a hydrological model, and scenarios for water availability and demand in the ZRB until 2050, the paper shows how the waters of the ZRB could be allocated in a way that fairly distributes costs and benefits.

  20. Climate Change Impact Assessments for International Market Systems (CLIMARK)

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Winkler, J. A.; Andresen, J.; Black, J.; Bujdoso, G.; Chmielewski, F.; Kirschke, D.; Kurlus, R.; Liszewska, M.; Loveridge, S.; Niedzwiedz, T.; Nizalov, D.; Rothwell, N.; Tan, P.; Ustrnul, Z.; von Witzke, H.; Zavalloni, C.; Zhao, J.; Zhong, S.

    2012-12-01

    The vast majority of climate change impact assessments evaluate how local or regional systems and processes may be affected by a future climate. Alternative strategies that extend beyond the local or regional scale are needed when assessing the potential impacts of climate change on international market systems, including agricultural commodities. These industries have multiple production regions that are distributed worldwide and are likely to be differentially impacted by climate change. Furthermore, for many industries and market systems, especially those with long-term climate-dependent investments, temporal dynamics need to be incorporated into the assessment process, including changing patterns of international trade, consumption and production, and evolving adaptation strategies by industry stakeholder groups. A framework for conducting climate change assessments for international market systems, developed as part of the CLIMARK (Climate Change and International Markets) project is outlined, and progress toward applying the framework for an impact assessment for the international tart cherry industry is described. The tart cherry industry was selected for analysis in part because tart cherries are a perennial crop requiring long-term investments by the producer. Components of the project include the preparation of fine resolution climate scenarios, evaluation of phenological models for diverse production regions, the development of a yield model for tart cherry production, new methods for incorporating individual decision making and adaptation options into impact assessments, and modification of international trade models for use in impact studies. Innovative aspects of the project include linkages between model components and evaluation of the mega-uncertainty surrounding the assessment outcomes. Incorporation of spatial and temporal dynamics provides a more comprehensive evaluation of climate change impacts and an assessment product of potentially greater