Science.gov

Sample records for acquiring nuclear weapons

  1. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    SciTech Connect

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-09

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  2. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-01

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  3. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-01-03

    William Potter , and Nikolai Sokov, Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe, The James Martin Center For...See William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons that People Forget,” International Herald Tribune, May 31, 2000. 87 Sam Nunn, Igor...their security.97 94 Kent Harris , “NATO Allies Want U.S. Nuclear Weapons out of Europe

  4. Virtual nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.

    1997-08-01

    The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

  5. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOEpatents

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  6. Effects of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sartori, Leo

    1983-01-01

    Fundamental principles governing nuclear explosions and their effects are discussed, including three components of a nuclear explosion (thermal radiation, shock wave, nuclear radiation). Describes how effects of these components depend on the weapon's yield, its height of burst, and distance of detonation point. Includes effects of three…

  7. The nuclear weapons world

    SciTech Connect

    Burke, P.

    1988-01-01

    This book presents insight into the technical world of weapons production. It discusses accountability in nuclear weapons decisionmaking. Nuclear decisions and the weapons and strategy they concern are too mammoth, too complex and too intimidating a subject for most of us to grapple with. The more so because informed debate is rare, and because information is difficult to obtain. In Britain, Parliamentary questions receive evasive answers or no answers at all, and the rationale of official secrecy is used as a reason to reveal less and less about decisions on national defense: between 1981 and 1987, for example, the number of open government documents published on defence fell from fifty-seven to two. In the case of NATO, decisions on nuclear strategy into the next century are taken in secret by defence ministers meeting in the Nuclear Planning Group.

  8. Nuclear Weapons and Schools.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Howie, David I.

    1984-01-01

    The growing debate on nuclear weapons in recent years has begun to make inroads into school curricula. Elementary and secondary school teachers now face the important task of educating their students on issues relating to nuclear war without indoctrinating them to a particular point of view. (JBM)

  9. Pakistans Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-02-12

    2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A. Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve ...strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan’s...context where these broader tensions and conflicts are present. 1 Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been ongoing

  10. US nuclear weapons policy

    SciTech Connect

    May, M.

    1990-12-05

    We are closing chapter one'' of the nuclear age. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union and to Europe, some of the major determinants of nuclear policy will not be what they have been for the last forty-five years. Part of the task for US nuclear weapons policy is to adapt its nuclear forces and the oganizations managing them to the present, highly uncertain, but not urgently competitive situation between the US and the Soviet Union. Containment is no longer the appropriate watchword. Stabilization in the face of uncertainty, a more complicated and politically less readily communicable goal, may come closer. A second and more difficult part of the task is to deal with what may be the greatest potential source of danger to come out of the end of the cold war: the breakup of some of the cooperative institutions that managed the nuclear threat and were created by the cold war. These cooperative institutions, principally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Warsaw Pact, the US-Japan alliance, were not created specifically to manage the nuclear threat, but manage it they did. A third task for nuclear weapons policy is that of dealing with nuclear proliferation under modern conditions when the technologies needed to field effective nuclear weapons systems and their command and control apparatus are ever more widely available, and the leverage over some potential proliferators, which stemmed from superpower military support, is likely to be on the wane. This paper will make some suggestions regarding these tasks, bearing in mind that the unsettled nature of that part of the world most likely to become involved in nuclear weapons decisions today must make any suggestions tentative and the allowance for surprise more than usually important.

  11. Nuclear weapons, nuclear effects, nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Bing, G.F.

    1991-08-20

    This paper provides a brief and mostly non-technical description of the militarily important features of nuclear weapons, of the physical phenomena associated with individual explosions, and of the expected or possible results of the use of many weapons in a nuclear war. Most emphasis is on the effects of so-called ``strategic exchanges.``

  12. Proliferation of nuclear weapons: opportunities for control and abolition.

    PubMed

    Sidel, Victor W; Levy, Barry S

    2007-09-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. "Horizontal" proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. "Vertical" proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation--and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons--involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large.

  13. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition

    PubMed Central

    Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690

  14. Nuclear Weapons and Science Education.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wellington, J. J.

    1984-01-01

    Provides suggestions on how science teachers can, and should, deal with the nuclear weapons debate in a balanced and critical way. Includes a table outlining points for and against deterrence and disarmament. (JN)

  15. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-04-01

    complimentary. For- mer NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and for- mer senior Pentagon official Franklin Miller accused Germany of lifting the lid of...President Barack Obama, speech on nuclear weapons, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009. 3. Franklin Miller, George Robertson , and Kori Schake, Ger...US Nuclear Weapons 1945-2009. 40. During the Cold War, two U.S. air bases in the United States—Cannon, NM, and Seymour Johnson, NC—had respon

  16. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-12-19

    officials, including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister Ryabkov, have indicated that it is too soon to move forward on negotiations...Sergei Lavrov , have stated that a future arms control agreement should also include limits on missile defenses, strategic-range weapons that carry...conventional warheads, and possibly weapons in space. Minister Lavrov stated, specifically, that it is impossible to discuss only one aspect of the

  17. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-02-14

    several Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister Ryabkov, have indicated that it is too soon to move forward on... Lavrov , have stated that a future arms control agreement should also include limits on missile defenses, strategic-range weapons that carry conventional...warheads, and possibly weapons in space. Minister Lavrov stated, specifically, that it is impossible to discuss only one aspect of the problem at

  18. Nuclear weapon reliability evaluation methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.

    1993-06-01

    This document provides an overview of those activities that are normally performed by Sandia National Laboratories to provide nuclear weapon reliability evaluations for the Department of Energy. These reliability evaluations are first provided as a prediction of the attainable stockpile reliability of a proposed weapon design. Stockpile reliability assessments are provided for each weapon type as the weapon is fielded and are continuously updated throughout the weapon stockpile life. The reliability predictions and assessments depend heavily on data from both laboratory simulation and actual flight tests. An important part of the methodology are the opportunities for review that occur throughout the entire process that assure a consistent approach and appropriate use of the data for reliability evaluation purposes.

  19. What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2007-03-01

    Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

  20. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    ScienceCinema

    Hart, Mark

    2016-07-12

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  1. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Hart, Mark

    2014-11-20

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  2. Counterproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-04-01

    an occurrence. In his book, Atomic Tragedy, Sean Malloy writes that Henry Stimson, the United States Secretary of War, warned in April, 1945 that...Ibid., 380. 41 Ibid. 42 Sean L. Malloy , Atomic Tragedy: Henry L. Stimson and the Decision to use the Bomb Against Japan (Ithaca, New York...Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 96-97. 45 Robert M. Gates, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office

  3. The Forbidden Weapon - The Employment of Army Tactical Nuclear Weapons.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1991-02-01

    needs to retain a tactical nuclear weapons capability because TNW, if needed on the battlefield, can be delivered by Air Force or Navy systems . 14...delivery sys- tem. Secondly, remaining Army tactical nuclear weapons systems may be negotiated to reduced levels or relinquished in the not too distant...tactical nuclear weapons system by 1954 to provide the Army with a real- istic TNW capability. The Corporal surface-to-surfacE missile, with a seventy-five

  4. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-02-22

    Fast, reliable, and accurate communications are essential for nuclear weapon accident response operations. Moreover, securing adequate internal ...activities near the scene of a nuclear weapon accident to speed the flow of information to the public and the internal audience. Although it is 183...Departments and Agencies in a nuclear weapon accident. Inherent in this event are the relationships between international , national, State, and

  5. Nuclear weapons and regional conflict

    SciTech Connect

    Latter, A.L.; Martinelli, E.A.

    1993-05-01

    An important national defense objective for the US in the post cold-war era -- according to Secretary of Defense, Cheney is to deter regional conflicts. To satisfy this objective there is more or less general agreement that nuclear weapons are not needed, especially against regional powers like Iraq that do not (as yet) have a nuclear capability. Modern conventional weapons (PGMs), it is believed, are adequate when used in the traditional way of fighting: massive ground forces with heavy ground equipment, supported by air and naval forces. Of course, there are arguments against this view. For example, nuclear advocates call attention to deeply buried targets that are unattackable with conventional munitions. But this argument, and others, for US use (or threat of use) of nuclear weapons are presently discounted in favor of the political/moral advantages of a no-first-use policy. We do not wish to take sides in this debate. We believe, however, that the debate win continue as political, military, technical and economic factors undergo inevitable changes. In this brief paper, we want to present another pro-nuclear argument which, to the best of our knowledge, has received little or no attention. This argument, we believe, could become important in weighing the pros and cons of the debate if domestic pressures cause the defense budget to undergo such severe cuts that we must either abandon our political commitments or adopt a non-traditional war-fighting strategy that is effective under a greatly reduced defense budget.

  6. Nuclear Weapons Complex reconfiguration study

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    Shortly after assuming duties as Secretary of Energy, I reviewed the Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization Report'' submitted to the Congress in January 1989 as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 1988 and 1989. My review showed that several of the report's assumptions needed to be re-evaluated. During this eighteen-month review, dramatic world changes forced further reassessments of the future Nuclear Weapons Complex. These changes are reflected in the new report. The new report presents a plan to achieve a reconfigured complex, called Complex-21. Complex-21 would be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operated than the Complex of today. Complex-21 would be able to safely and reliability support nuclear deterrent stockpile objectives set forth by the President and funded by the Congress. It would be consistent with realities of the emerging international security environment and flexible enough to accommodate the likely range of deterrent contingencies. In addition, Complex-21 would be constructed and operated to comply with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and orders. Achieving Complex-21 will require significant resources. This report provides and organized approach toward selecting the most appropriate configuration for Complex-21, satisfying environmental requirements, and minimizing costs. The alternative -- to continue to use piecemeal fixes to run an antiquated complex -- will be more expensive and provide a less reliable Nuclear Weapons Complex. As a consequence, implementation of the Complex-21 plan is considered necessary to ensure continued viability of our nuclear deterrent.

  7. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  8. Nuclear weapons testing

    SciTech Connect

    Heylin, M.

    1988-02-15

    The author examines the history of efforts to ban, or at least constrain, nuclear tests. The issue has been marked by shifts in attitude by the superpowers in recent times. The Reagan Administration sees a comprehensive test ban only as a very long-term goal for the U.S. The Soviets, on the other hand, have been pushing extremely hard lately for a ban on all testing. The author discusses the pros and cons of such a ban by examining the arguments of the U.S. Department of Energy, Nobel Laureate Glenn T. Seaborg, and Associate Director for Defense Systems at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory George H. Miller. Other issues that are discussed include verification, joint testing, and reliability. He concludes with a discussion of the future of the ban.

  9. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Their Purpose and Placement

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-06-01

    nuclear detonation is a strategic event, politically and militarily, regardless of the yield or delivery means. - Richard Weitz, “The Historical ...on nuclear weapons. Focusing on tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) facilitates a discussion free from many of these historical arguments. The value...an overview of previous definitions for TNW before creating his own. In “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic

  10. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-09-01

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures and dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.

  11. Radioactive Fallout From Nuclear Weapons Testing ...

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    2016-05-16

    Detonating nuclear weapons above ground sends radioactive materials into the atmosphere from the ground level up to very high elevations. Overtime, these materials settle out of the atmosphere and fall to the ground. Fallout typically contains hundreds of different radionuclides. Since the end of aboveground nuclear weapons testing, radionuclides have largely decayed away.

  12. Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, J.C. ); Kay, D.A. )

    1992-07-01

    UN inspectors discovered an electromagnetic isotope separation factory that put Iraq just 18-30 months away from having enough material for a bomb. They also found European centrifuge technology and plans for an implosion device. The inspections of Iraq mandated by the United Nations as a cease-fire condition at the end of the Gulf War in February 1991 have revealed a clandestine nuclear materials production and weapons design program of unexpected size and sophistication. The total value of that program, in terms of equipment and personnel deployed between 1981 and 1991, may be on the order of $5-10 billion. The program employed an estimated 7000 scientist and 20,000 workers. 6 refs., 4 figs.

  13. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed Central

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-01-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

  14. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war

    SciTech Connect

    Harris, J.B.; Markusen, E.

    1986-01-01

    This book contains 12 sections, each consisting of several papers. Some of the section titles are: Is Hiroshima Our Text.; Nuclear Weapons and Their Effects; Can Nuclear War be Survived.; The Debate Over U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons Policy; and Costs of the Arms Race.

  15. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

    SciTech Connect

    1994-03-01

    The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) that will extend from the US-Mexican border to Antarctica`s territorial boundaries, including large areas of open ocean. Under the treaty, signatory states pledge not to test, use, produce, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons; to use nuclear materials and facilities {open_quotes}exclusively for peaceful purposes;{close_quotes} and not to permit the stationing or development of nuclear weapons on their territories.

  16. Nuclear Weapons Effects (Self-Teaching Materials).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Developed by the Civil Defense Preparedness Agency, this autoinstructional text deals with nuclear weapons effects. The destructive effects of an atomic blast are first introduced, and then long-term radioactive consequences are stressed. (CP)

  17. Computational Challenges in Nuclear Weapons Simulation

    SciTech Connect

    McMillain, C F; Adams, T F; McCoy, M G; Christensen, R B; Pudliner, B S; Zika, M R; Brantley, P S; Vetter, J S; May, J M

    2003-08-29

    After a decade of experience, the Stockpile Stewardship Program continues to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons. The Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASCI) program was established to provide leading edge, high-end simulation capabilities needed to meet the program's assessment and certification requirements. The great challenge of this program lies in developing the tools and resources necessary for the complex, highly coupled, multi-physics calculations required to simulate nuclear weapons. This paper describes the hardware and software environment we have applied to fulfill our nuclear weapons responsibilities. It also presents the characteristics of our algorithms and codes, especially as they relate to supercomputing resource capabilities and requirements. It then addresses impediments to the development and application of nuclear weapon simulation software and hardware and concludes with a summary of observations and recommendations on an approach for working with industry and government agencies to address these impediments.

  18. Large Bilateral Reductions in Superpower Nuclear Weapons.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-07-01

    Taylor and- Francis, London and Philadephia, 1984. Szilard , Leo , "Minimal Deterrent vs Saturation Parity", Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 1964, pp...reduction of nuclear weapons. Szilard (1964) describes a Minimal Deterrent alternative that involves significant reductions in strategic and theater 0...nuclear forces. Szilard uses the mutual assured destruction criteria of 25 million people and calculates a U.S. strategic force of 40 1-3 Mt weapons

  19. Initial radiations from tactical nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Loewe, W.E.

    1985-08-01

    Neutron and gamma-ray free-field kermas and fluence spectra for ranges between 1 and 2 km are presented for three tactical nuclear weapons and are compared with nuclear radiations at Hiroshima. The three tactical weapons are modeled as near-surface bursts of a fusion explosive, a fission explosive, and a suppressed-neutron explosive represented by the Little Boy bomb used at Hiroshima.

  20. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-30

    WORK UNIT NUMBER 7 . PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress,101 Independence Ave SE... 7 ; the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing October 7 . It quickly became clear that the treaty was far short of the votes for approval...build new nuclear weapons, and abandon CRS-4 7 Physicians for Social Responsibility, “PSR: Bush Nuclear Weapons Plan Sets Stage for new Bombs

  1. Cognitive Consistency in Beliefs about Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Linden

    The paper details a study supporting the hypothesis that people's opinions about nuclear arms control are influenced by their logically relevant beliefs about nuclear weapons, nuclear war, and the Soviet Union. The hypothesis should not be construed to imply that these beliefs are the only influences or the most powerful influences on arms control…

  2. Nuclear weapons databook. Volume V: British, French, and Chinese nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S.; Burrows, A.S.; Fieldhouse, R.W.

    1994-12-31

    How insecurity and the search military independence drove post World War II nuclear proliferation beyond the United States and the Soviet Union is the subject of the latest and most voluminous title in the Natural Resources Defense Council`s highly acclaimed Nuclear Weapons Databook series. Volume 5 explains how atomic and thermonuclear weapons spread to Britain, France, and China despite the political turmoil and economic hardship that beset these countries. The history of the British nuclear weapons program includes the most comprehensive collection of photos and specifications of British warheads and nuclear tests ever assembled in one publication. The role of the United States in the French nuclear weapons program is discussed. This is a comprehensive source for the mechanics and politics of nuclear weapons proliferation.

  3. The history of nuclear weapon safety devices

    SciTech Connect

    Plummer, D.W.; Greenwood, W.H.

    1998-06-01

    The paper presents the history of safety devices used in nuclear weapons from the early days of separables to the latest advancements in MicroElectroMechanical Systems (MEMS). Although the paper focuses on devices, the principles of Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety implementation will also be presented.

  4. Principles of Guided Missiles and Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Naval Personnel Program Support Activity, Washington, DC.

    Fundamentals of missile and nuclear weapons systems are presented in this book which is primarily prepared as the second text of a three-volume series for students of the Navy Reserve Officers' Training Corps and the Officer Candidate School. Following an introduction to guided missiles and nuclear physics, basic principles and theories are…

  5. Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-08-01

    every fowl of tyrant wing. Shakespeare, The Phoenix and the Turtle 1. Introduction Sixty years after the United States detonated the first nuclear...Carlyle, E. Skroch, K. Wood. 2006. Anatomy of a project to produce a first nuclear weapon. Sci. Global Security 14 163–182. International Atomic

  6. Nuclear Weapons: Concepts, Issues, and Controversies.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Reardon, Betty; And Others

    1983-01-01

    The schools must confront and deal with the issues of the nuclear weapons controversy on pain of ceasing to be relevant to the critical needs of the rising generation. Every aspect of the nuclear arms controversy needs to be discussed in secondary and university classrooms. (RM)

  7. Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-09-01

    The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera.

  8. Recapitalizing Nuclear Weapons (Walker Paper, Number 8)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-08-01

    Information Warfare and later executive officer for the Direc- tor of Operations at Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC), Scott AFB, Illinois... Allison Mc- farlane posits that all WMD are not equal and urges caution in establishing US nuclear weapons policy against the generic term WMD.13...11 August 2004, 2–3. 13. Allison Mcfarlane, “All Weapons of Mass Destruction are not Equal,” MIT Center for International Studies, Audit of

  9. Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste.

    PubMed

    Boulton, Frank

    2015-07-24

    The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the 'new nuclear build' programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology.

  10. Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

    SciTech Connect

    O'Brien, K H

    2005-08-15

    Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

  11. Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kemp, R. Scott

    2016-06-01

    Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

  12. History of Nuclear Weapons Design and Production

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Oelrich, Ivan

    2007-04-01

    The nuclear build-up of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as an arms race. Some part was indeed a bilateral competition, but much was the result of automatic application of technical advances as they became available, without careful consideration of strategic implications. Thus, the history of nuclear weapon design is partly designers responding to stated military needs and partly the world responding to constant innovations in nuclear capability. Today, plans for a new nuclear warhead are motivated primarily by the desire to maintain a nuclear design and production capability for the foreseeable future.

  13. Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

    SciTech Connect

    Burroughs, J.R.

    1991-01-01

    Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality of deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.

  14. Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-12-04

    tyrant wing.” Shakespeare, The Phoenix and the Turtle Subject classifications: Government: defense, foreign policy; Military: targeting...Carlyle, E. Skroch, K. Wood. 2006. Anatomy of a project to produce a first nuclear weapon. Sci. & Global Security. 14 163-182. 4 December 2007 35

  15. What Do Americans Know about Nuclear Weapons?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Zweigenhaft, Richard L.

    1984-01-01

    Reports on a survey of knowledge of and attitudes toward nuclear weapons. Respondents (N=938) were students and adults aged 15 to 89 who completed a 51-item questionnaire. Also reports on an experiment in which college students (N=166) were given the survey under one of four different conditions. (JN)

  16. The monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Garwin, Richard L.

    2014-05-09

    This paper partially reviews and updates the potential for monitoring and verification of nuclear weapons, including verification of their destruction. Cooperative monitoring with templates of the gamma-ray spectrum are an important tool, dependent on the use of information barriers.

  17. Nuclear Weapon Testing Limitations and International Security

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Corden, Pierce S.

    2017-01-01

    For over 50 years stopping nuclear weapon tests has been sought to support achieving international security without nuclear weapons. Testing is the critical path beyond primitive fission devices, e.g. to develop thermonuclear weapons, reduce weight and volume and increase yield. The 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts considered ways to verify a test ban. With then-limitations on seismology, and lack of in-country monitoring and on-site inspections, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits testing only in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, and is verified by National Technical Means. The US and USSR agreed to a limit of 150 kilotons on underground explosions in the 1970s-80s. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear explosions. Its International Monitoring System - seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide sensors - is being used, and has easily detected testing by the DPRK. On-site inspections will be available under an in-force Treaty. A 2012 National Academy report concludes that cheating attempts would not undermine U.S. security, and the program for monitoring and extending the life of US weapons has succeeded since US testing ceased in 1992.

  18. Defense against nuclear weapons: a decision analysis.

    PubMed

    Orient, J M

    1985-02-01

    Response to the public health threat posed by nuclear weapons is a medical imperative. The United States, in contrast to other nations, has chosen a course that assures maximal casualties in the event of a nuclear attack, on the theory that prevention of the attack is incompatible with preventive measures against its consequences, such as blast injuries and radiation sickness. A decision analysis approach clarifies the risks and benefits of a change to a strategy of preparedness.

  19. Nuclear weapon proliferation indicators and observables

    SciTech Connect

    Paternoster, Richard R

    1992-12-01

    This report discusses indicators and observables that might be present from various phases of a nuclear weapon development effort. The indicators themselves are accompanied by some general discussions of what is likely to be observable by inspection or sampling techniques. The areas discussed include nuclear materials production, materials fabrication, related technology development, testing, and scientific personnel. Brief discussions of on-site inspections, sampling techniques, and evasion of safeguards are also included.

  20. The nuclear weapons free world . We already live in

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Antonini, R.

    We do live in a nuclear weapons free world, already. After a long debate about nuclear weapons the situation today is such that, officially, no governement is in favor of them. The reason is to be found in the strongest moral stigma on nuclear weapons. Moreover the vast majority of the most influencial people share this view.

  1. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-05-05

    plutonium for another three weapons (in addition to the estimated 4 -6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).29 The 5MWe reactor was again shut...information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 05 MAY 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00...00-2009 4 . TITLE AND SUBTITLE North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d

  2. Nuclear proliferation: The diplomatic role of non-weaponized programs

    SciTech Connect

    Reynolds, R.R.

    1996-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has not seen the end of reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence or diplomacy purposes. The use of nuclear weapons for such purposes is as evident in the threshold states as in the nuclear powers. The nuclear weapon states used their nuclear weapons for deterrence, bargaining, and blackmail, even during the early years of the Cold War when the US was essentially non-Weaponized. In the nuclear non-Weaponized states in Asia a non-Weaponized deterrent relationship is developing between India and Pakistan and North Korea has used its nuclear program to restore diplomatic relations with the international community. The role of nuclear weapons in the post Cold War world is determined by the role of non-Weaponized programs in proliferating states. This paper describes examples in South Asia and the Korean peninsula and show that while an increased reliance on nuclear weapons programs may be a threat to the current non-proliferation regime, the focus on non-Weaponized programs rather than on weapons themselves actually improves international security by reducing the threat of nuclear war.

  3. The Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons Connection.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Leventhal, Paul

    1990-01-01

    Explains problems enforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Provides factual charts and details concerning the production of nuclear energy and arms, the processing and disposal of waste products, and outlines the nuclear fuel cycle. Discusses safeguards, the risk of nuclear terrorism, and ways to deal with these problems. (NL)

  4. The Nuclear Power/Nuclear Weapons Connection.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Totten, Sam; Totten, Martha Wescoat

    1985-01-01

    Once they have nuclear power, most countries will divert nuclear materials from commercial to military programs. In excerpts from the book "Facing the Danger" (by Totten, S. and M. W., Crossing Press, 1984), five anti-nuclear activists explain how and why they have been addressing the nuclear connection. (RM)

  5. Changing Soviet views of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Sloss, L. Associates, Washington, DC )

    1990-10-01

    The purpose of this paper is to summarize current Soviet views about nuclear weapons, and to assess the implications of these views for US policies and programs. I will focus particularly on implications of interest to the nuclear laboratories. The task is complicated by the fact that Soviet views about nuclear weapons are not straightforward. There are certain benefits from glasnost in that there now is more open debate about a range of issues in the Soviet Union, including defense issues. Thus, we now have a great deal of published material to draw upon in assessing Soviet views, and experts in the West can talk much more freely to Soviet experts. However, this information explosion makes it more difficult to discriminate signal from noise, particularly as there continues to be both propaganda and deception in Soviet statements about defense issues. Clearly, some Soviet statements about nuclear weapons are designed to influence attitudes and actions in the West. I shall cite some examples in this paper.

  6. Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

    SciTech Connect

    Cornwell, G.C.

    1998-12-01

    Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.

  7. What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2011-04-01

    Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

  8. Revitalizing the Nuclear Weapons Enterprise

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-03-01

    units failing Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections ( NORI ). In assessing the Air Force, the Schlesinger Task Force found a cause for these...all of the time. For example, the Air Force unit involved in the “Bent Spear” incident in 2007 had passed their NORI about 16 months earlier.52

  9. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, and the Arms Race.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Hollander, Jack, Ed.

    A symposium was organized to reexamine the realities of vertical proliferation between the United States and the Soviet Union and to place into perspective the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, including the possible role of commercial nuclear power in facilitating proliferation. The four invited symposium…

  10. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    SciTech Connect

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to transform the

  11. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1977-01-01

    surface explosion, gases continue to expand, although 62 DESCRIPTIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS mote slowly than initially, and form a tion. RAINIER was a 1.7...SOL.IOIFII:D - POINT 2.104 The effects of the RAINIER MOLTEN ROCK event of Operation Plumbbob in 1957evet o OpraionPlu~bob n 157 Figure 2.1󈧇. The...weather bulkheads may render useless stabilizer bulkheads and the fuse!age interior equipment mounted on or near frame near the cockpit were buckled

  12. Nuclear Weapons Effects Mitigation Techniques

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-06-01

    radiation will set fire to combustible materials, result in flash blind6ess or burns of the eyes, and cause personnel casualties due to skin burns...nookout ýiou] d help. AlI so remove all types of )Yeglorusesn tc prvovnt suhnorlulent Iinjur-y finm the blant wave. ’--"’Minimize~p expostid skin area.9...341 As an individual, one of the simplest ways to protect yourself beore a nuclear attack in to keep exposed skin ar’eas to a minimum. The chances of

  13. Physics in the Confrontation of Nuclear Weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Toevs, James

    2011-03-01

    Had the detonations on 9/11 involved nuclear explosives rather than jet fuel the number of deaths and the costs would have been multiplied by 100 or 1,000. This talk will briefly describe the nuclear threat and then focus on the technologies, both extant and evolving, for the detection and interdiction of clandestine trafficking of nuclear weapons and nuclear and radiological material. The methods vary from passive detection of heat, gamma radiation, neutrons, or other signatures from nuclear material, through radiological approaches to examine contents of vehicles and cargo containers, to active interrogation concepts that are under development. All of these methods have major physics components ranging from simple gamma ray detection as learned in a senior undergraduate lab to the latest ideas in muon production and acceleration.

  14. Nuclear energy in a nuclear weapon free world

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph

    2009-01-01

    The prospect of a nuclear renaissance has revived a decades old debate over the proliferation and terrorism risks of the use of nuclear power. This debate in the last few years has taken on an added dimension with renewed attention to disarmament. Increasingly, concerns that proliferation risks may reduce the prospects for realizing the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world are being voiced.

  15. Patenting the bomb: nuclear weapons, intellectual property, and technological control.

    PubMed

    Wellerstein, Alex

    2008-03-01

    During the course of the Manhattan Project, the U.S. government secretly attempted to acquire a monopoly on the patent rights for inventions used in the production of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. The use of patents as a system of control, while common for more mundane technologies, would seem at first glance to conflict with the regimes of secrecy that have traditionally been associated with nuclear weapons. In explaining the origins and operations of the Manhattan Project patent system, though, this essay argues that the utilization of patents was an ad hoc attempt at legal control of the atomic bomb by Manhattan Project administrators, focused on the monopolistic aspects of the patent system and preexisting patent secrecy legislation. From the present perspective, using patents as a method of control for such weapons seems inadequate, if not unnecessary; but at the time, when the bomb was a new and essentially unregulated technology, patents played an important role in the thinking of project administrators concerned with meaningful postwar control of the bomb.

  16. Nuclear weapons issues in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Joeck, N.

    1993-07-02

    This report discusses how the US can play a productive mediating role in South Asia by engaging India and Pakistan in an international forum to manage nuclear weapons, as Edward Teller advocated. India and Pakistan have developed their nuclear capabilities because they fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten fear their neighbors, not because they want to threaten the US. The appropriate response for the US, therefore, is diplomatic engagement and negotiations. In addition to the international approach, encouragement and facilitation of regional and bilateral interactions will also be important. Formal arms control agreements have been reached, but less formal confidence-building measures, and unilateral security pledges may well be combined to form a more secure strategic environment in South Asia than a nuclear armed confrontation across the porous South Asian border.

  17. Non-strategic sea-based nuclear weapons. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Tol, V.; Maarten, J.

    1990-06-22

    This paper addresses the complex political and military issues surrounding deployment of Non-Strategic Sea-Based Nuclear Weapons. These include weapons designed for Nuclear Anti-Air and Anti-Submarine warfare, Nuclear Gravity bombs, and Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise missiles. Specifically, this study examines the serious arguments made for and against these weapons on military and political grounds. Following the discussion of specific pros and cons, three alternative approaches to dealing with these weapons are examined as the Navy's current positions.

  18. Is There Future Utility in Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Weapons Save Lives

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-02-13

    scale great power war, which has been avoided worldwide since the Atomic Age began. The United States must continue to resource the nuclear deterrent...breaking out.”2 Effectively, the argument is that nuclear weapons do not stop war. This is correct. A historical review from the inception of the Atomic ...financial tradeoffs, and argue that “… the price of global elimination of starvation, provision of health care, provision of shelter and clean water

  19. Controlling nuclear weapons: Democracy versus guardianship

    SciTech Connect

    Dahl, R.

    1985-01-01

    This is not a new plan for arms control but an inquiry as to whether democratic institutions can cope with the major problems of public policy today. Robert Dahl points out that decisions on nuclear weapons (or disposal of nuclear waste, reactor safety or industrial pollution, to cite a few examples) are too complex and technical for the average citizen; yet if they are turned over to an elite of experts or ''wise men'' or guardians, there is no guarantee that those men will have the moral and other qualities needed to serve the public good-delegated power in these circumstances tends to become alienated power. Dahl has a partial answer: make use of the new communications technology to raise level of public knowledge and understanding.

  20. Nuclear Weapons--A Suitable Topic for the Classroom?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Eijkelhof, Harrie; And Others

    1984-01-01

    Describes the development and implementation of curriculum materials that discuss nuclear weapons and the evaluation of those materials by administrators, teachers, and students. Also discusses the place of the study of nuclear weapons in the curriculum and aims of the materials. Suggested student activities are included. (JM)

  1. DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-04-27

    2010 DoD Instruction O-5210.63, “DoD Procedures for Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials (SNM),” November 21, 2006 DoD...DOD INSTRUCTION 5210.42 DOD NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERSONNEL RELIABILITY ASSURANCE Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of...from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. Reissues and renames: DoD Instruction 5210.42, “ Nuclear Weapons Personnel

  2. DOE Nuclear Weapon Reliability Definition: History, Description, and Implementation

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, D.L.; Cashen, J.J.; Sjulin, J.M.; Bierbaum, R.L.; Kerschen, T.J.

    1999-04-01

    The overarching goal of the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapon reliability assessment process is to provide a quantitative metric that reflects the ability of the weapons to perform their intended function successfully. This white paper is intended to provide insight into the current and long-standing DOE definition of nuclear weapon reliability, which can be summarized as: The probability of achieving the specified yield, at the target, across the Stockpile-To-Target Sequence of environments, throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.

  3. Wartime nuclear weapons research in Germany and Japan.

    PubMed

    Grunden, Walter E; Walker, Mark; Yamnazaki, Masakatsu

    2005-01-01

    This article compares military research projects during the Second World War to develop nuclear weapons in Germany and Japan, two countries who lost the war and failed to create nuclear weapons. The performance and motivations of the scientists, as well as the institutional support given the work, is examined, explaining why, in each case, the project went as far as it did-but no further. The story is carried over into the postwar period, when the two cultures and their scientists had to deal with the buildup of nuclear weapons during the cold war and the new nuclear power industry.

  4. Doctors' attitudes on civil defence and nuclear weapon issues.

    PubMed

    Hunter-Brown, I H

    1989-01-01

    97 out of 219 doctors responded to a questionnaire on medical aspects of nuclear weapons. A majority of the respondents considered that the then-current civil defence planning was not a valuable use of National Health Service resources, and that an attack with nuclear weapons would cause a degree of suffering beyond the profession's capacity to treat; thought doctors should have a special voice on nuclear issues; and believed Britain should not be increasing its nuclear weapons, and that if expenditure on them were reduced, the savings should go on health. The high support for organizations like MAPW was gratifying.

  5. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-04-01

    2007,” ibid.; SIPRI Yearbook 2007. 5 “Nuclear Notebook,” ibid. 6 “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” International Panel on Fissile Materials...State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under...Nuclear Weapons in Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http

  6. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-01-03

    Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy Summary North Korea’s first test of a nuclear weapon on October 9...2006, and its multiple missile tests of July 4, 2006, escalate the issue of North Korea in U.S. foreign policy. These acts show a North Korean intent...1 North Korea’s Nuclear Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 U.N

  7. Perfection and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Teleology, and Motives.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brummett, Barry

    1989-01-01

    Uses Kenneth Burke's theory of perfection to explore the vocabularies of nuclear weapons in United States public discourse and how "the Bomb" as a God term has gained imbalanced ascendancy in centers of power. (MS)

  8. A Conceptual Framework for Teaching about Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jacobson, Willard; And Others

    1983-01-01

    Concepts which represent the minimal conceptual essentials for the study of nuclear weapons in secondary level social studies classes are discussed, and issues and controversies which may rise during such a study are examined. (RM)

  9. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-02-20

    produced enough plutonium for at least six nuclear weapons and tested a nuclear weapon with a yield of under 1 kiloton in October 2006. Pyongyang shut...collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources...currently valid OMB control number. 1 . REPORT DATE 20 FEB 2008 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2008 to 00-00-2008 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

  10. Nuclear Weapons and Communication Studies: A Review Essay.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1998-01-01

    Reviews the body of work inspired by the late Cold War period, where nuclear weapons briefly became a compelling object for communication scholars. Considers the prospects for nuclear communication scholarship in post-Cold War culture. Discusses "nuclear criticism" and issues regarding the bomb in communication. (SC)

  11. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  12. Attitudes toward nuclear weapons: France, Great Britain, and Germany

    SciTech Connect

    Zinner, P.E.

    1991-10-01

    The objective of this report is to explore current attitudes in the major European countries (France, Great Britain, and Germany) toward the possession of nuclear weapons and the eventual pooling of existing national nuclear capabilities in a European nuclear force, as part of an emerging European security structure under the aegis of the European community (EC).

  13. Operation TEAPOT, 1955 Continental Nuclear Weapons Test Series

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1981-11-23

    Rock VI observer programs, troop tests, and technical service programs; AEC scientific and diagnostic experiments to evaluate the effects of the nuclear...TESLA, TURK, BEE, ESS, APPLE 1, and APPLE 2, generally involved instruction on the effects of nuclear weapons, observation of a nuclear detonation, and a...militar4 equipment and structures to withstand nuclear detonations. Scientific experiments studying the effects of each nuclear detona- tion were conducted

  14. US changes course on nuclear-weapons strategy

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gwynne, Peter

    2010-05-01

    US President Barack Obama has signalled a new approach to nuclear-weapons policy that limits their use against other states and documents how the country will ensure the viability of existing stockpiles. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which sets out the US's nuclear strategy over a 10-year period, also calls for a highly skilled workforce to ensure "the long-term safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal and to support the full range of nuclear-security work".

  15. Proliferation concerns in the Russian closed nuclear weapons complex cities : a study of regional migration behavior.

    SciTech Connect

    Flores, Kristen Lee

    2004-07-01

    The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the legacy of the USSR weapons complex with an estimated 50 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons cities containing facilities responsible for research, production, maintenance, and destruction of the weapons stockpile. The Russian Federation acquired ten such previously secret, closed nuclear weapons complex cities. Unfortunately, a lack of government funding to support these facilities resulted in non-payment of salaries to employees and even plant closures, which led to an international fear of weapons material and knowledge proliferation. This dissertation analyzes migration in 33 regions of the Russian Federation, six of which contain the ten closed nuclear weapons complex cities. This study finds that the presence of a closed nuclear city does not significantly influence migration. However, the factors that do influence migration are statistically different in regions containing closed nuclear cities compared to regions without closed nuclear cities. Further, these results show that the net rate of migration has changed across the years since the break up of the Soviet Union, and that the push and pull factors for migration have changed across time. Specifically, personal and residential factors had a significant impact on migration immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but economic infrastructure and societal factors became significant in later years. Two significant policy conclusions are derived from this research. First, higher levels of income are found to increase outmigration from regions, implying that programs designed to prevent migration by increasing incomes for closed city residents may be counter-productive. Second, this study finds that programs designed to increase capital and build infrastructure in the new Russian Federation will be more effective for employing scientists and engineers from the weapons complex, and consequently reduce the potential for emigration of

  16. The future of nuclear weapons: A Chinese perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Zhai Zhihai

    1992-12-31

    China understands very well the importance of nuclear weapons because it is the only country in the world that was seriously threatened with nuclear attacks by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and the 1970s, respectively. The events of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have fundamentally rocked the world. Most Eastern European countries have cast away their socialist regimes and are accepting Western-type democracy and market economies. Communist parties have been banned and old bureaucracies have been dismantled. The Warsaw Pact, which had existed as a symbol and unified military institution of the Eastern bloc, was quietly dissolved. The Soviet Union, the prime player of the Cold War and America`s main rival, suddenly disintegrated into fifteen independent states and no longer is a heavy-weight player in the world political arena. These developments have shaken the foundations of nuclear diplomacy and politics that have existed for forty years. The abrupt ending of the Cold War has left many questions about nuclear weapons that will not go away as easily as the war. What role, if any, will nuclear weapons play in this decade and early in the next century? Will nuclear weapons still be important in maintaining world peace as they have been during the Cold War ear? Or will nuclear weapons be a destabilizing factor in the new world order? 6 refs.

  17. The future of nuclear weapons: Proliferation in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Kamal, N.

    1992-12-31

    The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987, followed by the dramatic changes in East-West relations since 1989 and the more recent Soviet-American strategic arms limitation agreement, have greatly eased public concerns about the danger of nuclear war. The context has also changed for the Nonaligned Movement, which had made nuclear disarmament and condemnation of the concept of nuclear deterrence the primary themes of its multilateral disarmament diplomacy. More important would be the interrelationship among the states possessing nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). In any case, there is little risk of a revival of nuclear competition. Both France and China have decided to sign the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); they are the only two nuclear-weapon states that have stayed outside the regime. Meanwhile, Brazil and Argentina have moved further down the nonproliferation road by engaging in confidence-building measures and moving closer to joining the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone established under the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. South Africa has also agreed to embrace the NPT as well as a nuclear-weapons-free zone regime for the entire African continent, while North Korea has agreed to sign a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thereby allowing in principle international inspection of its nuclear facilities. In the third world regions, the dangers of nuclear proliferation and competitive nuclear buildup are most pronounced in South Asia, a region where a variety of complicating problems exist: acute threat perceptions, historical emity, religious and sectarian animosity, ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, ambitions for regional dominance, and domestic political instability. This chapter will focus primarily on South Asia, although references will also be made to other regions, where relevant. 17 refs.

  18. Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Acton, James

    2016-03-01

    U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

  19. Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

    SciTech Connect

    Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G.; Barke, R.P.

    1994-04-01

    This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

  20. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-05-27

    tested a plutonium nuclear device in October 2006. U.S. officials have cited evidence that North Korea also operates a secret highly enriched...with Iran and Syria aimed at producing nuclear weapons. On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced that it had conducted a second nuclear test . On April...Korea’s Nuclear Test and Withdrawal from the Six Party Talks..........................................1 Bush Administration-North Korean Agreements

  1. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

  2. Solid Phase Microextraction for the Analysis of Nuclear Weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Chambers, D M

    2001-06-01

    This document is a compendium of answers to commonly asked questions about solid phase microextraction as it relates to the analysis of nuclear weapons. We have also included a glossary of terms associated with this analytical method as well as pertinent weapons engineering terminology. Microextraction is a new collection technique being developed to nonintrusively sample chemicals from weapon headspace gases for subsequent analysis. The chemicals that are being targeted outgas from the high explosives and other organic materials used in the weapon assembly. This technique is therefore a valuable tool to: (1) remotely detect and assess the aging of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and, in some cases, Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) organic materials; and (2) identify potential compatibility issues (i.e., materials interactions) that should be more carefully monitored during surveillance tear-downs. Microextraction is particularly attractive because of the practical constraints inherent to the weapon surveillance procedure. To remain transparent to other core surveillance activities and fall within nuclear safety guidelines, headspace analysis of the weapons requires a procedure that: (1) maintains ambient temperature conditions; (2) allows practical collection times of less than 20 min; (3) maintains the integrity of the weapon gas volume; (4) provides reproducible and quantitative results; and (5) can identify all possible targets.

  3. Changing Our Ways of Thinking: Health Professionals and Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Neal, Mary

    1984-01-01

    Outlines the issues raised by health professionals concerned about the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war, including epidemics, civil defense, arms costs, psychosocial aspects, and ethical responsibility. Appendixes include lists of antinuclear organizations, medical professional associations, and 160 references. (SK)

  4. Nuclear Weapons and the Future: An "Unthinkable" Proposal.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Tyler, Robert L.

    1982-01-01

    The author looks ahead 30 or 40 years to see what might come of the nuclear weapons predicament. As a minimal first step in the campaign against nuclear warfare, he suggests a unilateral and complete disarmament by the United States. (AM)

  5. Psychology and Nuclear Weapon Issues: Topics, Concepts, and Bibliography.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Nelson, Linden, Comp.

    The document outlines 15 topics, each with concepts and selected references, to illustrate the relevance of psychology for understanding and coping with the threat of nuclear war. Awareness of the literature is intended to encourage psychologists to become more active in applying psychological concepts to nuclear weapons issues. The articles and…

  6. Chinese tactical nuclear weapons. Master`s thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Owens, G.B.

    1996-06-01

    The United States, Russia and Great Britain have retired all nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, China has not, China seems to value highly tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). Most studies of China`s nuclear arsenal focus on strategic nuclear weapons. This focus could mislead those trying to understand PRC TNW strategy. The purpose of this thesis is to explain China`s TNW development. China`s nuclear arsenal evolution can be described in three phases. In the first phase, China developed a limited strategic nuclear deterrent. China`s arsenal was driven by threat. Technology supplanted threat as the dominant driver during the next phase. While conducting research to miniaturize strategic warheads, were developed. During the third phase, a reduced threat caused political leaders to restrain the nuclear program. The nuclear program reverted to its primary objective - building strategic weapons, causing TNW production to level off. This study explains the last two phases of TNW development. The research goals are twofold: to compare threat and technology, the primary motivations driving TNW production; and to examine the relationship between doctrine and development, describing how one influences the other. The conclusion offers U.S. foreign policy recommendations.

  7. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-07-30

    Fissile Material Report 2007,” International Panel on Fissile Materials http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf; SIPRI Yearbook 2007...for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under pretty...Weapons in Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http

  8. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-03-30

    between 30 and 50 kilograms, enough for five to eight atomic weapons. After North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006, the six party talks...the plutonium reprocessing plant produced enough weapons grade plutonium for the production of several atomic bombs. North Korea tested an atomic...produces and tests atomic bombs, and the locations where North Korea stores plutonium and atomic bombs. The declaration also reportedly contains no

  9. The unique signal concept for detonation safety in nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Spray, S.D.; Cooper, J.A.

    1993-06-01

    The purpose of a unique signal (UQS) in a nuclear weapon system is to provide an unambiguous communication of intent to detonate from the UQS information input source device to a stronglink safety device in the weapon in a manner that is highly unlikely to be duplicated or simulated in normal environments and in a broad range of ill-defined abnormal environments. This report presents safety considerations for the design and implementation of UQSs in the context of the overall safety system.

  10. Nuclear Weapon Effects Uncertainties in Tactical Warfare

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1975-10-01

    wart - where battles were) and- numbers of weapons. After t.’e -cOhclusi6r: of -the war, a number of sistuations might prevail: T- -he interchange...Variability -to a lesser degree results from -the predict- koh of yx-ld- =based on cloud diamete.- -When- comparing the predictionv mod-ewi Th-FM- 3-12

  11. Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manual

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1990-09-01

    SUMMARY OF SPECIALIZED CAPABILITIES 20-1 G eneral ............................................................................. 20-1 20-2 Purpose...and Analysis Form ............................... 5-E-17 5-E-7 Weapons Accident Environmental Radiation Alpha Probe Data Form ................. 5-E-19...Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 13 Nov 88. (j) JCS Publication 1-03.6, Joint Reporting Structure Event/Incident Report , Nov 80. (k) TP 20-11

  12. Managing nuclear weapons in a changing world: Proceedings

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1992-12-31

    The Center for Security and Technology Studies was established at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to support long-range technical studies on issues of importance to US national security. An important goal of the Center is to bring together Laboratory staff and the broader outside community through a program of technical studies, visitors, symposia, seminars, workshops, and publications. With this in mind, the Center and LLNL`s Defense Systems Program sponsored a conference on Managing Nuclear Weapons in a Changing World held on November 17--18,1992. The first day of the meeting focused on nuclear weapons issues in the major geographical areas of the world. On the second day, the conference participants discussed what could be done to manage, control, and account for nuclear weapons in this changing world. Each of the talks and the concluding panel discussion are being indexed as separate documents.

  13. Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

    This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

  14. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  15. The use of neutron scattering in nuclear weapons research

    SciTech Connect

    Juzaitis, R.J.

    1995-10-01

    We had a weapons science breakout session last week. Although it would have been better to hold it closer in time to this workshop, I think that it was very valuable. it may have been less of a {open_quotes}short-sleeve{close_quotes} workshop environment than we would have liked, but as the first time two communities-the weapons community and the neutron scattering community- got together, it was a wonderful opportunity to transfer information during the 24 presentations that were made. This report contains discussions on the fundamental analysis of documentation of the enduring stockpile; LANSCE`s contribution to weapons; spallation is critical to understanding; weapons safety assessments; applied nuclear physics requires cross section information; fission models need refinement; and establishing teams on collaborative projects.

  16. Development of glass vitrification at SRL as a waste treatment technique for nuclear weapon components

    SciTech Connect

    Coleman, J.T.; Bickford, D.F.

    1991-01-01

    This report discusses the development of vitrification for the waste treatment of nuclear weapons components at the Savannah River Site. Preliminary testing of surrogate nuclear weapon electronic waste shows that glass vitrification is a viable, robust treatment method.

  17. Development of glass vitrification at SRL as a waste treatment technique for nuclear weapon components

    SciTech Connect

    Coleman, J.T.; Bickford, D.F.

    1991-12-31

    This report discusses the development of vitrification for the waste treatment of nuclear weapons components at the Savannah River Site. Preliminary testing of surrogate nuclear weapon electronic waste shows that glass vitrification is a viable, robust treatment method.

  18. Nuclear weapons in the 1990s and beyond

    SciTech Connect

    Van Oudenaren, J.

    1992-12-31

    This chapter explores on a country-by-country and region-by-region basis the factors that will influence the debates concerning nuclear weapons in both the nuclear and nonnuclear states. The recent political changes in Europe and longer-term developments such as the continuing diffusion of economic and technological power throughout the world are calling into question basic assumptions about the compatibility of the existing nuclear order with other aspects of the international system. Together the United States and the former Soviet Union possess over 95 percent of the nuclear warheads in existence, but only about 10 percent of world population and 35 percent of gross national product. France and Britain have large and growing nuclear arsenals, while Japan and Germany, both of which have larger populations and economies and exposed geopolitically, are barred from access to nuclear weapons. In the third world there is lingering resentment at the perceived efforts by the great powers to deny nuclear weapons to rising regional influentials in the case of important countries such as India, Israel, and South Africa. More fundamentally, there is uncertainty about the very identity of at least three of the five declared nuclear powers. France and Britain are engaged in a long-term process that could lead to full political union in a larger European Community. Meanwhile, the former Soviet Union has moved in the opposite direction and at a far more rapid pace. The August 1991 coup and its aftermath severely weakened central control in Moscow, leading to declarations of independence by the union republic. Nuclear weapons almost certainly will play less of a role in structuring a bipolar American-Russian competition, but they could well play a more dangerous and destabilizing role in the third world, as well as Japan, Germany, and other countries previously thought of as middle powers that are now assuming greater global importance. 5 refs.

  19. Nuclear-weapons dismantlement: Identifying a hidden warhead

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Finney, John; Acton, James M.

    2014-06-01

    A means of verifying that nuclear warheads to be dismantled are genuine items has been proposed that potentially reveals no information to an inspector about the design of the weapons. Two experts explain the ins and outs of the method and its implications for arms-control policy. See Article p.497

  20. The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. National Issues Forums.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mitchell, Greg; Melville, Keith

    Designed to stimulate thinking about United States-Soviet relationships in terms of nuclear weapons and national security, this document presents ideas and issues that represent differing viewpoints and positions. Chapter 1, "Rethinking the U.S.-Soviet Relationship," considers attempts to achieve true national security, and chapter 2,…

  1. Post Cold War Nuclear Weapons Policy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-03-20

    contrary position are those, like Scott D. Sagan , who believe that more nuclear armed states contribute to instability and a greater potential for...direct conflict with the NPT). According to Sagan and those who agree with him more nuclear armed states will lead to even more proliferation as new...Harvard Magazine, volume 103, issue 1, 34-35. 29 David Cortright, Overcoming Nuclear Dangers, 2. 30 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of

  2. The Drivers of Indias Nuclear Weapons Program

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-06-01

    135 Ankit Panda , “India Inches Closer to Credible Nuclear Triad with K-4 SLBM Test,” The Diplomat, May 13, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/india...212 Panda , “India Inches Closer to Credible Nuclear Triad with K-4 SLBM Test.” 213 Rajagopalan, “The Logic of Assured Retaliation...Ankit Panda , “The Nuclear Problem in India-Japan Relations,” The Diplomat, October 31, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/the-nuclear-problem-in-india

  3. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  4. The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Brooks, Linton F.

    2007-03-01

    This paper will examine our plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to ``transform'' the stockpile and supporting infrastructure. We proceed from the premise that the United States will need a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working. Today's stockpile---comprised of legacy warheads left over from the Cold War---is safe and reliable. That said, we see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in assuring the long-term safety and reliability of our current stockpile. Nor is today's nuclear weapons complex sufficiently ``responsive'' to fixing technical problems in the stockpile, or to potential adverse geopolitical change. Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs. Our approach is to develop and field replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile---so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)---as a means to transform both the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

  5. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-07-01

    reprocessed enough separated plutonium for another three weapons (in addition to the estimated 4 -6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).27...collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 01 JUL 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED...00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4 . TITLE AND SUBTITLE North Korea?s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c

  6. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-12-16

    for another three weapons (in addition to the estimated 4 -6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).27 The 5MWe reactor was again shut...with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 16 DEC 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES...COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4 . TITLE AND SUBTITLE North Korea?s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c

  7. Impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on strategic stability

    SciTech Connect

    Chrzanowski, P.

    1991-03-20

    This presentation is to discuss the impact of a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile on the strategic stability. Methodologies used to study strategic stability issues include what are basically strategic-force exchange models. These models are used to simulate a massive nuclear exchange in which one side attacks and the other side retaliates. These models have been of interest to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program. Researchers have been looking at issues concerning the stability of the transition period, during which some defenses have been deployed and during which deterrence and war-fighting capability reply partly on defense and partly on offense. Also, more recently, with interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and force reductions beyond START, the same calculation engines have been used to examine the impact of reduced forces on strategic stability. For both the SDI and the START reduction cases, exchange models are able to address only a rather narrow class of strategic stability issues. Other broader stability questions that are unrelated to nuclear weapons or that relate to nuclear weapons but are not addressed by the calculational tools which are not included in this discussion. 6 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab. (BN)

  8. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-10-11

    Armando, May 25; 2006: Krakatau (jointly with U.K.), February 23; Unicorn, August 30. NNSA’s FY2006 request stated that, for pit certification, “The...conducted a subcritical experiment, “ Krakatau ,” at the Nevada Test Site. 12/08/05 — The U.N. General Assembly adopted, 168-2, a resolution on nuclear

  9. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-08-16

    14; Oboe 9, June 7; Mario, August 29; Rocco, September 26; 2003: Piano, September 19; 2004: Armando, May 25; 2006: Krakatau (jointly with U.K...experiment, “ Krakatau ,” at the Nevada Test Site. 12/08/05 — The U.N. General Assembly adopted, 168-2, a resolution on nuclear disarmament that, among other

  10. Nuclear Weapon Yield Determination through Nano Indentation of Thermally Degraded Automobile Paint

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-03-01

    NUCLEAR WEAPON YIELD DETERMINATION THROUGH NANO INDENTATION OF THERMALLY DEGRADED AUTOMOBILE PAINT THESIS Michael Joseph Richards...NUCLEAR WEAPON YIELD DETERMINATION THROUGH NANO INDENATION OF THERMALLY DEGRADED AUTOMOBILE PAINT THESIS Presented to the Faculty Department...that has the potential to overcome these limitations relies on the change in automobile paint caused by the thermal pulse of the weapon. This work

  11. Nuclear Weapon Initiatives: Low-Yield R&D, Advanced Concepts, Earth Penetrators, Test Readiness

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-02

    weapon-produced collateral effects . The current nuclear weapons stockpile, while possessing some limited ground penetration capability and lower ...RNEP bar use of the weapon? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Would RNEP have an adverse effect on nuclear nonproliferation? . . 56 Will Targets Be...73 List of Figures Figure 1. Earth penetration reduces yield needed to destroy buried targets . . . . 45 Figure 2. Lower yield

  12. The role of the weapons laboratory in nuclear security

    SciTech Connect

    Barry, W.R. )

    1989-07-01

    The role of the Nuclear Systems/Surety Division and its relationship to the Air Force Weapons Laboratory are described. The Function and goals of the security section within that division, under basic DOD guidance, are considered. Reference is made to work on ballistic protection shrouds for Minuteman II and III and Air Force nuclear weapon shipping containers. BNL-TSO contributions to AFWL study projects are explained. This involvement has existed since 1984 in regard to security improvements for SAC alert aircraft. The work involves ballistic screening and development of a taxiway-gap cable vehicle barrier. Future activities may deal with alert system upgrades, access denial systems, security seals, comprehensive security analysis, and criteria development.

  13. The Gravest Danger:. Nuclear Weapons and Their Proliferation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, S.

    2005-02-01

    Nuclear weapons are unique in their terrifying potential. With an energy release a million times larger than that of previous explosives, mass destruction is inevitable. The prospect of the spread of nuclear weapons and other dangerous technologies into the hands of suicidal terrorists and rogue nations unrestrained by the norms of civilized behavior has led President Bush to remark that "the gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology." This talk will address what can and should be done, in the face of new challenges in times punctuated by terrorist threats, to sustain and strengthen the non-proliferation regime, taking into consideration technical realities, and the roles and limits of diplomatic initiatives and of military force.

  14. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-06-26

    the work plan in 2009, it did not support the adoption of a draft program of work for 2010.60 Ambassador Zamir Akram , Pakistan’s Permanent...Also see Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram , Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, August 31, 2010. 61 Statement...by Ambassador Zamir Akram , February 18, 2010. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues Congressional Research Service 10

  15. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-10-07

    Service 2 nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on- site safety and security procedures,”3 but...1980s. Highly-enriched uranium ( HEU ) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. The country’s main...United States that it would produce only LEU ,12 U.S. and Pakistani officials who were in government in 1990 indicated during a 1994 meeting that

  16. Use of commercial manipulator to handle a nuclear weapon component

    SciTech Connect

    Baker, C.P.

    1994-08-01

    Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) has developed a manipulator workcell to load and unload nuclear weapon pit assemblies from a cart. To develop this workcell, PNL procured a commercially available manipulator, equipped it with force-sensing and vision equipment, and developed manipulator control software. Manipulator workcell development demonstrated that commercially available manipulator systems can successfully perform this task if the appropriate manipulator is selected and the manipulator workcell tooling and software are carefully designed.

  17. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-02-04

    Fissile Materials http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/ site_down/gfmr07.pdf; SIPRI Yearbook 2007. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates... Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under pretty close lock and key...Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748

  18. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-12-09

    International Panel on Fissile Materials http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/ site_down/gfmr07.pdf; SIPRI Yearbook 2007. The International Panel on Fissile...and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under pretty close lock...Pakistan,” Pakistan Security Research Unit Brief Number 22, University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080

  19. Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel: Chemical Surety

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-02

    2001 Nuclear and Chemical Weapons and Materiel Chemical Surety *Army Regulation 50–6 Effective 26 July 2001 H i s t o r y . T h i s p u b l i s h e s... effective and uniform implementation of the personnel reliability program (PRP). c. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) will— (1...assistance visits to enhance the effectiveness of the surety program. (3) Provide surety related information through USANCA publications. (4) Prepare

  20. Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-06-04

    What signatures show the presence of nuclear weapons and SNM? For purposes of this report, a signature is a property by which a substance (in...density Atomic number, abbreviated “Z,” is the number of protons in an atom’s nucleus. It is a property of individual atoms. In contrast, density is a...bulk property , expressed as mass per unit volume. In general, the densest materials are those of high Z. These properties may be used to detect

  1. National Security to Nationalist Myth: Why Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2004-09-01

    28 See what Scott Sagan notes is the “seminal text of neorealism,” Kenneth N. Waltz , Theory of International Politics...Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” IAEA Information Circular. INFCIRC/140. Geneva: 22 April 1970. Waltz , Kenneth N. Theory of International...that includes both the new Iraqi government and Iran. A. BALANCE OF POWER AND MILITARY DOCTRINE: THE THEORY Neorealist theory predicates that

  2. Towards a tactical nuclear weapons treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards?

    SciTech Connect

    Saunders, Emily C.; Rowberry, Ariana N.; Fearey, Bryan L.

    2012-07-12

    In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?

  3. Risk Assessment for Emergency Planning Related to Nuclear Weapons Accidents

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-09-25

    Nuclea, Weapons Fixed Facilities," SAI/PL-83-3, Science Applications, Inc. (March 1983). 3) NUREG -0654/FEMA-REP-1 (Rev. 1), "Criteria for Preparation and...Evaluation of Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." November 1980. 4) NUREG -0396, EPA 520/1-78-016...8217 December 1978. 5) "Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants," NUREG -75/014, WASH-1400, USNRC, October

  4. Nuclear Materials: Plutonium Processing in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-02

    metal parts, Los Alamos uses ion exchange, after having dissolved the scrap with nitric acid. Sixteen of Los Alamos’ pyrochemical furnaces are used for...weapons components was done, produced much of the scrap . All plutonium processing operations for recovering metal are currently shut down and are not...impure plutonium metal . For the purposes of this report, the various types of scrap or residue are compiled into 14 general categories.1 Graphite

  5. A Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Challenges to Nuclear Weapon Nonproliferation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-03-30

    civilian nuclear power infrastructure. Light water reactors require enriched uranium to operate, albeit at much lower enrichment percentages...the horizon. Twenty-two years after the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident the world’s nuclear energy industry is booming.1 Nuclear energy is...experiencing a strong revival around the world and in the United States. There are currently 439 nuclear reactors operating worldwide, in 30 countries. Thirty

  6. Human response to nuclear and advanced technology weapons effects. Final report, January-December 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Coleman, J.L.

    1996-05-01

    The purpose of this study is to help the system survivability analyst estimate hardness requirements for systems exposed to nuclear weapons and advanced technology weapons (ATWs). The system survivability analyst is often asked to make quick, order-of-magnitude estimates on the hardness requirements for existing or proposed systems based upon human responses to the effects of nuclear weapons and ATWs. The intent of this report is to identity the general range of human survivability to nuclear weapons and ATWs and to provide simple example calcuiations and scenarios that can give the reader rough estimates of the effects of these weapons. While high-powered microwave (HPM) and laser weapons are considered in this report, the main emphasis is on nuclear weapons and their ionizing radiation effects.

  7. Report of the Canberra Commission on the elimination of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    1996-08-14

    The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, convened in November 1995 by the Government of Australia, says the threat of nuclear terrorism and political uncertainties in the post-Cold War world make it imperative that nuclear weapons should be abolished.

  8. Canberra Commission outlines steps to rid the world of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    1996-08-14

    The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, convened in November 1995 by the Government of Australia, says the threat of nuclear terrorism and political uncertainties in the post-Cold War world make it imperative that nuclear weapons should be abolished.

  9. Nuclear weapons tests and environmental consequences: a global perspective.

    PubMed

    Prăvălie, Remus

    2014-10-01

    The beginning of the atomic age marked the outset of nuclear weapons testing, which is responsible for the radioactive contamination of a large number of sites worldwide. The paper aims to analyze nuclear weapons tests conducted in the second half of the twentieth century, highlighting the impact of radioactive pollution on the atmospheric, aquatic, and underground environments. Special attention was given to the concentration of main radioactive isotopes which were released, such as ¹⁴C, ¹³⁷Cs, and ⁹⁰Sr, generally stored in the atmosphere and marine environment. In addition, an attempt was made to trace the spatial delimitation of the most heavily contaminated sites worldwide, and to note the human exposure which has caused a significantly increased incidence of thyroidal cancer locally and regionally. The United States is one of the important examples of assessing the correlation between the increase in the thyroid cancer incidence rate and the continental-scale radioactive contamination with ¹³¹I, a radioactive isotope which was released in large amounts during the nuclear tests carried out in the main test site, Nevada.

  10. Proliferation dangers associated with nuclear medicine: getting weapons-grade uranium out of radiopharmaceutical production.

    PubMed

    Williams, Bill; Ruff, Tilman A

    2007-01-01

    Abolishing the threat of nuclear war requires the outlawing of nuclear weapons and dismantling current nuclear weapon stockpiles, but also depends on eliminating access to fissile material (nuclear weapon fuel). The near-universal use of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce radiopharmaceuticals is a significant proliferation hazard. Health professionals have a strategic opportunity and obligation to progress the elimination of medically-related commerce in HEU, closing one of the most vulnerable pathways to the much-feared 'terrorist bomb'.

  11. Nuclear Weapons Security Crisis: What Does History Teach?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-07-01

    1. Polonium - 210 , used in nuclear weapons as a neutron initia- tor, has a half-life of 138 days, eventually decaying to lead-206. See “Factsheets and...FAQs: Polonium - 210 ,” International Atomic Energy Agency, available from www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/ English/polonium210.html. 2. As...207- 210 . 59. Quoted in Rhodes, Twilight of the Bombs, p. 95. 60. See Chap. 2 by Tertrais in this volume. 61. There is no certainty about the role that

  12. 2002-2003 Engineering Accomplishments: Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Detection

    SciTech Connect

    Hernandez, J E; Valentine, J

    2004-04-09

    The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA, is a federal agency charged with safeguarding the nation from weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons such as crude devices, and radiological dispersal devices (RDD), also known as dirty bombs. Both of which could be delivered using unconventional means such as by transporting them by a car or boat. Two years ago DTRA partnered with NNSA to evaluate commercially available technologies that could be deployed quickly to defend against threats posed by unconventional nuclear weapons under a program called the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) Program. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was one of several National laboratories that participated in this program, which consisted in developing, deploying, and demonstrating detection systems suitable for military base protection. Two key contributions to this program by the LLNL team were the development of two Radiation Detection Buoys (RDB) deployed at Naval Base in Kings Bay in Georgia, and the Detection and Tracking System (DTS) demonstrated at Fort Leonard Wood Missouri, headquarters for the Total Force's Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN). The RDB's were designed to detect the potential transportation of an unconventional nuclear or radiological weapon by a boat. The RDB's consisted of two commercial marine buoys instrumented with several types of detectors sensitive to gamma rays and neutrons, two key modes of energy emitted by radioactive materials. The engineering team selected a standard marine buoy as the overall system platform for this deployment since buoys are already designed to sustain the harsh marine environment, and also for their covertness, since once deployed, they look just like any other buoy on the water. Since this was the first time such a system was ever deployed, the team choose to instrument the buoys with a suite of different types of detectors with the goal to learn which detectors would be best suited for

  13. Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Science, Technologies, Observations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-08-04

    like gamma rays. What signatures show the presence of nuclear weapons and SNM? For purposes of this report, a signature is a property by which a...number and density Atomic number, abbreviated “Z,” is the number of protons in an atom’s nucleus. It is a property of individual atoms. In contrast...density is a bulk property , expressed as mass per unit volume. In general, the densest materials are those of high Z. These properties may be used

  14. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-05-26

    production of nuclear fuel ,” which may be a reference to a uranium enrichment program. 4 On May 25, 2009, North Korea announced it had conducted a second...weapons (in addition to the estimated 4 -6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).29 The 5MWe reactor was again shut down in July 2007...a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 26 MAY 2009 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED

  15. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-12-05

    valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 05 DEC 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4 . TITLE AND SUBTITLE North Korea’s...separated plutonium for another three weapons (in addition to the estimated 4 -6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).50 The 5MWe CRS-10 51...on denuclearization. Key components of the agreement include halting production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and delivery of heavy fuel oil to

  16. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-21

    valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 21 NOV 2007 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2007 to 00-00-2007 4 . TITLE AND SUBTITLE North Korea’s...three weapons (in addition to the estimated 4 -6 bomb-worth from reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods).49 The 5MWe reactor was again shut down in July...2005 on denuclearization. Key components of the agreement include halting production at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and delivery of heavy fuel oil to

  17. Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-24

    on Territory X X X X Nuclear Power Reactors X X X Nuclear Research Reactors X X X X Nuclear Weapons Design X Uranium Enrichment X Spent Fuel...Semipalatinsk research reactors reactors safeguards Part of the Baikal-1 and fueled with agreement not IGR reactor complexes at at least 22 yet concluded...plutonium production production reactors ; reactors have been spent fuel closed, but plutonium reprocessing; separation continues. production of fuel

  18. Theft and Diversion of Special Nuclear Materials and Military Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1975-03-12

    7 II. Computed Probability per Year for Nuclear Diversion....... 10 III. Amount of U235 Compounds for One Critical Ms...15 IVo Probability of Success,for Making a Nuclear Weapon from UF6 . 19 V. Risk Assessments for Attempted Diversion of F....... 22 VIo Probability of...Richardson of the Nuclear Safety Division, is due special acknowledgment for their interest in the project, and for their financial aid in supporting

  19. National Certification Methodology for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Goodwin, B T; Juzaitis, R J

    2006-08-07

    and December of 2001 and continued in 2002 have proven useful in developing the methodology, and future workshops should prove useful in further refining this framework. Each laboratory developed an approach to certification with some differences in detailed implementation. The general methodology introduces specific quantitative indicators for assessing confidence in our nuclear weapon stockpile. The quantitative indicators are based upon performance margins for key operating characteristics and components of the system, and these are compared to uncertainties in these factors. These criteria can be summarized in a quantitative metric (for each such characteristic) expressed as: (i.e., confidence in warhead performance depends upon CR significantly exceeding unity for all these characteristics). These Confidence Ratios are proposed as a basis for guiding technical and programmatic decisions on stockpile actions. This methodology already has been deployed in certifying weapons undergoing current life extension programs or component remanufacture. The overall approach is an adaptation of standard engineering practice and lends itself to rigorous, quantitative, and explicit criteria for judging the robustness of weapon system and component performance at a detailed level. There are, of course, a number of approaches for assessing these Confidence Ratios. The general certification methodology was publicly presented for the first time to a meeting of Strategic Command SAG in January 2002 and met with general approval. At that meeting, the Laboratories committed to further refine and develop the methodology through the implementation process. This paper reflects the refinement and additional development to date. There will be even further refinement at a joint laboratory workshop later in FY03. A common certification methodology enables us to engage in peer reviews and evaluate nuclear weapon systems on the basis of explicit and objective metrics. The clarity provided by

  20. Development of the nuclear weapons complex EP architecture

    SciTech Connect

    Murray, C.; Halbleib, L.

    1996-07-01

    The Nuclear Weapons Guidance Team is an interagency committee led by Earl Whiteman, DOE that chartered the generation of EP40100, Concurrent Qualification and its successor EP401099, Concurrent Engineering and Qualification. As this new philosophy of concurrent operations has evolved and as implementation has been initiated, conflicts and insufficiencies in the remaining Engineering Procedures (EPs) have become more apparent. At the Guidance Team meeting in November 1995, this issue was explored and several approaches were considered. It was concluded at this meeting, that a smaller set of interagency EPs described in a hierarchical system could provide the necessary interagency direction to support complex-wide implementation. This set consolidates many existing EP processes where consistency and commonality are critical to success of the extended enterprise. The Guidance Team subsequently chartered an interagency team to initiate development activity associated with the envisioned new EP set. This team had participation from seven Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) sites as well as DOE/AL and DP-14 (team members are acknowledged later in this report). Per the Guidance Team, this team, referred to as the Architecture Subcommittee, was to map out and define an EP Architecture for the interagency EPs, make recommendations regarding a more agile process for EP approval and suggest an aggressive timeline to develop the combined EPs. The Architecture Subcommittee was asked to brief their output at the February Guidance Team meeting. This SAND report documents the results of the Architecture Subcommittee`s recommendations.

  1. Steps toward a Middle East free of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Leonard, J.

    1991-04-01

    In the aftermath of the Gulf War, all eyes are focused on the dangers of proliferation in the Middle East. President Bush, in his postwar address to Congress, called for immediate action to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them, warning that it would be tragic if the nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf were now, in the wake of war, to embark on a new arms race. Secretary of State James Baker has recently returned from a tour of the region, and consultations on proliferation were reportedly high on his agenda. At the same time, the fierce political antagonisms and unbridled military competitions that have long characterized the Middle East leave many skeptical as to what can realistically be done. While all states in the region - including Israel - have publicly supported the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, doubt over the feasibility of the proposal runs high. Why on earth, it is asked, would Israelis give up the protection of their nuclear monopoly What assurances from their Arab adversaries or from the US could possibly replace this ultimate deterrent

  2. Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

    SciTech Connect

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1993-07-01

    The Democratic People`s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is one of the Cold War`s last remaining totalitarian regimes. Rarely has any society been as closed to outside influences and so distant from political, economic, and military developments around the globe. In 1991 and in 1992, however, this dictatorship took a number of political steps which increased Pyongyang`s interaction with the outside world. Although North Korea`s style of engagement with the broader international community involved frequent pauses and numerous steps backward, many observers believed that North Korea was finally moving to end its isolated, outlaw status. As the end of 1992 approached, however, delay and obstruction by Pyongyang became intense as accumulating evidence suggested that the DPRK, in violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was seeking to develop nuclear weapons. On March 12, 1993, North Korea announced that it would not accept additional inspections proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve concerns about possible violations and instead would withdraw from the Treaty. Pyongyang`s action raised the specter that, instead of a last act of the Cold War, North Korea`s diplomatic maneuvering would unravel the international norms that were to be the basis of stability and peace in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the discovery that North Korea was approaching the capability to produce nuclear weapons suggested that the nuclear threat, which had been successfully managed throughout the Cold War era, could increase in the post-Cold War era.

  3. Plus c`est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

    SciTech Connect

    Maaranen, S.A.

    1996-07-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO`s New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future.

  4. Relevance of Nuclear Weapons Clean-Up Experience to Dirty Bomb Response

    SciTech Connect

    Vantine, H C; Crites, T R

    2002-08-19

    During the past 50 years, the United States has experienced 32 major nuclear weapons accidents, nine of which released special nuclear material to the environment. Response to these accidents, coupled with recovery experience following the Russian satellite reentry and weapons test site cleanup, form the basis for determining actions that might be required following a nuclear terrorist event involving the release of radioactive material. Though valuable information has been gained following the recovery from various commercial accidents, most notably the Chernobyl nuclear power plant failure and the dismantled radiography source in the Brazilian city of Goi nia, this paper will focus on the lessons learned from the U.S. nuclear weapons program.

  5. Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

    In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

  6. The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. Teacher's Guide. National Issues Forums in the Classroom.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Levy, Tedd

    This teacher's guide is designed to accompany the National Issues Forums'"The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security." Activities and ideas are provided to challenge students to debate and discuss the United States-Soviet related issues of nuclear weapons and national security. The guide is divided into sections that…

  7. Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

    SciTech Connect

    1997-01-01

    In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

  8. Nuclear Weapon Systems Today: A Unit Curriculum for Liberal Arts Students.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Shanebrook, J. Richard

    1988-01-01

    Described is a unit of study on nuclear weapons from a course on nuclear technology. Provided are the elements of first strike attack designed for invoking students' interest and an explanation of each. (YP)

  9. Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials

    SciTech Connect

    Gosnell, T. B., LLNL; Hall, J. M.; Jam, C. L.; Knapp, D. A.; Koenig, Z. M.; Luke, S. J.; Pohl, B. A.; Schach von Wittenau, A.; Wolford, J. K.

    1997-02-03

    There has been an accelerating national interest in countering nuclear smuggling. This has caused a corresponding expansion of interest in the use of gamma-ray spectrometers for checkpoint monitoring, nuclear search, and within networks of nuclear and collateral sensors. All of these are fieldable instruments--ranging from large, fixed portal monitors to hand-held and remote monitoring equipment. For operational reasons, detectors with widely varying energy resolution and detection efficiency will be employed. In many instances, such instruments must be sensitive to weak signals, always capable of recognizing the gamma-ray signatures from nuclear weapons materials (NWM), often largely insensitive to spectral alteration by radiation transport through intervening materials, capable of real-time implementation, and able to discriminate against signals from commonly encountered legitimate gamma-ray sources, such as radiopharmaceuticals. Several decades of experience in classified programs have shown that all of these properties are not easily achieved and successful approaches were of limited scope--such as the detection of plutonium only. This project was originally planned as a two-year LDRD-ER. Since funding for 1997 was not sustained, this is a report of the first year's progress.

  10. Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-11-02

    components of nuclear weapons other than fissile material such as tritium and non-nuclear components will need to be considered. To ensure that a nuclear...difficult and time-consuming as possible. Other components which play an important role in nuclear weapons such as tritium should also be subject to a...Canadian deuterium -uranium reactors of currently operating types or evolutionary adaptations of them, employing mixed-oxide fuel in a once-through

  11. Environmental and health effects of the nuclear industry and nuclear weapons: a current evaluation.

    PubMed

    Johnson, C J

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear weapons industry in the U.S. comprises nine major plants, supported by a network of subcontractors and grantee institutions. Weapons development progresses at the Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos Laboratories under the auspices of the University of California. Fissionable materials and tritium are produced at the Savannah River Plant (du Pont) or at Hanford. Reprocessing of plutonium and weapons grade uranium and manufacture of components are carried out at Rocky Flats (formerly Dow, now Rockwell Int.). Large amounts of radionuclides are generated or involved in operations at most of the nine plants. Internal reports of surveillance efforts by weapons plant personnel to monitor emissions of radioactive gases and particulates have now been released by several of the plants (in one case through litigation). Those reports document major releases of radioactive gases and particulates to the environment in the past, and continuing routine releases of some importance. Few investigations have been made of effects from these potent carcinogens in local populations. There have been several preliminary reports (Rocky Flats, Los Alamos and Savannah River) and one comprehensive report [Ambio 10: 176 (1981)]. Evidence of significantly increased rates of cancer of the more radiosensitive organs has been demonstrated. Adequate cancer registry and vital statistics data are essential for the comprehensive investigations of somatic and genetic effects which should be carried out around all nuclear installations near population centres.

  12. Physical and Mathematical Description of Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) Signatures

    SciTech Connect

    Mattingly, J.K.; Mihalczo, J.T.; Mullens, J.A.; Valentine, T.E.

    1997-09-26

    This report describes all time and frequency analysis parameters measured with the new Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) processor with three input channels: (1) the 252Cf source ionization chamber (2) a detection channel; and (3) a second detection channel for active measurements. An intuitive and physical description of the various functions is given as well as a brief mathematical description and a brief description of how the data are acquired. If the fill five channel capability is used, the number of functions increases in number but not in type. The parameters provided by this new NWIS processor can be divided into two general classes: time analysis signatures including multiplicities and frequency analysis signatures. Data from measurements with an 18.75 kg highly enriched uranium (93.2 wt 0/0, 235U) metai casting for storage are presented to illustrate the various time and frequency analysis parameters.

  13. Physical and mathematical description of Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) signatures

    SciTech Connect

    Mihalczo, J.T.; Valentine, T.E.; Mullens, J.A.; Mattingly, J.K.

    1997-09-26

    This report describes all time and frequency analysis parameters measured with the new Nuclear Weapons Identification System (NWIS) processor with three input channels: (1) the {sup 252}Cf source ionization chamber; (2) a detection channel; and (3) a second detection channel for active measurements. An intuitive and physical description of the various functions is given as well as a brief mathematical description and a brief description of how the data are acquired. If the full five channel capability is used, the number of functions increases in number but not in type. The parameters provided by this new NWIS processor can be divided into two general classes: time analysis signatures including multiplicities and frequency analysis signatures. Data from measurements with an 18.75 kg highly enriched uranium (93.2 wt%, {sup 235}U) metal casting for storage are presented to illustrate the various time and frequency analysis parameters.

  14. Proceedings: 17th Asilomar conference on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Hickman, R.G.; Meier, C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The objective of the 1983 conference was to provide for the technical exchange of ideas relating to the science and technology of the immediate effects of nuclear weapon explosions. Separate abstracts were prepared for 39 of the papers.

  15. Total Quality Management and nuclear weapons: A historian`s perspective

    SciTech Connect

    Meade, R.A.

    1993-11-01

    Total Quality Management (TQM) has become a significant management theme at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper discusses the historical roots of TQM at Los Alamos and how TQM has been used in the development of nuclear weapons.

  16. A comparison of commercial/industry and nuclear weapons safety concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, R.R.; Summers, D.A.

    1996-07-01

    In this paper the authors identify factors which influence the safety philosophy used in the US commercial/industrial sector and compare them against those factors which influence nuclear weapons safety. Commercial/industrial safety is guided by private and public safety standards. Generally, private safety standards tend to emphasize product reliability issues while public (i.e., government) safety standards tend to emphasize human factors issues. Safety in the nuclear weapons arena is driven by federal requirements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) between the Departments of Defense and Energy. Safety is achieved through passive design features integrated into the nuclear weapon. Though the common strand between commercial/industrial and nuclear weapons safety is the minimization of risk posed to the general population (i.e., public safety), the authors found that each sector tends to employ a different safety approach to view and resolve high-consequence safety issues.

  17. The nuclear-weapon states and article VI of the NPT

    SciTech Connect

    Mendelsohn, J.; Lockwood, D.

    1995-03-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty rests on a basic bargain between the five declared nuclear-weapon states - the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China and 167 states that do not possess nuclear weapons. In addition, to the arms control and disarmaments commitments in Article VI, the parties pledge in the treaty`s pramble their determination to seek a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and express the understanding that in connection with the treaty on general and complete disarmament the parties should seek the cessation of manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stock piles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. The author discusses the status of these agreements and the extent to which they have been fulfilled.

  18. Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

    SciTech Connect

    Francis, S.

    1992-06-01

    This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950`s. (FI)

  19. Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

    SciTech Connect

    Francis, S.

    1992-01-01

    This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950's. (FI)

  20. Source terms for plutonium aerosolization from nuclear weapon accidents

    SciTech Connect

    Stephens, D.R.

    1995-07-01

    The source term literature was reviewed to estimate aerosolized and respirable release fractions for accidents involving plutonium in high-explosive (HE) detonation and in fuel fires. For HE detonation, all estimates are based on the total amount of Pu. For fuel fires, all estimates are based on the amount of Pu oxidized. I based my estimates for HE detonation primarily upon the results from the Roller Coaster experiment. For hydrocarbon fuel fire oxidation of plutonium, I based lower bound values on laboratory experiments which represent accident scenarios with very little turbulence and updraft of a fire. Expected values for aerosolization were obtained from the Vixen A field tests, which represent a realistic case for modest turbulence and updraft, and for respirable fractions from some laboratory experiments involving large samples of Pu. Upper bound estimates for credible accidents are based on experiments involving combustion of molten plutonium droplets. In May of 1991 the DOE Pilot Safety Study Program established a group of experts to estimate the fractions of plutonium which would be aerosolized and respirable for certain nuclear weapon accident scenarios.

  1. Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    SciTech Connect

    Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A.; Hull, A.L.; Carey, D.A.; Sim, J.R.; Smith, M.G.

    1994-08-01

    The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

  2. An Extended Deterrence Regime to Counter Iranian Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Options

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-09-01

    United States would do everything possible to prevent war in Europe from erupting . 10 Yet another lesson is that the United States and its NATO allies... progress is made in other areas of weapons design, Iran could start manufacturing nuclear weapons, much as already has been done by North Korea...hopeful outcome seems problematic. If so, the real issue will be the pace and timing of Iran’s progress toward becoming nuclear-armed. Economic conditions

  3. Living with the Devil: Stability in the 21st Century World With or Without Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-03-01

    is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. iii Contents Page DISCLAIMER...weapon. Third, the temperatures in a nuclear explosion far exceed conventional detonations. The nuclear thermal energy is transmitted as both light...and heat. This thermal energy is capable of causing skin burns and starting fires. Finally, the nuclear explosion will produce a variety of

  4. Understanding Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Guide to the Issues. New Edition.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mayers, Teena

    Intended for secondary and college level students and teachers, this guide discusses the nuclear arms control issue. There are four sections. Section I discusses U.S. nuclear strategy from 1945 to the present, strategic nuclear weapons competition between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), U.S.…

  5. A {open_quotes}New{close_quotes} regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-02-15

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The {open_quote}new{close_quotes} in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be {open_quotes}new,{close_quotes} when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification.

  6. Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

    Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

  7. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be

  8. Chinese attitudes toward nuclear weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War

    SciTech Connect

    Ryan, M.A.

    1986-01-01

    Fundamental Chinese attitudes related to nuclear disarmament and proliferation, civil defense against nuclear attack, and the likely repercussions of nuclear war were set during the Korean War. Chinese viewpoints were heavily influenced by Western writings on nuclear matters from 1945-1950 and were characterized by an integrated military, political, and psychological realism. Previous studies, failing to make use of relevant Chinese-language materials, have neglected this crucial formative period. Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations considered using nuclear weapons in Korea and China and attempted to shape the political settlement of the war through nuclear threats. The Chinese reaction was notable for its efforts to counteract the effects of fear among its population. They acknowledged the unprecedented destructiveness, not the military decisiveness, of the weapons, but they adamantly denied that nuclear threats would cow them. Chinese propaganda stressed the Soviet deterrent and skillfully appealed to worldwide opposition to nuclear weapons, often utilizing Western spokesmen and playing upon the theme of US misuse of science. The Chinese considered a nuclear attack relatively unlikely but were prepared to absorb an attack and fight a war of long duration. In Korea both the terrain and the extensive tunneling by Chinese troops afforded significant protection from nuclear weapons.

  9. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    PubMed

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

  10. Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Controlling and eliminating nuclear-weapon materials

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    von Hippel, Frank

    2010-02-01

    Fissile material -- in practice plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- is the essential ingredient in nuclear weapons. Controlling and eliminating fissile material and the means of its production is therefore the common denominator for nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. From a fundamentalist anti-nuclear-weapon perspective, the less fissile material there is and the fewer locations where it can be found, the safer a world we will have. A comprehensive fissile-material policy therefore would have the following elements: *Consolidation of all nuclear-weapon-usable materials at a minimum number of high-security sites; *A verified ban on the production of HEU and plutonium for weapons; *Minimization of non-weapon uses of HEU and plutonium; and *Elimination of all excess stocks of plutonium and HEU. There is activity on all these fronts but it is not comprehensive and not all aspects are being pursued vigorously or competently. It is therefore worthwhile to review the situation. )

  11. "Fat Man and Little Boy": The Cinematic Representation of Interests in the Nuclear Weapons Organization.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    1993-01-01

    Examines the ironic "problems" of the 1989 Hollywood film "Fat Man and Little Boy" (portraying the construction of the atomic bomb at the Los Alamos Laboratory during World War II) to demonstrate the ideological operations of nuclear texts, and the role of the nuclear weapons organization as a symbolic form in cultural…

  12. Coping With Nuclear Weapons Policy: How Expert Do You Have To Be?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ruina, Jack

    1983-01-01

    Points out that policy decisions about nuclear weapons evolve from politics, bureaucracy, and technology, indicating that intelligent people can learn enough about technology to make judgments about policy issues. Suggests, however, that much more thinking is necessary to arrive at a coherent perspective about what constitutes nuclear weapons…

  13. Controlling the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Study Guide for Teachers and Students

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    United States Institute of Peace, 2005

    2005-01-01

    The objectives of this teaching guide are: (1) to increase student understanding of the prevalence and spread of nuclear weapons; (2) to familiarize students with historic and contemporary measures to control nuclear proliferation and stimulate their thinking of potential strategies for doing so in the future; (3) to develop students' analytical…

  14. Stopping the emergence of nuclear weapon states in the Third World: An examination of the Iraq weapons inspection program. Study project

    SciTech Connect

    Block, D.A.

    1993-01-31

    The end of the Gulf War and the implementation of United Nation (UN) resolutions uncovered an Iraqi multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons program. Iraq's ability to pursue this clandestine program for more than a decade, despite periodic inspections, suggest that the myriad of treaties and agreements designed to curb proliferation may be inadequate. Clearly more must be done to deter and counter the spread of these deadly weapon. The UN weapons inspections in Iraq provide insight into possible solutions to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in the developing world. This study examines the policy and operational aspects associated with an intrusive United Nations inspection program. In its final analysis, this paper suggests that an effective challenge inspection program is a necessary element in countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Further, it suggests that the UN, as the only internationally accepted enforcement organization, be fully engaged in nonproliferation issues and support the challenge inspection program.

  15. The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2014-12-01

    The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

  16. First use of nuclear weapons: the constitutional role of a Congressional leadership committee

    SciTech Connect

    Banks, W.C.

    1986-01-01

    Although the War Powers Act brought some constitutional order to the question of respective prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches of government, the Act is flawed in the matter of first use of nuclear weapons. The author reviews the Supreme Court decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadna that the legislative veto was unconstitutional as it relates to the committee approval mechanism involved in the first-use proposal. He finds that neither the case nor the Constitution precludes the first-use proposal, then argues for the committee approval mechanism on the grounds that such an important decision should be shared. The urgency to fire nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack is not present in a first-use scenario since conventional weapons would already be engaged. The Committee mechanism would involve Congress without jeopardizing speed and secrecy.

  17. DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Nakanishi, K.K.

    1993-02-12

    The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory`s (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE`s Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE`s weapons laboratories.

  18. DOE/LLNL verification symposium on technologies for monitoring nuclear tests related to weapons proliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Nakanishi, K.K.

    1993-02-12

    The rapidly changing world situation has raised concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the ability to monitor a possible clandestine nuclear testing program. To address these issues, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Treaty Verification Program sponsored a symposium funded by the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Arms Control, Division of Systems and Technology. The DOE/LLNL Symposium on Technologies for Monitoring Nuclear Tests Related to Weapons Proliferation was held at the DOE's Nevada Operations Office in Las Vegas, May 6--7,1992. This volume is a collection of several papers presented at the symposium. Several experts in monitoring technology presented invited talks assessing the status of monitoring technology with emphasis on the deficient areas requiring more attention in the future. In addition, several speakers discussed proliferation monitoring technologies being developed by the DOE's weapons laboratories.

  19. The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

    SciTech Connect

    Garaizar, Xabier

    2009-07-02

    In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

  20. Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria`s nuclear weapons experience. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    Horton, R.E.

    1998-04-01

    The primary focus of this paper is the impact of key South African leaders on the successful developments and subsequent rollbacks of South Africa`s nuclear weapons capability. It highlights the key milestones in the development of South Africa`s nuclear weapon capability. It also relates how different groups within South Africa (scientists, politicians, military and technocrats) interacted to successfully produce South Africa`s nuclear deterrent. It emphasizes the pivotal influence of the senior political leadership to pursue nuclear rollback given the disadvantages of its nuclear means to achieve vital national interests. The conclusions drawn from flu`s effort are the South African nuclear program was an extreme response to its own identity Crisis. Nuclear weapons became a means to achieving a long term end of a closer affiliation with the West. A South Africa yearning to be identified as a Western nation and receive guarantees of its security rationalized the need for a nuclear deterrent. The deterrent was intended to draw in Western support to counter a feared total onslaught by Communist forces in the region. Two decades later, that same South Africa relinquished its nuclear deterrent and reformed its domestic policies to secure improved economic and political integration with the West.

  1. Nationwide Defense against Nuclear Weapons: Properties of Prim-Read Deployments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1981-04-01

    p,6 IDA PAME P-1395 NATIONWIDE DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS: PROPERTIES OF PRIM- READ DEPLOYMENTS Alan F. Karr April 1981 DTIC 4t JUL. 2 98...DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS Final PROPERTIES OF PRIM- READ DEPLOYMENTS 4 19F0111N o.4100 U*6 7. Am W~~I UYN~ nQ~n MUMUWN611t Alan F. Karr IDA...E el*,iSdfuoE a iuv it. ICU wols EmEMan rwmae "oi WeMW11,6 M Nationwide defense, Prim- Read deployment, Interceptor deployment, defense against

  2. Ethics for environmental health research: the case of the U.S. Nuclear weapons industry.

    PubMed

    Wing, Steve

    2010-01-01

    Exploitation of workers and communities based on class and race has profoundly influenced occupational and environmental health. During production and testing of nuclear weapons in the United States, class and race have affected exposures to radiation and other hazards as well as protection programs and monitoring of exposures. This situation has contributed to health disparities and has hindered advancement of research into the health effects of ionizing radiation and other exposures from nuclear weapons production. Organizing by workers and affected communities can bring about a better understanding of the health effects of ionizing radiation as well as more ethical research practices.

  3. Nuclear Weapons Materials Gone Missing: What Does History Teach?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-11-01

    produce 1,000 grams or 1-kg every day.) To produce weapons-grade plutonium, which contains more than 94 percent plutonium-239, the reactor’s irradiated ...agent for Israeli gov- ernment agencies. It also was in a partnership with Israelis ostensibly to develop technology to irradiate fruit to eliminate... insects . The partnership was called ISORAD, and the small board at the Israeli end in- cluded the chairman of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission

  4. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    SciTech Connect

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if further action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.

  5. Assessment of the safety of US nuclear weapons and related nuclear test requirements: A post-Bush Initiative update

    SciTech Connect

    Kidder, R.E.

    1991-12-10

    The Nuclear Weapons Reduction Initiative announced by President Bush on September 27, 1991, is described herein as set forth in Defense Secretary Cheney`s Nuclear Arsenal Reduction Order issued September 28, 1991. The implications of the Bush Initiative for improved nuclear weapons safety are assessed in response to a request by US Senators Harkin, Kennedy, and Wirth to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that the author prepare such an assessment. The author provides an estimate of the number of nuclear tests needed to accomplish a variety of specified warhead safety upgrades, then uses the results of this estimate to answer three questions posed by the Senators. These questions concern pit reuse and the number of nuclear tests needed for specified safety upgrades of those ballistic missiles not scheduled for retirement, namely the Minuteman III, C4, and D5 missiles.

  6. Argumentation in the Canadian House of Commons on the Issue of Nuclear Weapons for Canada.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jones, John Alfred

    The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 forced the Canadian House of Commons to consider whether Canadian forces in NORAD and NATO were effective without nuclear warheads on special weapons systems. This paper provides an overview of the debates and their milieu, identifies the issues involved, and analyzes the effects of the argumentation. The…

  7. The Dangers of Dualism as a World View in the Age of Nuclear Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Groner, Cary

    1984-01-01

    People's conceptual ordering of the universe has traditionally taken the form of dualism, "good and evil" and "us against them." In this age of nuclear weapons, this is highly dangerous thinking. We must rid ourselves of nationalism and commit ourselves to peace in all our dealings. (CS)

  8. Temporal trends in childhood leukaemia incidence following exposure to radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed

    Wakeford, Richard; Darby, Sarah C; Murphy, Michael F G

    2010-05-01

    Notably raised rates of childhood leukaemia incidence have been found near some nuclear installations, in particular Sellafield and Dounreay in the United Kingdom, but risk assessments have concluded that the radiation doses estimated to have been received by children or in utero as a result of operations at these installations are much too small to account for the reported increases in incidence. This has led to speculation that the risk of childhood leukaemia arising from internal exposure to radiation following the intake of radioactive material released from nuclear facilities has been substantially underestimated. The radionuclides discharged from many nuclear installations are similar to those released into the global environment by atmospheric nuclear weapons testing, which was at its height in the late-1950s and early-1960s. Measurements of anthropogenic radionuclides in members of the general public resident in the vicinity of Sellafield and Dounreay have found levels that do not differ greatly from those in persons living remote from nuclear installations that are due to ubiquitous exposure to the radioactive debris of nuclear weapons testing. Therefore, if the leukaemia risk to children resulting from deposition within the body of radioactive material discharged from nuclear facilities has been grossly underestimated, then a pronounced excess of childhood leukaemia would have been expected as a consequence of the short period of intense atmospheric weapons testing. We have examined childhood leukaemia incidence in 11 large-scale cancer registries in three continents for which data were available at least as early as 1962. We found no evidence of a wave of excess cases corresponding to the peak of radioactive fallout from atmospheric weapons testing. The absence of a discernible increase in the incidence of childhood leukaemia following the period of maximum exposure to the radioactive debris of this testing weighs heavily against the suggestion that

  9. The Future Role and Need for Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-01-01

    overwhelming devastation and destruction nuclear weapons can render speaks directly to the ability to defeat adversaries. Nuclear force size and type are... Extroverted US versus Introverted Challenger Most future challengers the United States will face are likely to be introverted states. Introverted states are...not naturally more aggressive than Extroverted ones, but for the past half-century and for the foreseeable future, the Extroverted states (after

  10. Ultra-high resolution mass separator--application to detection of nuclear weapons tests.

    PubMed

    Peräjärvi, K; Eronen, T; Elomaa, V-V; Hakala, J; Jokinen, A; Kettunen, H; Kolhinen, V S; Laitinen, M; Moore, I D; Penttilä, H; Rissanen, J; Saastamoinen, A; Toivonen, H; Turunen, J; Aystö, J

    2010-03-01

    A Penning trap-based purification process having a resolution of about 1 ppm is reported. In this context, we present for the first time a production method for the most complicated and crucially important nuclear weapons test signature, (133m)Xe. These pure xenon samples are required by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to standardize and calibrate the worldwide network of xenon detectors.

  11. Report to Congress on stockpile reliability, weapon remanufacture, and the role of nuclear testing

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, G.H.; Brown, P.S.; Alonso, C.T.

    1987-10-01

    This report analyzes two issues: (1) ''whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability,'' or (2) ''whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems.'' Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the US Congress for more restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, ''Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories.'' Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.

  12. American Physicists, Nuclear Weapons in World War II, and Social Responsibility

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Badash, Lawrence

    2005-06-01

    Social responsibility in science has a centuries-long history, but it was such a minor thread that most scientists were unaware of the concept. Even toward the conclusion of the Manhattan Project, which produced the first nuclear weapons, only a handful of its participants had some reservations about use of a weapon of mass destruction. But the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki not only made society more aware of the importance of science, they made scientists more aware of their responsibility to society. I describe the development of the concept of social responsibility and its appearance among American scientists both before and after the end of World War II.

  13. Safety issues in robotic handling of nuclear weapon parts

    SciTech Connect

    Drotning, W.; Wapman, W.; Fahrenholtz, J.

    1993-12-31

    Robotic systems are being developed by the Intelligent Systems and Robotics Center at Sandia National Laboratories to perform automated handling tasks with radioactive weapon parts. These systems will reduce the occupational radiation exposure to workers by automating operations that are currently performed manually. The robotic systems at Sandia incorporate several levels of mechanical, electrical, and software safety for handling hazardous materials. For example, tooling used by the robot to handle radioactive parts has been designed with mechanical features that allow the robot to release its payload only at designated locations in the robotic workspace. In addition, software processes check for expected and unexpected situations throughout the operations. Incorporation of features such as these provides multiple levels of safety for handling hazardous or valuable payloads with automated intelligent systems.

  14. Nuclear Weapons. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its Uranium Processing Facility Should Better Reflect Funding Estimates and Technology Readiness

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-11-01

    metal. Recovery extraction centrifugal contactors A process that uses solvent to extract uranium for purposes of purification. Agile machining A...Appropriations, U.S. Senate NUCLEAR WEAPONS National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its Uranium Processing Facility Should Better...00-2010 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Nuclear Weapons: National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plans for Its Uranium Processing Facility Should Better

  15. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-07-02

    and security mechanism. The Six Party Agreement was negotiated following a North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the imposition of sanctions...against North Korea by the United Nations Security Council, and mounting congressional criticism of Administration policy. The nuclear test signaled...in Macau — the object of U.S. financial sanctions since September 2005 because of Banco Delta’s involvement in North Korean criminal counterfeiting

  16. Nuclear weapons. The balance of terror, the quest for peace

    SciTech Connect

    Edwards, A.J.C.

    1985-01-01

    This book provides a study from first principles of nuclear strategy and the balance of terror. This book addresses the most fundamental issues of our time - what is the balance of terror. How did it come to be. Is it necessary. How has it affected world politics. Will it keep the world at peace. Is it stable in an intrinsic and a dynamic sense. How real a threat is a first strike advantage. What can arms control agreements contribute. What should the objectives of such agreements be. How might a nuclear conflict begin. What would be the chance of containing such a conflict once begun. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the balance of terror. Are there any alternatives to a balance of terror, such as general or nuclear disarmament, which would be both attainable and preferable. If not, what can be done to make a better balance of terror. What are the main threats to stability. What should the West's policies be. What role is there for the independent nuclear deterrents of smaller countries. And how have recent developments such as the American 'star-wars' programme and the 'nuclear winter' hypothesis affected the answers to all these questions.

  17. The future of US nuclear weapons in a restructured world

    SciTech Connect

    Slocombe, W.B.

    1992-12-31

    The upheavals in the internal politics and in the international role of the former USSR have already profoundly changed the threats against which the United States and the West, generally, must make their security arrangements, and, particularly, their plans for nuclear forces. Changes in the USSR and in its role in central Europe are erasing both the general American-Soviet confrontation from which nuclear war could have emerged and the more specific threat of a sudden armor-led Soviet assault on Western Europe that could have posed for the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the choice of defeat or quick nuclear escalation. Even in a dramatically transformed world there will continue to be international tensions, crises, and even wars in which US forces may participate, as the Persian Gulf war demonstrated. Despite the shadow that actual or potential third-country nuclear potential may cast over US military operations in such contexts, US nuclear capabilities will have a minimal role in most such security issues because their destructiveness is so disproportionate to what is likely to be at stake.

  18. The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-01-01

    their strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,000 warheads with no more than 500 launchers without weakening security. 22 Deutch suggests the following force...weapon-states/?hpt=hp_t1. 22 Bruce Blair, et al., “Smaller and Safer,” Foreign Affairs 89, 5 (2010). 23 John Deutch , “A Nuclear Posture for Today...Littlefield. 2013. Deutch , J. “A Nuclear Posture for Today.” Foreign Affairs 84, 1. 2005. European Defense Agency: Long-Term Vision. 2006. Evans, G

  19. Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yaffe, Michael David

    On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of

  20. The Continuing Environmental Threat of Nuclear Weapons: Integrated Policy Responses

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Robock, Alan; Toon, Owen B.; Turco, Richard P.; Oman, Luke; Stenchikov, Georgiy L.; Bardeen, Charles

    2007-05-01

    Humans have come to the realization that pollution of the atmosphere with gases and particles in the past 50 years is the dominant cause of atmospheric change. While land-use change can produce large regional effects, ozone depletion, global warming, and nuclear smoke all are human-driven problems that have actual or potential global adverse impacts on our fragile environment, each with severe consequences for humanity. These effects were, or would be, inadvertent and unplanned consequences of normal daily activities, the defense policies of many nations, and nuclear proliferation. Thus, we must seek ways of continuing our normal lives while protecting ourselves from environmental catastrophe.

  1. Acoustic Analysis of Plutonium and Nuclear Weapon Components at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Saleh, T. A.; Reynolds, J. J.; Rowe, C. A.; Freibert, F. J.; Ten Cate, J. A.; Ulrich, T. J.; Farrow, A. M.

    2012-12-01

    One of the primary missions of Los Alamos National Laboratory is to use science based techniques to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile of the United States. As such we use numerous NDE techniques to monitor materials and systems properties in weapons. Two techniques will be discussed in this presentation, Acoustic Resonance Spectroscopy (ARS) and Acoustic Emission (AE). ARS is used to observe manufacturing variations or changes in the plutonium containing component (pit) of the weapon system. Both quantitative and qualitative comparisons can be used to determine variation in the pit components. Piezoelectric transducer driven acoustic resonance experiments will be described along with initial qualitative and more complex analysis and comparison techniques derived from earthquake analysis performed at LANL. Similarly, AE is used to measure the time of arrival of acoustic signals created by mechanical events that can occur in nuclear weapon components. Both traditional time of arrival techniques and more advanced techniques are used to pinpoint the location and type of acoustic emission event. Similar experiments on tensile tests of brittle phases of plutonium metal will be described.

  2. Plutonium and uranium contamination in soils from former nuclear weapon test sites in Australia

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Child, D. P.; Hotchkis, M. A. C.

    2013-01-01

    The British government performed a number of nuclear weapon tests on Australian territory from 1952 through to 1963 with the cooperation of the Australian government. Nine fission bombs were detonated in South Australia at Emu Junction and Maralinga, and a further three fission weapons were detonated in the Monte Bello Islands off the coast of Western Australia. A number of soil samples were collected by the Australian Radiation Laboratories in 1972 and 1978 during field surveys at these nuclear weapon test sites. They were analysed by gamma spectrometry and, for a select few samples, by alpha spectrometry to measure the remaining activities of fission products, activation products and weapon materials. We have remeasured a number of these Montebello Islands and Emu Junction soil samples using the ANTARES AMS facility, ANSTO. These samples were analysed for plutonium and uranium isotopic ratios and isotopic concentrations. Very low 240Pu/239Pu ratios were measured at both sites (∼0.05 for Alpha Island and ∼0.02 for Emu Field), substantially below global fallout averages. Well correlated but widely varying 236U and plutonium concentrations were measured across both sites, but 233U did not correlate with these other isotopes and instead showed correlation with distance from ground zero, indicating in situ production in the soils.

  3. Nuclear weapons decision-making; an application of organization theory to the mini-nuke case

    SciTech Connect

    Kangas, J.L.

    1985-01-01

    This dissertation addresses the problem of constructing and developing normative theory responsive to the need for improving the quality of decision-making in the nuclear weapons policy-making. Against the background of a critical evaluation of various paradigms in the literature (systems analysis and opposed-systems designed, the bureaucratic politics model, and the cybernetic theory of decision) an attempt is made to design an alternative analytic framework based on the writings of numerous organization theorists such as Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. The framework is applied to the case of mini-nukes, i.e., proposals in the mid-1970s to develop and deploy tens of thousands of very low-yield (sub-kiloton), miniaturized fission weapons in NATO. Heuristic case study identifies the type of study undertaken in the dissertation in contrast to the more familiar paradigmatic studies identified, for example, with the Harvard Weapons Project. Application of the analytic framework developed in the dissertation of the mini-nuke case resulted in an empirical understanding of why decision making concerning tactical nuclear weapons has been such a complex task and why force modernization issues in particular have been so controversial and lacking in policy resolution.

  4. Anti-nuclear weapons activism in the United States and Great Britain: a comparative analysis

    SciTech Connect

    Sussman, G.

    1987-01-01

    This study is a response to the lacuna in empirical research into political activism and the nuclear issue and seeks to ascertain the social and value characteristics, political attitudes, and political behavior of activists in the United States and Great Britain. Consideration is also given to gender differences in light of evidence of an emerging gender gap in these two countries. The study investigates the common forces cited in two sets of literature - post-industrialism and anti-nuclear weapons movements - which provide a framework for analysis. Survey research data is employed to assess cross-national similarities and differences. The findings obtained indicate that while American and British activists exhibit common social and value characteristics, British activists appear more integrated in their political opposition to nuclear weapons compared with their American counterparts. Survey results indicate that the political-action repertoire of these activists is quite diverse, suggesting a new style of politics in advanced industrial democracies. Gender-based analysis reveals two important findings. First, activist American men differ significantly from the other three social groups in their attitudes towards nuclear weapons. Second, activist women in both national settings participate at a level equal to or exceeding that of activist men.

  5. Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

    SciTech Connect

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod; Whitney, Paul D.

    2010-04-16

    A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferation risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.

  6. Approaches to integrating nuclear weapons stockpile management and arms control objectives.

    SciTech Connect

    Sanders, Lani Miyoshi; DeLand, Sharon Marie; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2010-06-01

    Historically, U.S. arms control policy and the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise have been reactive to each other, rather than interdependent and mutually reinforcing. One element of the divergence has been the long timescale necessary to plan and create substantive changes in the infrastructure vs. the inherent unpredictability of arms control outcomes. We explore several examples that illustrate this tension, some of the costs and implications associated with this reactive paradigm, and illustrate that, while the nuclear weapons enterprise has long considered the implications of arms control in sizing capacity of its missions, it has not substantively considered arms control in construction requirement for capabilities and products. Since previous arms control agreements have limited numbers and types of deployed systems, with delivery systems as the object of verification, this disconnect has not been forefront. However, as future agreements unfold, the warhead itself may become the treaty limited item and the object of verification. Such a scenario might offer both the need and the opportunity to integrate nuclear weapons and arms control requirements in unprecedented ways. This paper seeks to inspire new thinking on how such integration could be fostered and the extent to which it can facilitate significant reduction in nuclear stockpiles.

  7. Strategic weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-09-01

    This paper describes the Defense Department's process for formulating its strategic weapons targeting policy and translating that policy into a nuclear war plan-the Single Integrated Operational Plan. GAO provides information on the relationship between the strategic nuclear targeting process and the determination of requirements for nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, level of civilian oversight, and categories and types of targets. These strategic nuclear weapons systems, commonly known as the triad, include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers armed with nuclear bombs and missiles.

  8. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-01-05

    earlier than Bosworth; he testified that North Korean Foreign Ministry official, Lee Gun , stated that a peace agreement...September 24, 2008; and Yi Chong- chin , “DPRK official at energy aid talks comments on nuclear verification issue,” Yonhap News Agency, September 19...complete denuclearization. If these 51 Choe Sang- hun , “Tensions rise on Korean peninsula,” New

  9. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk

  10. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-05-10

    plan in 2009, it did not support the adoption of a draft program of work for 2010.58 Ambassador Zamir Akram , Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the...Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram , Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, August 31, 2010. 59 Statement by Ambassador...Zamir Akram , February 18, 2010. 60 Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, “Playing the Nuclear Game: Pakistan and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty,” Arms

  11. The Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposal

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1990-06-01

    Intelligence stated that, "The Soviet Union under Gorbachev is also paying increased attention to international proposals for naval arms controls and...American nuclear guarantee for many reasons, one being that NATO refuses to pay the price for substitutes. 4 0 "Nonnuclear Zones: Important Factor of...They do not want to destroy them. Success in the cold war a( nieves this. The hot war may lose all this and more too... the loss of Western Europe or

  12. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-05-04

    tested a plutonium nuclear device in October 2006. U.S. officials have cited evidence that North Korea also operates a secret highly enriched...programs. It cited as the reason for its decision a statement approved by the United Nations Security Council criticizing North Korea’s test launch...the missile test violated Security Resolution 1718 of October 2006, which banned tests of long-range North Korean missiles. The statement called on

  13. Japan's anti-nuclear weapons policy misses its target, even in the war on terrorism.

    PubMed

    DiFilippo, Anthony

    2003-01-01

    While actively working to promote the abolition of all nuclear weapons from the world since the end of the cold war, Japan's disarmament policies are not without problems. Promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons as Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella creates a major credibility problem for Tokyo, since this decision maintains a Japanese deterrence policy at the same time that officials push for disarmament. Tokyo also advocates a gradual approach to the abolition of nuclear weapons, a decision that has had no effect on those countries that have been conducting sub-critical nuclear testing, nor stopped India and Pakistan from carrying out nuclear tests. Consistent with Article 9 of the Constitution, the Japanese war-renouncing constitutional clause, Tokyo toughened Japan's sizeable Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme in the early 1990s. Because of the anti-military guidelines included in Japan's ODA programme, Tokyo stopped new grant and loan aid to India and Pakistan in 1998 after these countries conducted nuclear tests. However, because of the criticism Japan faced from its failure to participate in the 1991 Gulf War, Tokyo has been seeking a new Japanese role in international security during the post-cold war period. Deepening its commitment to the security alliance with the US, Tokyo has become increasingly influenced by Washington's global polices, including the American war on terrorism. After Washington decided that Pakistan would be a key player in the US war on terrorism, Tokyo restored grant and loan aid to both Islamabad and New Delhi, despite the unequivocal restrictions of Japan's ODA programme.

  14. The Effects of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons on Civil-Military Relations in India

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-01-01

    and military leadership had begun to consider the strategic use of nuclear weapons. George Perkovich claims that when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ... Indira Gandhi vehemently denied.44 Amidst such accusations, the inability of American satellites to locate two of India’s Jaguar squadrons intensified...Summer 2009 [ 31 ] the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research, was developed to test the submarine’s turbines and propellers. Other reports

  15. Tactical Nuclear Weapons-Does the U.S. Army Still Need Them?

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1995-05-17

    Tactical Nuclear Weapons-Does the U.S. Army Still Need Them? Unclassified 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 6. AUTHOR( S ...Strategic Studies 901 S . National Ave Springfield , MO 65802 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM( S )9. SPONSORING...MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS , 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER( S ) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A PUBLIC RELEASE , 13. SUPPLEMENTARY

  16. Literature survey of blast and fire effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas

    SciTech Connect

    Reitter, T.A.; McCallen, D.B.; Kang, S.W.

    1982-06-01

    The American literature of the past 30 years on fire and blast effects of nuclear weapons on urban areas has been surveyed. The relevant work is briefly sketched and areas where information is apparently lacking are noted. This report is intended to provide the basis for suggesting research priorities in the fire and blast effects area for the Federal Emergency Management Agency. It is also intended to provide entry into the literature for researchers. over 850 references are given.

  17. Detection Technology in the 21st Century: The Case of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-03-26

    warfare project was years ahead of the Germans, producing five million cattle cakes packed with anthrax. Even the United States had a plan to use the...signal from large ships.) Since the cessation of atmospheric nuclear testing , man-made background due to fallout has declined to levels well below 9...imaging the relatively weak attenuated signal from a shielded weapon. The Soviets developed a similar passive imaging system, and successfully tested it

  18. The role of belief systems in shaping nuclear weapons policy preference and thinking in Brazil

    SciTech Connect

    Krasno, J.E.C.

    1994-12-31

    This study examines motivations behind the decisions of national leaders to pursue or not to pursue the development of nuclear weapons. The research, which builds upon work done in the field of Political Psychology, was conducted in Brazil and focuses on the role that belief systems play in shaping policy preferences and thinking by members of the Brazilian elite on nuclear issues. The data were gathered in Brazil through in-depth interviews and a questionnaire administered to members of the Brazilian elite who be- long to groups which have input in forming policy. Proliferation studies, generally, have concentrated on the acquisition of nuclear technology and have rarely studied motivations which contribute to the demand for these weapons. Research on beliefs and policy formation suggests that beliefs and values should be expected to play a role in shaping nuclear policy. The results show that beliefs about status, power, competition, and moral considerations do correlate very significantly with policy thinking on nuclear issues and therefore sustain the hypothesis of this study. However, the findings on worldview do not significantly correlate with nuclear policy thinking and therefore do not sustain the prevailing hypothesis on that relationship.

  19. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-05-15

    Material Report 2007,” ibid.; SIPRI Yearbook 2007. 7 “Nuclear Notebook,” ibid. 8 “Global Fissile Material Report 2007,” International Panel on Fissile...said that the arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances.41 Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David... University of Bradford, November 18, 2007. Available at http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief_22finalised.pdf 49 Alex Wagner, “U.S

  20. Handbook for Nuclear Weapons Effects under Arctic Conditions. Sanitized.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1980-04-30

    Large areas are covered by hummock ice which can be piled up 6-7 m above the surrounding ice over the polar ocean. The pile-up can reach 13 m near...surrounding ridged and hummocked sea ice. Icebergs are not expected to be large enough or experienced frequently enough to be of ipcrtance. A nuclear burst...with craters from surface TNT events in r-ay, sand, basalt and shale. Similarly, Figure 3-10 presents a comparison of apparent crater depths versus

  1. A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-05-01

    signals or samples molecules from nuclear materials and turns them into information. This is indicated schematically in figure 12. The front end ...short-lived isotopes ending in stable 208Pb. The most prominent gamma rays are 239 keV from 212Pb, 511, 583 and 2614 keV from 208Tl, and 911 and...isotopes ending in 206Pb. The most prominent gamma rays are 609, 1120, and 1764 keV from 214Bi. • Potassium activity is due to decay of 40K, which

  2. Physical Security Modeling for the Shipboard Nuclear Weapons Security Program,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-04-01

    STATISTICS 3-11 NSWC TR 82-50 REFERENCES 3-1) Chapman, L.D., and Engi, D.,"Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (Snap)-Overview," NUREG /CR-0960, SAND79...34 NUREG /CR-0725, SAND79-0617, Sandia Laboratories, March 1979. 3-3) Grant III, F.H., Engi, D., and Chapman, L.D.,"User’s Guide for SNAP," NUREG /CR...34 Science Applications, Inc., SAI-78-995-LJ, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission report NUREG /CR-0532, December 1978 4-5) McDaniel, T. and Huszar, L

  3. Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Miller, A. J.; Krueger, A. J.; Prabhakara, C.; Hilsenrath, E.

    1974-01-01

    Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

  4. Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Needs to Establish a Cost and Schedule Baseline for Manufacturing a Critical Nuclear Weapon Component

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-05-01

    MOX mixed-oxide NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration PF-4 Plutonium Facility-4 building RRW Reliable Replacement Warhead TA-50...disassembles legacy pits and removes and oxidizes the plutonium, which can be used as a feed metal for the mixed-oxide ( MOX ) fuel polishing activities...Facility at the Savannah River Site. MOX fuel polishing This program purifies plutonium from the ARIES project to specifications that would allow direct

  5. The Plutonium Transition from Nuclear Weapons to Crypt

    SciTech Connect

    Gray, L.W.

    2000-03-14

    With the end of the ''Cold War'' thousands of nuclear warheads are being dismantled. The National Academy of Sciences termed this growing stockpile of plutonium and highly enriched uranium ''a clear and present danger'' to international security. DOE/MD selected a duel approach to plutonium disposition--burning MOX fuel in existing reactors and immobilization in a ceramic matrix surrounded by HLW glass. MOX material will be pits and clean metal. The challenges come with materials that will be transferred to Immobilization--these range from engineered materials to residues containing < 30% Pu. Impurity knowledge range from guesses to actual data. During packaging, sites will flag ''out of the ordinary'' containers for characterized. If the process history is lost, characterization cost will escalate rapidly. After two step blending and ceramic precursor addition, cold press and sintering will form 0.5-kg ceramic pucks containing {le}50 g Pu. Pucks will be sealed in cans, placed into magazines, then into HLW canisters; these canisters will be filled with HLW glass prior to being transported to the HLW repository. The Immobilization Program must interface with DP, EM, RW, and NN. Overlaid on top of these interfaces are the negotiations with the Russians.

  6. Probabilistic cost-benefit analysis of enhanced safety features for strategic nuclear weapons at a representative location

    SciTech Connect

    Stephens, D.R.; Hall, C.H.; Holman, G.S.; Graham, K.F.; Harvey, T.F.; Serduke, F.J.D.

    1993-10-01

    We carried out a demonstration analysis of the value of developing and implementing enhanced safety features for nuclear weapons in the US stockpile. We modified an approach that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) developed in response to a congressional directive that NRC assess the ``value-impact`` of regulatory actions for commercial nuclear power plants. Because improving weapon safety shares some basic objectives with NRC regulations, i.e., protecting public health and safety from the effects of accidents involving radioactive materials, we believe the NRC approach to be appropriate for evaluating weapons-safety cost-benefit issues. Impact analysis includes not only direct costs associated with retrofitting the weapon system, but also the expected costs (or economic risks) that are avoided by the action, i.e., the benefits.

  7. North Korea's nuclear weapons program:verification priorities and new challenges.

    SciTech Connect

    Moon, Duk-ho

    2003-12-01

    A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined.

  8. Strategies for the disposition of high explosives resulting from dismantlement of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Pruneda, C.; Humphrey, J.

    1993-03-01

    Many thousands of pounds of high quality main-charge explosives will result as surplus from the dismantlement of returns from the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The method most often employed for dealing with this surplus explosive is destruction by open burning. However, open burning as a means of treating excess explosives is losing favor because of environmental concerns associated with such an uncontrolled thermal destruction process. Thus, alternative processes for treatment of excess explosives from weapon dismantlement is discussed. These alternatives include: reformulation, crystalline component recovery, chemical conversion of the crystalline component to higher value products which may have civilian or military applications and, when necessary, treatment as waste in an environmentally benign fashion.

  9. Nuclear weapons, proliferation, and terrorism: U.S. response in the twenty-first century

    SciTech Connect

    DeLawter, D.A.

    1998-11-01

    As the remaining superpower in the post-Cold War world, the US needs to re-evaluate its policy toward the growing threat to US national interests and the effects of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), specifically nuclear devices, and their use by terrorist groups against US interests abroad. As the world reacts to the implosion of the former Soviet Union, there are increased numbers of nations and possibly terrorist groups trying to become players in the international arena. This study describes the ease of obtaining the scientific knowledge, plans, and materials to enable a terrorist`s construction of a nuclear device. It also analyzes motivation of terrorist groups, concluding that a nuclear weapon, capable of inflicting violence in the extreme, fulfills the terrorist`s goal of violence in support of a political agenda or to inspire radical change. Given the guidance from the national level, this study proposes a series of policy options available to the NCA for application in an aggressive counterproliferation policy. Finally, the US must rapidly reorganize its counterproliferation structure and methods to streamline a more aggressive approach that is recognized and feared by potential nuclear terrorists; augment current political efforts with a clearly defined counterproliferation military mission and associated doctrine.

  10. Soviet Nordic nuclear-weapon free-zone proposal. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Lumsden, C.A.

    1990-06-01

    This thesis examines the Soviet proposal and its ramifications for the United States and the West. The central theme running through each Soviet proposal has been removal of American nuclear guarantees. Preservation of US national security interests and hence US ability to extend its forward defense would be gravely threatened by such a NWFZ. However, unilateral agreement on a NWFZ is unlikely by the anticipated members of the Nordic NWFZ the US, USSR, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Greenland, and Sweden. The US has military installations in Iceland and Greenland and banning of nuclear weapons during wartime is inconceivable. The question then arises as to which nation or groups of nations will dominate and which will acquiesce. Inevitably the debate breaks down to a tug of war between the two superpowers. It is really the politics surrounding the nuclear weapons that is the heart of the nuclear-free-zone debate. Changing world politics demand that the West develop a unified strategy toward the USSR. Through NATO it must preserve its vital economic political and military objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible naval forces and strong political and economic ties to the governments of the nations bordering the Baltic are essential. Strong NATO naval forces operating in the Baltic Sea must be seen as guarantors of the West's strategic aims and interests. A Nordic NWFZ would prevent this.

  11. Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Has a New Approach to Managing the B61-12 Life Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and Other Risks Remain

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-02-01

    Department of Energy responsible for the nation’s nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactor programs. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety... NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Has a New Approach to Managing the B61-12 Life Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and...February 2016 NUCLEAR WEAPONS NNSA Has a New Approach to Managing the B61-12 Life Extension, but a Constrained Schedule and Other Risks Remain

  12. The Army Before Last: Military Transformation and the Impact of Nuclear Weapons on the US Army During the Early Cold War

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2004-09-01

    deterrent rather than increasing investment in nuclear weapons and delivery systems .9 This thinking was based on the Army’s belief that nuclear weapons...War .................................................. 21 Table 2. US Army Cannon Delivery System (Nuclear Capable)....................... 42 Table 3...US Army Rocket & Missile Systems 1953-1991................................. 43 x THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY

  13. Cooperative measures to support the Indo-Pak Agreement Reducing Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons.

    SciTech Connect

    Mishra, Sitakanta; Ahmed, Mansoor

    2014-04-01

    In 2012, India and Pakistan reaffirmed the Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons. Despite a history of mutual animosity and persistent conflict between the two countries, this agreement derives strength from a few successful nuclear confidence building measures that have stood the test of time. It also rests on the hope that the region would be spared a nuclear holocaust from an accidental nuclear weapon detonation that might be misconstrued as a deliberate use of a weapon by the other side. This study brings together two emerging strategic analysts from South Asia to explore measures to support the Agreement and further develop cooperation around this critical issue. This study briefly dwells upon the strategic landscape of nuclear South Asia with the respective nuclear force management structures, doctrines, and postures of India and Pakistan. It outlines the measures in place for the physical protection and safety of nuclear warheads, nuclear materials, and command and control mechanisms in the two countries, and it goes on to identify the prominent, emerging challenges posed by the introduction of new weapon technologies and modernization of the respective strategic forces. This is followed by an analysis of the agreement itself leading up to a proposed framework for cooperative measures that might enhance the spirit and implementation of the agreement.

  14. Lifetime predictions for alumina ceramics used in nuclear weapons stockpile components

    SciTech Connect

    Glass, S.J.; Monroe, S.L.; Newton, C.

    1997-09-01

    Ceramic materials are used extensively in non-nuclear components in the weapons stockpile including neutron tubes, firing sets, radar, strong link and weak link assemblies, batteries, and current/voltage stacks. Ceramics also perform critical functions in electronics, passively as insulators and actively as resistors and capacitors. Glass and ceramic seals also provide hermetic electrical feedthroughs in connectors for many weapons components. The primary goal of the ceramic material lifetime prediction program is to provide the enhanced surveillance program with the capability to specify the reliability and lifetimes of glass and ceramic-containing components under conditions typical of the stockpile environment. The authors have studied the reliability and subcritical crack growth (SCG) behavior of 94% alumina (Al{sub 2}O{sub 3}), which is likely the most common ceramic in the stockpile. Measurements have been made on aluminas manufactured by four war reserve qualified vendors (Coors, Wesgo, AlSiMag, and Diamonite). These materials are expected to be representative of typical product obtained from vendors who have supplied alumina for weapons components during the past several decades.

  15. AAAS Assessment of the Role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead in the US Nuclear Weapons Complex

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tarter, C. Bruce

    2007-03-01

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a study of the role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) in the US Nuclear Weapons Complex during the latter part of 2006. As the Chair of that study I will report our principal findings and recommendations. Our conclusions are based on the experience and knowledge of the committee members, the information available in numerous reports and related analyses, and on presentations and discussions with DOE/NNSA officials, staff members from the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories, and others with special expertise and perspectives.

  16. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    DOE PAGES

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; ...

    2016-05-18

    We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. Wemore » find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less

  17. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  18. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    SciTech Connect

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-18

    We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  19. (236)U and (239,)(240)Pu ratios from soils around an Australian nuclear weapons test site.

    PubMed

    Tims, S G; Froehlich, M B; Fifield, L K; Wallner, A; De Cesare, M

    2016-01-01

    The isotopes (236)U, (239)Pu and (240)Pu are present in surface soils as a result of global fallout from nuclear weapons tests carried out in the 1950's and 1960's. These isotopes potentially constitute artificial tracers of recent soil erosion and sediment movement. Only Accelerator Mass Spectrometry has the requisite sensitivity to measure all three isotopes at these environmental levels. Coupled with its relatively high throughput capabilities, this makes it feasible to conduct studies of erosion across the geographical extent of the Australian continent. In the Australian context, however, global fallout is not the only source of these isotopes. As part of its weapons development program the United Kingdom carried out a series of atmospheric and surface nuclear weapons tests at Maralinga, South Australia in 1956 and 1957. The tests have made a significant contribution to the Pu isotopic abundances present in the region around Maralinga and out to distances ∼1000 km, and impact on the assessment techniques used in the soil and sediment tracer studies. Quantification of the relative fallout contribution derived from detonations at Maralinga is complicated owing to significant contamination around the test site from numerous nuclear weapons safety trials that were also carried out around the site. We show that (236)U can provide new information on the component of the fallout that is derived from the local nuclear weapons tests, and highlight the potential of (236)U as a new fallout tracer.

  20. Technology diffusion of a different nature: Applications of nuclear safeguards technology to the chemical weapons verification regime

    SciTech Connect

    Kadner, S.P.; Reisman, A.; Turpen, E.

    1996-10-01

    The following discussion focuses on the issue of arms control implementation from the standpoint of technology and technical assistance. Not only are the procedures and techniques for safeguarding nuclear materials undergoing substantial changes, but the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) will give rise to technical difficulties unprecedented in the implementation of arms control verification. Although these regimes present new challenges, an analysis of the similarities between the nuclear and chemical weapons non-proliferation verification regimes illustrates the overlap in technological solutions. Just as cost-effective and efficient technologies can solve the problems faced by the nuclear safeguards community, these same technologies offer solutions for the CWC safeguards regime. With this in mind, experts at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), who are responsible for verification implementation, need to devise a CWC verification protocol that considers the technology already available. The functional similarity of IAEA and the OPCW, in conjunction with the technical necessities of both verification regimes, should receive attention with respect to the establishment of a technical assistance program. Lastly, the advanced status of the nuclear and chemical regime vis-a-vis the biological non-proliferation regime can inform our approach to implementation of confidence building measures for biological weapons.

  1. Doses from external irradiation to Marshall Islanders from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    PubMed

    Bouville, André; Beck, Harold L; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Annual doses from external irradiation resulting from exposure to fallout from the 65 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted in the Marshall Islands at Bikini and Enewetak between 1946 and 1958 have been estimated for the first time for Marshallese living on all inhabited atolls. All tests that deposited fallout on any of the 23 inhabited atolls or separate reef islands have been considered. The methodology used to estimate the radiation doses at the inhabited atolls is based on test- and location-specific radiation survey data, deposition density estimates of 137Cs, and fallout times-of-arrival provided in a companion paper (Beck et al.), combined with information on the radionuclide composition of the fallout at various times after each test. These estimates of doses from external irradiation have been combined with corresponding estimates of doses from internal irradiation, given in a companion paper (Simon et al.), to assess the cancer risks among the Marshallese population (Land et al.) resulting from exposure to radiation from the nuclear weapons tests.

  2. Los Alamos neutron science center nuclear weapons stewardship and unique national scientific capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Schoenberg, Kurt F

    2010-12-15

    This presentation gives an overview of the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) and its contributions to science and the nuclear weapons program. LANSCE is made of multiple experimental facilities (the Lujan Center, the Weapons Neutron Research facility (WNR), the Ultra-Cold Neutron facility (UCN), the proton Radiography facility (pRad) and the Isotope Production Facility (IPF)) served by the its kilometer long linear accelerator. Several research areas are supported, including materials and bioscience, nuclear science, materials dynamics, irradiation response and medical isotope production. LANSCE is a national user facility that supports researchers worldwide. The LANSCE Risk Mitigation program is currently in progress to update critical accelerator equipment to help extend the lifetime of LANSCE as a key user facility. The Associate Directorate of Business Sciences (ADBS) plays an important role in the continued success of LANSCE. This includes key procurement support, human resource support, technical writing support, and training support. LANSCE is also the foundation of the future signature facility MARIE (Matter-Radiation Interactions in Extremes).

  3. Health consequences and health systems response to the Pacific U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program.

    PubMed

    Palafox, Neal A; Riklon, Sheldon; Alik, Wilfred; Hixon, Allen L

    2007-03-01

    Between 1946 and 1958, the United States detonated 67 thermonuclear devices in the Pacific as part of their U.S. Nuclear Weapons Testing Program (USNWTP). The aggregate explosive power was equal to 7,200 Hiroshima atomic bombs. Recent documents released by the U.S. government suggest that the deleterious effects of the nuclear testing were greater and extended farther than previously known. The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) government and affected communities have sought refress through diplomatic routes with the U.S. government, however, existing medical programs and financial reparations have not adequately addressed many of the health consequences of the USNWTP. Since radiation-induced cancers may have a long latency, a healthcare infrastructure is needed to address both cancer and related health issues. This article reviews the health consequences of the Pacific USNWTP and the current health systems ability to respond.

  4. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War. Papers Based on a Symposium of the Forum on Physics and Society of the American Physical Society, (Washington, D.C., April 1982).

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Morrison, Philip; And Others

    Three papers on nuclear weapons and nuclear war, based on talks given by distinguished physicists during an American Physical Society-sponsored symposium, are provided in this booklet. They include "Caught Between Asymptotes" (Philip Morrison), "We are not Inferior to the Soviets" (Hans A. Bethe), and "MAD vs. NUTS"…

  5. User’s Guide and History of ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate/Fuel Oil) as a Nuclear Weapons Effect Simulation Explosive

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1983-03-31

    continue the combustion process . This, afterburning leads to longer duration blast waves and higher impulses. Some thoughts again were given to the use...and use of ANFO as a nuclear weapons blast , cratering, and ground shock simulation source, is traced from 1966 to 1976 when the first full scale target...FACTORS 4 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 9 LIST OF TABLES 15 .i Section 1 A HISTORY OF THE USE O0 ANFO FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS BLAST AND SHOCK SIMULATION 17 1.1

  6. Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese, and United States nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect

    Schultz, V. ); Schultz, S.C. ); Robison, W.L. )

    1991-05-01

    A considerable literature exists on the Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese and their atolls; however, this literature consists of a large number of governmental documents that are relatively unknown and difficult to locate. This is particularly true of the documents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and those related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Because a comprehensive bibliography on the impact of nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese and their atolls does not exist, the preparation of a bibliography that includes sufficient information to locate all types of reports seems justified. This document is the bibliography.

  7. Electromagnetic Signature Technique as a Promising Tool to Verify Nuclear Weapons Storage and Dismantlement under a Nuclear Arms Control Regime

    SciTech Connect

    Bunch, Kyle J.; Williams, Laura S.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep

    2012-08-01

    The 2010 ratification of the New START Treaty has been widely regarded as a noteworthy national security achievement for both the Obama administration and the Medvedev-Putin regime, but deeper cuts are envisioned under future arms control regimes. Future verification needs will include monitoring the storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondaries, and other materials. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under future arms control regimes will pose new challenges. Since acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes, non-nuclear non-sensitive signatures may provide a significant verification tool without the use of additional information barriers. The use of electromagnetic signatures to monitor nuclear material storage containers is a promising technology with the potential to fulfill these challenging requirements. Research performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to confirm the presence of specific components on a “yes/no” basis without revealing classified information. Arms control inspectors might use this technique to verify the presence or absence of monitored items, including both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Although additional research is needed to study signature aspects such as uniqueness and investigate container-specific scenarios, the technique potentially offers a rapid and cost-effective tool to verify reduction and dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons.

  8. American perspectives on security : energy, environment, nuclear weapons, and terrorism : 2010.

    SciTech Connect

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.; Silva, Carol L.

    2011-03-01

    We report findings from an Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone among the American public in mid-2010 on US energy and environmental security. Key areas of investigation include public perceptions shaping the context for debate about a comprehensive national energy policy, and what levels of importance are assigned to various prospective energy technologies. Additionally, we investigate how public views on global climate change are evolving, how the public assesses the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, preferences for managing used nuclear fuel, and public trust in sources of scientific and technical information. We also report findings from a national Internet survey and a subset of questions administered by telephone in mid-2010 on public views of the relevance of US nuclear weapons today, support for strategic arms control, and assessments of the potential for nuclear abolition. Additionally, we analyze evolving public views of the threat of terrorism, assessments of progress in the struggle against terrorism, and tolerance for intrusive antiterror policies. Where possible, findings from each survey are compared with previous surveys in this series for analyses of trends.

  9. Feasibility and options for purchasing nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from the former Soviet Union (FSU)

    SciTech Connect

    1994-12-31

    In response to a recent tasking from the National Security Council, this report seeks to analyze the possible options open to the US for purchasing, from the former Soviet Union (FSU) substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the accelerated weapons retirements and dismantlements that will soon be taking place. The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the implications of some of the options that now appear to be open to the United States, it being recognized that several issues might have to be addressed in further detail if the US Government, on its own, or acting with others seeks to negotiate any such purchases on an early basis. As an outgrowth of the dissolution of the Soviet Union three of the C.I.S. republics now possessing nuclear weapons, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have stated that it is their goal, without undue delay, to become non-nuclear weapon states as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of overriding US concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, and the significant opportunity that the availability of such a large quantity of surplus weapons grade material might present in this regard, especially to a cash-starved FSU Republic. Additionally, the US, in its endeavor to drawdown its own arsenal, needs to assure itself that these materials are not being reconfigured into more modern weapons within the CIS in a manner which would be inconsistent with the stated intentions and publicized activities. The direct purchase of these valuable materials by the US government or by interested US private enterprises could alleviate these security concerns in a straightforward and very expeditious manner, while at the same time pumping vitally needed hard currency into the struggling CIS economy. Such a purchase would seem to be entirely consistent with the Congressional mandate indicated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.

  10. The spread of nuclear-weapon-free zones: Building a new nuclear bargain

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, Z.S.

    1996-02-01

    The United States (US), France and Britain took a small step in the direction of nuclear disarmament when they announced they would ratify the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga, also called the South Pacific nuclear-free-zone treaty. The author examines the protocols of this treaty and the implications for its adoption.

  11. Guadalajara accord between Brazil and Argentina: A tentative step toward the nuclear-weapons-free Latin America envisioned by the treaty of TLATELOLCO. Master's thesis

    SciTech Connect

    Martin, F.X.

    1991-12-01

    In 1967, the Treaty of Tlatelolco declared Latin America to be a nuclear weapons free zone, but this goal remains unfulfilled. Argentina and Brazil, the Latin America nations most capable of building nuclear weapons, refuse to comply with the treaty. Argentine and Brazilian military leaders pursued the development of nuclear weapons from the 1970s to the late 1980s. The emergence of democratic regimes during the 1980s encouraged the gradual denuclearization of weapons research in these nations. In July 1991, the presidents of Argentina and Brazil signed an accord in Guadalajara, Mexico, each promising to end the development of nuclear weapons. The risks of nuclear proliferation may be reduced because of this agreement. The Guadalajara Accord offers hope that nuclear proliferation in Latin America can be slowed and perhaps stopped. The establishment of civilian control over the military and the reduction in the belligerent rivalry between Argentina and Brazil are central factors in ending the quest for nuclear weapons. The firm commitment of these civilian leaders to pursue only peaceful nuclear activities is a positive sign. The adoption of IAEA full scope safeguards in Argentina and Brazil will be the best guarantee for a nuclear weapons free Latin America.

  12. A Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosure For Use Within A Nuclear Weapons Monitoring Regime

    SciTech Connect

    White, Helen; Tanner, Jennifer E.; Allen, Keir; Benz, Jacob M.; McOmish, Sarah; Simmons, Kevin L.

    2012-10-01

    AWE and PNNL are engaged in a technical collaboration investigating techniques to enhance continuity of knowledge over Treaty Accountable Items, with emphasis on a verified nuclear weapons dismantlement process. Tamper Indicating Enclosures (TIE) will likely be deployed as part of a chain of custody regime to indicate an unauthorised attempt to access a Treaty Accountable Item, or secure authenticated monitoring equipment. In 2011, the collaboration presented a paper at the INMM annual conference held in Palm Desert, CA titled “Passive Tamper Indicating Enclosures Incorporating Embedded Optical Fibre”, which discussed the concept of integrating optical fibres into TIEs for use as a passive tamper indicating mechanism. This paper provides an update on the Fibre Optic based TIE and introduces a second passive TIE concept based on the use of Poly(Methyl MethAcrylate) (PMMA). Concepts relating to deployment, tamper indication, and unique identification will be discussed.

  13. Plutonium segregation in glassy aerodynamic fallout from a nuclear weapon test.

    PubMed

    Holliday, K S; Dierken, J M; Monroe, M L; Fitzgerald, M A; Marks, N E; Gostic, R C; Knight, K B; Czerwinski, K R; Hutcheon, I D; McClory, J W

    2017-02-14

    This study combines electron microscopy equipped with energy dispersive spectroscopy to probe major element composition and autoradiography to map plutonium in order to examine the spatial relationships between plutonium and fallout composition in aerodynamic glassy fallout from a nuclear weapon test. A sample set of 48 individual fallout specimens were interrogated to reveal that the significant chemical heterogeneity of this sample set could be described compositionally with a relatively small number of compositional endmembers. Furthermore, high concentrations of plutonium were never associated with several endmember compositions and concentrated with the so-called mafic glass endmember. This result suggests that it is the physical characteristics of the compositional endmembers and not the chemical characteristics of the individual component elements that govern the un-burnt plutonium distribution with respect to major element composition in fallout.

  14. Vertical migration studies of 137Cs from nuclear weapons fallout and the Chernobyl accident.

    PubMed

    Almgren, S; Isaksson, M

    2006-01-01

    The vertical migration of (137)Cs originating from nuclear weapons fallout (NWF) and the Chernobyl accident has been studied at 33 sampling sites in western Sweden. An attempt to describe the present depth distribution with a solution to the convection-diffusion equation (CDE) with a pulse-like fallout event as the initial condition was made. A sum of two CDEs describing the NWF and Chernobyl debris was fitted to the actual depth profiles measured by soil sampling. The fitted depth profiles were used to correct in situ measurements for the actual depth distribution, showing good agreement with the accumulated activities in soil samples. As expected, the vertical migration was very slow and most caesium was still present in the upper soil layers. The ranges of the apparent convection velocity, v, and apparent diffusion coefficient, D, were between 0 and 0.35 cm/year and 0.06 and 2.63 cm(2)/year, respectively.

  15. Low Prevalence of Chronic Beryllium Disease among Workers at a Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Arjomandi, M; Seward, J P; Gotway, M B; Nishimura, S; Fulton, G P; Thundiyil, J; King, T E; Harber, P; Balmes, J R

    2010-01-11

    To study the prevalence of beryllium sensitization (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) in a cohort of workers from a nuclear weapons research and development facility. We evaluated 50 workers with BeS with medical and occupational histories, physical examination, chest imaging with HRCT (N=49), and pulmonary function testing. Forty of these workers also underwent bronchoscopy for bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL) and transbronchial biopsies. The mean duration of employment at the facility was 18 yrs and the mean latency (from first possible exposure) to time of evaluation was 32 yrs. Five of the workers had CBD at the time of evaluation (based on histology or HRCT); three others had evidence of probable CBD. These workers with BeS, characterized by a long duration of potential Be exposure and a long latency, had a low prevalence of CBD.

  16. The nuclear weapons inheritance project: student-to-student dialogues and interactive peer education in disarmament activism.

    PubMed

    Buhmann, Caecilie Böck

    2007-01-01

    The Nuclear Weapons Inheritance Project is a student run and student initiated project founded in 2001 with the purpose of increasing awareness of health effects of nuclear policies and empowering university students to take action in a local and international context. The project uses dialogues to discuss nuclear disarmament with university students and a method of interactive peer education to train new trainers. The project has met more than 1500 students in nuclear weapon states in dialogue and trained about 400 students from all over the world. This article describes the methods and results of the project and discuss how the experience of the project can be used in other projects seeking to increase awareness of a topic and to initiate action on social injustice.

  17. An estimate of Sandia resources for underground nuclear weapons effects testing.

    SciTech Connect

    Bomber, Thomas M.; Zeuch, David Henry

    2003-11-01

    We conducted a study of the time and resources that would be required for Sandia National Laboratories to once again perform nuclear weapons effects experiments of the sort that it did in the past. The study is predicated on the assumptions that if underground nuclear weapons effects testing (UG/NWET) is ever resumed, (1) a brief series of tests (i.e., 2-3) would be done, and (2) all required resources other than those specific to SNL experiments would be provided by others. The questions that we sought to answer were: (1) What experiments would SNL want to do and why? (2) How much would they cost? (3) How long would they take to field? To answer these questions, we convened panels of subject matter experts first to identify five experiments representative of those that SNL has done in the past, and then to determine the costs and timelines to design, fabricate and field each of them. We found that it would cost $76M to $84M to do all five experiments, including 164 to 174 FTEs to conduct all five experiments in a single test. Planning and expenditures for some of the experiments needed to start as early as 5.5 years prior to zero-day, and some work would continue up to 2 years beyond the event. Using experienced personnel as mentors, SNL could probably field such experiments within the next five years. However, beyond that time frame, loss of personnel would place us in the position of essentially starting over.

  18. Historical Exposures to Chemicals at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant: A Pilot Retrospective Exposure Assessment

    SciTech Connect

    Robertson, Janeen Denise

    1999-02-01

    In a mortality study of white males who had worked at the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant between 1952 and 1979, an increased number of deaths from benign and unspecified intracranial neoplasms was found. A case-control study nested within this cohort investigated the hypothesis that an association existed between brain tumor death and exposure to either internally deposited plutonium or external ionizing radiation. There was no statistically significant association found between estimated radiation exposure from internally deposited plutonium and the development of brain tumors. Exposure by job or work area showed no significant difference between the cohort and the control groups. An update of the study found elevated risk estimates for (1) all lymphopoietic neoplasms, and (2) all causes of death in employees with body burdens greater than or equal to two nanocuries of plutonium. There was an excess of brain tumors for the entire cohort. Similar cohort studies conducted on worker populations from other plutonium handling facilities have not yet shown any elevated risks for brain tumors. Historically, the Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant used large quantities of chemicals in their production operations. The use of solvents, particularly carbon tetrachloride, was unique to Rocky Flats. No investigation of the possible confounding effects of chemical exposures was done in the initial studies. The objectives of the present study are to (1) investigate the history of chemical use at the Rocky Flats facility; (2) locate and analyze chemical monitoring information in order to assess employee exposure to the chemicals that were used in the highest volume; and (3) determine the feasibility of establishing a chemical exposure assessment model that could be used in future epidemiology studies.

  19. U.S. Department of Energy, Defense Programs, activities to support the safe, secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect

    Turner, J.

    1993-12-31

    In September 1991 President Bush announced sweeping cuts in the US nuclear weapon stockpile as well as changes in deployment to remove significant numbers of weapons from alert status and to return to the US for storage many weapons formerly based abroad in US sites. In October 1991 President Gorbachev announced similar moves for the Soviet Union. Even though the Gorbachev announcement represented a substantial step forward in reducing tension between the US and the Soviet Union, the US continued to be concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union and the prospects for internal stability. As a result, in November 1991 the Administration began talks with the Soviets in a number of areas including field disablement of nuclear weapons to prevent unauthorized use, emergency response in the event of a weapons accident, and command and control of nuclear weapons. The Nunn-Lugar legislation assured assistance to the Soviet Union in the safe, secure dismantlement (SSD) of weapons to implement the Gorbachev commitment and in the development of measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Energy (DOE) is supporting and collaborating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in several areas due to the DOE responsibilities for developing, assembling, and dismantling US warheads and as the custodian of the nuclear materials stockpile. Russia, as the successor state to the Soviet Union, controls the nuclear weapons of the Former Soviet Union. Thus, DOE`s nuclear weapon and nuclear materials expertise are being applied particularly to Russia. However, the DOE is also providing assistance to Belarus and is prepared to assist Ukraine and Kazakhstan as well if agreements can be reached. In this paper, the DOE SSD activities in support of DOD as the US Executive Agent will be discussed. Two areas will not be covered, namely, DOD activities and the purchase of highly enriched uranium.

  20. Prediction of ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests as it relates to siting of a nuclear waste storage facility at NTS and compatibility with the weapons test program

    SciTech Connect

    Vortman, L.J. III

    1980-04-01

    This report assumes reasonable criteria for NRC licensing of a nuclear waste storage facility at the Nevada Test Site where it would be exposed to ground motion from underground nuclear weapons tests. Prediction equations and their standard deviations have been determined from measurements on a number of nuclear weapons tests. The effect of various independent parameters on standard deviation is discussed. That the data sample is sufficiently large is shown by the fact that additional data have little effect on the standard deviation. It is also shown that coupling effects can be separated out of the other contributions to the standard deviation. An example, based on certain licensing assumptions, shows that it should be possible to have a nuclear waste storage facility in the vicinity of Timber Mountain which would be compatible with a 700 kt weapons test in the Buckboard Area if the facility were designed to withstand a peak vector acceleration of 0.75 g. The prediction equation is a log-log linear equation which predicts acceleration as a function of yield of an explosion and the distance from it.

  1. Fallout Deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak Nuclear Weapons Tests

    PubMed Central

    Beck, Harold L.; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E.; Simon, Steven L.

    2009-01-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m-2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for all the 31 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands and to estimate fallout deposition density. Our analysis suggested that only 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in substantial fallout deposition on any of the 25 inhabited atolls. This analysis was confirmed by the fact that the sum of our estimates of 137Cs deposition from these 20 tests at each atoll is in good agreement with the total 137Cs deposited as estimated from contemporary soil sample analyses. The monitoring data and meteorological analyses were used to quantitatively estimate the deposition density of 63 activation and fission products for each nuclear test, plus the cumulative deposition of 239+240Pu at each atoll. Estimates of the degree of fractionation of fallout from each test at each atoll, as well as of the fallout transit times from the test sites to the atolls were used in this analysis. The estimates of radionuclide deposition density, fractionation, and transit times reported here are the most complete available anywhere and are suitable for estimations of both external and internal dose to representative persons as described in companion papers. PMID:20622548

  2. Cancer mortality risk among military participants of a 1958 atmospheric nuclear weapons test.

    PubMed Central

    Watanabe, K K; Kang, H K; Dalager, N A

    1995-01-01

    OBJECTIVES. This study was undertaken to determine if Navy veterans who participated in an atmospheric nuclear test in 1958 were at increased risk of death from certain cancers. METHODS. Cancer mortality risk of 8554 Navy veterans who participated in an atmospheric nuclear test in the Pacific was compared with that of 14,625 Navy veterans who did not participate in any test. Radiation dosage information was obtained from film badges for 88% of the test participants. RESULTS. The median radiation dose for the test participants was 388 mrem (3.88 millisieverts [mSv]). Among participants who received the highest radiation dose (> 1000 mrem, or 10 mSv), an increased mortality risk for all causes (relative risk [RR] = 1.23; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.04, 1.45), all cancers (RR = 1.42; 95% CI = 1.03, 1.96), and liver cancer (RR = 6.42; 95% CI = 1.17, 35.3) was observed. The risk for cancer of the digestive organs was elevated among test participants (rate ratio = 1.47; 95% CI = 1.06, 2.04) but with no significant dose-response trend. Many of the cancers of a priori interest were not significantly elevated in the overall test participant group or in the group that received the highest radiation dose. CONCLUSIONS. Most of the cancers suspected of being radiogenic were not significantly elevated among the test participants. Nevertheless, increased risks for certain cancers cannot be ruled out at this time. Veterans who participated in the nuclear weapons tests should continue to be monitored. PMID:7702116

  3. Fallout deposition in the Marshall Islands from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests.

    PubMed

    Beck, Harold L; Bouville, André; Moroz, Brian E; Simon, Steven L

    2010-08-01

    Deposition densities (Bq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in nuclear weapons testing fallout from tests conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls (1946-1958) have been estimated on a test-specific basis for 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. A complete review of various historical and contemporary data, as well as meteorological analysis, was used to make judgments regarding which tests deposited fallout in the Marshall Islands and to estimate fallout deposition density. Our analysis suggested that only 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in substantial fallout deposition on any of the 23 inhabited atolls. This analysis was confirmed by the fact that the sum of our estimates of 137Cs deposition from these 20 tests at each atoll is in good agreement with the total 137Cs deposited as estimated from contemporary soil sample analyses. The monitoring data and meteorological analyses were used to quantitatively estimate the deposition density of 63 activation and fission products for each nuclear test, plus the cumulative deposition of 239+240Pu at each atoll. Estimates of the degree of fractionation of fallout from each test at each atoll, as well as of the fallout transit times from the test sites to the atolls were used in this analysis. The estimates of radionuclide deposition density, fractionation, and transit times reported here are the most complete available anywhere and are suitable for estimations of both external and internal dose to representative persons as described in companion papers.

  4. Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese, and United States nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect

    Robison, W.L. ); Schultz, V. ); Schultz, S.C. )

    1991-04-01

    A considerable literature exists on the Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap Marshallese and their atolls; however, this literature consists of a large number of governmental documents that are relatively unknown and difficult to locate. This is particularly true of the documents of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and those related to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands. Because a comprehensive bibliography on the impact of nuclear weapons testing on the Marshallese and their atolls does not exist, the preparation of a bibliography that includes sufficient information to locate all types of reports seems justified. Primary sources of information in preparing this bibliography were bibliographies on Oceania, citations in published papers, CIS Index and Abstracts, Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications, Nuclear Science Abstracts, Energy Research Abstracts, numerous bibliographies on radiation ecology, and suggestions by many individuals whom we contacted. One goal in this bibliography is to include complete documentation of the source of congressional reports and other government-related publications. In addition, page numbers for material in this bibliography are provided in parentheses when the subject matter of a book or document is not restricted to nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands.

  5. Transfer of 137Cs from Chernobyl debris and nuclear weapons fallout to different Swedish population groups.

    PubMed

    Rääf, C L; Hubbard, L; Falk, R; Agren, G; Vesanen, R

    2006-08-15

    Data from measurements on the body burden of (134)Cs, (137)Cs and (40)K in various Swedish populations between 1959 and 2001 has been compiled into a national database. The compilation is a co-operation between the Departments of Radiation Physics in Malmö and Göteborg, the National Radiation Protection Authority (SSI) and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI). In a previous study the effective ecological half time and the associated effective dose to various Swedish populations due to internal contamination of (134)Cs and (137)Cs have been assessed using the database. In this study values of human body burden have been combined with data on the local and regional ground deposition of fallout from nuclear weapons tests (only (137)Cs) and Chernobyl debris (both (134)Cs and (137)Cs), which have enabled estimates of the radioecological transfer in the studied populations. The assessment of the database shows that the transfer of radiocesium from Chernobyl fallout to humans varies considerably between various populations in Sweden. In terms of committed effective dose over a 70 y period from internal contamination per unit activity deposition, the general (predominantly urban) Swedish population obtains 20-30 microSv/kBq m(-2). Four categories of populations exhibit higher radioecological transfer than the general population; i.) reindeer herders ( approximately 700 microSv/kBq m(-2)), ii.) hunters in the counties dominated by forest vegetation ( approximately 100 microSv/kBq m(-2)), iii.) rural non-farming populations living in sub-arctic areas (40-150 microSv/kBq m(-2)), and iv.) farmers ( approximately 50 microSv/kBq m(-2)). Two important factors determine the aggregate transfer from ground deposition to man; i.) dietary habits (intakes of foodstuff originating from natural and semi-natural ecosystems), and ii.) inclination to follow the recommended food restriction by the authorities. The transfer to the general population is considerably lower

  6. Effectiveness of United StatesLed Economic Sanctions as a Counterproliferation Tool Against Irans Nuclear Weapons Program

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-12-01

    blank) 2. REPORT DATE December 2015 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITED STATES...views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S...interdiction efforts against Iran’s nuclear weapons program has significant policy implications. U.S. policy makers need to know whether their current

  7. Containment and safety review for the Mighty Oak Nuclear Weapon Effects Test

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-05-01

    On the morning of April 10, 1986, the US Department of Energy (DOE) conducted a nuclear weapons effects test, Mighty Oak, 1300 feet below the surface of Rainier Mesa in the T tunnel complex. From the standpoint of containment, there was no accidental release of radioactivity to the atmosphere whatsoever. All radioactivity was contained within the tunnel complex until April 16 when the first controlled purging of the tunnel took place. Mighty Oak purging resulted in a known amount of radioactive noble gases being released in a controlled manner to the atmosphere. The maximum dose any person would have received standing in the open, downwind, for the entire period of purging, would have been 0.27 microrem. From the standpoint of data recovery, Mighty Oak was successful. Approximately 85% of the data from prime test objectives was recovered; however, only 70% of the overall data was recovered. Most equipment - experiment, diagnostic, and construction - within the tunnel complex was lost. This loss occurred as a result of high temperature and radiation. Other passive experiments and data were recovered. Loss of normally recoverable and reusable equipment was approximately 32 million dollars.

  8. The assessment of radiation exposures in Native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada.

    PubMed

    Frohmberg, E; Goble, R; Sanchez, V; Quigley, D

    2000-02-01

    Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Sedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations.

  9. Graphical method for forecasting radiation exposure from multi-aged fallout from nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Haaland, C.M.

    1986-06-01

    After a nuclear attack it may be necessary for emergency workers, such as firemen, utility workers and medical personnel, to perform urgent tasks in areas highly contaminated by radioactive fallout. To assist the control of radiation exposure of these workers, it will be useful to provide means to forecast radiation exposures both inside and outside the fallout shelter. The method described in this paper is intended for use during the first few days to weeks after the attack, after which time more sophisticated methods may become available. This method requires only a radiation-rate meter, special graph paper, and a timepiece. Communications with Emergency Operating Centers or other sources of information are not necessary. The method permits the determination of the age of fallout and future exposure rates for a location that might be subjected to a number of different fallout clouds, without requiring knowledge of the weapon yields or times of detonation. This method will provide results with less accuracy if different-aged fallout clouds arrive simultaneously. The method is self-correcting so that if the actual decay rate is different than that which is assumed, the forecasted rates will have less error than results obtained by previous methods.

  10. A graphical method for forecasting radiation exposure from multi-aged fallout from nuclear weapons.

    PubMed

    Haaland, C M

    1986-06-01

    After a nuclear attack it may be necessary for emergency workers, such as firemen, utility workers and medical personnel, to perform urgent tasks in areas highly contaminated by radioactive fallout. To assist the control of radiation exposure of these workers, it will be useful to provide means to forecast radiation exposures both inside and outside the fallout shelter. The method described in this paper is intended for use during the first few days to weeks after the attack, after which time more sophisticated methods may become available. This method requires only a radiation-rate meter, special graph paper, and a timepiece. Communications with Emergency Operating Centers or other sources of information are not necessary. The method permits the determination of the age of fallout and future exposure rates for a location that might be subjected to a number of different fallout clouds, without requiring knowledge of the weapon yields or times of detonation. This method will provide results with less accuracy if different-aged fallout clouds arrive simultaneously. The method is self-correcting so that if the actual decay rate is different than that which is assumed, the forecasted rates will have less error than results obtained by previous methods.

  11. Military Participants at U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Testing— Methodology for Estimating Dose and Uncertainty

    PubMed Central

    Till, John E.; Beck, Harold L.; Aanenson, Jill W.; Grogan, Helen A.; Mohler, H. Justin; Mohler, S. Shawn; Voillequé, Paul G.

    2014-01-01

    Methods were developed to calculate individual estimates of exposure and dose with associated uncertainties for a sub-cohort (1,857) of 115,329 military veterans who participated in at least one of seven series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests or the TRINITY shot carried out by the United States. The tests were conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Test Site. Dose estimates to specific organs will be used in an epidemiological study to investigate leukemia and male breast cancer. Previous doses had been estimated for the purpose of compensation and were generally high-sided to favor the veteran's claim for compensation in accordance with public law. Recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to digitize the historical records supporting the veterans’ compensation assessments make it possible to calculate doses and associated uncertainties. Our approach builds upon available film badge dosimetry and other measurement data recorded at the time of the tests and incorporates detailed scenarios of exposure for each veteran based on personal, unit, and other available historical records. Film badge results were available for approximately 25% of the individuals, and these results assisted greatly in reconstructing doses to unbadged persons and in developing distributions of dose among military units. This article presents the methodology developed to estimate doses for selected cancer cases and a 1% random sample of the total cohort of veterans under study. PMID:24758578

  12. The assessment of radiation exposures in native American communities from nuclear weapons testing in Nevada

    SciTech Connect

    Frohmberg, E.; Goble, R.; Sanchez, V.; Quigley, D.

    2000-02-01

    Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing. Because of differences in diet, activities, and housing, their radiation exposures are only very imperfectly represented in the Department of Energy dose reconstructions. There are important missing pathways, including exposures to radioactive iodine from eating small game. The dose reconstruction model assumptions about cattle feeding practices across a year are unlikely to apply to the native communities as are other model assumptions about diet. Thus exposures from drinking milk and eating vegetables have not yet been properly estimated for these communities. Through consultations with members of the affected communities, these deficiencies could be corrected and the dose reconstruction extended to Native Americans. An illustration of the feasibility of extending the dose reconstruction is provided by a sample calculation to estimate radiation exposures to the thyroid from eating radio-iodine-contaminated rabbit thyroids after the Dedan test. The illustration is continued with a discussion of how the calculation results may be used to make estimates for other tests and other locations.

  13. The relationship of thyroid cancer with radiation exposure from nuclear weapon testing in the Marshall Islands.

    PubMed

    Takahashi, Tatsuya; Schoemaker, Minouk J; Trott, Klaus R; Simon, Steven L; Fujimori, Keisei; Nakashima, Noriaki; Fukao, Akira; Saito, Hiroshi

    2003-03-01

    The US nuclear weapons testing program in the Pacific conducted between 1946 and 1958 resulted in radiation exposure in the Marshall Islands. The potentially widespread radiation exposure from radio-iodines of fallout has raised concerns about the risk of thyroid cancer in the Marshallese population. The most serious exposures and its health hazards resulted from the hydrogen-thermonuclear bomb test, the Castle BRAVO, on March 1, 1954. Between 1993 and 1997, we screened 3,709 Marshallese for thyroid disease who were born before the BRAVO test. It was 60% of the entire population at risk and who were still alive at the time of our examinations. We diagnosed 30 thyroid cancers and found 27 other study participants who had been operated for thyroid cancer before our screening in this group. Fifty-seven Marshallese born before 1954 (1.5%) had thyroid cancer or had been operated for thyroid cancer. Nearly all (92%) of these cancers were papillary carcinoma. We derived estimates of individual thyroid dose proxy from the BRAVO test in 1954 on the basis of published age-specific doses estimated on Utirik atoll and 137Cs deposition levels on the atolls where the participants came from. There was suggestive evidence that the prevalence of thyroid cancer increased with category of estimated dose to the thyroid.

  14. Risk-Based Decision Process for Accelerated Closure of a Nuclear Weapons Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Butler, L.; Norland, R. L.; DiSalvo, R.; Anderson, M.

    2003-02-25

    Nearly 40 years of nuclear weapons production at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS or Site) resulted in contamination of soil and underground systems and structures with hazardous substances, including plutonium, uranium and hazardous waste constituents. The Site was placed on the National Priority List in 1989. There are more than 370 Individual Hazardous Substance Sites (IHSSs) at RFETS. Accelerated cleanup and closure of RFETS is being achieved through implementation and refinement of a regulatory framework that fosters programmatic and technical innovations: (1) extensive use of ''accelerated actions'' to remediate IHSSs, (2) development of a risk-based screening process that triggers and helps define the scope of accelerated actions consistent with the final remedial action objectives for the Site, (3) use of field instrumentation for real time data collection, (4) a data management system that renders near real time field data assessment, and (5) a regulatory agency consultative process to facilitate timely decisions. This paper presents the process and interim results for these aspects of the accelerated closure program applied to Environmental Restoration activities at the Site.

  15. Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

    SciTech Connect

    Bunch, Kyle J.; Jones, Anthony M.; Ramuhalli, Pradeep; Benz, Jacob M.; Denlinger, Laura Schmidt

    2014-05-04

    The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic

  16. Interim Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on the Survivability of Systems and Assets to Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) and other Nuclear Weapon Effects (NWE)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-08-01

    major platforms for High Altitude EMP ( HEMP ) protection, and the Navy implemented a requirements review process. United States Strategic Command...Army improving process for independent review of survivability – Air Force committing resources for testing major platforms for HEMP protection...battlespaces where nuclear weapons are threatening or are being employed. The most likely case(s) are use of nuclear weapons by others. Although

  17. Tacit Knowledge Involvement in the Production of Nuclear Weapons: A Critical Component of a Credible US Nuclear Deterrent in the 21st Century

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-02-14

    form of the National Ignition Facility ( NIF ) at LLNL, the Dual-Axis Hydrodynamic Radiographic Test (DAHRT) Facility at LANL and the Z Machine at...not work, this knowledge adds little to sustaining capacity to design or build a nuclear weapon. Interestingly while the NIF and ASCI have...the novelty of the NIF wears off that the SSMP will not be stimulating. Further, it is hard to entice young scientists to remain at the laboratory

  18. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

  19. Global Security Rule Sets An Analysis of the Current Global Security Environment and Rule Sets Governing Nuclear Weapons Release

    SciTech Connect

    Mollahan, K; Nattrass, L

    2004-09-30

    America is in a unique position in its history. In maintaining its position as the world's only superpower, the US consistently finds itself taking on the role of a global cop, chief exporter of hard and soft power, and primary impetus for globalization. A view of the current global situation shows an America that can benefit greatly from the effects of globalization and soft power. Similarly, America's power can be reduced significantly if globalization and its soft power are not handled properly. At the same time, America has slowly come to realize that its next major adversary is not a near peer competitor but terrorism and disconnected nations that seek nuclear capabilities. In dealing with this new threat, America needs to come to terms with its own nuclear arsenal and build a security rule set that will establish for the world explicitly what actions will cause the US to consider nuclear weapons release. This rule set; however, needs to be established with sensitivity to the US's international interests in globalization and soft power. The US must find a way to establish its doctrine governing nuclear weapons release without threatening other peaceful nations in the process.

  20. A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

    SciTech Connect

    Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N; Boyer, Brian D; Leitch, Rosalyn M

    2009-01-01

    With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

  1. Difficulties in Determining If Nuclear Training of Foreigners Contributes to Weapons Proliferation. Report by the Comptroller General of the United States.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Congress of the U.S., Washington, DC. House Committee on Appropriations.

    The General Accounting Office (GAO) conclusion that it is impossible to determine the contribution of U.S. nuclear training of foreigners to the spread of nuclear weapons is presented. The GAO position is that there is no way to ascertain the true intentions of foreign nationals being trained or the motivations of their countries. Issues…

  2. Forging a Framework to Improve the Emergency Management Community’s Ability to Respond to a Nuclear or Radiological Weapons Attack

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-03-01

    WEAPONS AND THEIR EFFECTS Nuclear weapons have only been used twice on civilian populations: in Hiroshima and Nagasaki , Japan, in August 1945. Well...Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the...of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for

  3. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    SciTech Connect

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  4. A tool for site restoration planning following a nuclear weapons accident: Part 2, Developing a site restoration strategy

    SciTech Connect

    Tawil, J.J.

    1988-05-01

    The objectives of this paper are to describe a process for developing site restoration strategies following a nuclear weapons accident, and demonstrate how to carry out this process using actual data from a military exercise. The exercise that I will be discussing is the Survey Response Force Exercise conducted in Savanna, Illinois in July 1986. It is called SRFX-86 for short. While a site restoration analysis using the SRP was conducted during the exercise, the present analysis is somewhat different in that it contains illustrations of some of the recent revisions and enhancements to the SRP. 5 figs., 3 tabs.

  5. Use of Lasers to Study the Impact of Fractionation and Condensation on the Toxicity of Nuclear Weapon Fallout

    SciTech Connect

    Vidnovic III, T; Bradley, K S; Debonnel, C S; Dipeso, G; Fournier, K; Karpenko, V P; Tobin, M

    2005-04-01

    An experimental concept has been developed to collect data to aid in the refinement of simulation programs designed to predict the fallout effects arising from surface and shallowly buried nuclear weapon detonations. These experiments, called the Condensation Debris Experiments (CDE), are intended to study the condensation/fractionation of material that is liberated following an initial deposition of laser energy onto a small, characterized target. The CDE effort also encompasses target development and material studies as well as supporting computational efforts studying radiation hydrodynamics, computational fluid dynamics, and relevant neutron activation processes (not discussed here).

  6. A high resolution record of chlorine-36 nuclear-weapons-tests fallout from Central Asia

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Green, J.R.; Cecil, L.D.; Synal, H.-A.; Santos, J.; Kreutz, K.J.; Wake, C.P.

    2004-01-01

    The Inilchek Glacier, located in the Tien Shan Mountains, central Asia, is unique among mid-latitude glaciers because of its relatively large average annual accumulation. In July 2000, two ice cores of 162 and 167 meters (m) in length were collected from the Inilchek Glacier for (chlorine-36) 36Cl analysis a part of a collaborative international effort to study the environmental changes archived in mid-latitude glaciers worldwide. The average annual precipitation at the collection site was calculated to be 1.6 m. In contrast, the reported average annual accumulations at the high-latitude Dye-3 glacial site, Greenland, the mid-latitude Guliya Ice Cap, China, and the mid-latitude Upper Fremont Glacier, Wyoming, USA, were 0.52, 0.16 and 0.76 m, respectively. The resolution of the 36Cl record in one of the Inilchek ice cores was from 2 to 10 times higher than the resolution of the records at these other sites and could provide an opportunity for detailed study of environmental changes that have occurred over the past 150 years. Despite the differences in accumulation among these various glacial sites, the 36Cl profile and peak concentrations for the Inilchek ice core were remarkably similar in shape and magnitude to those for ice cores from these other sites. The 36Cl peak concentration from 1958, the year during the mid-1900s nuclear-weapons-tests period when 36Cl fallout was largest, was preserved in the Inilchek core at a depth of 90.56 m below the surface of the glacier (74.14-m-depth water equivalent) at a concentration of 7.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/gram (g) of ice. Peak 36Cl concentrations from Dye-3, Guliya and the Upper Fremont glacial sites were 7.1 ?? 105, 5.4 ?? 105 and 0.7 ?? 105 atoms of 36Cl/g of ice, respectively. Measurements of 36Cl preserved in ice cores improve estimates of historical worldwide atmospheric deposition of this isotope and allow the sources of 36Cl in ground water to be better identified. ?? 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.

  7. Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear weapon attack – examples from four American cities

    PubMed Central

    Bell, William C; Dallas, Cham E

    2007-01-01

    Background The threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States has grown significantly in recent years, focusing attention on the medical and public health disaster capabilities of the nation in a large scale crisis. While the hundreds of thousands or millions of casualties resulting from a nuclear weapon would, in and of itself, overwhelm our current medical response capabilities, the response dilemma is further exacerbated in that these resources themselves would be significantly at risk. There are many limitations on the resources needed for mass casualty management, such as access to sufficient hospital beds including specialized beds for burn victims, respiration and supportive therapy, pharmaceutical intervention, and mass decontamination. Results The effects of 20 kiloton and 550 kiloton nuclear detonations on high priority target cities are presented for New York City, Chicago, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Thermal, blast and radiation effects are described, and affected populations are calculated using 2000 block level census data. Weapons of 100 Kts and up are primarily incendiary or radiation weapons, able to cause burns and start fires at distances greater than they can significantly damage buildings, and to poison populations through radiation injuries well downwind in the case of surface detonations. With weapons below 100 Kts, blast effects tend to be stronger than primary thermal effects from surface bursts. From the point of view of medical casualty treatment and administrative response, there is an ominous pattern where these fatalities and casualties geographically fall in relation to the location of hospital and administrative facilities. It is demonstrated that a staggering number of the main hospitals, trauma centers, and other medical assets are likely to be in the fatality plume, rendering them essentially inoperable in a crisis. Conclusion Among the consequences of this outcome would be the probable loss

  8. The Role of the Geographic Combatant Commander in Counterproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-04-05

    weapons gave such a clear offensive advantage to their possessors, inspections , and prohibitions against their possible production from civilian...States and North Korea crafted a bilateral agreement which basically consisted of North Korea remaining in the NPT and submitting to IAEA inspections ...hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and

  9. Atmospheric nuclear weapon test history as characterized by the deposition of sup 14 C in human teeth

    SciTech Connect

    Nishizawa, K.; Togari, A.; Matsumoto, S.; Nagatsu, T. )

    1990-08-01

    The {sup 14}C concentration in the collagen of human teeth was retrospectively investigated to determine whether its incorporation was related to atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Teeth were extracted for dental therapy from July 1987 to February 1988 from patients who were residents in Japan. Tooth collagen was extracted with HCl and converted to amorphous C by heating in a vacuum line. Specimens for {sup 14}C analysis were prepared by mixing the amorphous C with silver powder. The {sup 14}C concentration was measured by mass spectrometer. The {sup 14}C concentration in tooth collagen rapidly increased in 1961 after the bomb tests, peaked around 1967-1968, and then gradually decreased. The collagen of human teeth maintains the {sup 14}C concentration at the age of root completion for life. The results of this study indicate that the history of environmental contamination from atmospheric nuclear weapon's tests has been characterized by deposition of {sup 14}C in the tooth collagen {sup 14}C of human beings.

  10. On the public perception of the risks from nuclear weapons: Would oralloy be more acceptable than plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Kunsman, D.M.

    1993-03-01

    We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant difference between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.

  11. On the public perception of the risks from nuclear weapons: Would oralloy be more acceptable than plutonium?

    SciTech Connect

    Kunsman, D.M.

    1993-03-01

    We technologists generally only address risk magnitudes in our analyses, although other studies have found nineteen additional dimensions for the way the public perceives risk. These include controllability, voluntariness, catastrophic potential, and trust in the institution putting forth the risk. We and the geneml public use two different languages, and to understand what their concerns are, we need to realize that the culture surrounding nuclear weapons is completely alien to the general public. Ultimately, the acceptability of a risk is a values question, not a technical question. For most of the risk dimensions, the public would perceive no significant difference between using oralloy and plutonium. This does not mean that the suggested design change should not be proposed, only that the case for, or against, it be made comprehensively using the best information available today. The world has changed: the ending of the cold war has decreased the benefit of nuclear weapons in the minds of the public and the specter of Chernobyl has increased the perceived risks of processes that use radioactive materials. Our analyses need to incorporate the lessons pertinent to this newer world.

  12. Iran’s Growing Nuclear Weapons Program: A Catalyst for Regional Instability in the Middle East

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1993-03-10

    Iran," The Washington Post, November 10, 1992, p. 1. 66. Timmerman, p. 62. 67. Anne Gieks and Gerald Segal, China and the Arms Trade, St. Martin’s...Weapons," ROA National Security Report (January 1993). Gieks, Anne, and Gerald Segal. China and the Arms Trade. New York: St. Martains Press, New...1980. Goodman, David S.G., and Gerald Segal. China In the Nineties: Crisis Management and Beyond. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford, England. 1991

  13. The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components: An Assessment

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-01-01

    Pentagon and White 50 The first START treaty was proposed by President Ronald Reagan in 1982. 51...weapons arsenal. It was in 1982, under the Reagan Administration, that the mission of the office began to change. As one study summarized: From...attempt to rescue American hostages from Iran and the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada . The latter operation, and in particular anecdotal stories such as

  14. A perspective on public concerns about exposure to fallout from the production and testing of nuclear weapons.

    PubMed

    Hoffman, F Owen; Apostoaei, A Iulian; Thomas, Brian A

    2002-05-01

    Exposures of the American public occurred nationwide from the testing of nuclear weapons in the United States, the Pacific, and the former Soviet Union. After decades of diminished public awareness on the subject of health risks resulting from exposure to fallout, the release of the National Cancer Institute's 1997 report on nationwide exposure to 131I from the Nevada Test Site (NTS) has led to renewed interest. Public requests for information are focused on individual and family health problems, the right to credible and full disclosure of information, and the need for medical care and assistance for exposure-related health problems. Public concerns have been raised regarding: (a) the lack of information on the potential health risks from exposure to all biologically significant radionuclides in fallout; (b) the lack of independent oversight that includes public participation; (c) governmental portrayal of exposures averaged over very large segments of the population without identification of much larger values for individuals or population subgroups likely to be at highest risk; and (d) a governmental response to known or suspected human exposures that consumes large periods of time and devotes considerable funding to various research-related activities before serious consideration is given to addressing health care responsibilities to exposed individuals. To some extent, these complaints and concerns are rooted in the legacy of government secrecy surrounding the development and testing of nuclear weapons, public distrust of government sources of information about radiation exposures and health risks, and the imposition of past exposures without informed consent. Members of the public participating in the oversight of dose reconstruction projects and epidemiologic studies are requesting information on the total impact from all relevant sources of exposure at each site that might contribute significantly to an individual's risk, including exposure to local

  15. Regional Rivalries and Nuclear Responses. Volume 2. The South Korean Case: A Nuclear Weapons Program Embedded in an Environment of Great Power Concerns. (Sanitized)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1978-02-28

    Japanese might also expect the South Koreans to submit to such practical safeguards as low Inventories of nuclear fuel , rigorous site Inspection and...program during the 1980s by closing the fuel cycle and stock- piling plutonlum, by developing or acquiring delivery systems that would be capa- ble...well as political design—design of guidelines for nuclear export policies of the "supplier1’ nations, acceptance of safer fuel cycles, and the

  16. "A Hedge against the Future": The Post-Cold War Rhetoric of Nuclear Weapons Modernization

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Bryan C.

    2010-01-01

    Rhetoric has traditionally played an important role in constituting the nuclear future, yet that role has changed significantly since the declared end of the Cold War. Viewed from the perspectives of nuclear criticism and postmodern theories of risk and security, current rhetoric of US nuclear modernization demonstrates how contingencies of voice…

  17. NMCSSC Simulation for the Assessment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (SATAN II). System Description. Change 3

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1975-03-01

    option, by a tar,-ct-type factor similar to that "described in the section on acquisition probabilities. 22 REPQoIT04 (Fire Retort) (continued) Print Field ...of decision) 67 CH-3 i REPORT 04 (Fire Report) (continued) Print Field V-Number Item Description 29 V25 RPPERS Weapon system (1/Ground, 2/Air, 3/ADM...that define the field of operationa are defined by their’ right and left front and right and Sleft rear coordinates. These coordinates are those

  18. S. 1576: This Act may be cited as the Global Nuclear Weapons Material Control Act, introduced in the United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, July 26, 1991

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1991-01-01

    This bill would help stop the spread of nuclear weapons by controlling the production of nuclear weapons material. The materials refer to highly enriched uranium and plutonium, both of which are no longer being produced by the US. This bill urges the President to negotiate an agreement with the USSR on cooperative mutual inspection measures to assure that the USSR joins the US in ending production of nuclear weapons material and to pursue discussions on the technical requirements for implementing verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads and safeguarded reuse or permanent disposal of the nuclear materials. The Secretary of Energy is responsible for demonstrating by October, 1995, technical capabilities for: the verifiable dismantlement of nuclear warheads at existing facilities and the disposal of nuclear weapons material. Funds are appropriated for these purposes.

  19. Opportunities for Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute developing computer-aided design programs for pharmaceutical drug discovery. Final report

    SciTech Connect

    1996-09-23

    The goal of this study is to determine whether physicists at the Russian Nuclear Weapons Institute can profitably service the need for computer aided drug design (CADD) programs. The Russian physicists` primary competitive advantage is their ability to write particularly efficient code able to work with limited computing power; a history of working with very large, complex modeling systems; an extensive knowledge of physics and mathematics, and price competitiveness. Their primary competitive disadvantage is their lack of biology, and cultural and geographic issues. The first phase of the study focused on defining the competitive landscape, primarily through interviews with and literature searches on the key providers of CADD software. The second phase focused on users of CADD technology to determine deficiencies in the current product offerings, to understand what product they most desired, and to define the potential demand for such a product.

  20. The association betweeen cancers and low level radiation: An evaluation of the epidemiological evidence at the Hanford Nuclear Weapons Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Britton, J. |

    1993-05-01

    Cancer has traditionally been linked to exposure to high doses of radiation, but there is considerable controversy regarding the carcinogenicity of low doses of ionizing radiation in humans. Over the past 30 years there have been 14 studies conducted on employees at the Hanford nuclear weapons facility to investigate the relationship between exposure to low doses of radiation and mortality due to cancer (1-14). Interest in this issue was originally stimulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was trying to determine whether the linear extrapolation of health effects from high to low dose exposure was accurate. If the risk has been underestimated, then the maximum permissible occupational radiation exposure in the United States had been set too high. Because the health risk associated with low level radiation are unclear and controversial it seems appropriate to review the studies relating to Hanford at this time.

  1. Toward a more rigorous application of margins and uncertainties within the nuclear weapons life cycle : a Sandia perspective.

    SciTech Connect

    Klenke, Scott Edward; Novotny, George Charles; Paulsen Robert A., Jr.; Diegert, Kathleen V.; Trucano, Timothy Guy; Pilch, Martin M.

    2007-12-01

    This paper presents the conceptual framework that is being used to define quantification of margins and uncertainties (QMU) for application in the nuclear weapons (NW) work conducted at Sandia National Laboratories. The conceptual framework addresses the margins and uncertainties throughout the NW life cycle and includes the definition of terms related to QMU and to figures of merit. Potential applications of QMU consist of analyses based on physical data and on modeling and simulation. Appendix A provides general guidelines for addressing cases in which significant and relevant physical data are available for QMU analysis. Appendix B gives the specific guidance that was used to conduct QMU analyses in cycle 12 of the annual assessment process. Appendix C offers general guidelines for addressing cases in which appropriate models are available for use in QMU analysis. Appendix D contains an example that highlights the consequences of different treatments of uncertainty in model-based QMU analyses.

  2. Soviet Weapon-System Acquisition

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1991-09-01

    available in theIWest, provides the central coordination and policy guidance for Soviet weapons acquisition and oversees all military-related research...Machine Building Nuclear weapons and high- (MISREDMASH), (MSM) energy lasers i Ministry of Ship Building Naval vessels and naval (MINSUDPROM), (MSP) weapons...MINRADPROM), (MRP) equipment, guidance -and- control systems, navigation 3 equipment, and military computers Ministry of Communications

  3. Detection of thoracic infections by nuclear medicine techniques in the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome

    SciTech Connect

    Kramer, E.L.; Sanger, J.J. )

    1989-11-01

    The challenge of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) for nuclear medicine has been the early detection of related intrathoracic opportunistic infections, inflammatory conditions, and neoplasms. Gallium-67 citrate scanning has proved a sensitive test not only for Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia but for many of the other opportunistic infections and malignancies, including mycobacterial infections and lymphoma. Patterns and intensity of gallium uptake may suggest more specific diagnoses. Indium-111-labeled white blood cells may also be a valuable diagnostic tool in the AIDS patient.41 references.

  4. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    PubMed

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

  5. Limited war, limited autonomy: The state, domestic politics, and the evolution of U. S. nuclear weapons policy (Volumes 1 and 2)

    SciTech Connect

    Mlyn, E.J.

    1991-01-01

    This study examines the nature of the relationship between state and society for the formation of US nuclear weapons policy. By looking at three case studies that cover the years 1960-1983, Mlyn, seeks to determine whether society and, in turn, domestic politics have been important for the formulation of US nuclear weapons policy. The theoretical approach, which applies the conceptual underpinnings of statism, draws on existing theory in American politics and international relations. The case studies are constructed from interviews with former government officials, archival research, and secondary sources. The substantive focus of the study is the relationship between declaratory policy and targeting policy. For much of the nuclear age, declaratory policy embraced mutual assured destruction (MAD) while actual targeting policy embraced war fighting, or the opposite of MAD. As the state moved toward a declaratory policy that embraced war fighting and limited nuclear options, it lost its autonomy from society in formulating nuclear weapons policy. This loss of autonomy coincided with a relative decline for the US vis a vis the Soviet Union in the overall strategic nuclear balance. The causes and consequences of this shift are explored.

  6. Critical Elements and Needs for Nuclear Weapons Maintenance: A Delphi Study

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-06-01

    Nuclear Surety Inspections (NSI) and Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections ( NORI ) to assess the units. SE assists with NSSAVs/inspections and...technical data prevents standardized maintenance practices” and makes their jobs harder. This also makes major inspections like NSIs and NORIs more

  7. Terrifying Landscapes: A Study of Scientific Research Into Understanding Motivations of Non-State Actors to Acquire and/or Use Weapons of Mass Destruction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-06-22

    Terrorism, NonState Actors, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Exploration of the Pinkerton Database ”, in “NonState Actors, Terrorism, and Weapons of...for the broad research community. One such database is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which covers over 69,000 incidents since 1970...problems encountered in other databases around issues of consistency in counting methods, comprehensiveness of geopolitical coverage, and breadth of

  8. US defense policy, US Air Force doctrine and strategic nuclear weapon systems, 1958-1964: the case of the Minuteman ICBM

    SciTech Connect

    Reed, G.A.

    1986-01-01

    This study examines the efforts of the US Air Force during 1958-1964 to develop doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems. These years were characterized by rapid, extensive change in the technology of nuclear weapons delivery systems, centering in ICBMs replacing bombers as the chief vehicles. Simultaneously, national military strategy changed with the transfer of power from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administrations, shifting from reliance on overwhelming nuclear retaliation to emphasis on balanced conventional and nuclear forces. Against this background, the study poses the question: did the Air Force, when confronted with major changes in technology and national policy, develop doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems that was politically acceptable, technically feasible, and strategically sound. Using the development of the Minuteman ICBM as a case study, the study examines the evolution of Air Force doctrine and concludes that the Air Force did not, because of conceptual problems and bureaucratic exigencies, develop a doctrine adequate to the requirements of deterrence in the dawning era of solid-fuel ICBMs.

  9. Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference: Avoiding a Nuclear Catastrophe. Summary Report

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-12-01

    is posed by Iran’s ballistic missiles—short-range Scud B and C missiles, medium-range Shahab - 3 and Ashura missiles, long-range Safir space launch...DEC 2010 2. REPORT TYPE 3 . DATES COVERED 00-00-2010 to 00-00-2010 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Avoiding a Nuclear Catastrophe. Summary Report 5a...2010. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN: 978-1-58566211-1 1. Nuclear nonproliferation—Congresses. 2. Deterrence (Strategy)—Congresses. 3

  10. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-01-23

    2003. See, also, Butler, Amy. DTRA Director Pushes Conventionally- armed ICBMS. Defense Daily, January 26, 2004. p. 5. 96 Connolly, Allison ...U.S. Nuclear Forces. Natural Resources Defense Council. February 13, 2002. 125 Tyson, Anne Scott . New Push for Bunker-Buster Nuke. Christian Science...Sokolsky, Richard D. and Eugene B. Rumer. Nuclear Alarmists. Washington Post. March 15, 2002. p. 23. 150 Daalder, Ivo and James M. Lindsay . A New

  11. Iran With Nuclear Weapons: Anticipating the Consequences for U.S. Policy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-09-01

    32 Iran’s nuclear Delivery options 42 essential elements of Three Models for Iran’s nuclear operationalization 44 Iran’s operational Command... fusion cells and to tie into NATO’s new Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC) will be crucial in this regard. Likewise, because... example , the use of swarm boats to surround U.S. and allied naval platforms operating in the Persian Gulf region.31 31 The swarm tactic refers to the

  12. Classification of hot particles from the Chernobyl accident and nuclear weapons detonations by non-destructive methods.

    PubMed

    Zheltonozhsky, V; Mück, K; Bondarkov, M

    2001-01-01

    Both after the Chernobyl accident and nuclear weapon detonations, agglomerates of radioactive material, so-called hot particles, were released or formed which show a behaviour in the environment quite different from the activity released in gaseous or aerosol form. The differences in their characteristic properties, in the radionuclide composition and the uranium and actinide contents are described in detail for these particles. While nuclear bomb hot particles (both from fission and fusion bombs) incorporate well detectable trace amounts of 60Co and 152Eu, these radionuclides are absent in Chernobyl hot particles. In contrast, Chernobyl hot particles contain 125Sb and 144Ce which are absent in atomic bomb HPs. Obvious differences are also observable between fusion and fission bombs' hot particles (significant differences in 152Eu/l55Eu, 154Eu/155Eu and 238Pu/239Pu ratios) which facilitate the identification of HPs of unknown provensence. The ratio of 239Pu/240Pu in Chernobyl hot particles could be determined by a non-destructive method at 1:1.5. A non-destructive method to determine the content of non-radioactive elements by Kalpha-emission measurements was developed by which inactive Zr, Nb, Fe and Ni could be verified in the particles.

  13. Evaluation of the effects of radiation-induced conductivity on charge separation in nuclear weapons during radiographic inspection

    SciTech Connect

    Farnum, E.H.; Holder, M.D.

    1997-11-04

    Radiography is routinely used for non-destructive inspection of nuclear weapons at Pantex. For example, X radiography can be used to observe the positions of valves, to verify that a stronglink is in the safe position, or to inspect internal mechanical assembly details. Because of the presence of heavy metals in warheads, such operations are carried out with high energy x-rays produced by linear accelerators (Linacs), and substantial doses can be accumulated, especially if images from more than one direction are required. In December 1996, the basis for safety assurance of Linac operations at Pantex was called into question. Questions concerned the level of electrical charge separation in the high explosive (HE) dielectric and possible consequences of high electrical fields. Linac operations, which affect other critical missions at Pantex, were suspended and the Weapons Labs were asked to perform a critical analysis to determine what controls were required to assure safety. The postulated mechanism by which fields could build-up involved creation of charge (primarily Compton Electrons) by incident X-ray photons, and their accumulation in the high explosive. Building on a model originally developed by Mike George at Los Alamos for somewhat different conditions, Livermore developed a model which predicted the voltages which would occur in the vicinity of the detonator cables, and showed how these voltages depend on bulk resistivity of the HE and on the dose and dose rate. The authors proposed that the effects of radiation induced conductivity (RIC) would dominate, and showed that at steady state, neither dose nor dose rate would affect the voltage. They also proposed a series of experiments on HE assemblies to measure the RIC and to confirm the level of voltages attained. The experiments were conducted in March and April. These efforts were successful and showed that voltages were insignificant, and did not depend on dose or dose rate.

  14. Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Forces

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-09-01

    and DOD officials also told GAO—that the administration has considered various options for the U.S. nuclear force structure , including options in...alternative strategic force structures in preparation for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. DOD officials also told GAO that the department had assessed...START) with Russia. The figure shows DOD’s current planned strategic force structure for implementing New START, including the number of delivery

  15. Waste is a Terrible Thing to Mind: Perspectives on the Cleanup of the United States Nuclear Weapons Complex

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bodde, David

    1997-03-01

    For the 50 years of the Cold War, the United States nuclear arsenal was the cornerstone of our national security. These weapons were designed, manufactured, and armed with fissionable materials in an industrial complex that, at its peak, included about 16 major facilities and vast tracts of land in Nevada, Idaho, Washington, and South Carolina. Included among these are such well-known sites as the Savannah River Plant, the Hanford, Oak Ridge, and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The Cold War, that "long twilight struggle" in the evocative phrase of John Kennedy, left little time and few resources for understanding and managing the environmental consequences of nuclear weapons production. At the same time, perceptions of the special nature of the atom led to a concentration of governance in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Thus, external feedback for the managers of the complex was heavily filtered. But the imperatives of the Cold War have waned, and our understanding of the implications for the environment and the health and safety of workers has grown. By 1995 the Department of Energy (DoE) had spent about 23 billion in identifying and characterizing its waste, managing it, and assessing the actions needed to clean up the 120 sites in 36 states. Yet the majority of the task appeared ahead. Estimates made in 1995 suggested a total cost ranging from 200-350 billion and a time to complete of 75 years. If these were true, the cleanup of the weapons complex would become the largest civil works project in the history of humankind. Over the past year or so, the DoE program has shifted its focus from studies to actual cleanup. A strategic plan has been proposed that would accomplish most of the needed work over ten years at a cost of about $85 billion. At the same time, the Department is proposing to transfer oversight to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the states. This Invited

  16. The Future of Nuclear Archaeology: Reducing Legacy Risks of Weapons Fissile Material

    SciTech Connect

    Wood, Thomas W.; Reid, Bruce D.; Toomey, Christopher M.; Krishnaswami, Kannan; Burns, Kimberly A.; Casazza, Larry O.; S. Daly, Don; L. Duckworth, Leesa

    2014-01-01

    This report describes the value proposition for a "nuclear archeological" technical capability and applications program, targeted at resolving uncertainties regarding fissile materials production and use. At its heart, this proposition is that we can never be sure that all fissile material is adequately secure without a clear idea of what "all" means, and that uncertainty in this matter carries risk. We argue that this proposition is as valid today, under emerging state and possible non-state nuclear threats, as it was in an immediate post-Cold-War context, and describe how nuclear archeological methods can be used to verify fissile materials declarations, or estimate and characterize historical fissile materials production independently of declarations.

  17. Nuclear weapons and civil defense. The influence of the medical profession in 1955 and 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Kornfeld, H.

    1983-02-01

    The issue of nuclear war and its medical consequences is discussed from a historical perspective. The Federal Emergency Management Agency has proposed a multi-billion dollar program designed to relocate the population over a period of several days to help residents find protection from lethal fallout. The American Medical Association is called on to make a clear statement to the government that adequate preparation for a nuclear holocaust is impossible and that the medical problems would be awesome and without precedent. Forty-seven references are included. (JMT)

  18. Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Dilemma: A Cooperative Approach to International Security in the 1990s

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1993-01-01

    Vladislav Zubok , "Tyranny of the Weak: Russia’s New Foreign Policy," World Policy Journal 9, no. 2 (1992): 203-205. 57 support for economic reform. They...8217 Views of the Soviet Army." Problems of Communism 37, no. 3-4 (May-August 1988): 110-116. Zubok , Vladislav . "Tyranny of the Weak: Russia’s New Foreign Policy." World Policy Journal 9, no. 2 (1992): i91-217. ...republics. 15 Kurt M . Campbell et al., Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union

  19. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects Test, Evaluation, and Simulation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-04-01

    engagements as an offset to 7 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015 : A...The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, New York Harper Collins, 1999 11 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015 ...Developments and Ballistic Missile Threats Through 2015 , Unclassified Summary of National Intelligence Estimate, National Intelligence Council, December 2001

  20. Studying the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Using a Slide-Rule Computer

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Shastri, Ananda

    2007-01-01

    This paper describes the construction of a slide-rule computer that allows one to quickly determine magnitudes of several effects that result from the detonation of a nuclear device. Suggestions for exercises are also included that allow high school and college-level physics students to explore scenarios involving these effects. It is hoped that…

  1. The Future of Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1992-04-01

    Keating, and Joseph Rotblat . Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1990. Golblat, Jozef (ed.). Non... Joseph Kruzel, May 17, 1991. Dunn, Lewis A. "Building on Success: the NPT at Fifteen" in Survival, May/June 1986, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3. Dunn, Lewis A

  2. Applying Agile MethodstoWeapon/Weapon-Related Software

    SciTech Connect

    Adams, D; Armendariz, M; Blackledge, M; Campbell, F; Cloninger, M; Cox, L; Davis, J; Elliott, M; Granger, K; Hans, S; Kuhn, C; Lackner, M; Loo, P; Matthews, S; Morrell, K; Owens, C; Peercy, D; Pope, G; Quirk, R; Schilling, D; Stewart, A; Tran, A; Ward, R; Williamson, M

    2007-05-02

    This white paper provides information and guidance to the Department of Energy (DOE) sites on Agile software development methods and the impact of their application on weapon/weapon-related software development. The purpose of this white paper is to provide an overview of Agile methods, examine the accepted interpretations/uses/practices of these methodologies, and discuss the applicability of Agile methods with respect to Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) Technical Business Practices (TBPs). It also provides recommendations on the application of Agile methods to the development of weapon/weapon-related software.

  3. A microstructural analysis of solder joints from the electronic assemblies of dismantled nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Vianco, P.T.; Rejent, J.A.

    1997-05-01

    MC1814 Interconnection Boxes from dismantled B57 bombs, and MC2839 firing Sets from retired W70-1 warheads were obtained from the Pantex facility. Printed circuit boards were selected from these components for microstructural analysis of their solder joints. The analysis included a qualitative examination of the solder joints and quantitative assessments of (1) the thickness of the intermetallic compound layer that formed between the solder and circuit board Cu features, and (2) the Pb-rich phase particle distribution within the solder joint microstructure. The MC2839 solder joints had very good workmanship qualities. The intermetallic compound layer stoichiometry was determined to be that of Cu6Sn5. The mean intermetallic compound layer thickness for all solder joints was 0.885 mm. The magnitude of these values did not indicate significant growth over the weapon lifetime. The size distribution of the Pb-rich phase particles for each of the joints were represented by the mean of 9.85 {times} 10{sup {minus}6} mm{sup 2}. Assuming a spherical geometry, the mean particle diameter would be 3.54 mm. The joint-to-joint difference of intermetallic compound layer thickness and Pb-rich particle size distribution was not caused by varying thermal environments, but rather, was a result of natural variations in the joint microstructure that probably existed at the time of manufacture. The microstructural evaluation of the through-hole solder joints form the MC2839 and MC1814 components indicated that the environmental conditions to which these electronic units were exposed in the stockpile, were benign regarding solder joint aging. There was an absence of thermal fatigue damage in MC2839 circuit board, through-hole solder joints. The damage to the eyelet solder joints of the MC1814 more likely represented infant mortality failures at or very near the time of manufacture, resulting from a marginal design status of this type of solder joint design.

  4. Nuclear weapons at 70: reflections on the context and legacy of the Manhattan Project

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reed, B. Cameron

    2015-08-01

    August 2015 marks the 70th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These bombs, the products of the United States Army’s Manhattan Project, helped to end World War II and had enormous long-term effects on global political strategies by setting the stage for the Cold War and nuclear proliferation. This article explores the context and legacy of the Manhattan Project. The state of the war in the summer of 1945 is described, as are how the target cities came to be chosen, deliberations surrounding whether the bombs should be used directly or demonstrated first, and the long-term effects of the Project on individual scientists, the relationship between scientists and society, the subsequent development of nuclear arsenals around the world, and the current status of these arsenals and how they might evolve in the future.

  5. Research and Analytical Evaluation of the Soviet Union and Modernization of Nuclear Weapons Forces in Europe.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-04-01

    Soviet Freedom of Action .. .......... 66 D. Seeking to Nip in the Bud ... .......... 68 E. Direct Focus on the Flexible Options Issue . . 71 F. Flexible...the use of military force. D. SEEKING TO NIP IN TIE BUD Far more revealinki than direct commentaries of the nature, depth, and ramifications of Soviet...particular, it has emphasized that it will nc , be possible to limit any nuclear conflict to Europe or to avoid escala - tion to the point of a strategic

  6. 20 Years of Success: Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    None, None

    2015-10-22

    On Oct. 22, 2015, NNSA celebrated the proven success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program at a half-day public event featuring remarks by Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Lt. Gen. (retired) Frank G. Klotz. The event also featured remarks by Deputy Secretary of Energy Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall and NNSA Principal Deputy Administrator Madelyn Creedon.

  7. Consequence modeling for nuclear weapons probabilistic cost/benefit analyses of safety retrofits

    SciTech Connect

    Harvey, T.F.; Peters, L.; Serduke, F.J.D.; Hall, C.; Stephens, D.R.

    1998-01-01

    The consequence models used in former studies of costs and benefits of enhanced safety retrofits are considered for (1) fuel fires; (2) non-nuclear detonations; and, (3) unintended nuclear detonations. Estimates of consequences were made using a representative accident location, i.e., an assumed mixed suburban-rural site. We have explicitly quantified land- use impacts and human-health effects (e.g. , prompt fatalities, prompt injuries, latent cancer fatalities, low- levels of radiation exposure, and clean-up areas). Uncertainty in the wind direction is quantified and used in a Monte Carlo calculation to estimate a range of results for a fuel fire with uncertain respirable amounts of released Pu. We define a nuclear source term and discuss damage levels of concern. Ranges of damages are estimated by quantifying health impacts and property damages. We discuss our dispersal and prompt effects models in some detail. The models used to loft the Pu and fission products and their particle sizes are emphasized.

  8. Concepts and Strategies for Transparency Monitoring of Nuclear Materials at the Back End of the Fuel/Weapons Cycle

    SciTech Connect

    COSTIN, LAURENCE; DAVIES, PETER; PREGENZER, ARIAN L.

    1999-10-01

    Representatives of the Department of Energy, the national laboratories, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), and others gathered to initiate the development of broad-based concepts and strategies for transparency monitoring of nuclear materials at the back end of the fuel/weapons cycle, including both geologic disposal and monitored retrievable storage. The workshop focused on two key questions: ''Why should we monitor?'' and ''What should we monitor?'' These questions were addressed by identifying the range of potential stakeholders, concerns that stakeholders may have, and the information needed to address those concerns. The group constructed a strategic framework for repository transparency implementation, organized around the issues of safety (both operational and environmental), diversion (assuring legitimate use and security), and viability (both political and economic). Potential concerns of the international community were recognized as the possibility of material diversion, the multinational impacts of potential radionuclide releases, and public and political perceptions of unsafe repositories. The workshop participants also identified potential roles that the WIPP may play as a monitoring technology development and demonstration test-bed facility. Concepts for WIPP'S potential test-bed role include serving as (1) an international monitoring technology and development testing facility, (2) an international demonstration facility, and (3) an education and technology exchange center on repository transparency technologies.

  9. Military participants at U.S. Atmospheric nuclear weapons testing--methodology for estimating dose and uncertainty.

    PubMed

    Till, John E; Beck, Harold L; Aanenson, Jill W; Grogan, Helen A; Mohler, H Justin; Mohler, S Shawn; Voillequé, Paul G

    2014-05-01

    Methods were developed to calculate individual estimates of exposure and dose with associated uncertainties for a sub-cohort (1,857) of 115,329 military veterans who participated in at least one of seven series of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests or the TRINITY shot carried out by the United States. The tests were conducted at the Pacific Proving Grounds and the Nevada Test Site. Dose estimates to specific organs will be used in an epidemiological study to investigate leukemia and male breast cancer. Previous doses had been estimated for the purpose of compensation and were generally high-sided to favor the veteran's claim for compensation in accordance with public law. Recent efforts by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to digitize the historical records supporting the veterans' compensation assessments make it possible to calculate doses and associated uncertainties. Our approach builds upon available film badge dosimetry and other measurement data recorded at the time of the tests and incorporates detailed scenarios of exposure for each veteran based on personal, unit, and other available historical records. Film badge results were available for approximately 25% of the individuals, and these results assisted greatly in reconstructing doses to unbadged persons and in developing distributions of dose among military units. This article presents the methodology developed to estimate doses for selected cancer cases and a 1% random sample of the total cohort of veterans under study.

  10. ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

    SciTech Connect

    Bergren, C

    2009-01-16

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical processing canyons.

  11. ESTABLISHING FINAL END STATE FOR A RETIRED NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION REACTOR; COLLABORATION BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS, REGULATORS, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT - 11052

    SciTech Connect

    Bergren, C.; Flora, M.; Belencan, H.

    2010-11-17

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a 310-square-mile United States Department of Energy nuclear facility located along the Savannah River (SRS) near Aiken, South Carolina. Nuclear weapons material production began in the early 1950s, utilizing five production reactors. In the early 1990s all SRS production reactor operations were terminated. The first reactor closure end state declaration was recently institutionalized in a Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Early Action Record of Decision. The decision for the final closure of the 318,000 square foot 105-P Reactor was determined to be in situ decommissioning (ISD). ISD is an acceptable and cost effective alternative to off-site disposal for the reactor building, which will allow for consolidation of remedial action wastes generated from other cleanup activities within the P Area. ISD is considered protective by the regulators, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), public and stakeholders as waste materials are stabilized/immobilized, and radioactivity is allowed to naturally decay, thus preventing future exposure to the environment. Stakeholder buy-in was critical in the upfront planning in order to achieve this monumental final decision. Numerous public meetings and workshops were held in two different states (covering a 200 mile radius) with stakeholder and SRS Citizens Advisory Board participation. These meetings were conducted over an eight month period as the end state decision making progressed. Information provided to the public evolved from workshop to workshop as data became available and public input from the public meetings were gathered. ISD is being considered for the balance of the four SRS reactors and other hardened facilities such as the chemical Separation Facilities (canyons).

  12. Nuclear nonproliferation strategies for South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, Z.S.

    1994-05-03

    Continued expansion of the nuclear weapons capabilities of India and Pakistan, coupled with ongoing conflict between them, raises the probability of nuclear war in South Asia. A nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan could also harm efforts to discourage other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. United States policy opposes the spread of nuclear weapons because proliferation increases threats to U.S. national security and to world peace and stability. However, there is debate on the dangers of an escalating arms race in South Asia. Steps taken by the United States and other countries to persuade India and Pakistan to end their nuclear weapons programs have had limited success, at most slowing down their pace. A complicating factor is that India maintains a nuclear capability in part to deter China, whereas Pakistan`s nuclear weapons capability is aimed at deterring India`s superior conventional and nuclear capabilities. Analysts and policy officials are divided on how to avoid an arms race in South Asia. The Clinton Administration has renewed efforts to break the deadlock over nonproliferation, but longstanding obstacles have blocked progress. Pakistan favors a regional approach to nonproliferation, while India insists on a global approach that treats the nuclear powers on an equal basis with non nuclear weapon countries. This report analyzes the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan and reviews several options for U.S. nonproliferation policy in South Asia.

  13. Nuclear Weapons, Proliferation, and Terrorism: U.S. Response in the Twenty-First Century

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1998-01-01

    Westview Press, Inc., 1988), 8-25. 2 Michael Klare, Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), 204-205. 13 3 Patrick J . Garrity...anc =eoons Ŗ’S jeffersc- conearan J ^ ^ Arlington, VA 22202^302. and to re Office of ’.’a- agemem and Budge: -aperwor* Reduction Proiect („7uJ.Ql88...12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum200words) ., r , , , TTo J ^ i * u r As the remaining superpower in the

  14. How to Deter and Coerce Iran into Giving Up Its Nuclear Weapons Program

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-12-01

    Ali Akbar Salehi , the current head of the AEOI, announced that they could enrich all the way to 100%, if they wanted, or if they needed to.123...well,’” Reuters (February 11, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/11/us-iran-nuclear- salehi -idUSTRE61A4AS20100211, accessed February 27...assassination attempt on November 29, 2010.183 His predecessor, Ali Akbar Salehi , was appointed by Ahmadinejad on July 17, 2009, and was a powerful figure that

  15. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    SciTech Connect

    Rhodes, E.; Dickerman, C.E.; De Volpi, A.; Peters, C.W.

    1992-07-01

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by ``electronic collimation`` (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs.

  16. APSTNG: Neutron interrogation for detection of nuclear and CW weapons, explosives, and drugs

    SciTech Connect

    Rhodes, E.; Dickerman, C.E.; De Volpi, A. ); Peters, C.W. )

    1992-01-01

    A recently developed neutron diagnostic probe system has the potential to satisfy a significant number of van-mobile and fixed- portal requirements for nondestructive verification of sealed munitions and detection of contraband explosives and drugs. The probe is based on a unique associated-particle sealed-tube neutron generator (APSTNG) that interrogates the object of interest with a low-intensity beam of 14-MeV neutrons generated from the deuterium-tritium reaction and that detects the alpha-particle associated with each neutron. Gamma-ray spectra of resulting neutron inelastic scattering and fission reactions identify nuclides associated with all major chemicals in chemical warfare agents, explosives, and drugs, as well as many pollutants and fissile and fertile special nuclear material. Flight times determined from determined from detection times of the gamma-rays and alpha-particles yield a separate tomographic image of each identified nuclide. The APSTNG also forms the basis for a compact fast-neutron transmission imaging system that can be used along with or instead of the emission imaging system; a collimator is not required since scattered neutrons are removed by electronic collimation'' (detected neutrons not having the proper flight time to be uncollided are discarded). The small and relatively inexpensive APSTNG exhibits high reliability and can be quickly replaced. Proof-of-concept experiments have been performed under laboratory conditions for simulated nuclear and chemical warfare munitions and for explosives and drugs.

  17. Office of Inspector General audit report on ``The U.S. Department of Energy`s efforts to preserve the knowledge base needed to operate a downsized nuclear weapons complex``

    SciTech Connect

    1998-10-01

    Maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent is a cornerstone of US national security policy. The President has stated that the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is a supreme national interest. The Department of Energy`s (Department) Office of Defense Programs is charged with ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of this stockpile. The Department must now rely on scientific understanding and expert judgment, rather than on nuclear testing and the development of new weapons, to predict, identify, and correct problems affecting the stockpile. The scientific understanding and judgment will be based on the knowledge created by the Department and its predecessor agencies throughout the history of the nuclear weapons program as well as such factors as nonnuclear testing and advanced computer modeling. To preserve the knowledge base, the Department must assemble, maintain, and assure user-friendly access to a comprehensive, well-organized archive of data, information, and knowledge regarding nuclear weapons. The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Department had developed a program to preserve the knowledge base needed to operate a downsized nuclear weapons complex. In particular, the author assessed the Department`s efforts to preserve the data, information, and knowledge needed to ensure the vitality of the weapons complex.

  18. Contracting in the national interest: Establishing the legal framework for the interaction of science, government, and industry at a nuclear weapons laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Furman, N.S.

    1988-04-01

    Sandia National Laboratories, the nation's nuclear ordnance laboratory, is operated on a no-profit, no-fee basis by ATandT Technologies, Inc., as a prime contractor for the Department of Energy. This unique arrangement began in 1949 when President Harry Truman personally requested that ATandT assume management of the nuclear weapons laboratory as a service in the national interest. The story of how this unusual relationship came about makes for an interesting chapter in the annals of US legal and institutional history. This report describes the historical background, political negotiations, and prime contract provisos that established the legal framework for the Labs.

  19. A Safer Nuclear Enterprise - Application to Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES)(U)

    SciTech Connect

    Morris, Tommy J.

    2012-07-05

    Activities and infrastructure that support nuclear weapons are facing significant challenges. Despite an admirable record and firm commitment to make safety a primary criterion in weapons design, production, handling, and deployment - there is growing apprehension about terrorist acquiring weapons or nuclear material. At the NES Workshop in May 2012, Scott Sagan, who is a proponent of the normal accident cycle, presented. Whether a proponent of the normal accident cycle or High Reliability Organizations - we have to be diligent about our safety record. Constant vigilance is necessary to maintain our admirable safety record and commitment to Nuclear Explosive Safety.

  20. Long-range tropospheric transport of uranium and plutonium weapons fallout from Semipalatinsk nuclear test site to Norway.

    PubMed

    Wendel, Cato Christian; Fifield, L Keith; Oughton, Deborah H; Lind, Ole Christian; Skipperud, Lindis; Bartnicki, Jerzy; Tims, Stephen G; Høibråten, Steinar; Salbu, Brit

    2013-09-01

    A combination of state-of-the-art isotopic fingerprinting techniques and atmospheric transport modelling using real-time historical meteorological data has been used to demonstrate direct tropospheric transport of radioactive debris from specific nuclear detonations at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan to Norway via large areas of Europe. A selection of archived air filters collected at ground level at 9 stations in Norway during the most intensive atmospheric nuclear weapon testing periods (1957-1958 and 1961-1962) has been screened for radioactive particles and analysed with respect to the concentrations and atom ratios of plutonium (Pu) and uranium (U) using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Digital autoradiography screening demonstrated the presence of radioactive particles in the filters. Concentrations of (236)U (0.17-23nBqm(-3)) and (239+240)Pu (1.3-782μBqm(-3)) as well as the atom ratios (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.237) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.7) varied widely indicating several different sources. Filter samples from autumn and winter tended to have lower atom ratios than those sampled in spring and summer, and this likely reflects a tropospheric influence in months with little stratospheric fallout. Very high (236)U, (239+240)Pu and gross beta activity concentrations as well as low (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.0517-0.077), (241)Pu/(239)Pu (0.00025-0.00062) and (236)U/(239)Pu (0.0188-0.046) atom ratios, characteristic of close-in and tropospheric fallout, were observed in filters collected at all stations in Nov 1962, 7-12days after three low-yield detonations at Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan). Atmospheric transport modelling (NOAA HYSPLIT_4) using real-time meteorological data confirmed that long range transport of radionuclides, and possibly radioactive particles, from Semipalatinsk to Norway during this period was plausible. The present work shows that direct tropospheric transport of fallout from atmospheric nuclear detonations periodically may have

  1. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    1995-01-01

    This book describes environmental, safety, and health problems throughout the nuclear weapons complex and what the Department of Energy is doing to address them. Because of the secrecy that until recently surrounded nuclear weapons, many citizens today are unaware of how and where nuclear weapons were made and the resulting problems. The intention of this book it to help foster better public understanding of some of the issues concerning the nuclear legacy of the Cold War so as to help hasten progress as the DOE moves ahead on resolving these problems. Chapter 1 is an overview and a summary, including a brief history of the Department's nuclear weapons complex. Chapter 2 describes nuclear warhead production for uranium mining to final assembly to give a sense of the scale and complexity of nuclear weapons production and to characterize the sources and varieties of wastes and contamination. Chapters 3 and 4 look at the wastes and the contamination left by the Cold War and the progress and plans for solving these problems. Chapter 5 provides and international perspective on the legacy of nuclear weapons production. Chapter 6 describes the engineering and institutional challenges faced by the DOE as it embarks on new missions. Chapter 7 presents some of the long-term issues our nation faces as we come to terms with the legacy of the Cold War. The book ends with a glossary of terms and a list of books and reports that provide additional information about the nuclear weapons complex and the Department's plans for its cleanup.

  2. Exposure and genetics increase risk of beryllium sensitisation and chronic beryllium disease in the nuclear weapons industry

    SciTech Connect

    Van Dyke, M. V.; Martyny, John W.; Mroz, M. M.; Silveira, L. J.; Strand, M.; Cragle, D. L.; Tankersley, W. G.; Wells, S. M.; Newman, L. S.; Maier, L. A.

    2011-04-02

    Beryllium sensitisation (BeS) and chronic beryllium disease (CBD) are caused by exposure to beryllium with susceptibility affected by at least one well-studied genetic host factor, a glutamic acid residue at position 69 (E69) of the HLA-DPb chain (DPbE69). However, the nature of the relationship between exposure and carriage of the DPbE69 genotype has not been well studied. The goal of this study was to determine the relationship between DP{beta}E69 and exposure in BeS and CBD. Current and former workers (n=181) from a US nuclear weapons production facility, the Y-12 National Security Complex (Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA), were enrolled in a case-control study including 35 individuals with BeS and 19 with CBD. HLA-DPB1 genotypes were determined by PCR-SSP. Beryllium exposures were assessed through worker interviews and industrial hygiene assessment of work tasks. After removing the confounding effect of potential beryllium exposure at another facility, multivariate models showed a sixfold (OR 6.06, 95% CI 1.96 to 18.7) increased odds for BeS and CBD combined among DP{beta}E69 carriers and a fourfold (OR 3.98, 95% CI 1.43 to 11.0) increased odds for those exposed over an assigned lifetime-weighted average exposure of 0.1 {micro}g/m{sup 3}. Those with both risk factors had higher increased odds (OR 24.1, 95% CI 4.77 to 122). DP{beta}E69 carriage and high exposure to beryllium appear to contribute individually to the development of BeS and CBD. Among workers at a beryllium-using facility, the magnitude of risk associated with either elevated beryllium exposure or carriage of DP{beta}E69 alone appears to be similar.

  3. Trends in childhood leukaemia in the Nordic countries in relation to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed Central

    Darby, S. C.; Olsen, J. H.; Doll, R.; Thakrar, B.; Brown, P. D.; Storm, H. H.; Barlow, L.; Langmark, F.; Teppo, L.; Tulinius, H.

    1992-01-01

    OBJECTIVE--To obtain further information about the risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to ionising radiation at low doses and low dose rates before or after birth or to the father's testes shortly before conception. DESIGN--Observational study of trends in incidence of childhood leukaemia in relation to estimated radiation exposures due to fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing during the 1950s and 1960s. SETTING--Nordic countries. SUBJECTS--Children aged under 15 years. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES--Incidence rates of leukaemia by age at diagnosis, sex, country, and calendar year of diagnosis or year of birth; exposure category; relation between leukaemia and exposure for children aged 0-14 and 0-4 separately. RESULTS--During the high fallout period the average estimated dose equivalent to the fetal red bone marrow was around 140 mu Sv and the average annual testicular dose 140 mu Sv. There was little evidence of increased incidence of leukaemia among children born in these years. Doses to the red bone marrow of a child after birth were higher, and during the high exposure period children would have been subjected to an additional dose equivalent of around 1500 mu Sv, similar to doses received by children in several parts of central and eastern Europe owing to the Chernobyl accident and about 50% greater than the annual dose equivalent to the red bone marrow of a child from natural radiation. leukaemia incidence and red marrow dose was not related overall, but rates of leukaemia in the high exposure period were slightly higher than in the surrounding medium exposure period (relative risk for ages 0-14: 1.07, 95% confidence interval 1.00 to 1.14; for ages 0-4: 1.11, 1.00 to 1.24). CONCLUSIONS--Current predicted risks of childhood leukaemia after exposure to radiation are not greatly underestimated for low dose rate exposures. PMID:1586779

  4. Long-term stewardship of the environmental legacy at restored sites within the Department of Energy nuclear weapons complex.

    PubMed

    Wells, James R; Spitz, Henry B

    2003-11-01

    It is readily apparent, as the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management proceeds in remediating its vast network of contaminated nuclear weapons facilities, that final cleanup at many facilities will not be performed to a level allowing unrestricted use of the facility. Instead, these facilities must rely on engineering, administrative, and institutional controls to ensure the level of cleanup performed at the site remains adequately protective of public health and the environment. In order for these controls to remain effective, however, a plan for long-term stewardship of these sites must be developed that is approved by the U.S. Congress. Although this sounds simple enough for the present, serious questions remain regarding how best to implement a program of stewardship to ensure its effectiveness over time, particularly for sites with residual contamination of radionuclides with half-lives on the order of thousands of years. Individual facilities have attempted to answer these questions at the site-specific level. However, the complexities of the issues require federal support and oversight to ensure the programs implemented at each of the facilities are consistent and effective. The Department of Energy recently submitted a report to Congress outlining the extent of long-term stewardship needs at each of its facilities. As a result, the time is ripe for forward thinking Congressional action to address the relevant issues and ensure the remedy of long-term stewardship successfully carries out its intended purpose and remains protective of public health and the environment. The regulatory elements necessary for the stewardship program to succeed can only be implemented through the plenary powers of the U.S. Congress.

  5. Middle East Security Issues: In the Shadow of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1999-12-01

    states to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1987, for example, Qadhafi s ta ted that “we should be l ike the Chi- nese—poor and r id ing donkeys ...UK). Dr. Ibrahim A. Karawan is the associate director of the Middle East Center a t the Univers i ty of Utah and a member of the faculty

  6. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing 235U, 233U, and 232Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P.

    2012-02-01

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of 235U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving 233U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  7. Preliminary results of calculations for heavy-water nuclear-power-plant reactors employing {sup 235}U, {sup 233}U, and {sup 232}Th as a fuel and meeting requirements of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

    SciTech Connect

    Ioffe, B. L.; Kochurov, B. P.

    2012-02-15

    A physical design is developed for a gas-cooled heavy-water nuclear reactor intended for a project of a nuclear power plant. As a fuel, the reactor would employ thorium with a small admixture of enriched uranium that contains not more than 20% of {sup 235}U. It operates in the open-cycle mode involving {sup 233}U production from thorium and its subsequent burnup. The reactor meets the conditions of a nonproliferation of nuclear weapons: the content of fissionable isotopes in uranium at all stages of the process, including the final one, is below the threshold for constructing an atomic bomb, the amount of product plutonium being extremely small.

  8. Prevent, Counter, and Respond - A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats (FY 2016-FY2020)

    SciTech Connect

    2015-03-01

    NNSA’s second core mission is reducing global nuclear dangers by preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials, countering efforts to acquire such weapons or materials, and responding to nuclear or radiological incidents. In 2015, NNSA reorganized its nonproliferation activities based on core competencies and realigned its counterterrorism and counterproliferation functions to more efficiently address both current and emerging threats and challenges. The reorganization accompanied the March 2015 release of the first ever Prevent, Counter, and Respond – A Strategic Plan to Reduce Global Nuclear Threats. This report, which NNSA will update annually, highlights key nuclear threat trends and describes NNSA’s integrated threat reduction strategy.

  9. Environmental assessment for the purchase of Russian low enriched uranium derived from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1994-01-01

    The United States is proposing to purchase from the Russian Federation low enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The purchase would be accomplished through a proposed contract requiring the United States to purchase 15,250 metric tons (tonnes) of LEU (or 22,550 tonnes of UF{sub 6}) derived from blending 500 metric tones uranium (MTU) of HEU from nuclear warheads. The LEU would be in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) and would be converted from HEU in Russia. The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) is the entity proposing to undertake the contract for purchase, sale, and delivery of the LEU from the Russian Federation. The US Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating the procedure for gaining confidence that the LEU is derived from HEU that is derived from dismantled nuclear weapons (referred to as ``transparency),`` and would administer the transparency measures for the contract. There are six environments that could potentially be affected by the proposed action; marine (ocean); US ports of entry; truck or rail transportation corridors; the Portsmouth GDP; the electric power industry; and the nuclear fuel cycle industry. These environmental impacts are discussed.

  10. The risk of leukaemia in young children from exposure to tritium and carbon-14 in the discharges of German nuclear power stations and in the fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing.

    PubMed

    Wakeford, Richard

    2014-05-01

    Towards the end of 2007, the results were published from a case-control study (the "KiKK Study") of cancer in young children, diagnosed <5 years of age during 1980-2003 while resident near nuclear power stations in western Germany. The study found a tendency for cases of leukaemia to live closer to the nearest nuclear power station than their matched controls, producing an odds ratio that was raised to a statistically significant extent for residence within 5 km of a nuclear power station. The findings of the study received much publicity, but a detailed radiological risk assessment demonstrated that the radiation doses received by young children from discharges of radioactive material from the nuclear reactors were much lower than those received from natural background radiation and far too small to be responsible for the statistical association reported in the KiKK Study. This has led to speculation that conventional radiological risk assessments have grossly underestimated the risk of leukaemia in young children posed by exposure to man-made radionuclides, and particular attention has been drawn to the possible role of tritium and carbon-14 discharges in this supposedly severe underestimation of risk. Both (3)H and (14)C are generated naturally in the upper atmosphere, and substantial increases in these radionuclides in the environment occurred as a result of their production by atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons during the late 1950s and early 1960s. If the leukaemogenic effect of these radionuclides has been seriously underestimated to the degree necessary to explain the KiKK Study findings, then a pronounced increase in the worldwide incidence of leukaemia among young children should have followed the notably elevated exposure to (3)H and (14)C from nuclear weapons testing fallout. To investigate this hypothesis, the time series of incidence rates of leukaemia among young children <5 years of age at diagnosis has been examined from ten cancer registries

  11. Nuclear Weapons Effects Seminar

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1987-04-10

    Materiel Management Engineering Avail j:’dfor S&rvivabiltiy Section Dist A Tinker Air Force Base, Oklhaoma 73145 Dist ACKNOWLEDGMENT: Boeing...Air Logistic Center (ALC) Materiel Management Engineering Division (MME) will designate a survivability Office of Prime Responsibility (OPR) within the...division, thus providing a central core of engineering survivability expertise for the System Program Managers (SPM’s) and Item Managers (IM’s

  12. Risk in the Weapons Stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Noone, Bailey C

    2012-08-14

    When it comes to the nuclear weapons stockpile, risk must be as low as possible. Design and care to keep the stockpile healthy involves all aspects of risk management. Design diversity is a method that helps to mitigate risk.

  13. Ecological half-time and effective dose from chernobyl debris and from nuclear weapons fallout of 137Cs as measured in different Swedish populations.

    PubMed

    Rääf, C L; Hubbard, L; Falk, R; Agren, G; Vesanen, R

    2006-05-01

    The fallout in Sweden of radiocesium from nuclear weapons tests during the 1960's (137Cs) and from the Chernobyl accident in 1986 (134Cs and 137Cs) has transferred to humans through different ecological pathways. Data from whole-body burden measurements of 134Cs, 137Cs, and 40K in various Swedish populations between 1964 and 2002 have been compiled. This database enables an evaluation of the temporal and geographical dependence of the transfer of radiocesium from ground deposition to humans and the associated absorbed dose. The body burdens of 137Cs gradually decrease after the peak values reached in 1965 from nuclear weapons fallout and in 1987 from the Chernobyl fallout, but at a varying rate depending on the population. Assuming a dual exponential decrease, a short-term component of typically 1-2 y and a long-term component of 5-10 y are found in urban populations in Sweden. Among reindeer herders and hunters the effective ecological half-time is mono-exponential with a half-time of 5-7 y. The estimated time-integrated effective dose to an individual during a period of 50 y from the Chernobyl fallout is, on average, approximately 10 mSv for reindeer herders, which is 10-100 times higher than the estimated dose received by urban populations in the three major Swedish urban areas (Malmö, Göteborg, and Stockholm).

  14. National Security Issues 1981 Symposium. Strategic Nuclear Policies, Weapons, and the C3 Connection, October 13-14, 1981,

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1981-01-01

    Soviet culture and Soviet military of parity, which ultimately stabilizes the world and theory. accepts the status quo. The Soviet elite can never We... culture . These are vastly different meters or more. That embraces a wide spectrum from those of China, which is far less aggressive which we regard as...depth of Chinese cul- tinction which we draw between INF and strategic iure. By that I mean culture not only with a capital weapons does not exist in

  15. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Graham, Thomas, Jr.

    2014-05-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a "threat to peace and security", in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  16. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    SciTech Connect

    Graham, Thomas Jr.

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  17. Acquired experience resulting from transforming a chemical installation into a nuclear one

    SciTech Connect

    Zamfirache, M.; Stefan, L.; Bornea, A.; Stefanescu, I.

    2015-03-15

    ICIT-Valcea has developed an experimental pilot-scale installation for tritium and deuterium separation. The main objective of this pilot was to demonstrate the water detritiation technology and to transfer this technology to the CANDU reactors of the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. The pilot-scale installation was initiated in 1992. The initial design and construction were performed similarly to chemical plants as the separation of isotopes was focused on only hydrogen and deuterium to assess feasibility. In a second phase we have begun to transform it into a nuclear facility with the aim of separating tritium. Moving to tritium separation has imposed a lot of changes. Changes consisted mainly of: -) re-design of the technological systems for nuclear material processing, applying specific codes and standards (ASME, Romanian nuclear specific pressure boundary prescriptions for code classification); -) design and implementation of new systems, classified as safety systems; -) re-design and implementation of command and control systems, complying with the requirements of reliability and maintenance required for the project promoted; -) revaluation of auxiliary systems (utilities, power supply); -) implementing radiation protection systems, including secondary barriers; -) implementing and maintaining environment operational program specific to the new nuclear plant; -) developing and conducting safety analyzes; and -) the production of specific documentation to obtain the necessary permits for construction, commissioning and operation of the plant.

  18. The distribution and history of nuclear weapons related contamination in sediments from the Ob River, Siberia as determined by isotopic ratios of plutonium and neptunium.

    PubMed

    Kenna, T C; Sayles, F L

    2002-01-01

    Isotopic ratios of Pu and Np measured in sediment cores from 5 locations in the Ob River drainage basin show clear evidence of input from sources other than global fallout (non-fallout sources). Historical contaminant records obtained by combining isotopic ratio information with chronological information indicate that non-fallout inputs are from several sources that have varied significantly over the past 50 years. Unique isotopic signatures observed in sediments from tributaries that drain areas containing known or suspected sources of non-fallout contamination are used to identify the source of materials in sediments collected at downstream locations. These data can lead to a better understanding of the transport behavior, fate, and relative importance of particle reactive, weapons related contaminants originating from the nuclear facilities Mayak. Tomsk-7, and Semipalitinsk, which lie within the drainage basin. From our work to date, we draw the following conclusions: (1) Persistent non-fallout contamination is observed in the Ob River above its confluence with the Irtysh River, indicating contamination from the Tomsk-7 facility. (2) Non-fallout contamination in the Tobol River above its confluence with the Irtysh River indicates contamination from the Mayak facility. (3) Non-fallout contamination in the Irtysh River above its confluence with the Tobol River indicates contamination from the Semipalitinsk weapons test site. (4) The occurrence of isotopic ratios in Ob Delta sediments that are similar to those observed in source tributaries suggests that contamination from at least two sources has been transported along the length of the river system. (5) Global fallout, a result of high-yield atmospheric weapons tests conducted by the FSU and USA primarily, is the dominant source of Pu and Np to the region; however, there have been brief periods when inputs from non-fallout sources exceeded those from global fallout.

  19. Operation Desert Shield: Medical aspects of weapons of mass destruction

    SciTech Connect

    Knudson, G.B. )

    1991-06-01

    The authors concern over possible use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. forces in the Middle East has increased because Iraq has violated the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, attempted to acquire nuclear capability and delivery systems, and is reported to be developing biological weapons. The Army Medical Department has had no experience, since World War I, in the management and treatment of mass casualties contaminated by chemical agents, and has never treated casualties resulting from the use of nuclear or biological weapons used against our soldiers. Management and diagnosis of casualties will be complicated by their possible exposure to a mixture of chemical warfare and biological warfare agents. Triage is an essential aspect in the management of mass casualties since the number of injured patients will exceed the maximum medical capability to treat each patient on arrival. All levels of medical support must be prepared to protect themselves, their equipment and supplies, and their patients from contamination. In contaminated operations on the integrated battlefield, it will be of utmost importance to incorporate flexibility and innovation to match the medical and tactical situation.

  20. 11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    11. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. SITE RETURNS WERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHIPPED TO THE ROCKY FLATS PLANT FROM THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STOCKPILE FOR RETIREMENT, TESTING, OR UPGRADING. FISSILE MATERIALS (PLUTONIUM, URANIUM, ETC.) AND RARE MATERIALS (BERYLLIUM) WERE RECOVERED FOR REUSE, AND THE REMAINDER WAS DISPOSED. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

  1. Closing the circle on the splitting of the atom: The environmental legacy of nuclear weapons production in the United States and what the Department of Energy is doing about it

    SciTech Connect

    1996-01-01

    In the grand scheme of things we are a little more than halfway through the cycle of splitting the atom for weapons purposes. If we visualize this historic cycle as the full sweep of a clockface, at zero hour we would find the first nuclear chain reaction by Enrico Fermi, followed immediately by the Manhattan Project and the explosion of the first atomic bombs. From two o`clock until five, the United States built and ran a massive industrial complex that produced tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. At half past, the Cold War ended, and the United States shut down most of its nuclear weapons factories. The second half of this cycle involves dealing with the waste and contamination from nuclear weapons production - a task that had, for the most part, been postponed into the indefinite future. That future is now upon us. Dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War is in many ways as big a challenge for us today as the building of the atomic bomb was for the Manhattan Project pioneers in the 1940s. Our challenges are political and social as well as technical, and we are meeting those challenges. We are reducing risks, treating wastes, developing new technologies, and building democratic institutions for a constructive debate on our future course.

  2. Elevated in vivo strontium-90 from nuclear weapons test fallout among cancer decedents: a case-control study of deciduous teeth.

    PubMed

    Mangano, Joseph J; Sherman, Janette D

    2011-01-01

    Risks to health from large-scale atmospheric nuclear weapons testing are still relatively unknown. A sample of 85,000 deciduous teeth collected from Americans born during the bomb-testing years assessed risk by in vivo measurement of residual strontium-90 (Sr-90) concentrations, using liquid scintillation spectrometry. The authors' analysis included 97 deciduous teeth from persons born between 1959 and 1961 who were diagrosed with cancer, and 194 teeth of matched controls. Average Sr-90 in teeth of persons who died of cancer was significantly greater than for controls (OR = 2.22; p < 0.04). This discovery suggests that many thousands have died or will die of cancer due to exposure to fallout, far more than previously believed.

  3. Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2014-06-01

    national security, resource management , and responsible command. The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits...sisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons prolifera- tion are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more “proliferation-resistant” or by...tion attendant to the further spread of nuclear energy programs are manageable . This view is fortified with a narrative. A sharp line is drawn

  4. Knowledge, Attitudes and Beliefs Regarding Nuclear "Weapons": A Survey of Registered Voters in Los Angeles County in 1985.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kierulff, Stephen; Zippin, David

    This study examines the relationship between knowledge and attitudes with respect to nuclear issues, including the nuclear freeze proposal, MX missle, and Strategic Defense Initiative. Adults (N=750) drawn from a list of registered voters in Los Angeles County were sent a 53-item questionnaire. Of the respondents, 64 percent were male, 53 percent…

  5. Substituting water for chlorofluorocarbon liquid in density measuring baths for nuclear weapon components on non-fissile alloys

    SciTech Connect

    Beitscher, S.; Palachek, A.D.

    1991-09-23

    This project was part of a Rocky Flats Plant and Department of Energy weapons complex effort to reduce release of hazardous materials to the atmosphere. Experiments were performed to determine whether deionized water could be substituted for trichlorotrifluoroethane (CFC 113) in the bath of a density measuring system. In the first experiment, 14 parts of seven types were tested: They included shells of beryllium, vanadium, titanium, stainless steel, uranium, a uranium alloy, and casting feed strips of a uranium alloy. Each part was measured for density five times in each medium. The entire experiment was repeated -- the only change being addition of a wetting agent to the water. Two additional experiments were confided to the uranium alloy casting feed strips. As a result of this study, it is recommended that CFC be discontinued as a bath medium for the part types studied in this investigation and that deionized water be substituted.

  6. Sandia National Laboratories/Production Agency Weapon Waste Minimization Plan

    SciTech Connect

    Skinrood, A.C.; Radosevich, L.G.

    1991-07-01

    This Plan describes activities to reduce the usage of hazardous materials and the production of hazardous material waste during the development, production, stockpile, and retirement phases of war reserve nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon test units. Activities related to the development and qualification of more benign materials and processes for weapon production and the treatment and disposal of these materials from weapon retirement are described in separate plans.

  7. Weapons dismantlement issues in independent Ukraine

    SciTech Connect

    Zack, N.R.; Kirk, E.J.

    1994-07-01

    The American Association for the Advancement of Science sponsored a seminar during September 1993, in Kiev, Ukraine, entitled ``Toward a Nuclear Free Future -- Barriers and Problems.`` It brought together Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Americans to discuss the legal, political, safeguards and security, economic, and technical dimensions of nuclear weapons dismantlement and destruction. US representatives initiated discussions on legal and treaty requirements and constraints, safeguards and security issues surrounding dismantlement, storage and disposition of nuclear materials, warhead transportation, and economic considerations. Ukrainians gave presentations on arguments for and against the Ukraine keeping nuclear weapons, Ukrainian Parliament non-approval of START I, alternative strategies for dismantling silos and launchers, and economic and security implications of nuclear weapons removal from the Ukraine. Participants from Belarus discussed proliferation and control regime issues, This paper will highlight and detail the issues, concerns, and possible impacts of the Ukraine`s dismantlement of its nuclear weapons.

  8. Creating an educational consortium to support the recruitment and retention of expertise for the nuclear weapons complex

    SciTech Connect

    Harmon, Frank; Wells, Douglas P.; Hunt, Alan; Beller, Denis

    2006-12-13

    From FY 02-05 IAC has been a part of the DOE Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative and its predecessor organization Advanced Accelerator Applications. In the IAC program effort has been divided into three parts; Student Research, Accelerator Driven Nuclear Research and Materials Science. Within the three parts specific research and development activities have been undertaken in Student Research, which supported undergraduate and graduate students, post-docs, engineering staff, program administration, project infrastructure, visiting and summer faculty appointments, visiting scientists, and support of students and faculty at the University of Michigan, Texas A&M University, University of Texas and UNLV; Accelerator Driven Nuclear Research included the use of electron accelerators to study driven sub-critical nuclear systems (ADS) and to provide practical methods of monitoring and assaying nuclear materials for accountancy in non proliferation applications (Materials Accountability and Control, MA&C); and Materials Science research at IAC supported all AFC national technical areas.

  9. Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mian, Zia

    2014-05-01

    India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

  10. Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

    SciTech Connect

    Mian, Zia

    2014-05-09

    India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

  11. Probability of people survival in a nuclear weapon blast environment. Final report 17 Apr 79-24 Apr 80

    SciTech Connect

    Longinow, A.

    1980-05-01

    This study was concerned with predicting the probability of survival of people located in personnel shelters when subjected to the blast effects produced by the detonation of a 1-MT weapon near the ground surface. Personnel shelters analyzed re buried or with the roof slab at grade. The roof slab is the weakest structural component. Its partial or total collapse results in casualties. When the shelter is thus breached, casualties can also be produced by the blast loading when overpressures are sufficiently high. The analysis formulated predicts the probability of roof slab survival when subjected to an airblast loading. Probability of people survival against slab collapse is estimated based on the fraction of shelter area unaffected by collapse. Probability of survival against blast pressure entering the shelter area is determined using available casualty data. Results are combined to yield the probability of survival against both effects. The analysis considers the variability of selected geometric parameters of the roof slab, material properties and airblast parameters.

  12. A historical application of social amplification of risk model: Economic impacts of risk events at nuclear weapons facilities?

    SciTech Connect

    Metz, W.C.

    1996-12-31

    Public perceptions of risk have proven to be a critical barrier to the federal government`s extensive, decade-long, technical and scientific effort to site facilities for the interim storage and permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The negative imagery, fear, and anxiety that are linked to ``nuclear`` and ``radioactive`` technologies, activities, and facilities by the public originate from the personal realities and experiences of individuals and the information they receive. These perceptions continue to be a perplexing problem for those responsible for making decisions about federal nuclear waste management policies and programs. The problem of understanding and addressing public perceptions is made even more difficult because there are decidedly different opinions about HLW held by the public and nuclear industry and radiation health experts.

  13. Characterization of U/Pu particles originating from the nuclear weapon accidents at Palomares, Spain, 1966 and Thule, Greenland, 1968.

    PubMed

    Lind, O C; Salbu, B; Janssens, K; Proost, K; García-León, M; García-Tenorio, R

    2007-04-15

    Following the USAF B-52 bomber accidents at Palomares, Spain in 1966 and at Thule, Greenland in 1968, radioactive particles containing uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were dispersed into the environment. To improve long-term environmental impact assessments for the contaminated ecosystems, particles from the two sites have been isolated and characterized with respect to properties influencing particle weathering rates. Low (239)Pu/(235)U (0.62-0.78) and (240)Pu/(239)Pu (0.055-0.061) atom ratios in individual particles from both sites obtained by Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS) show that the particles contain highly enriched U and weapon-grade Pu. Furthermore, results from electron microscopy with Energy Dispersive X-ray analysis (EDX) and synchrotron radiation (SR) based micrometer-scale X-ray fluorescence (micro-XRF) 2D mapping demonstrated that U and Pu coexist throughout the 1-50 microm sized particles, while surface heterogeneities were observed in EDX line scans. SR-based micrometer-scale X-ray Absorption Near Edge Structure Spectroscopy (micro-XANES) showed that the particles consisted of an oxide mixture of U (predominately UO(2) with the presence of U(3)O(8)) and Pu ((III)/(IV), (IV)/(V) or (III), (IV) and (V)). Neither metallic U or Pu nor uranyl or Pu(VI) could be observed. Characteristics such as elemental distributions, morphology and oxidation states are remarkably similar for the Palomares and Thule particles, reflecting that they originate from similar source and release scenarios. Thus, these particle characteristics are more dependent on the original material from which the particles are derived (source) and the formation of particles (release scenario) than the environmental conditions to which the particles have been exposed since the late 1960s.

  14. Biologic and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

    PubMed

    Bozeman, William P; Dilbero, Deanna; Schauben, Jay L

    2002-11-01

    Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) are capable of producing massive casualties and are typically grouped into nuclear, biologic, and chemical weapons. In the wake of the September 11th disasters, attention to terrorist groups and the potential for use of WMDs has increased. Biologic and chemical weapons are relatively accessible and inexpensive to develop, and are thought to be the most available to foreign states and subnational terrorist groups. This article reviews various biologic and chemical weapons, including emergency diagnosis and management of selected agents.

  15. Residual radionuclide concentrations and estimated radiation doses at the former French nuclear weapons test sites in Algeria.

    PubMed

    Danesi, P R; Moreno, J; Makarewicz, M; Louvat, D

    2008-11-01

    In order to assess the level of residual radioactivity and evaluate the radiological conditions at the former French nuclear testing sites of Reggane and Taourirt Tan Afella in the south of Algeria, the International Atomic Energy Agency, at the request of the government of Algeria, conducted a field mission to the sites in 1999. At these locations, France conducted a number of nuclear tests in the early 1960s. At the ground zero locality of the ''Gerboise Blanche'' atmospheric test (Reggane) and in the vicinity of a tunnel where radioactive lava was ejected during a poorly contained explosion (Taourirt Tan Afella), non-negligible levels of radioactive material could still be measured. Using the information collected and using realistic potential exposure scenarios, radiation doses to potential occupants and visitors to the sites were estimated.

  16. Deterrence and Engagement: U.S. and North Korean Interactions over Nuclear Weapons since the End of the Cold War

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-12-01

    73 As Scott Sagan says: Strong states do what they can: they can pursue a form of internal balancing by adopting the costly, but self-reliant, policy...Renewed ed. Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003). 72 In 1956, the United States abandoned French interests because...China, Britain, France and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), ch. 2. 74 Scott Sagan , “Why Do

  17. Operation REDWING-Project 6.4. Airborne Antennas and Phototubes for Determination of Nuclear-Weapon Yield

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-04-01

    irradiance to give estimates of atmospheric attenuation due to clouds and haze. Measurements of ambient light intensity and of the variability of...nuclear cloud . When the fireball was visible, its radius could be used as a measure of yield, provided that the picture and the range between...radiation intensity data was compared with the ex- pected irradiance to give estimates of atmospheric attenuation due to clouds and haze. Measure- ments

  18. Nuclear weapons test detection: Ensuring a verifiable treaty. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty research and development program 1995 progress report

    SciTech Connect

    1995-12-31

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) has an active program to provide technologies for monitoring and verifying a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). DOE technologies will significantly increase the nation`s capability to identify potential nuclear explosions with high confidence and with minimal false alarms. This report presents the highlights of the first year of this program. The primary objectives of the CTBT monitoring system are to deter nuclear explosions in all environments (underground, underwater, or in the atmosphere) and, if such an explosion does occur, to detect, locate, and identify its source. The system is designed to provide credible evidence to national authorities to aid in resolving ambiguities and to serve as the basis for appropriate action. To collect this evidence, one must develop technologies that can detect and identify the signals from a nuclear test against a background of hundreds of thousands of benign events. The monitoring system must have high sensitivity to detect the events of interest and, to minimize false alarms, it must identify those events with a high level of confidence.

  19. Nuclear archeology in a bottle: evidence of pre-Trinity U.S. weapons activities from a waste burial site.

    PubMed

    Schwantes, Jon M; Douglas, Matthew; Bonde, Steven E; Briggs, James D; Farmer, Orville T; Greenwood, Lawrence R; Lepel, Elwood A; Orton, Christopher R; Wacker, John F; Luksic, Andrzej T

    2009-02-15

    During World War II, the Hanford Site in Washington became the location for U.S. plutonium production. In 2004, a bottle containing a sample of plutonium was recovered from a Hanford waste trench. Here, state-of-the-art instrumental analyses, reactor model simulations, and investigative science techniques were used to provide insights as to the origin of this unknown sample, a process collectively termed as nuclear archeology. Isotopic age dating conducted on the sample in 2007 indicated the sample was separated from the spent fuel 61.6 +/- 4.5 years earlier. The isotope (22)Na, a detectable product of a secondary nuclear reaction, proved useful as a powerful tool for nuclear forensic analysis as (1) an easily detectable signifier of the presence of alpha emitting actinides, (2) an indicator of sample splitting, and (3) a measure of the time since sample splitting. Analytical results of minor actinide isotopes and reactor model simulations confirmed the material originated from the X-10 reactor in Oak Ridge, TN. Corroborated by historical documents, we concluded this sample was part of the first batch of Pu separated at T-Plant, Hanford, the world's first industrial-scale reprocessing facility, on December 9, 1944. This sample represents the oldest known collection of man-made (239)Pu in the world.

  20. Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jenkins, Bonnie

    1997-01-01

    Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

  1. JPRS report, arms control, protocol to the treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests

    SciTech Connect

    1990-08-01

    The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, confirming the provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of July 3, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, convinced of the necessity to ensure effective verification of compliance with the Treaty. Contents of the Treaty are enclosed.

  2. Deposition of artificial radionuclides from atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests estimated by soil inventories in French areas low-impacted by Chernobyl.

    PubMed

    Le Roux, Gaël; Duffa, Céline; Vray, Françoise; Renaud, Philippe

    2010-03-01

    Soil inventories of anthropogenic radionuclides were investigated in altitudinal transects in 2 French regions, Savoie and Montagne Noire. Rain was negligible in these 2 areas the days after the Chernobyl accident. Thus anthropogenic radionuclides are coming hypothetically only from Global Fallout following Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests. This is confirmed by the isotopic signatures ((238)Pu/(239+240)Pu; (137)Cs/(239+240)Pu; and (241)Am/(239+240)Pu) close to Global Fallout value. In Savoie, a peat core age-dated by (210)Pb(ex) confirmed that the main part of deposition of anthropogenic radionuclides occurred during the late sixties and the early seventies. In agreement with previous studies, the anthropogenic radionuclide inventories are well correlated with the annual precipitations. However, this is the first time that a study investigates such a large panel of annual precipitation and therefore of anthropogenic radionuclide deposition. It seems that at high-altitude sites, deposition of artificial radionuclides was higher possibly due to orographic precipitations.

  3. On-line high-performance liquid chromatography-ultraviolet-nuclear magnetic resonance method of the markers of nerve agents for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    PubMed

    Mazumder, Avik; Gupta, Hemendra K; Garg, Prabhat; Jain, Rajeev; Dubey, Devendra K

    2009-07-03

    This paper details an on-flow liquid chromatography-ultraviolet-nuclear magnetic resonance (LC-UV-NMR) method for the retrospective detection and identification of alkyl alkylphosphonic acids (AAPAs) and alkylphosphonic acids (APAs), the markers of the toxic nerve agents for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Initially, the LC-UV-NMR parameters were optimized for benzyl derivatives of the APAs and AAPAs. The optimized parameters include stationary phase C(18), mobile phase methanol:water 78:22 (v/v), UV detection at 268nm and (1)H NMR acquisition conditions. The protocol described herein allowed the detection of analytes through acquisition of high quality NMR spectra from the aqueous solution of the APAs and AAPAs with high concentrations of interfering background chemicals which have been removed by preceding sample preparation. The reported standard deviation for the quantification is related to the UV detector which showed relative standard deviations (RSDs) for quantification within +/-1.1%, while lower limit of detection upto 16mug (in mug absolute) for the NMR detector. Finally the developed LC-UV-NMR method was applied to identify the APAs and AAPAs in real water samples, consequent to solid phase extraction and derivatization. The method is fast (total experiment time approximately 2h), sensitive, rugged and efficient.

  4. Analyses of combined mortality data on workers at the Hanford Site, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant.

    PubMed

    Gilbert, E S; Fry, S A; Wiggs, L D; Voelz, G L; Cragle, D L; Petersen, G R

    1989-10-01

    An important objective of studies of workers exposed occupationally to chronic low doses of ionizing radiation is to provide a direct assessment of health risks resulting from this exposure. This objective is most effectively accomplished by conducting combined analyses that allow evaluation of the totality of evidence from all study populations. In this paper, combined analyses of mortality in workers at the Hanford Site, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant are presented. These combined analyses provide no evidence of a correlation between radiation exposure and mortality from all cancer or from leukemia. Of 11 other specific types of cancer analyzed, multiple myeloma was the only cancer found to exhibit a statistically significant correlation with radiation exposure. Estimates of the excess risk of all cancer and of leukemia, based on the combined data, were negative. Upper confidence limits based on the combined data were lower than for any single population, and were similar to estimates obtained from recent analyses of A-bomb survivor data. These results strengthen support for the conclusion that estimates obtained through extrapolation from high-dose data do not seriously underestimate risks of low-dose exposure, but leave open the possibility that extrapolation may overestimate risks.

  5. Antisatellite Weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Garwin, Richard L.; White, Andrew D.

    1984-08-01

    Satellites are vulnerable to the existing Soviet ASAT weapon, to the U.S. ASAT under development, to the large numbers of ICBMs in existence, and to many future threats, including space mines. An ban on ASAT use and test is adequately verifiable to increase U.S. security and to reduce the likelihood of at least one cause of war. The U.S. should move with urgency to negotiate such a ban with the Soviet Union and then with other nations, because the ability efficiently to destroy the satellites of others is less valuable to the U.S. than the reduced threat to our own satellites under a treaty regime.

  6. Controlling Weapons-Grade Fissile Material

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Rotblat, J.

    1977-01-01

    Discusses the problems of controlling weapons-grade fissionable material. Projections of the growth of fission nuclear reactors indicates sufficient materials will be available to construct 300,000 atomic bombs each containing 10 kilograms of plutonium by 1990. (SL)

  7. Radiation exposure due to local fallout from Soviet atmospheric nuclear weapons testing in Kazakhstan: solid cancer mortality in the Semipalatinsk historical cohort, 1960-1999.

    PubMed

    Bauer, Susanne; Gusev, Boris I; Pivina, Ludmila M; Apsalikov, Kazbek N; Grosche, Bernd

    2005-10-01

    Little information is available on the health effects of exposures to fallout from Soviet nuclear weapons testing and on the combined external and internal environmental exposures that have resulted from these tests. This paper reports the first analysis of the Semipalatinsk historical cohort exposed in the vicinity of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, Kazakhstan. The cohort study, which includes 19,545 inhabitants of exposed and comparison villages of the Semipalatinsk region, was set up in the 1960s and comprises 582,750 person-years of follow-up between 1960 and 1999. Cumulative effective radiation dose estimates in this cohort range from 20 mSv to approximately 4 Sv. Rates of mortality and cancer mortality in the exposed group substantially exceeded those of the comparison group. Dose-response analyses within the exposed group confirmed a significant trend with dose for all solid cancers (P < 0.0001) and for digestive and respiratory cancers (P = 0.0255 and P < 0.0001), whereas no consistent dose-response trend was found for all causes of death (P = 0.4296). Regarding specific cancer sites, a significant trend with dose was observed for lung cancer (P = 0.0001), stomach cancer (P = 0.0050), and female breast cancer (P = 0.0040) as well as for esophagus cancer in women (P = 0.0030). The excess relative risk per sievert for all solid cancers combined was 1.77 (1.35; 2.27) based on the total cohort data, yet a selection bias regarding the comparison group could not be entirely ruled out. The excess relative risk per sievert based on the cohort's exposed group was 0.81 (0.46; 1.33) for all solid cancers combined and thus still exceeds current risk estimates from the Life Span Study. Future epidemiological assessments based on this cohort will benefit from extension of follow-up and ongoing validation of dosimetric data.

  8. A history of the people of Bikini following nuclear weapons testing in the Marshall Islands: with recollections and views of elders of Bikini Atoll.

    PubMed

    Niedenthal, J

    1997-07-01

    The people of Bikini Atoll were moved from their homeland in 1946 to make way for the testing of 23 nuclear weapons by the United States government, beginning with the world's fourth atomic detonation. The subsequent half-century exodus of the Bikini people included a 2-y stay on Rongerik Atoll, where near starvation resulted, and a 6-mo sojourn on Kwajalein Atoll, where they lived in tents beside a runway used by the U.S. military. In 1948, they were finally relocated to Kili, a small, isolated, 200-acre island owned by the U.S. Trust Territory government. Numerous hardships have been faced there, not the least of which was the loss of skills required for self-sustenance. Located 425 miles south of Bikini, Kili Island is without a sheltered lagoon. Thus for six months of the year, fishing and sailing become futile endeavors. Because of the residual radioactive contamination from the nuclear testing, the majority of the Bikinian population still resides on Kili today. One attempt was made to resettle Bikini in the late 1960's when President Lyndon B. Johnson, on recommendations from the Atomic Energy Commission, declared Bikini Atoll safe for habitation. In 1978, however, it was discovered by the U.S. Department of Energy that in the span of only one year, some of the returned islanders were showing a 75% increase in their body burdens of 137Cs. In 1978, the people residing on Bikini were moved again, this time to a small island in Majuro Atoll. In the early 1980's, the Bikinians filed a class action lawsuit against the U.S. government for damages arising out of the nuclear testing program. Although the claim was dismissed, eventually a $90 million trust fund was established for their local government. Since then the leaders of the people of Bikini residing on Kili Island and Majuro Atoll have been confronted with the immense responsibility of determining how to clean their atoll while at the same time maintaining the health and welfare of their displaced

  9. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIES AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR TECHNOLOGIES APPLICABLE TO DEACTIVATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACILITIES

    SciTech Connect

    Reilkoff, T. E.; Hetland, M. D.; O'Leary, E. M.

    2002-02-25

    The Deactivation and Decommissioning Focus Area's (DDFA's) mission is to develop, demonstrate, and deploy improved deactivation and decommissioning (D&D) technologies. This mission requires that emphasis be continually placed on identifying technologies currently employed or under development in other nuclear as well as nonnuclear industries and government agencies. In support of DDFA efforts to clean up the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) radiologically contaminated surplus facilities using technologies that improve worker safety, reduce costs, and accelerate cleanup schedules, a study was conducted to identify innovative technologies developed for use in nonnuclear arenas that are appropriate for D&D applications.

  10. Implementation of neutron counting techniques at US facilities for IAEA verification of excess materials from nuclear weapons production

    SciTech Connect

    Stewart, J.E.; Krick, M.S.; Langner, D.G.; Reilly, T.D.; Theis, W.; Lemaire, R.J.; Xiao, J.

    1995-08-01

    The U.S. Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, announced by President Clinton before the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, commits the U.S. to placing under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards excess nuclear materials no longer needed for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. As of July 1, 1995, the IAEA had completed Initial Physical Inventory Verification (IPIV) at two facilities: a storage vault in the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant containing highly enriched uranium (HOW) metal and another storage vault in the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) containing plutonium oxide and plutonium-bearing residues. Another plutonium- storage vault, located at Rocky Flats, is scheduled for the IPIV in the fall of 1995. Conventional neutron coincidence counting is one of the routinely applied IAEA nondestructive assay (ND) methods for verification of uranium and plutonium. However, at all three facilities mentioned above, neutron ND equipment had to be modified or developed for specific facility needs such as the type and configuration of material placed under safeguards. This document describes those modifications and developments.

  11. Tactical laser weapons and other directed-energy weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Rongrui

    1993-07-01

    This paper briefly introduces the current development status of three directed-energy weapons: laser weapons, radio frequency/microwave weapons, and charged-particle-beam weapons. Among them, the tactical laser weapon may be the first to find application.

  12. Nuclear Archeology in a Bottle: Evidence of Pre-Trinity U.S. Weapons Activities from a Waste Burial Site

    SciTech Connect

    Schwantes, Jon M.; Douglas, Matthew; Bonde, Steven E.; Briggs, David; Farmer, Orville T.; Greenwood, Lawrence R.; Lepel, Elwood A.; Orton, Christopher R.; Wacker, John F.; Luksic, Andrzej T.

    2009-02-15

    During World War II, the Hanford Site in Washington was chosen for plutonium production. In 2004, a bottle containing a sample of plutonium was recovered from a Hanford waste trench. Isotopic age dating indicated the sample was separated from the fuel pellet 64 ±2.8 years earlier. Detectable products of secondary nuclear reactions, such as 22Na, proved useful as 1) a detectable analog for alpha emitting actinides, 2) an indicator of sample splitting, and 3) a measure of the time since sample splitting. The sample origin was identified as the X-10 reactor, Oak Ridge, TN. Corroborated by historical documents, we concluded this sample was part of the first batch of Pu separated at T-Plant, Hanford, the world’s first industrial-scale reprocessing facility, on December 9, 1944.

  13. Architectures & requirements for advanced weapon controllers.

    SciTech Connect

    McMurtrey, Brian J.; Klarer, Paul Richard; Bryan, Jon R.

    2004-02-01

    This report describes work done in FY2003 under Advanced and Exploratory Studies funding for Advanced Weapons Controllers. The contemporary requirements and envisioned missions for nuclear weapons are changing from the class of missions originally envisioned during development of the current stockpile. Technology available today in electronics, computing, and software provides capabilities not practical or even possible 20 years ago. This exploratory work looks at how Weapon Electrical Systems can be improved to accommodate new missions and new technologies while maintaining or improving existing standards in nuclear safety and reliability.

  14. Nuclear Security for Floating Nuclear Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Skiba, James M.; Scherer, Carolynn P.

    2015-10-13

    Recently there has been a lot of interest in small modular reactors. A specific type of these small modular reactors (SMR,) are marine based power plants called floating nuclear power plants (FNPP). These FNPPs are typically built by countries with extensive knowledge of nuclear energy, such as Russia, France, China and the US. These FNPPs are built in one country and then sent to countries in need of power and/or seawater desalination. Fifteen countries have expressed interest in acquiring such power stations. Some designs for such power stations are briefly summarized. Several different avenues for cooperation in FNPP technology are proposed, including IAEA nuclear security (i.e. safeguards), multilateral or bilateral agreements, and working with Russian design that incorporates nuclear safeguards for IAEA inspections in non-nuclear weapons states

  15. Teaching Activities on Horizontal Nuclear Proliferation.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Zola, John

    1990-01-01

    Provides learning activities concerning the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Includes step-by-step directions for four activities: (1) the life cycle of nuclear weapons; (2) nuclear nonproliferation: pros and cons; (3) the nuclear power/nuclear weapons connection; and (4) managing nuclear proliferation. (NL)

  16. Europe's nuclear dominos

    SciTech Connect

    Sharp, J. )

    1993-06-01

    As long as the United States continues to play a leading role in NATO, the incentive for European powers to acquire independent nuclear weapons is virtually zero. Most European power, however, have relatively sophisticated nuclear establishments and could easily manufacture nuclear explosives if they judged that their security required an independent capability. They might judge so if the United States pulls out of Europe and out of NATO. It is the opinion of the author that if the United States withdraws, and if France and Britain insist on maintaining their current status as independent nuclear weapons powers, they will encourage proliferation by example. The likelihood of different countries deciding to manufacture nuclear weapons under these cicumstances is evaluated. The future of NATO is assessed. The conclusions of and future structure of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) is discussed. The impact of United Nations involvement in preventing proliferation is evaluated. Recommendations are proposed for the utilization of existing organizations to deter proliferation in Europe.

  17. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent

    SciTech Connect

    Keillor, Martin E.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Baciak, James E.; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S.; Emer, Dudley F.; Kernan, Warnick J.; Kirkham, Randy R.; MacDougall, Matthew R.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Rishel, Jeremy P.; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E.; Smart, John E.

    2016-01-01

    An experiment to release radioactive particles representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven “air cannon” was used to release lanthanum-140 at ambient temperatures. The radioisotope 140La was chosen as a representative fission fragment with a short half-life and prominent gamma-ray emissions; the choice was also influenced by the successful production and use of 140La with low levels of radioactive contaminants in the Defence Research and Development Canada Field Trials. The source was created through activation of high-purity lanthanum oxide at the TRIGA research reactor of Washington State University, Pullman, Washington. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area for which the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. A vehicle-mounted spectrometer, and handheld and backpack instruments ranging from polyvinyl toluene to high purity germanium, were used to survey the plume. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of On-Site Inspection.

  18. PRex: An Experiment to Investigate Detection of Near-field Particulate Deposition from a Simulated Underground Nuclear Weapons Test Vent.

    PubMed

    Keillor, Martin E; Arrigo, Leah M; Baciak, James E; Chipman, Veraun; Detwiler, Rebecca S; Emer, Dudley F; Kernan, Warnick J; Kirkham, Randy R; MacDougall, Matthew R; Milbrath, Brian D; Rishel, Jeremy P; Seifert, Allen; Seifert, Carolyn E; Smart, John E

    2016-05-01

    A radioactive particulate release experiment to produce a near-field ground deposition representative of small-scale venting from an underground nuclear test was conducted to gather data in support of treaty capability development activities. For this experiment, a CO2-driven "air cannon" was used to inject (140)La, a radioisotope of lanthanum with 1.7-d half-life and strong gamma-ray emissions, into the lowest levels of the atmosphere at ambient temperatures. Witness plates and air samplers were laid out in an irregular grid covering the area where the plume was anticipated to deposit based on climatological wind records. This experiment was performed at the Nevada National Security Site, where existing infrastructure, radiological procedures, and support personnel facilitated planning and execution of the work. A vehicle-mounted NaI(Tl) spectrometer and a polyvinyl toluene-based backpack instrument were used to survey the deposited plume. Hand-held instruments, including NaI(Tl) and lanthanum bromide scintillators and high purity germanium spectrometers, were used to take in situ measurements. Additionally, three soil sampling techniques were investigated and compared. The relative sensitivity and utility of sampling and survey methods are discussed in the context of on-site inspection.

  19. American press coverage of US-Soviet relations, the Soviet Union, nuclear weapons, arms control, and national security: A bibliography

    SciTech Connect

    Dorman, W.A.; Manoff, R.K.; Weeks, J.

    1988-01-01

    This bibliography covers work that addresses coverage of nuclear and arms control issues, defense, the Soviet Union, and Soviet-American relations by the American news media between 1965 and 1988. Material selected for inclusion either discusses press performance or addresses conditions -- such as classification of information -- that directly impact on media coverage of such issues. Bodies of literature on media coverage of conflict elsewhere in the world lie outside the Center's current mandate (which has shaped the parameters of this bibliography) except insofar as such conflicts are presented by the news media specifically in the context of US-Soviet relations. Much the same is true of such issues as the North-South flow of information and the debate over calls for a New World Information Order. However, the authors have decided to include assessments of American media coverage of the Vietnam War as a case study of a watershed conflict that raised many of the issues discussed throughout this literature in a particularly compelling way.

  20. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  1. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 9, 2011 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of...

  2. 77 FR 66513 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-11-05

    ... Documents#0;#0; ] Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons... economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the...

  3. 3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 3 The President 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means...

  4. 3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 3 The President 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means...

  5. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of...

  6. 75 FR 68671 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-08

    ... Notice of November 4, 2010--Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means...

  7. Marked longevity of human lung parenchymal elastic fibers deduced from prevalence of D-aspartate and nuclear weapons-related radiocarbon

    SciTech Connect

    Shapiro, S.D.; Endicott, S.K.; Province, M.A.; Pierce, J.A.; Campbell, E.J. )

    1991-05-01

    Normal structure and function of the lung parenchyma depend upon elastic fibers. Amorphous elastin is biochemically stable in vitro, and may provide a metabolically stable structural framework for the lung parenchyma. To test the metabolic stability of elastin in the normal human lung parenchyma, we have (a) estimated the time elapsed since the synthesis of the protein through measurement of aspartic acid racemization and (b) modeled the elastin turnover through measurement of the prevalence of nuclear weapons-related {sup 14}C. Elastin purified by a new technique from normal lung parenchyma was hydrolyzed; then the prevalences of D-aspartate and {sup 14}C were measured by gas chromatography and accelerator-mass spectrometry, respectively. D-aspartate increased linearly with age; Kasp (1.76 x 10{sup {minus} 3} yr{sup {minus} 1}) was similar to that previously found for extraordinarily stable human tissues, indicating that the age of lung parenchymal elastin corresponded with the age of the subject. Radiocarbon prevalence data also were consistent with extraordinary metabolic stability of elastin; the calculated mean carbon residence time in elastin was 74 yr (95% confidence limits, 40-174 yr). These results indicate that airspace enlargement characteristic of 'aging lung' is not associated with appreciable new synthesis of lung parenchymal elastin. The present study provides the first tissue-specific evaluation of turnover of an extracellular matrix component in humans and underscores the potential importance of elastin for maintenance of normal lung structure. Most importantly, the present work provides a foundation for strategies to directly evaluate extracellular matrix injury and repair in diseases of lung (especially pulmonary emphysema), vascular tissue, and skin.

  8. Risk of chronic myeloid and acute leukemia mortality after exposure to ionizing radiation among workers at four U.S. nuclear weapons facilities and a nuclear naval shipyard.

    PubMed

    Schubauer-Berigan, Mary K; Daniels, Robert D; Fleming, Donald A; Markey, Andrea M; Couch, James R; Ahrenholz, Steven H; Burphy, Jenneh S; Anderson, Jeri L; Tseng, Chih-Yu

    2007-02-01

    A nested case-control study was conducted among workers at five U.S. nuclear facilities to evaluate leukemia mortality risk (excluding chronic lymphocytic) from ionizing radiation using worksite doses and adjusting for potential confounding. Conditional logistic regression was used to estimate the relative risk (RR) of exposed workers and the excess relative risk (ERR) per unit of radiation among 206 cases and 823 age-matched controls. Adjusting for sex and benzene, the RR of leukemia for workers receiving more than 10 mSv was higher compared to those receiving lower or no dose; however, the risk increase was attenuated in the highest dose group. The ERR per 10 mSv was 1.44% (95% CI: < -1.03%, 7.59%) but was higher for workers born after 1921 compared to workers born earlier or when excluding leukemias of uncertain type. Excluding the 7% who were high-dose workers (> 100 mSv), the sex- and benzene-adjusted ERR per 10 mSv was 6.82% (95% CI: -2.87%, 24.1%). The results suggest that risks among these nuclear workers are comparable to those observed in high-dose populations, although no evidence was observed of a positive quadratic dose-response term in this study. This large study is among the first to jointly evaluate benzene and ionizing radiation risk.

  9. A resolution to express the sense of the Senate regarding the importance of preventing the Government of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

    THOMAS, 112th Congress

    Sen. Graham, Lindsey [R-SC

    2012-02-16

    02/16/2012 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (text of measure as introduced: CR S858) (All Actions) Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

  10. Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Robock, A.

    2011-12-01

    A nuclear war between Russia and the United States could still produce nuclear winter, even using the reduced arsenals of about 4000 total nuclear weapons that will result by 2017 in response to the New START treaty. A nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country using 50 Hiroshima-sized atom bombs as airbursts on urban areas, could produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history. This scenario, using much less than 1% of the explosive power of the current global nuclear arsenal, would produce so much smoke from the resulting fires that it would plunge the planet to temperatures colder than those of the Little Ice Age of the 16th to 19th centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Crop model studies of agriculture in the U.S. and China show massive crop losses, even for this regional nuclear war scenario. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion with enhanced ultraviolet radiation reaching the surface. These surprising conclusions are the result of recent research (see URL) by a team of scientists including those who produced the pioneering work on nuclear winter in the 1980s, using the NASA GISS ModelE and NCAR WACCM GCMs. The soot is self-lofted into the stratosphere, and the effects of regional and global nuclear war would last for more than a decade, much longer than previously thought. Nuclear proliferation continues, with nine nuclear states now, and more working to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. The continued environmental threat of the use of even a small number of nuclear weapons must be considered in nuclear policy deliberations in Russia, the U.S., and the rest of the world.

  11. Mortality among military participants at the 1957 PLUMBBOB nuclear weapons test series and from leukemia among participants at the SMOKY test.

    PubMed

    Caldwell, Glyn G; Zack, Matthew M; Mumma, Michael T; Falk, Henry; Heath, Clark W; Till, John E; Chen, Heidi; Boice, John D

    2016-09-01

    Health effects following low doses of ionizing radiation are uncertain. Military veterans at the Nevada test site (NTS) during the SMOKY atmospheric nuclear weapons test in 1957 were reported to be at increased risk for leukemia in 1979, but this increase was not evaluated with respect to radiation dose. The SMOKY test was one of 30 tests in 1957 within the PLUMBBOB test series. These early studies led to public laws where atomic veterans could qualify for compensation for presumptive radiogenic diseases. A retrospective cohort study was conducted of 12219 veterans at the PLUMBBOB test series, including 3020 at the SMOKY nuclear test. Mortality follow-up was through 2010 and observed causes of death were compared with expected causes based on general population rates. Radiation dose to red bone marrow was based on individual dose reconstructions, and Cox proportional hazards models were used to evaluate dose response for all leukemias other than chronic lymphocytic leukemia (non-CLL leukemia). Vital status was determined for 95.3% of the 12 219 veterans. The dose to red bone marrow was low (mean 3.2 mGy, maximum 500 mGy). Military participants at the PLUMBBOB nuclear test series remained relatively healthy after 53 years and died at a lower rate than the general population. In contrast, and in comparison with national rates, the SMOKY participants showed significant increases in all causes of death, respiratory cancer, leukemia, nephritis and nephrosis, and accidents, possibly related in part to lifestyle factors common to enlisted men who made up 81% of the SMOKY cohort. Compared with national rates, a statistically significant excess of non-CLL leukemia was observed among SMOKY participants (Standardized Mortality Ratio  =  1.89, 95% 1.24-2.75, n  =  27) but not among PLUMBBOB participants after excluding SMOKY (SMR  =  0.87, 95% 0.64-1.51, n  =  47). Leukemia risk, initially reported to be significantly increased among SMOKY

  12. Radiological Weapons Control: A Soviet and US Perspective. Occasional Paper 29.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Issraelyan, Victor L.; Flowerree, Charles C.

    Two international diplomats from the Soviet Union and the United States focus on the need for a treaty to ban the use of radiological weapons. Radiological weapons are those based on the natural decay of nuclear material such as waste from military or civilian nuclear reactors. Such devices include both weapons and equipment, other than a nuclear…

  13. ACUTE AND CHRONIC INTAKES OF FALLOUT RADIONUCLIDES BY MARSHALLESE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AT BIKINI AND ENEWETAK AND RELATED INTERNAL RADIATION DOSES

    PubMed Central

    Simon, Steven L.; Bouville, André; Melo, Dunstana; Beck, Harold L.; Weinstock, Robert M.

    2014-01-01

    Annual internal radiation doses resulting from both acute and chronic intakes of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in fallout from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak from 1946 through 1958 have been estimated for the residents living on all atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Internal radiation absorbed doses to the tissues most at risk to cancer induction (red bone marrow, thyroid, stomach, and colon) have been estimated for representative persons of all population communities for all birth years from 1929 through 1968, and for all years of exposure from 1948 through 1970. The acute intake estimates rely on a model using, as its basis, historical urine bioassay data, for members of the Rongelap Island and Ailinginae communities as well as for Rongerik residents. The model also utilizes fallout times of arrival and radionuclide deposition densities estimated for all tests and all atolls. Acute intakes of 63 radionuclides were estimated for the populations of the 20 inhabited atolls and for the communities that were relocated during the testing years for reasons of safety and decontamination. The model used for chronic intake estimates is based on reported whole-body, urine, and blood counting data for residents of Utrik and Rongelap. Dose conversion coefficients relating intake to organ absorbed dose were developed using internationally accepted models but specifically tailored for intakes of particulate fallout by consideration of literature-based evidence to choose the most appropriate alimentary tract absorption fraction (f1) values. Dose estimates were much higher for the thyroid gland than for red marrow, stomach wall, or colon. The highest thyroid doses to adults were about 7,600 mGy for the people exposed on Rongelap; thyroid doses to adults were much lower, by a factor of 100 or more, for the people exposed on the populated atolls of Kwajalein and Majuro. The estimates of radionuclide intake and

  14. The transient distributions of nuclear weapon-generated tritium and its decay product 3 He in the Mediterranean Sea, 1952-2011, and their oceanographic potential

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Roether, W.; Jean-Baptiste, P.; Fourré, E.; Sültenfuß, J.

    2013-10-01

    We present a comprehensive account of tritium and 3He in the Mediterranean Sea since the appearance of the tritium generated by the atmospheric nuclear-weapon testing in the 1950s and early 1960s, based on essentially all available observations. Tritium in surface waters rose to 20-30 TU in 1964 (TU = 1018 × [3H]/H]), a factor of about 100 above the natural level, and thereafter declined 30-fold up to 2011. The decline was largely due to radioactive tritium decay, which produced significant amounts of its stable daughter 3He. We present the scheme by which we separate the tritiugenic part of 3He and the part due to release from the sea floor (terrigenic part). We show that the tritiugenic component can be quantified throughout the Mediterranean waters, typically to a ± 0.15 TU equivalent, mostly because the terrigenic part is low in 3He. This fact makes the Mediterranean unique in offering a potential for the use of tritiugenic 3He as a tracer. The transient distributions of the two tracers are illustrated by a number of sections spanning the entire sea and relevant features of their distributions are noted. By 2011, the 3He concentrations in the top few hundred metres had become low, in response to the decreasing tritium concentrations combined with a flushing out by the general westward drift of these waters. Tritium-3He ages in Levantine Intermediate Water (LIW) were obtained repeated in time at different locations, defining transit times from the LIW source region east of Rhodes. The ages show an upward trend with the time elapsed since the surface-water tritium maximum, which arises because the repeated observations represent increasingly slower moving parts of the full transit time spectrum of LIW. The transit time dispersion revealed by this new application of tritium-3He dating is considerable. We find mean transit times of 12 ± 2 yr up to the Strait of Sicily, 18 ± 3 yr up to the Tyrrhenian Sea, and 22 ± 4 yr up into the Western Mediterranean

  15. The transient distributions of nuclear weapon-generated tritium and its decay product 3He in the Mediterranean Sea, 1952-2011, and their oceanographic potential

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Roether, W.; Jean-Baptiste, P.; Fourré, E.; Sültenfuß, J.

    2013-04-01

    We present a comprehensive account of tritium and 3He in the Mediterranean Sea since the appearance of the tritium generated by the atmospheric nuclear-weapon testing in the 1950's and early 1960's, based on essentially all available observations. Tritium in surface waters rose to 20-30 TU in 1964 (TU = 1018 · [3H]/[H]), a factor of about 100 above the natural level, and thereafter declined 30-fold up to 2011. The decline was largely due to radioactive tritium decay, which produced significant amounts of its stable daughter 3He. We present the scheme by which we separate the tritiugenic part of 3He and the part due to release from the sea floor (terrigenic part). We show that the tritiugenic component can be quantified throughout the Mediterranean waters, typically to a ±0.15 TU equivalent, mostly because the terrigenic part is low in 3He. This fact makes the Mediterranean unique in offering a potential for the use of tritiugenic 3He as a tracer. The transient distributions of the two tracers are illustrated by a number of sections spanning the entire sea and relevant features of their distributions are noted. By 2011, the 3He concentrations in the top few hundred meters had become low, in response to the decreasing tritium concentrations combined with a flushing out by the general westward drift of these waters. Tritium-3He ages in Levantine Intermediate Water (LIW) were obtained repeated in time at different locations, defining transit times from the LIW source region east of Rhodes. The ages show an upward trend with the time elapsed since the surface-water tritium maximum, which arises because the repeated observations represent increasingly slower moving parts of the full transit time spectrum of LIW. The transit time dispersion found by this new application of tritium-3He dating is considerable. We find mean transit times of 12 ± 2 yr up to the Strait of Sicily, 18 ± 3 yr up to the Tyrrhenian Sea, and 22 ± 4 yr up into the Western Mediterranean. We

  16. Acute and chronic intakes of fallout radionuclides by Marshallese from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak and related internal radiation doses.

    PubMed

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André; Melo, Dunstana; Beck, Harold L; Weinstock, Robert M

    2010-08-01

    Annual internal radiation doses resulting from both acute and chronic intakes of all important dose-contributing radionuclides occurring in fallout from nuclear weapons testing at Bikini and Enewetak from 1946 through 1958 have been estimated for the residents living on all atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Internal radiation absorbed doses to the tissues most at risk to cancer induction (red bone marrow, thyroid, stomach, and colon) have been estimated for representative persons of all population communities for all birth years from 1929 through 1968, and for all years of exposure from 1948 through 1970. The acute intake estimates rely on a model using, as its basis, historical urine bioassay data, for members of the Rongelap Island and Ailinginae communities as well as for Rongerik residents. The model also utilizes fallout times of arrival and radionuclide deposition densities estimated for all tests and all atolls. Acute intakes of 63 radionuclides were estimated for the populations of the 20 inhabited atolls and for the communities that were relocated during the testing years for reasons of safety and decontamination. The model used for chronic intake estimates is based on reported whole-body, urine, and blood counting data for residents of Utrik and Rongelap. Dose conversion coefficients relating intake to organ absorbed dose were developed using internationally accepted models but specifically tailored for intakes of particulate fallout by consideration of literature-based evidence to choose the most appropriate alimentary tract absorption fraction (f1) values. Dose estimates were much higher for the thyroid gland than for red marrow, stomach wall, or colon. The highest thyroid doses to adults were about 7,600 mGy for the people exposed on Rongelap; thyroid doses to adults were much lower, by a factor of 100 or more, for the people exposed on the populated atolls of Kwajalein and Majuro. The estimates of radionuclide intake and

  17. Strategies for denaturing the weapons-grade plutonium stockpile

    SciTech Connect

    Buckner, M.R.; Parks, P.B.

    1992-10-01

    In the next few years, approximately 50 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 150 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) may be removed from nuclear weapons in the US and declared excess. These materials represent a significant energy resource that could substantially contribute to our national energy requirements. HEU can be used as fuel in naval reactors, or diluted with depleted uranium for use as fuel in commercial reactors. This paper proposes to use the weapons-grade plutonium as fuel in light water reactors. The first such reactor would demonstrate the dual objectives of producing electrical power and denaturing the plutonium to prevent use in nuclear weapons.

  18. Testing weapons in space

    SciTech Connect

    Carter, A.B.

    1989-07-01

    The Antiballistic-Missile Treaty seems to forbid the testing of ABM weapons in space, but the US has pushed for a broad interpretation of the language. Would a more permissive regime really serve US interests This paper reviews the rationale of the treaty's provisions to help answer this question. Four modes of testing a space weapon are treated differently by the ABM treaty: (1) an orbiting weapon intercepts a ballistic weapon is flight; (2) intercepting weapon is launched on a suborbital flight; (3) both weapon and target are placed in space; and (4) orbiting weapon is aimed at an aircraft in flight or a target on the ground. Three approaches to negotiating an agreement to limit testing weapons in space are discussed. They differ in the strictness of the limits.

  19. AS-IS (ACTIVE SAFING AND ISOLATION SYSTEM): A Satellite-Based Remote Continuing Authorization Concept with Application to Control of Naval Strategic Nuclear Missiles and Tactical Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1992-06-01

    V. SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS .......................... 33 References ..................................................... 35 Appendixes A. The...without any direct physical access, and alter or reprogram their functionality. Inter-Satellite Links AS-IS Comma ASIS Downfinks -MOM ENABLED Weapon...encrypted NCA signal at breakwater, and react accordingly. When the NCA transmission directs the missile into its ’DISABLE’ state, the launched SLBM

  20. Politics and Didactics of Peace Education: "Securing Peace in the Nuclear Age--The Case of the Neutron Weapon". A Course for Political Instruction in Schools in Hessen.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Krell, Gert

    1980-01-01

    Describes a course developed for the public schools of Hessen, Germany, through the cooperative efforts of army officers, peace researchers, and educators. Information is presented on goals and contents of peace education as a part of political education, learning goals, course sequence, and content related to the neutron weapons controversy. (DB)

  1. Nuclear Proliferation: A Global Nuclear Strategy

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-03-30

    thinking about nuclear weapons as a “ Wild Card ” in this case. Finally, just as North Korea is using nuclear weapons as a “bargaining chip,” we...definite disadvantage for non-nuclear nations not to have a nuclear” Wild Card ”. So some misguided Japanese politicians are attracted to the “ Wild Card ” advantage

  2. 48 CFR 212.270 - Major weapon systems as commercial items.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Major weapon systems as... Requirements for the Acquisition of Commercial Items 212.270 Major weapon systems as commercial items. The DoD policy for acquiring major weapon systems as commercial items is in Subpart 234.70....

  3. 48 CFR 212.270 - Major weapon systems as commercial items.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Major weapon systems as... Requirements for the Acquisition of Commercial Items 212.270 Major weapon systems as commercial items. The DoD policy for acquiring major weapon systems as commercial items is in Subpart 234.70....

  4. 48 CFR 212.270 - Major weapon systems as commercial items.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Major weapon systems as... Requirements for the Acquisition of Commercial Items 212.270 Major weapon systems as commercial items. The DoD policy for acquiring major weapon systems as commercial items is in Subpart 234.70....

  5. 48 CFR 212.270 - Major weapon systems as commercial items.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Major weapon systems as... Requirements for the Acquisition of Commercial Items 212.270 Major weapon systems as commercial items. The DoD policy for acquiring major weapon systems as commercial items is in Subpart 234.70....

  6. 48 CFR 212.270 - Major weapon systems as commercial items.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Major weapon systems as... Requirements for the Acquisition of Commercial Items 212.270 Major weapon systems as commercial items. The DoD policy for acquiring major weapon systems as commercial items is in Subpart 234.70....

  7. 78 FR 67289 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-12

    ... Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President issued Executive Order 13094 amending...

  8. Recovery of weapon plutonium as feed material for reactor fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Armantrout, G.A.; Bronson, M.A.; Choi, Jor-Shan

    1994-03-16

    This report presents preliminary considerations for recovering and converting weapon plutonium from various US weapon forms into feed material for fabrication of reactor fuel elements. An ongoing DOE study addresses the disposition of excess weapon plutonium through its use as fuel for nuclear power reactors and subsequent disposal as spent fuel. The spent fuel would have characteristics similar to those of commercial power spent fuel and could be similarly disposed of in a geologic repository.

  9. Human metabolism and ecological transfer of radioactive caesium: Comparative studies of Chernobyl debris and nuclear weapons fallout, in Southern Sweden and in Bryansk, Russia

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Raaf, Christopher Leopold

    The whole-body content of radiocaesium was measured in a South-Swedish urban group of people residing in the city of Lund (55.7°N, 13.2°E) between 1960 and 1994. The results from the survey have been analysed in order to estimate the ecological half-time, Teff,eco, of fallout radiocaesium and the aggregate transfer from ground deposition to man in the region. After 1987, the biological half-times, Ts, of 137Cs and 40K in man were also determined in the reference group through whole-body content measurements in combination with 24-hour urine sampling. Relationships between 24-hour urinary excretion and body burden of 137Cs in the group together with data from the literature were then applied to urine samples collected in 1994 and 1995 from adult subjects living in the highly contaminated region of Bryansk, Russia, in order to estimate their average body burden of 137Cs. The equivalent biological half-time for 137Cs in females of the Lund reference group was, on average (+/-1 WSE), 66 +/- 3 d, which agrees with other findings, whereas the value for the males, 81 +/- 4 d, was, on average, significantly lower than what is found in the literature. This is partly explained by the elevated mean age and relatively low mean body muscle mass of the males investigated in the group during the post-Chernobyl study period. The effective ecological half-time for 137Cs from Chernobyl was found to be 1.8 +/- 0.2 y. The aggregate transfer of 137Cs from deposition to mean activity concentration in man was estimated to be 1.7 Bq kg-1/kBq m-2. These vales may be compared with an effective ecological half-time of 1.3 years found in the reference group in the 1960s, and an aggregate transfer factor of 9.8 Bq kg-1/kBq m-2. The average committed effective dose from ingested 137Cs Chernobyl fallout in the study group was estimated to be 0.02 mSv and from the nuclear weapons fallout to 0.20 mSv. The estimates of whole-body content of 137Cs in the Russian subjects obtained through

  10. Nuclear war: Opposing viewpoints

    SciTech Connect

    Szumski, B.

    1985-01-01

    This book presents opposing viewpoints on nuclear war. Topics discussed include: how nuclear would begin; would humanity survive; would civil defense work; will an arms agreement work; and can space weapons reduce the risk of nuclear war.

  11. RADIATION DOSES AND CANCER RISKS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS ASSOCIATED WITH EXPOSURE TO RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT FROM BIKINI AND ENEWETAK NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS: SUMMARY

    PubMed Central

    Simon, Steven L.; Bouville, André; Land, Charles E.; Beck, Harold L.

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls during 1946–1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence, and the related cancer risks. Detailed methods and results are presented in a series of companion papers in this volume. From our analysis, we concluded that 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in measurable fallout deposition on one or more of the inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands. In this work, we estimated deposition densities (kBq m−2) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides at each of the 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Quantitative deposition estimates were made for 63 radionuclides from each test at each atoll. Those estimates along with reported measurements of exposure rates at various times after fallout were used to estimate radiation absorbed doses to the red bone marrow, thyroid gland, stomach wall, and colon wall of atoll residents from both external and internal exposure. Annual doses were estimated for six age groups ranging from newborns to adults. We found that the total deposition of 137Cs, external dose, internal organ doses, and cancer risks followed the same geographic pattern with the large population of the southern atolls receiving the lowest doses. Permanent residents of the southern atolls who were of adult age at the beginning of the testing period received external doses ranging from 5 to 12 mGy on average; the external doses to adults at the mid-latitude atolls ranged from 22 to 59 mGy on average, while the residents of the northern atolls received external doses in the hundreds to over 1,000 mGy. Internal doses varied significantly by age at exposure, location, and organ. Except

  12. Radiation doses and cancer risks in the Marshall Islands associated with exposure to radioactive fallout from Bikini and Enewetak nuclear weapons tests: summary.

    PubMed

    Simon, Steven L; Bouville, André; Land, Charles E; Beck, Harold L

    2010-08-01

    Nuclear weapons testing conducted at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls during 1946-1958 resulted in exposures of the resident population of the present-day Republic of the Marshall Islands to radioactive fallout. This paper summarizes the results of a thorough and systematic reconstruction of radiation doses to that population, by year, age at exposure, and atoll of residence, and the related cancer risks. Detailed methods and results are presented in a series of companion papers in this volume. From our analysis, we concluded that 20 of the 66 nuclear tests conducted in or near the Marshall Islands resulted in measurable fallout deposition on one or more of the inhabited atolls of the Marshall Islands. In this work, we estimated deposition densities (kBq m(-2)) of all important dose-contributing radionuclides at each of the 32 atolls and separate reef islands of the Marshall Islands. Quantitative deposition estimates were made for 63 radionuclides from each test at each atoll. Those estimates along with reported measurements of exposure rates at various times after fallout were used to estimate radiation absorbed doses to the red bone marrow, thyroid gland, stomach wall, and colon wall of atoll residents from both external and internal exposure. Annual doses were estimated for six age groups ranging from newborns to adults. We found that the total deposition of 137Cs, external dose, internal organ doses, and cancer risks followed the same geographic pattern with the large population of the southern atolls receiving the lowest doses. Permanent residents of the southern atolls who were of adult age at the beginning of the testing period received external doses ranging from 5 to 12 mGy on average; the external doses to adults at the mid-latitude atolls ranged from 22 to 59 mGy on average, while the residents of the northern atolls received external doses in the hundreds to over 1,000 mGy. Internal doses varied significantly by age at exposure, location, and organ. Except

  13. Transcriptomic evidence that longevity of acquired plastids in the photosynthetic slugs Elysia timida and Plakobranchus ocellatus does not entail lateral transfer of algal nuclear genes.

    PubMed

    Wägele, Heike; Deusch, Oliver; Händeler, Katharina; Martin, Rainer; Schmitt, Valerie; Christa, Gregor; Pinzger, Britta; Gould, Sven B; Dagan, Tal; Klussmann-Kolb, Annette; Martin, William

    2011-01-01

    Sacoglossan sea slugs are unique in the animal kingdom in that they sequester and maintain active plastids that they acquire from the siphonaceous algae upon which they feed, making the animals photosynthetic. Although most sacoglossan species digest their freshly ingested plastids within hours, four species from the family Plakobranchidae retain their stolen plastids (kleptoplasts) in a photosynthetically active state on timescales of weeks to months. The molecular basis of plastid maintenance within the cytosol of digestive gland cells in these photosynthetic metazoans is yet unknown but is widely thought to involve gene transfer from the algal food source to the slugs based upon previous investigations of single genes. Indeed, normal plastid development requires hundreds of nuclear-encoded proteins, with protein turnover in photosystem II in particular known to be rapid under various conditions. Moreover, only algal plastids, not the algal nuclei, are sequestered by the animals during feeding. If algal nuclear genes are transferred to the animal either during feeding or in the germ line, and if they are expressed, then they should be readily detectable with deep-sequencing methods. We have sequenced expressed mRNAs from actively photosynthesizing, starved individuals of two photosynthetic sea slug species, Plakobranchus ocellatus Van Hasselt, 1824 and Elysia timida Risso, 1818. We find that nuclear-encoded, algal-derived genes specific to photosynthetic function are expressed neither in P. ocellatus nor in E. timida. Despite their dramatic plastid longevity, these photosynthetic sacoglossan slugs do not express genes acquired from algal nuclei in order to maintain plastid function.

  14. Proliferation Persuasion. Coercive Bargaining with Nuclear Technology

    SciTech Connect

    Volpe, Tristan A.

    2015-08-31

    Why do states wait for prolonged periods of time with the technical capacity to produce nuclear weapons? Only a handful of countries have ever acquired the sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology needed to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Yet the enduring trend over the last five decades is for these states to delay or forgo exercising the nuclear weapons option provided by uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. I show that states pause at this threshold stage because they use nuclear technology to bargain for concessions from both allies and adversaries. But when does nuclear latency offer bargaining benefits? My central argument is that challengers must surmount a dilemma to make coercive diplomacy work: the more they threaten to proliferate, the harder it becomes to reassure others that compliance will be rewarded with nuclear restraint. I identify a range of mechanisms able to solve this credibility problem, from arms control over breakout capacity to third party mediation and confidence building measures. Since each step towards the bomb raises the costs of implementing these policies, a state hits a sweet spot when it first acquires enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR) technology. Subsequent increases in proliferation capability generate diminishing returns at the bargaining table for two reasons: the state must go to greater lengths to make a credible nonproliferation promise, and nuclear programs exhibit considerable path dependency as they mature over time. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about power in world politics, less nuclear latency thereby yields more coercive threat advantages. I marshal new primary source evidence from archives and interviews to identify episodes in the historical record when states made clear decisions to use ENR technology as a bargaining chip, and employ this theory of proliferation persuasion to explain how Japan, North Korea, and Iran succeeded and failed to barter concessions from the

  15. Systems engineering analysis of kinetic energy weapon concepts

    SciTech Connect

    Senglaub, M.

    1996-06-01

    This study examines, from a systems engineering design perspective, the potential of kinetic energy weapons being used in the role of a conventional strategic weapon. Within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, strategic weapon experience falls predominantly in the nuclear weapons arena. The techniques developed over the years may not be the most suitable methodologies for use in a new design/development arena. For this reason a more fundamental approach was pursued with the objective of developing an information base from which design decisions might be made concerning the conventional strategic weapon system concepts. The study examined (1) a number of generic missions, (2) the effects of a number of damage mechanisms from a physics perspective, (3) measures of effectiveness (MOE`s), and (4) a design envelope for kinetic energy weapon concepts. With the base of information a cut at developing a set of high-level system requirements was made, and a number of concepts were assessed against these requirements.

  16. Nuclear Terrorism.

    SciTech Connect

    Hecker, Siegfried S.

    2001-01-01

    As pointed out by several speakers, the level of violence and destruction in terrorist attacks has increased significantly during the past decade. Fortunately, few have involved weapons of mass destruction, and none have achieved mass casualties. The Aum Shinrikyo release of lethal nerve agent, sarin, in the Tokyo subway on March 20, 1995 clearly broke new ground by crossing the threshold in attempting mass casualties with chemical weapons. However, of all weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons still represent the most frightening threat to humankind. Nuclear weapons possess an enormous destructive force. The immediacy and scale of destruction are unmatched. In addition to destruction, terrorism also aims to create fear among the public and governments. Here also, nuclear weapons are unmatched. The public's fear of nuclear weapons or, for that matter, of all radioactivity is intense. To some extent, this fear arises from a sense of unlimited vulnerability. That is, radioactivity is seen as unbounded in three dimensions - distance, it is viewed as having unlimited reach; quantity, it is viewed as having deadly consequences in the smallest doses (the public is often told - incorrectly, of course - that one atom of plutonium will kill); and time, if it does not kill you immediately, then it will cause cancer decades hence.

  17. Acquiring Secure Systems Through Information Economics

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-05-01

    Introduction “For all future weapons systems that DoD will acquire or procure, DoD will mandate specific cybersecurity standards for weapons...systems to meet. Acquisition and procurement policy and practice will be updated to promote effective cybersecurity throughout a system’s life cycle...physical damage or injury Motivating Contractor Efforts - Contractors have different priorities than the DOD when it comes to cybersecurity - Classic

  18. A Tat-grafted anti-nucleic acid antibody acquires nuclear-localization property and a preference for TAR RNA

    SciTech Connect

    Jeong, Jong-Geun; Kim, Dong-Sik; Kim, Yong-Sung; Kwon, Myung-Hee

    2011-03-18

    Highlights: {yields} We generate '{sub H3}Tat-3D8' by grafting Tat{sub 48-60} peptide to VH CDR of 3D8 scFv antibody. {yields} {sub H3}Tat-3D8 antibody retains nucleic acid binding and hydrolyzing activities. {yields} {sub H3}Tat-3D8 acquires a preference for TAR RNA structure. {yields} Properties of Tat{sub 48-60} is transferred to an antibody via Tat-grafting into a CDR. -- Abstract: The 3D8 single chain variable fragment (3D8 scFv) is an anti-nucleic acid antibody that can hydrolyze nucleic acids and enter the cytosol of cells without reaching the nucleus. The Tat peptide, derived from the basic region of the HIV-1 Tat protein, translocates to cell nuclei and has TAR RNA binding activity. In this study, we generated a Tat-grafted antibody ({sub H3}Tat-3D8) by replacing complementarity-determining region 3 (CDR3) within the VH domain of the 3D8 scFv with a Tat{sub 48-60} peptide (GRKKRRQRRRPPQ). {sub H3}Tat-3D8 retained the DNA-binding and DNA-hydrolyzing activity of the scFv, and translocated to the nuclei of HeLa cells and preferentially recognized TAR RNA. Thus, the properties associated with the Tat peptide were transferred to the antibody via Tat-grafting without loss of the intrinsic DNA-binding and hydrolyzing activities of the 3D8 scFv antibody.

  19. XPO1 inhibitor combination therapy with bortezomib or carfilzomib induces nuclear localization of IκBα and overcomes acquired proteasome inhibitor resistance in human multiple myeloma.

    PubMed

    Turner, Joel G; Kashyap, Trinayan; Dawson, Jana L; Gomez, Juan; Bauer, Alexis A; Grant, Steven; Dai, Yun; Shain, Kenneth H; Meads, Mark; Landesman, Yosef; Sullivan, Daniel M

    2016-11-29

    Acquired proteasome-inhibitor (PI) resistance is a major obstacle in the treatment of multiple myeloma (MM). We investigated whether the clinical XPO1-inhibitor selinexor, when combined with bortezomib or carfilzomib, could overcome acquired resistance in MM. PI-resistant myeloma cell lines both in vitro and in vivo and refractory myeloma patient biopsies were treated with selinexor/bortezomib or carfilzomib and assayed for apoptosis. Mechanistic studies included NFκB pathway protein expression assays, immunofluorescence microscopy, ImageStream flow-cytometry, and proximity-ligation assays. IκBα knockdown and NFκB activity were measured in selinexor/bortezomib-treated MM cells. We found that selinexor restored sensitivity of PI-resistant MM to bortezomib and carfilzomib. Selinexor/bortezomib treatment inhibited PI-resistant MM tumor growth and increased survival in mice. Myeloma cells from PI-refractory MM patients were sensitized by selinexor to bortezomib and carfilzomib without affecting non-myeloma cells. Immunofluorescence microscopy, Western blot, and ImageStream analyses of MM cells showed increases in total and nuclear IκBα by selinexor/bortezomib. Proximity ligation found increased IκBα-NFκB complexes in treated MM cells. IκBα knockdown abrogated selinexor/bortezomib-induced cytotoxicity in MM cells. Selinexor/bortezomib treatment decreased NFκB transcriptional activity. Selinexor, when used with bortezomib or carfilzomib, has the potential to overcome PI drug resistance in MM. Sensitization may be due to inactivation of the NFκB pathway by IκBα.

  20. Federal Guidance Report No. 4: Estimates and Evaluation of Fallout in the United States from Nuclear Weapons Testing Conducted Through 1962

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    This Federal Radiation Council report includes a full study and analysis of fallout expected in 1963 from nuclear testing that occurred in the past. This report covers fallout expected from Soviet and United States tests through 1962.

  1. Dealing with a Nuclear Iran: Applying Historical Lessons in Deterrence

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-02-15

    Israel is widely considered to have acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1960’ s . Although never acknowledged, the “overall consensus is that Israel...Harvard University Press, 1960), 3-20. 4 Ibid, 6. 5 Ibid, 187. 6 Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour, Perfect Deterrence (Cambridge, UK...11 December 2011). Zagare , Frank C., and D. Marc Kilgour. Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

  2. Vertical nuclear proliferation.

    PubMed

    Sidel, Victor W

    2007-01-01

    All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

  3. Nuclear disarmament verification

    SciTech Connect

    DeVolpi, A.

    1993-12-31

    Arms control treaties, unilateral actions, and cooperative activities -- reflecting the defusing of East-West tensions -- are causing nuclear weapons to be disarmed and dismantled worldwide. In order to provide for future reductions and to build confidence in the permanency of this disarmament, verification procedures and technologies would play an important role. This paper outlines arms-control objectives, treaty organization, and actions that could be undertaken. For the purposes of this Workshop on Verification, nuclear disarmament has been divided into five topical subareas: Converting nuclear-weapons production complexes, Eliminating and monitoring nuclear-weapons delivery systems, Disabling and destroying nuclear warheads, Demilitarizing or non-military utilization of special nuclear materials, and Inhibiting nuclear arms in non-nuclear-weapons states. This paper concludes with an overview of potential methods for verification.

  4. XPO1 inhibitor combination therapy with bortezomib or carfilzomib induces nuclear localization of IκBα and overcomes acquired proteasome inhibitor resistance in human multiple myeloma

    PubMed Central

    Turner, Joel G.; Kashyap, Trinayan; Dawson, Jana L.; Gomez, Juan; Bauer, Alexis A.; Grant, Steven; Dai, Yun; Shain, Kenneth H.; Meads, Mark; Landesman, Yosef; Sullivan, Daniel M.

    2016-01-01

    Acquired proteasome-inhibitor (PI) resistance is a major obstacle in the treatment of multiple myeloma (MM). We investigated whether the clinical XPO1-inhibitor selinexor, when combined with bortezomib or carfilzomib, could overcome acquired resistance in MM. PI-resistant myeloma cell lines both in vitro and in vivo and refractory myeloma patient biopsies were treated with selinexor/bortezomib or carfilzomib and assayed for apoptosis. Mechanistic studies included NFκB pathway protein expression assays, immunofluorescence microscopy, ImageStream flow-cytometry, and proximity-ligation assays. IκBα knockdown and NFκB activity were measured in selinexor/bortezomib-treated MM cells. We found that selinexor restored sensitivity of PI-resistant MM to bortezomib and carfilzomib. Selinexor/bortezomib treatment inhibited PI-resistant MM tumor growth and increased survival in mice. Myeloma cells from PI-refractory MM patients were sensitized by selinexor to bortezomib and carfilzomib without affecting non-myeloma cells. Immunofluorescence microscopy, Western blot, and ImageStream analyses of MM cells showed increases in total and nuclear IκBα by selinexor/bortezomib. Proximity ligation found increased IκBα-NFκB complexes in treated MM cells. IκBα knockdown abrogated selinexor/bortezomib-induced cytotoxicity in MM cells. Selinexor/bortezomib treatment decreased NFκB transcriptional activity. Selinexor, when used with bortezomib or carfilzomib, has the potential to overcome PI drug resistance in MM. Sensitization may be due to inactivation of the NFκB pathway by IκBα. PMID:27806331

  5. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  6. Proceedings of Conference on Applications of Chemistry to Nuclear Weapons Effects (2nd). Held on 12-14 September 1972. Abstracts of Papers

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1974-12-23

    by the Defense Nuclear Agency C (DNA) -- formerly the Defense Atomic Support Agency--in cooperation with the N Air Force Cambridge Research...principal reactions in ionized air containing water vapor -------- 77 Recent flowing afterglow results on ionospheric ion-neutral reactions...Measurement of NO concentrations in excited air fromy-band emission ---------------------- 101 (* ) Applications of advanced photometric and image

  7. JPRS report: Nuclear developments, [October 6, 1989

    SciTech Connect

    1989-10-06

    Partial contents of this report include: Nuclear Weapons; Nuclear Development; Nuclear Power Plant; Uranium; Missiles; Space Firm Protested; Satellite; Rocket Launching; Nuclear Submarine; Environmental; Radioactivity; Radiation Accident; and Tritium Sparks.

  8. Atypical Cell Populations Associated with Acquired Resistance to Cytostatics and Cancer Stem Cell Features: The Role of Mitochondria in Nuclear Encapsulation

    PubMed Central

    Gustmann, Sebastian; Jastrow, Holger; Acikelli, Ali Haydar; Dammann, Philip; Klein, Jacqueline; Dembinski, Ulrike; Bardenheuer, Walter; Malak, Sascha; Araúzo-Bravo, Marcos J.; Schultheis, Beate; Aldinger, Constanze; Strumberg, Dirk

    2014-01-01

    Until recently, acquired resistance to cytostatics had mostly been attributed to biochemical mechanisms such as decreased intake and/or increased efflux of therapeutics, enhanced DNA repair, and altered activity or deregulation of target proteins. Although these mechanisms have been widely investigated, little is known about membrane barriers responsible for the chemical imperviousness of cell compartments and cellular segregation in cytostatic-treated tumors. In highly heterogeneous cross-resistant and radiorefractory cell populations selected by exposure to anticancer agents, we found a number of atypical recurrent cell types in (1) tumor cell cultures of different embryonic origins, (2) mouse xenografts, and (3) paraffin sections from patient tumors. Alongside morphologic peculiarities, these populations presented cancer stem cell markers, aberrant signaling pathways, and a set of deregulated miRNAs known to confer both stem-cell phenotypes and highly aggressive tumor behavior. The first type, named spiral cells, is marked by a spiral arrangement of nuclei. The second type, monastery cells, is characterized by prominent walls inside which daughter cells can be seen maturing amid a rich mitochondrial environment. The third type, called pregnant cells, is a giant cell with a syncytium-like morphology, a main nucleus, and many endoreplicative functional progeny cells. A rare fourth cell type identified in leukemia was christened shepherd cells, as it was always associated with clusters of smaller cells. Furthermore, a portion of resistant tumor cells displayed nuclear encapsulation via mitochondrial aggregation in the nuclear perimeter in response to cytostatic insults, probably conferring imperviousness to drugs and long periods of dormancy until nuclear eclosion takes place. This phenomenon was correlated with an increase in both intracellular and intercellular mitochondrial traffic as well as with the uptake of free extracellular mitochondria. All these cellular

  9. Atypical cell populations associated with acquired resistance to cytostatics and cancer stem cell features: the role of mitochondria in nuclear encapsulation.

    PubMed

    Díaz-Carballo, David; Gustmann, Sebastian; Jastrow, Holger; Acikelli, Ali Haydar; Dammann, Philip; Klein, Jacqueline; Dembinski, Ulrike; Bardenheuer, Walter; Malak, Sascha; Araúzo-Bravo, Marcos J; Schultheis, Beate; Aldinger, Constanze; Strumberg, Dirk

    2014-11-01

    Until recently, acquired resistance to cytostatics had mostly been attributed to biochemical mechanisms such as decreased intake and/or increased efflux of therapeutics, enhanced DNA repair, and altered activity or deregulation of target proteins. Although these mechanisms have been widely investigated, little is known about membrane barriers responsible for the chemical imperviousness of cell compartments and cellular segregation in cytostatic-treated tumors. In highly heterogeneous cross-resistant and radiorefractory cell populations selected by exposure to anticancer agents, we found a number of atypical recurrent cell types in (1) tumor cell cultures of different embryonic origins, (2) mouse xenografts, and (3) paraffin sections from patient tumors. Alongside morphologic peculiarities, these populations presented cancer stem cell markers, aberrant signaling pathways, and a set of deregulated miRNAs known to confer both stem-cell phenotypes and highly aggressive tumor behavior. The first type, named spiral cells, is marked by a spiral arrangement of nuclei. The second type, monastery cells, is characterized by prominent walls inside which daughter cells can be seen maturing amid a rich mitochondrial environment. The third type, called pregnant cells, is a giant cell with a syncytium-like morphology, a main nucleus, and many endoreplicative functional progeny cells. A rare fourth cell type identified in leukemia was christened shepherd cells, as it was always associated with clusters of smaller cells. Furthermore, a portion of resistant tumor cells displayed nuclear encapsulation via mitochondrial aggregation in the nuclear perimeter in response to cytostatic insults, probably conferring imperviousness to drugs and long periods of dormancy until nuclear eclosion takes place. This phenomenon was correlated with an increase in both intracellular and intercellular mitochondrial traffic as well as with the uptake of free extracellular mitochondria. All these cellular

  10. New initiatives a condition of weapons lab's vitality

    SciTech Connect

    Crawford, M.

    1994-03-28

    Directors of the nation's three nuclear weapons research laboratories say shrinking budgets and loss of staff may seriously affect defense capabilities in the coming years. To safeguard this capacity, the steady recent erosion of funding for defense-related activities must be halted, and the federal government must commit to building large new research instruments that are needed to evaluate weapons performance and conduct fundamental science research, directors of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories told the House Armed Services Committee's Military Application of Nuclear Energy Panel at a March 22 hearing. Attracting young researchers to the weapons labs takes more than money for salaries; there must be cutting-edge research opportunities that in many cases may have no direct relationship to weapons work.

  11. Big projects could threaten weapons labs` research base

    SciTech Connect

    Lawler, A.

    1996-05-24

    Every few seconds, a mushroom cloud explodes on Paul Cunningham`s Computer screen. The unsettling image is a screen saver in the office of the chief of nuclear materials and stockpile management at Los Alamos National Laboratory - and a wry reminder of the radical changes underway at the three US weapons labs. Now that the US has renounced underground nuclear testing, simulations are becoming the weapons designers chief tool for ensuring that the nuclear arsenal is reliable. The new approach to testing, stockpile stewardship, has triggered a fierce debate within the defense community. At issue is how to keep a balance between financing such new and costly stewardship projects as the $1.1 billion National Ignition Facility, which will simulate the conditions of nuclear detonation, and maintaining a critical mass of experienced weapons designers. This artical describes the debate and funding and political problems which go with it.

  12. Space Weapons: effect on strategic stability

    SciTech Connect

    Velikhov, Y.P.

    1984-05-01

    Two distinct directions in space militarizaiton, the creation of anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) and the development of space-based anti-missile systems (SBAMS), are closely meshed with the problems of strategic balance and stability, as well as with prospects for substantial nuclear arms reductions. The creation of a constant threat to satellites will impair the prospects of reaching agreements on a freeze of nuclear weapons, deep reductions, and confidence in their verification. The anti-missile program would be expensive and unreliable. There are sound reasons to believe that cheaper and more effective countermeasures are available. A cooperative space program with the Soviet Union could contribute to and expedite the solution of increasingly acute global problems such as economic development, energy, resources, and ecology, and could be a basis for successful space exploration and settlement. 2 figures.

  13. Nuclear weapons effects studies for the 5ESS switch. Volume 3. EMP (electromagnetic pulse) studies. Part 1. Testing and analysis. Final technical report, 7 January 1985-30 September 1986

    SciTech Connect

    Beauchamp, N.A.; Fuller, D.R.; Harris, J.D.; Polakos, P.A.; Spata, D.A.

    1986-09-01

    As part of its Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Mitigation Program, the National Communications System (NCS) funded ATandT to study the ability of the ATandT 5ESS(TM) Switch to withstand the potentially disabling effects of EMP from high-altitude nuclear bursts and fallout radiation from distant near-surface bursts. This volume reports the results of the assessment of the survivability and performance of a standard 5ESS Switch in a HEMP environment. A fully operational 5ESS Switch and its ancillary central-office support equipment were exposed to simulated-HEMP fields of 5 kV/m to 80 kV/m at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory test facilities. The tests (1) established the physical survivability of the switch, (2) investigated the types of upsets that occur (i.e., temporary and permanent changes in logic-circuit functioning), and (3) characterized the performance of the switch upon exposure to one or more EMP pulses as a function of incident field level and time after exposure. Performance was characterized in terms of the switch's ability to (1) hold calls set up before the EMP exposure, (2) recover automatically from EMP-induced upsets, and (3) establish new connections during and after recovery.

  14. Future Foreign Perceptions of Chemical Weapons Utility

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-10-01

    Iraq’s and Syria’s nuclear weapons programs, and the specter of such action may have precipitated Libya to abandon its program. North Korea and Iran ...declared as such. Today, only seven states have not acceded to the CWC: Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar , North Korea , Somalia, and Syria.1 Of those...seven, Syria and North Korea most evidently maintain active offensive CW programs. Of CWC state par- ties, the United States has expressed compliance

  15. US strategic nuclear forces, end of 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Norris, R.S.; Arkin, W.M.

    1997-01-01

    Quantitative data on operational nuclear weapons is tabulated and described in some detail in the article. Nuclear weapons categories reported include intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers and weapons. The total number of warheads in the U.S. arsenal is approximately 7150, slightly lower than last year`s level of almost 8000 warheads. There are 1085 launchers and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines.

  16. Countering the Nuclear Terrorist Threat

    SciTech Connect

    Vantine, H C

    2002-10-04

    The nuclear/radioactive threat to homeland security posed by terrorists can be broken into four categories. Of highest concern is the use of an improvised nuclear device (IND). An IND, as its name implies, is a nuclear explosive device. It produces nuclear yield, and this nuclear yield has catastrophic effects. An IND is the ultimate terrorist weapon, and terrorist groups are actively attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Detonation of an IND could dwarf the devastation of the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. Dealing with the aftermath of an IND would be horrific. Rescue efforts and cleanup would be hazardous and difficult. Workers would have to wear full protection suits and self-contained breathing apparatus. Because of the residual radioactivity, in certain locations they could only work short times before acquiring their ''lifetime'' dose. As with the Chernobyl event, some rescue workers might well expose themselves to lethal doses of radiation, adding to the casualty toll. Enormous volumes of contaminated debris would have to be removed and disposed. If a terrorist group decides not to pursue an actual nuclear device, it might well turn to Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) or ''dirty bombs'' as they are often called. RDDs spread radioactivity but they do not generate nuclear yield. The fabrication of an RDD requires radioactive material and a dispersal mechanism. Radioactive materials are used all over the world for medical, industrial, and research applications. Standards for safe handling and accountability of radioactive material vary around the world. Stories in the press suggest inadequate controls on radiological materials in parts of the world. The effects of an RDD vary widely, and are measured in terms of contamination area, health effects to the exposed population, and economic consequences. Even a negligible, but measurable, exposure would exploit the general public's fear of things radioactive and would have significant

  17. Nuclear weapons effects studies for the 5ESS (trademark) switch. Volume 2. EM (electromagnetic) shielding characteristics of structures. Final report, 1 July 1985-30 September 1986

    SciTech Connect

    Beauchamp, N.A.; Farber, L.; Federico, S.S.

    1986-09-01

    As part of its Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Mitigation Program, the National Communications System (NCS) funded ATandT to study the ability of the ATandT 5ESS(TM) Switch to withstand the potentially disabling effects of EMP from high-altitude nuclear bursts and fallout radiation from distant near-surface bursts. This volume documents the study to characterize the electromagnetic (EM) shielding effectiveness of the trailer used to shelter the test switch during simulated-EMP testing and of central-office buildings in which 5ESS Switches might be housed in the Public Switched Network. The results were used to estimate the attenuated fields incident upon n installed switch and its associated intra-office cabling. Because the building types examined can provide a wide range of EM shielding values, no single set of attenuation curves will suffice to characterize central-office structures.

  18. Issues in the use of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel in VVER-1000 Nuclear Reactors: Comparison of UO2 and MOX Fuels

    SciTech Connect

    Carbajo, J.J.

    2005-05-27

    The purpose of this report is to quantify the differences between mixed oxide (MOX) and low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and to assess in reasonable detail the potential impacts of MOX fuel use in VVER-1000 nuclear power plants in Russia. This report is a generic tool to assist in the identification of plant modifications that may be required to accommodate receiving, storing, handling, irradiating, and disposing of MOX fuel in VVER-1000 reactors. The report is based on information from work performed by Russian and U.S. institutions. The report quantifies each issue, and the differences between LEU and MOX fuels are described as accurately as possible, given the current sources of data.

  19. Technosocial Predictive Analytics for Illicit Nuclear Trafficking

    SciTech Connect

    Sanfilippo, Antonio P.; Butner, R. Scott; Cowell, Andrew J.; Dalton, Angela C.; Haack, Jereme N.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Riensche, Roderick M.; White, Amanda M.; Whitney, Paul D.

    2011-03-29

    Illicit nuclear trafficking networks are a national security threat. These networks can directly lead to nuclear proliferation, as state or non-state actors attempt to identify and acquire nuclear weapons-related expertise, technologies, components, and materials. The ability to characterize and anticipate the key nodes, transit routes, and exchange mechanisms associated with these networks is essential to influence, disrupt, interdict or destroy the function of the networks and their processes. The complexities inherent to the characterization and anticipation of illicit nuclear trafficking networks requires that a variety of modeling and knowledge technologies be jointly harnessed to construct an effective analytical and decision making workflow in which specific case studies can be built in reasonable time and with realistic effort. In this paper, we explore a solution to this challenge that integrates evidentiary and dynamic modeling with knowledge management and analytical gaming, and demonstrate its application to a geopolitical region at risk.

  20. Air weapon fatalities.

    PubMed Central

    Milroy, C M; Clark, J C; Carter, N; Rutty, G; Rooney, N

    1998-01-01

    AIMS: To describe characteristics of a series of people accidentally and deliberately killed by air powered weapons. METHODS: Five cases of fatal airgun injury were identified by forensic pathologists and histopathologists. The circumstances surrounding the case, radiological examination, and pathological findings are described. The weapon characteristics are also reported. RESULTS: Three of the victims were adult men, one was a 16 year old boy, and one an eight year old child. Four of the airguns were .22 air rifles, the other a .177 air rifle. Two committed suicide, one person shooting himself in the head, the other in the chest. In both cases the guns were fired at contact range. Three of the cases were classified as accidents: in two the pellet penetrated into the head and in one the chest. CONCLUSIONS: One person each year dies from an air powered weapon injury in the United Kingdom. In addition there is considerable morbidity from airgun injuries. Fatalities and injuries are most commonly accidents, but deliberately inflicted injuries occur. Airguns are dangerous weapons when inappropriately handled and should not be considered as toys. Children should not play with airguns unsupervised. Images PMID:9797730

  1. Names and Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kauffman, Charles

    1989-01-01

    Traces the theoretical significance of using names as titles for situations, and applies this analysis to the United States' intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Argues that the names given to ICBMs preserve their utility as weapons by linking them to the myths of the nineteenth-century western frontier. (MM)

  2. Comparison of doses and risks obtained from dose reconstructions for historical operations of federal facilities that supported the development, production, or testing of nuclear weapons.

    PubMed

    Reed, E W; Thiessen, K M; Hoffman, F O; Apostoaei, A I

    2003-06-01

    Five dose reconstruction projects focusing on historical public exposures from U.S. government nuclear facilities have been completed in the last 12 y (Fernald, Hanford, Nevada Test Site, Oak Ridge, Rocky Flats). Using information available in published reports, doses and excess health risks of the most serious contaminants in each study are compared for representative maximally and typically exposed individuals. For both the representative maximally exposed individual and the representative typically exposed individual, the highest excess risks of cancer incidence were from 131I released from Hanford, Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge and 222Rn released from Fernald (with central estimates for maximally exposed individuals approaching or exceeding 10(-2)); the lowest risks for both maximally and typically exposed individuals were from 239/240Pu and carbon tetrachloride released from Rocky Flats. Excess health risks to the representative maximally exposed individual were at or below 10(-40 for releases from Rocky Flats. For representative typically exposed individuals, the excess risks from releases of mixed radionuclides in the Clinch River (Oak Ridge), PCBs in East Fork Poplar Creek (Oak Ridge), and both plutonium and carbon tetrachloride released from Rocky Flats were mostly below 10(-5).

  3. Nuclear pursuits

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-05-01

    This table lists quantities of warheads (in stockpile, peak number per year, total number built, number of known test explosions), weapon development milestones (developers of the atomic bomb and hydrogen bomb, date of first operational ICBM, first nuclear-powered naval SSN in service, first MIRVed missile deployed), and testing milestones (first fission test, type of boosted fission weapon, multistage thermonuclear test, number of months from fission bomb to multistage thermonuclear bomb, etc.), and nuclear infrastructure (assembly plants, plutonium production reactors, uranium enrichment plants, etc.). Countries included in the tally are the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China.

  4. Acquired hyperpigmentations*

    PubMed Central

    Cestari, Tania Ferreira; Dantas, Lia Pinheiro; Boza, Juliana Catucci

    2014-01-01

    Cutaneous hyperpigmentations are frequent complaints, motivating around 8.5% of all dermatological consultations in our country. They can be congenital, with different patterns of inheritance, or acquired in consequence of skin problems, systemic diseases or secondary to environmental factors. The vast majority of them are linked to alterations on the pigment melanin, induced by different mechanisms. This review will focus on the major acquired hyperpigmentations associated with increased melanin, reviewing their mechanisms of action and possible preventive measures. Particularly prominent aspects of diagnosis and therapy will be emphasized, with focus on melasma, post-inflammatory hyperpigmentation, periorbital pigmentation, dermatosis papulosa nigra, phytophotodermatoses, flagellate dermatosis, erythema dyschromicum perstans, cervical poikiloderma (Poikiloderma of Civatte), acanthosis nigricans, cutaneous amyloidosis and reticulated confluent dermatitis PMID:24626644

  5. Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-03-14

    an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy , and urge others to do the same. —President...involved reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy . The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), re- leased one year later, further...re- duce the importance of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy , it may have inspired them to rely more on nuclear weapons to meet

  6. Terrorists and Nuclear Technology

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Krieger, David

    1975-01-01

    This essay explores the ways terrorist groups may gain possession of nuclear materials; the way in which they may use nuclear weapons and other nuclear technologies to their benefit; and various courses of action designed to minimize the possibilities of terrorists utilizing nuclear technology to their benefit and society's detriment. (BT)

  7. Look at nuclear artillery yield options using JANUS, a wargame simulation code

    SciTech Connect

    Andre, C.G.

    1982-06-15

    JANUS, a two-sided, interactive wargame simulation code, was used to explore how using each of several different yield options in a nuclear artillery shell might affect a tactical battlefield simulation. In a general sense, the results or outcomes of these simulations support the results or outcomes of previous studies. In these simulations the Red player knew of the anticipated nuclear capability of the Blue player. Neither side experienced a decisive win over the other, and both continued fighting and experienced losses that, under most historical circumstances, would have been termed unacceptable - that is, something else would have happened (the attack would have been called off). During play, each side had only fragmentary knowledge of the remaining resources on the other side - thus each side desired to continue fighting on the basis of known information. We found that the anticipated use of nuclear weapons by either side affects the character of a game significantly and that, if the employment of nuclear weapons is to have a decided effect on the progress and outcome of a battle, each side will have to have an adequate number of nuclear weapons. In almost all the simulations we ran using JANUS, enhanced radiation (ER) weapons were more effective than 1-kt fission weapons in imposing overall losses on Red. The typical visibility in the JANUS simulation limited each side's ability to acquire units deep into enemy territory and so the 10-kt fission weapon was not useful against enemy tanks that were not engaged in battle. (Troop safety constraints limited its use on tanks that were engaged in direct fire with the enemy).

  8. Plan for a laser weapon verification research program

    SciTech Connect

    Karr, T.J.

    1990-03-01

    Currently there is great interest in the question of how, or even whether, a treaty limiting the development and deployment of laser weapons could be verified. The concept of cooperative laser weapon verification is that each party would place monitoring stations near the other party's declared or suspect laser weapon facilities. The monitoring stations would measure the primary laser observables'' such as power or energy, either directly or by collecting laser radiation scattered from the air or the target, and would verify that the laser is operated within treaty limits. This concept is modeled along the lines of the seismic network recently activated in the USSR as a joint project of the United States Geologic Survey and the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The seismic data, gathered cooperatively, can be used by each party as it wishes, including to support verification of future nuclear test ban treaties. For laser weapon verification the monitoring stations are envisioned as ground-based, and would verify treaty limitations on ground-based laser anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and on the ground-based development of other laser weapons. They would also contribute to verification of limitations on air-, sea- and space-based laser weapons, and the technology developed for cooperative verification could also be used in national technical means of verification. 2 figs., 4 tabs.

  9. Nuclear relations in South Asia

    SciTech Connect

    Joeck, N.

    1998-12-18

    The strategic landscape of South Asia changed dramatically in 1998. With the reciprocal testing of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan emerged from the world of threshold status to an overt posture which has yet to be fully defined. Each claims the status of a nuclear weapon state, yet the contours of that status are unclear. A number of important strategic issues have been raised by these dramatic events. This paper will attempt to examine the implications of this new posture for each country and for the region. First and foremost, the decisions to test nuclear weapons are a product of each individual state making a sovereign decision about its national security needs. Both have made clear for a number of years that their attitudes toward nuclear weapons-and by default, toward nuclear nonproliferation-will not be directed by outsiders. They have rejected the global norms that oppose the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, embodied in the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and that embrace the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, captured in Article VI of that treaty. The decisions reached in New Delhi and lslamabad have been questioned by many, but the tests cannot be undone and it now falls on both countries to make further decisions about what strategies will best serve them, and what obligations they must now assume. Issues such as strategic planning, weaponization, deployment, and command and control, which heretofore were relegated to the back burner, may no longer be deferred.

  10. Concept of Operations for Nuclear Warhead Embedded Sensors

    SciTech Connect

    Rockett, P D; Koncher, T R

    2012-05-16

    Embedded arms-control-sensors provide a powerful new paradigm for managing compliance with future nuclear weapons treaties, where deployed warhead numbers will be reduced to 1000 or less. The CONOPS (Concept of Operations) for use with these sensors is a practical tool with which one may help define design parameters, including size, power, resolution, communications, and physical structure. How frequently must data be acquired and must a human be present? Will such data be acquired for only stored weapons or will it be required of deployed weapons as well? Will tactical weapons be subject to such monitoring or will only strategic weapons apply? Which data will be most crucial? Will OSI's be a component of embedded sensor data management or will these sensors stand alone in their data extraction processes? The problem space is massive, but can be constrained by extrapolating to a reasonable future treaty regime and examining the bounded options this scenario poses. Arms control verification sensors, embedded within the warhead case or aeroshell, must provide sufficient but not excessively detailed data, confirming that the item is a nuclear warhead and that it is a particular warhead without revealing sensitive information. Geolocation will be provided by an intermediate transceiver used to acquire the data and to forward the data to a central processing location. Past Chain-of-Custody projects have included such devices and will be primarily responsible for adding such indicators in the future. For the purposes of a treaty regime a TLI will be verified as a nuclear warhead by knowledge of (a) the presence and mass of SNM, (b) the presence of HE, and (c) the reporting of a unique tag ID. All of these parameters can be obtained via neutron correlation measurements, Raman spectroscopy, and fiber optic grating fabrication, respectively. Data from these sensors will be pushed out monthly and acquired nearly daily, providing one of several verification layers in depth

  11. Potential Biological Weapons Threats

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1999-08-01

    Iraq’s admission in 1995 to having quantities of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin ready to use as weapons have clearly shown that research in...could cause large loss of life, in addition to disruption, panic, and overwhelming of the civilian health- care resources (12). To be used for a...Biological agents involved in bioterrorism or biocrimes3 Pathogens Toxins Anti- crop agents Traditional biological warfare agents Bacillus

  12. Modular weapon control unit

    SciTech Connect

    Boccabella, M.F.; McGovney, G.N.

    1997-01-01

    The goal of the Modular Weapon Control Unit (MWCU) program was to design and develop a reconfigurable weapon controller (programmer/sequencer) that can be adapted to different weapon systems based on the particular requirements for that system. Programmers from previous systems are conceptually the same and perform similar tasks. Because of this commonality and the amount of re-engineering necessary with the advent of every new design, the idea of a modular, adaptable system has emerged. Also, the controller can be used in more than one application for a specific weapon system. Functionality has been divided into a Processor Module (PM) and an Input/Output Module (IOM). The PM will handle all operations that require calculations, memory, and timing. The IOM will handle interfaces to the rest of the system, input level shifting, output drive capability, and detection of interrupt conditions. Configuration flexibility is achieved in two ways. First, the operation of the PM is determined by a surface mount Read-Only Memory (ROM). Other surface-mount components can be added or neglected as necessary for functionality. Second, IOMs consist of configurable input buffers, configurable output drivers, and configurable interrupt generation. Further, these modules can be added singly or in groups to a Processor Module to achieve the required I/O configuration. The culmination of this LDRD was the building of both Processor Module and Input/Output Module. The MWCU was chosen as a test system to evaluate Low-Temperature Co-fired Ceramic (LTCC) technology, desirable for high component density and good thermal characteristics.

  13. TRACKING SURPLUS PLUTONIUM FROM WEAPONS TO DISPOSITION

    SciTech Connect

    Allender, J.; Beams, J.; Sanders, K.; Myers, L.

    2013-07-16

    Supporting nuclear nonproliferation and global security principles, beginning in 1994 the United States has withdrawn more than 50 metric tons (MT) of government-controlled plutonium from potential use in nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration, established protocols for the tracking of this "excess" and "surplus" plutonium, and for reconciling the current storage and utilization of the plutonium to show that its management is consistent with the withdrawal policies. Programs are underway to ensure the safe and secure disposition of the materials that formed a major part of the weapons stockpile during the Cold War, and growing quantities have been disposed as waste, after which they are not included in traditional nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) data systems. A combination of resources is used to perform the reconciliations that form the basis for annual reporting to DOE, to U.S. Department of State, and to international partners including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

  14. Investigations and Recommendations on the Use of Existing Experiments in Criticality Safety Analysis of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities for Weapons-Grade Plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Rearden, B.T.

    2002-05-29

    Sensitivity and Uncertainty (S/U) methods, recently developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have been demonstrated to determine the applicability of critical benchmark experiments to the criticality code validation of design systems. These methods, although still under development, have been recently published in several sources. Development of the techniques used in this report was conducted through joint support from the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to provide a physics-based approach for the establishment of the area of applicability of critical experiments per the requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.1. Use of these methods may allow users to interpolate and extrapolate the traditional area of applicability (AOA) of a given set of critical experiments to include new application areas that may not have been anticipated during the experiment design. The new S/U analytical tools include the SEN1 and SEN3 sensitivity analysis sequences, which will be available with the next release of the Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) code system. These analysis sequences compute the relative change in the system neutron multiplication factor, k{sub eff}, which would be observed for perturbations in the group-wise neutron cross-section data for each reaction of each nuclide in the system. The CANDE code uses sensitivity data determined separately for the design system applications and the individual experiments, along with the cross-section-covariance data, to calculate integral parameters which give a measure of the similarity between a particular design system and an experimental benchmark. A high-valued integral parameter for an experiment application pair indicates that the experiment demonstrates similar properties to the application. Thus, the experiment is applicable for the criticality code validation of the design system. A theoretical basis for the S/U techniques applied in this

  15. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  16. 78 FR 20625 - Spent Nuclear Fuel Management at the Savannah River Site

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-04-05

    ...). This end product will not be useable in nuclear weapons, but will be available for use in commercial... of SNF at SRS, particularly the SRS SNF EIS and the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation...

  17. Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies for South Asia

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1994-05-03

    a nuclear arsenal. India is presumed to possess components for nuclear weapons including the actual fissile material "pits" or "cores" for weapons...weapons with various aircraft and with ŕ "Lack of Capital Deters Russians from Building VVERs in India," Nucleonics Week, October 1, 1992; "India...ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear explosive devices or outside of safeguards. India opposes regional arms control measures that

  18. Integration of Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development with UNSCR 1540 Implementation - Context and Challenges

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Essner, J

    2008-11-03

    On 28 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 (2004), obliging States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems. It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials. This mandate was extended an additional two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673 (2006) and an additional three years with the adoption of Resolution 1810 (2008). UNSCR 1540 is a key nonproliferation and counterterrorism tool that needs to be implemented well. Its obligations are a core part of nuclear infrastructure development.

  19. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-05-18

    can be used to produce Polonium - 210 for civilian purposes (for nuclear batteries) or in conjunction with beryllium to create a neutron initiator for a...nuclear weapon. These experiments were conducted between 1989 and 1993. Polonium , according to many observers, is not ideal for nuclear weapons

  20. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-04-12

    1993 on irradiating bismuth, which can be used to produce Polonium - 210 for civilian purposes (for nuclear batteries) or in conjunction with beryllium...to create a neutron initiator for a nuclear weapon. However, polonium , according to many observers, is not ideal for nuclear weapons purposes. The