Science.gov

Sample records for nuclear weapons tests

  1. Nuclear weapons testing

    SciTech Connect

    Heylin, M.

    1988-02-15

    The author examines the history of efforts to ban, or at least constrain, nuclear tests. The issue has been marked by shifts in attitude by the superpowers in recent times. The Reagan Administration sees a comprehensive test ban only as a very long-term goal for the U.S. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been pushing extremely hard lately for a ban on all testing. The author discusses the pros and cons of such a ban by examining the arguments of the U.S. Department of Energy, Nobel Laureate Glenn T. Seaborg, and Associate Director for Defense Systems at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory George H. Miller. Other issues that are discussed include verification, joint testing, and reliability. He concludes with a discussion of the future of the ban.

  2. Need the U.S. resume nuclear weapons testing?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tannenbaum, Benn

    2005-04-01

    The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since 1992. Nuclear weapons are very complicated devices and have many possible failure modes. The U.S. has invested many hundreds of millions of dollars and many thousands of man-years in ensuring the safety and security of the stockpile. Are these efforts sufficient? Do we understand how nuclear weapons work---and decay---sufficiently well to preclude the need for further testing? This presentation will examine how nuclear weapons work, describe possible failure modes, and explore various technologies and techniques used for certifying nuclear weapons. The presentation will also explore what, if any, useful information would likely be gained from a nuclear weapon test. Finally, the presentation will examine the statistics of small numbers to determine how many tests would likely be needed to reveal complicated problems with the arsenal.

  3. New Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nelson, Robert A.

    2003-04-01

    Some U.S. politicians and members of U.S. weapon laboratories are urging the United States to develop a new generation of precision low-yield nuclear weapons "mininukes," with equivalent yields of a few kilotons of TNT or less. Small nuclear weapons are necessary, they argue, to fill the gap between large conventional munitions and our existing high-yield nuclear weapons. They argue that low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons could destroy hardened underground command bunkers and storage sites for chemical or biological weapons while "limiting collateral damage." We have shown, however, that even a small nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 kiloton (less than 10% of the Hiroshima bomb) would produce a fatal dose of radioactive fallout over a radius of several kilometers. Moreover, low-yield nuclear weapons are unlikely to destroy buried stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and may actually disperse active agents over the countryside. If new nuclear weapons require full underground testing, this would end the nuclear testing moratorium that the United States and Russia have maintained since 1992 and would likely destroy prospects for eventual entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

  4. New Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    2003-03-01

    Some U.S. politicians and members of U.S. weapon laboratories are urging the United States to develop a new generation of precision low-yield nuclear weapons—``mininukes," with equivalent yields of a few kilotons of TNT or less. Small nuclear weapons are necessary, they argue, to fill the gap between large conventional munitions and our existing high-yield nuclear weapons. They argue that low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons could destroy hardened underground command bunkers and storage sites for chemical or biological weapons while ``limiting collateral damage." We have shown, however, that even a small nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 kiloton (less than 10% of the Hiroshima bomb) would produce a fatal dose of radioactive fallout over a radius of several kilometers. Moreover, low-yield nuclear weapons are unlikely to destroy buried stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons—and may actually disperse active agents over the countryside. If new nuclear weapons require full underground testing, this would end the nuclear testing moratorium that the United States and Russia have maintained since 1992 and would likely destroy prospects for eventual entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ct.

  5. Nuclear weapons tests and environmental consequences: a global perspective.

    PubMed

    Prăvălie, Remus

    2014-10-01

    The beginning of the atomic age marked the outset of nuclear weapons testing, which is responsible for the radioactive contamination of a large number of sites worldwide. The paper aims to analyze nuclear weapons tests conducted in the second half of the twentieth century, highlighting the impact of radioactive pollution on the atmospheric, aquatic, and underground environments. Special attention was given to the concentration of main radioactive isotopes which were released, such as ¹⁴C, ¹³⁷Cs, and ⁹⁰Sr, generally stored in the atmosphere and marine environment. In addition, an attempt was made to trace the spatial delimitation of the most heavily contaminated sites worldwide, and to note the human exposure which has caused a significantly increased incidence of thyroidal cancer locally and regionally. The United States is one of the important examples of assessing the correlation between the increase in the thyroid cancer incidence rate and the continental-scale radioactive contamination with ¹³¹I, a radioactive isotope which was released in large amounts during the nuclear tests carried out in the main test site, Nevada. PMID:24563393

  6. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  7. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-01

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  8. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Vaughen, V.C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described.

  9. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SELECTED HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

    EPA Science Inventory

    The paper presents a general review of public safety standards as adapted by the nuclear weapons testing program in the United States, and the impact of these changing standards on the nuclear testing program itself. The review notes the importance of improvements in diagnostic i...

  10. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  11. Nuclear weapons and nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Cassel, C.; McCally, M.; Abraham, H.

    1984-01-01

    This book examines the potential radiation hazards and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include medical responsibility and thermonuclear war, the threat of nuclear war, nuclear weaponry, biological effects, radiation injury, decontamination, long-term effects, ecological effects, psychological aspects, the economic implications of nuclear weapons and war, ethics, civil defense, arms control, nuclear winter, and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war.

  12. Temporal trends in childhood leukaemia incidence following exposure to radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed

    Wakeford, Richard; Darby, Sarah C; Murphy, Michael F G

    2010-05-01

    Notably raised rates of childhood leukaemia incidence have been found near some nuclear installations, in particular Sellafield and Dounreay in the United Kingdom, but risk assessments have concluded that the radiation doses estimated to have been received by children or in utero as a result of operations at these installations are much too small to account for the reported increases in incidence. This has led to speculation that the risk of childhood leukaemia arising from internal exposure to radiation following the intake of radioactive material released from nuclear facilities has been substantially underestimated. The radionuclides discharged from many nuclear installations are similar to those released into the global environment by atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, which was at its height in the late-1950s and early-1960s. Measurements of anthropogenic radionuclides in members of the general public resident in the vicinity of Sellafield and Dounreay have found levels that do not differ greatly from those in persons living remote from nuclear installations that are due to ubiquitous exposure to the radioactive debris of nuclear weapons testing. Therefore, if the leukaemia risk to children resulting from deposition within the body of radioactive material discharged from nuclear facilities has been grossly underestimated, then a pronounced excess of childhood leukaemia would have been expected as a consequence of the short period of intense atmospheric weapons testing. We have examined childhood leukaemia incidence in 11 large-scale cancer registries in three continents for which data were available at least as early as 1962. We found no evidence of a wave of excess cases corresponding to the peak of radioactive fallout from atmospheric weapons testing. The absence of a discernible increase in the incidence of childhood leukaemia following the period of maximum exposure to the radioactive debris of this testing weighs heavily against the suggestion that

  13. Cancer in People Exposed to Nuclear Weapons Testing

    MedlinePlus

    ... payment of $100,000. Onsite participants People (including military personnel) who were present onsite during above-ground nuclear ... be entitled to a payment of $75,000. (Military personnel exposed to radiation at Hiroshima or Nagasaki are ...

  14. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOEpatents

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  15. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  16. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  17. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Child, D. P.; Hotchkis, M. A. C.

    2013-01-01

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of the Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by the Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low 240Pu/239Pu ratios were measured at both sites (∼0.05 for Alpha Island and ∼0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying 236U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but 233U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  18. Endless generations of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Taylor, T.B.

    1986-11-01

    The author feels that pursuit of Star Wars and continued US nuclear testing is blocking progress toward the eventual worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. It is also bound to reveal new ways to attack military or civilian targets that will, in turn, stimulate further searches for new types of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Some of these developments could intensify the belief that limited nuclear wars can be fought and won. In short, development of new generations of nuclear weapons will provide the kind of positive feedback to the nuclear arms race that will greatly expand its dangers and its costs. Further proliferation of new types of nuclear weapons will increase the already extreme complexity of military planning and response, and the attendant dangers of nuclear war occurring by accident or through misinterpretation of information. Assessments of possible new military threats will become more uncertain as the complexities increase. Uncertainty can lead to catastrophic mistakes. Real or mistakenly perceived gaps in nuclear preparedness are likely to be used as further arguments for vast new military expenditures. We may all come to long for the relative simplicity of military nuclear issues during the first decade or so following the end of World War II. For these reasons, the author is convinced that there should be a halt to all nuclear tests, worldwide, as soon as possible. 2 references.

  19. Nuclear weapon reliability evaluation methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.

    1993-06-01

    This document provides an overview of those activities that are normally performed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide nuclear weapon reliability evaluations for the Department of Energy. These reliability evaluations are first provided as a prediction of the attainable stockpile reliability of a proposed weapon design. Stockpile reliability assessments are provided for each weapon type as the weapon is fielded and are continuously updated throughout the weapon stockpile life. The reliability predictions and assessments depend heavily on data from both laboratory simulation and actual flight tests. An important part of the methodology are the opportunities for review that occur throughout the entire process that assure a consistent approach and appropriate use of the data for reliability evaluation purposes.

  20. Assessment of the safety of US nuclear weapons and related nuclear test requirements: A post-Bush Initiative update

    SciTech Connect

    Kidder, R.E.

    1991-12-10

    The Nuclear Weapons Reduction Initiative announced by President Bush on September 27, 1991, is described herein as set forth in Defense Secretary Cheney`s Nuclear Arsenal Reduction Order issued September 28, 1991. The implications of the Bush Initiative for improved nuclear weapons safety are assessed in response to a request by US Senators Harkin, Kennedy, and Wirth to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that the author prepare such an assessment. The author provides an estimate of the number of nuclear tests needed to accomplish a variety of specified warhead safety upgrades, then uses the results of this estimate to answer three questions posed by the Senators. These questions concern pit reuse and the number of nuclear tests needed for specified safety upgrades of those ballistic missiles not scheduled for retirement, namely the Minuteman III, C4, and D5 missiles.

  1. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  2. Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Miller, A. J.; Krueger, A. J.; Prabhakara, C.; Hilsenrath, E.

    1974-01-01

    Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

  3. US nuclear weapons policy

    SciTech Connect

    May, M.

    1990-12-05

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  4. Nuclear weapons at sea

    SciTech Connect

    Fieldhouse, R.

    1987-09-01

    It is important to consider naval strategy in the context of the forces available to implement it: any strategy not based on existing force capabilities is just talk. An examination of US and Soviet naval forces reveals two important points: First, the current US naval force structure provides significant advantages over the Soviet Union and permits an aggressive forward strategy, while Soviet naval force structure and practice require the Soviet Navy to stay closer to home. Second, for different reasons both navies are thoroughly armed with tactical nuclear weapons; this creates a risk that any superpower naval conflict will escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. This risk may be increasing because of disparities between US and Soviet naval forces and strategies: whereas the US Navy concentrates its offensive power in its aircraft carriers, for forward operations, the Soviet Navy concentrates its offensive power in land-based aircraft and in its submarines, for operations closer to home. Any US naval advantages pertain exclusively to conventional forces and conflict. Once nuclear weapons are used any superiority will evaporate. The full implications and dangers of this fact have been ignored in the proposed US maritime strategy, which overlooks the probability of the use of nuclear weapons and focuses exclusively on a conventional war. 10 references.

  5. Nuclear weapon detection categorization analysis

    SciTech Connect

    1997-12-01

    This statement of work is for the Proof of Concept for nuclear weapon categories utility in Arms control. The focus of the project will be to collect, analyze and correlate Intrinsic Radiation (INRAD) calculation results for the purpose of defining measurable signatures that differentiate categories of nuclear weapons. The project will support START III negotiations by identifying categories of nuclear weapons. The categories could be used to clarify sub-limits on the total number of nuclear weapons.

  6. Doses from external irradiation to Marshall Islanders from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    PubMed

    Bouville, André; Beck, Harold L; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Annual doses from external irradiation resulting from exposure to fallout from the 65 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands at Bikini and Enewetak between 1946 and 1958 have been estimated for the first time for Marshallese living on all inhabited atolls. All tests that deposited fallout on any of the 23 inhabited atolls or separate reef islands have been considered. The methodology used to estimate the radiation doses at the inhabited atolls is based on test- and location-specific radiation survey data, deposition density estimates of 137Cs, and fallout times-of-arrival provided in a companion paper (Beck et al.), combined with information on the radionuclide composition of the fallout at various times after each test. These estimates of doses from external irradiation have been combined with corresponding estimates of doses from internal irradiation, given in a companion paper (Simon et al.), to assess the cancer risks among the Marshallese population (Land et al.) resulting from exposure to radiation from the nuclear weapons tests. PMID:20622549

  7. Historical perspectives on selected health and safety aspects of nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed

    Black, S C; Potter, G D

    1986-07-01

    This paper presents a general review of public safety standards as adapted by the nuclear weapons testing program in the United States, and the impact of these changing standards on the nuclear testing program itself. The review notes the importance of improvements in diagnostic instrumentation and methodologies from a relatively simple degree of sophistication to their current high level. Use of the improved methodologies uncovered a serious oversight affecting human exposure, namely, that of not recognizing the relative importance of all potential transport/dosimetric pathways for risk assessment. The testing program, from its inception in the Pacific in 1946 to the present time in Nevada, is viewed from the perspective of providing improved radiation protection to the general public. PMID:3331999

  8. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    DOE PAGESBeta

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-18

    We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. Wemore » find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less

  9. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  10. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    PubMed

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond. PMID:19772154

  11. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  12. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    PubMed

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer. PMID:26141189

  13. Radiation doses to local populations near nuclear weapons test sites worldwide.

    PubMed

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André

    2002-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing was conducted in the atmosphere at numerous sites worldwide between 1946 and 1980, which resulted in exposures to local populations as a consequence of fallout of radioactive debris. The nuclear tests were conducted by five nations (United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China) primarily at 16 sites. The 16 testing sites, located in nine different countries on five continents (plus Oceania) contributed nearly all of the radioactive materials released to the environment by atmospheric testing; only small amounts were released at a fewother minor testing sites. The 16 sites discussed here are Nevada Test Site, USA (North American continent), Bikini and Enewetak, Marshall Islands (Oceania); Johnston Island, USA (Oceania), Christmas and Malden Island, Kiribati (Oceania); Emu Field, Maralinga, and Monte Bello Islands, Australia (Australian continent); Mururoa and Fangataufa, French Polynesia (Oceania), Reggane, Algeria (Africa), Novaya Zemlya and Kapustin Yar, Russia (Europe), Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan (Asia), and Lop Nor, China (Asia). There were large differences in the numbers of tests conducted at each location and in the total explosive yields. Those factors, as well as differences in population density, lifestyle, environment, and climate at each site, led to large differences in the doses received by local populations. In general, the tests conducted earliest led to the highest individual and population exposures, although the amount of information available for a few of these sites is insufficient to provide any detailed evaluation of radiation exposures. The most comprehensive information for any site is for the Nevada Test Site. The disparities in available information add difficulty to determining the radiation exposures of local populations at each site. It is the goal of this paper to summarize the available information on external and internal doses received by the public living in the regions near each of the

  14. An estimate of Sandia resources for underground nuclear weapons effects testing.

    SciTech Connect

    Bomber, Thomas M.; Zeuch, David Henry

    2003-11-01

    We conducted a study of the time and resources that would be required for Sandia National Laboratories to once again perform nuclear weapons effects experiments of the sort that it did in the past. The study is predicated on the assumptions that if underground nuclear weapons effects testing (UG/NWET) is ever resumed, (1) a brief series of tests (i.e., 2-3) would be done, and (2) all required resources other than those specific to SNL experiments would be provided by others. The questions that we sought to answer were: (1) What experiments would SNL want to do and why? (2) How much would they cost? (3) How long would they take to field? To answer these questions, we convened panels of subject matter experts first to identify five experiments representative of those that SNL has done in the past, and then to determine the costs and timelines to design, fabricate and field each of them. We found that it would cost $76M to $84M to do all five experiments, including 164 to 174 FTEs to conduct all five experiments in a single test. Planning and expenditures for some of the experiments needed to start as early as 5.5 years prior to zero-day, and some work would continue up to 2 years beyond the event. Using experienced personnel as mentors, SNL could probably field such experiments within the next five years. However, beyond that time frame, loss of personnel would place us in the position of essentially starting over.

  15. Fallout Deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak Nuclear Weapons Tests

    PubMed Central

    Beck, Harold L.; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E.; Simon, Steven L.

    2009-01-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m-2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for all the 31 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands and to estimate fallout deposition density. Our analysis suggested that only 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in substantial fallout deposition on any of the 25 inhabited atolls. This analysis was confirmed by the fact that the sum of our estimates of 137Cs deposition from these 20 tests at each atoll is in good agreement with the total 137Cs deposited as estimated from contemporary soil sample analyses. The monitoring data and meteorological analyses were used to quantitatively estimate the deposition density of 63 activation and fission products for each nuclear test, plus the cumulative deposition of 239+240Pu at each atoll. Estimates of the degree of fractionation of fallout from each test at each atoll, as well as of the fallout transit times from the test sites to the atolls were used in this analysis. The estimates of radionuclide deposition density, fractionation, and transit times reported here are the most complete available anywhere and are suitable for estimations of both external and internal dose to representative persons as described in companion papers. PMID:20622548

  16. Fallout deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    PubMed

    Beck, Harold L; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands and to estimate fallout deposition density. Our analysis suggested that only 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in substantial fallout deposition on any of the 23 inhabited atolls. This analysis was confirmed by the fact that the sum of our estimates of 137Cs deposition from these 20 tests at each atoll is in good agreement with the total 137Cs deposited as estimated from contemporary soil sample analyses. The monitoring data and meteorological analyses were used to quantitatively estimate the deposition density of 63 activation and fission products for each nuclear test, plus the cumulative deposition of 239+240Pu at each atoll. Estimates of the degree of fractionation of fallout from each test at each atoll, as well as of the fallout transit times from the test sites to the atolls were used in this analysis. The estimates of radionuclide deposition density, fractionation, and transit times reported here are the most complete available anywhere and are suitable for estimations of both external and internal dose to representative persons as described in companion papers. PMID:20622548

  17. Cancer mortality risk among military participants of a 1958 atmospheric nuclear weapons test.

    PubMed Central

    Watanabe, K K; Kang, H K; Dalager, N A

    1995-01-01

    OBJECTIVES. This study was undertaken to determine if Navy veterans who participated in an atmospheric nuclear test in 1958 were at increased risk of death from certain cancers. METHODS. Cancer mortality risk of 8554 Navy veterans who participated in an atmospheric nuclear test in the Pacific was compared with that of 14,625 Navy veterans who did not participate in any test. Radiation dosage information was obtained from film badges for 88% of the test participants. RESULTS. The median radiation dose for the test participants was 388 mrem (3.88 millisieverts [mSv]). Among participants who received the highest radiation dose (> 1000 mrem, or 10 mSv), an increased mortality risk for all causes (relative risk [RR] = 1.23; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.04, 1.45), all cancers (RR = 1.42; 95% CI = 1.03, 1.96), and liver cancer (RR = 6.42; 95% CI = 1.17, 35.3) was observed. The risk for cancer of the digestive organs was elevated among test participants (rate ratio = 1.47; 95% CI = 1.06, 2.04) but with no significant dose-response trend. Many of the cancers of a priori interest were not significantly elevated in the overall test participant group or in the group that received the highest radiation dose. CONCLUSIONS. Most of the cancers suspected of being radiogenic were not significantly elevated among the test participants. Nevertheless, increased risks for certain cancers cannot be ruled out at this time. Veterans who participated in the nuclear weapons tests should continue to be monitored. PMID:7702116

  18. Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese, and United States nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect

    Schultz, V. ); Schultz, S.C. ); Robison, W.L. )

    1991-05-01

    A considerable literature exists on the Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese and their atolls; however, this literature consists of a large number of governmental documents that are relatively unknown and difficult to locate. This is particularly true of the documents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and those related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Because a comprehensive bibliography on the impact of nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese and their atolls does not exist, the preparation of a bibliography that includes sufficient information to locate all types of reports seems justified. This document is the bibliography.

  19. Nuclear weapon-free zones

    SciTech Connect

    Zinner, P.E.

    1988-06-01

    The literature dealing with nuclear weapon-free zones is not as prominent as is that on arms control and reduction negotiations, confidence-building measures, and a variety of other security-related issues. Documentary sources are relatively scarce and they are widely scattered. Yet on close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that nuclear weapon-free zones have been the object of widespread, intense interest in most regions of the world. Six international treaties designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are now in force. A substantial portion of the globe is already under some sort of nuclear weapon-free regime. Proposals for creating additional nuclear weapon-free zones abound. In Europe, the only region where adversary alliances maintain a high concentration of nuclear weapons, issues concerning the viability of nuclear weapon-free zones have attracted special attention. The following pages contain information intended to help to put problems in perspective, create awareness of trends, and provide a basis for identifying factors that may bear significantly on evaluating options in the formulation of national and alliance security policies concerning nuclear weapon-free zones. 31 refs.

  20. Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, M.M.

    1987-08-01

    The author discusses what is being done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He says that two mechanisms need to be strengthened: international safeguards to ensure that civilian nuclear materials and technology are not diverted to military purposes, and controls on the export of such materials and technology. While 135 nations signed the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is not enough. Detecting diversion of nuclear materials to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosives is not easy. It is also difficult to enforce safeguard systems when countries are exporting nuclear technology and materials. The author says nuclear-weapon states need to agree to a complete test ban to convince other nations to give up trying to acquire nuclear weapons.

  1. The relationship of thyroid cancer with radiation exposure from nuclear weapon testing in the Marshall Islands.

    PubMed

    Takahashi, Tatsuya; Schoemaker, Minouk J; Trott, Klaus R; Simon, Steven L; Fujimori, Keisei; Nakashima, Noriaki; Fukao, Akira; Saito, Hiroshi

    2003-03-01

    The US nuclear weapons testing program in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands. The potentially widespread radiation exposure from radio-iodines of fallout has raised concerns about the risk of thyroid cancer in the Marshallese population. The most serious exposures and its health hazards resulted from the hydrogen-thermonuclear bomb test, the Castle BRAVO, on March 1, 1954. Between 1993 and 1997, we screened 3,709 Marshallese for thyroid disease who were born before the BRAVO test. It was 60% of the entire population at risk and who were still alive at the time of our examinations. We diagnosed 30 thyroid cancers and found 27 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before our screening in this group. Fifty-seven Marshallese born before 1954 (1.5%) had thyroid cancer or had been operated for thyroid cancer. Nearly all (92%) of these cancers were papillary carcinoma. We derived estimates of individual thyroid dose proxy from the BRAVO test in 1954 on the basis of published age-specific doses estimated on Utirik atoll and 137Cs deposition levels on the atolls where the participants came from. There was suggestive evidence that the prevalence of thyroid cancer increased with category of estimated dose to the thyroid. PMID:12675119

  2. Nuclear weapon system risk assessment

    SciTech Connect

    Carlson, D.D.

    1993-11-01

    Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a process for evaluating hazardous operations by considering what can go wrong, the likelihood of these undesired events, and the resultant consequences. Techniques used in PRA originated in the 1960s. Although there were early exploratory applications to nuclear weapons and other technologies, the first major application of these techniques was in the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400, {sup 1} in which the risks of nuclear power accidents were thoroughly investigated for the first time. Recently, these techniques have begun to be adapted to nuclear weapon system applications. This report discusses this application to nuclear weapon systems.

  3. Nuclear weapons and the law.

    PubMed

    Murray, R K

    1999-01-01

    The history of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is summarized, with a discussion of some of its earlier Advisory Opinions. The Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear arms is considered in the light of the principles of international humanitarian law and a review of nuclear weapons effects. The present government's position on nuclear weapons as outlined in the Strategic Defence Review (which ignores the issue of legality) is examined critically. PMID:10371869

  4. Nuclear weapons are legal tools

    SciTech Connect

    Almond, H.H. Jr.

    1985-05-01

    Responding to an article by Elliot Meyrowitz stating that nuclear weapons are illegal threats, the author observes that international law does not forbid the possession or use of nuclear weapons, whose existence operates as part of the checks and balances process that maintains deterrence. Because nuclear weapons have never been identified among states as illegal, either by treaties or by customary international law, attempts by opposing states to establish illegality through declarations fall short of an effectively shared strategy. The author concludes that we must use the time that deterrence permits to forcefully promote policies optimizing the claims of people for human dignity rather than focusing on the fruitless search to make nuclear weapons illegal.

  5. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  6. Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese, and United States nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect

    Robison, W.L. ); Schultz, V. ); Schultz, S.C. )

    1991-04-01

    A considerable literature exists on the Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese and their atolls; however, this literature consists of a large number of governmental documents that are relatively unknown and difficult to locate. This is particularly true of the documents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and those related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Because a comprehensive bibliography on the impact of nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese and their atolls does not exist, the preparation of a bibliography that includes sufficient information to locate all types of reports seems justified. Primary sources of information in preparing this bibliography were bibliographies on Oceania, citations in published papers, CIS Index and Abstracts, Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications, Nuclear Science Abstracts, Energy Research Abstracts, numerous bibliographies on radiation ecology, and suggestions by many individuals whom we contacted. One goal in this bibliography is to include complete documentation of the source of congressional reports and other government-related publications. In addition, page numbers for material in this bibliography are provided in parentheses when the subject matter of a book or document is not restricted to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands.

  7. Testing times: A nuclear weapons laboratory at the end of the Cold War

    SciTech Connect

    Gusterson, H.

    1992-01-01

    This dissertation focuses on the role of discursive and other practices in the construction of two alternative regimes of truth in regard to nuclear weapons, and in the cultural production of persons at the Livermore Laboratory and in the local anti-nuclear movement. In the 1980s the scientists' regime of truth was challenged by a heterogeneous anti-nuclear movement recruited largely from the humanistic middle class - a class fragment profoundly hostile to the policies of the Reagan Administration. The movement attacked the Laboratory in a number of ways, ranging from local ballot initiatives and lobbying in Washington to civil disobedience at the Laboratory. By the end of the 1980s this movement, in combination with Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and a decade of internal scandals at the Laboratory, left the Laboratory weakened - though Laboratory scientists and managers are currently working to adapt the system of ideas and practices evolved during the Cold War to legitimate continued weapons work in a post-Cold War environment.

  8. What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2007-03-01

    Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

  9. Application of NEPA to nuclear weapons production, storage, and testing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project

    SciTech Connect

    Sauber, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirement of environmental impact statements for the testing of military equipment, specifically nuclear weapons, conflicts with national security objectives. The author examines NEPA and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in terms of the environmental effects of weapons testing and the relevant case law. The Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Education Project sought to resolve the conflict by distinguishing between a project which is contemplated and one which is proposed. The classification scheme embodied in the FOIA exemption for national security may cause unwarranted frustration of NEPA's goals. The author outlines a new classification system and review mechanism that could curb military abuse in this area.

  10. A high resolution record of chlorine-36 nuclear-weapons-tests fallout from Central Asia

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Green, J.R.; Cecil, L.D.; Synal, H.-A.; Santos, J.; Kreutz, K.J.; Wake, C.P.

    2004-01-01

    The Inilchek Glacier, located in the Tien Shan Mountains, central Asia, is unique among mid-latitude glaciers because of its relatively large average annual accumulation. In July 2000, two ice cores of 162 and 167 meters (m) in length were collected from the Inilchek Glacier for (chlorine-36) 36Cl analysis a part of a collaborative international effort to study the environmental changes archived in mid-latitude glaciers worldwide. The average annual precipitation at the collection site was calculated to be 1.6 m. In contrast, the reported average annual accumulations at the high-latitude Dye-3 glacial site, Greenland, the mid-latitude Guliya Ice Cap, China, and the mid-latitude Upper Fremont Glacier, Wyoming, USA, were 0.52, 0.16 and 0.76 m, respectively. The resolution of the 36Cl record in one of the Inilchek ice cores was from 2 to 10 times higher than the resolution of the records at these other sites and could provide an opportunity for detailed study of environmental changes that have occurred over the past 150 years. Despite the differences in accumulation among these various glacial sites, the 36Cl profile and peak concentrations for the Inilchek ice core were remarkably similar in shape and magnitude to those for ice cores from these other sites. The 36Cl peak concentration from 1958, the year during the mid-1900s nuclear-weapons-tests period when 36Cl fallout was largest, was preserved in the Inilchek core at a depth of 90.56 m below the surface of the glacier (74.14-m-depth water equivalent) at a concentration of 7.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/gram (g) of ice. Peak 36Cl concentrations from Dye-3, Guliya and the Upper Fremont glacial sites were 7.1 ?? 105, 5.4 ?? 105 and 0.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/g of ice, respectively. Measurements of 36Cl preserved in ice cores improve estimates of historical worldwide atmospheric deposition of this isotope and allow the sources of 36Cl in ground water to be better identified. ?? 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

  11. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Hart, Mark

    2014-11-20

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  12. Historical overview of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing and estimates of fallout in the continental United States.

    PubMed

    Beck, Harold L; Bennett, Burton G

    2002-05-01

    From 1945 to 1980, over 500 weapons tests were conducted in the atmosphere at a number of locations around the world. These tests resulted in the release of substantial quantities of radioactive debris to the environment. Local, intermediate, and global fallout deposition densities downwind from test sites depended on the heights of bursts, the yields, and the half-lives and volatilities of the particular fission or activation products, as well as on the meteorological conditions. A number of national and international monitoring programs were established to trace the fallout through the atmosphere and biosphere. These programs included continuous monitoring of ground-level air, exposure rates, and deposition as well as periodic sampling of food, bone, water, soil, and stratospheric air. Although data for specific high-yield tests are still classified, the fission and fusion yields of the various tests and test series have been estimated and from this information the quantities of specific fission and activation products released into the atmosphere have been determined. The geographic and temporal variations in the fallout deposition of specific radionuclides based on both actual measurements and model calculations are discussed in this paper. A feasibility study to estimate the deposition density (deposition per unit area) of particular radionuclides from both Nevada Test Site and "global" fallout on a county-by-county scale for the continental United States is described. These deposition estimates provide a basis for reconstructing population exposure and dose. They support the feasibility of a more detailed evaluation of the population doses that resulted from fallout from atmospheric tests to document the experience fully and to report results more systematically and completely to the world community. The impact of weapons fallout will continue to be felt for years to come since a contaminant baseline has been imposed on the ambient radiation environment that

  13. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    SciTech Connect

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-08-15

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  14. Nuclear weapons and regional conflict

    SciTech Connect

    Latter, A.L.; Martinelli, E.A.

    1993-05-01

    An important national defense objective for the US in the post cold-war era -- according to Secretary of Defense, Cheney is to deter regional conflicts. To satisfy this objective there is more or less general agreement that nuclear weapons are not needed, especially against regional powers like Iraq that do not (as yet) have a nuclear capability. Modern conventional weapons (PGMs), it is believed, are adequate when used in the traditional way of fighting: massive ground forces with heavy ground equipment, supported by air and naval forces. Of course, there are arguments against this view. For example, nuclear advocates call attention to deeply buried targets that are unattackable with conventional munitions. But this argument, and others, for US use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons are presently discounted in favor of the political/moral advantages of a no-first-use policy. We do not wish to take sides in this debate. We believe, however, that the debate win continue as political, military, technical and economic factors undergo inevitable changes. In this brief paper, we want to present another pro-nuclear argument which, to the best of our knowledge, has received little or no attention. This argument, we believe, could become important in weighing the pros and cons of the debate if domestic pressures cause the defense budget to undergo such severe cuts that we must either abandon our political commitments or adopt a non-traditional war-fighting strategy that is effective under a greatly reduced defense budget.

  15. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  16. Reassessment of gastrointestinal dose from a continental United States nuclear weapons test

    SciTech Connect

    Clarke, G.M.

    1987-01-01

    Factors which may have contributed to substantial sheep losses allegedly caused by radioactive fallout from the Continental United States Atmospheric Weapons Testing Program conducted during the 1950's were examined. This led to a focus on one 1953 test, Shot II of the Upshot-Knothole Test Series. Estimates of surface gamma activity on the grazing area foraged by a single herd of sheep were made from analysis of published graphs and from original calculations. They indicated that the external gamma dose was not responsible for any serious radiobiological damage. Results of the evaluation of surface radiocontamination coupled with estimates of the amount of activity ingested per sheep during the interval from 2 hours to 12 hours after shot detonation were used to estimate the beta dose to the gastrointestinal (GI) tract. Those calculations led to an estimated beta dose to the lower GI tract of approx. 2.0 x 10/sup 4/ rad during the first day. This is a life-threatening dose by any standard.

  17. Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

    SciTech Connect

    Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

    1998-05-01

    The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

  18. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  19. Nuclear weapons are illegal threats

    SciTech Connect

    Meyrowitz, E.L.

    1985-05-01

    Challenging Harry Almond's position that nuclear deterrence is workable, the author contends that there is no historical basis for believing that anticipation of the horrors of war will be an effective deterrent. He questions the belief that the nuclear balance of terror has maintained the peace for the past 40 years because an arms race is inherently unstable. The argument that the pursuit of national interests takes precedence over any limitation imposed by international law reflects a perception of international law that is comparable to the Third Reich. The bases for a legal evaluation of the status of nuclear weapons under international law come from express and implicit treaty provisions, international custom, general principles of international law, judicial decisions, resolutions at the United Nations, and the opinions of qualified jurists as well as military necessity.

  20. Military participants at U.S. Atmospheric nuclear weapons testing--methodology for estimating dose and uncertainty.

    PubMed

    Till, John E; Beck, Harold L; Aanenson, Jill W; Grogan, Helen A; Mohler, H Justin; Mohler, S Shawn; Voillequé, Paul G

    2014-05-01

    Methods were developed to calculate individual estimates of exposure and dose with associated uncertainties for a sub-cohort (1,857) of 115,329 military veterans who participated in at least one of seven series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests or the TRINITY shot carried out by the United States. The tests were conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Test Site. Dose estimates to specific organs will be used in an epidemiological study to investigate leukemia and male breast cancer. Previous doses had been estimated for the purpose of compensation and were generally high-sided to favor the veteran's claim for compensation in accordance with public law. Recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to digitize the historical records supporting the veterans' compensation assessments make it possible to calculate doses and associated uncertainties. Our approach builds upon available film badge dosimetry and other measurement data recorded at the time of the tests and incorporates detailed scenarios of exposure for each veteran based on personal, unit, and other available historical records. Film badge results were available for approximately 25% of the individuals, and these results assisted greatly in reconstructing doses to unbadged persons and in developing distributions of dose among military units. This article presents the methodology developed to estimate doses for selected cancer cases and a 1% random sample of the total cohort of veterans under study. PMID:24758578

  1. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  2. Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, J.C. ); Kay, D.A. )

    1992-07-01

    UN inspectors discovered an electromagnetic isotope separation factory that put Iraq just 18-30 months away from having enough material for a bomb. They also found European centrifuge technology and plans for an implosion device. The inspections of Iraq mandated by the United Nations as a cease-fire condition at the end of the Gulf War in February 1991 have revealed a clandestine nuclear materials production and weapons design program of unexpected size and sophistication. The total value of that program, in terms of equipment and personnel deployed between 1981 and 1991, may be on the order of $5-10 billion. The program employed an estimated 7000 scientist and 20,000 workers. 6 refs., 4 figs.

  3. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    SciTech Connect

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G.; Barke, R.P.

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  4. Development of glass vitrification at SRL as a waste treatment technique for nuclear weapon components

    SciTech Connect

    Coleman, J.T.; Bickford, D.F.

    1991-12-31

    This report discusses the development of vitrification for the waste treatment of nuclear weapons components at the Savannah River Site. Preliminary testing of surrogate nuclear weapon electronic waste shows that glass vitrification is a viable, robust treatment method.

  5. Development of glass vitrification at SRL as a waste treatment technique for nuclear weapon components

    SciTech Connect

    Coleman, J.T.; Bickford, D.F.

    1991-01-01

    This report discusses the development of vitrification for the waste treatment of nuclear weapons components at the Savannah River Site. Preliminary testing of surrogate nuclear weapon electronic waste shows that glass vitrification is a viable, robust treatment method.

  6. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-12-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

  7. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    PubMed

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  8. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed Central

    Darby, S. C.; Olsen, J. H.; Doll, R.; Thakrar, B.; Brown, P. D.; Storm, H. H.; Barlow, L.; Langmark, F.; Teppo, L.; Tulinius, H.

    1992-01-01

    OBJECTIVE--To obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. DESIGN--Observational study of trends in incidence of childhood leukaemia in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. SETTING--Nordic countries. SUBJECTS--Children aged under 15 years. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES--Incidence rates of leukaemia by age at diagnosis, sex, country, and calendar year of diagnosis or year of birth; exposure category; relation between leukaemia and exposure for children aged 0-14 and 0-4 separately. RESULTS--During the high fallout period the average estimated dose equivalent to the fetal red bone marrow was around 140 mu Sv and the average annual testicular dose 140 mu Sv. There was little evidence of increased incidence of leukaemia among children born in these years. Doses to the red bone marrow of a child after birth were higher, and during the high exposure period children would have been subjected to an additional dose equivalent of around 1500 mu Sv, similar to doses received by children in several parts of central and eastern Europe owing to the Chernobyl accident and about 50% greater than the annual dose equivalent to the red bone marrow of a child from natural radiation. leukaemia incidence and red marrow dose was not related overall, but rates of leukaemia in the high exposure period were slightly higher than in the surrounding medium exposure period (relative risk for ages 0-14: 1.07, 95% confidence interval 1.00 to 1.14; for ages 0-4: 1.11, 1.00 to 1.24). CONCLUSIONS--Current predicted risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to radiation are not greatly underestimated for low dose rate exposures. PMID:1586779

  9. Nuclear weapons test detection: Ensuring a verifiable treaty. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development program 1995 progress report

    SciTech Connect

    1995-12-31

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program to provide technologies for monitoring and verifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). DOE technologies will significantly increase the nation`s capability to identify potential nuclear explosions with high confidence and with minimal false alarms. This report presents the highlights of the first year of this program. The primary objectives of the CTBT monitoring system are to deter nuclear explosions in all environments (underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere) and, if such an explosion does occur, to detect, locate, and identify its source. The system is designed to provide credible evidence to national authorities to aid in resolving ambiguities and to serve as the basis for appropriate action. To collect this evidence, one must develop technologies that can detect and identify the signals from a nuclear test against a background of hundreds of thousands of benign events. The monitoring system must have high sensitivity to detect the events of interest and, to minimize false alarms, it must identify those events with a high level of confidence.

  10. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  11. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    SciTech Connect

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  12. Initial radiations from tactical nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Loewe, W.E.

    1985-08-01

    Neutron and gamma-ray free-field kermas and fluence spectra for ranges between 1 and 2 km are presented for three tactical nuclear weapons and are compared with nuclear radiations at Hiroshima. The three tactical weapons are modeled as near-surface bursts of a fusion explosive, a fission explosive, and a suppressed-neutron explosive represented by the Little Boy bomb used at Hiroshima.

  13. Nuclear weapon safety: How safe is safe

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-04-01

    The safety criteria that have been specified for modern nuclear weapons are very demanding. The majority of the weapons in the current stockpile will have to be modified to meet them, unless they are retired. Moreover, for some weapons we still lack necessary data to perform credible safety analyses. Although plutonium dispersal is a much less threatening danger than a sizable nuclear yield, it is nevertheless a potentially serious hazard, particularly if the plutonium is aerosolized in a chemical detonation. The panel recommended the following actions: (1) equip all stockpiled weapons with Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety, and build all aircraft-launched bombs and cruise missiles with insensitive high explosive and fire-resistant cores; (2) began an immediate review of the acceptability of retaining missile systems without IHE, fire-resistant cores, or 1.3 class propellant in close proximity to the warheads; (3) continue safety studies and allocate necessary resources to weapons and military laboratories; (4) affirm enhanced safety as the top priority goal of the US nuclear weapons program, and design all future weapons to be as safe as practically achievable, consistent with reasonable military requirements.

  14. Intergenerational issues regarding nuclear power, nuclear waste, and nuclear weapons.

    PubMed

    Ahearne, J F

    2000-12-01

    Nuclear power, nuclear waste, and nuclear weapons raise substantial public concern in many countries. While new support for nuclear power can be found in arguments concerning greenhouse gases and global warming, the long-term existence of radioactive waste has led to requirements for 10,000-year isolation. Some of the support for such requirements is based on intergenerational equity arguments. This, however, places a very high value on lives far in the future. An alternative is to use discounting, as is applied to other resource applications. Nuclear weapons, even though being dismantled by the major nations, are growing in number due to the increase in the number of countries possessing these weapons of mass destruction. This is an unfortunate legacy for future generations. PMID:11314726

  15. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  16. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Harris, J.B.; Markusen, E.

    1986-01-01

    This book contains 12 sections, each consisting of several papers. Some of the section titles are: Is Hiroshima Our Text.; Nuclear Weapons and Their Effects; Can Nuclear War be Survived.; The Debate Over U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy; and Costs of the Arms Race.

  17. Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-09-01

    The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera.

  18. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  19. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  20. The history of nuclear weapon safety devices

    SciTech Connect

    Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

    1998-06-01

    The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

  1. Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kemp, R. Scott

    2016-06-01

    Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

  2. History of Nuclear Weapons Design and Production

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Oelrich, Ivan

    2007-04-01

    The nuclear build-up of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as an arms race. Some part was indeed a bilateral competition, but much was the result of automatic application of technical advances as they became available, without careful consideration of strategic implications. Thus, the history of nuclear weapon design is partly designers responding to stated military needs and partly the world responding to constant innovations in nuclear capability. Today, plans for a new nuclear warhead are motivated primarily by the desire to maintain a nuclear design and production capability for the foreseeable future.

  3. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  4. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  5. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-01

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  6. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  7. Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1985-07-01

    The President established the Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management at the direction of the Congress to address fiscal accountability and discipline in the nation's nuclear weapons program. The Task Group was asked to ''examine the procedures used by DOD and DOE in establishing requirements for, and providing resources for, the research, development, testing, production, surveillance, and retirement of nuclear weapons,'' and to recommend any needed change in coordination, budgeting, or management procedures. The Task Group was also asked to address ''whether DOD should assume the responsibility for funding current DOE weapon activities and material production programs.'' The Task Group found that the present relationship between DOD and DOE for managing the nuclear weapons program is sound. Accordingly, the Task Group sought a process for improving the integrated determination of nuclear weapon requirements and the management of nuclear weapon production.

  8. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition

    PubMed Central

    Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690

  9. Defense against nuclear weapons: a decision analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Orient, J.M.

    1985-02-01

    Response to the public health threat posed by nuclear weapons is a medical imperative. The United States, in contrast to other nations, has chosen a course that assures maximal casualties in the event of a nuclear attack, on the theory that prevention of the attack is incompatible with preventive measures against its consequences, such as blast injuries and radiation sickness. A decision analysis approach clarifies the risks and benefits of a change to a strategy of preparedness.

  10. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  11. European security, nuclear weapons and public confidence

    SciTech Connect

    Gutteridge, W.

    1982-01-01

    This book presents papers on nuclear arms control in Europe. Topics considered include political aspects, the balance of power, nuclear disarmament in Europe, the implications of new conventional technologies, the neutron bomb, theater nuclear weapons, arms control in Northern Europe, naval confidence-building measures in the Baltic, the strategic balance in the Arctic Ocean, Arctic resources, threats to European stability, developments in South Africa, economic cooperation in Europe, European collaboration in science and technology after Helsinki, European cooperation in the area of electric power, and economic cooperation as a factor for the development of European security and cooperation.

  12. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    SciTech Connect

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  13. Changing Soviet views of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Sloss, L. Associates, Washington, DC )

    1990-10-01

    The purpose of this paper is to summarize current Soviet views about nuclear weapons, and to assess the implications of these views for US policies and programs. I will focus particularly on implications of interest to the nuclear laboratories. The task is complicated by the fact that Soviet views about nuclear weapons are not straightforward. There are certain benefits from glasnost in that there now is more open debate about a range of issues in the Soviet Union, including defense issues. Thus, we now have a great deal of published material to draw upon in assessing Soviet views, and experts in the West can talk much more freely to Soviet experts. However, this information explosion makes it more difficult to discriminate signal from noise, particularly as there continues to be both propaganda and deception in Soviet statements about defense issues. Clearly, some Soviet statements about nuclear weapons are designed to influence attitudes and actions in the West. I shall cite some examples in this paper.

  14. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    SciTech Connect

    Burroughs, J.R.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality of deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.

  15. Nuclear proliferation: The diplomatic role of non-weaponized programs

    SciTech Connect

    Reynolds, R.R.

    1996-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has not seen the end of reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence or diplomacy purposes. The use of nuclear weapons for such purposes is as evident in the threshold states as in the nuclear powers. The nuclear weapon states used their nuclear weapons for deterrence, bargaining, and blackmail, even during the early years of the Cold War when the US was essentially non-Weaponized. In the nuclear non-Weaponized states in Asia a non-Weaponized deterrent relationship is developing between India and Pakistan and North Korea has used its nuclear program to restore diplomatic relations with the international community. The role of nuclear weapons in the post Cold War world is determined by the role of non-Weaponized programs in proliferating states. This paper describes examples in South Asia and the Korean peninsula and show that while an increased reliance on nuclear weapons programs may be a threat to the current non-proliferation regime, the focus on non-Weaponized programs rather than on weapons themselves actually improves international security by reducing the threat of nuclear war.

  16. Residual radionuclide concentrations and estimated radiation doses at the former French nuclear weapons test sites in Algeria.

    PubMed

    Danesi, P R; Moreno, J; Makarewicz, M; Louvat, D

    2008-11-01

    In order to assess the level of residual radioactivity and evaluate the radiological conditions at the former French nuclear testing sites of Reggane and Taourirt Tan Afella in the south of Algeria, the International Atomic Energy Agency, at the request of the government of Algeria, conducted a field mission to the sites in 1999. At these locations, France conducted a number of nuclear tests in the early 1960s. At the ground zero locality of the ''Gerboise Blanche'' atmospheric test (Reggane) and in the vicinity of a tunnel where radioactive lava was ejected during a poorly contained explosion (Taourirt Tan Afella), non-negligible levels of radioactive material could still be measured. Using the information collected and using realistic potential exposure scenarios, radiation doses to potential occupants and visitors to the sites were estimated. PMID:18513985

  17. The IAEA: Neutralizing Iraq's nuclear weapons potential

    SciTech Connect

    Zifferero, M.

    1993-04-01

    With support from UNSCOM and staff members from several countries, the IAEA has succeeded in identifying and destroying most of Iraq's nuclear weapons potential. IAEA activities in Iraq have also established a sound basis for long-term monitoring of Iraq. This will involve several procedures and techniques, including the periodic monitoring of Iraq's main bodies of water and unannounced visits of resident inspectors to plants, factories, and research centers.

  18. Elevated in vivo strontium-90 from nuclear weapons test fallout among cancer decedents: a case-control study of deciduous teeth.

    PubMed

    Mangano, Joseph J; Sherman, Janette D

    2011-01-01

    Risks to health from large-scale atmospheric nuclear weapons testing are still relatively unknown. A sample of 85,000 deciduous teeth collected from Americans born during the bomb-testing years assessed risk by in vivo measurement of residual strontium-90 (Sr-90) concentrations, using liquid scintillation spectrometry. The authors' analysis included 97 deciduous teeth from persons born between 1959 and 1961 who were diagrosed with cancer, and 194 teeth of matched controls. Average Sr-90 in teeth of persons who died of cancer was significantly greater than for controls (OR = 2.22; p < 0.04). This discovery suggests that many thousands have died or will die of cancer due to exposure to fallout, far more than previously believed. PMID:21319726

  19. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the

  20. The Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons Connection.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Leventhal, Paul

    1990-01-01

    Explains problems enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Provides factual charts and details concerning the production of nuclear energy and arms, the processing and disposal of waste products, and outlines the nuclear fuel cycle. Discusses safeguards, the risk of nuclear terrorism, and ways to deal with these problems. (NL)

  1. The Nuclear Power/Nuclear Weapons Connection.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Totten, Sam; Totten, Martha Wescoat

    1985-01-01

    Once they have nuclear power, most countries will divert nuclear materials from commercial to military programs. In excerpts from the book "Facing the Danger" (by Totten, S. and M. W., Crossing Press, 1984), five anti-nuclear activists explain how and why they have been addressing the nuclear connection. (RM)

  2. Testing the Patriot air defense weapon system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Graham, W. L.; McClay, L. F.

    1983-11-01

    A summary of the overall test program of the Patriot air defense weapon system is presented, including preparations for system integration tests and surveillance tests, with particular emphasis placed on the guidance flight test program. The major components of the system are described, and subsystem tests consisting of static and dynamic plume tests, static propulsion tests, dynamic propulsion test firings, and control system test firings are discussed. A series of system-level preflight guidance tests which consisted of a captive carry flight test program and other tests is considered. Tests on more sophisticated missions such as ECM, jamming, and combinations of ECM and chaff are addressed. Test data collection techniques are covered.

  3. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, and the Arms Race.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hollander, Jack, Ed.

    A symposium was organized to reexamine the realities of vertical proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to place into perspective the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, including the possible role of commercial nuclear power in facilitating proliferation. The four invited symposium…

  4. Estimation of dose to human tissues from ingestion of foods exposed to fallout from nuclear weapons tests in Nevada

    SciTech Connect

    Whicker, F.W. ); Kirchner, T.B. . Natural Resources Ecology Lab.)

    1991-01-01

    This paper provides a brief overview of the methodology developed to estimate the transport of radionuclides through agricultural ecosystems to persons of various ages, lifestyles, and geographic locations. The methodology, embodied in the computer code PATHWAY, was used to convert estimates of fallout deposition to time-dependent concentrations of radionuclides in food products, total intakes by people, and organ-specific doses from 21 radionuclides in fallout from 86 nuclear test events. A summary of model prediction uncertainties, an assessment of predictive accuracy, and a discussion of the relative importance of different exposure pathways is also provided. 14 refs.

  5. The risk of leukaemia in young children from exposure to tritium and carbon-14 in the discharges of German nuclear power stations and in the fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed

    Wakeford, Richard

    2014-05-01

    Towards the end of 2007, the results were published from a case-control study (the "KiKK Study") of cancer in young children, diagnosed <5 years of age during 1980-2003 while resident near nuclear power stations in western Germany. The study found a tendency for cases of leukaemia to live closer to the nearest nuclear power station than their matched controls, producing an odds ratio that was raised to a statistically significant extent for residence within 5 km of a nuclear power station. The findings of the study received much publicity, but a detailed radiological risk assessment demonstrated that the radiation doses received by young children from discharges of radioactive material from the nuclear reactors were much lower than those received from natural background radiation and far too small to be responsible for the statistical association reported in the KiKK Study. This has led to speculation that conventional radiological risk assessments have grossly underestimated the risk of leukaemia in young children posed by exposure to man-made radionuclides, and particular attention has been drawn to the possible role of tritium and carbon-14 discharges in this supposedly severe underestimation of risk. Both (3)H and (14)C are generated naturally in the upper atmosphere, and substantial increases in these radionuclides in the environment occurred as a result of their production by atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s. If the leukaemogenic effect of these radionuclides has been seriously underestimated to the degree necessary to explain the KiKK Study findings, then a pronounced increase in the worldwide incidence of leukaemia among young children should have followed the notably elevated exposure to (3)H and (14)C from nuclear weapons testing fallout. To investigate this hypothesis, the time series of incidence rates of leukaemia among young children <5 years of age at diagnosis has been examined from ten cancer registries

  6. The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Brooks, Linton F.

    2007-03-01

    This paper will examine our plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to ``transform'' the stockpile and supporting infrastructure. We proceed from the premise that the United States will need a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working. Today's stockpile---comprised of legacy warheads left over from the Cold War---is safe and reliable. That said, we see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in assuring the long-term safety and reliability of our current stockpile. Nor is today's nuclear weapons complex sufficiently ``responsive'' to fixing technical problems in the stockpile, or to potential adverse geopolitical change. Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs. Our approach is to develop and field replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile---so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)---as a means to transform both the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

  7. The ``Nuclear Renaissance'' and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lyman, Edwin S.

    2007-05-01

    As interest grows around the world in nuclear power as an energy source that could help control greenhouse gas emissions, some have proclaimed the arrival of a ``nuclear renaissance.'' But can the increased risks of more nuclear power be managed? The political crisis surrounding Iran's pursuit of uranium enrichment has exposed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Also, al Qaeda's declared interest in weapons of mass destruction raises the concern that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons by stealing materials from poorly secured facilities. Growth of nuclear energy would require the construction of many additional uranium enrichment plants. And the generation of more spent nuclear fuel without a credible waste disposal strategy would increase political support for reprocessing, which separates large quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from spent fuel. There is little evidence that the various institutional arrangements and technical schemes proposed to mitigate the security risks of a major nuclear expansion would be effective. This talk will focus on the measures necessary to allow large-scale global growth of nuclear power without resulting in an unacceptably high risk of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and will discuss the feasibility of such measures. To cite this abstract, use the following reference: http://meetings.aps.org/link/BAPS.2007.OSS07.E1.2

  8. Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Joeck, N.

    1993-07-02

    This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

  9. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph

    2009-01-01

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  10. A summary of evidence on radiation exposures received near to the Semipalatinsk nuclear weapons test site in Kazakhstan.

    PubMed

    Simon, Steven L; Baverstock, Keith F; Lindholm, Carita

    2003-06-01

    The presently available evidence about the magnitude of doses received by members of the public living in villages in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk nuclear test in Kazakhstan, particularly with respect to external radiation, while preliminary, is conflicting. The village of Dolon, in particular, has been identified for many years as the most highly exposed location in the vicinity of the test site. Previous publications cited external doses of more than 2 Gy to residents of Dolon while an expert group assembled by the WHO in 1997 estimated that external doses were likely to have been less than 0.5 Gy. In 2001, a larger expert group workshop was held in Helsinki jointly by the WHO, the National Cancer Institute of the United States, and the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland, with the expressed purpose to acquire data to evaluate the state of knowledge concerning doses received in Kazakhstan. This paper summarizes evidence presented at that workshop. External dose estimates from calculations based on sparse physical measurements and bio-dosimetric estimates based on chromosome abnormalities and electron paramagnetic resonance from a relatively small sample of teeth do not agree well. The physical dose estimates are generally higher than the biodosimetric estimates (1 Gy or more compared to 0.5 Gy or less). When viewed in its entirety, the present body of evidence does not appear to support external doses greater than 0.5 Gy; however, research is continuing to try and resolve the difference in dose estimates from the different methods. Thyroid doses from internal irradiation, which can only be estimated via calculation, are expected to have been several times greater than the doses from external irradiation, especially where received by small children. PMID:12822581

  11. Non-strategic sea-based nuclear weapons. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Tol, V.; Maarten, J.

    1990-06-22

    This paper addresses the complex political and military issues surrounding deployment of Non-Strategic Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons. These include weapons designed for Nuclear Anti-Air and Anti-Submarine warfare, Nuclear Gravity bombs, and Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise missiles. Specifically, this study examines the serious arguments made for and against these weapons on military and political grounds. Following the discussion of specific pros and cons, three alternative approaches to dealing with these weapons are examined as the Navy's current positions.

  12. Relevance of Nuclear Weapons Clean-Up Experience to Dirty Bomb Response

    SciTech Connect

    Vantine, H C; Crites, T R

    2002-08-19

    During the past 50 years, the United States has experienced 32 major nuclear weapons accidents, nine of which released special nuclear material to the environment. Response to these accidents, coupled with recovery experience following the Russian satellite reentry and weapons test site cleanup, form the basis for determining actions that might be required following a nuclear terrorist event involving the release of radioactive material. Though valuable information has been gained following the recovery from various commercial accidents, most notably the Chernobyl nuclear power plant failure and the dismantled radiography source in the Brazilian city of Goi nia, this paper will focus on the lessons learned from the U.S. nuclear weapons program.

  13. Controlling nuclear weapons: Democracy versus guardianship

    SciTech Connect

    Dahl, R.

    1985-01-01

    This is not a new plan for arms control but an inquiry as to whether democratic institutions can cope with the major problems of public policy today. Robert Dahl points out that decisions on nuclear weapons (or disposal of nuclear waste, reactor safety or industrial pollution, to cite a few examples) are too complex and technical for the average citizen; yet if they are turned over to an elite of experts or ''wise men'' or guardians, there is no guarantee that those men will have the moral and other qualities needed to serve the public good-delegated power in these circumstances tends to become alienated power. Dahl has a partial answer: make use of the new communications technology to raise level of public knowledge and understanding.

  14. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    PubMed

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection. PMID:27023040

  15. NESST: A nuclear energy safety and security treaty-Separating nuclear energy from nuclear weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    McNamara, Brendan

    2012-06-01

    Fission and Fusion energy is matched by the need to completely separate civilian energy programmes from the production of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT, 1968) muddles these issues together. The case is presented here for making a new Nuclear Energy Security Treaty (NESST) which is rigorous, enforceable without violence, and separate from the political quagmire of nuclear weapons.

  16. Countering nuclear weapons of mass destruction: Are we doing enough?

    SciTech Connect

    Moore, L.A.

    1998-04-15

    Countering nuclear fissile material leakage from the former Soviet Union should be the First National Security Priority of the United States. Once these nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials have dispersed to the possession of Third World rogue states, there is not much one can do to prevent their usage in a regional setting by US Military means. This study discusses national policy and military options available to counter hostile countries nuclear weapons before and after use. There are no clear cut policies and easy military means for neutralizing nuclear weapons in the most likely scenarios. Therefore, The US National Command Authority should consider the framework of these policy and military options in countering nuclear weapons of mass destruction in the future.

  17. US nuclear weapons stockpile (June 1993)

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S. ); Arkin, W.M.

    1993-06-01

    The US. nuclear stockpile is at its lowest level since late 1958 or early 1959. In the past year, many weapons were returned to central military storage depots in the United States and funneled to the Energy Department's Pantex facility for final disassembly and disposal. This article presents a table showing the author's current estimate of the composition of the current operational stockpile, which contains some 10,500 warheads. Also categorized are warheads in [open quotes]inactive reserve[close quotes] and warheads awaiting eventual disassembly. The warheads are generally grouped as bombs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles. Initial production dates and yield are listed for the warheads.

  18. Nuclear Weapons--A Suitable Topic for the Classroom?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Eijkelhof, Harrie; And Others

    1984-01-01

    Describes the development and implementation of curriculum materials that discuss nuclear weapons and the evaluation of those materials by administrators, teachers, and students. Also discusses the place of the study of nuclear weapons in the curriculum and aims of the materials. Suggested student activities are included. (JM)

  19. 76 FR 1136 - Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-07

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop AGENCY..., academia, military, test instrument manufacturers, etc.) of electroshock weapons that provide...

  20. A history of the people of Bikini following nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: with recollections and views of elders of Bikini Atoll.

    PubMed

    Niedenthal, J

    1997-07-01

    The people of Bikini Atoll were moved from their homeland in 1946 to make way for the testing of 23 nuclear weapons by the United States government, beginning with the world's fourth atomic detonation. The subsequent half-century exodus of the Bikini people included a 2-y stay on Rongerik Atoll, where near starvation resulted, and a 6-mo sojourn on Kwajalein Atoll, where they lived in tents beside a runway used by the U.S. military. In 1948, they were finally relocated to Kili, a small, isolated, 200-acre island owned by the U.S. Trust Territory government. Numerous hardships have been faced there, not the least of which was the loss of skills required for self-sustenance. Located 425 miles south of Bikini, Kili Island is without a sheltered lagoon. Thus for six months of the year, fishing and sailing become futile endeavors. Because of the residual radioactive contamination from the nuclear testing, the majority of the Bikinian population still resides on Kili today. One attempt was made to resettle Bikini in the late 1960's when President Lyndon B. Johnson, on recommendations from the Atomic Energy Commission, declared Bikini Atoll safe for habitation. In 1978, however, it was discovered by the U.S. Department of Energy that in the span of only one year, some of the returned islanders were showing a 75% increase in their body burdens of 137Cs. In 1978, the people residing on Bikini were moved again, this time to a small island in Majuro Atoll. In the early 1980's, the Bikinians filed a class action lawsuit against the U.S. government for damages arising out of the nuclear testing program. Although the claim was dismissed, eventually a $90 million trust fund was established for their local government. Since then the leaders of the people of Bikini residing on Kili Island and Majuro Atoll have been confronted with the immense responsibility of determining how to clean their atoll while at the same time maintaining the health and welfare of their displaced

  1. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  2. Ukraine: Independent nuclear weapons capability rising. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Dewing, M.J.

    1993-06-01

    This thesis argues that Ukraine will move from possession of CIS-controlled nuclear weapons to the development of an independent nuclear capability. It attempts to show how the factors driving Ukraine towards remaining a nuclear state outweigh the factors acting in restraint. This thesis describes the contents of the Ukrainian arsenal, reviews its current material condition and investigates the likelihood that Ukraine can directly control it. This thesis also shows why Ukraine's most likely course in developing and independent nuclear weapons capability will be to retain its 46 SS-24 ICBMs. United States, Ukraine, Russia, Strategic weapons, National strategy, Nuclear strategy, Arms control, Strategic stability, Nuclear weapons Strategic command and control, International relations.

  3. Stability of nuclear forces versus weapons of mass destruction

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-12-01

    The model derived for nuclear missile exchanges is used to describe the interaction between two forces, of which one has nuclear weapons and the other has weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The model equations are solved analytically for exchanges, costs, and stability indices by analytically minimizing the cost of first strikes. The analysis is restricted to theater operations, as WMD are inferior to nuclear weapons in strategic counter force operations, but quite adequate for theater operations against exposed forces. The analysis treats only in-theater forces as companion papers show that ex-theater forces, which enter as survivable forces, cancel out of the theater balances treated here. Optimal nuclear weapon and WMD allocations are proportional to the opponent`s carriers and inversely proportional to one`s own weapons. Thus, as WMD increase, WMD allocations to nuclear forces fall, reflecting a shift from damage limiting to inflicting damage with surviving forces. Nuclear weapon kill probabilities degrade rapidly against dispersed forces. As they fall, their allocation to WMD falls sharply as they become ineffective and are reallocated to value. Thus, damage limiting is primarily effective for undispersed forces, which produces an incentive for the nuclear side to use his weapons while they are still effective.

  4. India`s nuclear weapons posture: The end of ambiguity. Master`s thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, S.D.

    1996-12-01

    This thesis examines the future of India`s nuclear weapons posture. Since testing a nuclear device in 1974, India been able to produce weapons material within its civilian nuclear power program. Despite having this nuclear weapons capability, India prefers to maintain an ambiguous nuclear posture. New pressures in the post-cold war era -- the loss of the Soviet Union as a strategic ally, the indefinite extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the rise of Hindu nationalism, and India`s growing participation in the global economy -- have the potential to derail India`s current nuclear policy. This thesis identifies the domestic and international pressures on India, and assesses the prospects for India to retain its ambiguous policy, renounce the nuclear option, or assemble an overt nuclear arsenal.

  5. A nuclear-weapon-free world: Desirable? Feasible?

    SciTech Connect

    Rotblat, J.; Steinberger, J.; Udgaonkar, B.

    1993-12-31

    The authors seeks answers to two key questions: Is an nuclear-weapons-free-world (NWFW) desirable, and is it feasible? Organized into six parts, the book begins with a historical review of attempts to abolish nuclear weapons. Five subsequent parts address the desirability of an NWFW, its feasibility, alternative routes to this goal, and intermediate steps to this end. The authors deals with many obstacles and difficulties facing those who wish to progress from today`s world of 50,000 or more nuclear weapons to one where none exist and strong international verification assures that no rogue state will resurrect these dread devices.

  6. Perfection and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Teleology, and Motives.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brummett, Barry

    1989-01-01

    Uses Kenneth Burke's theory of perfection to explore the vocabularies of nuclear weapons in United States public discourse and how "the Bomb" as a God term has gained imbalanced ascendancy in centers of power. (MS)

  7. A Conceptual Framework for Teaching about Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jacobson, Willard; And Others

    1983-01-01

    Concepts which represent the minimal conceptual essentials for the study of nuclear weapons in secondary level social studies classes are discussed, and issues and controversies which may rise during such a study are examined. (RM)

  8. Search for sanity: The politics of nuclear weapons and disarmament

    SciTech Connect

    Joseph, P.; Rosenblum, S.

    1984-01-01

    This book examines the political aspects of nuclear weapons and arms control. Topics considered include nuclear deterrence, military strategy, the military-industrial complex, the nuclear balance, first strike, nuclear errors and accidents, treaty verification, survival, the economic impact of military spending, Western European peace movements, peace movements in Eastern Europe, the cold war, nuclear diplomacy, moral aspects, the defense budget, national security, foreign policy, proliferation, and nuclear disarmament.

  9. An Important Issue: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Castellano, Doc

    2001-03-01

    Historic Facts and Philosophy: In August, 1947, I participated in a secret meeting concerning the validity and use of a hydrogen bomb. I vigorously supported a ``Super Manhattan Project" to build an ``H" bomb. My philosophy at the time was `bigger and better,' to ensure that no nation attacked the U.S. Our retaliation with ``H" bombs vs. ``A" bombs would be too overwhelming for any nation to risk attacking us should they obtain their own ``A" bombs. Thus, all nations would be forced to use diplomacy. I am older and wiser, and am now convinced that World Test Ban Treaties, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and space free of any military weapons is the best policy for all nations and humanity. With current nuclear testing at nearby Yucca Flats, Nevada, Vandenberg AF/Missile site, Cal Tech, etc., I therefore propose that our new APS California Division form a three-person committee to tabulate all pertinent data and submit it to a qualified expert for review and further action. Comments and suggestions are invited.

  10. ACUTE AND CHRONIC INTAKES OF FALLOUT RADIONUCLIDES BY MARSHALLESE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AT BIKINI AND ENEWETAK AND RELATED INTERNAL RADIATION DOSES

    PubMed Central

    Simon, Steven L.; Bouville, André; Melo, Dunstana; Beck, Harold L.; Weinstock, Robert M.

    2014-01-01

    Annual internal radiation doses resulting from both acute and chronic intakes of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in fallout from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak from 1946 through 1958 have been estimated for the residents living on all atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Internal radiation absorbed doses to the tissues most at risk to cancer induction (red bone marrow, thyroid, stomach, and colon) have been estimated for representative persons of all population communities for all birth years from 1929 through 1968, and for all years of exposure from 1948 through 1970. The acute intake estimates rely on a model using, as its basis, historical urine bioassay data, for members of the Rongelap Island and Ailinginae communities as well as for Rongerik residents. The model also utilizes fallout times of arrival and radionuclide deposition densities estimated for all tests and all atolls. Acute intakes of 63 radionuclides were estimated for the populations of the 20 inhabited atolls and for the communities that were relocated during the testing years for reasons of safety and decontamination. The model used for chronic intake estimates is based on reported whole-body, urine, and blood counting data for residents of Utrik and Rongelap. Dose conversion coefficients relating intake to organ absorbed dose were developed using internationally accepted models but specifically tailored for intakes of particulate fallout by consideration of literature-based evidence to choose the most appropriate alimentary tract absorption fraction (f1) values. Dose estimates were much higher for the thyroid gland than for red marrow, stomach wall, or colon. The highest thyroid doses to adults were about 7,600 mGy for the people exposed on Rongelap; thyroid doses to adults were much lower, by a factor of 100 or more, for the people exposed on the populated atolls of Kwajalein and Majuro. The estimates of radionuclide intake and

  11. Acute and chronic intakes of fallout radionuclides by Marshallese from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak and related internal radiation doses.

    PubMed

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André; Melo, Dunstana; Beck, Harold L; Weinstock, Robert M

    2010-08-01

    Annual internal radiation doses resulting from both acute and chronic intakes of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in fallout from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak from 1946 through 1958 have been estimated for the residents living on all atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Internal radiation absorbed doses to the tissues most at risk to cancer induction (red bone marrow, thyroid, stomach, and colon) have been estimated for representative persons of all population communities for all birth years from 1929 through 1968, and for all years of exposure from 1948 through 1970. The acute intake estimates rely on a model using, as its basis, historical urine bioassay data, for members of the Rongelap Island and Ailinginae communities as well as for Rongerik residents. The model also utilizes fallout times of arrival and radionuclide deposition densities estimated for all tests and all atolls. Acute intakes of 63 radionuclides were estimated for the populations of the 20 inhabited atolls and for the communities that were relocated during the testing years for reasons of safety and decontamination. The model used for chronic intake estimates is based on reported whole-body, urine, and blood counting data for residents of Utrik and Rongelap. Dose conversion coefficients relating intake to organ absorbed dose were developed using internationally accepted models but specifically tailored for intakes of particulate fallout by consideration of literature-based evidence to choose the most appropriate alimentary tract absorption fraction (f1) values. Dose estimates were much higher for the thyroid gland than for red marrow, stomach wall, or colon. The highest thyroid doses to adults were about 7,600 mGy for the people exposed on Rongelap; thyroid doses to adults were much lower, by a factor of 100 or more, for the people exposed on the populated atolls of Kwajalein and Majuro. The estimates of radionuclide intake and

  12. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  13. Nuclear Weapons and Communication Studies: A Review Essay.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1998-01-01

    Reviews the body of work inspired by the late Cold War period, where nuclear weapons briefly became a compelling object for communication scholars. Considers the prospects for nuclear communication scholarship in post-Cold War culture. Discusses "nuclear criticism" and issues regarding the bomb in communication. (SC)

  14. US changes course on nuclear-weapons strategy

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gwynne, Peter

    2010-05-01

    US President Barack Obama has signalled a new approach to nuclear-weapons policy that limits their use against other states and documents how the country will ensure the viability of existing stockpiles. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which sets out the US's nuclear strategy over a 10-year period, also calls for a highly skilled workforce to ensure "the long-term safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of nuclear-security work".

  15. The future of nuclear weapons: A Chinese perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Zhai Zhihai

    1992-12-31

    China understands very well the importance of nuclear weapons because it is the only country in the world that was seriously threatened with nuclear attacks by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and the 1970s, respectively. The events of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have fundamentally rocked the world. Most Eastern European countries have cast away their socialist regimes and are accepting Western-type democracy and market economies. Communist parties have been banned and old bureaucracies have been dismantled. The Warsaw Pact, which had existed as a symbol and unified military institution of the Eastern bloc, was quietly dissolved. The Soviet Union, the prime player of the Cold War and America`s main rival, suddenly disintegrated into fifteen independent states and no longer is a heavy-weight player in the world political arena. These developments have shaken the foundations of nuclear diplomacy and politics that have existed for forty years. The abrupt ending of the Cold War has left many questions about nuclear weapons that will not go away as easily as the war. What role, if any, will nuclear weapons play in this decade and early in the next century? Will nuclear weapons still be important in maintaining world peace as they have been during the Cold War ear? Or will nuclear weapons be a destabilizing factor in the new world order? 6 refs.

  16. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be

  17. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  18. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    SciTech Connect

    Garaizar, Xabier

    2009-07-02

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  19. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Kamal, N.

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  20. Solid Phase Microextraction for the Analysis of Nuclear Weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Chambers, D M

    2001-06-01

    This document is a compendium of answers to commonly asked questions about solid phase microextraction as it relates to the analysis of nuclear weapons. We have also included a glossary of terms associated with this analytical method as well as pertinent weapons engineering terminology. Microextraction is a new collection technique being developed to nonintrusively sample chemicals from weapon headspace gases for subsequent analysis. The chemicals that are being targeted outgas from the high explosives and other organic materials used in the weapon assembly. This technique is therefore a valuable tool to: (1) remotely detect and assess the aging of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and, in some cases, Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) organic materials; and (2) identify potential compatibility issues (i.e., materials interactions) that should be more carefully monitored during surveillance tear-downs. Microextraction is particularly attractive because of the practical constraints inherent to the weapon surveillance procedure. To remain transparent to other core surveillance activities and fall within nuclear safety guidelines, headspace analysis of the weapons requires a procedure that: (1) maintains ambient temperature conditions; (2) allows practical collection times of less than 20 min; (3) maintains the integrity of the weapon gas volume; (4) provides reproducible and quantitative results; and (5) can identify all possible targets.

  1. National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Goodwin, B T; Juzaitis, R J

    2006-08-07

    Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories have developed a common framework and key elements of a national certification methodology called Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU). A spectrum from senior managers to weapons designers has been engaged in this activity at the two laboratories for on the order of a year to codify this methodology in an overarching and integrated paper. Following is the certification paper that has evolved. In the process of writing this paper, an important outcome has been the realization that a joint Livermore/Los Alamos workshop on QMU, focusing on clearly identifying and quantifying differences between approaches between the two labs plus developing an even stronger technical foundation on methodology, will be valuable. Later in FY03, such a joint laboratory workshop will be held. One of the outcomes of this workshop will be a new version of this certification paper. A comprehensive approach to certification must include specification of problem scope, development of system baseline models, formulation of standards of performance assessment, and effective procedures for peer review and documentation. This document concentrates on the assessment and peer review aspects of the problem. In addressing these points, a central role is played by a 'watch list' for weapons derived from credible failure modes and performance gate analyses. The watch list must reflect our best assessment of factors that are critical to weapons performance. High fidelity experiments and calculations as well as full exploitation of archival test data are essential to this process. Peer review, advisory groups and red teams play an important role in confirming the validity of the watch list. The framework for certification developed by the Laboratories has many basic features in common, but some significant differences in the detailed technical implementation of the overall methodology remain. Joint certification workshops held in June

  2. Psychology and Nuclear Weapon Issues: Topics, Concepts, and Bibliography.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Linden, Comp.

    The document outlines 15 topics, each with concepts and selected references, to illustrate the relevance of psychology for understanding and coping with the threat of nuclear war. Awareness of the literature is intended to encourage psychologists to become more active in applying psychological concepts to nuclear weapons issues. The articles and…

  3. Changing Our Ways of Thinking: Health Professionals and Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Neal, Mary

    1984-01-01

    Outlines the issues raised by health professionals concerned about the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, including epidemics, civil defense, arms costs, psychosocial aspects, and ethical responsibility. Appendixes include lists of antinuclear organizations, medical professional associations, and 160 references. (SK)

  4. Nuclear Weapons and the Future: An "Unthinkable" Proposal.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Tyler, Robert L.

    1982-01-01

    The author looks ahead 30 or 40 years to see what might come of the nuclear weapons predicament. As a minimal first step in the campaign against nuclear warfare, he suggests a unilateral and complete disarmament by the United States. (AM)

  5. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  6. RADIATION DOSES AND CANCER RISKS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE TO RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM BIKINI AND ENEWETAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS: SUMMARY

    PubMed Central

    Simon, Steven L.; Bouville, André; Land, Charles E.; Beck, Harold L.

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls during 1946–1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence, and the related cancer risks. Detailed methods and results are presented in a series of companion papers in this volume. From our analysis, we concluded that 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in measurable fallout deposition on one or more of the inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands. In this work, we estimated deposition densities (kBq m−2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides at each of the 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Quantitative deposition estimates were made for 63 radionuclides from each test at each atoll. Those estimates along with reported measurements of exposure rates at various times after fallout were used to estimate radiation absorbed doses to the red bone marrow, thyroid gland, stomach wall, and colon wall of atoll residents from both external and internal exposure. Annual doses were estimated for six age groups ranging from newborns to adults. We found that the total deposition of 137Cs, external dose, internal organ doses, and cancer risks followed the same geographic pattern with the large population of the southern atolls receiving the lowest doses. Permanent residents of the southern atolls who were of adult age at the beginning of the testing period received external doses ranging from 5 to 12 mGy on average; the external doses to adults at the mid-latitude atolls ranged from 22 to 59 mGy on average, while the residents of the northern atolls received external doses in the hundreds to over 1,000 mGy. Internal doses varied significantly by age at exposure, location, and organ. Except

  7. Radiation doses and cancer risks in the Marshall Islands associated with exposure to radioactive fallout from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests: summary.

    PubMed

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André; Land, Charles E; Beck, Harold L

    2010-08-01

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls during 1946-1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence, and the related cancer risks. Detailed methods and results are presented in a series of companion papers in this volume. From our analysis, we concluded that 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in measurable fallout deposition on one or more of the inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands. In this work, we estimated deposition densities (kBq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides at each of the 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Quantitative deposition estimates were made for 63 radionuclides from each test at each atoll. Those estimates along with reported measurements of exposure rates at various times after fallout were used to estimate radiation absorbed doses to the red bone marrow, thyroid gland, stomach wall, and colon wall of atoll residents from both external and internal exposure. Annual doses were estimated for six age groups ranging from newborns to adults. We found that the total deposition of 137Cs, external dose, internal organ doses, and cancer risks followed the same geographic pattern with the large population of the southern atolls receiving the lowest doses. Permanent residents of the southern atolls who were of adult age at the beginning of the testing period received external doses ranging from 5 to 12 mGy on average; the external doses to adults at the mid-latitude atolls ranged from 22 to 59 mGy on average, while the residents of the northern atolls received external doses in the hundreds to over 1,000 mGy. Internal doses varied significantly by age at exposure, location, and organ. Except

  8. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    SciTech Connect

    Juzaitis, R.J.

    1995-10-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a {open_quotes}short-sleeve{close_quotes} workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE`s contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects.

  9. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  10. Uranium enrichment and nuclear-weapon proliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Krass, Allan S.; Boskma, Peter; Elzen, Boeli; Smit, Wim A

    1983-01-01

    The authors review state-of-the-art enrichment technology, and evaluate the impact of this technology on the proliferation problem. They place the technological development into the context of the economic and institutional environment that has evolved around the enrichment industry, and suggest some measures which might be taken to reduce the proliferation dangers inherent in the industry. They specifically note the world excess of supply over demand which, coupled with the refusal of a number of countries with enrichment capability to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, intensifies the weapons risk. 336 references, 52 figures, 20 tables.

  11. Nuclear testing: Executive summary

    SciTech Connect

    Drell, S.; Cornwall, J.; Dyson, F.

    1995-08-01

    The authors have examined the experimental and analytic bases for understanding the performance of each of the weapon types that are currently planned to remain in the US enduring nuclear stockpile. They have also examined whether continued underground tests at various nuclear yield thresholds would add significantly to the confidence in this stockpile in the years ahead. The starting point for this examination was a detailed review of past experience in developing and testing modern nuclear weapons, their certification and recertification processes, their performance margins, and evidence of aging or other trends over time for each weapon type in the enduring stockpile. The findings, as summarized in Conclusions 1 through 6, are consistent with US agreement to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of unending duration, that includes a standard ``supreme national interest`` clause. Recognizing that the challenge of maintaining an effective nuclear stockpile for an indefinite period without benefit of underground tests is an important and also a new one, the US should affirm its readiness to invoke the supreme national interest clause should the need arise as a result of unanticipated technical problems in the enduring stockpile.

  12. Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

    This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

  13. Cleaning up the nuclear weapons complex: A herculean challenge

    SciTech Connect

    Probst, K.N.; McGovern, M.H.

    1996-12-31

    For nearly five decades, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors engaged in a highly secretive, complex, and massive endeavor to fabricate nuclear weapons for national security purposes. Large-scale production of nuclear weapons was an unprecedented undertaking requiring thousands of facilities, dozens of large tracts of land, huge volumes of dangerous materials, and great quantities of water. With the Cold Wars end and the emergence of new types of national security concerns, weapons production operations have, for the most part, ceased, and much of the secrecy under which they were shrouded has lifted. The subsequent revelation reveal at many sites tremendous volumes of soil and groundwater are contaminated with both radioactive and hazardous materials. Wastes stored for years pose substantial dangers, and many aging facilities that harbor highly radioactive and sensitive materials are deteriorating. The topics covered in this overview article include the following: more to `cleanup` than cleaning up; a fragmented regulatory regime; new regulatory regimes.

  14. Nuclear-weapons dismantlement: Identifying a hidden warhead

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Finney, John; Acton, James M.

    2014-06-01

    A means of verifying that nuclear warheads to be dismantled are genuine items has been proposed that potentially reveals no information to an inspector about the design of the weapons. Two experts explain the ins and outs of the method and its implications for arms-control policy. See Article p.497

  15. Risk assessment methodologies for nuclear weapons compared to risk assessment methodologies for nuclear reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Benjamin, A.S.

    1994-12-31

    There are major differences between the safety principles for nuclear weapons and for nuclear reactors. For example, a principal concern for nuclear weapons is to prevent electrical energy from reaching the nuclear package during accidents produced by crashes, fires, and other hazards, whereas the foremost concern for nuclear reactors is to maintain coolant around the core in the event of certain system failures. Not surprisingly, new methods have had to be developed to assess the risk from nuclear weapons. These include fault tree transformations that accommodate time dependencies, thermal and structural analysis techniques that are fast and unconditionally stable, and Monte-Carlo-based sampling methods that incorporate intelligent searching. This paper provides an overview of the new methods for nuclear weapons, compares them with existing methods for nuclear reactors, identifies some of their dual-use characteristics, and discusses ongoing developmental activities.

  16. Detection of uranium-based nuclear weapons using neutron-induced fission

    SciTech Connect

    Moss, C.E.; Byrd, R.C.; Feldman, W.C.; Auchampaugh, G.F.; Estes, G.P.; Ewing, R.I.; Marlow, K.W.

    1991-12-01

    Although plutonium-based nuclear weapons can usually be detected by their spontaneous emission of neutrons and gammas, the radiation emitted by weapons based entirely on highly-enriched uranium can often be easily shielded. Verification of a treaty that limits the number of such weapons may require an active technique, such as interrogating the suspect assembly with an external neutron source and measuring the number of fission neutrons produced. Difficulties include distinguishing between source and fission neutrons, the variations in yield for different materials and geometries, and the possibility of non-nuclear weapons that may contain significant amounts of fissionable depleted uranium. We describe simple measurements that test the induced-fission technique using an isotopic Am-Li source, an novel energy-sensitive neutron detector, and several small assemblies containing {sup 235}U, {sup 238}U, lead, and polyethylene. In all cases studied, the neutron yields above the source energy are larger for the {sup 235}U assemblies than for assemblies containing only lead or depleted uranium. For more complex geometries, corrections for source transmission may be necessary. The results are promising enough to recommend further experiments and calculations using examples of realistic nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. 5 refs., 11 figs.

  17. Facing reality: The future of the US nuclear weapons complex

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-01-01

    Facing Reality is a collaboration by 15 authors from environmental and grass-roots groups. The authors bluntly conclude that whether the inertia, habit, or material interest, the nuclear weapons establishment has proven itself incapable of genuine reform.' They therefore call for government agencies other than the Department of Energy to manage the tasks of decontamination and decommissioning. Just a partial list of what needs to be done to clean up the DOE's mess is daunting: closing, decommissioning, and decontaminating production facilities, dismantling thousands of nuclear warheads, safely storing dangerous radioactive materials, identifying alternative employment for weapons specialists, conducting meaningful health studies of workers and citizens exposed to radiation, and providng compensation for the victims of the nuclear buildup.

  18. Blocking the spread of nuclear weapons. American and European perspectives

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, G.C.; Holst, J.J.

    1986-01-01

    This volume is the product of separate but parallel studies undertaken by two panels of experts-one from the United States, the other from Western Europe-on new approaches to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. Neither panel sounded a doomsday alarm; each concluded that the chances for controlling proliferation lie in good part on building on the sound foundation of existing policies and institutional structures. Among the other conclusions derived from the parallel studies: The threat of nuclear proliferation is a specific, definable danger in a limited number of countries. The incentives that appear to make nuclear weapons an interesting option to some states must be understood, and potential proliferators must be persuaded that their acquisition will not lead to national security. Effective persuasion is more likely to come from non-nuclear weapon nations. Europe and the United States must collaborate in engaging such third-party persuaders in this endeavor. The panels' intensive examination of the six states of greatest near-term concern leads to the conclusion that the uneasy status quo will probably prevail for the next several years, yet these are volatile situations. The nature of the threat demands an extraordinary degree of international collaboration.

  19. Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability

    SciTech Connect

    Chrzanowski, P.

    1991-03-20

    This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

  20. How to make nuclear weapons obsolete

    SciTech Connect

    Jastrow, R.; Brown, L.

    1985-01-01

    This book is in favor of Star Wars. The jargon-free quick pace should attract a wide range of readers, while the skeptics will remain unpersuaded, in part by the debatable assertions which are to be found in the analysis. One such of particular importance is the remain unpersuaded, in part by the debatable assertions which are to be found in the analysis. One such of particular importance is the claim that even a leaky nuclear umbrella or shield will enhance the credibility of U.S. retaliation.

  1. A fast track to zero nuclear weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative and the New Agenda Coalition.

    PubMed

    Green, R

    2000-01-01

    The Middle Powers Initiative is a network of international citizen organizations working to encourage the nuclear weapon states and their influential allies to move rapidly to eliminate nuclear weapons via practical steps including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The New Agenda Coalition is a group of middle-ranking nations whose governments have also called for the early elimination of nuclear weapons via similar steps. The work of MPI and NAC at the United Nations and elsewhere is described, and their impact on NATO nuclear weapons policy discussed. PMID:10824520

  2. The Gravest Danger:. Nuclear Weapons and Their Proliferation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, S.

    2005-02-01

    Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying potential. With an energy release a million times larger than that of previous explosives, mass destruction is inevitable. The prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons and other dangerous technologies into the hands of suicidal terrorists and rogue nations unrestrained by the norms of civilized behavior has led President Bush to remark that "the gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology." This talk will address what can and should be done, in the face of new challenges in times punctuated by terrorist threats, to sustain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, taking into consideration technical realities, and the roles and limits of diplomatic initiatives and of military force.

  3. Use of commercial manipulator to handle a nuclear weapon component

    SciTech Connect

    Baker, C.P.

    1994-08-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a manipulator workcell to load and unload nuclear weapon pit assemblies from a cart. To develop this workcell, PNL procured a commercially available manipulator, equipped it with force-sensing and vision equipment, and developed manipulator control software. Manipulator workcell development demonstrated that commercially available manipulator systems can successfully perform this task if the appropriate manipulator is selected and the manipulator workcell tooling and software are carefully designed.

  4. Patenting the bomb: nuclear weapons, intellectual property, and technological control.

    PubMed

    Wellerstein, Alex

    2008-03-01

    During the course of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. government secretly attempted to acquire a monopoly on the patent rights for inventions used in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The use of patents as a system of control, while common for more mundane technologies, would seem at first glance to conflict with the regimes of secrecy that have traditionally been associated with nuclear weapons. In explaining the origins and operations of the Manhattan Project patent system, though, this essay argues that the utilization of patents was an ad hoc attempt at legal control of the atomic bomb by Manhattan Project administrators, focused on the monopolistic aspects of the patent system and preexisting patent secrecy legislation. From the present perspective, using patents as a method of control for such weapons seems inadequate, if not unnecessary; but at the time, when the bomb was a new and essentially unregulated technology, patents played an important role in the thinking of project administrators concerned with meaningful postwar control of the bomb. PMID:18505023

  5. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect

    Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  6. Nuclear stress test

    MedlinePlus

    ... Persantine stress test; Thallium stress test; Stress test - nuclear; Adenosine stress test; Regadenoson stress test; CAD - nuclear stress; Coronary artery disease - nuclear stress; Angina - nuclear ...

  7. Weapons sponsorship: Promoting strategic defense in the nuclear era

    SciTech Connect

    Pratt, E.K.

    1989-01-01

    This study develops a framework for an elite network analysis using a concept called weapons sponsorship (i.e., the utilization of resources by individuals and groups for the promotion of new weapons systems) and traces the evolution of U.S. policy regarding Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) from the immediate post-World War II period up to, and including, President Reagan's decision to initiate the Strategic Defense Initiative. The analysis of the major networks of BMD sponsors found relations between these policy-planning groups to be largely uncoordinated, often competitive, and sometimes antagonistic. In addition, several of these networks were highly polarized internally. These discoveries led to a reassessment of the influence and interests of the military-industrial complex, resulting in several findings concerning strategic defense in particular, and the arms race in general. For many BMD proponents, exotic BMD schemes offered a chance to break out of the strategic stalemate in offensive weaponry. Thus, a failed Star Wars would indicate that the political power of weapons sponsors interested in pursuing strategic superiority in the nuclear age is weakening.

  8. Comparison of doses and risks obtained from dose reconstructions for historical operations of federal facilities that supported the development, production, or testing of nuclear weapons.

    PubMed

    Reed, E W; Thiessen, K M; Hoffman, F O; Apostoaei, A I

    2003-06-01

    Five dose reconstruction projects focusing on historical public exposures from U.S. government nuclear facilities have been completed in the last 12 y (Fernald, Hanford, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats). Using information available in published reports, doses and excess health risks of the most serious contaminants in each study are compared for representative maximally and typically exposed individuals. For both the representative maximally exposed individual and the representative typically exposed individual, the highest excess risks of cancer incidence were from 131I released from Hanford, Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge and 222Rn released from Fernald (with central estimates for maximally exposed individuals approaching or exceeding 10(-2)); the lowest risks for both maximally and typically exposed individuals were from 239/240Pu and carbon tetrachloride released from Rocky Flats. Excess health risks to the representative maximally exposed individual were at or below 10(-40 for releases from Rocky Flats. For representative typically exposed individuals, the excess risks from releases of mixed radionuclides in the Clinch River (Oak Ridge), PCBs in East Fork Poplar Creek (Oak Ridge), and both plutonium and carbon tetrachloride released from Rocky Flats were mostly below 10(-5). PMID:12822578

  9. Auditing nuclear weapons quality programs at Los Alamos

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, A.H.

    1988-01-01

    Some of the problems involved in introducing quality assurance on a broad scale in a national laboratory are discussed. A philosophy of how QA can be utilized beneficially in research and development activities is described briefly, and our experiences at Los Alamos in applying QA to nuclear weapons activities are outlines. The important role of audits is emphasized; audits are used not merely to determine the effectiveness of QA programs but also to explain and demonstrate the usefulness of QA to a generally sceptical body of engineers and scientists. Finally, some ways of easing the application of QA in the future are proposed. 1 ref.

  10. Improved tritium monitoring at the Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Brain, W.F.; Click, C.N.; Griffis, D.W.

    1995-12-31

    This paper describes the development of a system capable of sampling ambient levels of both elemental and oxidized tritium in ambient air at the US Department of Energy`s Pantex Nuclear Weapons Plant. The system of monitors uses a combination of commercial laboratory equipment and custom fabricated components. Problems inherent in tritium sampling, and those specific to weather extremes in Texas, were identified and researched. Experience with the sampling network is still limited, but concentrations of oxidized tritium are presently comparable to the original sampling network.

  11. Human response to nuclear and advanced technology weapons effects. Final report, January-December 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Coleman, J.L.

    1996-05-01

    The purpose of this study is to help the system survivability analyst estimate hardness requirements for systems exposed to nuclear weapons and advanced technology weapons (ATWs). The system survivability analyst is often asked to make quick, order-of-magnitude estimates on the hardness requirements for existing or proposed systems based upon human responses to the effects of nuclear weapons and ATWs. The intent of this report is to identity the general range of human survivability to nuclear weapons and ATWs and to provide simple example calcuiations and scenarios that can give the reader rough estimates of the effects of these weapons. While high-powered microwave (HPM) and laser weapons are considered in this report, the main emphasis is on nuclear weapons and their ionizing radiation effects.

  12. The PEACE PIPE: Recycling nuclear weapons into a TRU storage/shipping container

    SciTech Connect

    Floyd, D.; Edstrom, C.; Biddle, K.; Orlowski, R.; Geinitz, R.; Keenan, K.; Rivera, M.

    1997-03-01

    This paper describes results of a contract undertaken by the National Conversion Pilot Project (NCPP) at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) to fabricate stainless steel ``pipe`` containers for use in certification testing at Sandia National Lab, Albuquerque to qualify the container for both storage of transuranic (TRU) waste at RFETS and other DOE sites and shipping of the waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP). The paper includes a description of the nearly ten-fold increase in the amount of contained plutonium enabled by the product design, the preparation and use of former nuclear weapons facilities to fabricate the components, and the rigorous quality assurance and test procedures that were employed. It also describes how stainless steel nuclear weapons components can be converted into these pipe containers, a true ``swords into plowshare`` success story.

  13. Comparison of methodologies for assessing the risks from nuclear weapons and from nuclear reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Benjamin, A.S.

    1996-08-01

    There are important differences between the safety principles for nuclear weapons and for nuclear reactors. For example, a principal concern for nuclear weapons is to prevent electrical energy from reaching the nuclear package during accidents produced by crashes, fires, and other hazards, whereas the foremost concern for nuclear reactors is to maintain coolant around the core in the event of certain system failures. Not surprisingly, new methods have had to be developed to assess the risk from nuclear weapons. These include fault tree transformations that accommodate time dependencies, thermal and structural analysis techniques that are fast and unconditionally stable, and parameter sampling methods that incorporate intelligent searching. This paper provides an overview of the new methods for nuclear weapons and compares them with existing methods for nuclear reactors. It also presents a new intelligent searching process for identifying potential nuclear detonation vulnerabilities. The new searching technique runs very rapidly on a workstation and shows promise for providing an accurate assessment of potential vulnerabilities with far fewer physical response calculations than would be required using a standard Monte Carlo sampling procedure.

  14. Report of the Canberra Commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    1996-08-14

    The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, convened in November 1995 by the Government of Australia, says the threat of nuclear terrorism and political uncertainties in the post-Cold War world make it imperative that nuclear weapons should be abolished.

  15. Canberra Commission outlines steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    1996-08-14

    The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, convened in November 1995 by the Government of Australia, says the threat of nuclear terrorism and political uncertainties in the post-Cold War world make it imperative that nuclear weapons should be abolished.

  16. Proliferation dangers associated with nuclear medicine: getting weapons-grade uranium out of radiopharmaceutical production.

    PubMed

    Williams, Bill; Ruff, Tilman A

    2007-01-01

    Abolishing the threat of nuclear war requires the outlawing of nuclear weapons and dismantling current nuclear weapon stockpiles, but also depends on eliminating access to fissile material (nuclear weapon fuel). The near-universal use of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce radiopharmaceuticals is a significant proliferation hazard. Health professionals have a strategic opportunity and obligation to progress the elimination of medically-related commerce in HEU, closing one of the most vulnerable pathways to the much-feared 'terrorist bomb'. PMID:17987979

  17. Development of the nuclear weapons complex EP architecture

    SciTech Connect

    Murray, C.; Halbleib, L.

    1996-07-01

    The Nuclear Weapons Guidance Team is an interagency committee led by Earl Whiteman, DOE that chartered the generation of EP40100, Concurrent Qualification and its successor EP401099, Concurrent Engineering and Qualification. As this new philosophy of concurrent operations has evolved and as implementation has been initiated, conflicts and insufficiencies in the remaining Engineering Procedures (EPs) have become more apparent. At the Guidance Team meeting in November 1995, this issue was explored and several approaches were considered. It was concluded at this meeting, that a smaller set of interagency EPs described in a hierarchical system could provide the necessary interagency direction to support complex-wide implementation. This set consolidates many existing EP processes where consistency and commonality are critical to success of the extended enterprise. The Guidance Team subsequently chartered an interagency team to initiate development activity associated with the envisioned new EP set. This team had participation from seven Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) sites as well as DOE/AL and DP-14 (team members are acknowledged later in this report). Per the Guidance Team, this team, referred to as the Architecture Subcommittee, was to map out and define an EP Architecture for the interagency EPs, make recommendations regarding a more agile process for EP approval and suggest an aggressive timeline to develop the combined EPs. The Architecture Subcommittee was asked to brief their output at the February Guidance Team meeting. This SAND report documents the results of the Architecture Subcommittee`s recommendations.

  18. Acoustic Analysis of Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Components at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Saleh, T. A.; Reynolds, J. J.; Rowe, C. A.; Freibert, F. J.; Ten Cate, J. A.; Ulrich, T. J.; Farrow, A. M.

    2012-12-01

    One of the primary missions of Los Alamos National Laboratory is to use science based techniques to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States. As such we use numerous NDE techniques to monitor materials and systems properties in weapons. Two techniques will be discussed in this presentation, Acoustic Resonance Spectroscopy (ARS) and Acoustic Emission (AE). ARS is used to observe manufacturing variations or changes in the plutonium containing component (pit) of the weapon system. Both quantitative and qualitative comparisons can be used to determine variation in the pit components. Piezoelectric transducer driven acoustic resonance experiments will be described along with initial qualitative and more complex analysis and comparison techniques derived from earthquake analysis performed at LANL. Similarly, AE is used to measure the time of arrival of acoustic signals created by mechanical events that can occur in nuclear weapon components. Both traditional time of arrival techniques and more advanced techniques are used to pinpoint the location and type of acoustic emission event. Similar experiments on tensile tests of brittle phases of plutonium metal will be described.

  19. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    SciTech Connect

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  20. Israeli nuclear weapons and war in the Middle East. Master`s thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Harden, J.D.

    1997-12-01

    This thesis examines the influence of the Israeli nuclear weapons capability on conflict in the Middle East. There are two perspectives regarding the impact of nuclear proliferation on strategic stability. Three paths to strategic instability are examined: preventive attacks, preemptive attacks, and the escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear war. The optimistic perspective argues that nuclear weapons make preventive and preemptive attacks less likely, and keep conventional conflict from escalating to nuclear war. The pessimistic perspective argues the opposite that nuclear weapons make preventive and preemptive attacks more likely, and raise the likelihood of escalation to nuclear war. My analysis of the Israeli cases shows that opaque nuclear proliferation decreases the pressure for preventive attacks, increases the chances for miscalculation, and creates sufficient concern about nuclear weapons to reduce the likelihood of preemptive attacks. Two factors help reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation as posed by proliferation pessimists, opaque nuclear weapons programs and nondeclaratory nuclear weapons policies. The implication of this research is that if the United States cannot dissuade a country from going nuclear, it should reinforce its incentives to maintain opacity and a nondeclaratory policy. Particular attention should be given to states which resist these efforts, as they represent the greatest risk of nuclear weapons use.

  1. Why the United States should negotiate a ban on naval tactical nuclear weapons. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Malloy, T.W.

    1991-12-01

    The naval tactical nuclear weapons that the US Navy has in storage neither provide adequate deterrence nor increased warfighting capability. If the US and the USSR eliminated these weapons the US Navy would be in a more dominant position compared to the Soviets. With both the US and USSR announcing unilateral removal of their tactical nuclear weapons from naval units, while at the same time maintaining them in storage, the US has tacitly agreed to a ban on these weapons without making any provisions for verifying Soviet compliance. This is not a good situation, all the drawbacks associated with these weapons remain, and none of the benefits of removing them from the inventory have been realized. As long as tactical naval nuclear weapons exist, the costs for maintaining, storing and training on these weapons will continue to be incurred. Moreover, in the present situation of unverified agreement, the Soviets still have access to non-strategic naval nuclear weapons. There is no assurance that some of these weapons will not find their way onboard a Soviet warship during unsettled times in the USSR. These issues can be resolved if the US seeks a mutually verifiable treaty with the USSR completely banning naval tactical nuclear weapons.

  2. Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials

    SciTech Connect

    Gosnell, T. B., LLNL; Hall, J. M.; Jam, C. L.; Knapp, D. A.; Koenig, Z. M.; Luke, S. J.; Pohl, B. A.; Schach von Wittenau, A.; Wolford, J. K.

    1997-02-03

    There has been an accelerating national interest in countering nuclear smuggling. This has caused a corresponding expansion of interest in the use of gamma-ray spectrometers for checkpoint monitoring, nuclear search, and within networks of nuclear and collateral sensors. All of these are fieldable instruments--ranging from large, fixed portal monitors to hand-held and remote monitoring equipment. For operational reasons, detectors with widely varying energy resolution and detection efficiency will be employed. In many instances, such instruments must be sensitive to weak signals, always capable of recognizing the gamma-ray signatures from nuclear weapons materials (NWM), often largely insensitive to spectral alteration by radiation transport through intervening materials, capable of real-time implementation, and able to discriminate against signals from commonly encountered legitimate gamma-ray sources, such as radiopharmaceuticals. Several decades of experience in classified programs have shown that all of these properties are not easily achieved and successful approaches were of limited scope--such as the detection of plutonium only. This project was originally planned as a two-year LDRD-ER. Since funding for 1997 was not sustained, this is a report of the first year's progress.

  3. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  4. The Meteorological Monitoring program at a former nuclear weapons plant

    SciTech Connect

    Maxwell, D.R.; Bowen, B.M.

    1994-02-01

    The purpose of the Meteorological Monitoring program at Rocky Flats Plant (RFP) is to provide meteorological information for use in assessing the transport, and diffusion, and deposition of effluent actually or potentially released into the atmosphere by plant operations. Achievement of this objective aids in protecting health and safety of the public, employees, and environment, and directly supports Emergency Response programs at RFP. Meteorological information supports the design of environmental monitoring networks for impact assessments, environmental surveillance activities, remediation activities, and emergency responses. As the mission of the plant changes from production of nuclear weapons parts to environmental cleanup and economic development, smaller releases resulting from remediation activities become more likely. These possible releases could result from airborne fugitive dust, evaporation from collection ponds, or grass fires.

  5. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    SciTech Connect

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  6. The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. Teacher's Guide. National Issues Forums in the Classroom.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Levy, Tedd

    This teacher's guide is designed to accompany the National Issues Forums'"The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security." Activities and ideas are provided to challenge students to debate and discuss the United States-Soviet related issues of nuclear weapons and national security. The guide is divided into sections that describe: (1)…

  7. Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

    In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

  8. Characterizing noise in the global nuclear weapon monitoring system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Schultz, Colin

    2013-03-01

    Under the auspices of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, a worldwide monitoring system designed to detect the illegal testing of nuclear weaponry has been under construction since 1999. The International Monitoring System is composed of a range of sensors, including detectors for hydroacoustic and seismic signals, and when completed, will include 60 infrasound measurement arrays set to detect low-frequency sound waves produced by an atmospheric nuclear detonation.

  9. Nuclear Weapon Systems Today: A Unit Curriculum for Liberal Arts Students.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Shanebrook, J. Richard

    1988-01-01

    Described is a unit of study on nuclear weapons from a course on nuclear technology. Provided are the elements of first strike attack designed for invoking students' interest and an explanation of each. (YP)

  10. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    SciTech Connect

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    2014-04-01

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

  11. 90074: Nuclear weapons production complex: Environmental compliance and waste management

    SciTech Connect

    Holt, M.

    1997-01-17

    The aging nuclear weapons production complex, managed by the Department of Energy (DOE), faces enormous environmental and waste management problems. Several hundred billion dollars may be needed to clean up leaking waste pits, groundwater contamination, growing accumulations of radioactive - waste, and uncontrolled liquid discharges at DOE facilities. DOE`s cleanup program is carried out by the Office of Environmental Management (EM). Cleanup funding escalated rapidly after the end of the Cold War, although it has plateaued at about $6 billion per year under the Clinton Administration. Congress has expressed growing concern about the rising costs of DOE`s cleanup program. A major cost driver has been environmental regulations and cleanup schedules that the Department is required to meet, although DOE also has been accused of poorly managing many projects and allowing costs to escalate unnecessarily. DOE`s environmental program consists of a variety of major activities, including environmental restoration, waste management, development of new cleanup technology, and stabilization of surplus nuclear material and facilities. Environmental restoration involves cleanup and mitigation of past environmental contamination and uncontained waste sites, including decontamination and decommissioning of permanently closed DOE facilities.

  12. Environmental and health effects of the nuclear industry and nuclear weapons: a current evaluation.

    PubMed

    Johnson, C J

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear weapons industry in the U.S. comprises nine major plants, supported by a network of subcontractors and grantee institutions. Weapons development progresses at the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos Laboratories under the auspices of the University of California. Fissionable materials and tritium are produced at the Savannah River Plant (du Pont) or at Hanford. Reprocessing of plutonium and weapons grade uranium and manufacture of components are carried out at Rocky Flats (formerly Dow, now Rockwell Int.). Large amounts of radionuclides are generated or involved in operations at most of the nine plants. Internal reports of surveillance efforts by weapons plant personnel to monitor emissions of radioactive gases and particulates have now been released by several of the plants (in one case through litigation). Those reports document major releases of radioactive gases and particulates to the environment in the past, and continuing routine releases of some importance. Few investigations have been made of effects from these potent carcinogens in local populations. There have been several preliminary reports (Rocky Flats, Los Alamos and Savannah River) and one comprehensive report [Ambio 10: 176 (1981)]. Evidence of significantly increased rates of cancer of the more radiosensitive organs has been demonstrated. Adequate cancer registry and vital statistics data are essential for the comprehensive investigations of somatic and genetic effects which should be carried out around all nuclear installations near population centres. PMID:6765303

  13. Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

  14. Iraqi nuclear weapons development program. Final report, October 1, 1992--September 30, 1993

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-09-30

    This is an abstract of the final report focusing on the collection, collation, analysis, and recording of information pertaining to Iraqi nuclear weapons development and on the long term monitoring of Iraq.

  15. A comparison of commercial/industry and nuclear weapons safety concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, R.R.; Summers, D.A.

    1996-07-01

    In this paper the authors identify factors which influence the safety philosophy used in the US commercial/industrial sector and compare them against those factors which influence nuclear weapons safety. Commercial/industrial safety is guided by private and public safety standards. Generally, private safety standards tend to emphasize product reliability issues while public (i.e., government) safety standards tend to emphasize human factors issues. Safety in the nuclear weapons arena is driven by federal requirements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the Departments of Defense and Energy. Safety is achieved through passive design features integrated into the nuclear weapon. Though the common strand between commercial/industrial and nuclear weapons safety is the minimization of risk posed to the general population (i.e., public safety), the authors found that each sector tends to employ a different safety approach to view and resolve high-consequence safety issues.

  16. Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

    SciTech Connect

    Francis, S.

    1992-01-01

    This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950's. (FI)

  17. Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

    SciTech Connect

    Francis, S.

    1992-06-01

    This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950`s. (FI)

  18. Total Quality Management and nuclear weapons: A historian`s perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Meade, R.A.

    1993-11-01

    Total Quality Management (TQM) has become a significant management theme at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper discusses the historical roots of TQM at Los Alamos and how TQM has been used in the development of nuclear weapons.

  19. Design and implementation of a nuclear weapons management system submodule: Shipboard security force system. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Settlemyer, S.R.

    1991-09-01

    The Nuclear Weapons Management System combines the strengths of an expert system with the flexibility of a database management system to assist the Weapons Officer, Security Officer, and the Personnel Reliability Program Officer in the performance of administrative duties associated with the nuclear weapons programs in the United States Navy. This thesis examines the need for, and ultimately the design of, a system that will assist the Security Officer in administrative duties associated with the Shipboard Self Defense Force. This system, designed and coded utilizing dBASE IV, can be implemented as a stand alone system. Furthermore, it interfaces with the expert system submodule that handles the PRP screening process.

  20. The nuclear weapons freeze and a cancer metaphor. A physician's view.

    PubMed

    Bruwer, A

    1985-08-01

    The nuclear arms race has been described as a cancer spreading through human society and threatening its existence. Bruwer characterizes the current superpower reaction to this nuclear threat, deterrence through a mutual weapons buildup, as a palliative approach that can only postpone death. He compares a bilateral weapons freeze to a hypothetical cancer freeze, a strategy that would not get rid of existing arsenals, but would buy negotiating time to work toward the elimination of these weapons. Answering critics who say that a freeze is unrealistic, or does not go far enough, Bruwer reminds them that it would be a beginning. PMID:4009900

  1. A {open_quotes}New{close_quotes} regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-02-15

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The {open_quote}new{close_quotes} in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be {open_quotes}new,{close_quotes} when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification.

  2. Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Guide to the Issues. New Edition.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mayers, Teena

    Intended for secondary and college level students and teachers, this guide discusses the nuclear arms control issue. There are four sections. Section I discusses U.S. nuclear strategy from 1945 to the present, strategic nuclear weapons competition between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), U.S.…

  3. Abolition of nuclear weapons: Implications for U.S. security interests

    SciTech Connect

    Weber, T.S.

    1998-12-01

    This thesis analyzes the arguments concerning the abolition of nuclear weapons, specifically the feasibility and desirability of nuclear disarmament. Past attempts at nuclear disarmament and relevant international treaties and legal opinions also are discussed. The nuclear disarmament movement has grown considerably since the end of the Cold War. As the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons gains influence, it may have an increasing impact upon national security policy. Abolitionists argue that nuclear disarmament is both desirable and feasible. This thesis concludes that nuclear disarmament is not feasible and that abolitionist arguments for the desirability of nuclear disarmament are flawed. States will continue to maintain nuclear arsenals for the foreseeable future. It would be unwise and dangerous for the United States to pursue a policy of nuclear disarmament in the near term.

  4. Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

  5. Chinese attitudes toward nuclear weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War

    SciTech Connect

    Ryan, M.A.

    1986-01-01

    Fundamental Chinese attitudes related to nuclear disarmament and proliferation, civil defense against nuclear attack, and the likely repercussions of nuclear war were set during the Korean War. Chinese viewpoints were heavily influenced by Western writings on nuclear matters from 1945-1950 and were characterized by an integrated military, political, and psychological realism. Previous studies, failing to make use of relevant Chinese-language materials, have neglected this crucial formative period. Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations considered using nuclear weapons in Korea and China and attempted to shape the political settlement of the war through nuclear threats. The Chinese reaction was notable for its efforts to counteract the effects of fear among its population. They acknowledged the unprecedented destructiveness, not the military decisiveness, of the weapons, but they adamantly denied that nuclear threats would cow them. Chinese propaganda stressed the Soviet deterrent and skillfully appealed to worldwide opposition to nuclear weapons, often utilizing Western spokesmen and playing upon the theme of US misuse of science. The Chinese considered a nuclear attack relatively unlikely but were prepared to absorb an attack and fight a war of long duration. In Korea both the terrain and the extensive tunneling by Chinese troops afforded significant protection from nuclear weapons.

  6. Stopping the emergence of nuclear weapon states in the Third World: An examination of the Iraq weapons inspection program. Study project

    SciTech Connect

    Block, D.A.

    1993-01-31

    The end of the Gulf War and the implementation of United Nation (UN) resolutions uncovered an Iraqi multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons program. Iraq's ability to pursue this clandestine program for more than a decade, despite periodic inspections, suggest that the myriad of treaties and agreements designed to curb proliferation may be inadequate. Clearly more must be done to deter and counter the spread of these deadly weapon. The UN weapons inspections in Iraq provide insight into possible solutions to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in the developing world. This study examines the policy and operational aspects associated with an intrusive United Nations inspection program. In its final analysis, this paper suggests that an effective challenge inspection program is a necessary element in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it suggests that the UN, as the only internationally accepted enforcement organization, be fully engaged in nonproliferation issues and support the challenge inspection program.

  7. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    PubMed

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined. PMID:16920155

  8. Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    von Hippel, Frank

    2010-02-01

    Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )

  9. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

  10. Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.

    SciTech Connect

    Flores, Kristen Lee

    2004-07-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of

  11. Nuclear Stress Test

    MedlinePlus

    ... Scan Diagnostic Tests and Procedures Echocardiography Electrocardiogram Electrophysiology Studies Exercise Stress Test Holter Monitoring Intravascular Ultrasound Nuclear Ventriculography Optical ...

  12. Controlling the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Study Guide for Teachers and Students

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    United States Institute of Peace, 2005

    2005-01-01

    The objectives of this teaching guide are: (1) to increase student understanding of the prevalence and spread of nuclear weapons; (2) to familiarize students with historic and contemporary measures to control nuclear proliferation and stimulate their thinking of potential strategies for doing so in the future; (3) to develop students' analytical…

  13. "Fat Man and Little Boy": The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1993-01-01

    Examines the ironic "problems" of the 1989 Hollywood film "Fat Man and Little Boy" (portraying the construction of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II) to demonstrate the ideological operations of nuclear texts, and the role of the nuclear weapons organization as a symbolic form in cultural discourse. (SR)

  14. Coping With Nuclear Weapons Policy: How Expert Do You Have To Be?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ruina, Jack

    1983-01-01

    Points out that policy decisions about nuclear weapons evolve from politics, bureaucracy, and technology, indicating that intelligent people can learn enough about technology to make judgments about policy issues. Suggests, however, that much more thinking is necessary to arrive at a coherent perspective about what constitutes nuclear weapons…

  15. The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2014-12-01

    The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

  16. First use of nuclear weapons: the constitutional role of a Congressional leadership committee

    SciTech Connect

    Banks, W.C.

    1986-01-01

    Although the War Powers Act brought some constitutional order to the question of respective prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches of government, the Act is flawed in the matter of first use of nuclear weapons. The author reviews the Supreme Court decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadna that the legislative veto was unconstitutional as it relates to the committee approval mechanism involved in the first-use proposal. He finds that neither the case nor the Constitution precludes the first-use proposal, then argues for the committee approval mechanism on the grounds that such an important decision should be shared. The urgency to fire nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack is not present in a first-use scenario since conventional weapons would already be engaged. The Committee mechanism would involve Congress without jeopardizing speed and secrecy.

  17. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease Among Workers at aNuclearWeaponsResearchandDevelopmentFacility

    PubMed Central

    Arjomandi, Mehrdad; Seward, James; Gotway, Michael B.; Nishimura, Stephen; Fulton, George P.; Thundiyil, Josef; King, Talmadge E.; Harber, Philip; Balmes, John R.

    2012-01-01

    Objective To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. Methods We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with high-resolution computed tomography (N = 49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage and transbronchial biopsies. Results The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 years and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 years. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or high-resolution computed tomography); three others had evidence of probable CBD. Conclusions These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD. PMID:20523233

  18. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

    2010-01-11

    To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

  19. Strategic weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-09-01

    This paper describes the Defense Department's process for formulating its strategic weapons targeting policy and translating that policy into a nuclear war plan-the Single Integrated Operational Plan. GAO provides information on the relationship between the strategic nuclear targeting process and the determination of requirements for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, level of civilian oversight, and categories and types of targets. These strategic nuclear weapons systems, commonly known as the triad, include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers armed with nuclear bombs and missiles.

  20. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    SciTech Connect

    Graham, Thomas Jr.

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Graham, Thomas, Jr.

    2014-05-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a "threat to peace and security", in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  2. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  3. Attitudes and reactions to nuclear weapons: responses to fear arousal

    SciTech Connect

    Herman, K.L.

    1987-01-01

    This study employed a pre-posttest design to investigate how degree of commitment to a preventive nuclear war strategy, and various demographic characteristics influence nuclear-war-related factors. Two hundred sixteen college students were assigned to one of four groups. Subjects in the first two groups completed the pretest, and waited three weeks before receiving the posttest. The posttest asked subjects in the first group to imagine and write about what might happen to them in the event of a major nuclear war, and re-administered the pretest research questions. Individuals in the second group responded to a fantasy on earthquakes, followed by the posttest. Subjects in the third group responded only to the nuclear was fantasy and theposttest, while those individuals in the fourth group were administered the posttest only. Subjects committed to a strategy considered their chance of death by nuclear war more likely after the nuclear-war fantasy than after the earthquake fantasy. Subjects uncommitted viewed their chance of death by nuclear was as less likely after the nuclear war fantasy than after the earthquake fantasy. This supports previous research indicating that cognitive strategies may be employed to reduce fear arousal. Women reported greater (a) chance of death by nuclear war, (b) nuclear anxiety, (c) nuclear concern, and (d) fear of the future than men. Subjects committed to a strategy expressed greater nuclear concern, greater nuclear anxiety, and employed less nuclear denial than those who were uncommitted.

  4. Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria`s nuclear weapons experience. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Horton, R.E.

    1998-04-01

    The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful developments and subsequent rollbacks of South Africa`s nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the key milestones in the development of South Africa`s nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa`s nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from flu`s effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own identity Crisis. Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation and receive guarantees of its security rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared total onslaught by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West.

  5. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. The Heritage lectures; No. 506

    SciTech Connect

    Spring, B.

    1994-12-31

    This lecture is on the proliferation of nuclear arms. More precisely, it will be on how best to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms. For as much as the policy community may disagree about the proper policies for preventing nuclear proliferation, the author thinks all share the goal of preventing proliferation. The best prescription for preventing all sorts of proliferation - biological, chemical, missile, and space technology, as well as nuclear is for the U.S. government to pursue a balanced non-proliferation policy. Such a balanced policy requires bringing four distinct approaches to addressing the proliferation problem together in a coherent fashion. These distinct approaches are: (1) deterring the use of the weapon in question, (2) defending against the use of the weapon in question, (3) destroying preemptively the weapon in question, and (4) controlling the spread of the weapon in question directly through arms control. In the authors view, a balanced and effective nonproliferation policy should not shun or slight any of these approaches. All make a unique contribution toward the whole and serve to reinforce one another in limiting the effects of proliferation and ultimately discouraging proliferation itself. This does not mean, however, that there is no requirement to make trade-offs among the four. Indeed, the real trick is assuring that there is an appropriate division of labor among the four. The author explains this general policy in terms of the specific challenges posed by the proliferation of nuclear arms.

  6. An assessment of nondestructive testing technologies for chemical weapons monitoring

    SciTech Connect

    Taylor, T.T.

    1993-05-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE), with the US Army Chemical Research, Development and Engineering Center (CRDEC) under the sponsorship of the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), completed testing of Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) technology on live agent systems. The tests were conducted at Tooele Army Depot during August 1992. The Nondestructive Evaluation systems were tested for potential use in verifying chemical treaty requirements. Five technologies, two neutron and three acoustic, were developed at DOE laboratories. Two systems from the United Kingdom (one neutron and one acoustic) were also included in the field trials. All systems tested showed the ability to distinguish among the VX, GB, and Mustard. Three of the systems (two acoustic and one neutron) were used by On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) personnel.

  7. Japan`s nuclear weapons options and U.S. security interests

    SciTech Connect

    Sharman, C.H.

    1998-06-01

    Japan is a virtual nuclear weapons power. It has the scientific and technical ability to produce hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons, but has chosen not to do so for political reasons. This thesis examines the historical development of Japan`s nuclear energy and aerospace programs since the mid-1950s and considers the possibility that at various points in its history, Japan used these programs as a cover to insure that its nuclear weapons options remained open. This thesis analyzes internal and external factors that may have influenced Japan`s nuclear policies. External factors include regional threats, international pressures to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and distrust of US commitments to provide for Japan`s defense. Internal factors include Japan`s historical tradition of a strong military state and Japan`s unique nuclear allergy. While both external and internal factors have influenced the path of Japans nuclear energy and aerospace programs, internal factors will drive Japan to maintain its plutonium-based energy program and will allow Japan to remain a virtual nuclear power well into the twenty-first century.

  8. Safety issues in robotic handling of nuclear weapon parts

    SciTech Connect

    Drotning, W.; Wapman, W.; Fahrenholtz, J.

    1993-12-31

    Robotic systems are being developed by the Intelligent Systems and Robotics Center at Sandia National Laboratories to perform automated handling tasks with radioactive weapon parts. These systems will reduce the occupational radiation exposure to workers by automating operations that are currently performed manually. The robotic systems at Sandia incorporate several levels of mechanical, electrical, and software safety for handling hazardous materials. For example, tooling used by the robot to handle radioactive parts has been designed with mechanical features that allow the robot to release its payload only at designated locations in the robotic workspace. In addition, software processes check for expected and unexpected situations throughout the operations. Incorporation of features such as these provides multiple levels of safety for handling hazardous or valuable payloads with automated intelligent systems.

  9. Argumentation in the Canadian House of Commons on the Issue of Nuclear Weapons for Canada.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jones, John Alfred

    The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 forced the Canadian House of Commons to consider whether Canadian forces in NORAD and NATO were effective without nuclear warheads on special weapons systems. This paper provides an overview of the debates and their milieu, identifies the issues involved, and analyzes the effects of the argumentation. The…

  10. The Dangers of Dualism as a World View in the Age of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Groner, Cary

    1984-01-01

    People's conceptual ordering of the universe has traditionally taken the form of dualism, "good and evil" and "us against them." In this age of nuclear weapons, this is highly dangerous thinking. We must rid ourselves of nationalism and commit ourselves to peace in all our dealings. (CS)

  11. Materials characterization capabilities at DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories and Production Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Pyper, J.W.

    1984-06-01

    The materials characterization and analytical chemistry capabilities at the 11 DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories or Production Plants have been surveyed and compared. In general, all laboratories have similar capabilities and equipment. Facilities or capabilities that are unique or that exist at only a few laboratories are described in detail.

  12. Russian/US nuclear weapons labs share NDT technologies for emergency response

    SciTech Connect

    Fry, D.A.

    1997-04-01

    In December 1995 a team of NDT experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory travelled to the Russian city of Sarov, also known as Arzamas-16, to officially transfer to Russia NDT equipment--a mobile radiography system--built for use in nuclear emergency response. Previously, during the period August 29 through September 16, 1994, nine Russian nuclear weapons experts had been trained on the safe and effective use and maintenance of this NDT equipment, a mobile radiography capability, at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The training occurred mainly at Los Alamos` Technical Area 8--where NDT in support of the US nuclear weapons program has taken place since the 1940s. The Russians came from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the Russian Federal Nuclear Centers at Arzamas-165 (VNIIEF) and Chelyabinsk-70 (VNIITF).

  13. Towards a mutually reinforcing future : opportunities to integrate nuclear weapons stewardship and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-07-01

    2010 NPR and President Obama's 2009 Prague Speech highlighted two key objectives with an inherent underlying tension: (1) Moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons; and (2) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Objective 1 depends, inter alia, upon reductions in stockpiles at home and abroad and maintaining stability. Objective 2 depends upon needed investments in modernization and life extension. Objectives being pursued predominantly in parallel by largely separate communities.

  14. Military Participants at U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing— Methodology for Estimating Dose and Uncertainty

    PubMed Central

    Till, John E.; Beck, Harold L.; Aanenson, Jill W.; Grogan, Helen A.; Mohler, H. Justin; Mohler, S. Shawn; Voillequé, Paul G.

    2014-01-01

    Methods were developed to calculate individual estimates of exposure and dose with associated uncertainties for a sub-cohort (1,857) of 115,329 military veterans who participated in at least one of seven series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests or the TRINITY shot carried out by the United States. The tests were conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Test Site. Dose estimates to specific organs will be used in an epidemiological study to investigate leukemia and male breast cancer. Previous doses had been estimated for the purpose of compensation and were generally high-sided to favor the veteran's claim for compensation in accordance with public law. Recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to digitize the historical records supporting the veterans’ compensation assessments make it possible to calculate doses and associated uncertainties. Our approach builds upon available film badge dosimetry and other measurement data recorded at the time of the tests and incorporates detailed scenarios of exposure for each veteran based on personal, unit, and other available historical records. Film badge results were available for approximately 25% of the individuals, and these results assisted greatly in reconstructing doses to unbadged persons and in developing distributions of dose among military units. This article presents the methodology developed to estimate doses for selected cancer cases and a 1% random sample of the total cohort of veterans under study. PMID:24758578

  15. American Physicists, Nuclear Weapons in World War II, and Social Responsibility

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Badash, Lawrence

    2005-06-01

    Social responsibility in science has a centuries-long history, but it was such a minor thread that most scientists were unaware of the concept. Even toward the conclusion of the Manhattan Project, which produced the first nuclear weapons, only a handful of its participants had some reservations about use of a weapon of mass destruction. But the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only made society more aware of the importance of science, they made scientists more aware of their responsibility to society. I describe the development of the concept of social responsibility and its appearance among American scientists both before and after the end of World War II.

  16. Integrating workplace exposure databases for occupational medicine services and epidemiologic studies at a former nuclear weapons facility.

    PubMed

    Ruttenber, A J; McCrea, J S; Wade, T D; Schonbeck, M F; LaMontagne, A D; Van Dyke, M V; Martyny, J W

    2001-02-01

    We outline methods for integrating epidemiologic and industrial hygiene data systems for the purpose of exposure estimation, exposure surveillance, worker notification, and occupational medicine practice. We present examples of these methods from our work at the Rocky Flats Plant--a former nuclear weapons facility that fabricated plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons and is now being decontaminated and decommissioned. The weapons production processes exposed workers to plutonium, gamma photons, neutrons, beryllium, asbestos, and several hazardous chemical agents, including chlorinated hydrocarbons and heavy metals. We developed a job exposure matrix (JEM) for estimating exposures to 10 chemical agents in 20 buildings for 120 different job categories over a production history spanning 34 years. With the JEM, we estimated lifetime chemical exposures for about 12,000 of the 16,000 former production workers. We show how the JEM database is used to estimate cumulative exposures over different time periods for epidemiological studies and to provide notification and determine eligibility for a medical screening program developed for former workers. We designed an industrial hygiene data system for maintaining exposure data for current cleanup workers. We describe how this system can be used for exposure surveillance and linked with the JEM and databases on radiation doses to develop lifetime exposure histories and to determine appropriate medical monitoring tests for current cleanup workers. We also present time-line-based graphical methods for reviewing and correcting exposure estimates and reporting them to individual workers. PMID:11217711

  17. Nuclear weapons. The balance of terror, the quest for peace

    SciTech Connect

    Edwards, A.J.C.

    1985-01-01

    This book provides a study from first principles of nuclear strategy and the balance of terror. This book addresses the most fundamental issues of our time - what is the balance of terror. How did it come to be. Is it necessary. How has it affected world politics. Will it keep the world at peace. Is it stable in an intrinsic and a dynamic sense. How real a threat is a first strike advantage. What can arms control agreements contribute. What should the objectives of such agreements be. How might a nuclear conflict begin. What would be the chance of containing such a conflict once begun. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the balance of terror. Are there any alternatives to a balance of terror, such as general or nuclear disarmament, which would be both attainable and preferable. If not, what can be done to make a better balance of terror. What are the main threats to stability. What should the West's policies be. What role is there for the independent nuclear deterrents of smaller countries. And how have recent developments such as the American 'star-wars' programme and the 'nuclear winter' hypothesis affected the answers to all these questions.

  18. Plutonium gamma-ray measurements for mutual reciprocal inspections of dismantled nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Koenig, Z.M.; Carlson, J.B.; Clark, D.; Gosnell, T.B.

    1995-07-01

    The O`Leary-Mikhailov agreement of March 1994 stated that the U.S. and the Russian Federation would engage in mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI) of fissile materials removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. It was decided to begin with the plutonium (Pu) removed from dismantled weapons and held in storage containers. Later discussions between U.S. and Russian technical experts led to the conclusion that, to achieve the O`Leary-Mikhailov objectives, Pu MRI would need to determine that the material in the containers has properties consistent with a nuclear-weapon component. Such a property is a {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratio consistent with weapons-grade material. One of the candidate inspection techniques under consideration for Pu MRI is to use a narrow region (630-670 keV) of the plutonium gamma-ray spectrum, taken with a high-purity germanium detector, to determine that it is weapons-grade plutonium as well as to estimate the minimum mass necessary to produce the observed gamma-ray intensity. We developed software (the Pu600 code) for instrument control and analysis especially for this purpose. In November 1994, U.S. and Russian scientists met at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for joint experiments to evaluate candidate Pu MRI inspection techniques. In one of these experiments, gamma-ray intensities were measured from three unclassified weapons-grade plutonium source standards and one reactor-grade standard (21% {sup 240}pu). Using our software, we determined the {sup 240}Pu/{sup 239}Pu ratio of these standards to accuracies within {+-}10%, which is adequate for Pu MRI. The minimum mass estimates varied, as expected, directly with the exposed surface area of the standards.

  19. The Continuing Environmental Threat of Nuclear Weapons: Integrated Policy Responses

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Robock, Alan; Toon, Owen B.; Turco, Richard P.; Oman, Luke; Stenchikov, Georgiy L.; Bardeen, Charles

    2007-05-01

    Humans have come to the realization that pollution of the atmosphere with gases and particles in the past 50 years is the dominant cause of atmospheric change. While land-use change can produce large regional effects, ozone depletion, global warming, and nuclear smoke all are human-driven problems that have actual or potential global adverse impacts on our fragile environment, each with severe consequences for humanity. These effects were, or would be, inadvertent and unplanned consequences of normal daily activities, the defense policies of many nations, and nuclear proliferation. Thus, we must seek ways of continuing our normal lives while protecting ourselves from environmental catastrophe.

  20. 11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

  1. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of

  2. Nuclear weapons decision-making; an application of organization theory to the mini-nuke case

    SciTech Connect

    Kangas, J.L.

    1985-01-01

    This dissertation addresses the problem of constructing and developing normative theory responsive to the need for improving the quality of decision-making in the nuclear weapons policy-making. Against the background of a critical evaluation of various paradigms in the literature (systems analysis and opposed-systems designed, the bureaucratic politics model, and the cybernetic theory of decision) an attempt is made to design an alternative analytic framework based on the writings of numerous organization theorists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. The framework is applied to the case of mini-nukes, i.e., proposals in the mid-1970s to develop and deploy tens of thousands of very low-yield (sub-kiloton), miniaturized fission weapons in NATO. Heuristic case study identifies the type of study undertaken in the dissertation in contrast to the more familiar paradigmatic studies identified, for example, with the Harvard Weapons Project. Application of the analytic framework developed in the dissertation of the mini-nuke case resulted in an empirical understanding of why decision making concerning tactical nuclear weapons has been such a complex task and why force modernization issues in particular have been so controversial and lacking in policy resolution.

  3. US, Russian reach agreement on sale of nuclear weapons material

    SciTech Connect

    Lockwood, D.

    1993-03-01

    As part of the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) talks, the USA and Russia on February 18, 1993 signed an agreement committing the USA to purchase, over the next 20 years, 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from former USSR nuclear warheads. The process will not actually begin until a detailed contract is negotiated and arrangements are agreed, on a bilateral basis, between Russia and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on the division of the proceeds.

  4. De-Alerting and De-Activating Strategic Nuclear Weapons

    SciTech Connect

    KARAS, THOMAS H.

    2001-04-01

    Despite the end of the Cold War, the US and Russia continue to maintain their ICBMs and many SLBMs in a highly alerted state--they are technically prepared to launch the missiles within minutes of a command decision to do so. Some analysts argue that, particularly in light of the distressed condition of the Russian military, these high alert conditions are tantamount to standing on the edge of a nuclear cliff from which we should now step back. They have proposed various bilateral ''de-alerting'' measures, to be taken prior to and outside the context of the formal strategic arms reduction treaty (START) process. This paper identifies several criteria for a stable de-alerting regime, but fails to find de-alerting measures that convincingly satisfy the criteria. However, some de-alerting measures have promise as de-activation measures for systems due for elimination under the START II and prospective START III treaties. Moreover, once these systems are deactivated, a considerable part of the perceived need to keep nuclear forces on high alert as a survivability hedge will be reduced. At the same time, the U.S. and Russia could consider building on their earlier cooperative actions to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war by enhancing their communications links and possibly joining in efforts to improve early warning systems.

  5. Interim storage of dismantled nuclear weapon components at the U.S. Department of Energy Pantex Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Guidice, S.J.; Inlow, R.O.

    1995-12-31

    Following the events of 1989 and the subsequent cessation of production of new nuclear weapons by the US, the mission of the Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Weapons Complex has shifted from production to dismantlement of retired weapons. The sole site in the US for accomplishing the dismantlement mission is the DOE Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas. Pending a national decision on the ultimate storage and disposition of nuclear components form the dismantled weapons, the storage magazines within the Pantex Plant are serving as the interim storage site for pits--the weapon plutonium-bearing component. The DOE has stipulated that Pantex will provide storage for up to 12,000 pits pending a Record of Decision on a comprehensive site-wide Environmental Impact Statement in November 1996.

  6. Handbook for nuclear weapons effects under arctic conditions. sanitized. Final report, June 1979-April 1980

    SciTech Connect

    Keith, J.R.; Wallace, W.E.

    1980-04-30

    This report describes the changes to be expected in nuclear weapons effects in arctic conditions as compared with the temperature regions of the works. Previous research in this area was reviewed, and relevant information is presented. The emphasis was placed on low-altitude and underwater bursts and effects. Inadequacies and uncertainties in current prediction techniques are given. The characteristics of the arctic region of importance in nuclear-effect calculations are given. The effects considered include air blast, cratering, thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, EMP, HF communication degradation, water shock, water waves, and acoustic effects.

  7. Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-06-01

    Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

  8. Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod; Whitney, Paul D.

    2010-04-16

    A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

  9. Public distrust and hazard management success at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant.

    PubMed

    Hohenemser, C

    1987-06-01

    Based on experience gained while serving a public oversight commission appointed by the governor of Colorado, hazard management at the Department of Energy's Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant is reviewed. Specific reference is made to the plant's history of controversy, its defense-in-depth strategy of hazard control, occupational health issues, public exposure to plutonium, and the assessment of low-probability, high-consequence risks. This leads to the conclusion that Rocky Flats is, by any objective standard, a hazard management success. It follows that public distrust of Rocky Flats arises as much from fear and loathing of nuclear weapons themselves as from the manufacturing process by which they are made. PMID:3616001

  10. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk