75 FR 55801 - Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-09-14

... 0938-AP87 Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing... Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities for FY 2011.'' DATES: Effective... illustrate the skilled nursing facility (SNF) prospective payment system (PPS) payment rate computations for...

78 FR 41013 - Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for CY 2014...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-09

... [CMS-1450-CN] RIN 0938-AR52 Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for CY 2014, Home Health Quality Reporting Requirements, and Cost Allocation of Home Health Survey... period titled ``Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for CY...

The impact of health reform on the Medicare Advantage program: realigning payment with performance.

PubMed

Biles, Brian; Casillas, Giselle; Arnold, Grace; Guterman, Stuart

2012-10-01

The Affordable Care Act enacts a new payment system for private health plans available to Medicare beneficiaries through the Medicare Advantage (MA) program. The system, which is being phased in through 2017, aims to (1) reduce the excess pay­ments received by private plans relative to per capita spending in traditional Medicare, and (2) reward plans that earn high performance ratings. Using 2009 data, this issue brief pres­ents analysis of the distributional impact on MA plan payments of these new policies as if they had been fully implemented in that year. We find that, when the polices [sic] are in place, they will bring overall MA plan payments nationwide down from 114 percent to 102 per­cent of what spending would have been for the same enrollees if they had been enrolled in traditional Medicare. While payments will vary across the nation, high-performing MA plans stand to benefit from this new arrangement.

Value-Based Payment Reform and the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015: A Primer for Plastic Surgeons.

PubMed

Squitieri, Lee; Chung, Kevin C

2017-07-01

In 2015, the U.S. Congress passed the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, which effectively repealed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services sustainable growth rate formula and established the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Quality Payment Program. The Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act represents an unparalleled acceleration toward value-based payment models and a departure from traditional volume-driven fee-for-service reimbursement. The Quality Payment Program includes two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System pathway replaces existing quality reporting programs and adds several new measures to create a composite performance score for each provider (or provider group) that will be used to adjust reimbursed payment. The advanced alternative payment model pathway is available to providers who participate in qualifying Advanced Alternative Payment Models and is associated with an initial 5 percent payment incentive. The first performance period for the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System opens January 1, 2017, and closes on December 31, 2017, and is associated with payment adjustments in January of 2019. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that the majority of providers will begin participation in 2017 through the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System pathway, but aims to have 50 percent of payments tied to quality or value through Advanced Alternative Payment Models by 2018. In this article, the authors describe key components of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act to providers navigating through the Quality Payment Program and discuss how plastic surgeons may optimize their performance in this new value-based payment program.

PACE and the Medicare+Choice risk-adjusted payment model.

PubMed

Temkin-Greener, H; Meiners, M R; Gruenberg, L

2001-01-01

This paper investigates the impact of the Medicare principal inpatient diagnostic cost group (PIP-DCG) payment model on the Program of All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly (PACE). Currently, more than 6,000 Medicare beneficiaries who are nursing home certifiable receive care from PACE, a program poised for expansion under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Overall, our analysis suggests that the application of the PIP-DCG model to the PACE program would reduce Medicare payments to PACE, on average, by 38%. The PIP-DCG payment model bases its risk adjustment on inpatient diagnoses and does not capture adequately the risk of caring for a population with functional impairments.

76 FR 13292 - Medicare Program: Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and CY 2011...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-03-11

... Prospective Payment System and CY 2011 Payment Rates; Changes to the Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment System and CY 2011 Payment Rates; Changes to Payments to Hospitals for Graduate Medical Education Costs..., 2010, entitled ``Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and CY 2011 Payment...

76 FR 78281 - Medicare Program; First Semi-Annual Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-16

... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS-1586-N] Medicare Program; First Semi-Annual Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient Payment (HOP--Formerly Known as the Advisory Panel on Ambulatory Payment Classification Groups--APC Panel)--February 27...

77 FR 60315 - Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-03

... Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2013 Rates; Hospitals' Resident Caps for Graduate Medical Education Payment Purposes; Quality... entitled ``Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and...

Variation in Payment Rates under Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System.

PubMed

Krinsky, Sam; Ryan, Andrew M; Mijanovich, Tod; Blustein, Jan

2017-04-01

To measure variation in payment rates under Medicare's Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) and identify the main payment adjustments that drive variation. Medicare cost reports for all Medicare-certified hospitals, 1987-2013, and Dartmouth Atlas geographic files. We measure the Medicare payment rate as a hospital's total acute inpatient Medicare Part A payment, divided by the standard IPPS payment for its geographic area. We assess variation using several measures, both within local markets and nationally. We perform a factor decomposition to identify the share of variation attributable to specific adjustments. We also describe the characteristics of hospitals receiving different payment rates and evaluate changes in the magnitude of the main adjustments over time. Data downloaded from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Dartmouth Atlas. In 2013, Medicare paid for acute inpatient discharges at a rate 31 percent above the IPPS base. For the top 10 percent of discharges, the mean rate was double the IPPS base. Variations were driven by adjustments for medical education and care to low-income populations. The magnitude of variation has increased over time. Adjustments are a large and growing share of Medicare hospital payments, and they create significant variation in payment rates. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Comparison of Medicaid Payments Relative to Medicare Using Inpatient Acute Care Claims from the Medicaid Program: Fiscal Year 2010-Fiscal Year 2011.

PubMed

Stone, Devin A; Dickensheets, Bridget A; Poisal, John A

2018-02-01

To compare Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS) inpatient hospital payments to expected Medicare payments. Medicaid and Medicare claims data, Medicare's MS-DRG grouper and inpatient prospective payment system pricer (IPPS pricer). Medicaid FFS inpatient hospital claims were run through Medicare's MS-DRG grouper and IPPS pricer to compare Medicaid's actual payment against what Medicare would have paid for the same claim. Average inpatient hospital claim payments for Medicaid were 68.8 percent of what Medicare would have paid in fiscal year 2010, and 69.8 percent in fiscal year 2011. Including Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH), graduate medical education (GME), and supplemental payments reduces a substantial proportion of the gap between Medicaid and Medicare payments. Medicaid payments relative to expected Medicare payments tend to be lower and vary by state Medicaid program, length of stay, and whether payments made outside of the Medicaid claims process are included. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Medicare and Medicaid Physician Payment Incentives

PubMed Central

Burney, Ira L.; Schieber, George J.; Blaxall, Martha O.; Gabel, Jon R.

1979-01-01

The incentives in the Medicare and Medicaid physician payment systems and their effects on six interrelated aspects of health care costs and beneficiary access to care were analyzed. Research results and data presented indicate that Medicare and Medicaid physician payment incentives are inconsistent with current public policy goals of (1) containing inflation in fees and expenditures, (2) encouraging physician participation in public programs, (3) improving the geographic and specialty distributions of physicians, (4) encouraging primary care instead of surgery, and also outpatient rather than inpatient treatment. PMID:10309053

Medicare and Medicaid programs: hospital outpatient prospective payment; ambulatory surgical center payment; hospital value-based purchasing program; physician self-referral; and patient notification requirements in provider agreements. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2011-11-30

This final rule with comment period revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) for CY 2012 to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system. In this final rule with comment period, we describe the changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare hospital outpatient services paid under the OPPS. In addition, this final rule with comment period updates the revised Medicare ambulatory surgical center (ASC) payment system to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system. In this final rule with comment period, we set forth the relative payment weights and payment amounts for services furnished in ASCs, specific HCPCS codes to which these changes apply, and other ratesetting information for the CY 2012 ASC payment system. We are revising the requirements for the Hospital Outpatient Quality Reporting (OQR) Program, adding new requirements for ASC Quality Reporting System, and making additional changes to provisions of the Hospital Inpatient Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program. We also are allowing eligible hospitals and CAHs participating in the Medicare Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program to meet the clinical quality measure reporting requirement of the EHR Incentive Program for payment year 2012 by participating in the 2012 Medicare EHR Incentive Program Electronic Reporting Pilot. Finally, we are making changes to the rules governing the whole hospital and rural provider exceptions to the physician self-referral prohibition for expansion of facility capacity and changes to provider agreement regulations on patient notification requirements.

Medicare Program; Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and Alternative Payment Model (APM) Incentive Under the Physician Fee Schedule, and Criteria for Physician-Focused Payment Models. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2016-11-04

The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) repeals the Medicare sustainable growth rate (SGR) methodology for updates to the physician fee schedule (PFS) and replaces it with a new approach to payment called the Quality Payment Program that rewards the delivery of high-quality patient care through two avenues: Advanced Alternative Payment Models (Advanced APMs) and the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) for eligible clinicians or groups under the PFS. This final rule with comment period establishes incentives for participation in certain alternative payment models (APMs) and includes the criteria for use by the Physician-Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory Committee (PTAC) in making comments and recommendations on physician-focused payment models (PFPMs). Alternative Payment Models are payment approaches, developed in partnership with the clinician community, that provide added incentives to deliver high-quality and cost-efficient care. APMs can apply to a specific clinical condition, a care episode, or a population. This final rule with comment period also establishes the MIPS, a new program for certain Medicare-enrolled practitioners. MIPS will consolidate components of three existing programs, the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), the Physician Value-based Payment Modifier (VM), and the Medicare Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program for Eligible Professionals (EPs), and will continue the focus on quality, cost, and use of certified EHR technology (CEHRT) in a cohesive program that avoids redundancies. In this final rule with comment period we have rebranded key terminology based on feedback from stakeholders, with the goal of selecting terms that will be more easily identified and understood by our stakeholders.

42 CFR 460.180 - Medicare payment to PACE organizations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... SERVICES (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS OF ALL-INCLUSIVE CARE FOR THE ELDERLY (PACE) PROGRAMS OF ALL-INCLUSIVE CARE FOR THE ELDERLY (PACE) Payment § 460.180 Medicare payment to PACE organizations. (a) Principle of...

Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs; Short Inpatient Hospital Stays; Transition for Certain Medicare-Dependent, Small Rural Hospitals Under the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System; Provider Administrative Appeals and Judicial Review. Final rule with comment period; final rule.

PubMed

2015-11-13

This final rule with comment period revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) and the Medicare ambulatory surgical center (ASC) payment system for CY 2016 to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems. In this final rule with comment period, we describe the changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare services paid under the OPPS and those paid under the ASC payment system. In addition, this final rule with comment period updates and refines the requirements for the Hospital Outpatient Quality Reporting (OQR) Program and the ASC Quality Reporting (ASCQR) Program. Further, this document includes certain finalized policies relating to the hospital inpatient prospective payment system: Changes to the 2-midnight rule under the short inpatient hospital stay policy; and a payment transition for hospitals that lost their status as a Medicare-dependent, small rural hospital (MDH) because they are no longer in a rural area due to the implementation of the new Office of Management and Budget delineations in FY 2015 and have not reclassified from urban to rural before January 1, 2016. In addition, this document contains a final rule that finalizes certain 2015 proposals, and addresses public comments received, relating to the changes in the Medicare regulations governing provider administrative appeals and judicial review relating to appropriate claims in provider cost reports.

78 FR 27485 - Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-10

... Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment... [CMS-1599-P] RIN 0938-AR53 Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute... capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience...

77 FR 63751 - Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-17

... [CMS-1588-F2] RIN 0938-AR12 Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2013 Rates; Hospitals' Resident Caps for Graduate Medical Education Payment Purposes; Quality Reporting Requirements for...

Medicare program; End-Stage Renal Disease prospective payment system, quality incentive program, and Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies. Final rule.

PubMed

2014-11-06

This final rule will update and make revisions to the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) prospective payment system (PPS) for calendar year (CY) 2015. This rule also finalizes requirements for the ESRD quality incentive program (QIP), including for payment years (PYs) 2017 and 2018. This rule will also make a technical correction to remove outdated terms and definitions. In addition, this final rule sets forth the methodology for adjusting Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (DMEPOS) fee schedule payment amounts using information from the Medicare DMEPOS Competitive Bidding Program (CBP); makes alternative payment rules for certain DME under the Medicare DMEPOS CBP; clarifies the statutory Medicare hearing aid coverage exclusion and specifies devices not subject to the hearing aid exclusion; will not update the definition of minimal self-adjustment; clarifies the Change of Ownership (CHOW) and provides for an exception to the current requirements; revises the appeal provisions for termination of a CBP contract, including the beneficiary notification requirement under the Medicare DMEPOS CBP, and makes a technical change to the regulation related to the conditions for awarding contracts for furnishing infusion drugs under the Medicare DMEPOS CBP.

Payment policy and inefficient benefits in the Medicare+Choice program.

PubMed

Pizer, Steven D; Frakt, Austin B; Feldman, Roger

2003-06-01

We investigated whether constraints on premium rebates by health plans in the Medicare+Choice program result in inefficient benefits. Since relationships between revenue and benefits could be confounded by unobserved variation in the cost of coverage, we took advantage of natural experiment that occurred following passage of the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000. Our findings indicate that benefits in zero premium plans were more sensitive to changes in payment rates than were benefits in plans that charged nonzero premiums. These results strongly suggest that current Medicare policy induces plans to offer benefits that are not valued by enrollees at or above their cost.

Medicare program; offset of Medicare payments to individuals to collect past-due obligations arising from breach of scholarship and loan contracts--HCFA. Final rule.

PubMed

1992-05-04

This final rule sets forth the procedures to be followed for collection of past-due amounts owed by individuals who breached contracts under certain scholarship and loan programs. The programs that would be affected are the National Health Service Corps Scholarship, the Physician Shortage Area Scholarship, and the Health Education Assistance Loan. These procedures would apply to those individuals who breached contracts under the scholarship and loan programs and who-- Accept Medicare assignment for services; Are employed by or affiliated with a provider, Health Maintenance Organization, or Competitive Medical Plan that receives Medicare payment for services; or Are members of a group practice that receives Medicare payment for services. This regulation implements section 1892 of the Social Security Act, as added by section 4052 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987.

Contrary To Popular Belief, Medicaid Hospital Admissions Are Often Profitable Because Of Additional Medicare Payments.

PubMed

Stensland, Jeffrey; Gaumer, Zachary R; Miller, Mark E

2016-12-01

It is generally believed that most hospitals lose money on Medicaid admissions. The data suggest otherwise. Medicaid admissions are often profitable for hospitals because of payments from both the Medicaid program and the Medicare program, including payments for uncompensated care and from the Medicare disproportionate-share hospital program. On average, adding a single Medicaid patient day in fiscal year 2017 will increase most hospitals' Medicare payments by more than $300. When added to Medicaid payments, these payments often cause Medicaid patients to be profitable for hospitals. In contrast, adding a single charity care day in the same year will decrease overall Medicare payments by about $20 on average. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services recently announced a proposal to shift some Medicare payments from supporting hospitals' costs for Medicaid patients to directly supporting their costs for uncompensated care. If that proposal is adopted, hospitals' profits on Medicaid patients would decrease, but their losses on care for the uninsured would be reduced. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

Medicare's post-acute care payment: a review of the issues and policy proposals.

PubMed

Linehan, Kathryn

2012-12-07

Medicare spending on post-acute care provided by skilled nursing facility providers, home health providers, inpatient rehabilitation facility providers, and long-term care hospitals has grown rapidly in the past several years. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission and others have noted several long-standing problems with the payment systems for post-acute care and have suggested refinements to Medicare's post-acute care payment systems that are intended to encourage the delivery of appropriate care in the right setting for a patient's condition. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 contained several provisions that affect the Medicare program's post-acute care payment systems and also includes broader payment reforms, such as bundled payment models. This issue brief describes Medicare's payment systems for post-acute care providers, evidence of problems that have been identified with the payment systems, and policies that have been proposed or enacted to remedy those problems.

77 FR 40951 - Medicare Program; End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System, Quality Incentive Program...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-07-11

...This rule proposes to update and make revisions to the End- Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) prospective payment system (PPS) for calendar year (CY) 2013. This rule also proposes to set forth requirements for the ESRD quality incentive program (QIP), including for payment year (PY) 2015 and beyond. This proposed rule will implement changes to bad debt reimbursement for all Medicare providers, suppliers, and other entities eligible to receive bad debt. (See the Table of Contents for a listing of the specific issues addressed in this proposed rule.)

76 FR 9502 - Medicare Program; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for Calendar Year 2011...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-02-18

... [CMS-1510-F2] RIN 0938-AP88 Medicare Program; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for Calendar Year 2011; Changes in Certification Requirements for Home Health Agencies and Hospices; Correction... set forth an update to the Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including: The...

Payment policy and the growth of Medicare Advantage.

PubMed

Zarabozo, Carlos; Harrison, Scott

2009-01-01

This paper reviews recent trends in Medicare Advantage, examining program costs, access to plans, enrollment, plan bids, and benchmarks. We find that current policy has favored the growth of particular types of plans. Bid data show that plans are paid, on average, 113 percent of what expenditures would have been under the traditional Medicare program. Although some of the plan payments are used to finance extra benefits for enrollees, paying plans at higher than fee-for-service levels could affect the sustainability of the Medicare program and result in increased costs for all taxpayers and beneficiaries.

MEDICARE PAYMENTS AND SYSTEM-LEVEL HEALTH-CARE USE

PubMed Central

ROBBINS, JACOB A.

2015-01-01

The rapid growth of Medicare managed care over the past decade has the potential to increase the efficiency of health-care delivery. Improvements in care management for some may improve efficiency system-wide, with implications for optimal payment policy in public insurance programs. These system-level effects may depend on local health-care market structure and vary based on patient characteristics. We use exogenous variation in the Medicare payment schedule to isolate the effects of market-level managed care enrollment on the quantity and quality of care delivered. We find that in areas with greater enrollment of Medicare beneficiaries in managed care, the non–managed care beneficiaries have fewer days in the hospital but more outpatient visits, consistent with a substitution of less expensive outpatient care for more expensive inpatient care, particularly at high levels of managed care. We find no evidence that care is of lower quality. Optimal payment policies for Medicare managed care enrollees that account for system-level spillovers may thus be higher than those that do not. PMID:27042687

76 FR 73025 - Medicare Program; Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, Five-Year Review of Work...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-28

...This final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services. It also addresses, implements or discusses certain statutory provisions including provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act) and the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) of 2008. In addition, this final rule with comment period discusses payments for Part B drugs; Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule: Signature on Requisition; Physician Quality Reporting System; the Electronic Prescribing (eRx) Incentive Program; the Physician Resource-Use Feedback Program and the value modifier; productivity adjustment for ambulatory surgical center payment system and the ambulance, clinical laboratory, and durable medical equipment prosthetics orthotics and supplies (DMEPOS) fee schedules; and other Part B related issues.

Prospective payment and the Medicare hospice benefit.

PubMed

Bloom, B S; Amenta, M O

1993-01-01

The objective of this study was to determine the effects of very high cost patients on hospice financial status. Ten Pennsylvania hospices dually certified by Medicare were randomly selected and agreed to participate. Patient age, sex, diagnosis, length of stay and payer were fairly uniform across hospices. Payments varied by diagnosis and payer. High cost patients were irregularly found in hospices; low cost patients were commonly and regularly distributed. Every hospice had at least one high cost patient. In one, the uncompensated payment for the 6.6 percent of patients defined as high cost ($7,300 and above) would have been 14.7 percent of total annual revenues. In another, uncompensated payments for high cost patients (9.8 percent) would have accounted for 17.2 percent of revenue. In 96.3 percent of the instances patients utilized less than the Medicare Hospice Benefit maximum allowable cost ($7,300); and, 98.8 percent of the time patients stayed less than the maximum allowable length of time of 210 days. A logistic regression model found long length of stay (p < 0.0001), Medicare hospice benefit as primary payer (p < 0.0001), any hospitalization during hospice stay (p < 0.003) and cerebrovascular disease diagnosis (p < 0.02) to be significantly related to high cost. Between the time the study was planned and completed, Medicare instituted a reinsurance program allowing unused funds below the maximum allowable limit from one patient to be used for patients who exhausted their benefits. Thus, no study hospice was adversely affected by high cost patients. However, it should serve as an object lesson to Medicare in using prospective payment.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

75 FR 73169 - Medicare Program; Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-29

...This final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services. It finalizes the calendar year (CY) 2010 interim relative value units (RVUs) and issues interim RVUs for new and revised procedure codes for CY 2011. It also addresses, implements, or discusses certain provisions of both the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA). In addition, this final rule with comment period discusses payments under the Ambulance Fee Schedule (AFS), the Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) payment system, and the Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule (CLFS), payments to end-stage renal disease (ESRD) facilities, and payments for Part B drugs. Finally, this final rule with comment period also includes a discussion regarding the Chiropractic Services Demonstration program, the Competitive Bidding Program for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (CBP DMEPOS), and provider and supplier enrollment issues associated with air ambulances.

Impact of the Medicare interim payment system on length of use in home care among patients with Medicare-only payment source.

PubMed

Han, Beth; Remsburg, Robin E

2005-01-01

Using data from the 1996 and 2000 National Home and Hospice Care Surveys (N = 2,455), we examined length of use in home care among patients with Medicare-only payment source before and during the Medicare interim payment system (IPS). Logistic regression analyses revealed that patients were 2.9 times more likely to be discharged within 60 days during IPS than before IPS. The impact of Medicare IPS on length of use in home care among patients with Medicare only was stronger than what the existing literature indicates, which combines Medicare patients with multiple payment sources and patients with Medicare-only together.

Medicare program; hospital outpatient prospective payment system and CY 2007 payment rates; CY 2007 update to the ambulatory surgical center covered procedures list; Medicare administrative contractors; and reporting hospital quality data for FY 2008 inpatient prospective payment system annual payment update program--HCAHPS survey, SCIP, and mortality. Final rule with comment period and final rule.

PubMed

2006-11-24

This final rule with comment period revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system, and to implement certain related provisions of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 and the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005. In this final rule with comment period, we describe changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare hospital outpatient services paid under the prospective payment system. These changes are applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2007. In addition, this final rule with comment period implements future CY 2009 required reporting on quality measures for hospital outpatient services paid under the prospective payment system. This final rule with comment period revises the current list of procedures that are covered when furnished in a Medicare-approved ambulatory surgical center (ASC), which are applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2007. This final rule with comment period revises the emergency medical screening requirements for critical access hospitals (CAHs). This final rule with comment period supports implementation of a restructuring of the contracting entities responsibilities and functions that support the adjudication of Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims. This restructuring is directed by section 1874A of the Act, as added by section 911 of the MMA. The prior separate Medicare intermediary and Medicare carrier contracting authorities under Title XVIII of the Act have been replaced with the Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC) authority. This final rule continues to implement the requirements of the DRA that require that we expand the "starter set" of 10 quality measures that we used in FY 2005 and FY 2006 for the hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) Reporting Hospital Quality Data

42 CFR 405.377 - Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments. 405.377 Section 405.377 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension...

42 CFR 405.377 - Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments. 405.377 Section 405.377 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension...

75 FR 49029 - Medicare Program; End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-12

...This final rule implements a case-mix adjusted bundled prospective payment system (PPS) for Medicare outpatient end-stage renal disease (ESRD) dialysis facilities beginning January 1, 2011 (ESRD PPS), in compliance with the statutory requirement of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA), enacted July 15, 2008. This ESRD PPS also replaces the current basic case-mix adjusted composite payment system and the methodologies for the reimbursement of separately billable outpatient ESRD services.

MACRA, MIPS, and the New Medicare Quality Payment Program: An Update for Radiologists.

PubMed

Rosenkrantz, Andrew B; Nicola, Gregory N; Allen, Bibb; Hughes, Danny R; Hirsch, Joshua A

2017-03-01

The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015 advances the goal of tying Medicare payments to quality and value. In April 2016, CMS published an initial proposed rule for MACRA, renaming it the Quality Payment Program (QPP). Under QPP, clinicians receive payments through either advanced alternative payment models or the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), a consolidation of existing federal performance programs that applies positive or negative adjustments to fee-for-service payments. Most physicians will participate in MIPS. This review highlights implications of the QPP and MIPS for radiologists. Although MIPS incorporates radiology-specific quality measures, radiologists will also be required to participate in other practice improvement activities, including patient engagement. Recognizing physicians' unique practice patterns, MIPS will provide special considerations in performance evaluation for physicians with limited face-to-face patient interaction. Although such considerations will affect radiologists' likelihood of success under QPP, many practitioners will be ineligible for the considerations under currently proposed criteria. Reporting using qualified clinical data registries will benefit radiologists' performance by allowing expanded arrays of MIPS and non-MIPS specialty-specific measures. A group practice reporting option will substantially reduce administrative burden but introduce new challenges by requiring uniform determination of patient-facing status and performance measurement for all of the group's physicians (diagnostic radiologists, interventional radiologists, and nonradiologists) under the same taxpayer identification number. Given that the initial MIPS performance period begins in 2017, radiologists must begin preparing for QPP and taking actions to ensure their future success under this new quality-based payment system. Copyright © 2016 American College of Radiology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights

42 CFR 421.304 - Medicare integrity program contractor functions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... services for which Medicare payment may be made either directly or indirectly. (b) Auditing, settling and.... 421.304 Section 421.304 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM MEDICARE CONTRACTING Medicare Integrity Program...

Medicare payment system for hospital inpatients: diagnosis-related groups.

PubMed

Baker, Judith J

2002-01-01

Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRGs) are categories of patient conditions that demonstrate similar levels of hospital resources required to treat the conditions. Each inpatient that is discharged from an acute care hospital can be classified into one of the 506 DRGs currently utilized by the Medicare program. The Medicare DRG prospective payment methodology has been in use for almost two decades and is used by hospital managers for planning and decisionmaking. The viability of DRGs for future prospective payment depends on the ability to keep up with the times through updates of the current methodology.

Medicare payments to the neurology workforce in 2012

PubMed Central

Skolarus, Lesli E.; Burke, James F.; Callaghan, Brian C.; Becker, Amanda

2015-01-01

Objective: Little is known about how neurology payments vary by service type (i.e., evaluation and management [E/M] vs tests/treatments) and compare to other specialties, yet this information is necessary to help neurology define its position on proposed payment reform. Methods: Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data from 2012 were used. These data included all direct payments to providers who care for fee-for-service Medicare recipients. Total payment was determined by medical specialty and for various services (e.g., E/M, EEG, electromyography/nerve conduction studies, polysomnography) within neurology. Payment and proportion of services were then calculated across neurologists' payment categories. Results: Neurologists comprised 1.5% (12,317) of individual providers who received Medicare payments and were paid $1.15 billion by Medicare in 2012. Sixty percent ($686 million) of the Medicare payment to neurologists was for E/M, which was a lower proportion than primary providers (approximately 85%) and higher than surgical subspecialties (range 9%–51%). The median neurologist received nearly 75% of their payments from E/M. Two-thirds of neurologists received 60% or more of their payment from E/M services and over 20% received all of their payment from E/M services. Neurologists in the highest payment category performed more services, of which a lower proportion were E/M, and performed at a facility, compared to neurologists in lower payment categories. Conclusion: E/M is the dominant source of payment to the majority of neurologists and should be prioritized by neurology in payment restructuring efforts. PMID:25832665

Medicare payments to the neurology workforce in 2012.

PubMed

Skolarus, Lesli E; Burke, James F; Callaghan, Brian C; Becker, Amanda; Kerber, Kevin A

2015-04-28

Little is known about how neurology payments vary by service type (i.e., evaluation and management [E/M] vs tests/treatments) and compare to other specialties, yet this information is necessary to help neurology define its position on proposed payment reform. Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data from 2012 were used. These data included all direct payments to providers who care for fee-for-service Medicare recipients. Total payment was determined by medical specialty and for various services (e.g., E/M, EEG, electromyography/nerve conduction studies, polysomnography) within neurology. Payment and proportion of services were then calculated across neurologists' payment categories. Neurologists comprised 1.5% (12,317) of individual providers who received Medicare payments and were paid $1.15 billion by Medicare in 2012. Sixty percent ($686 million) of the Medicare payment to neurologists was for E/M, which was a lower proportion than primary providers (approximately 85%) and higher than surgical subspecialties (range 9%-51%). The median neurologist received nearly 75% of their payments from E/M. Two-thirds of neurologists received 60% or more of their payment from E/M services and over 20% received all of their payment from E/M services. Neurologists in the highest payment category performed more services, of which a lower proportion were E/M, and performed at a facility, compared to neurologists in lower payment categories. E/M is the dominant source of payment to the majority of neurologists and should be prioritized by neurology in payment restructuring efforts. © 2015 American Academy of Neurology.

Medicare and Medicaid programs: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs; electronic reporting pilot; Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities Quality Reporting Program; revision to Quality Improvement Organization regulations. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2012-11-15

This final rule with comment period revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) and the Medicare ambulatory surgical center (ASC) payment system for CY 2013 to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems. In this final rule with comment period, we describe the changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare services paid under the OPPS and those paid under the ASC payment system. In addition, this final rule with comment period updates and refines the requirements for the Hospital Outpatient Quality Reporting (OQR) Program, the ASC Quality Reporting (ASCQR) Program, and the Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility (IRF) Quality Reporting Program. We are continuing the electronic reporting pilot for the Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program, and revising the various regulations governing Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs), including the secure transmittal of electronic medical information, beneficiary complaint resolution and notification processes, and technical changes. The technical changes to the QIO regulations reflect CMS' commitment to the general principles of the President's Executive Order on Regulatory Reform, Executive Order 13563 (January 18, 2011).

The first 3 years of Medicare prospective payment: An overview

PubMed Central

Guterman, Stuart; Eggers, Paul W.; Riley, Gerald; Greene, Timothy F.; Terrell, Sherry A.

1988-01-01

This article provides a synopsis of the available evidence on the impact of the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for hospitals over the first 3 years of its implementation. The impact of PPS on hospitals, Medicare beneficiaries, post-hospital care, other payers for inpatient hospital services, other health care providers, and Medicare program operations and expenditures is examined. PMID:10312519

Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System Policy Changes and Fiscal Year 2016 Rates; Revisions of Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers, Including Changes Related to the Electronic Health Record Incentive Program; Extensions of the Medicare-Dependent, Small Rural Hospital Program and the Low-Volume Payment Adjustment for Hospitals. Final rule; interim final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2015-08-17

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems for FY 2016. Some of these changes implement certain statutory provisions contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act), the Pathway for Sustainable Growth Reform(SGR) Act of 2013, the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014, the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, and other legislation. We also are addressing the update of the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis subject to these limits for FY 2016.As an interim final rule with comment period, we are implementing the statutory extensions of the Medicare dependent,small rural hospital (MDH)Program and changes to the payment adjustment for low-volume hospitals under the IPPS.We also are updating the payment policies and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) for FY 2016 and implementing certain statutory changes to the LTCH PPS under the Affordable Care Act and the Pathway for Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) Reform Act of 2013 and the Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014.In addition, we are establishing new requirements or revising existing requirements for quality reporting by specific providers (acute care hospitals,PPS-exempt cancer hospitals, and LTCHs) that are participating in Medicare, including related provisions for eligible hospitals and critical access hospitals participating in the Medicare Electronic Health Record (EHR)Incentive Program. We also are updating policies relating to the

75 FR 71799 - Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and CY 2011 Payment Rates...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-24

...The final rule with comment period in this document revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system and to implement certain provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act). In this final rule with comment period, we describe the changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare hospital outpatient services paid under the prospective payment system. These changes are applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2011. In addition, this final rule with comment period updates the revised Medicare ambulatory surgical center (ASC) payment system to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system and to implement certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act. In this final rule with comment period, we set forth the applicable relative payment weights and amounts for services furnished in ASCs, specific HCPCS codes to which these changes apply, and other pertinent ratesetting information for the CY 2011 ASC payment system. These changes are applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2011. In this document, we also are including two final rules that implement provisions of the Affordable Care Act relating to payments to hospitals for direct graduate medical education (GME) and indirect medical education (IME) costs; and new limitations on certain physician referrals to hospitals in which they have an ownership or investment interest. In the interim final rule with comment period that is included in this document, we are changing the effective date for otherwise eligible hospitals and critical access hospitals that have been reclassified from urban to rural under section 1886(d)(8)(E) of the Social Security

76 FR 40497 - Medicare Program; Changes to the End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System for CY 2012...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-08

...] RIN 0938-AQ27 Medicare Program; Changes to the End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System for... through Federal Digital System (FDsys), a service of the U.S. Government Printing Office. This database... Internet on the CMS Web site. The Addenda to the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Prospective Payment System...

Medicare Program: Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment and Ambulatory Surgical Center Payment Systems and Quality Reporting Programs; Organ Procurement Organization Reporting and Communication; Transplant Outcome Measures and Documentation Requirements; Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Programs; Payment to Nonexcepted Off-Campus Provider-Based Department of a Hospital; Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program; Establishment of Payment Rates Under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule for Nonexcepted Items and Services Furnished by an Off-Campus Provider-Based Department of a Hospital. Final rule with comment period and interim final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2016-11-14

This final rule with comment period revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) and the Medicare ambulatory surgical center (ASC) payment system for CY 2017 to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems. In this final rule with comment period, we describe the changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare services paid under the OPPS and those paid under the ASC payment system. In addition, this final rule with comment period updates and refines the requirements for the Hospital Outpatient Quality Reporting (OQR) Program and the ASC Quality Reporting (ASCQR) Program. Further, in this final rule with comment period, we are making changes to tolerance thresholds for clinical outcomes for solid organ transplant programs; to Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) definitions, outcome measures, and organ transport documentation; and to the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record Incentive Programs. We also are removing the HCAHPS Pain Management dimension from the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program. In addition, we are implementing section 603 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 relating to payment for certain items and services furnished by certain off-campus provider-based departments of a provider. In this document, we also are issuing an interim final rule with comment period to establish the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule payment rates for the nonexcepted items and services billed by a nonexcepted off-campus provider-based department of a hospital in accordance with the provisions of section 603.

78 FR 74229 - Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, Clinical...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-10

...This major final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule, clinical laboratory fee schedule, and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services. This final rule with comment period also includes a discussion in the Supplementary Information regarding various programs. (See the Table of Contents for a listing of the specific issues addressed in the final rule with comment period.)

Medicare program: changes to the hospital outpatient prospective payment system and CY 2008 payment rates, the ambulatory surgical center payment system and CY 2008 payment rates, the hospital inpatient prospective payment system and FY 2008 payment rates; and payments for graduate medical education for affiliated teaching hospitals in certain emergency situations Medicare and Medicaid programs: hospital conditions of participation; necessary provider designations of critical access hospitals. Interim and final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2007-11-27

This final rule with comment period revises the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system. We describe the changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare hospital outpatient services paid under the prospective payment system. These changes are applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2008. In addition, the rule sets forth the applicable relative payment weights and amounts for services furnished in ASCs, specific HCPCS codes to which the final policies of the ASC payment system apply, and other pertinent rate setting information for the CY 2008 ASC payment system. Furthermore, this final rule with comment period will make changes to the policies relating to the necessary provider designations of critical access hospitals and changes to several of the current conditions of participation requirements. The attached document also incorporates the changes to the FY 2008 hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) payment rates made as a result of the enactment of the TMA, Abstinence Education, and QI Programs Extension Act of 2007, Public Law 110-90. In addition, we are changing the provisions in our previously issued FY 2008 IPPS final rule and are establishing a new policy, retroactive to October 1, 2007, of not applying the documentation and coding adjustment to the FY 2008 hospital-specific rates for Medicare-dependent, small rural hospitals (MDHs) and sole community hospitals (SCHs). In the interim final rule with comment period in this document, we are modifying our regulations relating to graduate medical education (GME) payments made to teaching hospitals that have Medicare affiliation agreements for certain emergency situations.

Medicare Part D payments for neurologist-prescribed drugs

PubMed Central

Burke, James F.; Kerber, Kevin A.; Skolarus, Lesli E.; Callaghan, Brian C.

2016-01-01

Objective: To describe neurologists' Medicare Part D prescribing patterns and the potential effect of generic substitutions and price negotiation, which is currently prohibited. Methods: The 2013 Medicare Part D Prescriber Public Use and Summary files were used. Payments for medications were aggregated by provider and drug (brand or generic). Payment, proportion of generic claims or day's supply, and median payment per monthly supply of medication were calculated by physician specialty and drug. Savings from generic substitution were estimated for brand drugs with a generic available. Medicare prices were compared to drug prices negotiated by the federal government with pharmaceutical manufacturers for the Veterans Administration (VA). Results: Neurologists comprised 13,060 (1.2%) providers with $5.0 billion (4.8%) in total payments, third highest of all specialties, with a median monthly payment of $141 (interquartile range $85–225). Multiple sclerosis drugs had the highest payments ($1.8 billion). Within neurologic disease groups ($3.4 billion in payments), 54.2%–91.8% of monthly supplies were generic, but 11.9%–71.3% of the payment was for generic medications. Generic substitution resulted in a $269 million (6.5%) payment decrease. VA pricing resulted in $1.5 billion (44.5% of $3.4 billion) in savings. Conclusions: High payment per monthly supply of medication underlies the high total neurology drug payments and is driven by multiple sclerosis drugs. Lowering drug expenditures by Medicare should focus on drug prices. PMID:27009256

Payment Reduction and Medicare Private Fee-for-Service Plans

PubMed Central

Frakt, Austin B.; Pizer, Steven D.; Feldman, Roger

2009-01-01

Medicare private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans are paid like other Medicare Advantage (MA) plans but are exempt from many MA requirements. Recently, Congress set average payments well above the costs of traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare, inducing dramatic increases in PFFS plan enrollment. This has significant implications for Medicare's budget, provoking calls for policy change. We predict the effect of proposals to cut PFFS payments on PFFS plan participation and enrollment. We find that small reductions in payment rates would reduce PFFS participation and enrollment; if Congress reduces payments to traditional FFS levels it would cause the vast majority (85 percent) of PFFS plans to exit the market. PMID:19544932

The Medicare Access And CHIP Reauthorization Act: Effects On Medicare Payment Policy And Spending.

PubMed

Hussey, Peter S; Liu, Jodi L; White, Chapin

2017-04-01

In 2015, Congress repealed the Sustainable Growth Rate formula for Medicare physician payment, eliminating mandatory payment cuts when spending exceeded what was budgeted. In its place, Congress enacted the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which established a two-track performance-based payment system that encourages physicians to participate in alternative payment models. MACRA could have huge effects on health care delivery, but the nature of those effects is highly uncertain. Using the RAND Corporation's Health Care Payment and Delivery Simulation Model, we estimated the effects of MACRA on Medicare spending and utilization and examined how effects would differ under various scenarios. We estimate that MACRA will decrease Medicare spending on physician services by -$35 to -$106 billion (-2.3 percent to -7.1 percent) and change spending on hospital services by $32 to -$250 billion (0.7 percent to -5.1 percent) in 2015-30. The spending effects are critically dependent on the strength of incentives in the alternative payment models, particularly the incentives for physicians to reduce hospital spending and physician responses to MACRA payment rates. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

Cost of schizophrenia in the Medicare program.

PubMed

Feldman, Rachel; Bailey, Robert A; Muller, James; Le, Jennifer; Dirani, Riad

2014-06-01

Medicare beneficiaries diagnosed with non-schizoaffective schizophrenia (MBS) in a 5% national Medicare fee-for-service sample from 2003-2007 were followed for 1-6 years. Medicare population and cost estimates also were made from 2001-2009. Service utilization and Medicare (and beneficiary share) payments for all services except prescription drugs were analyzed. Although adults with schizophrenia make up approximately 1% of the US adult population, they represent about 1.5% of Medicare beneficiaries. MBSs are disproportionately male and minority compared to national data describing the overall schizophrenia population. They also are younger than the general Medicare population (GMB): males are 9 years younger than females on average, and most enter Medicare long before age 65 through eligibility for social security disability, remaining in the program until death. The cost of care for MBSs in 2009 was, on average, 80% higher than for the average GMB per patient year (2010 dollars), and more than 50% of these costs are attributable to a combination of psychiatric and medical hospitalizations, concentrated in about 30% of MBSs with 1 or more hospitalizations per year. From 2004-2009, total estimated Medicare fee-for-service payments for MBSs increased from $9.4 billion to $11.5 billion, excluding Part D prescription drugs and payments for services to MBSs in Medicare for less than 1 year. Study results characterize utilization and costs for other services and suggest opportunities for further study to inform policy to improve access and continuity of care and decrease costs to the Medicare program associated with this population.

Risk Adjustment for Medicare Total Knee Arthroplasty Bundled Payments.

PubMed

Clement, R Carter; Derman, Peter B; Kheir, Michael M; Soo, Adrianne E; Flynn, David N; Levin, L Scott; Fleisher, Lee

2016-09-01

The use of bundled payments is growing because of their potential to align providers and hospitals on the goal of cost reduction. However, such gain sharing could incentivize providers to "cherry-pick" more profitable patients. Risk adjustment can prevent this unintended consequence, yet most bundling programs include minimal adjustment techniques. This study was conducted to determine how bundled payments for total knee arthroplasty (TKA) should be adjusted for risk. The authors collected financial data for all Medicare patients (age≥65 years) undergoing primary unilateral TKA at an academic center over a period of 2 years (n=941). Multivariate regression was performed to assess the effect of patient factors on the costs of acute inpatient care, including unplanned 30-day readmissions. This analysis mirrors a bundling model used in the Medicare Bundled Payments for Care Improvement initiative. Increased age, American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) class, and the presence of a Medicare Major Complications/Comorbid Conditions (MCC) modifier (typically representing major complications) were associated with increased costs (regression coefficients, $57 per year; $729 per ASA class beyond I; and $3122 for patients meeting MCC criteria; P=.003, P=.001, and P<.001, respectively). Differences in costs were not associated with body mass index, sex, or race. If the results are generalizable, Medicare bundled payments for TKA encompassing acute inpatient care should be adjusted upward by the stated amounts for older patients, those with elevated ASA class, and patients meeting MCC criteria. This is likely an underestimate for many bundling models, including the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement program, incorporating varying degrees of postacute care. Failure to adjust for factors that affect costs may create adverse incentives, creating barriers to care for certain patient populations. [Orthopedics. 2016; 39(5):e911-e916.]. Copyright 2016, SLACK Incorporated.

76 FR 19655 - Medicare Program; Waiver Designs in Connection With the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-04-07

... Savings Program and the Innovation Center AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and...) of the Social Security Act (of the Act), as added by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) authorizes the... payment and service delivery models by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation. This notice with...

Having it all: national benefit equity and local payment parity in Medicare.

PubMed

Dowd, Bryan; Feldman, Roger

2002-01-01

The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has identified two important problems with the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program: nationwide geographic inequity in government-financed benefits, and unequal government payments for M+C plans versus fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare in the same market area. MedPAC concludes that both problems cannot be solved simultaneously. We argue that both problems could be solved if Congress discontinued its policy of underwriting the cost of FFS Medicare. Instead, Congress should define a national entitlement benefit package and have all health plans submit bids on the package in each market area. The government's premium contribution should be equal to the lowest bid submitted by a qualified health plan in each market area. The contribution could be adjusted for health risk, the special obligations of FFS Medicare, and welfare enhancements associated with FFS Medicare that are valued by both beneficiaries and taxpayers but unrelated to beneficiaries' health status.

Practice arrangement and medicare physician payment in otolaryngology.

PubMed

Cracchiolo, Jennifer; Ridge, John A; Egleston, Brian; Lango, Miriam

2015-06-01

Medicare Part B physician payment indicates a cost to Medicare beneficiaries for a physician service and connotes physician clinical productivity. The objective of this study was to determine whether there was an association between practice arrangement and Medicare physician payment. Cross-sectional study. Medicare provider utilization and payment data. Otolaryngologists from 1 metropolitan area were included as part of a pilot study. A generalized linear model was used to determine the effect of practice-specific variables including patient volumes on physician payment. Of 67 otolaryngologists included, 23 (34%) provided services through an independent practice, while others were employed by 1 of 3 local academic centers. Median payment was $58,895 per physician for the year, although some physicians received substantially higher payments. Reimbursements to faculty at 1 academic department were higher than to those at other institutions or to independent practitioners. After adjustments were made for patient volumes, physician subspecialty, and gender, payments to each faculty at Hospital C were 2 times higher than to those at Hospital A (relative ratio [RR] 2.03; 95% CI, 1.27-3.27; P = .003); 2 times higher than to faculty at Hospital B (RR 2.04; 95% CI, 1.4-2.7; P = .0001); and 1.6 times higher than to independent practitioners (RR 1.6; 95% CI, 1.04-2.7; P = .03). Payments to physicians in the other groups were not significantly different. Differences in reimbursement corresponded to an emphasis on procedures over office visits but not Medicare case mix adjustments for patient discharges from associated institutions. Variation in the cost of academic otolaryngology care may be subject in part to institutional factors. © American Academy of Otolaryngology—Head and Neck Surgery Foundation 2015.

The origins, development, and passage of Medicare's revolutionary prospective payment system.

PubMed

Mayes, Rick

2007-01-01

This article explains the origins, development, and passage of the single most influential postwar innovation in medical financing: Medicare's prospective payment system (PPS). Inexorably rising medical inflation and deep economic deterioration forced policymakers in the late 1970s to pursue radical reform of Medicare to keep the program from insolvency. Congress and the Reagan administration eventually turned to the one alternative reimbursement system that analysts and academics had studied more than any other and had even tested with apparent success in New Jersey: prospective payment with diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Rather than simply reimbursing hospitals whatever costs they charged to treat Medicare patients, the new model paid hospitals a predetermined, set rate based on the patient's diagnosis. The most significant change in health policy since Medicare and Medicaid's passage in 1965 went virtually unnoticed by the general public. Nevertheless, the change was nothing short of revolutionary. For the first time, the federal government gained the upper hand in its financial relationship with the hospital industry. Medicare's new prospective payment system with DRGs triggered a shift in the balance of political and economic power between the providers of medical care (hospitals and physicians) and those who paid for it--power that providers had successfully accumulated for more than half a century.

Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities (SNFs) for FY 2016, SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program, SNF Quality Reporting Program, and Staffing Data Collection. Final Rule.

PubMed

2015-08-04

This final rule updates the payment rates used under the prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) for fiscal year (FY) 2016. In addition, it specifies a SNF all-cause all-condition hospital readmission measure, as well as adopts that measure for a new SNF Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, and includes a discussion of SNF VBP Program policies we are considering for future rulemaking to promote higher quality and more efficient health care for Medicare beneficiaries. Additionally, this final rule will implement a new quality reporting program for SNFs as specified in the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (IMPACT Act). It also amends the requirements that a long-term care (LTC) facility must meet to qualify to participate as a skilled nursing facility (SNF) in the Medicare program, or a nursing facility (NF) in the Medicaid program, by establishing requirements that implement the provision in the Affordable Care Act regarding the submission of staffing information based on payroll data.

78 FR 2407 - Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Nomination Letters

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-01-11

... GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Nomination Letters AGENCY: Government Accountability Office (GAO). ACTION: Notice on letters of nomination. SUMMARY: The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and gave the Comptroller...

76 FR 81503 - Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Nomination Letters

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-28

... GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Nomination Letters AGENCY: Government Accountability Office (GAO). ACTION: Notice on letters of nomination. SUMMARY: The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and gave the Comptroller...

Risk Adjustment May Lessen Penalties On Hospitals Treating Complex Cardiac Patients Under Medicare's Bundled Payments.

PubMed

Markovitz, Adam A; Ellimoottil, Chandy; Sukul, Devraj; Mullangi, Samyukta; Chen, Lena M; Nallamothu, Brahmajee K; Ryan, Andrew M

2017-12-01

To reduce variation in spending, Medicare has considered implementing a cardiac bundled payment program for acute myocardial infarction and coronary artery bypass graft. Because the proposed program does not account for patient risk factors when calculating hospital penalties or rewards ("reconciliation payments"), it might unfairly penalize certain hospitals. We estimated the impact of adjusting for patients' medical complexity and social risk on reconciliation payments for Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for the two conditions in the period 2011-13. Average spending per episode was $29,394. Accounting for medical complexity substantially narrowed the gap in reconciliation payments between hospitals with high medical severity (from a penalty of $1,809 to one of $820, or a net reduction of $989), safety-net hospitals (from a penalty of $217 to one of $87, a reduction of $130), and minority-serving hospitals (from a penalty of $70 to a reward of $56, an improvement of $126) and their counterparts. Accounting for social risk alone narrowed these gaps but had minimal incremental effects after medical complexity was accounted for. Risk adjustment may preserve incentives to care for patients with complex conditions under Medicare bundled payment programs.

Contrary to cost-shift theory, lower Medicare hospital payment rates for inpatient care lead to lower private payment rates.

PubMed

White, Chapin

2013-05-01

Many policy makers believe that when Medicare constrains its payment rates for hospital inpatient care, private insurers end up paying higher rates as a result. I tested this "cost-shifting" theory using a unique new data set that combines MarketScan private claims data with Medicare hospital cost reports. Contrary to the theory, I found that hospital markets with relatively slow growth in Medicare inpatient hospital payment rates also had relatively slow growth in private hospital payment rates during 1995-2009. Using regression analyses, I found that a 10 percent reduction in Medicare payment rates led to an estimated reduction in private payment rates of 3 percent or 8 percent, depending on the statistical model used. These payment rate spillovers may reflect an effort by hospitals to rein in their operating costs in the face of lower Medicare payment rates. Alternatively, hospitals facing cuts in Medicare payment rates may also cut the payment rates they seek from private payers to attract more privately insured patients. My findings indicate that repealing cuts in Medicare payment rates would not slow the growth in spending on hospital care by private insurers and would in fact be likely to accelerate the growth in private insurers' costs and premiums.

From politics to policy: a new payment approach in Medicare Advantage.

PubMed

Berenson, Robert A

2008-01-01

While the Medicare Advantage program's future remains contentious politically, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission's (MedPAC's) recommended policy of financial neutrality at the local level between private plans and traditional Medicare ignores local market dynamics in important ways. An analysis correlating plan bids against traditional Medicare's local spending levels likely would provide an alternative method of setting benchmarks, by producing a blend of local and national rates. A result would be that the rural and lower-cost urban "floor counties" would have benchmarks below currently inflated levels but above what financial neutrality at the local level--MedPAC's approach--would produce.

75 FR 30917 - Medicare Program; Supplemental Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-02

...This proposed rule is a supplement to the fiscal year (FY) 2011 hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) and long- term care prospective payment system (LTCH PPS) proposed rule published in the May 4, 2010 Federal Register. This supplemental proposed rule would implement certain statutory provisions relating to Medicare payments to hospitals for inpatient services that are contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act). It would also specify statutorily required changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the rates for Medicare acute care hospital inpatient services for operating costs and capital-related costs, and for long-term care hospital costs.

Medicare Program; FY 2017 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update and Hospice Quality Reporting Requirements. Final rule.

PubMed

2016-08-05

This final rule will update the hospice wage index, payment rates, and cap amount for fiscal year (FY) 2017. In addition, this rule changes the hospice quality reporting program, including adopting new quality measures. Finally, this final rule includes information regarding the Medicare Care Choices Model (MCCM).

Evidence-Based Imaging Guidelines and Medicare Payment Policy

PubMed Central

Sistrom, Christopher L; McKay, Niccie L

2008-01-01

Objective This study examines the relationship between evidence-based appropriateness criteria for neurologic imaging procedures and Medicare payment determinations. The primary research question is whether Medicare is more likely to pay for imaging procedures as the level of appropriateness increases. Data Sources The American College of Radiology Appropriateness Criteria (ACRAC) for neurological imaging, ICD-9-CM codes, CPT codes, and payment determinations by the Medicare Part B carrier for Florida and Connecticut. Study Design Cross-sectional study of appropriateness criteria and Medicare Part B payment policy for neurological imaging. In addition to descriptive and bivariate statistics, multivariate logistic regression on payment determination (yes or no) was performed. Data Collection Methods The American College of Radiology Appropriateness Criteria (ACRAC) documents specific to neurological imaging, ICD-9-CM codes, and CPT codes were used to create 2,510 medical condition/imaging procedure combinations, with associated appropriateness scores (coded as low/middle/high). Principal Findings As the level of appropriateness increased, more medical condition/imaging procedure combinations were payable (low = 61 percent, middle = 70 percent, and high = 74 percent). Logistic regression indicated that the odds of a medical condition/imaging procedure combination with a middle level of appropriateness being payable was 48 percent higher than for an otherwise similar combination with a low appropriateness score (95 percent CI on odds ratio=1.19–1.84). The odds ratio for being payable between high and low levels of appropriateness was 2.25 (95 percent CI: 1.66–3.04). Conclusions Medicare could improve its payment determinations by taking advantage of existing clinical guidelines, appropriateness criteria, and other authoritative resources for evidence-based practice. Such an approach would give providers a financial incentive that is aligned with best

76 FR 70227 - Medicare Program; End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System and Quality Incentive...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-10

...This final rule updates and makes certain revisions to the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) prospective payment system (PPS) for calendar year (CY) 2012. We are also finalizing the interim final rule with comment period published on April 6, 2011, regarding the transition budget-neutrality adjustment under the ESRD PPS,. This final rule also sets forth requirements for the ESRD quality incentive program (QIP) for payment years (PYs) 2013 and 2014. In addition, this final rule revises the ambulance fee schedule regulations to conform to statutory changes. This final rule also revises the definition of durable medical equipment (DME) by adding a 3-year minimum lifetime requirement (MLR) that must be met by an item or device in order to be considered durable for the purpose of classifying the item under the Medicare benefit category for DME. Finally, this final rule implements certain provisions of section 154 of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) related to the durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics and supplies (DMEPOS) Competitive Acquisition Program and responds to comments received on an interim final rule published January 16, 2009, that implemented these provisions of MIPPA effective April 18, 2009. (See the Table of Contents for a listing of the specific issues addressed in this final rule.)

42 CFR 447.31 - Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments. 447.31 Section 447.31 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF... Provisions § 447.31 Withholding Medicare payments to recover Medicaid overpayments. (a) Basis and purpose...

Medicare program; coverage and payment of ambulance services; inflation update for CY 2004. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2003-12-05

This final rule provides the sunset date for the interim bonus payment for rural ambulance mileage of 18 through 50 miles as required by the Medicare, Medicaid and State Child Health Insurance Program Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) and provides notice of the annual Ambulance Inflation Factor (AIF) for ambulance services for calendar year (CY) 2004. The statute requires that this inflation factor be applied in determining the fee schedule amounts and payment limits for ambulance services.

Leap of Faith--Medicare's New Physician Payment System.

PubMed

Oberlander, Jonathan; Laugesen, Miriam J

2015-09-24

Medicare's new payment system reflects the movement toward value-based payment, which is built on the view that we can contain costs only by eliminating fee-for-service payment. But there are important problems with this belief and the reforms it inspires.

78 FR 48995 - Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, DME Face-to...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-12

...This document corrects technical errors that appeared in the final rule with comment period published in the Federal Register on November 16, 2012, entitled ``Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician Fee Schedule, DME Face-to-Face Encounters, Elimination of the Requirement for Termination of Non-Random Prepayment Complex Medical Review and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2013.''

Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Policy Changes and Fiscal Year 2017 Rates; Quality Reporting Requirements for Specific Providers; Graduate Medical Education; Hospital Notification Procedures Applicable to Beneficiaries Receiving Observation Services; Technical Changes Relating to Costs to Organizations and Medicare Cost Reports; Finalization of Interim Final Rules With Comment Period on LTCH PPS Payments for Severe Wounds, Modifications of Limitations on Redesignation by the Medicare Geographic Classification Review Board, and Extensions of Payments to MDHs and Low-Volume Hospitals. Final rule.

PubMed

2016-08-22

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems for FY 2017. Some of these changes will implement certain statutory provisions contained in the Pathway for Sustainable Growth Reform Act of 2013, the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014, the Notice of Observation Treatment and Implications for Care Eligibility Act of 2015, and other legislation. We also are providing the estimated market basket update to apply to the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis subject to these limits for FY 2017. We are updating the payment policies and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) for FY 2017. In addition, we are making changes relating to direct graduate medical education (GME) and indirect medical education payments; establishing new requirements or revising existing requirements for quality reporting by specific Medicare providers (acute care hospitals, PPS-exempt cancer hospitals, LTCHs, and inpatient psychiatric facilities), including related provisions for eligible hospitals and critical access hospitals (CAHs) participating in the Electronic Health Record Incentive Program; updating policies relating to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, and the Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program; implementing statutory provisions that require hospitals and CAHs to furnish notification to Medicare beneficiaries, including Medicare Advantage enrollees, when the beneficiaries receive outpatient observation services for more than 24 hours; announcing the implementation of the Frontier Community Health Integration Project Demonstration; and

42 CFR 405.371 - Suspension, offset, and recoupment of Medicare payments to providers and suppliers of services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Suspension, offset, and recoupment of Medicare payments to providers and suppliers of services. 405.371 Section 405.371 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR...

42 CFR 405.371 - Suspension, offset, and recoupment of Medicare payments to providers and suppliers of services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Suspension, offset, and recoupment of Medicare payments to providers and suppliers of services. 405.371 Section 405.371 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR...

75 FR 46169 - Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System and CY...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-03

...This proposed rule would revise the Medicare hospital outpatient prospective payment system (OPPS) to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system and to implement certain provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act). In this proposed rule, we describe the proposed changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the payment rates for Medicare hospital outpatient services paid under the prospective payment system. These proposed changes would be applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2011. In addition, this proposed rule would update the revised Medicare ambulatory surgical center (ASC) payment system to implement applicable statutory requirements and changes arising from our continuing experience with this system and to implement certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act. In this proposed rule, we set forth the proposed applicable relative payment weights and amounts for services furnished in ASCs, specific HCPCS codes to which these proposed changes would apply, and other pertinent ratesetting information for the CY 2011 ASC payment system. These proposed changes would be applicable to services furnished on or after January 1, 2011. This proposed rule also includes proposals to implement provisions of the Affordable Care Act relating to payments to hospitals for direct graduate medical education (GME) and indirect medical education (IME) costs; and new limitations on certain physician referrals to hospitals in which they have an ownership or investment interest.

Will Changes to Medicare Payment Rates Alter Hospice's Cost-Saving Ability?

PubMed

Taylor, Donald H; Bhavsar, Nrupen A; Bull, Janet H; Kassner, Cordt T; Olson, Andrew; Boucher, Nathan A

2018-05-01

On January 1, 2016, Medicare implemented a new "two-tiered" model for hospice services, with per diem rates increased for days 1 through 60, decreased for days 61 and greater, and service intensity add-on payments made retrospectively for the last seven days of life. To estimate whether the Medicare hospice benefit's potential for cost savings will change as a result of the January 2016 change in payment structure. Analysis of decedents' claims records using propensity score matching, logistic regression, and sensitivity analysis. All age-eligible Medicare decedents who received care and died in North Carolina in calendar years 2009 and 2010. Costs to Medicare for hospice and other healthcare services. Medicare costs were reduced from hospice election until death using both 2009-2010 and new 2016 payment structures and rates. Mean cost savings were $1,527 with actual payment rates, and would have been $2,105 with the new payment rates (p < 0.001). Cost savings were confirmed by reducing the number of days used for cost comparison by three days for those with hospice stays of at least four days ($4,318 using 2009-2010 rates, $3,138 for 2016 rates: p < 0.001). Cost savings were greater for males ($3,393) versus females ($1,051) and greatest in cancer ($6,706) followed by debility and failure to thrive ($5,636) and congestive heart failure ($1,309); dementia patients had higher costs (+$1,880) (p < 0.001). When adding 3 days to the comparison period, hospice increased costs to Medicare. Medicare savings could continue with the 2016 payment rate change. Cost savings were found for all primary diagnoses analyzed except dementia.

Medicare payment changes and nursing home quality: effects on long-stay residents.

PubMed

Konetzka, R Tamara; Norton, Edward C; Stearns, Sally C

2006-09-01

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 dramatically changed the way that Medicare pays skilled nursing facilities, providing a natural experiment in nursing home behavior. Medicare payment policy (directed at short-stay residents) may have affected outcomes for long-stay, chronic-care residents if services for these residents were subsidized through cost-shifting prior to implementation of Medicare prospective payment for nursing homes. We link changes in both the form and level of Medicare payment at the facility level with changes in resident-level quality, as represented by pressure sores and urinary tract infections in Minimum Data Set (MDS) assessments. Results show that long-stay residents experienced increased adverse outcomes with the elimination of Medicare cost reimbursement.

75 FR 23851 - Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-05-04

... Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment... operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing... changes to the amounts and factors used to determine the rates for Medicare acute care hospital inpatient...

No association between Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services payments and volume of Medicare beneficiaries or per-capita health care costs for each state.

PubMed

Harewood, Gavin C; Alsaffar, Omar

2015-03-01

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services recently published data on Medicare payments to physicians for 2012. We investigated regional variations in payments to gastroenterologists and evaluated whether payments correlated with the number of Medicare patients in each state. We found that the mean payment per gastroenterologist in each state ranged from $35,293 in Minnesota to $175,028 in Mississippi. Adjusted per-physician payments ranged from $11 per patient in Hawaii to $62 per patient in Washington, DC. There was no correlation between the mean per-physician payment and the mean number of Medicare patients per physician (r = 0.09), there also was no correlation between the mean per-physician payment and the overall mean per-capita health care costs for each state (r = -0.22). There was a 5.6-fold difference between the states with the lowest and highest adjusted Medicare payments to gastroenterologists. Therefore, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services payments do not appear to be associated with the volume of Medicare beneficiaries or overall per-capita health care costs for each state. Copyright © 2015 AGA Institute. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

78 FR 61202 - Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-03

... Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities for FY 2014; Correction AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid...; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities for FY 2014.'' DATES: These...

Early Results of Medicare's Bundled Payment Initiative for a 90-Day Total Joint Arthroplasty Episode of Care.

PubMed

Iorio, Richard; Clair, Andrew J; Inneh, Ifeoma A; Slover, James D; Bosco, Joseph A; Zuckerman, Joseph D

2016-02-01

In 2011 Medicare initiated a Bundled Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) program with the goal of introducing a payment model that would "lead to higher quality, more coordinated care at a lower cost to Medicare." A Model 2 bundled payment initiative for Total Joint Replacement (TJR) was implemented at a large, tertiary, urban academic medical center. The episode of care includes all costs through 90 days following discharge. After one year, data on 721 Medicare primary TJR patients were available for analysis. Average length of stay (LOS) was decreased from 4.27 days to 3.58 days (Median LOS 3 days). Discharges to inpatient facilities decreased from 71% to 44%. Readmissions occurred in 80 patients (11%), which is slightly lower than before implementation. The hospital has seen cost reduction in the inpatient component over baseline. Early results from the implementation of a Medicare BPCI Model 2 primary TJR program at this medical center demonstrate cost-savings. IV economic and decision analyses-developing an economic or decision model. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Medicare program; clarification of Medicare's accrual basis of accounting policy--HCFA. Final rule.

PubMed

1995-06-27

This final rule revises the Medicare regulations to clarify the concept of "accrual basis of accounting" to indicate that expenses must be incurred by a provider of health care services before Medicare will pay its share of those expenses. This rule does not signify a change in policy but, rather, incorporates into the regulations Medicare's longstanding policy regarding the circumstances under which we recognize, for the purposes of program payment, a provider's claim for costs for which it has not actually expended funds during the current cost reporting period.

Diagnosis-Based Risk Adjustment for Medicare Capitation Payments

PubMed Central

Ellis, Randall P.; Pope, Gregory C.; Iezzoni, Lisa I.; Ayanian, John Z.; Bates, David W.; Burstin, Helen; Ash, Arlene S.

1996-01-01

Using 1991-92 data for a 5-percent Medicare sample, we develop, estimate, and evaluate risk-adjustment models that utilize diagnostic information from both inpatient and ambulatory claims to adjust payments for aged and disabled Medicare enrollees. Hierarchical coexisting conditions (HCC) models achieve greater explanatory power than diagnostic cost group (DCG) models by taking account of multiple coexisting medical conditions. Prospective models predict average costs of individuals with chronic conditions nearly as well as concurrent models. All models predict medical costs far more accurately than the current health maintenance organization (HMO) payment formula. PMID:10172666

Medicare program; prospective payment system for hospital outpatient services--HCFA. Proposed rule.

PubMed

1998-09-08

As required by sections 4521, 4522, and 4523 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, this proposed rule would eliminate the formula-driven overpayment for certain outpatient hospital services, extend reductions in payment for costs of hospital outpatient services, and establish in regulations a prospective payment system for hospital outpatient services (and for Medicare Part B services furnished to inpatients who have no Part A coverage). The prospective payment system would simplify our current payment system and apply to all hospitals, including those that are excluded from the inpatient prospective payment system. The Balanced Budget Act provides for implementation of the prospective payment system effective January 1, 1999, but delays application of the system to cancer hospitals until January 1, 2000. The hospital outpatient prospective payment system would also apply to partial hospitalization services furnished by community mental health centers. Although the statutory effective date for the outpatient prospective payment system is January 1, 1999, implementation of the new system will have to be delayed because of year 2000 systems concerns. The demands on intermediary bill processing systems and HCFA internal systems to become compliant for the year 2000 preclude making the major systems changes that are required to implement the prospective payment system. The outpatient prospective payment system will be implemented for all hospitals and community mental health centers as soon as possible after January 1, 2000, and a notice of the anticipated implementation date will be published in the Federal Register at least 90 days in advance. This document also proposes new requirements for provider departments and provider-based entities. These proposed changes, as revised based on our consideration of public comments, will be effective 30 days after publication of a final rule. This proposed rule would also implement section 9343(c) of the Omnibus Budget

Geographic variations in hospital charges and Medicare payments for major joint arthroplasty.

PubMed

Thakore, Rachel V; Greenberg, Sarah E; Bulka, Catherine M; Ehrenfeld, Jesse M; Obremskey, William T; Sethi, Manish K

2015-05-01

National data on hospital-level charges and Medicare payments have shown that joint arthroplasty is the most common surgical procedure among the elderly. Yet, no study has investigated micro and macro level geographic variations in hospital charges and payment. We used the Medicare Provider Charge Data to investigate Medicare payments and charges for 2750 hospitals accounting for 427,207 patients who underwent major joint arthroplasty and 932 hospitals for 18,714 patients who had a complication/comorbidity. We found a significant difference in hospital charges and payments based on geographic region (P<0.001). We concluded that hospital charges demonstrate a high variability even when using areas to control for differences in hospital wages and high variation in reimbursements in some areas remains unexplained by Medicare's current method of calculating reimbursement. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Higher Incentive Payments in Medicare Advantage's Pay-for-Performance Program Did Not Improve Quality But Did Increase Plan Offerings.

PubMed

Layton, Timothy J; Ryan, Andrew M

2015-12-01

To evaluate the effects of the size of financial bonuses on quality of care and the number of plan offerings in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration. Publicly available data from CMS from 2009 to 2014 on Medicare Advantage plan quality ratings, the counties in the service area of each plan, and the benchmarks used to construct plan payments. The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration began in 2012. Under the Demonstration, all Medicare Advantage plans were eligible to receive bonus payments based on plan-level quality scores (star ratings). In some counties, plans were eligible to receive bonus payments that were twice as large as in other counties. We used this variation in incentives to evaluate the effects of bonus size on star ratings and the number of plan offerings in the Demonstration using a differences-in-differences identification strategy. We used matching to create a comparison group of counties that did not receive double bonuses but had similar levels of the preintervention outcomes. Results from the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the receipt of double bonuses was not associated with an increase in star ratings. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with a statistically insignificant increase of +0.034 (approximately 1 percent) in the average star rating (p > .10, 95 percent CI: -0.015, 0.083). In contrast, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an increase in the number of plans offered. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an overall increase of +0.814 plans (approximately 5.8 percent) (p < .05, 95 percent CI: 0.078, 1.549). We estimate that the double bonuses increased payments by $3.43 billion over the first 3 years of the Demonstration. At great expense to Medicare, double bonuses in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration were not associated with improved quality but were associated with more plan

Vulnerability of Rural Hospitals to Medicare Outpatient Payment Reform

PubMed Central

Mohr, Penny E.; Franco, Sheila J.; Blanchfield, Bonnie B.; Cheng, C. Michael; Evans, William N.

1999-01-01

Because the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 requires implementation of a Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for hospital outpatient services, the authors evaluated the potential impact of outpatient PPS on rural hospitals. Areas examined include: (1) How dependent are rural hospitals on outpatient revenue? (2) Are they more likely than urban hospitals to be vulnerable to payment reform? (3) What types of rural hospitals will be most vulnerable to reform? Using Medicare cost report data, the authors found that small size and government ownership are more common among rural than urban hospitals and are the most important determinants of vulnerability to payment reform. PMID:11481724

Impact of Medicare payment reductions on access to surgical services.

PubMed Central

Mitchell, J B; Cromwell, J

1995-01-01

OBJECTIVE. This study evaluates the impact of surgical fee reductions under Medicare on the utilization of surgical services. DATA SOURCES. Medicare physician claims data were obtained from 11 states for a five-year time period (1985-1989). STUDY DESIGN. Under OBRA-87, Medicare reduced payments for 11 surgical procedures. A fixed effects regression method was used to determine the impact of these payment reductions on access to care for potentially vulnerable Medicare beneficiaries: joint Medicaid-eligibles, blacks, and the very old. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS. Medicare claims and enrollment data were used to construct a cross-section time-series of population-based surgical rates from 1985 through 1989. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS. Reductions in surgical fees led to small but significant increases in use for three procedures, small decreases in use for two procedures, and no impact on the remaining six procedures. There was little evidence that access to surgery was impaired for potentially vulnerable enrollees; in fact, declining fees often led to greater rates of increases for some subgroups. CONCLUSIONS. Our results suggest that volume responses by surgeons to payment changes under the Medicare Fee Schedule may be smaller than HCFA's original estimates. Nevertheless, both access and quality of care should continue to be closely monitored. PMID:8537224

Medicare payment changes and physicians' incomes.

PubMed

Weeks, William B; Wallace, Amy E

2002-01-01

An effort to control the physician portion of Medicare expenditures and to narrow the income gap between primary care and procedure-based physicians was effected through t he enactment of the Medicare Fee Schedule (MFS). To determine whether academic and private sector physicians' incomes had demonstrated changes consistent with payment changes, we collected income information from surveys of private sector physicians and academic physicians in six specialties: (1) family practice; (2) general internal medicine; (3) psychiatry; (4) general surgery; (5) radiology; and (6) anesthesiology. With the exception of general internal medicine, the anticipated changes in Medicare revenue were not closely associated with income changes in either the academic or private sector group. Academic physicians were underpaid, relative to their private sector counterparts, but modestly less so at the end of the period examined. Our findings suggest that using changes in payment schedules to change incomes in order to influence the attractiveness of different specialties, even with a very large payer, may be ineffective. Should academic incomes remain uncompetitive with private sector incomes, it may be increasingly difficult to persuade physicians to enter academic careers.

75 FR 46948 - Medicare Program; Listening Session Regarding Confidential Feedback Reports and the...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-08-04

... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS-1578-N] Medicare Program; Listening Session Regarding Confidential Feedback Reports and the Implementation of a Value-Based Payment Modifier for Physicians, September 24, 2010 AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid...

Medicare physician payment systems: impact of 2011 schedule on interventional pain management.

PubMed

Manchikanti, Laxmaiah; Singh, Vijay; Caraway, David L; Benyamin, Ramsin M; Hirsch, Joshua A

2011-01-01

Physicians in the United States have been affected by significant changes in the patterns of medical practice evolving over the last several decades. The recently passed affordable health care law, termed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the ACA, for short) affects physicians more than any other law. Physician services are an integral part of health care. Physicians are paid in the United States for their personal services. This payment also includes the overhead expenses for maintaining an office and providing services. The payment system is highly variable in the private insurance market; however, governmental systems have a formula-based payment, mostly based on the Medicare payment system. Physician services are billed under Part B. Since the inception of the Medicare program in 1965, several methods have been used to determine the amounts paid to physicians for each covered service. Initially, the payment systems compensated physicians on the basis of their charges. In 1975, just over 10 years after the inception of the Medicare program, payments changed so as not to exceed the increase in the Medical Economic Index (MEI). Nevertheless, the policy failed to curb increases in costs, leading to the determination of a yearly change in fees by legislation from 1984 to 1991. In 1992, the fee schedule essentially replaced the prior payment system that was based on the physician's charges, which also failed to live up to expectations for operational success. Then, in 1998, the sustainable growth rate (SGR) system was introduced. In 2009, multiple attempts were made by Congress to repeal the formula - rather unsuccessfully. Consequently, the SGR formula continues to hamper physician payments. The mechanism of the SGR includes 3 components that are incorporated into a statutory formula: expenditure targets, growth rate period, and annual adjustments of payment rates for physician services. Further, the relative value of a physician fee schedule

How will provider-focused payment reform impact geographic variation in Medicare spending?

PubMed

Auerbach, David; Mehrotra, Ateev; Hussey, Peter; Huckfeldt, Peter J; Alpert, Abby; Lau, Christopher; Shier, Victoria

2015-06-01

The Institute of Medicine has recently argued against a value index as a mechanism to address geographic variation in spending and instead promoted payment reform targeted at individual providers. It is unknown whether such provider-focused payment reform reduces geographic variation in spending. We estimated the potential impact of 3 Medicare provider-focused payment policies-pay-for-performance, bundled payment, and accountable care organizations-on geographic variation in Medicare spending across Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs). We compared geographic variation in spending, measured using the coefficient of variation (CV) across HRRs, between the baseline case and a simulation of each of the 3 policies. Policy simulation based on 2008 national Medicare data combined with other publicly available data. Compared with the baseline (CV, 0.171), neither pay-for-performance nor accountable care organizations would change geographic variation in spending (CV, 0.171), while bundled payment would modestly reduce geographic variation (CV, 0.165). In our models, the bundled payment for inpatient and post acute care services in Medicare would modestly reduce geographic variation in spending, but neither accountable care organizations nor pay-for-performance appear to have an impact.

Impact of Medicare's prospective payment system on hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, and home health agencies: how the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 may have altered service patterns for Medicare providers.

PubMed

Kulesher, Robert R

2006-01-01

The prospective payment system is one of many changes in reimbursement that has affected the delivery of health care. Originally developed for the payment of inpatient hospital services, it has become a major factor in how all health insurance is reimbursed. The policy implications extend beyond the Medicare program and affect the entire health care delivery system. Initially implemented in 1982 for payments to hospitals, prospective payment system was extended to payments for skilled nursing facility and home health agency services by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The intent of the Balanced Budget Act was to bring into balance the federal budget through reductions in spending. The decisions that providers have made to mitigate the impact are a function of ownership type, organizational mission, and current level of Medicare participation. This article summarizes the findings of several initial studies on the Balanced Budget Act's impact and discusses how changes in Medicare reimbursement policy have influenced the delivery of health care for the general public and for Medicare beneficiaries.

76 FR 26431 - Medicare Program; Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities Prospective Payment System-Update for Rate...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-05-06

...This final rule updates the prospective payment rates for Medicare inpatient hospital services provided by inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs) for discharges occurring during the rate year (RY) beginning July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012. The final rule also changes the IPF prospective payment system (PPS) payment rate update period to a RY that coincides with a fiscal year (FY). In addition, the rule implements policy changes affecting the IPF PPS teaching adjustment. It also rebases and revises the Rehabilitation, Psychiatric, and Long-Term Care (RPL) market basket, and makes some clarifications and corrections to terminology and regulations text.

42 CFR 422.304 - Monthly payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

...) MEDICARE PROGRAM MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM Payments to Medicare Advantage Organizations § 422.304 Monthly... original fee-for-service benefits for an individual in an MA payment area for a month. (1) Payment of bid...

78 FR 29139 - Medicare Program; Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Model 1 Open Period

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-17

... initiative. DATES: Model 1 of the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Deadline: Interested organizations... initiative. For additional information on this initiative go to the CMS Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Web site at http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/BPCI-Model-1/index.html . SUPPLEMENTARY...

Medicare Program; Advancing Care Coordination Through Episode Payment Models (EPMs); Cardiac Rehabilitation Incentive Payment Model; and Changes to the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model (CJR). Final rule.

PubMed

2017-01-03

This final rule implements three new Medicare Parts A and B episode payment models, a Cardiac Rehabilitation (CR) Incentive Payment model and modifications to the existing Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement model under section 1115A of the Social Security Act. Acute care hospitals in certain selected geographic areas will participate in retrospective episode payment models targeting care for Medicare fee-forservice beneficiaries receiving services during acute myocardial infarction, coronary artery bypass graft, and surgical hip/femur fracture treatment episodes. All related care within 90 days of hospital discharge will be included in the episode of care. We believe these models will further our goals of improving the efficiency and quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries receiving care for these common clinical conditions and procedures.

Unintended consequences of eliminating Medicare payments for consultations1

PubMed Central

Song, Zirui; Ayanian, John Z.; Wallace, Jacob; He, Yulei; Gibson, Teresa B.; Chernew, Michael E.

2013-01-01

Background Prior to 2010, Medicare payments for consultations (commonly billed by specialists) were substantially higher than for office visits of similar complexity (commonly billed by primary care physicians). In January 2010, Medicare eliminated consultation payments from the Part B Physician Fee Schedule and increased fees for office visits. This change was intended to be budget neutral and to decrease payments to specialists while increasing payments to primary care physicians. We assessed the impact of this policy on spending, volume, and complexity for outpatient office encounters in 2010. Methods We examined 2007–2010 outpatient claims for 2,247,810 Medicare beneficiaries with Medicare Supplemental (Medigap) coverage through large employers in the Thomson Reuters MarketScan Database. We used segmented regression analysis to study changes in spending, volume, and complexity of office encounters adjusted for age, sex, health status, secular trends, seasonality, and hospital referral region. Results “New” office visits largely replaced consultations in 2010. An average of $10.20 (6.5 percent) more was spent per beneficiary per quarter on physician encounters after the policy. The total volume of physician encounters did not change significantly. The increase in spending was largely explained by higher office visit fees from the policy and a shift toward higher complexity visits to both specialists and primary care physicians. Conclusions The elimination of consultations led to a net increase in spending on visits to both primary care physicians and specialists. Higher prices, partially due to the subjectivity of codes in the physician fee schedule, explained the spending increase, rather than higher volumes. PMID:23336095

The Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HAC) reduction program: using cranberry treatment to reduce catheter-associated urinary tract infections and avoid Medicare payment reduction penalties.

PubMed

Saitone, T L; Sexton, R J; Sexton Ward, A

2018-01-01

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) established the Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) established a total HAC scoring methodology to rank hospitals based upon their HAC performance. Hospitals that rank in the lowest quartile based on their HAC score are subject to a 1% reduction in their total Medicare reimbursements. In FY 2017, 769 hospitals incurred payment reductions totaling $430 million. This study analyzes how improvements in the rate of catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTI), based on the implementation of a cranberry-treatment regimen, impact hospitals' HAC scores and likelihood of avoiding the Medicare-reimbursement penalty. A simulation model is developed and implemented using public data from the CMS' Hospital Compare website to determine how hospitals' unilateral and simultaneous adoption of cranberry to improve CAUTI outcomes can affect HAC scores and the likelihood of a hospital incurring the Medicare payment reduction, given results on cranberry effectiveness in preventing CAUTI based on scientific trials. The simulation framework can be adapted to consider other initiatives to improve hospitals' HAC scores. Nearly all simulated hospitals improved their overall HAC score by adopting cranberry as a CAUTI preventative, assuming mean effectiveness from scientific trials. Many hospitals with HAC scores in the lowest quartile of the HAC-score distribution and subject to Medicare reimbursement reductions can improve their scores sufficiently through adopting a cranberry-treatment regimen to avoid payment reduction. The study was unable to replicate exactly the data used by CMS to establish HAC scores for FY 2018. The study assumes that hospitals subject to the Medicare payment reduction were not using cranberry as a prophylactic treatment for their catheterized patients, but is unable to confirm that this is true in all cases. The study also assumes that hospitalized catheter

An Economic History of Medicare Part C

PubMed Central

Mcguire, Thomas G; Newhouse, Joseph P; Sinaiko, Anna D

2011-01-01

Context: Twenty-five years ago, private insurance plans were introduced into the Medicare program with the stated dual aims of (1) giving beneficiaries a choice of health insurance plans beyond the fee-for-service Medicare program and (2) transferring to the Medicare program the efficiencies and cost savings achieved by managed care in the private sector. Methods: In this article we review the economic history of Medicare Part C, known today as Medicare Advantage, focusing on the impact of major changes in the program's structure and of plan payment methods on trends in the availability of private plans, plan enrollment, and Medicare spending. Additionally, we compare the experience of Medicare Advantage and of employer-sponsored health insurance with managed care over the same time period. Findings: Beneficiaries' access to private plans has been inconsistent over the program's history, with higher plan payments resulting in greater choice and enrollment and vice versa. But Medicare Advantage generally has cost more than the traditional Medicare program, an overpayment that has increased in recent years. Conclusions: Major changes in Medicare Advantage's payment rules are needed in order to simultaneously encourage the participation of private plans, the provision of high-quality care, and to save Medicare money. PMID:21676024

77 FR 53967 - Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program-Stage 2

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-09-04

...This final rule specifies the Stage 2 criteria that eligible professionals (EPs), eligible hospitals, and critical access hospitals (CAHs) must meet in order to qualify for Medicare and/or Medicaid electronic health record (EHR) incentive payments. In addition, it specifies payment adjustments under Medicare for covered professional services and hospital services provided by EPs, eligible hospitals, and CAHs failing to demonstrate meaningful use of certified EHR technology (CEHRT) and other program participation requirements. This final rule revises certain Stage 1 criteria, as finalized in the July 28, 2010 final rule, as well as criteria that apply regardless of Stage.

Medicare program; hospital inpatient prospective payment systems for acute care hospitals and the long-term care hospital prospective payment system and FY 2012 rates; hospitals' FTE resident caps for graduate medical education payment. Final rules.

PubMed

2011-08-18

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems and to implement certain statutory provisions contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act) and other legislation. We also are setting forth the update to the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis subject to these limits. We are updating the payment policy and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and implementing certain statutory changes made by the Affordable Care Act. In addition, we are finalizing an interim final rule with comment period that implements section 203 of the Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act of 2010 relating to the treatment of teaching hospitals that are members of the same Medicare graduate medical education affiliated groups for the purpose of determining possible full-time equivalent (FTE) resident cap reductions.

Measuring Function for Medicare Inpatient Rehabilitation Payment

PubMed Central

Carter, Grace M.; Relies, Daniel A.; Ridgeway, Gregory K.; Rimes, Carolyn M.

2003-01-01

We studied 186,766 Medicare discharges to the community in 1999 from 694 inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF). Statistical models were used to examine the relationship of functional items and scales to accounting cost within impairment categories. For most items, more independence leads to lower costs. However, two items are not associated with cost in the expected way. The probable causes of these anomalies are discussed along with implications for payment policy. We present the rules used to construct administratively simple, homogeneous, resource use groups that provide reasonable incentives for access and quality care and that determine payments under the new IRF prospective payment system (PPS). PMID:12894633

Medicare Program; FY 2016 Hospice Wage Index and Payment Rate Update and Hospice Quality Reporting Requirements. Final rule.

PubMed

2015-08-06

This final rule will update the hospice payment rates and the wage index for fiscal year (FY) 2016 (October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016), including implementing the last year of the phase-out of the wage index budget neutrality adjustment factor (BNAF). Effective on January 1, 2016, this rule also finalizes our proposals to differentiate payments for routine home care (RHC) based on the beneficiary's length of stay and implement a service intensity add-on (SIA) payment for services provided in the last 7 days of a beneficiary's life, if certain criteria are met. In addition, this rule will implement changes to the aggregate cap calculation mandated by the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation Act of 2014 (IMPACT Act), align the cap accounting year for both the inpatient cap and the hospice aggregate cap with the federal fiscal year starting in FY 2017, make changes to the hospice quality reporting program, clarify a requirement for diagnosis reporting on the hospice claim, and discuss recent hospice payment reform research and analyses.

Medicare Part D: successes and continuing challenges. Impact of Medicare Part D on Massachusetts health programs and beneficiaries.

PubMed

Thomas, Cindy Parks; Sussman, Jeffrey

2007-05-30

On January 1, 2006, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented the Medicare Drug Benefit, or "Medicare Part D." The program offers prescription drug coverage for the one million Medicare beneficiaries in Massachusetts. Part D affects Massachusetts state health programs and beneficiaries in a number of ways. The program: (1) provides prescription drug insurance, including catastrophic coverage, through a choice of private prescription drug plans (PDPs) or integrated Medicare Advantage (MA-PD) health plans; (2) shifts prescription drug coverage for dual-eligible Medicare / Medicaid beneficiaries from Medicaid to Medicare Part D drug plans; (3) requires a maintenance-of-effort, or "clawback" payments from states to CMS designed to capture a portion of states' Medicaid savings to help finance the benefit; (4) offers additional help for premiums and cost sharing to low income beneficiaries through the Low Income Subsidy (LIS); and (5) provides a subsidy to employer groups that maintain their own prescription drug coverage for retired beneficiaries. This paper summarizes the activities involved in implementing Medicare Part D, the impact it has had on Massachusetts health programs, and the experiences of beneficiaries and others conducting outreach and enrollment. The data are drawn from interviews with officials and documents provided by state health programs, CMS and the Social Security Administration, and representatives of provider and advocacy groups involved in the enrollment and ongoing support of Medicare beneficiaries.

Patient casemix classification for medicare psychiatric prospective payment.

PubMed

Drozd, Edward M; Cromwell, Jerry; Gage, Barbara; Maier, Jan; Greenwald, Leslie M; Goldman, Howard H

2006-04-01

For a proposed Medicare prospective payment system for inpatient psychiatric facility treatment, the authors developed a casemix classification to capture differences in patients' real daily resource use. Primary data on patient characteristics and daily time spent in various activities were collected in a survey of 696 patients from 40 inpatient psychiatric facilities. Survey data were combined with Medicare claims data to estimate intensity-adjusted daily cost. Classification and Regression Trees (CART) analysis of average daily routine and ancillary costs yielded several hierarchical classification groupings. Regression analysis was used to control for facility and day-of-stay effects in order to compare hierarchical models with models based on the recently proposed payment system of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. CART analysis identified a small set of patient characteristics strongly associated with higher daily costs, including age, psychiatric diagnosis, deficits in daily living activities, and detox or ECT use. A parsimonious, 16-group, fully interactive model that used five major DSM-IV categories and stratified by age, illness severity, deficits in daily living activities, dangerousness, and use of ECT explained 40% (out of a possible 76%) of daily cost variation not attributable to idiosyncratic daily changes within patients. A noninteractive model based on diagnosis-related groups, age, and medical comorbidity had explanatory power of only 32%. A regression model with 16 casemix groups restricted to using "appropriate" payment variables (i.e., those with clinical face validity and low administrative burden that are easily validated and provide proper care incentives) produced more efficient and equitable payments than did a noninteractive system based on diagnosis-related groups.

The spillover effects of Medicare managed care: Medicare Advantage and hospital utilization.

PubMed

Baicker, Katherine; Chernew, Michael E; Robbins, Jacob A

2013-12-01

More than a quarter of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage, which was created in large part to improve the efficiency of health care delivery by promoting competition among private managed care plans. This paper explores the spillover effects of the Medicare Advantage program on the traditional Medicare program and other patients, taking advantage of changes in Medicare Advantage payment policy to isolate exogenous increases in Medicare Advantage enrollment and trace out the effects of greater managed care penetration on hospital utilization and spending throughout the health care system. We find that when more seniors enroll in Medicare managed care, hospital costs decline for all seniors and for commercially insured younger populations. Greater managed care penetration is not associated with fewer hospitalizations, but is associated with lower costs and shorter stays per hospitalization. These spillovers are substantial - offsetting more than 10% of increased payments to Medicare Advantage plans. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The Spillover Effects of Medicare Managed Care: Medicare Advantage and Hospital Utilization

PubMed Central

Baicker, Katherine; Chernew, Michael; Robbins, Jacob

2013-01-01

More than a quarter of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage, which was created in large part to improve the efficiency of health care delivery by promoting competition among private managed care plans. This paper explores the spillover effects of the Medicare Advantage program on the traditional Medicare program and other patients, taking advantage of changes in Medicare Advantage payment policy to isolate exogenous increases in Medicare Advantage enrollment and trace out the effects of greater managed care penetration on hospital utilization and spending throughout the health care system. We find that when more seniors enroll in Medicare managed care, hospital costs decline for all seniors and for commercially insured younger populations. Greater managed care penetration is not associated with fewer hospitalizations, but is associated with lower costs and shorter stays per hospitalization. These spillovers are substantial – offsetting more than 10% of increased payments to Medicare Advantage plans. PMID:24308880

Effects of Medicare Payment Reform: Evidence from the Home Health Interim and Prospective Payment Systems

PubMed Central

Huckfeldt, Peter J; Sood, Neeraj; Escarce, José J; Grabowski, David C; Newhouse, Joseph P

2014-01-01

Medicare continues to implement payment reforms that shift reimbursement from fee-for-service towards episode-based payment, affecting average and marginal payment. We contrast the effects of two reforms for home health agencies. The Home Health Interim Payment System in 1997 lowered both types of payment; our conceptual model predicts a decline in the likelihood of use and costs, both of which we find. The Home Health Prospective Payment System in 2000 raised average but lowered marginal payment with theoretically ambiguous effects; we find a modest increase in use and costs. We find little substantive effect of either policy on readmissions or mortality. PMID:24395018

75 FR 30756 - Medicare Program; Supplemental Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-02

.... 93.773, Medicare--Hospital Insurance; and Program No. 93.774, Medicare-- Supplementary Medical... technical errors that appeared in the supplementary proposed rule entitled ``Medicare Program; Supplemental... Doc. 2010-12567 filed May 21, 2010, there are technical and typographical errors that are identified...

Medicare payment reform and provider entry and exit in the post-acute care market.

PubMed

Huckfeldt, Peter J; Sood, Neeraj; Romley, John A; Malchiodi, Alessandro; Escarce, José J

2013-10-01

To understand the impacts of Medicare payment reform on the entry and exit of post-acute providers. Medicare Provider of Services data, Cost Reports, and Census data from 1991 through 2010. We examined market-level changes in entry and exit after payment reforms relative to a preexisting time trend. We also compared changes in high Medicare share markets relative to lower Medicare share markets and for freestanding relative to hospital-based facilities. We calculated market-level entry, exit, and total stock of home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and inpatient rehabilitation facilities from Provider of Services files between 1992 and 2010. We linked these measures with demographic information from the Census and American Community Survey, information on Certificate of Need laws, and Medicare share of facilities in each market drawn from Cost Report data. Payment reforms reducing average and marginal payments reduced entries and increased exits from the market. Entry effects were larger and more persistent than exit effects. Entry and exit rates fluctuated more for home health agencies than skilled nursing facilities. Effects on number of providers were consistent with entry and exit effects. Payment reform affects market entry and exit, which in turn may affect market structure, access to care, quality and cost of care, and patient outcomes. Policy makers should consider potential impacts of payment reforms on post-acute care market structure when implementing these reforms. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Medicare Payment Reform and Provider Entry and Exit in the Post-Acute Care Market

PubMed Central

Huckfeldt, Peter J; Sood, Neeraj; Romley, John A; Malchiodi, Alessandro; Escarce, José J

2013-01-01

Objective To understand the impacts of Medicare payment reform on the entry and exit of post-acute providers. Data Sources Medicare Provider of Services data, Cost Reports, and Census data from 1991 through 2010. Study Design We examined market-level changes in entry and exit after payment reforms relative to a preexisting time trend. We also compared changes in high Medicare share markets relative to lower Medicare share markets and for freestanding relative to hospital-based facilities. Data Extraction Methods We calculated market-level entry, exit, and total stock of home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, and inpatient rehabilitation facilities from Provider of Services files between 1992 and 2010. We linked these measures with demographic information from the Census and American Community Survey, information on Certificate of Need laws, and Medicare share of facilities in each market drawn from Cost Report data. Principal Findings Payment reforms reducing average and marginal payments reduced entries and increased exits from the market. Entry effects were larger and more persistent than exit effects. Entry and exit rates fluctuated more for home health agencies than skilled nursing facilities. Effects on number of providers were consistent with entry and exit effects. Conclusions Payment reform affects market entry and exit, which in turn may affect market structure, access to care, quality and cost of care, and patient outcomes. Policy makers should consider potential impacts of payment reforms on post-acute care market structure when implementing these reforms. PMID:23557215

Comparing mandated health care reforms: the Affordable Care Act, accountable care organizations, and the Medicare ESRD program.

PubMed

Watnick, Suzanne; Weiner, Daniel E; Shaffer, Rachel; Inrig, Jula; Moe, Sharon; Mehrotra, Rajnish

2012-09-01

In addition to extending health insurance coverage, the Affordable Care Act of 2010 aims to improve quality of care and contain costs. To this end, the act allowed introduction of bundled payments for a range of services, proposed the creation of accountable care organizations (ACOs), and established the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test new care delivery and payment models. The ACO program began April 1, 2012, along with demonstration projects for bundled payments for episodes of care in Medicaid. Yet even before many components of the Affordable Care Act are fully in place, the Medicare ESRD Program has instituted legislatively mandated changes for dialysis services that resemble many of these care delivery reform proposals. The ESRD program now operates under a fully bundled, case-mix adjusted prospective payment system and has implemented Medicare's first-ever mandatory pay-for-performance program: the ESRD Quality Incentive Program. As ACOs are developed, they may benefit from the nephrology community's experience with these relatively novel models of health care payment and delivery reform. Nephrologists are in a position to assure that the ACO development will benefit from the ESRD experience. This article reviews the new ESRD payment system and the Quality Incentive Program, comparing and contrasting them with ACOs. Better understanding of similarities and differences between the ESRD program and the ACO program will allow the nephrology community to have a more influential voice in shaping the future of health care delivery in the United States.

Future considerations for clinical dermatology in the setting of 21st century American policy reform: The Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act and Alternative Payment Models in dermatology.

PubMed

Barbieri, John S; Miller, Jeffrey J; Nguyen, Harrison P; Forman, Howard P; Bolognia, Jean L; VanBeek, Marta J

2017-06-01

With the introduction of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act, clinicians who are not eligible for an exemption must choose to participate in 1 of 2 new reimbursement models: the Merit-based Incentive Payment System or Alternative Payment Models (APMs). Although most dermatologists are expected to default into the Merit-based Incentive Payment System, some may have an interest in exploring APMs, which have associated financial incentives. However, for dermatologists interested in the APM pathway, there are currently no options other than joining a qualifying Accountable Care Organization, which make up only a small subset of Accountable Care Organizations overall. As a result, additional APMs relevant to dermatologists are needed to allow those interested in the APMs to explore this pathway. Fortunately, the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act establishes a process for new APMs to be approved and the creation of bundled payments for skin diseases may represent an opportunity to increase the number of APMs available to dermatologists. In this article, we will provide a detailed review of APMs under the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act and discuss the development and introduction of APMs as they pertain to dermatology. Copyright © 2017 American Academy of Dermatology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

76 FR 18930 - Medicare Programs: Changes to the End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System Transition...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-04-06

... Payment System Transition Budget-Neutrality Adjustment AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services... comment will revise the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) transition budget-neutrality adjustment finalized... on April 1, 2011 through December 31, 2011. We are revising the transition budget-neutrality...

The Economics of Skin Cancer: An Analysis of Medicare Payment Data.

PubMed

Chen, Jenny T; Kempton, Steven J; Rao, Venkat K

2016-09-01

The incidence and cost of nonmelanoma skin cancers are skyrocketing. Five million cases cost $8.1 billion in 2011. The average cost of treatment per patient increased from $1000 in 2006 to $1600 in 2011. We present a study of the economics and costs of skin cancer management in Medicare patients. We studied data released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in 2014. Treatment modalities for the management of skin cancer were reviewed, and costs of treatment were quantified for a sample of 880,000 providers. Review of Medicare payment records related to the management of skin cancer yielded data from over 880,000 health care providers who received $77 billion in Medicare payments in 2012. From 1992 to 2009, the rate of Mohs micrographic surgery (MMS) has increased by 700%, and these procedures typically have Medicare payments 120% to 370% more than surgical excision, even when including pathology fees. From 1992 to 2009, MMS increased by 700%, whereas surgical excisions increased by only 20%. In 2009, 1800 providers billed Medicare for MMS; in 2012, that number increased to 3209. On average, 1 in 4 cases of skin cancer is treated with MMS. Mohs excision is more expensive than surgical excision in an office setting. Procedures requiring the operating room are much more expensive than office procedures. In an era of high deductible health plans, patients' financial burden is much less with simple excisions of skin cancers done in a clinic when compared with Mohs surgery or operative interventions.

42 CFR 418.307 - Periodic interim payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM HOSPICE CARE Payment for Hospice Care § 418.307 Periodic interim payments... payments. The biweekly interim payment amount is based on the total estimated Medicare payments for the...

Effects of Medicare payment reform: evidence from the home health interim and prospective payment systems.

PubMed

Huckfeldt, Peter J; Sood, Neeraj; Escarce, José J; Grabowski, David C; Newhouse, Joseph P

2014-03-01

Medicare continues to implement payment reforms that shift reimbursement from fee-for-service toward episode-based payment, affecting average and marginal payment. We contrast the effects of two reforms for home health agencies. The home health interim payment system in 1997 lowered both types of payment; our conceptual model predicts a decline in the likelihood of use and costs, both of which we find. The home health prospective payment system in 2000 raised average but lowered marginal payment with theoretically ambiguous effects; we find a modest increase in use and costs. We find little substantive effect of either policy on readmissions or mortality. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Medicare: Reasonableness of Health Maintenance Organization Payments Not Assured

DTIC Science & Technology

1989-03-07

diagnosis related group ESRD end stage renal disease FAR Federal Acquisition Regulations GAO General Accounting Office HCFA Health Care Financing...national average per capita Medicare costs for the pay- ment year being developed. 2. Estimates county (or, for end stage renal disease [ESRD] enrollees...intensity adjustments. Although the HMO Page 31 GAO/HRD941 Medicare Payments to HMOs Chapter 2 The Adjusted Coinninity Rate Proema Not Funcioning as

Medicare and Medicaid programs; Home Health Prospective Payment System rate update for CY 2014, home health quality reporting requirements, and cost allocation of home health survey expenses. Final rule.

PubMed

2013-12-02

This final rule will update the Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rates, the national per-visit rates, the low-utilization payment adjustment (LUPA) add-on, and the non-routine medical supply (NRS) conversion factor under the Medicare prospective payment system for home health agencies (HHAs), effective January 1, 2014. As required by the Affordable Care Act, this rule establishes rebasing adjustments, with a 4-year phase-in, to the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rates; the national per-visit rates; and the NRS conversion factor. In addition, this final rule will remove 170 diagnosis codes from assignment to diagnosis groups within the HH PPS Grouper, effective January 1, 2014. Finally, this rule will establish home health quality reporting requirements for CY 2014 payment and subsequent years and will clarify that a state Medicaid program must provide that, in certifying HHAs, the state's designated survey agency carry out certain other responsibilities that already apply to surveys of nursing facilities and Intermediate Care Facilities for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities (ICF-IID), including sharing in the cost of HHA surveys. For that portion of costs attributable to Medicare and Medicaid, we will assign 50 percent to Medicare and 50 percent to Medicaid, the standard method that CMS and states use in the allocation of expenses related to surveys of nursing homes.

Rural Implications of Medicare's Post-Acute-Care Transfer Payment Policy

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schoenman, Julie A.; Mueller, Curt D.

2005-01-01

Under the Medicare post-acute-care (PAC) transfer policy, acute-care hospitals are reimbursed under a per-diem formula whenever beneficiaries are discharged from selected diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) to a skilled nursing facility, home health care, or a prospective payment system (PPS)-excluded facility. Total per-diem payments are below the…

Rural implications of Medicare's post-acute-care transfer payment policy.

PubMed

Schoenman, Julie A; Mueller, Curt D

2005-01-01

Under the Medicare post-acute-care (PAC) transfer policy, acute-care hospitals are reimbursed under a per-diem formula whenever beneficiaries are discharged from selected diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) to a skilled nursing facility, home health care, or a prospective payment system (PPS)-excluded facility. Total per-diem payments are below the full DRG payment only when the patient's length of stay (LOS) is short relative to the geometric mean LOS for the DRG; otherwise, the full DRG payment is received. This policy originally applied to 10 DRGs beginning in fiscal year 1999 and was expanded to additional DRGs in FY2004. The Secretary may include other DRGs and types of PAC settings in future expansions. This article examines how the initial policy change affected rural and urban hospitals and investigates the likely impact of the FY2004 expansion and other possible future expansions. The authors used 1998-2001 Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MEDPAR) data to investigate changes in hospital discharge patterns after the original policy was implemented, compute the change in Medicare revenue resulting from the payment change, and simulate the expected revenue reductions under expansions to additional DRGs and swing-bed discharges. Neither rural nor urban hospitals appear to have made a sustained change in their discharge behavior so as to limit their exposure to the transfer policy. Financial impacts from the initial policy were similar in relative terms for both types of hospitals and would be expected to be fairly similar for an expansion to additional DRGs. On average, including swing-bed discharges in the transfer policy would have a very small financial impact on small rural hospitals; only hospitals that make extensive use of swing beds after a short inpatient stay might expect large declines in total Medicare revenue. Rural hospitals are not disproportionately harmed by the PAC transfer policy. An expanded policy may even benefit rural hospitals by

Medicare home health payment reform may jeopardize access for clinically complex and socially vulnerable patients.

PubMed

Rosati, Robert J; Russell, David; Peng, Timothy; Brickner, Carlin; Kurowski, Daniel; Christopher, Mary Ann; Sheehan, Kathleen M

2014-06-01

The Affordable Care Act directed Medicare to update its home health prospective payment system to reflect more recent data on costs and use of services-an exercise known as rebasing. As a result, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services will reduce home health payments 3.5 percent per year in the period 2014-17. To determine the impact that these reductions could have on beneficiaries using home health care, we examined the Medicare reimbursement margins and the use of services in a national sample of 96,621 episodes of care provided by twenty-six not-for-profit home health agencies in 2011. We found that patients with clinically complex conditions and social vulnerability factors, such as living alone, had substantially higher service delivery costs than other home health patients. Thus, the socially vulnerable patients with complex conditions represent less profit-lower-to-negative Medicare margins-for home health agencies. This financial disincentive could reduce such patients' access to care as Medicare payments decline. Policy makers should consider the unique characteristics of these patients and ensure their continued access to Medicare's home health services when planning rebasing and future adjustments to the prospective payment system. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

42 CFR § 512.320 - Treatment of incentive programs or add-on payments under existing Medicare payment systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2017-10-01

... INFRASTRUCTURE AND MODEL PROGRAMS EPISODE PAYMENT MODEL Pricing and Payment § 512.320 Treatment of incentive... under such models are independent of, and do not affect, any incentive programs or add-on payments under... 42 Public Health 5 2017-10-01 2017-10-01 false Treatment of incentive programs or add-on payments...

Medicare program; hospital inpatient prospective payment systems for acute care hospitals and the long-term care hospital prospective payment system and fiscal year 2013 rates; hospitals' resident caps for graduate medical education payment purposes; quality reporting requirements for specific providers and for ambulatory surgical centers. final rule.

PubMed

2012-08-31

We are revising the Medicare hospital inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS) for operating and capital-related costs of acute care hospitals to implement changes arising from our continuing experience with these systems. Some of the changes implement certain statutory provisions contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act) and other legislation. These changes will be applicable to discharges occurring on or after October 1, 2012, unless otherwise specified in this final rule. We also are updating the rate-of-increase limits for certain hospitals excluded from the IPPS that are paid on a reasonable cost basis subject to these limits. The updated rate-of-increase limits will be effective for cost reporting periods beginning on or after October 1, 2012. We are updating the payment policies and the annual payment rates for the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for inpatient hospital services provided by long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and implementing certain statutory changes made by the Affordable Care Act. Generally, these changes will be applicable to discharges occurring on or after October 1, 2012, unless otherwise specified in this final rule. In addition, we are implementing changes relating to determining a hospital's full-time equivalent (FTE) resident cap for the purpose of graduate medical education (GME) and indirect medical education (IME) payments. We are establishing new requirements or revised requirements for quality reporting by specific providers (acute care hospitals, PPS-exempt cancer hospitals, LTCHs, and inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs)) that are participating in Medicare. We also are establishing new administrative, data completeness, and extraordinary circumstance waivers or extension requests requirements, as well as a reconsideration process, for quality reporting by ambulatory surgical centers

42 CFR 495.208 - Avoiding duplicate payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.208 Avoiding duplicate payment. (a) Unless a qualifying MA EP is entitled to a maximum payment for a year under the Medicare FFS EHR incentive program, payment for such an individual is only made under the MA EHR incentive program...

42 CFR 495.208 - Avoiding duplicate payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.208 Avoiding duplicate payment. (a) Unless a qualifying MA EP is entitled to a maximum payment for a year under the Medicare FFS EHR incentive program, payment for such an individual is only made under the MA EHR incentive program...

42 CFR 495.208 - Avoiding duplicate payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.208 Avoiding duplicate payment. (a) Unless a qualifying MA EP is entitled to a maximum payment for a year under the Medicare FFS EHR incentive program, payment for such an individual is only made under the MA EHR incentive program...

Medicare payments for noninvasive diagnostic imaging are now higher to nonradiologist physicians than to radiologists.

PubMed

Levin, David C; Rao, Vijay M; Parker, Laurence; Frangos, Andrea J; Sunshine, Jonathan H

2011-01-01

Radiologists have always been considered the physicians who "control" noninvasive diagnostic imaging (NDI) and are primarily responsible for its growth. Yet nonradiologists have become increasingly aggressive in their performance and interpretation of imaging. The purpose of this study was to track overall Medicare payments to radiologists and nonradiologist physicians in recent years. The Medicare Part B files covering all fee-for-service physician payments for 1998 to 2008 were the data source. All codes for discretionary NDI were selected. Procedures mandated by the patient's clinical condition (eg, supervision and interpretation codes for interventional procedures, radiation therapy planning) were excluded, as were nonimaging radionuclide tests. Medicare physician specialty codes were used to identify radiologists and nonradiologists. Payments in all places of service were included. Overall Medicare NDI payments to radiologists and nonradiologist physicians from 1998 through 2008 were compared. A separate analysis of NDI payments to cardiologists was conducted, because next to radiologists, they are the highest users of imaging. In 1998, overall Part B payments to radiologists for discretionary NDI were $2.563 billion, compared with $2.020 billion to nonradiologists (ie, radiologists' payments were 27% higher). From 1998 to 2006, payments to nonradiologists increased by 166%, compared with 107% to radiologists. By 2006, payments to nonradiologists exceeded those to radiologists. By 2008, the second year after implementation of the Deficit Reduction Act, payments to radiologists had dropped by 13%, compared with 11% to nonradiologists. In 2008, nonradiologists received $4.807 billion for discretionary NDI, and radiologists received $4.638 billion. Payments to cardiologists for NDI increased by 195% from 1998 to 2006, then dropped by 8% by 2008. The growth in fee-for-service payments to nonradiologists for NDI was considerably more rapid than the growth for

42 CFR 412.125 - Effect of change of ownership on payments under the prospective payment systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... prospective payment systems. 412.125 Section 412.125 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Payments to Hospitals Under the Prospective Payment Systems § 412.125 Effect of change of...

76 FR 34633 - Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-14

....773, Medicare--Hospital Insurance; and Program No. 93.774, Medicare-- Supplementary Medical Insurance... errors in the proposed rule entitled ``Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient...-9644 of May 5, 2011 (76 FR 25788), there were a number of technical and typographical errors that are...

A Quantitative Analysis of the Relationship between Medicare Payment and Service Volume for Glaucoma Procedures from 2005 through 2009.

PubMed

Gong, Dan; Jun, Lin; Tsai, James C

2015-05-01

To calculate the association between Medicare payment and service volume for 6 commonly performed glaucoma procedures. Retrospective, longitudinal database study. A 100% dataset of all glaucoma procedures performed on Medicare Part B beneficiaries within the United States from 2005 to 2009. Fixed-effects regression model using Medicare Part B carrier data for all 50 states and the District of Columbia, controlling for time-invariant carrier-specific characteristics, national trends in glaucoma service volume, Medicare beneficiary population, number of ophthalmologists, and income per capita. Payment-volume elasticities, defined as the percent change in service volume per 1% change in Medicare payment, for laser trabeculoplasty (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] code 65855), trabeculectomy without previous surgery (CPT code 66170), trabeculectomy with previous surgery (CPT code 66172), aqueous shunt to reservoir (CPT code 66180), laser iridotomy (CPT code 66761), and scleral reinforcement with graft (CPT code 67255). The payment-volume elasticity was nonsignificant for 4 of 6 procedures studied: laser trabeculoplasty (elasticity, -0.27; 95% confidence interval [CI], -1.31 to 0.77; P = 0.61), trabeculectomy without previous surgery (elasticity, -0.42; 95% CI, -0.85 to 0.01; P = 0.053), trabeculectomy with previous surgery (elasticity, -0.28; 95% CI, -0.83 to 0.28; P = 0.32), and aqueous shunt to reservoir (elasticity, -0.47; 95% CI, -3.32 to 2.37; P = 0.74). Two procedures yielded significant associations between Medicare payment and service volume. For laser iridotomy, the payment-volume elasticity was -1.06 (95% CI, -1.39 to -0.72; P < 0.001): for every 1% decrease in CPT code 66761 payment, laser iridotomy service volume increased by 1.06%. For scleral reinforcement with graft, the payment-volume elasticity was -2.92 (95% CI, -5.72 to -0.12; P = 0.041): for every 1% decrease in CPT code 67255 payment, scleral reinforcement with graft service volume increased by

76 FR 16788 - Medicare Program; Solicitation of Two Nominations to the Advisory Panel on Ambulatory Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-03-25

... September 30, 2011.) E. L. Hambrick, M.D., J.D., Chair, a CMS Medical Officer Ruth L. Bush, M.D., M.P.H... disability; medical or technical specialty; and type of hospital, hospital health system, or other Medicare... encompasses hospital payment systems; hospital medical care delivery systems; provider billing systems; APC...

75 FR 21329 - Medicaid Program; State Allotments for Payment of Medicare Part B Premiums for Qualifying...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-23

... includes payment for premiums for Medicare Part B. Section 4732 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA... formula for determining State allotments. However, since certain States projected a deficit in their... minimize the impact on States with FY QI allotments that might be greater than their QI expenditures for...

Physician customary charges and Medicare payment experience: Study findings

PubMed Central

Kowalczyk, George I.; Harden, Stephen D.

1991-01-01

Customary charges have had significant impacts in determining reasonable prices under the historic Medicare physician payment system. This article contains new, comprehensive information on customary charges as well as data aggregated at the physician level. These baseline data have some important policy implications, such as the study findings, that indicate that the Medicare fee schedule is likely to have significant impacts on individual physician practices. The study is based on data for medical, surgical, and consultation services for nine States. PMID:10122362

Medicare program; inpatient psychiatric facilities prospective payment system--update for fiscal year beginning October 1, 2014 (FY 2015). Final rule.

PubMed

2014-08-06

This final rule will update the prospective payment rates for Medicare inpatient hospital services provided by inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs). These changes will be applicable to IPF discharges occurring during the fiscal year (FY) beginning October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2015. This final rule will also address implementation of ICD-10-CM and ICD-10-PCS codes; finalize a new methodology for updating the cost of living adjustment (COLA), and finalize new quality measures and reporting requirements under the IPF quality reporting program.

Impact of changes in Medicare payments on the financial condition of nonprofit hospitals.

PubMed

Das, Dhiman

2013-01-01

This article examines the implications of revenue changes on the financial condition of nonprofit hos pitals. I examine these implications empirically by studying the effect of changes in Medicare payments in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Using data from the Healthcare Cost Report Information System maintained by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services between 1996 and 2004, I show that even though revenue fell significantly, resulting in a decline in profitability, hospitals did not significantly change their capital structure and use of capital. An important implication of this is a higher cost of borrowing for these hospitals, which can affect future capital accumulation and viability. Nonprofit hospitals are a very important part of the healthcare delivery system in the United States. Medicare patients constitute the single largest segment of their revenue sources. Understanding the consequences of the changes in Medicare reimbursement on hospital finances is useful in framing future revisions of Medicare payments.

Bundle Payment Program Initiative: Roles of a Nurse Navigator and Home Health Professionals.

PubMed

Peiritsch, Heather

2017-06-01

With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) introduced a new value-based payment model, the Bundle Payment Care Initiative. The CMS Innovation (Innovation Center) authorized hospitals to participate in a pilot to test innovative payment and service delivery models that have a potential to reduce Medicare expenditures while maintaining or improving the quality of care for beneficiaries. A hospital-based home care agency, Abington Jefferson Health Home Care Department, led the initiative for the development and implementation of the Bundled Payment Program. This was a creative and innovative method to improve care along the continuum while testing a value-based care model.

Association of Practice-Level Social and Medical Risk With Performance in the Medicare Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier Program

PubMed Central

Epstein, Arnold M.; Orav, E. John; Filice, Clara E.; Samson, Lok Wong; Joynt Maddox, Karen E.

2017-01-01

Importance Medicare recently launched the Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier (PVBM) Program, a mandatory pay-for-performance program for physician practices. Little is known about performance by practices that serve socially or medically high-risk patients. Objective To compare performance in the PVBM Program by practice characteristics. Design, Setting, and Participants Cross-sectional observational study using PVBM Program data for payments made in 2015 based on performance of large US physician practices caring for fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries in 2013. Exposures High social risk (defined as practices in the top quartile of proportion of patients dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid) and high medical risk (defined as practices in the top quartile of mean Hierarchical Condition Category risk score among fee-for-service beneficiaries). Main Outcomes and Measures Quality and cost z scores based on a composite of individual measures. Higher z scores reflect better performance on quality; lower scores, better performance on costs. Results Among 899 physician practices with 5 189 880 beneficiaries, 547 practices were categorized as low risk (neither high social nor high medical risk) (mean, 7909 beneficiaries; mean, 320 clinicians), 128 were high medical risk only (mean, 3675 beneficiaries; mean, 370 clinicians), 102 were high social risk only (mean, 1635 beneficiaries; mean, 284 clinicians), and 122 were high medical and social risk (mean, 1858 beneficiaries; mean, 269 clinicians). Practices categorized as low risk performed the best on the composite quality score (z score, 0.18 [95% CI, 0.09 to 0.28]) compared with each of the practices categorized as high risk (high medical risk only: z score, −0.55 [95% CI, −0.77 to −0.32]; high social risk only: z score, −0.86 [95% CI, −1.17 to −0.54]; and high medical and social risk: −0.78 [95% CI, −1.04 to −0.51]) (P < .001 across groups). Practices categorized as high social risk

Rebasing the Medicare Payment for Dialysis: Rationale, Challenges, and Opportunities

PubMed Central

Johnson, Doug

2014-01-01

After Medicare’s implementation of the bundled payment for dialysis in 2011, there has been a predictable decrease in the use of intravenous drugs included in the bundle. The change in use of erythropoiesis-stimulating agents, which decreased by 37% between 2007, when its allowance in the bundle was calculated, and 2012, was because of both changes in the Food and Drug Administration labeling for erythropoiesis-stimulating agents in 2011 and cost-containment efforts at the facility level. Legislation in 2012 required Medicare to decrease (rebase) the bundled payment for dialysis in 2014 to reflect this decrease in intravenous drug use, which amounted to a cut of 12% or $30 per treatment. Medicare subsequently decided to phase in this decrease in payment over several years to offset the increase in dialysis payment that would otherwise have occurred with inflation. A 3% reduction from the rebasing would offset an approximately 3% increase in the market basket that determines a facility’s costs for 2014 and 2015. Legislation in March of 2014 provides that the rebasing will result in a 1.25% decrease in the market basket adjustment in 2016 and 2017 and a 1% decrease in the market basket adjustment in 2018 for an aggregate rebasing of 9.5% spread over 5 years. Adjusting to this payment decrease in inflation-adjusted dollars will be challenging for many dialysis providers in an industry that operates at an average 3%–4% margin. Closure of facilities, decreases in services, and increased consolidation of the industry are possible scenarios. Newer models of reimbursement, such as ESRD seamless care organizations, offer dialysis providers the opportunity to align incentives between themselves, nephrologists, hospitals, and other health care providers, potentially improving outcomes and saving money, which will be shared between Medicare and the participating providers. PMID:25189926

Medicare intensive care unit use: analysis of incidence, cost, and payment.

PubMed

Cooper, Liesl M; Linde-Zwirble, Walter T

2004-11-01

To determine the incidence, cost, and payment for intensive care unit services among Medicare beneficiaries. Retrospective observational database cohort study. All nonfederal hospitals with intensive care unit beds (n = 5003) paid through the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS). We used all fiscal year 2000 Medicare IPPS hospitalizations with consistent payment information (n = 10,657,587). None. We examined the distribution of cost and payments overall, by hospital type, and by diagnosis related group. Intensive care was used in 2,353,208 cases (21.1%). The overall incidence was 59.8 cases per thousand beneficiaries in the aged (65+) population, increasing with age from 36.2 (65-69) to 91.6 (85+). Intensive care unit patients cost nearly three times floor patients (4,135 dollars vs. 5,571 dollars), with two thirds of costs associated with the intensive care unit portion of the stay, 2,278 dollars per intensive care unit day. However, intensive care unit cases were paid at a rate only twice floor cases (11,704 dollars vs. 5,835 dollars). Only 83% of costs were paid for intensive care unit patients, compared with 105% for floor patients, generating a 5.8 billion dollars loss to hospitals when intensive care unit care is required. There was a linear association between the percent intensive care unit in a diagnosis related group and the percent paid, with payment >90% of cost only in diagnosis related groups with >/=60% intensive care unit cases. We found that teaching hospitals were better paid than nonteaching hospitals (87% vs. 78% of costs, respectively), but this was only due to indirect medical education payments. Intensive care is common, expensive, and poorly paid in the Medicare population. Few diagnosis related groups have a large enough intensive care unit population to ensure adequate payment. Additional diagnosis related groups for conditions common to the intensive care unit would improve payment and enable incentives for efficiency.

78 FR 31560 - Medicare Program; Public Meeting in Calendar Year 2013 for New Clinical Laboratory Test Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-05-24

... announces a public meeting to receive comments and recommendations (including accompanying data on which recommendations are based) from the public on the appropriate basis for establishing payment amounts for new or substantially revised Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes being considered for Medicare...

Statistical uncertainty in the Medicare shared savings program.

PubMed

DeLia, Derek; Hoover, Donald; Cantor, Joel C

2012-01-01

Analyze statistical risks facing CMS and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). We calculate the probability that shared savings formulas lead to inappropriate payment, payment denial, and/or financial penalties, assuming that ACOs generate real savings in Medicare spending ranging from 0-10%. We also calculate expected payments from CMS to ACOs under these scenarios. The probability of an incorrect outcome is heavily dependent on ACO enrollment size. For example, in the MSSP two-sided model, an ACO with 5,000 enrollees that keeps spending constant faces a 0.24 probability of being inappropriately rewarded for savings and a 0.26 probability of paying an undeserved penalty for increased spending. For an ACO with 50,000 enrollees, both of these probabilities of incorrect outcomes are equal to 0.02. The probability of inappropriate payment denial declines as real ACO savings increase. Still, for ACOs with 5,000 patients, the probability of denial is at least 0.15 even when true savings are 5-7%. Depending on ACO size and the real ACO savings rate, expected ACO payments vary from $115,000 to $35.3 million. Our analysis indicates there may be greater statistical uncertainty in the MSSP than previously recognized. CMS and ACOs will have to consider this uncertainty in their financial, administrative, and care management planning. We also suggest analytic strategies that can be used to refine ACO payment formulas in the longer term to ensure that the MSSP (and other ACO initiatives that will be influenced by it) work as efficiently as possible.

42 CFR § 414.1435 - Qualifying APM participant determination: Medicare option.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2017-10-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1435 Qualifying APM participant determination: Medicare option. (a) Payment amount method. The...

77 FR 31620 - Medicare Program; Public Meeting in Calendar Year 2012 for New Clinical Laboratory Tests Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-29

... announces a public meeting to receive comments and recommendations from the public on the appropriate basis... System (HCPCS) codes being considered for Medicare payment under the clinical laboratory fee schedule... the Federal Register notice of a meeting to receive comments and recommendations (and data on which...

76 FR 68011 - Medicare Program; Advanced Payment Model

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-02

..., coordinated care and generate cost savings. The Advance Payment Model will test whether and how pre-paying a..., Medicaid, and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) beneficiaries. One potential mechanism for achieving this goal is for CMS to partner with groups of health care providers of services and suppliers...

78 FR 73547 - Medicare Program; Semi-Annual Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient Payment (HOP...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-06

...) March 10-11, 2014 AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Department of Health and Human... Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient Payment (the Panel) for 2014. The purpose of the Panel is to advise... therapeutic services supervision issues. DATES: Meeting Dates: The first semi-annual meeting in 2014 is...

Distribution and Determinants of 90-Day Payments for Multilevel Posterior Lumbar Fusion: A Medicare Analysis.

PubMed

Jain, Nikhil; Phillips, Frank M; Khan, Safdar N

2018-04-01

A retrospective, economic analysis. The objective of this article is to analyze the distribution of 90-day payments, sources of variation, and reimbursement for complications and readmissions for primary ≥3-level posterior lumbar fusion (PLF) from Medicare data. A secondary objective was to identify risk factors for complications. Bundled payments represent a single payment system to cover all costs associated with a single episode of care, typically over 90 days. The dollar amount spent on different health service providers and the variation in payments for ≥3-level PLF have not been analyzed from a bundled perspective. Administrative claims data were used to study 90-day Medicare (2005-2012) reimbursements for primary ≥3-level PLF for deformity and degenerative conditions of the lumbar spine. Distribution of payments, sources of variation, and reimbursements for managing complications were studied using linear regression models. Risk factors for complications were studied by stepwise multiple-variable logistic regression analysis. Hospital payments comprised 73.8% share of total 90-day payment. Adjusted analysis identified several factors for variation in index hospital payments. The average 90-day Medicare payment for all multilevel PLFs without complications was $35,878 per patient. The additional average cost of treating complications with/without revision surgery within 90 days period ranged from $17,284 to $68,963. A 90-day bundle for ≥3-level PLF with readmission ranges from $88,648 (3 levels) to $117,215 (8+ levels). Rates and risk factors for complications were also identified. The average 90-day payment per patient from Medicare was $35,878 with several factors such as levels of surgery, comorbidities, and development of complications influencing the cost. The study also identifies the risks and costs associated with complications and readmissions and emphasize the significant effect these would have on bundled payments (additional burden of up

Medicare Program; Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model for Acute Care Hospitals Furnishing Lower Extremity Joint Replacement Services. Final rule.

PubMed

2015-11-24

This final rule implements a new Medicare Part A and B payment model under section 1115A of the Social Security Act, called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model, in which acute care hospitals in certain selected geographic areas will receive retrospective bundled payments for episodes of care for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR) or reattachment of a lower extremity. All related care within 90 days of hospital discharge from the joint replacement procedure will be included in the episode of care. We believe this model will further our goals in improving the efficiency and quality of care for Medicare beneficiaries with these common medical procedures.

Financial implications of choice of dialysis type of the revised Medicare payment system: an economic analysis.

PubMed

Hornberger, John; Hirth, Richard A

2012-08-01

In 2011, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act replaced the case-mix-adjusted composite payment system for Medicare outpatient dialysis facilities with a bundled end-stage renal disease prospective payment system (PPS). We assessed the economic implications for modality choice of the revised Medicare payment system. Microeconomic analyses. Patients eligible for dialysis in the United States. The perspective of this analysis is that of a financial administrator of a representative dialysis center in the United States. Data were obtained from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the US Renal Data System, the DOPPS (Dialysis Outcomes and Practice Patterns Study) Practice Monitor, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Medicare fee schedules. Recently implemented end-stage renal disease PPS versus the prior case-mix composite payment system. Medicare payment per month, center fixed and variable costs per month, net difference in revenue and variable costs (direct contribution), and net difference in revenue and total costs (operating margin). The direct contribution and operating margin for in-center hemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis are expected to be positive under the new bundled PPS. For Medicare fiscal intermediaries/administrators, paid treatments for home hemodialysis vary from 3.2 to more than 4.8 per week. The direct contribution and operating margin are expected to be negative for home hemodialysis if the number of paid treatments is similar between in-center and home hemodialysis; they are almost identical when the number of paid treatments increases for home hemodialysis by approximately 1 per week. Experience across centers and intermediaries/administrators may vary. Sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess the robustness of findings and determine which variables most influenced results. The new bundled PPS created a financial incentive for increased use of peritoneal dialysis. Use of home hemodialysis may be influenced by

75 FR 70371 - Medicare Program; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for Calendar Year 2011...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-17

...This final rule sets forth an update to the Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including: the national standardized 60-day episode rates, the national per-visit rates, the nonroutine medical supply (NRS) conversion factors, and the low utilization payment amount (LUPA) add-on payment amounts, under the Medicare prospective payment system for HHAs effective January 1, 2011. This rule also updates the wage index used under the HH PPS and, in accordance with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act), updates the HH PPS outlier policy. In addition, this rule revises the home health agency (HHA) capitalization requirements. This rule further adds clarifying language to the ``skilled services'' section. The rule finalizes a 3.79 percent reduction to rates for CY 2011 to account for changes in case-mix, which are unrelated to real changes in patient acuity. Finally, this rule incorporates new legislative requirements regarding face-to-face encounters with providers related to home health and hospice care.

42 CFR 408.65 - Payment options.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Payment options. 408.65 Section 408.65 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PREMIUMS FOR SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE Direct Remittance: Individual Payment § 408.65 Payment options...

Medicare overpayments to private plans, 1985-2012: shifting seniors to private plans has already cost Medicare US$282.6 billion.

PubMed

Hellander, Ida; Himmelstein, David U; Woolhandler, Steffie

2013-01-01

Previous research has documented Medicare overpayments to the private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans that compete with traditional fee-for-service Medicare. This research has assessed individual categories of overpayment for, at most, a few years. However, no study has calculated the total overpayments to private plans since the program's inception. Prior to 2004, selective enrollment of healthier seniors was the major source of excess payments. We estimate this has added US$41 billion to Medicare's costs since 1985. Medicare adopted a risk-adjustment scheme in 2004, but this has not curbed private plans' ability to game the payment system. This has added US$122.5 billion to Medicare's costs since 2004. Congress mandated increased payment to private plans in the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act, which was mitigated, to a degree, by the subsequent Affordable Care Act. In total, we find that Medicare has overpaid private insurers by US$282.6 billion since 1985. Risk adjustment does not work in for-profit MA plans, which have a financial incentive, the data, and the ingenuity to game whatever system Medicare devises. It is time to end Medicare's costly experiment with privatization. The U.S. needs to adopt a single-payer national health insurance program with effective methods for controlling costs.

Will Medicare Advantage payment reforms impact plan rebates and enrollment?

PubMed

Nicholas, Lauren Hersch

2014-01-01

To assess the relationship between Medicare Advantage (MA) plan rebates and enrollment and simulate the effects of Affordable Care Act (ACA) payment reforms. First difference regressions of county-level MA payment and enrollment data from CMS from 2006 to 2010. A $10 decrease in the per member/per month rebate to MA plans was associated with a 0.20 percentage point (0.9%) decrease in MA penetration (P < .001) and a 7.1% decline in the average MA enrollee's risk score (P < .001). These effects are small overall, but larger in counties with low levels of traditional Medicare spending; a $10 decrease in monthly rebates was associated with a 0.64 percentage point decline in MA penetration and a 10% decrease in risk score. ACA reforms are predicted to reduce the level of rebates in lower-spending counties, leading to enrollment decreases of 1.7 to 1.9 percentage points in the lowest-spending counties. The simulation predicts that the disenrollment would come from MA enrollees with higher risk scores. MA enrollment responds to availability of supplemental benefits supported by rebates. ACA provisions designed to lower MA spending will predominantly affect Medicare beneficiaries living in counties where MA plans may be unable to offer a comparable product at a price similar to that of traditional Medicare.

Statistical Uncertainty in the Medicare Shared Savings Program

PubMed Central

DeLia, Derek; Hoover, Donald; Cantor, Joel C.

2012-01-01

Objective Analyze statistical risks facing CMS and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Methods We calculate the probability that shared savings formulas lead to inappropriate payment, payment denial, and/or financial penalties, assuming that ACOs generate real savings in Medicare spending ranging from 0–10%. We also calculate expected payments from CMS to ACOs under these scenarios. Results The probability of an incorrect outcome is heavily dependent on ACO enrollment size. For example, in the MSSP two-sided model, an ACO with 5,000 enrollees that keeps spending constant faces a 0.24 probability of being inappropriately rewarded for savings and a 0.26 probability of paying an undeserved penalty for increased spending. For an ACO with 50,000 enrollees, both of these probabilities of incorrect outcomes are equal to 0.02. The probability of inappropriate payment denial declines as real ACO savings increase. Still, for ACOs with 5,000 patients, the probability of denial is at least 0.15 even when true savings are 5–7%. Depending on ACO size and the real ACO savings rate, expected ACO payments vary from $115,000 to $35.3 million. Discussion Our analysis indicates there may be greater statistical uncertainty in the MSSP than previously recognized. CMS and ACOs will have to consider this uncertainty in their financial, administrative, and care management planning. We also suggest analytic strategies that can be used to refine ACO payment formulas in the longer term to ensure that the MSSP (and other ACO initiatives that will be influenced by it) work as efficiently as possible. PMID:24800155

42 CFR 412.505 - Conditions for payment under the prospective payment system for long-term care hospitals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... payment system for long-term care hospitals. 412.505 Section 412.505 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Prospective Payment System for Long-Term Care Hospitals § 412.505 Conditions for...

Medicare program; revisions to payment policies under the physician fee schedule, clinical laboratory fee schedule & other revisions to Part B for CY 2014. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2013-12-10

This major final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule, clinical laboratory fee schedule, and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services. This final rule with comment period also includes a discussion in the Supplementary Information regarding various programs. (See the Table of Contents for a listing of the specific issues addressed in the final rule with comment period.)

77 FR 25283 - Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Changes in Provider and Supplier Enrollment, Ordering and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-04-27

...This final rule finalizes several provisions of the Affordable Care Act implemented in the May 5, 2010 interim final rule with comment period. It requires all providers of medical or other items or services and suppliers that qualify for a National Provider Identifier (NPI) to include their NPI on all applications to enroll in the Medicare and Medicaid programs and on all claims for payment submitted under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. In addition, it requires physicians and other professionals who are permitted to order and certify covered items and services for Medicare beneficiaries to be enrolled in Medicare. Finally, it mandates document retention and provision requirements on providers and supplier that order and certify items and services for Medicare beneficiaries.

42 CFR 422.316 - Special rules for payments to Federally qualified health centers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM Payments to Medicare Advantage Organizations § 422.316 Special rules for payments to Federally qualified health centers...

42 CFR 403.310 - Reduction in payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL PROVISIONS SPECIAL PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS Recognition of State Reimbursement Control Systems § 403.310... amount by which the Medicare payments under the system exceed the amount of Medicare payments to such...

The Center For Medicare And Medicaid Innovation's blueprint for rapid-cycle evaluation of new care and payment models.

PubMed

Shrank, William

2013-04-01

The Affordable Care Act established the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to test innovative payment and service delivery models. The goal is to reduce program expenditures while preserving or improving the quality of care provided to beneficiaries of Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance Program. Central to the success of the Innovation Center is a new, rapid-cycle approach to evaluation. This article describes that approach--setting forth how the Rapid Cycle Evaluation Group aims to deliver frequent feedback to providers in support of continuous quality improvement, while rigorously evaluating the outcomes of each model tested. This article also describes the relationship between the group's work and that of the Office of the Actuary at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which plays a central role in the assessment of new models.

Medicare program; inpatient rehabilitation facility prospective payment system for federal fiscal year 2015.

PubMed

2014-08-06

This final rule updates the prospective payment rates for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) for federal fiscal year (FY) 2015 as required by the statute. This final rule finalizes a policy to collect data on the amount and mode (that is, Individual, Concurrent, Group, and Co-Treatment) of therapy provided in the IRF setting according to therapy discipline, revises the list of diagnosis and impairment group codes that presumptively meet the "60 percent rule'' compliance criteria, provides a way for IRFs to indicate on the Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility-Patient Assessment Instrument (IRF-PAI) form whether the prior treatment and severity requirements have been met for arthritis cases to presumptively meet the "60 percent rule'' compliance criteria, and revises and updates quality measures and reporting requirements under the IRF quality reporting program (QRP). This rule also delays the effective date for the revisions to the list of diagnosis codes that are used to determine presumptive compliance under the "60 percent rule'' that were finalized in FY 2014 IRF PPS final rule and adopts the revisions to the list of diagnosis codes that are used to determine presumptive compliance under the "60 percent rule'' that are finalized in this rule. This final rule also addresses the implementation of the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM), for the IRF prospective payment system (PPS), which will be effective when ICD-10-CM becomes the required medical data code set for use on Medicare claims and IRF-PAI submissions.

Bundled payment initiatives for Medicare and non-Medicare total joint arthroplasty patients at a community hospital: bundles in the real world.

PubMed

Doran, James P; Zabinski, Stephen J

2015-03-01

In the setting of current United States healthcare reform, bundled payment initiatives and episode of care payment models for total joint arthroplasty (TJA) have become increasingly common. The following is a review of our results and experience in a community hospital with bundled payment initiatives for both non-Medicare and Medicare TJA patients since 2011. We have successfully decreased the cost of the TJA episode of care in comparison to our historical averages prior to 2011. This cost-reduction has primarily been achieved through decreased length of inpatient stay, increased discharge to home rather than to skilled nursing or inpatient rehabilitation facilities, reduction in implant cost, improvement in readmission rate and migration of cases to lower cost sites of service. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

High Variation of Intravitreal Injection Rates and Medicare Anti-Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor Payments per Injection in the United States.

PubMed

Erie, Jay C; Barkmeier, Andrew J; Hodge, David O; Mahr, Michael A

2016-06-01

To estimate geographic variation of intravitreal injection rates and Medicare anti-vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) drug costs per injection in aging Americans. Observational cohort study using 2013 Medicare claims database. United States fee-for-service (FFS) Part B Medicare beneficiaries and their providers. Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data furnished by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services was used to identify all intravitreal injection claims and anti-VEGF drug claims among FFS Medicare beneficiaries in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in 2013. The rate of FFS Medicare beneficiaries receiving intravitreal injections and the mean Medicare-allowed drug payment per anti-VEGF injection was calculated nationally and for each state. Geographic variations were evaluated by using extremal quotient, coefficient of variation, and systematic component of variance (SCV). Rate of FFS Medicare Part B beneficiaries receiving intravitreal injections (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] code, 67028), nationally and by state; mean Medicare-allowed drug payment per anti-VEGF injection (CPT code, 67028; and treatment-specific J-codes, J0178, J2778, J9035, J3490, and J3590) nationally and by state. In 2013, the rate of FFS Medicare beneficiaries receiving intravitreal injections varied widely by 7-fold across states (range by state, 4 per 1000 [Wyoming]-28 per 1000 [Utah]), averaging 19 per 1000 beneficiaries. The mean SCV was 8.5, confirming high nonrandom geographic variation. There were more than 2.1 million anti-VEGF drug claims, totaling more than $2.3 billion in Medicare payments for anti-VEGF agents in 2013. The mean national Medicare drug payment per anti-VEGF injection varied widely by 6.2-fold across states (range by state, $242 [South Carolina]-$1509 [Maine]), averaging $1078 per injection. Nationally, 94% of injections were office based and 6% were facility based. High variation was observed in intravitreal injection rates and

Future considerations for clinical dermatology in the setting of 21st century American policy reform: The Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act and the Merit-based Incentive Payment System.

PubMed

Barbieri, John S; Miller, Jeffrey J; Nguyen, Harrison P; Forman, Howard P; Bolognia, Jean L; VanBeek, Marta J

2017-06-01

As the implementation of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act begins, many dermatologists who provide Medicare Part B services will be subject to the reporting requirements of the Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). Clinicians subject to MIPS will receive a composite score based on performance across 4 categories: quality, advancing care information, improvement activities, and cost. Depending on their overall MIPS score, clinicians will be eligible for a positive or negative payment adjustment. Quality will replace the Physician Quality Reporting System and clinicians will report on 6 measures from a list of over 250 options. Advancing care information will replace meaningful use and will assess clinicians on activities related to integration of electronic health record technology into their practice. Improvement activities will require clinicians to attest to completion of activities focused on improvements in care coordination, beneficiary engagement, and patient safety. Finally, cost will be determined automatically from Medicare claims data. In this article, we will provide a detailed review of the Medicare Access and Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act with a focus on MIPS and briefly discuss the potential implications for dermatologists. Copyright © 2017 American Academy of Dermatology, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Sugar daddy. Most Americans know Medicare as the health insurance program for the elderly, but to providers, it's a jobs program, a capital financier and a safety net.

PubMed

Hallam, K; Gardner, J

1999-11-08

Most Americans know Medicare as the health insurance program that covers the elderly. But to providers it's much more that. The program pays for medical education, finances capital projects and subsidizes care for the indigent. Should Medicare continue making those add-on payments? Is that the program's mission? The debate is intensifying.

Medicare’s Payment Strategy For End-Stage Renal Disease Now Embraces Bundled Payment And Pay-For-Performance To Cut Costs

PubMed Central

Swaminathan, Shailender; Mor, Vincent; Mehrotra, Rajnish; Trivedi, Amal

2013-01-01

Since 1973 Medicare has provided health insurance coverage to all people who have been diagnosed with end-stage renal disease, or kidney failure. In this article we trace the history of payment policies in Medicare’s dialysis program from 1973 to 2011, while also providing some insight into the rationale for changes made over time. Initially, Medicare adopted a fee-for-service payment policy for dialysis care, using the same reimbursement standards employed in the broader Medicare program. However, driven by rapid spending growth in this population, the dialysis program has implemented innovative payment reforms, such as prospective bundled payments and pay-for-performance incentives. It is uncertain whether these strategies can stem the increase in the total cost of dialysis to Medicare, or whether they can do so without adversely affecting the quality of care. Future research on the intended and unintended consequences of payment reform will be critical. PMID:22949455

75 FR 44313 - Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-28

... care issues. Frank Szeflinski, (303) 844-7119, Medicare Advantage issues. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION... MCO Managed Care Organization MITA Medicaid Information Technology Architecture MMIS Medicaid... Payment Calculation for Eligible Hospitals c. Medicare Share d. Charity Care e. Transition Factor f...

78 FR 43820 - Medicare Program; Medical Loss Ratio Requirements for the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-22

... Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs; Correction AGENCY: Centers for Medicare... Medicare Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs final rule and does not make... Register titled ``Medicare Program; Medical Loss Ratio Requirements for the Medicare Advantage and the...

Medicare program; hospital inpatient prospective payment systems for acute care hospitals and the long-term care hospital prospective payment system and fiscal year 2015 rates; quality reporting requirements for specific providers; reasonable compensation equivalents for physician services in excluded hospitals and certain teaching hospitals; provider administrative appeals and judicial review; enforcement provisions for organ transplant centers; and electronic health record (EHR) incentive program. Final rule.

PubMed

2014-08-22

are participating in Medicare. We are updating policies relating to the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, and the Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program. In addition, we are making technical corrections to the regulations governing provider administrative appeals and judicial review; updating the reasonable compensation equivalent (RCE) limits, and revising the methodology for determining such limits, for services furnished by physicians to certain teaching hospitals and hospitals excluded from the IPPS; making regulatory revisions to broaden the specified uses of Medicare Advantage (MA) risk adjustment data and to specify the conditions for release of such risk adjustment data to entities outside of CMS; and making changes to the enforcement procedures for organ transplant centers. We are aligning the reporting and submission timelines for clinical quality measures for the Medicare HER Incentive Program for eligible hospitals and critical access hospitals (CAHs) with the reporting and submission timelines for the Hospital IQR Program. In addition, we provide guidance and clarification of certain policies for eligible hospitals and CAHs such as our policy for reporting zero denominators on clinical quality measures and our policy for case threshold exemptions. In this document, we are finalizing two interim final rules with comment period relating to criteria for disproportionate share hospital uncompensated care payments and extensions of temporary changes to the payment adjustment for low-volume hospitals and of the Medicare-Dependent, Small Rural Hospital (MDH) Program.

Medicare program; payment policies under the physician fee schedule, five-year review of work relative value units, clinical laboratory fee schedule: signature on requisition, and other revisions to part B for CY 2012. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2011-11-28

This final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services. It also addresses, implements or discusses certain statutory provisions including provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (collectively known as the Affordable Care Act) and the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act (MIPPA) of 2008. In addition, this final rule with comment period discusses payments for Part B drugs; Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule: Signature on Requisition; Physician Quality Reporting System; the Electronic Prescribing (eRx) Incentive Program; the Physician Resource-Use Feedback Program and the value modifier; productivity adjustment for ambulatory surgical center payment system and the ambulance, clinical laboratory, and durable medical equipment prosthetics orthotics and supplies (DMEPOS) fee schedules; and other Part B related issues.

Fee-for-service will remain a feature of major payment reforms, requiring more changes in Medicare physician payment.

PubMed

Ginsburg, Paul B

2012-09-01

Many health policy analysts envision provider payment reforms currently under development as replacements for the traditional fee-for-service payment system. Reforms include per episode bundled payment and elements of capitation, such as global payments or accountable care organizations. But even if these approaches succeed and are widely adopted, the core method of payment to many physicians for the services they provide is likely to remain fee-for-service. It is therefore critical to address the current shortcomings in the Medicare physician fee schedule, because it will affect physician incentives and will continue to play an important role in determining the payment amounts under payment reform. This article reviews how the current payment system developed and is applied, and it highlights areas that require careful review and modification to ensure the success of broader payment reform.

42 CFR 414.707 - Basis of payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Basis of payment. 414.707 Section 414.707 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Payment for Drugs and Biologicals...

42 CFR 414.707 - Basis of payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Basis of payment. 414.707 Section 414.707 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Payment for Drugs and Biologicals...

Specialty Payment Model Opportunities and Assessment

PubMed Central

White, Chapin; Chan, Chris; Huckfeldt, Peter J.; Kofner, Aaron; Mulcahy, Andrew W.; Pollak, Julia; Popescu, Ioana; Timbie, Justin W.; Hussey, Peter S.

2015-01-01

Abstract This article describes the results of a simulation analysis of a payment model for specialty oncology services that is being developed for possible testing by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS asked MITRE and RAND to conduct simulation analyses to preview some of the possible impacts of the payment model and to inform design decisions related to the model. The simulation analysis used an episode-level dataset based on Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims for historical oncology episodes provided to Medicare FFS beneficiaries in 2010. Under the proposed model, participating practices would continue to receive FFS payments, would also receive per-beneficiary per-month care management payments for episodes lasting up to six months, and would be eligible for performance-based payments based on per-episode spending for attributed episodes relative to a per-episode spending target. The simulation offers several insights into the proposed payment model for oncology: (1) The care management payments used in the simulation analysis—$960 total per six-month episode—represent only 4 percent of projected average total spending per episode (around $27,000 in 2016), but they are large relative to the FFS revenues of participating oncology practices, which are projected to be around $2,000 per oncology episode. By themselves, the care management payments would increase physician practices’ Medicare revenues by roughly 50 percent on average. This represents a substantial new outlay for the Medicare program and a substantial new source of revenues for oncology practices. (2) For the Medicare program to break even, participating oncology practices would have to reduce utilization and intensity by roughly 4 percent. (3) The break-even point can be reduced if the care management payments are reduced or if the performance-based payments are reduced. PMID:28083365

42 CFR 447.30 - Withholding the Federal share of payments to Medicaid providers to recover Medicare overpayments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... Medicaid providers to recover Medicare overpayments. 447.30 Section 447.30 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE... payments to Medicaid providers to recover Medicare overpayments. (a) Basis and purpose. This section...

Association of hospital participation in a quality reporting program with surgical outcomes and expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries.

PubMed

Osborne, Nicholas H; Nicholas, Lauren H; Ryan, Andrew M; Thumma, Jyothi R; Dimick, Justin B

2015-02-03

The American College of Surgeons National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (ACS NSQIP) provides feedback to hospitals on risk-adjusted outcomes. It is not known if participation in the program improves outcomes and reduces costs relative to nonparticipating hospitals. To evaluate the association of enrollment and participation in the ACS NSQIP with outcomes and Medicare payments compared with control hospitals that did not participate in the program. Quasi-experimental study using national Medicare data (2003-2012) for a total of 1,226,479 patients undergoing general and vascular surgery at 263 hospitals participating in ACS NSQIP and 526 nonparticipating hospitals. A difference-in-differences analytic approach was used to evaluate whether participation in ACS NSQIP was associated with improved outcomes and reduced Medicare payments compared with nonparticipating hospitals that were otherwise similar. Control hospitals were selected using propensity score matching (2 control hospitals for each ACS NSQIP hospital). Thirty-day mortality, serious complications (eg, pneumonia, myocardial infarction, or acute renal failure and a length of stay >75th percentile), reoperation, and readmission within 30 days. Hospital costs were assessed using price-standardized Medicare payments during hospitalization and 30 days after discharge. After accounting for patient factors and preexisting time trends toward improved outcomes, there were no statistically significant improvements in outcomes at 1, 2, or 3 years after (vs before) enrollment in ACS NSQIP. For example, in analyses comparing outcomes at 3 years after (vs before) enrollment, there were no statistically significant differences in risk-adjusted 30-day mortality (4.3% after enrollment vs 4.5% before enrollment; relative risk [RR], 0.96 [95% CI, 0.89 to 1.03]), serious complications (11.1% after enrollment vs 11.0% before enrollment; RR, 0.96 [95% CI, 0.91 to 1.00]), reoperations (0.49% after enrollment vs 0.45% before

Medicare program; home health prospective payment system rate update for calendar year 2012. Final rule.

PubMed

2011-11-04

This final rule sets forth updates to the home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) rates, including: the national standardized 60-day episode rates; the national per-visit rates; and the low utilization payment amount (LUPA) under the Medicare PPS for home health agencies effective January 1, 2012. This rule applies a 1.4 percent update factor to the episode rates, which reflects a 1 percent reduction applied to the 2.4 percent market basket update factor, as mandated by the Affordable Care Act. This rule also updates the wage index used under the HH PPS, and further reduces home health payments to account for continued nominal growth in case-mix which is unrelated to changes in patient health status. This rule removes two hypertension codes from the HH PPS case-mix system, thereby requiring recalibration of the case-mix weights. In addition, the rule implements two structural changes designed to decrease incentives to upcode and provide unneeded therapy services. Finally, this rule incorporates additional flexibility regarding face-to-face encounters with providers related to home health care.

30-Day Episode Payments and Heart Failure Outcomes Among Medicare Beneficiaries.

PubMed

Wadhera, Rishi K; Joynt Maddox, Karen E; Wang, Yun; Shen, Changyu; Yeh, Robert W

2018-05-01

The purpose of this study was to examine the association of 30-day payments for an episode of heart failure (HF) care at the hospital level with patient outcomes. There is increased focus among policymakers on improving value for HF care, given its rising prevalence and associated financial burden in the United States; however, little is known about the relationship between payments and mortality for a 30-day episode of HF care. Using Medicare claims data for all fee-for-service beneficiaries hospitalized for HF between July 1, 2011, and June 30, 2014, we examined the association between 30-day Medicare payments at the hospital level (beginning with a hospital admission for HF and across multiple settings following discharge) and patient 30-day mortality using mixed-effect logistic regression models. We included 1,343,792 patients hospitalized for HF across 2,948 hospitals. Mean hospital-level 30-day Medicare payments per beneficiary were $15,423 ± $1,523. Overall observed mortality in the cohort was 11.3%. Higher hospital-level 30-day payments were associated with lower patient mortality after adjustment for patient characteristics (odds ratio per $1,000 increase in payments: 0.961; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.954 to 0.967). This relationship was slightly attenuated after accounting for hospital characteristics and HF volume, but remained significant (odds ratio per $1,000 increase: 0.968; 95% CI: 0.962 to 0.975). Additional adjustment for potential mediating factors, including cardiac service capability and post-acute service use, did not significantly affect the relationship. Higher hospital-level 30-day episode payments were associated with lower patient mortality following a hospitalization for HF. This has implications for policies that incentivize reduction in payments without considering value. Further investigation is needed to understand the mechanisms that underlie this relationship. Copyright © 2018 American College of Cardiology

75 FR 32858 - Medicare Program; Policy and Technical Changes to the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-10

... Medicare Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs; Corrections AGENCY: Centers for... Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs'' which appeared in the April 15, 2010 Federal... and Technical Changes to the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs...

Medicare and Medicaid Programs; CY 2016 Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update; Home Health Value-Based Purchasing Model; and Home Health Quality Reporting Requirements. Final rule.

PubMed

2015-11-05

This final rule will update Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rates, the national per-visit rates, and the non-routine medical supply (NRS) conversion factor under the Medicare prospective payment system for home health agencies (HHAs), effective for episodes ending on or after January 1, 2016. As required by the Affordable Care Act, this rule implements the 3rd year of the 4-year phase-in of the rebasing adjustments to the HH PPS payment rates. This rule updates the HH PPS case-mix weights using the most current, complete data available at the time of rulemaking and provides a clarification regarding the use of the "initial encounter'' seventh character applicable to certain ICD-10-CM code categories. This final rule will also finalize reductions to the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rate in CY 2016, CY 2017, and CY 2018 of 0.97 percent in each year to account for estimated case-mix growth unrelated to increases in patient acuity (nominal case-mix growth) between CY 2012 and CY 2014. In addition, this rule implements a HH value-based purchasing (HHVBP) model, beginning January 1, 2016, in which all Medicare-certified HHAs in selected states will be required to participate. Finally, this rule finalizes minor changes to the home health quality reporting program and minor technical regulations text changes.

Assessing Medicare's Approach To Covering New Drugs In Bundled Payments For Oncology.

PubMed

Muldoon, L Daniel; Pelizzari, Pamela M; Lang, Kelsey A; Vandigo, Joe; Pyenson, Bruce S

2018-05-01

New oncology therapies can contribute to survival or quality of life, but payers and policy makers have raised concerns about the cost of these therapies. Similar concerns extend beyond cancer. In seeking a solution, payers are increasingly turning toward value-based payment models in which providers take financial risk for costs and outcomes. These models, including episode payment and bundled payment, create financial gains for providers who reduce cost, but they also create concerns about potential stinting on necessary treatments. One approach, which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services adopted in the Oncology Care Model (OCM), is to partially adjust medical practices' budgets for their use of novel therapies, defined in this case as new oncology drugs or new indications for existing drugs approved after December 31, 2014. In an analysis of the OCM novel therapies adjustment using historical Medicare claims data, we found that the adjustment may provide important financial protection for practices. In a simulation we performed, the adjustment reduced the average loss per treatment episode by $758 (from $807 to $49) for large practices that use novel therapies often. Lessons from the OCM can have implications for other alternative payment models.

Medicare program; FY 2014 inpatient prospective payment systems: changes to certain cost reporting procedures related to disproportionate share hospital uncompensated care payments. Interim final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2013-10-03

: In the fiscal year (FY) 2014 inpatient prospective payment systems (IPPS)/long-term care hospital (LTCH) PPS final rule, we established the methodology for determining the amount of uncompensated care payments made to hospitals eligible for the disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment adjustment in FY 2014 and a process for making interim and final payments. This interim final rule with comment period revises certain operational considerations for hospitals with Medicare cost reporting periods that span more than one Federal fiscal year and also makes changes to the data that will be used in the uncompensated care payment calculation in order to ensure that data from Indian Health Service (IHS) hospitals are included in Factor 1 and Factor 3 of that calculation.

42 CFR 422.308 - Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments. 422.308 Section 422.308 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM Payments to...

78 FR 8535 - Medicare Program: Comprehensive End-Stage Renal Disease Care Model Announcement

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-06

... develop and test innovative health care payment and service delivery models that show promise of reducing program expenditures, while preserving or enhancing the quality of care for Medicare, Medicaid, and... disease (ESRD). This population has complex health care needs, typically with comorbid conditions and...

Medicare incentive payments for meaningful use of electronic health records: accounting and reporting developments.

PubMed

2012-02-01

The Healthcare Financial Management Association through its Principles and Practices (P&P) Board publishes issue analyses to provide short-term practical assistance on emerging issues in healthcare financial management. In a new issue analysis excerpted in this article, HFMA's P&P Board provides some clarity to the healthcare industry on certain accounting and reporting issues resulting from incentive payments under the Medicare program for the meaningful use of electronic health record (EHR) technology. Consultation on these matters with independent auditors is highly recommended.

Variations in Medicare Reimbursement in Radiation Oncology: An Analysis of the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data Set

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Vu, Charles C.; Lanni, Thomas B.; Robertson, John M., E-mail: JRobertson@beaumont.edu

Purpose: The purposes of this study were to summarize recently published data on Medicare reimbursement to individual radiation oncologists and to identify the causes of variation in Medicare reimbursement in radiation oncology. Methods and Materials: The Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier Public Use File (POSPUF), which details nearly all services provided by radiation oncologists in 2012, was used for this study. The data were filtered and analyzed by physician and by billing code. Statistical analysis was performed to identify differences in reimbursements based on sex, rurality, billing of technical services, or location in a certificatemore » of need (CON) state. Results: There were 4135 radiation oncologists who received a total of $1,499,625,803 in payments from Medicare in 2012. Seventy-five percent of radiation oncologists were male. The median reimbursement was $146,453. The code with the highest total reimbursement was 77418 (radiation treatment delivery intensity modulated radiation therapy [IMRT]). The most commonly billed evaluation and management (E/M) code for new visits was 99205 (49%). The most commonly billed E/M code for established visits was 99213 (54%). Forty percent of providers billed none of their new office visits using 99205 (the highest E/M billing code), whereas 34% of providers billed all of their new office visits using 99205. For the 1510 radiation oncologists (37%) who billed technical services, median Medicare reimbursement was $606,008, compared with $93,921 for all other radiation oncologists (P<.001). On multivariate analysis, technical services billing (P<.001), male sex (P<.001), and rural location (P=.007) were predictive of higher Medicare reimbursement. Conclusions: The billing of technical services, with their high capital and labor overhead requirements, limits any comparison in reimbursement between individual radiation oncologists or between radiation oncologists and other

Variations in Medicare Reimbursement in Radiation Oncology: An Analysis of the Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data Set.

PubMed

Vu, Charles C; Lanni, Thomas B; Robertson, John M

2016-04-01

The purposes of this study were to summarize recently published data on Medicare reimbursement to individual radiation oncologists and to identify the causes of variation in Medicare reimbursement in radiation oncology. The Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data: Physician and Other Supplier Public Use File (POSPUF), which details nearly all services provided by radiation oncologists in 2012, was used for this study. The data were filtered and analyzed by physician and by billing code. Statistical analysis was performed to identify differences in reimbursements based on sex, rurality, billing of technical services, or location in a certificate of need (CON) state. There were 4135 radiation oncologists who received a total of $1,499,625,803 in payments from Medicare in 2012. Seventy-five percent of radiation oncologists were male. The median reimbursement was $146,453. The code with the highest total reimbursement was 77418 (radiation treatment delivery intensity modulated radiation therapy [IMRT]). The most commonly billed evaluation and management (E/M) code for new visits was 99205 (49%). The most commonly billed E/M code for established visits was 99213 (54%). Forty percent of providers billed none of their new office visits using 99205 (the highest E/M billing code), whereas 34% of providers billed all of their new office visits using 99205. For the 1510 radiation oncologists (37%) who billed technical services, median Medicare reimbursement was $606,008, compared with $93,921 for all other radiation oncologists (P<.001). On multivariate analysis, technical services billing (P<.001), male sex (P<.001), and rural location (P=.007) were predictive of higher Medicare reimbursement. The billing of technical services, with their high capital and labor overhead requirements, limits any comparison in reimbursement between individual radiation oncologists or between radiation oncologists and other specialists. Male sex and rural practice location are

Financial implications to Medicare from changing the dialysis modality mix under the bundled prospective payment system.

PubMed

Liu, Frank X; Walton, Surrey M; Leipold, Robert; Isbell, Deborah; Golper, Thomas A

2014-01-01

The economic burden of treating end-stage renal disease (ESRD) continues to grow. As one response, effective January 1, 2011, Medicare implemented a bundled prospective payment system (PPS, including injectable drugs) for dialysis patients. This study investigated the 5-year budget impact on Medicare under the new PPS of changes in the distribution of patients undergoing peritoneal dialysis (PD), in-center hemodialysis (ICHD), and home hemodialysis (HHD). An Excel-based budget impact model was created to assess dialysis-associated Medicare costs. The model accounted for dialysis access establishment, the current monthly capitation physician payment for ESRD, Medicare dialysis payments (including start-up costs), training, oral drug costs, and the costs and probabilities of adverse events including access failure, hospitalization for access infection, pneumonia, septicemia, and cardiovascular events. United States Renal Data System (USRDS) data were used to project the US Medicare dialysis patient population across time. The baseline scenario assumed a stable distribution of PD (7.7%), HHD (1.3%) and ICHD (91.0%) over 5 years. Three comparison scenarios raised the proportions of PD and HHD by (1) 1% and 0.5%, (2) 2% and 0.75%, and (3) 3% and 1% each year; a fourth scenario held HHD constant and lowered PD by 1% per year. Under the bundled PPS, scenarios that increased PD and HHD from 7.7% and 1.3% over 5 years resulted in cumulative savings to Medicare of $114.8M (Scenario 1, 11.7% PD and 3.3% HHD at year 5), $232.9M (Scenario 2, 15.7% PD and 4.3% HHD at year 5), and $350.9M (Scenario 3, 19.7% PD and 5.3% HHD at year 5). When the PD population was decreased from 7.7% in 2013 to 3.7% by 2017 with a constant HHD population, the total Medicare payment for dialysis patients increased by over $121.2M. Under Medicare bundled PPS, increasing the proportion of patients on PD and HHD vs ICHD could generate substantial savings in dialysis-associated costs to Medicare

A Comparison of Ambulatory Surgery Center Production Costs and Medicare Payments: Evidence on Colonoscopy and Endoscopy.

PubMed

Mitchell, Jean M; Carey, Kathleen

2016-02-01

Ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) are freestanding facilities that specialize in surgical and diagnostic procedures that do not require an overnight stay. While it is generally assumed that ASCs are less costly than hospital outpatient surgery departments, there is sparse empirical evidence regarding their relative production costs. To estimate ASC production costs using financial and claims records for procedures performed by surgery centers that specialize in gastroenterology procedures (colonoscopy and endoscopy). We estimate production costs in ASCs that specialize in gastroenterology procedures using financial cost and patient discharge data from Pennsylvania for the time period 2004-2013. We focus on the 2 primary procedures (colonoscopies and endoscopies) performed at each ASC. We use our estimates to predict average costs for each procedure and then compare predicted costs to Medicare ACS payments for these procedures. Comparisons of the costs of each procedure with 2013 national Medicare ASC payment rates suggest that Medicare payments exceed production costs for both colonoscopy and endoscopy. This study demonstrated that it is feasible to estimate production costs for procedures performed in freestanding surgery centers. The procedure-specific cost estimates can then be compared with ASC payment rates to ascertain if payments are aligned with costs. This approach can serve as an evaluation template for CMS and private insurers who are concerned that ASC facility payments for specific procedures may be excessive.

78 FR 13346 - Medicare Program; Changes to the Semi-Annual Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-27

... (HOP Panel)--March 11 and March 12, 2013 AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), HHS... Program; Semi-Annual Meeting of the Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient Payment (HOP Panel)--March 11...-annual meeting of the Advisory Panel on Hospital Outpatient Payment (HOP, the Panel) for 2013. We note...

Mortality, Hospital Costs, Payments, and Readmissions Associated With Clostridium difficile Infection Among Medicare Beneficiaries.

PubMed

Drozd, Edward M; Inocencio, Timothy J; Braithwaite, Shamonda; Jagun, Dayo; Shah, Hemal; Quon, Nicole C; Broderick, Kelly C; Kuti, Joseph L

2015-11-01

The management of Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) among hospitalized patients is costly, and ongoing payment reform is compelling hospitals to reduce its burden. To assess the impact of CDI on mortality, hospital costs, healthcare use, and Medicare payments for beneficiaries who were discharged with CDI listed as a secondary International Classification of Diseases , Ninth Revision , Clinical Modification claim diagnosis. Data were analyzed from the 2009 to 2010 5% random sample Medicare Standard Analytic Files of beneficiary claims. Patients with index hospitalizations with CDI as a secondary diagnosis and no previous hospitalization within 30 days were identified. Outcomes included inpatient and 30-day mortality, inpatient costs, index hospital payments, all-provider payments, net hospital losses, payment to cost ratio, length of stay (LOS), and 30-day readmission; outcomes were each risk adjusted using propensity score matching and regression modeling techniques. A total of 3262 patients with CDI were identified after matching to patients without a CDI diagnosis. After risk adjustment, secondary CDI was associated with statistically significantly (all P < 0.05) greater inpatient mortality (3.1% vs. 1.7%), 30-day mortality (4.1% vs. 2.2%), longer LOS (7.0 days vs. 3.8 days), higher rates of 30-day hospital readmissions (14.8% vs. 10.4%), and greater hospital costs ($16,184 vs. $13,954) compared with the non-CDI cohort. The risk-adjusted payment-to-cost ratio was shown to be lower for patients with CDI than those without (0.76 vs. 0.85). Secondary CDI is associated with greater adjusted mortality, costs, LOS, and hospital readmissions, while receiving similar hospital reimbursement compared with patients without CDI in a Medicare population.

Mortality, Hospital Costs, Payments, and Readmissions Associated With Clostridium difficile Infection Among Medicare Beneficiaries

PubMed Central

Drozd, Edward M.; Inocencio, Timothy J.; Braithwaite, Shamonda; Jagun, Dayo; Shah, Hemal; Quon, Nicole C.; Broderick, Kelly C.; Kuti, Joseph L.

2015-01-01

Background The management of Clostridium difficile infection (CDI) among hospitalized patients is costly, and ongoing payment reform is compelling hospitals to reduce its burden. To assess the impact of CDI on mortality, hospital costs, healthcare use, and Medicare payments for beneficiaries who were discharged with CDI listed as a secondary International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification claim diagnosis. Methods Data were analyzed from the 2009 to 2010 5% random sample Medicare Standard Analytic Files of beneficiary claims. Patients with index hospitalizations with CDI as a secondary diagnosis and no previous hospitalization within 30 days were identified. Outcomes included inpatient and 30-day mortality, inpatient costs, index hospital payments, all-provider payments, net hospital losses, payment to cost ratio, length of stay (LOS), and 30-day readmission; outcomes were each risk adjusted using propensity score matching and regression modeling techniques. Results A total of 3262 patients with CDI were identified after matching to patients without a CDI diagnosis. After risk adjustment, secondary CDI was associated with statistically significantly (all P < 0.05) greater inpatient mortality (3.1% vs. 1.7%), 30-day mortality (4.1% vs. 2.2%), longer LOS (7.0 days vs. 3.8 days), higher rates of 30-day hospital readmissions (14.8% vs. 10.4%), and greater hospital costs ($16,184 vs. $13,954) compared with the non-CDI cohort. The risk-adjusted payment-to-cost ratio was shown to be lower for patients with CDI than those without (0.76 vs. 0.85). Conclusions Secondary CDI is associated with greater adjusted mortality, costs, LOS, and hospital readmissions, while receiving similar hospital reimbursement compared with patients without CDI in a Medicare population. PMID:27885315

The Relationship Between Magnet Designation, Electronic Health Record Adoption, and Medicare Meaningful Use Payments.

PubMed

Lippincott, Christine; Foronda, Cynthia; Zdanowicz, Martin; McCabe, Brian E; Ambrosia, Todd

2017-08-01

The objective of this study was to examine the relationship between nursing excellence and electronic health record adoption. Of 6582 US hospitals, 4939 were eligible for the Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, and 6419 were eligible for evaluation on the HIMSS Analytics Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model. Of 399 Magnet hospitals, 330 were eligible for the Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, and 393 were eligible for evaluation in the HIMSS Analytics Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model. Meaningful use attestation was defined as receipt of a Medicare Electronic Health Record Incentive Program payment. The adoption electronic health record was defined as Level 6 and/or 7 on the HIMSS Analytics Electronic Medical Record Adoption Model. Logistic regression showed that Magnet-designated hospitals were more likely attest to Meaningful Use than non-Magnet hospitals (odds ratio = 3.58, P < .001) and were more likely to adopt electronic health records than non-Magnet hospitals (Level 6 only: odds ratio = 3.68, P < .001; Level 6 or 7: odds ratio = 4.02, P < .001). This study suggested a positive relationship between Magnet status and electronic health record use, which involves earning financial incentives for successful adoption. Continued investigation is needed to examine the relationships between the quality of nursing care, electronic health record usage, financial implications, and patient outcomes.

Medicare program; competitive acquisition for certain durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) and other issues. Final rule.

PubMed

2007-04-10

This final rule establishes competitive bidding programs for certain Medicare Part B covered items of durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) throughout the United States in accordance with sections 1847(a) and (b) of the Social Security Act. These competitive bidding programs, which will be phased in over several years, utilize bids submitted by DMEPOS suppliers to establish applicable payment amounts under Medicare Part B.

42 CFR 411.108 - Taking into account entitlement to Medicare.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM EXCLUSIONS FROM MEDICARE AND LIMITATIONS ON MEDICARE PAYMENT Limitations... basis of ESRD, age, or disability (or eligible on the basis of ESRD) include, but are not limited to... Medicare on the basis of disability without denying or terminating coverage for similarly situated...

76 FR 68525 - Medicare Program; Home Health Prospective Payment System Rate Update for Calendar Year 2012

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-04

...This final rule sets forth updates to the home health prospective payment system (HH PPS) rates, including: the national standardized 60-day episode rates; the national per-visit rates; and the low utilization payment amount (LUPA) under the Medicare PPS for home health agencies effective January 1, 2012. This rule applies a 1.4 percent update factor to the episode rates, which reflects a 1 percent reduction applied to the 2.4 percent market basket update factor, as mandated by the Affordable Care Act. This rule also updates the wage index used under the HH PPS, and further reduces home health payments to account for continued nominal growth in case-mix which is unrelated to changes in patient health status. This rule removes two hypertension codes from the HH PPS case-mix system, thereby requiring recalibration of the case-mix weights. In addition, the rule implements two structural changes designed to decrease incentives to upcode and provide unneeded therapy services. Finally, this rule incorporates additional flexibility regarding face-to-face encounters with providers related to home health care.

42 CFR 414.102 - General payment rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false General payment rules. 414.102 Section 414.102 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Fee Schedules for...

42 CFR 414.102 - General payment rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false General payment rules. 414.102 Section 414.102 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Fee Schedules for...

42 CFR 414.102 - General payment rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false General payment rules. 414.102 Section 414.102 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Fee Schedules...

42 CFR 414.102 - General payment rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false General payment rules. 414.102 Section 414.102 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Fee Schedules...

42 CFR 414.102 - General payment rules.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false General payment rules. 414.102 Section 414.102 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Fee Schedules...

Medicare program; prospective payment system and consolidated billing for skilled nursing facilities for FY 2015. Final rule.

PubMed

2014-08-05

This final rule updates the payment rates used under the prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) for fiscal year (FY) 2015. In addition, it adopts the most recent Office of Management and Budget (OMB) statistical area delineations to identify a facility's urban or rural status for the purpose of determining which set of rate tables will apply to the facility, and to determine the SNF PPS wage index including a 1-year transition with a blended wage index for all providers for FY 2015. This final rule also contains a revision to policies related to the Change of Therapy (COT) Other Medicare Required Assessment (OMRA). This final rule includes a discussion of a provision related to the Affordable Care Act involving Civil Money Penalties. Finally, this final rule discusses the SNF therapy payment research currently underway within CMS, observed trends related to therapy utilization among SNF providers, and the agency's commitment to accelerating health information exchange in SNFs.

What Financial Incentives Will Be Created by Medicare Bundled Payments for Total Hip Arthroplasty?

PubMed

Clement, R Carter; Kheir, Michael M; Soo, Adrianne E; Derman, Peter B; Levin, L Scott; Fleisher, Lee A

2016-09-01

Bundled payments are gaining popularity in arthroplasty as a tactic for encouraging providers and hospitals to work together to reduce costs. However, this payment model could potentially motivate providers to avoid unprofitable patients, limiting their access to care. Rigorous risk adjustment can prevent this adverse effect, but most current bundling models use limited, if any, risk-adjustment techniques. This study aims to identify and quantify the financial incentives that are likely to develop with total hip arthroplasty (THA) bundled payments that are not accompanied by comprehensive risk stratification. Financial data were collected for all Medicare-eligible patients (age 65+) undergoing primary unilateral THA at an academic center over a 2-year period (n = 553). Bundles were considered to include operative hospitalizations and unplanned readmissions. Multivariate regression was performed to assess the impact of clinical and demographic factors on the variable cost of THA episodes, including unplanned readmissions. (Variable costs reflect the financial incentives that will emerge under bundled payments). Increased costs were associated with advanced age (P < .001), elevated body mass index (BMI; P = .005), surgery performed for hip fracture (P < .001), higher American Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA) Physical Classification System grades (P < .001), and MCCs (Medicare modifier for major complications; P < .001). Regression coefficients were $155/y, $107/BMI point, $2775 for fracture cases, $2137/ASA grade, and $4892 for major complications. No association was found between costs and gender or race. If generalizable, our results suggest that Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services bundled payments encompassing acute inpatient care should be adjusted upward by the aforementioned amounts (regression coefficients above) for advanced age, increasing BMI, cases performed for fractures, elevated ASA grade, and major complications (as defined by Medicare MCC

Medicare's prospective payment system: A critical appraisal

PubMed Central

Coulam, Robert F.; Gaumer, Gary L.

1992-01-01

Implementation of the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) for hospital payment has produced major changes in the hospital industry and in the way hospital services are used by physicians and their patients. The substantial published literature that examines these changes is reviewed in this article. This literature suggests that most of the intended effects of PPS on costs and intensity of care have been realized. But the literature fails to answer fundamental questions about the effectiveness and equity of administered pricing as a policy tool for cost containment. The literature offers some hope that the worst fears about the effects of PPS on quality of care and the health of the hospital industry have not materialized. But because of data lags, the studies done to date seem to tell us more about the effects of the early, more generous period of PPS than about the opportunity costs of reducing hospital cost inflation. PMID:25372306

Medicare Program; Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities Prospective Payment System--Update for Fiscal Year Beginning October 1, 2015 (FY 2016). Final rule.

PubMed

2015-08-05

This final rule updates the prospective payment rates for Medicare inpatient hospital services provided by inpatient psychiatric facilities (IPFs) (which are freestanding IPFs and psychiatric units of an acute care hospital or critical access hospital). These changes are applicable to IPF discharges occurring during fiscal year (FY) 2016 (October 1, 2015 through September 30, 2016). This final rule also implements: a new 2012-based IPF market basket; an updated IPF labor-related share; a transition to new Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) designations in the FY 2016 IPF Prospective Payment System (PPS) wage index; a phase-out of the rural adjustment for IPF providers whose status changes from rural to urban as a result of the wage index CBSA changes; and new quality measures and reporting requirements under the IPF quality reporting program. This final rule also reminds IPFs of the October 1, 2015 implementation of the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM), and updates providers on the status of IPF PPS refinements.

Medicare and Medicaid programs; CY 2015 Home Health Prospective Payment System rate update; Home Health Quality Reporting Requirements; and survey and enforcement requirements for home health agencies. Final rule.

PubMed

2014-11-06

This final rule updates Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including the national, standardized 60-day episode payment rates, the national per-visit rates, and the non-routine medical supply (NRS) conversion factor under the Medicare prospective payment system for home health agencies (HHAs), effective for episodes ending on or after January 1, 2015. As required by the Affordable Care Act, this rule implements the second year of the four-year phase-in of the rebasing adjustments to the HH PPS payment rates. This rule provides information on our efforts to monitor the potential impacts of the rebasing adjustments and the Affordable Care Act mandated face-to-face encounter requirement. This rule also implements: Changes to simplify the face-to-face encounter regulatory requirements; changes to the HH PPS case-mix weights; changes to the home health quality reporting program requirements; changes to simplify the therapy reassessment timeframes; a revision to the Speech-Language Pathology (SLP) personnel qualifications; minor technical regulations text changes; and limitations on the reviewability of the civil monetary penalty provisions. Finally, this rule also discusses Medicare coverage of insulin injections under the HH PPS, the delay in the implementation of the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM), and a HH value-based purchasing (HH VBP) model.

76 FR 63017 - Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-11

... to the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs for Contract Year 2013 and Other Proposed Changes; Considering Changes to the Conditions of Participation for Long Term Care... to the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Programs for Contract Year 2013...

42 CFR 411.46 - Lump-sum payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Lump-sum payments. 411.46 Section 411.46 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM... Covered Under Workers' Compensation § 411.46 Lump-sum payments. (a) Lump-sum commutation of future...

Using chronic disease risk factors to adjust Medicare capitation payments

PubMed Central

Schauffler, Helen Halpin; Howland, Jonathan; Cobb, Janet

1992-01-01

This study evaluates the use of risk factors for chronic disease as health status adjusters for Medicare's capitation formula, the average adjusted per capita costs (AAPCC). Risk factor data for the surviving members of the Framingham Study cohort who were examined in 1982-83 were merged with 100 percent Medicare payment data for 1984 and 1985, matching on Social Security number and sex. Seven different AAPCC models were estimated to assess the independent contributions of risk factors and measures of prior utilization and disability in increasing the explanatory power of AAPCC. The findings suggest that inclusion of risk factors for chronic disease as health status adjusters can improve substantially the predictive accuracy of AAPCC. PMID:10124441

Specialty Payment Model Opportunities and Assessment: Oncology Simulation Report.

PubMed

White, Chapin; Chan, Chris; Huckfeldt, Peter J; Kofner, Aaron; Mulcahy, Andrew W; Pollak, Julia; Popescu, Ioana; Timbie, Justin W; Hussey, Peter S

2015-07-15

This article describes the results of a simulation analysis of a payment model for specialty oncology services that is being developed for possible testing by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). CMS asked MITRE and RAND to conduct simulation analyses to preview some of the possible impacts of the payment model and to inform design decisions related to the model. The simulation analysis used an episode-level dataset based on Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims for historical oncology episodes provided to Medicare FFS beneficiaries in 2010. Under the proposed model, participating practices would continue to receive FFS payments, would also receive per-beneficiary per-month care management payments for episodes lasting up to six months, and would be eligible for performance-based payments based on per-episode spending for attributed episodes relative to a per-episode spending target. The simulation offers several insights into the proposed payment model for oncology: (1) The care management payments used in the simulation analysis-$960 total per six-month episode-represent only 4 percent of projected average total spending per episode (around $27,000 in 2016), but they are large relative to the FFS revenues of participating oncology practices, which are projected to be around $2,000 per oncology episode. By themselves, the care management payments would increase physician practices' Medicare revenues by roughly 50 percent on average. This represents a substantial new outlay for the Medicare program and a substantial new source of revenues for oncology practices. (2) For the Medicare program to break even, participating oncology practices would have to reduce utilization and intensity by roughly 4 percent. (3) The break-even point can be reduced if the care management payments are reduced or if the performance-based payments are reduced.

77 FR 38066 - Medicare Program; Announcement of a New Opportunity for Participation in the Advance Payment...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-06-26

... achieving better health for populations, better health care for individuals, and lower growth in expenditures through continuous improvement for Medicare, Medicaid, and Children's Health Insurance Program... DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS-5505-N3...

Telehealth and Medicare: Payment Policy, Current Use, and Prospects for Growth

PubMed Central

Gilman, Matlin; Stensland, Jeff

2013-01-01

Objective Evaluate the growth in various types of Medicare-paid telehealth services. Background There has been a long-standing hope that telehealth could be used to reduce rural patients’ travel times to specialty physicians. Medicare covers telehealth services provided through live, interactive videoconferencing between a beneficiary located at a certified rural site and a distant practitioner. Methods We analyzed 100% of telehealth Medicare claims for 2009 matched to individual patient ZIP codes and individual provider characteristics. Results Despite increases in Medicare payment rates for telehealth services, expansions of covered services, reductions in provider requirements, and provisions of federal grants to encourage telehealth, growth in adoption of telehealth among providers has been modest. Medicare claims indicate that only 369 providers had 10 or more Medicare telehealth consultations in 2009. Roughly half of the 369 were mental health professionals, and about one-in-five of the 369 were non-physician professionals (e.g., physician assistants and nurse practitioners). On balance, the strong areas of telehealth are mental health and, surprisingly, nonphysician professionals. The comparative advantage of mental health could be the verbal (rather than physical contact) nature of mental health care, and the comparative advantage of non-physician professionals could be their lower labor costs. PMID:24834368

Changes in the use of postacute care during the initial Medicare payment reforms.

PubMed

Lin, Wen-Chieh; Kane, Robert L; Mehr, David R; Madsen, Richard W; Petroski, Gregory F

2006-08-01

To examine changes in postacute care (PAC) use during the initial Medicare payment reforms enacted by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. We used claims data from the 5 percent Medicare beneficiary sample in 1996, 1998, and 2000. Linked data from the Denominator file, Provider of Service file, and Area Resource File provided additional patient, hospital, and market-area characteristics. Six disease groups with high PAC use were selected for analysis. We used multinomial logit regression to examine how PAC use differed by year of service, controlling for patient, hospital, and market-area characteristics. There were major changes in PAC use, and a portion of services shifted to settings where reimbursement remained cost-based. During the first reform, the home health agency interim payment system, home health use decreased consistently across disease groups. This decrease was accompanied by increased use in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs). Following the implementation of the prospective payment system for SNFs, the use of inpatient rehabilitation facilities increased. The shift in usage among settings occurred in two stages that corresponded to the timing of payment reforms for home health agencies and SNFs. Evidence strongly suggests the substitutability between PAC settings. Financial incentives, in addition to clinical needs and individual preferences, play a major role in PAC use.

42 CFR 412.432 - Method of payment under the inpatient psychiatric facility prospective payment system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR... inpatient psychiatric facility receives payment under this subpart for inpatient operating cost and capital-related costs for each inpatient stay following submission of a bill. (b) Periodic interim payments (PIP...

42 CFR 412.20 - Hospital services subject to the prospective payment systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... payment systems. 412.20 Section 412.20 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Hospital Services Subject to and Excluded From the Prospective Payment Systems for Inpatient...

Understanding the Impacts of the Medicare Modernization Act: Concerns of Congressional Staff

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mueller, Keith J.; Coburn, Andrew F.; MacKinney, Clinton; McBride, Timothy D.; Slifkin, Rebecca T.; Wakefield, Mary K.

2005-01-01

Sweeping changes to the Medicare program embodied in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), including a new prescription drug benefit, changes in payment policies, and reform of the Medicare managed-care program, have major implications for rural health care. The most efficient mechanism for research to…

Medicare Postacute Care Payment Reforms Have Potential to Improve Efficiency, but May Need Changes to Cut Costs

PubMed Central

Grabowski, David C.; Huckfeldt, Peter J.; Sood, Neeraj; Escarce, José J; Newhouse, Joseph P.

2012-01-01

The Affordable Care Act mandates changes in payment policies for Medicare postacute care services intended to contain spending in the long run and help ensure the program’s financial sustainability. In addition to reducing annual payment increases to providers under the existing prospective payment systems, the act calls for demonstration projects of bundled payment, accountable care organizations, and other strategies to promote care coordination and reduce spending. Experience with the adoption of Medicare prospective payment systems in postacute care settings approximately a decade ago suggests that current reforms could, but need not necessarily, produce such undesirable effects as decreased access for less profitable patients, poorer patient outcomes, and only short-lived curbs on spending. Policy makers will need to be vigilant in monitoring the impact of the Affordable Care Act reforms and be prepared to amend policies as necessary to ensure that the reforms exert persistent controls on spending without compromising the delivery of patient-appropriate postacute services. PMID:22949442

42 CFR 418.308 - Limitation on the amount of hospice payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... total Medicare payment to a hospice for care furnished during a cap period is limited by the hospice cap... HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM HOSPICE CARE Payment for Hospice Care § 418.308 Limitation...

42 CFR 413.60 - Payments to providers: General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... MEDICARE PROGRAM PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE SERVICES... the provider on a cost basis, the intermediary may adjust its rate of payment to an estimate of the result under the Medicare principles of reimbursement. If no organization is paying the provider on a...

42 CFR 412.521 - Basis of payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Basis of payment. 412.521 Section 412.521 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM... medical records requested by a QIO, in accordance with § 476.78(c) of this chapter. (c) Payment by workers...

Medicare Advantage reforms: comparing House and Senate bills.

PubMed

Biles, Brian; Arnold, Grace

2009-12-01

The Medicare Advantage (MA) program, which enables Medicare beneficiaries to enjoy private health plan coverage, is a major element of the current health care reform discussion on Capitol Hill--in large part because payments to MA plans in 2009 are expected to run at least $11 billion more than traditional Medicare would have cost. While the pending Senate and House bills both endeavor to reduce these extra MA payments, their approaches are different. The bills also differ on other aspects of reforming the MA program, such as plans' allowable geographic areas, their risk-adjustment systems and reporting requirements, their potential bonuses for achieving high-quality care and providing good management, and their beneficiary protections. This issue brief compares the above and other provisions in the House and Senate bills, which have a common overall goal to improve the value that Medicare obtains for the dollars it spends

Medicare Financing of Graduate Medical Education

PubMed Central

Rich, Eugene C; Liebow, Mark; Srinivasan, Malathi; Parish, David; Wolliscroft, James O; Fein, Oliver; Blaser, Robert

2002-01-01

The past decade has seen ongoing debate regarding federal support of graduate medical education, with numerous proposals for reform. Several critical problems with the current mechanism are evident on reviewing graduate medical education (GME) funding issues from the perspectives of key stakeholders. These problems include the following: substantial interinstitutional and interspecialty variations in per-resident payment amounts; teaching costs that have not been recalibrated since 1983; no consistent control by physician educators over direct medical education (DME) funds; and institutional DME payments unrelated to actual expenditures for resident education or to program outcomes. None of the current GME reform proposals adequately address all of these issues. Accordingly, we recommend several fundamental changes in Medicare GME support. We propose a re-analysis of the true direct costs of resident training (with appropriate adjustment for local market factors) to rectify the myriad problems with per-resident payments. We propose that Medicare DME funds go to the physician organization providing resident instruction, keeping DME payments separate from the operating revenues of teaching hospitals. To ensure financial accountability, we propose that institutions must maintain budgets and report expenditures for each GME program. To establish educational accountability, Residency Review Committees should establish objective, annually measurable standards for GME program performance; programs that consistently fail to meet these minimum standards should lose discretion over GME funds. These reforms will solve several long-standing, vexing problems in Medicare GME funding, but will also uncover the extent of undersupport of GME by most other health care payers. Ultimately, successful reform of GME financing will require “all-payer” support. PMID:11972725

42 CFR 419.20 - Hospitals subject to the hospital outpatient prospective payment system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... prospective payment system. 419.20 Section 419.20 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM FOR HOSPITAL... Outpatient Prospective Payment System § 419.20 Hospitals subject to the hospital outpatient prospective...

42 CFR 412.6 - Cost reporting periods subject to the prospective payment systems.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... payment systems. 412.6 Section 412.6 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES... prospective payment system for inpatient operating costs, the reasonable costs of services furnished before...

42 CFR 405.372 - Proceeding for suspension of payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Proceeding for suspension of payment. 405.372 Section 405.372 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension of Payment...

42 CFR 405.372 - Proceeding for suspension of payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Proceeding for suspension of payment. 405.372 Section 405.372 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension of Payment...

42 CFR § 414.1405 - Payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2017-10-01

...) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1405 Payment. (a) General. Each MIPS eligible... 42 Public Health 3 2017-10-01 2017-10-01 false Payment. § 414.1405 Section § 414.1405 Public...

Better Patient Care At High-Quality Hospitals May Save Medicare Money And Bolster Episode-Based Payment Models.

PubMed

Tsai, Thomas C; Greaves, Felix; Zheng, Jie; Orav, E John; Zinner, Michael J; Jha, Ashish K

2016-09-01

US policy makers are making efforts to simultaneously improve the quality of and reduce spending on health care through alternative payment models such as bundled payment. Bundled payment models are predicated on the theory that aligning financial incentives for all providers across an episode of care will lower health care spending while improving quality. Whether this is true remains unknown. Using national Medicare fee-for-service claims for the period 2011-12 and data on hospital quality, we evaluated how thirty- and ninety-day episode-based spending were related to two validated measures of surgical quality-patient satisfaction and surgical mortality. We found that patients who had major surgery at high-quality hospitals cost Medicare less than those who had surgery at low-quality institutions, for both thirty- and ninety-day periods. The difference in Medicare spending between low- and high-quality hospitals was driven primarily by postacute care, which accounted for 59.5 percent of the difference in thirty-day episode spending, and readmissions, which accounted for 19.9 percent. These findings suggest that efforts to achieve value through bundled payment should focus on improving care at low-quality hospitals and reducing unnecessary use of postacute care. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

75 FR 70013 - Medicare Program; Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility Prospective Payment System for Federal Fiscal...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-16

... Insurance; and Program No. 93.774, Medicare-- Supplementary Medical Insurance Program) Dated: November 9...: Correction notice. SUMMARY: This document corrects a technical error that appeared in the notice published in... of July 22, 2010 (75 FR 42836), there was a technical error that we are identifying and correcting in...

76 FR 76541 - Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-07

... Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 42 CFR Part 401 Medicare Program; Availability of Medicare Data...; Availability of Medicare Data for Performance Measurement AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS... regarding the release and use of standardized extracts of Medicare claims data for qualified entities to...

Looking at CER from Medicare's perspective.

PubMed

Mohr, Penny

2012-05-01

Comparative effectiveness research (CER) is rapidly adding to the amount of data available to health care coverage and payment decision makers. Medicare's decisions have a large effect on coverage and reimbursement policies throughout the health insurance industry and will likely influence the entire U.S. health care system; thus, examining its role in integrating CER into policy is crucial. To describe the potential benefits of CER to support payment and coverage decisions in the Medicare program, limitations on its use,the role of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in improving the infrastructure for CER, and to discuss challenges that must be addressed to integrate CER into CMS's decision-making process. A defining feature of CER is that it provides the type of evidence that will help decision makers, such as patients, clinicians, and payers,make more informed treatment and policy decisions. Because CMS is responsible for more than 47 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries, the way that Medicare uses CER has the potential to have a large impact on public and individual health. Currently many critical payment and coverage decisions within the Medicare program are made on the basis of poor quality evidence, and CER has the potential to greatly improve the quality of decision making. Despite common misconceptions, CMS is not prohibited by law from using CER apart from some reasonable limitations. CMS is,however, required to support the development of the CER infrastructure by making their data more readily available to researchers. While CER has substantial potential to improve the quality of the agency's policy decisions,challenges remain to integrate CER into Medicare's processes. These challenges include statutory ambiguities, lack of sufficient staff and internal resources to take advantage of CER, and the lack of an active voice in setting priorities for CER and study design. Although challenges exist, CER has the potential to greatly

42 CFR 412.120 - Reductions to total payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Payments to Hospitals Under the Prospective Payment Systems § 412.120 Reductions to total payments. (a) Deductible and coinsurance... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Reductions to total payments. 412.120 Section 412...

78 FR 72155 - Medicare Program; End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System, Quality Incentive Program...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-02

...This rule updates and makes revisions to the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) prospective payment system (PPS) for calendar year (CY) 2014. This rule also sets forth requirements for the ESRD quality incentive program (QIP), including for payment year (PY) 2016 and beyond. In addition, this rule clarifies the grandfathering provision related to the 3-year minimum lifetime requirement (MLR) for Durable Medical Equipment (DME), and provides clarification of the definition of routinely purchased DME. This rule also implements budget-neutral fee schedules for splints and casts, and intraocular lenses (IOLs) inserted in a physician's office. Finally, this rule makes a few technical amendments and corrections to existing regulations related to payment for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) items and services.

42 CFR 413.125 - Payment for home health agency services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Payment for home health agency services. 413.125 Section 413.125 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE...

42 CFR 405.352 - Adjustment of title XVIII incorrect payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Adjustment of title XVIII incorrect payments. 405.352 Section 405.352 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension of Payment...

42 CFR 405.352 - Adjustment of title XVIII incorrect payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Adjustment of title XVIII incorrect payments. 405.352 Section 405.352 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension of Payment...

42 CFR 412.108 - Special treatment: Medicare-dependent, small rural hospitals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Special Treatment of Certain Facilities Under the Prospective Payment System for Inpatient Operating Costs... including days and discharges from units excluded from the prospective payment system under §§ 412.25...

Design Challenges of an Episode-Based Payment Model in Oncology: The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Oncology Care Model.

PubMed

Kline, Ronald M; Muldoon, L Daniel; Schumacher, Heidi K; Strawbridge, Larisa M; York, Andrew W; Mortimer, Laura K; Falb, Alison F; Cox, Katherine J; Bazell, Carol; Lukens, Ellen W; Kapp, Mary C; Rajkumar, Rahul; Bassano, Amy; Conway, Patrick H

2017-07-01

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services developed the Oncology Care Model as an episode-based payment model to encourage participating practitioners to provide higher-quality, better-coordinated care at a lower cost to the nearly three-quarter million fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries with cancer who receive chemotherapy each year. Episode payment models can be complex. They combine into a single benchmark price all payments for services during an episode of illness, many of which may be delivered at different times by different providers in different locations. Policy and technical decisions include the definition of the episode, including its initiation, duration, and included services; the identification of beneficiaries included in the model; and beneficiary attribution to practitioners with overall responsibility for managing their care. In addition, the calculation and risk adjustment of benchmark episode prices for the bundle of services must reflect geographic cost variations and diverse patient populations, including varying disease subtypes, medical comorbidities, changes in standards of care over time, the adoption of expensive new drugs (especially in oncology), as well as diverse practice patterns. Other steps include timely monitoring and intervention as needed to avoid shifting the attribution of beneficiaries on the basis of their expected episode expenditures as well as to ensure the provision of necessary medical services and the development of a meaningful link to quality measurement and improvement through the episode-based payment methodology. The complex and diverse nature of oncology business relationships and the specific rules and requirements of Medicare payment systems for different types of providers intensify these issues. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services believes that by sharing its approach to addressing these decisions and challenges, it may facilitate greater understanding of the model within the oncology

Paying for the Medicare program.

PubMed

Munnell, A H

1985-01-01

Although the hospital insurance (HI) trust fund acted as a source of strength for the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program during its recent financial crises, projections by HCFA and CBO reveal that the Medicare program will experience financing problems of its own within the next decade. No one would argue that Medicare's financing problems should be solved simply by raising more money. However, the prospect of insolvency in the HI trust fund and the increasing strain on general revenues from the Supplementary Medical Insurance trust fund require policymakers to survey the options for increasing Medicare revenues while cost-control devices are being developed. Indeed, even if cost-control efforts are completely successful, additional revenues may be needed in the future to finance new initiatives in the Medicare program. Therefore, this paper will look briefly at current efforts to regain control of soaring hospital and physician costs and then examine some of the more feasible options for increasing Medicare revenues.

42 CFR 460.182 - Medicaid payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Medicaid payment. 460.182 Section 460.182 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED...) Payment § 460.182 Medicaid payment. (a) Under a PACE program agreement, the State administering agency...

78 FR 12427 - Medicare Program; Medical Loss Ratio Requirements for the Medicare Advantage and the Medicare...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-22

...This proposed rule would implement medical loss ratio (MLR) requirements for the Medicare Advantage Program and the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.

78 FR 40835 - Medicare Program; End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System, Quality Incentive Program...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-08

...This rule proposes to update and make revisions to the End- Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) prospective payment system (PPS) for calendar year (CY) 2014. This rule also proposes to set forth requirements for the ESRD quality incentive program (QIP), including for payment year (PY) 2016 and beyond. In addition, this rule proposes to clarify the grandfathering provision related to the 3-year minimum lifetime requirement (MLR) for Durable Medical Equipment (DME). In addition, it provides clarification of the definition of routinely purchased DME. This rule also proposes the implementation of budget- neutral fee schedules for splints and casts, and intraocular lenses (IOLs) inserted in a physician's office. Finally, this rule would make a few technical amendments and corrections to existing regulations related to payment for DMEPOS items and services.

Medicare risk contracting: Determinants of market entry

PubMed Central

Porell, Frank W.; Wallack, Stanley S.

1990-01-01

The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 made it more attractive for health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other competitive medical plans to enter into risk contracts with Medicare. Since the start of the TEFRA program in April 1985, more than 160 HMOs have had risk contracts with Medicare under the program. An investigation of factors associated with TEFRA risk-market entry at the end of 1986 revealed that high adjusted average per capita cost payment levels, prior Medicare cost-contract experience, and prior Federal qualification were the most important factors distinguishing market entrants from nonentrants. PMID:10113567

76 FR 41178 - Medicare Program; Proposed Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-13

... Insurance; and Program No. 93.774, Medicare-- Supplementary Medical Insurance Program) Dated: July 7, 2011...), HHS. ACTION: Correction of proposed rule. SUMMARY: This document corrects technical errors that... explanation of publishing such Tables on the Internet), reflect an error in the calculation of the...

Trends in prevalence of patient case-mix adjusters used in the Medicare dialysis payment system.

PubMed

Hollenbeak, Christopher S; Rubin, Robert J; Tzivelekis, Spiros; Stephens, J Mark

2015-06-01

The Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System (PPS) used data from 2006-08 to set weights for each case-mix adjuster that is part of the bundled payment formula. The details of the population case-mix were not made public, and little is known about consistency of case-mix over time. This study estimated the prevalence of case-mix adjusters during 2006-2008 and analyzed changes in case-mix prevalence from 2000-2008. Cross-sectional cohort study using United States Renal Data System data for Medicare dialysis patients. Three 3-year cohorts (2000-02, 2003-05, 2006-08) were analyzed for changes over time in case-mix prevalence. Double-digit trends were observed in many case-mix categories between 2000-02 and 2006-08. Large declines were observed in prevalence of patients with low BMI, pericarditis, new to dialysis, and ages 18-44. Large increases were observed in chronic co-morbidities, pneumonia and age cohort 80+. Substantial changes in case-mix adjuster prevalence suggest the PPS payment formula should be regularly updated.

Effects of Medicare payment changes on nursing home staffing and deficiencies.

PubMed

Konetzka, R Tamara; Yi, Deokhee; Norton, Edward C; Kilpatrick, Kerry E

2004-06-01

To investigate the effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and associated rate changes on quality of care as represented by staffing ratios and regulatory deficiencies. Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) data from 1996-2000 were linked with Area Resource File (ARF) and Medicare Cost Report data to form a panel dataset. A difference-in-differences model was used to assess effects of the PPS and the BBRA (Balanced Budget Refinement Act) on staffing and deficiencies, a design that allows the separation of the effects of the policies from general trends. Ordinary least squares and negative binomial models were used. The OSCAR and Medicare Cost Report data are self-reported by nursing facilities; ARF data are publicly available. Data were linked by provider ID and county. We find that professional staffing decreased and regulatory deficiencies increased with PPS, and that both effects were mitigated with the BBRA rate increases. The effects appear to increase with the percent of Medicare residents in the facility except, in some cases, at the highest percentage of Medicare. The findings on staffing are statistically significant. The effects on deficiencies, though exhibiting consistent signs and magnitudes with the staffing results, are largely insignificant. Medicare's PPS system and associated rate cuts for SNFs have had a negative effect on staffing and regulatory compliance. Further research is necessary to determine whether these changes are associated with worse outcomes. Findings from this investigation could help guide policy modifications that support the provision of quality nursing home care.

42 CFR 412.8 - Publication of schedules for determining prospective payment rates.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Publication of schedules for determining prospective payment rates. 412.8 Section 412.8 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL...

42 CFR 422.308 - Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments. 422.308 Section 422.308 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM...

42 CFR 422.308 - Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments. 422.308 Section 422.308 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM...

42 CFR 422.308 - Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Adjustments to capitation rates, benchmarks, bids, and payments. 422.308 Section 422.308 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) MEDICARE ADVANTAGE PROGRAM...

Medicare Chronic Care Management Payments and Financial Returns to Primary Care Practices: A Modeling Study.

PubMed

Basu, Sanjay; Phillips, Russell S; Bitton, Asaf; Song, Zirui; Landon, Bruce E

2015-10-20

Physicians have traditionally been reimbursed for face-to-face visits. A new non-visit-based payment for chronic care management (CCM) of Medicare patients took effect in January 2015. To estimate financial implications of CCM payment for primary care practices. Microsimulation model incorporating national data on primary care use, staffing, expenditures, and reimbursements. National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey and other published sources. Medicare patients. 10 years. Practice-level. Comparison of CCM delivery approaches by staff and physicians. Net revenue per full-time equivalent (FTE) physician; time spent delivering CCM services. If nonphysician staff were to deliver CCM services, net revenue to practices would increase despite opportunity and staffing costs. Practices could expect approximately $332 per enrolled patient per year (95% CI, $234 to $429) if CCM services were delivered by registered nurses (RNs), approximately $372 (CI, $276 to $468) if services were delivered by licensed practical nurses, and approximately $385 (CI, $286 to $485) if services were delivered by medical assistants. For a typical practice, this equates to more than $75 ,00 of net annual revenue per FTE physician and 12 hours of nursing service time per week if 50% of eligible patients enroll. At a minimum, 131 Medicare patients (CI, 115 to 140 patients) must enroll for practices to recoup the salary and overhead costs of hiring a full-time RN to provide CCM services. If physicians were to deliver all CCM services, approximately 25% of practices nationwide could expect net revenue losses due to opportunity costs of face-to-face visit time. The CCM program may alter long-term primary care use, which is difficult to predict. Practices that rely on nonphysician team members to deliver CCM services will probably experience substantial net revenue gains but must enroll a sufficient number of eligible patients to recoup costs. None.

42 CFR § 414.1450 - APM incentive payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2017-10-01

... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Alternative Payment Model Incentive § 414.1450 APM incentive payment. (a) In... 42 Public Health 3 2017-10-01 2017-10-01 false APM incentive payment. § 414.1450 Section § 414...

How Successful Is Medicare Advantage?

PubMed Central

Newhouse, Joseph P; McGuire, Thomas G

2014-01-01

Context Medicare Part C, or Medicare Advantage (MA), now almost 30 years old, has generally been viewed as a policy disappointment. Enrollment has vacillated but has never come close to the penetration of managed care plans in the commercial insurance market or in Medicaid, and because of payment policy decisions and selection, the MA program is viewed as having added to cost rather than saving funds for the Medicare program. Recent changes in Medicare policy, including improved risk adjustment, however, may have changed this picture. Methods This article summarizes findings from our group's work evaluating MA's recent performance and investigating payment options for improving its performance even more. We studied the behavior of both beneficiaries and plans, as well as the effects of Medicare policy. Findings Beneficiaries make “mistakes” in their choice of MA plan options that can be explained by behavioral economics. Few beneficiaries make an active choice after they enroll in Medicare. The high prevalence of “zero-premium” plans signals inefficiency in plan design and in the market's functioning. That is, Medicare premium policies interfere with economically efficient choices. The adverse selection problem, in which healthier, lower-cost beneficiaries tend to join MA, appears much diminished. The available measures, while limited, suggest that, on average, MA plans offer care of equal or higher quality and for less cost than traditional Medicare (TM). In counties, greater MA penetration appears to improve TM's performance. Conclusions Medicare policies regarding lock-in provisions and risk adjustment that were adopted in the mid-2000s have mitigated the adverse selection problem previously plaguing MA. On average, MA plans appear to offer higher value than TM, and positive spillovers from MA into TM imply that reimbursement should not necessarily be neutral. Policy changes in Medicare that reform the way that beneficiaries are charged for MA plan

How successful is Medicare Advantage?

PubMed

Newhouse, Joseph P; McGuire, Thomas G

2014-06-01

Medicare Part C, or Medicare Advantage (MA), now almost 30 years old, has generally been viewed as a policy disappointment. Enrollment has vacillated but has never come close to the penetration of managed care plans in the commercial insurance market or in Medicaid, and because of payment policy decisions and selection, the MA program is viewed as having added to cost rather than saving funds for the Medicare program. Recent changes in Medicare policy, including improved risk adjustment, however, may have changed this picture. This article summarizes findings from our group's work evaluating MA's recent performance and investigating payment options for improving its performance even more. We studied the behavior of both beneficiaries and plans, as well as the effects of Medicare policy. Beneficiaries make "mistakes" in their choice of MA plan options that can be explained by behavioral economics. Few beneficiaries make an active choice after they enroll in Medicare. The high prevalence of "zero-premium" plans signals inefficiency in plan design and in the market's functioning. That is, Medicare premium policies interfere with economically efficient choices. The adverse selection problem, in which healthier, lower-cost beneficiaries tend to join MA, appears much diminished. The available measures, while limited, suggest that, on average, MA plans offer care of equal or higher quality and for less cost than traditional Medicare (TM). In counties, greater MA penetration appears to improve TM's performance. Medicare policies regarding lock-in provisions and risk adjustment that were adopted in the mid-2000s have mitigated the adverse selection problem previously plaguing MA. On average, MA plans appear to offer higher value than TM, and positive spillovers from MA into TM imply that reimbursement should not necessarily be neutral. Policy changes in Medicare that reform the way that beneficiaries are charged for MA plan membership are warranted to move more

Indirect medical education and disproportionate share adjustments to Medicare inpatient payment rates.

PubMed

Nguyen, Nguyen Xuan; Sheingold, Steven H

2011-11-04

The indirect medical education (IME) and disproportionate share hospital (DSH) adjustments to Medicare's prospective payment rates for inpatient services are generally intended to compensate hospitals for patient care costs related to teaching activities and care of low income populations. These adjustments were originally established based on the statistical relationships between IME and DSH and hospital costs. Due to a variety of policy considerations, the legislated levels of these adjustments may have deviated over time from these "empirically justified levels," or simply, "empirical levels." In this paper, we estimate the empirical levels of IME and DSH using 2006 hospital data and 2009 Medicare final payment rules. Our analyses suggest that the empirical level for IME would be much smaller than under current law-about one-third to one-half. Our analyses also support the DSH adjustment prescribed by the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)--about one-quarter of the pre-ACA level. For IME, the estimates imply an increase in costs of 1.88% for each 10% increase in teaching intensity. For DSH, the estimates imply that costs would rise by 0.52% for each 10% increase in the low-income patient share for large urban hospitals. Public Domain.

The experience of rural independent pharmacies with medicare part D: reports from the field.

PubMed

Radford, Andrea; Slifkin, Rebecca; Fraser, Roslyn; Mason, Michelle; Mueller, Keith

2007-01-01

The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) created prescription drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries through a new Part D program, the single largest addition to Medicare since its creation in 1965. Prior to program implementation in January 2006, concerns had been voiced as to how independent pharmacies, which represent a higher proportion of all retail pharmacies in rural areas, would fare under the new program. This article describes first-hand reports from rural pharmacist-owners about their experiences with Medicare Part D plans in the first 7 months of 2006 in order to gain a more thorough understanding of the challenges faced by rural independent pharmacies as a result of program implementation. A semi-structured interview protocol was utilized in telephone interviews with 22 pharmacist-owners of rural independent pharmacies in 10 states. The rural independent pharmacists interviewed are experiencing major changes in payment, administrative burden, and interaction with patients as a result of the shift of patients into Medicare Part D plans. While administrative burden has greatly increased, payment and clinical interaction have decreased. Actions should be considered that would help rural independent pharmacists adjust to the new circumstances of having Medicare patients mirror, for administrative and payment purposes, commercially insured patients. Long-term modification of existing policies and regulations may be necessary to assure reasonable access to pharmaceuticals for rural populations. Further study is needed to determine how best to target these modifications to essential pharmacies.

Effects of Medicare Payment Changes on Nursing Home Staffing and Deficiencies

PubMed Central

Konetzka, R Tamara; Yi, Deokhee; Norton, Edward C; Kilpatrick, Kerry E

2004-01-01

Objective To investigate the effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and associated rate changes on quality of care as represented by staffing ratios and regulatory deficiencies. Data Sources Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) data from 1996–2000 were linked with Area Resource File (ARF) and Medicare Cost Report data to form a panel dataset. Study Design A difference-in-differences model was used to assess effects of the PPS and the BBRA (Balanced Budget Refinement Act) on staffing and deficiencies, a design that allows the separation of the effects of the policies from general trends. Ordinary least squares and negative binomial models were used. Data Collection Methods The OSCAR and Medicare Cost Report data are self-reported by nursing facilities; ARF data are publicly available. Data were linked by provider ID and county. Principal Findings We find that professional staffing decreased and regulatory deficiencies increased with PPS, and that both effects were mitigated with the BBRA rate increases. The effects appear to increase with the percent of Medicare residents in the facility except, in some cases, at the highest percentage of Medicare. The findings on staffing are statistically significant. The effects on deficiencies, though exhibiting consistent signs and magnitudes with the staffing results, are largely insignificant. Conclusions Medicare's PPS system and associated rate cuts for SNFs have had a negative effect on staffing and regulatory compliance. Further research is necessary to determine whether these changes are associated with worse outcomes. Findings from this investigation could help guide policy modifications that support the provision of quality nursing home care. PMID:15149474

42 CFR 414.313 - Initial method of payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... inpatients who were not admitted solely to receive maintenance dialysis. (iv) Administration of hepatitis B... (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH SERVICES Determination of Reasonable... of this subchapter. (b) Services for which payment is not included in the add-on payment. (1...

42 CFR 495.211 - Payment adjustments effective for 2015 and subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and MA-affiliated eligible hospitals. 495.211 Section 495... PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.211 Payment adjustments effective for 2015 and subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and MA-affiliated eligible...

42 CFR 495.211 - Payment adjustments effective for 2015 and subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and MA-affiliated eligible hospitals. 495.211 Section 495... PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.211 Payment adjustments effective for 2015 and subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and MA-affiliated eligible...

42 CFR 495.211 - Payment adjustments effective for 2015 and subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and MA-affiliated eligible hospitals. 495.211 Section 495... PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.211 Payment adjustments effective for 2015 and subsequent MA payment years with respect to MA EPs and MA-affiliated eligible...

What Incentives Are Created by Medicare Payments for Total Hip Arthroplasty?

PubMed

Clement, R Carter; Soo, Adrianne E; Kheir, Michael M; Derman, Peter B; Flynn, David N; Levin, L Scott; Fleisher, Lee A

2016-09-01

Differences in profitability and contribution margin (CM) between various patient populations may make certain patients particularly attractive (or unattractive) to providers. This study seeks to identify patient characteristics associated with increased profit and CM among Medicare patients undergoing total hip arthroplasty (THA). The expected Medicare reimbursement for consecutive patients of Medicare-eligible age (65+ years) undergoing primary unilateral elective THA (n = 498) was calculated in accordance with Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services policy. Costs were derived from the hospital's cost accounting system. Profit and CM were calculated for each patient as reimbursement less total and variable costs, respectively. Patients were compared based on clinical and demographic factors by univariate and multivariate analyses. Medicare patients undergoing THA generated negative average profits but substantial positive CMs. Lower profit and CM were associated with higher American Society of Anesthesiologists Physical Status Classification (P < .01, P = .03), older age (P < .01), and longer length of stay (P < .01, P = .03). No association was found with gender, body mass index, or race. If our results are generalizable, Medicare patients requiring THA are currently financially attractive, but institutions have a long-term incentive to shift resources to more profitable patients and service lines, which may eventually restrict access to care for this population. THA providers have a financial incentive to favor Medicare patients with younger age, lower American Society of Anesthesiologists Physical Status Classification, and those who can be expected to require relatively short admissions. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services must strive to accurately match reimbursement rates to provider costs to avoid inequitable payments to providers and financial incentives discouraging treatment of high-risk patients or other patient subpopulations. Copyright

Medicare Program; Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities for FY 2017, SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program, SNF Quality Reporting Program, and SNF Payment Models Research. Final rule.

PubMed

2016-08-05

This final rule updates the payment rates used under the prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) for fiscal year (FY) 2017. In addition, it specifies a potentially preventable readmission measure for the Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing Program (SNF VBP), and implements requirements for that program, including performance standards, a scoring methodology, and a review and correction process for performance information to be made public, aimed at implementing value-based purchasing for SNFs. Additionally, this final rule includes additional polices and measures in the Skilled Nursing Facility Quality Reporting Program (SNF QRP). This final rule also responds to comments on the SNF Payment Models Research (PMR) project.

76 FR 21372 - Medicare Program; Solicitation for Proposals for the Medicare Community-Based Care Transitions...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-04-15

...] Medicare Program; Solicitation for Proposals for the Medicare Community-Based Care Transitions Program... interested parties of an opportunity to apply to participate in the Medicare Community-based Care Transitions Program, which was authorized by section 3026 of the Affordable Care Act. DATES: Proposals will be...

Financial Performance of Rural Medicare ACOs.

PubMed

Nattinger, Matthew C; Mueller, Keith; Ullrich, Fred; Zhu, Xi

2018-12-01

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has facilitated the development of Medicare accountable care organizations (ACOs), mostly through the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). To inform the operation of the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation's (CMMI) ACO programs, we assess the financial performance of rural ACOs based on different levels of rural presence. We used the 2014 performance data for Medicare ACOs to examine the financial performance of rural ACOs with different levels of rural presence: exclusively rural, mostly rural, and mixed rural/metropolitan. Of the ACOs reporting performance data, we identified 97 ACOs with a measurable rural presence. We found that successful rural ACO financial performance is associated with the ACO's organizational type (eg, physician-based) and that 8 of the 11 rural ACOs participating in the Advanced Payment Program (APP) garnered savings for Medicare. Unlike previous work, we did not find an association between ACO size or experience and rural ACO financial performance. Our findings suggest that rural ACO financial success is likely associated with factors unique to rural environments. Given the emphasis CMS has placed on rural ACO development, further research to identify these factors is warranted. © 2016 National Rural Health Association.

Trends in Medicare Service Volume for Cataract Surgery and the Impact of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule.

PubMed

Gong, Dan; Jun, Lin; Tsai, James C

2017-08-01

To calculate the associations between Medicare payment and service volume for complex and noncomplex cataract surgeries. The 2005-2009 CMS Part B National Summary Data Files, CMS Part B Carrier Summary Data Files, and the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. Conducting a retrospective, longitudinal analysis using a fixed-effects model of Medicare Part B carriers representing all 50 states and the District of Columbia from 2005 to 2009, we calculated the Medicare payment-service volume elasticities for noncomplex (CPT 66984) and complex (CPT 66982) cataract surgeries. Service volume data were extracted from the CMS Part B National Summary and Carrier Summary Data Files. Payment data were extracted from the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule. From 2005 to 2009, the proportion of total cataract services billed as complex increased from 3.2 to 6.7 percent. Every 1 percent decrease in Medicare payment was associated with a nonsignificant change in noncomplex cataract service volume (elasticity = 0.15, 95 percent CI [-0.09, 0.38]) but a statistically significant increase in complex cataract service volume (elasticity = -1.12, 95 percent CI [-1.60, -0.63]). Reduced Medicare payment was associated with a significant increase in complex cataract service volume but not in noncomplex cataract service volume, resulting in a shift toward performing a greater proportion of complex cataract surgeries from 2005 to 2009. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

US hospital payment adjustments for innovative technology lag behind those in Germany, France, and Japan.

PubMed

Hernandez, John; Machacz, Susanne F; Robinson, James C

2015-02-01

Medicare pioneered add-on payments to facilitate the adoption of innovative technologies under its hospital prospective payment system. US policy makers are now experimenting with broader value-based payment initiatives, but these have not been adjusted for innovation. This article examines the structure, processes, and experience with Medicare's hospital new technology add-on payment program since its inception in 2001 and compares it with analogous payment systems in Germany, France, and Japan. Between 2001 and 2015 CMS approved nineteen of fifty-three applications for the new technology add-on payment program. We found that the program resulted in $201.7 million in Medicare payments in fiscal years 2002-13-less than half the level anticipated by Congress and only 34 percent of the amount projected by CMS. The US program approved considerably fewer innovative technologies, compared to analogous technology payment mechanisms in Germany, France and Japan. We conclude that it is important to adjust payments for new medical innovations within prospective and value-based payment systems explicitly as well as implicitly. The most straightforward method to use in adjusting value-based payments is for the insurer to retrospectively adjust spending targets to account for the cost of new technologies. If CMS made such retrospective adjustments, it would not financially penalize hospitals for adopting beneficial innovations. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

The effect of integration of hospitals and post-acute care providers on Medicare payment and patient outcomes.

PubMed

Konetzka, R Tamara; Stuart, Elizabeth A; Werner, Rachel M

2018-02-07

In this paper we examine empirically the effect of integration on Medicare payment and rehospitalization. We use 2005-2013 data on Medicare beneficiaries receiving post-acute care (PAC) in the U.S. to examine integration between hospitals and the two most common post-acute care settings: skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and home health agencies (HHA), using two measures of integration-formal vertical integration and informal integration representing preferential relationships between providers without formal relationships. Our identification strategy is twofold. First, we use longitudinal models with a fixed effect for each hospital-PAC pair in a market to test how changes in integration impact patient outcomes. Second, we use an instrumental variable approach to account for patient selection into integrated providers. We find that vertical integration between hospitals and SNFs increases Medicare payments and reduces rehospitalization rates. However, vertical integration between hospitals and HHAs has little effect, nor does informal integration between hospitals and either PAC setting. Copyright © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

78 FR 64951 - Medicare Program; Part A Premiums for CY 2014 for the Uninsured Aged and for Certain Disabled...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-30

... 0938-AR57 Medicare Program; Part A Premiums for CY 2014 for the Uninsured Aged and for Certain Disabled...'') and by certain disabled individuals who have exhausted other entitlement. The monthly Part A premium... payment of a monthly premium for certain disabled individuals who have exhausted other entitlement. These...

76 FR 61103 - Medicare Program; Comprehensive Primary Care Initiative

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-03

... interest by November 15, 2011 using the LOI template provided on the Innovation Center Web site at http://www.innovation.cms.gov /. Application Submission Deadline: Applications must be received through an... practice redesign in primary care through payment reform. The Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation...

Medicare program; revisions to payment policies under the Physician Fee Schedule, Clinical Laboratory Fee Schedule, access to identifiable data for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Models & other revisions to Part B for CY 2015. Final rule with comment period.

PubMed

2014-11-13

This major final rule with comment period addresses changes to the physician fee schedule, and other Medicare Part B payment policies to ensure that our payment systems are updated to reflect changes in medical practice and the relative value of services, as well as changes in the statute. See the Table of Contents for a listing of the specific issues addressed in this rule.

Paying for Children's Medical Care: Is the Medicare Experience Helpful?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moon, Marilyn; And Others

1993-01-01

Discusses the implications of the Medicare program's rate setting system on health care reform and considers whether such a procedure could be applied to a health insurance system that included children. Examines desirable characteristics of a provider payment system, special health needs of children, and hospital and physician payment issues.…

The initial impact of Medicare's new prospective payment system for kidney dialysis.

PubMed

Hirth, Richard A; Turenne, Marc N; Wheeler, John R C; Nahra, Tammie A; Sleeman, Kathryn K; Zhang, Wei; Messana, Joseph A

2013-10-01

Medicare implemented a new prospective payment system (PPS) on January 1, 2011. This PPS covers an expanded bundle of services, including services previously paid on a fee-for-service basis. The objectives of the new PPS include more efficient decisions about treatment service combinations and modality choice. Primary data for this study are Medicare claims files for all dialysis patients for whom Medicare is the primary payer. We compare use of key injectable medications under the bundled PPS to use when those drugs were separately billable and examine variability across providers. We also compare each patient's dialysis modality before and after the PPS. Use of relatively expensive drugs, including erythropoiesis-stimulating agents, declined substantially after institution of the new PPS, whereas use of iron products, often therapeutic substitutes for erythropoiesis-stimulating agents, increased. Less expensive vitamin D products were substituted for more expensive types. Drug spending overall decreased by ∼$25 per session, or about 5 times the mandated reduction in the base payment rate of ∼$5. Use of peritoneal dialysis increased in 2011 after being nearly flat in the years prior to the PPS, with the increase concentrated in patients in their first or second year of dialysis. Home hemodialysis continued to increase as a percentage of total dialysis services, but at a rate similar to the pre-PPS trend. The expanded bundle dialysis PPS provided incentives for the use of lower cost therapies. These incentives seem to have motivated dialysis providers to move toward lower cost methods of care in both their use of drugs and choice of modalities. Copyright © 2013 National Kidney Foundation, Inc. All rights reserved.

Examination of Industry Payments to Radiation Oncologists in 2014 Using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments Database.

PubMed

Jairam, Vikram; Yu, James B

2016-01-01

To use the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments database to characterize payments made to radiation oncologists and compare their payment profile with that of medical and surgical oncologists. The June 2015 release of the Open Payments database was accessed, containing all payments made to physicians in 2014. The general payments dataset was used for analysis. Data on payments made to medical, surgical, and radiation oncologists was obtained and compared. Within radiation oncology, data regarding payment category, sponsorship, and geographic distribution were identified. Basic statistics including mean, median, range, and sum were calculated by provider and by transaction. Among the 3 oncologic specialties, radiation oncology had the smallest proportion (58%) of compensated physicians and the lowest mean ($1620) and median ($112) payment per provider. Surgical oncology had the highest proportion (84%) of compensated physicians, whereas medical oncology had the highest mean ($6371) and median ($448) payment per physician. Within radiation oncology, nonconsulting services accounted for the most money to physicians ($1,042,556), whereas the majority of the sponsors were medical device companies (52%). Radiation oncologists in the West accepted the most money ($2,041,603) of any US Census region. Radiation oncologists in 2014 received a large number of payments from industry, although less than their medical or surgical counterparts. As the Open Payments database continues to be improved, it remains to be seen whether this information will be used by patients to inform choice of providers or by lawmakers to enact policy regulating physician-industry relationships. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Examination of Industry Payments to Radiation Oncologists in 2014 Using the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments Database

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jairam, Vikram; Yu, James B., E-mail: james.b.yu@yale.edu

Purpose: To use the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payments database to characterize payments made to radiation oncologists and compare their payment profile with that of medical and surgical oncologists. Methods and Materials: The June 2015 release of the Open Payments database was accessed, containing all payments made to physicians in 2014. The general payments dataset was used for analysis. Data on payments made to medical, surgical, and radiation oncologists was obtained and compared. Within radiation oncology, data regarding payment category, sponsorship, and geographic distribution were identified. Basic statistics including mean, median, range, and sum were calculated by providermore » and by transaction. Results: Among the 3 oncologic specialties, radiation oncology had the smallest proportion (58%) of compensated physicians and the lowest mean ($1620) and median ($112) payment per provider. Surgical oncology had the highest proportion (84%) of compensated physicians, whereas medical oncology had the highest mean ($6371) and median ($448) payment per physician. Within radiation oncology, nonconsulting services accounted for the most money to physicians ($1,042,556), whereas the majority of the sponsors were medical device companies (52%). Radiation oncologists in the West accepted the most money ($2,041,603) of any US Census region. Conclusions: Radiation oncologists in 2014 received a large number of payments from industry, although less than their medical or surgical counterparts. As the Open Payments database continues to be improved, it remains to be seen whether this information will be used by patients to inform choice of providers or by lawmakers to enact policy regulating physician–industry relationships.« less

42 CFR 412.112 - Payments determined on a per case basis.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Payments to Hospitals Under the Prospective Payment Systems § 412.112 Payments determined on a per case basis. A hospital is... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Payments determined on a per case basis. 412.112...

42 CFR 414.58 - Payment of charges for physician services to patients in providers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Payment of charges for physician services to patients in providers. 414.58 Section 414.58 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM PAYMENT FOR PART B MEDICAL AND OTHER...

42 CFR 409.41 - Requirement for payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Requirement for payment. 409.41 Section 409.41 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM HOSPITAL INSURANCE BENEFITS Home Health Services Under Hospital Insurance § 409.41 Requirement for...

42 CFR § 512.703 - CR incentive payment model participants.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2017-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2017-10-01 2017-10-01 false CR incentive payment model participants. § 512.703... SERVICES (CONTINUED) HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND MODEL PROGRAMS EPISODE PAYMENT MODEL CR Incentive Payment Model for EPM and Medicare Fee-for-Service Participants § 512.703 CR incentive payment model...

Secondary Interpretation of CT Examinations: Frequency and Payment in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Population.

PubMed

Lu, Michael T; Hallett, Travis R; Hemingway, Jennifer; Hughes, Danny R; Hoffmann, Udo; Duszak, Richard

2016-09-01

Secondary interpretation of diagnostic imaging examinations (providing a second formal interpretation for imaging performed at another institution) may reduce repeat imaging after transfer of care. Recently, CMS requested information to guide payment policy. We aimed to study historic trends in submitted claims and payments for secondary interpretation services in the Medicare fee-for-service population. Applying current procedural terminology codes by body part to Medicare Part B aggregate claims files, we identified all CT interpretation services rendered between 1999 and 2012. Secondary interpretation services were identified using combined code modifiers 26 and 77, in accordance with CMS billing guidelines. The frequencies of billed and denied services were extracted for primary and secondary CT interpretation services. Primary versus secondary interpretation denial rates were calculated and compared. Of all 227 million Medicare Part B claims for CT services, 299,468 (0.13%) were for secondary interpretation services. From 1999 to 2012, growth in secondary interpretation claims outpaced that in primary interpretation claims (+811% versus +56%; compound annual growth rate 17% versus 3.2%). As a percentage of all services, secondary interpretations increased from 0.05% in 1999 to 0.30% in 2012. Denial rates for second interpretations decreased from 1999 to 2012 (12.7% to 7.0%), and now approach those for primary interpretations (5.4% in 2012). Medicare claims for secondary interpretation of CT examinations are growing but account for less than 1% of all billed CT interpretation services. Denial rates are similar to those of primary interpretation services. Copyright © 2016 American College of Radiology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Disclosure of Industry Payments to Physicians: An Epidemiologic Analysis of Early Data From the Open Payments Program

PubMed Central

Marshall, Deborah C.; Jackson, Madeleine E.; Hattangadi-Gluth, Jona A.

2016-01-01

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' Open Payments program implements Section 6002 of the Affordable Care Act requiring medical product manufacturers to report payments made to physicians or teaching hospitals, as well as ownership or investment interests held by physicians in the manufacturer. To determine the characteristics and distribution of these industry payments by specialty, we analyzed physician payments made between August 1, 2013 and December 31, 2013 that were publicly disclosed by Open Payments. We compared payments between specialty type (grouped as medical, surgical, and other specialties) and across specialties within each type, using Pearson's chi square test and the Kruskal-Wallis test. The number of physicians receiving payments was compared to the total number of active physicians in each specialty in 2012. We also analyzed physician ownership interests. There were 2.7 million identified payments to recipient physicians totaling $527 million. Allopathic and osteopathic physicians received 2.43 million payments totaling $475 million. General payments represented 90% ($430 million) of payments by total value (per-physician median:$100, IQR:$31-$273, mean:$1,407, SD:$23,766) with the remaining 10% ($45 million) as research payments (median:$2,365, IQR:$592-$8,550; mean:$12,880, SD:$66,743). Physicians most likely to receive general payments were cardiovascular specialists (78%) and neurosurgeons (77%); those least likely were pathologists (9%). Reports of ownership interest in reporting entities included $310 million in dollar amount invested and $447 million in value of interest held by 2,093 physicians. In conclusion, the distribution and characteristics of industry payments to physicians varied widely by specialty during the first half-year of Open Payments reporting. PMID:26763512

77 FR 16841 - Medicare Program; Solicitation for Proposals for the Medicare Graduate Nurse Education...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-03-22

...] Medicare Program; Solicitation for Proposals for the Medicare Graduate Nurse Education Demonstration... informs interested parties of an opportunity to apply to participate in the Medicare Graduate Nurse... advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) in order to meet the health care needs of the growing Medicare...

42 CFR 412.332 - Payment based on the hospital-specific rate.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Prospective Payment System for Inpatient Hospital Capital Costs Determination of Transition Period Payment Rates for... (f) is determined by multiplying the applicable hospital-specific rate by the DRG weighting factor...

Medicare program; requirements for providers and suppliers to establish and maintain Medicare enrollment. Final rule.

PubMed

2006-04-21

This final rule requires that all providers and suppliers (other than physicians or practitioners who have elected to "opt-out" of the Medicare program) complete an enrollment form and submit specific information to us. This final rule also requires that all providers and suppliers periodically update and certify the accuracy of their enrollment information to receive and maintain billing privileges in the Medicare program. In addition, this final rule implements provisions in the statute that require us to ensure that all Medicare providers and suppliers are qualified to provide the appropriate health care services. These statutory provisions include requirements meant to protect beneficiaries and the Medicare Trust Funds by preventing unqualified, fraudulent, or excluded providers and suppliers from providing items or services to Medicare beneficiaries or billing the Medicare program or its beneficiaries.

The impact of Medicare home health policy changes on Medicare beneficiaries: part II.

PubMed

Ahrens, Joann

2005-01-01

This brief presents the results of a follow-up study (Murtaugh et al., 2003) on the effects of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 on Medicare home health service use and beneficiary outcomes.[The results of the initial study (McCall et al., 2001) were discussed in a Spring 2003 policy brief and fact sheet.] The 2003 study found that the new payment systems have had a significant impact on the Medicare home health benefit: utilization declined, aggregate payments and payments per visit decreased (and then increased), the mix of services shifted, and the types of patients served appears to have changed. These results show that policy goals-in this case attempting to limit the use of the Medicare home health benefit while shifting services towards skilled care-can be instituted through changes in the payment system, though it is important to examine the impact of changes for possible unintended effects. Further study on the sustained impact of the current payment system-particularly on quality of care-is still needed.

Early Impact of Medicare Accountable Care Organizations on Inpatient Surgical Spending.

PubMed

Nathan, Hari; Thumma, Jyothi R; Ryan, Andrew M; Dimick, Justin B

2018-05-16

To evaluate whether hospital participation in accountable care organizations (ACOs) is associated with reduced Medicare spending for inpatient surgery. ACOs have proliferated rapidly and now cover more than 32 million Americans. Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACOs have shown modest success in reducing medical spending. Whether they have reduced surgical spending remains unknown. We used 100% Medicare claims from 2010 to 2014 for patients aged 65 to 99 years undergoing 6 common elective surgical procedures [abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) repair, colectomy, coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG), hip or knee replacement, or lung resection]. We compared total Medicare payments for 30-day surgical episodes, payments for individual components of care (index hospitalization, readmissions, physician services, and postacute care), and clinical outcomes for patients treated at MSSP ACO hospitals versus matched controls at non-ACO hospitals. We accounted for preexisting trends independent of ACO participation using a difference-in-differences approach. Among 341,675 patients at 427 ACO hospitals and 1,024,090 matched controls at 1531 non-ACO hospitals, patient and hospital characteristics were well-balanced. Average baseline payments were similar at ACO versus non-ACO hospitals. ACO participation was not associated with reductions in total Medicare payments [difference-in-differences estimate=-$72, confidence interval (CI95%): -$228 to +$84] or individual components of payments. ACO participation was also not associated with clinical outcomes. Duration of ACO participation did not affect our estimates. Although Medicare ACOs have had success reducing spending for medical care, they have not had similar success with surgical spending. Given that surgical care accounts for 30% of total health care costs, ACOs and policymakers must pay greater attention to reducing surgical expenditures.

Experience with Designing and Implementing a Bundled Payment Program for Total Hip Replacement.

PubMed

Whitcomb, Winthrop F; Lagu, Tara; Krushell, Robert J; Lehman, Andrew P; Greenbaum, Jordan; McGirr, Joan; Pekow, Penelope S; Calcasola, Stephanie; Benjamin, Evan; Mayforth, Janice; Lindenauer, Peter K

2015-09-01

Bundled payments, also known as episode-based payments, are intended to contain health care costs and promote quality. In 2011 a bundled payment pilot program for total hip replacement was implemented by an integrated health care delivery system in conjunction with a commercial health plan subsidiary. In July 2015 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model to test bundled payment for hip and knee replacement. Stakeholders were identified and a structure for program development and implementation was created. An Oversight Committee provided governance over a Clinical Model Subgroup and a Financial Model Subgroup. The pilot program included (1) a clinical model of care encompassing the period from the preoperative evaluation through the third postoperative visit, (2) a pricing model, (3) a program to share savings, and (4) a patient engagement and expectation strategy. Compared to 32 historical controls-patients treated before bundle implementation-45 post-bundle-implementation patients with total hip replacement had a similar length of hospital stay (3.0 versus 3.4 days, p=.24), higher rates of discharge to home or home with services than to a rehabilitation facility (87% versus 63%), similar adjusted median total payments ($22,272 versus $22,567, p=.43), and lower median posthospital payments ($704 versus $1,121, p=.002), and were more likely to receive guideline-consistent care (99% versus 95%, p=.05). The bundled payment pilot program was associated with similar total costs, decreased posthospital costs, fewer discharges to rehabilitation facilities, and improved quality. Successful implementation of the program hinged on buy-in from stakeholders and close collaboration between stakeholders and the clinical and financial teams.

42 CFR 417.105 - Payment for supplemental health services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Payment for supplemental health services. 417.105 Section 417.105 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPETITIVE MEDICAL...

42 CFR 417.105 - Payment for supplemental health services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Payment for supplemental health services. 417.105 Section 417.105 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM (CONTINUED) HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPETITIVE MEDICAL...

42 CFR 412.89 - Payment adjustment for certain replaced devices.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Payments for... implantation of the device determines the DRG assignment. (2) CMS lists the DRGs that qualify under paragraph (b)(1) of this section in the annual final rule for the hospital inpatient prospective payment system...

Do heart failure disease management programs make financial sense under a bundled payment system?

PubMed

Eapen, Zubin J; Reed, Shelby D; Curtis, Lesley H; Hernandez, Adrian F; Peterson, Eric D

2011-05-01

Policy makers have proposed bundling payments for all heart failure (HF) care within 30 days of an HF hospitalization in an effort to reduce costs. Disease management (DM) programs can reduce costly HF readmissions but have not been economically attractive for caregivers under existing fee-for-service payment. Whether a bundled payment approach can address the negative financial impact of DM programs is unknown. Our study determined the cost-neutral point for the typical DM program and examined whether published HF DM programs can be cost saving under bundled payment programs. We used a decision analytic model using data from retrospective cohort studies, meta-analyses, 5 randomized trials evaluating DM programs, and inpatient claims for all Medicare beneficiaries discharged with an HF diagnosis from 2001 to 2004. We determined the costs of DM programs and inpatient care over 30 and 180 days. With a baseline readmission rate of 22.9%, the average cost for readmissions over 30 days was $2,272 per patient. Under base-case assumptions, a DM program that reduced readmissions by 21% would need to cost $477 per patient to be cost neutral. Among evaluated published DM programs, 2 of the 5 would increase provider costs (+$15 to $283 per patient), whereas 3 programs would be cost saving (-$241 to $347 per patient). If bundled payments were broadened to include care over 180 days, then program saving estimates would increase, ranging from $419 to $1,706 per patient. Proposed bundled payments for HF admissions provide hospitals with a potential financial incentive to implement DM programs that efficiently reduce readmissions. Copyright © 2011 Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: EFFECT OF BENCHMARK CHANGES ON PLAN BIDS

PubMed Central

Song, Zirui; Landrum, Mary Beth; Chernew, Michael E.

2013-01-01

Bidding has been proposed to replace or complement the administered prices in Medicare pays to hospitals and health plans. In 2006, the Medicare Advantage program implemented a competitive bidding system to determine plan payments. In perfectly competitive models, plans bid their costs and thus bids are insensitive to the benchmark. Under many other models of competition, bids respond to changes in the benchmark. We conceptualize the bidding system and use an instrumental variable approach to study the effect of benchmark changes on bids. We use 2006–2010 plan payment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, published county benchmarks, actual realized fee-for-service costs, and Medicare Advantage enrollment. We find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about a $0.53 increase in bids, suggesting that plans in the Medicare Advantage market have meaningful market power. PMID:24308881

Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage: effect of benchmark changes on plan bids.

PubMed

Song, Zirui; Landrum, Mary Beth; Chernew, Michael E

2013-12-01

Bidding has been proposed to replace or complement the administered prices that Medicare pays to hospitals and health plans. In 2006, the Medicare Advantage program implemented a competitive bidding system to determine plan payments. In perfectly competitive models, plans bid their costs and thus bids are insensitive to the benchmark. Under many other models of competition, bids respond to changes in the benchmark. We conceptualize the bidding system and use an instrumental variable approach to study the effect of benchmark changes on bids. We use 2006-2010 plan payment data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, published county benchmarks, actual realized fee-for-service costs, and Medicare Advantage enrollment. We find that a $1 increase in the benchmark leads to about a $0.53 increase in bids, suggesting that plans in the Medicare Advantage market have meaningful market power. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Medicare's private plans: a report card on Medicare Advantage.

PubMed

Gold, Marsha

2009-01-01

With higher payments and expanded private-plan authority, Medicare Advantage (MA) has caused the market to grow. One in three Medicare beneficiaries with Part D now gets this coverage through MA. Analysis of the sources of and reasons for enrollment growth suggest a troubling report card. Clearly, the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) has expanded choice and the private-sector role. But it also has added to Medicare's complexity and costs and has created potential inequities, without apparent improvements in quality. However the debate ends, a stronger system of performance monitoring and accountability is needed to meet Medicare's essential fiduciary requirements and oversight responsibilities.

42 CFR 415.164 - Payment to a fund.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

...) MEDICARE PROGRAM SERVICES FURNISHED BY PHYSICIANS IN PROVIDERS, SUPERVISING PHYSICIANS IN TEACHING SETTINGS, AND RESIDENTS IN CERTAIN SETTINGS Physician Services in Teaching Settings § 415.164 Payment to a fund. (a) General rules. Payment for certain voluntary services by physicians in teaching hospitals (as...

77 FR 50110 - Medicare Program; Request for Nominations for Members for the Medicare Evidence Development...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-08-20

...] Medicare Program; Request for Nominations for Members for the Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage... notice announces the request for nominations for membership on the Medicare Evidence Development... Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) concerning the adequacy of scientific evidence available to...

76 FR 71571 - Medicare Program; Town Hall Meeting on FY 2013 Applications for New Medical Services and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-18

... Payments Under the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid... and technologies under the hospital inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS). Interested parties are invited to this meeting to present their comments, recommendations, and data regarding whether the...

42 CFR 417.105 - Payment for supplemental health services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Payment for supplemental health services. 417.105 Section 417.105 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS, COMPETITIVE MEDICAL PLANS, AND...

42 CFR 495.206 - Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA... RECORD TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.206 Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations. (a) CMS makes payment to qualifying MA...

42 CFR 495.206 - Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA... RECORD TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.206 Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations. (a) CMS makes payment to qualifying MA...

42 CFR 495.206 - Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA... RECORD TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.206 Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations. (a) CMS makes payment to qualifying MA...

42 CFR 495.206 - Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA... RECORD TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.206 Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations. (a) CMS makes payment to qualifying MA...

42 CFR 495.206 - Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA... RECORD TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to Medicare Advantage (MA) Organizations § 495.206 Timeframe for payment to qualifying MA organizations. (a) CMS makes payment to qualifying MA...

42 CFR 412.535 - Publication of the Federal prospective payment rates.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Prospective Payment System for Long-Term Care Hospitals § 412.535 Publication of the Federal prospective... care hospital prospective payment system effective for each annual update in the Federal Register. (a...

42 CFR 424.124 - Conditions for payment for physician services and ambulance services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM CONDITIONS FOR MEDICARE PAYMENT Special... connection with covered inpatient hospital services; and (2) They meet the conditions set forth in paragraphs...

42 CFR 424.124 - Conditions for payment for physician services and ambulance services.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICARE PROGRAM CONDITIONS FOR MEDICARE PAYMENT Special... connection with covered inpatient hospital services; and (2) They meet the conditions set forth in paragraphs...

42 CFR 495.320 - FFP for payments to Medicaid providers.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false FFP for payments to Medicaid providers. 495.320 Section 495.320 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN... INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to the Medicaid Program § 495.320 FFP for payments to Medicaid...

Radiation oncology services in the modern era: evolving patterns of usage and payments in the office setting for medicare patients from 2000 to 2010.

PubMed

Shen, Xinglei; Showalter, Timothy N; Mishra, Mark V; Barth, Sanford; Rao, Vijay; Levin, David; Parker, Laurence

2014-07-01

We evaluated long-term changes in the volume and payments for radiation oncology services in the intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) era from 2000 to 2010 using a database of Medicare claims. We used the Medicare Physician/Supplier Procedure Summary Master File (PSPSMF) for each year from 2000 to 2010 to tabulate the volume and payments for radiation oncology services. This database provides a summary of each billing code submitted to Medicare part B. We identified all codes used in radiation oncology services and categorized billing codes by treatment modality and place of service. We focused our analysis on office-based practices. Total office-based patient volume increased 8.2% from 2000 to 2010, whereas total payments increased 217%. Increase in overall payments increased dramatically from 2000 to 2007, but subsequently plateaued from 2008 to 2010. Increases in complexity of care, and image guidance in particular, have also resulted in higher payments. The cost of radiation oncology services increased from 2000 to 2010, mostly due to IMRT, but also with significant contribution from increased overall complexity of care. A cost adjustment occurred after 2007, limiting further growth of payments. Future health policy studies should explore the potential for further cost containment, including differences in use between freestanding and hospital outpatient facilities. Copyright © 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology.

42 CFR 413.172 - Principles of prospective payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Principles of prospective payment. 413.172 Section... SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PRINCIPLES OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE...-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Services and Organ Procurement Costs § 413.172 Principles of prospective...

42 CFR 409.100 - To whom payment is made.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... insurance benefits only to a participating provider. (2) For home health services (including medical... PROGRAM HOSPITAL INSURANCE BENEFITS Payment of Hospital Insurance Benefits § 409.100 To whom payment is... or consulting arrangement). (b) Exceptions. Medicare may pay hospital insurance benefits as follows...

42 CFR § 512.710 - Determination of CR incentive payments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2017-10-01

... SERVICES (CONTINUED) HEALTH CARE INFRASTRUCTURE AND MODEL PROGRAMS EPISODE PAYMENT MODEL CR Incentive Payment Model for EPM and Medicare Fee-for-Service Participants § 512.710 Determination of CR incentive... 42 Public Health 5 2017-10-01 2017-10-01 false Determination of CR incentive payments. § 512.710...

42 CFR 412.304 - Implementation of the capital prospective payment system.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Prospective Payment System for Inpatient Hospital Capital Costs General Provisions § 412.304 Implementation of the capital prospective payment system. (a) General rule. As described in §§ 412.312 through 412.370...

The Impact of Hospital Pay-for-Performance on Hospital and Medicare Costs

PubMed Central

Kruse, Gregory B; Polsky, Daniel; Stuart, Elizabeth A; Werner, Rachel M

2012-01-01

Objective To evaluate the effects of Medicare's hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project on hospital revenues, costs, and margins and on Medicare costs. Data Sources/Study Setting All health care utilization for Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction (AMI; ICD-9-CM code 410.x1) in fiscal years 2002–2005 from Medicare claims, containing 420,211 admissions with AMI. Study Design We test for changes in hospital costs and revenues and Medicare payments among 260 hospitals participating in the Medicare hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project and a group of 780 propensity-score-matched comparison hospitals. Effects were estimated using a difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects, testing for changes in costs among pay-for-performance hospitals above and beyond changes in comparison hospitals. Principal Findings We found no significant effect of pay-for-performance on hospital financials (revenues, costs, and margins) or Medicare payments (index hospitalization and 1 year after admission) for AMI patients. Conclusions Pay-for-performance in the CMS hospital demonstration project had minimal impact on hospital financials and Medicare payments to providers. As P4P extends to all hospitals under the Affordable Care Act, these results provide some estimates of the impact of P4P and emphasize our need for a better understanding of the financial implications of P4P on providers and payers if we want to create sustainable and effective programs to improve health care value. PMID:23088391

The impact of hospital pay-for-performance on hospital and Medicare costs.

PubMed

Kruse, Gregory B; Polsky, Daniel; Stuart, Elizabeth A; Werner, Rachel M

2012-12-01

To evaluate the effects of Medicare's hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project on hospital revenues, costs, and margins and on Medicare costs. All health care utilization for Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction (AMI; ICD-9-CM code 410.x1) in fiscal years 2002-2005 from Medicare claims, containing 420,211 admissions with AMI. We test for changes in hospital costs and revenues and Medicare payments among 260 hospitals participating in the Medicare hospital pay-for-performance demonstration project and a group of 780 propensity-score-matched comparison hospitals. Effects were estimated using a difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects, testing for changes in costs among pay-for-performance hospitals above and beyond changes in comparison hospitals. We found no significant effect of pay-for-performance on hospital financials (revenues, costs, and margins) or Medicare payments (index hospitalization and 1 year after admission) for AMI patients. Pay-for-performance in the CMS hospital demonstration project had minimal impact on hospital financials and Medicare payments to providers. As P4P extends to all hospitals under the Affordable Care Act, these results provide some estimates of the impact of P4P and emphasize our need for a better understanding of the financial implications of P4P on providers and payers if we want to create sustainable and effective programs to improve health care value. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Experience with Designing and Implementing a Bundled Payment Program for Total Hip Replacement

PubMed Central

Whitcomb, Winthrop F.; Lagu, Tara; Krushell, Robert J.; Lehman, Andrew P.; Greenbaum, Jordan; McGirr, Joan; Pekow, Penelope S.; Calcasola, Stephanie; Benjamin, Evan; Mayforth, Janice; Lindenauer, Peter K.

2015-01-01

Background Bundled payments, also known as episode-based payments, are intended to contain health care costs and promote quality. In 2011 a bundled payment pilot program for total hip replacement was implemented by an integrated health care delivery system in conjunction with a commercial health plan subsidiary. In July 2015 the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) proposed the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model to test bundled payment for hip and knee replacement. Methods Stakeholders were identified and a structure for program development and implementation was created. An Oversight Committee provided governance over a Clinical Model Subgroup and a Financial Model Subgroup. Results The pilot program included (1) a clinical model of care encompassing the period from the preoperative evaluation through the third postoperative visit, (2) a pricing model, (3) a program to share savings, and (4) a patient engagement and expectation strategy. Compared to 32 historical controls— patients treated before bundle implementation—45 post-bundle-implementation patients with total hip replacement had a similar length of hospital stay (3.0 versus 3.4 days, p = .24), higher rates of discharge to home or home with services than to a rehabilitation facility (87% versus 63%), similar adjusted median total payments ($22,272 versus $22,567, p = .43), and lower median posthospital payments ($704 versus $1,121, p = .002), and were more likely to receive guideline-consistent care (99% versus 95%, p = .05). Discussion The bundled payment pilot program was associated with similar total costs, decreased posthospital costs, fewer discharges to rehabilitation facilities, and improved quality. Successful implementation of the program hinged on buy-in from stakeholders and close collaboration between stakeholders and the clinical and financial teams. PMID:26289235

Payment Rates for Personal Care Assistants and the Use of Long-Term Services and Supports among Those Dually Eligible for Medicare and Medicaid

PubMed Central

Ko, Michelle; Newcomer, Robert; Kang, Taewoon; Hulett, Denis; Chu, Philip; Bindman, Andrew B

2014-01-01

Objective To examine the association between payment rates for personal care assistants and use of long-term services and supports (LTSS) following hospital discharge among dual eligible Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. Data Sources State hospital discharge, Medicaid and Medicare claims, and assessment data on California Medicaid LTSS users from 2006 to 2008. Study Design Cross-sectional study. We used multinomial logistic regression to analyze county personal care assistant payment rates and postdischarge LTSS use, and estimate marginal probabilities of each outcome across the range of rates paid in California. Data Extraction Methods We identified dual eligible Medicare and Medicaid adult beneficiaries discharged from an acute care hospital with no hospitalizations or LTSS use in the preceding 12 months. Principal Findings Personal care assistant payment rates were modestly associated with home and community-based services (HCBS) use versus nursing facility entry following hospital discharge (RRR 1.2, 95 percent CI: 1.0–1.4). For a rate of $6.75 per hour, the probability of HCBS use was 5.6 percent (95 percent CI: 4.2–7.1); at $11.75 per hour, 18.0 percent (95 percent CI: 12.5–23.4). Payment rate was not associated with the probability of nursing facility entry. Conclusions Higher payment rates for personal care assistants may increase utilization of HCBS, but with limited substitution for nursing facility care. PMID:25327166

Payment rates for personal care assistants and the use of long-term services and supports among those dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.

PubMed

Ko, Michelle; Newcomer, Robert; Kang, Taewoon; Hulett, Denis; Chu, Philip; Bindman, Andrew B

2014-12-01

To examine the association between payment rates for personal care assistants and use of long-term services and supports (LTSS) following hospital discharge among dual eligible Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. State hospital discharge, Medicaid and Medicare claims, and assessment data on California Medicaid LTSS users from 2006 to 2008. Cross-sectional study. We used multinomial logistic regression to analyze county personal care assistant payment rates and postdischarge LTSS use, and estimate marginal probabilities of each outcome across the range of rates paid in California. We identified dual eligible Medicare and Medicaid adult beneficiaries discharged from an acute care hospital with no hospitalizations or LTSS use in the preceding 12 months. Personal care assistant payment rates were modestly associated with home and community-based services (HCBS) use versus nursing facility entry following hospital discharge (RRR 1.2, 95 percent CI: 1.0-1.4). For a rate of $6.75 per hour, the probability of HCBS use was 5.6 percent (95 percent CI: 4.2-7.1); at $11.75 per hour, 18.0 percent (95 percent CI: 12.5-23.4). Payment rate was not associated with the probability of nursing facility entry. Higher payment rates for personal care assistants may increase utilization of HCBS, but with limited substitution for nursing facility care. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

Savings estimate for a Medicare insured group

PubMed Central

Birnbaum, Howard; Holland, Stephen K.; Lenhart, Gregory; Reilly, Helena L.; Hoffman, Kevin; Pardo, Dennis P.

1991-01-01

Estimates of the savings potential of a managed-care program for a Medicare retiree population in Michigan under a hypothetical Medicare insured group (MIG) are presented in this article. In return for receiving an experience-rated capitation payment, a MIG would administer all Medicare and employer complementary benefits for its enrollees. A study of the financial and operational feasibility of implementing a MIG for retirees of a national corporation involving an analysis of 1986 claims data finds that selected managed-care initiatives implemented by a MIG would generate an annual savings of 3.8 percent of total (Medicare plus complementary) expenditures. Although savings are less than the 5 percent to be retained by Medicare, this finding illustrates the potential for savings from managed-care initiatives to Medicare generally and to MIGs elsewhere, where savings may be greater if constraints are less restrictive. PMID:10113700

42 CFR 412.79 - Determination of the hospital-specific rate for inpatient operating costs for Medicare-dependent...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Determination of Transition Period Payment Rates for the Prospective Payment System for Inpatient... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Determination of the hospital-specific rate for...

Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse regulations.

PubMed

Liang, F Z; Black, B L

1991-11-01

Specific business arrangements that are protected under legislation and regulations governing parties doing business with Medicare or Medicaid are discussed. Regulations implementing the Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act of 1987 specify practices and activities that are not subject to criminal penalties under the antikickback provisions of the Social Security Act or to exclusion from Medicare or state health-care programs. As of July 29, 1991, all organized health-care settings that receive payments from either Medicare or state health-care programs must comply with these regulations. The final rule sets forth "safe harbors"--exceptions to prohibitions against (1) kickbacks, bribes, rebates, and other illegal activities involving remunerations for patient referrals and (2) inducements to purchase or lease goods paid for by Medicare or state health-care programs. The safe harbors comprise 11 broad categories--investment interests, space rental, equipment rental, personal services and management contracts, purchase of a medical practice, referral services, warranties, discounts, employees, group purchasing organizations, and waiver of deductibles and coinsurance. Implications for pharmacy are discussed. These regulations will affect the purchase of pharmaceuticals by institutional pharmacies. Each institution should review its current practices to determine whether they are within the safe harbors.

Vertical integration strategies: revenue effects in hospital and Medicare markets.

PubMed

Cody, M

1996-01-01

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the revenue effects of seven vertically integrated strategies on California hospitals. The strategies investigated were managed care contracts, physician affiliations, ambulatory care, ambulatory surgery, home health services, inpatient rehabilitation, and skilled nursing care. The study population included 242 not-for-profit hospitals in continuous operation from 1983 to 1990. Many hospitals developed vertically integrated programs in the 1980s as inpatient utilization fell in response to the Medicare Prospective Payment program. Net revenue rose on average by $2,080 from 1983 to 1990, but fell by $2,421 from the Medicare program. On the whole, the more physicians affiliated with a hospital, the higher the net revenue. However, in the Medicare population, the number of managed care contracts was significant. The pre-hospital strategies generated significant revenue, while the post-hospital strategies did not. In the Medicare program, inpatient rehabilitation significantly reduced revenue.

Measuring Provider Performance for Physicians Participating in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System.

PubMed

Squitieri, Lee; Chung, Kevin C

2017-07-01

In 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services began requiring all eligible providers to participate in the Quality Payment Program or face financial reimbursement penalty. The Quality Payment Program outlines two paths for provider participation: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System and Advanced Alternative Payment Models. For the first performance period beginning in January of 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that approximately 83 to 90 percent of eligible providers will not qualify for participation in an Advanced Alternative Payment Model and therefore must participate in the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System program. The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System path replaces existing quality-reporting programs and adds several new measures to evaluate providers using four categories of data: (1) quality, (2) cost/resource use, (3) improvement activities, and (4) advancing care information. These categories will be combined to calculate a weighted composite score for each provider or provider group. Composite Merit-Based Incentive Payment System scores based on 2017 performance data will be used to adjust reimbursed payment in 2019. In this article, the authors provide relevant background for understanding value-based provider performance measurement. The authors also discuss Merit-Based Incentive Payment System reporting requirements and scoring methodology to provide plastic surgeons with the necessary information to critically evaluate their own practice capabilities in the context of current performance metrics under the Quality Payment Program.

Medicare program; home health prospective payment system rate update for calendar year 2011; changes in certification requirements for home health agencies and hospices. Final rule.

PubMed

2010-11-17

This final rule sets forth an update to the Home Health Prospective Payment System (HH PPS) rates, including: the national standardized 60-day episode rates, the national per-visit rates, the nonroutine medical supply (NRS) conversion factors, and the low utilization payment amount (LUPA) add-on payment amounts, under the Medicare prospective payment system for HHAs effective January 1, 2011. This rule also updates the wage index used under the HH PPS and, in accordance with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (Affordable Care Act), updates the HH PPS outlier policy. In addition, this rule revises the home health agency (HHA) capitalization requirements. This rule further adds clarifying language to the "skilled services" section. The rule finalizes a 3.79 percent reduction to rates for CY 2011 to account for changes in case-mix, which are unrelated to real changes in patient acuity. Finally, this rule incorporates new legislative requirements regarding face-to-face encounters with providers related to home health and hospice care.

42 CFR 405.350 - Individual's liability for payments made to providers and other persons for items and services...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Individual's liability for payments made to... Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension of Payment, Recovery of Overpayments, and...

42 CFR 405.350 - Individual's liability for payments made to providers and other persons for items and services...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Individual's liability for payments made to... Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM FEDERAL HEALTH INSURANCE FOR THE AGED AND DISABLED Suspension of Payment, Recovery of Overpayments, and...

Wide variation in payments for Medicare beneficiary oncology services suggests room for practice-level improvement.

PubMed

Clough, Jeffrey D; Patel, Kavita; Riley, Gerald F; Rajkumar, Rahul; Conway, Patrick H; Bach, Peter B

2015-04-01

In recent years many policy makers have recommended alternative payment models in medical oncology in order to reduce costs and improve patient outcomes. Yet information on how oncology practices differ in their use of key service categories is limited. We measured annual payments for key service categories delivered to fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries receiving care from 1,534 medical oncology practices in 2011-12. In 2012, differences in payments per beneficiary at the seventy-fifth-percentile practice compared to the twenty-fifth-percentile practice were $3,866 for chemotherapy (including administration and supportive care drugs), $1,872 for acute medical hospitalizations, and $439 for advanced imaging. Supportive care drugs, bevacizumab, and positron-emission tomography accounted for the greatest percentage of variation. Average practice payments for service categories were highly correlated across years but not correlated with each other, which suggests that service categories may be affected by different physician practice characteristics. These differences, even when clinical guidelines exist, demonstrate the potential for quality improvement that could be accelerated through alternative payment models. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

Bundled payment and enhanced recovery after surgery.

PubMed

Huang, Jeffrey

2015-01-01

Medicare's fee-for-service (FFS) payment model may contribute to unsustainable spending growth. Payers are turning to alternative payment methods. The leading alternative payment model to the FFS problem is bundled payment. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is taking another step to improve healthcare quality at lower cost. The CMS's Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation developed four models of bundled payments and 48 discrete clinical condition episodes. Many surgical care procedures are included in the 48 different clinical condition episodes.

42 CFR 411.162 - Medicare benefits secondary to group health plan benefits.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... entitled on the basis of age or disability), Medicare is secondary to any GHP (including a retirement plan... Medicare payments as follows: (i) Primary payments only for Medicare covered services that are— (A... have been entitled to Medicare as early as March 1, 1991, Medicare is secondary payer only from March 1...

Medicare program; Medicare depreciation, useful life guidelines--HCFA. Final rule.

PubMed

1983-08-18

These final rules amend Medicare regulations to clarify which useful life guidelines may be used by providers of health care services to determine the useful life of a depreciable asset for Medicare reimbursement purposes. Current regulations state that providers must utilize the Departmental useful life guidelines or, if none have been published by the Department, either the American Hospital Association (AHA) useful life guidelines of 1973 of IRS guidelines. We are eliminating the reference to IRS guidelines because these are now outdated for Medicare purposes since they have been rendered obsolete either by the IRS or by statutory change. We are also deleting the specific reference to the 1973 AHA guidelines since these guidelines are updated by the AHA periodically. In addition, we are clarifying that certain tax legislation on accelerated depreciation, passed by Congress, does not apply to the Medicare program.

Registered Nurse Staffing in Pennsylvania Nursing Homes: Comparison before and after Implementation of Medicare's Prospective Payment System.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kanda, Katsuya; Mezey, Mathy

1991-01-01

Examined changes in resident acuity and registered nurse staffing in all nursing homes in Pennsylvania before and after introduction of Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983. Found that acuity of nursing home residents increased significantly since introduction of PPS, full-time registered nurse staffing remained unchanged, and…

Fee-for-Service Medicare in a Competitive Market Environment

PubMed Central

Dowd, Bryan E.; Coulam, Robert F.; Feldman, Roger; Pizer, Steven D.

2005-01-01

Since its inception, the Medicare Program has allowed for the participation of private health plans, but the relationship of private plans to the government-sponsored fee-for-service (FFS) plan has been the subject of debate. Increased payments to private plans, the introduction of regional preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and a mandated demonstration of price competition that includes FFS Medicare reflect an ongoing attempt to define the role of private plans. The purpose of this article is to explore the roles of private plans and FFS Medicare and to attempt to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each. PMID:17290642

Specialty Payment Model Opportunities and Assessment

PubMed Central

Mulcahy, Andrew W.; Chan, Chris; Hirshman, Samuel; Huckfeldt, Peter J.; Kofner, Aaron; Liu, Jodi L.; Lovejoy, Susan L.; Popescu, Ioana; Timbie, Justin W.; Hussey, Peter S.

2015-01-01

Abstract Gastroenterology and cardiology services are common and costly among Medicare beneficiaries. Episode-based payment, which aims to create incentives for high-quality, low-cost care, has been identified as a promising alternative payment model. This article describes research related to the design of episode-based payment models for ambulatory gastroenterology and cardiology services for possible testing by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The authors analyzed Medicare claims data to describe the frequency and characteristics of gastroenterology and cardiology index procedures, the practices that delivered index procedures, and the patients that received index procedures. The results of these analyses can help inform CMS decisions about the definition of episodes in an episode-based payment model; payment adjustments for service setting, multiple procedures, or other factors; and eligibility for the payment model. PMID:28083363

75 FR 78705 - Medicare Program; Request for Nominations for Members for the Medicare Evidence Development...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-12-16

...] Medicare Program; Request for Nominations for Members for the Medicare Evidence Development & Coverage... notice announces the request for nominations for consideration for membership on the Medicare Evidence... serve on the MEDCAC. Nominees are selected based upon their individual qualifications and not as...

Medicare Program; Inpatient Rehabilitation Facility Prospective Payment System for Federal Fiscal Year 2018. Final rule.

PubMed

2017-08-03

This final rule updates the prospective payment rates for inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs) for federal fiscal year (FY) 2018 as required by the statute. As required by section 1886(j)(5) of the Social Security Act (the Act), this rule includes the classification and weighting factors for the IRF prospective payment system's (IRF PPS) case-mix groups and a description of the methodologies and data used in computing the prospective payment rates for FY 2018. This final rule also revises the International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM) diagnosis codes that are used to determine presumptive compliance under the "60 percent rule," removes the 25 percent payment penalty for inpatient rehabilitation facility patient assessment instrument (IRF-PAI) late transmissions, removes the voluntary swallowing status item (Item 27) from the IRF-PAI, summarizes comments regarding the criteria used to classify facilities for payment under the IRF PPS, provides for a subregulatory process for certain annual updates to the presumptive methodology diagnosis code lists, adopts the use of height/weight items on the IRF-PAI to determine patient body mass index (BMI) greater than 50 for cases of single-joint replacement under the presumptive methodology, and revises and updates measures and reporting requirements under the IRF quality reporting program (QRP).

75 FR 23105 - Medicare Program; Inpatient Psychiatric Facilities Prospective Payment System Payment-Update for...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-04-30

... Disorders Fourth Edition--Text Revision. DRGs Diagnosis-related groups. FY Federal fiscal year. ICD-9-CM...) coding and diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) classification changes discussed in the annual update to the... for the following patient-level characteristics: Medicare Severity diagnosis related groups (MS-DRGs...

42 CFR 412.101 - Special treatment: Inpatient hospital payment adjustment for low-volume hospitals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEMS FOR INPATIENT HOSPITAL SERVICES Special Treatment of Certain Facilities Under the Prospective Payment System for... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Special treatment: Inpatient hospital payment...

Results of the Medicare Health Support disease-management pilot program.

PubMed

McCall, Nancy; Cromwell, Jerry

2011-11-03

In the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Congress required the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to test the commercial disease-management model in the Medicare fee-for-service program. The Medicare Health Support Pilot Program was a large, randomized study of eight commercial programs for disease management that used nurse-based call centers. We randomly assigned patients with heart failure, diabetes, or both to the intervention or to usual care (control) and compared them with the use of a difference-in-differences method to evaluate the effects of the commercial programs on the quality of clinical care, acute care utilization, and Medicare expenditures for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. The study included 242,417 patients (163,107 in the intervention group and 79,310 in the control group). The eight commercial disease-management programs did not reduce hospital admissions or emergency room visits, as compared with usual care. We observed only 14 significant improvements in process-of-care measures out of 40 comparisons. These modest improvements came at substantial cost to the Medicare program in fees paid to the disease-management companies ($400 million), with no demonstrable savings in Medicare expenditures. In this large study, commercial disease-management programs using nurse-based call centers achieved only modest improvements in quality-of-care measures, with no demonstrable reduction in the utilization of acute care or the costs of care.

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of a Capitated Patient Navigation Program for Medicare Beneficiaries with Lung Cancer.

PubMed

Shih, Ya-Chen Tina; Chien, Chun-Ru; Moguel, Rocio; Hernandez, Mike; Hajek, Richard A; Jones, Lovell A

2016-04-01

To assess the cost-effectiveness of implementing a patient navigation (PN) program with capitated payment for Medicare beneficiaries diagnosed with lung cancer. Cost-effectiveness analysis. A Markov model to capture the disease progression of lung cancer and characterize clinical benefits of PN services as timeliness of treatment and care coordination. Taking a payer's perspective, we estimated the lifetime costs, life years (LYs), and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) and addressed uncertainties in one-way and probabilistic sensitivity analyses. Model inputs were extracted from the literature, supplemented with data from a Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services demonstration project. Compared to usual care, PN services incurred higher costs but also yielded better outcomes. The incremental cost and effectiveness was $9,145 and 0.47 QALYs, respectively, resulting in an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $19,312/QALY. One-way sensitivity analysis indicated that findings were most sensitive to a parameter capturing PN survival benefit for local-stage patients. CE-acceptability curve showed the probability that the PN program was cost-effective was 0.80 and 0.91 at a societal willingness-to-pay of $50,000 and $100,000/QALY, respectively. Instituting a capitated PN program is cost-effective for lung cancer patients in Medicare. Future research should evaluate whether the same conclusion holds in other cancers. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

42 CFR 460.182 - Medicaid payment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 42 Public Health 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Medicaid payment. 460.182 Section 460.182 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) PROGRAMS OF ALL-INCLUSIVE CARE FOR THE ELDERLY (PACE) PROGRAMS OF ALL-INCLUSIVE CARE FOR THE ELDERLY (PACE...

Knowledge and opinions regarding Medicare reimbursement for laparoscopic cholecystectomy.

PubMed

Madan, Atul K; Tichansky, David S; Barton, Ginny E; Taddeucci, Raymond J

2007-11-01

Medicare, via its fee schedule, determines amount of payment to physicians for services for its beneficiaries. Because many private insurance companies base their payment schedule on Medicare rates, it is important for physicians to know the rates of commonly performed procedures. In addition, it seems that public perception is that physicians receive substantial payments for procedures. This investigation explores patient, student, resident, and surgeon knowledge and opinion of Medicare reimbursements for laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Patients, students, residents, and surgeons filled out an IRB-exempted survey. The survey included a written description of a laparoscopic cholecystectomy. All participants were asked to give their thoughts of what Medicare currently reimburses for a laparoscopic cholecystectomy ($622) and what they thought Medicare should reimburse for a laparoscopic cholecystectomy for our geographic area. There were 105 participants (47 patients, 17 medical students, 33 surgical residents, and 8 attending surgeons) in the investigation. The reported mean reimbursements of what each group thought Medicare pays were patients, $9,396; students, $3,077; residents, $800; and surgeons, $711. The reported mean reimbursements of what each group thought Medicare should pay were patients, $8,067; students, $3,971; residents, $1,444; and surgeons, $1,600. The mean reimbursements were statistically different between all groups in both the amount Medicare currently pays and the amount Medicare should pay. Most of our participants overestimated what Medicare currently pays for laparoscopic cholecystectomy. Even the mean amount reported in the attending surgeon group was greater than the actual payment. All groups felt Medicare should pay more than the current rate; however, only patients thought Medicare should pay less than they currently pay (probably because of the incorrect perception of the current fee schedule).

76 FR 67801 - Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-02

... Community Care Network NP Nurse Practitioner NPI National Provider Identifier NQF National Quality Forum OIG...: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 212 / Wednesday, November 2... Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations AGENCY: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS...

Prices Don't Drive Regional Medicare Spending Variations

PubMed Central

Gottlieb, Daniel J.; Zhou, Weiping; Song, Yunjie; Andrews, Kathryn Gilman; Skinner, Jonathan S.; Sutherland, Jason M.

2010-01-01

Per capita Medicare spending is more than twice as high in New York City and Miami than in places like Salem, Oregon. How much of these differences can be explained by Medicare's paying more to compensate for the higher cost of goods and services in such areas? To answer this question, we analyzed Medicare spending after adjusting for local price differences in 306 Hospital Referral Regions. The price-adjustment analysis resulted in less variation in what Medicare pays regionally, but not much. The findings suggest that utilization—not local price differences—drives Medicare regional payment variations, along with special payments for medical education and care for the poor. PMID:20110290

75 FR 67751 - Medicare Program: Community-Based Care Transitions Program (CCTP) Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-03

...] Medicare Program: Community-Based Care Transitions Program (CCTP) Meeting AGENCY: Centers for Medicare... guidance and ask questions about the upcoming Community-based Care Transitions Program. The meeting is open... registration information will be posted on the CMS Care Transitions Web site at http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjects...

42 CFR 413.82 - Direct GME payments: Special rules for States that formerly had a waiver from Medicare...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... formerly had a waiver from Medicare reimbursement principles. 413.82 Section 413.82 Public Health CENTERS... OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE SERVICES; OPTIONAL... of a State reimbursement control system under section 1886(c) of the Act, section 402 of the Social...

42 CFR 413.82 - Direct GME payments: Special rules for States that formerly had a waiver from Medicare...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... formerly had a waiver from Medicare reimbursement principles. 413.82 Section 413.82 Public Health CENTERS... OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE SERVICES; OPTIONAL... of a State reimbursement control system under section 1886(c) of the Act, section 402 of the Social...

42 CFR 413.82 - Direct GME payments: Special rules for States that formerly had a waiver from Medicare...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... formerly had a waiver from Medicare reimbursement principles. 413.82 Section 413.82 Public Health CENTERS... OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE SERVICES; OPTIONAL... of a State reimbursement control system under section 1886(c) of the Act, section 402 of the Social...

42 CFR 413.82 - Direct GME payments: Special rules for States that formerly had a waiver from Medicare...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... formerly had a waiver from Medicare reimbursement principles. 413.82 Section 413.82 Public Health CENTERS... OF REASONABLE COST REIMBURSEMENT; PAYMENT FOR END-STAGE RENAL DISEASE SERVICES; OPTIONAL... of a State reimbursement control system under section 1886(c) of the Act, section 402 of the Social...

42 CFR 410.172 - Payment for partial hospitalization services in CMHCs: Conditions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Payment for partial hospitalization services in CMHCs: Conditions. 410.172 Section 410.172 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES MEDICARE PROGRAM SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE (SMI) BENEFITS...

An Analysis of Medicare Reimbursement to Ophthalmologists: Years 2012 to 2013.

PubMed

Han, Everett; Baisiwala, Shivani; Jain, Atul; Bundorf, M Kate; Pershing, Suzann

2017-10-01

To analyze trends in utilization and payment of ophthalmic services in the Medicare population for years 2012 and 2013. Retrospective, cross-sectional study. A retrospective cross-sectional observational analysis was performed using publicly available Medicare Physician and Other Supplier aggregate file and the Physician and Other Supplier Public Use File. Variables analyzed included aggregate beneficiary demographics, Medicare payments to ophthalmologists, ophthalmic medical services provided, and the most common Medicare-reimbursed ophthalmic services. In 2013, total Medicare Part B reimbursement for ophthalmology was $5.8 billion, an increase of 3.6% from the previous year. From 2012 to 2013, the total number of ophthalmology services rendered increased by 2.2%, while average dollar amount reimbursed per ophthalmic service decreased by 5.4%. The top 5 highest reimbursed services accounted for 85% of total ophthalmic Medicare payments in 2013, an 11% increase from 2012. During 2013, drug reimbursement represented 32.8% of the total Medicare payments to ophthalmologists. Ranibizumab and aflibercept alone accounted for 95% of the entire $1.9 billion in drug reimbursements ophthalmologists in 2013. Medicare Part B reimbursement for ophthalmologists was primarily driven by use of anti-vascular endothelial growth factor (anti-VEGF) injections from 2012 to 2013. Of the total drug payments to ophthalmologists, biologic anti-VEGF agents ranibizumab and aflibercept accounted for 95% of all drug reimbursement. This is in contrast to other specialties, in which drug reimbursement represented only a small portion of Medicare reimbursement. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Competitive bidding in Medicare: who benefits from competition?

PubMed

Song, Zirui; Landrum, Mary Beth; Chernew, Michael E

2012-09-01

To conduct the first empirical study of competitive bidding in Medicare. We analyzed 2006-2010 Medicare Advantage data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services using longitudinal models adjusted for market and plan characteristics. A $1 increase in Medicare's payment to health maintenance organization (HMO) plans led to a $0.49 (P <.001) increase in plan bids, with $0.34 (P <.001) going to beneficiaries in the form of extra benefits or lower cost sharing. With preferred provider organization and private fee-for-service plans included, higher Medicare payments increased bids less ($0.33 per dollar), suggesting more competition among these latter plans. As a market-based alternative to cost control through administrative pricing, competitive bidding relies on private insurance plans proposing prices they are willing to accept for insuring a beneficiary. However, competition is imperfect in the Medicare bidding market. As much as half of every dollar in increased plan payment went to higher bids rather than to beneficiaries. While having more insurers in a market lowered bids, the design of any bidding system for Medicare should recognize this shortcoming of competition.

Competitive Bidding in Medicare: Who Benefits From Competition?

PubMed Central

Song, Zirui; Landrum, Mary Beth; Chernew, Michael E.

2012-01-01

Objectives To conduct the first empirical study of competitive bidding in Medicare. Study Design and Methods We analyzed 2006–2010 Medicare Advantage data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services using longitudinal models adjusted for market and plan characteristics. Results A $1 increase in Medicare's payment to health maintenance organization (HMO) plans led to a $0.49 (P <.001) increase in plan bids, with $0.34 (P <.001) going to beneficiaries in the form of extra benefits or lower cost sharing. With preferred provider organization and private fee-for-service plans included, higher Medicare payments increased bids less ($0.33 per dollar), suggesting more competition among these latter plans. Conclusions As a market-based alternative to cost control through administrative pricing, competitive bidding relies on private insurance plans proposing prices they are willing to accept for insuring a beneficiary. However, competition is imperfect in the Medicare bidding market. As much as half of every dollar in increased plan payment went to higher bids rather than to beneficiaries. While having more insurers in a market lowered bids, the design of any bidding system for Medicare should recognize this shortcoming of competition. PMID:23009305

Medicare Program; End-Stage Renal Disease Prospective Payment System, Payment for Renal Dialysis Services Furnished to Individuals With Acute Kidney Injury, and End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program. Final rule.

PubMed

2017-11-01

This rule updates and makes revisions to the end-stage renal disease (ESRD) prospective payment system (PPS) for calendar year (CY) 2018. It also updates the payment rate for renal dialysis services furnished by an ESRD facility to individuals with acute kidney injury (AKI). This rule also sets forth requirements for the ESRD Quality Incentive Program (QIP), including for payment years (PYs) 2019 through 2021.

Making Medicare Advantage a Middle-Class Program

PubMed Central

Glazer, Jacob; McGuire, Thomas

2013-01-01

This paper studies the role of Medicare's premium policy in sorting beneficiaries between traditional Medicare (TM) and managed care plans in the Medicare Advantage (MA) program. Beneficiaries vary in their demand for care. TM fully accommodates demand but creates a moral hazard inefficiency. MA rations care but disregards some elements of the demand. We describe an efficient assignment of beneficiaries to these two options, and argue that efficiency requires an MA program oriented to serve the large middle part of the distribution of demand: the “middle class.” Current Medicare policy of a “single premium” for MA plans cannot achieve efficient sorting. We characterize the demand-based premium policy that can implement the efficient assignment of enrollees to plans. If only a single premium is feasible, the second-best policy involves too many of the low-demand individuals in MA and a too low level of services relative to the first best. We identify approaches to using premium policy to revitalize MA and improve the efficiency of Medicare. PMID:23454916

Making Medicare advantage a middle-class program.

PubMed

Glazer, Jacob; McGuire, Thomas G

2013-03-01

This paper studies the role of Medicare's premium policy in sorting beneficiaries between traditional Medicare (TM) and managed care plans in the Medicare advantage (MA) program. Beneficiaries vary in their demand for care. TM fully accommodates demand but creates a moral hazard inefficiency. MA rations care but disregards some elements of the demand. We describe an efficient assignment of beneficiaries to these two options, and argue that efficiency requires an MA program oriented to serve the large middle part of the distribution of demand: the "middle class." Current Medicare policy of a "single premium" for MA plans cannot achieve efficient sorting. We characterize the demand-based premium policy that can implement the efficient assignment of enrollees to plans. If only a single premium is feasible, the second-best policy involves too many of the low-demand individuals in MA and a too low level of services relative to the first best. We identify approaches to using premium policy to revitalize MA and improve the efficiency of Medicare. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Setting Physicians' Prices in FFS Medicare: An Economic Perspective

PubMed Central

Dowd, Bryan; Feldman, Roger; Nyman, John; Town, Bob

2006-01-01

Recent policy discussions by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) regarding physician prices in the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare Program reflect movement toward a market pricing model. Earlier objectives such as sustainable levels of spending have given way to concerns over the relationship between fees and actual costs, access to care, and the importance of demand and supply in local markets. An important objective in other policy settings is economically efficient distribution of services. We explain the meaning of economic efficiency for Medicare physician prices and explore difficulties one might encounter in pursuing economic efficiency, as well as the cost of not pursuing it. PMID:17427848

Episode-Based Payment and Direct Employer Purchasing of Healthcare Services: Recent Bundled Payment Innovations and the Geisinger Health System Experience.

PubMed

Slotkin, Jonathan R; Ross, Olivia A; Newman, Eric D; Comrey, Janet L; Watson, Victoria; Lee, Rachel V; Brosious, Megan M; Gerrity, Gloria; Davis, Scott M; Paul, Jacquelyn; Miller, E Lynn; Feinberg, David T; Toms, Steven A

2017-04-01

One significant driver of the disjointed healthcare often observed in the United States is the traditional fee-for-service payment model which financially incentivizes the volume of care delivered over the quality and coordination of care. This problem is compounded by the wide, often unwarranted variation in healthcare charges that purchasers of health services encounter for substantially similar episodes of care. The last 10 years have seen many stakeholder organizations begin to experiment with novel financial payment models that strive to obviate many of the challenges inherent in customary quantity-based cost paradigms. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act has allowed many care delivery systems to partner with Medicare in episode-based payment programs such as the Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative, and in patient-based models such as the Medicare Shared Savings Program. Several employer purchasers of healthcare services are experimenting with innovative payment models to include episode-based bundled rate destination centers of excellence programs and the direct purchasing of accountable care organization services. The Geisinger Health System has over 10 years of experience with episode-based payment bundling coupled with the care delivery reengineering which is integral to its ProvenCare® program. Recent experiences at Geisinger have included participation in BPCI and also partnership with employer-purchasers of healthcare through the Pacific Business Group on Health (representing Walmart, Lowe's, and JetBlue Airways). As the shift towards value-focused care delivery and patient experience progresses forward, bundled payment arrangements and direct purchasing of healthcare will be critical financial drivers in effecting change. Copyright © 2017 by the Congress of Neurological Surgeons.

A Medicare primer.

PubMed

Satiani, Bhagwan

2009-08-01

Medicare is a massive and essential safety healthcare net for the elderly in the United States. It covers 45 million people in 2009 (almost one-sixth of the population) and projected to cover an increasing number of aged beneficiaries with a decreasing number of workers paying into the system. Medicare spending is about 13% of the federal budget and 3.2% of gross domestic product. A 7.4% annual growth rate in spending is expected to lead to potential insolvency by 2019. Spending on physician services and other suppliers is about 20% of Medicare outlays. Payment updates for physician services are insufficient in relation to the cost of providing services. The most serious issue remains a permanent fix for the sustained growth rate formula used for calculating payment updates for physicians. Further procrastination of difficult but essential decisions on funding has dire implications for Vascular Surgery and the patients we serve.

78 FR 25013 - Medicare Program; Requirements for the Medicare Incentive Reward Program and Provider Enrollment

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-04-29

...This proposed rule would revise the Incentive Reward Program provisions in Sec. 420.405 and certain provider enrollment requirements in part 424, subpart P. The most significant of these revisions include: changing the Incentive Reward Program potential reward amount for information on individuals and entities who are or have engaged in acts or omissions which resulted in the imposition of a sanction from 10 percent of the overpayments recovered in the case or $1,000, whichever is less, to 15 percent of the final amount collected applied to the first $66,000,000 for the sanctionable conduct; expanding the instances in which a felony conviction can serve as a basis for denial or revocation of a provider or supplier's enrollment; if certain criteria are met, enabling us to deny enrollment if the enrolling provider, supplier, or owner thereof had an ownership relationship with a previously enrolled provider or supplier that had a Medicare debt; enabling us to revoke Medicare billing privileges if we determine that the provider or supplier has a pattern or practice of submitting claims for services that fail to meet Medicare requirements; and limiting the ability of ambulance suppliers to ``backbill'' for services performed prior to enrollment. We believe this proposed rule would--increase the incentive for individuals to report information on individuals and entities that have or are engaged in sanctionable conduct; improve our ability to detect new fraud schemes; and help us ensure that fraudulent entities and individuals do not enroll in or maintain their enrollment in the Medicare program.

75 FR 68790 - Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate, and Annual Deductible...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-09

... 0938-AP81 Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate, and Annual... (SMI) program beginning January 1, 2011. In addition, this notice announces the monthly premium for... beneficiaries with modified adjusted gross income above certain threshold amounts. The monthly actuarial rates...

76 FR 67572 - Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate, and Annual Deductible...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-01

... 0938-AQ16 Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate, and Annual... (SMI) program beginning January 1, 2012. In addition, this notice announces the monthly premium for... beneficiaries with modified adjusted gross income above certain threshold amounts. The monthly actuarial rates...

78 FR 64943 - Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate, and Annual Deductible...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-10-30

... 0938-AR58 Medicare Program; Medicare Part B Monthly Actuarial Rates, Premium Rate, and Annual... (SMI) program beginning January 1, 2014. In addition, this notice announces the monthly premium for... beneficiaries with modified adjusted gross income above certain threshold amounts. The monthly actuarial rates...

78 FR 75304 - Medicare Program; Medicare Secondary Payer and Certain Civil Money Penalties

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-11

... [CMS-6061-ANPRM] RIN 0938-AR88 Medicare Program; Medicare Secondary Payer and Certain Civil Money... practices for which civil money penalties (CMPs) may or may not be imposed for failure to comply with...-3951. I. Background A. Imposition of Civil Money Penalties (CMPs) In 1981, the Congress added section...

75 FR 21207 - Medicare Program; Ambulatory Surgical Centers, Conditions for Coverage

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014