Science.gov

Sample records for securities primary auctions

  1. Secure quantum sealed-bid auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Naseri, Mosayeb

    2009-05-01

    A new experimentally feasible and secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication based on GHZ states is proposed. In this scheme all bidders Bob, Charlie, … , and Zach use M groups n-particle GHZ states to represent their bids. Here, an auctioneer gives the auction outcome by performing a sequence of n-particle GHZ-basis measurements on the final quantum states. It has been shown that using this method guarantees the honesty of the protocol, and malicious bidders can not collude with the auctioneers.

  2. Improved secure quantum sealed-bid auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yang, Yu-Guang; Naseri, Mosayeb; Wen, Qiao-Yan

    2009-10-01

    The security of a secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication based on GHZ states [M. Naseri, Opt. Commun. 282 (2009) 1939] is reexamined. It is shown that the protocol does not complete the task of a sealed-bid auction fairly. It is shown that a dishonest bidder can obtain all the other one's secret bids by two special types of attack, i.e., double Controlled NOT attack or using fake entangled particles. Furthermore, a simple possible improvement of the protocol is proposed.

  3. Secure quantum sealed-bid auction with post-confirmation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhao, Zhiwen; Naseri, Mosayeb; Zheng, Yuanqing

    2010-08-01

    A new secure quantum auction with post-confirmation is proposed, which is a direct application of the multi-particle super dense coding scheme to the auction problem. In this scheme all bidders use M groups n-particle GHZ states to represent their bids. Different from classical auction protocols and the previous secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocols, in the present scheme, by introducing a post-confirmation mechanism the honesty of the quantum sealed-bid auction is guaranteed, i.e., malicious bidders cannot collude with auctioneers. Also by sharing secret keys with the bidders the auctioneer could insure the anonymity of the bidders.

  4. Cryptanalysis and improvement of a secure quantum sealed-bid auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Qin, Su-Juan; Gao, Fei; Wen, Qiao-Yan; Meng, Luo-Ming; Zhu, Fu-Chen

    2009-10-01

    The security of a secure quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication [Mosayeb Naseri, Opt. Commun. 282 (2009) 1939] is analyzed. It is shown that this protocol is unfair as a malicious bidder can obtain others' bids without being found, and then he can optimize his bid to win the auction. Finally, a simple improvement to resist this attack is proposed.

  5. Auction-based Security Game for Multiuser Cooperative Networks

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, An; Cai, Yueming; Yang, Wendong; Cheng, Yunpeng

    2013-04-01

    In this paper, we develop an auction-based algorithm to allocate the relay power efficiently to improve the system secrecy rate in a cooperative network, where several source-destination pairs and one cooperative relay are involved. On the one hand, the cooperative relay assists these pairs to transmit under a peak power constraint. On the other hand, the relay is untrusty and is also a passive eavesdropper. The whole auction process is completely distributed and no instantaneous channel state information exchange is needed. We also prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed power auction game. Moreover, the Pareto optimality is also validated. Simulation results show that our proposed auction-based algorithm can effectively improve the system secrecy rate. Besides, the proposed auction-based algorithm can converge to the unique NE point within a finite number of iterations. More interestingly, we also find that the proposed power auction mechanism is cheat-proof.

  6. Revisiting "The Loophole of the Improved Secure Quantum Sealed-Bid Auction with Post-Confirmation and Solution"

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Qing-Le; Zhang, Wei-Wei; Su, Qi

    2014-09-01

    Recently, Luo et al. make a detailed analysis on the security of quantum sealed-bid auction with post-confirmation protocol (Quantum Information Processing, Volume 11, Issue 6, pp 1359-1369, 2012) and present the corresponding improved strategy for its loophole. Unfortunately, we find their improved version is still not as secure as expected, since it is vulnerable to malicious bidders in collusion with the auctioneer. And there is an unreasonable suspicion in the honesty of the auctioneer for special situation. Then we propose an improved strategy, which can perfectly defeat kinds of attacks.

  7. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued? 356.4 Section 356.4 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT SALE AND ISSUE OF...

  8. 31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction? 356.17 Section 356.17 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE SALE AND ISSUE OF MARKETABLE BOOK-ENTRY...

  9. Cryptanalysis and melioration of secure quantum sealed-bid auction with post-confirmation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    He, Li-Bao; Huang, Liu-Sheng; Yang, Wei; Xu, Rui; Han, Dian-Qi

    2012-12-01

    We investigate the quantum sealed-bid auction protocol proposed by Zhao et al. (Opt Commun 283:1394, 2010). It uses M groups n-particle GHZ states to represent bids and a post-confirmation mechanism to guarantee the honesty of the quantum sealed-bid auction. However, in our opinion the protocol still does not complete the task of a sealed-bid auction fairly. It is shown that a large group of dishonest bidders can collude to obtain all the other one's secret bids before the opening phase of the auction with a probability polynomially close to one. Moreover, a simple feasible improvement of the protocol is proposed.

  10. 31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction? 356.17 Section 356.17 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT SALE AND ISSUE OF MARKETABLE BOOK-ENTRY TREASURY...

  11. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What are the book-entry systems in... BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT SALE AND ISSUE OF MARKETABLE BOOK-ENTRY TREASURY BILLS, NOTES, AND BONDS... book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained? There are...

  12. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained? 356.4 Section 356.4 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE...

  13. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained? 356.4 Section 356.4 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE...

  14. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained? 356.4 Section 356.4 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE...

  15. Do I hear... anyone here? Tax-exempt healthcare facilities have taken a hit on auction-rate securities as the mortgage meltdown has investors skittish.

    PubMed

    Evans, Melanie

    2008-02-25

    The crisis in auction-rate securities is coming down hard on tax-exempt providers. Buyers are disappearing, sending interest rates soaring. Some hospitals and other healthcare borrowers are being forced to pay maximum interest. "Basically, the investor pool has all but vanished," says Melissa Williams, left, of Christus Health. PMID:18491765

  16. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... and conditions in this part, the regulations in 31 CFR part 363 (for securities held in TreasuryDirect), the regulations in 31 CFR part 357 (for securities held in the commercial book-entry system and Legacy... part to distinguish such securities from “inflation-protected” securities. We refer to...

  17. 12 CFR 619.9260 - Primary security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Primary security. 619.9260 Section 619.9260 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM DEFINITIONS § 619.9260 Primary security. The basic collateral securing the loan....

  18. 12 CFR 619.9260 - Primary security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 12 Banks and Banking 7 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Primary security. 619.9260 Section 619.9260 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM DEFINITIONS § 619.9260 Primary security. The basic collateral securing the loan....

  19. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... and conditions in this part, the regulations in 31 CFR part 363 (for securities held in TreasuryDirect), the regulations in 31 CFR part 357 (for securities held in the commercial book-entry system and...

  20. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... and conditions in this part, the regulations in 31 CFR part 363 (for securities held in TreasuryDirect), the regulations in 31 CFR part 357 (for securities held in the commercial book-entry system and Legacy... distinguish such notes and bonds from “inflation-protected securities” and “floating rate notes.” We refer...

  1. 31 CFR 356.17 - How and when do I pay for securities awarded in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... actual settlement amount due. (See § 356.25.) (c) Legacy Treasury Direct ®. Unless you make other... payable to Legacy Treasury Direct and mail it with the bid to the Federal Reserve Bank handling your... inflation adjustment. (3) Payment by maturing securities. You may use maturing securities held in...

  2. Essays on wholesale auctions in deregulated electricity markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Baltaduonis, Rimvydas

    2007-12-01

    The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including price spikes, inefficiency, security, and the overall relationship of market clearing prices to generation costs. Unsatisfactory outcomes in these markets are thought to have resulted in part from strategic generator behaviors encouraged by inappropriate market design features. In this dissertation, I examine the performance of three auction mechanisms for wholesale power markets - Offer Cost Minimization auction, Payment Cost Minimization auction and Simple-Offer auction - when electricity suppliers act strategically. A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the traditional Offer Cost Minimization auction with the intention to solve the problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. Efficiency concerns for this proposal were voiced due to insights predicated on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using a game theoretic approach and an experimental method, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices that they are willing to sell at, but also the start-up fees, which are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that the complex structure of the offers leaves considerable room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti-competitive and inefficient market outcomes. In the last chapter of my dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to contrast the performance of two complex-offer auctions against the performance of a simple-offer auction, in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs - fixed and variable - through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that a simple-offer auction significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects

  3. 19 CFR 127.34 - Auctioneer's commissions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Auctioneer's commissions. 127.34 Section 127.34 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY GENERAL ORDER, UNCLAIMED, AND ABANDONED MERCHANDISE Proceeds of Sale § 127.34...

  4. Improving the secrecy rate by turning foes to allies: An auction scheme

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ma, Ya-Yan; Wang, Bao-Yun

    2015-09-01

    Security against eavesdroppers is a critical issue in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, a scenario consisting of one primary pair and multiple secondary pairs is considered. The secondary transmitters (STs) work in half-duplex mode and they are potential eavesdroppers on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to simultaneously transmit with the primary transmitter (PT). A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is employed to model the interaction between the PT and STs. With the proposed auction scheme, the hostile relationship between the PT and STs is transformed into a cooperative relationship. An iterative algorithm based on the max-min criteria is proposed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs for an access chance in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Numerical results show that the proposed auction scheme not only improves the PT’s security but also increases the access opportunities of the STs. Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61271232 and 61372126) and the University Postgraduate Research and Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. CXZZ12-0472).

  5. Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Parkes, David C.; Rabin, Michael O.; Thorpe, Christopher

    We present a cryptographic protocol for conducting efficient, provably correct and secrecy-preserving combinatorial clock-proxy auctions. The “clock phase” functions as a trusted auction despite price discovery: bidders submit encrypted bids, and prove for themselves that they meet activity rules, and can compute total demand and thus verify price increases without revealing any information about individual demands. In the sealed-bid “proxy phase”, all bids are revealed the auctioneer via time-lapse cryptography and a branch-and-bound algorithm is used to solve the winner-determination problem. Homomorphic encryption is used to prove the correctness of the solution, and establishes the correctness of the solution to any interested party. Still an NP-hard optimization problem, the use of homomorphic encryption imposes additional computational time on winner-determination that is linear in the size of the branch-and-bound search tree, and thus roughly linear in the original (search-based) computational time. The result is a solution that avoids, in the usual case, the exponential complexity of previous cryptographically-secure combinatorial auctions.

  6. Auctioning Airport Slots?

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Gruyer, Nicolas; Lenoir, Nathalie

    2003-01-01

    The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring effluent slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the Euopean commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary" utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

  7. Anonymous, Yet Trustworthy Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chanda, Prasit Bikash; Naessens, Vincent; de Decker, Bart

    An auction is an inevitable market mechanism to setup prices of goods or services in a competitive and dynamic environment. Anonymity of bidders is required to conceal their business strategies from competitors. However, it is also essential to provide the seller guarantees that a bidder is trustworthy and competent enough to perform certain tasks (e.g transports). This paper proposes an auction protocol where bidders will participate anonymously, yet prove to be trustworthy and competent and can be held accountable towards auctioneers and sellers. Moreover, the protocol introduces promises, bonuses and compensations to ensure the best price for the sellers, extra profit for bidders and opportunities for newcomers in the business. It also handles ties, and copes with last minute bidding. Finally, the auction’s fair proceedings and outcome can be verified by everyone.

  8. Three essays on auction markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Shunda, Nicholas James

    This dissertation contains a series of theoretical investigations of auction markets. The essays it contains cover wholesale electricity markets, a popular selling mechanism on eBay, and supplier entry into multi-unit procurement auctions. The study in Chapter 1 compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts as if the auction featured a discriminatory final payment method when, in fact, the markets are uniform price auctions. The proposed alternative explicitly accounts for the market-clearing price during the allocation phase. We find that the proposed alternative largely outperforms the current practice on the basis of procurement costs in the context of simple auction markets featuring both day-ahead and real-time auctions and that the procurement cost advantage of the alternative is complete when we simulate the effects of increased competition. We also find that a tradeoff between the objectives of procurement cost minimization and productive efficiency emerges in our simple auction markets and persists in the face of increased competition. The study in Chapter 2 considers a possible rationale for an auction with a buy price. In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. The "Buy-It-Now" option on eBay is a leading example of an auction with a buy price. The study develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the

  9. Quantum English auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Piotrowski, Edward W.; Sładkowski, Jan

    2003-02-01

    We continue the analysis of quantum-like description of markets and economics. The approach has roots in the recently developed quantum game theory and quantum computing. The present paper is devoted to quantum English auction which we consider as a special class of quantum market games. The approach allows to calculate profit intensities for various possible strategies.

  10. Adaptive Techniques for Online Auctions

    SciTech Connect

    Sakas, D. P.; Vlachos, D. S.; Simos, T. E.

    2007-12-26

    Online auctions consider a setting in which agents arrive dynamically and require that an allocation and payment decision is made before they depart. An auctioneer must take a decision having no knowledge about the time horizon and the strategy of the bidder agent. In this work, we present an utility theory based model which is capable of taking the auctioneer decision and adopt its assumptions about the bidders from the results of past auctions. Simulation results are presented in order to test the efficiency of the proposed model.

  11. Adaptive Techniques for Online Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sakas, D. P.; Vlachos, D. S.; Simos, T. E.

    2007-12-01

    Online auctions consider a setting in which agents arrive dynamically and require that an allocation and payment decision is made before they depart. An auctioneer must take a decision having no knowledge about the time horizon and the strategy of the bidder agent. In this work, we present an utility theory based model which is capable of taking the auctioneer decision and adopt its assumptions about the bidders from the results of past auctions. Simulation results are presented in order to test the efficiency of the proposed model.

  12. 31 CFR 356.33 - Does the Treasury have any discretion in the auction process?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... discretion in the auction process? (a) We have the discretion to: (1) Accept, reject, or refuse to recognize... to modify the terms and conditions of new securities and to depart from the customary pattern...

  13. 31 CFR 356.33 - Does the Treasury have any discretion in the auction process?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... discretion in the auction process? (a) We have the discretion to: (1) Accept, reject, or refuse to recognize... to modify the terms and conditions of new securities and to depart from the customary pattern...

  14. 31 CFR 356.33 - Does the Treasury have any discretion in the auction process?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... discretion in the auction process? (a) We have the discretion to: (1) Accept, reject, or refuse to recognize... to modify the terms and conditions of new securities and to depart from the customary pattern...

  15. Multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction using single photons as message carrier

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Liu, Wen-Jie; Wang, Hai-Bin; Yuan, Gong-Lin; Xu, Yong; Chen, Zhen-Yu; An, Xing-Xing; Ji, Fu-Gao; Gnitou, Gnim Tchalim

    2016-02-01

    In this study, a novel multiparty quantum sealed-bid auction protocol using the single photons as the message carrier of bids is proposed, followed by an example of three-party auction. Compared with those protocols based on the entangled states (GHZ state, EPR pairs, etc.), the present protocol is more economic and feasible within present technology. In order to guarantee the security and the fairness of the auction, the decoy photon checking technique and an improved post-confirmation mechanism with EPR pairs are introduced, respectively.

  16. 76 FR 81932 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits; Revised Construction Permit Number in Auction 93

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-29

    ... listed in Attachment A to the Auction 93 Procedures Public Notice, 76 FR 78645, December 19, 2011, to MM... COMMISSION Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits; Revised Construction Permit Number in Auction 93... the construction permit number for one of the FM broadcast construction permits for Auction 93....

  17. Internet Auction Sellers: Does Size Really Matter?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Halstead, Diane; Becherer, Richard C.

    2003-01-01

    Examines the Internet auction phenomenon as it relates to the marketing mix of online auction sellers. The data indicate that, while there is great diversity among businesses that utilize online auctions, distinct cost leadership and differentiation marketing strategies are both evident. These two approaches are further distinguished in terms of…

  18. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... such offers will be sold to cover the bids, according to each such offeror's pro rata share of all... each auction, the Administrator will pay a pro rata share of the proceeds of each auction to the... withheld for the purposes of establishing the Auction Subaccount. Each unit's pro rata share will...

  19. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through...

  20. Exploring Online Auction Behaviors and Motivations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jeon, Sua; Crutsinger, Christy; Kim, Haejung

    2008-01-01

    The availability and convenience of the Internet, combined with the variety of products available at any given time, have contributed to the success of online auctions.This exploratory study examined online auction behaviors among college students in an attempt to identify underlying dimensions of auction motivations. Questionnaires completed by…

  1. A new quantum sealed-bid auction protocol with secret order in post-confirmation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Jing-Tao; Chen, Xiu-Bo; Xu, Gang; Meng, Xiang-Hua; Yang, Yi-Xian

    2015-10-01

    A new security protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction is proposed to resist the collusion attack from some malicious bidders. The most significant feature of this protocol is that bidders prepare their particles with secret order in post-confirmation for encoding bids. In addition, a new theorem and its proof are given based on the theory of combinatorial mathematics, which can be used as evaluation criteria for the collusion attack. It is shown that the new protocol is immune to the collusion attack and meets the demand for a secure auction. Compared with those previous protocols, the security, efficiency and availability of the proposed protocol are largely improved.

  2. Statistical Properties of Online Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Namazi, Alireza; Schadschneider, Andreas

    We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are studied. The analysis of the data reveals surprisingly simple distributions and relations, typically of power-law form. Based on these findings we introduce a simple method to identify suspicious auctions that could be influenced by a form of fraud known as shill bidding. Furthermore the influence of bidding strategies is discussed. The results indicate that the observed behavior is related to a mixture of agents using a variety of strategies.

  3. Biological auctions with multiple rewards

    PubMed Central

    Reiter, Johannes G.; Kanodia, Ayush; Gupta, Raghav; Nowak, Martin A.; Chatterjee, Krishnendu

    2015-01-01

    The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards. PMID:26180069

  4. Auctions for coastal energy resources

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Griffin, Robert M.

    It is becoming increasingly common to allocate public resources to the private sector for the purpose of developing these resources. One of the earliest uses of auctions in the U.S. for allocating rights to public resources was in the offshore oil and gas industry. The U.S. Federal government, through the Department of Interior (DOI), has used auctions to allocate development rights to offshore oil and gas resources to the private sector since the 1950's. Since then many things have changed. Oil and gas markets have gone through boom and bust cycles, giant technological advances in extraction and assessment have taken place, and alternative energy based in the coastal zone is now in demand in markets as well. There has been an enormous amount of research into the drivers of bidder behavior in auctions and optimal auction design in the last 60 years as well. Throughout all of this, the DOI has continued to use basically the same exact auction design to allocate oil and gas leases. The U.S. offshore oil and gas resources sold by the Department of Interior have accounted for more than $65 billion in revenue since the program started. These offshore resources are an important source of government revenue and national wealth. Additionally, the expansion of the energy sector offshore has enormous potential for electricity generation in the U.S., estimated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory as approaching 54 gigawatts by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Taken together, the DOI controls access to a large part of the future of energy in the U.S. The research herein assesses the auction formats used to allocate both fossil fuels and renewable resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The first manuscript looks at the current method used by the DOI to allocate oil and gas leases on the OCS, and is primarily interested in how bidders behave in this environment. Using latent class estimation techniques to separate distinct bidding behavior in a laboratory

  5. Learning from California`s QF auction

    SciTech Connect

    Gribik, P.

    1995-04-15

    California`s 1993 qualifying facility (QF) auction dramatically illustrates problems that can be encountered in structuring auctions for electric utility solicitations of supply-side resources from qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities. In the 1993 California QF auction, three California utilities were to select QFs that would be awarded long-term purchased-power contracts. The auction produced some unexpected outcomes that could potentially cost the utilities and their customers tens of millions of dollars per year. A year after the auction was held, the parties were still attempting to revise contracts, or even rebid a portion of the auction. And all of this effort may come to naught, depending upon what happens now that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has struck down the auction process under California`s Biennial Resource Plan Update, claiming that it violates the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) by using an improper method to calculate avoided costs. A study of the California QF auction illustrates yet again that the devil is in the details. And the stakes will only rise farther as regulators in other states rely more on auctions to open up the electric industry to further competition.

  6. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by...

  7. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by...

  8. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by...

  9. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by...

  10. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by...

  11. Collusion in Auctions for Emission Permits: An Experimental Analysis

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Burtraw, Dallas; Goeree, Jacob; Holt, Charles A.; Myers, Erica; Palmer, Karen; Shobe, William

    2009-01-01

    Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms--uniform and discriminatory price sealed-bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to…

  12. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... yields or discount rates through successively higher yields or discount rates, up to the amount required to meet the offering amount. When necessary, we prorate bids at the highest accepted yield or... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high...

  13. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... yields or discount rates through successively higher yields or discount rates, up to the amount required to meet the offering amount. When necessary, we prorate bids at the highest accepted yield or... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high...

  14. Security Approaches in Using Tablet Computers for Primary Data Collection in Clinical Research

    PubMed Central

    Wilcox, Adam B.; Gallagher, Kathleen; Bakken, Suzanne

    2013-01-01

    Next-generation tablets (iPads and Android tablets) may potentially improve the collection and management of clinical research data. The widespread adoption of tablets, coupled with decreased software and hardware costs, has led to increased consideration of tablets for primary research data collection. When using tablets for the Washington Heights/Inwood Infrastructure for Comparative Effectiveness Research (WICER) project, we found that the devices give rise to inherent security issues associated with the potential use of cloud-based data storage approaches. This paper identifies and describes major security considerations for primary data collection with tablets; proposes a set of architectural strategies for implementing data collection forms with tablet computers; and discusses the security, cost, and workflow of each strategy. The paper briefly reviews the strategies with respect to their implementation for three primary data collection activities for the WICER project. PMID:25848559

  15. Spiral of Hatred: Social Effects in Buyer-Seller Cross-Comments Left on Internet Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nielek, Radoslaw; Wawer, Aleksander; Wierzbicki, Adam

    An auction platform is a dynamic environment where a rich variety of social effects can be observed. Most of those effects remain unnoticed or even hidden to ordinary users. The in-depth studies of such effects should allow us to identify and understand the key factors influencing users’ behaviour. The material collected from the biggest Polish auction house has been analyzed. NLP algorithms were applied to extract sentiment-related content from collected comments. Emotional distance between negative, neutral and positive comments has been calculated. The obtained results confirm the existence of the spiral-of-hatred effect but also indicate that much more complex patterns of mutual relations between sellers and buyers exist. The last section contains a several suggestions which can prove useful to improve trustworthiness of users’ reports and security of an auction platform in general.

  16. Sequential Auctions in Uncertain Information Settings

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fatima, Shaheen; Wooldridge, Michael; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncertainty of the bidders. Specifically, there are three key auction parameters that the bidders could be uncertain about: the valuations of the objects for sale, the number of objects for sale, and the number of participating bidders. We analyse the bidding behaviour for each of these three sources of uncertainty. For each setting, we first find the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that comprise a series. Then we analyze the effect of these uncertainties on the computational and economic properties of the equilibrium solution. The former analysis is essential if we want to use software agents to bid on our behalf. The latter is essential because both the auctioneer and the bidders want to know how these uncertainties affect their profits. Thus we compare the outcomes for these settings from the perspective of the bidders (i.e., in terms of their profits), from the perspective of the auctioneer (i.e., in terms of his revenue), and from a global perspective (i.e., in terms of auction efficiency).

  17. Quantum auctions: Facts and myths

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Piotrowski, Edward W.; Sładkowski, Jan

    2008-06-01

    Quantum game theory, whatever opinions may be held due to its abstract physical formalism, have already found various applications even outside the orthodox physics domain. In this paper we introduce the concept of a quantum auction, its advantages and drawbacks. Then we describe the models that have already been put forward. A general model involves Wigner formalism and infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces - we envisage that the implementation might not be an easy task. But a restricted model advocated by the Hewlett-Packard group (Hogg et al.) seems to be much easier to implement. We focus on problems related to combinatorial auctions and technical assumptions that are made. Powerful quantum algorithms for finding solutions would extend the range of possible applications. Quantum strategies, being qubits, can be teleported but are immune from cloning - therefore extreme privacy of the agent’s activity could in principle be guaranteed. Then we point out some key problems that have to be solved before commercial use would be possible. With present technology, optical networks, single photon sources and detectors seems to be sufficient for an experimental realization in the near future.

  18. Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chen, Po-An; Kempe, David

    We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction, namely, when a friend wins. On the other hand, when an enemy or competitor wins, a bidder might derive negative utility. Such spite and altruism will alter the bidding strategies. A simple and natural model for bidders’ utilities in these settings posits that the utility of a losing bidder i as a result of bidder j winning is a constant (positive or negative) fraction of bidder j’s utility.

  19. 41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management... Sales Process Competitive Sales § 102-38.95 What is an auction? An auction is a sale where the...

  20. Auctioneering Training Certificate Program 93-1001. Final Report.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Clark, Charles H.

    A project was conducted to prepare a catalog of duties and tasks, performance objectives and guides, and instructional materials that would enable schools to develop instructional programs designed to prepare persons to enter the career of auctioneering. An occupational survey of auctioneers was conducted; a writing team of auctioneers prepared…

  1. Competitive Financing Mechanisms: Auctions Used by Federal Agencies.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Joyner, Carlotta C.

    This report reviews auctions used by various federal agencies to examine the feasibility of using similar auctions to determine interest rates for student borrowing through the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program. The review identified 31 different auctions, divided into two major…

  2. Impact of Patient Portal Secure Messages and Electronic Visits on Adult Primary Care Office Visits

    PubMed Central

    Crane, Sarah J.; Chaudhry, Rajeev; Ebbert, Jon O.; Ytterberg, Karen; Tulledge-Scheitel, Sidna M.; Stroebel, Robert J.

    2014-01-01

    Abstract Introduction: Secure messages and electronic visits (“e-visits”) through patient portals provide patients with alternatives to face-to-face appointments, telephone contact, letters, and e-mails. Limited information exists on how portal messaging impacts face-to-face visits in primary care. Materials and Methods: We conducted a retrospective cohort study of 2,357 primary care patients who used electronic messaging (both secure messages and e-visits) on a patient portal. Face-to-face appointment frequencies (visits/year) of each patient were calculated before and after the first message in a matched-pairs analysis. We analyzed visit frequencies with and without adjustments for a first message surge in visits, and we examined subgroups of high message utilizers and long-term users. Results: Primary care patients who sent at least one message (secure message or e-visit) had a mean of 2.43 (standard deviation [SD] 2.3) annual face-to-face visits before the first message and 2.47 (SD 2.8) after, a nonsignificant difference (p=0.45). After adjustment for a first message surge in visits, no significant visit frequency differences were observed (mean, 2.35 annual visits per patient both before and after first message; p=0.93). Subgroup analysis also showed no significant change in visit frequency for patients with higher message utilization or for those who had used the messaging feature longer. Conclusions: No significant change in face-to-face visit frequency was observed following implementation of portal messaging. Secure messaging and e-visits through a patient portal may not result in a change of adult primary care face-to-face visits. PMID:24350803

  3. Bidding Agents That Perpetrate Auction Fraud

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Trevathan, Jarrod; McCabe, Alan; Read, Wayne

    This paper presents a software bidding agent that inserts fake bids on the seller's behalf to inflate an auction's price. This behaviour is referred to as shill bidding. Shill bidding is strictly prohibited by online auctioneers, as it defrauds unsuspecting buyers by forcing them to pay more for the item. The malicious bidding agent was constructed to aid in developing shill detection techniques. We have previously documented a simple shill bidding agent that incrementally increases the auction price until it reaches the desired profit target, or it becomes too risky to continue bidding. This paper presents an adaptive shill bidding agent which when used over a series of auctions with substitutable items, can revise its strategy based on bidding behaviour in past auctions. The adaptive agent applies a novel prediction technique referred to as the Extremum Consistency (EC) algorithm, to determine the optimal price to aspire for. The EC algorithm has successfully been used in handwritten signature verification for determining the maximum and minimum values in an input stream. The agent's ability to inflate the price has been tested in a simulated marketplace and experimental results are presented.

  4. China’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

    PubMed Central

    Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

    2013-01-01

    This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities. PMID:25506125

  5. 47 CFR 1.2208 - Public notice of auction completion and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... PROCEDURE Grants by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse... broadcast television spectrum incentive auction conducted under section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, public... indicate that the reassignments of television channels and reallocations of broadcast television...

  6. Books at Auction: The Art of Deaccessioning.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Model, Peter

    1981-01-01

    Lack of space and budget cuts force many libraries to weed out books and to be selective in accepting collection bequests. The approach for deciding which books to weed out and whether to dispose of these books through dealers or auctions are decisions private clubs and many libraries must make. (RBF)

  7. 43 CFR 2546.4 - Public auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 2 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Public auctions. 2546.4 Section 2546.4 Public Lands: Interior Regulations Relating to Public Lands (Continued) BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) COLOR-OF-TITLE AND OMITTED LANDS Snake...

  8. 43 CFR 2546.4 - Public auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Public auctions. 2546.4 Section 2546.4 Public Lands: Interior Regulations Relating to Public Lands (Continued) BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) COLOR-OF-TITLE AND OMITTED LANDS Snake...

  9. 43 CFR 2546.4 - Public auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 2 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Public auctions. 2546.4 Section 2546.4 Public Lands: Interior Regulations Relating to Public Lands (Continued) BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) COLOR-OF-TITLE AND OMITTED LANDS Snake...

  10. 43 CFR 2546.4 - Public auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 2 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Public auctions. 2546.4 Section 2546.4 Public Lands: Interior Regulations Relating to Public Lands (Continued) BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) COLOR-OF-TITLE AND OMITTED LANDS Snake...

  11. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    .... This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real... property, will determine and document the minimum sale price acceptable. In determining a minimum sale... on sales of program and property. For NP property, credit may be offered to facilitate the...

  12. 7 CFR 1955.131 - Auctioneers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 14 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Auctioneers. 1955.131 Section 1955.131 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) RURAL HOUSING SERVICE, RURAL BUSINESS-COOPERATIVE SERVICE, RURAL UTILITIES SERVICE, AND FARM SERVICE AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (CONTINUED)...

  13. Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions

    SciTech Connect

    Joskow, P.L.; Schmalensee, R.; Bailey, E.M.

    1997-12-31

    Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO{sub 2}). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO{sub 2} emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices.

  14. Auctions vs negotiations: a study of price differentials.

    PubMed

    Kjerstad, Egil

    2005-12-01

    Recent contributions in auction and bargaining theory suggest that a procurer should place more faith in the power of competition among alternative suppliers than in his or her own negotiating skill. Based on data from 216 contracts between procurers and suppliers of medical and surgical articles, we test whether auctions and bargaining result in significantly different prices. The main results are that auctions give 'thicker' markets compared with negotiations, as expected, but that auctions do not result in significantly lower prices compared with negotiations. PMID:15945037

  15. Security risk assessment of the primary layer of wavelength division multiplexing passive optical network

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Koudelka, Petr; Siska, Petr; Latal, Jan; Poboril, Radek; Hajek, Lukas; Kepak, Stanislav; Vasinek, Vladimir

    2015-01-01

    Next-generation passive optical access networks come to the fore nowadays. These optical next-generation networks are the response to the increasing qualitative requirements from end users. Technologies using Time Division Multiplexing include NG-PON (XG-PON 1 and XG-PON 2) and 10GEPON. Their advantage is the applicability to older topologies, which are operated by the original technology of passive optical access networks. Wavelength Division Multiplexing Passive Optical Network (WDM-PON) is an alternative also belonging to next-generation networks. Time Division Multiplexing is in this case replaced by Wavelength Division Multiplexing. Certain variants of WDM-PON use a combination of broadband light source, optical circulator, optical phased array and tunable FP laser. Construction of the terminal units (ONU) is advantageous because it can always tune in to the appropriate wavelength in the given optical DWDM channel (100 GHz). The disadvantage is the increased security risk on the primary layer due to channel crosstalk in an optical phased array (AWG). The aim of this paper is to assess the degree of security risk in real conditions. The article includes both simulation and real measurements in C + L bands with 100 GHz DWDM spacing.

  16. Health Auctions: a Valuation Experiment (HAVE) study protocol

    PubMed Central

    Kularatna, Sanjeewa; Petrie, Dennis; Scuffham, Paul A; Byrnes, Joshua

    2016-01-01

    Introduction Quality-adjusted life years are derived using health state utility weights which adjust for the relative value of living in each health state compared with living in perfect health. Various techniques are used to estimate health state utility weights including time-trade-off and standard gamble. These methods have exhibited limitations in terms of complexity, validity and reliability. A new composite approach using experimental auctions to value health states is introduced in this protocol. Methods and analysis A pilot study will test the feasibility and validity of using experimental auctions to value health states in monetary terms. A convenient sample (n=150) from a population of university staff and students will be invited to participate in 30 auction sets with a group of 5 people in each set. The 9 health states auctioned in each auction set will come from the commonly used EQ-5D-3L instrument. At most participants purchase 2 health states, and the participant who acquires the 2 ‘best’ health states on average will keep the amount of money they do not spend in acquiring those health states. The value (highest bid and average bid) of each of the 24 health states will be compared across auctions to test for reliability across auction groups and across auctioneers. A test retest will be conducted for 10% of the sample to assess reliability of responses for health states auctions. Feasibility of conducting experimental auctions to value health states will also be examined. The validity of estimated health states values will be compared with published utility estimates from other methods. This pilot study will explore the feasibility, reliability and validity in using experimental auction for valuing health states. Ethics and dissemination Ethical clearance was obtained from Griffith University ethics committee. The results will be disseminated in peer-reviewed journals and major international conferences. PMID:27056589

  17. A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Meister, J. Patrick; Anderson, Kyle J.

    2007-01-01

    The authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is…

  18. A Trustworthy Internet Auction Model with Verifiable Fairness.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liao, Gen-Yih; Hwang, Jing-Jang

    2001-01-01

    Describes an Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed. (Author/AEF)

  19. 75 FR 8070 - Closed Auction of Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for July 20, 2010; Auction 88...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-23

    ... announces the auction of certain broadcast FM, AM, and FM Translator construction permits scheduled to... certain broadcast FM, AM, and FM Translator construction permits and sought comment on the procedures to... resolve mutual exclusivity between applications for new AM stations on 640 kHz and 1230 kHz in the...

  20. Approximating the Qualitative Vickrey Auction by a Negotiation Protocol

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hindriks, Koen V.; Tykhonov, Dmytro; de Weerdt, Mathijs

    A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose this constraint but still approximate the outcome of the auction. In this paper we show that a multi-round multi-party negotiation protocol may be used to this end if the negotiating agents are capable of learning opponent preferences. The latter condition can be met by current state of the art negotiation technology. We show that this protocol approximates the theoretical outcome predicted by a so-called Qualitative Vickrey auction mechanism (even) on a complex multi-issue domain.

  1. Detecting Fraud in Internet Auction Systems

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peng, Yanlin; Zhang, Linfeng; Guan, Yong

    Fraud compromises the thriving Internet auction market. Studies have shown that fraudsters often manipulate their reputations through sophisticated collusions with accomplices, enabling them to defeat the reputation-based feedback systems that are used to combat fraud. This paper presents an algorithm that can identify colluding fraudsters in real time. Experiments with eBay transaction data show that the algorithm has low false negative and false positive rates. Furthermore, the algorithm can identify fraudsters who are innocent at the time of the data collection, but engage in fraudulent transactions soon after they accumulate good feedback ratings.

  2. Smarter than Others? Conjectures in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

    PubMed Central

    Hu, Rui; Chen, Qinghua

    2015-01-01

    Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), has also attracted significant attention. Various models have been proposed, but they often fail to explain satisfactorily the real bid-distribution characteristics. This paper discusses LUBA bid-distribution characteristics, including the inverted-J shape and the exponential decrease in the upper region. The authors note that this type of distribution, which initially increases and later decreases, cannot be derived from the symmetric Nash equilibrium framework based on perfect information that has previously been used. A novel optimization model based on non-perfect information is presented. The kernel of this model is the premise that agents make decisions to achieve maximum profit based on imaginary information or assumptions regarding the behavior of others. PMID:25849631

  3. Auction Mechanism to Allocate Air Traffic Control Slots

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Raffarin, Marianne

    2003-01-01

    This article deals with an auction mechanism for airspace slots, as a means of solving the European airspace congestion problem. A disequilibrium, between Air Traffic Control (ATC) services supply and ATC services demand are at the origin of almost one fourth of delays in the air transport industry in Europe. In order to tackle this congestion problem, we suggest modifying both pricing and allocation of ATC services, by setting up an auction mechanism. Objects of the auction will be the right for airlines to cross a part of the airspace, and then to benefit from ATC services over a period corresponding to the necessary time for the crossing. Allocation and payment rules have to be defined according to the objectives of this auction. The auctioneer is the public authority in charge of ATC services, whose aim is to obtain an efficient allocation. Therefore, the social value will be maximized. Another objective is to internalize congestion costs. To that end, we apply the principle of Clarke-Groves mechanism auction: each winner has to pay the externalities imposed on other bidders. The complex context of ATC leads to a specific design for this auction.

  4. Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

    PubMed Central

    Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A. N.

    2012-01-01

    Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets. PMID:22279553

  5. Competition strength influences individual preferences in an auction game

    PubMed Central

    Toelch, Ulf; Jubera-Garcia, Esperanza; Kurth-Nelson, Zeb; Dolan, Raymond J.

    2014-01-01

    Competitive interactions between individuals are ubiquitous in human societies. Auctions represent an institutionalized context for these interactions, a context where individuals frequently make non-optimal decisions. In particular, competition in auctions can lead to overbidding, resulting in the so-called winner’s curse, often explained by invoking emotional arousal. In this study, we investigated an alternative possibility, namely that competitors’ bids are construed as a source of information about the good’s common value thereby influencing an individuals’ private value estimate. We tested this hypothesis by asking participants to bid in a repeated all-pay auction game for five different real items. Crucially, participants had to rank the auction items for their preference before and after the experiment. We observed a clear relation between auction dynamics and preference change. We found that low competition reduced preference while high competition increased preference. Our findings support a view that competitors’ bids in auction games are perceived as valid social signal for the common value of an item. We suggest that this influence of social information constitutes a major cause for the frequently observed deviations from optimality in auctions. PMID:25168161

  6. Statistical theory of the continuous double auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Smith, Eric; Doyne Farmer, J.; Gillemot, László; Krishnamurthy, Supriya

    2003-12-01

    Most modern financial markets use a continuous double auction mechanism to store and match orders and facilitate trading. In this paper we develop a microscopic dynamical statistical model for the continuous double auction under the assumption of IID random order flow, and analyse it using simulation, dimensional analysis, and theoretical tools based on mean field approximations. The model makes testable predictions for basic properties of markets, such as price volatility, the depth of stored supply and demand versus price, the bid-ask spread, the price impact function, and the time and probability of filling orders. These predictions are based on properties of order flow and the limit order book, such as share volume of market and limit orders, cancellations, typical order size, and tick size. Because these quantities can all be measured directly there are no free parameters. We show that the order size, which can be cast as a non-dimensional granularity parameter, is in most cases a more significant determinant of market behaviour than tick size. We also provide an explanation for the observed highly concave nature of the price impact function. On a broader level, this work suggests how stochastic models based on zero intelligence agents may be useful to probe the structure of market institutions. Like the model of perfect rationality, a stochastic zero intelligence model can be used to make strong predictions based on a compact set of assumptions, even if these assumptions are not fully believable.

  7. The communications spectrum: Frequency allocations and auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pritchard, Wilbur

    1997-01-01

    Demands on the communications spectrum have increased sharply because of the growth in radio communication services, the large bandwidths now required, and the rapid increases in world population. The problem will be exacerbated by the requirements of high definition television and the enormous amounts of information that will be transmitted by radio. The electromagnetic spectrum is a finite natural resource of great value used for emergency communications and military operations as well as for commercial purposes. Both government and the marketplace have proper roles in the allocation of its resources. There are no viable alternatives to international organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union or to agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission for the regulation of radio communication and the assignment of spectrum to essential public services. Although government auctions of spectrum are justifiable where there is no way to distinguish among commercial entities seeking to use the same bands for similar services, the practice is inherently inequitable and discourages development of new uses for the spectrum by removing investment protection. Recommended alternatives to auctions are: (1) lotteries, which keep assets and proceeds in the economy; and (2) ongoing charges for current as well as new users of the spectrum.

  8. Bandwidth auction for SVC streaming in dynamic multi-overlay

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Xiong, Yanting; Zou, Junni; Xiong, Hongkai

    2010-07-01

    In this paper, we study the optimal bandwidth allocation for scalable video coding (SVC) streaming in multiple overlays. We model the whole bandwidth request and distribution process as a set of decentralized auction games between the competing peers. For the upstream peer, a bandwidth allocation mechanism is introduced to maximize the aggregate revenue. For the downstream peer, a dynamic bidding strategy is proposed. It achieves maximum utility and efficient resource usage by collaborating with a content-aware layer dropping/adding strategy. Also, the convergence of the proposed auction games is theoretically proved. Experimental results show that the auction strategies can adapt to dynamic join of competing peers and video layers.

  9. 31 CFR 363.202 - What marketable Treasury securities may I purchase and hold through my TreasuryDirect ® account?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... security that is available for purchase through the TreasuryDirect ® website. One day each week, marketable securities that are scheduled for auction within 8 weeks will be made available on the TreasuryDirect...

  10. 31 CFR 363.202 - What marketable Treasury securities may I purchase and hold through my TreasuryDirect ® account?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... security that is available for purchase through the TreasuryDirect ® website. One day each week, marketable securities that are scheduled for auction within 8 weeks will be made available on the TreasuryDirect...

  11. A Research Study on Secure Attachment Using the Primary Caregiving Approach

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ebbeck, Marjory; Phoon, Dora Mei Yong; Tan-Chong, Elizabeth Chai Kim; Tan, Marilyn Ai Bee; Goh, Mandy Lian Mui

    2015-01-01

    A child's positive sense of well-being is central to their overall growth and development. With an increasing number of mothers in the workforce, many infants and toddlers spend much time in child care services. Hence it is crucial that caregivers provide a secure base for the child to develop secure attachment with educarers. Given multiple…

  12. 6. East rear, cattle auction arena below in background, Omaha ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    6. East rear, cattle auction arena below in background, Omaha livestock market offices above. View to west. - South Omaha Union Stock Yards, Stock Yards Autopark, 2900 "O" Plaza, Omaha, Douglas County, NE

  13. Auction fever: exploring informational social influences on bidder choices.

    PubMed

    Chen, Yi-Fen

    2011-01-01

    Previous investigations of herd behavior have identified the importance of informational social influences in consumer decision making. This research presents three studies examining herd behavior in online auctions. The three studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including bid number, feedback ratings, and number of questions and answers. This research also investigated the effect of different levels of herd cues on bidder online choices under high and low brand awareness in online auctions. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, different levels of herd cues influence bidder online choices in both high and low brand awareness product situations. PMID:21192763

  14. A Study of Central Auction Based Wholesale Electricity Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ceppi, Sofia; Gatti, Nicola

    The deregulation of electricity markets produced significant economic benefits, reducing prices to customers and opening several opportunities for new actors, e.g., new generators and distributors. A prominent scientific and technological challenge is the automation of such markets. In particular, we focus our attention on wholesale electricity markets based on a central auction. In these markets, generators sell electricity by means of a central auction to a public authority. Instead, the distribution of electricity to customers takes part in retail markets. The main works presented in the literature model wholesale markets as oligopolies, neglecting thus the specific auction mechanism. In this paper, we enrich these models by introducing an auction mechanism shaped on that used in the Italian wholesale electricity market, we solve the winner determination problem, and we preliminarily study the problem of searching for equilibria.

  15. Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Extent Of The Primary Groundwater Contaminants At The Y-12 National Security Complex

    SciTech Connect

    2013-12-01

    This report presents data summary tables and maps used to define and illustrate the approximate lateral extent of groundwater contamination at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The data tables and maps address the primary (i.e., most widespread and mobile) organic, inorganic, and radiological contaminants in the groundwater. The sampling locations, calculated contaminant concentrations, plume boundary values, and paired map format used to define, quantify, delineate, and illustrate the approximate extent of the primary organic, inorganic, and radiological contaminants in groundwater at Y-12 are described.

  16. Security

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Technology & Learning, 2008

    2008-01-01

    Anytime, anywhere, learning provides opportunities to create digital learning environments for new teaching styles and personalized learning. As part of making sure the program is effective, the safety and security of students and assets are essential--and mandated by law. The Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) addresses Internet content…

  17. Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Altarelli, F.; Braunstein, A.; Realpe-Gomez, J.; Zecchina, R.

    2009-07-01

    Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being in the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). On the basis of the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message-passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution, and we derive from its properties the phase diagram of the problem. As the control parameter (average value of the budgets) is varied, we find two phase transitions delimiting a region in which long-range correlations arise.

  18. The association of family food security and depression in mothers having primary school children in Ray-Iran

    PubMed Central

    2014-01-01

    Background As a major public health problem, food insecurity has adverse social and psychological effects, in addition to the impact on public health. This study aimed to determine the association of household food security and depression in mothers with primary school children in Ray County. Methods This descriptive, analytical cross-sectional study was conducted on 430 mothers with primary school children in the spring 2010. During a two-stage cluster sampling, an 18-items food security questionnaire (USDA) and the Beck depression inventory were completed via interviewing mothers. Chi-squared test, one-way analysis of variance, simple regression and stepwise multiple regression were used to describe and analyze data, and to identify related factors using SPSS-16 software. Results The prevalence of food insecurity and depression in mothers were 50.2% and 51.4% respectively. Also 34.6% of mothers in the "food secure" group were depressed and 77.8% in "food insecure with hunger" group were depressed and this difference was statistically significant. Twelve out of the 20 examined variables (age, family size, number of children, economic status, home ownership, employment households, educational level of the mother and also the head of household, height, energy intake, and carbohydrate and protein intakes) were significantly associated with food security and depression. Food insecurity and depression in mothers with primary school children in Ray County showed a significant positive correlation (P < 0.001). Conclusion The prevalence of household food insecurity and depression in the studied population were high. Since there is a significant relationship between food insecurity and depression, more attention must be paid to this group. PMID:24940566

  19. Competition in decentralized electricity markets: Three papers on electricity auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Harbord, David William Cameron

    This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis of electricity auctions written over a period of twelve years. The first paper models price competition in a decentralized wholesale market for electricity as a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction. In both the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria of the model, above marginal cost pricing and inefficient despatch of generating units occur. An alternative regulatory pricing rule is considered and it is shown that offering to supply at marginal cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms. The second paper analyses strategic interaction between long-term contracts and price competition in the British electricity wholesale market, and confirms that forward contracts will tend to put downward pressure on spot market prices. A 'strategic commitment' motive for selling forward contracts is also identified: a generator may commit itself to bidding lower prices into the spot market in order to ensure that it will be despatched with its full capacity. The third paper characterizes bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids.

  20. Auctionable fixed transmission rights for congestion management

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Alomoush, Muwaffaq Irsheid

    the transaction by the ISO, take a decision to expand the existing system, or retain the original structure of the system. Also, the thesis investigates the impact of wheeling transactions on congestion management, where we present a generalized mathematical model for the Fixed Transmission Right (FTR) auction. The auction guarantees FTR availability to all participants on a non-discriminatory basis, in which system users are permitted to buy, sell and trade FTRs through an auction. When FTRs are utilized with LMPs, they increase the efficient use of the transmission system and let a transmission customer gain advantageous features such as acquiring a mechanism to offset the extra cost due to congestion charges, providing financial and operational certainty and making system users pay for the actual use of the congested paths. The thesis also highlighted FTR trading in secondary markets to self-arrange access across different paths, create long-term transmission rights and provide more commercial certainty.

  1. Worst-Case Cooperative Jamming for Secure Communications in CIoT Networks

    PubMed Central

    Li, Zhen; Jing, Tao; Ma, Liran; Huo, Yan; Qian, Jin

    2016-01-01

    The Internet of Things (IoT) is a significant branch of the ongoing advances in the Internet and mobile communications. Yet, the use of a large number of IoT devices can severely worsen the spectrum scarcity problem. The usable spectrum resources are almost entirely occupied, and thus, the increasing demands of radio access from IoT devices cannot be met. To tackle this problem, the Cognitive Internet of Things (CIoT) has been proposed. In a CIoT network, secondary users, i.e., sensors and actuators, can access the licensed spectrum bands provided by licensed primary users (such as cellular telephones). Security is a major concern in CIoT networks. However, the traditional encryption method at upper layers (such as symmetric and asymmetric ciphers) may not be suitable for CIoT networks since these networks are composed of low-profile devices. In this paper, we address the security issues in spectrum-leasing-based CIoT networks using physical layer methods. Considering that the CIoT networks are cooperative in nature, we propose to employ cooperative jamming to achieve secure transmission. In our proposed cooperative jamming scheme, a certain secondary user is employed as the helper to harvest energy transmitted by the source and then uses the harvested energy to generate an artificial noise that jams the eavesdropper without interfering with the legitimate receivers. The goal is to minimize the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper subject to the Quality of Service (QoS) constraints of the primary traffic and the secondary traffic. We formulate the minimization problem into a two-stage robust optimization problem based on the worst-case Channel State Information of the Eavesdropper (ECSI). By using Semi-Definite Programming (SDP), the optimal solutions of the transmit covariance matrices can be obtained. Moreover, in order to build an incentive mechanism for the secondary users, we propose an auction framework based on the cooperative

  2. Using Laboratory Experiments for Policymaking: An Example from the Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cummings, Ronald G.; Holt, Charles A.; Laury, Susan K.

    2004-01-01

    In recent years, interest has been growing in policy applications of different auction systems. This paper reports a series of experiments that were used to design and implement an auction in a unique policymaking environment. In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law that mandated that the state hold an auction in drought years to pay…

  3. 49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED) ODOMETER DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS § 580.9 Odometer record retention for auction companies. Each auction company shall establish and... following records: (a) The name of the most recent owner (other than the auction company); (b) The name...

  4. A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ding, Ding; Luo, Siwei; Gao, Zhan

    To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equilibrium of demand and supply. As a new mechanism for grid resource allocation, GDAM is proved to be strategy-proof, economically efficient, weakly budget-balanced and individual rational. Simulation results also confirm that GDAM outperforms the traditional one on both the total trade amount and the user satisfaction percentage, specially as more users are involved in the auction market.

  5. Application for Single Price Auction Model (SPA) in AC Network

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wachi, Tsunehisa; Fukutome, Suguru; Chen, Luonan; Makino, Yoshinori; Koshimizu, Gentarou

    This paper aims to develop a single price auction model with AC transmission network, based on the principle of maximizing social surplus of electricity market. Specifically, we first formulate the auction market as a nonlinear optimization problem, which has almost the same form as the conventional optimal power flow problem, and then propose an algorithm to derive both market clearing price and trade volume of each player even for the case of market-splitting. As indicated in the paper, the proposed approach can be used not only for the price evaluation of auction or bidding market but also for analysis of bidding strategy, congestion effect and other constraints or factors. Several numerical examples are used to demonstrate effectiveness of our method.

  6. Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ghosh, Gagan Pratap

    In my dissertation, I investigate the effects of budget-constraints in multi-unit auctions. This is done in three parts. First, I analyze a case where all bidders have a common budget constraint. Precisely, I analyze an auction where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed bid, first-price auctions, to bidders who have demand for both units. Bidders differ with respect to their valuations for the units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint which binds their ability to spend in the auction. I show that if valuation distribution is atom-less, then their does not exist any symmetric equilibrium in this auction game. In the second and third parts of my thesis, I analyze the sale of licenses for the right to drill for oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the United States. These sales are conducted using simultaneous sealed-bid first-price auctions for multiple licenses, each representing a specific area (called a tract). Using aspects of observed bidding-behavior, I first make a prima facie case that bidders are budget-constrained in these auctions. In order to formalize this argument, I develop a simple extension of the standard model (where bidders differ in their valuations for the objects) by incorporating (random) budgets for the bidders. The auction-game then has a two-dimensional set of types for each player. I study the theoretical properties of this auction, assuming for simplicity that two units are being sold. I show that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies that is symmetric with respect to the players and with respect to the units. The strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a permutation) of his budget between the two auctions. I then characterize the equilibrium in terms of the bid-distribution and iso-bid curves in the value-budget space. I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild

  7. A Multiple Auctions Support System BiddingBot based on a Cooperative Bidding Mechanism among Agents

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ito, Takayuki; Hattori, Hiromitsu; Shintani, Toramatsu

    Online auctions are becoming an increasingly important channel for electronic commerce. There are a number of online auction sites on the Internet. It is hard for users to attend, monitor, and make bids at simultaneous multiple auctions. In this paper, we implement BiddingBot which is a multiagent system that supports users in attending, monitoring, and bidding in multiple auctions. Further, we propose a new cooperative bidding mechanism among agents. Our current experiment demonstrates that our new cooperative bidding mechanism can effectively support users to monitor, attend, and make bids on multiple simultaneous auctions.

  8. Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions

    PubMed Central

    Gugler, Klaus; Weichselbaumer, Michael; Zulehner, Christine

    2015-01-01

    We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups. PMID:25673884

  9. Building Secure Attachments for Primary School Children: A Mixed Methods Study

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ubha, Neerose; Cahill, Sharon

    2014-01-01

    Despite the wide implications of attachment theory there remains a lack of research exploring interventions which encapsulate the principles of an attachment-based framework in the school context. The aim of this research was to address this gap by implementing an intervention for a group of five primary-aged pupils with identified insecure…

  10. Worst-Case Cooperative Jamming for Secure Communications in CIoT Networks.

    PubMed

    Li, Zhen; Jing, Tao; Ma, Liran; Huo, Yan; Qian, Jin

    2016-01-01

    The Internet of Things (IoT) is a significant branch of the ongoing advances in the Internet and mobile communications. The use of a large number of IoT devices makes the spectrum scarcity problem even more serious. The usable spectrum resources are almost entirely occupied, and thus, the increasing radio access demands of IoT devices cannot be met. To tackle this problem, the Cognitive Internet of Things (CIoT) has been proposed. In a CIoT network, secondary users, i.e., sensors and actuators, can access the licensed spectrum bands provided by licensed primary users (such as telephones). Security is a major concern in CIoT networks. However, the traditional encryption method at upper layers (such as symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography) may be compromised in CIoT networks, since these types of networks are heterogeneous. In this paper, we address the security issue in spectrum-leasing-based CIoT networks using physical layer methods. Considering that the CIoT networks are cooperative networks, we propose to employ cooperative jamming to achieve secrecy transmission. In the cooperative jamming scheme, a certain secondary user is employed as the helper to harvest energy transmitted by the source and then uses the harvested energy to generate an artificial noise that jams the eavesdropper without interfering with the legitimate receivers. The goal is to minimize the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper subject to the quality of service (QoS) constraints of the primary traffic and the secondary traffic. We formulate the considered minimization problem into a two-stage robust optimization problem based on the worst-case Channel State Information of the Eavesdropper. By using semi-definite programming (SDP), the optimal solutions of the transmit covariance matrices can be obtained. Moreover, in order to build an incentive mechanism for the secondary users, we propose an auction framework based on the cooperative jamming scheme

  11. Understanding Persuasive Online Sales Messages from eBay Auctions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    White, Barbara Jo; Clapper, Danial; Noel, Rita; Fortier, Jenny; Grabolosa, Pierre

    2007-01-01

    Online auctions are dominated by eBay, which started bringing together buyers and sellers in 1995. eBay product listings can easily be used in business communication courses to better understand online sales messages. One great advantage is that the vast majority of nearly 15 million listings a day are written and assembled by everyday consumers…

  12. Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered Via the Internet

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Asker, John; Grosskopf, Brit; McKinney, C. Nicholas; Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.; Weizsacker, Georg

    2004-01-01

    The authors present an experimental design used to teach concepts in the economics of auctions and implications for e-Business procurement. The experiment is easily administered and can be adapted to many different treatments. The chief innovation is that it does not require the use of a lab or class time. Instead, the design can be implemented on…

  13. Making Marketing Principles Tangible: Online Auctions as Living Case Studies

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wood, Charles M.; Suter, Tracy A.

    2004-01-01

    This article presents an effective course supplement for Principles of Marketing classes. An experiential project involving online auctions is offered to instructors seeking to create a more participatory student environment and an interactive teaching style. A number of learning points are illustrated that allow instructors to use an auction…

  14. 75 FR 16878 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-04-02

    ... Rate Securities and Variable Rate Demand Obligations March 26, 2010. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of... Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs''). The proposed rule change would: (i) Amend Rules G-8, books and records, and G-34(c), variable rate security...

  15. 77 FR 57085 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction; Release of Files with Recalculated Road Miles for Auction 901...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-17

    .../ecfs/ . 1. In the Auction 901 Procedures Public Notice, 77 FR 32092, May 31, 2012, the Bureaus... Notice, 77 FR 7152, February 10, 2012, in calculating the number of road miles associated with each eligible census block, the Bureaus used the sum of linear road miles within the block plus half of the...

  16. Design and Promotion Strategy of Marketing Platform of Aquatic Auction based on Internet

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peng, Jianliang

    For the online trade and promotion of aquatic products and related materials through the network between supply and demand, the design content and effective promotional strategies of aquatic auctions online marketing platform is proposed in this paper. Design elements involve the location of customer service, the basic function of the platform including the purchase of general orders, online auctions, information dissemination, and recommendation of fine products, human services, and payment preferences. Based on network and mobile e-commerce transaction support, the auction platform makes the transaction of aquatic products well in advance. The results are important practical value for the design and application of online marketing platform of aquatic auction.

  17. A QoS-Enabled Double Auction Protocol for the Service Grid

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gao, Zhan; Luo, Siwei

    Traditional double auction protocols only concern the price information of participants without considering their QoS requirements, which makes them unsuitable for the service grid. In this paper we first introduce QoS information into double auction to present the QoS-enabled Double Auction Protocol (QDAP). QDAP tries to assign the asks which have the least candidate bids firstly to make more participants trade and provides QoS guarantee at the same time. Simulation experiments have been performed to compare QDAP with two traditional double auction protocols and the result shows that QDAP is more suitable for the service grid.

  18. A Large Generator's Bids in an Electricity Supply Auction: Uniform Pricing vs. Pay-as-Bid Pricing

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yamamoto, Yoshihiro; Tezuka, Tetsuo

    A pay-as-bid auction has been adopted in a balancing market under New Electricity Trading Arrangements in England and Wales since 2001 instead of a uniform price auction previously used in a day-ahead pool market. In contrast, a spot market in Japan, where a general electric utility would be the main supplier, plans to employ a uniform price auction. In this paper we model an electricity spot market in which one large generator competes with many fringe generators to supply electricity, analyze how this large generator bids to maximize its profits, and report some implication for the design of this market. Three types of auction are analyzed: a highest-winning-bid pricing (HWB) uniform price auction, a lowest-losing-bid pricing (LLB) uniform price auction and a pay-as-bid auction. It is shown that the slope of the bid curve, which is obtained by plotting the large generator's bidding prices against its generation costs, are steeper in an LLB uniform price auction and flatter in a pay-as-bid auction than those in an HWB uniform price auction. This implies that an LLB uniform price auction or a pay-as-bid auction would make room for the fringe generators to win an auction.

  19. Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Said, Maher

    We study a stochastic sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population of privately-informed buyers. We characterize the set of efficient allocation rules and show that a dynamic VCG mechanism is both efficient and periodic ex post incentive compatible; we also show that the revenue-maximizing direct mechanism is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. We then consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with and without a reserve price. We construct equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect mechanism where bidders reveal their private information in every period, yielding the same outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes.

  20. Auction-based distributed efficient economic operations of microgrid systems

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zou, Suli; Ma, Zhongjing; Liu, Xiangdong

    2014-12-01

    This paper studies the economic operations of the microgrid in a distributed way such that the operational schedule of each of the units, like generators, load units, storage units, etc., in a microgrid system, is implemented by autonomous agents. We apply and generalise the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism which was proposed by Lazar and Semret to efficiently allocate the divisible network resources. Considering the economic operation for the microgrid systems, the generators play as sellers to supply energy and the load units play as the buyers to consume energy, while a storage unit, like battery, super capacitor, etc., may transit between buyer and seller, such that it is a buyer when it charges and becomes a seller when it discharges. Furthermore in a connected mode, each individual unit competes against not only the other individual units in the microgrid but also the exogenous main grid possessing fixed electricity price and infinite trade capacity; that is to say, the auctioneer assigns the electricity among all individual units and the main grid with respect to the submitted bid strategies of all individual units in the microgrid in an economic way. Due to these distinct characteristics, the underlying auction games are distinct from those studied in the literature. We show that under mild conditions, the efficient economic operation strategy is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the PSP auction games, and propose a distributed algorithm under which the system can converge to an NE. We also show that the performance of worst NE can be bounded with respect to the system parameters, say the energy trading price with the main grid, and based upon that, the implemented NE is unique and efficient under some conditions.

  1. Single-Parameter Combinatorial Auctions with Partially Public Valuations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Goel, Gagan; Karande, Chinmay; Wang, Lei

    We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent i for a set S of items can be expressed as v i f(S), where v i is a private single parameter of the agent, and the function f is publicly known. Our motivation behind studying this problem is two-fold: (a) Such valuation functions arise naturally in the case of ad-slots in broadcast media such as Television and Radio. For an ad shown in a set S of ad-slots, f(S) is, say, the number of unique viewers reached by the ad, and v i is the valuation per-unique-viewer. (b) From a theoretical point of view, this factorization of the valuation function simplifies the bidding language, and renders the combinatorial auction more amenable to better approximation factors. We present a general technique, based on maximal-in-range mechanisms, that converts any α-approximation non-truthful algorithm (α ≤ 1) for this problem into Ω(α/log{n}) and Ω(α)-approximate truthful mechanisms which run in polynomial time and quasi-polynomial time, respectively.

  2. AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE NETWORK PERMIT MARKETS

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wada, Kentaro; Akamatsu, Takashi

    This paper proposes a new auction mechanism for implementing the tradable network permit markets. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a specific time period, we design an auction mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links in the user's preferred path. The objective of the proposed mechanism is to achieve a socially optimal state with minimal revelation of users' private information. In order to achieve this, the mechanism employs an evolutionary approach that has an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user and (2) the proposed mechanism converges to an approximate socially optimal state in the sense that the achieved value of the social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.

  3. 78 FR 68839 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-15

    ...In this document, the Wireless Telecommunications and Wireline Competition Bureaus (the Bureaus) announce the rescheduling of Auction 902 and revise the dates and deadlines for the filing window for short- form applications and other auction...

  4. 75 FR 8703 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for May 25, 2010; Notice and Filing...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-25

    ... Public Notice, 74 FR 67221, December 18, 2009. i. Licenses to be Offered in Auction 87 2. Auction 87 will... Second Report and Order, 71 FR 26245, May 5, 2006, meaning that those preexisting relationships alone... seeking to participate in a Commission auction and select licenses in the same or overlapping markets....

  5. 7 CFR 29.75a - Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors... § 29.75a Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets. (a)(1) Each lot of burley tobacco displayed for sale on auction warehouse floors shall have a minimum space of...

  6. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption...

  7. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption...

  8. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption...

  9. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption...

  10. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section 780.620 Labor Regulations Relating to Labor (Continued) WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR... for Exemption § 780.620 Minimum wage for livestock auction work. The application of the exemption...

  11. 77 FR 15369 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS Data of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-03-15

    ... COMMISSION Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS Data of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks AGENCY: Federal... information system (GIS) data for the census blocks potentially eligible for Mobility Fund Phase I support to...-0432 (TTY). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS...

  12. 75 FR 57947 - Auction of VHF Commercial Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-23

    ...; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 90 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission... scheduled to commence on February 15, 2011 (Auction 90). This document also seeks comment on competitive... the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In such cases, the Bureaus, in their...

  13. Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bajari, Patrick; Hortacsu, Ali

    2005-01-01

    Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the strict rationality assumptions to be implausible. Using bid data from first-price auction experiments, we estimate four alternative structural models: (1) risk-neutral Bayes-Nash, (2) risk-averse…

  14. 29 CFR 780.619 - Work “in connection with” livestock auction operations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Work âin connection withâ livestock auction operations. 780... FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption § 780.619 Work “in connection with” livestock...

  15. 77 FR 38061 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Supplemental Short-Form Instructions and Other Information

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-26

    ... Notice, 77 FR 32092, May 31, 2012, the Bureaus provided general instructions for completing FCC Form 180... COMMISSION Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Supplemental Short-Form Instructions and Other Information AGENCY... provide other information regarding Auction 901. DATES: Short-Form applications are due prior to 6 p.m....

  16. 31 CFR 356.22 - Does the Treasury have any limitations on auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Does the Treasury have any limitations on auction awards? 356.22 Section 356.22 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money..., PUBLIC DEBT SERIES NO. 1-93) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.22 Does the Treasury...

  17. Sold! The Elementary Classroom Auction as Learning Tool of Communication and Economics

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Boyd, Josh; Boyd, Gina

    2014-01-01

    An auction, though an economic tool, is essentially a performance dependent on communication (Smith, 1989). The auctioneer dictates the pace, asks for bids, and acknowledges responses; the enterprise is controlled by a voice (Boyce, 2001). Bidders must listen and respond strategically to the communication of the people around them. An auction…

  18. 30 CFR 285.220 - What auction format may MMS use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 285.220 What auction format may MMS use... renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through the...

  19. 30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined...

  20. 30 CFR 285.220 - What auction format may MMS use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 285... competitive auctions to award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats,...

  1. 30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined...

  2. Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo

    This paper presents a new multi-unit auction protocol (IR protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called LDS has been developed for combinatorial auctions of multiple different items and has proven to be robust against false-name bids. Although we can modify the LDS protocol to handle multi-unit auctions, in which multiple units of an identical item are auctioned, the protocol is complicated and requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine the combination of bundles to obtain a high social surplus or revenue. For the auctioneer, our newly developed IR protocol is easier to use than the LDS, since the combination of bundles is automatically determined in a flexible manner according to the declared evaluation values of agents. The evaluation results show that the IR protocol can obtain a better social surplus than that obtained by the LDS protocol.

  3. Teaching Marginal Cost, Supply, and Efficiency with an English-Auction Experiment.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bernard, John C.; Schulze, William

    2000-01-01

    Describes a computerized English-auction experiment that helps students to understand marginal cost and its interrelationships with supply and the efficiency of competitive markets. Explains that the English auction is in a market where there are many sellers (students) and one buyer (computer). States that this exercise offers a good introduction…

  4. 75 FR 52793 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Order Granting Approval of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-08-27

    ...), 75 FR 16878 (``Original Notice'') (the ``original proposed rule change''). \\4\\ See letters from... Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62550 (July 22, 2010), 75 FR 44296 (``Notice of Amendment No. 1''). II... Made Transparent by the MSRB on Municipal Auction Rate Securities and Variable Rate Demand...

  5. Pricing strategies, the strength of bidding intentions, and online auction performance: a cross-cultural study.

    PubMed

    Peng, Yu-Shu; Jan, Lih-Tsyr

    2009-10-01

    Over the past decade, electronic markets based on the Internet, particularly online auctions, have become popular venues for conducting business. Previous studies often focused on the construction of the best bidding model, while few studies have tried to integrate multiple pricing strategies to predict the probability of closing an auction and the price premium. This study constructs a mediated model to examine the relationship among pricing strategies, the strength of bidding intentions, and online auction performance. The sample consists of 1,055 auctions of iPod MP3 players from eBay Web sites in Hong Kong, Singapore, Belgium, and France. Empirical results show that the pricing strategies directly influence both the probability of closing an auction and the level of price premium. The pricing strategies also indirectly influence the price premium through the mediating effect of the strength of bidding intentions. PMID:19817564

  6. Analysis of Residential Demand Response and Double-Auction Markets

    SciTech Connect

    Fuller, Jason C.; Schneider, Kevin P.; Chassin, David P.

    2011-10-10

    Demand response and dynamic pricing programs are expected to play increasing roles in the modern Smart Grid environment. While direct load control of end-use loads has existed for decades, price driven response programs are only beginning to be explored at the distribution level. These programs utilize a price signal as a means to control demand. Active markets allow customers to respond to fluctuations in wholesale electrical costs, but may not allow the utility to control demand. Transactive markets, utilizing distributed controllers and a centralized auction can be used to create an interactive system which can limit demand at key times on a distribution system, decreasing congestion. With the current proliferation of computing and communication resources, the ability now exists to create transactive demand response programs at the residential level. With the combination of automated bidding and response strategies coupled with education programs and customer response, emerging demand response programs have the ability to reduce utility demand and congestion in a more controlled manner. This paper will explore the effects of a residential double-auction market, utilizing transactive controllers, on the operation of an electric power distribution system.

  7. Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Toft, I. E.; Bagnall, A. J.

    This paper introduces a new adaptive sniping agent for the Continuous Double Auction. We begin by analysing the performance of the well known Kaplan sniper in two extremes of market conditions. We generate volatile and stable market conditions using the well known Zero Intelligence-Constrained agent and a new zero-intelligence agent Small Increment (SI). ZI-C agents submit random but profitable bids/offers and cause high volatility in prices and individual trader performance. Our new zero-intelligence agent, SI, makes small random adjustments to the outstanding bid/offer and hence is more cautious than ZI-C. We present results for SI in self-play and then analyse Kaplan in volatile and stable markets. We demonstrate that the non-adaptive Kaplan sniper can be configured to suit either market conditions, but no single configuration is performs well across both market types. We believe that in a dynamic auction environment where current or future market conditions cannot be predicted a viable sniping strategy should adapt its behaviour to suit prevailing market conditions. To this end, we propose the Adaptive Sniper (AS) agent for the CDA. AS traders classify sniping opportunities using a statistical model of market activity and adjust their classification thresholds using a Widrow-Hoff adapted search. Our AS agent requires little configuration, and outperforms the original Kaplan sniper in volatile and stable markets, and in a mixed trader type scenario that includes adaptive strategies from the literature.

  8. Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chen, Qinghua; Huang, Zi-Gang; Wang, Yougui; Lai, Ying-Cheng

    2015-09-01

    Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in analyzing a variety of socio-economic phenomena using methods from statistical and nonlinear physics. We study a class of complex systems arising from economics, the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) systems, which is a recently emerged class of online auction game systems. Through analyzing large, empirical data sets of LUBA, we identify a general feature of the bid price distribution: an inverted J-shaped function with exponential decay in the large bid price region. To account for the distribution, we propose a multi-agent model in which each agent bids stochastically in the field of winner’s attractiveness, and develop a theoretical framework to obtain analytic solutions of the model based on mean field analysis. The theory produces bid-price distributions that are in excellent agreement with those from the real data. Our model and theory capture the essential features of human behaviors in the competitive environment as exemplified by LUBA, and may provide significant quantitative insights into complex socio-economic phenomena.

  9. Impacts of climate and land use change on ecosystem hydrology and net primary productivity: Linking water availability to food security in Asia

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dangal, S. R. S.; Tian, H.; Pan, S.; Zhang, B.; Yang, J.

    2015-12-01

    The nexus approach to food, water and energy security in Asia is extremely important and relevant as the region has to feed two-third of the world's population and accounts for 59% of the global water consumption. The distribution pattern of food, water and energy resources have been shaped by the legacy effect of both natural and anthropogenic disturbances and therefore are vulnerable to climate change and human activities including land use/cover change (LUCC) and land management (irrigation and nitrogen fertilization). In this study, we used the Dynamic Land Ecosystem Model (DLEM) to examine the effects of climate change, land use/cover change, and land management practices (irrigation and nitrogen fertilization) on the spatiotemporal trends and variability in water availability and its role in limiting net primary productivity (NPP) and food security in the 20th and early 21st centuries. Our specific objectives are to quantify how climate change, LUCC and other environmental changes have interactively affected carbon and water dynamics across the Asian region. In particular, we separated the Asian region into several sub-region based on the primary limiting factor - water, food and energy. We then quantified how changes in environmental factors have altered the water and food resources during the past century. We particularly focused on Net Primary Productivity (NPP) and water cycle (Evapotranspiration, discharge, and runoff) as a measure of available food and water resources, respectively while understanding the linkage between food and water resources in Asia.

  10. 75 FR 74719 - Auction of VHF Commercial Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-01

    ... Auction 90 Comment Public Notice 75 FR 59747, September 23, 2010. i. Background 2. The Media Bureau... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS... 90 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: This document announces...

  11. Bid distribution derived from consistent mixed strategy in lowest unique bid auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhao, Yinan; Chen, Qinghua; Wang, Yougui

    2014-12-01

    The Lowest Unique Bid Auction (LUBA) booms recently through the Internet. A typical distribution pattern of bid price in this reverse auction has been found and needs to be interpreted. The distribution curve is a decreasing one whose slope has a close relationship with the number of agents participating in the auction. To explain this stylized fact, we develop a model assuming that agents prefer to bid on the price at which the probability of winning is higher. The bid distributions of actual auctions with the number of agents less than 200 can be fitted very well using the parameters for the value of items and the number of bids. When this number becomes larger, however, a deviation occurs between prediction and empirical data, which can be adjusted by introducing cognitive illusion of the bid number.

  12. Analysis of a Receipt-Free Auction Protocol in the Applied Pi Calculus

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dong, Naipeng; Jonker, Hugo; Pang, Jun

    We formally study two privacy-type properties for online auction protocols: bidding-price-secrecy and receipt-freeness. These properties are formalised as observational equivalences in the applied π calculus. We analyse the receipt-free auction protocol by Abe and Suzuki. Bidding-price-secrecy of the protocol is verified using ProVerif, whereas receipt-freeness of the protocol is proved manually.

  13. Modeling and simulation of a double auction artificial financial market

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Raberto, Marco; Cincotti, Silvano

    2005-09-01

    We present a double-auction artificial financial market populated by heterogeneous agents who trade one risky asset in exchange for cash. Agents issue random orders subject to budget constraints. The limit prices of orders may depend on past market volatility. Limit orders are stored in the book whereas market orders give immediate birth to transactions. We show that fat tails and volatility clustering are recovered by means of very simple assumptions. We also investigate two important stylized facts of the limit order book, i.e., the distribution of waiting times between two consecutive transactions and the instantaneous price impact function. We show both theoretically and through simulations that if the order waiting times are exponentially distributed, even trading waiting times are also exponentially distributed.

  14. Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market

    PubMed Central

    2016-01-01

    The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85. PMID:27031110

  15. Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

    PubMed

    Yim, Kyubin; Oh, Gabjin; Kim, Seunghwan

    2016-01-01

    The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85. PMID:27031110

  16. Green Auctions and Reduction of Information Rents in Payments for Environmental Services: An Experimental Investigation in Sunan County, Northwestern China

    PubMed Central

    Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

    2015-01-01

    Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the “Grain for Green” Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. “Perfect information” in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions. PMID:25793263

  17. Green auctions and reduction of information rents in payments for environmental services: an experimental investigation in Sunan County, northwestern China.

    PubMed

    Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

    2015-01-01

    Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the "Grain for Green" Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. "Perfect information" in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions. PMID:25793263

  18. Thoraco-pelvic orthosis: a portable and removable bassinet for secure patient immobilization after primary bladder exstrophy closure.

    PubMed

    Castagnetti, Marco; Berrettini, Alfredo; Beniamin, Francesco; Rigamonti, Waifro

    2010-12-01

    A portable and removable thoraco-pelvic orthosis for patient immobilization after neonatal primary bladder exstrophy closure is described. The device is made of a polyethylene shell, moulded at 170°C, coated inside with a 5 mm pad of plastazote and works applying a constant gentle pressure on the hips. PMID:20857296

  19. 75 FR 44296 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-07-28

    ... Exchange Act Release No. 61793 (March 26, 2010), 75 FR 16878 (April 2, 2010) (File No. SR-MSRB-2010-02). \\4... on Municipal Auction Rate Securities and Variable Rate Demand Obligations July 22, 2010. On March 10...'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs''). The proposed rule change was published for...

  20. Identification of shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects.

    PubMed

    Hatipkarasulu, Yilmaz; Gill, James H

    2004-04-01

    The increasing number of companies providing internet services and auction tools helped popularize the online reverse auction trend for purchasing commodities and services in the last decade. As a result, a number of owners, both public and private, accepted the online reverse auctions as the bidding technique for their construction projects. Owners, while trying to minimize their costs for construction projects, are also required to address their ethical responsibilities to the shareholders. In the case of online reverse auctions for construction projects, the ethical issues involved in the bidding technique directly reflects on the owner's ethical and social responsibilities to their shareholders. The goal of this paper is to identify the shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects by analyzing the ethical issues for the parties involved in the process. The identification of the ethical issues and responsibilities requires clear definition and understanding of professional ethics and the roles of the involved parties. In this paper, first, the concept of professional ethics and social responsibility is described in a general form. To illustrate the ethical issues and responsibilities, a sample case of bidding for a construction project using online reverse auction techniques is presented in which the shareholders were actively involved in questioning the ethical issues. The issues involved in the bidding process and their reflection on the shareholder responsibilities are described and analyzed for each stage of the process. A brief discussion of the overall process is also included to address the general ethical issues involved in online reverse auctions. PMID:15152854

  1. A Bayesian formulation for auction-based task allocation in heterogeneous multi-agent teams

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pippin, Charles E.; Christensen, Henrik

    2011-06-01

    In distributed, heterogeneous, multi-agent teams, agents may have different capabilities and types of sensors. Agents in dynamic environments will need to cooperate in real-time to perform tasks with minimal costs. Some example scenarios include dynamic allocation of UAV and UGV robot teams to possible hurricane survivor locations, search and rescue and target detection. Auction based algorithms scale well because agents generally only need to communicate bid information. In addition, the agents are able to perform their computations in parallel and can operate on local information. Furthermore, it is easy to integrate humans and other vehicle types and sensor combinations into an auction framework. However, standard auction mechanisms do not explicitly consider sensors with varying reliability. The agents sensor qualities should be explicitly accounted. Consider a scenario with multiple agents, each carrying a single sensor. The tasks in this case are to simply visit a location and detect a target. The sensors are of varying quality, with some having a higher probability of target detection. The agents themselves may have different capabilities, as well. The agents use knowledge of their environment to submit cost-based bids for performing each task and an auction is used to perform the task allocation. This paper discusses techniques for including a Bayesian formulation of target detection likelihood into this auction based framework for performing task allocation across multi-agent heterogeneous teams. Analysis and results of experiments with multiple air systems performing distributed target detection are also included.

  2. Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions.

    PubMed

    Gupta, Alok; Parente, Stephen T; Sanyal, Pallab

    2012-12-01

    Healthcare is an important social and economic component of modern society, and the effective use of information technology in this industry is critical to its success. As health insurance premiums continue to rise, competitive bidding may be useful in generating stronger price competition and lower premium costs for employers and possibly, government agencies. In this paper, we assess an endeavor by several Fortune 500 companies to reduce healthcare procurement costs for their employees by having HMOs compete in open electronic auctions. Although the auctions were successful in generating significant cost savings for the companies in the first year, i.e., 1999, they failed to replicate the success and were eventually discontinued after two more years. Over the past decade since the failed auction experiment, effective utilization of information technologies have led to significant advances in the design of complex electronic markets. Using this knowledge, and data from the auctions, we point out several shortcomings of the auction design that, we believe, led to the discontinuation of the market after three years. Based on our analysis, we propose several actionable recommendations that policy makers can use to design a sustainable electronic market for procuring health insurance. PMID:23224233

  3. 7 CFR 29.75a - Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors... COMMODITY STANDARDS AND STANDARD CONTAINER REGULATIONS TOBACCO INSPECTION Regulations Mandatory Inspection § 29.75a Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets. (a)(1) Each...

  4. 7 CFR 29.75a - Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors... COMMODITY STANDARDS AND STANDARD CONTAINER REGULATIONS TOBACCO INSPECTION Regulations Mandatory Inspection § 29.75a Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets. (a)(1) Each...

  5. 7 CFR 29.75b - Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction... AGRICULTURE COMMODITY STANDARDS AND STANDARD CONTAINER REGULATIONS TOBACCO INSPECTION Regulations Mandatory Inspection § 29.75b Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated...

  6. 7 CFR 29.75b - Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction... AGRICULTURE COMMODITY STANDARDS AND STANDARD CONTAINER REGULATIONS TOBACCO INSPECTION Regulations Mandatory Inspection § 29.75b Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated...

  7. 77 FR 60690 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 26, 2013; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-04

    ... Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 94 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice... commence on March 26, 2013. This document also seeks comment on competitive bidding procedures for Auction... that FM allotment will be awarded by competitive bidding procedures. Once mutual exclusivity exists...

  8. 76 FR 1158 - Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-07

    ... COMMISSION Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive... comment on competitive bidding procedures for Auction 92. DATES: Comments are due on or before January 12... the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its...

  9. 78 FR 11179 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-02-15

    ... Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 95 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice... July 16, 2013. This document also seeks comment on competitive bidding procedures for Auction 95. DATES... any other reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. The Bureau...

  10. 75 FR 61752 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 29, 2011; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-06

    ... Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 91 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice... March 29, 2011 (Auction 91). This document also seeks comment on competitive bidding procedures for... the construction permit for that FM allotment will be awarded by competitive bidding procedures....

  11. 78 FR 21355 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for October 24, 2013; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-04-10

    ..., 76 FR 73830, November 29, 2011 and 76 FR 81562, December 28, 2011. Auction 902 will award one-time... Mobility Fund Phase I, 77 FR 14012. Petitions for designation as an ETC should be filed in WC Docket No. 09... COMMISSION Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for October 24, 2013; Comment Sought on...

  12. 76 FR 76174 - Request for Information on the State of the Offshore Renewable Energy Industry-Auction Format...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-06

    ...BOEM invites public comment on a proposed set of auction formats which may be used to issue commercial renewable energy leases on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). BOEM is examining several auction formats, each designed to efficiently issue renewable energy leases to those who value them most and are best positioned to develop them, while also ensuring that the government receives a fair......

  13. Electronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating an E-Sourcing Tool into a Sales and Purchasing Cross-Course Negotiation Project

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Williams, Jacqueline A.; Dobie, Kathryn

    2011-01-01

    Electronic reverse auctions are increasingly being used by firms to improve firm financial and operational performance. The described teaching innovation serves as a model for introducing electronic reverse auctions as a central element in a comprehensive negotiation exercise involving sales management and purchasing management students. Results…

  14. 75 FR 56533 - Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Postpones Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-16

    ... COMMISSION Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Postpones Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz... document announces the postponement of Auction 89. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless... related documents are also available on the Internet at the Commission's Web site:...

  15. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ..., 2004 for BTA service areas are eligible for special incentives in the auction process. See 47 CFR 1... entity will have both de facto and de jure control of the entity. See 47 CFR 1.2110(i). (g) Records... authorizations awarded in the Commission BRS auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004. (f)...

  16. 7 CFR 29.75b - Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... warehouse floors in designated markets. 29.75b Section 29.75b Agriculture Regulations of the Department of... Inspection § 29.75b Display of baled flue-cured tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets. Each lot of baled flue-cured tobacco displayed for sale on auction warehouse floors shall have...

  17. 77 FR 11115 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Limited Extension of Deadlines for Comments and Reply Comments on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-02-24

    ... released the Auction 901 Comment Public Notice, 77 FR 7152, February 10, 2012, which seeks comment on... Commission in the USF/ICC Transformation Order, 76 FR 73830, November 29, 2011 and 76 FR 81562, December 28... COMMISSION Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Limited Extension of Deadlines for Comments and Reply Comments...

  18. Physical contact influences how much people pay at celebrity auctions.

    PubMed

    Newman, George E; Bloom, Paul

    2014-03-11

    Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person's immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people's expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions. PMID:24567388

  19. Physical contact influences how much people pay at celebrity auctions

    PubMed Central

    Newman, George E.; Bloom, Paul

    2014-01-01

    Contagion is a form of magical thinking in which people believe that a person’s immaterial qualities or essence can be transferred to an object through physical contact. Here we investigate how a belief in contagion influences the sale of celebrity memorabilia. Using data from three high-profile estate auctions, we find that people’s expectations about the amount of physical contact between the object and the celebrity positively predicts the final bids for items that belonged to well-liked individuals (e.g., John F. Kennedy) and negatively predicts final bids for items that belonged to disliked individuals (e.g., Bernard Madoff). A follow-up experiment further suggests that these effects are driven by contagion beliefs: when asked to bid on a sweater owned by a well-liked celebrity, participants report that they would pay substantially less if it was sterilized before they received it. However, sterilization increases the amount they would pay for a sweater owned by a disliked celebrity. These studies suggest that magical thinking may still have effects in contemporary Western societies and they provide some unique demonstrations of contagion effects on real-world purchase decisions. PMID:24567388

  20. Bidding process in online auctions and winning strategy: Rate equation approach.

    PubMed

    Yang, I; Kahng, B

    2006-06-01

    Online auctions have expanded rapidly over the last decade and have become a fascinating new type of business or commercial transaction in this digital era. Here we introduce a master equation for the bidding process that takes place in online auctions. We find that the number of distinct bidders who bid k times up to the tth bidding progresses, called the k-frequent bidder, seems to scale as n(k)(t) approximately tk(-2.4). The successfully transmitted bidding rate by the k-frequent bidder is likely to scale as q(k)(t) approximately k(-1.4), independent of t for large t. This theoretical prediction is close to empirical data. These results imply that bidding at the last moment is a rational and effective strategy to win in an eBay auction. PMID:16907028

  1. The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions

    PubMed Central

    van den Bos, Wouter; Li, Jian; Lau, Tatiana; Maskin, Eric; Cohen, Jonathan D.; Montague, P. Read; McClure, Samuel M.

    2009-01-01

    Auctions, normally considered as devices facilitating trade, also provide a way to probe mechanisms governing one's valuation of some good or action. One of the most intriguing phenomena in auction behavior is the winner's curse — the strong tendency of participants to bid more than rational agent theory prescribes, often at a significant loss. The prevailing explanation suggests that humans have limited cognitive abilities that make estimating the correct bid difficult, if not impossible. Using a series of auction structures, we found that bidding approaches rational agent predictions when participants compete against a computer. However, the winner's curse appears when participants compete against other humans, even when cognitive demands for the correct bidding strategy are removed. These results suggest the humans assign significant future value to victories over human but not over computer opponents even though such victories may incur immediate losses, and that this valuation anomaly is the origin of apparently irrational behavior. PMID:20305741

  2. Bidding process in online auctions and winning strategy: Rate equation approach

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yang, I.; Kahng, B.

    2006-06-01

    Online auctions have expanded rapidly over the last decade and have become a fascinating new type of business or commercial transaction in this digital era. Here we introduce a master equation for the bidding process that takes place in online auctions. We find that the number of distinct bidders who bid k times up to the t th bidding progresses, called the k -frequent bidder, seems to scale as nk(t)˜tk-2.4 . The successfully transmitted bidding rate by the k -frequent bidder is likely to scale as qk(t)˜k-1.4 , independent of t for large t . This theoretical prediction is close to empirical data. These results imply that bidding at the last moment is a rational and effective strategy to win in an eBay auction.

  3. Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Deng, Xiaotie; Sun, Yang; Yin, Ming; Zhou, Yunhong

    In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

  4. Reciprocity in Online Markets: Empirical Studies of Auction and Barter Markets

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ye, Shun

    2013-01-01

    My dissertation seeks to understand how reciprocity affects transaction outcomes and mechanism design in online markets. The first essay examines negative reciprocity illustrated as feedback-revoking behavior in the eBay auction market, focusing on its impact and implications for reputation system design. I utilize the biggest policy change of…

  5. 49 CFR Appendix F to Part 599 - Salvage Auction Certification Form

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Salvage Auction Certification Form F Appendix F to Part 599 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY... CONSUMER ASSISTANCE TO RECYCLE AND SAVE ACT PROGRAM Pt. 599, App. F Appendix F to Part 599—Salvage...

  6. 40 CFR 97.421 - Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance... TRADING PROGRAMS TR NOX Annual Trading Program § 97.421 Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR NOX...

  7. 40 CFR 97.421 - Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 21 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance... TRADING PROGRAMS TR NOX Annual Trading Program § 97.421 Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR NOX...

  8. 40 CFR 97.421 - Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance... TRADING PROGRAMS TR NOX Annual Trading Program § 97.421 Recordation of TR NOX Annual allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR NOX...

  9. On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Constantin, Florin; Parkes, David C.

    In a dynamic market, being able to update one's value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. This is nicely captured by the model of interdependent values (IDV): a bidder's value can explicitly depend on the private information of other bidders. In this paper we present preliminary results about the revenue properties of dynamic auctions for IDV bidders. We adopt a computational approach to design single-item revenue-optimal dynamic auctions with known arrivals and departures but (private) signals that arrive online. In leveraging a characterization of truthful auctions, we present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the design problem. Although a discretization is imposed on bidder signals the solution is a mechanism applicable to continuous signals. The formulation size grows exponentially in the dependence of bidders' values on other bidders' signals. We highlight general properties of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions in a simple parametrized example and study the sensitivity of prices and revenue to model parameters.

  10. 47 CFR 27.604 - Limitation on licenses won at auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 47 Telecommunication 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Limitation on licenses won at auction. 27.604 Section 27.604 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES MISCELLANEOUS WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Guard Band A and B Blocks (757-758/787-788 MHz and...

  11. 31 CFR 356.33 - Does the Treasury have any discretion in the auction process?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Does the Treasury have any discretion... CIRCULAR, PUBLIC DEBT SERIES NO. 1-93) Miscellaneous Provisions § 356.33 Does the Treasury have any discretion in the auction process? (a) We have the discretion to: (1) Accept, reject, or refuse to...

  12. See Art History in a New Light: Have an Art Auction

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Benter, Doris J.

    2008-01-01

    At Portledge School in Locust Valley, New York, ninth graders in their upper school study art history for one semester. The visual arts department has created a vigorous new syllabus culminating in an hour-long mock art auction. The department selects several art movements (e.g., Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Abstract Expressionism, Social Realism,…

  13. 25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2012-04-01 2011-04-01 true Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted...

  14. 25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted...

  15. 25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted...

  16. 25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted...

  17. Teaching Undergraduate Money and Banking: T-Bill Auctions and Stock Market Models

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Saros, Daniel E.

    2009-01-01

    The author offers innovative approaches to 3 topics that are typically only briefly mentioned (if at all) in money and banking courses. The first topic is a Treasury bill auction experiment in which students have an opportunity to participate directly. The results from a class of 14 money and banking students are used to explain how an instructor…

  18. 30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale? 585.220 Section 585.220 Mineral Resources BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy...

  19. A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto

    We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the threshold price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.

  20. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Direct, you may submit bids by using one of our approved methods, e.g., computer, automated telephone... telephone call to designated Treasury employees if you submit them prior to the relevant bidding deadline... was mailed prior to the auction date. (3) If you are submitting a bid by computer or...

  1. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... Direct, you may submit bids by using one of our approved methods, e.g., computer, automated telephone... telephone call to designated Treasury employees if you submit them prior to the relevant bidding deadline... was mailed prior to the auction date. (3) If you are submitting a bid by computer or...

  2. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... Direct, you may submit bids by using one of our approved methods, e.g., computer, automated telephone... telephone call to designated Treasury employees if you submit them prior to the relevant bidding deadline... it was mailed prior to the auction date. (3) If you are submitting a bid by computer or...

  3. 49 CFR Appendix F to Part 599 - Salvage Auction Cerification Form

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Salvage Auction Cerification Form F Appendix F to Part 599 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY... CONSUMER ASSISTANCE TO RECYCLE AND SAVE ACT PROGRAM Pt. 599, App. F Appendix F to Part 599—Salvage...

  4. 49 CFR Appendix F to Part 599 - Salvage Auction Certification Form

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Salvage Auction Certification Form F Appendix F to Part 599 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY... CONSUMER ASSISTANCE TO RECYCLE AND SAVE ACT PROGRAM Pt. 599, App. F Appendix F to Part 599—Salvage...

  5. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION...

  6. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION...

  7. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION...

  8. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION...

  9. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION...

  10. 77 FR 9655 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-02-17

    ..., 77 FR 7152, February 10, 2012, comments are due on or before February 24, 2012. Reply comments are... Public Notice, 77 FR 7152, February 10, 2012, all filings in response to the notice must refer to AU... program requirements in the Auction 901 (Mobility Fund Phase I) Comment Public Notice, 77 FR...

  11. Design Implications of Real-Time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Investigation

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sanyal, Pallab

    2009-01-01

    Information Technology (IT) has spawned the growth of novel and innovative market mechanisms (such as online auctions) and associated businesses (such as eBay and Priceline) that were not feasible without the capabilities and reach of these modern information technologies. Previous studies on designing trading mechanisms for online markets…

  12. Comparisons of auction mechanisms in a multiple unit setting: A consideration for restructuring electric power markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bernard, John Charles

    The objective of this study was to compare the performance of five single sided auctions that could be used in restructured electric power markets across different market sizes in a multiple unit setting. Auction selection would profoundly influence an industry over $200 billion in size in the United States, and the consequences of implementing an inappropriate mechanism would be great. Experimental methods were selected to analyze the auctions. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first testing the sealed offer last accepted offer (LAO) and first rejected offer (FRO), and the clock English (ENG) and sealed offer English (SOE) in markets of sizes two and six. The FRO, SOE, and ENG used the same pricing rule. Second round testing was on the LAO, FRO, and the nonuniform price multiple unit Vickrey (MUV) in markets of sizes two, four, and six. Experiments lasted 23 and 75 periods for rounds 1 and 2 respectively. Analysis of variance and contrast analysis were used to examine the data. The four performance measures used were price, efficiency, profits per unit, and supply revelation. Five basic principles were also assessed: no sales at losses, all low cost capacity should be offered and sold, no high cost capacity should sell, and the market should clear. It was expected group size and auction type would affect performance. For all performance measures, group size was a significant variable, with smaller groups showing poorer performance. Auction type was significant only for the efficiency performance measure, where clock auctions outperformed the others. Clock auctions also proved superior for the first four principles. The FRO performed poorly in almost all situations, and should not be a preferred mechanism in any market. The ENG was highly efficient, but expensive for the buyer. The SOE appeared superior to the FRO and ENG. The clock improves efficiency over the FRO while less information kept prices under the ENG. The MUV was superior in revealing costs

  13. Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction.

    PubMed

    Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, G H

    2015-01-01

    One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer's utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider. PMID:26431035

  14. A Highly Secure Mobile Agent System Architecture

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Okataku, Yasukuni; Okutomi, Hidetoshi; Yoshioka, Nobukazu; Ohgishi, Nobuyuki; Honiden, Shinichi

    We propose a system architecture for mobile agents to improve their security in the environments of insecure networks and non-sophisticated terminals such as PDAs. As mobile agents freely migrate onto their favorite terminals through insecure networks or terminals, it is not appropriate for them to store some secret information for authentication and encryption/decryption. We introduce one and more secure nodes(OASIS NODE) for securely generating and verifying authentication codes. The each agent’s data are encrypted by a pseudo-chaos cipher mechanism which doesn’t need any floating processing co-processor. We’ve constructed a prototype system on a Java mobile agent framework, “Bee-gent" which implements the proposed authentication and cipher mechanisms, and evaluated their performances and their applicability to business fields such as an auction system by mobile agents.

  15. 78 FR 72081 - Closed Auction of AM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for May 6, 2014; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-02

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS... Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 84 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice... the instructions for submitting comments. Federal Communications Commission's Web site:...

  16. The influence of an online auction's product price and e-retailer reputation on consumers' perception, attitude, and behavioral intention.

    PubMed

    Wu, Wann-Yih; Huang, Po-Ching; Fu, Chen-Su

    2011-06-01

    Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. In this study, a 2 (product price: high vs. low) × 2 (e-retailer reputation: high vs. low) experimental design was used to understand whether the product price and e-retailer reputation will influence consumers' perceived risk, attitude toward the website and purchase intention. The results of this study indicate that perceived risk negatively influences consumer attitude toward the website and online purchase intention, while consumer attitude toward the website positively influences purchase intention. Moreover, involvement moderates the influence of product price and e-retailer reputation only on social risk but does not have a significant effect on consumer attitude toward the website. This study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users' behavior. Finally, the managerial implications, limitations and future research directions are also provided. PMID:21332721

  17. 9 CFR 3.113 - Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... marine mammals. 3.113 Section 3.113 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION..., Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals Transportation Standards § 3.113 Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals. No dealer, research facility, exhibitor, or operator of an auction sale...

  18. 9 CFR 3.113 - Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... marine mammals. 3.113 Section 3.113 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION..., Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals Transportation Standards § 3.113 Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals. No dealer, research facility, exhibitor, or operator of an auction sale...

  19. 9 CFR 3.113 - Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... marine mammals. 3.113 Section 3.113 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION..., Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals Transportation Standards § 3.113 Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals. No dealer, research facility, exhibitor, or operator of an auction sale...

  20. 9 CFR 3.113 - Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... marine mammals. 3.113 Section 3.113 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION..., Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals Transportation Standards § 3.113 Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals. No dealer, research facility, exhibitor, or operator of an auction sale...

  1. 9 CFR 3.113 - Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... marine mammals. 3.113 Section 3.113 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION..., Treatment, and Transportation of Marine Mammals Transportation Standards § 3.113 Primary enclosures used to transport marine mammals. No dealer, research facility, exhibitor, or operator of an auction sale...

  2. Biased Random-Key Genetic Algorithms for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions.

    PubMed

    de Andrade, Carlos Eduardo; Toso, Rodrigo Franco; Resende, Mauricio G C; Miyazawa, Flávio Keidi

    2015-01-01

    In this paper we address the problem of picking a subset of bids in a general combinatorial auction so as to maximize the overall profit using the first-price model. This winner determination problem assumes that a single bidding round is held to determine both the winners and prices to be paid. We introduce six variants of biased random-key genetic algorithms for this problem. Three of them use a novel initialization technique that makes use of solutions of intermediate linear programming relaxations of an exact mixed integer linear programming model as initial chromosomes of the population. An experimental evaluation compares the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms with the standard mixed linear integer programming formulation, a specialized exact algorithm, and the best-performing heuristics proposed for this problem. The proposed algorithms are competitive and offer strong results, mainly for large-scale auctions. PMID:25299242

  3. Equilibrium Strategy and Population-Size Effects in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pigolotti, Simone; Bernhardsson, Sebastian; Juul, Jeppe; Galster, Gorm; Vivo, Pierpaolo

    2012-02-01

    In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium distribution of strategies. We then study the properties of the solution as a function of the mean number of players, and compare them with a large data set of internet auctions. The theory agrees with the data with striking accuracy for small population-size N, while for larger N a qualitatively different distribution is observed. We interpret this result as the emergence of two different regimes, one in which adaptation is feasible and one in which it is not. Our results question the actual possibility of a large population to adapt and find the optimal strategy when participating in a collective game.

  4. Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions.

    PubMed

    Maciejovsky, Boris; Budescu, David V

    2007-05-01

    There is strong evidence that groups perform better than individuals do on intellective tasks with demonstrably correct solutions. Typically, these studies assume that group members share common goals. The authors extend this line of research by replacing standard face-to-face group interactions with competitive auctions, allowing for conflicting individual incentives. In a series of studies involving the well-known Wason selection task, they demonstrate that competitive auctions induce learning effects equally impressive as those of standard group interactions, and they uncover specific and general knowledge transfers from these institutions to new reasoning problems. The authors identify payoff feedback and information pooling as the driving factors underlying these findings, and they explain these factors within the theoretical framework of collective induction. PMID:17484609

  5. A Supplier Bidding Strategy Through Q-Learning Algorithm in Electricity Auction Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Xiong, Gaofeng; Hashiyama, Tomonori; Okuma, Shigeru

    One of the most important issues for power suppliers in the deregulated electric industry is how to bid into the electricity auction market to satisfy their profit-maximizing goals. Based on the Q-Learning algorithm, this paper presents a novel supplier bidding strategy to maximize supplier’s profit in the long run. In this approach, the supplier bidding strategy is viewed as a kind of stochastic optimal control problem and each supplier can learn from experience. A competitive day-ahead electricity auction market with hourly bids is assumed here, where no supplier possesses the market power. The dynamics and the incomplete information of the market are considered. The impacts of suppliers’ strategic bidding on the market price are analyzed under uniform pricing rule and discriminatory pricing rule. Agent-based simulations are presented. The simulation results show the feasibility of the proposed bidding strategy.

  6. A Q-Learning-Based Supplier Bidding Strategy in Electricity Auction Market

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Xiong, Gaofeng; Hashiyama, Tomonori; Okuma, Shigeru

    One of the most important issues for power suppliers in the deregulated electric industry is how to bid into the electricity auction market to satisfy their profit-maximizing goals. Based on the Q-Learning algorithm, this paper presents a novel supplier bidding strategy to maximize supplier’s profit in the long run. In this approach, the supplier bidding strategy is viewed as one kind of stochastic optimal control problem and each supplier can learn from experience. A competitive day-ahead electricity auction market with hourly bids is assumed here, where no supplier possesses the market power and all suppliers winning the market are paid based on their own bid prices. The dynamics and the incomplete information of the market are considered. The impact of suppliers’ strategic bidding on the market price is analyzed. Agent-based simulations are presented. The simulation results show the feasibility of the proposed bidding strategy.

  7. Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mous, Lonneke; Robu, Valentin; La Poutré, Han

    This paper studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face when participating in multiple, sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementary-valued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this model from a decision-theoretic perspective and we show, for a setting where the competition is formed by local bidders, that using options can increase the expected profit for both buyers and sellers. Furthermore, we derive the equations that provide minimum and maximum bounds between which a synergy buyer's bids should fall in order for both sides to have an incentive to use the options mechanism. Next, we perform an experimental analysis of a market in which multiple synergy bidders are active simultaneously.

  8. Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction

    PubMed Central

    Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, GH

    2015-01-01

    One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer’s utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider. PMID:26431035

  9. A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reyes H., Gonzalo

    As part of the pension reform recently approved in Chile, the government introduced a centralized auction mechanism to provide the Disability and Survivors (D&S) Insurance that covers recent contributors among the more than 8 million participants in the mandatory private pension system. This paper is intended as a case study presenting the main distortions found in the decentralized operation of the system that led to this reform and the challenges faced when designing a competitive auction mechanism to be implemented jointly by the Pension Fund Managers (AFP). In a typical bilateral contract the AFP retained much of the risk and the Insurance Company acted in practice as a reinsurer. The process to hire this contract was not competitive and colligated companies ended up providing the service. Several distortions affected competition in the market through incentives to cream-skim members by AFPs (since they bear most of the risk) or efforts to block disability claims. Since the price of this insurance is hidden in the fees charged by AFPs for the administration of individual accounts and pension funds there was lack of price transparency. Since new AFPs have no history of members’ disability and mortality profile the insurance contract acted as a barrier to entry in the market of AFP services, especially when D&S insurance costs reached 50% of total costs. Cross-subsidies between members of the same AFP, inefficient risk pooling (due to pooling occurring at the AFP rather than at the system level) and regulatory arbitrage, since AFPs provided insurance not being regulated as an insurance company, were also present. A centralized auction mechanism solves these market failures, but also gives raise to new challenges, such as how to design a competitive auction that attracts participation and deters collusion. Design features that were incorporated in the regulation to tackle these issues, such as dividing coverage into predefined percentage blocks, are presented

  10. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How are bids submitted in an auction? 356.11 Section 356.11 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT SALE AND ISSUE OF MARKETABLE BOOK-ENTRY TREASURY BILLS, NOTES, AND BONDS...

  11. Alternative security

    SciTech Connect

    Weston, B.H. )

    1990-01-01

    This book contains the following chapters: The Military and Alternative Security: New Missions for Stable Conventional Security; Technology and Alternative Security: A Cherished Myth Expires; Law and Alternative Security: Toward a Just World Peace; Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, Therefore More Peaceful, World; Economics and Alternative Security: Toward a Peacekeeping International Economy; Psychology and Alternative Security: Needs, Perceptions, and Misperceptions; Religion and Alternative Security: A Prophetic Vision; and Toward Post-Nuclear Global Security: An Overview.

  12. 75 FR 32773 - Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses Scheduled for December 7...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-06-09

    ... certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to certain areas in their geographic..., Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For auction legal questions: Sayuri Rajapakse at (202) 418-0660; for... 89 will include a total of 1,868 licenses. These include licenses for spectrum not previously...

  13. 78 FR 45524 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-07-29

    .... SUMMARY: This document announces the intention to hold an auction of H Block licenses in the 1915-1920 and...) announces its intention to hold an auction of licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz (Lower H Block) and 1995-2000... with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. Under this...

  14. The impact of product information and trials on demand for smokeless tobacco and cigarettes: Evidence from experimental auctions

    PubMed Central

    Rousu, Matthew C.; O'Connor, Richard; Thrasher, James F; June, Kristie; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James

    2014-01-01

    Introduction Epidemiological and toxicological evidence suggests lower risk of smokeless tobacco (ST) products compared to cigarettes. Less is known, however, about consumer perceptions and use of novel forms of ST, including snus and dissolvable tobacco. Methods In this study, we conducted in-person experimental auctions in Buffalo, NY, Columbia, SC, and Selinsgrove, PA with 571 smokers to test the impact of information and product trials on smokers’ preferences. Auctions were conducted between November 2010-November 2011. Results We found no evidence of an impact of product trials on demand in our auctions. Anti-ST information increased demand for cigarettes when presented alone, but when presented with Pro-ST information it decreased demand for cigarettes. It did not decrease demand for ST products. Anti-smoking information increased demand for ST products, but did not affect cigarette demand. Conclusions These findings suggest that credible and effective communications about tobacco harm reduction should reinforce the negative effects of smoking. PMID:24321456

  15. A Winner Determination Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions Based on Hybrid Artificial Fish Swarm Algorithm

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zheng, Genrang; Lin, ZhengChun

    The problem of winner determination in combinatorial auctions is a hotspot electronic business, and a NP hard problem. A Hybrid Artificial Fish Swarm Algorithm(HAFSA), which is combined with First Suite Heuristic Algorithm (FSHA) and Artificial Fish Swarm Algorithm (AFSA), is proposed to solve the problem after probing it base on the theories of AFSA. Experiment results show that the HAFSA is a rapidly and efficient algorithm for The problem of winner determining. Compared with Ant colony Optimization Algorithm, it has a good performance with broad and prosperous application.

  16. A Robust Open Ascending-price Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Terada, Kenji

    This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily in the Internet. This is the first protocol that has these two characteristics. We show that our new protocol outperforms an existing protocol, which satisfies (ii), with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue.

  17. Collection Security.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Boss, Richard W.

    1984-01-01

    Presents a systematic approach to the problem of security of library collections and facilities from theft and vandalism. Highlights include responses to losses, defining security needs, typical weaknesses of facilities, policies and procedures that weaken a library's security, conducting a security audit, cost of security, cost-effectiveness, and…

  18. Security Evolution.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    De Patta, Joe

    2003-01-01

    Examines how to evaluate school security, begin making schools safe, secure schools without turning them into fortresses, and secure schools easily and affordably; the evolution of security systems into information technology systems; using schools' high-speed network lines; how one specific security system was developed; pros and cons of the…

  19. Bidding Heuristics for Simultaneous Auctions: Lessons from TAC Travel

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Greenwald, Amy; Naroditskiy, Victor; Lee, Seong Jae

    We undertake an experimental study of heuristics designed for the Travel division of the Trading Agent Competition. Our primary goal is to analyze the performance of the sample average approximation (SAA) heuristic, which is approximately optimal in the decision-theoretic (DT) setting, in this game-theoretic (GT) setting. To this end, we conduct experiments in four settings, three DT and one GT. The relevant distinction between the DT and the GT settings is: in the DT settings, agents' strategies do not affect the distribution of prices. Because of this distinction, the DT experiments are easier to analyze than the GT experiments. Moreover, settings with normally distributed prices, and controlled noise, are easier to analyze than those with competitive equilibrium prices. In the studied domain, analysis of the DT settings with possibly noisy normally distributed prices informs our analysis of the richer DT and GT settings with competitive equilibrium prices. In future work, we plan to investigate whether this experimental methodology - namely, transferring knowledge gained in a DT setting with noisy signals to a GT setting - can be applied to analyze heuristics for playing other complex games.

  20. 75 FR 38545 - Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands in White Pine County, NV

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-07-02

    ...: 14X5232] Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands in White Pine County, NV AGENCY... Management (BLM) proposes to offer one parcel of public land of approximately 2.5 acres in White Pine County... proposed sale of public lands until August 16, 2010. If the BLM decision is to proceed with the sale,...

  1. 40 CFR 97.721 - Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2 allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2... SO2 TRADING PROGRAMS TR SO2 Group 2 Trading Program § 97.721 Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2 allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR SO2 Group...

  2. 40 CFR 97.621 - Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1 allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1... SO2 TRADING PROGRAMS TR SO2 Group 1 Trading Program § 97.621 Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1 allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR SO2 Group...

  3. 40 CFR 97.721 - Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2 allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2... SO2 TRADING PROGRAMS TR SO2 Group 2 Trading Program § 97.721 Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2 allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR SO2 Group...

  4. 40 CFR 97.621 - Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1 allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 21 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1... SO2 TRADING PROGRAMS TR SO2 Group 1 Trading Program § 97.621 Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1 allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR SO2 Group...

  5. 40 CFR 97.621 - Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1 allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 22 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1... SO2 TRADING PROGRAMS TR SO2 Group 1 Trading Program § 97.621 Recordation of TR SO2 Group 1 allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR SO2 Group...

  6. 40 CFR 97.721 - Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2 allowance allocations and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 40 Protection of Environment 21 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2... SO2 TRADING PROGRAMS TR SO2 Group 2 Trading Program § 97.721 Recordation of TR SO2 Group 2 allowance allocations and auction results. (a) By November 7, 2011, the Administrator will record in each TR SO2 Group...

  7. 76 FR 60830 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-30

    ... Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction 93 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice... commence on March 27, 2012. This document also seeks comment on competitive bidding procedures for this... that FM allotment will be awarded by competitive bidding procedures. Once mutual exclusivity exists...

  8. 78 FR 50086 - Notice of Competitive Auction for Solar Energy Development on Public Lands in the State of Colorado

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-08-16

    ... Bureau of Land Management Notice of Competitive Auction for Solar Energy Development on Public Lands in... applicant to submit a right-of-way (ROW) application and a plan of development for solar energy projects on... solicitations of interest and ROW applications within two designated Solar Energy Zones (SEZ): Los Mogotes...

  9. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ..., 2004 for BTA service areas are eligible for special incentives in the auction process. See 47 CFR 1... entity will have both de facto and de jure control of the entity. See 47 CFR 1.2110(i). (g) Records... areas in installments over a ten (10) year period running from the date that their BTA...

  10. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ..., 2004 for BTA service areas are eligible for special incentives in the auction process. See 47 CFR 1... entity will have both de facto and de jure control of the entity. See 47 CFR 1.2110(i). (g) Records... areas in installments over a ten (10) year period running from the date that their BTA...