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Sample records for stockpile reliability weapon

  1. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  2. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  3. Nuclear weapon reliability evaluation methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.

    1993-06-01

    This document provides an overview of those activities that are normally performed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide nuclear weapon reliability evaluations for the Department of Energy. These reliability evaluations are first provided as a prediction of the attainable stockpile reliability of a proposed weapon design. Stockpile reliability assessments are provided for each weapon type as the weapon is fielded and are continuously updated throughout the weapon stockpile life. The reliability predictions and assessments depend heavily on data from both laboratory simulation and actual flight tests. An important part of the methodology are the opportunities for review that occur throughout the entire process that assure a consistent approach and appropriate use of the data for reliability evaluation purposes.

  4. Reliability Degradation Due to Stockpile Aging

    SciTech Connect

    Robinson, David G.

    1999-04-01

    The objective of this reseach is the investigation of alternative methods for characterizing the reliability of systems with time dependent failure modes associated with stockpile aging. Reference to 'reliability degradation' has, unfortunately, come to be associated with all types of aging analyes: both deterministic and stochastic. In this research, in keeping with the true theoretical definition, reliability is defined as a probabilistic description of system performance as a funtion of time. Traditional reliability methods used to characterize stockpile reliability depend on the collection of a large number of samples or observations. Clearly, after the experiments have been performed and the data has been collected, critical performance problems can be identified. A Major goal of this research is to identify existing methods and/or develop new mathematical techniques and computer analysis tools to anticipate stockpile problems before they become critical issues. One of the most popular methods for characterizing the reliability of components, particularly electronic components, assumes that failures occur in a completely random fashion, i.e. uniformly across time. This method is based primarily on the use of constant failure rates for the various elements that constitute the weapon system, i.e. the systems do not degrade while in storage. Experience has shown that predictions based upon this approach should be regarded with great skepticism since the relationship between the life predicted and the observed life has been difficult to validate. In addition to this fundamental problem, the approach does not recognize that there are time dependent material properties and variations associated with the manufacturing process and the operational environment. To appreciate the uncertainties in predicting system reliability a number of alternative methods are explored in this report. All of the methods are very different from those currently used to assess stockpile reliability, but have been used extensively in various forms outside Sandia National Laboratories. It is hoped that this report will encourage the use of 'nontraditional' reliabilty and uncertainty techniques in gaining insight into stockpile reliability issues.

  5. National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Goodwin, B T; Juzaitis, R J

    2006-08-07

    Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories have developed a common framework and key elements of a national certification methodology called Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU). A spectrum from senior managers to weapons designers has been engaged in this activity at the two laboratories for on the order of a year to codify this methodology in an overarching and integrated paper. Following is the certification paper that has evolved. In the process of writing this paper, an important outcome has been the realization that a joint Livermore/Los Alamos workshop on QMU, focusing on clearly identifying and quantifying differences between approaches between the two labs plus developing an even stronger technical foundation on methodology, will be valuable. Later in FY03, such a joint laboratory workshop will be held. One of the outcomes of this workshop will be a new version of this certification paper. A comprehensive approach to certification must include specification of problem scope, development of system baseline models, formulation of standards of performance assessment, and effective procedures for peer review and documentation. This document concentrates on the assessment and peer review aspects of the problem. In addressing these points, a central role is played by a 'watch list' for weapons derived from credible failure modes and performance gate analyses. The watch list must reflect our best assessment of factors that are critical to weapons performance. High fidelity experiments and calculations as well as full exploitation of archival test data are essential to this process. Peer review, advisory groups and red teams play an important role in confirming the validity of the watch list. The framework for certification developed by the Laboratories has many basic features in common, but some significant differences in the detailed technical implementation of the overall methodology remain. Joint certification workshops held in June and December of 2001 and continued in 2002 have proven useful in developing the methodology, and future workshops should prove useful in further refining this framework. Each laboratory developed an approach to certification with some differences in detailed implementation. The general methodology introduces specific quantitative indicators for assessing confidence in our nuclear weapon stockpile. The quantitative indicators are based upon performance margins for key operating characteristics and components of the system, and these are compared to uncertainties in these factors. These criteria can be summarized in a quantitative metric (for each such characteristic) expressed as: (i.e., confidence in warhead performance depends upon CR significantly exceeding unity for all these characteristics). These Confidence Ratios are proposed as a basis for guiding technical and programmatic decisions on stockpile actions. This methodology already has been deployed in certifying weapons undergoing current life extension programs or component remanufacture. The overall approach is an adaptation of standard engineering practice and lends itself to rigorous, quantitative, and explicit criteria for judging the robustness of weapon system and component performance at a detailed level. There are, of course, a number of approaches for assessing these Confidence Ratios. The general certification methodology was publicly presented for the first time to a meeting of Strategic Command SAG in January 2002 and met with general approval. At that meeting, the Laboratories committed to further refine and develop the methodology through the implementation process. This paper reflects the refinement and additional development to date. There will be even further refinement at a joint laboratory workshop later in FY03. A common certification methodology enables us to engage in peer reviews and evaluate nuclear weapon systems on the basis of explicit and objective metrics. The clarity provided by such metrics enables each laboratory and our common customers to understand the meaning and logic of technical and management decisions affecting stockpile performance and safety.

  6. Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability

    SciTech Connect

    Chrzanowski, P.

    1991-03-20

    This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

  7. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  8. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  9. Stockpile surveillance: Past and future

    SciTech Connect

    Johnson, K.; Keller, J.; Ekdahl, C.; Krajcik, R.; Salazar, L.; Kelly, E.; Paulsen, R.

    1996-01-01

    The US nuclear weapon stockpile is entering a different era. Continuous introduction of new weapons into the stockpile, a large production capacity, and underground nuclear testing played important roles in how the nuclear weapons stockpile was managed in the past. These are no longer elements of the nuclear weapons program. Adjustments need to be made to compensate for the loss of these elements. The history of the stockpile indicates that problems have been found in both nuclear and nonnuclear components through a variety of methods including the Stockpile Evaluation Program, stockpile management activities, underground nuclear tests, and research activities. Changes have been made to the stockpile when necessary to assure safety, performance, and reliability. There have been problems found in each of the weapon types expected to be in the stockpile in the year 2000. It is reasonable to expect problems will continue to arise in the stockpile as it ages beyond the original design expectations.

  10. Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

    ScienceCinema

    None

    2015-01-07

    A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

  11. Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    2014-10-28

    A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

  12. Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-06-01

    Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

  13. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  14. Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)

    SciTech Connect

    Webster, Robert B.

    2012-06-29

    Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overview of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.

  15. A Research of Weapon System Storage Reliability Simulation Method Based on Fuzzy Theory

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Shi, Yonggang; Wu, Xuguang; Chen, Haijian; Xu, Tingxue

    Aimed at the problem of the new, complicated weapon equipment system storage reliability analyze, the paper researched on the methods of fuzzy fault tree analysis and fuzzy system storage reliability simulation, discussed the path that regarded weapon system as fuzzy system, and researched the storage reliability of weapon system based on fuzzy theory, provided a method of storage reliability research for the new, complicated weapon equipment system. As an example, built up the fuzzy fault tree of one type missile control instrument based on function analysis, and used the method of fuzzy system storage reliability simulation to analyze storage reliability index of control instrument.

  16. Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Adams, Marvin L.

    2014-05-09

    The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.

  17. Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Adams, Marvin L.

    2014-05-01

    The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.

  18. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction

    SciTech Connect

    1993-10-01

    ;Table of Contents: Articles of the Convention; Annex on Chemicals; Annex on Implementation and Verification (including General Rules of Verification, Destruction of Chemical Weapons and their Production Facilities, Challenge Inspections, Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons, and Activities not Prohibited); and Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information.

  19. The Stockpile Monitor Program

    SciTech Connect

    Buntain, G.A.; Fletcher, M.; Rabie, R.

    1994-07-01

    Recent political changes have led to drastic reductions in the number of nuclear warheads in stockpile, as well as increased expectations for warhead-service lives. In order to support and maintain a shrinking and aging nuclear stockpile, weapon scientists and engineers need detailed information describing the environments experienced by weapons in the field. Hence, the Stockpile Monitor Program was initiated in 1991 to develop a comprehensive and accurate database of temperature and humidity conditions experienced by nuclear warheads both in storage and on-alert.

  20. Stewarding a Reduced Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Goodwin, B T; Mara, G

    2008-04-18

    The future of the US nuclear arsenal continues to be guided by two distinct drivers: the preservation of world peace and the prevention of further proliferation through our extended deterrent umbrella. Timely implementation of US nuclear policy decisions depends, in part, on the current state of stockpile weapons, their delivery systems, and the supporting infrastructure within the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In turn, the present is a product of past choices and world events. Now more than ever, the nuclear weapons program must respond to the changing global security environment and to increasing budget pressures with innovation and sound investments. As the nation transitions to a reduced stockpile, the successes of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) present options to transition to a sustainable complex better suited to stockpile size, national strategic goals and budgetary realities. Under any stockpile size, we must maintain essential human capital, forefront capabilities, and have a right-sized effective production capacity. We present new concepts for maintaining high confidence at low stockpile numbers and to effectively eliminate the reserve weapons within an optimized complex. We, as a nation, have choices to make on how we will achieve a credible 21st century deterrent.

  1. Quality assurance and reliability sub-committee W88-0/Mk5 weapon assessment NSA lab test results (u)

    SciTech Connect

    Whitney, Earl M

    2010-11-29

    The purpose of this report is to gather appropriate level of relevant stockpile surveillance data to assess trends in the NEP quality, reliability, performance, and safety over the life of the system. The objectives are to gather relevant stockpile data to assess NEP quality and trends and to develop metrics to assess the suitability of the surveillance sampling regime to meet assessment process requirements.

  2. Stockpile Stewardship: How we Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent without Testing

    SciTech Connect

    2014-09-04

    In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

  3. Estimated Russian stockpile, September 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S.; Arkin, W.

    1996-09-01

    An estimate of the size and composition of the former Soviet nuclear stockpile, based on START I memorandum of understanding data, is provided. The estimate covers operational forces that are assumed to be in a ready condition available for use. Total warhead stockpiles are estimated at about 12,000. Strategic offensive warheads comprise 7500 of the total, strategic defense missiles are estimated at 1200, land-based nonstrategic bombers and fighters at 1600, and naval nonstrategic weapons at 1600. Subtotals are provided for weapons categories (missiles, bombers, etc.) and weapons launchers.

  4. Manufacturing high reliability weapon grade transformers in small lots

    SciTech Connect

    Archer, W.E.; Sanchez, R.O.

    1998-08-01

    Sandia has used flyback transformers for many years, primarily to charge capacitors for capacitive discharge units. Important characteristics of the transformer design are to meet inductance, turns ratio, and high voltage breakdown requirements as well as not magnetically saturating during each energy transfer cycle. Sandia has taken over production responsibility for magnetic components from a previous GE/LM, General Electric/Lockheed Martin, facility in Florida that produced {approximately} 50 K units per year. Vanguard Electronics is working with Sandia to transfer many of these designs to Vanguard`s small manufacturing facility in Gardena, CA. The challenge is to achieve the required high reliability and meet all the other electrical requirements with such small quantities of parts, {approximately} 100 per year. DOE requirements include high reliability {le} 3 failures per 10,000 components per 20 years while meeting numerous other environmental requirements. The basic design and prove-in required four lots of preproduction parts, extensive environmental testing, and numerous design changes. The manufacturing problems that affected performance of the transformer will be presented. These include encapsulation voids and core alignment. Also, some extended life test data that predicts long term reliability of newly produced transformers versus older designs will be compared.

  5. H.R. 4849: A Bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} and opened for signature and signed by the United States on January 13, 1993. Introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, July 28, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The report H.R. 4849 is a bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, known as the Chemical Weapons Convention. The proposed legislative text is included.

  6. Stockpile Management Program quarterly report. 2. quarter 1998

    SciTech Connect

    1998-11-01

    The objective of this program is to ensure the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile by: (1) maintaining robust nuclear facilities that comprise the infrastructure needed to conduct the various laboratory programs; (2) maintaining capabilities and qualified personnel needed to successfully implement the Program and ensure availability of competencies; (3) meeting present and future production and surveillance requirements to support the enduring stockpile and other programmatic deliverables; and (4) capturing and maintaining expertise and competency in the processes and technologies required to build a complete physics package. Summaries of accomplishments are presented for approximately 30 projects managed under this program.

  7. Science and technology in the stockpile stewardship program, S & TR reprints

    SciTech Connect

    Storm, E

    1998-04-08

    This document reports on these topics: Computer Simulations in Support of National Security; Enhanced Surveillance of Aging Weapons; A New Precision Cutting Tool: The Femtosecond Laser; Superlasers as a Tool of Stockpile Stewardship; Nova Laser Experiments and Stockpile Stewardship; Transforming Explosive Art into Science; Better Flash Radiography Using the FXR; Preserving Nuclear Weapons Information; Site 300s New Contained Firing Facility; The Linear Electric Motor: Instability at 1,000 gs; A Powerful New Tool to Detect Clandestine Nuclear Tests; High Explosives in Stockpile Surveillance Indicate Constancy; Addressing a Cold War Legacy with a New Way to Produce TATB; Jumpin Jupiter! Metallic Hydrogen; Keeping the Nuclear Stockpile Safe, Secure, and Reliable; The Multibeam FabryPerot Velocimeter: Efficient Measurements of High Velocities; Theory and Modeling in Material Science; The Diamond Anvil Cell; Gamma-Ray Imaging Spectrometry; X-Ray Lasers and High-Density Plasma

  8. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition

    PubMed Central

    Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690

  9. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    SciTech Connect

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-08-15

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start with an improved vision of the future stockpile and enterprise, and find a path that moves us toward that future. The goal of this approach is to achieve a more affordable, sustainable, and responsive enterprise. In order to transform the enterprise in this way, the SSP warhead designs that drive the enterprise must change. Designs that emphasize manufacturability, certifiability, and increased safety and security can enable enterprise transformation. It is anticipated that such warheads can be certified and sustained with high confidence without nuclear testing. The SSP provides the tools to provide such designs, and can develop replacement designs and produce them for the stockpile. The Cold War currency of optimizing warhead yield-to-weight can be replaced by SSP designs optimizing margin-to-uncertainty. The immediate challenge facing the nuclear weapons enterprise is to find a credible path that leads to this vision of the future stockpile and enterprise. Reliable warheads within a sustainable enterprise can best be achieved by shifting from a program of legacy-warhead refurbishment to one of warhead replacement. The nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons enterprise must transform together to achieve this vision. The current Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program represents an approach that can begin this process of transformation. If the RRW program succeeds, the designs, manufacturing complex, and certification strategy can evolve together and in so doing come up with a more cost-efficient solution that meets today's and tomorrow's national security requirements.

  10. Nuclear stockpile stewardship and Bayesian image analysis (DARHT and the BIE)

    SciTech Connect

    Carroll, James L

    2011-01-11

    Since the end of nuclear testing, the reliability of our nation's nuclear weapon stockpile has been performed using sub-critical hydrodynamic testing. These tests involve some pretty 'extreme' radiography. We will be discussing the challenges and solutions to these problems provided by DARHT (the world's premiere hydrodynamic testing facility) and the BIE or Bayesian Inference Engine (a powerful radiography analysis software tool). We will discuss the application of Bayesian image analysis techniques to this important and difficult problem.

  11. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    SciTech Connect

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  12. Materials and Sensor R&D to Transform the Nuclear Stockpile: Livermore?s Transformational Materials Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Maxwell, R; Fried, L; Campbell, G; Saab, A; Kotovsky, J; Carter, C; Chang, J

    2009-10-11

    As the nation's nuclear weapons age and the demands placed on them change, significant challenges face the nuclear stockpile. Risks include material supply issues, ever-increasing lifecycle costs, and loss of technical expertise across the weapons complex. For example, non-nuclear materials are becoming increasingly difficult to replace because manufacturing methods and formulations have evolved in such a way as to render formerly available materials unprofitable, unsafe, or otherwise obsolete. Subtle formulation changes in available materials that occur without the knowledge of the weapons community for proprietary reasons have frequently affected the long-term performance of materials in the nuclear weapon environment. Significant improvements in performance, lifetime, or production cost can be realized with modern synthesis, modeling, and manufacturing methods. For example, there are currently supply and aging issues associated with the insensitive high explosive formulations LX-17 and PBX 9502 that are based on triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) and Kel-F, neither of which are commercially available today. Assuring the reliability of the stockpile through surveillance and regularly scheduled Life Extension Programs is an increasingly expensive endeavor. Transforming our current stockpile surveillance--a system based on destructive testing of increasingly valuable assets--to a system based on embedded sensors has a number of potential advantages that include long-term cost savings, reduced risk associated with asset transportation, state-of-health assessments in the field, and active management of the stockpile.

  13. Aging and Radiation Effects in Stockpile Electronics

    SciTech Connect

    Hartman, E.F.

    1999-03-25

    It is likely that aging is affecting the radiation hardness of stockpile electronics, and we have seen apparent examples of aging that affects the electronic radiation hardness. It is also possible that low-level intrinsic radiation that is inherent during stockpile life will damage or in a sense age electronic components. Both aging and low level radiation effects on radiation hardness and stockpile reliability need to be further investigated by using both test and modeling strategies that include appropriate testing of electronic components withdrawn from the stockpile.

  14. Big projects could threaten weapons labs` research base

    SciTech Connect

    Lawler, A.

    1996-05-24

    Every few seconds, a mushroom cloud explodes on Paul Cunningham`s Computer screen. The unsettling image is a screen saver in the office of the chief of nuclear materials and stockpile management at Los Alamos National Laboratory - and a wry reminder of the radical changes underway at the three US weapons labs. Now that the US has renounced underground nuclear testing, simulations are becoming the weapons designers chief tool for ensuring that the nuclear arsenal is reliable. The new approach to testing, stockpile stewardship, has triggered a fierce debate within the defense community. At issue is how to keep a balance between financing such new and costly stewardship projects as the $1.1 billion National Ignition Facility, which will simulate the conditions of nuclear detonation, and maintaining a critical mass of experienced weapons designers. This artical describes the debate and funding and political problems which go with it.

  15. Draft Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement on Stockpile Stewardship and Management for a Modern Pit Facility

    SciTech Connect

    N /A

    2003-06-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, including production readiness required to maintain that stockpile. Since 1989, DOE has been without the capability to produce stockpile certified plutonium pits, which are an essential component of nuclear weapons. NNSA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and Congress have highlighted the lack of long-term pit production capability as a national security issue requiring timely resolution. While a small interim capacity is currently being established at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), classified analyses indicate projected capacity requirements (number of pits to be produced over a period of time), and agility (ability to rapidly change from production of one pit type to another, ability to simultaneously produce multiple pit types, or the flexibility to produce pits of a new design in a timely manner) necessary for long-term support of the stockpile will require a long-term pit production capability. In particular, identification of a systemic problem associated with an existing pit type, class of pits, or aging phenomenon cannot be adequately responded to today, nor could it be with the small capability being established at LANL (see Section S.2 for a more detailed discussion regarding the purpose and need for a Modern Pit Facility [MPF]).

  16. Bayesian methods for estimating the reliability in complex hierarchical networks (interim report).

    SciTech Connect

    Marzouk, Youssef M.; Zurn, Rena M.; Boggs, Paul T.; Diegert, Kathleen V.; Red-Horse, John Robert; Pebay, Philippe Pierre

    2007-05-01

    Current work on the Integrated Stockpile Evaluation (ISE) project is evidence of Sandia's commitment to maintaining the integrity of the nuclear weapons stockpile. In this report, we undertake a key element in that process: development of an analytical framework for determining the reliability of the stockpile in a realistic environment of time-variance, inherent uncertainty, and sparse available information. This framework is probabilistic in nature and is founded on a novel combination of classical and computational Bayesian analysis, Bayesian networks, and polynomial chaos expansions. We note that, while the focus of the effort is stockpile-related, it is applicable to any reasonably-structured hierarchical system, including systems with feedback.

  17. Quality control of meteorological data for the chemical stockpile emergency preparedness program.

    SciTech Connect

    Liljegren, J.C.; Tschopp, S.; Rogers, K.; Wasmer, F.; Liljegren, L.; Myirski, M.; Decision and Information Sciences; U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency

    2009-08-01

    The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Meteorological Support Project ensures the accuracy and reliability of data acquired by meteorological monitoring stations located at seven U.S. Army chemical weapons depots where storage and weapons destruction (demilitarization) activities are ongoing. The data are delivered in real time to U.S. Army plume dispersion models, which are used to plan for and respond to a potential accidental release of a chemical weapons agent. The project provides maintenance, calibration, and audit services for the instrumentation; collection, automated screening, visual inspection, and analysis of the data; and problem reporting and tracking to carefully control the data quality. The resulting high-quality meteorological data enhance emergency response modeling and public safety.

  18. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  19. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)

    MedlinePLUS

    ... is not a first response tool. Rapid Coordination & Transport The SNS Program is committed to have 12- ... for the most rapid transportation. Concurrent to SNS transport, the SNS Program will deploy its Stockpile Service ...

  20. 77 FR 22559 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-04-16

    ... Bureau of Industry and Security Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons...) 482-4895, Lawrence.Hall@bis.doc.gov . SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Abstract The Chemical Weapons... weapons (CW). The CWC prohibits the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention,...

  1. Stockpile Stewardship: Los Alamos

    SciTech Connect

    McMillan, Charlie; Morgan, Nathanial; Goorley, Tom; Merrill, Frank; Funk, Dave; Korzekwa, Deniece; Laintz, Ken

    2012-01-26

    "Heritage of Science" is a short video that highlights the Stockpile Stewardship program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Stockpile Stewardship was conceived in the early 1990s as a national science-based program that could assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without the need for full-scale underground nuclear testing. This video was produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory for screening at the Lab's Bradbury Science Museum in Los Alamos, NM and is narrated by science correspondent Miles O'Brien.

  2. Stockpile Stewardship: Los Alamos

    ScienceCinema

    McMillan, Charlie; Morgan, Nathanial; Goorley, Tom; Merrill, Frank; Funk, Dave; Korzekwa, Deniece; Laintz, Ken

    2014-08-12

    "Heritage of Science" is a short video that highlights the Stockpile Stewardship program at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Stockpile Stewardship was conceived in the early 1990s as a national science-based program that could assure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without the need for full-scale underground nuclear testing. This video was produced by Los Alamos National Laboratory for screening at the Lab's Bradbury Science Museum in Los Alamos, NM and is narrated by science correspondent Miles O'Brien.

  3. A Sandia nuclear weapon knowledge management program plan for FY 1998--2003. Volume 1: Synopsis

    SciTech Connect

    1998-02-01

    This volume contains a synopsis and briefing charts for a five-year plan which describes a Knowledge Management Program needed to meet Sandia`s responsibility for maintaining safety, security, reliability, and operational effectiveness of the nuclear weapon stockpile. Although the knowledge and expertise required to maintain and upgrade the stockpile continues to be critical to the country`s defense, Sandia`s historical process for developing and advancing future knowledge and expertise needs to be addressed. This plan recommends implementing an aggressive Knowledge Management Program to assure retention and furtherance of Sandia`s expertise, beginning in fiscal year 1998, as an integrated approach to solving the expertise dilemma.

  4. A random onset model for degradation of high-reliability systems

    SciTech Connect

    Vanderwiel, Scott A; Wilson, Alyson G; Graves, Todd L; Reese, Christopher S

    2009-07-22

    Both the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) maintain weapons stockpiles: items like bullets, missiles and bombs that have already been produced and are being stored until needed. Ideally, these stockpiles maintain high reliability over time. To assess reliability, a surveillance program is implemented, where units are periodically removed from the stockpile and tested. The most definitive tests typically destroy the weapons so a given unit is tested only once. Surveillance managers need to decide how many units should be tested, how often they should be tested, what tests should be done, and how the resulting data are used to estimate the stockpile's current and future reliability. These issues are particularly critical from a planning perspective: given what has already been observed and our understanding of the mechanisms of stockpile aging, what is an appropriate and cost-effective surveillance program? Surveillance programs are costly, broad, and deep, especially in the DOE, where the US nuclear weapons surveillance program must 'ensure, through various tests, that the reliability of nuclear weapons is maintained' in the absence of full-system testing (General Accounting Office, 1996). The DOE program consists primarily of three types of tests: nonnuclear flight tests, that involve the actual dropping or launching of a weapon from which the nuclear components have been removed; and nonnuclear and nuclear systems laboratory tests, which detect defects due to aging, manufacturing, and design of the nonnuclear and nuclear portions of the weapons. Fully integrated analysis of the suite of nuclear weapons surveillance data is an ongoing area of research (Wilson et al., 2007). This paper introduces a simple model that captures high-level features of stockpile reliability over time and can be used to answer broad policy questions about surveillance programs. Our intention is to provide a framework that generates tractable answers that integrate expert knowledge and high-level summaries of surveillance data to allow decision-making about appropriate trade-offs between the cost of data and the precision of stockpile reliability estimates.

  5. 11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

  6. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program

    SciTech Connect

    Krummel, J.R.; Policastro, A.J.; Olshansky, S.J.; McGinnis, L.D.

    1990-10-01

    As part of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program mandated by Public Law 99--145 (Department of Defense Authorization Act), an independent review is presented of the US Army Phase I environmental report for the disposal program at the Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) in Arkansas. The Phase I report addressed new and additional concerns not incorporated in the final programmatic environmental impact statement (FPEIS). Those concerns were addressed by examining site-specific data for the PBA and by recommending the scope and content of a more detailed site- specific study. This dependent review evaluates whether the new site-specific data presented in the Phase I report would alter the decision in favor of on-site disposal that was reached in the FPEIS, and whether the recommendations for the scope and content of the site-specific study are adequate. Based on the methods and assumptions presented in the FPEIS, the inclusion of more detailed site-specific data in the Phase I report does not change the decision reached in the FPEIS (which favored on-site disposal at PBA). It is recommended that alternative assumptions about meteorological conditions be considered and that site-specific data on water, ecological, socioeconomic, and cultural resources, and emergency planning and preparedness be considered explicitly in the site-specific EIS decision-making process. 13 refs., 1 fig.

  7. 16 CFR 1210.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR CIGARETTE LIGHTERS Stockpiling 1210.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. Stockpiling means to... cigarette lighters shall not manufacture or import lighters that do not comply with the requirements of...

  8. 16 CFR 1210.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR CIGARETTE LIGHTERS Stockpiling 1210.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. Stockpiling means to... cigarette lighters shall not manufacture or import lighters that do not comply with the requirements of...

  9. 16 CFR 1210.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR CIGARETTE LIGHTERS Stockpiling 1210.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. Stockpiling means to... cigarette lighters shall not manufacture or import lighters that do not comply with the requirements of...

  10. 16 CFR 1210.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR CIGARETTE LIGHTERS Stockpiling 1210.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. Stockpiling means to... cigarette lighters shall not manufacture or import lighters that do not comply with the requirements of...

  11. Lifetime predictive capabilities for materials in the enduring stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Koeck, D.C.

    1996-03-01

    Although materials understanding and modeling is not currently advanced to the point of failure prediction for most critical areas for stockpile components, research should continue to extend the knowledge base and enable science based choices for future programs or upgrades. Several critical areas are lacking for a science-based lifetime extension of the current stockpile. Hermeticity is critical for many components but modeling and predicative capabilities are limited in these areas. PETN is prevalent throughout the stockpile but modeling and predictive capability for autocatalysis and non-hermetic lifetimes is limited. Corrosion is a frequently observed age-related finding from the historical stockpile but the ability to predict the initiation of corrosion is limited. Advanced electronics are in some current weapons types and will most likely be a part of any retrofits and upgrades in the future. Understanding of stress voiding and electromigration in microelectronics is limited and predictions are not yet available. Polymeric materials are prevalent throughout the stockpile and temperature dependent response mass transport properties are not well understood. Modeling and predictive capabilities for polymeric materials are limited.

  12. Sandia National Laboratories/Production Agency Weapon Waste Minimization Plan

    SciTech Connect

    Skinrood, A.C.; Radosevich, L.G.

    1991-07-01

    This Plan describes activities to reduce the usage of hazardous materials and the production of hazardous material waste during the development, production, stockpile, and retirement phases of war reserve nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon test units. Activities related to the development and qualification of more benign materials and processes for weapon production and the treatment and disposal of these materials from weapon retirement are described in separate plans.

  13. An Introduction to Risk with a Focus on Design Diversity in the Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-13

    The maintenance and security of nuclear weapons in the stockpile involves decisions based on risk analysis and quantitative measures of risk. Risk is a factor in all decisions, a particularly important factor in decisions of a large scale. One example of high-risk decisions we will discuss is the risk involved in design diversity within the stockpile of nuclear weapons arsenal. Risk is defined as 'possibility of loss or injury' and the 'degree of probability of such loss' (Kaplan and Garrick 12). To introduce the risk involved with maintaining the weapons stockpile we will draw a parallel to the design and maintenance of Southwest Airlines fleet of Boeing 737 planes. The clear benefits for cost savings in maintenance of having a uniform fleet are what historically drove Southwest to have only Boeing 737s in their fleet. Less money and resources are need for maintenance, training, and materials. Naturally, risk accompanies those benefits. A defect in a part of the plane indicates a potential defect in that same part in all the planes of the fleet. As a result, safety, business, and credibility are at risk. How much variety or diversity does the fleet need to mitigate that risk? With that question in mind, a balance is needed to accommodate the different risks and benefits of the situation. In a similar way, risk is analyzed for the design and maintenance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In conclusion, risk must be as low as possible when it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk, and to help balance options in stockpile stewardship.

  14. The destruction of weapons under the chemical weapons convention

    SciTech Connect

    Smithson, A.E.; Lenihan, M.

    1996-07-01

    As the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) enters into force, countries with stocks of chemical weapons will begin the task of destroying them. In the U.S. whose stockpile consists of approximately 30,000 tons of nerve and blister agents at eight separate sites in the continental United States at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, the Army has designed a highly-automated {close_quotes}baseline{close_quotes} system to dismantle and incinerate the weapons. Although researchers have identified potential alternatives to incineration, involving chemical neutralization and biodegradation, it appears that these techniques are likely to substitute for incineration at most, at two sites: Newport, Indiana, and Aberdeen, Maryland. The Russian destruction program is less advanced than that of the U.S. and probably cannot be carried out effectively without significant and technical assistance from abroad, an urgent requirement given that the Duma Defense Committee has described Russian Chemical weapons storage sites as insecure and unsafe.

  15. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan...

  16. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan...

  17. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan...

  18. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan...

  19. 15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan...

  20. Sample sizes for confidence limits for reliability.

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.

    2010-02-01

    We recently performed an evaluation of the implications of a reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons for surveillance to support estimates of reliability. We found that one technique developed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) under-estimates the required sample size for systems-level testing. For a large population the discrepancy is not important, but for a small population it is important. We found that another technique used by SNL provides the correct required sample size. For systems-level testing of nuclear weapons, samples are selected without replacement, and the hypergeometric probability distribution applies. Both of the SNL techniques focus on samples without defects from sampling without replacement. We generalized the second SNL technique to cases with defects in the sample. We created a computer program in Mathematica to automate the calculation of confidence for reliability. We also evaluated sampling with replacement where the binomial probability distribution applies.

  1. A Sandia weapon review bulletin : defense programs, Autumn 1992.

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-09-01

    Topics in this issue: (1) Focal Point and STEP. Sandia National Laboratories has always focused its advanced weapon development not only on future weapon needs, but also on the engineering and manufacturing sciences needed to meet them. Both areas are changing dramatically. As the nation dismantles many of its warheads, it becomes essential that those that remain are increasingly reliable, secure, capable, and safe. And as development resources diminish, it becomes vital that they are applied to the most critical technologies in a disciplined manner. The mission of the Focal Point program and the Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) is to develop processes for meeting these challenges. Focal Point offers a decision-making process for allocating Sandia's resources to meets its defense programs strategic goals. (2) Defense Programs news in brief. (3) Dismantling the nuclear stockpile. (4) W88/MK5: Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system meets all requirements and goals. (5) The Common Radar Fuze. (6) Insertable-explosive arming of firing sets. (7) Preparing for fewer underground tests.

  2. Stockpile Stewardship's 20th Anniversary

    SciTech Connect

    Hecker, Siegfried; Gottemoeller, Rose; Reis, Victor H.; McMillan, Charles; Rohlfing, Joan; Hurricane, Omar; Hagengruber, Roger; Taylor, John

    2015-10-22

    A short oral history of the NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship Program, produced in association with the 20th anniversary of the program. It features Siegfried Hecker, Rose Gottemoeller, Victor Reis, Charles McMillan, Joan Rohlfing, Omar Hurricane, Roger Hagengruber, and John Taylor.

  3. Predictive method for weapon storage environments

    SciTech Connect

    Rabie, R.L.

    1996-08-01

    The Los Alamos National Laboratory Stockpile Monitor Program provides for the placement of Campbell Scientific Inc. data loggers in many weapons storage areas for the purpose of gathering environmental information such as relative humidity and temperature. Not all storage areas can be covered, however, so a means of estimating storage conditions is needed. This report describes one such technique.

  4. Stockpile Dismantlement Database Training Materials

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-11-01

    This document, the Stockpile Dismantlement Database (SDDB) training materials is designed to familiarize the user with the SDDB windowing system and the data entry steps for Component Characterization for Disposition. The foundation of information required for every part is depicted by using numbered graphic and text steps. The individual entering data is lead step by step through generic and specific examples. These training materials are intended to be supplements to individual on-the-job training.

  5. 16 CFR 1212.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Stockpiling. 1212.20 Section 1212.20 Commercial Practices CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT REGULATIONS SAFETY STANDARD FOR MULTI-PURPOSE LIGHTERS Stockpiling § 1212.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. “Stockpiling” means to manufacture or import a product that...

  6. Weapon container catalog. Volumes 1 & 2

    SciTech Connect

    Brown, L.A.; Higuera, M.C.

    1998-02-01

    The Weapon Container Catalog describes H-gear (shipping and storage containers, bomb hand trucks and the ancillary equipment required for loading) used for weapon programs and for special use containers. When completed, the catalog will contain five volumes. Volume 1 for enduring stockpile programs (B53, B61, B83, W62, W76, W78, W80, W84, W87, and W88) and Volume 2, Special Use Containers, are being released. The catalog is intended as a source of information for weapon program engineers and also provides historical information. The catalog also will be published on the SNL Internal Web and will undergo periodic updates.

  7. Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP): Process and project requirements

    SciTech Connect

    Ma, Kwok Kee

    1993-06-01

    The Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) is aimed at identifying weapon components suitable for use in more than one weapon and for qualifying components so identified for multiple use. Work includes identifying the means to maintain the manufacturing capability for these items. This document provides the participants in STEP a common, consistent understanding of the process and requirements. The STEP objectives are presented and the activities are outlined. The STEP project selections are based on the customer needs, product applicability, and maturity of the technology used. A formal project selection process is described and the selection criteria are defined. The concept of {open_quotes}production readiness{close_quotes} is introduced, along with a summary of the project requirements and deliverables to demonstrate production readiness.

  8. The development of global vaccine stockpiles

    PubMed Central

    Yen, Catherine; Hyde, Terri B; Costa, Alejandro J; Fernandez, Katya; Tam, John S; Hugonnet, Stéphane; Huvos, Anne M; Duclos, Philippe; Dietz, Vance J; Burkholder, Brenton T

    2016-01-01

    Global vaccine stockpiles, in which vaccines are reserved for use when needed for emergencies or supply shortages, have effectively provided countries with the capacity for rapid response to emergency situations, such as outbreaks of yellow fever and meningococcal meningitis. The high cost and insufficient supply of many vaccines, including oral cholera vaccine and pandemic influenza vaccine, have prompted discussion on expansion of the use of vaccine stockpiles to address a wider range of emerging and re-emerging diseases. However, the decision to establish and maintain a vaccine stockpile is complex and must take account of disease and vaccine characteristics, stockpile management, funding, and ethical concerns, such as equity. Past experience with global vaccine stockpiles provide valuable information about the processes for their establishment and maintenance. In this Review we explored existing literature and stockpile data to discuss the lessons learned and to inform the development of future vaccine stockpiles. PMID:25661473

  9. The development of global vaccine stockpiles.

    PubMed

    Yen, Catherine; Hyde, Terri B; Costa, Alejandro J; Fernandez, Katya; Tam, John S; Hugonnet, Stéphane; Huvos, Anne M; Duclos, Philippe; Dietz, Vance J; Burkholder, Brenton T

    2015-03-01

    Global vaccine stockpiles, in which vaccines are reserved for use when needed for emergencies or supply shortages, have effectively provided countries with the capacity for rapid response to emergency situations, such as outbreaks of yellow fever and meningococcal meningitis. The high cost and insufficient supply of many vaccines, including oral cholera vaccine and pandemic influenza vaccine, have prompted discussion on expansion of the use of vaccine stockpiles to address a wider range of emerging and re-emerging diseases. However, the decision to establish and maintain a vaccine stockpile is complex and must take account of disease and vaccine characteristics, stockpile management, funding, and ethical concerns, such as equity. Past experience with global vaccine stockpiles provide valuable information about the processes for their establishment and maintenance. In this Review we explored existing literature and stockpile data to discuss the lessons learned and to inform the development of future vaccine stockpiles. PMID:25661473

  10. [Biological weapons].

    PubMed

    Kerwat, K; Becker, S; Wulf, H; Densow, D

    2010-08-01

    Biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction that use pathogens (bacteria, viruses) or the toxins produced by them to target living organisms or to contaminate non-living substances. In the past, biological warfare has been repeatedly used. Anthrax, plague and smallpox are regarded as the most dangerous biological weapons by various institutions. Nowadays it seems quite unlikely that biological warfare will be employed in any military campaigns. However, the possibility remains that biological weapons may be used in acts of bioterrorism. In addition all diseases caused by biological weapons may also occur naturally or as a result of a laboratory accident. Risk assessment with regard to biological danger often proves to be difficult. In this context, an early identification of a potentially dangerous situation through experts is essential to limit the degree of damage. PMID:20717866

  11. Risk communications and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency-Planning Program

    SciTech Connect

    Vogt, B.M.; Sorensen, J.H.

    1994-09-01

    The CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program) was created to improve emergency planning and response capabilities at the eight sites around the country that store chemical weapons. These weapons are scheduled to be destroyed in the near future. In preparation of the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DPEIS) for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP), it was proposed that the Army mitigate accidents through an enhanced community emergency preparedness program at the eight storage sites. In 1986, the Army initiated the development of an Emergency Response Concept Plan (ERCP) for the CSDP, one of 12 technical support studies conducted during preparation of the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS). The purpose of this document is to provide a fairly comprehensive source book on risk, risk management, risk communication research and recommended risk communication practices. It does not merely summarize each publication in the risk communication literature, but attempts to synthesize them along the lines of a set of organizing principles. Furthermore, it is not intended to duplicate other guidance manuals (such as Covello et al.`s manual on risk comparison). The source book was developed for the CSEPP in support of the training module on risk communications. Although the examples provided are specific to CSEPP, its use goes beyond that of CSEPP as the findings apply to a broad spectrum of risk communication topics. While the emphasis is on communication in emergency preparedness and response specific to the CSEPP, the materials cover other non-emergency communication settings. 329 refs.

  12. Strategic weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-09-01

    This paper describes the Defense Department's process for formulating its strategic weapons targeting policy and translating that policy into a nuclear war plan-the Single Integrated Operational Plan. GAO provides information on the relationship between the strategic nuclear targeting process and the determination of requirements for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, level of civilian oversight, and categories and types of targets. These strategic nuclear weapons systems, commonly known as the triad, include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers armed with nuclear bombs and missiles.

  13. Using Direct Sub-Level Entity Access to Improve Nuclear Stockpile Simulation Modeling

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Y. Parker

    1999-08-01

    Direct sub-level entity access is a seldom-used technique in discrete-event simulation modeling that addresses the accessibility of sub-level entity information. The technique has significant advantages over more common, alternative modeling methods--especially where hierarchical entity structures are modeled. As such, direct sub-level entity access is often preferable in modeling nuclear stockpile, life-extension issues, an area to which it has not been previously applied. Current nuclear stockpile, life-extension models were demonstrated to benefit greatly from the advantages of direct sub-level entity access. In specific cases, the application of the technique resulted in models that were up to 10 times faster than functionally equivalent models where alternative techniques were applied. Furthermore, specific implementations of direct sub-level entity access were observed to be more flexible, efficient, functional, and scalable than corresponding implementations using common modeling techniques. Common modeling techniques (''unbatch/batch'' and ''attribute-copying'') proved inefficient and cumbersome in handling many nuclear stockpile modeling complexities, including multiple weapon sites, true defect analysis, and large numbers of weapon and subsystem types. While significant effort was required to enable direct sub-level entity access in the nuclear stockpile simulation models, the enhancements were worth the effort--resulting in more efficient, more capable, and more informative models that effectively addressed the complexities of the nuclear stockpile.

  14. System reliability assessment with an approximate reasoning model

    SciTech Connect

    Eisenhawer, S.W.; Bott, T.F.; Helm, T.M.; Boerigter, S.T.

    1998-12-31

    The projected service life of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile will exceed the original design life of their critical components. Interim metrics are needed to describe weapon states for use in simulation models of the nuclear weapons complex. The authors present an approach to this problem based upon the theory of approximate reasoning (AR) that allows meaningful assessments to be made in an environment where reliability models are incomplete. AR models are designed to emulate the inference process used by subject matter experts. The emulation is based upon a formal logic structure that relates evidence about components. This evidence is translated using natural language expressions into linguistic variables that describe membership in fuzzy sets. The authors introduce a metric that measures the acceptability of a weapon to nuclear deterrence planners. Implication rule bases are used to draw a series of forward chaining inferences about the acceptability of components, subsystems and individual weapons. They describe each component in the AR model in some detail and illustrate its behavior with a small example. The integration of the acceptability metric into a prototype model to simulate the weapons complex is also described.

  15. Environmental and safety obligations of the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect

    Tanzman, E.A.

    1994-04-07

    Among its many unique and precedent-setting provisions, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) includes important requirements for States Parties to protect the public safety and the environment in the course of carrying out the treaty. These obligations will apply to the destruction of chemical weapons, of former chemical weapons production facilities, and to other activities under the Convention such as the verification scheme. This morning, I will briefly discuss the Convention`s safety and environmental obligations, concentrating on their effects in this country as the United States chemical weapons stockpile is destroyed.

  16. 16 CFR 1212.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR MULTI-PURPOSE LIGHTERS Stockpiling § 1212.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. “Stockpiling” means.... Manufacturers and importers of multi-purpose lighters shall not manufacture or import such lighters that do not... rate. (d) Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. All firms and persons who make or import...

  17. 16 CFR 1212.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR MULTI-PURPOSE LIGHTERS Stockpiling § 1212.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. “Stockpiling” means.... Manufacturers and importers of multi-purpose lighters shall not manufacture or import such lighters that do not... rate. (d) Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. All firms and persons who make or import...

  18. 16 CFR 1212.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR MULTI-PURPOSE LIGHTERS Stockpiling § 1212.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. “Stockpiling” means.... Manufacturers and importers of multi-purpose lighters shall not manufacture or import such lighters that do not... rate. (d) Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. All firms and persons who make or import...

  19. 16 CFR 1212.20 - Stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... STANDARD FOR MULTI-PURPOSE LIGHTERS Stockpiling § 1212.20 Stockpiling. (a) Definition. “Stockpiling” means.... Manufacturers and importers of multi-purpose lighters shall not manufacture or import such lighters that do not... rate. (d) Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. All firms and persons who make or import...

  20. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  1. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  2. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  3. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  4. 16 CFR 1205.7 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... SAFETY STANDARD FOR WALK-BEHIND POWER LAWN MOWERS The Standard 1205.7 Prohibited stockpiling. (a... prescribed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. (b) Prohibited acts. Stockpiling of power lawn mowers... prohibited. (c) Base period. The base period for power lawn mowers is, at the option of each manufacturer...

  5. The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?

    PubMed

    Borrmann, Robin

    2010-01-01

    This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for--and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving--a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs). PMID:21314080

  6. New Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nelson, Robert A.

    2003-04-01

    Some U.S. politicians and members of U.S. weapon laboratories are urging the United States to develop a new generation of precision low-yield nuclear weapons "mininukes," with equivalent yields of a few kilotons of TNT or less. Small nuclear weapons are necessary, they argue, to fill the gap between large conventional munitions and our existing high-yield nuclear weapons. They argue that low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons could destroy hardened underground command bunkers and storage sites for chemical or biological weapons while "limiting collateral damage." We have shown, however, that even a small nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 kiloton (less than 10% of the Hiroshima bomb) would produce a fatal dose of radioactive fallout over a radius of several kilometers. Moreover, low-yield nuclear weapons are unlikely to destroy buried stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and may actually disperse active agents over the countryside. If new nuclear weapons require full underground testing, this would end the nuclear testing moratorium that the United States and Russia have maintained since 1992 and would likely destroy prospects for eventual entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

  7. Sinclair Stockpiles CFCs for Future Use.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    George, Stephen C.

    1996-01-01

    A Dayton (Ohio) community college's 21 buildings were cooled by a network of 5 chillers, all of which used soon-to-be-banned chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). A reclamation program provides the college with reusable refrigerant and eliminates chiller replacement costs. Refrigerant from three of the old units is stockpiled for use in the two other

  8. 16 CFR 1201.6 - Prohibited stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Prohibited stockpiling. 1201.6 Section 1201.6 Commercial Practices CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT REGULATIONS... fire, when such doors or other assemblies are required by a Federal, State, local or municipal...

  9. New Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    2003-03-01

    Some U.S. politicians and members of U.S. weapon laboratories are urging the United States to develop a new generation of precision low-yield nuclear weapons—``mininukes," with equivalent yields of a few kilotons of TNT or less. Small nuclear weapons are necessary, they argue, to fill the gap between large conventional munitions and our existing high-yield nuclear weapons. They argue that low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons could destroy hardened underground command bunkers and storage sites for chemical or biological weapons while ``limiting collateral damage." We have shown, however, that even a small nuclear weapon with a yield of 1 kiloton (less than 10% of the Hiroshima bomb) would produce a fatal dose of radioactive fallout over a radius of several kilometers. Moreover, low-yield nuclear weapons are unlikely to destroy buried stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons—and may actually disperse active agents over the countryside. If new nuclear weapons require full underground testing, this would end the nuclear testing moratorium that the United States and Russia have maintained since 1992 and would likely destroy prospects for eventual entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ct.

  10. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 710 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730 through 774). ** For export control purposes, Cook Islands and Niue are not... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL...

  11. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 710 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730 through 774). ** For export control purposes, Cook Islands and Niue are not... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL...

  12. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 710 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730 through 774). ** For export control purposes, Cook Islands and Niue are not... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL...

  13. Technical basis for chemical stockpile emergency planning

    SciTech Connect

    Newsom, D.E.; Madore, M.A.; Paddock, R.A.; Absil, M.J.G.

    1995-06-01

    As part of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, an Accident Planning Base Review Group (APBRG) was convened in December 1992. The APBRG`s mission was to update the accident basis for protective action strategy planning in the vicinity of eight US chemical agent stockpile sites. The results of the APBRG`s work are being issued as site-specific Emergency Planning Guides (EPGs). The EPGs give emergency planners--Army, State, and local--updated assessment of the chemical hazard and guidance on how to plan for a broad range of accidents by planning for a manageable number of accident categories. This paper addresses: (1) the rationale for updating the accident planning base; (2) the modeling methodology used to assess the chemical hazard; and (3) strategies that are advocated in the EPGs for the use of models by planners.

  14. Polymeric materials replacement issues for the LANL stockpile.

    SciTech Connect

    Sandoval, C. W.; Gladysz, G. M.; Stephens, T. S.; Gleiman, S. S.; Mendoza, D.; Baker, G. K.; Schoonover, J. R.; Schneider, Jim; Perry, B.; Lula, J. W.

    2002-01-01

    A number of materials in the LANL stockpile are no longer available due to lack of availability or environment, safety and health issues. Silastic S-5370 a polysiloxane foam used to manufacture multiple components in LANL systems has been discontinued by Dow Corning. Kerimid 601 is a polyimide resin used as the binder for the syntactic foam used as a support material in the W76. It contains MDA, which has been identified by OSHA as a carcinogen and is no longer used in the nuclear weapons complex. In addition, the Thornel carbon mat used in the syntactic foam formulation is no longer available. These issues have created major challenges in the effort to reestablish aft support production capability for the W76 LEP. Urethane Encapsulant 7200, an adhesive used to bond explosive booster pellets and detonator components, was originally manufactured by Hexcel Corporation and is no longer available. The details of the projects currently underway to provide replacements for these materials will be discussed.

  15. Analytical Characterization of the Thorium Nitrate Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Mattus, CH

    2003-12-30

    For several years, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been supporting the Defense Logistics Agency-Defense National Stockpile Center with stewardship of a thorium nitrate (ThN) stockpile. The effort for fiscal year 2002 was to prepare a sampling and analysis plan and to use the activities developed in the plan to characterize the ThN stockpile. The sampling was performed in June and July 2002 by RWE NUKEM with oversight by ORNL personnel. The analysis was performed by Southwest Research Institute of San Antonio, Texas, and data validation was performed by NFT, Inc., of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Of the {approx} 21,000 drums in the stockpile, 99 were sampled and 53 were analyzed for total metals composition, radiological constituents (using alpha and gamma spectrometry), and oxidizing characteristics. Each lot at the Curtis Bay Depot was sampled. Several of the samples were also analyzed for density. The average density of the domestic ThN was found to be 1.89 {+-} 0.08 g/cm{sup 3}. The oxidizer test was performed following procedures issued by the United Nations in 1999. Test results indicated that none of the samples tested was a Division 5.1 oxidizer per Department of Transportation definition. The samples were analyzed for total metals following the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency methods SW-846-6010B and 6020 (EPA 2003) using a combination of inductively coupled plasma--atomic emission spectroscopy and inductively coupled plasma--mass spectroscopy techniques. The results were used to compare the composition of the eight Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals present in the sample (arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, selenium, and silver) to regulatory limits. None of the samples was found to be hazardous for toxicity characteristics. The radiological analyses confirmed, when possible, the results obtained by the inductively coupled plasma analyses. These results--combined with the historical process knowledge acquired on the material and the results of previous tests--classified the ThN as low-level radioactive waste for disposal purposes. This characterization was necessary to continue the efforts associated with disposition of the material at the Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada. With the current work presented in this report, the analytical characterization phase is completed for this source material stockpile.

  16. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the way other major powers view their nuclear capability. Finally, and though of less cosmic importance, it will save money in the long run.

  17. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  18. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-01

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  19. Arms Control: US and International efforts to ban biological weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-12-01

    The Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention, the treaty that bans the development, production, and stockpiling and acquisition of biological weapons was opened for signature in 1972 and came into force in 1975 after being ratified by 22 governments, including the depository nations of the USA, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union. In support of the Convention, the USA later established export controls on items used to make biological weapons. Further, in accordance with the 1990 President`s Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, actions were taken to redefine and expand US export controls, as well as to encourage multilateral controls through the Australia Group. Thus far, the Convention has not been effective in stopping the development of biological weapons. The principal findings as to the reasons of the failures of the Convention are found to be: the Convention lacks universality, compliance measures are effective, advantage of verification may outweigh disadvantages. Recommendations for mitigating these failures are outlined in this report.

  20. Burning weapons-grade plutonium in reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Newman, D.F.

    1993-06-01

    As a result of massive reductions in deployed nuclear warheads, and their subsequent dismantlement, large quantities of surplus weapons- grade plutonium will be stored until its ultimate disposition is achieved in both the US and Russia. Ultimate disposition has the following minimum requirements: (1) preclude return of plutonium to the US and Russian stockpiles, (2) prevent environmental damage by precluding release of plutonium contamination, and (3) prevent proliferation by precluding plutonium diversion to sub-national groups or nonweapons states. The most efficient and effective way to dispose of surplus weapons-grade plutonium is to fabricate it into fuel and use it for generation of electrical energy in commercial nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade plutonium can be used as fuel in existing commercial nuclear power plants, such as those in the US and Russia. This recovers energy and economic value from weapons-grade plutonium, which otherwise represents a large cost liability to maintain in safeguarded and secure storage. The plutonium remaining in spent MOX fuel is reactor-grade, essentially the same as that being discharged in spent UO{sub 2} fuels. MOX fuels are well developed and are currently used in a number of LWRs in Europe. Plutonium-bearing fuels without uranium (non-fertile fuels) would require some development. However, such non-fertile fuels are attractive from a nonproliferation perspective because they avoid the insitu production of additional plutonium and enhance the annihilation of the plutonium inventory on a once-through fuel cycle.

  1. Towards Reliable Cross Sections for National Security Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Escher, J E; Dietrich, F S; Nobre, G A; Thompson, I J

    2011-02-24

    Stockpile stewardship requires the description of weapons performance without resorting to underground nuclear testing. In the earlier tests, selected isotopes were used as detectors, and recovered after irradiation. Aspects of nuclear device performance were inferred by comparing the measured isotopic ratios to those predicted from simulations. The reaction flows that produce the final isotopic distributions proceed through regions of the nuclear chart that include unstable nuclei. Presently, improved nuclear data input is required to reanalyze prior tests and to certify the stockpile's reliability and safety. Many important cross sections are unknown, as is shown in the example of the Yttrium reaction network (Figure 1). The relevant reactions include (n,2n), (n,n'), (n,gamma), (n,p) and other charged-particle emitting reactions. The cross sections have to be calculated or inferred from indirect measurements. In both cases, reliable optical models that are valid a few nucleons away from stability are needed. The UNEDF Nuclear Reaction activities address this need by combining nuclear-structure input from UNEDF structure calculations with modern reaction theory and large-scale computational capabilities to develop microscopic nucleon-nucleus optical potentials that can be extrapolated to unstable nuclei. In addition, the reaction calculation tools and optical models developed in this context are proving valuable for planning and interpreting indirect (surrogate) measurements of the required cross sections.

  2. Preserving nuclear weapons information

    SciTech Connect

    1997-05-01

    This report describes the Nuclear Weapons Information Project (NWIP). The NWIP was initiated in an effort to document and preserve information from scientists who have worked with the nuclear weapons projects and are near retirement age.

  3. U.S. Army chemical demilitarization and remediation activity non-stockpile monitoring approach

    SciTech Connect

    Queen, J.; Miskelly, P.; Chatfield, M.J.

    1995-06-01

    In Section 176 of Public Law (PL) 102-484, the 1993 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the U.S. Army to submit a report identifying the locations, types, and quantities of non-stockpile chemical material (NSCM). As part of that report, published in the Survey and Analysis Report for the Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Program, five categories of NSCM were addressed: buried chemical warfare material (CWM); recovered chemical weapons- and miscellaneous CWM. To better define the scope of CWM burial sites, four separate types of sites were discussed-chemical agent identification set (CAIS) burials, small CWM burial sites with no explosives, small CWM burial sites with explosives, and large CWM burial sites (with and without explosives). A total of 215 potential CWM burial sites, distributed throughout 33 states, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia, were identified. This article describes the rapid response system; CAIS characterization and disposal; monitoring during RRS operations; monitoring standards, and the non-stockpile monitoring program.

  4. Requirements for the development of advanced nuclear weapon concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Brown, P.S.

    1990-01-15

    In this paper, requirements for the development of advanced nuclear weapon concepts are discussed. This paper addresses third generation nuclear weapons, and the advance workshop literature describes third generation nuclear weapons as including earth penetrating warheads (EPWs) and maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs), as well as nuclear directed energy weapons (NDEWs). A historical context for the evolution of advanced nuclear weapon concepts is presented, discussing the types of advanced concepts and how they differ from conventional nuclear weapons currently in the stockpile. The policy context for doing R D on nuclear directed energy weapons and how this R D relates to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is discussed. Some military requirements for the various advanced concepts and discuss potential missions are provided, indicating the potential advantages and disadvantages of the various applications. Arms control and stability considerations as they relate to the development of advanced concepts and the implications of the rapidly changing political relationships between the US and the Soviets, and between their respective allies are also discussed.

  5. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOEpatents

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  6. Recycle and treatment approaches for weapon components

    SciTech Connect

    Wheelis, W.T.

    1992-01-01

    Recent national and world events indicate that nuclear weapon stockpiles will be reduced. To meet these requirements will necessitate the dismantlement and safe disposal, in accordance with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines, of a wide variety of components (representing more than 30 years of hardware development). The primary regulatory driver for these components is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Weapon components contain hazardous materials (e.g., heavy metals), PCBS, self-contained explosives, radioactive material, gas-filled tubes, etc. In addition, these components may be classified and are generally sealed in a potting compound, making waste stream separation difficult. Because of the wide range of materials found in these components, advanced processes that are technologically robust (i.e., can handle a wide variation of materials), cost-effective, recycle as much material as possible, provide true waste minimization, and are frilly regulatory compliant are needed. The Waste Component Recycle, Treatment, and Disposal Integrated Demonstration (WeDID) is a Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (ERWM) program that is examining issues in these areas and demonstrating technologies that can be used for the safe disposal of the non-nuclear components of a nuclear weapon.

  7. Recycle and treatment approaches for weapon components

    SciTech Connect

    Wheelis, W.T.

    1992-09-01

    Recent national and world events indicate that nuclear weapon stockpiles will be reduced. To meet these requirements will necessitate the dismantlement and safe disposal, in accordance with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines, of a wide variety of components (representing more than 30 years of hardware development). The primary regulatory driver for these components is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Weapon components contain hazardous materials (e.g., heavy metals), PCBS, self-contained explosives, radioactive material, gas-filled tubes, etc. In addition, these components may be classified and are generally sealed in a potting compound, making waste stream separation difficult. Because of the wide range of materials found in these components, advanced processes that are technologically robust (i.e., can handle a wide variation of materials), cost-effective, recycle as much material as possible, provide true waste minimization, and are frilly regulatory compliant are needed. The Waste Component Recycle, Treatment, and Disposal Integrated Demonstration (WeDID) is a Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (ERWM) program that is examining issues in these areas and demonstrating technologies that can be used for the safe disposal of the non-nuclear components of a nuclear weapon.

  8. Science Based Stockpile Stewardship, Uncertainty Quantification, and Surrogate Reactions

    SciTech Connect

    Stoyer, M A; McNabb, D P; Burke, J T; Bernstein, L A

    2009-08-06

    Stewardship of this nation's nuclear weapons is predicated on developing a fundamental scientific understanding of the physics and chemistry required to describe weapon performance without the need to resort to underground nuclear testing and to predict expected future performance as a result of intended or unintended modifications. In order to construct more reliable models, underground nuclear test data is being reanalyzed in novel ways. To improve the interpretation of these experiments with quantified uncertainties, improved nuclear data is required. As an example, the thermonuclear yield of a device was often inferred through the use of radiochemical detectors. Conversion of the detector activations observed to thermonuclear yield was accomplished through explosion code calculations (models) and a good set of nuclear reaction cross-sections. Because of the unique high-fluence environment of an exploding nuclear weapon, many reactions occurred on radioactive nuclides, for which only theoretically calculated cross-sections are available. Surrogate nuclear reactions at STARS/LIBERACE offer the opportunity to measure cross-sections on unstable nuclei and thus improve the quality of the nuclear reaction cross-section sets. One radiochemical detector that was loaded in devices was mono-isotopic yttrium ({sup 89}Y). Nuclear reactions produced {sup 87}Y and {sup 88}Y which could be quantified post-shot as a ratio of {sup 87}Y/{sup 88}Y. The yttrium cross-section set from 1988 is shown in Figure 1(a) and contains approximately 62 cross-sections interconnecting the yttrium nuclides. The 6 experimentally measured cross-sections are shown in Figure 1(b). Any measurement of cross-sections on {sup 87}Y or {sup 88}Y would improve the quality of the cross-section set. A recent re-evaluation of the yttrium cross-section set was performed with many more calculated reaction cross-sections included.

  9. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  10. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  11. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  12. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  13. 30 CFR 823.12 - Soil removal and stockpiling.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Soil removal and stockpiling. 823.12 Section... ON PRIME FARMLAND § 823.12 Soil removal and stockpiling. (a) Prime farmland soils shall be removed from the areas to be disturbed before drilling, blasting, or mining. (b) The minimum depth of soil...

  14. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR COAL EXTRACTION INCIDENTAL TO THE EXTRACTION OF OTHER MINERALS 702.16 Stockpiling...

  15. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR COAL EXTRACTION INCIDENTAL TO THE EXTRACTION OF OTHER MINERALS 702.16 Stockpiling...

  16. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR COAL EXTRACTION INCIDENTAL TO THE EXTRACTION OF OTHER MINERALS 702.16 Stockpiling...

  17. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR COAL EXTRACTION INCIDENTAL TO THE EXTRACTION OF OTHER MINERALS 702.16 Stockpiling...

  18. 30 CFR 702.16 - Stockpiling of minerals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Stockpiling of minerals. 702.16 Section 702.16 Mineral Resources OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR GENERAL EXEMPTION FOR COAL EXTRACTION INCIDENTAL TO THE EXTRACTION OF OTHER MINERALS 702.16 Stockpiling...

  19. Thorium Nitrate Stockpile--From Here to Eternity

    SciTech Connect

    Hermes, W. H.; Hylton, T. D.; Mattus, C.H.; Storch, S. N.; Singley, P.S.; Terry. J. W.; Pecullan, M.; Reilly, F. K.

    2003-02-26

    The Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC), a field level activity of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has stewardship of a stockpile of thorium nitrate that has been in storage for decades. The stockpile is made up of approximately 3.2 million kg (7 million lb) of thorium nitrate crystals (hydrate form) stored at two depot locations in the United States. DNSC sought technical assistance from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to define and quantify the management options for the thorium nitrate stockpile. This paper describes methodologies and results comprising the work in Phase 1 and Phase 2. The results allow the DNSC to structure and schedule needed tasks to ensure continued safe long-term storage and/or phased disposal of the stockpile.

  20. CRAX/Cassandra Reliability Analysis Software

    SciTech Connect

    Robinson, D.

    1999-02-10

    Over the past few years Sandia National Laboratories has been moving toward an increased dependence on model- or physics-based analyses as a means to assess the impact of long-term storage on the nuclear weapons stockpile. These deterministic models have also been used to evaluate replacements for aging systems, often involving commercial off-the-shelf components (COTS). In addition, the models have been used to assess the performance of replacement components manufactured via unique, small-lot production runs. In either case, the limited amount of available test data dictates that the only logical course of action to characterize the reliability of these components is to specifically consider the uncertainties in material properties, operating environment etc. within the physics-based (deterministic) model. This not only provides the ability to statistically characterize the expected performance of the component or system, but also provides direction regarding the benefits of additional testing on specific components within the system. An effort was therefore initiated to evaluate the capabilities of existing probabilistic methods and, if required, to develop new analysis methods to support the inclusion of uncertainty in the classical design tools used by analysts and design engineers at Sandia. The primary result of this effort is the CMX (Cassandra Exoskeleton) reliability analysis software.

  1. Science based stockpile stewardship, uncertainty quantification, and fission fragment beams

    SciTech Connect

    Stoyer, M A; McNabb, D; Burke, J; Bernstein, L A; Wu, C Y

    2009-09-14

    Stewardship of this nation's nuclear weapons is predicated on developing a fundamental scientific understanding of the physics and chemistry required to describe weapon performance without the need to resort to underground nuclear testing and to predict expected future performance as a result of intended or unintended modifications. In order to construct more reliable models, underground nuclear test data is being reanalyzed in novel ways. The extent to which underground experimental data can be matched with simulations is one measure of the credibility of our capability to predict weapon performance. To improve the interpretation of these experiments with quantified uncertainties, improved nuclear data is required. As an example, the fission yield of a device was often determined by measuring fission products. Conversion of the measured fission products to yield was accomplished through explosion code calculations (models) and a good set of nuclear reaction cross-sections. Because of the unique high-fluence environment of an exploding nuclear weapon, many reactions occurred on radioactive nuclides, for which only theoretically calculated cross-sections are available. Inverse kinematics reactions at CARIBU offer the opportunity to measure cross-sections on unstable neutron-rich fission fragments and thus improve the quality of the nuclear reaction cross-section sets. One of the fission products measured was {sup 95}Zr, the accumulation of all mass 95 fission products of Y, Sr, Rb and Kr (see Fig. 1). Subsequent neutron-induced reactions on these short lived fission products were assumed to cancel out - in other words, the destruction of mass 95 nuclides was more or less equal to the production of mass 95 nuclides. If a {sup 95}Sr was destroyed by an (n,2n) reaction it was also produced by (n,2n) reactions on {sup 96}Sr, for example. However, since these nuclides all have fairly short half-lives (seconds to minutes or even less), no experimental nuclear reaction cross-sections exist, and only theoretically modeled cross-sections are available. Inverse kinematics reactions at CARIBU offer the opportunity, should the beam intensity be sufficient, to measure cross-sections on a few important nuclides in order to benchmark the theoretical calculations and significantly improve the nuclear data. The nuclides in Fig. 1 are prioritized by importance factor and displayed in stoplight colors, green the highest and red the lowest priority.

  2. University Research Program in Robotics - "Technologies for Micro-Electrical-Mechanical Systems in directed Stockpile Work (DSW) Radiation and Campaigns", Final Technical Annual Report, Project Period 9/1/06 - 8/31/07

    SciTech Connect

    James S. Tulenko; Carl D. Crane

    2007-12-13

    The University Research Program in Robotics (URPR) is an integrated group of universities performing fundamental research that addresses broad-based robotics and automation needs of the NNSA Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) and Campaigns. The URPR mission is to provide improved capabilities in robotics science and engineering to meet the future needs of all weapon systems and other associated NNSA/DOE activities.

  3. Visual Inspection Reliability for Precision Manufactured Parts

    DOE PAGESBeta

    See, Judi E.

    2015-09-04

    Sandia National Laboratories conducted an experiment for the National Nuclear Security Administration to determine the reliability of visual inspection of precision manufactured parts used in nuclear weapons.

  4. [Viruses as biological weapons].

    PubMed

    Akali, Alper

    2005-07-01

    The destruction made by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons used by governments and terrorist groups in the near history is posing anxiety and fear for human being. Rumour about the possible use of these agents leads to the development of serious negative effects on populations. Since there are no vaccine and therapy for most viral agents and cost of production as biological weapons is low, interest rate is rising for viruses. In this review, general characteristics, diagnosis, therapy and protective measures for viral agents such as variola virus, hemorrhagic fever viruses, encephalitis viruses, Hantaviruses and Nipah viruses, those can be used as biological weapon, have been summarized. PMID:16358499

  5. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  6. The nuclear weapons legacy

    SciTech Connect

    Stadie, K.B.

    1996-01-01

    On the 50th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, two new reports from the US DOE shed light on nuclear weapons production and its aftermath. This article summarizes and comments on the two reports: Closing the Circle on the Splitting of the Atom: the Environmental Legacy of Nuclear Weapons Production in the United States and What the Department of Energy is Doing About it; and Estimating the Cold War Mortgage: the 1995 Baseline Environmental Management Report.

  7. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program rapid accident assessment

    SciTech Connect

    Chester, C.V.

    1990-08-01

    This report develops a scheme for the rapid assessment of a release of toxic chemicals resulting from an accident in one of the most chemical weapon demilitarization plants or storage areas. The system uses such inputs as chemical and pressure sensors monitoring the plant and reports of accidents radioed to the Emergency Operations Center by work parties or monitoring personnel. A size of release can be estimated from previous calculations done in the risk analysis, from back calculation from an open-air chemical sensor measurement, or from an estimated percentage of the inventory of agent at the location of the release. Potential consequences of the estimated release are calculated from real-time meteorological data, surrounding population data, and properties of the agent. In addition to the estimated casualties, area coverage and no-death contours vs time would be calculated. Accidents are assigned to one of four categories: community emergencies, which are involve a threat to off-site personnel; on-post emergencies, which involve a threat only to on-site personnel; advisory, which involves a potential for threat to on-site personnel; and chemical occurrence, which can produce an abnormal operating condition for the plant but no immediate threat to on-site personnel. 9 refs., 20 tabs.

  8. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  9. Compatibility and Outgassing Studies for Directed Stockpile Work (FY05)

    SciTech Connect

    Alviso, C; Harvey, C; Vance, A

    2005-11-23

    Compatibility and outgassing studies of non-nuclear materials were carried out in support of the W80 Life Extension Program. These studies included small-scale laboratory experiments as well as participation in Sandia's Materials Aging and Compatibility test (MAC-1). Analysis of the outgassing signature of removable epoxy foam (REF) revealed unusually high levels of volatile organic compounds in the material. REF was replaced with the polyurethane PMDI. Laboratory compatibility tests of high priority materials were performed and revealed incompatibilities between Viton A (LX-07 binder) and syntactic polysulfide as well as Viton A and REF. With the removal of REF from the system, the incompatibility with Viton A is not an issue. In the case of the viton/polysulfide, both of these materials have a history of reliability in the stockpile, and the observed results, while scientifically interesting, appear to be a laboratory anomaly. Participation in the MAC-1 test led to a detailed study of Viton A degradation. At elevated temperatures up to 70 C, the Viton A samples darkened and exhibited increased crosslinking. Laboratory experiments were pursued to correlate the observed changes to exposure to specific compounds that were present in the MAC-1 canister atmospheres. Exposure to siloxanes resulted in changes similar to those seen in the MAC-1 samples. Knowledge gained from the MAC-1 test will be applied to the upcoming MAC-2 test planned for FY06. Finally, the suitability of isotopically labeled nitrogen fill gas ({sup 15}N{sub 2}) was addressed. This gas will behave as standard nitrogen with no compatibility concerns expected.

  10. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    PubMed

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary. PMID:16296384

  11. The nuclear weapons world

    SciTech Connect

    Burke, P.

    1988-01-01

    This book presents insight into the technical world of weapons production. It discusses accountability in nuclear weapons decisionmaking. Nuclear decisions and the weapons and strategy they concern are too mammoth, too complex and too intimidating a subject for most of us to grapple with. The more so because informed debate is rare, and because information is difficult to obtain. In Britain, Parliamentary questions receive evasive answers or no answers at all, and the rationale of official secrecy is used as a reason to reveal less and less about decisions on national defense: between 1981 and 1987, for example, the number of open government documents published on defence fell from fifty-seven to two. In the case of NATO, decisions on nuclear strategy into the next century are taken in secret by defence ministers meeting in the Nuclear Planning Group.

  12. Investigating disease outbreaks under a protocol to the biological and toxin weapons convention.

    PubMed Central

    Wheelis, M.

    2000-01-01

    The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons agents or delivery devices for anything other than peaceful purposes. A protocol currently in the final stages of negotiation adds verification measures to the convention. One of these measures will be international investigation of disease outbreaks that suggest a violation of the convention, i.e., outbreaks that may be caused by use of biological weapons or release of harmful agents from a facility conducting prohibited work. Adding verification measures to the current Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will affect the international public health and epidemiology communities; therefore, active involvement of these communities in planning the implementation details of the protocol will be important. PMID:11076717

  13. Decrease of calorific value and particle size in coal stockpiles

    SciTech Connect

    Sensogut, C.; Ozdeniz, A.H.

    2008-07-01

    During storage of excess amount of coal, they lose both their economical value and cause environmental problems. In this work, two industrial-sized stockpiles were constituted at a coal stockyard of Western Lignite Corporation (WLC) in Tuncbilek, Turkey. The size of the stockpiles, formed as triangle prisms, was about 10 m x 5 m wide with a height of 3 m; each mass being approximately 120 tons of coal in total. Some of the parameters that were effective on the stockpiles were measured in a continuous manner during this experimental work. The calorific losses and the decreases that occurred in particle size due to atmospheric conditions were also examined and detailed as the result of this work.

  14. The human element in Russia`s chemical weapons disposal efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Khripunov, I.

    1995-07-01

    There has been ample room for global concern about the speed with which the Russian Federation has been moving to destroy the enormous stockpile of Soviet-built chemical warfare (CW) agents since the termination of CS production in 1987. The use of CW by terrorists in Japan in 1995 brought new focus on the need to eliminate the CW stockpiles. Coincidence or not, the Russian government took a major public step toward dismantling CW weapons just four days after the Tokyo terrorist attack. The author examines the reasons for the delays in Russian CW decommissioning effort and the failure to consider the human element in dealing with local communities where CW weapons are to be destroyed.

  15. Potential Radon-222 Emissions from the Thorium Nitrate Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Terry, J.W.

    2003-09-04

    The Defense National Stockpile Center (DNSC), a field level activity of the Defense Logistics Agency, has stewardship of a stockpile of thorium nitrate that has been in storage for decades. The thorium nitrate stockpile was produced from 1959 to 1964 for the Atomic Energy Commission and previously has been under the control of several federal agencies. The stockpile consists of approximately 7 million pounds of thorium nitrate crystals (hydrate form) stored at two depot locations in the United States (75% by weight at Curtis Bay, Maryland, and 25% by weight at Hammond, Indiana). The material is stored in several configurations in over 21,000 drums. The U.S. Congress has declared the entire DNSC thorium nitrate stockpile to be in excess of the needs of the Department of Defense. Part of DNSC's mission is to safely manage the continued storage, future sales, and/or disposition of the thorium nitrate stockpile. Historically, DNSC has sold surplus thorium nitrate to domestic and foreign companies, but there is no demand currently for this material. Analyses conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in 2001 demonstrated that disposition of the thorium nitrate inventory as a containerized waste, without processing, is the least complex and lowest-cost option for disposition. A characterization study was conducted in 2002 by ORNL, and it was determined that the thorium nitrate stockpile may be disposed of as low-level waste. The Nevada Test Site (NTS) was used as a case study for the disposal alternative, and special radiological analyses and waste acceptance requirements were documented. Among the special radiological considerations is the emission of {sup 220}Rn and {sup 222}Rn from buried material. NTS has a performance objective on the emissions of radon: 20 pCi m{sup -2} sec{sup -1} at the surface of the disposal facility. The radon emissions from the buried thorium nitrate stockpile have been modeled. This paper presents background information and summarizes the results of modeling radon emissions and compares those results with the NTS performance objective.

  16. Air weapon fatalities.

    PubMed Central

    Milroy, C M; Clark, J C; Carter, N; Rutty, G; Rooney, N

    1998-01-01

    AIMS: To describe characteristics of a series of people accidentally and deliberately killed by air powered weapons. METHODS: Five cases of fatal airgun injury were identified by forensic pathologists and histopathologists. The circumstances surrounding the case, radiological examination, and pathological findings are described. The weapon characteristics are also reported. RESULTS: Three of the victims were adult men, one was a 16 year old boy, and one an eight year old child. Four of the airguns were .22 air rifles, the other a .177 air rifle. Two committed suicide, one person shooting himself in the head, the other in the chest. In both cases the guns were fired at contact range. Three of the cases were classified as accidents: in two the pellet penetrated into the head and in one the chest. CONCLUSIONS: One person each year dies from an air powered weapon injury in the United Kingdom. In addition there is considerable morbidity from airgun injuries. Fatalities and injuries are most commonly accidents, but deliberately inflicted injuries occur. Airguns are dangerous weapons when inappropriately handled and should not be considered as toys. Children should not play with airguns unsupervised. Images PMID:9797730

  17. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  18. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three

  19. Medicalized weapons & modern war.

    PubMed

    Gross, Michael L

    2010-01-01

    "Medicalized" weapons--those that rely on advances in neuroscience, physiology, and pharmacology--offer the prospect of reducing casualties and protecting civilians. They could be especially useful in modern asymmetric wars in which conventional states are pitted against guerrilla or insurgent forces. But may physicians and other medical workers participate in their development? PMID:20166514

  20. US weapons secrets revealed

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S.; Arkin, W.M.

    1993-03-01

    Extraordinary details have only recently been revealed about the struggle over the control of early U.S. nuclear weapons and their initial deployments abroad. The information comes from a newly declassified top secret report, part of a larger study, The History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972, commissioned by Defense Secretary James R. Schlisinger in summer 1974.

  1. Names and Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kauffman, Charles

    1989-01-01

    Traces the theoretical significance of using names as titles for situations, and applies this analysis to the United States' intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Argues that the names given to ICBMs preserve their utility as weapons by linking them to the myths of the nineteenth-century western frontier. (MM)

  2. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  3. Multiple smart weapons employment mechanism

    SciTech Connect

    McGlynn, M.P.; Meiklejohn, W.D.

    1993-07-20

    A digital communications armament network adaptor is described for carrying multiple smart weapons on a single wing pylon station of an aircraft, comprising: an aircraft having a weapons controller configured in compliance with MIL-STD 1553; multiple wing-mounted pylons on said aircraft, each providing a weapons station with communications and ejection and release mechanisms electrically connected to said controller for the airborne launch of smart weapons; a multiple ejector rack affixed to at least one pylon, said rack holding a plurality of smart weapons; and an electronic digital network connected between the controller and said rack-mounted smart weapons, said network located in said rack and including circuitry which receives coded digital communications from said controller and selectively rebroadcasts said communications to one of said smart weapons on said rack designated by said coded communications, thereby controlling all required functions of said designated smart weapon.

  4. Towards a mutually reinforcing future : opportunities to integrate nuclear weapons stewardship and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-07-01

    2010 NPR and President Obama's 2009 Prague Speech highlighted two key objectives with an inherent underlying tension: (1) Moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons; and (2) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Objective 1 depends, inter alia, upon reductions in stockpiles at home and abroad and maintaining stability. Objective 2 depends upon needed investments in modernization and life extension. Objectives being pursued predominantly in parallel by largely separate communities.

  5. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    SciTech Connect

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  6. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES...

  7. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES...

  8. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES Loading, Hauling, and Dumping Safety...

  9. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES Loading, Hauling, and Dumping Safety...

  10. 30 CFR 57.9314 - Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Trimming stockpile and muckpile faces. 57.9314 Section 57.9314 Mineral Resources MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR METAL AND NONMETAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH SAFETY AND HEALTH STANDARDS-UNDERGROUND METAL AND NONMETAL MINES Loading, Hauling, and Dumping Safety...

  11. STOCKPILED PRAIRIEGRASS PROVIDES HIGH-QUALITY FALL GRAZING FOR LAMBS

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    New varieties of prairiegrass (Bromus catharticus Vahl. = B. willdenowii Kunth.) exhibit improved persistence over ‘Matua’ under USA growing conditions, but animal performance data is lacking. We evaluated performance of lambs grazing stockpiled ‘Dixon’ prairiegrass on West Virginia hill pasture in...

  12. Leachate From Biosolid Stockpiles: Nutrients and Metal Mobility.

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peckenham, J. M.; Nadeau, J. A.; Amirbahman, A.; Brutsaert, W.; Wilson, J.

    2004-05-01

    Field stacking of biosolids prior to utilization is a standard agricultural practice. The Maine Department of Environmental Protection is concerned about how this stacking affects groundwater quality, in particular, nitrate-N leached from stockpiles. Maine regulations have had much stricter siting standards for field stacking since 2002. In 2002 we initiated an experiment to characterize the nitrogen chemistry of leachate. Mass loading of nitrogen leaving stockpiles was determined experimentally by placing biosolids on plastic-lined cells to collect liquid flowing through and over the pile. These piles contained approximately 60 cubic meters of biosolids. Biosolid stockpile geometry affects the amount of leachate generated. In a parallel experiment, the composition of leachate moving through till-derived soil has been gauged using pan lysimeters and shallow wells under field conditions. Initial results indicate that ammonia is the dominant nitrogen species released (2,200 to 4,800 mg/L). Nitrate concentrations were found to be less than 1 mg/L in the leachate. Dissolved organic carbon loading was also high (5,800 to 10,000 mg/L). Several heavy metals and phosphorous were detected in association with the leachate in the surrounding lysimeters and boreholes. Additional data from sites reclaimed using biosolids substantiate the transport of nitrogen and metals to groundwater, even without the concentrating effect of stockpiles. These data suggest that soils may not significantly attenuate metal transport under ambient conditions.

  13. Stockpiled Prairie Grass For Fall-Grazing Lambs

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    New varieties of prairiegrass (Bromus catharticus Vahl. = B. willdenowii Kunth.) exhibit improved persistence over 'Matua' under USA growing conditions, but animal performance data is lacking. Therefore, we evaluated performance of lambs grazing fall-stockpiled 'Dixon' prairiegrass on a West Virgin...

  14. Technology resource document for the assembled chemical weapons assessment environmental impact statement. Vol. 3 : assembled systems for weapons destruction at Pine Bluff Arsenal.

    SciTech Connect

    Kimmell, T.; Folga, S., Frey, G.; Molberg, J.; Kier, P.; Templin, B.; Goldberg, M.

    2001-05-04

    This volume of the Technical Resource Document (TRD) for the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the ''Design, Construction and Operation of One or More Pilot Test Facilities for Assembled Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies at One or More Sites'' (PMACWA 2001g) pertains to the destruction of assembled chemical weapons (ACW) stored in the U.S. Army's unitary chemical stockpile at Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), located outside Pine Bluff, Arkansas. This volume presents technical and process information on each of the destruction technologies applicable to treatment of the specific ACW stored at PBA. The destruction technologies described are those that have been demonstrated as part of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) selection process (see Volume 1).

  15. Technology resource document for the assembled chemical weapons assessment environmental impact statement. Vol. 5 : assembled systems for weapons destruction at Blue Grass Army Depot.

    SciTech Connect

    Kimmell, T.; Folga, S., Frey, G.; Molberg, J.; Kier, P.; Templin, B.; Goldberg, M.

    2001-05-02

    This volume of the Technical Resource Document (TRD) for the ''Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Design, Construction and Operation of One or More Pilot Test Facilities for Assembled Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies at One or More Sites'' (PMACWA 2001g) pertains to the destruction of assembled chemical weapons (ACW) stored in the U.S. Army's unitary chemical stockpile at Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), located outside Richmond, Kentucky. This volume presents technical and process information on each of the destruction technologies applicable to treatment of the specific ACW stored at BGAD. The destruction technologies described are those that have been demonstrated as part of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) selection process (see Volume 1).

  16. NEAR REAL TIME CHARACTERIZATION OF BNL STOCKPILED SOILS, ANOTHER ASTD SUCCESS STORY.

    SciTech Connect

    BOWERMAN,B.S.; ADAMS,J.W.; KALB,P.D.; LOCKWOOD,A.

    2003-02-23

    As of October 2001, approximately 7,000 yd{sup 3} of stockpiled soil, contaminated to varying degrees with radioactive materials and heavy metals, remained at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) after the remediation of the BNL Chemical/Animal/Glass Pits disposal area. During the 1997 removal action, the more hazardous/radioactive materials were segregated, along with, chemical liquids and solids, animal carcasses, intact gas cylinders, and a large quantity of metal and glass debris. Nearly all of these materials have been disposed of. In order to ensure that all debris was removed and to characterize the large quantity of heterogeneous soil, BNL initiated an extended sorting, segregation, and characterization project, co-funded by the BNL Environmental Management Directorate and the DOE EM Office of Science and Technology Accelerated Site Technology Deployment (ASTD) program. Project objectives were to remove any non-conforming items, and to assure that mercury and radioactive contaminant levels were within acceptable limits for disposal as low-level radioactive waste. Sorting and segregation were conducted simultaneously. Large stockpiles, ranging from 150 to 1,200 yd{sup 3}, were subdivided into manageable 20 yd{sup 3} ''subpiles'' after powered vibratory screening. The 1/2 inch screen removed gravel and almost all non-conforming items, which were separated for further characterization. Soil that passed through the screen was also visually inspected before being moved to a subpile. Eight samples plus QA duplicates were collected from each subpile for chemical analysis, and a 1-Liter jar of material for gamma spectroscopy. A field lab equipped for chemical analysis and gamma spectroscopy was set up in a trailer close by the stockpile site. Chemical analysis included X-ray fluorescence (XRF) to screen for high (>260 ppm) total mercury concentrations, and modified Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) tests to verify that the soils were not RCRA hazardous. The modified (1/10th scale) TCLP tests minimized secondary (leachate) waste and maximized tumbler capacity and sample throughput. TCLP leachate analysis was accomplished using a Milestone Direct Mercury Analyzer (DMA-80). Gamma spectroscopy provided verification of previously measured Am-241, Cs-137, and Co-60 contamination levels. After analyses were completed and reviewed, the stockpiles were reconstructed for later disposal as discrete entities within a disposal site profile. The ASTD field laboratory completed more than 2,500 analyses of total Hg (XRF) and TCLP/DMA analyses over an 18-week period. Reliable statistical verification was accomplished for more than 98% of the stockpile sub-piles; for most sub-piles, TCLP analyses were completed within two days. This enhanced level of confidence in soil characterization was accomplished at a cost far below equivalent baseline techniques. One of the most significant aspects of the project success was schedule acceleration. The original schedule projected activities extending from early April until September 30. Due to efficiency and reliability of the vibratory screening operation and cooperative, dry summer weather, stockpile reconstruction was completed in the third week of August. Reduction of the planned sample collection rate, from three samples per 5 yd{sup 3} to two, resulted in further schedule acceleration. The resulting sample frequency, however, was still 22 times greater than the baseline frequency (one per 55 yd{sup 3}).

  17. Planning guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program

    SciTech Connect

    Shumpert, B.L.; Watson, A.P.; Sorensen, J.H. and others

    1995-02-01

    This planning guide was developed under the direction of the U.S. Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which jointly coordinate and direct the development of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). It was produced to assist state, local, and Army installation planners in formulating and coordinating plans for chemical events that may occur at the chemical agent stockpile storage locations in the continental United States. This document provides broad planning guidance for use by both on-post and off-post agencies and organizations in the development of a coordinated plan for responding to chemical events. It contains checklists to assist in assuring that all important aspects are included in the plans and procedures developed at each Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) location. The checklists are supplemented by planning guidelines in the appendices which provide more detailed guidance regarding some issues. The planning guidance contained in this document will help ensure that adequate coordination between on-post and off-post planners occurs during the planning process. This planning guide broadly describes an adequate emergency planning base that assures that critical planning decisions will be made consistently at every chemical agent stockpile location. This planning guide includes material drawn from other documents developed by the FEMA, the Army, and other federal agencies with emergency preparedness program responsibilities. Some of this material has been developed specifically to meet the unique requirements of the CSEPP. In addition to this guidance, other location-specific documents, technical studies, and support studies should be used as needed to assist in the planning at each of the chemical agent stockpile locations to address the specific hazards and conditions at each location.

  18. Early retirement for weaponeers?

    SciTech Connect

    Weisman, J.

    1994-07-01

    Department of Energy`s Lawrence Livermore Laboratory`s once-vital nuclear weapons division is now in dire straits. The laboratory was established in 1952, during the titanic struggle over the hydrogen bomb, has grown steadily from $7 million to its peak of $1.1 billion in 1991. The future for key members of their most experienced weapons design team is uncertain. Over the past two years, Livermore`s operating budget has fallen by 12.5 percent or $127.6 million. Nearly 750 employees, 10 percent of the work force, accepted early retirement offers last year. Further budget cuts will force another 300 to 600 personnel out by the end of 1995. The future resides in the U.S. Congress.

  19. Bioterrorism: pathogens as weapons.

    PubMed

    Anderson, Peter D; Bokor, Gyula

    2012-10-01

    Biowarfare has been used for centuries. The use of biological weapons in terrorism remains a threat. Biological weapons include infectious agents (pathogens) and toxins. The most devastating bioterrorism scenario would be the airborne dispersal of pathogens over a concentrated population area. Characteristics that make a specific pathogen a high-risk for bioterrorism include a low infective dose, ability to be aerosolized, high contagiousness, and survival in a variety of environmental conditions. The most dangerous potential bioterrorism agents include the microorganisms that produce anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox. Other diseases of interest to bioterrorism include brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis, Q fever, and viral encephalitis. Food safety and water safety threats are another area of concern. PMID:23011963

  20. US nuclear weapons policy

    SciTech Connect

    May, M.

    1990-12-05

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  1. Modular weapon control unit

    SciTech Connect

    Boccabella, M.F.; McGovney, G.N.

    1997-01-01

    The goal of the Modular Weapon Control Unit (MWCU) program was to design and develop a reconfigurable weapon controller (programmer/sequencer) that can be adapted to different weapon systems based on the particular requirements for that system. Programmers from previous systems are conceptually the same and perform similar tasks. Because of this commonality and the amount of re-engineering necessary with the advent of every new design, the idea of a modular, adaptable system has emerged. Also, the controller can be used in more than one application for a specific weapon system. Functionality has been divided into a Processor Module (PM) and an Input/Output Module (IOM). The PM will handle all operations that require calculations, memory, and timing. The IOM will handle interfaces to the rest of the system, input level shifting, output drive capability, and detection of interrupt conditions. Configuration flexibility is achieved in two ways. First, the operation of the PM is determined by a surface mount Read-Only Memory (ROM). Other surface-mount components can be added or neglected as necessary for functionality. Second, IOMs consist of configurable input buffers, configurable output drivers, and configurable interrupt generation. Further, these modules can be added singly or in groups to a Processor Module to achieve the required I/O configuration. The culmination of this LDRD was the building of both Processor Module and Input/Output Module. The MWCU was chosen as a test system to evaluate Low-Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) technology, desirable for high component density and good thermal characteristics.

  2. Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    Dattelbaum, Dana

    2014-11-03

    As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

  3. Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

    ScienceCinema

    Dattelbaum, Dana

    2015-01-05

    As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

  4. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  5. Stockpiled prairiegrass-brassica hybrid mixtures tolerate repeated defoliation in autumn

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Stockpiling herbage can help redistribute nutrient availability and supplement quantity to sustain or finish livestock, depending on production objectives. Typically, autumn stockpiled herbage is harvested, with little expectation for useable regrowth. Brassicas (Brassica spp.) and prairiegrass (B...

  6. Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, August 3, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The hearing addresses H.R. 4849 a bill to implement the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. The proposed text of the legislation is included. Statement of government and industry officials are included along with documents submitted for the record.

  7. 30 CFR 77.211 - Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming... WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.211 Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general. (a) Tunnels located below stockpiles, surge piles, and coal storage...

  8. 30 CFR 77.211 - Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming... WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.211 Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general. (a) Tunnels located below stockpiles, surge piles, and coal storage...

  9. 30 CFR 77.211 - Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming... WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.211 Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general. (a) Tunnels located below stockpiles, surge piles, and coal storage...

  10. 30 CFR 77.211 - Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming... WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.211 Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general. (a) Tunnels located below stockpiles, surge piles, and coal storage...

  11. 30 CFR 77.211 - Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming... WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.211 Draw-off tunnels; stockpiling and reclaiming operations; general. (a) Tunnels located below stockpiles, surge piles, and coal storage...

  12. The morality of weapons research.

    PubMed

    Forge, John

    2004-07-01

    I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as 'defensive' weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause. PMID:15362709

  13. Manual for national implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E.A.; Gualtieri, D.S.; Grimes, S.W.

    1993-12-01

    The Convention on the Prohibition on the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, opened for signature, January 13, 1993, in Paris, France (CWC), is an unprecedented multilateral effort to eradicate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction and assure their continued absence through international verification. The CWC has been signed by over 150 nations, and is expected to enter into force in 1995. With its far-reaching system to verify compliance, the CWC presages a new foundation for international security based neither on fear nor on trust, but on the rule of law. A central feature of the CWC is that it requires each State Party to take implementing measures to make the Convention operative. The CWC goes beyond all prior arms control treaties in this regard. For this approach to succeed, and to inspire the eradication of other categories of mass destruction weaponry, coordination and planning are vital to harmonize CWC national implementation among States Parties. This Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention is designed to assist States Parties, duly taking into account the distinctive aspects of their legal systems, in maximizing CWC enforcement consistent with their national legal obligations.

  14. An analysis of Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program exercise results. Volume 1: The CSEPP Exercise Results Database

    SciTech Connect

    Hewett, P.L. Jr.; Mitrani, J.E.; Absil-Mills, M.J.G.; Tallarovic, P.; Molsen, J.; Vercellone, J.; Madore, M.A.

    1998-06-01

    The primary focus of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) is to enhance the response capabilities of the eight US Army installations that store chemical weapons agent and of the communities immediately surrounding each Army storage installation. Exercises are a major component of the program and are conducted annually at each of the eight installations. Following each exercise, a report summarizing the results of the exercise is produced. To gain a better perspective on the site-specific and program-wide results of these exercises, the Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness requested that Argonne National Laboratory develop a database containing the results of exercises held through June 1996. This document provides a summary of the process used to develop the CSEPP Exercise Results Database. The database provides CSEPP managers in the Department of the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency a method for tracking and analyzing exercise results. The report discusses the collection and coding of exercise data and provides tables to guide coding of future exercise results. An electronic copy of the database (CD-ROM) accompanies the report. This report focuses only on methods used to collect exercise data and develop the database; Volume 2 discusses the analysis of the data collected.

  15. Emergency preparedness among people living near US army chemical weapons sites after September 11, 2001.

    PubMed

    Williams, Bryan L; Magsumbol, Melina S

    2007-09-01

    We examined trust in the army and perceptions of emergency preparedness among residents living near the Anniston, Ala, and Richmond, Ky, US Army chemical weapons stockpile sites shortly after September 11, 2001. Residents (n = 655) living near the 2 sites who participated in a cross-sectional population were relatively unprepared in the event of a chemical emergency. The events of September 11 gave rise to concerns regarding the security of stored chemical weapons and the sites' vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Although residents expressed trust in the army to manage chemical weapons safely, only a few expressed a desire to actively participate in site decisions. Compliance with procedures during emergencies could be seriously limited, putting residents in these sites at higher levels of risk of exposure to chemical hazards than nonresidents. PMID:17666684

  16. Emergency Preparedness Among People Living Near US Army Chemical Weapons Sites After September 11, 2001

    PubMed Central

    Williams, Bryan L.; Magsumbol, Melina S.

    2007-01-01

    We examined trust in the army and perceptions of emergency preparedness among residents living near the Anniston, Ala, and Richmond, Ky, US Army chemical weapons stockpile sites shortly after September 11, 2001. Residents (n = 655) living near the 2 sites who participated in a cross-sectional population were relatively unprepared in the event of a chemical emergency. The events of September 11 gave rise to concerns regarding the security of stored chemical weapons and the sites vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Although residents expressed trust in the army to manage chemical weapons safely, only a few expressed a desire to actively participate in site decisions. Compliance with procedures during emergencies could be seriously limited, putting residents in these sites at higher levels of risk of exposure to chemical hazards than nonresidents. PMID:17666684

  17. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  18. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  19. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  20. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  1. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This...

  2. Probabilistic cost-benefit analysis of enhanced safety features for strategic nuclear weapons at a representative location

    SciTech Connect

    Stephens, D.R.; Hall, C.H.; Holman, G.S.; Graham, K.F.; Harvey, T.F.; Serduke, F.J.D.

    1993-10-01

    We carried out a demonstration analysis of the value of developing and implementing enhanced safety features for nuclear weapons in the US stockpile. We modified an approach that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed in response to a congressional directive that NRC assess the ``value-impact`` of regulatory actions for commercial nuclear power plants. Because improving weapon safety shares some basic objectives with NRC regulations, i.e., protecting public health and safety from the effects of accidents involving radioactive materials, we believe the NRC approach to be appropriate for evaluating weapons-safety cost-benefit issues. Impact analysis includes not only direct costs associated with retrofitting the weapon system, but also the expected costs (or economic risks) that are avoided by the action, i.e., the benefits.

  3. Weapons and Minority Youth Violence.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Northrop, Daphne; Hamrick, Kim

    Weapons violence is a major public health problem that especially impacts minority youth. Interventions designed to reduce weapon use by youth are categorized as educational/behavioral change, legal, and technological/environmental. Few educational programs currently exist, but those that do largely concern firearm safety courses, public…

  4. Military implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, August 9, 11, 18, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The hearing addresses implementation of the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. The impact on military organizations is examined. Global aspects of the scope of chemical weapons included in the Convention are also examined. Statement of government and military officials are included along with documents submitted for the record.

  5. Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21). Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, March 22, April 13, May 13 and 17, June 9 and 23, 1994

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    The hearing addresses implementation of the obligations of the United States under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their destruction. Key provisions of the Treaty are provided. Global aspects of the scope of chemical weapons included in the Convention are also examined. Statement of government and military officials are included along with documents submitted for the record.

  6. Numerical modelling of flow over stockpiles: Implications on dust emissions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Badr, T.; Harion, J. L.

    This paper considers fugitive dust emissions from open aggregate storage piles on industrial sites. The process of wind erosion depends strongly on the local wind flow characteristics and is considerably affected by flow field changes caused by any modifications in terrain geometry. Prediction of wind flow over stockpiles plays a dominant role in the assessment of potential erosion and the evaluation of its environmental impact. Three-dimensional numerical simulations, based on solution of the Reynolds Averaged Navier-Stokes equations and the k-? shear stress transport turbulence model, were performed to describe the flow over two typical pile geometries with different wind directions. The surface roughness effect was also accounted for in the simulations. Results are then validated against wind tunnel derived experimental data from an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study. The simulations presented in this study successfully predict flow patterns over the stockpiles. Further development of these simulations will allow testing of more realistic site configurations, including various pile geometries and complex terrain as well as different flow conditions.

  7. U.S. Department of Energy, Defense Programs, activities to support the safe, secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect

    Turner, J.

    1993-12-31

    In September 1991 President Bush announced sweeping cuts in the US nuclear weapon stockpile as well as changes in deployment to remove significant numbers of weapons from alert status and to return to the US for storage many weapons formerly based abroad in US sites. In October 1991 President Gorbachev announced similar moves for the Soviet Union. Even though the Gorbachev announcement represented a substantial step forward in reducing tension between the US and the Soviet Union, the US continued to be concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union and the prospects for internal stability. As a result, in November 1991 the Administration began talks with the Soviets in a number of areas including field disablement of nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use, emergency response in the event of a weapons accident, and command and control of nuclear weapons. The Nunn-Lugar legislation assured assistance to the Soviet Union in the safe, secure dismantlement (SSD) of weapons to implement the Gorbachev commitment and in the development of measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Energy (DOE) is supporting and collaborating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in several areas due to the DOE responsibilities for developing, assembling, and dismantling US warheads and as the custodian of the nuclear materials stockpile. Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, controls the nuclear weapons of the Former Soviet Union. Thus, DOE`s nuclear weapon and nuclear materials expertise are being applied particularly to Russia. However, the DOE is also providing assistance to Belarus and is prepared to assist Ukraine and Kazakhstan as well if agreements can be reached. In this paper, the DOE SSD activities in support of DOD as the US Executive Agent will be discussed. Two areas will not be covered, namely, DOD activities and the purchase of highly enriched uranium.

  8. How electroshock weapons kill!

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2010-03-01

    Growing numbers of law enforcement officers now carry an electroshock weapon (ESW). Over 500 U.S. deaths have followed ESW use in the past 26 years; over 450 of these deaths followed use of an electromuscular disruptor in the past 9 years. Most training courses teach that ESWs are safe; that they can kill only by the direct effect of electric current on the heart; and that a death following use of an ESW always has some other cause. All these teachings are false! The last was disproved by Lundquist.^1 Williams^2 ruled out direct electrical effects as a cause of almost all the 213 deaths he studied, leaving disruption of normal physiological processes as the only alternative explanation. Careful study of all such deaths identifies 4 different ways that death has or could have been brought about by the ESW: kidney failure following rhabdomyolysis [rare]; cardiac arrest from hyperkalemia following rhabdomyolysis [undocumented]; lactic acid-induced ventricular fibrillation [conclusive proof impossible]; and [most common] anoxia from so much lactic acid in the circulating blood that it acts as an oxygen scavenger, continuously depleting the blood of oxygen until most of the lactate has been metabolized. ^1M. Lundquist, BAPS 54(1) K1.270(2009). ^2Howard E. Williams, Taser Electronic Control Devices and Sudden In-Custody Death, 2008.

  9. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  10. Nuclear weapons are legal tools

    SciTech Connect

    Almond, H.H. Jr.

    1985-05-01

    Responding to an article by Elliot Meyrowitz stating that nuclear weapons are illegal threats, the author observes that international law does not forbid the possession or use of nuclear weapons, whose existence operates as part of the checks and balances process that maintains deterrence. Because nuclear weapons have never been identified among states as illegal, either by treaties or by customary international law, attempts by opposing states to establish illegality through declarations fall short of an effectively shared strategy. The author concludes that we must use the time that deterrence permits to forcefully promote policies optimizing the claims of people for human dignity rather than focusing on the fruitless search to make nuclear weapons illegal.

  11. Use of hazard assessments to achieve risk reduction in the USDOE Stockpile Stewardship (SS-21) Program

    SciTech Connect

    Fischer, S.R.; Konkel, H.; Bott, T.; Eisenhawer, S.W.; DeYoung, L.; Hockert, J.

    1995-07-01

    This paper summarizes the nuclear explosive hazard assessment activities performed to support US Department of Energy (DOE) Stockpile Stewardship Demonstration Project SS-21, better known as the ``Seamless Safety`` program. Past practice within the DOE Complex has dictated the use of a significant number of post-design/fabrication safety reviews to analyze the safety associated with operations on nuclear explosives and to answer safety questions. These practices have focused on reviewing-in or auditing-in safety vs incorporating safety in the design process. SS-21 was proposed by the DOE as an avenue to develop a program to ``integrate established, recognized, verifiable safety criteria into the process at the design stage rather than continuing the reliance on reviews, evaluations and audits.`` The entire Seamless Safety design and development process is verified by a concurrent hazard assessment (HA). The primary purpose of the SS-21 Demonstration Project HA was to demonstrate the feasibility of performing concurrent HAs as part of an engineering design and development effort and then to evaluate the use of the HA to provide an indication in the risk reduction or gain in safety achieved. To accomplish this objective, HAs were performed on both baseline (i.e., old) and new (i.e. SS-21) B61-0 Center Case Section disassembly processes. These HAs were used to support the identification and documentation of weapon- and process-specific hazards and safety-critical operating steps. Both HAs focused on identifying accidents that had the potential for worker injury, public health effects, facility damage, toxic gas release, and dispersal of radioactive materials. A comparison of the baseline and SS-21 process risks provided a semi-quantitative estimate of the risk reduction gained via the Seamless Safety process.

  12. Nuclear weapons and nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Cassel, C.; McCally, M.; Abraham, H.

    1984-01-01

    This book examines the potential radiation hazards and environmental impacts of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include medical responsibility and thermonuclear war, the threat of nuclear war, nuclear weaponry, biological effects, radiation injury, decontamination, long-term effects, ecological effects, psychological aspects, the economic implications of nuclear weapons and war, ethics, civil defense, arms control, nuclear winter, and long-term biological consequences of nuclear war.

  13. Chemical incident management: gaseous emissions from a stockpile of coal.

    PubMed

    Freudenstein, U; Crowley, D; Welch, F

    2000-01-01

    Spontaneous combustion of coal releases a wide range of airborne pollutants which, in high concentrations, may be hazardous to health. Little is known about how the effects on health change in relation to the release of multiple substances. This article reports an incident in which a stockpile of coal released potentially harmful gases into the environment. Although the resultant health effects reported were few, the co-ordinated response by local authorities and health authorities highlighted the advantage of a multidisciplinary approach. Public health departments need to be aware of major chemical hazards within their district. Prompt environmental monitoring and exposure measurement needs to be arranged as this is crucial to making an appropriate response. Updated registers are needed from private companies and public bodies; who can provide timely measurements of chemical hazards. Health districts with more than one local authority may benefit from pooling resources and knowledge in order to prepare for such an incident. PMID:10787025

  14. Nuclear Theory for Astrophysics, Stockpile Stewardship, and Homeland Security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hayes, Anna

    2004-10-01

    A large number of problems key to astrophysics, stockpile stewardship, and homeland defense rely on knowledge of nuclear physics in regimes inaccessible to experiment. In stellar and nuclear explosions unstable nuclei and nuclear isomers are produced in copious quantities and are used to diagnose the explosion. Similarly, analysis of the unstable nuclei from the debris will be key to attribution in the event of a terrorist domestic nuclear attack. In the case of nuclear non-proliferation a number of new schemes are being considered by the IAEA to address the ever greater needs, including neutrino monitoring of the plutonium content of reactors. For all of these problems detailed nuclear theory is required. In this talk I discuss the theoretical physics needs for the type of problems of overlapping interest to astrophysics and national security.

  15. Consistency analysis on laser signal in laser guided weapon simulation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yin, Ruiguang; Zhang, Wenpan; Guo, Hao; Gan, Lin

    2015-10-01

    The hardware-in-the-loop simulation is widely used in laser semi-active guidance weapon experiments, the authenticity of the laser guidance signal is the key problem of reliability. In order to evaluate the consistency of the laser guidance signal, this paper analyzes the angle of sight, laser energy density, laser spot size, atmospheric back scattering, sun radiation and SNR by comparing the different working state between actual condition and hardware-in-the-loop simulation. Based on measured data, mathematical simulation and optical simulation result, laser guidance signal effects on laser seeker are determined. By using Monte Carlo method, the laser guided weapon trajectory and impact point distribution are obtained, the influence of the systematic error are analyzed. In conclusion it is pointed out that the difference between simulation system and actual system has little influence in normal guidance, has great effect on laser jamming. The research is helpful to design and evaluation of laser guided weapon simulation.

  16. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  17. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were

  18. Biosolid stockpiles are a significant point source for greenhouse gas emissions.

    PubMed

    Majumder, Ramaprasad; Livesley, Stephen J; Gregory, David; Arndt, Stefan K

    2014-10-01

    The wastewater treatment process generates large amounts of sewage sludge that are dried and then often stored in biosolid stockpiles in treatment plants. Because the biosolids are rich in decomposable organic matter they could be a significant source for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, yet there are no direct measurements of GHG from stockpiles. We therefore measured the direct emissions of methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and carbon dioxide (CO2) on a monthly basis from three different age classes of biosolid stockpiles at the Western Treatment Plant (WTP), Melbourne, Australia, from December 2009 to November 2011 using manual static chambers. All biosolid stockpiles were a significant point source for CH4 and N2O emissions. The youngest biosolids (<1 year old) had the greatest CH4 and N2O emissions of 60.2kg of CO2-e per Mg of biosolid per year. Stockpiles that were between 1 and 3 years old emitted less overall GHG (?29kg CO2-eMg(-1)yr(-1)) and the oldest stockpiles emitted the least GHG (?10kg CO2-eMg(-1)yr(-1)). Methane emissions were negligible in all stockpiles but the relative contribution of N2O and CO2 changed with stockpile age. The youngest stockpile emitted two thirds of the GHG emission as N2O, while the 1-3 year old stockpile emitted an equal amount of N2O and CO2 and in the oldest stockpile CO2 emissions dominated. We did not detect any seasonal variability of GHG emissions and did not observe a correlation between GHG flux and environmental variables such as biosolid temperature, moisture content or nitrate and ammonium concentration. We also modeled CH4 emissions based on a first order decay model and the model based estimated annual CH4 emissions were higher as compared to the direct field based estimated annual CH4 emissions. Our results indicate that labile organic material in stockpiles is decomposed over time and that nitrogen decomposition processes lead to significant N2O emissions. Carbon decomposition favors CO2 over CH4 production probably because of aerobic stockpile conditions or CH4 oxidation in the outer stockpile layers. Although the GHG emission rate decreased with biosolid age, managers of biosolid stockpiles should assess alternate storage or uses for biosolids to avoid nutrient losses and GHG emissions. PMID:24835360

  19. Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by Chemical Weapons Convention inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Tanzman, E.A.

    1994-10-21

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the United States system of constitutional law. This discussion is about the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by the CWC and about how federal implementing legislation can allow verification inspections to take place in the United States under the Chemical Weapons Convention while remaining in compliance with the Constitution. By implementing legislation, the author means a federal statute that would be enacted separately from Senate approval of the Convention itself. Although implementing legislation is a relatively unusual accompaniment to a treaty, it will be necessary to the CWC, and the Administration has submitted a bill that was under consideration in the last Congress and presumably will be reintroduced early next year. The Fourth and Fifth Amendment problems posed by the CWC arise from the verification inspection scheme embodied in the treaty. The CWC depends heavily on on-site inspections to verify compliance with its key requirements. These include destroying all chemicals weapons stockpiles and bringing potential chemical weapons precursors under international control. The Convention contains four distinct kinds of inspections: systematic inspections of chemical weapons storage and destruction facilities, routine inspections of various declared facilities, challenge inspections, and a variant on challenge inspections in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. All inspections are supposed to be only as intrusive as necessary to carry out the Convention. These inspections will be carried out by inspectors employed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, which is responsible for enforcing the Convention. Generally, the inspected State Party is permitted to assign observers to accompany the inspectors.

  20. Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.

    SciTech Connect

    Flores, Kristen Lee

    2004-07-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of potential proliferants.

  1. Is this the time for a high-energy laser weapon program?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kiel, David H.

    2013-02-01

    The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has made large investments weaponizing laser technology for air defense. Despite billions of dollars spent, there has not been a successful transition of a high-energy laser (HEL) weapon from the lab to the field. Is the dream of a low-cost-per-shot, deep-magazine, speed-of-light HEL weapon an impossible dream or a set of technologies that are ready to emerge on the modern battlefield? Because of the rapid revolution taking place in modern warfare that is making conventional defensive weapons very expensive relative to the offensive weapons systems, the pull for less expensive air defense may necessitate a HEL weapon system. Also, due to the recent technological developments in solid-state lasers (SSL), especially fiber lasers, used throughout manufacturing for cutting and welding, a HEL weapon finally may be able to meet all the requirements of ease of use, sustainability, and reliability. Due to changes in warfare and SSL technology advances, the era of HEL weapons isn't over; it may be just starting if DoD takes an evolutionary approach to fielding a HEL weapon. The U.S. Navy, with its large ships and their available electric power, should lead the way.

  2. Effects of a chemical weapons incineration plant on red-tailed tropicbirds

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Schreiber, E.A.; Doherty, P.F.; Schenk, G.A.

    2001-01-01

    From 1990 to 2000, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) incinerated part of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll, central Pacific Ocean, which also is a National Wildlife Refuge and home to approximately a half-million breeding seabirds. The effect on wildlife of incineration of these weapons is unknown. Using a multi-strata mark-recapture analysis, we investigated the effects of JACADS on reproductive success, survival, and movement probabilities of red-tailed tropicbirds (Phaethon rubricauda) nesting both downwind and upwind of the incineration site. We found no effect of chemical incineration on these tropicbird demographic parameters over the 8 years of our study. An additional 3 years of monitoring tropicbird demography will take place, post-incineration.

  3. ENZYMES FOR DEGRADATION OF ENERGETIC MATERIALS AND DEMILITARIZATION OF EXPLOSIVES STOCKPILES, SERDP ANNUAL (INTERIM) REPORT

    EPA Science Inventory

    The current stockpile of energetic materials requiring disposal contains about half a million tons. Through 2001. over 2.1 million tons are expected to pass through the stockpile for disposal. Safe and environmentally acceptable methods for disposing of these materials are needed...

  4. Nuclear weapons testing

    SciTech Connect

    Heylin, M.

    1988-02-15

    The author examines the history of efforts to ban, or at least constrain, nuclear tests. The issue has been marked by shifts in attitude by the superpowers in recent times. The Reagan Administration sees a comprehensive test ban only as a very long-term goal for the U.S. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been pushing extremely hard lately for a ban on all testing. The author discusses the pros and cons of such a ban by examining the arguments of the U.S. Department of Energy, Nobel Laureate Glenn T. Seaborg, and Associate Director for Defense Systems at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory George H. Miller. Other issues that are discussed include verification, joint testing, and reliability. He concludes with a discussion of the future of the ban.

  5. What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2007-03-01

    Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

  6. What future for nuclear weapons?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Steinberger, J.

    1998-05-01

    What have nuclear weapons to do with QCD? The temperatures in nuclear explosions are too low to generate quark-gluon plasma (but only by a factor of 10 -6). Perhaps what they have in common is that they were both invented by physicists. But please don't blame me for this harangue, rather blame the conference organisers who accepted it. Nuclear weapons are not the only grave danger facing our society, there are plenty of competitors: global population growth, anthropomorphic ecological damage such as the greenhouse effect, the rapid exhaustion of important resources such as oil and gas, etc. What is special about the nuclear weapons danger is that it could probably be eliminated without much trouble and with a consequent benefit to all, nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots alike.

  7. Handheld ultrasonic concealed weapon detector

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wilde, Norbert; Niederhaus, Steve; Lam, Hon; Lum, Chris

    2002-08-01

    A handheld, battery-operated prototype of a concealed weapon detector (CWD) has been built and tested. Designed to detect both metallic and non-metallic weapons, the sensor utilizes focused ultrasound (40 kHz frequency) to remotely detect concealed objects from beyond arm's length out to a range of about 25 feet (8 meters). Applications include weapon detection in prison settings, by officers in the field for stand-off frisking of suspects, and as supplemental security at courthouse entrances and other monitored portals. The detector emits an adjustable, audible alarm (with provision for an earphone jack) as well as a visible light-bar indicator when an object has been detected. An aiming light, with momentary switch, allows the user to accurately determine the location of the concealed object. A presentation of the detector's capabilities and limitations will be presented along with probability of detection (PD) data obtained using the latest prototype version.

  8. Quantification of water storage in fingers associated with preferential flow in milled peat stockpiles

    SciTech Connect

    Holden, N.M.; Ward, S.M.

    1999-06-01

    The economic value of stockpiled milled peat for fuel energy is dependent on its wet-weight water content when sold. Research into milled peat stockpile rewetting has shown that, while there is surface rewetting (a wet layer), there is also significant through-flow water movement into the center of the stockpile with associated zones (termed fingers) of water storage. A method of quantifying the importance of finger storage was developed using serial digital images obtained in the field. Results showed that the wetted volume within a stockpile was similar regardless of milled peat type ({approx}40%), and that the internal wetting contributed up to 28 times more to final water content than the surface wet layer. Thus surface wet layers have relatively little economic impact when compared with finger storage. Field observation of through-flow indicated that a rivulet flow mechanism in conjunction with stockpile geometry contributes to the development of fingers.

  9. Millimeter-wave concealed weapon detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chang, Yu-Wen; Juhola, Markku; Grainger, William; Wang, Beining; Manahan, Brian

    1997-02-01

    Millimeter-wave concealed weapon detection, based on the use of a fast scan short-range FMCW 94 GHz radar, was evaluated in a small business innovative research phase I under the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) program. The feasibility of a fast circular scan technique invented by Chang Industry has been firmly established, with handgun images recorded. This fast scan technique is essential both for remote sensing and full-body fixed site scanner applications. Although only raw image data was obtained in Phase I, we propose to apply super-resolution image enhancements and target recognition software algorithms to provide more reliable detection. Endorsement from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, to provide operational input and testing and evaluation, and the hiring of a consultant to plan for future program financing (including venture capital investment) make the project very attractive for commercialization.

  10. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Hart, Mark

    2014-11-20

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  11. Prevention of the Outer Space Weaponization

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhukov, Gennady P.

    2002-01-01

    9 states. The satellites of various functions (early warning, communication, data acquisition, reconnaissance and navigation) were actively used and continue to be used with the purposes of raising efficiency of ground armed forces, especially in fight against international terrorism. At the same time such satellites are not a weapon in the sense of that word since they do not create the threats of armed attack in outer space or from outer space. Moreover, they promote maintaining of stability in the international relations. For this reason the reconnaissance and data acquisition satellites used for the verification of observance by States of the arms limitation agreements are under international protection as national technical means of the control. Similar protection is enjoyed by the early warning satellites. With the help of space communication facilities the more reliable operative connection of the statesmen is organized in the strained situations. By this way the probability of making of the incorrect retaliatory decisions in critical political situations is reduced. At the same time it's necessary to take into consideration that the activities of such satellite systems are tightly connected with ground armed forces of the states. the earth, what from the point of view of international law may be qualified as establishing a partial demilitarization regime in outer space. After the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons it will be possible to speak about establishing of an international legal regime of complete demilitarization in outer space eliminating any kinds of weapon from outer space. in a peaceful time. weaponization.The main task of this paper is to analyze and to discuss the present binding regime of the outer space deweaponization and particular measures on consolidation and strengthening of this regime. agreements of the Russian Federation and the USA into multilateral Treaties. Such "immunity" would cover all operating space objects, irrespective of their military or civil designation. This approach is quite justified taking into consideration that military sattelites enhanced international peace and security and had broad advantages, such as treaty compliance and monitoring, the global positioning system, counter-terrorism and sanctions enforcement. Many examples of the last years demonstrate the tendency of engagement of military satellites into commercial space services. transparency on the pre-launch stage of space activity, including satellite inspection before ignition. Objects Flight Path Tracking. implemantation of a non-use of force and threat of force - a fundamental principle of modern international law. This implies the application of the menshened principle of international law by means of a treaty to the outer space activities with reference to the actions made in outer space, or directed from outer space against targets on the Earth as well as directed from the Earth against objects moving in outer space. to the possibility of conclusion in future of a multilateral arrangement on the prohibition of the space-based ABM. Accordingly, it is discussed the problem of an efficient international control over the prohibition of placement of the above mentioned weapons into outer space. to the challenges of the new millennium. 8

  12. Ciliates Expel Environmental Legionella-Laden Pellets To Stockpile Food

    PubMed Central

    Hojo, Fuhito; Sato, Daisuke; Matsuo, Junji; Miyake, Masaki; Nakamura, Shinji; Kunichika, Miyuki; Hayashi, Yasuhiro; Yoshida, Mitsutaka; Takahashi, Kaori; Takemura, Hiromu; Kamiya, Shigeru

    2012-01-01

    When Tetrahymena ciliates are cultured with Legionella pneumophila, the ciliates expel bacteria packaged in free spherical pellets. Why the ciliates expel these pellets remains unclear. Hence, we determined the optimal conditions for pellet expulsion and assessed whether pellet expulsion contributes to the maintenance of growth and the survival of ciliates. When incubated with environmental L. pneumophila, the ciliates expelled the pellets maximally at 2 days after infection. Heat-killed bacteria failed to produce pellets from ciliates, and there was no obvious difference in pellet production among the ciliates or bacterial strains. Morphological studies assessing lipid accumulation showed that pellets contained tightly packed bacteria with rapid lipid accumulation and were composed of the layers of membranes; bacterial culturability in the pellets rapidly decreased, in contrast to what was seen in ciliate-free culture, although the bacteria maintained membrane integrity in the pellets. Furthermore, ciliates newly cultured with pellets were maintained and grew vigorously compared with those without pellets. In contrast, a human L. pneumophila isolate killed ciliates 7 days postinfection in a Dot/Icm-dependent manner, and pellets harboring this strain did not support ciliate growth. Also, pellets harboring the human isolate were resuscitated by coculturing with amoebae, depending on Dot/Icm expression. Thus, while ciliates expel pellet-packaged environmental L. pneumophila for stockpiling food, the pellets packaging the human isolate are harmful to ciliate survival, which may be of clinical significance. PMID:22635991

  13. Weapons engineering tritium facility overview

    SciTech Connect

    Najera, Larry

    2011-01-20

    Materials provide an overview of the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) as introductory material for January 2011 visit to SRS. Purpose of the visit is to discuss Safety Basis, Conduct of Engineering, and Conduct of Operations. WETF general description and general GTS program capabilities are presented in an unclassified format.

  14. Endless generations of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Taylor, T.B.

    1986-11-01

    The author feels that pursuit of Star Wars and continued US nuclear testing is blocking progress toward the eventual worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons. It is also bound to reveal new ways to attack military or civilian targets that will, in turn, stimulate further searches for new types of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. Some of these developments could intensify the belief that limited nuclear wars can be fought and won. In short, development of new generations of nuclear weapons will provide the kind of positive feedback to the nuclear arms race that will greatly expand its dangers and its costs. Further proliferation of new types of nuclear weapons will increase the already extreme complexity of military planning and response, and the attendant dangers of nuclear war occurring by accident or through misinterpretation of information. Assessments of possible new military threats will become more uncertain as the complexities increase. Uncertainty can lead to catastrophic mistakes. Real or mistakenly perceived gaps in nuclear preparedness are likely to be used as further arguments for vast new military expenditures. We may all come to long for the relative simplicity of military nuclear issues during the first decade or so following the end of World War II. For these reasons, the author is convinced that there should be a halt to all nuclear tests, worldwide, as soon as possible. 2 references.

  15. Acoustic Analysis of Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Components at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Saleh, T. A.; Reynolds, J. J.; Rowe, C. A.; Freibert, F. J.; Ten Cate, J. A.; Ulrich, T. J.; Farrow, A. M.

    2012-12-01

    One of the primary missions of Los Alamos National Laboratory is to use science based techniques to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States. As such we use numerous NDE techniques to monitor materials and systems properties in weapons. Two techniques will be discussed in this presentation, Acoustic Resonance Spectroscopy (ARS) and Acoustic Emission (AE). ARS is used to observe manufacturing variations or changes in the plutonium containing component (pit) of the weapon system. Both quantitative and qualitative comparisons can be used to determine variation in the pit components. Piezoelectric transducer driven acoustic resonance experiments will be described along with initial qualitative and more complex analysis and comparison techniques derived from earthquake analysis performed at LANL. Similarly, AE is used to measure the time of arrival of acoustic signals created by mechanical events that can occur in nuclear weapon components. Both traditional time of arrival techniques and more advanced techniques are used to pinpoint the location and type of acoustic emission event. Similar experiments on tensile tests of brittle phases of plutonium metal will be described.

  16. Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension

    SciTech Connect

    Turbiville, G.H.

    1996-06-01

    One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons is the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.

  17. Weapons in an Affluent Suburban School.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hawkins, Stephanie R.; Campanaro, Amy; Pitts, Traci Bice; Steiner, Hans

    2002-01-01

    Investigated the self-reported violence and weapon carrying behaviors of largely affluent, suburban adolescents in San Francisco, California. Survey data indicated that weapons carrying was a significant issue for these high school students. Predictors of weapon carrying did not differ in comparison to predictors among inner city youth. Distinct…

  18. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  19. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  20. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  1. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  2. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander...

  3. Weapons in an Affluent Suburban School.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hawkins, Stephanie R.; Campanaro, Amy; Pitts, Traci Bice; Steiner, Hans

    2002-01-01

    Investigated the self-reported violence and weapon carrying behaviors of largely affluent, suburban adolescents in San Francisco, California. Survey data indicated that weapons carrying was a significant issue for these high school students. Predictors of weapon carrying did not differ in comparison to predictors among inner city youth. Distinct

  4. Weapons in Schools. NSSC Resource Paper.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Butterfield, George E., Ed.; Turner, Brenda, Ed.

    More than ever, our public school system must confront weapons in schools and become aware of steadily rising statistics on youth homicide and suicide. This report delineates the problem, discusses why children carry weapons to school, and outlines strategies for keeping weapons out of schools and for improving school safety. Although some

  5. Biological weapons and US law.

    PubMed

    Ferguson, J R

    1997-08-01

    During the past 8 years, the US Congress has developed a comprehensive legal framework to prevent the illegitimate use of toxins and infectious agents. As part of this framework, Congress has defined as a federal crime virtually every step in the process of developing or acquiring a biological agent for use as a weapon. At the same time, Congress has vested federal law enforcement agencies with broad civil and investigative powers to enable the government to intervene before such weapons are used or even developed. Finally, Congress has directed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to establish a regulatory regime to monitor the location and transfer of hazardous biological agents and to insure that any use of such agents complies with appropriate biosafety requirements. PMID:9244312

  6. Modeling the national pediatric vaccine stockpile: supply shortages, health impacts and cost consequences.

    PubMed

    Shrestha, Sundar S; Wallace, Gregory S; Meltzer, Martin I

    2010-08-31

    Pediatric vaccine stockpiles have been in place in the U.S. since 1983 to address the potential disruption in supply of routine pediatric vaccines. Increases in the number of vaccines recommended for pediatric and adolescent patients have increased the cost of stocking and maintaining the stockpile. Based on a spreadsheet-based model (VacStockpile) we developed, we estimated potential supply shortages of 14 stockpiled vaccines as of August 1, 2008 and its health and financial impacts under various shortage and stockpile scenarios. To illustrate the implications of policy options, we compared "high" to "low" stockpile scenarios. The high stockpile scenario ensures a 6-month vaccine supply to vaccinate all children according to recommended schedules. The low scenario comprised of 50% of the high scenario or existing stocks, whichever is smaller. For each vaccine, we used a weighted average of five shortage scenarios ranging from 0% to 100%, in 25% increments. Demand for each vaccine was based on current distribution or birth cohort size. The probabilities of shortages were based on number of manufacturers, market stability, history of manufacturing problems, and production complexity. CDC contract prices were used to estimate costs. Expert opinion and literature provided estimates of health impacts due to shortages. Applying the probabilities of shortages to all vaccines in a single year, the "low" scenario could cost $600 million, with 376,000 vaccine-preventable cases occurring and 1774 deaths. The "high" scenario could cost $2 billion, with an additional $1.6 billion initial stocking, and result in 7100 vaccine-preventable cases occurring and 508 deaths. Based on the assumptions in the model, there is the potential for large differences in outcomes between the scenarios although some outcomes could potentially be averted with measures such as catch-up campaigns after shortages. Using the VacStockpile policy makers can readily evaluate the implications of assumptions and decide which set of assumptions they wish to use in planning. PMID:20638451

  7. Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory at Pantex: Testing and data handling capabilities of Sandia National Laboratories at the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas

    SciTech Connect

    Peters, W.R.

    1993-08-01

    The Weapons Evaluation Test Laboratory (WETL), operated by Sandia Laboratories at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, is engaged primarily in the testing of weapon systems in the stockpile or of newly produced weapon systems for the Sandia Surety Assessment Center. However, the WETL`s unique testing equipment and data-handling facilities are frequently used to serve other organizations. Service to other organizations includes performing special tests on weapon components, subassemblies, and systems for purposes such as basic development and specific problem investigation. The WETL staff also sends equipment to other laboratories for specific tests that cannot be performed at Pantex. For example, we modified and sent equipment to Brookhaven National Laboratory for testing with their Neutral Particle Beam. WETL supplied the engineering expertise to accomplish the needed modifications to the equipment and the technicians to help perform many special tests at Brookhaven. A variety of testing is possible within the WETL, including: Accelerometer, decelerometer, and G-switch g-level/closure testing; Neutron generator performance testing; weapon systems developmental tests; weapon system component testing; weapon system failure-mode-duplication tests; simultaneity measurements; environmental extreme testing; parachute deployment testing; permissive action link (PAL) testing and trajectory-sensing signal generator (TSSG) testing. WETL`s existing equipment configurations do not restrict the testing performed at the WETL. Equipment and facilities are adapted to specific requirements. The WETL`s facilities can often eliminate the need to build or acquire new test equipment, thereby saving time and expense.

  8. The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Stern, J.E.

    1992-01-01

    This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed Second, how can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat to national sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement. The first danger is that the agreement will be so minimalist that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that the treaty will have such a weak enforcement mechanism that although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relative ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the [open quotes]balance of terror.[close quotes] The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.

  9. Visual inspection reliability for precision manufactured parts

    SciTech Connect

    See, Judi E.

    2015-09-04

    Sandia National Laboratories conducted an experiment for the National Nuclear Security Administration to determine the reliability of visual inspection of precision manufactured parts used in nuclear weapons. In addition visual inspection has been extensively researched since the early 20th century; however, the reliability of visual inspection for nuclear weapons parts has not been addressed. In addition, the efficacy of using inspector confidence ratings to guide multiple inspections in an effort to improve overall performance accuracy is unknown. Further, the workload associated with inspection has not been documented, and newer measures of stress have not been applied.

  10. National Ignition Facility Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect

    N /A

    2001-02-23

    This Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) was prepared pursuant to a Joint Stipulation and Order approved and entered as an order of the court on October 27, 1997, in partial settlement of the lawsuit Civ. No. 97-936 (SS) (D.D.C.), ''Natural Resources Defense Council [NRDC] et al. v. Richardson et al.'' The Joint Stipulation and Order is reproduced at the end of this document as Attachment 1. In the Joint Stipulation and Order, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) agreed to prepare an SEIS to the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0236, DOE 1996a) to evaluate the reasonably foreseeable significant adverse environmental impacts of continuing to construct and of operating the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Livermore, California, with respect to any potential or confirmed contamination in the area by hazardous, toxic, and/or radioactive materials. On September 25, 1998, DOE announced in the ''Federal Register'' the agency's intent to prepare this SEIS for the NIF portion (Volume III, Appendix I) of the SSM PEIS. DOE's need for preparation of this SEIS, consistent with the previously established need for NIF (DOE 1996a, Appendix I), is to determine how the results of characterization studies completed pursuant to the Joint Stipulation and Order should affect the manner in which DOE proceeds with the construction and operation of NIF. On August 5, 1999, DOE issued an amended Notice of Intent to prepare this SEIS, which incorporated changes in schedule resulting from new relevant information. The SSM PEIS addressed alternative plans for DOE's defense program activities related to nuclear weapons stockpile issues at several DOE laboratories, including LLNL. The environmental consequences of construction and operation of NIF were addressed in detail in SSM PEIS Volume III, Appendix I, entitled ''National Ignition Facility Project Specific Analysis'' (NIF PSA). The Record of Decision (ROD) for the SSM PEIS was published in the ''Federal Register'' on December 26, 1996 (61 FR 68014). In the ROD, DOE announced its decision to construct and operate NIF at LLNL. The NIF is an experimental facility that would use laser light to initiate a fusion reaction in very small quantities of hydrogen by a process known as inertial confinement fusion. The start of physical construction of NIF was authorized on March 7, 1997, and groundbreaking for the NIF occurred on May 29, 1997. Construction of the NIF is ongoing; the conventional facilities are over 94% complete and are expected to be completed in late 2001.

  11. Threat is in the sex of the beholder: men find weapons faster than do women.

    PubMed

    Sulikowski, Danielle; Burke, Darren

    2014-01-01

    In visual displays, people locate potentially threatening stimuli, such as snakes, spiders, and weapons, more quickly than similar benign stimuli, such as beetles and gadgets. Such biases are likely adaptive, facilitating fast responses to potential threats. Currently, and historically, men have engaged in more weapons-related activities (fighting and hunting) than women. If biases of visual attention for weapons result from selection pressures related to these activities, then we would predict such biases to be stronger in men than in women. The current study reports the results of two visual search experiments, in which men showed a stronger bias of attention toward guns and knives than did women, whether the weapons were depicted wielded or not. When the weapons were depicted wielded, both sexes searched for them with more caution than when they were not. Neither of these effects extended reliably to syringes, a non-weapon-yet potentially threatening-object. The findings are discussed with respect to the "weapons effect" and social coercion theory. PMID:25353710

  12. Technique for Measuring Hybrid Electronic Component Reliability

    SciTech Connect

    Green, C.C.; Hernandez, C.L.; Hosking, F.M.; Robinson, D.; Rutherford, B.; Uribe, F.

    1999-01-01

    Materials compatibility studies of aged, engineered materials and hardware are critical to understanding and predicting component reliability, particularly for systems with extended stockpile life requirements. Nondestructive testing capabilities for component reliability would significantly enhance lifetime predictions. For example, if the detection of crack propagation through a solder joint can be demonstrated, this technique could be used to develop baseline information to statistically determine solder joint lifelengths. This report will investigate high frequency signal response techniques for nondestructively evaluating the electrical behavior of thick film hybrid transmission lines.

  13. A comparison of commercial/industry and nuclear weapons safety concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, R.R.; Summers, D.A.

    1996-07-01

    In this paper the authors identify factors which influence the safety philosophy used in the US commercial/industrial sector and compare them against those factors which influence nuclear weapons safety. Commercial/industrial safety is guided by private and public safety standards. Generally, private safety standards tend to emphasize product reliability issues while public (i.e., government) safety standards tend to emphasize human factors issues. Safety in the nuclear weapons arena is driven by federal requirements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the Departments of Defense and Energy. Safety is achieved through passive design features integrated into the nuclear weapon. Though the common strand between commercial/industrial and nuclear weapons safety is the minimization of risk posed to the general population (i.e., public safety), the authors found that each sector tends to employ a different safety approach to view and resolve high-consequence safety issues.

  14. Five minutes past midnight: The clear and present danger of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials

    SciTech Connect

    Roberts, G.B.

    1996-02-01

    Growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons grade fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) are a `clear and present danger` to international security. Much of this material is uncontrolled and unsecured in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Access to these materials is the primary technical barrier to a nuclear weapons capability since the technology know-how for a bomb making is available in the world scientific community. Strategies to convince proliferators to give up their nuclear ambitions are problematic since those ambitions are a party of largest regional security. There is no national material control and accounting in Russia. No one knows exactly how much fissile materials they have, and if any is missing. A bankrupt atomic energy industry, unpaid employees and little or no security has created a climate in which more and more fissile materials will likely be sold in black markets or diverted to clandestine nuclear weapons programs or transnational terrorist groups. Control over these materials will ultimately rely on the continuous and simultaneous exercise of several measures. While there is little one can do now to stop a determined proliferator, over time international consensus and a strengthened non-proliferation regime will convince proliferators that the costs outweigh the gains.

  15. Program of technical assistance to the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, informal report

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1995-01-01

    Currently, U.S. organizations provide technical support to the U.S. Delegation for its work as part of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague. The current efforts of the PrepCom are focussed on preparations for the Entry-Into-Force (EIF) of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (often referred to as the {open_quotes}Chemical Weapons Convention{close_quotes} (CWC)). EIF of the CWC is expected in 1995, and shortly thereafter the PrepCom will cease to exist, with the OPCW taking over responsibilities under the CWC. A U.S. program of technical assistance to the OPCW for its verification responsibilities may be created as part of U.S. policy objectives after EIF of the CWC. In the summary below, comments by participants are presented in Square Brackets Some of the same points arose several times during the discussions; they are grouped together under the most pertinent heading.

  16. New weapons and the arms race

    SciTech Connect

    Tsipis, K.

    1983-01-01

    In speaking about technologies that could further animate the weapons competition between the US and the USSR, it is useful to distinguish between technologies that have already been incorporated into specific weapons systems, and new technologies that are of a generic nature, can be used in a variety of applications, and can best be described by the tasks that they can perform rather than any specific weapons' application. The author discusses these in reverse order.

  17. Weapons labs in a new world

    SciTech Connect

    Anderson, C.

    1993-10-08

    This article describes the diversification and downsizing that is taking place in the weapons programs at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore now that nuclear weapons testing has been discontinued. R D and testing programs budgets have been reduced and personnel number about half that of 1986. Some scientists will take early retirement, some will move to other projects, and some will continue to do nuclear weapons design without testing.

  18. Smart Weapons Operability Enhancement program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Welsh, James P.

    1993-08-01

    Smart Weapons Operability Enhancement (SWOE) is a coordinated, cooperative Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force effort to integrate and validate a targets in backgrounds scene generation process. The SWOE Process has been developed to generate realistic multi- spectral, including IR and MMW, scenes representative of the greatest possible range of world wide battlefield scenarios. This Process is based on fundamental physics formulations which produce accurate temporal and spatial distributions of the energy fields reaching any given weapon sensor aperture. There are six areas of specific focus: (1) codification of methods to make measurements in support of synthetic generation of battlefield scenes, (2) automation of information bases construction for a world wide range of battlefields, (3) multi-spectral scene physics modeling for a world wide range of battlefield scenarios, (4) synthetic battlefield background environment and target rendering, (5) integration of synthetic battlefield scene generation capabilities onto common computer workstations, and (6) integration of the SWOE Process into an architecture that is compatible for use with state-of-the-art distributed networks.

  19. Handheld ultrasonic concealed weapon detector

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wild, Norbert C.; Doft, Frank; Breuner, Dennis; Felber, Franklin S.

    2001-02-01

    A handheld, battery-operated prototype of a concealed weapon detector has been built and tested. Designed to detect both metallic and non-metallic weapons, the sensor utilizes focused ultrasound (40 kHz frequency) to remotely detect concealed objects from beyond arm's length out to a range of about 12 feet (4 meters). The detector can be used in prison settings, by officers in the field to allow for stand-off frisking of suspects, and to supplement security at courthouse entrances and other monitored portals. The detector emits an audible alarm (with provision for an earphone jack) as well as a visible light-bar indicator when an object is detected. A high intensity aiming light, with momentary switch, allows the user to accurately determine the location of the concealed object. Current efforts are aimed at increasing the probability of detection, reducing the false-alarm rate, and extending the range of detectability out to 20 feet. Plans for accomplishing these tasks will be presented together with data showing the effective range and probability of detection for the present system.

  20. Proposed Laser-Based HED physics experiments for Stockpile Stewardship

    SciTech Connect

    Benage, John F.; Albright, Brian J.; Fernandez, Juan C.

    2012-09-04

    An analysis of the scientific areas in High Energy Density (HED) physics that underpin the enduring LANL mission in Stockpile Stewardship (SS) has identified important research needs that are not being met. That analysis has included the work done as part of defining the mission need for the High Intensity Laser Laboratory (HILL) LANL proposal to NNSA, LDRD DR proposal evaluations, and consideration of the Predictive Capability Framework and LANL NNSA milestones. From that evaluation, we have identified several specific and scientifically-exciting experimental concepts to address those needs. These experiments are particularly responsive to physics issues in Campaigns 1 and 10. These experiments are best done initially at the LANL Trident facility, often relying on the unique capabilities available there, although there are typically meritorious extensions envisioned at future facilities such as HILL, or the NIF once the ARC short-pulse laser is available at sufficient laser intensity. As the focus of the LANL HEDP effort broadens from ICF ignition of the point design at the conclusion of the National Ignition Campaign, into a more SS-centric effort, it is useful to consider these experiments, which address well-defined issues, with specific scientific hypothesis to test or models to validate or disprove, via unit-physics experiments. These experiments are in turn representative of a possible broad experimental portfolio to elucidate the physics of interest to these campaigns. These experiments, described below, include: (1) First direct measurement of the evolution of particulates in isochorically heated dense plasma; (2) Temperature relaxation measurements in a strongly-coupled plasma; (3) Viscosity measurements in a dense plasma; and (4) Ionic structure factors in a dense plasma. All these experiments address scientific topics of importance to our sponsors, involve excellent science at the boundaries of traditional fields, utilize unique capabilities at LANL, and contribute to the Campaign milestone in 2018. Given their interdisciplinary nature, it is not surprising that these research needs are not being addressed by the other excellent high-energy density physics (HEDP) facilities coming on line, facilities aimed squarely at more established fields and missions. Although energy rich, these facilities deliver radiation (e.g., particle beams for isochoric heating) over a timescale that is too slow in these unit physics experiments to eliminate hydrodynamic evolution of the target plasma during the time it is being created. A theme shared by all of these experiments is the need to quickly create a quasi-homogeneous 'initial state' whose properties and evolution we wish to study. Otherwise, we cannot create unit experiments to isolate the physics of interest and validate the models in our codes, something that cannot be done with the integrated experiments often done in HED. Moreover, these experiments in some cases involve combinations of solid and plasmas, or matter in the warm-dense matter state, where neither the theoretical approximations of solid state or of fully-ionized weakly-coupled plasmas can be used. In all cases, the capability of 'isochoric heating' ('flash' heating at constant density) is important. In some cases, the ability to selectively heat to different degrees different species within a target, whether mixed or adjacent to each other, is critical for the experiment. This capability requires the delivery of very high power densities, which require the conversion of the laser into very short and intense pulses of secondary radiation (electrons, ions, neutrons, x-rays). Otherwise, there is no possibility of a clean experiment to constrain the models, in the cases there are any, or inform the creation of one. Another typical requirement of these experiments is the ability to probe these exotic extreme conditions of matter with flexible and diverse sources of secondary radiation. Without a high-intensity high-power laser with some unique attributes available on Trident today (e.g., ultra-high laser-pulse contrast), there is no way to deliver such diverse probes, with the required flux and/or brilliance, exquisitely synchronized to the plasma formation source.

  1. Treatment-donation-stockpile dynamics in ebola convalescent blood transfusion therapy.

    PubMed

    Huo, Xi; Sun, Xiaodan; Lan, Kunquan; Wu, Jianhong

    2016-03-01

    The interim guidance issued by the World Health Organization during the West Africa 2014 Ebola outbreak provides guidelines on the use of convalescent blood from Ebola survivors for transfusion therapy. Here we develop a novel mathematical model, based on the interim guidance, to examine the nonlinear transmission-treatment-donation-stockpile dynamics during an Ebola outbreak and with a large scale use of the transfusion therapy in the population. We estimate the reduction of case fatality ratio by introducing convalescent blood transfusion as a therapy, and inform optimal treatment-donation-stockpile strategies to balance the treatment need for case fatality ratio reduction and the strategic need of maintaining a minimal blood bank stockpile for other control priorities. PMID:26721704

  2. Physical security technologies for weapons complex reconfiguration facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-07-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was a member of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (WCR) Safeguards and Security (S&S) team providing assistance to the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration. The physical security systems in the new and upgraded facilities being considered for the WCR had to meet DOE orders and other requirements set forth in the WCR Programmatic Design Criteria (PDC), incorporate the latest physical security technologies using proven state-of-the-art systems and meet fundamental security principles. The outcome was to avoid costly retrofits and provide effective and comprehensive protection against current and projected threats with minimal impact on operations, costs and schedule. Physical security requirements for WCR facilities include: (1) reducing S&S life-cycle costs, (2) where feasible automating S&S functions to minimize operational costs, access to critical assets and exposure of people to hazardous environments, (3) increasing the amount of delay to outsider adversary attack, (4) compartmentalizing the facility to minimize the number of personnel requiring access to critical areas and (5) having reliable and maintainable systems. To be most effective against threats physical security must be integrated with facility operations, safety and other S&S activities, such as material control and accountability, nuclear measurements and computer and information security. This paper will discuss the S&S issues, requirements, technology opportunities and needs. Physical security technologies and systems considered in the design effort of the Weapons Complex Reconfiguration facilities will be reviewed.

  3. Stockpiles and food availability in feeding facilities after the Great East Japan Earthquake.

    PubMed

    Nozue, Miho; Ishikawa-Takata, Kazuko; Sarukura, Nobuko; Sako, Kazuko; Tsuboyama-Kasaoka, Nobuyo

    2014-01-01

    Food stockpiles and methods of ensuring food availability after the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11, 2011 have been studied. Questionnaires were sent to 1911 registered dietitians and general dietitians who were members of the Japan Dietetic Association in August 2012. Four hundred thirty-five dietitians (22.8%) completed the questionnaire about work involved in feeding facilities, types and administration of meals, and food stockpiles. Methods of ensuring food availability, preparation, and accommodating food for special dietary uses were recorded for the three-day period immediately following the earthquake, and the period from 4 days to one month after the earthquake. Three days after the earthquake, differences in administration of meals at feeding facilities providing three meals daily, food stockpiles, organization, contactable facilities, and how to contact them for food items were assessed. Sixty-nine percent of all feeding facilities in this study had stockpiles of food before the Great East Japan Earthquake. Administration of meals in feeding facilities and the possibility of contact with cooperative feeding facilities were found to correlate positively with ensuring the availability of food groups. Food scores were higher in facilities providing three meals daily by direct administration of meals and with accessible public administrators, cooperative facilities and suppliers, and facilities that were contactable by landline telephone, mobile phone, fax or email. The necessity for natural disaster-readiness through continuous stockpiling food at feeding facilities is confirmed. Each prospective feeding facility must be required to plan its stockpiles, their turnover and replaceability to maximise food security in the face of disaster. PMID:24901104

  4. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  5. [Myocardial infarction after conduction electrical weapon shock].

    PubMed

    Ben Ahmed, H; Bouzouita, K; Selmi, K; Chelli, M; Mokaddem, A; Ben Ameur, Y; Boujnah, M R

    2013-04-01

    Controversy persists over the safety of conducted electrical weapons, which are increasingly used by law enforcement agencies around the world. We report a case of 33-year-old man who had an acute inferior myocardial infarction after he was shot in the chest with an electrical weapon. PMID:22551781

  6. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  7. [Modern pneumatic weapons and injuries they cause].

    PubMed

    Kozachenko, I N

    2013-01-01

    The data on the history of development and further improvement of pneumatic weapons are presented with special reference to specific features of different types and varieties of these weapons, cartridges for them, and the sphere of their application. Investigations into peculiarities of damages caused by high-capacity pneumatic weapons to the objects of forensic medical expertise affected from different distances are reviewed. Results of forensic medical expertise and clinical studies on the structure of body injuries inflicted by gunshots from pneumatic weapons to the human body are discussed. The author emphasizes the necessity of developing up-to-date terminology and classification of gunshot injuries caused by shooting from pneumatic weapons. PMID:23802298

  8. Childhood maltreatment and threats with weapons.

    PubMed

    Casiano, Hygiea; Mota, Natalie; Afifi, Tracie O; Enns, Murray W; Sareen, Jitender

    2009-11-01

    The relationship between childhood maltreatment and future threats with weapons is unknown. We examined data from the nationally representative National Comorbidity Survey Replication (n = 5692) and conducted multiple logistic regression analyses to determine the association between childhood maltreatment and lifetime behavior of threatening others with a gun or other weapon. After adjusting for sociodemographic variables, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and witnessing domestic violence were significantly associated with threats made with a gun (adjusted odds ratios [AOR] ranging between 3.38 and 4.07) and other weapons (AOR ranging between 2.16 and 2.83). The greater the number of types of maltreatment experienced, the stronger the association with lifetime threats made to others with guns and any weapons. Over 94% of respondents who experienced maltreatment and made threats reported that the maltreatment occurred prior to threatening others with weapons. Prevention efforts that reduce exposure to maltreatment may reduce violent behavior in later life. PMID:19996725

  9. Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William

    1998-12-01

    Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the size of a CD ROM drive of a computer.

  10. Recovery from a chemical weapons accident or incident: A concept paper on planning

    SciTech Connect

    Herzenberg, C.L.; Haffenden, R.; Lerner, K.; Meleski, S.A.; Tanzman, E.A.; Lewis, L.M.; Hemphill, R.C.; Adams, J.D.

    1994-04-01

    Emergency planning for an unintended release of chemical agent from the nation`s chemical weapons stockpile should include preparation for. the period following implementation of immediate emergency response. That period -- the recovery, reentry, and restoration stage -- is the subject of this report. The report provides an overview of the role of recovery, reentry, and restoration planning in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), describes the transition from immediate emergency response to restoration, and analyzes the legal framework that would govern restoration activities. Social, economic, and administrative issues, as well as technical ones, need to be considered in the planning effort. Because of possible jurisdictional conflicts, appropriate federal, state, and local agencies need to be included in a coordinated planning process. Advance consideration should be given to the pertinent federal and state statutes and regulations. On the federal level, the principal statutes and regulations to be considered are those associated with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the National Environmental Policy Act. This report recommends that extensive preaccident planning be undertaken for the recovery, reentry, and restoration stage and outlines several key issues that should be considered in that planning. The need for interagency cooperation and coordination at all levels of the planning process is emphasized.

  11. Performance by Fall-Calving Cows Grazing Tall Fescue Pastures with Different Proportions Stockpiled

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Tall fescue [Lolium arundinaceum (Schreb.) Darbysh.] is often stockpiled to reduce winter feed costs for cattle. Over two consecutive years, a total of 158 Gelbvieh Angus fall-calving cows (599 6.0 kg) were allocated randomly to one of eight 10-ha tall fescue pastures (subdivided into six 1.6-h...

  12. 75 FR 54852 - National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee Request for Public Comments on the Potential...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-09

    ...This notice is to advise the public that the National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee, co-chaired by the Departments of Commerce and State, is seeking public comments on the potential market impact of the proposed disposal levels of excess materials for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Annual Materials...

  13. Performance by Fall-Calving Cows Grazing Tall Fescue Pastures With Different Proportions Stockpiled

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Tall fescue [Lolium arundinaceum (Schreb.) S.J. Darbyshire.] is often stockpiled to reduce winter feed costs for cattle. Over two consecutive years, a total of 158 Gelbvieh Angus fall-calving cows (1318 plus/minus 13.2 lb) were allocated randomly to one of eight 24-acre tall fescue pastures on 18 ...

  14. A&M. Special shielding materials. Stockpile of magnetite, used for making ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    A&M. Special shielding materials. Stockpile of magnetite, used for making high-density concrete, and loading conveyor near TAN-607 construction site. Date: September 25, 1953. INEEL negative no. 8710 - Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Test Area North, Scoville, Butte County, ID

  15. Effects of Forage Management on the Nutritive Value of Stockpiled Bermudagrass

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    'Common' and 'Tifton 44' bermudagrass [Cynodon dactylon (L.) Pers.] located near Fayetteville and Batesville, AR, respectively, were chosen to evaluate the effects of stockpiling initiation date (August or September), and N fertilization rate (0, 37, 74, or 111 kg N ha-1) on the nutritive value of f...

  16. 78 FR 68028 - National Defense Stockpile Market Impact Committee Request for Public Comments on the Potential...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-13

    ... Act) (50 U.S.C. 98, et seq.), the Department of Defense's Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), as National... Defense Stockpile Manager, the DLA must produce an Annual Materials Plan proposing the maximum quantity of each listed material that may be acquired, disposed of, upgraded, or sold by the DLA in a...

  17. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  18. Nitrogen rate and application timing affect the yield and risk associated with stockpiling tall fescue for winter grazing

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Stockpiled tall fescue can provide economical winter feed for grazing livestock in the mid-Atlantic of the United States. The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of N rate and application timing on the yield of stockpiled tall fescue. Four N rates ranging from 0 to 120 lb N/acre wer...

  19. Voice command weapons launching system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Brown, H. E.

    1984-09-01

    This abstract discloses a voice-controlled weapons launching system for use by a pilot of an aircraft against a plurality of simultaneously appearing (i.e., existing) targets, such as two or more aggressor aircraft (or tanks, or the like) attacking more aggressor aircraft. The system includes, in combination, a voice controlled input device linked to and controlling a computer; apparatus (such as a television camera, receiver, and display), linked to and actuated by the computer by a voice command from the pilot, for acquiring and displaying an image of the multi-target area; a laser, linked to and actuated by the computer by a voice command from the pilot to point to (and to lock on to) any one of the plurality of targets, with the laser emitting a beam toward the designated (i.e., selected) target; and a plurality of laser beam-rider missiles, with a different missile being launched toward and attacking each different designated target by riding the laser beam to that target. Unlike the prior art, the system allows the pilot to use his hands full-time to fly and to control the aircraft, while also permitting him to launch each different missile in rapid sequence by giving a two-word spoken command after he has visually selected each target of the plurality of targets, thereby making it possible for the pilot of a single defender aircraft to prevail against the plurality of simultaneously attacking aircraft, or tanks, or the like.

  20. Electroshock weapons can be lethal!

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lundquist, Marjorie

    2008-03-01

    Electroshock weapons (EWs)-stun guns, tasers, riot shields-are electroconductive devices designed to safely incapacitate healthy men neuromuscularly, so they are called nonlethal or less-lethal. EW firms seeking large nonmilitary markets targeted law enforcement and corrections personnel, who began using EWs in prisons/jails and on public patrol in 1980 in the USA. This shifted the EW-shocked population from healthy soldiers to a heterogeneous mix of both sexes, ages 6-92, in a wide variety of health conditions! An EW operates by disrupting normal physiological processes, producing transient effects in healthy people. But if a person's health is sufficiently compromised, the margin of safety can be lost, resulting in death or permanent health problems. 325 people have died after EW shock since 1980. Did the EW cause these deaths? Evidence indicates that EWs do play a causal role in most such deaths. EWs can be lethal for people in diabetic shock^1 (hypoglycemia), which may be why Robert Dziekanski-a Polish immigrant to Canada-died so quickly after he was tasered at Vancouver Airport: not having eaten for over 10 hours, he likely was severely hypoglycemic. The EW death rate in North America is 30 times higher than need be, because EW users have not been properly trained to use EWs on a heterogeneous population safely! ^1J. Clinical Engineering 30(3):111(2005).

  1. Neutron Capture Reactions for Stockpile Stewardship and Basic Science

    SciTech Connect

    Parker, W; Agvaanluvsan, U; Becker, J; Wilk, P; Wu, C; Bredeweg, T; Couture, A; Haight, R; Jandel, M; O'Donnell, J; Reifarth, R; Rundberg, R; Ullmann, J; Vieira, D; Wouters, J; Sheets, S; Mitchell, G; Becvar, F; Krticka, M

    2007-08-04

    The capture process is a nuclear reaction in which a target atom captures an incident projectile, e.g. a neutron. The excited-state compound nucleus de-excites by emitting photons. This process creates an atom that has one more neutron than the target atom, so it is a different isotope of the same element. With low energy (slow) neutron projectiles, capture is the dominant reaction, other than elastic scattering. However, with very heavy nuclei, fission competes with capture as a method of de-excitation of the compound nucleus. With higher energy (faster) incident neutrons, additional reactions are also possible, such as emission of protons or emission of multiple neutrons. The probability of a particular reaction occurring (such as capture) is referred to as the cross section for that reaction. Cross sections are very dependent on the incoming neutron's energy. Capture reactions can be studied either using monoenergetic neutron sources or 'white' neutron sources. A 'white' neutron source has a wide range of neutron energies in one neutron beam. The advantage to the white neutron source is that it allows the study of cross sections as they depend on neutron energies. The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, located at Los Alamos National Laboratory, provides an intense white neutron source. Neutrons there are created by a high-energy proton beam from a linear accelerator striking a heavy metal (tungsten) target. The neutrons range in energy from subthermal up to very fast - over 100 MeV in energy. Low-energy neutron reaction cross sections fluctuate dramatically from one target to another, and they are very difficult to predict by theoretical modeling. The cross sections for particular capture reactions are important for defense sciences, advanced reactor concepts, transmutation of radioactive wastes and nuclear astrophysics. We now have a strong collaboration between Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, North Carolina State University and Charles University in Prague. In this paper, we report neutron capture studies that are of particular interest to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. In addition to determining neutron capture cross sections, we are also interested in the nuclear properties of the excited state compound nuclei created in the capture reactions. One model that describes the behavior of the nucleus is the statistical model. Our statistical studies included measuring the photon strength function, resonance parameters, level density and gamma-ray ({gamma}-ray) cascade multiplicity. The DANCE array allows the separation of cascades by the number of transitions (multiplicity) in the cascade, and this makes it possible to study detailed properties of the statistical cascade such as the relationship between multiplicity and energy distributions. The work reported here includes reaction on molybdenum targets, europium targets, gadolinium targets and the first americium-242m target. Our goal is to improve the accuracy and provide new measurements for stable and radioactive targets. We are especially interested in energy-dependent neutron capture cross sections. In all of our experiments, the photons emitted in the capture reactions are gamma rays, and they are detected by the barium fluoride crystal array named the Detector for Advanced Neutron Capture Experiments (DANCE) shown in Fig. 1. The detector array is made of 160 crystals arranged in a sphere around the target. There are four different crystal shapes, each of which covers an equal solid angle. This array was specifically designed to measure neutron capture cross sections with targets that were milligram sized or smaller, including radioactive targets. The barium fluoride crystals are scintillation (light generating) detectors with very fast response time, and are therefore suitable for high count rate experiments. Actual neutron capture events must be reliably distinguished from background {gamma}-rays, which are always present in neutron induced reactions. To reduce the background of scattered neutrons, a lithium hyd

  2. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of roles lobbied the US President to deploy the long-range weapons being developed by the Defense Department. In the course of deliberations, political preferences suppressed military considerations of deterrence and only a small portion of the original modernization program was implemented.

  3. Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Rotblat, J.

    1977-01-01

    Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)

  4. Toxins as Weapons: A Historical Review.

    PubMed

    Pita, R; Romero, A

    2014-07-01

    This review article summarizes the use of toxins as weapons dating from the First World War until today, when there is a high concern of possible terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction. All through modern history, military programs and terrorist groups have favored toxins because of their high toxicity. However, difficulties of extraction or synthesis, as well as effective dissemination to cause a large number of casualties, have been the most important drawbacks. Special emphasis is focused on ricin and botulinum toxin, the most important toxins that have attracted the attention of military programs and terrorist groups. Other toxins like trichothecenes, saxitoxin, and Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) are also discussed. A short section about anthrax is also included: Although Bacillus anthracis is considered a biological weapon rather than a toxin weapon, it produces a toxin that is finally responsible for the anthrax disease. PMID:26227025

  5. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-12-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

  6. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  7. The physic and employment of neutron weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zimmerman, Peter D.

    1983-10-01

    Well known physical relationships make it possible to estimate the military effects of low yield nuclear weapons. Since weapons effects tables already exist for fission explosives, it is possible to calculate approximately the impact of thermonuclear and enhanced radiation weapons (ERWs) on a tactical situation. The principal physical problem is the calculation of the ratio of neutron production in an ERW explosion to that in a fission explosion. Our calculation indicate that the ERW is less effective against tanks than is widely believed. The collateral damage for an ERW with a reasonable ratio of fission to fusion yield is shown to extend to a distance of about 75% of that of a fission weapon with the same energy release.

  8. University Management of Weapons Labs? No.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Archer, Dane

    1986-01-01

    Offers reasons why universities should not manage weapons laboratories, such as the Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, operated by the University of California. (A viewpoint favoring such university management is presented in SE 538 518.) (JN)

  9. Micromachining technology for advanced weapon systems

    SciTech Connect

    Sniegowski, J.J.

    1996-12-31

    An overview of planned uses for polysilicon surface-micromachining technology in advanced weapon systems is presented. Specifically, this technology may allow consideration of fundamentally new architectures for realization of surety component functions.

  10. Weapons dismantlement issues in independent Ukraine

    SciTech Connect

    Zack, N.R.; Kirk, E.J.

    1994-07-01

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a seminar during September 1993, in Kiev, Ukraine, entitled ``Toward a Nuclear Free Future -- Barriers and Problems.`` It brought together Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Americans to discuss the legal, political, safeguards and security, economic, and technical dimensions of nuclear weapons dismantlement and destruction. US representatives initiated discussions on legal and treaty requirements and constraints, safeguards and security issues surrounding dismantlement, storage and disposition of nuclear materials, warhead transportation, and economic considerations. Ukrainians gave presentations on arguments for and against the Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons, Ukrainian Parliament non-approval of START I, alternative strategies for dismantling silos and launchers, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons removal from the Ukraine. Participants from Belarus discussed proliferation and control regime issues, This paper will highlight and detail the issues, concerns, and possible impacts of the Ukraine`s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.

  11. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed Central

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-01-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

  12. Pantex: safety in nuclear weapons processing.

    PubMed

    Johannesen, R E; Farrell, L M

    2000-11-01

    The Pantex Plant, located in the Texas panhandle near Amarillo, is a major Department of Energy (DOE) participant in maintaining the safety of the nation's nuclear weapons resources and protecting the employees, public, and environment. With more than 168,000 person-years of operations involving nuclear materials, explosives, and hazardous chemicals, Pantex has maintained a notable safety record. This article overviews the nuclear weapon activities at Pantex and describes their safety culture. PMID:11045518

  13. Initial radiations from tactical nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Loewe, W.E.

    1985-08-01

    Neutron and gamma-ray free-field kermas and fluence spectra for ranges between 1 and 2 km are presented for three tactical nuclear weapons and are compared with nuclear radiations at Hiroshima. The three tactical weapons are modeled as near-surface bursts of a fusion explosive, a fission explosive, and a suppressed-neutron explosive represented by the Little Boy bomb used at Hiroshima.

  14. Reliability training

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Lalli, Vincent R. (Editor); Malec, Henry A. (Editor); Dillard, Richard B.; Wong, Kam L.; Barber, Frank J.; Barina, Frank J.

    1992-01-01

    Discussed here is failure physics, the study of how products, hardware, software, and systems fail and what can be done about it. The intent is to impart useful information, to extend the limits of production capability, and to assist in achieving low cost reliable products. A review of reliability for the years 1940 to 2000 is given. Next, a review of mathematics is given as well as a description of what elements contribute to product failures. Basic reliability theory and the disciplines that allow us to control and eliminate failures are elucidated.

  15. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    PubMed Central

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-01-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

  16. [Scientific progress and new biological weapons].

    PubMed

    Berche, Patrick

    2006-02-01

    The biological weapons are different from conventional weapons, because living germs hold an extraordinary and predictable potential for multiplication, propagation and genetic variation during their dissemination in a susceptible population. Only natural pathogens (1rst generation weapons) have been used in the past (smallpox virus, plague, anthrax, toxins...). However, new threats are emerging, due to the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and its exponential worldwide diffusion. It is possible to synthesize microorganisms from in silico sequences widely diffused on Internet (poliovirus, influenza...), thus resulting in the accessibility of very dangerous virus confined today in high-security laboratories (virus Ebola...). It is possible also to "improve" pathogens by genetic manipulations, becoming more resistant or virulent (2nd generation weapons). Finally, one can now create de novo new pathogens by molecular breeding (DNA shuffling), potentially highly dangerous for naive populations (3rd generation weapons). Making biological weapons does not require too much technological resources and appears accessible to terrorists, due to low cost and easy use. Although the destructive consequences are difficult to predict, the psychological and social damages should be considerable, because of the highly emotional burden in the population associated to the transgression by man of a taboo of life. PMID:16457765

  17. Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

    PubMed

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-06-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

  18. China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Fieldhouse, R. )

    1991-05-01

    Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler.

  19. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  20. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  1. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  2. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  3. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  4. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  5. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  6. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2012-10-01 2011-10-01 true Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  7. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  8. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  9. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  10. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  11. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11... § 15.11 Explosives and dangerous weapons. No person shall carry, use or possess within the Preserve... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond...

  12. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  13. 48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217.173 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Mulityear Contracting 217.173 Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. As authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2306b(h... contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items, services, and logistics support for a weapon...

  14. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a...

  15. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-02-03

    ... COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN 3150-AI49 Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons... guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA). This guidance would be used by licensees and certificate holders applying to the NRC to obtain enhanced weapons under the NRC's proposed...

  16. A Conceptual Framework for Allocation of Federally Stockpiled Ventilators During Large-Scale Public Health Emergencies.

    PubMed

    Zaza, Stephanie; Koonin, Lisa M; Ajao, Adebola; Nystrom, Scott V; Branson, Richard; Patel, Anita; Bray, Bruce; Iademarco, Michael F

    2016-01-01

    Some types of public health emergencies could result in large numbers of patients with respiratory failure who need mechanical ventilation. Federal public health planning has included needs assessment and stockpiling of ventilators. However, additional federal guidance is needed to assist states in further allocating federally supplied ventilators to individual hospitals to ensure that ventilators are shipped to facilities where they can best be used during an emergency. A major consideration in planning is a hospital's ability to absorb additional ventilators, based on available space and staff expertise. A simple pro rata plan that does not take these factors into account might result in suboptimal use or unused scarce resources. This article proposes a conceptual framework that identifies the steps in planning and an important gap in federal guidance regarding the distribution of stockpiled mechanical ventilators during an emergency. PMID:26828799

  17. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Toet, Alexander

    2003-09-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the non-literal nature of these images. Especially for dynamic crowd surveillance purposes it may be impossible to rapidly asses with certainty which individual in the crowd is the one carrying the observed weapon. Sensor fusion is an enabling technology that may be used to solve this problem. Through fusion the signal of the sensor that depicts the weapon can be displayed in the context provided by a sensor of a different modality. We propose an image fusion scheme in which non-literal imagery can be fused with standard color images such that the result clearly displays the observed weapons in the context of the original color image. The procedure is such that the relevant contrast details from the non-literal image are transferred to the color image without altering the original color distribution of this image. The result is a natural looking color image that fluently combines all details from both input sources. When an observer who performs a dynamic crowd surveillance task, detects a weapon in the scene, he will also be able to quickly determine which person in the crowd is actually carrying the observed weapon (e.g. "the man with the red T-shirt and blue jeans"). The method is illustrated by the fusion of thermal 8-12 ?m imagery with standard RGB color images.

  18. Certainty in Stockpile Computing: Recommending a Verification and Validation Program for Scientific Software

    SciTech Connect

    Lee, J.R.

    1998-11-01

    As computing assumes a more central role in managing the nuclear stockpile, the consequences of an erroneous computer simulation could be severe. Computational failures are common in other endeavors and have caused project failures, significant economic loss, and loss of life. This report examines the causes of software failure and proposes steps to mitigate them. A formal verification and validation program for scientific software is recommended and described.

  19. Organic Amendment Effects on Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Long-Term Stockpiled Soils

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zvomuya, F.; Laskosky, J.

    2014-12-01

    In oil sands projects in Alberta, Canada, salvaged soils are often placed in large stockpiles where they are stored for the duration of the project, typically 20-30 years. Alberta regulations require that topsoil and subsoil are salvaged in two distinct operations - a process known as two-lifting. Reclamation using long-term stockpiled soils often gives poor results, characterized by lower soil organic carbon and nitrogen concentrations compared with equivalent natural, undisturbed soils. It is thought that the change from an aerobic to an anaerobic environment during soil stockpiling and back again to aerobic during placement are largely responsible for the low carbon and nitrogen due to microbial activity transforming C and N in the soil into CO2, CH4 and N2O and releasing them to the atmosphere. Evidence from recent studies indicates that biochar improves soil physical, chemical and biological properties, and hence could mitigate C and N losses due to greenhouse gas emissions from the soil indirectly. We postulate that documented improvements in soil physical, chemical, and biological properties in soils treated with amendments such as biochar may help mitigate C and N losses due to greenhouse gas emissions from the soil indirectly. This laboratory incubation experiment tested the effects of differential rates (0, 10, 20, and 40 g biochar carbon equivalents kg-1 dry soil) of biochar, peat, and humalite on greenhouse gas emissions from a 25-year old two-lift stockpiled soil. The soils were fertilized according to standard practice, placed in 120-mL plastic containers, and incubated at 25°C for 45 days. Gas samples were taken at 1- to 7-day intervals and analyzed for CO2, CH4, and N2O. Data on treatment differences in emissions will be presented. Results from this experiment will provide an insight into the potential for organic amendments to mitigate greenhouse gas emission during reclamation using degraded soils.

  20. Advances and Challenges In Uncertainty Quantification with Application to Climate Prediction, ICF design and Science Stockpile Stewardship

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Klein, R.; Woodward, C. S.; Johannesson, G.; Domyancic, D.; Covey, C. C.; Lucas, D. D.

    2012-12-01

    Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) is a critical field within 21st century simulation science that resides at the very center of the web of emerging predictive capabilities. The science of UQ holds the promise of giving much greater meaning to the results of complex large-scale simulations, allowing for quantifying and bounding uncertainties. This powerful capability will yield new insights into scientific predictions (e.g. Climate) of great impact on both national and international arenas, allow informed decisions on the design of critical experiments (e.g. ICF capsule design, MFE, NE) in many scientific fields, and assign confidence bounds to scientifically predictable outcomes (e.g. nuclear weapons design). In this talk I will discuss a major new strategic initiative (SI) we have developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to advance the science of Uncertainty Quantification at LLNL focusing in particular on (a) the research and development of new algorithms and methodologies of UQ as applied to multi-physics multi-scale codes, (b) incorporation of these advancements into a global UQ Pipeline (i.e. a computational superstructure) that will simplify user access to sophisticated tools for UQ studies as well as act as a self-guided, self-adapting UQ engine for UQ studies on extreme computing platforms and (c) use laboratory applications as a test bed for new algorithms and methodologies. The initial SI focus has been on applications for the quantification of uncertainty associated with Climate prediction, but the validated UQ methodologies we have developed are now being fed back into Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SSS) and ICF UQ efforts. To make advancements in several of these UQ grand challenges, I will focus in talk on the following three research areas in our Strategic Initiative: Error Estimation in multi-physics and multi-scale codes ; Tackling the "Curse of High Dimensionality"; and development of an advanced UQ Computational Pipeline to enable complete UQ workflow and analysis for ensemble runs at the extreme scale (e.g. exascale) with self-guiding adaptation in the UQ Pipeline engine. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344 and was funded by the Uncertainty Quantification Strategic Initiative Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project at LLNL under project tracking code 10-SI-013 (UCRL LLNL-ABS-569112).

  1. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  2. Evaluation of environmental effect of coal stockpile in Muara Telang, Banyuasin, Indonesia

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rusdianasari; Arita, Susila; Ibrahim, Eddy; Ngudiantoro

    2013-04-01

    Stockpile commonly serves as a temporary dump before the coal is transported through the waterways. This study investigated the effects of coal stockpiles on the surrounding environment: air, water, and soil. The location of the study is in the estuary of Telang, South-Sumatra, Indonesia, which is located at the edge of the river of Telang and close to the residential community. The monitoring of the environmental impact from the stockpile is intended to conduct an environmental assessment owing the existence and operations of coal accumulation. Enviromental impact analysis was conducted based on the value of the effluent, air pollution (dust), soil and water by determining the parameters of the coal wastewater pH, total suspended solid, ferrous dan ferrous metals contents. The results indicate that the total suspended particulate, total suspended solids, noise level, ferrous metal and manganese metal were 10-14 ?g/Nm3 249-355 mg/L, 41.3 to 50.3 dBA, 6.074 to7.579 mg/L, and 1.987 to 2.678 mg/L, respectively. Meanwhile the pH of water and soil were 3 to 4 and 2.83 to 4.02 respectively. It is concluded that the pH value are beyond the threshold standard.

  3. The simulation of laser-based guided weapon engagements

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Al-Jaberi, Mubarak; Richardson, Mark; Coath, John; Jenkin, Robin

    2006-05-01

    The laser is an integrated part of many weapon systems, such as laser guided bombs, laser guided missiles and laser beam-riding missiles. These systems pose a significant threat to military assets on the modern battlefield. The lasers used in beam-riding missiles are particularly hard to detect as they typically use relatively low power lasers. Beamriders are also particularly difficult to defeat as current countermeasure systems have not been optimized against this threat. Some recent field trails conducted in the United Arab Emirates desert have demonstrated poor performance of both laser beam-riding systems and the LWRs designed to detect them. The aim of this research is to build a complete evaluation tool capable of assessing all the phases of an engagement of a main battle tank or armoured fighting vehicle with a laser based guided weapon. To this end a software model has been produced using Matlab & Simulink. This complete model has been verified using lab based experimentation and by comparison to the result of the mentioned field trials. This project will enable both the evaluation and design of any generic laser warning receiver or missile seeker and specific systems if various parameters are known. Moreover, this model will be used as a guide to the development of reliable countermeasures for laser beam-riding missiles.

  4. Model-Based Reliability Analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Rene L. Bierbaum; Thomas d. Brown; Thomas J. Kerschen

    2001-01-22

    Modeling, in conjunction with testing, is a rich source of insight. Model parameters are easily controlled and monitoring can be done unobtrusively. The ability to inject faults without otherwise affecting performance is particularly critical. Many iterations can be done quickly with a model while varying parameters and conditions based on a small number of validation tests. The objective of Model-Based Reliability Analysis (MBRA) is to identify ways to capitalize on the insights gained from modeling to make both qualitative and quantitative statements about product reliability. MBRA will be developed and exercised in the realm of weapon system development and maintenance, where the challenges of severe environmental requirements, limited production quantities, and use of one-shot devices can make testing prohibitively expensive. However, the general principles will also be applicable to other product types.

  5. Implementing the chemical weapons convention

    SciTech Connect

    Kellman, B.; Tanzman, E. A.

    1999-12-07

    In 1993, as the CWC ratification process was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the CWC with national law could cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States as to how the CWC would be carried out. As a result, the author's colleagues and the author prepared the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Committee of CWC Legal Experts, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Central Europe, reviewed the Manual. In February 1998, they finished the second edition of the Manual in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Manual tries to increase understanding of the Convention by identifying its obligations and suggesting methods of meeting them. Education about CWC obligations and available alternatives to comply with these requirements can facilitate national response that are consistent among States Parties. Thus, the Manual offers options that can strengthen international realization of the Convention's goals if States Parties act compatibly in implementing them. Equally important, it is intended to build confidence that the legal issues raised by the Convention are finite and addressable. They are now nearing competition of an internet version of this document so that interested persons can access it electronically and can view the full text of all of the national implementing legislation it cites. The internet address, or URL, for the internet version of the Manual is http: //www.cwc.ard.gov. This paper draws from the Manual. It comparatively addresses approximately thirty implementing issues, showing how various States Parties have enacted measures that are responsive to CWC obligations. It is intended to highlight the issues that States Parties must address and to identify trends among States Parties that might be useful to States that have not yet made crucial decisions as to how to resolve key matters. At various points in the text, country names are listed in parenthesis to identify pieces of national legislation that demonstrate the point in the text. It should not be inferred that nations not listed have not addressed the point or have taken a different position. In some cases, a nation's position is explained in somewhat more depth to give specific detail to an assertion in the text. Attached to this paper is a chart which illustrates how States Parties in the Central European region as well as the United States respond to the issues raised. Obviously, in preparing such a chart, many subtle provisions in national legislation must be simplified. The point of the chart is to portray, on a few pages, the major trends of legislation.

  6. Laser weapons come down to earth

    SciTech Connect

    Morrison, D.C.

    1985-05-01

    The Star Wars debate seldom mentions the fact that low-powered lasers are already widely used as adjuncts to conventional weaponry and tactical laser weapons will soon be ready for military arsenals. The superpowers will both have mass-produced directed-energy weapons available soon. Other directed-energy weapons, such as particle beams, atmospheric compression waves, microwaves, and radio-frequency waves are in various stages of development. The Stingray, a low-energy, tank-mounted laser that targets enemy electro-optical systems and crazes the inside of the tank cockpit, uses an innovative slab design instead of the conventional rod. The slab neutralizes the heating effect, improving beam quality tenfold. The author discusses the possibility that the psychological impact of battlefield lasers could match or exceed the physiological effects because of eye damage.

  7. Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women

    PubMed Central

    Sorenson, Susan B.; Wiebe, Douglas J.

    2004-01-01

    Objectives. We assessed weapon use in intimate partner violence and perspectives on hypothetical firearm policies. Methods. We conducted structured in-person interviews with 417 women in 67 battered womens shelters. Results. Words, hands/fists, and feet were the most common weapons used against and by battered women. About one third of the battered women had a firearm in the home. In two thirds of these households, the intimate partner used the gun(s) against the woman, usually threatening to shoot/kill her (71.4%) or to shoot at her (5.1%). Most battered women thought spousal notification/consultation regarding gun purchase would be useful and that a personalized firearm (smart gun) in the home would make things worse. Conclusions. A wide range of objects are used as weapons against intimate partners. Firearms, especially handguns, are more common in the homes of battered women than in households in the general population. PMID:15284052

  8. Passive millimeter-wave concealed weapon detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sinclair, Gordon N.; Anderton, Rupert N.; Appleby, Roger

    2001-02-01

    A method of detecting weapons concealed under clothing using passive millimeter wave imaging is described. The optical properties of clothing are discussed and examples given of the spectral reflectivity and transmission. The transmission tends to be constant from 60 to 150 GHz above which it decreases for some clothing materials. The transmission of a cotton T-shirt is typically 95% and of a leather jacket up to 85% at lower frequencies. A model is presented for calculating the contrast of a metallic concealed weapon when hidden under clothing and it indicates contrasts as large as 200 K can be realized outdoors. The advantages of real time over static frame imagery are discussed. It is concluded that real time imagery offers considerable advantages as weapons can be very varied in size, position and orientation and movement offers vital clues to the human observer which aid the recognition process.

  9. Closing loopholes in the Biological Weapons Convention.

    PubMed

    van Aken, Jan; Hammond, Edward

    2002-01-01

    The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) received two major blows in the past months. Negotiations for a protocol to strengthen the BTWC came to a halt and the Fifth Review Conference was unable to reach agreement on a final declaration. In addition, ongoing research projects, predominantly in the United States, are threatening to undermine the comprehensive ban on the development, production and use of biological weapons. This article provides two examples of research that exploit perceived loopholes in the BTWC or impinge on the scope of the Convention, namely the planned use of biological agents for forced drug eradication and the development of anti-material agents. PMID:12044027

  10. AQM: Accelerometer for precision-guided weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Boura, A.; Aujay, O.; Bost, J. L.

    1988-11-01

    Pendular, monolithic accelerometer structures with surface areas of a few millimeters have been designed, fabricated and tested. The results support the possibility of applying this technology to homing weapons and projectile drift correction. Around these small monolithic structures it is possible to construct accelerometers which occupy a volume of between 1 and 4 cu cm. Certain prototypes have shown resistance to shocks up to 20,000 G, while others exhibit a static measuring range greater than 100 G. Recent experimental results and the extrapolations that can be deduced with regard to usable sensors for precision-guided weapons are discussed.

  11. History of US nuclear weapon safety assessment: The early years

    SciTech Connect

    Spray, S.D.

    1996-06-01

    From the beginnings of the U.S. nuclear weapons program, military and civilian dual- agency judgment has been fundamental to achieving nuclear weapon and weapon system safety. This interaction was initiated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The principle of using dual-agency judgment has been perpetuated in the design and assessment of the weapon and weapon system acceptance process since that time. This fundamental approach is still used today in all phases of the weapon life. In this paper, an overview of the history and philosophy of the approach is described.

  12. SSD Reliability

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zambelli, C.; Olivo, P.

    SSD are complex electronic systems prone to wear-out and failure mechanisms mainly related to their basic component: the Flash memory. The reliability of a Flash memory depends on many technological and architectural aspects, from the physical concepts on which the store paradigm is achieved to the interaction among cells, from possible new physical mechanisms arising as the technology scales down to the countermeasures adopted within the memory controller to face erroneous behaviors.

  13. Product acceptance environmental and destructive testing for reliability.

    SciTech Connect

    Dvorack, Michael A.; Kerschen, Thomas J.; Collins, Elmer W.

    2007-08-01

    To determine whether a component is meeting its reliability requirement during production, acceptance sampling is employed in which selected units coming off the production line are subjected to additional environmental and/or destructive tests that are within the normal environment space to which the component is expected to be exposed throughout its life in the Stockpile. This report describes what these tests are and how they are scored for reliability purposes. The roles of screens, Engineering Use Only tests, and next assembly product acceptance testing are also discussed, along with both the advantages and disadvantages of environmental and destructive testing.

  14. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  15. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  16. The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Alexander, Archibald S.; And Others

    This book is composed of four papers prepared to illuminate the problem areas which might arise if the policies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other measures to limit chemical and biological weapons are ratified by the United States Senate. The papers included are: Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; The Use of Herbicides in War: A…

  17. Impulse noise trauma during army weapon firing.

    PubMed

    Munjal, K R; Singh, V P

    1997-04-01

    A 100 infanty personnel firing modern weapons such as the Anti Tank Guided Missile, 106mm Recoiless Gun (RCL), 84mm Rocket Launcher (RL) and 81mm Mortar were studied for the effect of impulse noise on the ear and the evolution of the Temporary Threshold Shift (TTS), Recovery Time (RT) and Permanent Threshold Shift (PTS) was traced. PMID:23119288

  18. Probability of survival from multiple weapon attacks

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-02-01

    This note discusses the survival probabilities for multiple weapons missile attacks. It derives analytic and approximate expressions for average survival probabilities. Both are readily computable. The exponential approximation is sufficiently useful for rough calculations and is well suited to analytic optimizations.

  19. Stability issues in reconstitution by weapon addition

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-08-01

    Reconstitution of strategic forces by the unilateral uploading of additional weapons from initially symmetric modest force levels reduces first strike stability. These changes are quantified and traced to changes in first and second strike costs in a model of missile exchanges in which both strikes are optimized analytically.

  20. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  1. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-01

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  2. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  3. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  4. The history of nuclear weapon safety devices

    SciTech Connect

    Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

    1998-06-01

    The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

  5. Managing nuclear weapons in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, G.

    1993-03-16

    This report discusses the management and security of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war United States. The definition of what constitutes security is clearly changing in the US. It is now a much more integrated view that includes defense and the economy. The author tries to bring some semblance of order to these themes in this brief adaptation of a presentation.

  6. University Management of Weapons Labs? Yes.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kahn, James S.

    1986-01-01

    Promulgates the view that university management of weapons laboratories provides the best scientific results, and more independent advice than could be possible under government or industrial management. Focuses on Los Alamos and Livermore national laboratories, operated by the University of California. (An opposing viewpoint is presented in SE

  7. Doomsday weapons in the hands of many

    SciTech Connect

    Bailey, K.C.

    1991-01-01

    In an analysis of doomsday weapon proliferation, the author of this book details the specifications for nuclear, chemical, and biological warhead production; lists the countries that have acquired or are developing such technology; describes the interests and motivations of those countries; and assesses arms control policies.

  8. The Strategic Weapon System Training Program.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cantor, Jeffrey A.

    1986-01-01

    The U.S. Navy's Strategic Weapon System training program has five principal components: needs assessment/task analysis (Personnel Performance Profile); instructional design (Training Path System); instructional development (Curricula); training implementation; and personnel and training evaluation. This training model illustrates how a program…

  9. The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Alexander, Archibald S.; And Others

    This book is composed of four papers prepared to illuminate the problem areas which might arise if the policies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other measures to limit chemical and biological weapons are ratified by the United States Senate. The papers included are: Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; The Use of Herbicides in War: A

  10. Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-09-01

    The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera.

  11. Multiple weapon system distributed sensor concept

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rafailov, Michael K.

    2009-05-01

    Distributed Sensor Concept-DISCO was proposed for multiplication of individual weapon capability through cooperative target engagement. DISCO creates practically distributed in space sensor network that performs sensing by exchanging of pre-track frame and GNC data. Concept of operations for DISCO is based on complete absence of any kind of host vehicle with its weight allocated for unique and costly propulsion, communication and avionics, and, in the same time DISCO preserves the original idea of multiplicity of lightweight effective weapon dispensed from an unitary payload Three major benefits of DISCO are: immediate PBO deployment; absence of any kind of carrier or "central" vehicle or bus; multiplicity of weapon. DISCO sensor network supports target handover without active ranging but by triangulating. Digital video-signal processing that supports DISCO is Recursive Adaptive Frame Integration of Limited data. Each sensor disseminates to and receives frame, calibration and GNC data from other sensors in the network. In this paper efficiency of DISCO weapon system is discussed for acquisition, accurate handover and track correlation.

  12. Optimizing Tactics for Use of the U.S. Antiviral Strategic National Stockpile for Pandemic Influenza

    PubMed Central

    Dimitrov, Nedialko B.; Goll, Sebastian; Hupert, Nathaniel; Pourbohloul, Babak; Meyers, Lauren Ancel

    2011-01-01

    In 2009, public health agencies across the globe worked to mitigate the impact of the swine-origin influenza A (pH1N1) virus. These efforts included intensified surveillance, social distancing, hygiene measures, and the targeted use of antiviral medications to prevent infection (prophylaxis). In addition, aggressive antiviral treatment was recommended for certain patient subgroups to reduce the severity and duration of symptoms. To assist States and other localities meet these needs, the U.S. Government distributed a quarter of the antiviral medications in the Strategic National Stockpile within weeks of the pandemic's start. However, there are no quantitative models guiding the geo-temporal distribution of the remainder of the Stockpile in relation to pandemic spread or severity. We present a tactical optimization model for distributing this stockpile for treatment of infected cases during the early stages of a pandemic like 2009 pH1N1, prior to the wide availability of a strain-specific vaccine. Our optimization method efficiently searches large sets of intervention strategies applied to a stochastic network model of pandemic influenza transmission within and among U.S. cities. The resulting optimized strategies depend on the transmissability of the virus and postulated rates of antiviral uptake and wastage (through misallocation or loss). Our results suggest that an aggressive community-based antiviral treatment strategy involving early, widespread, pro-rata distribution of antivirals to States can contribute to slowing the transmission of mildly transmissible strains, like pH1N1. For more highly transmissible strains, outcomes of antiviral use are more heavily impacted by choice of distribution intervals, quantities per shipment, and timing of shipments in relation to pandemic spread. This study supports previous modeling results suggesting that appropriate antiviral treatment may be an effective mitigation strategy during the early stages of future influenza pandemics, increasing the need for systematic efforts to optimize distribution strategies and provide tactical guidance for public health policy-makers. PMID:21283514

  13. Algal biochar enhances the re-vegetation of stockpiled mine soils with native grass.

    PubMed

    Roberts, David A; Cole, Andrew J; Paul, Nicholas A; de Nys, Rocky

    2015-09-15

    In most countries the mining industry is required to rehabilitate disturbed land with native vegetation. A typical approach is to stockpile soils during mining and then use this soil to recreate landforms after mining. Soil that has been stockpiled for an extended period typically contains little or no organic matter and nutrient, making soil rehabilitation a slow and difficult process. Here, we take freshwater macroalgae (Oedogonium) cultivated in waste water at a coal-fired power station and use it as a feedstock for the production of biochar, then use this biochar to enhance the rehabilitation of two types of stockpiled soil - a ferrosol and a sodosol - from the adjacent coal mine. While the biomass had relatively high concentrations of some metals, due to its cultivation in waste water, the resulting biochar did not leach metals into the pore water of soil-biochar mixtures. The biochar did, however, contribute essential trace elements (particularly K) to soil pore water. The biochar had very strong positive effects on the establishment and growth of a native plant (Kangaroo grass, Themeda australis) in both of the soils. The addition of the algal biochar to both soils at 10 t ha(-1) reduced the time to germination by the grass and increased the growth and production of plant biomass. Somewhat surprisingly, there was no beneficial effect of a higher application rate (25 t ha(-1)) of the biochar in the ferrosol, which highlights the importance of matching biochar application rates to the requirements of different types of soil. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that algal biochar can be produced from biomass cultivated in waste water and used at low application rates to improve the rehabilitation of a variety of soils typical of coal mines. This novel process links biomass production in waste water to end use of the biomass in land rehabilitation, simultaneously addressing two environmental issues associated with coal-mining and processing. PMID:26172107

  14. Optimizing tactics for use of the U.S. antiviral strategic national stockpile for pandemic influenza.

    PubMed

    Dimitrov, Nedialko B; Goll, Sebastian; Hupert, Nathaniel; Pourbohloul, Babak; Meyers, Lauren Ancel

    2011-01-01

    In 2009, public health agencies across the globe worked to mitigate the impact of the swine-origin influenza A (pH1N1) virus. These efforts included intensified surveillance, social distancing, hygiene measures, and the targeted use of antiviral medications to prevent infection (prophylaxis). In addition, aggressive antiviral treatment was recommended for certain patient subgroups to reduce the severity and duration of symptoms. To assist States and other localities meet these needs, the U.S. Government distributed a quarter of the antiviral medications in the Strategic National Stockpile within weeks of the pandemic's start. However, there are no quantitative models guiding the geo-temporal distribution of the remainder of the Stockpile in relation to pandemic spread or severity. We present a tactical optimization model for distributing this stockpile for treatment of infected cases during the early stages of a pandemic like 2009 pH1N1, prior to the wide availability of a strain-specific vaccine. Our optimization method efficiently searches large sets of intervention strategies applied to a stochastic network model of pandemic influenza transmission within and among U.S. cities. The resulting optimized strategies depend on the transmissability of the virus and postulated rates of antiviral uptake and wastage (through misallocation or loss). Our results suggest that an aggressive community-based antiviral treatment strategy involving early, widespread, pro-rata distribution of antivirals to States can contribute to slowing the transmission of mildly transmissible strains, like pH1N1. For more highly transmissible strains, outcomes of antiviral use are more heavily impacted by choice of distribution intervals, quantities per shipment, and timing of shipments in relation to pandemic spread. This study supports previous modeling results suggesting that appropriate antiviral treatment may be an effective mitigation strategy during the early stages of future influenza pandemics, increasing the need for systematic efforts to optimize distribution strategies and provide tactical guidance for public health policy-makers. PMID:21283514

  15. A magic sword or a big itch: an historical look at the United States biological weapons programme.

    PubMed

    Hay, A

    1999-01-01

    In the late 1950s interest in entomological warfare increased, and literature describing the US biological warfare programmes on the use of the mosquito Aedes aegypti, the vector for transmitting yellow fever, has now been released. Yellow fever was considered as a suitable disease to use in southern regions of the former Soviet Union. The US destroyed its biological weapon stockpiles in the early 1970s. In addition to its offensive biological warfare programme, the US conducted extensive trials to assess its own vulnerability to biological attack. These trials and a later series of threat analyses indicate that biological agents could, indeed, affect large areas of the US if the attackers were allowed to proceed unmolested. Some of the threat analyses present highly questionable scenarios. PMID:10472190

  16. 72. OVERALL VIEW OF WEAPONS STORAGE AREA IGLOO FIELDS. TAKEN ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    72. OVERALL VIEW OF WEAPONS STORAGE AREA IGLOO FIELDS. TAKEN FROM ROOF OF BUILDING 232 (MINE SHOP) LOOKING NORTH. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME

  17. 76. VIEW OF SECOND WEAPONS STORAGE AREA ALONG SERVICE ROAD ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    76. VIEW OF SECOND WEAPONS STORAGE AREA ALONG SERVICE ROAD SHOWING BUILDINGS 338-333 LOOKING NORTHWEST. - Loring Air Force Base, Weapons Storage Area, Northeastern corner of base at northern end of Maine Road, Limestone, Aroostook County, ME

  18. Teen Weapon Use Varies by Race and Gender: Study

    MedlinePLUS

    ... nih.gov/medlineplus/news/fullstory_156732.html Teen Weapon Use Varies by Race and Gender: Study Black ... likelihood of an American teen using or carrying weapons varies according to race and gender, new research ...

  19. 76 FR 1136 - Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-07

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology Electroshock Weapons Test and Measurement Workshop AGENCY..., academia, military, test instrument manufacturers, etc.) of electroshock weapons that provide...

  20. US technical assistance to the IAEA and the chemical weapons convection (CWC) - a review and look to the future

    SciTech Connect

    Indusi, J.; Parsick, R.J.; Reisman, A.W.

    1997-08-01

    This paper reviews the Safeguards mandate of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and describes U.S. technical support programs. We also review the mandate of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and speculate on the technical areas where U.S. assistance may prove useful. The IAEA was organized in 1957 in response to President Eisenhower`s {open_quotes}Atoms for Peace{close_quotes} initiative presented to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has been organized by a Preparatory Commission (PREPCOM) to prepare for the entry-into-force of this new convention which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The safeguards mandate of the IAEA is to carry out verifications of nuclear material pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other voluntary but legally binding agreements. U.S. technical support programs have provided and continue to provide assistance in the form of Cost-Free Experts (CFE`s), systems studies on new safeguards approaches, training, computerized information systems, and equipment for nuclear materials measurements and containment and surveillance systems. Because the CWC just recently entered into force (April 29, 1997), verification procedures of the OPCW are not yet fully developed. However, it is expected, and can already be seen for many aspects of the technical task, that there are many similarities between the verification activities of the OPCW and those carried out by the IAEA. This paper will discuss potential technical support areas that can help strengthen the OPCW. 9 refs.

  1. Toward Armageddon: The proliferation of unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Occasional Paper No. 36

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, A.J.

    1989-12-01

    The author concludes that it is probable that unconventional weapons and their associated delivery systems will form a permanent part of future political and strategic calculations in the Middle East. Some possible consequences of this situation can be divided into three classes: intra-regional, inter-regional and extra-regional. There is no doubt that Israel, driven by the need for security,precipitated the proliferation of unconventional weapons and of surface-to-surface missiles in the Middle East. It will now be driven to secure itself from the new threat to its security posed by its regional opponents. The most significant extra-regional consequence of developments in the Middle East may be further complication of great power arms control negotiations. To the re-discovery by the United States and the Soviet Union of their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce the level of their nuclear weapons must now be added the desire to reduce, if not entirely eliminate, their chemical weapons stockpiles in advance of a global ban. It is possible that lesser powers will learn from the evidence of the great powers behavior, although that contradicts much of what we know of the psychology of decision making in international politics. What is necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, is that the U.S. and the USSR as the two external powers with potentially the greatest leverage, work together toward the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict in a region marked by more than a generation of competition between them.

  2. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  3. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  4. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  5. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  6. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13 Section... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  7. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  8. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  9. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  10. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  11. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  12. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons Qualification Criteria H Appendix H to Part 73.... H Appendix H to Part 73—Weapons Qualification Criteria The B-27 Target or a target of equivalent difficulty will be used for all weapon qualification testing. Table H-1—Minimum Day Firing Criteria 1...

  13. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  14. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons Qualification Criteria H Appendix H to Part 73.... H Appendix H to Part 73—Weapons Qualification Criteria The B-27 Target or a target of equivalent difficulty will be used for all weapon qualification testing. Table H-1—Minimum Day Firing Criteria 1...

  15. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  16. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  17. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13 Section... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  18. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  19. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  20. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  1. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 15.15... EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons and explosives. No person entering or while at Mt. Weather or the NETC will carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended...

  2. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  3. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  4. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  5. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  6. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  7. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  8. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  9. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  10. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  11. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  12. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  13. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  14. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2014-01-01 2013-01-01 true Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  15. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  16. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. 504.14... SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  17. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  18. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. 520.15... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  19. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  20. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  1. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2012-10-01 2011-10-01 true Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  2. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  3. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  4. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  5. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  6. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  7. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  8. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 15.15... EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons and explosives. No person entering or while at Mt. Weather or the NETC will carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended...

  9. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  10. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  11. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  12. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  13. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons Qualification Criteria H Appendix H to Part 73.... H Appendix H to Part 73—Weapons Qualification Criteria The B-27 Target or a target of equivalent difficulty will be used for all weapon qualification testing. Table H-1—Minimum Day Firing Criteria 1...

  14. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  15. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  16. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... CONDUCT IN OR ON THE BUREAU OF THE MINT BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives,...

  17. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  18. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  19. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  20. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  1. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  2. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  3. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons Qualification Criteria H Appendix H to Part 73.... H Appendix H to Part 73—Weapons Qualification Criteria The B-27 Target or a target of equivalent difficulty will be used for all weapon qualification testing. Table H-1—Minimum Day Firing Criteria 1...

  4. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  5. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  6. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  7. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2012-04-01 2011-04-01 true Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  8. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  9. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  10. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  11. 36 CFR 702.7 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 702.7... Weapons and explosives. Except where duly authorized by law, and in the performance of law enforcement functions, no person shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  12. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  13. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  14. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  15. Adolescents Who Carry Weapons to School: A Review of Cases

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Finkenbine, Ryan D.; Dwyer, R. Gregg

    2006-01-01

    Multiple self-report surveys have collected data about weapons in school. This record review study considers characteristics of 47 adolescents adjudicated for carrying weapons at school and provides a descriptive analysis against a comparison group of 37 juveniles with other offenses. Demographics, weapon type, legal history, prior school…

  16. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  17. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  18. 31 CFR 407.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 407.13 Section... TREASURY ANNEX § 407.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  19. 32 CFR 228.7 - Prohibition on weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Prohibition on weapons and explosives. 228.7... (CONTINUED) MISCELLANEOUS SECURITY PROTECTIVE FORCE § 228.7 Prohibition on weapons and explosives. No persons... illegal or legally controlled weapon (e.g., throwing stars, switchblades), explosives, or items...

  20. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  1. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  2. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the...

  3. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  4. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No...

  5. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  6. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor...

  7. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  8. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  9. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 8 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  10. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any...

  11. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or...

  12. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2012-10-01 2011-10-01 true Weapons and explosives. 15.15... EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons and explosives. No person entering or while at Mt. Weather or the NETC will carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended...

  13. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11... FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or...

  14. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  15. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  16. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  17. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  18. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  19. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 15.15... EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons and explosives. No person entering or while at Mt. Weather or the NETC will carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended...

  20. 43 CFR 423.30 - Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons, firearms, explosives, and... WATERBODIES Rules of Conduct § 423.30 Weapons, firearms, explosives, and fireworks. (a) You may possess... exceptions: (1) You must not have a weapon in your possession when at or in a Reclamation facility. (2)...

  1. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives...

  2. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying...

  3. 44 CFR 15.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 15.15... EMERGENCY TRAINING CENTER § 15.15 Weapons and explosives. No person entering or while at Mt. Weather or the NETC will carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or items intended...

  4. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly...

  5. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or...

  6. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is...

  7. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized...

  8. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except...

  9. 10 CFR Appendix H to Part 73 - Weapons Qualification Criteria

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons Qualification Criteria H Appendix H to Part 73.... H Appendix H to Part 73—Weapons Qualification Criteria The B-27 Target or a target of equivalent difficulty will be used for all weapon qualification testing. Table H-1—Minimum Day Firing Criteria 1...

  10. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears,...

  11. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will...

  12. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes....

  13. Adolescents Who Carry Weapons to School: A Review of Cases

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Finkenbine, Ryan D.; Dwyer, R. Gregg

    2006-01-01

    Multiple self-report surveys have collected data about weapons in school. This record review study considers characteristics of 47 adolescents adjudicated for carrying weapons at school and provides a descriptive analysis against a comparison group of 37 juveniles with other offenses. Demographics, weapon type, legal history, prior school

  14. The nuclear weapons free world . We already live in

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Antonini, R.

    We do live in a nuclear weapons free world, already. After a long debate about nuclear weapons the situation today is such that, officially, no governement is in favor of them. The reason is to be found in the strongest moral stigma on nuclear weapons. Moreover the vast majority of the most influencial people share this view.

  15. Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jenkins, Bonnie

    1997-01-01

    Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

  16. Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jenkins, Bonnie

    1997-01-01

    Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms

  17. Defense resource distribution between protection and redundancy for constant resource stockpiling pace.

    PubMed

    Levitin, Gregory; Hausken, Kjell

    2011-10-01

    The article considers the optimal resource distribution in a parallel system between increasing protection and providing redundancy in a situation when the attacker's and defender's resources are stockpiling and the resource increment rate is constant. It is assumed that the system must perform within an exogenously given time horizon and the attack time probability is uniformly distributed along this horizon. The defender optimizes the resource distribution in order to minimize the system destruction probability during the time horizon. First, we find the optimal pace of construction of the new redundant elements assuming that the construction must start in the initial stage of the stockpiling process. We show that starting construction of new elements in the beginning of the system's existence results in its high initial vulnerability. Introducing the time delay before starting the construction can reduce the initial system vulnerability and the entire system destruction probability. The problem of optimization of time delay and new element construction pace is considered with and without constraint on the initial system vulnerability. Examples illustrating the methodology of the optimal defense strategy analysis are presented. PMID:21388424

  18. A database system for characterization of munitions items in conventional ammunition demilitarization stockpiles

    SciTech Connect

    Chun, K.C.; Chiu, S.Y.; Ditmars, J.D.; Huber, C.C.; Nortunen, L.; Sabb, R.

    1994-05-01

    The MIDAS (Munition Items Disposition Action System) database system is an electronic data management system capable of storage and retrieval of information on the detailed structures and material compositions of munitions items designated for demilitarization. The types of such munitions range from bulk propellants and small arms to projectiles and cluster bombs. The database system is also capable of processing data on the quantities of inert, PEP (propellant, explosives and pyrotechnics) and packaging materials associated with munitions, components, or parts, and the quantities of chemical compounds associated with parts made of PEP materials. Development of the MIDAS database system has been undertaken by the US Army to support disposition of unwanted ammunition stockpiles. The inventory of such stockpiles currently includes several thousand items, which total tens of thousands of tons, and is still growing. Providing systematic procedures for disposing of all unwanted conventional munitions is the mission of the MIDAS Demilitarization Program. To carry out this mission, all munitions listed in the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition inventory must be characterized, and alternatives for resource recovery and recycling and/or disposal of munitions in the demilitarization inventory must be identified.

  19. A model "go-kit" for use at Strategic National Stockpile Points of Dispensing.

    PubMed

    May, Larissa; Cote, Timothy; Hardeman, Bernard; Gonzalez, Gabriela R; Adams, Sherry B; Blair, Roderick K; Pane, Gregg

    2007-01-01

    The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is a national repository of pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies forseeably needed during a medical disaster. In the event of SNS deployment, state and local public health authorities must be prepared to receive, distribute, and dispense the materials. We propose a cache of supplies, termed the "POD go-kit," prepared in advance and locally available prior to the establishment of Points of Dispensing (POD) for SNS material. Characteristics of the preassembled go-kit are its multiplicity of use, ease of storage and transportation, minimal redundancy with SNS material, and packaging in a manner consistent with POD function. The POD go-kit is assembled into 4 separate "subkits": administrative supplies, patient routing supplies, dispensing supplies, and POD staff protection supplies. Incorporating existing practices from the SNS Listserv, this article itemizes the contents of the POD go-kit and its subkits and provides a rationale for its packaging. The Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) has not certified the proposed "POD go-kit" as a standardized POD go-kit. PMID:17149096

  20. 78 FR 75910 - Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-13

    ...; ] DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA) and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial activities...

  1. 76 FR 76935 - Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-09

    ... Bureau of Industry and Security Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on... implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA), and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial...

  2. Draft Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

    SciTech Connect

    N /A

    2004-02-27

    This ''Site-wide Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Operation of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Supplemental Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement'' (LLNL SW/SPEIS) describes the purpose and need for agency action for the continued operation of LLNL and analyzes the environmental impacts of these operations. The primary purpose of continuing operation of LLNL is to provide support for the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship missions. LLNL, located about 40 miles east of San Francisco, California, is also needed to support other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) programs and Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the newly established U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This LLNL SW/SPEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of reasonable alternatives for ongoing and foreseeable future operations, facilities, and activities at LLNL. The reasonable alternatives include the No Action Alternative, Proposed Action, and the Reduced Operation Alternative. The major decision to be made by DOE/NNSA is to select one of the alternatives for the continued operation of the LLNL. As part of the Proposed Action, DOE/NNSA is considering: using additional materials including plutonium on the National Ignition Facility (NIF); increasing the administrative limit for plutonium in the Superblock, which includes the Plutonium Facility, the Tritium Facility, and the Hardened Engineering Test Building; conducting the Integrated Technology Project, using laser isotope separation to provide material for Stockpile Stewardship experiments, in the Plutonium Facility; increasing the material-at-risk limit for the Plutonium Facility; and increasing the Tritium Facility material-at-risk. A discussion of these issues is presented in Section S.5.2, Proposed Action. The ''National Environmental Policy Act'' (NEPA) establishes environmental policy, sets goals, and provides means for implementing the policy. NEPA contains provisions to ensure that Federal agencies adhere to the letter and spirit of the Act. The key provision requires preparation of an environmental impact statement on ''major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment'' (40 ''Code of Federal Regulations'' [CFR] {section}1502.3). NEPA ensures that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and actions are taken (40 CFR {section}1500.1[b]). DOE has a policy to prepare sitewide environmental impact statements documents for certain large, multiple-facility sites such as LLNL (10 CFR {section}1021.330). In August 1992, DOE released the ''Final Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Report for Continued Operations of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore'' (LLNL EIS/EIR). A Record of Decision (ROD) (58 ''Federal Register'' [FR] 6268) was issued in January 1993. With the passage of more than 10 years since the publication of the 1992 LLNL EIS/EIR (DOE/EIS-0157) and because of proposed modifications to existing projects and new programs, NNSA determined that it was appropriate to prepare a new LLNL SW/SPEIS.

  3. Ending the scourge of chemical weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Brin, J.

    1993-04-01

    After more than 20 years of arduous negotiations, representatives from 131 countries gathered in Paris in January to sign a treaty banning the development, production, and transfer to other countries of chemical-warfare agents and their means of delivery. The treaty - called the Chemical Weapons Convention, or CWC - complements the more limited Geneva Protocol of 1925, which bans the use of toxic chemicals in warfare. When the CWC enters into force in about two years, it will prohibit the manufacture for military purposes of lethal chemicals such as sulfur mustard, which causes painful skin blistering and lung damage, and nerve agents, which cause rapid death by interfering with the transmission of nerve impulses. The goal is to eliminate from the earth this particularly inhumane form of warfare. The paper discusses facets of the treaty, especially the verification challenge with its inspection on demand features. Short accompanying pieces discuss classifying chemicals and the destruction of chemical weapons under the CWC.

  4. America's Secret Educational Weapon: Community Colleges

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Magrath, C. Peter

    2008-01-01

    The U.S. has a powerful weapon in its educational arsenal: its community colleges. Yet these institutions, according to the author, are so often overlooked in discussions of the future of U.S. society and the U.S. work force that they might as well be deemed "top secret." More than 1,200 community colleges enroll some 47% of all undergraduates.

  5. Medical implications of enhanced radiation weapons.

    PubMed

    Reeves, Glen I

    2010-12-01

    During the 1960s through 1980s the United States and several other nations developed, and even considered deploying, enhanced-radiation warheads (ERWs). The main effect of ERWs (sometimes called "neutron bombs"), as compared to other types of nuclear weapons, is to enhance radiation casualties while reducing blast and thermal damage to the infrastructure. Five nations were reported to have developed and tested ERWs during this period, but since the termination of the "Cold War" there have been no threats of development, deployment, or use of such weapons. However, if the technology of a quarter of a century ago has been developed, maintained, or even advanced since then, it is conceivable that the grim possibility of future ERW use exists. The type of destruction, initial triage of casualties, distribution of patterns of injury, and medical management of ERWs will be shown to significantly differ from that of fission weapons. Emergency response planners and medical personnel, civilian or military, must be aware of these differences to reduce the horrible consequences of ERW usage and appropriately treat casualties. PMID:21265303

  6. Changing Soviet views of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Sloss, L. Associates, Washington, DC )

    1990-10-01

    The purpose of this paper is to summarize current Soviet views about nuclear weapons, and to assess the implications of these views for US policies and programs. I will focus particularly on implications of interest to the nuclear laboratories. The task is complicated by the fact that Soviet views about nuclear weapons are not straightforward. There are certain benefits from glasnost in that there now is more open debate about a range of issues in the Soviet Union, including defense issues. Thus, we now have a great deal of published material to draw upon in assessing Soviet views, and experts in the West can talk much more freely to Soviet experts. However, this information explosion makes it more difficult to discriminate signal from noise, particularly as there continues to be both propaganda and deception in Soviet statements about defense issues. Clearly, some Soviet statements about nuclear weapons are designed to influence attitudes and actions in the West. I shall cite some examples in this paper.

  7. The Chemical Weapons Convention -- Legal issues

    SciTech Connect

    1997-08-01

    The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) offers a unique challenge to the US system of constitutional law. Its promise of eliminating what is the most purely genocidal type of weapon from the world`s arsenals as well as of destroying the facilities for producing these weapons, brings with it a set of novel legal issues. The reservations about the CWC expressed by US business people are rooted in concern about safeguarding confidential business information and protecting the constitutional right to privacy. The chief worry is that international verification inspectors will misuse their power to enter commercial property and that trade secrets or other private information will be compromised as a result. It has been charged that the Convention is probably unconstitutional. The author categorically disagrees with that view and is aware of no scholarly writing that supports it. The purpose of this presentation is to show that CWC verification activities can be implemented in the US consistently with the traditional constitutional regard for commercial and individual privacy. First, he very briefly reviews the types of verification inspections that the CWC permits, as well as some of its specific privacy protections. Second, he explains how the Fourth Amendment right to privacy works in the context of CWC verification inspections. Finally, he reviews how verification inspections can be integrated into these constitutional requirements in the SU through a federal implementing statute.

  8. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    SciTech Connect

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  9. Air gun wounding and current UK laws controlling air weapons.

    PubMed

    Bruce-Chwatt, Robert Michael

    2010-04-01

    Air weapons whether rifles or pistols are, potentially, lethal weapons. The UK legislation is complex and yet little known to the public. Hunting with air weapons and the laws controlling those animals that are permitted to be shot with air weapons is even more labyrinthine due to the legal power limitations on the possession of air weapons. Still relatively freely available by mail order or on the Internet, an increasing number of deaths have been reported from the misuse of air weapons or accidental discharges. Ammunition for air weapons has become increasingly sophisticated, effective and therefore increasingly dangerous if misused, though freely available being a mere projectile without a concomitant cartridge containing a propellant and an initiator. PMID:20211450

  10. Shelf-life extension program (SLEP) as a significant contributor to Strategic National Stockpile Maintenance: the Israeli experience with ciprofloxacin.

    PubMed

    Bodas, Moran; Yuval, Landschaft; Zadok, Ron; Hess, Zippora; Haran, Batya; Kaplan, Mimi; Eisenkraft, Arik

    2012-06-01

    In the past decade, the 2001 anthrax incident in the U.S. and the 2003 SARS epidemic have highlighted the biological threat to civilian populations. The risk posed by the natural or manmade spread of biological agents among the population dictates a need for better national preparedness. One key component of this preparation is the establishment of a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) of pharmaceuticals that would provide appropriate medical countermeasures in case of an outbreak. However, to reduce the expense of such a stockpile and to make it worthwhile, there is also a need for a shelf-life extension program (SLEP) through which pharmaceuticals could be extended beyond manufacturer-ascribed shelf life, as long as they meet regulation standards. In this article, we review the Israeli experience with the national ciprofloxacin stockpile procurement and shelf-life extension program. PMID:22578017

  11. Measures to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention

    SciTech Connect

    Tanzman, E.; Kellman, B.

    1999-11-05

    This seminar is another excellent opportunity for those involved in preventing chemical weapons production and use to learn from each other about how the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) can become a foundation of arms control in Africa and around the world. The author is grateful to the staff of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for inviting him to address this distinguished seminar. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone, and do not represent the position of the government of the US nor or of any other institution. In 1993, as the process of CWC ratification was beginning, concerns arose that the complexity of integrating the treaty with national law would cause each nation to implement the Convention without regard to what other nations were doing, thereby causing inconsistencies among States Parties in how the Convention would be carried out. As a result the Manual for National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was prepared and presented it to each national delegation at the December 1993 meeting of the Preparatory Commission in The Hague. During its preparation, the Manual was reviewed by the Committee of Legal Experts on National Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a group of distinguished international jurists, law professors, legally-trained diplomats, government officials, and Parliamentarians from every region of the world, including Mica. In February 1998, the second edition of the Manual was published in order to update it in light of developments since the CWC entered into force on 29 April 1997. The second edition 1998 clarified the national implementation options to reflect post-entry-into-force thinking, added extensive references to national implementing measures that had been enacted by various States Parties, and included a prototype national implementing statute developed by the authors to provide a starting point for those whose national implementing measures were still under development. Last month, the Web Edition of the Manual was completed. It's internet address, or URL, is http://www.cwc.anl.gov/.

  12. Enzymes for Degradation of Energetic Materials and Demilitarization of Explosives Stockpiles - SERDP Annual (Interim) Report, 12/98

    SciTech Connect

    Shah, M.M.

    1999-01-18

    The current stockpile of energetic materials requiring disposal contains about half a million tons. Through 2001, over 2.1 million tons are expected to pass through the stockpile for disposal. Safe and environmentally acceptable methods for disposing of these materials are needed. This project is developing safe, economical, and environmentally sound processes using biocatalyst (enzymes) to degrade energetic materials and to convert them into economically valuable products. Alternative methods for destroying these materials are hazardous, environmentally unacceptable, and expensive. These methods include burning, detonation, land and sea burial, treatment at high temperature and pressure, and treatment with harsh chemicals. Enzyme treatment operates at room temperature and atmospheric pressure in a water solution.

  13. Comparison Between Multicopter Uav and Total Station for Estimating Stockpile Volumes

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Arango, C.; Morales, C. A.

    2015-08-01

    Currently the UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) have become an alternative for different engineering applications, especially in surveying, one of these applications is the calculation of volumes of stockpiled material, but there are questions about its accuracy and efficiency, the purpose of this article is to compare traditional surveying methods for estimating total volumes through data obtained by total stations and data obtained by a multicopter UAV. In order to answer these questions we obtain data from the same location and the results were compared. After comparing the results it was found that there was a 2,88% difference between the volume calculated with the total station data and the actual volume, and -0,67% difference between the volume calculated with the UAV data and the actual volume, concluding that the estimated volume with UAV data is more accurate.

  14. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronics system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    SciTech Connect

    Perez, C.L.; Johnson, J.O.

    1994-05-01

    The utilization of reconnaissance/surveillance satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; neutrons, gamma rays, and X-rays from fission and fusion weapons; and directed neutral particle beams and lasers. Electronic equipment, including modem integrated circuits, may undergo permanent or transient changes of the electrical properties of the active components when exposed to these sources of radiation. This report summarizes the results of the Monte Carlo Adjoint Shielding code system -- MASH v1.0 calculations designed to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized spaced based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emanating from a thermonuclear weapon detonation. The MASH calculations modeled several source/platform geometry configurations, obtaining results for multiple distances and weapon detonation positions relative to the platform. For certain source/platform orientations, the results indicate vulnerabilities to the C{sup 3} bay critical components box to radiation damage from a nuclear weapon detonation. Neutron protection factors ranged from 0.7 to 3.4 for the three platform configurations analyzed, and gamma-ray protection factors ranged from approximately 1.5 to 9.8. The results further indicate the source has a direct line-of-sight to the critical components box for certain source/platform orientations, regardless of the number of interceptors present. The merits of utilizing the MASH code system for estimating dose and shielding factors for spaced based assets has been demonstrated. The geometry configuration studied here is greatly simplified compared to those that will be encountered in an actual design.

  15. The effect of chemical weapons incineration on the survival rates of Red-tailed Tropicbirds

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Schreiber, E.A.; Schenk, G.A.; Doherty, P.F., Jr.

    2001-01-01

    In 1992, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) began incinerating U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles on Johnston Atoll (Pacific Ocean) where about 500,000 seabirds breed, including Red-tailed Tropicbirds (Phaethon rubricauda). We hypothesized that survival rates of birds were lower in those nesting downwind of the incinerator smokestack compared to those upwind, and that birds might move away from the area. From 1992 - 2000 we monitored survival and movements between areas upwind and downwind from the JACADS facility. We used a multi-strata mark recapture approach to model survival, probability of recapture and movement. Probability of recapture was significantly higher for birds in downwind areas (owing to greater recapture effort) and thus was an important 'nuisance' parameter to take into account in modeling. We found no differences in survival between birds nesting upwind ( 0.8588) and downwind (0.8550). There was no consistent difference in movement rates between upwind or downwind areas from year to year: differences found may be attributed to differing vegetation growth and human activities between the areas. Our results suggest that JACADS has had no documentable influence on the survival and year to year movement of Red-tailed Tropicbirds.

  16. A suggested approach to applying IAEA safeguards to plutonium in weapons components

    SciTech Connect

    Lu, M.S.; Allentuck, J.

    1998-08-01

    It is the announced policy of the United States to make fissile material removed from its nuclear weapons stockpile subject to the US-IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. Much of this material is plutonium in the form of pits. The application of traditional IAEA safeguards would reveal Restricted Data to unauthorized persons which is prohibited by US law and international treaties. Prior to the availability of a facility for the conversion of the plutonium in the pits to a non-sensitive form this obvious long-term solution to the problem is foreclosed. An alternative near-term approach to applying IAEA safeguards while preserving the necessary degree of confidentiality is required. This paper identifies such an approach. It presents in detail the form of the US declaration; the safeguards objectives which are met; inspection techniques which are utilized and the conclusion which the IAEA could reach concerning the contents of each item and the aggregate of all items. The approach would reveal the number of containers and the aggregate mass of plutonium in a set of n containers presented to the IAEA for verification while protecting data of the isotopic composition and plutonium mass of individual components. The suggested approach provides for traceability from the time the containers are sealed until the conversion of the plutonium to a non-sensitive form.

  17. [Neurological effects of chemical and biological weapons].

    PubMed

    Inoue, Naohide

    2003-11-01

    Neurological manifestations of chemical and biological weapons are reviewed. Nerve agents in current use, storage, or production include tabun, sarin, soman and VX. The initial effects of exposure to a nerve agent depend on the dose and on the route of exposure. Sarin, the agent studied most thoroughly in man in Matumoto and Tokyo attacked by Aum shinrikyo will cause miosis, rhinorrehea and shortness of breath are initial complaints immediately after inhalation exposure of the vapor. The severe cases showed loss of consciousness and convulsions. Respiratory arrest may occur. The most toxic of the nerve agents is VX. It is thought to be 100 times as toxic as sarin for humans by the percutaneous rout. The similar findings to sarin exposure are also observed in cases exposured to VX. Atropin and PAM will be effective in the early stage. BZ (benzilate) is a delayed onset incapacitation agent. It causes severe hallucination. The cyanide compounds are among the most rapidly acting of war gases, resulting in death. Anthrax has been the most attractive biological weapon for a long time. Anthrax is an acute bacterial infection of the skin and lungs in man and animals. Meningoencephalitis has been reported in the terminal stage in anthrax infection. In autopsy, it is really confirmed in the characteristic findings of the meningeal abnormality. The potential weaponization of variola virus continues to pose a military threat because the aerosol infectivity of the virus and the development of susceptible populations. A high rate of lethality, a staunch resistance to treatments and a rapid onset of severe generalised muscle weakness make botulinum toxin a suitable agent for biological warfare particularly by oral administration. PMID:15152492

  18. Cardiac fibrillation risk of Taser weapons.

    PubMed

    Leitgeb, Norbert

    2014-06-01

    The debate on potential health hazards associated with delivering electric discharges to incapacitated subjects, in particular on whether electric discharge weapons are lethal, less lethal or non-lethal, is still controversial. The cardiac fibrillation risks of Taser weapons X26 and X3 have been investigated by measuring the delivered high-tension pulses in dependence on load impedance. Excitation thresholds and sinus-to-Taser conversion factors have been determined by numerical modeling of endocardial, myocardial, and epicardial cells. Detailed quantitative assessment of cardiac electric exposure has been performed by numerical simulation at the normal-weighted anatomical model NORMAN. The impact of anatomical variation has been quantified at an overweight model (Visible Man), both with a spatial resolution of 2 2 2 mm voxels. Spacing and location of dart electrodes were systematically varied and the worst-case position determined. Based on volume-weighted cardiac exposure assessment, the fibrillation probability of the worst-case hit was determined to 30% (Taser X26) and 9% (Taser X3). The overall risk assessment of Taser application accounting for realistic spatial hit distributions was derived from training sessions of police officers under realistic scenarios and by accounting for the influence of body (over-)weight as well as gender. The analysis of the results showed that the overall fibrillation risk of Taser use is not negligible. It is higher at Taser X26 than at Taser X3 and amounts to about 1% for Europeans with an about 20% higher risk for Asians. Results demonstrate that enhancement as well as further reduction of fibrillation risk depends on responsible use or abuse of Taser weapons. PMID:24776896

  19. Immobilization of excess weapons plutonium in Russia

    SciTech Connect

    Borisov, G B; Jardine, L J; Mansourov, O A

    1999-01-25

    In this paper, we examine the logic and framework for the development of a capability to immobilize excess Russian weapons plutonium by the year 2004. The initial activities underway in Russia, summarized here, include engineering feasibility studies of the immobilization of plutonium-containing materials at the Krasnoyarsk and Mayak industrial sites. In addition, research and development (R&D) studies are underway at Russian institutes to develop glass and ceramic forms suitable for the immobilization of plutonium-containing materials, residues, and wastes and for their geologic disposal.

  20. HWIL testing of smart weapon systems

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Swamp, Michael; Havlicsek, Howard

    2005-05-01

    The increase in sophistication of shoulder and gun launched smart weapon systems have increased the demands placed on the flight motion simulator. The high spin rate and accelerations seen during launch drastically exceed the capability of the roll axes on today"s motion simulators. Improvements are necessary to the bearing and drive system to support these requirements. This paper documents the requirements, design, and testing of a flight motion simulator produced to meet these challenges. This design can be incorporated into a new flight motion simulator, or as this paper describes, can be retrofitted into an existing flight motion simulator to improve its capability.

  1. European security, nuclear weapons and public confidence

    SciTech Connect

    Gutteridge, W.

    1982-01-01

    This book presents papers on nuclear arms control in Europe. Topics considered include political aspects, the balance of power, nuclear disarmament in Europe, the implications of new conventional technologies, the neutron bomb, theater nuclear weapons, arms control in Northern Europe, naval confidence-building measures in the Baltic, the strategic balance in the Arctic Ocean, Arctic resources, threats to European stability, developments in South Africa, economic cooperation in Europe, European collaboration in science and technology after Helsinki, European cooperation in the area of electric power, and economic cooperation as a factor for the development of European security and cooperation.

  2. How (not) to sell nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Jehiel, P.; Moldovanu, B.; Stacchetti, E.

    1996-09-01

    The authors offer a model of interactions between potential buyers of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials. The model depicts a sale that creates negative externalities on non-acquirers. Section I presents the market model where the seller owns an indivisible good, and there are several potential buyers. Section II describes the seller`s revenue-maximazation problem. Section III presents an optimal mechanism for the complete information case. An auction form is described that has an equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies. 25 refs.

  3. History of Nuclear Weapons Design and Production

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Oelrich, Ivan

    2007-04-01

    The nuclear build-up of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as an arms race. Some part was indeed a bilateral competition, but much was the result of automatic application of technical advances as they became available, without careful consideration of strategic implications. Thus, the history of nuclear weapon design is partly designers responding to stated military needs and partly the world responding to constant innovations in nuclear capability. Today, plans for a new nuclear warhead are motivated primarily by the desire to maintain a nuclear design and production capability for the foreseeable future.

  4. DOE battery program for weapon applications

    SciTech Connect

    Clark, R.P.; Baldwin, A.R.

    1992-01-01

    This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

  5. DOE battery program for weapon applications

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Clark, R. P.; Baldwin, A. R.

    This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting, and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

  6. DOE battery program for weapon applications

    SciTech Connect

    Clark, R.P.; Baldwin, A.R.

    1992-11-01

    This report discusses the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Battery program which originates from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and involves activities ranging from research, design and development to testing, consulting and production support. The primary customer is the DOE/Office of Defense Programs, although work is also done for various Department of Defense agencies and their contractors. The majority of the SNL activities involve thermal battery (TB) and lithium ambient temperature battery (LAMB)technologies. Smaller efforts are underway in the areas of silver oxide/zinc and nickel oxide/cadmium batteries as well as double layer capacitors.

  7. Structural adaptations to diverse fighting styles in sexually selected weapons

    PubMed Central

    McCullough, Erin L.; Tobalske, Bret W.; Emlen, Douglas J.

    2014-01-01

    The shapes of sexually selected weapons differ widely among species, but the drivers of this diversity remain poorly understood. Existing explanations suggest weapon shapes reflect structural adaptations to different fighting styles, yet explicit tests of this hypothesis are lacking. We constructed finite element models of the horns of different rhinoceros beetle species to test whether functional specializations for increased performance under species-specific fighting styles could have contributed to the diversification of weapon form. We find that horns are both stronger and stiffer in response to species-typical fighting loads and that they perform more poorly under atypical fighting loads, which suggests weapons are structurally adapted to meet the functional demands of fighting. Our research establishes a critical link between weapon form and function, revealing one way malemale competition can drive the diversification of animal weapons. PMID:25201949

  8. Performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Pei; Liu, Min; Su, Yu; Zhang, Ke

    2014-12-01

    High energy laser weapons are ready for some of today's most challenging military applications. Based on the analysis of the main tactical/technical index and combating process of high energy laser weapon, a performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon was established. Firstly, the index decomposition and workflow of high energy laser weapon was proposed. The entire system was composed of six parts, including classical target, platform of laser weapon, detect sensor, tracking and pointing control, laser atmosphere propagation and damage assessment module. Then, the index calculation modules were designed. Finally, anti-missile interception simulation was performed. The system can provide reference and basis for the analysis and evaluation of high energy laser weapon efficiency.

  9. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  10. EFFECT OF SOURCE AND RATE OF NITROGEN AND SULFUR FERTILIZER ON YIELD, QUALITY, AND MINERAL COMPOSITION OF STOCKPILED TALL FESCUE

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Field research was conducted for 2 yr to determine the effect of nitrogen (N) and sulfur (S) source and rate effects on stockpiled tall fescue (Festuca arundinacea Schreb.) forage yield, quality, and mineral content at different harvest dates. High lysine fertilizer (HLF), which contains approximate...

  11. Soil microbial characteristics and seed bank dynamics of stock-piled top soils in ther western Rio Grande Plains

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Increased energy extraction has impacted rangelands throughout the western U.S. Ecological restoration can be enhanced with proper management of affected top soils. Little information exists on effects of stockpiling on soil microbial community composition and functionality and seed bank dynamics. T...

  12. Vulnerability of digitized platforms to modern rf electromagnetic weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Frater, Michael R.; Ryan, Michael J.

    2001-08-01

    Radio Frequency Directed Energy Weapons (RF DEW) have the potential to disrupt the operation of, or cause the failure of, a broad range of military electronic equipment. Over the past 30 years, there has been considerable effort in the development of these weapons. Recent reports suggest that a number of countries, including the USA and Russia, have fielded such weapons. This paper examines the potential performance of non-nuclear RF DEW.

  13. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-03-16

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository.

  14. Growth Performance by Fall-Calving Cow-Calf Pairs Grazing Tall Fescue Pastures with Different Proportions Stockpiled Until Late Fall

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Stockpiling tall fescue (Festuca arundinacea Schreb.) is a viable but variable management practice used to reduce winter feed costs for cattle. The objective of this 2-yr study was to determine the impact of stockpiling different proportions of total fescue acreage on growth performance of fall-calv...

  15. Open architecture applied to next-generation weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rose, Leo J.; Shaver, Jonathan; Young, Quinn; Christensen, Jacob

    2014-06-01

    The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) has postulated a new weapons concept known as Flexible Weapons to define and develop technologies addressing a number of challenges. Initial studies on capability attributes of this concept have been conducted and AFRL plans to continue systems engineering studies to quantify metrics against which the value of capabilities can be assessed. An important aspect of Flexible Weapons is having a modular "plug-n-play" hardware and software solution, supported by an Open Architecture and Universal Armament Interface (UAI) common interfaces. The modular aspect of Flexible Weapons is a means to successfully achieving interoperability and composability at the weapon level. Interoperability allows for vendor competition, timely technology refresh, and avoids costs by ensuring standard interfaces widely supported in industry, rather than an interface unique to a particular vendor. Composability provides for the means to arrange an open end set of useful weapon systems configurations. The openness of Flexible Weapons is important because it broadens the set of computing technologies, software updates, and other technologies to be introduced into the weapon system, providing the warfighter with new capabilities at lower costs across the life cycle. One of the most critical steps in establishing a Modular, Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) for weapons is the validation of compliance with the standard.

  16. INTERIOR OF WEAPONS CLEANING CLASSROOM. view TO WEST. Plattsburgh ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    INTERIOR OF WEAPONS CLEANING CLASSROOM. view TO WEST. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Combined Arms Training Maintenance Building, Off Perimeter Road in Firearms Training Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

  17. Non-strategic sea-based nuclear weapons. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Tol, V.; Maarten, J.

    1990-06-22

    This paper addresses the complex political and military issues surrounding deployment of Non-Strategic Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons. These include weapons designed for Nuclear Anti-Air and Anti-Submarine warfare, Nuclear Gravity bombs, and Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise missiles. Specifically, this study examines the serious arguments made for and against these weapons on military and political grounds. Following the discussion of specific pros and cons, three alternative approaches to dealing with these weapons are examined as the Navy's current positions.

  18. Diagnosis and Prognosis of Weapon Systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Nolan, Mary; Catania, Rebecca; deMare, Gregory

    2005-01-01

    The Prognostics Framework is a set of software tools with an open architecture that affords a capability to integrate various prognostic software mechanisms and to provide information for operational and battlefield decision-making and logistical planning pertaining to weapon systems. The Prognostics NASA Tech Briefs, February 2005 17 Framework is also a system-level health -management software system that (1) receives data from performance- monitoring and built-in-test sensors and from other prognostic software and (2) processes the received data to derive a diagnosis and a prognosis for a weapon system. This software relates the diagnostic and prognostic information to the overall health of the system, to the ability of the system to perform specific missions, and to needed maintenance actions and maintenance resources. In the development of the Prognostics Framework, effort was focused primarily on extending previously developed model-based diagnostic-reasoning software to add prognostic reasoning capabilities, including capabilities to perform statistical analyses and to utilize information pertaining to deterioration of parts, failure modes, time sensitivity of measured values, mission criticality, historical data, and trends in measurement data. As thus extended, the software offers an overall health-monitoring capability.

  19. The dangers of new weapon systems

    SciTech Connect

    Gutteridge, W.; Taylor, T.

    1983-01-01

    Clearly any effort to understand the impact of technological change on arms control must consider the nature of that change. It is this to which the first four papers in this volume are devoted. If there is conventional wisdom here, it says that change is rapid and rather unpredictable. Furthermore it is generated by large organisations of scientists, soldiers and officials in both East and West pursuing what they see as the technologically possible. Only rarely do they need to refer to each other's achievements to justify their own efforts. The papers in this section comment directly or indirectly on the elements in this conventional wisdom. Long's contribution, for instance, analyses US efforts to operate a decision-making system meant to produce weapons which fill a military need rather than just incorporate some appealing technological opportunity. His writing reminds us that technological advances rarely spring from the blue but from areas where progress seemed possible and to which funds had been directed. Tsipis, for his part, relies on the laws of physics to support his scepticism of the prospects for 'beam' weapons.

  20. Fungi and fungal toxins as weapons.

    PubMed

    Paterson, R Russell M

    2006-09-01

    Recent aggressive attacks on innocent citizens have resulted in governments increasing security. However, there is a good case for prevention rather than reaction. Bioweapons, mycotoxins, fungal biocontrol agents (FBCA), and even pharmaceuticals contain, or are, toxins and need to be considered in the context of the new paradigm. Is it desirable to discuss such issues? None of the fungi are (a) as toxic as botulinum toxin from Clostridium botulinum, and (b) as dangerous as nuclear weapons. One toxin may be defined as a pharmaceutical and vice versa simply by a small change in concentration or a moiety. Mycotoxins are defined as naturally occurring toxic compounds obtained from fungi. They are the biggest chronic health risk when incorporated into the diet. The current list of fungal toxins as biochemical weapons is small, although awareness is growing of the threats they may pose. T-2 toxin is perhaps the biggest concern. A clear distinction is required between the biological (fungus) and chemical (toxin) aspects of the issue. There is an obvious requirement to be able to trace these fungi and compounds in the environment and to know when concentrations are abnormal. Many FBCA, produce toxins. This paper indicates how to treat mycotoxicosis and decontaminate mycotoxins. There is considerable confusion and inconsistency surrounding this topic which requires assessment in an impartial and scientific manner. PMID:16908123