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Sample records for stockpile reliability weapon

  1. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  2. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  3. Nuclear weapon reliability evaluation methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.

    1993-06-01

    This document provides an overview of those activities that are normally performed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide nuclear weapon reliability evaluations for the Department of Energy. These reliability evaluations are first provided as a prediction of the attainable stockpile reliability of a proposed weapon design. Stockpile reliability assessments are provided for each weapon type as the weapon is fielded and are continuously updated throughout the weapon stockpile life. The reliability predictions and assessments depend heavily on data from both laboratory simulation and actual flight tests. An important part of the methodology are the opportunities for review that occur throughout the entire process that assure a consistent approach and appropriate use of the data for reliability evaluation purposes.

  4. US nuclear weapons stockpile (June 1993)

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S. ); Arkin, W.M.

    1993-06-01

    The US. nuclear stockpile is at its lowest level since late 1958 or early 1959. In the past year, many weapons were returned to central military storage depots in the United States and funneled to the Energy Department's Pantex facility for final disassembly and disposal. This article presents a table showing the author's current estimate of the composition of the current operational stockpile, which contains some 10,500 warheads. Also categorized are warheads in [open quotes]inactive reserve[close quotes] and warheads awaiting eventual disassembly. The warheads are generally grouped as bombs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles. Initial production dates and yield are listed for the warheads.

  5. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  6. Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability

    SciTech Connect

    Chrzanowski, P.

    1991-03-20

    This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

  7. National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Goodwin, B T; Juzaitis, R J

    2006-08-07

    Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories have developed a common framework and key elements of a national certification methodology called Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU). A spectrum from senior managers to weapons designers has been engaged in this activity at the two laboratories for on the order of a year to codify this methodology in an overarching and integrated paper. Following is the certification paper that has evolved. In the process of writing this paper, an important outcome has been the realization that a joint Livermore/Los Alamos workshop on QMU, focusing on clearly identifying and quantifying differences between approaches between the two labs plus developing an even stronger technical foundation on methodology, will be valuable. Later in FY03, such a joint laboratory workshop will be held. One of the outcomes of this workshop will be a new version of this certification paper. A comprehensive approach to certification must include specification of problem scope, development of system baseline models, formulation of standards of performance assessment, and effective procedures for peer review and documentation. This document concentrates on the assessment and peer review aspects of the problem. In addressing these points, a central role is played by a 'watch list' for weapons derived from credible failure modes and performance gate analyses. The watch list must reflect our best assessment of factors that are critical to weapons performance. High fidelity experiments and calculations as well as full exploitation of archival test data are essential to this process. Peer review, advisory groups and red teams play an important role in confirming the validity of the watch list. The framework for certification developed by the Laboratories has many basic features in common, but some significant differences in the detailed technical implementation of the overall methodology remain. Joint certification workshops held in June and December of 2001 and continued in 2002 have proven useful in developing the methodology, and future workshops should prove useful in further refining this framework. Each laboratory developed an approach to certification with some differences in detailed implementation. The general methodology introduces specific quantitative indicators for assessing confidence in our nuclear weapon stockpile. The quantitative indicators are based upon performance margins for key operating characteristics and components of the system, and these are compared to uncertainties in these factors. These criteria can be summarized in a quantitative metric (for each such characteristic) expressed as: (i.e., confidence in warhead performance depends upon CR significantly exceeding unity for all these characteristics). These Confidence Ratios are proposed as a basis for guiding technical and programmatic decisions on stockpile actions. This methodology already has been deployed in certifying weapons undergoing current life extension programs or component remanufacture. The overall approach is an adaptation of standard engineering practice and lends itself to rigorous, quantitative, and explicit criteria for judging the robustness of weapon system and component performance at a detailed level. There are, of course, a number of approaches for assessing these Confidence Ratios. The general certification methodology was publicly presented for the first time to a meeting of Strategic Command SAG in January 2002 and met with general approval. At that meeting, the Laboratories committed to further refine and develop the methodology through the implementation process. This paper reflects the refinement and additional development to date. There will be even further refinement at a joint laboratory workshop later in FY03. A common certification methodology enables us to engage in peer reviews and evaluate nuclear weapon systems on the basis of explicit and objective metrics. The clarity provided by such metrics enables each laboratory and our common customers to understand the meaning and logic

  8. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  9. Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    2014-10-28

    A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

  10. Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2015-01-07

    A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

  11. Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-06-01

    Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

  12. Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)

    SciTech Connect

    Webster, Robert B.

    2012-06-29

    Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overview of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.

  13. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  14. Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition

    E-print Network

    Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign FY 2012 a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing. Science-based weapons's Budget. Page 105 #12;Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign FY

  15. Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Adams, Marvin L.

    2014-05-09

    The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.

  16. Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Adams, Marvin L.

    2014-05-01

    The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.

  17. The Stockpile Monitor Program

    SciTech Connect

    Buntain, G.A.; Fletcher, M.; Rabie, R.

    1994-07-01

    Recent political changes have led to drastic reductions in the number of nuclear warheads in stockpile, as well as increased expectations for warhead-service lives. In order to support and maintain a shrinking and aging nuclear stockpile, weapon scientists and engineers need detailed information describing the environments experienced by weapons in the field. Hence, the Stockpile Monitor Program was initiated in 1991 to develop a comprehensive and accurate database of temperature and humidity conditions experienced by nuclear warheads both in storage and on-alert.

  18. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction

    SciTech Connect

    1993-10-01

    ;Table of Contents: Articles of the Convention; Annex on Chemicals; Annex on Implementation and Verification (including General Rules of Verification, Destruction of Chemical Weapons and their Production Facilities, Challenge Inspections, Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, and Activities not Prohibited); and Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information.

  19. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and

    E-print Network

    Sussex, University of

    (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being

  20. Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Goodwin, B T; Mara, G

    2008-04-18

    The future of the US nuclear arsenal continues to be guided by two distinct drivers: the preservation of world peace and the prevention of further proliferation through our extended deterrent umbrella. Timely implementation of US nuclear policy decisions depends, in part, on the current state of stockpile weapons, their delivery systems, and the supporting infrastructure within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In turn, the present is a product of past choices and world events. Now more than ever, the nuclear weapons program must respond to the changing global security environment and to increasing budget pressures with innovation and sound investments. As the nation transitions to a reduced stockpile, the successes of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) present options to transition to a sustainable complex better suited to stockpile size, national strategic goals and budgetary realities. Under any stockpile size, we must maintain essential human capital, forefront capabilities, and have a right-sized effective production capacity. We present new concepts for maintaining high confidence at low stockpile numbers and to effectively eliminate the reserve weapons within an optimized complex. We, as a nation, have choices to make on how we will achieve a credible 21st century deterrent.

  1. The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Brooks, Linton F.

    2007-03-01

    This paper will examine our plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to ``transform'' the stockpile and supporting infrastructure. We proceed from the premise that the United States will need a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working. Today's stockpile---comprised of legacy warheads left over from the Cold War---is safe and reliable. That said, we see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in assuring the long-term safety and reliability of our current stockpile. Nor is today's nuclear weapons complex sufficiently ``responsive'' to fixing technical problems in the stockpile, or to potential adverse geopolitical change. Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs. Our approach is to develop and field replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile---so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)---as a means to transform both the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

  2. Quality assurance and reliability sub-committee W88-0/Mk5 weapon assessment NSA lab test results (u)

    SciTech Connect

    Whitney, Earl M

    2010-11-29

    The purpose of this report is to gather appropriate level of relevant stockpile surveillance data to assess trends in the NEP quality, reliability, performance, and safety over the life of the system. The objectives are to gather relevant stockpile data to assess NEP quality and trends and to develop metrics to assess the suitability of the surveillance sampling regime to meet assessment process requirements.

  3. Stockpile Stewardship: How we Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent without Testing

    SciTech Connect

    2014-09-04

    In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

  4. Nonnuclear Consolidation Environmental Assessment. Executive summary, Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-06-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is developing a proposal, known as Complex 21, to reconfigure the Nation`s Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex). The complex is a set of interrelated facilities that design, manufacture, test, and maintain this country`s nuclear weapons. The Complex also produces and/or recycles the nuclear materials used in building weapons and stores nuclear materials for future use. DOE also dismantles the weapons retired from the stockpile. In addition, DOE conducts surveillance and maintenance activities to ensure the reliability and safety of the stockpiled weapons throughout their operational life.

  5. Stockpile Management Program quarterly report. 2. quarter 1998

    SciTech Connect

    1998-11-01

    The objective of this program is to ensure the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile by: (1) maintaining robust nuclear facilities that comprise the infrastructure needed to conduct the various laboratory programs; (2) maintaining capabilities and qualified personnel needed to successfully implement the Program and ensure availability of competencies; (3) meeting present and future production and surveillance requirements to support the enduring stockpile and other programmatic deliverables; and (4) capturing and maintaining expertise and competency in the processes and technologies required to build a complete physics package. Summaries of accomplishments are presented for approximately 30 projects managed under this program.

  6. Science and technology in the stockpile stewardship program, S & TR reprints

    SciTech Connect

    Storm, E

    1998-04-08

    This document reports on these topics: Computer Simulations in Support of National Security; Enhanced Surveillance of Aging Weapons; A New Precision Cutting Tool: The Femtosecond Laser; Superlasers as a Tool of Stockpile Stewardship; Nova Laser Experiments and Stockpile Stewardship; Transforming Explosive Art into Science; Better Flash Radiography Using the FXR; Preserving Nuclear Weapons Information; Site 300Õs New Contained Firing Facility; The Linear Electric Motor: Instability at 1,000 gÕs; A Powerful New Tool to Detect Clandestine Nuclear Tests; High Explosives in Stockpile Surveillance Indicate Constancy; Addressing a Cold War Legacy with a New Way to Produce TATB; JumpinÕ Jupiter! Metallic Hydrogen; Keeping the Nuclear Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable; The Multibeam FabryÐPerot Velocimeter: Efficient Measurements of High Velocities; Theory and Modeling in Material Science; The Diamond Anvil Cell; Gamma-Ray Imaging Spectrometry; X-Ray Lasers and High-Density Plasma

  7. Estimated Russian stockpile, September 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S.; Arkin, W.

    1996-09-01

    An estimate of the size and composition of the former Soviet nuclear stockpile, based on START I memorandum of understanding data, is provided. The estimate covers operational forces that are assumed to be in a ready condition available for use. Total warhead stockpiles are estimated at about 12,000. Strategic offensive warheads comprise 7500 of the total, strategic defense missiles are estimated at 1200, land-based nonstrategic bombers and fighters at 1600, and naval nonstrategic weapons at 1600. Subtotals are provided for weapons categories (missiles, bombers, etc.) and weapons launchers.

  8. H.R. 4849: A Bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} and opened for signature and signed by the United States on January 13, 1993. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, July 28, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The report H.R. 4849 is a bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention. The proposed legislative text is included.

  9. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition

    PubMed Central

    Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690

  10. Manufacturing high reliability weapon grade transformers in small lots

    SciTech Connect

    Archer, W.E.; Sanchez, R.O.

    1998-08-01

    Sandia has used flyback transformers for many years, primarily to charge capacitors for capacitive discharge units. Important characteristics of the transformer design are to meet inductance, turns ratio, and high voltage breakdown requirements as well as not magnetically saturating during each energy transfer cycle. Sandia has taken over production responsibility for magnetic components from a previous GE/LM, General Electric/Lockheed Martin, facility in Florida that produced {approximately} 50 K units per year. Vanguard Electronics is working with Sandia to transfer many of these designs to Vanguard`s small manufacturing facility in Gardena, CA. The challenge is to achieve the required high reliability and meet all the other electrical requirements with such small quantities of parts, {approximately} 100 per year. DOE requirements include high reliability {le} 3 failures per 10,000 components per 20 years while meeting numerous other environmental requirements. The basic design and prove-in required four lots of preproduction parts, extensive environmental testing, and numerous design changes. The manufacturing problems that affected performance of the transformer will be presented. These include encapsulation voids and core alignment. Also, some extended life test data that predicts long term reliability of newly produced transformers versus older designs will be compared.

  11. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    SciTech Connect

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-08-15

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start with an improved vision of the future stockpile and enterprise, and find a path that moves us toward that future. The goal of this approach is to achieve a more affordable, sustainable, and responsive enterprise. In order to transform the enterprise in this way, the SSP warhead designs that drive the enterprise must change. Designs that emphasize manufacturability, certifiability, and increased safety and security can enable enterprise transformation. It is anticipated that such warheads can be certified and sustained with high confidence without nuclear testing. The SSP provides the tools to provide such designs, and can develop replacement designs and produce them for the stockpile. The Cold War currency of optimizing warhead yield-to-weight can be replaced by SSP designs optimizing margin-to-uncertainty. The immediate challenge facing the nuclear weapons enterprise is to find a credible path that leads to this vision of the future stockpile and enterprise. Reliable warheads within a sustainable enterprise can best be achieved by shifting from a program of legacy-warhead refurbishment to one of warhead replacement. The nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons enterprise must transform together to achieve this vision. The current Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program represents an approach that can begin this process of transformation. If the RRW program succeeds, the designs, manufacturing complex, and certification strategy can evolve together and in so doing come up with a more cost-efficient solution that meets today's and tomorrow's national security requirements.

  12. Nuclear stockpile stewardship and Bayesian image analysis (DARHT and the BIE)

    SciTech Connect

    Carroll, James L

    2011-01-11

    Since the end of nuclear testing, the reliability of our nation's nuclear weapon stockpile has been performed using sub-critical hydrodynamic testing. These tests involve some pretty 'extreme' radiography. We will be discussing the challenges and solutions to these problems provided by DARHT (the world's premiere hydrodynamic testing facility) and the BIE or Bayesian Inference Engine (a powerful radiography analysis software tool). We will discuss the application of Bayesian image analysis techniques to this important and difficult problem.

  13. ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

    E-print Network

    Sussex, University of

    ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION OPCW #12;#12;CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

  14. Materials and Sensor R&D to Transform the Nuclear Stockpile: Livermore?s Transformational Materials Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Maxwell, R; Fried, L; Campbell, G; Saab, A; Kotovsky, J; Carter, C; Chang, J

    2009-10-11

    As the nation's nuclear weapons age and the demands placed on them change, significant challenges face the nuclear stockpile. Risks include material supply issues, ever-increasing lifecycle costs, and loss of technical expertise across the weapons complex. For example, non-nuclear materials are becoming increasingly difficult to replace because manufacturing methods and formulations have evolved in such a way as to render formerly available materials unprofitable, unsafe, or otherwise obsolete. Subtle formulation changes in available materials that occur without the knowledge of the weapons community for proprietary reasons have frequently affected the long-term performance of materials in the nuclear weapon environment. Significant improvements in performance, lifetime, or production cost can be realized with modern synthesis, modeling, and manufacturing methods. For example, there are currently supply and aging issues associated with the insensitive high explosive formulations LX-17 and PBX 9502 that are based on triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) and Kel-F, neither of which are commercially available today. Assuring the reliability of the stockpile through surveillance and regularly scheduled Life Extension Programs is an increasingly expensive endeavor. Transforming our current stockpile surveillance--a system based on destructive testing of increasingly valuable assets--to a system based on embedded sensors has a number of potential advantages that include long-term cost savings, reduced risk associated with asset transportation, state-of-health assessments in the field, and active management of the stockpile.

  15. Aging and Radiation Effects in Stockpile Electronics

    SciTech Connect

    Hartman, E.F.

    1999-03-25

    It is likely that aging is affecting the radiation hardness of stockpile electronics, and we have seen apparent examples of aging that affects the electronic radiation hardness. It is also possible that low-level intrinsic radiation that is inherent during stockpile life will damage or in a sense age electronic components. Both aging and low level radiation effects on radiation hardness and stockpile reliability need to be further investigated by using both test and modeling strategies that include appropriate testing of electronic components withdrawn from the stockpile.

  16. Big projects could threaten weapons labs` research base

    SciTech Connect

    Lawler, A.

    1996-05-24

    Every few seconds, a mushroom cloud explodes on Paul Cunningham`s Computer screen. The unsettling image is a screen saver in the office of the chief of nuclear materials and stockpile management at Los Alamos National Laboratory - and a wry reminder of the radical changes underway at the three US weapons labs. Now that the US has renounced underground nuclear testing, simulations are becoming the weapons designers chief tool for ensuring that the nuclear arsenal is reliable. The new approach to testing, stockpile stewardship, has triggered a fierce debate within the defense community. At issue is how to keep a balance between financing such new and costly stewardship projects as the $1.1 billion National Ignition Facility, which will simulate the conditions of nuclear detonation, and maintaining a critical mass of experienced weapons designers. This artical describes the debate and funding and political problems which go with it.

  17. Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility

    SciTech Connect

    N /A

    2003-06-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, including production readiness required to maintain that stockpile. Since 1989, DOE has been without the capability to produce stockpile certified plutonium pits, which are an essential component of nuclear weapons. NNSA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and Congress have highlighted the lack of long-term pit production capability as a national security issue requiring timely resolution. While a small interim capacity is currently being established at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), classified analyses indicate projected capacity requirements (number of pits to be produced over a period of time), and agility (ability to rapidly change from production of one pit type to another, ability to simultaneously produce multiple pit types, or the flexibility to produce pits of a new design in a timely manner) necessary for long-term support of the stockpile will require a long-term pit production capability. In particular, identification of a systemic problem associated with an existing pit type, class of pits, or aging phenomenon cannot be adequately responded to today, nor could it be with the small capability being established at LANL (see Section S.2 for a more detailed discussion regarding the purpose and need for a Modern Pit Facility [MPF]).

  18. Quality control of meteorological data for the chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program.

    SciTech Connect

    Liljegren, J.C.; Tschopp, S.; Rogers, K.; Wasmer, F.; Liljegren, L.; Myirski, M.; Decision and Information Sciences; U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency

    2009-08-01

    The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Meteorological Support Project ensures the accuracy and reliability of data acquired by meteorological monitoring stations located at seven U.S. Army chemical weapons depots where storage and weapons destruction (demilitarization) activities are ongoing. The data are delivered in real time to U.S. Army plume dispersion models, which are used to plan for and respond to a potential accidental release of a chemical weapons agent. The project provides maintenance, calibration, and audit services for the instrumentation; collection, automated screening, visual inspection, and analysis of the data; and problem reporting and tracking to carefully control the data quality. The resulting high-quality meteorological data enhance emergency response modeling and public safety.

  19. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  20. A random onset model for degradation of high-reliability systems

    SciTech Connect

    Vanderwiel, Scott A; Wilson, Alyson G; Graves, Todd L; Reese, Christopher S

    2009-07-22

    Both the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) maintain weapons stockpiles: items like bullets, missiles and bombs that have already been produced and are being stored until needed. Ideally, these stockpiles maintain high reliability over time. To assess reliability, a surveillance program is implemented, where units are periodically removed from the stockpile and tested. The most definitive tests typically destroy the weapons so a given unit is tested only once. Surveillance managers need to decide how many units should be tested, how often they should be tested, what tests should be done, and how the resulting data are used to estimate the stockpile's current and future reliability. These issues are particularly critical from a planning perspective: given what has already been observed and our understanding of the mechanisms of stockpile aging, what is an appropriate and cost-effective surveillance program? Surveillance programs are costly, broad, and deep, especially in the DOE, where the US nuclear weapons surveillance program must 'ensure, through various tests, that the reliability of nuclear weapons is maintained' in the absence of full-system testing (General Accounting Office, 1996). The DOE program consists primarily of three types of tests: nonnuclear flight tests, that involve the actual dropping or launching of a weapon from which the nuclear components have been removed; and nonnuclear and nuclear systems laboratory tests, which detect defects due to aging, manufacturing, and design of the nonnuclear and nuclear portions of the weapons. Fully integrated analysis of the suite of nuclear weapons surveillance data is an ongoing area of research (Wilson et al., 2007). This paper introduces a simple model that captures high-level features of stockpile reliability over time and can be used to answer broad policy questions about surveillance programs. Our intention is to provide a framework that generates tractable answers that integrate expert knowledge and high-level summaries of surveillance data to allow decision-making about appropriate trade-offs between the cost of data and the precision of stockpile reliability estimates.

  1. hspthe harvard sussex program on chemical and biological weapons (CBW)

    E-print Network

    Sussex, University of

    hspthe harvard sussex program on chemical and biological weapons (CBW) Resource Guide of the use of chemical weapons Never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons Never to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engag To destroy chemical weapons

  2. Stockpile Stewardship: Los Alamos

    ScienceCinema

    McMillan, Charlie; Morgan, Nathanial; Goorley, Tom; Merrill, Frank; Funk, Dave; Korzekwa, Deniece; Laintz, Ken

    2014-08-12

    "Heritage of Science" is a short video that highlights the Stockpile Stewardship program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Stockpile Stewardship was conceived in the early 1990s as a national science-based program that could assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without the need for full-scale underground nuclear testing. This video was produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory for screening at the Lab's Bradbury Science Museum in Los Alamos, NM and is narrated by science correspondent Miles O'Brien.

  3. Stockpile Stewardship: Los Alamos

    SciTech Connect

    McMillan, Charlie; Morgan, Nathanial; Goorley, Tom; Merrill, Frank; Funk, Dave; Korzekwa, Deniece; Laintz, Ken

    2012-01-26

    "Heritage of Science" is a short video that highlights the Stockpile Stewardship program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Stockpile Stewardship was conceived in the early 1990s as a national science-based program that could assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without the need for full-scale underground nuclear testing. This video was produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory for screening at the Lab's Bradbury Science Museum in Los Alamos, NM and is narrated by science correspondent Miles O'Brien.

  4. Update on the Stockpile Monitor Program

    SciTech Connect

    Rivera, T.; Harry, H.H.

    1999-04-01

    In 1991 the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) launched a program to develop a comprehensive database of warhead storage conditions. Because of the extended lifetimes expected of the Stockpile, it became desirable to obtain as much detailed information on the storage environments as possible. Temperature and relative humidity at various facilities capable of storing and/or handling nuclear weapons were used as monitoring locations. The Stockpile Monitor Program (SMP) was implemented in a variety of locations as illustrated in a figure. Probably the most useful data come from the most extreme conditions monitored. The hottest outside temperatures and relative humidities come from Barksdale, while some of the lowest relative humidity values come from Nellis, which continue to be monitored. The coldest conditions come from Grand Forks, Griffiss, and KI Sawyer, none of which are presently being monitored. For this reason, the authors would like to begin monitoring Minot, ND. The outside extreme temperatures are ameliorated by the structures to a significant degree. For example, the hottest outside temperature (120 F) is contrasted by the corresponding cooler inside temperature (85 F), and the coldest outside temperature ({minus}35 F) is contrasted by the corresponding warmer inside temperature (+25 F). These data have become useful for calculations related to stockpile-to-target sequence (STS) and other analyses. SMP information has been provided to a number of outside agencies.

  5. 11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

  6. Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition

    E-print Network

    Weapons Activities/ Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign FY 2011, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The program provides this capability and pulsed power facilities. Science- based weapons assessments and certification requires

  7. An Introduction to Risk with a Focus on Design Diversity in the Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-13

    The maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the stockpile involves decisions based on risk analysis and quantitative measures of risk. Risk is a factor in all decisions, a particularly important factor in decisions of a large scale. One example of high-risk decisions we will discuss is the risk involved in design diversity within the stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal. Risk is defined as 'possibility of loss or injury' and the 'degree of probability of such loss' (Kaplan and Garrick 12). To introduce the risk involved with maintaining the weapons stockpile we will draw a parallel to the design and maintenance of Southwest Airlines fleet of Boeing 737 planes. The clear benefits for cost savings in maintenance of having a uniform fleet are what historically drove Southwest to have only Boeing 737s in their fleet. Less money and resources are need for maintenance, training, and materials. Naturally, risk accompanies those benefits. A defect in a part of the plane indicates a potential defect in that same part in all the planes of the fleet. As a result, safety, business, and credibility are at risk. How much variety or diversity does the fleet need to mitigate that risk? With that question in mind, a balance is needed to accommodate the different risks and benefits of the situation. In a similar way, risk is analyzed for the design and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In conclusion, risk must be as low as possible when it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk, and to help balance options in stockpile stewardship.

  8. Evacuation modeling near a chemical stockpile site

    SciTech Connect

    Newsom, D.E.; Madore, M.A.; Jaske, R.T.

    1992-01-01

    Dynamic evacuation modeling was used as an aid in emergency response planning by Tooele County, Utah, location of the United States' largest stockpile of unitary chemical weapons. The use of traffic modeling was affected both by the characteristics of the hazard and the unique topography of the area. To address these constraints Argonne National Laboratory, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Tooele County created a set of evacuation modeling scenarios to be stored in the county's emergency management information system. For use in planning, the scenarios enable the county to map out effective traffic management strategies. For us in exercises or emergency response the scenarios enable the county to quickly access data to make and implement evacuation decisions.

  9. Evacuation modeling near a chemical stockpile site

    SciTech Connect

    Newsom, D.E.; Madore, M.A.; Jaske, R.T.

    1992-06-01

    Dynamic evacuation modeling was used as an aid in emergency response planning by Tooele County, Utah, location of the United States` largest stockpile of unitary chemical weapons. The use of traffic modeling was affected both by the characteristics of the hazard and the unique topography of the area. To address these constraints Argonne National Laboratory, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Tooele County created a set of evacuation modeling scenarios to be stored in the county`s emergency management information system. For use in planning, the scenarios enable the county to map out effective traffic management strategies. For us in exercises or emergency response the scenarios enable the county to quickly access data to make and implement evacuation decisions.

  10. Sample sizes for confidence limits for reliability.

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.

    2010-02-01

    We recently performed an evaluation of the implications of a reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons for surveillance to support estimates of reliability. We found that one technique developed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) under-estimates the required sample size for systems-level testing. For a large population the discrepancy is not important, but for a small population it is important. We found that another technique used by SNL provides the correct required sample size. For systems-level testing of nuclear weapons, samples are selected without replacement, and the hypergeometric probability distribution applies. Both of the SNL techniques focus on samples without defects from sampling without replacement. We generalized the second SNL technique to cases with defects in the sample. We created a computer program in Mathematica to automate the calculation of confidence for reliability. We also evaluated sampling with replacement where the binomial probability distribution applies.

  11. Sandia National Laboratories/Production Agency Weapon Waste Minimization Plan

    SciTech Connect

    Skinrood, A.C.; Radosevich, L.G.

    1991-07-01

    This Plan describes activities to reduce the usage of hazardous materials and the production of hazardous material waste during the development, production, stockpile, and retirement phases of war reserve nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon test units. Activities related to the development and qualification of more benign materials and processes for weapon production and the treatment and disposal of these materials from weapon retirement are described in separate plans.

  12. A Sandia weapon review bulletin : defense programs, Autumn 1992.

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-09-01

    Topics in this issue: (1) Focal Point and STEP. Sandia National Laboratories has always focused its advanced weapon development not only on future weapon needs, but also on the engineering and manufacturing sciences needed to meet them. Both areas are changing dramatically. As the nation dismantles many of its warheads, it becomes essential that those that remain are increasingly reliable, secure, capable, and safe. And as development resources diminish, it becomes vital that they are applied to the most critical technologies in a disciplined manner. The mission of the Focal Point program and the Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) is to develop processes for meeting these challenges. Focal Point offers a decision-making process for allocating Sandia's resources to meets its defense programs strategic goals. (2) Defense Programs news in brief. (3) Dismantling the nuclear stockpile. (4) W88/MK5: Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system meets all requirements and goals. (5) The Common Radar Fuze. (6) Insertable-explosive arming of firing sets. (7) Preparing for fewer underground tests.

  13. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

    SciTech Connect

    Krummel, J.R.; Policastro, A.J.; Olshansky, S.J.; McGinnis, L.D.

    1990-10-01

    As part of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program mandated by Public Law 99--145 (Department of Defense Authorization Act), an independent review is presented of the US Army Phase I environmental report for the disposal program at the Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA) in Hermiston, Oregon. The Phase I report addressed new and additional concerns not incorporated in the final programmatic environmental impact statement (FPEIS). Those concerns were addressed by examining site-specific data for the Umatilla Depot Activity and by recommending the scope and content of a more detailed site-specific study. This independent review evaluates whether the new site-specific data presented in the Phase I report would alter the decision in favor of on-site disposal that was reached in the FPEIS, and whether the recommendations for the scope and content of the site-specific study are adequate. Based on the methods and assumptions presented in the FPEIS, the inclusion of more detailed site-specific data in the Phase I report does not change the decision reached in the FPEIS (which favored on-site disposal at UMDA). It is recommended that alternative assumptions about meteorological conditions be considered and that site-specific data on water, ecological, socioeconomic, and cultural resources; seismicity; and emergency planning and preparedness be considered explicitly in the site-specific EIS decision-making process. 7 refs., 1 fig.

  14. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

    SciTech Connect

    Krummel, J.R.; Policastro, A.J.; Olshansky, S.J.; McGinnis, L.D.

    1990-10-01

    As part of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program mandated by Public Law 99--145 (Department of Defense Authorization Act), an independent review is presented of the US Army Phase I environmental report for the disposal program at the Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) in Arkansas. The Phase I report addressed new and additional concerns not incorporated in the final programmatic environmental impact statement (FPEIS). Those concerns were addressed by examining site-specific data for the PBA and by recommending the scope and content of a more detailed site- specific study. This dependent review evaluates whether the new site-specific data presented in the Phase I report would alter the decision in favor of on-site disposal that was reached in the FPEIS, and whether the recommendations for the scope and content of the site-specific study are adequate. Based on the methods and assumptions presented in the FPEIS, the inclusion of more detailed site-specific data in the Phase I report does not change the decision reached in the FPEIS (which favored on-site disposal at PBA). It is recommended that alternative assumptions about meteorological conditions be considered and that site-specific data on water, ecological, socioeconomic, and cultural resources, and emergency planning and preparedness be considered explicitly in the site-specific EIS decision-making process. 13 refs., 1 fig.

  15. Nuclear Science for Stockpile Stewardship

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hartouni, Edward

    2006-10-01

    Stockpile Stewardship is based on our ability to make predicitons in complex systems for which a number of physics desciplines are required: material properties at high temperature and pressure, high energy density physics and nuclear physics. This talk will provide an overview of the role of nuclear science, both physics and radio-chemisty, with repect to both short term and long term needs of stockpile stewardship.

  16. Predictive method for weapon storage environments

    SciTech Connect

    Rabie, R.L.

    1996-08-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Stockpile Monitor Program provides for the placement of Campbell Scientific Inc. data loggers in many weapons storage areas for the purpose of gathering environmental information such as relative humidity and temperature. Not all storage areas can be covered, however, so a means of estimating storage conditions is needed. This report describes one such technique.

  17. 15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744...Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition...stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons in or by any country or...

  18. Strategic National Stockpile Point of Dispensing Plan

    E-print Network

    Huang, Haiying

    .................................................................................................................................................. SD-1 Support Document 2 POD Floor Plan at University CenterStrategic National Stockpile Point of Dispensing Plan Standard Operating Guidelines #12;RECORD OF CHANGES Strategic National Stockpile Point of Dispensing Plan Change # Date of Change Entered By Date

  19. 16 CFR 1207.12 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...ACT REGULATIONS SAFETY STANDARD FOR SWIMMING POOL SLIDES § 1207.12 Stockpiling...Stockpiling means manufacturing or importing swimming pool slides between the date of promulgation...importation) means the total number of swimming pool slides manufactured (or...

  20. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    SciTech Connect

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  1. Using Direct Sub-Level Entity Access to Improve Nuclear Stockpile Simulation Modeling

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Y. Parker

    1999-08-01

    Direct sub-level entity access is a seldom-used technique in discrete-event simulation modeling that addresses the accessibility of sub-level entity information. The technique has significant advantages over more common, alternative modeling methods--especially where hierarchical entity structures are modeled. As such, direct sub-level entity access is often preferable in modeling nuclear stockpile, life-extension issues, an area to which it has not been previously applied. Current nuclear stockpile, life-extension models were demonstrated to benefit greatly from the advantages of direct sub-level entity access. In specific cases, the application of the technique resulted in models that were up to 10 times faster than functionally equivalent models where alternative techniques were applied. Furthermore, specific implementations of direct sub-level entity access were observed to be more flexible, efficient, functional, and scalable than corresponding implementations using common modeling techniques. Common modeling techniques (''unbatch/batch'' and ''attribute-copying'') proved inefficient and cumbersome in handling many nuclear stockpile modeling complexities, including multiple weapon sites, true defect analysis, and large numbers of weapon and subsystem types. While significant effort was required to enable direct sub-level entity access in the nuclear stockpile simulation models, the enhancements were worth the effort--resulting in more efficient, more capable, and more informative models that effectively addressed the complexities of the nuclear stockpile.

  2. Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP): Process and project requirements

    SciTech Connect

    Ma, Kwok Kee

    1993-06-01

    The Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) is aimed at identifying weapon components suitable for use in more than one weapon and for qualifying components so identified for multiple use. Work includes identifying the means to maintain the manufacturing capability for these items. This document provides the participants in STEP a common, consistent understanding of the process and requirements. The STEP objectives are presented and the activities are outlined. The STEP project selections are based on the customer needs, product applicability, and maturity of the technology used. A formal project selection process is described and the selection criteria are defined. The concept of {open_quotes}production readiness{close_quotes} is introduced, along with a summary of the project requirements and deliverables to demonstrate production readiness.

  3. Multiscale science for science-based stockpile stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    Margolin, L.; Sharp, D.

    2000-12-01

    This is the final report of a three-year, Laboratory-Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The goal of this project has been to develop and apply the methods of multi scale science to the problems of fluid and material mixing due to instability and turbulence, and of materials characterization. Our specific focus has been on the SBSS (science-based stockpile stewardship) issue of assessing the performance of a weapons with off-design, aged, or remanufactured components in the absence of full-scale testing. Our products are physics models, based on microphysical principles and parameters, and suitable for implementation in the large scale design and assessment codes used in the nuclear weapons program.

  4. System reliability assessment with an approximate reasoning model

    SciTech Connect

    Eisenhawer, S.W.; Bott, T.F.; Helm, T.M.; Boerigter, S.T.

    1998-12-31

    The projected service life of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile will exceed the original design life of their critical components. Interim metrics are needed to describe weapon states for use in simulation models of the nuclear weapons complex. The authors present an approach to this problem based upon the theory of approximate reasoning (AR) that allows meaningful assessments to be made in an environment where reliability models are incomplete. AR models are designed to emulate the inference process used by subject matter experts. The emulation is based upon a formal logic structure that relates evidence about components. This evidence is translated using natural language expressions into linguistic variables that describe membership in fuzzy sets. The authors introduce a metric that measures the acceptability of a weapon to nuclear deterrence planners. Implication rule bases are used to draw a series of forward chaining inferences about the acceptability of components, subsystems and individual weapons. They describe each component in the AR model in some detail and illustrate its behavior with a small example. The integration of the acceptability metric into a prototype model to simulate the weapons complex is also described.

  5. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part...

  6. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part...

  7. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part...

  8. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part...

  9. Stockpile Dismantlement Database Training Materials

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-11-01

    This document, the Stockpile Dismantlement Database (SDDB) training materials is designed to familiarize the user with the SDDB windowing system and the data entry steps for Component Characterization for Disposition. The foundation of information required for every part is depicted by using numbered graphic and text steps. The individual entering data is lead step by step through generic and specific examples. These training materials are intended to be supplements to individual on-the-job training.

  10. Risk communications and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency-Planning Program

    SciTech Connect

    Vogt, B.M.; Sorensen, J.H.

    1994-09-01

    The CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program) was created to improve emergency planning and response capabilities at the eight sites around the country that store chemical weapons. These weapons are scheduled to be destroyed in the near future. In preparation of the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DPEIS) for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP), it was proposed that the Army mitigate accidents through an enhanced community emergency preparedness program at the eight storage sites. In 1986, the Army initiated the development of an Emergency Response Concept Plan (ERCP) for the CSDP, one of 12 technical support studies conducted during preparation of the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS). The purpose of this document is to provide a fairly comprehensive source book on risk, risk management, risk communication research and recommended risk communication practices. It does not merely summarize each publication in the risk communication literature, but attempts to synthesize them along the lines of a set of organizing principles. Furthermore, it is not intended to duplicate other guidance manuals (such as Covello et al.`s manual on risk comparison). The source book was developed for the CSEPP in support of the training module on risk communications. Although the examples provided are specific to CSEPP, its use goes beyond that of CSEPP as the findings apply to a broad spectrum of risk communication topics. While the emphasis is on communication in emergency preparedness and response specific to the CSEPP, the materials cover other non-emergency communication settings. 329 refs.

  11. The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?

    PubMed

    Borrmann, Robin

    2010-01-01

    This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for--and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving--a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs). PMID:21314080

  12. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard § 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  13. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard § 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  14. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard § 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  15. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard § 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  16. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard § 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  17. [Biological weapons].

    PubMed

    Kerwat, K; Becker, S; Wulf, H; Densow, D

    2010-08-01

    Biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction that use pathogens (bacteria, viruses) or the toxins produced by them to target living organisms or to contaminate non-living substances. In the past, biological warfare has been repeatedly used. Anthrax, plague and smallpox are regarded as the most dangerous biological weapons by various institutions. Nowadays it seems quite unlikely that biological warfare will be employed in any military campaigns. However, the possibility remains that biological weapons may be used in acts of bioterrorism. In addition all diseases caused by biological weapons may also occur naturally or as a result of a laboratory accident. Risk assessment with regard to biological danger often proves to be difficult. In this context, an early identification of a potentially dangerous situation through experts is essential to limit the degree of damage. PMID:20717866

  18. GeoffBrumfiel,Washington Nuclear watchdogs and former weapons

    E-print Network

    existing bombs detonate, so that the stockpile can be maintained without testing the weapons it contains. The National Ignition Facility uses 192 high-power lasers to fuse hydrogen isotopes together, releasing energy. But part of its environmental-impact statement, released in February, announced plans to line the hydrogen

  19. Evaluation of gas emissions from coal stockpile.

    PubMed

    Kozinc, J; Zupancic-Kralj, L; Zapusek, A

    2004-05-01

    Gas emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, dimethylsulfide, carbon monoxide and oxygen from a coal stockpile in Velenje were determined. Gases from the coal stockpile were collected in Alltech Standard sampling bags and then analysed using a capillary gas chromatograph and electrochemical sensors. A flame ionisation detector equipped with a Zr/Ni catalytic reactor was used for the determination of methane and carbon dioxide. Dimethylsulfide was detected with a flame photometric detector, and the concentrations of carbon monoxide and oxygen were determined by use of electrochemical sensors. The results showed that the main influence on gas emissions is related to the ambient temperature. Emissions of carbon dioxide during summer 2001 (average temperature during sampling period was 24 degrees C) were approximately 30-times higher than during winter 2002 (average temperature during sampling period was -2 degrees C) and were also influenced by the oxygen concentration. Carbon dioxide is mainly formed by oxidation of coal. Methane and dimethylsulfide are desorbed from coal, and are present in higher concentrations in stockpile emissions when stockpiles are renewed. The dimethylsulfide concentration, in contrast to laboratory experiments in stockpile emissions, falls immediately due to photo-degradation. PMID:15050809

  20. Acquisition reform: Impact of conversion to performance and commercial specifications/standards on the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Master`s thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Crisp, S.S.

    1996-06-01

    The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) was established to plan and execute the safe destruction of the nation`s stockpile of unitary chemical weapons. Execution of the program requires that multiple public issues be addressed including the public`s concern regarding safety and the environment. Another relevant issue is reform of the acquisition process, specifically the DoD requirement to convert military-unique specifications and standards to performance statements or commercial equivalents. This research provides evidence that acquisition reform initiatives on specifications and standards has had a positive influence on program costs with no overall program schedule delays. Continued efforts in this area should enhance the ability to demilitarize the nation`s deteriorating stockpile of lethal chemical weapons within projected cost while maintaining or improving the quality and safety levels currently set by the EPA.

  1. Towards Reliable Cross Sections for National Security Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Escher, J E; Dietrich, F S; Nobre, G A; Thompson, I J

    2011-02-24

    Stockpile stewardship requires the description of weapons performance without resorting to underground nuclear testing. In the earlier tests, selected isotopes were used as detectors, and recovered after irradiation. Aspects of nuclear device performance were inferred by comparing the measured isotopic ratios to those predicted from simulations. The reaction flows that produce the final isotopic distributions proceed through regions of the nuclear chart that include unstable nuclei. Presently, improved nuclear data input is required to reanalyze prior tests and to certify the stockpile's reliability and safety. Many important cross sections are unknown, as is shown in the example of the Yttrium reaction network (Figure 1). The relevant reactions include (n,2n), (n,n'), (n,gamma), (n,p) and other charged-particle emitting reactions. The cross sections have to be calculated or inferred from indirect measurements. In both cases, reliable optical models that are valid a few nucleons away from stability are needed. The UNEDF Nuclear Reaction activities address this need by combining nuclear-structure input from UNEDF structure calculations with modern reaction theory and large-scale computational capabilities to develop microscopic nucleon-nucleus optical potentials that can be extrapolated to unstable nuclei. In addition, the reaction calculation tools and optical models developed in this context are proving valuable for planning and interpreting indirect (surrogate) measurements of the required cross sections.

  2. Supervision of self-heating in peat stockpiles by aerial thermography

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tervo, Matti; Kauppinen, Timo T.

    1991-03-01

    The production of peat supplies approximately 4 % of the total energy consumption on Finland. Peat is produced in bogs, where the produced fuel is stored in stockpiles. Because of self-heating caused by microbe activities and chemical reactions there is an annual loss of about 5% of the energy content of stored peat. The supervision based on visual control combined with manual temperature measurements carried out on the peat bog is expensive, and furthermore a very unreliable method. Because the warm patterns in the peat stockpiles are not necessarily found. The damages can partly be avoided when self-heating is observed in time and the necessary actions are carried out. The Research Institute of Northern Finland, University of Oulu, started an experimentation of airborne thermal scanning supervision of peat stockpiles on initiative of A. Jalander Oy, a subsidiary of Kemira Oy, in 1987. The field studies have been made as a co-operate project of the Research Institute of Northern Finland and Building Laboratory, Technical Research Center of Finland (Oulu, Finland). During the experiment 2800 thermograms were taken of peat stockpiles, the inner temperature of 200 of the stockpiles being controlled on the bogs. On the basis of the studies it has been possible to define the criteria for thermal scanning of peat stockpiles. Depending on the weather conditions, even a difference of 2 degrees in the surface temperature of the stockpile can indicate a warmed pattern. In autumn 1990 a regular airborne supervision based on thermal scanning was started on the peat bogs of two producers, the peat bogs containing altogether approximately 1 million m3 of peat, the area supervised being about 3500 hectares. The flights were made three times an autumn with intervals of 4 weeks. The flights have been made on a four-seated airplane, the frame of which was equipped with a hole for the infrared scanner. The results were documented on videotape, and video printer shots of the suspected warmed stockpiles were sent to the producers. The supervision has proved to be quite reliable. The self-heating of the stockpiles has been observed at an early stage long before the ignition. The costs of airborne supervision have been covered with the amounts of the saved energy.

  3. Sinclair Stockpiles CFCs for Future Use.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    George, Stephen C.

    1996-01-01

    A Dayton (Ohio) community college's 21 buildings were cooled by a network of 5 chillers, all of which used soon-to-be-banned chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). A reclamation program provides the college with reusable refrigerant and eliminates chiller replacement costs. Refrigerant from three of the old units is stockpiled for use in the two other…

  4. Antisatellite Weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Garwin, Richard L.; White, Andrew D.

    1984-08-01

    Satellites are vulnerable to the existing Soviet ASAT weapon, to the U.S. ASAT under development, to the large numbers of ICBMs in existence, and to many future threats, including space mines. An ban on ASAT use and test is adequately verifiable to increase U.S. security and to reduce the likelihood of at least one cause of war. The U.S. should move with urgency to negotiate such a ban with the Soviet Union and then with other nations, because the ability efficiently to destroy the satellites of others is less valuable to the U.S. than the reduced threat to our own satellites under a treaty regime.

  5. Polymeric materials replacement issues for the LANL stockpile.

    SciTech Connect

    Sandoval, C. W.; Gladysz, G. M.; Stephens, T. S.; Gleiman, S. S.; Mendoza, D.; Baker, G. K.; Schoonover, J. R.; Schneider, Jim; Perry, B.; Lula, J. W.

    2002-01-01

    A number of materials in the LANL stockpile are no longer available due to lack of availability or environment, safety and health issues. Silastic S-5370 a polysiloxane foam used to manufacture multiple components in LANL systems has been discontinued by Dow Corning. Kerimid 601 is a polyimide resin used as the binder for the syntactic foam used as a support material in the W76. It contains MDA, which has been identified by OSHA as a carcinogen and is no longer used in the nuclear weapons complex. In addition, the Thornel carbon mat used in the syntactic foam formulation is no longer available. These issues have created major challenges in the effort to reestablish aft support production capability for the W76 LEP. Urethane Encapsulant 7200, an adhesive used to bond explosive booster pellets and detonator components, was originally manufactured by Hexcel Corporation and is no longer available. The details of the projects currently underway to provide replacements for these materials will be discussed.

  6. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  7. Technical basis for chemical stockpile emergency planning

    SciTech Connect

    Newsom, D.E.; Madore, M.A.; Paddock, R.A.; Absil, M.J.G.

    1995-06-01

    As part of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, an Accident Planning Base Review Group (APBRG) was convened in December 1992. The APBRG`s mission was to update the accident basis for protective action strategy planning in the vicinity of eight US chemical agent stockpile sites. The results of the APBRG`s work are being issued as site-specific Emergency Planning Guides (EPGs). The EPGs give emergency planners--Army, State, and local--updated assessment of the chemical hazard and guidance on how to plan for a broad range of accidents by planning for a manageable number of accident categories. This paper addresses: (1) the rationale for updating the accident planning base; (2) the modeling methodology used to assess the chemical hazard; and (3) strategies that are advocated in the EPGs for the use of models by planners.

  8. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

  9. Analytical Characterization of the Thorium Nitrate Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Mattus, CH

    2003-12-30

    For several years, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been supporting the Defense Logistics Agency-Defense National Stockpile Center with stewardship of a thorium nitrate (ThN) stockpile. The effort for fiscal year 2002 was to prepare a sampling and analysis plan and to use the activities developed in the plan to characterize the ThN stockpile. The sampling was performed in June and July 2002 by RWE NUKEM with oversight by ORNL personnel. The analysis was performed by Southwest Research Institute of San Antonio, Texas, and data validation was performed by NFT, Inc., of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Of the {approx} 21,000 drums in the stockpile, 99 were sampled and 53 were analyzed for total metals composition, radiological constituents (using alpha and gamma spectrometry), and oxidizing characteristics. Each lot at the Curtis Bay Depot was sampled. Several of the samples were also analyzed for density. The average density of the domestic ThN was found to be 1.89 {+-} 0.08 g/cm{sup 3}. The oxidizer test was performed following procedures issued by the United Nations in 1999. Test results indicated that none of the samples tested was a Division 5.1 oxidizer per Department of Transportation definition. The samples were analyzed for total metals following the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency methods SW-846-6010B and 6020 (EPA 2003) using a combination of inductively coupled plasma--atomic emission spectroscopy and inductively coupled plasma--mass spectroscopy techniques. The results were used to compare the composition of the eight Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals present in the sample (arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, and silver) to regulatory limits. None of the samples was found to be hazardous for toxicity characteristics. The radiological analyses confirmed, when possible, the results obtained by the inductively coupled plasma analyses. These results--combined with the historical process knowledge acquired on the material and the results of previous tests--classified the ThN as low-level radioactive waste for disposal purposes. This characterization was necessary to continue the efforts associated with disposition of the material at the Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada. With the current work presented in this report, the analytical characterization phase is completed for this source material stockpile.

  10. Modeling of coal stockpiles using a finite elements method

    SciTech Connect

    Ozdeniz, A.H.; Sensogut, C.

    2008-07-01

    In the case of coal stockpiles finding suitable environmental conditions, spontaneous combustion phenomenon will be unavoidable. In this study, an industrial-sized stockpile having a shape of triangle prism was constituted in a coal stockyard of Western Lignite Corporation (WLC), Turkey. The parameters of time, humidity and temperature of air, atmospheric pressure, velocity and direction of wind values that are effective on coal stockpile were measured in a continuous manner. These experimental works were transferred into a computer media in order to obtain similar outcomes by carrying out 2-dimensional analysis of the stockpile with Finite Elements Method (FEM). The performed experimental studies and obtained results were then compared.

  11. Requirements for the development of advanced nuclear weapon concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Brown, P.S.

    1990-01-15

    In this paper, requirements for the development of advanced nuclear weapon concepts are discussed. This paper addresses third generation nuclear weapons, and the advance workshop literature describes third generation nuclear weapons as including earth penetrating warheads (EPWs) and maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs), as well as nuclear directed energy weapons (NDEWs). A historical context for the evolution of advanced nuclear weapon concepts is presented, discussing the types of advanced concepts and how they differ from conventional nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile. The policy context for doing R D on nuclear directed energy weapons and how this R D relates to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is discussed. Some military requirements for the various advanced concepts and discuss potential missions are provided, indicating the potential advantages and disadvantages of the various applications. Arms control and stability considerations as they relate to the development of advanced concepts and the implications of the rapidly changing political relationships between the US and the Soviets, and between their respective allies are also discussed.

  12. University Research Program in Robotics - "Technologies for Micro-Electrical-Mechanical Systems in directed Stockpile Work (DSW) Radiation and Campaigns", Final Technical Annual Report, Project Period 9/1/06 - 8/31/07

    SciTech Connect

    James S. Tulenko; Carl D. Crane

    2007-12-13

    The University Research Program in Robotics (URPR) is an integrated group of universities performing fundamental research that addresses broad-based robotics and automation needs of the NNSA Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) and Campaigns. The URPR mission is to provide improved capabilities in robotics science and engineering to meet the future needs of all weapon systems and other associated NNSA/DOE activities.

  13. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-01

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  14. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  15. 76 FR 58463 - National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee Request for Public Comments on the Potential...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-21

    ...110907572-1571-01] National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee Request for Public Comments on the Potential Market Impact of Proposed Stockpile for Fiscal Year...the National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee (MIC), co-chaired by...

  16. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  17. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section...STANDARDS-OPERATIONS ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be...

  18. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  19. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  20. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  1. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section...STANDARDS-OPERATIONS ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be...

  2. Thorium Nitrate Stockpile--From Here to Eternity

    SciTech Connect

    Hermes, W. H.; Hylton, T. D.; Mattus, C.H.; Storch, S. N.; Singley, P.S.; Terry. J. W.; Pecullan, M.; Reilly, F. K.

    2003-02-26

    The Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC), a field level activity of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has stewardship of a stockpile of thorium nitrate that has been in storage for decades. The stockpile is made up of approximately 3.2 million kg (7 million lb) of thorium nitrate crystals (hydrate form) stored at two depot locations in the United States. DNSC sought technical assistance from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to define and quantify the management options for the thorium nitrate stockpile. This paper describes methodologies and results comprising the work in Phase 1 and Phase 2. The results allow the DNSC to structure and schedule needed tasks to ensure continued safe long-term storage and/or phased disposal of the stockpile.

  3. Locations and Status of Stockpile SitesLocations and Status of Stockpile Sites Pueblo,COPueblo,CO

    E-print Network

    obsolete and deteriorating with age. The U.S. national stockpile of lethal chemical warfare agents 32, Chemical and Biological Warfare Program· Section 1521, Destruction of existing stockpile of Section 1523, Annual report on chemical and biological warfare defense> National Center for Environmental

  4. Science Based Stockpile Stewardship, Uncertainty Quantification, and Surrogate Reactions

    SciTech Connect

    Stoyer, M A; McNabb, D P; Burke, J T; Bernstein, L A

    2009-08-06

    Stewardship of this nation's nuclear weapons is predicated on developing a fundamental scientific understanding of the physics and chemistry required to describe weapon performance without the need to resort to underground nuclear testing and to predict expected future performance as a result of intended or unintended modifications. In order to construct more reliable models, underground nuclear test data is being reanalyzed in novel ways. To improve the interpretation of these experiments with quantified uncertainties, improved nuclear data is required. As an example, the thermonuclear yield of a device was often inferred through the use of radiochemical detectors. Conversion of the detector activations observed to thermonuclear yield was accomplished through explosion code calculations (models) and a good set of nuclear reaction cross-sections. Because of the unique high-fluence environment of an exploding nuclear weapon, many reactions occurred on radioactive nuclides, for which only theoretically calculated cross-sections are available. Surrogate nuclear reactions at STARS/LIBERACE offer the opportunity to measure cross-sections on unstable nuclei and thus improve the quality of the nuclear reaction cross-section sets. One radiochemical detector that was loaded in devices was mono-isotopic yttrium ({sup 89}Y). Nuclear reactions produced {sup 87}Y and {sup 88}Y which could be quantified post-shot as a ratio of {sup 87}Y/{sup 88}Y. The yttrium cross-section set from 1988 is shown in Figure 1(a) and contains approximately 62 cross-sections interconnecting the yttrium nuclides. The 6 experimentally measured cross-sections are shown in Figure 1(b). Any measurement of cross-sections on {sup 87}Y or {sup 88}Y would improve the quality of the cross-section set. A recent re-evaluation of the yttrium cross-section set was performed with many more calculated reaction cross-sections included.

  5. Speculation without Oil Stockpiling as a Signature: A Dynamic Perspective

    E-print Network

    Babusiaux, Denis

    According to the standard analysis of commodity prices, stockpiling is a necessary signature of speculation. This paper develops an approach suggesting that speculation may temporarily push crude oil prices above the level ...

  6. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ...materials. Where combinations of such soil materials created by mixing have been shown to be equally or more favorable for plant growth than the B horizon, separate handling is not necessary. (d) Stockpiles shall be placed within the permit...

  7. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ...materials. Where combinations of such soil materials created by mixing have been shown to be equally or more favorable for plant growth than the B horizon, separate handling is not necessary. (d) Stockpiles shall be placed within the permit...

  8. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ...materials. Where combinations of such soil materials created by mixing have been shown to be equally or more favorable for plant growth than the B horizon, separate handling is not necessary. (d) Stockpiles shall be placed within the permit...

  9. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    30 Mineral Resources 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL...

  10. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL...

  11. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    30 Mineral Resources 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL...

  12. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    30 Mineral Resources 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL...

  13. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL...

  14. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOEpatents

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  15. Science based stockpile stewardship, uncertainty quantification, and fission fragment beams

    SciTech Connect

    Stoyer, M A; McNabb, D; Burke, J; Bernstein, L A; Wu, C Y

    2009-09-14

    Stewardship of this nation's nuclear weapons is predicated on developing a fundamental scientific understanding of the physics and chemistry required to describe weapon performance without the need to resort to underground nuclear testing and to predict expected future performance as a result of intended or unintended modifications. In order to construct more reliable models, underground nuclear test data is being reanalyzed in novel ways. The extent to which underground experimental data can be matched with simulations is one measure of the credibility of our capability to predict weapon performance. To improve the interpretation of these experiments with quantified uncertainties, improved nuclear data is required. As an example, the fission yield of a device was often determined by measuring fission products. Conversion of the measured fission products to yield was accomplished through explosion code calculations (models) and a good set of nuclear reaction cross-sections. Because of the unique high-fluence environment of an exploding nuclear weapon, many reactions occurred on radioactive nuclides, for which only theoretically calculated cross-sections are available. Inverse kinematics reactions at CARIBU offer the opportunity to measure cross-sections on unstable neutron-rich fission fragments and thus improve the quality of the nuclear reaction cross-section sets. One of the fission products measured was {sup 95}Zr, the accumulation of all mass 95 fission products of Y, Sr, Rb and Kr (see Fig. 1). Subsequent neutron-induced reactions on these short lived fission products were assumed to cancel out - in other words, the destruction of mass 95 nuclides was more or less equal to the production of mass 95 nuclides. If a {sup 95}Sr was destroyed by an (n,2n) reaction it was also produced by (n,2n) reactions on {sup 96}Sr, for example. However, since these nuclides all have fairly short half-lives (seconds to minutes or even less), no experimental nuclear reaction cross-sections exist, and only theoretically modeled cross-sections are available. Inverse kinematics reactions at CARIBU offer the opportunity, should the beam intensity be sufficient, to measure cross-sections on a few important nuclides in order to benchmark the theoretical calculations and significantly improve the nuclear data. The nuclides in Fig. 1 are prioritized by importance factor and displayed in stoplight colors, green the highest and red the lowest priority.

  16. The human element in Russia`s chemical weapons disposal efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Khripunov, I.

    1995-07-01

    There has been ample room for global concern about the speed with which the Russian Federation has been moving to destroy the enormous stockpile of Soviet-built chemical warfare (CW) agents since the termination of CS production in 1987. The use of CW by terrorists in Japan in 1995 brought new focus on the need to eliminate the CW stockpiles. Coincidence or not, the Russian government took a major public step toward dismantling CW weapons just four days after the Tokyo terrorist attack. The author examines the reasons for the delays in Russian CW decommissioning effort and the failure to consider the human element in dealing with local communities where CW weapons are to be destroyed.

  17. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  18. Towards a mutually reinforcing future : opportunities to integrate nuclear weapons stewardship and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-07-01

    2010 NPR and President Obama's 2009 Prague Speech highlighted two key objectives with an inherent underlying tension: (1) Moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons; and (2) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Objective 1 depends, inter alia, upon reductions in stockpiles at home and abroad and maintaining stability. Objective 2 depends upon needed investments in modernization and life extension. Objectives being pursued predominantly in parallel by largely separate communities.

  19. NEAR REAL TIME CHARACTERIZATION OF BNL STOCKPILED SOILS, ANOTHER ASTD SUCCESS STORY.

    SciTech Connect

    BOWERMAN,B.S.; ADAMS,J.W.; KALB,P.D.; LOCKWOOD,A.

    2003-02-23

    As of October 2001, approximately 7,000 yd{sup 3} of stockpiled soil, contaminated to varying degrees with radioactive materials and heavy metals, remained at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) after the remediation of the BNL Chemical/Animal/Glass Pits disposal area. During the 1997 removal action, the more hazardous/radioactive materials were segregated, along with, chemical liquids and solids, animal carcasses, intact gas cylinders, and a large quantity of metal and glass debris. Nearly all of these materials have been disposed of. In order to ensure that all debris was removed and to characterize the large quantity of heterogeneous soil, BNL initiated an extended sorting, segregation, and characterization project, co-funded by the BNL Environmental Management Directorate and the DOE EM Office of Science and Technology Accelerated Site Technology Deployment (ASTD) program. Project objectives were to remove any non-conforming items, and to assure that mercury and radioactive contaminant levels were within acceptable limits for disposal as low-level radioactive waste. Sorting and segregation were conducted simultaneously. Large stockpiles, ranging from 150 to 1,200 yd{sup 3}, were subdivided into manageable 20 yd{sup 3} ''subpiles'' after powered vibratory screening. The 1/2 inch screen removed gravel and almost all non-conforming items, which were separated for further characterization. Soil that passed through the screen was also visually inspected before being moved to a subpile. Eight samples plus QA duplicates were collected from each subpile for chemical analysis, and a 1-Liter jar of material for gamma spectroscopy. A field lab equipped for chemical analysis and gamma spectroscopy was set up in a trailer close by the stockpile site. Chemical analysis included X-ray fluorescence (XRF) to screen for high (>260 ppm) total mercury concentrations, and modified Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) tests to verify that the soils were not RCRA hazardous. The modified (1/10th scale) TCLP tests minimized secondary (leachate) waste and maximized tumbler capacity and sample throughput. TCLP leachate analysis was accomplished using a Milestone Direct Mercury Analyzer (DMA-80). Gamma spectroscopy provided verification of previously measured Am-241, Cs-137, and Co-60 contamination levels. After analyses were completed and reviewed, the stockpiles were reconstructed for later disposal as discrete entities within a disposal site profile. The ASTD field laboratory completed more than 2,500 analyses of total Hg (XRF) and TCLP/DMA analyses over an 18-week period. Reliable statistical verification was accomplished for more than 98% of the stockpile sub-piles; for most sub-piles, TCLP analyses were completed within two days. This enhanced level of confidence in soil characterization was accomplished at a cost far below equivalent baseline techniques. One of the most significant aspects of the project success was schedule acceleration. The original schedule projected activities extending from early April until September 30. Due to efficiency and reliability of the vibratory screening operation and cooperative, dry summer weather, stockpile reconstruction was completed in the third week of August. Reduction of the planned sample collection rate, from three samples per 5 yd{sup 3} to two, resulted in further schedule acceleration. The resulting sample frequency, however, was still 22 times greater than the baseline frequency (one per 55 yd{sup 3}).

  20. Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, August 3, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The hearing addresses H.R. 4849 a bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. The proposed text of the legislation is included. Statement of government and industry officials are included along with documents submitted for the record.

  1. Decrease of calorific value and particle size in coal stockpiles

    SciTech Connect

    Sensogut, C.; Ozdeniz, A.H.

    2008-07-01

    During storage of excess amount of coal, they lose both their economical value and cause environmental problems. In this work, two industrial-sized stockpiles were constituted at a coal stockyard of Western Lignite Corporation (WLC) in Tuncbilek, Turkey. The size of the stockpiles, formed as triangle prisms, was about 10 m x 5 m wide with a height of 3 m; each mass being approximately 120 tons of coal in total. Some of the parameters that were effective on the stockpiles were measured in a continuous manner during this experimental work. The calorific losses and the decreases that occurred in particle size due to atmospheric conditions were also examined and detailed as the result of this work.

  2. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program rapid accident assessment

    SciTech Connect

    Chester, C.V.

    1990-08-01

    This report develops a scheme for the rapid assessment of a release of toxic chemicals resulting from an accident in one of the most chemical weapon demilitarization plants or storage areas. The system uses such inputs as chemical and pressure sensors monitoring the plant and reports of accidents radioed to the Emergency Operations Center by work parties or monitoring personnel. A size of release can be estimated from previous calculations done in the risk analysis, from back calculation from an open-air chemical sensor measurement, or from an estimated percentage of the inventory of agent at the location of the release. Potential consequences of the estimated release are calculated from real-time meteorological data, surrounding population data, and properties of the agent. In addition to the estimated casualties, area coverage and no-death contours vs time would be calculated. Accidents are assigned to one of four categories: community emergencies, which are involve a threat to off-site personnel; on-post emergencies, which involve a threat only to on-site personnel; advisory, which involves a potential for threat to on-site personnel; and chemical occurrence, which can produce an abnormal operating condition for the plant but no immediate threat to on-site personnel. 9 refs., 20 tabs.

  3. Potential Radon-222 Emissions from the Thorium Nitrate Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Terry, J.W.

    2003-09-04

    The Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC), a field level activity of the Defense Logistics Agency, has stewardship of a stockpile of thorium nitrate that has been in storage for decades. The thorium nitrate stockpile was produced from 1959 to 1964 for the Atomic Energy Commission and previously has been under the control of several federal agencies. The stockpile consists of approximately 7 million pounds of thorium nitrate crystals (hydrate form) stored at two depot locations in the United States (75% by weight at Curtis Bay, Maryland, and 25% by weight at Hammond, Indiana). The material is stored in several configurations in over 21,000 drums. The U.S. Congress has declared the entire DNSC thorium nitrate stockpile to be in excess of the needs of the Department of Defense. Part of DNSC's mission is to safely manage the continued storage, future sales, and/or disposition of the thorium nitrate stockpile. Historically, DNSC has sold surplus thorium nitrate to domestic and foreign companies, but there is no demand currently for this material. Analyses conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2001 demonstrated that disposition of the thorium nitrate inventory as a containerized waste, without processing, is the least complex and lowest-cost option for disposition. A characterization study was conducted in 2002 by ORNL, and it was determined that the thorium nitrate stockpile may be disposed of as low-level waste. The Nevada Test Site (NTS) was used as a case study for the disposal alternative, and special radiological analyses and waste acceptance requirements were documented. Among the special radiological considerations is the emission of {sup 220}Rn and {sup 222}Rn from buried material. NTS has a performance objective on the emissions of radon: 20 pCi m{sup -2} sec{sup -1} at the surface of the disposal facility. The radon emissions from the buried thorium nitrate stockpile have been modeled. This paper presents background information and summarizes the results of modeling radon emissions and compares those results with the NTS performance objective.

  4. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  5. Stockpiled Prairie Grass For Fall-Grazing Lambs

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    New varieties of prairiegrass (Bromus catharticus Vahl. = B. willdenowii Kunth.) exhibit improved persistence over 'Matua' under USA growing conditions, but animal performance data is lacking. Therefore, we evaluated performance of lambs grazing fall-stockpiled 'Dixon' prairiegrass on a West Virgin...

  6. Leachate From Biosolid Stockpiles: Nutrients and Metal Mobility.

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peckenham, J. M.; Nadeau, J. A.; Amirbahman, A.; Brutsaert, W.; Wilson, J.

    2004-05-01

    Field stacking of biosolids prior to utilization is a standard agricultural practice. The Maine Department of Environmental Protection is concerned about how this stacking affects groundwater quality, in particular, nitrate-N leached from stockpiles. Maine regulations have had much stricter siting standards for field stacking since 2002. In 2002 we initiated an experiment to characterize the nitrogen chemistry of leachate. Mass loading of nitrogen leaving stockpiles was determined experimentally by placing biosolids on plastic-lined cells to collect liquid flowing through and over the pile. These piles contained approximately 60 cubic meters of biosolids. Biosolid stockpile geometry affects the amount of leachate generated. In a parallel experiment, the composition of leachate moving through till-derived soil has been gauged using pan lysimeters and shallow wells under field conditions. Initial results indicate that ammonia is the dominant nitrogen species released (2,200 to 4,800 mg/L). Nitrate concentrations were found to be less than 1 mg/L in the leachate. Dissolved organic carbon loading was also high (5,800 to 10,000 mg/L). Several heavy metals and phosphorous were detected in association with the leachate in the surrounding lysimeters and boreholes. Additional data from sites reclaimed using biosolids substantiate the transport of nitrogen and metals to groundwater, even without the concentrating effect of stockpiles. These data suggest that soils may not significantly attenuate metal transport under ambient conditions.

  7. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section 823.12 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR PERMANENT PROGRAM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS SPECIAL PERMANENT PROGRAM PERFORMANCE STANDARDS-OPERATIONS ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal...

  8. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES...

  9. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES...

  10. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    PubMed

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary. PMID:16296384

  11. Planning guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

    SciTech Connect

    Shumpert, B.L.; Watson, A.P.; Sorensen, J.H. and others

    1995-02-01

    This planning guide was developed under the direction of the U.S. Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which jointly coordinate and direct the development of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). It was produced to assist state, local, and Army installation planners in formulating and coordinating plans for chemical events that may occur at the chemical agent stockpile storage locations in the continental United States. This document provides broad planning guidance for use by both on-post and off-post agencies and organizations in the development of a coordinated plan for responding to chemical events. It contains checklists to assist in assuring that all important aspects are included in the plans and procedures developed at each Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) location. The checklists are supplemented by planning guidelines in the appendices which provide more detailed guidance regarding some issues. The planning guidance contained in this document will help ensure that adequate coordination between on-post and off-post planners occurs during the planning process. This planning guide broadly describes an adequate emergency planning base that assures that critical planning decisions will be made consistently at every chemical agent stockpile location. This planning guide includes material drawn from other documents developed by the FEMA, the Army, and other federal agencies with emergency preparedness program responsibilities. Some of this material has been developed specifically to meet the unique requirements of the CSEPP. In addition to this guidance, other location-specific documents, technical studies, and support studies should be used as needed to assist in the planning at each of the chemical agent stockpile locations to address the specific hazards and conditions at each location.

  12. Uncontrolled stockpiles of horse manure can be an unsightly, smelly and fly-infested mess. Stockpiles also

    E-print Network

    Mukhtar, Saqib

    . Stockpiles also can cause runoff pollution in nearby streams and ponds. For horse enthusiasts, veterinarians Agricultural Engineer, Extension Associate/Water Quality, Randall County Extension Agent-Agriculture, and Professor and Resident Director, Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Amarillo; The Texas A&M University

  13. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    PubMed

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system. PMID:22523138

  14. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  15. Emergency preparedness among people living near US army chemical weapons sites after September 11, 2001.

    PubMed

    Williams, Bryan L; Magsumbol, Melina S

    2007-09-01

    We examined trust in the army and perceptions of emergency preparedness among residents living near the Anniston, Ala, and Richmond, Ky, US Army chemical weapons stockpile sites shortly after September 11, 2001. Residents (n = 655) living near the 2 sites who participated in a cross-sectional population were relatively unprepared in the event of a chemical emergency. The events of September 11 gave rise to concerns regarding the security of stored chemical weapons and the sites' vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Although residents expressed trust in the army to manage chemical weapons safely, only a few expressed a desire to actively participate in site decisions. Compliance with procedures during emergencies could be seriously limited, putting residents in these sites at higher levels of risk of exposure to chemical hazards than nonresidents. PMID:17666684

  16. Multiple smart weapons employment mechanism

    SciTech Connect

    McGlynn, M.P.; Meiklejohn, W.D.

    1993-07-20

    A digital communications armament network adaptor is described for carrying multiple smart weapons on a single wing pylon station of an aircraft, comprising: an aircraft having a weapons controller configured in compliance with MIL-STD 1553; multiple wing-mounted pylons on said aircraft, each providing a weapons station with communications and ejection and release mechanisms electrically connected to said controller for the airborne launch of smart weapons; a multiple ejector rack affixed to at least one pylon, said rack holding a plurality of smart weapons; and an electronic digital network connected between the controller and said rack-mounted smart weapons, said network located in said rack and including circuitry which receives coded digital communications from said controller and selectively rebroadcasts said communications to one of said smart weapons on said rack designated by said coded communications, thereby controlling all required functions of said designated smart weapon.

  17. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    E-print Network

    Tang, Alfred

    2008-01-01

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  18. Neutrino Counter Nuclear Weapon

    E-print Network

    Alfred Tang

    2013-06-25

    Radiations produced by neutrino-antineutrino annihilation at the Z0 pole can be used to heat up the primary stage of a thermonuclear warhead and can in principle detonate the device remotely. Neutrino-antineutrino annihilation can also be used as a tactical assault weapon to target hideouts that are unreachable by conventional means.

  19. Names and Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kauffman, Charles

    1989-01-01

    Traces the theoretical significance of using names as titles for situations, and applies this analysis to the United States' intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Argues that the names given to ICBMs preserve their utility as weapons by linking them to the myths of the nineteenth-century western frontier. (MM)

  20. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  1. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  2. Medicalized weapons & modern war.

    PubMed

    Gross, Michael L

    2010-01-01

    "Medicalized" weapons--those that rely on advances in neuroscience, physiology, and pharmacology--offer the prospect of reducing casualties and protecting civilians. They could be especially useful in modern asymmetric wars in which conventional states are pitted against guerrilla or insurgent forces. But may physicians and other medical workers participate in their development? PMID:20166514

  3. Nuclear weapons in Europe

    SciTech Connect

    Pierre, A.J.

    1984-01-01

    This book presents papers on the issue of the deployment of intermediate-range American nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Topics considered include an American view on the struggle for Europe, military strategy, nuclear deterrence, the illusion of NATO's nuclear defense, arms control, political aspects, national security, and a German Social Democrat's perspective on nuclear weapons in Europe.

  4. Manual for national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E.A.; Gualtieri, D.S.; Grimes, S.W.

    1993-12-01

    The Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature, January 13, 1993, in Paris, France (CWC), is an unprecedented multilateral effort to eradicate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and assure their continued absence through international verification. The CWC has been signed by over 150 nations, and is expected to enter into force in 1995. With its far-reaching system to verify compliance, the CWC presages a new foundation for international security based neither on fear nor on trust, but on the rule of law. A central feature of the CWC is that it requires each State Party to take implementing measures to make the Convention operative. The CWC goes beyond all prior arms control treaties in this regard. For this approach to succeed, and to inspire the eradication of other categories of mass destruction weaponry, coordination and planning are vital to harmonize CWC national implementation among States Parties. This Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is designed to assist States Parties, duly taking into account the distinctive aspects of their legal systems, in maximizing CWC enforcement consistent with their national legal obligations.

  5. Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21). Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, March 22, April 13, May 13 and 17, June 9 and 23, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The hearing addresses implementation of the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. Key provisions of the Treaty are provided. Global aspects of the scope of chemical weapons included in the Convention are also examined. Statement of government and military officials are included along with documents submitted for the record.

  6. Military implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, August 9, 11, 18, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The hearing addresses implementation of the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. The impact on military organizations is examined. Global aspects of the scope of chemical weapons included in the Convention are also examined. Statement of government and military officials are included along with documents submitted for the record.

  7. Test Procedure Conducted Energy Weapons

    E-print Network

    Adler, Andy

    Test Procedure for Conducted Energy Weapons Version 1.1 2010/07/31 #12;Contents Page 0.0 Disclaimer A TASER M26 13 Appendix B TASER X26 23 #12;1 Test Procedure for Conducted Energy Weapons 0.0 Disclaimer Energy Weapons ("CEWs") in a controlled and repeatable manner across jurisdictions. The consistent

  8. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    SciTech Connect

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  9. Early retirement for weaponeers?

    SciTech Connect

    Weisman, J.

    1994-07-01

    Department of Energy`s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory`s once-vital nuclear weapons division is now in dire straits. The laboratory was established in 1952, during the titanic struggle over the hydrogen bomb, has grown steadily from $7 million to its peak of $1.1 billion in 1991. The future for key members of their most experienced weapons design team is uncertain. Over the past two years, Livermore`s operating budget has fallen by 12.5 percent or $127.6 million. Nearly 750 employees, 10 percent of the work force, accepted early retirement offers last year. Further budget cuts will force another 300 to 600 personnel out by the end of 1995. The future resides in the U.S. Congress.

  10. US nuclear weapons policy

    SciTech Connect

    May, M.

    1990-12-05

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  11. Modular weapon control unit

    SciTech Connect

    Boccabella, M.F.; McGovney, G.N.

    1997-01-01

    The goal of the Modular Weapon Control Unit (MWCU) program was to design and develop a reconfigurable weapon controller (programmer/sequencer) that can be adapted to different weapon systems based on the particular requirements for that system. Programmers from previous systems are conceptually the same and perform similar tasks. Because of this commonality and the amount of re-engineering necessary with the advent of every new design, the idea of a modular, adaptable system has emerged. Also, the controller can be used in more than one application for a specific weapon system. Functionality has been divided into a Processor Module (PM) and an Input/Output Module (IOM). The PM will handle all operations that require calculations, memory, and timing. The IOM will handle interfaces to the rest of the system, input level shifting, output drive capability, and detection of interrupt conditions. Configuration flexibility is achieved in two ways. First, the operation of the PM is determined by a surface mount Read-Only Memory (ROM). Other surface-mount components can be added or neglected as necessary for functionality. Second, IOMs consist of configurable input buffers, configurable output drivers, and configurable interrupt generation. Further, these modules can be added singly or in groups to a Processor Module to achieve the required I/O configuration. The culmination of this LDRD was the building of both Processor Module and Input/Output Module. The MWCU was chosen as a test system to evaluate Low-Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) technology, desirable for high component density and good thermal characteristics.

  12. Enhancement and fusion of data for concealed weapon detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Slamani, Mohamed-Adel; Ramac, Liane C.; Uner, Mucahit K.; Varshney, Pramod K.; Weiner, Donald D.; Alford, Mark G.; Ferris, David D., Jr.; Vannicola, Vincent C.

    1997-07-01

    A wide variety of concealed weapon detection systems are being investigated to determine the potential payoffs of employing these sensors to detect weapons concealed under a person's clothing. The enabling sensing mechanisms being studied include infrared, acoustic, millimeter wave, and X- ray sensors. The primary emphasis of this paper is on infrared. A new technique for processing sensor data by partitioning non-homogeneous images into homogeneous regions for later detection and identification processing is presented. The name of this method is Automated Statistical Characterization and Partitioning of Environments (A'SCAPE). A'SCAPE enables image enhancement for reliable detection and identification of weapons concealed under varying layers of clothing through its mapping process. By employing a variety of sensors, another enabling technology for concealed weapon detection (CWD) is sensor fusion. Concepts for experiments and analysis are discussed to determine the feasibility of sensor fusion approaches for CWD.

  13. Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    Dattelbaum, Dana

    2014-11-03

    As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

  14. Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

    ScienceCinema

    Dattelbaum, Dana

    2015-01-05

    As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

  15. EEC 581 Computer Architecture Lec 9 Multiprocessors (4.1 & 4.2)

    E-print Network

    Yu, Chansu

    (petroleum) exploration) · DoE stockpile stewardship (to ensure the safety and reliability of the nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons) · Earth and climate (climate and weather prediction, earthquake, tsunami

  16. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  17. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  18. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  19. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  20. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  1. Biosolid stockpiles are a significant point source for greenhouse gas emissions.

    PubMed

    Majumder, Ramaprasad; Livesley, Stephen J; Gregory, David; Arndt, Stefan K

    2014-10-01

    The wastewater treatment process generates large amounts of sewage sludge that are dried and then often stored in biosolid stockpiles in treatment plants. Because the biosolids are rich in decomposable organic matter they could be a significant source for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet there are no direct measurements of GHG from stockpiles. We therefore measured the direct emissions of methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and carbon dioxide (CO2) on a monthly basis from three different age classes of biosolid stockpiles at the Western Treatment Plant (WTP), Melbourne, Australia, from December 2009 to November 2011 using manual static chambers. All biosolid stockpiles were a significant point source for CH4 and N2O emissions. The youngest biosolids (<1 year old) had the greatest CH4 and N2O emissions of 60.2 kg of CO2-e per Mg of biosolid per year. Stockpiles that were between 1 and 3 years old emitted less overall GHG (?29 kg CO2-e Mg(-1) yr(-1)) and the oldest stockpiles emitted the least GHG (?10 kg CO2-e Mg(-1) yr(-1)). Methane emissions were negligible in all stockpiles but the relative contribution of N2O and CO2 changed with stockpile age. The youngest stockpile emitted two thirds of the GHG emission as N2O, while the 1-3 year old stockpile emitted an equal amount of N2O and CO2 and in the oldest stockpile CO2 emissions dominated. We did not detect any seasonal variability of GHG emissions and did not observe a correlation between GHG flux and environmental variables such as biosolid temperature, moisture content or nitrate and ammonium concentration. We also modeled CH4 emissions based on a first order decay model and the model based estimated annual CH4 emissions were higher as compared to the direct field based estimated annual CH4 emissions. Our results indicate that labile organic material in stockpiles is decomposed over time and that nitrogen decomposition processes lead to significant N2O emissions. Carbon decomposition favors CO2 over CH4 production probably because of aerobic stockpile conditions or CH4 oxidation in the outer stockpile layers. Although the GHG emission rate decreased with biosolid age, managers of biosolid stockpiles should assess alternate storage or uses for biosolids to avoid nutrient losses and GHG emissions. PMID:24835360

  2. Use of hazard assessments to achieve risk reduction in the USDOE Stockpile Stewardship (SS-21) Program

    SciTech Connect

    Fischer, S.R.; Konkel, H.; Bott, T.; Eisenhawer, S.W.; DeYoung, L.; Hockert, J.

    1995-07-01

    This paper summarizes the nuclear explosive hazard assessment activities performed to support US Department of Energy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Demonstration Project SS-21, better known as the ``Seamless Safety`` program. Past practice within the DOE Complex has dictated the use of a significant number of post-design/fabrication safety reviews to analyze the safety associated with operations on nuclear explosives and to answer safety questions. These practices have focused on reviewing-in or auditing-in safety vs incorporating safety in the design process. SS-21 was proposed by the DOE as an avenue to develop a program to ``integrate established, recognized, verifiable safety criteria into the process at the design stage rather than continuing the reliance on reviews, evaluations and audits.`` The entire Seamless Safety design and development process is verified by a concurrent hazard assessment (HA). The primary purpose of the SS-21 Demonstration Project HA was to demonstrate the feasibility of performing concurrent HAs as part of an engineering design and development effort and then to evaluate the use of the HA to provide an indication in the risk reduction or gain in safety achieved. To accomplish this objective, HAs were performed on both baseline (i.e., old) and new (i.e. SS-21) B61-0 Center Case Section disassembly processes. These HAs were used to support the identification and documentation of weapon- and process-specific hazards and safety-critical operating steps. Both HAs focused on identifying accidents that had the potential for worker injury, public health effects, facility damage, toxic gas release, and dispersal of radioactive materials. A comparison of the baseline and SS-21 process risks provided a semi-quantitative estimate of the risk reduction gained via the Seamless Safety process.

  3. Weapons and Minority Youth Violence.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Northrop, Daphne; Hamrick, Kim

    Weapons violence is a major public health problem that especially impacts minority youth. Interventions designed to reduce weapon use by youth are categorized as educational/behavioral change, legal, and technological/environmental. Few educational programs currently exist, but those that do largely concern firearm safety courses, public…

  4. Nuclear weapon-free zones

    SciTech Connect

    Zinner, P.E.

    1988-06-01

    The literature dealing with nuclear weapon-free zones is not as prominent as is that on arms control and reduction negotiations, confidence-building measures, and a variety of other security-related issues. Documentary sources are relatively scarce and they are widely scattered. Yet on close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that nuclear weapon-free zones have been the object of widespread, intense interest in most regions of the world. Six international treaties designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons are now in force. A substantial portion of the globe is already under some sort of nuclear weapon-free regime. Proposals for creating additional nuclear weapon-free zones abound. In Europe, the only region where adversary alliances maintain a high concentration of nuclear weapons, issues concerning the viability of nuclear weapon-free zones have attracted special attention. The following pages contain information intended to help to put problems in perspective, create awareness of trends, and provide a basis for identifying factors that may bear significantly on evaluating options in the formulation of national and alliance security policies concerning nuclear weapon-free zones. 31 refs.

  5. Effects of a chemical weapons incineration plant on red-tailed tropicbirds

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Schreiber, E.A.; Doherty, P.F.; Schenk, G.A.

    2001-01-01

    From 1990 to 2000, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) incinerated part of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll, central Pacific Ocean, which also is a National Wildlife Refuge and home to approximately a half-million breeding seabirds. The effect on wildlife of incineration of these weapons is unknown. Using a multi-strata mark-recapture analysis, we investigated the effects of JACADS on reproductive success, survival, and movement probabilities of red-tailed tropicbirds (Phaethon rubricauda) nesting both downwind and upwind of the incineration site. We found no effect of chemical incineration on these tropicbird demographic parameters over the 8 years of our study. An additional 3 years of monitoring tropicbird demography will take place, post-incineration.

  6. Strategies for the disposition of high explosives resulting from dismantlement of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Pruneda, C.; Humphrey, J.

    1993-03-01

    Many thousands of pounds of high quality main-charge explosives will result as surplus from the dismantlement of returns from the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The method most often employed for dealing with this surplus explosive is destruction by open burning. However, open burning as a means of treating excess explosives is losing favor because of environmental concerns associated with such an uncontrolled thermal destruction process. Thus, alternative processes for treatment of excess explosives from weapon dismantlement is discussed. These alternatives include: reformulation, crystalline component recovery, chemical conversion of the crystalline component to higher value products which may have civilian or military applications and, when necessary, treatment as waste in an environmentally benign fashion.

  7. Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.

    SciTech Connect

    Flores, Kristen Lee

    2004-07-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of potential proliferants.

  8. Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by Chemical Weapons Convention inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Tanzman, E.A.

    1994-10-21

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the United States system of constitutional law. This discussion is about the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by the CWC and about how federal implementing legislation can allow verification inspections to take place in the United States under the Chemical Weapons Convention while remaining in compliance with the Constitution. By implementing legislation, the author means a federal statute that would be enacted separately from Senate approval of the Convention itself. Although implementing legislation is a relatively unusual accompaniment to a treaty, it will be necessary to the CWC, and the Administration has submitted a bill that was under consideration in the last Congress and presumably will be reintroduced early next year. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment problems posed by the CWC arise from the verification inspection scheme embodied in the treaty. The CWC depends heavily on on-site inspections to verify compliance with its key requirements. These include destroying all chemicals weapons stockpiles and bringing potential chemical weapons precursors under international control. The Convention contains four distinct kinds of inspections: systematic inspections of chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities, routine inspections of various declared facilities, challenge inspections, and a variant on challenge inspections in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. All inspections are supposed to be only as intrusive as necessary to carry out the Convention. These inspections will be carried out by inspectors employed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, which is responsible for enforcing the Convention. Generally, the inspected State Party is permitted to assign observers to accompany the inspectors.

  9. Nuclear Theory for Astrophysics, Stockpile Stewardship, and Homeland Security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hayes, Anna

    2004-10-01

    A large number of problems key to astrophysics, stockpile stewardship, and homeland defense rely on knowledge of nuclear physics in regimes inaccessible to experiment. In stellar and nuclear explosions unstable nuclei and nuclear isomers are produced in copious quantities and are used to diagnose the explosion. Similarly, analysis of the unstable nuclei from the debris will be key to attribution in the event of a terrorist domestic nuclear attack. In the case of nuclear non-proliferation a number of new schemes are being considered by the IAEA to address the ever greater needs, including neutrino monitoring of the plutonium content of reactors. For all of these problems detailed nuclear theory is required. In this talk I discuss the theoretical physics needs for the type of problems of overlapping interest to astrophysics and national security.

  10. Consistency analysis on laser signal in laser guided weapon simulation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yin, Ruiguang; Zhang, Wenpan; Guo, Hao; Gan, Lin

    2015-10-01

    The hardware-in-the-loop simulation is widely used in laser semi-active guidance weapon experiments, the authenticity of the laser guidance signal is the key problem of reliability. In order to evaluate the consistency of the laser guidance signal, this paper analyzes the angle of sight, laser energy density, laser spot size, atmospheric back scattering, sun radiation and SNR by comparing the different working state between actual condition and hardware-in-the-loop simulation. Based on measured data, mathematical simulation and optical simulation result, laser guidance signal effects on laser seeker are determined. By using Monte Carlo method, the laser guided weapon trajectory and impact point distribution are obtained, the influence of the systematic error are analyzed. In conclusion it is pointed out that the difference between simulation system and actual system has little influence in normal guidance, has great effect on laser jamming. The research is helpful to design and evaluation of laser guided weapon simulation.

  11. Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension

    SciTech Connect

    Turbiville, G.H.

    1996-06-01

    One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons is the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.

  12. How electroshock weapons kill!

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2010-03-01

    Growing numbers of law enforcement officers now carry an electroshock weapon (ESW). Over 500 U.S. deaths have followed ESW use in the past 26 years; over 450 of these deaths followed use of an electromuscular disruptor in the past 9 years. Most training courses teach that ESWs are safe; that they can kill only by the direct effect of electric current on the heart; and that a death following use of an ESW always has some other cause. All these teachings are false! The last was disproved by Lundquist.^1 Williams^2 ruled out direct electrical effects as a cause of almost all the 213 deaths he studied, leaving disruption of normal physiological processes as the only alternative explanation. Careful study of all such deaths identifies 4 different ways that death has or could have been brought about by the ESW: kidney failure following rhabdomyolysis [rare]; cardiac arrest from hyperkalemia following rhabdomyolysis [undocumented]; lactic acid-induced ventricular fibrillation [conclusive proof impossible]; and [most common] anoxia from so much lactic acid in the circulating blood that it acts as an oxygen scavenger, continuously depleting the blood of oxygen until most of the lactate has been metabolized. ^1M. Lundquist, BAPS 54(1) K1.270(2009). ^2Howard E. Williams, Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death, 2008.

  13. Nuclear weapons are legal tools

    SciTech Connect

    Almond, H.H. Jr.

    1985-05-01

    Responding to an article by Elliot Meyrowitz stating that nuclear weapons are illegal threats, the author observes that international law does not forbid the possession or use of nuclear weapons, whose existence operates as part of the checks and balances process that maintains deterrence. Because nuclear weapons have never been identified among states as illegal, either by treaties or by customary international law, attempts by opposing states to establish illegality through declarations fall short of an effectively shared strategy. The author concludes that we must use the time that deterrence permits to forcefully promote policies optimizing the claims of people for human dignity rather than focusing on the fruitless search to make nuclear weapons illegal.

  14. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  15. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National...THE PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized...are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon....

  16. Is this the time for a high-energy laser weapon program?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kiel, David H.

    2013-02-01

    The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has made large investments weaponizing laser technology for air defense. Despite billions of dollars spent, there has not been a successful transition of a high-energy laser (HEL) weapon from the lab to the field. Is the dream of a low-cost-per-shot, deep-magazine, speed-of-light HEL weapon an impossible dream or a set of technologies that are ready to emerge on the modern battlefield? Because of the rapid revolution taking place in modern warfare that is making conventional defensive weapons very expensive relative to the offensive weapons systems, the pull for less expensive air defense may necessitate a HEL weapon system. Also, due to the recent technological developments in solid-state lasers (SSL), especially fiber lasers, used throughout manufacturing for cutting and welding, a HEL weapon finally may be able to meet all the requirements of ease of use, sustainability, and reliability. Due to changes in warfare and SSL technology advances, the era of HEL weapons isn't over; it may be just starting if DoD takes an evolutionary approach to fielding a HEL weapon. The U.S. Navy, with its large ships and their available electric power, should lead the way.

  17. OPEN FORUM ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Ban

    E-print Network

    Sussex, University of

    OPEN FORUM ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION Challenges to the Chemical Weapons Ban 1 MAY 2003 and Former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons Conference on Disarmament PRESENTATIONS Chemical Weapons Destruction CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: Sergey Baranovsky

  18. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  19. Since leading America's successful effort to develop nuclear weapons in World War II, the U.S. Department of Energy's

    E-print Network

    Since leading America's successful effort to develop nuclear weapons in World War II, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Laboratories have played a central role in keeping our nation secure and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent--are also working to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass

  20. Technique for Measuring Hybrid Electronic Component Reliability

    SciTech Connect

    Green, C.C.; Hernandez, C.L.; Hosking, F.M.; Robinson, D.; Rutherford, B.; Uribe, F.

    1999-01-01

    Materials compatibility studies of aged, engineered materials and hardware are critical to understanding and predicting component reliability, particularly for systems with extended stockpile life requirements. Nondestructive testing capabilities for component reliability would significantly enhance lifetime predictions. For example, if the detection of crack propagation through a solder joint can be demonstrated, this technique could be used to develop baseline information to statistically determine solder joint lifelengths. This report will investigate high frequency signal response techniques for nondestructively evaluating the electrical behavior of thick film hybrid transmission lines.

  1. 78 FR 68028 - National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee Request for Public Comments on the Potential...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-13

    ...the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act...of strategic and critical materials to supply the military, industrial, and essential civilian needs...Stockpile Manager to fund material research and development...

  2. Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory at Pantex: Testing and data handling capabilities of Sandia National Laboratories at the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas

    SciTech Connect

    Peters, W.R.

    1993-08-01

    The Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory (WETL), operated by Sandia Laboratories at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, is engaged primarily in the testing of weapon systems in the stockpile or of newly produced weapon systems for the Sandia Surety Assessment Center. However, the WETL`s unique testing equipment and data-handling facilities are frequently used to serve other organizations. Service to other organizations includes performing special tests on weapon components, subassemblies, and systems for purposes such as basic development and specific problem investigation. The WETL staff also sends equipment to other laboratories for specific tests that cannot be performed at Pantex. For example, we modified and sent equipment to Brookhaven National Laboratory for testing with their Neutral Particle Beam. WETL supplied the engineering expertise to accomplish the needed modifications to the equipment and the technicians to help perform many special tests at Brookhaven. A variety of testing is possible within the WETL, including: Accelerometer, decelerometer, and G-switch g-level/closure testing; Neutron generator performance testing; weapon systems developmental tests; weapon system component testing; weapon system failure-mode-duplication tests; simultaneity measurements; environmental extreme testing; parachute deployment testing; permissive action link (PAL) testing and trajectory-sensing signal generator (TSSG) testing. WETL`s existing equipment configurations do not restrict the testing performed at the WETL. Equipment and facilities are adapted to specific requirements. The WETL`s facilities can often eliminate the need to build or acquire new test equipment, thereby saving time and expense.

  3. Ciliates Expel Environmental Legionella-Laden Pellets To Stockpile Food

    PubMed Central

    Hojo, Fuhito; Sato, Daisuke; Matsuo, Junji; Miyake, Masaki; Nakamura, Shinji; Kunichika, Miyuki; Hayashi, Yasuhiro; Yoshida, Mitsutaka; Takahashi, Kaori; Takemura, Hiromu; Kamiya, Shigeru

    2012-01-01

    When Tetrahymena ciliates are cultured with Legionella pneumophila, the ciliates expel bacteria packaged in free spherical pellets. Why the ciliates expel these pellets remains unclear. Hence, we determined the optimal conditions for pellet expulsion and assessed whether pellet expulsion contributes to the maintenance of growth and the survival of ciliates. When incubated with environmental L. pneumophila, the ciliates expelled the pellets maximally at 2 days after infection. Heat-killed bacteria failed to produce pellets from ciliates, and there was no obvious difference in pellet production among the ciliates or bacterial strains. Morphological studies assessing lipid accumulation showed that pellets contained tightly packed bacteria with rapid lipid accumulation and were composed of the layers of membranes; bacterial culturability in the pellets rapidly decreased, in contrast to what was seen in ciliate-free culture, although the bacteria maintained membrane integrity in the pellets. Furthermore, ciliates newly cultured with pellets were maintained and grew vigorously compared with those without pellets. In contrast, a human L. pneumophila isolate killed ciliates 7 days postinfection in a Dot/Icm-dependent manner, and pellets harboring this strain did not support ciliate growth. Also, pellets harboring the human isolate were resuscitated by coculturing with amoebae, depending on Dot/Icm expression. Thus, while ciliates expel pellet-packaged environmental L. pneumophila for stockpiling food, the pellets packaging the human isolate are harmful to ciliate survival, which may be of clinical significance. PMID:22635991

  4. Prevention of the Outer Space Weaponization

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhukov, Gennady P.

    2002-01-01

    9 states. The satellites of various functions (early warning, communication, data acquisition, reconnaissance and navigation) were actively used and continue to be used with the purposes of raising efficiency of ground armed forces, especially in fight against international terrorism. At the same time such satellites are not a weapon in the sense of that word since they do not create the threats of armed attack in outer space or from outer space. Moreover, they promote maintaining of stability in the international relations. For this reason the reconnaissance and data acquisition satellites used for the verification of observance by States of the arms limitation agreements are under international protection as national technical means of the control. Similar protection is enjoyed by the early warning satellites. With the help of space communication facilities the more reliable operative connection of the statesmen is organized in the strained situations. By this way the probability of making of the incorrect retaliatory decisions in critical political situations is reduced. At the same time it's necessary to take into consideration that the activities of such satellite systems are tightly connected with ground armed forces of the states. the earth, what from the point of view of international law may be qualified as establishing a partial demilitarization regime in outer space. After the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons it will be possible to speak about establishing of an international legal regime of complete demilitarization in outer space eliminating any kinds of weapon from outer space. in a peaceful time. weaponization.The main task of this paper is to analyze and to discuss the present binding regime of the outer space deweaponization and particular measures on consolidation and strengthening of this regime. agreements of the Russian Federation and the USA into multilateral Treaties. Such "immunity" would cover all operating space objects, irrespective of their military or civil designation. This approach is quite justified taking into consideration that military sattelites enhanced international peace and security and had broad advantages, such as treaty compliance and monitoring, the global positioning system, counter-terrorism and sanctions enforcement. Many examples of the last years demonstrate the tendency of engagement of military satellites into commercial space services. transparency on the pre-launch stage of space activity, including satellite inspection before ignition. Objects Flight Path Tracking. implemantation of a non-use of force and threat of force - a fundamental principle of modern international law. This implies the application of the menshened principle of international law by means of a treaty to the outer space activities with reference to the actions made in outer space, or directed from outer space against targets on the Earth as well as directed from the Earth against objects moving in outer space. to the possibility of conclusion in future of a multilateral arrangement on the prohibition of the space-based ABM. Accordingly, it is discussed the problem of an efficient international control over the prohibition of placement of the above mentioned weapons into outer space. to the challenges of the new millennium. 8

  5. Energy harvesting device for power generation onboard gravity-dropped weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rastegar, J.; Murray, R.; Bridge, M.

    2012-04-01

    This paper describes the development and construction of an energy harvesting device to provide a safe, reliable source of electrical energy onboard gravity-dropped weapons such as aerial bombs. The generators collect and store mechanical energy as the weapon falls away from the aircraft. Only after the weapon has fallen away from the aircraft is the stored mechanical energy released, generating electricity through a hybrid piezoelectric and electromagnetic generation method. The design, construction, and testing of the generator is discussed at length. Conceptual designs for integrating the described energy harvester alongside current and alternative sources of electrical power are also discussed.

  6. Handheld ultrasonic concealed weapon detector

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wilde, Norbert; Niederhaus, Steve; Lam, Hon; Lum, Chris

    2002-08-01

    A handheld, battery-operated prototype of a concealed weapon detector (CWD) has been built and tested. Designed to detect both metallic and non-metallic weapons, the sensor utilizes focused ultrasound (40 kHz frequency) to remotely detect concealed objects from beyond arm's length out to a range of about 25 feet (8 meters). Applications include weapon detection in prison settings, by officers in the field for stand-off frisking of suspects, and as supplemental security at courthouse entrances and other monitored portals. The detector emits an adjustable, audible alarm (with provision for an earphone jack) as well as a visible light-bar indicator when an object has been detected. An aiming light, with momentary switch, allows the user to accurately determine the location of the concealed object. A presentation of the detector's capabilities and limitations will be presented along with probability of detection (PD) data obtained using the latest prototype version.

  7. What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2007-03-01

    Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

  8. Weapon-carrying and youth violence.

    PubMed

    Page, R M; Hammermeister, J

    1997-01-01

    Weapons, and firearms in particular, are widely available in the United States and are at the heart of youth violence. Many schools and communities throughout the nation have identified weapon-carrying among youth as a substantial health, educational, and social problem. In fact, one of the national health objectives for the year 2000 is to substantially reduce the incidence of weapon-carrying among adolescents. This paper reviews the prevalence of weapon-carrying by youth, reasons they carry weapons, ways that firearms are obtained, firearms and violence (especially youth violence), and the controlling of weapons in schools. PMID:9360727

  9. The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Stern, J.E.

    1992-01-01

    This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed Second, how can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat to national sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement. The first danger is that the agreement will be so minimalist that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that the treaty will have such a weak enforcement mechanism that although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relative ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the [open quotes]balance of terror.[close quotes] The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.

  10. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Hart, Mark

    2014-11-20

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  11. National Ignition Facility Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect

    N /A

    2001-02-23

    This Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) was prepared pursuant to a Joint Stipulation and Order approved and entered as an order of the court on October 27, 1997, in partial settlement of the lawsuit Civ. No. 97-936 (SS) (D.D.C.), ''Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC] et al. v. Richardson et al.'' The Joint Stipulation and Order is reproduced at the end of this document as Attachment 1. In the Joint Stipulation and Order, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) agreed to prepare an SEIS to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236, DOE 1996a) to evaluate the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse environmental impacts of continuing to construct and of operating the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California, with respect to any potential or confirmed contamination in the area by hazardous, toxic, and/or radioactive materials. On September 25, 1998, DOE announced in the ''Federal Register'' the agency's intent to prepare this SEIS for the NIF portion (Volume III, Appendix I) of the SSM PEIS. DOE's need for preparation of this SEIS, consistent with the previously established need for NIF (DOE 1996a, Appendix I), is to determine how the results of characterization studies completed pursuant to the Joint Stipulation and Order should affect the manner in which DOE proceeds with the construction and operation of NIF. On August 5, 1999, DOE issued an amended Notice of Intent to prepare this SEIS, which incorporated changes in schedule resulting from new relevant information. The SSM PEIS addressed alternative plans for DOE's defense program activities related to nuclear weapons stockpile issues at several DOE laboratories, including LLNL. The environmental consequences of construction and operation of NIF were addressed in detail in SSM PEIS Volume III, Appendix I, entitled ''National Ignition Facility Project Specific Analysis'' (NIF PSA). The Record of Decision (ROD) for the SSM PEIS was published in the ''Federal Register'' on December 26, 1996 (61 FR 68014). In the ROD, DOE announced its decision to construct and operate NIF at LLNL. The NIF is an experimental facility that would use laser light to initiate a fusion reaction in very small quantities of hydrogen by a process known as inertial confinement fusion. The start of physical construction of NIF was authorized on March 7, 1997, and groundbreaking for the NIF occurred on May 29, 1997. Construction of the NIF is ongoing; the conventional facilities are over 94% complete and are expected to be completed in late 2001.

  12. Endless generations of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Taylor, T.B.

    1986-11-01

    The author feels that pursuit of Star Wars and continued US nuclear testing is blocking progress toward the eventual worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. It is also bound to reveal new ways to attack military or civilian targets that will, in turn, stimulate further searches for new types of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Some of these developments could intensify the belief that limited nuclear wars can be fought and won. In short, development of new generations of nuclear weapons will provide the kind of positive feedback to the nuclear arms race that will greatly expand its dangers and its costs. Further proliferation of new types of nuclear weapons will increase the already extreme complexity of military planning and response, and the attendant dangers of nuclear war occurring by accident or through misinterpretation of information. Assessments of possible new military threats will become more uncertain as the complexities increase. Uncertainty can lead to catastrophic mistakes. Real or mistakenly perceived gaps in nuclear preparedness are likely to be used as further arguments for vast new military expenditures. We may all come to long for the relative simplicity of military nuclear issues during the first decade or so following the end of World War II. For these reasons, the author is convinced that there should be a halt to all nuclear tests, worldwide, as soon as possible. 2 references.

  13. Program of technical assistance to the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, informal report

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1995-01-01

    Currently, U.S. organizations provide technical support to the U.S. Delegation for its work as part of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. The current efforts of the PrepCom are focussed on preparations for the Entry-Into-Force (EIF) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (often referred to as the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} (CWC)). EIF of the CWC is expected in 1995, and shortly thereafter the PrepCom will cease to exist, with the OPCW taking over responsibilities under the CWC. A U.S. program of technical assistance to the OPCW for its verification responsibilities may be created as part of U.S. policy objectives after EIF of the CWC. In the summary below, comments by participants are presented in Square Brackets Some of the same points arose several times during the discussions; they are grouped together under the most pertinent heading.

  14. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National... INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, or attempting to do so is prohibited....

  15. WEAPONS ON CAMPUS Authority: Chief of Police

    E-print Network

    Scharf, Fred

    05.501 WEAPONS ON CAMPUS Authority: Chief of Police History: Established September 14, 2006 Source of weapons on UNCW property. II. Policy A. The University of North Carolina system of campuses is classified be unlawful for any person to possess the following weapons on UNCW property: 1. Dynamite cartridge, bomb

  16. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  17. Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

    E-print Network

    Sussex, University of

    Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs By Command of Her Majesty April 2002 Cm 5484 £5.00 #12;3 STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION

  18. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  19. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  20. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National... INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing or causing to be present a weapon on an Agency installation, or attempting to do so is prohibited....

  1. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  2. MN4602 Crouch 2004 REASSESSING WEAPON SYSTEM

    E-print Network

    MN4602 Crouch 2004 REASSESSING WEAPON SYSTEM OPERATIONAL TEST & EVALUATION METHODOLOGIES LTC Thom support assessing a weapon systems true cost and performance characteristics? S1: Can/should cost methodologies adequately address weapon systems total ownership cost (TOC)? S3: Are there critical cost

  3. Weapons in an Affluent Suburban School.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hawkins, Stephanie R.; Campanaro, Amy; Pitts, Traci Bice; Steiner, Hans

    2002-01-01

    Investigated the self-reported violence and weapon carrying behaviors of largely affluent, suburban adolescents in San Francisco, California. Survey data indicated that weapons carrying was a significant issue for these high school students. Predictors of weapon carrying did not differ in comparison to predictors among inner city youth. Distinct…

  4. Weapons in Schools. NSSC Resource Paper.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Butterfield, George E., Ed.; Turner, Brenda, Ed.

    More than ever, our public school system must confront weapons in schools and become aware of steadily rising statistics on youth homicide and suicide. This report delineates the problem, discusses why children carry weapons to school, and outlines strategies for keeping weapons out of schools and for improving school safety. Although some…

  5. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section 25.301-3...Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the...

  6. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  7. Recovery from a chemical weapons accident or incident: A concept paper on planning

    SciTech Connect

    Herzenberg, C.L.; Haffenden, R.; Lerner, K.; Meleski, S.A.; Tanzman, E.A.; Lewis, L.M.; Hemphill, R.C.; Adams, J.D.

    1994-04-01

    Emergency planning for an unintended release of chemical agent from the nation`s chemical weapons stockpile should include preparation for. the period following implementation of immediate emergency response. That period -- the recovery, reentry, and restoration stage -- is the subject of this report. The report provides an overview of the role of recovery, reentry, and restoration planning in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), describes the transition from immediate emergency response to restoration, and analyzes the legal framework that would govern restoration activities. Social, economic, and administrative issues, as well as technical ones, need to be considered in the planning effort. Because of possible jurisdictional conflicts, appropriate federal, state, and local agencies need to be included in a coordinated planning process. Advance consideration should be given to the pertinent federal and state statutes and regulations. On the federal level, the principal statutes and regulations to be considered are those associated with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the National Environmental Policy Act. This report recommends that extensive preaccident planning be undertaken for the recovery, reentry, and restoration stage and outlines several key issues that should be considered in that planning. The need for interagency cooperation and coordination at all levels of the planning process is emphasized.

  8. Biological weapons and US law.

    PubMed

    Ferguson, J R

    1997-08-01

    During the past 8 years, the US Congress has developed a comprehensive legal framework to prevent the illegitimate use of toxins and infectious agents. As part of this framework, Congress has defined as a federal crime virtually every step in the process of developing or acquiring a biological agent for use as a weapon. At the same time, Congress has vested federal law enforcement agencies with broad civil and investigative powers to enable the government to intervene before such weapons are used or even developed. Finally, Congress has directed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to establish a regulatory regime to monitor the location and transfer of hazardous biological agents and to insure that any use of such agents complies with appropriate biosafety requirements. PMID:9244312

  9. Threat is in the sex of the beholder: men find weapons faster than do women.

    PubMed

    Sulikowski, Danielle; Burke, Darren

    2014-01-01

    In visual displays, people locate potentially threatening stimuli, such as snakes, spiders, and weapons, more quickly than similar benign stimuli, such as beetles and gadgets. Such biases are likely adaptive, facilitating fast responses to potential threats. Currently, and historically, men have engaged in more weapons-related activities (fighting and hunting) than women. If biases of visual attention for weapons result from selection pressures related to these activities, then we would predict such biases to be stronger in men than in women. The current study reports the results of two visual search experiments, in which men showed a stronger bias of attention toward guns and knives than did women, whether the weapons were depicted wielded or not. When the weapons were depicted wielded, both sexes searched for them with more caution than when they were not. Neither of these effects extended reliably to syringes, a non-weapon-yet potentially threatening-object. The findings are discussed with respect to the "weapons effect" and social coercion theory. PMID:25353710

  10. Nuclear weapons and regional conflict

    SciTech Connect

    Latter, A.L.; Martinelli, E.A.

    1993-05-01

    An important national defense objective for the US in the post cold-war era -- according to Secretary of Defense, Cheney is to deter regional conflicts. To satisfy this objective there is more or less general agreement that nuclear weapons are not needed, especially against regional powers like Iraq that do not (as yet) have a nuclear capability. Modern conventional weapons (PGMs), it is believed, are adequate when used in the traditional way of fighting: massive ground forces with heavy ground equipment, supported by air and naval forces. Of course, there are arguments against this view. For example, nuclear advocates call attention to deeply buried targets that are unattackable with conventional munitions. But this argument, and others, for US use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons are presently discounted in favor of the political/moral advantages of a no-first-use policy. We do not wish to take sides in this debate. We believe, however, that the debate win continue as political, military, technical and economic factors undergo inevitable changes. In this brief paper, we want to present another pro-nuclear argument which, to the best of our knowledge, has received little or no attention. This argument, we believe, could become important in weighing the pros and cons of the debate if domestic pressures cause the defense budget to undergo such severe cuts that we must either abandon our political commitments or adopt a non-traditional war-fighting strategy that is effective under a greatly reduced defense budget.

  11. A comparison of commercial/industry and nuclear weapons safety concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, R.R.; Summers, D.A.

    1996-07-01

    In this paper the authors identify factors which influence the safety philosophy used in the US commercial/industrial sector and compare them against those factors which influence nuclear weapons safety. Commercial/industrial safety is guided by private and public safety standards. Generally, private safety standards tend to emphasize product reliability issues while public (i.e., government) safety standards tend to emphasize human factors issues. Safety in the nuclear weapons arena is driven by federal requirements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the Departments of Defense and Energy. Safety is achieved through passive design features integrated into the nuclear weapon. Though the common strand between commercial/industrial and nuclear weapons safety is the minimization of risk posed to the general population (i.e., public safety), the authors found that each sector tends to employ a different safety approach to view and resolve high-consequence safety issues.

  12. Proposed Laser-Based HED physics experiments for Stockpile Stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    Benage, John F.; Albright, Brian J.; Fernandez, Juan C.

    2012-09-04

    An analysis of the scientific areas in High Energy Density (HED) physics that underpin the enduring LANL mission in Stockpile Stewardship (SS) has identified important research needs that are not being met. That analysis has included the work done as part of defining the mission need for the High Intensity Laser Laboratory (HILL) LANL proposal to NNSA, LDRD DR proposal evaluations, and consideration of the Predictive Capability Framework and LANL NNSA milestones. From that evaluation, we have identified several specific and scientifically-exciting experimental concepts to address those needs. These experiments are particularly responsive to physics issues in Campaigns 1 and 10. These experiments are best done initially at the LANL Trident facility, often relying on the unique capabilities available there, although there are typically meritorious extensions envisioned at future facilities such as HILL, or the NIF once the ARC short-pulse laser is available at sufficient laser intensity. As the focus of the LANL HEDP effort broadens from ICF ignition of the point design at the conclusion of the National Ignition Campaign, into a more SS-centric effort, it is useful to consider these experiments, which address well-defined issues, with specific scientific hypothesis to test or models to validate or disprove, via unit-physics experiments. These experiments are in turn representative of a possible broad experimental portfolio to elucidate the physics of interest to these campaigns. These experiments, described below, include: (1) First direct measurement of the evolution of particulates in isochorically heated dense plasma; (2) Temperature relaxation measurements in a strongly-coupled plasma; (3) Viscosity measurements in a dense plasma; and (4) Ionic structure factors in a dense plasma. All these experiments address scientific topics of importance to our sponsors, involve excellent science at the boundaries of traditional fields, utilize unique capabilities at LANL, and contribute to the Campaign milestone in 2018. Given their interdisciplinary nature, it is not surprising that these research needs are not being addressed by the other excellent high-energy density physics (HEDP) facilities coming on line, facilities aimed squarely at more established fields and missions. Although energy rich, these facilities deliver radiation (e.g., particle beams for isochoric heating) over a timescale that is too slow in these unit physics experiments to eliminate hydrodynamic evolution of the target plasma during the time it is being created. A theme shared by all of these experiments is the need to quickly create a quasi-homogeneous 'initial state' whose properties and evolution we wish to study. Otherwise, we cannot create unit experiments to isolate the physics of interest and validate the models in our codes, something that cannot be done with the integrated experiments often done in HED. Moreover, these experiments in some cases involve combinations of solid and plasmas, or matter in the warm-dense matter state, where neither the theoretical approximations of solid state or of fully-ionized weakly-coupled plasmas can be used. In all cases, the capability of 'isochoric heating' ('flash' heating at constant density) is important. In some cases, the ability to selectively heat to different degrees different species within a target, whether mixed or adjacent to each other, is critical for the experiment. This capability requires the delivery of very high power densities, which require the conversion of the laser into very short and intense pulses of secondary radiation (electrons, ions, neutrons, x-rays). Otherwise, there is no possibility of a clean experiment to constrain the models, in the cases there are any, or inform the creation of one. Another typical requirement of these experiments is the ability to probe these exotic extreme conditions of matter with flexible and diverse sources of secondary radiation. Without a high-intensity high-power laser with some unique attributes available on Trident today (e.g., ultra-high laser-puls

  13. ANational Security Science Issue 2 2011 Also in this issue

    E-print Network

    Li, Hui

    ANational Security Science Issue 2 · 2011 Also in this issue No-meltdown nuclear reactors Safer provides the basis for confidence in the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing and supports's nuclear weapons stockpile through a science-based understanding of weapons safety, reliability

  14. 78 FR 68028 - National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee Request for Public Comments on the Potential...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-13

    ... Comments on the Potential Market Impact of the Proposed Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Materials Plan AGENCY... the proposed Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Stockpile Annual Materials Plan. The role of the Market... impact review process. DATES: To be considered, written comments must be received by December 13,...

  15. A&M. Special shielding materials. Stockpile of magnetite, used for making ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    A&M. Special shielding materials. Stockpile of magnetite, used for making high-density concrete, and loading conveyor near TAN-607 construction site. Date: September 25, 1953. INEEL negative no. 8710 - Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Test Area North, Scoville, Butte County, ID

  16. [Biological weapons and biological defence in Denmark].

    PubMed

    Heegaard, Erik Deichmann; Hansen, John-Erik Stig

    2005-09-01

    Biological weapons have been known for centuries, and since World War II, offensive programs have accelerated the development of these weapons considerably. The anthrax attacks in the fall 2001 and speculations regarding the research and development of Iraqi bioweapons have been causes for concern. The effect of biological weapons may be overwhelming, in particular when one is dealing with a contagious agent. The National Centre for Biological Defence provides a preparedness capability through evidence-based research and practical operational capabilities. PMID:16159486

  17. Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield (ICF) Campaign supports the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE)

    E-print Network

    on life extension options for future stockpile weapons. For example, the Stockpile Stewardship Program codes. The ICF program supports stockpile stewardship through two principal experimental directions, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing. It supports stockpile assessment

  18. Physical security technologies for weapons complex reconfiguration facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-07-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a member of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S&S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration. The physical security systems in the new and upgraded facilities being considered for the WCR had to meet DOE orders and other requirements set forth in the WCR Programmatic Design Criteria (PDC), incorporate the latest physical security technologies using proven state-of-the-art systems and meet fundamental security principles. The outcome was to avoid costly retrofits and provide effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, costs and schedule. Physical security requirements for WCR facilities include: (1) reducing S&S life-cycle costs, (2) where feasible automating S&S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, (3) increasing the amount of delay to outsider adversary attack, (4) compartmentalizing the facility to minimize the number of personnel requiring access to critical areas and (5) having reliable and maintainable systems. To be most effective against threats physical security must be integrated with facility operations, safety and other S&S activities, such as material control and accountability, nuclear measurements and computer and information security. This paper will discuss the S&S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical security technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed.

  19. Physical protection technologies for the reconfigured weapons complex

    SciTech Connect

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-08-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a memtier of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S&S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfigaration. New and improved S&S concepts, approaches and technologies were needed to support both new and upgraded facilities. Physical protection technologies used in these facilities were to use proven state-of-the-art systems in such areas as image processing, alarm communications and display, entry control, contraband detection, intrusion detection and video assessment, access delay, automation and robotics, and various insider protection systems. Factors considered in the selection of these technologies were protection against the design basis threat, reducing S&S life-cycle costs, automation of S&S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, increasing the amount of delay to an outsider adversary and having reliable and maintainable systems. This paper will discuss the S&S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical protection technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed.

  20. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of roles lobbied the US President to deploy the long-range weapons being developed by the Defense Department. In the course of deliberations, political preferences suppressed military considerations of deterrence and only a small portion of the original modernization program was implemented.

  1. Smart Weapons Operability Enhancement program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Welsh, James P.

    1993-08-01

    Smart Weapons Operability Enhancement (SWOE) is a coordinated, cooperative Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force effort to integrate and validate a targets in backgrounds scene generation process. The SWOE Process has been developed to generate realistic multi- spectral, including IR and MMW, scenes representative of the greatest possible range of world wide battlefield scenarios. This Process is based on fundamental physics formulations which produce accurate temporal and spatial distributions of the energy fields reaching any given weapon sensor aperture. There are six areas of specific focus: (1) codification of methods to make measurements in support of synthetic generation of battlefield scenes, (2) automation of information bases construction for a world wide range of battlefields, (3) multi-spectral scene physics modeling for a world wide range of battlefield scenarios, (4) synthetic battlefield background environment and target rendering, (5) integration of synthetic battlefield scene generation capabilities onto common computer workstations, and (6) integration of the SWOE Process into an architecture that is compatible for use with state-of-the-art distributed networks.

  2. Product acceptance environmental and destructive testing for reliability.

    SciTech Connect

    Dvorack, Michael A.; Kerschen, Thomas J.; Collins, Elmer W.

    2007-08-01

    To determine whether a component is meeting its reliability requirement during production, acceptance sampling is employed in which selected units coming off the production line are subjected to additional environmental and/or destructive tests that are within the normal environment space to which the component is expected to be exposed throughout its life in the Stockpile. This report describes what these tests are and how they are scored for reliability purposes. The roles of screens, Engineering Use Only tests, and next assembly product acceptance testing are also discussed, along with both the advantages and disadvantages of environmental and destructive testing.

  3. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  4. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly...

  5. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  6. Space weapon-The arms control dilemma

    SciTech Connect

    Jasani, B.

    1985-01-01

    Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, rather than ballistic missile defense, is the main focus of this volume, prepared by SIPRI. There are many authors from the West and the East. The volume as a whole argues a consistent case for a bilateral moratorium on the testing of ASAT weapons, to be followed by a complete ban.

  7. Policy on Firearms, Explosives, and Other Weapons

    E-print Network

    Page | 1 Policy on Firearms, Explosives, and Other Weapons Responsible Administrative Unit forth the policy on the use and storage of firearms, explosives and other dangerous or illegal weapons visitors to the campus. 2.0 POLICY 2.1 Except as expressly provided below, the possession of firearms

  8. Chapter 13 -Firearms, Weapons, Destructive Devices

    E-print Network

    Tullos, Desiree

    53 Chapter 13 - Firearms, Weapons, Destructive Devices The Oregon Administrative Rules contain OAR Definitions (1) "Firearm" means a weapon or device, by whatever name known, which is designed to expel Storage Area" means: Areas designated by OSU Security Services as secure areas for storage of firearms

  9. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly...

  10. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly...

  11. 48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...2010-10-01 false Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217... 217.173 Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. As authorized by 10 U...a multiyear contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items,...

  12. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...false Prohibition against carriage of weapons. 135.119 Section 135.119 Aeronautics...119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an...about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon, either concealed or unconcealed....

  13. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125 Section 552.125 National... § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final...

  14. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives. 0.215 Section 0...of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall...explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons, either openly or concealed,...

  15. 76 FR 1136 - Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-07

    ...Standards and Technology Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop AGENCY...manufacturers, etc.) of electroshock weapons that provide stand-off delivery of an...performance requirements for electroshock weapons, the Law Enforcement Standards...

  16. Childhood maltreatment and threats with weapons.

    PubMed

    Casiano, Hygiea; Mota, Natalie; Afifi, Tracie O; Enns, Murray W; Sareen, Jitender

    2009-11-01

    The relationship between childhood maltreatment and future threats with weapons is unknown. We examined data from the nationally representative National Comorbidity Survey Replication (n = 5692) and conducted multiple logistic regression analyses to determine the association between childhood maltreatment and lifetime behavior of threatening others with a gun or other weapon. After adjusting for sociodemographic variables, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and witnessing domestic violence were significantly associated with threats made with a gun (adjusted odds ratios [AOR] ranging between 3.38 and 4.07) and other weapons (AOR ranging between 2.16 and 2.83). The greater the number of types of maltreatment experienced, the stronger the association with lifetime threats made to others with guns and any weapons. Over 94% of respondents who experienced maltreatment and made threats reported that the maltreatment occurred prior to threatening others with weapons. Prevention efforts that reduce exposure to maltreatment may reduce violent behavior in later life. PMID:19996725

  17. Assessment of RA226 and toxic-element distribution at Tennessee Valley Authority phosphate slag stockpiles, Muscle Shoals, AL. 1910 (80 years) 1990. Report of Investigations/1990

    SciTech Connect

    May, A.; Boyle, J.R.

    1990-01-01

    The U.S. Bureau of Mines conducted studies to determine if phosphate slag stockpiles at Tennessee Valley Authority's National Fertilizer Development Center were hazardous materials. The stockpiles were not hazardous materials as determined by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) extraction procedure (EP) toxicity test. Rain water, trapped in a depression on top of the east slag stockpile, became seepage water at the base of the stockpile. Concentrations of EPA toxic elements in seepage water were much less than concentrations from an EPA EP toxicity test on the slag. Twelve elements-Na, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba, Cr, Mn, Co, Cu, Cd, Al, and P--had higher concentrations in seepage water than in rain water on top of the slag stockpiles, or in creek water adjacent to stockpile bases, indicating that they were leached from slag stockpiles.

  18. Improved $?$-weapons for Higgs hunting

    E-print Network

    G. Barenboim; C. Bosch; M. L. López-Ibáñez; O. Vives

    2013-11-28

    In this work, we use the results from Higgs searches in the $\\gamma\\gamma$ and $\\tau\\tau$ decay channels at LHC and indirect bounds as BR$(B \\to X_s \\gamma)$ to constrain the parameter space of a generic MSSM Higgs sector. In particular, we include the latest CMS results that look for additional Higgs states with masses up to 1 TeV. We show that the $\\tau \\tau$ channel is the best and most accurate weapon in the hunt for new Higgs states beyond the Standard Model. We obtain that present experimental results rule out additional neutral Higgs bosons in a generic MSSM below 300 GeV for any value of $\\tan \\beta$ and, for instance, values of $\\tan \\beta$ above 30 are only possible for Higgs masses above 600 GeV. ATLAS stored data has the potential to render this bound obsolete in the near future.

  19. Nuclear weapons are illegal threats

    SciTech Connect

    Meyrowitz, E.L.

    1985-05-01

    Challenging Harry Almond's position that nuclear deterrence is workable, the author contends that there is no historical basis for believing that anticipation of the horrors of war will be an effective deterrent. He questions the belief that the nuclear balance of terror has maintained the peace for the past 40 years because an arms race is inherently unstable. The argument that the pursuit of national interests takes precedence over any limitation imposed by international law reflects a perception of international law that is comparable to the Third Reich. The bases for a legal evaluation of the status of nuclear weapons under international law come from express and implicit treaty provisions, international custom, general principles of international law, judicial decisions, resolutions at the United Nations, and the opinions of qualified jurists as well as military necessity.

  20. Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William

    1998-12-01

    Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the size of a CD ROM drive of a computer.

  1. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-02-03

    ...NRC-2011-0017] RIN 3150-AI49 Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and Request for Comment...on a draft guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA). This...

  2. Organic Amendment Effects on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Long-Term Stockpiled Soils

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zvomuya, F.; Laskosky, J.

    2014-12-01

    In oil sands projects in Alberta, Canada, salvaged soils are often placed in large stockpiles where they are stored for the duration of the project, typically 20-30 years. Alberta regulations require that topsoil and subsoil are salvaged in two distinct operations - a process known as two-lifting. Reclamation using long-term stockpiled soils often gives poor results, characterized by lower soil organic carbon and nitrogen concentrations compared with equivalent natural, undisturbed soils. It is thought that the change from an aerobic to an anaerobic environment during soil stockpiling and back again to aerobic during placement are largely responsible for the low carbon and nitrogen due to microbial activity transforming C and N in the soil into CO2, CH4 and N2O and releasing them to the atmosphere. Evidence from recent studies indicates that biochar improves soil physical, chemical and biological properties, and hence could mitigate C and N losses due to greenhouse gas emissions from the soil indirectly. We postulate that documented improvements in soil physical, chemical, and biological properties in soils treated with amendments such as biochar may help mitigate C and N losses due to greenhouse gas emissions from the soil indirectly. This laboratory incubation experiment tested the effects of differential rates (0, 10, 20, and 40 g biochar carbon equivalents kg-1 dry soil) of biochar, peat, and humalite on greenhouse gas emissions from a 25-year old two-lift stockpiled soil. The soils were fertilized according to standard practice, placed in 120-mL plastic containers, and incubated at 25°C for 45 days. Gas samples were taken at 1- to 7-day intervals and analyzed for CO2, CH4, and N2O. Data on treatment differences in emissions will be presented. Results from this experiment will provide an insight into the potential for organic amendments to mitigate greenhouse gas emission during reclamation using degraded soils.

  3. Certainty in Stockpile Computing: Recommending a Verification and Validation Program for Scientific Software

    SciTech Connect

    Lee, J.R.

    1998-11-01

    As computing assumes a more central role in managing the nuclear stockpile, the consequences of an erroneous computer simulation could be severe. Computational failures are common in other endeavors and have caused project failures, significant economic loss, and loss of life. This report examines the causes of software failure and proposes steps to mitigate them. A formal verification and validation program for scientific software is recommended and described.

  4. Advances and Challenges In Uncertainty Quantification with Application to Climate Prediction, ICF design and Science Stockpile Stewardship

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Klein, R.; Woodward, C. S.; Johannesson, G.; Domyancic, D.; Covey, C. C.; Lucas, D. D.

    2012-12-01

    Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) is a critical field within 21st century simulation science that resides at the very center of the web of emerging predictive capabilities. The science of UQ holds the promise of giving much greater meaning to the results of complex large-scale simulations, allowing for quantifying and bounding uncertainties. This powerful capability will yield new insights into scientific predictions (e.g. Climate) of great impact on both national and international arenas, allow informed decisions on the design of critical experiments (e.g. ICF capsule design, MFE, NE) in many scientific fields, and assign confidence bounds to scientifically predictable outcomes (e.g. nuclear weapons design). In this talk I will discuss a major new strategic initiative (SI) we have developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to advance the science of Uncertainty Quantification at LLNL focusing in particular on (a) the research and development of new algorithms and methodologies of UQ as applied to multi-physics multi-scale codes, (b) incorporation of these advancements into a global UQ Pipeline (i.e. a computational superstructure) that will simplify user access to sophisticated tools for UQ studies as well as act as a self-guided, self-adapting UQ engine for UQ studies on extreme computing platforms and (c) use laboratory applications as a test bed for new algorithms and methodologies. The initial SI focus has been on applications for the quantification of uncertainty associated with Climate prediction, but the validated UQ methodologies we have developed are now being fed back into Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SSS) and ICF UQ efforts. To make advancements in several of these UQ grand challenges, I will focus in talk on the following three research areas in our Strategic Initiative: Error Estimation in multi-physics and multi-scale codes ; Tackling the "Curse of High Dimensionality"; and development of an advanced UQ Computational Pipeline to enable complete UQ workflow and analysis for ensemble runs at the extreme scale (e.g. exascale) with self-guiding adaptation in the UQ Pipeline engine. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344 and was funded by the Uncertainty Quantification Strategic Initiative Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project at LLNL under project tracking code 10-SI-013 (UCRL LLNL-ABS-569112).

  5. Optimization of low activity spectrometric gamma-gamma probes for ash determination in coal stockpiles.

    PubMed

    Asfahani, Jamal

    2003-06-01

    A stockpile probe based on backscattered gamma-gamma-ray technique was tested for the determination of coal ash. A centralized tool employing a gamma-ray source of very low radioactivity (1.85 MBq) was used. This logging tool was tested using 137Cs and 133 Ba sources with a 37 mm (diameter) by 75 mm NaI (TI) scintillation detector. Ten source-detector configurations were analyzed using 137Cs, and another nine source-detector configurations are analyzed, using 133Ba source, both for four geophysical models, having a borehole diameter of 90 mm. Regression analysis on the laboratory logging data for each studied configuration was carried out in order to establish calibration equations for ash prediction. The optimum configuration for the logging stockpile probe using 137Cs source was determined to be 80 mm source to detector spacing, and 80 mm iron thickness shielding. This configuration gives the best results for ash prediction. The root mean square (rms) deviation for ash is 1.52%. The optimum configuration for the logging stockpile probe using 133 Ba source is determined to be 85 mm source to detector spacing, and 50mm iron thickness shielding. This configuration gives the best results for ash prediction, where the rms deviation for ash is 1.47%. PMID:12798372

  6. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  7. Comparative Cost of Stockpiling Various Types of Respiratory Protective Devices to Protect the Health Care Workforce During an Influenza Pandemic.

    PubMed

    Baracco, Gio; Eisert, Sheri; Eagan, Aaron; Radonovich, Lewis

    2015-06-01

    Specific guidance on the size and composition of respiratory protective device (RPD) stockpiles for use during a pandemic is lacking. We explore the economic aspects of stockpiling various types and combinations of RPDs by adapting a pandemic model that estimates the impact of a severe pandemic on a defined population, the number of potential interactions between patients and health care personnel, and the potential number of health care personnel needed to fulfill those needs. Our model calculates the number of the different types of RPDs that should be stockpiled and the consequent cost of purchase and storage, prorating this cost over the shelf life of the inventory. Compared with disposable N95 or powered air-purifying respirators, we show that stockpiling reusable elastomeric half-face respirators is the least costly approach. Disposable N95 respirators take up significantly more storage space, which increases relative costs. Reusing or extending the usable period of disposable devices may diminish some of these costs. We conclude that stockpiling a combination of disposable N95 and reusable half-face RPDs is the best approach to preparedness for most health care organizations. We recommend against stockpiling powered air-purifying respirators as they are much more costly than alternative approaches. PMID:25874891

  8. Neutron Capture Reactions for Stockpile Stewardship and Basic Science

    SciTech Connect

    Parker, W; Agvaanluvsan, U; Becker, J; Wilk, P; Wu, C; Bredeweg, T; Couture, A; Haight, R; Jandel, M; O'Donnell, J; Reifarth, R; Rundberg, R; Ullmann, J; Vieira, D; Wouters, J; Sheets, S; Mitchell, G; Becvar, F; Krticka, M

    2007-08-04

    The capture process is a nuclear reaction in which a target atom captures an incident projectile, e.g. a neutron. The excited-state compound nucleus de-excites by emitting photons. This process creates an atom that has one more neutron than the target atom, so it is a different isotope of the same element. With low energy (slow) neutron projectiles, capture is the dominant reaction, other than elastic scattering. However, with very heavy nuclei, fission competes with capture as a method of de-excitation of the compound nucleus. With higher energy (faster) incident neutrons, additional reactions are also possible, such as emission of protons or emission of multiple neutrons. The probability of a particular reaction occurring (such as capture) is referred to as the cross section for that reaction. Cross sections are very dependent on the incoming neutron's energy. Capture reactions can be studied either using monoenergetic neutron sources or 'white' neutron sources. A 'white' neutron source has a wide range of neutron energies in one neutron beam. The advantage to the white neutron source is that it allows the study of cross sections as they depend on neutron energies. The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, located at Los Alamos National Laboratory, provides an intense white neutron source. Neutrons there are created by a high-energy proton beam from a linear accelerator striking a heavy metal (tungsten) target. The neutrons range in energy from subthermal up to very fast - over 100 MeV in energy. Low-energy neutron reaction cross sections fluctuate dramatically from one target to another, and they are very difficult to predict by theoretical modeling. The cross sections for particular capture reactions are important for defense sciences, advanced reactor concepts, transmutation of radioactive wastes and nuclear astrophysics. We now have a strong collaboration between Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, North Carolina State University and Charles University in Prague. In this paper, we report neutron capture studies that are of particular interest to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In addition to determining neutron capture cross sections, we are also interested in the nuclear properties of the excited state compound nuclei created in the capture reactions. One model that describes the behavior of the nucleus is the statistical model. Our statistical studies included measuring the photon strength function, resonance parameters, level density and gamma-ray ({gamma}-ray) cascade multiplicity. The DANCE array allows the separation of cascades by the number of transitions (multiplicity) in the cascade, and this makes it possible to study detailed properties of the statistical cascade such as the relationship between multiplicity and energy distributions. The work reported here includes reaction on molybdenum targets, europium targets, gadolinium targets and the first americium-242m target. Our goal is to improve the accuracy and provide new measurements for stable and radioactive targets. We are especially interested in energy-dependent neutron capture cross sections. In all of our experiments, the photons emitted in the capture reactions are gamma rays, and they are detected by the barium fluoride crystal array named the Detector for Advanced Neutron Capture Experiments (DANCE) shown in Fig. 1. The detector array is made of 160 crystals arranged in a sphere around the target. There are four different crystal shapes, each of which covers an equal solid angle. This array was specifically designed to measure neutron capture cross sections with targets that were milligram sized or smaller, including radioactive targets. The barium fluoride crystals are scintillation (light generating) detectors with very fast response time, and are therefore suitable for high count rate experiments. Actual neutron capture events must be reliably distinguished from background {gamma}-rays, which are always present in neutron induced reactions. To reduce the background of scattered neutrons, a lithium hyd

  9. Reliability training

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Lalli, Vincent R. (editor); Malec, Henry A. (editor); Dillard, Richard B.; Wong, Kam L.; Barber, Frank J.; Barina, Frank J.

    1992-01-01

    Discussed here is failure physics, the study of how products, hardware, software, and systems fail and what can be done about it. The intent is to impart useful information, to extend the limits of production capability, and to assist in achieving low cost reliable products. A review of reliability for the years 1940 to 2000 is given. Next, a review of mathematics is given as well as a description of what elements contribute to product failures. Basic reliability theory and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate failures are elucidated.

  10. Weapons Activities/ Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign FY 2011 Congressional Budget

    E-print Network

    Weapons Activities/ Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign FY 2011 Congressional Budget weapons assessment and certification requirements including weapon codes, weapons science, computing testing to determine weapon behavior. As such, ASC simulations are central to our national security. Our

  11. A magic sword or a big itch: an historical look at the United States biological weapons programme.

    PubMed

    Hay, A

    1999-01-01

    In the late 1950s interest in entomological warfare increased, and literature describing the US biological warfare programmes on the use of the mosquito Aedes aegypti, the vector for transmitting yellow fever, has now been released. Yellow fever was considered as a suitable disease to use in southern regions of the former Soviet Union. The US destroyed its biological weapon stockpiles in the early 1970s. In addition to its offensive biological warfare programme, the US conducted extensive trials to assess its own vulnerability to biological attack. These trials and a later series of threat analyses indicate that biological agents could, indeed, affect large areas of the US if the attackers were allowed to proceed unmolested. Some of the threat analyses present highly questionable scenarios. PMID:10472190

  12. Electroshock weapons can be lethal!

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2008-03-01

    Electroshock weapons (EWs)-stun guns, tasers, riot shields-are electroconductive devices designed to safely incapacitate healthy men neuromuscularly, so they are called nonlethal or less-lethal. EW firms seeking large nonmilitary markets targeted law enforcement and corrections personnel, who began using EWs in prisons/jails and on public patrol in 1980 in the USA. This shifted the EW-shocked population from healthy soldiers to a heterogeneous mix of both sexes, ages 6-92, in a wide variety of health conditions! An EW operates by disrupting normal physiological processes, producing transient effects in healthy people. But if a person's health is sufficiently compromised, the margin of safety can be lost, resulting in death or permanent health problems. 325 people have died after EW shock since 1980. Did the EW cause these deaths? Evidence indicates that EWs do play a causal role in most such deaths. EWs can be lethal for people in diabetic shock^1 (hypoglycemia), which may be why Robert Dziekanski-a Polish immigrant to Canada-died so quickly after he was tasered at Vancouver Airport: not having eaten for over 10 hours, he likely was severely hypoglycemic. The EW death rate in North America is 30 times higher than need be, because EW users have not been properly trained to use EWs on a heterogeneous population safely! ^1J. Clinical Engineering 30(3):111(2005).

  13. Some samples of weapons and instruments used as weapon in criminal offenses in Turkey.

    PubMed

    Uner, H Bülent; Gökdogan, Mira R; Cakan, Hüseyin

    2003-03-27

    The variety of instruments used for crime of violence is wide. Besides the manufactured legal weapons, there are comparable numbers of purchased instruments, which are used as lethal weapons and significant numbers of comprising home-made ones. The instruments used during the commission of a crime shows similarity throughout the countries. Nevertheless, there are small differences to be seen. The topic of this subject features the types of weapons used in criminal offenses in Turkey. PMID:12711190

  14. Electricity Reliability

    E-print Network

    Post, Wilfred M.

    Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability High Temperature Superconductivity (HTS) Visualization in the future because they have virtually no resistance to electric current, offering the possibility of new electric power equipment with more energy efficiency and higher capacity than today's systems

  15. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  16. Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, M.M.

    1987-08-01

    The author discusses what is being done to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He says that two mechanisms need to be strengthened: international safeguards to ensure that civilian nuclear materials and technology are not diverted to military purposes, and controls on the export of such materials and technology. While 135 nations signed the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is not enough. Detecting diversion of nuclear materials to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosives is not easy. It is also difficult to enforce safeguard systems when countries are exporting nuclear technology and materials. The author says nuclear-weapon states need to agree to a complete test ban to convince other nations to give up trying to acquire nuclear weapons.

  17. Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Rotblat, J.

    1977-01-01

    Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)

  18. University Management of Weapons Labs? No.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Archer, Dane

    1986-01-01

    Offers reasons why universities should not manage weapons laboratories, such as the Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, operated by the University of California. (A viewpoint favoring such university management is presented in SE 538 518.) (JN)

  19. Micromachining technology for advanced weapon systems

    SciTech Connect

    Sniegowski, J.J.

    1996-12-31

    An overview of planned uses for polysilicon surface-micromachining technology in advanced weapon systems is presented. Specifically, this technology may allow consideration of fundamentally new architectures for realization of surety component functions.

  20. Weapons dismantlement issues in independent Ukraine

    SciTech Connect

    Zack, N.R.; Kirk, E.J.

    1994-07-01

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a seminar during September 1993, in Kiev, Ukraine, entitled ``Toward a Nuclear Free Future -- Barriers and Problems.`` It brought together Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Americans to discuss the legal, political, safeguards and security, economic, and technical dimensions of nuclear weapons dismantlement and destruction. US representatives initiated discussions on legal and treaty requirements and constraints, safeguards and security issues surrounding dismantlement, storage and disposition of nuclear materials, warhead transportation, and economic considerations. Ukrainians gave presentations on arguments for and against the Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons, Ukrainian Parliament non-approval of START I, alternative strategies for dismantling silos and launchers, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons removal from the Ukraine. Participants from Belarus discussed proliferation and control regime issues, This paper will highlight and detail the issues, concerns, and possible impacts of the Ukraine`s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.

  1. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  2. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  3. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  4. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  5. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  6. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  7. The Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System: Interface Design Project

    E-print Network

    Virginia, University of

    The Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System: Interface Design Project Student Team: Julie in long-range `smart' weapon technology. The weapons control officer will be able to retarget the launching ship or submarine, further increasing the flexibility of this new weapons system. The objective

  8. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  9. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  10. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  11. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  12. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    PubMed

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  13. Initial radiations from tactical nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Loewe, W.E.

    1985-08-01

    Neutron and gamma-ray free-field kermas and fluence spectra for ranges between 1 and 2 km are presented for three tactical nuclear weapons and are compared with nuclear radiations at Hiroshima. The three tactical weapons are modeled as near-surface bursts of a fusion explosive, a fission explosive, and a suppressed-neutron explosive represented by the Little Boy bomb used at Hiroshima.

  14. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Fieldhouse, R. )

    1991-05-01

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler.

  15. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    PubMed Central

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-01-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

  16. Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

    PubMed

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-06-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

  17. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-02-03

    ... 10 CFR Part 73 RIN 3150-AI49 Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice... guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA). This guidance would be used by licensees and certificate holders applying to the NRC to obtain enhanced weapons under the NRC's proposed...

  18. Yeshiva University Weapons Policy The possession of any weapon (as defined in local, state and federal statutes, and includes, without

    E-print Network

    Emmons, Scott

    Yeshiva University Weapons Policy The possession of any weapon (as defined in local, state in criminal prosecution. In addition, the University reserves the right to confiscate the weapon. This Policy of whether the possessor is licensed to carry that weapon. Exceptions to this Policy may only be made

  19. US technical assistance to the IAEA and the chemical weapons convection (CWC) - a review and look to the future

    SciTech Connect

    Indusi, J.; Parsick, R.J.; Reisman, A.W.

    1997-08-01

    This paper reviews the Safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and describes U.S. technical support programs. We also review the mandate of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and speculate on the technical areas where U.S. assistance may prove useful. The IAEA was organized in 1957 in response to President Eisenhower`s {open_quotes}Atoms for Peace{close_quotes} initiative presented to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been organized by a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) to prepare for the entry-into-force of this new convention which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The safeguards mandate of the IAEA is to carry out verifications of nuclear material pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other voluntary but legally binding agreements. U.S. technical support programs have provided and continue to provide assistance in the form of Cost-Free Experts (CFE`s), systems studies on new safeguards approaches, training, computerized information systems, and equipment for nuclear materials measurements and containment and surveillance systems. Because the CWC just recently entered into force (April 29, 1997), verification procedures of the OPCW are not yet fully developed. However, it is expected, and can already be seen for many aspects of the technical task, that there are many similarities between the verification activities of the OPCW and those carried out by the IAEA. This paper will discuss potential technical support areas that can help strengthen the OPCW. 9 refs.

  20. Study of Windows Effects for Shock Wave Temperature Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    W. D. Turley, G. Stevens, L. Veeser, D. Holtkamp, A. Seifter

    2011-05-25

    Temperature measurements of shocked plutonium are needed for improved understanding of its equation of state (EOS) and will enable better understanding and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile.

  1. Algal biochar enhances the re-vegetation of stockpiled mine soils with native grass.

    PubMed

    Roberts, David A; Cole, Andrew J; Paul, Nicholas A; de Nys, Rocky

    2015-09-15

    In most countries the mining industry is required to rehabilitate disturbed land with native vegetation. A typical approach is to stockpile soils during mining and then use this soil to recreate landforms after mining. Soil that has been stockpiled for an extended period typically contains little or no organic matter and nutrient, making soil rehabilitation a slow and difficult process. Here, we take freshwater macroalgae (Oedogonium) cultivated in waste water at a coal-fired power station and use it as a feedstock for the production of biochar, then use this biochar to enhance the rehabilitation of two types of stockpiled soil - a ferrosol and a sodosol - from the adjacent coal mine. While the biomass had relatively high concentrations of some metals, due to its cultivation in waste water, the resulting biochar did not leach metals into the pore water of soil-biochar mixtures. The biochar did, however, contribute essential trace elements (particularly K) to soil pore water. The biochar had very strong positive effects on the establishment and growth of a native plant (Kangaroo grass, Themeda australis) in both of the soils. The addition of the algal biochar to both soils at 10 t ha(-1) reduced the time to germination by the grass and increased the growth and production of plant biomass. Somewhat surprisingly, there was no beneficial effect of a higher application rate (25 t ha(-1)) of the biochar in the ferrosol, which highlights the importance of matching biochar application rates to the requirements of different types of soil. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that algal biochar can be produced from biomass cultivated in waste water and used at low application rates to improve the rehabilitation of a variety of soils typical of coal mines. This novel process links biomass production in waste water to end use of the biomass in land rehabilitation, simultaneously addressing two environmental issues associated with coal-mining and processing. PMID:26172107

  2. The impact of weathering and aging on a LIMB ash stockpile material

    SciTech Connect

    Beeghly, J.H.; Bigham, J.M.; Dick, W.A.; Stehouwer, R.C.; Wolfe, W.B.

    1995-03-01

    A 1,500 ton temporary storage pile of water conditioned LIMB (Lime Injected Multistage Burner) ash by-product from the Ohio Edison Edgewater plant Lorain, OH was constructed in July, 1991 at a coal company near New Philadelphia, Ohio. This stockpile was created for dry FGD by-product material to be held in reserve for a land application uses field demonstration. High volume, beneficial uses of dry FGD by-products, such as for mine reclamation and embankment stabilization, will require temporary stockpiling of the by-product. Purpose for constructing this pile was to study changes with time in the LIMB by-product material when exposed to weathering. This by-product material was studied over a 2 1/2 year period. The water to control fugitive dust was added in the ash conditioner at the power plant while being loaded into dump trucks. Amount of water normally added in the conditioning process is close to the optimum moisture content of 40--50 % (dry weight basis), to construct a compacted road embankment or road base. Four environmental operating permits required for construction of the storage pile were obtained, three from Ohio EPA (air, water and solid waste), and one from the Ohio Division of Reclamation (revised reclamation area permit). There was no significant environmental impacts from storm runoff or leachate water from the LIMB ash stockpile during the initial 18 month period through December, 1992. After 2 1/2 years of storage, the potential value of the LIMB material for use as a road embankment material or soil conditioner has declined significantly. Ettringite formation occurs. Aging allows the expansive reaction to take place before its potential use as compacted structural fill or embankment.

  3. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    SciTech Connect

    Perez, C.L.; Johnson, J.O.

    1994-03-01

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation`s activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and, neutrons, gamma rays, and X-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication (C) bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,{gamma}/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  4. Draft Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect

    N /A

    2004-02-27

    This ''Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement'' (LLNL SW/SPEIS) describes the purpose and need for agency action for the continued operation of LLNL and analyzes the environmental impacts of these operations. The primary purpose of continuing operation of LLNL is to provide support for the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship missions. LLNL, located about 40 miles east of San Francisco, California, is also needed to support other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) programs and Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the newly established U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This LLNL SW/SPEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for ongoing and foreseeable future operations, facilities, and activities at LLNL. The reasonable alternatives include the No Action Alternative, Proposed Action, and the Reduced Operation Alternative. The major decision to be made by DOE/NNSA is to select one of the alternatives for the continued operation of the LLNL. As part of the Proposed Action, DOE/NNSA is considering: using additional materials including plutonium on the National Ignition Facility (NIF); increasing the administrative limit for plutonium in the Superblock, which includes the Plutonium Facility, the Tritium Facility, and the Hardened Engineering Test Building; conducting the Integrated Technology Project, using laser isotope separation to provide material for Stockpile Stewardship experiments, in the Plutonium Facility; increasing the material-at-risk limit for the Plutonium Facility; and increasing the Tritium Facility material-at-risk. A discussion of these issues is presented in Section S.5.2, Proposed Action. The ''National Environmental Policy Act'' (NEPA) establishes environmental policy, sets goals, and provides means for implementing the policy. NEPA contains provisions to ensure that Federal agencies adhere to the letter and spirit of the Act. The key provision requires preparation of an environmental impact statement on ''major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment'' (40 ''Code of Federal Regulations'' [CFR] {section}1502.3). NEPA ensures that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and actions are taken (40 CFR {section}1500.1[b]). DOE has a policy to prepare sitewide environmental impact statements documents for certain large, multiple-facility sites such as LLNL (10 CFR {section}1021.330). In August 1992, DOE released the ''Final Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Report for Continued Operations of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore'' (LLNL EIS/EIR). A Record of Decision (ROD) (58 ''Federal Register'' [FR] 6268) was issued in January 1993. With the passage of more than 10 years since the publication of the 1992 LLNL EIS/EIR (DOE/EIS-0157) and because of proposed modifications to existing projects and new programs, NNSA determined that it was appropriate to prepare a new LLNL SW/SPEIS.

  5. Nuclear weapons databook. Volume V: British, French, and Chinese nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S.; Burrows, A.S.; Fieldhouse, R.W.

    1994-12-31

    How insecurity and the search military independence drove post World War II nuclear proliferation beyond the United States and the Soviet Union is the subject of the latest and most voluminous title in the Natural Resources Defense Council`s highly acclaimed Nuclear Weapons Databook series. Volume 5 explains how atomic and thermonuclear weapons spread to Britain, France, and China despite the political turmoil and economic hardship that beset these countries. The history of the British nuclear weapons program includes the most comprehensive collection of photos and specifications of British warheads and nuclear tests ever assembled in one publication. The role of the United States in the French nuclear weapons program is discussed. This is a comprehensive source for the mechanics and politics of nuclear weapons proliferation.

  6. Laser weapons come down to earth

    SciTech Connect

    Morrison, D.C.

    1985-05-01

    The Star Wars debate seldom mentions the fact that low-powered lasers are already widely used as adjuncts to conventional weaponry and tactical laser weapons will soon be ready for military arsenals. The superpowers will both have mass-produced directed-energy weapons available soon. Other directed-energy weapons, such as particle beams, atmospheric compression waves, microwaves, and radio-frequency waves are in various stages of development. The Stingray, a low-energy, tank-mounted laser that targets enemy electro-optical systems and crazes the inside of the tank cockpit, uses an innovative slab design instead of the conventional rod. The slab neutralizes the heating effect, improving beam quality tenfold. The author discusses the possibility that the psychological impact of battlefield lasers could match or exceed the physiological effects because of eye damage.

  7. A database system for characterization of munitions items in conventional ammunition demilitarization stockpiles

    SciTech Connect

    Chun, K.C.; Chiu, S.Y.; Ditmars, J.D.; Huber, C.C.; Nortunen, L.; Sabb, R.

    1994-05-01

    The MIDAS (Munition Items Disposition Action System) database system is an electronic data management system capable of storage and retrieval of information on the detailed structures and material compositions of munitions items designated for demilitarization. The types of such munitions range from bulk propellants and small arms to projectiles and cluster bombs. The database system is also capable of processing data on the quantities of inert, PEP (propellant, explosives and pyrotechnics) and packaging materials associated with munitions, components, or parts, and the quantities of chemical compounds associated with parts made of PEP materials. Development of the MIDAS database system has been undertaken by the US Army to support disposition of unwanted ammunition stockpiles. The inventory of such stockpiles currently includes several thousand items, which total tens of thousands of tons, and is still growing. Providing systematic procedures for disposing of all unwanted conventional munitions is the mission of the MIDAS Demilitarization Program. To carry out this mission, all munitions listed in the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition inventory must be characterized, and alternatives for resource recovery and recycling and/or disposal of munitions in the demilitarization inventory must be identified.

  8. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    SciTech Connect

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E. A.

    1999-12-07

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty implementing issues, showing how various States Parties have enacted measures that are responsive to CWC obligations. It is intended to highlight the issues that States Parties must address and to identify trends among States Parties that might be useful to States that have not yet made crucial decisions as to how to resolve key matters. At various points in the text, country names are listed in parenthesis to identify pieces of national legislation that demonstrate the point in the text. It should not be inferred that nations not listed have not addressed the point or have taken a different position. In some cases, a nation's position is explained in somewhat more depth to give specific detail to an assertion in the text. Attached to this paper is a chart which illustrates how States Parties in the Central European region as well as the United States respond to the issues raised. Obviously, in preparing such a chart, many subtle provisions in national legislation must be simplified. The point of the chart is to portray, on a few pages, the major trends of legislation.

  9. Enzymes for Degradation of Energetic Materials and Demilitarization of Explosives Stockpiles - SERDP Annual (Interim) Report, 12/98

    SciTech Connect

    Shah, M.M.

    1999-01-18

    The current stockpile of energetic materials requiring disposal contains about half a million tons. Through 2001, over 2.1 million tons are expected to pass through the stockpile for disposal. Safe and environmentally acceptable methods for disposing of these materials are needed. This project is developing safe, economical, and environmentally sound processes using biocatalyst (enzymes) to degrade energetic materials and to convert them into economically valuable products. Alternative methods for destroying these materials are hazardous, environmentally unacceptable, and expensive. These methods include burning, detonation, land and sea burial, treatment at high temperature and pressure, and treatment with harsh chemicals. Enzyme treatment operates at room temperature and atmospheric pressure in a water solution.

  10. The effect of chemical weapons incineration on the survival rates of Red-tailed Tropicbirds

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Schreiber, E.A.; Schenk, G.A.; Doherty, P.F., Jr.

    2001-01-01

    In 1992, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) began incinerating U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles on Johnston Atoll (Pacific Ocean) where about 500,000 seabirds breed, including Red-tailed Tropicbirds (Phaethon rubricauda). We hypothesized that survival rates of birds were lower in those nesting downwind of the incinerator smokestack compared to those upwind, and that birds might move away from the area. From 1992 - 2000 we monitored survival and movements between areas upwind and downwind from the JACADS facility. We used a multi-strata mark recapture approach to model survival, probability of recapture and movement. Probability of recapture was significantly higher for birds in downwind areas (owing to greater recapture effort) and thus was an important 'nuisance' parameter to take into account in modeling. We found no differences in survival between birds nesting upwind ( 0.8588) and downwind (0.8550). There was no consistent difference in movement rates between upwind or downwind areas from year to year: differences found may be attributed to differing vegetation growth and human activities between the areas. Our results suggest that JACADS has had no documentable influence on the survival and year to year movement of Red-tailed Tropicbirds.

  11. A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components

    SciTech Connect

    Lu, M.S.; Allentuck, J.

    1998-08-01

    It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form.

  12. Exact and Heuristic Methods for the Weapon Target Assignment Problem

    E-print Network

    Ahuja, Ravindra

    2004-12-10

    The Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) problem is a fundamental problem arising in defense-related applications of operations research. This problem consists of optimally assigning n weapons to m targets so ...

  13. Choice of Weapons for the Truel Thomas S. Ferguson, UCLA

    E-print Network

    Ferguson, Thomas S.

    Choice of Weapons for the Truel Thomas S. Ferguson, UCLA 1. Truels. The truel is the extension at each other's. 2. Choosing Weapons for the Shubik Truel 1 #12;Before each shot in the Shubik truel, one

  14. 76. VIEW OF SECOND WEAPONS STORAGE AREA ALONG SERVICE ROAD ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    76. VIEW OF SECOND WEAPONS STORAGE AREA ALONG SERVICE ROAD SHOWING BUILDINGS 338-333 LOOKING NORTHWEST. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME

  15. Exact and Heuristic Methods for the Weapon Target Assignment Problem

    E-print Network

    Ahuja, Ravindra K.

    2004-04-02

    The Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) problem is a fundamental problem arising in defense-related applications of operations research. This problem consists of optimally assigning n weapons to m targets so that the total ...

  16. 72. OVERALL VIEW OF WEAPONS STORAGE AREA IGLOO FIELDS. TAKEN ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    72. OVERALL VIEW OF WEAPONS STORAGE AREA IGLOO FIELDS. TAKEN FROM ROOF OF BUILDING 232 (MINE SHOP) LOOKING NORTH. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME

  17. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... § 501.12 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on Research Center property shall carry firearms, bows and arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially...

  18. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. 423.30 Section 423.30 Public...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess firearms...must not use or possess explosives, or fireworks or pyrotechnics of any type,...

  19. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. 423.30 Section 423.30 Public...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess firearms...must not use or possess explosives, or fireworks or pyrotechnics of any type,...

  20. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. 423.30 Section 423.30 Public...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess firearms...must not use or possess explosives, or fireworks or pyrotechnics of any type,...

  1. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. 423.30 Section 423.30 Public...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess firearms...must not use or possess explosives, or fireworks or pyrotechnics of any type,...

  2. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. 423.30 Section 423.30 Public...Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess firearms...must not use or possess explosives, or fireworks or pyrotechnics of any type,...

  3. Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy

    E-print Network

    Bell, Mark Stephen

    What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its importance, this question has not been answered satisfactorily. Nuclear weapons can facilitate six conceptually distinct foreign ...

  4. 76 FR 1136 - Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-07

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop AGENCY..., academia, military, test instrument manufacturers, etc.) of electroshock weapons that provide...

  5. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ...true Weapons and explosives. 702.7 Section 702.7 Parks, Forests, and Public Property LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONDUCT ON LIBRARY PREMISES § 702.7 Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the...

  6. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ...false Weapons and explosives. 702.7 Section 702.7 Parks, Forests, and Public Property LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONDUCT ON LIBRARY PREMISES § 702.7 Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the...

  7. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ...false Weapons and explosives. 702.7 Section 702.7 Parks, Forests, and Public Property LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONDUCT ON LIBRARY PREMISES § 702.7 Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the...

  8. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ...false Weapons and explosives. 702.7 Section 702.7 Parks, Forests, and Public Property LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONDUCT ON LIBRARY PREMISES § 702.7 Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the...

  9. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  10. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  11. The Strategic Weapon System Training Program.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cantor, Jeffrey A.

    1986-01-01

    The U.S. Navy's Strategic Weapon System training program has five principal components: needs assessment/task analysis (Personnel Performance Profile); instructional design (Training Path System); instructional development (Curricula); training implementation; and personnel and training evaluation. This training model illustrates how a program…

  12. The history of nuclear weapon safety devices

    SciTech Connect

    Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

    1998-06-01

    The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

  13. Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-09-01

    The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera.

  14. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  15. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  16. Impulse noise trauma during army weapon firing.

    PubMed

    Munjal, K R; Singh, V P

    1997-04-01

    A 100 infanty personnel firing modern weapons such as the Anti Tank Guided Missile, 106mm Recoiless Gun (RCL), 84mm Rocket Launcher (RL) and 81mm Mortar were studied for the effect of impulse noise on the ear and the evolution of the Temporary Threshold Shift (TTS), Recovery Time (RT) and Permanent Threshold Shift (PTS) was traced. PMID:23119288

  17. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  18. University Management of Weapons Labs? Yes.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kahn, James S.

    1986-01-01

    Promulgates the view that university management of weapons laboratories provides the best scientific results, and more independent advice than could be possible under government or industrial management. Focuses on Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, operated by the University of California. (An opposing viewpoint is presented in SE…

  19. Stability issues in reconstitution by weapon addition

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-08-01

    Reconstitution of strategic forces by the unilateral uploading of additional weapons from initially symmetric modest force levels reduces first strike stability. These changes are quantified and traced to changes in first and second strike costs in a model of missile exchanges in which both strikes are optimized analytically.

  20. Uses for plutonium: Weapons, reactors, and other

    SciTech Connect

    Condit, R.H.

    1994-05-01

    This document begins with a introduction on criticality and supercriticality. Then, types and components, design and engineering, yields, and disassembly of nuclear weapons are discussed. Plutonium is evaluated as a reactor fuel, including neutronics and chemistry considerations. Finally, other uses of plutonium are analyzed.

  1. The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Alexander, Archibald S.; And Others

    This book is composed of four papers prepared to illuminate the problem areas which might arise if the policies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other measures to limit chemical and biological weapons are ratified by the United States Senate. The papers included are: Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; The Use of Herbicides in War: A…

  2. 3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ...of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential...of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On...posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

  3. 75 FR 68671 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-08

    ...Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents...Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994...of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and...

  4. 32 CFR 552.124 - Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...true Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition. 552.124 Section...124 Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition. (a) Privately owned...transported in the following manner: (1) Weapons, other than weapons being...

  5. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552.104 Section 552.104 National...AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition,...

  6. 76 FR 70317 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-11-10

    ...the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents...the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994...of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and...

  7. 3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents...Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November...of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and...

  8. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552.130 Section 552.130 ...Firearms, Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition,...

  9. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11... FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or...

  10. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  11. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition...

  12. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  13. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  14. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  15. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  16. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  17. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  18. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  19. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  20. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  1. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  2. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  3. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  4. Can nuclear weapons fallout mark the beginning of the

    E-print Network

    Barnosky, Anthony D.

    Feature Can nuclear weapons fallout mark the beginning of the Anthropocene Epoch? Colin N. Waters, and the fallout from nuclear weapons testing appears most suitable. The appearance of plutonium 239 (used in post- 1945 above-ground nuclear weapons tests) makes a good marker: This isotope is rare in nature

  5. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  6. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  7. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  8. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  9. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  10. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2014-01-01 2013-01-01 true Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  11. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  12. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  13. Millimetre -Wave Personnel Scanners for Automated Weapon Detection

    E-print Network

    Harvey, Andy

    Millimetre -Wave Personnel Scanners for Automated Weapon Detection Beatriz Grafulla-Gonz´alez1 of realistic millimetre-wave images and a sys- tem for detecting metallic weapons automatically. The latter of weapons concealed under clothes. Existing MMW simulation packages, e.g., PMWCM or Speos, are not designed

  14. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  15. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  16. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  17. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  18. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  19. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  20. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  1. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  2. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition...

  3. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  4. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  5. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  6. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  7. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13 Section... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  8. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  9. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  10. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  11. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  12. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  13. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  14. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  15. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  16. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  17. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition...

  18. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  19. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2012-04-01 2011-04-01 true Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  20. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  1. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  2. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  3. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  4. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  5. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  6. Adolescents Who Carry Weapons to School: A Review of Cases

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Finkenbine, Ryan D.; Dwyer, R. Gregg

    2006-01-01

    Multiple self-report surveys have collected data about weapons in school. This record review study considers characteristics of 47 adolescents adjudicated for carrying weapons at school and provides a descriptive analysis against a comparison group of 37 juveniles with other offenses. Demographics, weapon type, legal history, prior school…

  7. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  8. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  9. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  10. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  11. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  12. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13 Section... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  13. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  14. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  15. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  16. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition...

  17. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  18. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  19. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  20. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  1. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  2. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  3. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2012-10-01 2011-10-01 true Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  4. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  5. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  6. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  7. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  8. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons... paragraph (a) of this section does not apply to employees who are required to possess weapons or...

  9. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  10. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  11. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  12. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  13. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. 520.15... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  14. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  15. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13 Section... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  16. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. 504.14... SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  17. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ...Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons...or any other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  18. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ..., or other weapons on national wildlife refuges is prohibited except as may be authorized under the... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43...

  19. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ..., or other weapons on national wildlife refuges is prohibited except as may be authorized under the... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43...

  20. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 8 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use...

  1. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use...

  2. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ..., or other weapons on national wildlife refuges is prohibited except as may be authorized under the... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43...

  3. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25...BUILDING AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while...possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended to be...

  4. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section...MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry...possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  5. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7 Section 702...CONDUCT ON LIBRARY PREMISES § 702.7 Weapons and explosives. Except where duly...carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  6. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...2010-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section 1544.219 ...§ 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a) Flights for which screening...201(d), with respect to accessible weapons, do not apply to a law...

  7. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section...ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in...carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or explosives either openly or...

  8. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section...BELTSVILLE, MARYLAND § 502.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in...carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  9. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 15.15 Section 15...EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons and explosives. No person entering...possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended to...

  10. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section... Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and explosives. Except in connection...loaded or not, other dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives,...

  11. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7 Section 228...PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons entering...firearms, any illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars,...

  12. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section...BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while...carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  13. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4 Section 2...PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except...are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a...

  14. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504.14 Section...INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on...carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  15. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520.15 Section...SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION § 520.15 Weapons and explosives. No person while on...carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  16. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 true Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116 Section 552...Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms...secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition but separate from...

  17. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ...2010-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians...Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is...

  18. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ...2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section...National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and explosives. (a) No person while...carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  19. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002.4 Section...PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except...are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a...

  20. 2012 Boise State University 1 Possession of Firearms/Weapons

    E-print Network

    Barrash, Warren

    © 2012 Boise State University 1 Possession of Firearms/Weapons on University Owned or Controlled for the regulation of the possession of firearms and other weapons on university owned and controlled premises · Scope ­ applies to all firearms and other weapons on university owned or controlled premises

  1. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ...Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons...or any other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  2. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons...or any other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  3. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ...Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons...or any other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  4. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ...Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons...or any other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  5. Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jenkins, Bonnie

    1997-01-01

    Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

  6. 32 CFR 552.116 - Privately owned weapons-security.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Privately owned weapons-security. 552.116..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.116 Privately owned weapons—security. Privately owned arms and ammunition will be secured in the manner required for military weapons and ammunition...

  7. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  8. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  9. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  10. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  11. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  12. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ...2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries ...Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and...

  13. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ...2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries ...Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and...

  14. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ...2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries ...Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and...

  15. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ...2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries ...Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and...

  16. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ...2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section 27.43 Wildlife and Fisheries ...Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and...

  17. 48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items, services, and logistics support for a weapon system... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217.173 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE...

  18. EFFECT OF SOURCE AND RATE OF NITROGEN AND SULFUR FERTILIZER ON YIELD, QUALITY, AND MINERAL COMPOSITION OF STOCKPILED TALL FESCUE

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Field research was conducted for 2 yr to determine the effect of nitrogen (N) and sulfur (S) source and rate effects on stockpiled tall fescue (Festuca arundinacea Schreb.) forage yield, quality, and mineral content at different harvest dates. High lysine fertilizer (HLF), which contains approximate...

  19. Comparison Between Multicopter Uav and Total Station for Estimating Stockpile Volumes

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Arango, C.; Morales, C. A.

    2015-08-01

    Currently the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) have become an alternative for different engineering applications, especially in surveying, one of these applications is the calculation of volumes of stockpiled material, but there are questions about its accuracy and efficiency, the purpose of this article is to compare traditional surveying methods for estimating total volumes through data obtained by total stations and data obtained by a multicopter UAV. In order to answer these questions we obtain data from the same location and the results were compared. After comparing the results it was found that there was a 2,88% difference between the volume calculated with the total station data and the actual volume, and -0,67% difference between the volume calculated with the UAV data and the actual volume, concluding that the estimated volume with UAV data is more accurate.

  20. Space Weapons: effect on strategic stability

    SciTech Connect

    Velikhov, Y.P.

    1984-05-01

    Two distinct directions in space militarizaiton, the creation of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and the development of space-based anti-missile systems (SBAMS), are closely meshed with the problems of strategic balance and stability, as well as with prospects for substantial nuclear arms reductions. The creation of a constant threat to satellites will impair the prospects of reaching agreements on a freeze of nuclear weapons, deep reductions, and confidence in their verification. The anti-missile program would be expensive and unreliable. There are sound reasons to believe that cheaper and more effective countermeasures are available. A cooperative space program with the Soviet Union could contribute to and expedite the solution of increasingly acute global problems such as economic development, energy, resources, and ecology, and could be a basis for successful space exploration and settlement. 2 figures.

  1. Defense programs: A Sandia weapon review bulletin

    SciTech Connect

    Floyd, H.L.; Goetsch, B.; Doran, L.

    1993-11-01

    Sandia`s mission to explore technology that enhances US nuclear weapons capabilities has been the primary impetus for the development of a class of inertial measurement units not available commercially. The newest member of the family is the Ring Laser Gyro Assembly. The product of a five-year joint effort by Sandia and Honeywell`s Space and Strategic Systems Operation, the RLGA is a small, one-nautical-mile-per-hour-class inertial measurement unit that consumes only 16 watts - attributes that are important to a guidance and control capability for new or existing weapons. These same attributes led the Central Inertial Guidance Test Facility at Holloman Air Force Base to select the RLGA for their newest test instrumentation pod. The RLGA sensor assembly is composed of three Honeywell ring laser gyroscopes and three Sundstrand Data Control accelerometers that are selected from three types according to the user`s acceleration range and accuracy needs.

  2. Emergency management of chemical weapons injuries.

    PubMed

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-02-01

    The potential for chemical weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Classes of chemical weapons include nerve agents, vesicants (blister agents), choking agents, incapacitating agents, riot control agents, blood agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. The nerve agents work by blocking the actions of acetylcholinesterase leading to a cholinergic syndrome. Nerve agents include sarin, tabun, VX, cyclosarin, and soman. The vesicants include sulfur mustard and lewisite. The vesicants produce blisters and also damage the upper airways. Choking agents include phosgene and chlorine gas. Choking agents cause pulmonary edema. Incapacitating agents include fentanyl and its derivatives and adamsite. Riot control agents include Mace and pepper spray. Blood agents include cyanide. The mechanism of toxicity for cyanide is blocking oxidative phosphorylation. Toxic industrial chemicals include agents such as formaldehyde, hydrofluoric acid, and ammonia. PMID:22080590

  3. Medical implications of enhanced radiation weapons.

    PubMed

    Reeves, Glen I

    2010-12-01

    During the 1960s through 1980s the United States and several other nations developed, and even considered deploying, enhanced-radiation warheads (ERWs). The main effect of ERWs (sometimes called "neutron bombs"), as compared to other types of nuclear weapons, is to enhance radiation casualties while reducing blast and thermal damage to the infrastructure. Five nations were reported to have developed and tested ERWs during this period, but since the termination of the "Cold War" there have been no threats of development, deployment, or use of such weapons. However, if the technology of a quarter of a century ago has been developed, maintained, or even advanced since then, it is conceivable that the grim possibility of future ERW use exists. The type of destruction, initial triage of casualties, distribution of patterns of injury, and medical management of ERWs will be shown to significantly differ from that of fission weapons. Emergency response planners and medical personnel, civilian or military, must be aware of these differences to reduce the horrible consequences of ERW usage and appropriately treat casualties. PMID:21265303

  4. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    SciTech Connect

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  5. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

    SciTech Connect

    1997-08-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

  6. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing measures were still under development. Last month, the Web Edition of the Manual was completed. It's internet address, or URL, is http://www.cwc.anl.gov/.

  7. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronics system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    SciTech Connect

    Perez, C.L.; Johnson, J.O.

    1994-05-01

    The utilization of reconnaissance/surveillance satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; neutrons, gamma rays, and X-rays from fission and fusion weapons; and directed neutral particle beams and lasers. Electronic equipment, including modem integrated circuits, may undergo permanent or transient changes of the electrical properties of the active components when exposed to these sources of radiation. This report summarizes the results of the Monte Carlo Adjoint Shielding code system -- MASH v1.0 calculations designed to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized spaced based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emanating from a thermonuclear weapon detonation. The MASH calculations modeled several source/platform geometry configurations, obtaining results for multiple distances and weapon detonation positions relative to the platform. For certain source/platform orientations, the results indicate vulnerabilities to the C{sup 3} bay critical components box to radiation damage from a nuclear weapon detonation. Neutron protection factors ranged from 0.7 to 3.4 for the three platform configurations analyzed, and gamma-ray protection factors ranged from approximately 1.5 to 9.8. The results further indicate the source has a direct line-of-sight to the critical components box for certain source/platform orientations, regardless of the number of interceptors present. The merits of utilizing the MASH code system for estimating dose and shielding factors for spaced based assets has been demonstrated. The geometry configuration studied here is greatly simplified compared to those that will be encountered in an actual design.

  8. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  9. Uranium power and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

    PubMed

    Starr, C

    1984-06-01

    Only a few nonnuclear weapons states with uranium-fueled power plants have kept the weapons option open, and none has evidenced activities intended for diverting fissionable material from its civilian system. Analysis of alternative strategies shows that acquisition of nuclear weapons material would probably depend on military production facilities rather than diversion. Horizontal proliferation is primarily a political issue and is related only marginally to uranium power development. Restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act on the supply of equipment and fuel by the United States appear to have induced, in some nonnuclear weapons states, the building of small-scale facilities that can be modified for production of weapons material. More attention should be given to the international political, economic, and military factors that persuade such states to abjure nuclear weapons. PMID:17731979

  10. Performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Pei; Liu, Min; Su, Yu; Zhang, Ke

    2014-12-01

    High energy laser weapons are ready for some of today's most challenging military applications. Based on the analysis of the main tactical/technical index and combating process of high energy laser weapon, a performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon was established. Firstly, the index decomposition and workflow of high energy laser weapon was proposed. The entire system was composed of six parts, including classical target, platform of laser weapon, detect sensor, tracking and pointing control, laser atmosphere propagation and damage assessment module. Then, the index calculation modules were designed. Finally, anti-missile interception simulation was performed. The system can provide reference and basis for the analysis and evaluation of high energy laser weapon efficiency.

  11. The GSFC Combined Approach of ODC Stockpiling and Tribological Testing to Mitigate the Risks of ODC Elimination

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Predmore, Roamer; Woods, Claudia; Hovanec, Andrew

    1997-01-01

    In response to the elimination of production of several Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODCs) which have been widely used in successful space flight mechanism cleaning and lubricating procedures, GSFC developed and implemented an overall philosophy of mitigating the risks to flight hardware during the transition phase to ODC-Free cleaning procedures. One leg of that philosophy is the initiation of a several tier testing program which will deliver increasing amounts of information over the next few years, starting with original surface analysis comparisons between ODC and various ODC-Free cleaning technologies. The other leg is the stockpiling of an appropriate amount of ODC solvents such that all short term GSFC missions will be able to stay with or revert to heritage cleaning and lubricating procedures in the face of life issues. While tribological testing, mechanism life testing and space-flight experience will ultimately bring us into the 21st century with environmentally friendly means of cleaning long-life precision mechanism components, many satellites will be launched over the next few years with a number of important tribological questions unanswered. In order to prepare for this challenge, the Materials Engineering Branch in cooperation with the Electromechanical Branch launched an intensive review of all ongoing missions. The failure risk was determined for each long-life mechanism based on a number of parameters, including a comparison of flight solvents used to clean the heritage/life test hardware. Also studied was the ability of the mechanism manufacturers to stockpile ODCs based on state laws and company policies. A stockpiling strategy was constructed based on this information and subsequently implemented. This paper provides an overview of the GSFC ODC elimination risk mitigation philosophy as well as a detailed examination of the development of the ODC stockpiling plan.

  12. The GSFC Combined Approach of ODC Stockpiling and Tribological Testing to Mitigate the Risks of ODC Elimination

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Predmore, Roamer; LeBoeuf, Claudia; Hovanec, Andrew

    1997-01-01

    In response to the elimination of production of several Ozone Depleting Chemicals (ODC's) which have been widely used in successful space flight mechanism cleaning and lubricating procedures, GSFC developed and implemented an overall philosophy of mitigating the risks to flight hardware during the transition phase to ODC-free cleaning procedures. The short term leg of the philosophy was the stockpiling of an appropriate amount of ODC solvents such that all short term GSFC missions will be able to stay with or revert to heritage cleaning and lubricating procedures in the face of life issues. The long-term leg of that philosophy was the initiation of a several tier testing program that will deliver increasing amounts of information over the next few years, starting with accelerated lubricant life tests that compare lubricant life on surfaces cleaned with ODC solvents with lubricant life on surfaces cleaned with ODC-free solvents. While tribological testing, mechanism life testing and space-flight experience will ultimately bring us into the 21st century with environmentally friendly means of cleaning long-life precision mechanism components, many satellites will be launched over the next few years before a number of important tribological questions can be answered. In order to prepare for this challenge, the Materials Engineering Branch in cooperation with the Electromechanical Branch launched an intensive review of all ongoing missions. The failure risk was determined for each long-life lubricated mechanism based on a number of parameters, including 4 comparison of flight solvents used to clean the heritage/life test hardware. Also studied was the ability of the mechanism manufacturers to stockpile ODC's based on state laws and company policies. A stockpiling strategy was constructed based on this information and subsequently implemented. This paper provides an overview of the GSFC ODC elimination risk mitigation philosophy as well as a detailed examination of the development of the ODC stockpiling plan.

  13. Toxicity of vesicant agents scheduled for destruction by the chemical stockpile disposal program

    SciTech Connect

    Watson, A.P.; Griffin, G.D. )

    1992-11-01

    The vesicant agents of the unitary chemical munitions stockpile include various formulations of sulfur mustard [bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide; agents H, HD, and HT] and small quantities of the organic arsenical Lewisite [dichloro(2-chlorovinyl)arsine; agent L]. These agents can be dispersed in liquid, aerosol, or vapor form and are capable of producing severe chemical burns upon direct contact with tissue. Moist tissues such as the eyes, respiratory tract, and axillary areas are particularly affected. Available data summarizing acute dose response in humans and laboratory animals are summarized. Vesicant agents are also capable of generating delayed effects such as chronic bronchitis, carcinogenesis, or keratitis/keratopathy of the eye under appropriate conditions of exposure and dose. These effects may not become manifest until years following exposure. Risk analysis derived from carcinogenesis data indicates that sulfur mustard possesses a carcinogenic potency similar to that of benzo[a]pyrene. Because mustard agents are alkylating compounds, they destroy individual cells by reaction with cellular proteins, enzymes, RNA, and DNA. Once begun, tissue reaction is irreversible. Mustard agents are mutagenic; data for cellular and laboratory animal assays are presented. Reproductive effects have not been demonstrated in the offspring of laboratory rats. Acute Lewisite exposure has been implicated in cases of Bowen's disease, an intraepidermal squamous cell carcinoma. Lewisite is not known to generate reproductive or teratogenic effects. 112 refs., 1 fig., 6 tabs.

  14. ACAM2000™: The new smallpox vaccine for United States Strategic National Stockpile

    PubMed Central

    Nalca, Aysegul; Zumbrun, Elizabeth E

    2010-01-01

    Smallpox was eradicated more than 30 years ago, but heightened concerns over bioterrorism have brought smallpox and smallpox vaccination back to the forefront. The previously licensed smallpox vaccine in the United States, Dryvax® (Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.), was highly effective, but the supply was insufficient to vaccinate the entire current US population. Additionally, Dryvax® had a questionable safety profile since it consisted of a pool of vaccinia virus strains with varying degrees of virulence, and was grown on the skin of calves, an outdated technique that poses an unnecessary risk of contamination. The US government has therefore recently supported development of an improved live vaccinia virus smallpox vaccine. This initiative has resulted in the development of ACAM2000™ (Acambis, Inc.™), a single plaque-purified vaccinia virus derivative of Dryvax®, aseptically propagated in cell culture. Preclinical and clinical trials reported in 2008 demonstrated that ACAM2000™ has comparable immunogenicity to that of Dryvax®, and causes a similar frequency of adverse events. Furthermore, like Dryvax®, ACAM2000™ vaccination has been shown by careful cardiac screening to result in an unexpectedly high rate of myocarditis and pericarditis. ACAM2000™ received US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval in August 2007, and replaced Dryvax® for all smallpox vaccinations in February 2008. Currently, over 200 million doses of ACAM2000™ have been produced for the US Strategic National Stockpile. This review of ACAM2000™ addresses the production, characterization, clinical trials, and adverse events associated with this new smallpox vaccine. PMID:20531961

  15. Toxicity of vesicant agents scheduled for destruction by the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.

    PubMed Central

    Watson, A P; Griffin, G D

    1992-01-01

    The vesicant agents of the unitary chemical munitions stockpile include various formulations of sulfur mustard [bis-(2-chloroethyl) sulfide; agents H, HD, and HT] and small quantities of the organic arsenical Lewisite [dichloro(2-chlorovinyl) arsine; agent L]. These agents can be dispersed in liquid, aerosol, or vapor form and are capable of producing severe chemical burns upon direct contact with tissue. Moist tissues such as the eyes, respiratory tract, and axillary areas are particularly affected. Available data summarizing acute dose response in humans and laboratory animals are summarized. Vesicant agents are also capable of generating delayed effects such as chronic bronchitis, carcinogenesis, or keratitis/keratopathy of the eye under appropriate conditions of exposure and dose. These effects may not become manifest until years following exposure. Risk analysis derived from carcinogenesis data indicates that sulfur mustard possesses a carcinogenic potency similar to that of benzo[a]pyrene. Because mustard agents are alkylating compounds, they destroy individual cells by reaction with cellular proteins, enzymes, RNA, and DNA. Once begun, tissue reaction is irreversible. Mustard agents are mutagenic; data for cellular and laboratory animal assays are presented. Reproductive effects have not been demonstrated in the offspring of laboratory rats. Acute Lewisite exposure has been implicated in cases of Bowen's disease, an intraepidermal squamous cell carcinoma. Lewisite is not known to generate reproductive or teratogenic effects. PMID:1486858

  16. Integrated Baseline System (IBS), Version 1. 03. [Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

    SciTech Connect

    Bailey, B.M.; Burford, M.J.; Downing, T.R.; Matsumoto, S.W.; Schrank, E.E.; Williams, J.R.; Winters, C.

    1993-01-01

    The Integrated Baseline System (IBS), operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a system of computerized tools for emergency planing and analysis. This document is the user guide for the IBS and explains how to operate the IBS system. The fundamental function of the IBS is to provide tools that civilian emergency management personnel can use in developing emergency plans and in supporting emergency management activities to cope with a chemical-releasing event at a military chemical stockpile. Emergency management planners can evaluate concepts and ideas using the IBS system. The results of that experience can then be factored into refining requirements and plans. This document provides information for the general system user, and is the primary reference for the system features of the IBS. It is designed for persons who are familiar with general emergency management concepts, operations, and vocabulary. Although the IBS manual set covers basic and advanced operations, it is not a complete reference document set. Emergency situation modeling software in the IBS is supported by additional technical documents. Some of the other LBS software is commercial software for which more complete documentation is available. The IBS manuals reference such documentation where necessary. IBS is a dynamic system. Its capabilities are in a state of continuing expansion and enhancement.

  17. Integrated Baseline System (IBS), Version 1.03. User guide: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

    SciTech Connect

    Bailey, B.M.; Burford, M.J.; Downing, T.R.; Matsumoto, S.W.; Schrank, E.E.; Williams, J.R.; Winters, C.

    1993-01-01

    The Integrated Baseline System (IBS), operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is a system of computerized tools for emergency planing and analysis. This document is the user guide for the IBS and explains how to operate the IBS system. The fundamental function of the IBS is to provide tools that civilian emergency management personnel can use in developing emergency plans and in supporting emergency management activities to cope with a chemical-releasing event at a military chemical stockpile. Emergency management planners can evaluate concepts and ideas using the IBS system. The results of that experience can then be factored into refining requirements and plans. This document provides information for the general system user, and is the primary reference for the system features of the IBS. It is designed for persons who are familiar with general emergency management concepts, operations, and vocabulary. Although the IBS manual set covers basic and advanced operations, it is not a complete reference document set. Emergency situation modeling software in the IBS is supported by additional technical documents. Some of the other LBS software is commercial software for which more complete documentation is available. The IBS manuals reference such documentation where necessary. IBS is a dynamic system. Its capabilities are in a state of continuing expansion and enhancement.

  18. Terahertz imaging performance model for concealed weapon identification

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jacobs, Eddie; Driggers, Ronald G.; Krapels, Keith A.; De Lucia, Frank C.; Petkie, Douglas T.

    2004-12-01

    Terahertz imaging is becoming more viable for many applications due to advances in detector and emitter technologies. One of the applications for THz imaging is the detection and identification of concealed weapons (e.g., in airport security screening lines). The path described here provides an imaging performance model for the application of concealed weapon identification. The approach is the typical U.S. Army target acquisition model for sensor performance prediction coupled to the acquire methodology for weapon identification performance prediction.

  19. Contests with deadly weapons: telson sparring in mantis shrimp (Stomatopoda).

    PubMed

    Green, P A; Patek, S N

    2015-09-01

    Mantis shrimp strike with extreme impact forces that are deadly to prey. They also strike conspecifics during territorial contests, yet theoretical and empirical findings in aggressive behaviour research suggest competitors should resolve conflicts using signals before escalating to dangerous combat. We tested how Neogonodactylus bredini uses two ritualized behaviours to resolve size-matched contests: meral spread visual displays and telson (tailplate) strikes. We predicted that (i) most contests would be resolved by meral spreads, (ii) meral spreads would reliably signal strike force and (iii) strike force would predict contest success. The results were unexpected for each prediction. Contests were not resolved by meral spreads, instead escalating to striking in 33 of 34 experiments. The size of meral spread components did not strongly correlate with strike force. Strike force did not predict contest success; instead, winners delivered more strikes. Size-matched N. bredini avoid deadly combat not by visual displays, but by ritualistically and repeatedly striking each other's telsons until the loser retreats. We term this behaviour 'telson sparring', analogous to sparring in other weapon systems. We present an alternative framework for mantis shrimp contests in which the fight itself is the signal, serving as a non-lethal indicator of aggressive persistence or endurance. PMID:26399976

  20. Proliferation of biological weapons: challenges and responses.

    PubMed

    Millett, Piers D

    2004-01-01

    The threat posed by the proliferation of biological weapons (BW) confronts all strata of our society, from the individual, the nation, or the region to the truly international. The history of state-run offensive BW programmes and the attacks in the United States with powdered anthrax demonstrate that existing measures fall short of addressing this threat. This article examines the current regime and the concerns that confront it in order to suggest possible responses across the social strata that may mitigate future proliferation of BW. PMID:15015544

  1. Immobilization of excess weapons plutonium in Russia

    SciTech Connect

    Borisov, G B; Jardine, L J; Mansourov, O A

    1999-01-25

    In this paper, we examine the logic and framework for the development of a capability to immobilize excess Russian weapons plutonium by the year 2004. The initial activities underway in Russia, summarized here, include engineering feasibility studies of the immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at the Krasnoyarsk and Mayak industrial sites. In addition, research and development (R&D) studies are underway at Russian institutes to develop glass and ceramic forms suitable for the immobilization of plutonium-containing materials, residues, and wastes and for their geologic disposal.

  2. European security, nuclear weapons and public confidence

    SciTech Connect

    Gutteridge, W.

    1982-01-01

    This book presents papers on nuclear arms control in Europe. Topics considered include political aspects, the balance of power, nuclear disarmament in Europe, the implications of new conventional technologies, the neutron bomb, theater nuclear weapons, arms control in Northern Europe, naval confidence-building measures in the Baltic, the strategic balance in the Arctic Ocean, Arctic resources, threats to European stability, developments in South Africa, economic cooperation in Europe, European collaboration in science and technology after Helsinki, European cooperation in the area of electric power, and economic cooperation as a factor for the development of European security and cooperation.

  3. Open architecture applied to next-generation weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rose, Leo J.; Shaver, Jonathan; Young, Quinn; Christensen, Jacob

    2014-06-01

    The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has postulated a new weapons concept known as Flexible Weapons to define and develop technologies addressing a number of challenges. Initial studies on capability attributes of this concept have been conducted and AFRL plans to continue systems engineering studies to quantify metrics against which the value of capabilities can be assessed. An important aspect of Flexible Weapons is having a modular "plug-n-play" hardware and software solution, supported by an Open Architecture and Universal Armament Interface (UAI) common interfaces. The modular aspect of Flexible Weapons is a means to successfully achieving interoperability and composability at the weapon level. Interoperability allows for vendor competition, timely technology refresh, and avoids costs by ensuring standard interfaces widely supported in industry, rather than an interface unique to a particular vendor. Composability provides for the means to arrange an open end set of useful weapon systems configurations. The openness of Flexible Weapons is important because it broadens the set of computing technologies, software updates, and other technologies to be introduced into the weapon system, providing the warfighter with new capabilities at lower costs across the life cycle. One of the most critical steps in establishing a Modular, Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) for weapons is the validation of compliance with the standard.

  4. Diehl weapons lab works on sensors, lasers, flight control

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Flume, W.

    1986-06-01

    The Diehl Weapons Laboratory activities include: warheads, ballistics, sensor technology, mensuration technology, and simulation. The facilities at the laboratory are described. Research projects are summarized.

  5. INTERIOR OF WEAPONS CLEANING CLASSROOM. view TO WEST. Plattsburgh ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    INTERIOR OF WEAPONS CLEANING CLASSROOM. view TO WEST. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Combined Arms Training Maintenance Building, Off Perimeter Road in Firearms Training Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

  6. Separation requirements for protection of high altitude satellites from co-orbital antisatellite weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Wojcik, L.A.

    1985-01-01

    This thesis estimates lower bounds to initial separation distances required for safety of maneuverable, shielded satellites against destruction by pre-deployed, co-orbital, nuclear-armed antisatellite (ASAT) weapons with maneuvering capability. Offensive and defensive designs are constrained by reasonable bounds on cost and mass. For satellites in circular Earth orbit with a radius to twice the geosynchronous radius, the lower bound for thirty minutes of safety after initiation of an attack is found to be on the order of thousands of kilometers. The lower bound is not substantially greater for x-ray lasers than for simple nuclear warheads, except perhaps for very long x-ray lasers. The danger to strategic satellites does not depend on the development of exotic energy-beam weapons, but would arise if reliable command and control (CS) and guidance capabilities for maneuverable ASATs in high orbit were successfully developed. Current ASAT programs in the United States and Soviet Union have included development and testing of limited CS and guidance capabilities. Although neither side is known to presently have an ASAT system capable of attacking high-altitude satellites, the danger to satellites in high orbit from capabilities being currently developed suggests that the danger be addressed in the near future. One approach is to attempt to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union on separation rules for objects in high orbit. Separation rules offer the potential for a means of mitigating crisis and arms race instabilities introduced by ASAT weapons.

  7. 32 CFR 552.121 - Possession or retention of prohibited weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Possession or retention of prohibited weapons... prohibited weapons. Prohibited weapons are defined as: (a) Any instrument or weapon of the kind usually known... and/or explosives. (c) Any weapons not legally obtained. (d) Any instrument commonly used in...

  8. 32 CFR 552.121 - Possession or retention of prohibited weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Possession or retention of prohibited weapons... prohibited weapons. Prohibited weapons are defined as: (a) Any instrument or weapon of the kind usually known... and/or explosives. (c) Any weapons not legally obtained. (d) Any instrument commonly used in...

  9. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential... Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, the President... chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28,...

  10. 32 CFR 552.121 - Possession or retention of prohibited weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Possession or retention of prohibited weapons... prohibited weapons. Prohibited weapons are defined as: (a) Any instrument or weapon of the kind usually known... and/or explosives. (c) Any weapons not legally obtained. (d) Any instrument commonly used in...

  11. 32 CFR 552.121 - Possession or retention of prohibited weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Possession or retention of prohibited weapons... prohibited weapons. Prohibited weapons are defined as: (a) Any instrument or weapon of the kind usually known... and/or explosives. (c) Any weapons not legally obtained. (d) Any instrument commonly used in...

  12. 32 CFR 552.121 - Possession or retention of prohibited weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Possession or retention of prohibited weapons... prohibited weapons. Prohibited weapons are defined as: (a) Any instrument or weapon of the kind usually known... and/or explosives. (c) Any weapons not legally obtained. (d) Any instrument commonly used in...

  13. Terahertz imaging of subjects with concealed weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dickinson, Jason C.; Goyette, Thomas M.; Gatesman, Andrew J.; Joseph, Cecil S.; Root, Zachary G.; Giles, Robert H.; Waldman, Jerry; Nixon, William E.

    2006-05-01

    In response to the growing interest in developing terahertz imaging systems for concealed weapons detection, the Submillimeter-Wave Technology Laboratory (STL) at the University of Massachusetts Lowell has produced full-body terahertz imagery using coherent active radar measurement techniques. The proof-of-principle results were readily obtained utilizing the compact radar range resources at STL. Two contrasting techniques were used to collect the imagery. Both methods made use of in-house transceivers, consisting of two ultra-stable far-infrared lasers, terahertz heterodyne detection systems, and terahertz anechoic chambers. The first technique involved full beam subject illumination with precision azimuth and elevation control to produce high resolution images via two axis Fourier transforms. Imagery collected in this manner is presented at 1.56THz and 350GHz. The second method utilized a focused spot, moved across the target subject in a high speed two dimensional raster pattern created by a large two-axis positioning mirror. The existing 1.56THz compact radar range was modified to project a focused illumination spot on the target subject several meters away, and receive the back-reflected intensity. The process was repeated across two dimensions, and the resultant image was assembled and displayed utilizing minimal on-the-fly processing. Imagery at 1.56THz of human subjects with concealed weapons are presented and discussed for this scan type.

  14. Diagnosis and Prognosis of Weapon Systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Nolan, Mary; Catania, Rebecca; deMare, Gregory

    2005-01-01

    The Prognostics Framework is a set of software tools with an open architecture that affords a capability to integrate various prognostic software mechanisms and to provide information for operational and battlefield decision-making and logistical planning pertaining to weapon systems. The Prognostics NASA Tech Briefs, February 2005 17 Framework is also a system-level health -management software system that (1) receives data from performance- monitoring and built-in-test sensors and from other prognostic software and (2) processes the received data to derive a diagnosis and a prognosis for a weapon system. This software relates the diagnostic and prognostic information to the overall health of the system, to the ability of the system to perform specific missions, and to needed maintenance actions and maintenance resources. In the development of the Prognostics Framework, effort was focused primarily on extending previously developed model-based diagnostic-reasoning software to add prognostic reasoning capabilities, including capabilities to perform statistical analyses and to utilize information pertaining to deterioration of parts, failure modes, time sensitivity of measured values, mission criticality, historical data, and trends in measurement data. As thus extended, the software offers an overall health-monitoring capability.

  15. Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons.

    PubMed

    Paterson, R Russell M

    2006-09-01

    Recent aggressive attacks on innocent citizens have resulted in governments increasing security. However, there is a good case for prevention rather than reaction. Bioweapons, mycotoxins, fungal biocontrol agents (FBCA), and even pharmaceuticals contain, or are, toxins and need to be considered in the context of the new paradigm. Is it desirable to discuss such issues? None of the fungi are (a) as toxic as botulinum toxin from Clostridium botulinum, and (b) as dangerous as nuclear weapons. One toxin may be defined as a pharmaceutical and vice versa simply by a small change in concentration or a moiety. Mycotoxins are defined as naturally occurring toxic compounds obtained from fungi. They are the biggest chronic health risk when incorporated into the diet. The current list of fungal toxins as biochemical weapons is small, although awareness is growing of the threats they may pose. T-2 toxin is perhaps the biggest concern. A clear distinction is required between the biological (fungus) and chemical (toxin) aspects of the issue. There is an obvious requirement to be able to trace these fungi and compounds in the environment and to know when concentrations are abnormal. Many FBCA, produce toxins. This paper indicates how to treat mycotoxicosis and decontaminate mycotoxins. There is considerable confusion and inconsistency surrounding this topic which requires assessment in an impartial and scientific manner. PMID:16908123

  16. A microstructural analysis of solder joints from the electronic assemblies of dismantled nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Vianco, P.T.; Rejent, J.A.

    1997-05-01

    MC1814 Interconnection Boxes from dismantled B57 bombs, and MC2839 firing Sets from retired W70-1 warheads were obtained from the Pantex facility. Printed circuit boards were selected from these components for microstructural analysis of their solder joints. The analysis included a qualitative examination of the solder joints and quantitative assessments of (1) the thickness of the intermetallic compound layer that formed between the solder and circuit board Cu features, and (2) the Pb-rich phase particle distribution within the solder joint microstructure. The MC2839 solder joints had very good workmanship qualities. The intermetallic compound layer stoichiometry was determined to be that of Cu6Sn5. The mean intermetallic compound layer thickness for all solder joints was 0.885 mm. The magnitude of these values did not indicate significant growth over the weapon lifetime. The size distribution of the Pb-rich phase particles for each of the joints were represented by the mean of 9.85 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} mm{sup 2}. Assuming a spherical geometry, the mean particle diameter would be 3.54 mm. The joint-to-joint difference of intermetallic compound layer thickness and Pb-rich particle size distribution was not caused by varying thermal environments, but rather, was a result of natural variations in the joint microstructure that probably existed at the time of manufacture. The microstructural evaluation of the through-hole solder joints form the MC2839 and MC1814 components indicated that the environmental conditions to which these electronic units were exposed in the stockpile, were benign regarding solder joint aging. There was an absence of thermal fatigue damage in MC2839 circuit board, through-hole solder joints. The damage to the eyelet solder joints of the MC1814 more likely represented infant mortality failures at or very near the time of manufacture, resulting from a marginal design status of this type of solder joint design.

  17. Monolithic QCL design approaches for improved reliability and affordability

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Law, K. K.

    2013-12-01

    Many advances have been made recently in mid-wave infrared and long-wave infrared quantum cascade lasers (QCLs) technologies, and there is an increasing demand for these laser sources for ever expanding Naval, DoD and homeland security applications. We will discuss in this paper a portfolio of various Naval Air Warfare Weapons Division's current and future small business innovative research programs and efforts on significantly improving QCLs' performance, affordability, and reliability.

  18. Building the strategic national stockpile through the NIAID Radiation Nuclear Countermeasures Program.

    PubMed

    Rios, Carmen I; Cassatt, David R; Dicarlo, Andrea L; Macchiarini, Francesca; Ramakrishnan, Narayani; Norman, Mai-Kim; Maidment, Bert W

    2014-02-01

    The possibility of a public health radiological or nuclear emergency in the United States remains a concern. Media attention focused on lost radioactive sources and international nuclear threats, as well as the potential for accidents in nuclear power facilities (e.g., Windscale, Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima) highlight the need to address this critical national security issue. To date, no drugs have been licensed to mitigate/treat the acute and long-term radiation injuries that would result in the event of large-scale, radiation, or nuclear public health emergency. However, recent evaluation of several candidate radiation medical countermeasures (MCMs) has provided initial proof-of-concept of efficacy. The goal of the Radiation Nuclear Countermeasures Program (RNCP) of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (National Institutes of Health) is to help ensure the government stockpiling of safe and efficacious MCMs to treat radiation injuries, including, but not limited to, hematopoietic, gastrointestinal, pulmonary, cutaneous, renal, cardiovascular, and central nervous systems. In addition to supporting research in these areas, the RNCP continues to fund research and development of decorporation agents targeting internal radionuclide contamination, and biodosimetry platforms (e.g., biomarkers and devices) to assess the levels of an individual's radiation exposure, capabilities that would be critical in a mass casualty scenario. New areas of research within the program include a focus on special populations, especially pediatric and geriatric civilians, as well as combination studies, in which drugs are tested within the context of expected medical care management (e.g., antibiotics and growth factors). Moving forward, challenges facing the RNCP, as well as the entire radiation research field, include further advancement and qualification of animal models, dose conversion from animal models to humans, biomarker identification, and formulation development. This paper provides a review of recent work and collaborations supported by the RNCP. PMID:24648046

  19. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly...

  20. 7. VIEW OF WEAPONS DELIVERY ROAD CULVERT OF LOWER DIAGONAL ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    7. VIEW OF WEAPONS DELIVERY ROAD CULVERT OF LOWER DIAGONAL NO. 1 DRAIN, LOOKING 522 EAST OF NORTH. - Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Lower Diagonal No. 1 Drain, Bounded by West Gate Road & Weapons Delivery Road, Naval Air Station Fallon, Fallon, Churchill County, NV