Science.gov

Sample records for agricultural safeguard trigger

  1. Advanced integrated safeguards using front-end-triggering devices

    SciTech Connect

    Howell, J.A.; Whitty, W.J.

    1995-12-01

    This report addresses potential uses of front-end-triggering devices for enhanced safeguards. Such systems incorporate video surveillance as well as radiation and other sensors. Also covered in the report are integration issues and analysis techniques.

  2. 76 FR 31295 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-31

    ..., 2010 to September 30, 2011. 432 mt October 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012. Ice Cream 2,309,155 liters..., 2011. Cream 867,562 liters.... January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. Evaporated or Condensed Milk.... 2.... Dried Cream 21,166 kilograms.. January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. Dried Whey/Buttermilk...

  3. 75 FR 25200 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-07

    ... 30, 2011. Ice Cream 2,869,565 liters. January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010. Animal Feed Containing..., 2010 to December 31, 2010. Cream 1,165,099 liters. January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010. Evaporated or..., 2010. kilograms. Dried Cream 27,330 kilograms. January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2010. Dried...

  4. 77 FR 31296 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-25

    .... Ice Cream 2,309,155 liters....... January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. Animal Feed Containing Milk 39... 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. Cream 867,562 liters......... January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011... kilograms.... January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. Dried Cream 21,166 kilograms....... January 1, 2011...

  5. 77 FR 38033 - WTO Agricultural Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-26

    ... September 30, 2012. 419 mt October 1, 2012 to September 30, 2013. Ice Cream 1,693,727 liters....... January... December 31, 2012. Cream 484,311 liters......... January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2012. Evaporated or..., 2012 to December 31, 2012. Dried Cream 11,195 kilograms....... January 1, 2012 to December 31,...

  6. Safeguarding fruit crops in the age of agricultural globalization

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    The expansion of fruit production and markets into new geographic areas provides novel opportunities and challenges for the agricultural and marketing industries. In today’s competitive global market environment, growers need access to the best material available in terms of genetics and plant heal...

  7. 78 FR 37516 - WTO Agricultural Quantity-Based Safeguard Trigger Levels

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-06-21

    ... 30, 2014. Ice Cream 1,920,680 liters.... January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. Animal Feed Containing... 31, 2013. Mutton 5,928 mt January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. Cream 228,785 liters...... January 1... Milk 3,086,377 kilograms. January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013. Dried Cream 11,055...

  8. Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  9. Ending Agricultural Threats: Safeguarding America's Food for Everyone (EAT SAFE) Act of 2009

    THOMAS, 111th Congress

    Sen. Casey, Robert P., Jr. [D-PA

    2009-02-12

    02/12/2009 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. (text of measure as introduced: CR S2240-2242) (All Actions) Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

  10. 7 CFR 4290.506 - Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls... Safeguarding the RBIC's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  11. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE

    SciTech Connect

    Duc Cao; Richard Metcalf

    2010-07-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z-testing. A brief analysis of the impact of the safeguards optimization on the rest of plant efficiency, criticality concerns, and overall requirements is presented.

  12. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements..., with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents...

  13. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 966.56 Section 966.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... governing the issuance and the contents of Certificates of Privilege if such certificates are prescribed...

  14. 7 CFR 906.44 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 906.44 Section 906.44 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... authorized therefor, and rules governing the issuance and the contents of certificates of privilege if...

  15. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... governing the issuance and the contents of the special purpose certificate. (d) The committee may...

  16. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents of Certificates...

  17. 7 CFR 947.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 947.55 Section 947.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements..., with the approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents...

  18. 7 CFR 946.55 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguards. 946.55 Section 946.55 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... governing the issuance and the contents of the special purpose certificate. (d) The committee may...

  19. 7 CFR 945.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguards. 945.56 Section 945.56 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing Agreements... approval of the Secretary, shall prescribe rules governing the issuance and the contents of Certificates...

  20. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  1. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  2. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  3. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  4. 7 CFR 15b.25 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Procedural safeguards. 15b.25 Section 15b.25 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary, Secondary, Adult, and...

  5. Weakening density dependence from climate change and agricultural intensification triggers pest outbreaks: a 37-year observation of cotton bollworms.

    PubMed

    Ouyang, Fang; Hui, Cang; Ge, Saiying; Men, Xin-Yuan; Zhao, Zi-Hua; Shi, Pei-Jian; Zhang, Yong-Sheng; Li, Bai-Lian

    2014-09-01

    Understanding drivers of population fluctuation, especially for agricultural pests, is central to the provision of agro-ecosystem services. Here, we examine the role of endogenous density dependence and exogenous factors of climate and human activity in regulating the 37-year population dynamics of an important agricultural insect pest, the cotton bollworm (Helicoverpa armigera), in North China from 1975 to 2011. Quantitative time-series analysis provided strong evidence explaining long-term population dynamics of the cotton bollworm and its driving factors. Rising temperature and declining rainfall exacerbated the effect of agricultural intensification on continuously weakening the negative density dependence in regulating the population dynamics of cotton bollworms. Consequently, ongoing climate change and agricultural intensification unleashed the tightly regulated pest population and triggered the regional outbreak of H. armigera in 1992. Although the negative density dependence can effectively regulate the population change rate to fluctuate around zero at stable equilibrium levels before and after outbreak in the 1992, the population equilibrium jumped to a higher density level with apparently larger amplitudes after the outbreak. The results highlight the possibility for exogenous factors to induce pest outbreaks and alter the population regulating mechanism of negative density dependence and, thus, the stable equilibrium of the pest population, often to a higher level, posing considerable risks to the provision of agro-ecosystem services and regional food security. Efficient and timely measures of pest management in the era of Anthropocene should target the strengthening and revival of weakening density dependence caused by climate change and human activities.

  6. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-06-01

    Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been underappreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured. This paper argues that safeguards culture as an indicator of a country’s nonproliferation posture can be a useful tool.

  7. Weakening density dependence from climate change and agricultural intensification triggers pest outbreaks: a 37-year observation of cotton bollworms

    PubMed Central

    Ouyang, Fang; Hui, Cang; Ge, Saiying; Men, Xin-Yuan; Zhao, Zi-Hua; Shi, Pei-Jian; Zhang, Yong-Sheng; Li, Bai-Lian

    2014-01-01

    Understanding drivers of population fluctuation, especially for agricultural pests, is central to the provision of agro-ecosystem services. Here, we examine the role of endogenous density dependence and exogenous factors of climate and human activity in regulating the 37-year population dynamics of an important agricultural insect pest, the cotton bollworm (Helicoverpa armigera), in North China from 1975 to 2011. Quantitative time-series analysis provided strong evidence explaining long-term population dynamics of the cotton bollworm and its driving factors. Rising temperature and declining rainfall exacerbated the effect of agricultural intensification on continuously weakening the negative density dependence in regulating the population dynamics of cotton bollworms. Consequently, ongoing climate change and agricultural intensification unleashed the tightly regulated pest population and triggered the regional outbreak of H. armigera in 1992. Although the negative density dependence can effectively regulate the population change rate to fluctuate around zero at stable equilibrium levels before and after outbreak in the 1992, the population equilibrium jumped to a higher density level with apparently larger amplitudes after the outbreak. The results highlight the possibility for exogenous factors to induce pest outbreaks and alter the population regulating mechanism of negative density dependence and, thus, the stable equilibrium of the pest population, often to a higher level, posing considerable risks to the provision of agro-ecosystem services and regional food security. Efficient and timely measures of pest management in the era of Anthropocene should target the strengthening and revival of weakening density dependence caused by climate change and human activities. PMID:25535553

  8. 7 CFR 319.40-7 - Treatments and safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Treatments and safeguards. 319.40-7 Section 319.40-7 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN QUARANTINE NOTICES Logs, Lumber, and Other Wood Articles §...

  9. 7 CFR 319.40-7 - Treatments and safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Treatments and safeguards. 319.40-7 Section 319.40-7 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN QUARANTINE NOTICES Logs, Lumber, and Other Unmanufactured...

  10. 7 CFR 319.40-7 - Treatments and safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Treatments and safeguards. 319.40-7 Section 319.40-7 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN QUARANTINE NOTICES Logs, Lumber, and Other Unmanufactured...

  11. 7 CFR 319.40-7 - Treatments and safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Treatments and safeguards. 319.40-7 Section 319.40-7 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREIGN QUARANTINE NOTICES Logs, Lumber, and Other Wood Articles §...

  12. 7 CFR 352.10 - Inspection; safeguards; disposal.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 5 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Inspection; safeguards; disposal. 352.10 Section 352...; safeguards; disposal. (a) Inspection and release. Prohibited and restricted products and articles subject to... refused such entry or movement before unloading or landing, or which were refused such entry or...

  13. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of...

  14. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of...

  15. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of...

  16. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of...

  17. 7 CFR 996.60 - Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. 996.60... QUALITY AND HANDLING STANDARDS FOR DOMESTIC AND IMPORTED PEANUTS MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES Quality and Handling Standards § 996.60 Safeguard procedures for imported peanuts. (a) Prior to, or upon, arrival of...

  18. Building safeguards infrastructure

    SciTech Connect

    Stevens, Rebecca S; Mcclelland - Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  19. Agriculture

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    The EPA Agriculture Resource Directory offers comprehensive, easy-to-understand information about environmental stewardship on farms and ranches; commonsense, flexible approaches that are both environmentally protective and agriculturally sound.

  20. 7 CFR 966.56 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE TOMATOES GROWN IN FLORIDA Order..., may prescribe adequate safeguards to prevent handling of tomatoes pursuant to § 966.53 or § 966.54... applications with the committee to ship tomatoes pursuant to §§ 966.53 and 966.54; or (2) Handlers shall...

  1. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-12-03

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs.

  2. Strenghening Safeguards Authorities and Institutions

    SciTech Connect

    Goodman,M.; Lockwood, d.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Tape, J.W.

    2008-06-06

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system has changed in major ways from the establishment of the IAEA in 1957 until the present. Changes include strengthening the legal framework of safeguards; improvements in concepts and approaches for safeguards implementation; and significant improvements in the technical tools available to inspectors. In this paper, we explore three broad areas related to strengthening safeguards authorities and institutions: integrated safeguards and State-Level Approaches; special inspections; and NPT withdrawal and the continuation of safeguards.

  3. The safeguards options study

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  4. Strengthening regional safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-08-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980`s and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States.

  5. Safeguards Culture: Lessons Learned

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2009-05-27

    Abstract: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper builds on that theoretical discussion to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Paper: At the 2005 INMM/ESARDA Workshop on “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges,” in Santa Fe, New Mexico, I presented a paper entitled “Changing the Safeguards Culture: Broader Perspectives and Challenges.” That paper, coauthored by Karyn R. Durbin and Andrew Van Duzer, described a set of theoretical models that can be used as a basis for evaluating changes to safeguards culture. This paper updates that theoretical discussion, and seeks to address practical methods for influencing culture. It takes lessons from methods used to influence change in safety culture and security culture, and examines the applicability of these lessons to changing safeguards culture. Implicit in this discussion is an understanding that improving a culture is not an end in itself, but is one method of improving the underlying discipline, that is safety, security, or safeguards. Culture can be defined as a way of life, or general customs and beliefs of a particular group of people at a particular time. There are internationally accepted definitions of safety culture and nuclear security culture. As yet, there is no official agreed upon definition of safeguards culture. At the end of the paper I will propose my definition. At the Santa Fe Workshop the summary by the Co-Chairs of Working Group 1, “The Further Evolution of Safeguards,” noted: “It is clear that ‘safeguards culture

  6. International safeguards data authentication

    SciTech Connect

    Melton, R.B.; Smith, C.E.; DeLand, S.M.; Manatt, D.R.

    1996-07-01

    The International Safeguards community is becoming increasingly reliant on information stored in electronic form. In international monitoring and related activities it must be possible to verify and maintain the integrity of this electronic information. This paper discusses the use of data authentication technology to assist in accomplishing this task. The paper provides background information, identifies the relevance to international safeguards, discusses issues related to export controls, algorithm patents, key management and the use of commercial vs. custom software.

  7. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  8. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    SciTech Connect

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  9. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    SciTech Connect

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes.

  10. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  11. International Nuclear Safeguards at Sandia

    SciTech Connect

    Sternat, Matthew R.

    2015-02-01

    As global nuclear energy expands, assuring peaceful uses of nuclear technology becomes increasingly important. In addition to complying with international nuclear safeguards, a responsible nuclear energy program promotes a corresponding safeguards culture. Establishment of transparent peaceful uses of nuclear technologies starts with cooperative international engagements and safeguards systems. Developing states investing in nuclear energy must assure the international community of their longterm commitment to safeguards, safety, and security (3S) of nuclear materials and technologies. Cultivating a safeguards culture starts in the initial phases of infrastructure planning and must be integrated into the process of developing a responsible nuclear energy program. Sandia National Laboratories supports the implementation of safeguards culture through a variety of activities, including infrastructure development.

  12. Full spectrum optical safeguard

    DOEpatents

    Ackerman, Mark R.

    2008-12-02

    An optical safeguard device with two linear variable Fabry-Perot filters aligned relative to a light source with at least one of the filters having a nonlinear dielectric constant material such that, when a light source produces a sufficiently high intensity light, the light alters the characteristics of the nonlinear dielectric constant material to reduce the intensity of light impacting a connected optical sensor. The device can be incorporated into an imaging system on a moving platform, such as an aircraft or satellite.

  13. Research and Development for Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Inman, Guy M.

    This report summarizes the results of unclassified research and development contracts in the field of peaceful use safeguards regarding the use of nuclear material. These summaries indicate there is really no sharp line of demarcation between research for safeguards and research for many other purposes. It includes areas of research effort and…

  14. The Importance of Safeguards Culture

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2013-11-01

    This is a paper we plan to submit to the Nonproliferation Review for publication. The paper provides an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture and gauges its value to the safeguards community. Accompanying the paper are three additional documents that contain the figures and tables cited in the paper. NPR guidelines state these figures and tables are to be submitted in separate documents.

  15. Nuclear Materials Safeguards - Manpower Needs.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kanter, Manuel A.

    Nuclear safeguard systems, their operation and implications for future manpower needs, and the need for these topics to be integrated into the engineering education curriculum, are focused on in this paper. The elements of a safeguard system and factors influencing the selection of a particular system are presented. Projections concerning the use…

  16. Information analysis and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K. W.; Tape, J. W.

    2004-01-01

    After the first Gulf War, it was recognized that one of the key weaknesses of the international safeguards system was that there was no systematic attempt by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to analyze all available information about States nuclear programs to determine whether these programs were consistent with nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA, as part of its effort to redesign the international safeguards system, is looking closely at the issue of information review and evaluation. The application of information analysis (IA) techniques to the international nuclear safeguards system has the potential to revolutionize the form and practice of safeguards. Assessing the possibilities of IA for the IAEA, and in particular those embodied in concepts of information-driven safeguards, requires an understanding of IA, the limits on its effectiveness and the requirements placed on such analyses in a variety of safeguards contexts. The Australian Safeguards and Nonproliferation Office (ASNO) and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in July 2002 to undertake a joint study of 'information-driven safeguards' under a long-standing cooperative arrangement. It was decided that a broad range of ideas should be considered, and that the study would not be intended to be and would not be an elaboration of either US or Australian governmental positions. This paper reports some findings of Phase 1 of this collaborative effort and offers some initial thinking on the part of the authors on the outstanding issues to be addressed in Phase 2. An effort to explore through case studies alternative strategies for utilizing IA by the IAEA that provide the same or increased confidence in safeguards conclusions while allowing safeguards resource allocation to be determined not only by the types and quantities of nuclear material and facilities in a State but also by other objective factors.

  17. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented.

  18. Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards: A TEXTBOOK

    SciTech Connect

    Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Gallini, L.; Krass, A.; Kratzer, M.; Sanborn, J.; Ward, B.; Wulf, N. A.

    2012-03-13

    Nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are among the most pressing challenges to international peace and security that we face today. Iran and Syria remain in non-compliance with the safeguards requirements of the NPT, and the nuclear ambitions of North Korea remain unchecked. Despite these challenges, the NPT remains a cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the NPT play a critical role in deterring nuclear proliferation.How do they work? Where did they come from? And what is their future? This book answers these questions. Anyone studying the field of nuclear non-proliferation will benefit from reading this book, and for anyone entering the field, the book will enable them to get a running start. Part I describes the foundations of the international safeguards system: its origins in the 1930s - when new discoveries in physics made it clear immediately that nuclear energy held both peril and promise - through the entry into force in 1970 of the NPT, which codified the role of IAEA safeguards as a means to verify states NPT commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Part II describes the NPT safeguards system, which is based on a model safeguards agreement developed specifically for the NPT, The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has been published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/153. Part III describes events, especially in South Africa, the DPRK, and Iraq in the early 1990s, that triggered a transformation in the way in which safeguards were conceptualized and implemented.

  19. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by insiders requires careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification and careful attention to management of information can result in effective safeguards integration. Whether designing new systems or analyzing existing ones, understanding the interface between facility operations and safeguards is critical to cost-effective integrated safeguards systems that meet modern standards of performance.

  20. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    SciTech Connect

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested.

  1. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J.M.; Alvim, C.F.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-12-31

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC`s safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil.

  2. 7 CFR 980.501 - Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and....501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity requirements. (a) Each person who imports: (1) Potatoes, onions or tomatoes for consumption...

  3. 7 CFR 980.501 - Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and....501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and... imports: (1) Potatoes, onions or tomatoes for consumption by charitable institutions or distribution...

  4. 7 CFR 980.501 - Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and....501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity requirements. (a) Each person who imports: (1) Potatoes, onions or tomatoes for consumption...

  5. 7 CFR 980.501 - Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and....501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity requirements. (a) Each person who imports: (1) Potatoes, onions or tomatoes for consumption...

  6. 7 CFR 980.501 - Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and....501 Safeguard procedures for potatoes, onions, and tomatoes exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity requirements. (a) Each person who imports: (1) Potatoes, onions or tomatoes for consumption...

  7. 7 CFR 999.500 - Safeguard procedures for walnuts and certain dates exempt from grade, size, quality, and maturity...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguard procedures for walnuts and certain dates... § 999.500 Safeguard procedures for walnuts and certain dates exempt from grade, size, quality, and... or Native Americans on reservations; or (2) Walnuts which are: green walnuts (so immature that...

  8. Integrating Nuclear Information to Enhance Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Suski, N; Dubrin, J; Scarbrough, J

    2001-10-01

    Implementation of the Strengthened Safeguards System provides many new opportunities and challenges for collecting; analyzing and archiving nuclear materials safeguards information. For the first time in the history of safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be required not only to verify the accuracy of declarations, but also the completeness. To successfully implement the new safeguards regime, new and innovative ways of collecting, analyzing and archiving large amounts of safeguards information will be required. A conceptual system design that utilizes a geographical information system for the integration and analysis of this safeguards information will be described and demonstrated.

  9. Future issues in international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs.

  10. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-11-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA`s safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials.

  11. Regional Cooperation to Strengthen Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Minnini, Margot; Elkhamri, Oksana O.

    2016-06-06

    President Obama’s decision over four years ago to ”pivot” toward Asia represented an important strategic shift in American foreign policy and a rebalancing of U.S. economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has since supported a variety of regional initiatives aimed at promoting nuclear security and safeguards. When a new regional organization, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was established in 2010, DOE/NNSA became an early member and enthusiastic advocate. Launched on the initiative of Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia, the APSN aims to strengthen the quality and effectiveness of safeguards implementation in the Asia-Pacific region.

  12. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard; Robert Bean; Phillip Casey Durst; John Hockert; James Morgan

    2010-02-01

    Executive Summary Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC&A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many – owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: • In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem.

  13. New challenges in adolescent safeguarding.

    PubMed

    James, David R; Sargant, Nwanneka N; Bostock, Nancy; Khadr, Sophie

    2017-02-01

    The environment in which young people are growing up has changed significantly with the growth in social communication, changes in migration patterns and the proliferation of gangs. These changes pose a real and present danger to the health and well-being of young people in the UK and around the world. However, recognition of the safeguarding needs for this group continues to lag behind those of younger children and services often remain patchy and incomplete. We present a review of current safeguarding concerns as well as practical suggestions on their recognition and response for professionals working with young people in all branches of healthcare as well as education and wider society.

  14. Dynamic triggering

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Hill, David P.; Prejean, Stephanie; Schubert, Gerald

    2015-01-01

    Dynamic stresses propagating as seismic waves from large earthquakes trigger a spectrum of responses at global distances. In addition to locally triggered earthquakes in a variety of tectonic environments, dynamic stresses trigger tectonic (nonvolcanic) tremor in the brittle–plastic transition zone along major plate-boundary faults, activity changes in hydrothermal and volcanic systems, and, in hydrologic domains, changes in spring discharge, water well levels, soil liquefaction, and the eruption of mud volcanoes. Surface waves with periods of 15–200 s are the most effective triggering agents; body-wave trigger is less frequent. Triggering dynamic stresses can be < 1 kPa.

  15. Processing large sensor data sets for safeguards : the knowledge generation system.

    SciTech Connect

    Thomas, Maikel A.; Smartt, Heidi Anne; Matthews, Robert F.

    2012-04-01

    Modern nuclear facilities, such as reprocessing plants, present inspectors with significant challenges due in part to the sheer amount of equipment that must be safeguarded. The Sandia-developed and patented Knowledge Generation system was designed to automatically analyze large amounts of safeguards data to identify anomalous events of interest by comparing sensor readings with those expected from a process of interest and operator declarations. This paper describes a demonstration of the Knowledge Generation system using simulated accountability tank sensor data to represent part of a reprocessing plant. The demonstration indicated that Knowledge Generation has the potential to address several problems critical to the future of safeguards. It could be extended to facilitate remote inspections and trigger random inspections. Knowledge Generation could analyze data to establish trust hierarchies, to facilitate safeguards use of operator-owned sensors.

  16. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  17. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  18. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    SciTech Connect

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-09-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future.

  19. Nuclear materials safeguards for the future

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, J.W.

    1995-12-31

    Basic concepts of domestic and international safeguards are described, with an emphasis on safeguards systems for the fuel cycles of commercial power reactors. Future trends in institutional and technical measures for nuclear materials safeguards are outlined. The conclusion is that continued developments in safeguards approaches and technology, coupled with institutional measures that facilitate the global management and protection of nuclear materials, are up to the challenge of safeguarding the growing inventories of nuclear materials in commercial fuel cycles in technologically advanced States with stable governments that have signed the nonproliferation treaty. These same approaches also show promise for facilitating international inspection of excess weapons materials and verifying a fissile materials cutoff convention.

  20. Visualizing Safeguards: Software for Conceptualizing and Communicating Safeguards Data

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, N.

    2015-07-12

    The nuclear programs of states are complex and varied, comprising a wide range of fuel cycles and facilities. Also varied are the types and terms of states’ safeguards agreements with the IAEA, each placing different limits on the inspectorate’s access to these facilities. Such nuances make it difficult to draw policy significance from the ground-level nuclear activities of states, or to attribute ground-level outcomes to the implementation of specific policies or initiatives. While acquiring a firm understanding of these relationships is critical to evaluating and formulating effective policy, doing so requires collecting and synthesizing large bodies of information. Maintaining a comprehensive working knowledge of the facilities comprising even a single state’s nuclear program poses a challenge, yet marrying this information with relevant safeguards and verification information is more challenging still. To facilitate this task, Brookhaven National Laboratory has developed a means of capturing the development, operation, and safeguards history of all the facilities comprising a state’s nuclear program in a single graphic. The resulting visualization offers a useful reference tool to policymakers and analysts alike, providing a chronology of states’ nuclear development and an easily digestible history of verification activities across their fuel cycles.

  1. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment Methodology

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Trond Bjornard; Thomas Larson

    2007-09-01

    It is expected that nuclear energy will be a significant component of future supplies. New facilities, operating under a strengthened international nonproliferation regime will be needed. There is good reason to believe virtual engineering applied to the facility design, as well as to the safeguards system design will reduce total project cost and improve efficiency in the design cycle. Simulation Enabled Safeguards Assessment MEthodology (SESAME) has been developed as a software package to provide this capability for nuclear reprocessing facilities. The software architecture is specifically designed for distributed computing, collaborative design efforts, and modular construction to allow step improvements in functionality. Drag and drop wireframe construction allows the user to select the desired components from a component warehouse, render the system for 3D visualization, and, linked to a set of physics libraries and/or computational codes, conduct process evaluations of the system they have designed.

  2. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    SciTech Connect

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP.

  3. Acoustic techniques in nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Olinger, C.T.; Sinha, D.N.

    1995-07-01

    Acoustic techniques can be employed to address many questions relevant to current nuclear technology needs. These include establishing and monitoring intrinsic tags and seals, locating holdup in areas where conventional radiation-based measurements have limited capability, process monitoring, monitoring containers for corrosion or changes in pressure, and facility design verification. These acoustics applications are in their infancy with respect to safeguards and nuclear material management, but proof-of-principle has been demonstrated in many of the areas listed.

  4. Safeguards issues in spent fuel consolidation facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Belew, W.L.; Moran, B.W.

    1991-01-01

    In the nuclear power industry, the fuel assembly is the basic unit for nuclear material accountancy. The safeguards procedures for the spent fuel assemblies, therefore, are based on an item accountancy approach. When fuel consolidation occurs in at-reactor'' or away-from-reactor'' facilities, the fuel assemblies are disassembled and cease to be the basic unit containing nuclear material. Safeguards can no longer be based on item accountancy of fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pins containing plutonium are accessible, and the possibilities for diversion of spent fuel for clandestine reprocessing to recover the plutonium are increased. Thus, identifying the potential safeguards concerns created by operation of these facilities is necessary. Potential safeguards techniques to address these concerns also must be identified so facility designs may include the equipment and systems required to provide an acceptable level of assurance that the international safeguards objectives can be met when these facilities come on-line. The objectives of this report are (1) to identify the safeguards issues associated with operation of spent fuel consolidation facilities, (2) to provide a preliminary assessment of the assessment of the safeguards vulnerabilities introduced, and (3) to identify potential safeguards approaches that could meet international safeguards requirements. The safeguards aspects of spent fuel consolidation are addressed in several recent reports and papers. 11 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs.

  5. Are xenotransplantation safeguards legally viable?

    PubMed

    Florencio, P S; Ramanathan, E D

    2001-01-01

    Scientists agree on the need for robust public health safeguards to accompany the imminent introduction of xenotransplantation--clinical transplantation of animal tissue into humans. To protect society in the event of emerging infectious diseases, governments must devise a legally effective means of ensuring compliance with such safeguards. Neither consent law, the law of contracts, nor existing public health legislation can adequately enforce such compliance. Consent law serves as a mechanism of communicating the momentary waiver of legal rights, not as a durable enforcement doctrine. Because it would be essential for recipients personally to comply with public safety measures, the law of contracts would also be unable to compel compliance. Existing public health legislation would also likely be ineffective because it would need to be substantially amended to incorporate the heightened powers necessary for the periodic examination of asymptomatic xenotransplant recipients. Xenotransplantation-specific legislation would be a legally effective means of enforcing public health safeguards since it could require conforming behaviors and could impose monetary fines on those recipients who, having benefited from life-saving intervention, fail to comply. This Article argues that legislation implementing a post-xenotransplantation surveillance system should withstand constitutional scrutiny because it would not be discriminatory and because, although it would violate fundamental rights of recipients, such violations would be justified under existing constitutional doctrines.

  6. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY10

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf

    2010-10-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters within which nuclear facilities may operate to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details the additions to the advanced operating techniques that will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). Research this year focused on combining disparate pieces of data together to maximize operating time with minimal downtime due to safeguards. A Chi-Square and Croiser's cumulative sum were both included as part of the new analysis. Because of a major issue with the original data, the implementation of the two new tests did not add to the existing set of tests, though limited one-variable optimization made a small increase in detection probability. Additional analysis was performed to determine if prior analysis would have caused a major security or safety operating envelope issue. It was determined that a safety issue would have resulted from the prior research, but that the security may have been increased under certain conditions.

  7. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Swinhoe, Martyn T.

    2012-07-26

    The purpose of this talk is to give an overview of the role of modeling and simulation in Safeguards R&D and introduce you to (some of) the tools used. Some definitions are: (1) Modeling - the representation, often mathematical, of a process, concept, or operation of a system, often implemented by a computer program; (2) Simulation - the representation of the behavior or characteristics of one system through the use of another system, especially a computer program designed for the purpose; and (3) Safeguards - the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material. The role of modeling and simulation are: (1) Calculate amounts of material (plant modeling); (2) Calculate signatures of nuclear material etc. (source terms); and (3) Detector performance (radiation transport and detection). Plant modeling software (e.g. FACSIM) gives the flows and amount of material stored at all parts of the process. In safeguards this allow us to calculate the expected uncertainty of the mass and evaluate the expected MUF. We can determine the measurement accuracy required to achieve a certain performance.

  8. Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards: An Introduction to Safeguards for Emerging Nuclear States

    SciTech Connect

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Gastelum, Zoe N.; Olson, Jarrod; Mathews, Caroline E.; Solodov, Alexander; Zhernosek, Alena; Raffo-Caiado, Ana; Baldwin, George; Horak, Karl; McClelland-Kerr, John; VanSickle, Matthew; Mininni, Margot; Kovacic, Donald

    2009-10-06

    The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) hosted a workshop from May 4-22, 2009, on the fundamental elements of international safeguards. Entitled "A Technical Training Workshop on International Safeguards," the workshop introduced post-graduate students from Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia to the fundamental issues and best practices associated with international safeguards and encouraged them to explore potential career paths in safeguards. Workshops like these strengthen the international safeguards regime by promoting the development of a "safeguards culture" among young nuclear professionals within nascent nuclear countries. While this concept of safeguards culture is sometimes hard to define and even harder to measure, this paper will demonstrate that the promotion of safeguards cultures through workshops like these justifies the investment of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

  9. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  10. 34 CFR 300.623 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... § 300.623 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of personally... participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring the confidentiality of any personally...

  11. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  12. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  13. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  14. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  15. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... reporting discrepancies. (D) Password management (Addressable). Procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding passwords. (6)(i) Standard: Security incident procedures. Implement policies and procedures...

  16. 21 CFR 26.21 - Safeguard clause.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... OF PHARMACEUTICAL GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICE REPORTS, MEDICAL DEVICE QUALITY SYSTEM AUDIT REPORTS... Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices § 26.21 Safeguard clause....

  17. Current Status of Helium-3 Alternative Technologies for Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Henzlova, Daniela; Kouzes, R.; McElroy, R.; Peerani, P.; Aspinall, M.; Baird, K.; Bakel, A.; Borella, M.; Bourne, M.; Bourva, L.; Cave, F.; Chandra, R.; Chernikova, D.; Croft, S.; Dermody, G.; Dougan, A.; Ely, J.; Fanchini, E.; Finocchiaro, P.; Gavron, Victor; Kureta, M.; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Ishiyama, K.; Lee, T.; Martin, Ch.; McKinny, K.; Menlove, Howard Olsen; Orton, Ch.; Pappalardo, A.; Pedersen, B.; Peranteau, D.; Plenteda, R.; Pozzi, S.; Schear, M.; Seya, M.; Siciliano, E.; Stave, S.; Sun, L.; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Tagziria, H.; Vaccaro, S.; Takamine, J.; Weber, A. -L.; Yamaguchi, T.; Zhu, H.

    2015-12-01

    International safeguards inspectorates (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency {IAEA}, or Euratom) rely heavily on neutron assay techniques, and in particular, on coincidence counters for the verification of declared nuclear materials under safeguards and for monitoring purposes. While 3He was readily available, the reliability, safety, ease of use, gamma-ray insensitivity, and high intrinsic thermal neutron detection efficiency of 3He-based detectors obviated the need for alternative detector technologies. However, the recent decline of the 3He gas supply has triggered international efforts to develop and field neutron detectors that make use of alternative materials. In response to this global effort, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Euratom launched a joint effort aimed at bringing together international experts, technology users and developers in the field of nuclear safeguards to discuss and evaluate the proposed 3He alternative materials and technologies. The effort involved a series of two workshops focused on detailed overviews and viability assessments of various 3He alternative technologies for use in nuclear safeguards applications. The key objective was to provide a platform for collaborative discussions and technical presentations organized in a compact, workshop-like format to stimulate interactions among the participants. The meetings culminated in a benchmark exercise providing a unique opportunity for the first inter-comparison of several available alternative technologies. This report provides an overview of the alternative technology efforts presented during the two workshops along with a summary of the benchmarking activities and results. The workshop recommendations and key consensus observations are discussed in the report, and used to outline a proposed path forward and future needs foreseeable in the area of 3

  18. Fuzzy resource optimization for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.; Markin, J.T.

    1991-01-01

    Authorization, enforcement, and verification -- three key functions of safeguards systems -- form the basis of a hierarchical description of the system risk. When formulated in terms of linguistic rather than numeric attributes, the risk can be computed through an algorithm based on the notion of fuzzy sets. Similarly, this formulation allows one to analyze the optimal resource allocation by maximizing the overall detection probability, regarded as a linguistic variable. After summarizing the necessary elements of the fuzzy sets theory, we outline the basic algorithm. This is followed by a sample computation of the fuzzy optimization. 10 refs., 1 tab.

  19. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    DOE PAGES

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; ...

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocolsmore » and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.« less

  20. Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

    SciTech Connect

    Worrall, Louise G.; Worrall, Andrew; Flanagan, George F.; Croft, Steven

    2016-04-21

    We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235U- and 239Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

  1. Trigger finger

    MedlinePlus

    ... Redness in your cut or hand Swelling or warmth in your cut or hand Yellow or green drainage from the cut Hand pain or discomfort Fever If your trigger finger returns, call your surgeon. You may need another surgery.

  2. Safeguards.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Taylor, Steve, Ed.; And Others

    1993-01-01

    This policy bulletin addresses the issue of protecting the safety of people with developmental disabilities from their increased risk of neglect, abuse, and mistreatment. An article by Steven J. Taylor considers "The Paradox of Regulations," noting both the protective effects of regulations and their effect in stifling innovation and…

  3. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY09

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Robert Bean

    2009-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope is a strategy to determine a set of specific operating parameters which nuclear facilities may operate within to maximize safeguards effectiveness without sacrificing safety or plant efficiency. This paper details advanced statistical techniques will be applied to real plant process monitoring (PM) data from the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). As a result of the U.S. having no operating nuclear chemical reprocessing plants, there has been a strong interest in obtaining process monitoring data from the ICPP. The ICPP was shut down in 1996 and a recent effort has been made to retrieve the PM data from storage in a data mining effort. In a simulation based on this data, multi-tank and multi-attribute correlations were tested against synthetic diversion scenarios. Kernel regression smoothing was used to fit a curve to the historical data, and multivariable, residual analysis and cumulative sum techniques set parameters for operating conditions. Diversion scenarios were created and tested, showing improved results when compared with a previous study utilizing only one-variable Z- testing7.

  4. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  5. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  6. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates...

  7. 34 CFR 104.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards. 104.36 Section 104.36 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 104.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates...

  8. 32 CFR 154.68 - Safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Safeguarding procedures. 154.68 Section 154.68 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SECURITY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records §...

  9. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  10. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  11. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  12. 5 CFR 2500.9 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding. 2500.9 Section 2500.9 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT INFORMATION SECURITY REGULATION § 2500.9 Safeguarding. The Office of Administration shall protect information in its...

  13. 38 CFR 18.436 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... or are believed to need special instruction or related services. The system shall include: (1) Notice... Adult Education § 18.436 Procedural safeguards. (a) A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary education program shall implement a system of procedural safeguards with respect to...

  14. IMPLEMENTING THE SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN PROCESS

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, J Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC&A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  15. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  16. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  17. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  18. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  19. 28 CFR 25.8 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false System safeguards. 25.8 Section 25.8 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS The National Instant Criminal Background Check System § 25.8 System safeguards. (a) Information maintained in the...

  20. Safeguards and retrievability from waste forms

    SciTech Connect

    Danker, W.

    1996-05-01

    This report describes issues discussed at a session from the PLutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop related to safeguards and retrievability from waste forms. Throughout the discussion, the group probed the goals of disposition efforts, particularly an understanding of the {open_quotes}spent fuel standard{close_quotes}, since the disposition material form derives from these goals. The group felt strongly that not only the disposition goals but safeguards to meet these goals could affect the material form. Accordingly, the Department was encouraged to explore and apply safeguards as early in the implementation process as possible. It was emphasized that this was particularly true for any planned use of existing facilities. It is much easier to build safeguards approaches into the development of new facilities, than to backfit existing facilities. Accordingly, special safeguards challenges are likely to be encountered, given the cost and schedule advantages offered by use of existing facilities.

  1. Triggering Klystrons

    SciTech Connect

    Stefan, Kelton D.; /Purdue U. /SLAC

    2010-08-25

    To determine if klystrons will perform to the specifications of the LCLS (Linac Coherent Light Source) project, a new digital trigger controller is needed for the Klystron/Microwave Department Test Laboratory. The controller needed to be programmed and Windows based user interface software needed to be written to interface with the device over a USB (Universal Serial Bus). Programming the device consisted of writing logic in VHDL (VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated Circuits) hardware description language), and the Windows interface software was written in C++. Xilinx ISE (Integrated Software Environment) was used to compile the VHDL code and program the device, and Microsoft Visual Studio 2005 was used to compile the C++ based Windows software. The device was programmed in such a way as to easily allow read/write operations to it using a simple addressing model, and Windows software was developed to interface with the device over a USB connection. A method of setting configuration registers in the trigger device is absolutely necessary to the development of a new triggering system, and the method developed will fulfill this need adequately. More work is needed before the new trigger system is ready for use. The configuration registers in the device need to be fully integrated with the logic that will generate the RF signals, and this system will need to be tested extensively to determine if it meets the requirements for low noise trigger outputs.

  2. Safeguards for spent fuels: Verification problems

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1991-01-01

    The accumulation of large quantities of spent nuclear fuels world-wide is a serious problem for international safeguards. A number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member states, including the US, consider spent fuel to be a material form for which safeguards cannot be terminated, even after permanent disposal in a geologic repository. Because safeguards requirements for spent fuels are different from those of conventional bulk-handling and item-accounting facilities, there is room for innovation to design a unique safeguards regime for spent fuels that satisfies the goals of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty at a reasonable cost to both the facility and the IAEA. Various strategies being pursued for long-term management of spent fuels are examined with a realistic example to illustrate the problems of verifying safeguards under the present regime. Verification of a safeguards regime for spent fuels requires a mix of standard safeguards approaches, such as quantitative verification and use of seals, with other measures that are unique to spent fuels. 17 refs.

  3. Safeguards: The past present, and future

    SciTech Connect

    Seaton, M.B.

    1987-07-01

    The non-destructive assay techniques developed at Los Alamos have become a primary means for verification by the IAEA and most important for domestic safeguards. We must challenge our assumptions, e.g., that inventory differences are a valid measure of safeguards performance, that more money is the solution, and the threats are much exaggerated. A human reliability program will be initiated. Material control, accounting, and physical protection need further integration. A serious effort involving scholarships, internships, etc. is needed to attract and motivate young people. Increased emphasis will be placed on designing safeguards into new systems such as laser isotope separation. Finally, continuing generous support for the IAEA is most important.

  4. IAEA Safeguards: Past, Present, and Future

    SciTech Connect

    Santi, Peter A.; Hypes, Philip A.

    2012-06-14

    This talk will present an overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency with a specific focus on its international safeguards mission and activities. The talk will first present a brief history of the IAEA and discuss its current governing structure. It will then focus on the Safeguards Department and its role in providing assurance that nuclear materials are being used for peaceful purposes. It will then look at how the IAEA is currently evolving the way in which it executes its safeguards mission with a focus on the idea of a state-level approach.

  5. SAFEGUARDS CULTURE: WHAT IS IT AND DOES IT MATTER?

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-11-01

    The concepts of safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. With the support of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) the authors have attempted a rigorous analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, with the goal of determining its value to the international safeguards community, and to provide recommendations as to whether the concept deserves further development. As part of this analysis, the authors explore the distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance. The authors also discuss synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture.

  6. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  7. 34 CFR 303.415 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... Intervention Records § 303.415 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of... stages. (b) One official at each participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring...

  8. 34 CFR 303.415 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... Intervention Records § 303.415 Safeguards. (a) Each participating agency must protect the confidentiality of... stages. (b) One official at each participating agency must assume responsibility for ensuring...

  9. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific controls on the use, processing, storage, reproduction, and transmittal of classified information within the Department to provide protection for such information and to prevent access by...

  10. 22 CFR 9.13 - Safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION REGULATIONS § 9.13 Safeguarding. Specific controls on the use, processing, storage, reproduction, and transmittal of classified information within the Department to provide protection for such information and to prevent access by...

  11. Advanced safeguards for the nuclear renaissance

    SciTech Connect

    Miller, Michael C; Menlove, Howard O

    2008-01-01

    The global expansion of nuclear energy provides not only the benefit of carbon-neutral electricity, but also the potential for proliferation concern as well. Nuclear safeguards implemented at the state level (domestic) and at the international level by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are essential for ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused and are thereby a critical component of the increased usage of nuclear energy. In the same way that the 1950's Atoms for Peace initiative provided the foundation for a robust research and development program in nuclear safeguards, the expansion of nuclear energy that is underway today provides the impetus to enter a new era of technical development in the safeguards community. In this paper, we will review the history of nuclear safeguards research and development as well future directions.

  12. Safeguards Workforce Repatriation, Retention and Utilization

    SciTech Connect

    Gallucci, Nicholas; Poe, Sarah

    2015-10-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory was tasked by NA-241 to assess the transition of former IAEA employees back to the United States, investigating the rate of retention and overall smoothness of the repatriation process among returning safeguards professionals. Upon conducting several phone interviews, study authors found that the repatriation process went smoothly for the vast majority and that workforce retention was high. However, several respondents expressed irritation over the minimal extent to which their safeguards expertise had been leveraged in their current positions. This sentiment was pervasive enough to prompt a follow-on study focusing on questions relating to the utilization rather than the retention of safeguards professionals. A second, web-based survey was conducted, soliciting responses from a larger sample pool. Results suggest that the safeguards workforce may be oversaturated, and that young professionals returning to the United States from Agency positions may soon encounter difficulties finding jobs in the field.

  13. The Concept of Goals-Driven Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    R. Wigeland; T Bjornard; B. Castle

    2009-02-01

    The IAEA, NRC, and DOE regulations and requirements for safeguarding nuclear material and facilities have been reviewed and each organization’s purpose, objectives, and scope are discussed in this report. Current safeguards approaches are re-examined considering technological advancements and how these developments are changing safeguards approaches used by these organizations. Additionally, the physical protection approaches required by the IAEA, NRC, and DOE were reviewed and the respective goals, objectives, and requirements are identified and summarized in this report. From these, a brief comparison is presented showing the high-level similarities among these regulatory organizations’ approaches to physical protection. The regulatory documents used in this paper have been assembled into a convenient reference library called the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Reference Library. The index of that library is included in this report, and DVDs containing the full library are available.

  14. Security Management and Safeguards Office

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Bewley, Nathaniel M.

    2004-01-01

    The Security Management and Safeguards Office at NASA is here to keep the people working in a safe environment. They also are here to protect the buildings and documents from sabotage, espionage, and theft. During the summer of 2004, I worked with Richard Soppet in Physical Security. While I was working here I helped out with updating the map that we currently use at NASA Glenn Research Center, attended meetings for homeland security, worked with the security guards and the locksmith. The meetings that I attended for homeland security talked about how to protect ourselves before something happened, they told us to always be on the guard and look for anything suspicious, and the different ways that terrorist groups operate. When I was with the security guards I was taught how to check someone into the base, showed how to use a radar gun, observed a security guard make a traffic stop for training and was with them while they patrolled NASA Glenn Research Center to make sure things were running smooth and no one was in danger. When I was with the lock smith I was taught how to make keys and locks for the employees here at NASA. The lock smith also showed me that he had inventory cabinets of files that show how many keys were out to people and who currently has access to the rooms that they keys were made for. I also helped out the open house at NASA Glenn Research Center. I helped out by showing the Army Reserves, and Brook Park's SWAT team where all the main events were going to take place a week before the open house was going to begin. Then during the open house I helped out by making sure people had there IDS, checked through there bags, and handed out a map to them that showed where the different activities were going to take place. So the main job here at NASA Glenn Research Center for the Security Management and Safeguards Office is to make sure that nothing is stolen, sabotaged, and espionaged. Also most importantly make sure all the employees here at NASA are

  15. AFCI Safeguards Enhancement Study: Technology Development Roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, Leon E.; Dougan, A.; Tobin, Stephen; Cipiti, B.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Bakel, A. J.; Bean, Robert; Grate, Jay W.; Santi, P.; Bryan, Steven; Kinlaw, M. T.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Burr, Tom; Lehn, Scott A.; Tolk, K.; Chichester, David; Menlove, H.; Vo, D.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Merkle, P.; Wang, T. F.; Duran, F.; Nakae, L.; Warren, Glen A.; Friedrich, S.; Rabin, M.

    2008-12-31

    The Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) Safeguards Campaign aims to develop safeguards technologies and processes that will significantly reduce the risk of proliferation in the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle of tomorrow. The Safeguards Enhancement Study was chartered with identifying promising research and development (R&D) directions over timescales both near-term and long-term, and under safeguards oversight both domestic and international. This technology development roadmap documents recognized gaps and needs in the safeguarding of nuclear fuel cycles, and outlines corresponding performance targets for each of those needs. Drawing on the collective expertise of technologists and user-representatives, a list of over 30 technologies that have the potential to meet those needs was developed, along with brief summaries of each candidate technology. Each summary describes the potential impact of that technology, key research questions to be addressed, and prospective development milestones that could lead to a definitive viability or performance assessment. Important programmatic linkages between U.S. agencies and offices are also described, reflecting the emergence of several safeguards R&D programs in the U.S. and the reinvigoration of nuclear fuel cycles across the globe.

  16. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Richard; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-06-24

    U.S. efforts to promote the international expansion of nuclear energy through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) will result in a dramatic expansion of nuclear fuel cycle facilities in the United States. New demonstration facilities, such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF), the Advanced Burner Reactor (ABR), and the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) will use advanced nuclear and chemical process technologies that must incorporate increased proliferation resistance to enhance nuclear safeguards. The ASA-100 Project, “Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities,” commissioned by the NA-243 Office of NNSA, has been tasked with reviewing and developing advanced safeguards approaches for these demonstration facilities. Because one goal of GNEP is developing and sharing proliferation-resistant nuclear technology and services with partner nations, the safeguards approaches considered are consistent with international safeguards as currently implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This first report reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new fuel reprocessing processes to be deployed at the AFCF and CFTC facilities. Similar analyses addressing the ABR and transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication lines at AFCF and CFTC will be presented in subsequent reports.

  17. FUTURE SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; J. F. PILAT

    2000-09-01

    With new safeguards measures (under old and new authority) now available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there will be fundamental changes in the manner IAEA safeguards are implemented, raising questions about their effectiveness in meeting expanded Agency safeguards objectives. In order to characterize the capability of various safeguards approaches in meeting their objectives, it will be necessary to fully understand what is involved in the new safeguards equation. Both old and new measures will be required to construct a comprehensive picture of a State's nuclear activities and capabilities, and they both have strengths and weaknesses. There are (for political and cost reasons) likely to be tradeoffs between the two types of measures. Significant differences among measures with respect to the probability of their detecting an anomaly, along with other characteristics, need be considered in this context. Given the important role of both types of measures in future approaches, their inherent differences with regard to their capabilities and limitations, and their potential impact on the credibility of safeguards, it will be essential to consider these measures systematically, independently, and in combination in any effectiveness evaluation. This paper will consider concepts and issues in addressing this need.

  18. Safeguards Envelope: The First Steps

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Jean Ragusa; Robert Bean

    2008-03-01

    The possibility exists for real time accountancy and assay of nuclear materials as they move through a reprocessing facility. This project aims to establish working parameters and local figures of merit to identify possible diversion in real time with minimal operational impact. Factors such as pH, NOX gas concentration, flow speeds and radiation fields are rarely taken into account in safeguards methodologies and will be included to increase the confidence of location and assay of nuclear materials. An adaptable, real data model is being created of the contactors of the Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility and will be analyzed using the appropriate modeling codes. This model will then be subjected to three, diversion scenarios and a figure of merit methodology will be utilized to create the operational parameters under which these diversion scenarios would be detected. This analysis for figure of merit methodology will include statistical fluctuations, operator error, and a rudimentary analysis of transient conditions. The long term goal of the project includes expansion universally over the plant, methods of detection without requiring access to proprietary information, and an evaluation of the requirements for future figure of merit methodologies.

  19. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.; Rosenthal, M.; Fishbone, L.; Occhiogrosso, D.; Carroll, C.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Rankhauser, J.

    2008-10-22

    In 2007, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a yearlong review of the challenges facing the international safeguards system today and over the next 25 years. The study found that without new investment in international safeguards, the U.S. safeguards technology base, and our ability to support International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, will continue to erode and soon may be at risk. To reverse this trend, the then U.S. Secretary of Energy, Samuel Bodman, announced at the 2007 IAEA General Conference that the Department of Energy (DOE) would launch the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). He stated 'IAEA safeguards must be robust and capable of addressing proliferation threats. Full confidence in IAEA safeguards is essential for nuclear power to grow safely and securely. To this end, the U.S. Department of Energy will seek to ensure that modern technology, the best scientific expertise, and adequate resources are available to keep pace with expanding IAEA responsibilities.' To meet this goal, the NGSI objectives include the recruitment of international safeguards experts to work at the U.S. national laboratories and to serve at the IAEA's headquarters. Part of the latter effort will involve enhancing our existing efforts to place well-qualified Americans in a sufficient number of key safeguards positions within the IAEA's Department of Safeguards. Accordingly, the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards (ERIS) on October 22 and 23, 2008. The ISPO used a workshop format developed earlier with Sonalysts, Inc., that was followed at the U.S. Support Program's (USSP's) technology road-mapping sessions. ISPO invited participants from the U.S. DOE, the IAEA, the U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who either

  20. Building a Successful Machine Safeguarding Program

    SciTech Connect

    McConnell, S

    2003-03-06

    Safeguarding hazards associated with machines is a goal common to all health and safety professionals. Whether the individual is new to the safety field or has held associated responsibilities for a period of time, safeguarding personnel who work with or around machine tools and equipment should be considered an important aspect of the job. Although significant progress has been made in terms of safeguarding machines since the era prior to the organized safety movement, companies continue to be cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and workers continue to be injured, even killed by machine tools and equipment. In the early 1900s, it was common practice to operate transmission machinery (gears, belts, pulleys, shafting, etc.) completely unguarded. At that time, the countersunk set screw used on shafting had not been invented and projecting set screws were involved in many horrific accidents. Manufacturers built machines with little regard for worker safety. Workers were killed or seriously injured before definitive actions were taken to improve safety in the workplace. Many states adopted legislation aimed at requiring machine guarding and improved injury reduction. The first patent for a machine safeguard was issued in 1868 for a mechanical interlock. Other patents followed. As methods for safeguarding machinery and tools were developed, standards were written and programs were set up to monitor factories for compliance. Many of those standards continue to govern how we protect workers today. It is common to see machine tools built in the forties, fifties and sixties being used in machine shops today. In terms of safeguarding, these machines may be considered poorly designed, improperly safeguarded or simply unguarded. In addition to the potential threat of an OSHA citation, these conditions expose the operator to serious hazards that must be addressed. The safety professional can help line management determine workable solutions for

  1. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  2. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tape, James W

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  3. The Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. A discussion of the Safeguards Evaluation Method is presented in this paper.

  4. SAFEGUARDS ENVELOPE: PREVIOUS WORK AND EXAMPLES

    SciTech Connect

    Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill; William Charlton; Robert Bean

    2008-07-01

    The future expansion of nuclear power will require not just electricity production but fuel cycle facilities such as fuel fabrication and reprocessing plants. As large reprocessing facilities are built in various states, they must be built and operated in a manner to minimize the risk of nuclear proliferation. Process monitoring has returned to the spotlight as an added measure that can increase confidence in the safeguards of special nuclear material (SNM). Process monitoring can be demonstrated to lengthen the allowable inventory period by reducing accountancy requirements, and to reduce the false positive indications. The next logical step is the creation of a Safeguards Envelope, a set of operational parameters and models to maximize anomaly detection and inventory period by process monitoring while minimizing operator impact and false positive rates. A brief example of a rudimentary Safeguards Envelope is presented, and shown to detect synthetic diversions overlaying a measured processing plant data set. This demonstration Safeguards Envelope is shown to increase the confidence that no SNM has been diverted with minimal operator impact, even though it is based on an information sparse environment. While the foundation on which a full Safeguards Envelope can be built has been presented in historical demonstrations of process monitoring, several requirements remain yet unfulfilled. Future work will require reprocessing plant transient models, inclusion of “non-traditional” operating data, and exploration of new methods of identifying subtle events in transient processes.

  5. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-08-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues.

  6. Training in Environmental Analyses for Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Williams, R W; Gaffney, A M; Hutcheon, N A; Kersting, A B

    2009-05-28

    Responding to recommendations of the DOE/NNSA's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, a new course, Training in Environmental Sample Analysis for IAEA Safeguards, is being offered as a summer internship opportunity at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The first students completed the 8 week program during the summer of 2008. Interns are given training in the analysis of bulk environmental samples for safeguards through hands-on experience working in a clean laboratory, purifying U and Pu from bulk environmental samples, and measuring U and Pu isotope ratios by multi-collector ICP mass spectrometry. A series of lectures by invited safeguards and non-proliferation experts gives the students a broad picture of the safeguards work of the IAEA. At the end of the course, the students prepare a poster of their work to showcase at LLNL's summer student poster symposium. Both undergraduate and graduate students are recruited and hired as paid interns under the aegis of the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute in the Physical and Life Sciences Directorate at LLNL. This training course seeks to introduce students to analytical and interpretive skill-sets that are not generally taught at universities, and to encourage them to pursue careers with the IAEA.

  7. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  8. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    SciTech Connect

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems.

  9. Firearm trigger assembly

    DOEpatents

    Crandall, David L.; Watson, Richard W.

    2010-02-16

    A firearm trigger assembly for use with a firearm includes a trigger mounted to a forestock of the firearm so that the trigger is movable between a rest position and a triggering position by a forwardly placed support hand of a user. An elongated trigger member operatively associated with the trigger operates a sear assembly of the firearm when the trigger is moved to the triggering position. An action release assembly operatively associated with the firearm trigger assembly and a movable assembly of the firearm prevents the trigger from being moved to the triggering position when the movable assembly is not in the locked position.

  10. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    SciTech Connect

    Burbank, Roberta L.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Gitau, Ernest TN; Shergur, Jason M.; Scholz, Melissa A.; Undem, Halvor A.

    2014-03-28

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI’s ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI’s long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  11. The evolution of information-driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Budlong-sylvester, Kory W; Pilat, Joseph F

    2010-10-14

    From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

  12. Reactor monitoring and safeguards using antineutrino detectors

    SciTech Connect

    Bowden, N S

    2008-09-07

    Nuclear reactors have served as the antineutrino source for many fundamental physics experiments. The techniques developed by these experiments make it possible to use these very weakly interacting particles for a practical purpose. The large flux of antineutrinos that leaves a reactor carries information about two quantities of interest for safeguards: the reactor power and fissile inventory. Measurements made with antineutrino detectors could therefore offer an alternative means for verifying the power history and fissile inventory of a reactors, as part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other reactor safeguards regimes. Several efforts to develop this monitoring technique are underway across the globe.

  13. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated within parts 50, 56, 312, 314, and 600 of this chapter designed to ensure the safety of clinical...

  14. 29 CFR 452.83 - Enforcement of campaign safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Enforcement of campaign safeguards. 452.83 Section 452.83... AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 Campaign Safeguards § 452.83 Enforcement of campaign safeguards. Certain of... statutory right to sue is limited to the distribution of campaign literature by the labor organization...

  15. 10 CFR 1.13 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 1.13 Section 1... Headquarters Panels, Boards, and Committees § 1.13 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) was established by section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,...

  16. 10 CFR 1.13 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 1.13 Section 1... Headquarters Panels, Boards, and Committees § 1.13 Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) was established by section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,...

  17. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  18. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  19. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  20. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  1. 10 CFR Appendix G to Part 73 - Reportable Safeguards Events

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Reportable Safeguards Events G Appendix G to Part 73.... G Appendix G to Part 73—Reportable Safeguards Events Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.71 (b... shall report or record, as appropriate, the following safeguards events. I. Events to be reported...

  2. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  3. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  4. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  5. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  6. 10 CFR 75.7 - Notification of IAEA safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Notification of IAEA safeguards. 75.7 Section 75.7 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR MATERIAL-IMPLEMENTATION OF US/IAEA AGREEMENT General Provisions § 75.7 Notification of IAEA safeguards. (a) The licensee must inform the...

  7. 16 CFR 314.3 - Standards for safeguarding customer information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 16 Commercial Practices 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Standards for safeguarding customer... OF CONGRESS STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING CUSTOMER INFORMATION § 314.3 Standards for safeguarding customer information. (a) Information security program. You shall develop, implement, and maintain...

  8. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated... includes the requirements for informed consent (part 50 of this chapter) and institutional review...

  9. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 5 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Safeguards for patient safety. 312.88 Section 312... Severely-debilitating Illnesses § 312.88 Safeguards for patient safety. All of the safeguards incorporated... includes the requirements for informed consent (part 50 of this chapter) and institutional review...

  10. 45 CFR 164.312 - Technical safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Information § 164.312 Technical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1) Standard: Access control. Implement technical policies and procedures for electronic information systems that maintain electronic protected health information to allow access only to those persons or...

  11. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... business processes for protection of the security of electronic protected health information while... Information § 164.308 Administrative safeguards. (a) A covered entity or business associate must, in accordance with § 164.306: (1)(i) Standard: Security management process. Implement policies and procedures...

  12. 45 CFR 164.308 - Administrative safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... business processes for protection of the security of electronic protected health information while... Information § 164.308 Administrative safeguards. (a) A covered entity or business associate must, in accordance with § 164.306: (1)(i) Standard: Security management process. Implement policies and procedures...

  13. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  14. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  15. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  16. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare Department of Health and Human Services GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  17. 45 CFR 84.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Procedural safeguards. 84.36 Section 84.36 Public Welfare DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL ADMINISTRATION NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF HANDICAP IN PROGRAMS OR ACTIVITIES RECEIVING FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Preschool, Elementary,...

  18. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  19. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  20. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  1. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  2. 45 CFR 605.36 - Procedural safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare (Continued) NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION... Preschool, Elementary, and Secondary Education § 605.36 Procedural safeguards. A recipient that operates a... that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to examine...

  3. Evaluating safeguard effectiveness against violent insiders

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Fortney, D.S.

    1990-07-16

    The threat posed by a violent insiders presents a major challenge to safeguards managers. These insiders, in addition to their ability to exploit their special authorities, access, and knowledge of facility operations and safeguards, could use violence to defeat safeguards components and personnel. In protecting against theft of special nuclear material, facilities have emphasized the use of perimeter protection and physical barriers to protect against attacks by an outsider adversary group. Recently emphasis has begun to shift toward the implementation of hardware and procedural measures to protect against nonviolent insiders. Approaches are also needed to help assess the effectiveness of protection against those insiders who are willing to use violence. In this paper we describe an approach we're developing for dealing with violent insiders. We begin by categorizing insiders according to whether they are active or passive, rational or irrational, and whether they are willing to use force against safeguards components or coworkers. We define characteristics of each category, and describe the extent to which each category is adequately modelled by existing evaluation tools. We also discuss several modelling issues posed by active insiders, including: entry of contraband; reluctance to use violence; neutralization of insiders; and the ability to switch modes of attack between force, stealth, and deceit. 5 refs., 2 figs.

  4. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false System safeguards. 49.24 Section 49.24 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION (CONTINUED) SWAP...) Information security; (2) Business continuity—disaster recovery planning and resources; (3) Capacity...

  5. 17 CFR 49.24 - System safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 17 Commodity and Securities Exchanges 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false System safeguards. 49.24 Section 49.24 Commodity and Securities Exchanges COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION SWAP DATA... shall address each of the following categories of risk analysis and oversight: (1) Information...

  6. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards.

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-09-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  7. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Fast Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Boyer, Brian; Wallace, Rick L.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Kovacic, Don N.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This third report in the series reviews possible safeguards approaches for new fast reactors in general, and the ABR in particular. Fast-neutron spectrum reactors have been used since the early 1960s on an experimental and developmental level, generally with fertile blanket fuels to “breed” nuclear fuel such as plutonium. Whether the reactor is designed to breed plutonium, or transmute and “burn” actinides depends mainly on the design of the reactor neutron reflector and the whether the blanket fuel is “fertile” or suitable for transmutation. However, the safeguards issues are very similar, since they pertain mainly to the receipt, shipment and storage of fresh and spent plutonium and actinide-bearing “TRU”-fuel. For these reasons, the design of existing fast reactors and details concerning how they have been safeguarded were studied in developing advanced safeguards approaches for the new fast reactors. In this regard, the design of the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II “EBR-II” at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) was of interest, because it was designed as a collocated fast reactor with a pyrometallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication line – a design option being considered for the ABR. Similarly, the design of the Fast Flux Facility (FFTF) on the Hanford Site was studied, because it was a successful prototype fast reactor that ran for two decades to evaluate fuels and the design for commercial-scale fast reactors.

  8. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  9. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... costly to the Air Force. To keep requests for CILs at a minimum: (a) Personnel officers will tell members... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Safeguarding certificates. 887.2 Section 887.2 National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL...

  10. 32 CFR 887.2 - Safeguarding certificates.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... costly to the Air Force. To keep requests for CILs at a minimum: (a) Personnel officers will tell members... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Safeguarding certificates. 887.2 Section 887.2 National Defense Department of Defense (Continued) DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE MILITARY PERSONNEL...

  11. 45 CFR 164.310 - Physical safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... storage (Addressable). Create a retrievable, exact copy of electronic protected health information, when... Information § 164.310 Physical safeguards. A covered entity must, in accordance with § 164.306: (a)(1... electronic information systems and the facility or facilities in which they are housed, while ensuring...

  12. Readability of Special Education Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Mandic, Carmen Gomez; Rudd, Rima; Hehir, Thomas; Acevedo-Garcia, Dolores

    2012-01-01

    This study focused on literacy-related barriers to understanding the rights of students with disabilities and their parents within the special education system. SMOG readability scores were determined for procedural safeguards documents issued by all state departments of education. The average reading grade level was 16; 6% scored in the high…

  13. Applications of Virtual Reality to Nuclear Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stansfield, S.

    1998-11-03

    This paper explores two potential applications of Virtual Reality (VR) to international nuclear safeguards: training and information organization and navigation. The applications are represented by two existing prototype systems, one for training nuclear weapons dismantlement and one utilizing a VR model to facilitate intuitive access to related sets of information.

  14. "Safeguarding" Sports Coaching: Foucault, Genealogy and Critique

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Garratt, Dean; Piper, Heather; Taylor, Bill

    2013-01-01

    This paper offers a genealogical account of safeguarding in sport. Drawing specifically on Foucault's work, it examines the "politics of touch" in relation to the social and historical formation of child protection policy in sports coaching. While the analysis has some resonance with the context of coaching as a whole, for illustrative…

  15. Mass-spectrometric measurements for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Carter, J.A.; Smith, D.H.; Walker, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    The need of an on-site inspection device to provide isotopic ratio measurements led to the development of a quadrupole mass spectrometer mounted in a van. This mobile laboratory has the ability, through the use of the resin bead technique, to acquire, prepare, and analyze samples of interest to nuclear safeguards. Precision of the measurements is about 1 to 2%.

  16. Strengthening IAEA Safeguards for Research Reactors

    SciTech Connect

    Reid, Bruce D.; Anzelon, George A.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory

    2016-09-01

    During their December 10-11, 2013, workshop in Grenoble France, which focused on the history and future of safeguarding research reactors, the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) agreed to conduct a joint study exploring ways to strengthen the IAEA’s safeguards approach for declared research reactors. This decision was prompted by concerns about: 1) historical cases of non-compliance involving misuse (including the use of non-nuclear materials for production of neutron generators for weapons) and diversion that were discovered, in many cases, long after the violations took place and as part of broader pattern of undeclared activities in half a dozen countries; 2) the fact that, under the Safeguards Criteria, the IAEA inspects some reactors (e.g., those with power levels under 25 MWt) less than once per year; 3) the long-standing precedent of States using heavy water research reactors (HWRR) to produce plutonium for weapons programs; 4) the use of HEU fuel in some research reactors; and 5) various technical characteristics common to some types of research reactors that could provide an opportunity for potential proliferators to misuse the facility or divert material with low probability of detection by the IAEA. In some research reactors it is difficult to detect diversion or undeclared irradiation. In addition, infrastructure associated with research reactors could pose a safeguards challenge. To strengthen the effectiveness of safeguards at the State level, this paper advocates that the IAEA consider ways to focus additional attention and broaden its safeguards toolbox for research reactors. This increase in focus on the research reactors could begin with the recognition that the research reactor (of any size) could be a common path element on a large number of technically plausible pathways that must be considered when performing acquisition pathway analysis (APA) for developing a State Level Approach (SLA) and Annual Implementation Plan (AIP). To

  17. Safeguards Guidance for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities – International Safeguards Requirements for Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Scott DeMuth; Brent McGinnis; Michael Whitaker; James Morgan

    2010-04-01

    For the past two years, the United States National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of International Regimes and Agreements (NA-243), has sponsored the Safeguards-by-Design Project, through which it is hoped new nuclear facilities will be designed and constructed worldwide more amenable to nuclear safeguards. In the course of this project it was recognized that commercial designer/builders of nuclear facilities are not always aware of, or understand, the relevant domestic and international safeguards requirements, especially the latter as implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To help commercial designer/builders better understand these requirements, a report was prepared by the Safeguards-by-Design Project Team that articulated and interpreted the international nuclear safeguards requirements for the initial case of uranium enrichment plants. The following paper summarizes the subject report, the specific requirements, where they originate, and the implications for design and construction. It also briefly summarizes the established best design and operating practices that designer/builder/operators have implemented for currently meeting these requirements. In preparing the subject report, it is recognized that the best practices are continually evolving as the designer/builder/operators and IAEA consider even more effective and efficient means for meeting the safeguards requirements and objectives.

  18. Safeguard Application Options for the Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS)

    SciTech Connect

    Laughter, Mark D

    2008-10-01

    Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) are developing a Laser-Based Item Monitoring System (LBIMS) for advanced safeguards at nuclear facilities. LBIMS uses a low-power laser transceiver to monitor the presence and position of items with retroreflective tags. The primary advantages of LBIMS are its scalability to continuously monitor a wide range of items, its ability to operate unattended, its low cost of implementation, and its inherent information security due to its line-of-sight and non-broadcasting operation. The primary proposed safeguard application of LBIMS is described in its name: item monitoring. LBIMS could be implemented in a storage area to continuously monitor containers of nuclear material and the area in which they are stored. The system could be configured to provide off-site notification if any of the containers are moved or removed or if the area is accessed. Individual tags would be used to monitor storage containers, and additional tags could be used to record information regarding secondary storage units and room access. The capability to register small changes in tag position opens up the possibility of several other uses. These include continuously monitoring piping arrangements for design information verification or recording equipment positions for other safeguards systems, such as tracking the opening and closing of autoclaves as part of a cylinder tracking system or opening and closing valves on a sample or product take-off line. Combined with attribute tags, which transmit information from any kind of sensor by modulating the laser signal, LBIMS provides the capability to wirelessly and securely collect safeguards data, even in areas where radio-frequency or other wireless communication methods are not practicable. Four application types are described in this report: static item monitoring, in-process item monitoring with trigger tags, multi-layered integration with trigger tags, and line-of-sight data transfer with

  19. Safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G.; Remagen, H.H.; Weh, R.

    1989-11-01

    In the Federal Republic of Germany, the concept of spent-fuel management is based on a closed fuel cycle that has the following principal features: (1) intermediate dry storage of spent fuel; (2) reprocessing; (3) thermal recycling of unconsumed nuclear material; and (4) conditioning and final disposal of radioactive waste. Complementary to this concept, methods and techniques for the direct final disposal of spent fuel are under development, including investigations of licensing issues. Furthermore, a licensing procedure is under way for the construction of a pilot conditioning plant close to the Gorleben dry storage facility. Apart from operational safety and environmental protection, the issue of international safeguards is of paramount interest. This paper discusses safeguards aspects of spent-fuel management related to direct final disposal.

  20. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE DUPIC SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM

    SciTech Connect

    H. KIM; H. CHA; ET AL

    2001-02-01

    A safeguards system has been developed since 1993 in the course of supporting a fuel cycle process to fabricate CANDU fuel with spent PWR fuel (known as Direct Use of PWR spent fuel In CANDU, DUPIC). The major safeguards technology involved here was to design and fabricate a neutron coincidence counting system for process accountability, and also an unattended continuous monitoring system in association with independent verification by the IAEA. This combined technology was to produce information of nuclear material content and to maintain knowledge of the continuity of nuclear material flow. In addition to hardware development, diagnosis software is being developed to assist data acquisition, data review, and data evaluation based on a neural network system on the IAEA C/S system.

  1. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    SciTech Connect

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Shirley J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2011-10-10

    The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its nonproliferation obligations. The IAEA draws such conclusions from the evaluation of all available information. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of this “State-level” approach. Efficiently used, the Safeguards by Design (SBD) methodologies , , , now being developed can contribute to effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards. The Facility Safeguardability Assessment (FSA) introduced here supports SBD in three areas. 1. It describes necessary interactions between the IAEA, the State regulator, and the owner / designer of a new or modified facility to determine where SBD efforts can be productively applied, 2. It presents a screening approach intended to identify potential safeguard issues for; a) design changes to existing facilities; b) new facilities similar to existing facilities with approved safeguards approaches, and c) new designs, 3. It identifies resources (the FSA toolkit), such as good practice guides, design guidance, and safeguardability evaluation methods that can be used by the owner/designer to develop solutions for potential safeguards issues during the interactions with the State regulator and IAEA. FSA presents a structured framework for the application of the SBD tools developed in other efforts. The more a design evolves, the greater the probability that new safeguards issues could be introduced. Likewise, for first-of-a-kind facilities or research facilities that involve previously unused processes or technologies, it is reasonable to expect that a number of possible safeguards issues might exist. Accordingly, FSA is intended to help the designer and its safeguards experts identify early in the design process: • Areas where elements of previous accepted safeguards approach(es) may be applied

  2. Science and Technology Challenges for International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein

    2009-07-01

    The science and technology challenges for international safeguards range from cutting edge physics needs to practical technology solutions for high volume data handling and analysis issues. This paper will take a narrow look at some of the predominant challenges, which include those at high throughput commercial facilities and those in the detection of undeclared facilities. It is hoped that by highlighting these areas it can encourage a concerted effort by scientific institutions and industry to provide robust cost-effective solutions.

  3. Pebble bed modular reactor safeguards: developing new approaches and implementing safeguards by design

    SciTech Connect

    Beyer, Brian David; Beddingfield, David H; Durst, Philip; Bean, Robert

    2010-01-01

    The design of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) does not fit or seem appropriate to the IAEA safeguards approach under the categories of light water reactor (LWR), on-load refueled reactor (OLR, i.e. CANDU), or Other (prismatic HTGR) because the fuel is in a bulk form, rather than discrete items. Because the nuclear fuel is a collection of nuclear material inserted in tennis-ball sized spheres containing structural and moderating material and a PBMR core will contain a bulk load on the order of 500,000 spheres, it could be classified as a 'Bulk-Fuel Reactor.' Hence, the IAEA should develop unique safeguards criteria. In a multi-lab DOE study, it was found that an optimized blend of: (i) developing techniques to verify the plutonium content in spent fuel pebbles, (ii) improving burn-up computer codes for PBMR spent fuel to provide better understanding of the core and spent fuel makeup, and (iii) utilizing bulk verification techniques for PBMR spent fuel storage bins should be combined with the historic IAEA and South African approaches of containment and surveillance to verify and maintain continuity of knowledge of PBMR fuel. For all of these techniques to work the design of the reactor will need to accommodate safeguards and material accountancy measures to a far greater extent than has thus far been the case. The implementation of Safeguards-by-Design as the PBMR design progresses provides an approach to meets these safeguards and accountancy needs.

  4. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  5. Safeguard Requirements for Fusion Power Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert J. Goldston and Alexander Glaser

    2012-08-10

    Nuclear proliferation risks from magnetic fusion energy associated with access to fissile materials can be divided into three main categories: 1) clandestine production of fissile material in an undeclared facility, 2) covert production and diversion of such material in a declared and safeguarded facility, and 3) use of a declared facility in a breakout scenario, in which a state openly produces fissile material in violation of international agreements. The degree of risk in each of these categories is assessed, taking into account both state and non-state actors, and it is found that safeguards are required for fusion energy to be highly attractive from a non-proliferation standpoint. Specific safeguard requirements and R&D needs are outlined for each category of risk, and the technical capability of the ITER experiment, under construction, to contribute to this R&D is noted. A preliminary analysis indicates a potential legal pathway for fusion power systems to be brought under the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. "Vertical" proliferation risks associated with tritium and with the knowledge that can be gained from inertial fusion energy R&D are outlined.

  6. Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI) Cost Model

    SciTech Connect

    Mary Alice Price

    2010-07-11

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) began operating Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) under the Safeguards First Principle Initiative (SFPI), a risk-based and cost-effective program, in December 2006. The NTS SFPI Comprehensive Assessment of Safeguards Systems (COMPASS) Model is made up of specific elements (MC&A plan, graded safeguards, accounting systems, measurements, containment, surveillance, physical inventories, shipper/receiver differences, assessments/performance tests) and various sub-elements, which are each assigned effectiveness and contribution factors that when weighted and rated reflect the health of the MC&A program. The MC&A Cost Model, using an Excel workbook, calculates budget and/or actual costs using these same elements/sub-elements resulting in total costs and effectiveness costs per element/sub-element. These calculations allow management to identify how costs are distributed for each element/sub-element. The Cost Model, as part of the SFPI program review process, enables management to determine if spending is appropriate for each element/sub-element.

  7. Model of a Generic Natural Uranium Conversion Plant ? Suggested Measures to Strengthen International Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; Begovich, John M; Ferrada, Juan J

    2009-11-01

    This is the final report that closed a joint collaboration effort between DOE and the National Nuclear Energy Commission of Brazil (CNEN). In 2005, DOE and CNEN started a collaborative effort to evaluate measures that can strengthen the effectiveness of international safeguards at a natural uranium conversion plant (NUCP). The work was performed by DOE s Oak Ridge National Laboratory and CNEN. A generic model of a NUCP was developed and typical processing steps were defined. Advanced instrumentation and techniques for verification purposes were identified and investigated. The scope of the work was triggered by the International Atomic Energy Agency s 2003 revised policy concerning the starting point of safeguards at uranium conversion facilities. Prior to this policy only the final products of the uranium conversion plant were considered to be of composition and purity suitable for use in the nuclear fuel cycle and therefore, subject to the IAEA safeguards control. DOE and CNEN have explored options for implementing the IAEA policy, although Brazil understands that the new policy established by the IAEA is beyond the framework of the Quadripartite Agreement of which it is one of the parties, together with Argentina, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA. Two technical papers on this subject were published at the 2005 and 2008 INMM Annual Meetings.

  8. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  9. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    SciTech Connect

    Gilligan, Kimberly V.; Kirk, Bernadette Lugue

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  10. 10 CFR 72.184 - Safeguards contingency plan.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities... contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan. The licensee...

  11. 75 FR 78777 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Renewal

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-16

    ...: The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards was established by Section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act... accident phenomena; design of nuclear power plant structures, systems and components; materials...

  12. An American Academy for Training Safeguards Inspectors - An Idea Revisited

    SciTech Connect

    Philip Casey Durst; Robert Bean

    2010-07-01

    In 2009, we presented the idea of an American academy for training safeguards inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), due to the declining percentage of Americans in that international organization. In this paper we assert that there is still a compelling need for this academy. While the American Safeguards Academy would be useful in preparing and pre-training American inspectors for the IAEA, it would also be useful for preparing Americans for domestic safeguards duties in the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. DOE National Laboratories, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It is envisioned that such an academy would train graduate and post-graduate university students, DOE National Laboratory interns, and nuclear safeguards professionals in the modern equipment, safeguards measures, and approaches currently used by the IAEA. It is also envisioned that the Academy would involve the domestic nuclear industry, which could provide use of commercial nuclear facilities for tours and demonstrations of the safeguards tools and methods in actual nuclear facilities. This would be in support of the U.S. DOE National Nuclear Security Administration’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). This training would also help American nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation professionals better understand the potential limitations of the current tools used by the IAEA and give them a foundation from which to consider even more effective and efficient safeguards measures and approaches.

  13. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  14. Secret Objective Standoff: International Safeguards Educational Exercise

    SciTech Connect

    Okowita, Samantha L

    2014-01-01

    The International Safeguards Regime, being so multi-faceted, can be overwhelming to those first introduced to its many components. The organizers and lecturers of workshops and courses on nonproliferation often provide a series of independent lectures and must somehow demonstrate the cohesive and effective nature of the system. An exercise titled The Secret Objective Standoff was developed to complement lectures with hands-on learning to assist participants in bringing all the many components (IAEA agreements, export controls, treaty obligations, international diplomacy, etc.) of the International Safeguards Regime together. This exercise divides participants into teams that are assigned the role of either a country or the IAEA and asks that they fully immerse themselves in their roles. The teams are then randomly assigned three unique and secret objectives that are intended to represent realistic and current geopolitical scenarios. Through construction, trading, or hoarding of four resources (experts, technology, money, and uranium), the teams have a finite number of turns to accomplish their objectives. Each turn has three phases random dispersal of resources, a timed discussion where teams can coordinate and strategize with others, and an action phase. During the action phase, teams inform the moderator individually and secretly what they will be doing that turn. The exercise has been tested twice with Oak Ridge National Laboratory personnel, and has been conducted with outside participants twice, in each case the experience was well received by both participants and instructors. This exercise provides instructors the ability to modify the exercise before or during game play to best fit their educational goals. By offering a range of experiences, from an in-depth look at specific components to a generalized overview, this exercise is an effective tool in helping participants achieve a full understanding the International Safeguards Regime.

  15. A Simple Candle Filter Safeguard Device

    SciTech Connect

    Hurley, J.P.; Henderson, A.K.; Swanson, M.L.

    2002-09-18

    In order to reach the highest possible efficiencies in a coal-fired turbine-based power system, the turbine should be directly fired with the products of coal utilization. Two main designs employ these turbines: those based on pressurized fluidized-bed combustors (PFBCs) and those based on integrated gasification combined cycles (IGCCs). In both designs, the suspended particulates, or dust, must be cleaned from the gas before it enters the turbine to prevent fouling and erosion of the blades. To produce the cleanest gas, barrier filters are being developed and are in commercial use. Barrier filters are composed of porous, high-temperature materials that allow the hot gas to pass but collect the dust on the surface. The three main configurations are candle, cross-flow, and tube. Both candle and tube filters have been tested extensively. They are primarily composed of coarsely porous ceramic that serves as a structural support, overlain with a thin, microporous ceramic layer o n the dirty gas side that serves as the primary filter surface. They are highly efficient at removing particulate matter from the gas stream and, because of their ceramic construction, are resistant to gas and ash corrosion. However, ceramics are brittle, and individual elements can fail, allowing the particulates to pass through the hole left by the filter element and erode the turbine. Because of the possibility of occasional filter breakage, safeguard devices (SGDs) must be employed to prevent the dust streaming through broken filters from reaching the turbine. The Energy & Environmental Research Center (EERC) safeguard device is composed of three main parts: the ceramic substrate, the adhesive coating, and the safeguard device housing. This report describes the development and laboratory testing of each of those parts as well as the bench-scale performance of both types of complete SGDs.

  16. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    SciTech Connect

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  17. Fuzzy risk analysis for nuclear safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Zardecki, A.

    1993-01-01

    Analysis of a safeguards system, based on the notion of fuzzy sets and linguistic variables, concerns such as complexity and inherent imprecision in estimating the possibility of loss or compromise. The automated risk analysis allows the risk to be determined for an entire system based on estimates for lowest level components and the component proportion. In addition, for each component (asset) the most effective combination of protection mechanisms against a given set of threats is determined. A distinction between bar and featured risk is made.

  18. Lanthanum Bromide Detectors for Safeguards Measurements

    SciTech Connect

    Wright, J.

    2011-05-25

    Lanthanum bromide has advantages over other popular inorganic scintillator detectors. Lanthanum bromide offers superior resolution, and good efficiency when compared to sodium iodide and lanthanum chloride. It is a good alternative to high purity germanium detectors for some safeguards applications. This paper offers an initial look at lanthanum bromide detectors. Resolution of lanthanum bromide will be compared lanthanum chloride and sodium-iodide detectors through check source measurements. Relative efficiency and angular dependence will be looked at. Nuclear material spectra, to include plutonium and highly enriched uranium, will be compared between detector types.

  19. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    SciTech Connect

    Pilat, Joseph F; Budlong - Sylvester, Kory W

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R&D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the ongoing

  20. A colalborative environment for information driven safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Scott, Mark R; Michel, Kelly D

    2010-09-15

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  1. DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; Richard R. M. Metcalf; Phillip C. Durst

    2009-07-01

    A critical aspect of international safeguards activities performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the verification that facility design and construction (including upgrades and modifications) do not create opportunities for nuclear proliferation. These Design Information Verification activities require that IAEA inspectors compare current and past information about the facility to verify the operator’s declaration of proper use. The actual practice of DIV presents challenges to the inspectors due to the large amount of data generated, concerns about sensitive or proprietary data, the overall complexity of the facility, and the effort required to extract just the safeguards relevant information. Planned and anticipated facilities will (especially in the case of reprocessing plants) be ever larger and increasingly complex, thus exacerbating the challenges. This paper reports the results of a workshop held at the Idaho National Laboratory in March 2009, which considered technologies and methods to address these challenges. The use of 3D Laser Range Finding, Outdoor Visualization System, Gamma-LIDAR, and virtual facility modeling, as well as methods to handle the facility data issues (quantity, sensitivity, and accessibility and portability for the inspector) were presented. The workshop attendees drew conclusions about the use of these techniques with respect to successfully employing them in an operating environment, using a Fuel Conditioning Facility walk-through as a baseline for discussion.

  2. Electrochemically Modulated Separation for Plutonium Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pratt, Sandra H.; Breshears, Andrew T.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2013-12-31

    Accurate and timely analysis of plutonium in spent nuclear fuel is critical in nuclear safeguards for detection of both protracted and rapid plutonium diversions. Gamma spectroscopy is a viable method for accurate and timely measurements of plutonium provided that the plutonium is well separated from the interfering fission and activation products present in spent nuclear fuel. Electrochemically modulated separation (EMS) is a method that has been used successfully to isolate picogram amounts of Pu from nitric acid matrices. With EMS, Pu adsorption may be turned "on" and "off" depending on the applied voltage, allowing for collection and stripping of Pu without the addition of chemical reagents. In this work, we have scaled up the EMS process to isolate microgram quantities of Pu from matrices encountered in spent nuclear fuel during reprocessing. Several challenges have been addressed including surface area limitations, radiolysis effects, electrochemical cell performance stability, and chemical interferences. After these challenges were resolved, 6 µg Pu was deposited in the electrochemical cell with approximately an 800-fold reduction of fission and activation product levels from a spent nuclear fuel sample. Modeling showed that these levels of Pu collection and interference reduction may not be sufficient for Pu detection by gamma spectroscopy. The main remaining challenges are to achieve a more complete Pu isolation and to deposit larger quantities of Pu for successful gamma analysis of Pu. If gamma analyses of Pu are successful, EMS will allow for accurate and timely on-site analysis for enhanced Pu safeguards.

  3. Safeguards Guidance Document for Designers of Commercial Nuclear Facilities: International Nuclear Safeguards Requirements and Practices For Uranium Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean; Casey Durst

    2009-10-01

    This report is the second in a series of guidelines on international safeguards requirements and practices, prepared expressly for the designers of nuclear facilities. The first document in this series is the description of generic international nuclear safeguards requirements pertaining to all types of facilities. These requirements should be understood and considered at the earliest stages of facility design as part of a new process called “Safeguards-by-Design.” This will help eliminate the costly retrofit of facilities that has occurred in the past to accommodate nuclear safeguards verification activities. The following summarizes the requirements for international nuclear safeguards implementation at enrichment plants, prepared under the Safeguards by Design project, and funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of NA-243. The purpose of this is to provide designers of nuclear facilities around the world with a simplified set of design requirements and the most common practices for meeting them. The foundation for these requirements is the international safeguards agreement between the country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Relevant safeguards requirements are also cited from the Safeguards Criteria for inspecting enrichment plants, found in the IAEA Safeguards Manual, Part SMC-8. IAEA definitions and terms are based on the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, published in 2002. The most current specification for safeguards measurement accuracy is found in the IAEA document STR-327, “International Target Values 2000 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials,” published in 2001. For this guide to be easier for the designer to use, the requirements have been restated in plainer language per expert interpretation using the source documents noted. The safeguards agreement is fundamentally a

  4. 1996 initiatives under the CNEN/DOE safeguards cooperation agreement

    SciTech Connect

    Vinhas, L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Almeida, S.G. de; Dupree, S.; Reilly, D.; Smith, C.; Whitaker, J.M.

    1996-12-31

    In September 1995, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) signed an agreement on methods and technologies for safeguards applications. This agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, physical protection, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. CNEN is responsible for managing nuclear facilities and institutions in Brazil and is responsible for coordinating international safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). Following the ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement among Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and IAEA in March 1994, all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities in Brazil became subject to comprehensive safeguards. Collaboration between CNEN and DOE in 1996 is focusing on: (1) the use of a GRAND FORK detector at the Angra Nuclear Power Station, (2) a remote monitoring field trial, (3) workshops on environmental monitoring and analysis as a safeguards application, (4) developing and studying methods and techniques for applying safeguards at enrichment plants, and (5) support of CNEN`s safeguards analytical laboratory. This paper will describe each of the aforementioned safeguards cooperation activities.

  5. Safeguarding and Protecting Children in Maternity Services: Implications for Practice

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lazenbatt, Anne; Greer, Jean

    2009-01-01

    This article debates the issues involved in safeguarding and protecting children in maternity services and offers implications for professional practice. Midwives and other staff who work as members of the maternity team have a safeguarding role to play in the identification of babies and children who have been abused, or are at risk of abuse, and…

  6. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents...

  7. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents...

  8. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents...

  9. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents...

  10. 29 CFR 1910.335 - Safeguards for personnel protection.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... eyes or face from electric arcs or flashes or from flying objects resulting from electrical explosion... 29 Labor 5 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Safeguards for personnel protection. 1910.335 Section 1910....335 Safeguards for personnel protection. (a) Use of protective equipment—(1) Personal...

  11. 29 CFR 1910.335 - Safeguards for personnel protection.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... eyes or face from electric arcs or flashes or from flying objects resulting from electrical explosion... 29 Labor 5 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Safeguards for personnel protection. 1910.335 Section 1910....335 Safeguards for personnel protection. (a) Use of protective equipment—(1) Personal...

  12. 29 CFR 1910.335 - Safeguards for personnel protection.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... eyes or face from electric arcs or flashes or from flying objects resulting from electrical explosion... 29 Labor 5 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Safeguards for personnel protection. 1910.335 Section 1910....335 Safeguards for personnel protection. (a) Use of protective equipment—(1) Personal...

  13. 29 CFR 1910.335 - Safeguards for personnel protection.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... eyes or face from electric arcs or flashes or from flying objects resulting from electrical explosion... 29 Labor 5 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Safeguards for personnel protection. 1910.335 Section 1910....335 Safeguards for personnel protection. (a) Use of protective equipment—(1) Personal...

  14. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another....

  15. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another....

  16. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another....

  17. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and...

  18. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another....

  19. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and...

  20. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and...

  1. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and...

  2. 30 CFR 77.1008 - Relocation of drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Relocation of drills; safeguards. 77.1008... COAL MINES Ground Control § 77.1008 Relocation of drills; safeguards. (a) When a drill is being moved from one drilling area to another, drill steel, tools, and other equipment shall be secured and...

  3. 30 CFR 77.1013 - Air drills; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Air drills; safeguards. 77.1013 Section 77.1013... Control § 77.1013 Air drills; safeguards. Air shall be turned off and bled from the air hoses before hand-held air drills are moved from one working area to another....

  4. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  5. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  6. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  7. STATE-WIDE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS

    SciTech Connect

    K. W. BUDLONG-SYLVESTER; W. D. STANBRO

    2001-06-01

    Traditionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has relied upon prescriptive criteria to guide safeguards implementation. The prospect of replacing prescriptive safeguards criteria with more flexible performance criteria would constitute a structural change in safeguards and raises several important questions. Performance criteria imply that while safeguards goals will be fixed, the means of attaining those goals will not be explicitly prescribed. What would the performance objectives be under such a system? How would they be formulated? How would performance be linked to higher level safeguards objectives? How would safeguards performance be measured Statewide? The implementation of safeguards under performance criteria would also signal a dramatic change in the manner the Agency does business. A higher degree of flexibility could, in principle, produce greater effectiveness and efficiency, but would come with a need for increased Agency responsibility in practice. To the extent that reliance on prescriptive criteria decreases, the burden of justifying actions and ensuring their transparency will rise. Would there need to be limits to safeguards implementation? What would be the basis for setting such limits? This paper addresses these and other issues and questions relating to both the formulation and the implementation of performance-based criteria.

  8. 42 CFR 438.58 - Conflict of interest safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Conflict of interest safeguards. 438.58 Section 438... (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE State Responsibilities § 438.58 Conflict of interest... safeguards against conflict of interest on the part of State and local officers and employees and agents...

  9. Safeguards and security status report, August 1981-January 1982

    SciTech Connect

    Shipley, J.P.

    1982-09-01

    From August 1981 through January 1982, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in many activities that are described in the four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers those efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance varies from consultation on materials accounting problems, through development of specialized techniques and devices, to comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards helps make the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 concerns a relatively new set of activities at Los Alamos aimed at the security of information and computer systems. The focus this period has been on furthering the development of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating the emerging technology. Part 3 describes the development efforts that are essential to continued improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they are directed ultimately at recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. In addition, enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gaseous Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer.

  10. The Role of School Psychologists in Child Protection and Safeguarding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Woods, Kevin; Bond, Caroline; Tyldesley, Kath; Farrell, Peter; Humphrey, Neil

    2011-01-01

    Child protection and safeguarding are important aspects of work for all professionals working with children. The current article outlines the international context of school psychologists' work in relation to child protection and safeguarding and describes the United Kingdom context in more detail. Given the relatively recent broadening of the UK…

  11. 26 CFR 301.6803-1 - Accounting and safeguarding.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Accounting and safeguarding. 301.6803-1 Section 301.6803-1 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) PROCEDURE... Accounting and safeguarding. In cases coming within the provisions of section 6802 (2) and (3) and...

  12. Safeguards-By-Design: Guidance and Tools for Stakeholders

    SciTech Connect

    Mark Schanfein; Shirley Johnson

    2012-02-01

    Effective implementation of the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach can help meet the challenges of global nuclear energy growth, by designing facilities that have improved safeguardability and reduced safeguards-related life cycle costs. The ultimate goal of SBD is to implement effective and efficient safeguards that reduce the burden to both the facility operator and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's Next Generation Safeguards Initiative's Safeguards By Design Project has initiated multiple studies and workshops with industry and regulatory stakeholders, including the IAEA, to develop relevant documents to support the implementation of SBD. These 'Good Practices Guides' describe facility and process design features that will facilitate implementation of effective nuclear material safeguards starting in the earliest phases of design through to final design. These guides, which are in their final editorial stages, start at a high level and then narrow down to specific nuclear fuel cycle facilities such as Light Water Reactors, Generation III/IV Reactors, High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors, and Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants. Most recently, NGSI has begun development of a facility safeguardability assessment toolkit to assist the designer. This paper will review the current status of these efforts, provide some examples of these documents, and show some standard IAEA Unattended Instrumentation that is permanently installed in nuclear facilities for monitoring.

  13. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  14. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  15. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  16. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  17. 48 CFR 52.239-1 - Privacy or Security Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Privacy or Security....239-1 Privacy or Security Safeguards. As prescribed in 39.107, insert a clause substantially the same as the following: Privacy or Security Safeguards (AUG 1996) (a) The Contractor shall not publish...

  18. Changing Landscapes in Safeguarding Babies and Young Children in England

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lumsden, Eunice

    2014-01-01

    The importance of safeguarding children from violence is internationally recognised. However, detecting, intervening and protecting children from abuse both within the family and in institutions is complex. This paper specifically focuses on safeguarding in England and how workforce reform in the early years offers the opportunity to forge new…

  19. 30 CFR 77.204 - Openings in surface installations; safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 30 Mineral Resources 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Openings in surface installations; safeguards... COAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH MANDATORY SAFETY STANDARDS, SURFACE COAL MINES AND SURFACE WORK AREAS OF UNDERGROUND COAL MINES Surface Installations § 77.204 Openings in surface installations; safeguards....

  20. 75 FR 28074 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-19

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Accidental Radionuclide Releases.'' 10:15 a.m.-12 p.m.: Status of Risk-Informing Guidance of New...

  1. 76 FR 30404 - Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards; Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-25

    ... [Federal Register Volume 76, Number 101 (Wednesday, May 25, 2011)] [Notices] [Pages 30404-30405] [FR Doc No: 2011-12954] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee On Reactor Safeguards... (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) will hold a meeting...

  2. 75 FR 3501 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-01-21

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards...

  3. 75 FR 70304 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-17

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Power Reactors;'' Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) NSIR/DPR-ISG- 01,''Emergency Planning for Nuclear...

  4. 75 FR 21046 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-04-22

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... discussions with the NRC Chairman to discuss topics of mutual interest. 1 p.m.-4 p.m.: Boiling Water...

  5. 75 FR 64366 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-19

    ... From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards...

  6. 75 FR 51500 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-08-20

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor...

  7. 75 FR 13799 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-03-23

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Evaluation Report (SER) with Open Items Associated with the Review of the U.S. Evolutionary Power...

  8. 76 FR 5218 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-28

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... Facilities and Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) for Reactors (Open)--The Committee will...

  9. 75 FR 8154 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-23

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS... NRC staff regarding Digital I&C DAC Inspection Methodology. 10:30 a.m.-12 p.m.: New Advanced...

  10. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  11. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  12. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  13. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  14. 10 CFR 73.71 - Reporting of safeguards events.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Reporting of safeguards events. 73.71 Section 73.71 Energy... § 73.71 Reporting of safeguards events. (a)(1) Each licensee subject to the provisions of §§ 73.25, 73... revised information. Each licensee shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event submitted...

  15. 18 CFR 1301.69 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 18 Conservation of Power and Water Resources 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Safeguarding classified information. 1301.69 Section 1301.69 Conservation of Power and Water Resources TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PROCEDURES Protection of National Security Classified Information § 1301.69 Safeguarding...

  16. Systems Analysis of Safeguards Effectiveness in a Uranium Conversion Facility

    SciTech Connect

    Elayat, H A; Lambert, H; O'Connell, W J

    2004-06-16

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is interested in developing tools and methods for potential U.S. use in designing and evaluating safeguards systems. For this goal several DOE National Laboratories are defining the characteristics of typical facilities of several size scales, and the safeguards measures and instrumentation that could be applied. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is providing systems modeling and analysis of facility and safeguards operations, diversion path generation, and safeguards system effectiveness. The constituent elements of diversion scenarios are structured using directed graphs (digraphs) and fault trees. Safeguards indicator probabilities are based on sampling statistics and/or measurement accuracies. Scenarios are ranked based on value and quantity of material removed and the estimated probability of non-detection. Significant scenarios, especially those involving timeliness or randomly varying order of events, are transferred to simulation analysis. Simulations show the range of conditions encountered by the safeguards measurements and inspections, e.g., the quantities of intermediate materials in temporary storage and the time sequencing of material flow. Given a diversion campaign, simulations show how much the range of the same parameters observed by the safeguards system can differ from the base-case range. The combination of digraphs, fault trees, statistics and simulation constitute a method for evaluation of the estimated benefit of alternate or additional safeguards equipment or features. A generic example illustrates the method.

  17. Asthma triggers (image)

    MedlinePlus

    ... common asthma triggers are mold, pets, dust, grasses, pollen, cockroaches, odors from chemicals, and smoke from cigarettes. ... common asthma triggers are mold, pets, dust, grasses, pollen, cockroaches, odors from chemicals, and smoke from cigarettes.

  18. Organizational Culture, 3S, and Safeguards by Design

    SciTech Connect

    Mladineo, Stephen V.; Frazar, Sarah L.

    2012-01-31

    While Safety and Security Culture are well socialized among nuclear facility designers, the concept of safeguards culture is less well defined. One area where safeguards culture may play a helpful role is in the area of Safeguards by Design. This paper will include a theoretical discussion of organizational culture, leading with safety culture and security culture that are well known, and positing that there may be room to think about safeguards culture along with the others. It will also examine the utility of the 3S concept and how this concept has been used in training for newcomer states. These will lead into a discussion of how the addition of safeguards to the mix of safety by design and security by design can be valuable, particularly as it is socialized to newcomer states.

  19. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  20. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards:Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R; Morgan, James B; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Mr. Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. 7 CFR 1207.515 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE POTATO RESEARCH AND PROMOTION PLAN... handlers and importers on the handling, importation, and disposition of exempted potatoes. Also,...

  3. 7 CFR 1207.515 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE POTATO RESEARCH AND PROMOTION PLAN... handlers and importers on the handling, importation, and disposition of exempted potatoes. Also,...

  4. 7 CFR 1207.515 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE POTATO RESEARCH AND PROMOTION PLAN... handlers and importers on the handling, importation, and disposition of exempted potatoes. Also,...

  5. 7 CFR 1207.515 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; MISCELLANEOUS COMMODITIES), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE POTATO RESEARCH AND PROMOTION PLAN... handlers and importers on the handling, importation, and disposition of exempted potatoes. Also,...

  6. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    SciTech Connect

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-06-16

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  7. Robot speeds assays and enhances safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Phelan, P.F.; Powell, W.D.; Blankenship, R.W.

    1990-01-01

    At the Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility, a robotics system utilizing a gantry robot and an automated inventory system operates five calorimeters and two gamma isotopic assay instruments. This system has significantly improved safeguards, because the opportunity for diversion has been greatly reduced. Not only is the accountability much more timely because throughput has doubled but the special nuclear material has been made physically more secure in several ways. First, items awaiting assay are kept in the inventory system, whose doors remain locked whenever the robot is unattended. An alarm sounds if the doors are unlocked without authorization. Second, light curtains surround the robot's work envelope and pressure-sensitive pads cover the floor to detect entry into the assay area. Third, the robot weighs each item whenever it is moved, and the result is compared with the weight that was measured when the item was first put into inventory. 2 refs., 3 figs.

  8. Apparatus for safeguarding a radiological source

    DOEpatents

    Bzorgi, Fariborz M

    2014-10-07

    A tamper detector is provided for safeguarding a radiological source that is moved into and out of a storage location through an access porthole for storage and use. The radiological source is presumed to have an associated shipping container approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for transporting the radiological source. The tamper detector typically includes a network of sealed tubing that spans at least a portion of the access porthole. There is an opening in the network of sealed tubing that is large enough for passage therethrough of the radiological source and small enough to prevent passage therethrough of the associated shipping cask. Generally a gas source connector is provided for establishing a gas pressure in the network of sealed tubing, and a pressure drop sensor is provided for detecting a drop in the gas pressure below a preset value.

  9. Environmental monitoring for nuclear safeguards. Background paper

    SciTech Connect

    1995-09-01

    To assure that states are not violating their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) must verify that states do not possess convert nuclear facilities-a mission that prior to the 1991 Gulf War, it had neither the political backing nor the resources to conduct. The IAEA recognizes the importance of this new mission and is in the process of assuming it. One of the tools it is exploring to provide some indication of the presence of secret, or undeclared, nuclear activities and facilities is environmental monitoring. Modern sampling and analysis technologies provide powerful tools to detect the presence of characteristic substances that are likely to be emitted by such illicit activities. This background paper examines the prospects for such technologies to improve nuclear safeguards. It concludes that environmental monitoring can greatly increase the ability to detect undeclared activity at declared, or known, sites, and it can significantly increase the chances of detecting and locating undeclared sites.

  10. Analysis of the impact of safeguards criteria

    SciTech Connect

    Mullen, M.F.; Reardon, P.T.

    1981-01-01

    As part of the US Program of Technical Assistance to IAEA Safeguards, the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) was asked to assist in developing and demonstrating a model for assessing the impact of setting criteria for the application of IAEA safeguards. This report presents the results of PNL's work on the task. The report is in three parts. The first explains the technical approach and methodology. The second contains an example application of the methodology. The third presents the conclusions of the study. PNL used the model and computer programs developed as part of Task C.5 (Estimation of Inspection Efforts) of the Program of Technical Assistance. The example application of the methodology involves low-enriched uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. The effects of variations in seven parameters are considered: false alarm probability, goal probability of detection, detection goal quantity, the plant operator's measurement capability, the inspector's variables measurement capability, the inspector's attributes measurement capability, and annual plant throughput. Among the key results and conclusions of the analysis are the following: the variables with the greatest impact on the probability of detection are the inspector's measurement capability, the goal quantity, and the throughput; the variables with the greatest impact on inspection costs are the throughput, the goal quantity, and the goal probability of detection; there are important interactions between variables. That is, the effects of a given variable often depends on the level or value of some other variable. With the methodology used in this study, these interactions can be quantitatively analyzed; reasonably good approximate prediction equations can be developed using the methodology described here.

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. Safeguards Evaluation Method for evaluating vulnerability to insider threats

    SciTech Connect

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    As protection of DOE facilities against outsiders increases to acceptable levels, attention is shifting toward achieving comparable protection against insiders. Since threats and protection measures for insiders are substantially different from those for outsiders, new perspectives and approaches are needed. One such approach is the Safeguards Evaluation Method. This method helps in assessing safeguards vulnerabilities to theft or diversion of special nuclear meterial (SNM) by insiders. The Safeguards Evaluation Method-Insider Threat is a simple model that can be used by safeguards and security planners to evaluate safeguards and proposed upgrades at their own facilities. The method is used to evaluate the effectiveness of safeguards in both timely detection (in time to prevent theft) and late detection (after-the-fact). The method considers the various types of potential insider adversaries working alone or in collusion with other insiders. The approach can be used for a wide variety of facilities with various quantities and forms of SNM. An Evaluation Workbook provides documentation of the baseline assessment; this simplifies subsequent on-site appraisals. Quantitative evaluation is facilitated by an accompanying computer program. The method significantly increases an evaluation team's on-site analytical capabilities, thereby producing a more thorough and accurate safeguards evaluation.

  13. U. S. spent-fuel disposal strategies and International safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Pillay, K.K.; Picard, R.R.; Hafer, J.F. )

    1993-08-01

    Domestic safeguards for fissile nuclear materials are universal, and a variety of international safeguards regimes are applicable, in most member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to declared nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful missions. The U.S. strategy to dispose of all spent nuclear fuels (SNFs) and high-level wastes (HLWs) in engineered geologic repositories has a sometimes-overlooked consequence, namely, the need to maintain domestic and international safeguards in perpetuity. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which has the responsibility to accept and store the spent fuels in the long term either in surface facilities or in engineered geologic repositories, has yet to include safeguards issues in their mission plan.'' There are several stages in the nuclear fuel cycle where materials usable in weapons are available for diversion. This discussion, however, is limited to the potential diversion of spent fuels for clandestine plutonium recovery. The concepts proposed here highlight safeguards elements necessary for a pragmatic safeguards system for SNF from nuclear power generation. The efforts required to initiate and maintain a verifiable international safeguards regime are examined in the context of a typical storage facility in the United States.

  14. Oak Ridge National Laboratory Next Generation Safeguards Initiative

    SciTech Connect

    Kirk, Bernadette Lugue; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Whitaker, J Michael

    2011-12-01

    In 2007, the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NA-24) completed a comprehensive review of the current and potential future challenges facing the international safeguards system. The review examined trends and events impacting the mission of international safeguards and the implications of expanding and evolving mission requirements on the legal authorities and institutions that serve as the foundation of the international safeguards system, as well as the technological, financial, and human resources required for effective safeguards implementation. The review's findings and recommendations were summarized in the report, 'International Safeguards: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century (October 2007)'. One of the report's key recommendations was for DOE/NNSA to launch a major new program to revitalize the international safeguards technology and human resource base. In 2007, at the International Atomic Energy Agency's General Conference, then Secretary of Energy Samuel W. Bodman announced the newly created Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). NGSI consists of five program elements: (1) Policy development and outreach; (2) Concepts and approaches; (3) Technology and analytical methodologies; (4) Human resource development; and (5) Infrastructure development. The ensuing report addresses the 'Human Resource Development (HRD)' component of NGSI. The goal of the HRD as defined in the NNSA Program Plan (November 2008) is 'to revitalize and expand the international safeguards human capital base by attracting and training a new generation of talent.' One of the major objectives listed in the HRD goal includes education and training, outreach to universities, professional societies, postdoctoral appointments, and summer internships at national laboratories. ORNL is a participant in the NGSI program, together with several DOE laboratories such as Pacific

  15. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  16. Implementation of IT-based applications in the safeguards field

    SciTech Connect

    Ekenstam, G.C. af; Sallstrom, M.

    1995-12-31

    For many years the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, SKI, has used computers as a tool within nuclear material control and accountancy. Over the last five years a lot of effort has been put into projects related to the increasing possibilities of fast and reliable data transfer over large distances. The paper discusses related administrative and technical issues and presents experience gained in tasks of the Swedish Support Program to IAEA Safeguards and during the alternative Safeguards trials carried out by SKI. The following topics will be presented: (1) Main Safeguards purposes and data transfer; (2) Administrative systems and requirements; (3) Technical possibilities and experiences; and (4) The cost aspect.

  17. Process monitoring in international safeguards for reprocessing plants: A demonstration

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.

    1989-01-01

    In the period 1985--1987, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory investigated the possible role of process monitoring for international safeguards applications in fuel reprocessing plants. This activity was conducted under Task C.59, ''Review of Process Monitoring Safeguards Technology for Reprocessing Facilities'' of the US program of Technical Assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards program. The final phase was a demonstration of process monitoring applied in a prototypical reprocessing plant test facility at ORNL. This report documents the demonstration and test results. 35 figs.

  18. FY 2008 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative International Safeguards Education and Training Pilot Progerams Summary Report

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G; Essner, J; Dougan, A; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokova, E; Wehling, F

    2008-10-17

    Key component of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) launched by the National Nuclear Security Administration is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. Two pilot programs at university level, involving 44 students, were initiated and implemented in spring-summer 2008 and linked to hands-on internships at LANL or LLNL. During the internships, students worked on specific safeguards-related projects with a designated Laboratory Mentor to provide broader exposure to nuclear materials management and information analytical techniques. The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between the Texas A&M University (TAMU), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). It included a 16-lecture course held during a summer internship program. The instructors for the course were from LANL together with TAMU faculty and LLNL experts. The LANL-based course was shared with the students spending their internship at LLNL via video conference. A week-long table-top (or hands-on) exercise on was also conducted at LANL. The student population was a mix of 28 students from a 12 universities participating in a variety of summer internship programs held at LANL and LLNL. A large portion of the students were TAMU students participating in the NGSI pilot. The International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS) in cooperation with LLNL. It included a two-week intensive course consisting of 20 lectures and two exercises. MIIS, LLNL, and speakers from other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were

  19. Evaluating Safeguards Benefits of Process Monitoring as compared with Nuclear Material Accountancy

    SciTech Connect

    Humberto Garcia; Wen-Chiao Lin; Reed Carlson

    2014-07-01

    This paper illustrates potential safeguards benefits that process monitoring (PM) may have as a diversion deterrent and as a complementary safeguards measure to nuclear material accountancy (NMA). This benefit is illustrated by quantifying the standard deviation associated with detecting a considered material diversion scenario using either an NMA-based method or a PM-based approach. To illustrate the benefits of PM for effective safeguards, we consider a reprocessing facility. We assume that the diversion of interest for detection manifests itself as a loss of Pu caused by abnormally operating a dissolver for an extended period to accomplish protracted diversion (or misdirection) of Pu to a retained (unconditioned) waste stream. For detecting the occurrence of this diversion (which involves anomalous operation of the dissolver), we consider two different data evaluation and integration (DEI) approaches, one based on NMA and the other based on PM. The approach based on PM does not directly do mass balance calculations, but rather monitors for the possible occurrence of anomaly patterns related to potential loss of nuclear material. It is thus assumed that the loss of a given mass amount of nuclear material can be directly associated with the execution of proliferation-driven activities that trigger the occurrence of an anomaly pattern consisting of series of events or signatures occurring at different unit operations and time instances. By effectively assessing these events over time and space, the PM-based DEI approach tries to infer whether this specific pattern of events has occurred and how many times within a given time period. To evaluate the goodness of PM, the 3 Sigma of the estimated mass loss is computed under both DEI approaches as function of the number of input batches processed. Simulation results are discussed.

  20. 32 CFR 310.13 - Safeguarding personal information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    .... (a) General responsibilities. DoD Components shall establish appropriate administrative, technical and physical safeguards to ensure that the records in each system of records are protected from unauthorized access, alteration, or disclosure and that their confidentiality is preserved and...

  1. Development of Pattern Recognition Options for Combining Safeguards Subsystems

    SciTech Connect

    Burr, Thomas L.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2012-08-24

    This talk reviews project progress in combining process monitoring data and nuclear material accounting data to improve the over nuclear safeguards system. Focus on 2 subsystems: (1) nuclear materials accounting (NMA); and (2) process monitoring (PM).

  2. Nuclear safeguards and security: we can do better.

    SciTech Connect

    Johnston, R. G.; Warner, Jon S.; Garcia, A. R. E.; Martinez, R. K.; Lopez, L. N.; Pacheco, A. N.; Trujillo, S. J.; Herrera, A. M.; Bitzer, E. G. , III

    2005-01-01

    There are a number of practical ways to significantly improve nuclear safeguards and security. These include recognizing and minimizing the insider threat; using adversarial vulnerability assessments to find vulnerabilities and countermeasures; fully appreciating the disparate nature of domestic and international nuclear safeguards; improving tamper detection and tamper-indicating seals; not confusing the inventory and security functions; and recognizing the limitations of GPS tracking, contact memory buttons, and RFID tags. The efficacy of nuclear safeguards depends critically on employing sophisticated security strategies and effective monitoring hardware. The Vulnerability Assessment Team (VAT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory has extensively researched issues associated with nuclear safeguards, especially in the areas of tamper/intrusion detection, transport security, and vulnerability assessments. This paper discusses some of our findings, recommendations, and warnings.

  3. Interim Procedures Safeguarding Mobile Devices during International Travel

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    This procedure is for safeguarding EPA information and systems for all employees, contractors, and other users while on international travel or to specifically designated locations within the United States and foreign embassies.

  4. Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

    SciTech Connect

    Ivan R. Thomas; Ernest L. Laible

    2008-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper’s measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical

  5. Lessons from (triggered) tremor

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Gomberg, Joan

    2010-01-01

    I test a “clock-advance” model that implies triggered tremor is ambient tremor that occurs at a sped-up rate as a result of loading from passing seismic waves. This proposed model predicts that triggering probability is proportional to the product of the ambient tremor rate and a function describing the efficacy of the triggering wave to initiate a tremor event. Using data mostly from Cascadia, I have compared qualitatively a suite of teleseismic waves that did and did not trigger tremor with ambient tremor rates. Many of the observations are consistent with the model if the efficacy of the triggering wave depends on wave amplitude. One triggered tremor observation clearly violates the clock-advance model. The model prediction that larger triggering waves result in larger triggered tremor signals also appears inconsistent with the measurements. I conclude that the tremor source process is a more complex system than that described by the clock-advance model predictions tested. Results of this and previous studies also demonstrate that (1) conditions suitable for tremor generation exist in many tectonic environments, but, within each, only occur at particular spots whose locations change with time; (2) any fluid flow must be restricted to less than a meter; (3) the degree to which delayed failure and secondary triggering occurs is likely insignificant; and 4) both shear and dilatational deformations may trigger tremor. Triggered and ambient tremor rates correlate more strongly with stress than stressing rate, suggesting tremor sources result from time-dependent weakening processes rather than simple Coulomb failure.

  6. Fiscal Year 2014 Annual Report on BNLs Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper, Susan E.

    2014-10-10

    Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department contributes to the National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nonproliferation and International Security Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) through university engagement, safeguards internships, safeguards courses, professional development, recruitment, and other activities aimed at ensuring the next generation of international safeguards professionals is adequately prepared to support the U.S. safeguards mission. This report is a summary of BNL s work under the NGSI program in Fiscal Year 2014.

  7. Emerging National Space Launch Programs. Economics and Safeguards

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1993-01-01

    safeguard system (3ee Table 3.2). Now let us elaborate why SLV flight testi might not provide timely warniing. There are three reasons. First, some countries...ballistic missiles hereafter means surface-to-surface guided ballistic missiles only, Space launch vehicles ( SLVs ) are surface-to-space ballistic missiles...support missile nonproliferation. This dream is, however, hard to fulfill. xii A likely scheme for safeguarding SLVs , including sounding rockets, would

  8. THE NEXT GENERATION SAFEGUARDS PROFESSIONAL NETWORK: PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS

    SciTech Connect

    Zhernosek, Alena V; Lynch, Patrick D; Scholz, Melissa A

    2011-01-01

    President Obama has repeatedly stated that the United States must ensure that the international safeguards regime, as embodied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has 'the authority, information, people, and technology it needs to do its job.' The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) works to implement the President's vision through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), a program to revitalize the U.S. DOE national laboratories safeguards technology and human capital base so that the United States can more effectively support the IAEA and ensure that it meets current and emerging challenges to the international safeguards system. In 2009, in response to the human capital development goals of NGSI, young safeguards professionals within the Global Nuclear Security Technology Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory launched the Next Generation Safeguards Professional Network (NGSPN). The purpose of this initiative is to establish working relationships and to foster collaboration and communication among the next generation of safeguards leaders. The NGSPN is an organization for, and of, young professionals pursuing careers in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation - as well as mid-career professionals new to the field - whether working within the U.S. DOE national laboratory complex, U.S. government agencies, academia, or industry or at the IAEA. The NGSPN is actively supported by the NNSA, boasts more than 70 members, maintains a website and newsletter, and has held two national meetings as well as an NGSPN session and panel at the July 2010 Institute of Nuclear Material Management Annual Meeting. This paper discusses the network; its significance, goals and objectives; developments and progress to date; and future plans.

  9. International Safeguards and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Olsen, Khris B.; Smith, Leon E.; Frazar, Sarah L.; Kurzrok, Andrew J.; Orton, Christopher R.; Schanfein, Mark J.; Sayre, Amanda M.; Jones, Rebecca L.

    2016-07-21

    Established in 1965, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) strong technical ties and shared heritage with the nearby U.S. Department of Energy Hanford Site were central to the early development of expertise in nuclear fuel cycle signatures, separations chemistry, plutonium chemistry, environmental monitoring, modeling and analysis of reactor systems, and nuclear material safeguards and security. From these Hanford origins, PNNL has grown into a multi-program science and engineering enterprise that utilizes this diversity to strengthen the international safeguards regime. Today, PNNL supports the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its mission to provide assurances to the international community that nations do not use nuclear materials and equipment outside of peaceful uses. PNNL also serves in the IAEA’s Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) by providing analysis of environmental samples gathered around the world. PNNL is involved in safeguards research and development activities in support of many U.S. Government programs such as the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Research and Development, NNSA Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control, and the U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards. In addition to these programs, PNNL invests internal resources including safeguards-specific training opportunities for staff, and laboratory-directed research and development funding to further ideas that may grow into new capabilities. This paper and accompanying presentation highlight some of PNNL’s contributions in technology development, implementation concepts and approaches, policy, capacity building, and human capital development, in the field of international safeguards.

  10. Advanced techniques in safeguarding a conditioning facility for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1992-01-01

    Although reprocessing continues to be the main factor in the waste management of nuclear reactors, the alternative of direct final disposal is currently being developed to the level of industrial applications, based on an agreement between the heads of the federal government and the federal states of Germany. Thus, the Konrad and Gorleben sites are being studied as potential final repositories as is the pilot conditioning facility (PKA) under construction. Discussions on the application of safeguards measures have led to the drafting of an approach that will cover the entire back end of the fuel cycle. The conditioning of fuel prior to direct final disposal represents one element in the overall approach. A modern facility equipped with advanced technology, PKA is a pilot plant with regard to conditioning techniques as well as to safeguards. Therefore, the PKA safeguards approach is expected to facilitate future industrial applications of the conditioning procedure. This cannot be satisfactorily implemented without advanced safeguards techniques. The level of development of the safeguards techniques varies. While advanced camera and seal systems are basically available, the other techniques and methods still require research and development. Feasibility studies and equipment development are geared to providing applicable safeguards techniques in time for commissioning of the PKA.

  11. Health Information Security in Hospitals: the Application of Security Safeguards

    PubMed Central

    Mehraeen, Esmaeil; Ayatollahi, Haleh; Ahmadi, Maryam

    2016-01-01

    Introduction: A hospital information system has potentials to improve the accessibility of clinical information and the quality of health care. However, the use of this system has resulted in new challenges, such as concerns over health information security. This paper aims to assess the status of information security in terms of administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals. Methods: This was a survey study in which the participants were information technology (IT) managers (n=36) who worked in the hospitals affiliated to the top ranked medical universities (university A and university B). Data were collected using a questionnaire. The content validity of the questionnaire was examined by the experts and the reliability of the questionnaire was determined using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α=0.75). Results: The results showed that the administrative safeguards were arranged at a medium level. In terms of the technical safeguards and the physical safeguards, the IT managers rated them at a strong level. Conclusion: According to the results, among three types of security safeguards, the administrative safeguards were assessed at the medium level. To improve it, developing security policies, implementing access control models and training users are recommended. PMID:27046944

  12. THIEF: An interactive simulation of nuclear materials safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Stanbro, W. D.

    1990-01-01

    The safeguards community is facing an era in which it will be called upon to tighten protection of nuclear material. At the same time, it is probable that safeguards will face more competition for available resources from other activities such as environmental cleanup. To exist in this era, it will be necessary to understand and coordinate all aspects of the safeguards system. Because of the complexity of the interactions involved, this process puts a severe burden on designers and operators of safeguards systems. This paper presents a simulation tool developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to allow users to examine the interactions among safeguards elements as they apply to combating the insider threat. The tool consists of a microcomputer-based simulation in which the user takes the role of the insider trying to remove nuclear material from a facility. The safeguards system is run by the computer and consists of both physical protection and MC A computer elements. All data elements describing a scenario can be altered by the user. The program can aid in training, as well as in developing threat scenarios. 4 refs.

  13. Causality and headache triggers

    PubMed Central

    Turner, Dana P.; Smitherman, Todd A.; Martin, Vincent T.; Penzien, Donald B.; Houle, Timothy T.

    2013-01-01

    Objective The objective of this study was to explore the conditions necessary to assign causal status to headache triggers. Background The term “headache trigger” is commonly used to label any stimulus that is assumed to cause headaches. However, the assumptions required for determining if a given stimulus in fact has a causal-type relationship in eliciting headaches have not been explicated. Methods A synthesis and application of Rubin’s Causal Model is applied to the context of headache causes. From this application the conditions necessary to infer that one event (trigger) causes another (headache) are outlined using basic assumptions and examples from relevant literature. Results Although many conditions must be satisfied for a causal attribution, three basic assumptions are identified for determining causality in headache triggers: 1) constancy of the sufferer; 2) constancy of the trigger effect; and 3) constancy of the trigger presentation. A valid evaluation of a potential trigger’s effect can only be undertaken once these three basic assumptions are satisfied during formal or informal studies of headache triggers. Conclusions Evaluating these assumptions is extremely difficult or infeasible in clinical practice, and satisfying them during natural experimentation is unlikely. Researchers, practitioners, and headache sufferers are encouraged to avoid natural experimentation to determine the causal effects of headache triggers. Instead, formal experimental designs or retrospective diary studies using advanced statistical modeling techniques provide the best approaches to satisfy the required assumptions and inform causal statements about headache triggers. PMID:23534872

  14. AMY trigger system

    SciTech Connect

    Sakai, Yoshihide

    1989-04-01

    A trigger system of the AMY detector at TRISTAN e{sup +}e{sup -} collider is described briefly. The system uses simple track segment and shower cluster counting scheme to classify events to be triggered. It has been operating successfully since 1987.

  15. Global partnering related to nuclear materials safeguards and security - A pragmatic approach to international safeguards work

    SciTech Connect

    Stanford, Dennis

    2007-07-01

    This paper documents issues Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. has addressed in the performance of international work to safeguards and security work. It begins with a description of the package we put together for a sample proposal for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, for which we were ranked number one for technical approach and cost, and concludes with a discussion of approaches that we have taken to performing this work, including issues related to performing the work as part of a team. The primary focus is on communication, workforce, equipment, and coordination issues. Finally, the paper documents the rules that we use to assure the work is performed safely and successfully. (author)

  16. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-09-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of ``full-scope`` safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the ``flows`` between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance ``mailbox`` declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  17. International safeguards without material balance areas

    SciTech Connect

    Sanborn, J.B.; Lu Mingshih; Indusi, J.P.

    1992-01-01

    Recently altered perceptions of the role of the non-proliferation regime, as well as continued IAEA funding constraints, suggest a need to re-examine the fundamentals of IAEA verification strategy. This paper suggests that abandoning certain material balance area (MBA) related concepts that nominally form the basic framework of full-scope'' safeguards would result in a more flexible inspection regime. The MBA concept applied in the domestic context enables a national authority to localize losses in space and in time and to minimize the need to measure in-process inventory. However, these advantages do not accrue to an international verification regime because it cannot truly verify the flows'' between MBAs without extensive containment/surveillance measures. In the verification model studied, the entire nuclear inventory of a state is periodically declared and verified simultaneously in one or two large segments (containing possibly many MBAS). Simultaneous inventory of all MBAs within a segment would occur through advance mailbox'' declarations and random selection of MBAs for on-site verification or through enhanced containment/surveillance techniques. Flows are generally speaking not verified. This scheme would free the inspectorate from the obligation to attempt to verify on-site each stratum of the material balance of every facility declaring significant quantities of nuclear material.

  18. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTEGRATION WITH SAFETY ANALYSIS

    SciTech Connect

    Hearn, J; James Lightner, J

    2007-04-13

    The objective of this paper is to share the Savannah River Site lessons learned on Safeguards and Security (S&S) program integration with K-Area Complex (KAC) safety basis. The KAC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA), is managed by the Washington Savannah River Company (WSRC), and the S&S program, managed by Wackenhut Services, Incorporated--Savannah River Site (WSI-SRS). WSRC and WSI-SRS developed a contractual arrangement to recognize WSI-SRS requirements in the KAC safety analysis. Design Basis Threat 2003 (DBT03) security upgrades required physical modifications and operational changes which included the availability of weapons which could potentially impact the facility safety analysis. The KAC DSA did not previously require explicit linkage to the S&S program to satisfy the safety analysis. WSI-SRS have contractual requirements with the Department of Energy (DOE) which are separate from WSRC contract requirements. The lessons learned will include a discussion on planning, analysis, approval of the controls and implementation issues.

  19. Agriculture: Newsroom

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    Agriculture Newsroom. News releases, reports, and other documents from around EPA that are of interest or direct importance to the environmental management or compliance efforts of the agricultural community.

  20. Grassland agriculture

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    Agriculture in grassland environments is facing multiple stresses from: shifting demographics, declining and fragmented agricultural landscapes, declining environmental quality, variable and changing climate, volatile and increasing energy costs, marginal economic returns, and globalization. Degrad...

  1. Supplemental Report on Nuclear Safeguards Considerations for the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect

    Moses, David Lewis; Ehinger, Michael H

    2010-05-01

    Recent reports by Department of Energy National Laboratories have discussed safeguards considerations for the low enriched uranium (LEU) fueled Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) and the need for bulk accountancy of the plutonium in used fuel. These reports fail to account effectively for the degree of plutonium dilution in the graphitized-carbon pebbles that is sufficient to meet the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) 'provisional' guidelines for termination of safeguards on 'measured discards.' The thrust of this finding is not to terminate safeguards but to limit the need for specific accountancy of plutonium in stored used fuel. While the residual uranium in the used fuel may not be judged sufficiently diluted to meet the IAEA provisional guidelines for termination of safeguards, the estimated quantities of {sup 232}U and {sup 236}U in the used fuel at the target burn-up of {approx}91 GWD/MT exceed specification limits for reprocessed uranium (ASTM C787) and will require extensive blending with either natural uranium or uranium enrichment tails to dilute the {sup 236}U content to fall within specification thus making the PBMR used fuel less desirable for commercial reprocessing and reuse than that from light water reactors. Also the PBMR specific activity of reprocessed uranium isotopic mixture and its A{sub 2} values for effective dose limit if released in a dispersible form during a transportation accident are more limiting than the equivalent values for light water reactor spent fuel at 55 GWD/MT without accounting for the presence of the principal carry-over fission product ({sup 99}Tc) and any possible plutonium contamination that may be present from attempted covert reprocessing. Thus, the potentially recoverable uranium from PBMR used fuel carries reactivity penalties and radiological penalties likely greater than those for reprocessed uranium from light water reactors. These factors impact the economics of reprocessing, but a more significant

  2. Lessons Learned in International Safeguards - Implementation of Safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, Michael H; Johnson, Shirley

    2010-02-01

    The focus of this report is lessons learned at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP). However, the subject of lessons learned for application of international safeguards at reprocessing plants includes a cumulative history of inspections starting at the West Valley (New York, U.S.A.) reprocessing plant in 1969 and proceeding through all of the efforts over the years. The RRP is the latest and most challenging application the International Atomic Energy Agency has faced. In many ways the challenges have remained the same, timely inspection and evaluation with limited inspector resources, with the continuing realization that planning and preparations can never start early enough in the life cycle of a facility. Lessons learned over the years have involved the challenges of using ongoing advances in technology and dealing with facilities with increased throughput and continuous operation. This report will begin with a review of historical developments and lessons learned. This will provide a basis for a discussion of the experiences and lessons learned from the implementation of international safeguards at RRP.

  3. LHCb Topological Trigger Reoptimization

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Likhomanenko, Tatiana; Ilten, Philip; Khairullin, Egor; Rogozhnikov, Alex; Ustyuzhanin, Andrey; Williams, Michael

    2015-12-01

    The main b-physics trigger algorithm used by the LHCb experiment is the so- called topological trigger. The topological trigger selects vertices which are a) detached from the primary proton-proton collision and b) compatible with coming from the decay of a b-hadron. In the LHC Run 1, this trigger, which utilized a custom boosted decision tree algorithm, selected a nearly 100% pure sample of b-hadrons with a typical efficiency of 60-70%; its output was used in about 60% of LHCb papers. This talk presents studies carried out to optimize the topological trigger for LHC Run 2. In particular, we have carried out a detailed comparison of various machine learning classifier algorithms, e.g., AdaBoost, MatrixNet and neural networks. The topological trigger algorithm is designed to select all ’interesting” decays of b-hadrons, but cannot be trained on every such decay. Studies have therefore been performed to determine how to optimize the performance of the classification algorithm on decays not used in the training. Methods studied include cascading, ensembling and blending techniques. Furthermore, novel boosting techniques have been implemented that will help reduce systematic uncertainties in Run 2 measurements. We demonstrate that the reoptimized topological trigger is expected to significantly improve on the Run 1 performance for a wide range of b-hadron decays.

  4. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    SciTech Connect

    Robert S. Bean; John W. Hockert; David J. Hebditch

    2009-05-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  5. Safeguard monitoring of direct electrolytic reduction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jurovitzki, Abraham L.

    Nuclear power is regaining global prominence as a sustainable energy source as the world faces the consequences of depending on limited fossil based, CO2 emitting fuels. A key component to achieving this sustainability is to implement a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Without achieving this goal, a relatively small fraction of the energy value in nuclear fuel is actually utilized. This involves recycling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF)---separating fissile actinides from waste products and using them to fabricate fresh fuel. Pyroprocessing is a viable option being developed for this purpose with a host of benefits compared to other recycling options, such as PUREX. Notably, pyroprocessing is ill suited to separate pure plutonium from spent fuel and thus has non-proliferation benefits. Pyroprocessing involves high temperature electrochemical and chemical processing of SNF in a molten salt electrolyte. During this batch process, several intermediate and final streams are produced that contain radioactive material. While pyroprocessing is ineffective at separating pure plutonium, there are various process misuse scenarios that could result in diversion of impure plutonium into one or more of these streams. This is a proliferation risk that should be addressed with innovative safeguards technology. One approach to meeting this challenge is to develop real time monitoring techniques that can be implemented in the hot cells and coupled with the various unit operations involved with pyroprocessing. Current state of the art monitoring techniques involve external chemical assaying which requires sample removal from these unit operations. These methods do not meet International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) timeliness requirements. In this work, a number of monitoring techniques were assessed for their viability as online monitoring tools. A hypothetical diversion scenario for the direct electrolytic reduction process was experimentally verified (using Nd2O3 as a surrogate for PuO2

  6. ELECTROCHEMICALLY-MODULATED SEPARATIONS FOR SAFEGUARDS MEASUREMENTS

    SciTech Connect

    Green, Michael A.; Arrigo, Leah M.; Liezers, Martin; Orton, Christopher R.; Douglas, Matthew; Peper, Shane M.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Hazelton, Sandra G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.

    2010-08-11

    A critical objective of materials accountability in safeguards is the accurate and timely analysis of fuel reprocessing streams to detect both abrupt and prolonged diversions of nuclear materials. For this reason both on-line nondestructive (NDA) and destructive analysis (DA) approaches are sought-after. Current methods for DA involve grab sampling and laboratory based column extractions that are costly, hazardous, and time consuming. While direct on-line gamma measurements of Pu are desirable, they are not possible due to contributions from other actinides and fission products. Researchers at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory are currently investigating electrochemically-modulated separation (EMS) as a straightforward, cost-effective technology for selective separation of Pu or U from aqueous reprocessing streams. The EMS selectivity is electrochemically controlled and results from the sorption of Pu4+ and U4+ redox states onto the anodized target electrode, allowing for selective accumulation of U or Pu from nitric acid streams to be turned “on” or “off.” It is envisioned that this technology can be utilized to isolate Pu for both NDA and DA analysis. For the NDA approach, rapid Pu analysis by gamma-ray spectroscopy could be performed after chemical clean-up of activation and fission products by EMS. Likewise, in the DA approach, EMS could be used to retain and concentrate the Pu in nanogram quantities on the electrode surface to be transported to the lab for analysis using high precision mass spectrometry. Due to the challenges associated with complex matrices, a systematic investigation of the redox-dependent accumulation of Pu using EMS was necessary, and results will be presented. Approaches to mitigate interelement effects using large surface area cells will also be discussed. The EMS chemistry and spectroscopy for Pu isolation and measurement will be presented, proof-of-principle measurements will be described, and the application of this

  7. 7 CFR 956.66 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SWEET ONIONS GROWN IN THE WALLA WALLA... Onions shipped, pursuant to §§ 956.63 and 956.64, from entering channels of trade for other than the...) Handlers shall first file applications with the committee to ship such Walla Walla Sweet Onions....

  8. 7 CFR 956.66 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SWEET ONIONS GROWN IN THE WALLA WALLA... Onions shipped, pursuant to §§ 956.63 and 956.64, from entering channels of trade for other than the...) Handlers shall first file applications with the committee to ship such Walla Walla Sweet Onions....

  9. 7 CFR 956.66 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NUTS), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SWEET ONIONS GROWN IN THE WALLA WALLA... Onions shipped, pursuant to §§ 956.63 and 956.64, from entering channels of trade for other than the...) Handlers shall first file applications with the committee to ship such Walla Walla Sweet Onions....

  10. 7 CFR 956.66 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... AND ORDERS; FRUITS, VEGETABLES, NUTS), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SWEET ONIONS GROWN IN THE WALLA WALLA... Onions shipped, pursuant to §§ 956.63 and 956.64, from entering channels of trade for other than the...) Handlers shall first file applications with the committee to ship such Walla Walla Sweet Onions....

  11. 7 CFR 956.66 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... and Orders; Fruits, Vegetables, Nuts), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SWEET ONIONS GROWN IN THE WALLA WALLA... Onions shipped, pursuant to §§ 956.63 and 956.64, from entering channels of trade for other than the...) Handlers shall first file applications with the committee to ship such Walla Walla Sweet Onions....

  12. Calorimetry Triggering in ATLAS

    SciTech Connect

    Igonkina, O.; Achenbach, R.; Adragna, P.; Aharrouche, M.; Alexandre, G.; Andrei, V.; Anduaga, X.; Aracena, I.; Backlund, S.; Baines, J.; Barnett, B.M.; Bauss, B.; Bee, C.; Behera, P.; Bell, P.; Bendel, M.; Benslama, K.; Berry, T.; Bogaerts, A.; Bohm, C.; Bold, T.; /UC, Irvine /AGH-UST, Cracow /Birmingham U. /Barcelona, IFAE /CERN /Birmingham U. /Rutherford /Montreal U. /Santa Maria U., Valparaiso /DESY /DESY, Zeuthen /Geneva U. /City Coll., N.Y. /Barcelona, IFAE /CERN /Birmingham U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Birmingham U. /Lisbon, LIFEP /Rio de Janeiro Federal U. /City Coll., N.Y. /Birmingham U. /Copenhagen U. /Copenhagen U. /Brookhaven /Rutherford /Royal Holloway, U. of London /Pennsylvania U. /Montreal U. /SLAC /CERN /Michigan State U. /Chile U., Catolica /City Coll., N.Y. /Oxford U. /La Plata U. /McGill U. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Hamburg U. /DESY /DESY, Zeuthen /Geneva U. /Queen Mary, U. of London /CERN /Rutherford /Rio de Janeiro Federal U. /Birmingham U. /Montreal U. /CERN /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Liverpool U. /Royal Holloway, U. of London /Pennsylvania U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Geneva U. /Birmingham U. /NIKHEF, Amsterdam /Rutherford /Royal Holloway, U. of London /Rutherford /Royal Holloway, U. of London /AGH-UST, Cracow /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Birmingham U. /Hamburg U. /DESY /DESY, Zeuthen /Geneva U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Michigan State U. /Stockholm U. /Stockholm U. /Birmingham U. /CERN /Montreal U. /Stockholm U. /Arizona U. /Regina U. /Regina U. /Rutherford /NIKHEF, Amsterdam /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /DESY /DESY, Zeuthen /City Coll., N.Y. /University Coll. London /Humboldt U., Berlin /Queen Mary, U. of London /Argonne /LPSC, Grenoble /Arizona U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Birmingham U. /Antonio Narino U. /Hamburg U. /DESY /DESY, Zeuthen /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Birmingham U. /Chile U., Catolica /Indiana U. /Manchester U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Rutherford /City Coll., N.Y. /Stockholm U. /La Plata U. /Antonio Narino U. /Queen Mary, U. of London /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Antonio Narino U. /Pavia U. /City Coll., N.Y. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Pennsylvania U. /Barcelona, IFAE /Barcelona, IFAE /Chile U., Catolica /Genoa U. /INFN, Genoa /Rutherford /Barcelona, IFAE /Nevis Labs, Columbia U. /CERN /Antonio Narino U. /McGill U. /Rutherford /Santa Maria U., Valparaiso /Rutherford /Chile U., Catolica /Brookhaven /Oregon U. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Barcelona, IFAE /McGill U. /Antonio Narino U. /Antonio Narino U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Sydney U. /Rutherford /McGill U. /McGill U. /Pavia U. /Genoa U. /INFN, Genoa /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Barcelona, IFAE /SLAC /Stockholm U. /Moscow State U. /Stockholm U. /Birmingham U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /DESY /DESY, Zeuthen /Birmingham U. /Geneva U. /Oregon U. /Barcelona, IFAE /University Coll. London /Royal Holloway, U. of London /Birmingham U. /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /Birmingham U. /Birmingham U. /Oregon U. /La Plata U. /Geneva U. /Chile U., Catolica /McGill U. /Pavia U. /Barcelona, IFAE /Regina U. /Birmingham U. /Birmingham U. /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /Oxford U. /CERN /Kirchhoff Inst. Phys. /UC, Irvine /UC, Irvine /Wisconsin U., Madison /Rutherford /Mainz U., Inst. Phys. /CERN /Geneva U. /Copenhagen U. /City Coll., N.Y. /Wisconsin U., Madison /Rio de Janeiro Federal U. /Wisconsin U., Madison /Stockholm U. /University Coll. London

    2011-12-08

    The ATLAS experiment is preparing for data taking at 14 TeV collision energy. A rich discovery physics program is being prepared in addition to the detailed study of Standard Model processes which will be produced in abundance. The ATLAS multi-level trigger system is designed to accept one event in 2/10{sup 5} to enable the selection of rare and unusual physics events. The ATLAS calorimeter system is a precise instrument, which includes liquid Argon electro-magnetic and hadronic components as well as a scintillator-tile hadronic calorimeter. All these components are used in the various levels of the trigger system. A wide physics coverage is ensured by inclusively selecting events with candidate electrons, photons, taus, jets or those with large missing transverse energy. The commissioning of the trigger system is being performed with cosmic ray events and by replaying simulated Monte Carlo events through the trigger and data acquisition system.

  13. Dealing with Asthma Triggers

    MedlinePlus

    ... smell given off by paint or gas, and air pollution. If you notice that an irritant triggers your ... or other tobacco products around you. If outdoor air pollution is a problem, running the air conditioner or ...

  14. Dealing with Asthma Triggers

    MedlinePlus

    ... reactions stuff in the air, like smoke and pollution colds or the flu weather conditions exercise continue ... given off by paint or gas, and air pollution. If you notice that an irritant triggers your ...

  15. ELECTRONIC TRIGGER CIRCUIT

    DOEpatents

    Russell, J.A.G.

    1958-01-01

    An electronic trigger circuit is described of the type where an output pulse is obtained only after an input voltage has cqualed or exceeded a selected reference voltage. In general, the invention comprises a source of direct current reference voltage in series with an impedance and a diode rectifying element. An input pulse of preselected amplitude causes the diode to conduct and develop a signal across the impedance. The signal is delivered to an amplifier where an output pulse is produced and part of the output is fed back in a positive manner to the diode so that the amplifier produces a steep wave front trigger pulsc at the output. The trigger point of the described circuit is not subject to variation due to the aging, etc., of multi-electrode tabes, since the diode circuit essentially determines the trigger point.

  16. USSP-IAEA WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED SENSORS FOR SAFEGUARDS.

    SciTech Connect

    PEPPER,S.; QUEIROLO, A.; ZENDEL, M.; WHICHELLO, J.; ANNESE, C.; GRIEBE, J.; GRIEBE, R.

    2007-11-13

    The IAEA Medium Term Strategy (2006-2011) defines a number of specific goals in respect to the IAEA's ability to provide assurances to the international community regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy through States adherences to their respective non-proliferation treaty commitments. The IAEA has long used and still needs the best possible sensors to detect and measure nuclear material. The Department of Safeguards, recognizing the importance of safeguards-oriented R&D, especially targeting improved detection capabilities for undeclared facilities, materials and activities, initiated a number of activities in early 2005. The initiatives included letters to Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), personal contacts with known technology holders, topical meetings, consultant reviews of safeguards technology, and special workshops to identify new and novel technologies and methodologies. In support of this objective, the United States Support Program to IAEA Safeguards hosted a workshop on ''Advanced Sensors for Safeguards'' in Santa Fe, New Mexico, from April 23-27, 2007. The Organizational Analysis Corporation, a U.S.-based management consulting firm, organized and facilitated the workshop. The workshop's goal was to help the IAEA identify and plan for new sensors for safeguards implementation. The workshop, which was attended by representatives of seven member states and international organizations, included presentations by technology holders and developers on new technologies thought to have relevance to international safeguards, but not yet in use by the IAEA. The presentations were followed by facilitated breakout sessions where the participants considered two scenarios typical of what IAEA inspectors might face in the field. One scenario focused on an enrichment plant; the other scenario focused on a research reactor. The participants brainstormed using the technologies presented by the participants and other technologies known to them to propose

  17. Promoting global safeguards cooperation: Argentine-U.S. technical achievements

    SciTech Connect

    Owens, L.; Smith, C.

    1996-04-01

    The bilateral ENREN (Argentina National Nuclear Regulatory Board)-DOE Safeguards Agreement was signed by Dr. Dan Beninson, ENREN, and Dr. Kenneth Baker, DOE, at the Peaceful Uses Conference in Bariloche in 1994. Two major activities identified for immediate cooperation were: nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques for Pilcaniyeu, and advanced containment and surveillance at Embalse. Both of these are discussed here. While the activities of the past year and a half are significant, many more opportunities remain for valuable cooperative partnering to discover more effective and efficient ways to apply safeguards. Several that have been identified by ENREN and DOE for 1996 are: (1) environmental monitoring as a safeguards technique; (2) Pilcaniyeu measurement studies and joint IAEA support program activities; (3) information management and analysis tools; (4) safeguards analytical laboratory support; (5) study of the safeguards approach for Embalse; (6) expansion of the remote monitoring system at Embalse; (7) use of ground-penetrating radar technology at Embalse; and (8) computerized material control and accounting tools for Pilcaniyeu.

  18. Remote instrumentation and safeguards monitoring for the star project

    SciTech Connect

    Buettner, H M; Labiak, W; Spiridon, A

    2000-06-15

    A part of the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI) is the development of the Small Transportable Autonomous Reactor (STAR) for deployment in countries that do not have a nuclear industry. STARs would have an output of from 100 to 150 MW electric, would be fueled in the country of manufacture, and after 15 to 20 years of operation the reactor core would be returned to the country of manufacture for refueling. A candidate STAR design can be found in (Greenspan, 2000). This paper describes the design of the control and monitoring system that might be used. There are two unique features to this system. One is that the monitored information will be transmitted to a remote site for two purposes, safeguards, and allowing experts a great distance away direct access to view the reactor's operating parameters. The second feature is safeguards sensors will be designed into the system and there will monitoring of the safeguards aspects of the system for tampering. Any safeguards anomalies will be sent to the remote site as alarms. Encrypted satellite communications will be used to transmit the data. These features allow the STAR to be operated by a small staff and will reduce the costs of safeguards monitoring by reducing the number of plant visits by inspectors.

  19. Zone approaches to international safeguards of a nuclear fuel cycle

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.

    1986-01-01

    At present the IAEA designs its safeguards approach with regard to each type of nuclear facility so that the safeguards activities and effort are essentially the same for a given type and size of nuclear facility wherever it may be located. Conclusions regarding a state are derived by combining the results of safeguards verifications for the individual facilities within it. We have examined safeguards approaches for a state nuclear fuel cycle that take into account the existence of all of the nuclear facilities in the state. We have focussed on the fresh-fuel zone of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle, the several facilities of which use or process low-enriched uranium. At one extreme, flows and inventories would be verified at each material balance area. At the other extreme, the flows into and out of the zone and the inventory of the whole zone would be verified. The intention is to develop an approach which will make it possible to compare the technical effectiveness and the inspection effort for the facility-oriented approach, for the zone approach and for some reasonable intermediate safeguards approaches. Technical effectiveness, in these cases, means an estimate of the assurance that all nuclear material has been accounted for.

  20. Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New TRU Fuel Fabrication Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Durst, Philip C.; Ehinger, Michael H.; Boyer, Brian; Therios, Ike; Bean, Robert; Dougan, A.; Tolk, K.

    2007-12-15

    This second report in a series of three reviews possible safeguards approaches for the new transuranic (TRU) fuel fabrication processes to be deployed at AFCF – specifically, the ceramic TRU (MOX) fuel fabrication line and the metallic (pyroprocessing) line. The most common TRU fuel has been fuel composed of mixed plutonium and uranium dioxide, referred to as “MOX”. However, under the Advanced Fuel Cycle projects custom-made fuels with higher contents of neptunium, americium, and curium may also be produced to evaluate if these “minor actinides” can be effectively burned and transmuted through irradiation in the ABR. A third and final report in this series will evaluate and review the advanced safeguards approach options for the ABR. In reviewing and developing the advanced safeguards approach for the new TRU fuel fabrication processes envisioned for AFCF, the existing international (IAEA) safeguards approach at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility (PFPF) and the conceptual approach planned for the new J-MOX facility in Japan have been considered as a starting point of reference. The pyro-metallurgical reprocessing and fuel fabrication process at EBR-II near Idaho Falls also provided insight for safeguarding the additional metallic pyroprocessing fuel fabrication line planned for AFCF.

  1. 45 CFR 2508.10 - Who has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and automatic record..., and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and...

  2. 45 CFR 2508.10 - Who has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and automatic record..., and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and...

  3. 45 CFR 1159.15 - Who has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... of maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent...

  4. 45 CFR 2508.10 - Who has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and automatic record..., and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and...

  5. 45 CFR 1159.15 - Who has the responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of... of maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent...

  6. Triggered Earthquakes Following Parkfield?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hough, S. E.

    2004-12-01

    When the M5.0 Arvin earthquake struck approximately 30 hours after the 28 September 2004 M6.0 Parkfield earthquake, it seemed likely if not obvious that the latter had triggered the former. The odds of a M5.0 or greater event occurring by random chance in a given 2-day window is low, on the order of 2%. However, previously published results suggest that remotely triggered earthquakes are observed only following much larger mainshocks, typically M7 or above. Moreover, using a standard beta-statistic approach, one finds no pervasive regional increase of seismicity in the weeks following the Parkfield mainshock. (Neither were any moderate events observed at regional distances following the 1934 and 1966 Parkfield earthquakes.) Was Arvin a remotely triggered earthquake? To address this issue further I compare the seismicity rate changes following the Parkfield mainshock with those following 14 previous M5.3-7.1 earthquakes in central and southern California. I show that, on average, seismicity increased to a distance of at least 120 km following these events. For all but the M7.1 Hector Mine mainshock, this is well beyond the radius of what would be considered a traditional aftershock zone. Average seismicity rates also increase, albeit more weakly, to a distance of about 220 km. These results suggest that even moderate mainshocks in central and southern California do trigger seismicity at distances up to 220 km, supporting the inference that Arvin was indeed a remotely triggered earthquake. In general, only weak triggering is expected following moderate (M5.5-6.5) mainshocks. However, as illustrated by Arvin and, in retrospect, the 1986 M5.5 Oceanside earthquake, which struck just 5 days after the M5.9 North Palm Springs earthquake, triggered events can sometimes be large enough to generate public interest, and anxiety.

  7. Integrated safeguards & security for material protection, accounting, and control.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Cipiti, Benjamin B.

    2009-10-01

    Traditional safeguards and security design for fuel cycle facilities is done separately and after the facility design is near completion. This can result in higher costs due to retrofits and redundant use of data. Future facilities will incorporate safeguards and security early in the design process and integrate the systems to make better use of plant data and strengthen both systems. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the integration of materials control and accounting (MC&A) measurements with physical security design for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Locations throughout the plant where data overlap occurs or where MC&A data could be a benefit were identified. This mapping is presented along with the methodology for including the additional data in existing probabilistic assessments to evaluate safeguards and security systems designs.

  8. End user needs for enhanced IAEA Safeguards Information Management Capabilities

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.; Anzelon, G.; Deland, S.; Whiteson, R.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is undertaking a program for strengthening its safeguards on the recognition that safeguards must give assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material or that declared facilities are not being misused, but also of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities in States which have signed comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency. The IAEA has determined that the detection of undeclared nuclear activities and the creation of confidence in the continuing peaceful use of declared material and facilities is largely dependent on more information being made available to the Agency and on the capability of the Agency to make more effective use of this additional information, as well as existing information.

  9. Multilayered genetic safeguards limit growth of microorganisms to defined environments

    PubMed Central

    Gallagher, Ryan R.; Patel, Jaymin R.; Interiano, Alexander L.; Rovner, Alexis J.; Isaacs, Farren J.

    2015-01-01

    Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are commonly used to produce valuable compounds in closed industrial systems. However, their emerging applications in open clinical or environmental settings require enhanced safety and security measures. Intrinsic biocontainment, the creation of bacterial hosts unable to survive in natural environments, remains a major unsolved biosafety problem. We developed a new biocontainment strategy containing overlapping ‘safeguards’—engineered riboregulators that tightly control expression of essential genes, and an engineered addiction module based on nucleases that cleaves the host genome—to restrict viability of Escherichia coli cells to media containing exogenously supplied synthetic small molecules. These multilayered safeguards maintain robust growth in permissive conditions, eliminate persistence and limit escape frequencies to <1.3 × 10−12. The staged approach to safeguard implementation revealed mechanisms of escape and enabled strategies to overcome them. Our safeguarding strategy is modular and employs conserved mechanisms that could be extended to clinically or industrially relevant organisms and undomesticated species. PMID:25567985

  10. Safeguards techniques in a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Leitner, E.; Rudolf, K.; Weh, R. )

    1991-01-01

    The pilot conditioning plant at Gorleben, Germany, is designed as a multi-purpose plant. Its primary task is the conditioning of spent fuel assemblies into a form suitable for final disposal. As a pilot plant, it allows furthermore for the development and testing of various conditioning techniques. In terms of international safeguards, the pilot conditioning plant is basically considered an item facility. Entire fuel assemblies enter the plant in transport casks, whereas bins filled with fuel rods or canisters containing cut fuel rods leave the facility in final disposal packages (e.g. POLLUX). Each POLLUX final disposal package content is uniquely correlated to a definite number of fuel assemblies which have entered the conditioning process. For this type of facility, containment/surveillance (C/S) should take over the major role in nuclear material safeguards. This paper discusses the safeguards at the Gorleben plant.

  11. Safeguards for spent fuel in an irretrievable storage facility

    SciTech Connect

    Richter, B.; Stein, G. )

    1992-01-01

    Ultimately, high-level waste from the reprocessing of German spent fuel, spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel assemblies that will not be reprocessed, and spent THTR-300 fuel will be disposed of in a geologic repository in the Gorleben salt dome, provided it will be licensed; the exploration of the salt dome is under way. Because of its fissile material content, particularly plutonium, the International Atomic Energy Agency will not release spent fuel from safeguards, although the irradiated material will be packaged in huge containers and irretrievably buried in the salt. International safeguards in an irretrievable storage facility will have to be designed accordingly. This paper discusses various safeguards aspects, investigations, and results. Technical aspects were presented in a previous paper.

  12. Safeguards Approaches for Black Box Processes or Facilities

    SciTech Connect

    Diaz-Marcano, Helly; Gitau, Ernest TN; Hockert, John; Miller, Erin; Wylie, Joann

    2013-09-25

    The objective of this study is to determine whether a safeguards approach can be developed for “black box” processes or facilities. These are facilities where a State or operator may limit IAEA access to specific processes or portions of a facility; in other cases, the IAEA may be prohibited access to the entire facility. The determination of whether a black box process or facility is safeguardable is dependent upon the details of the process type, design, and layout; the specific limitations on inspector access; and the restrictions placed upon the design information that can be provided to the IAEA. This analysis identified the necessary conditions for safeguardability of black box processes and facilities.

  13. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  14. International Safeguards Technology and Policy Education and Training Pilot Programs

    SciTech Connect

    Dreicer, M; Anzelon, G A; Essner, J T; Dougan, A D; Doyle, J; Boyer, B; Hypes, P; Sokava, E; Wehling, F; Martin, J; Charlton, W

    2009-06-16

    A major focus of the National Nuclear Security Administration-led Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) is the development of human capital to meet present and future challenges to the safeguards regime. An effective university-level education in safeguards and related disciplines is an essential element in a layered strategy to rebuild the safeguards human resource capacity. NNSA launched two pilot programs in 2008 to develop university level courses and internships in association with James, Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) and Texas A&M University (TAMU). These pilot efforts involved 44 students in total and were closely linked to hands-on internships at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management pilot program was a collaboration between TAMU, LANL, and LLNL. The LANL-based coursework was shared with the students undertaking internships at LLNL via video teleconferencing. A weeklong hands-on exercise was also conducted at LANL. A second pilot effort, the International Nuclear Safeguards Policy and Information Analysis pilot program was implemented at MIIS in cooperation with LLNL. Speakers from MIIS, LLNL, and other U.S. national laboratories (LANL, BNL) delivered lectures for the audience of 16 students. The majority of students were senior classmen or new master's degree graduates from MIIS specializing in nonproliferation policy studies. The two pilots programs concluded with an NGSI Summer Student Symposium, held at LLNL, where 20 students participated in LLNL facility tours and poster sessions. The value of bringing together the students from the technical and policy pilots was notable and will factor into the planning for the continued refinement of the two programs in the coming years.

  15. Containment and surveillance -- A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    SciTech Connect

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-12-31

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future.

  16. A perspective on safeguarding and monitoring of excess military plutonium

    SciTech Connect

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-10-02

    The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective and framework for the development of safeguarding and monitoring procedures for the various stages of disposition of excess military plutonium. The paper briefly outlines and comments on some of the issues involved in safeguarding and monitoring excess military plutonium as it progresses from weapons through dismantlement, to fabrication as reactor fuel, to use in a reactor, and finally to storage and disposal as spent fuel. {open_quotes}Military{close_quotes} refers to ownership, and includes both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium. {open_quotes}Excess{close_quotes} refers to plutonium (in any form) that a government decides is no longer needed for military use and can be irrevocably removed from military stockpiles. Many of the issues and proposals presented in this paper are based on, or are similar to, those mentioned in the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on excess military plutonium. Safeguards for plutonium disposition are discussed elsewhere in terms of requirements established by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Here, the discussion is less specific. The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} is used broadly to refer to materials control and accountancy (MC&A), containment and surveillance (C&S), and physical protection of nuclear materials by the state that possesses those materials. This is also referred to as material protection, control, and accountancy (MPCA). The term {open_quotes}safeguarding{close_quotes} was chosen for brevity and to distinguish MPCA considered in this paper from international or IAEA safeguards. {open_quotes}Monitoring{close_quotes} is used to refer to activities designed to assure another party (state or international organization) that the nuclear materials of the host state (the United States or Russia) are secure and not subject to unauthorized use.

  17. Trigger mechanism for engines

    SciTech Connect

    Clark, L.R.

    1989-02-28

    A trigger mechanism is described for a blower-vacuum apparatus having a trigger mounted within a handle and a small engine comprising: a throttle; a ''L'' shaped lever having first and second legs mounted for rotation about an intermediate pivot within the handle when the trigger is depressed, interconnecting the trigger and the throttle, the second leg having first teeth defined therein, the lever further having idle, full throttle and stop positions; a normally raised latch means adapted to be rotated and axially depressed, the latch means having second teeth situated on a cam to engage the first teeth for holding the lever in an intermediate position between the idle and full throttle positions when the latch means is rotated. The latch means further are cam teeth into potential engagement with the lever teeth when the trigger is depressed, lever is biased to the stop position; and idle adjusting means means for intercepting the second leg for preventing the second leg from reaching the stop position when the latch means is raised.

  18. The CMS trigger system

    DOE PAGES

    Khachatryan, Vardan

    2017-01-24

    This paper describes the CMS trigger system and its performance during Run 1 of the LHC. The trigger system consists of two levels designed to select events of potential physics interest from a GHz (MHz) interaction rate of proton-proton (heavy ion) collisions. The first level of the trigger is implemented in hardware, and selects events containing detector signals consistent with an electron, photon, muon, tau lepton, jet, or missing transverse energy. A programmable menu of up to 128 object-based algorithms is used to select events for subsequent processing. The trigger thresholds are adjusted to the LHC instantaneous luminosity during datamore » taking in order to restrict the output rate to 100 kHz, the upper limit imposed by the CMS readout electronics. The second level, implemented in software, further refines the purity of the output stream, selecting an average rate of 400 Hz for offline event storage. The objectives, strategy and performance of the trigger system during the LHC Run 1 are described.« less

  19. The CMS trigger system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Khachatryan, V.; Sirunyan, A. M.; Tumasyan, A.; Adam, W.; Asilar, E.; Bergauer, T.; Brandstetter, J.; Brondolin, E.; Dragicevic, M.; Erö, J.; Flechl, M.; Friedl, M.; Frühwirth, R.; Ghete, V. M.; Hartl, C.; Hörmann, N.; Hrubec, J.; Jeitler, M.; Knünz, V.; König, A.; Krammer, M.; Krätschmer, I.; Liko, D.; Matsushita, T.; Mikulec, I.; Rabady, D.; Rahbaran, B.; Rohringer, H.; Schieck, J.; Schöfbeck, R.; Strauss, J.; Treberer-Treberspurg, W.; Waltenberger, W.; Wulz, C.-E.; Mossolov, V.; Shumeiko, N.; Suarez Gonzalez, J.; Alderweireldt, S.; Cornelis, T.; De Wolf, E. A.; Janssen, X.; Knutsson, A.; Lauwers, J.; Luyckx, S.; Van De Klundert, M.; Van Haevermaet, H.; Van Mechelen, P.; Van Remortel, N.; Van Spilbeeck, A.; Abu Zeid, S.; Blekman, F.; D'Hondt, J.; Daci, N.; De Bruyn, I.; Deroover, K.; Heracleous, N.; Keaveney, J.; Lowette, S.; Moreels, L.; Olbrechts, A.; Python, Q.; Strom, D.; Tavernier, S.; Van Doninck, W.; Van Mulders, P.; Van Onsem, G. P.; Van Parijs, I.; Barria, P.; Brun, H.; Caillol, C.; Clerbaux, B.; De Lentdecker, G.; Fasanella, G.; Favart, L.; Grebenyuk, A.; Karapostoli, G.; Lenzi, T.; Léonard, A.; Maerschalk, T.; Marinov, A.; Perniè, L.; Randle-conde, A.; Reis, T.; Seva, T.; Vander Velde, C.; Vanlaer, P.; Yonamine, R.; Zenoni, F.; Zhang, F.; Beernaert, K.; Benucci, L.; Cimmino, A.; Crucy, S.; Dobur, D.; Fagot, A.; Garcia, G.; Gul, M.; Mccartin, J.; Ocampo Rios, A. A.; Poyraz, D.; Ryckbosch, D.; Salva, S.; Sigamani, M.; Strobbe, N.; Tytgat, M.; Van Driessche, W.; Yazgan, E.; Zaganidis, N.; Basegmez, S.; Beluffi, C.; Bondu, O.; Brochet, S.; Bruno, G.; Caudron, A.; Ceard, L.; Da Silveira, G. G.; Delaere, C.; Favart, D.; Forthomme, L.; Giammanco, A.; Hollar, J.; Jafari, A.; Jez, P.; Komm, M.; Lemaitre, V.; Mertens, A.; Musich, M.; Nuttens, C.; Perrini, L.; Pin, A.; Piotrzkowski, K.; Popov, A.; Quertenmont, L.; Selvaggi, M.; Vidal Marono, M.; Beliy, N.; Hammad, G. H.; Aldá Júnior, W. L.; Alves, F. L.; Alves, G. A.; Brito, L.; Correa Martins Junior, M.; Hamer, M.; Hensel, C.; Mora Herrera, C.; Moraes, A.; Pol, M. E.; Rebello Teles, P.; Belchior Batista Das Chagas, E.; Carvalho, W.; Chinellato, J.; Custódio, A.; Da Costa, E. M.; Damiao, D. De Jesus; De Oliveira Martins, C.; Fonseca De Souza, S.; Huertas Guativa, L. M.; Malbouisson, H.; Matos Figueiredo, D.; Mundim, L.; Nogima, H.; Prado Da Silva, W. L.; Santoro, A.; Sznajder, A.; Tonelli Manganote, E. J.; Vilela Pereira, A.; Ahuja, S.; Bernardes, C. A.; De Souza Santos, A.; Dogra, S.; Fernandez Perez Tomei, T. R.; Gregores, E. M.; Mercadante, P. G.; Moon, C. S.; Novaes, S. F.; Padula, Sandra S.; Romero Abad, D.; Ruiz Vargas, J. C.; Aleksandrov, A.; Hadjiiska, R.; Iaydjiev, P.; Rodozov, M.; Stoykova, S.; Sultanov, G.; Vutova, M.; Dimitrov, A.; Glushkov, I.; Litov, L.; Pavlov, B.; Petkov, P.; Ahmad, M.; Bian, J. G.; Chen, G. M.; Chen, H. S.; Chen, M.; Cheng, T.; Du, R.; Jiang, C. H.; Plestina, R.; Romeo, F.; Shaheen, S. M.; Spiezia, A.; Tao, J.; Wang, C.; Wang, Z.; Zhang, H.; Asawatangtrakuldee, C.; Ban, Y.; Li, Q.; Liu, S.; Mao, Y.; Qian, S. J.; Wang, D.; Xu, Z.; Avila, C.; Cabrera, A.; Chaparro Sierra, L. F.; Florez, C.; Gomez, J. P.; Gomez Moreno, B.; Sanabria, J. C.; Godinovic, N.; Lelas, D.; Puljak, I.; Ribeiro Cipriano, P. M.; Antunovic, Z.; Kovac, M.; Brigljevic, V.; Kadija, K.; Luetic, J.; Micanovic, S.; Sudic, L.; Attikis, A.; Mavromanolakis, G.; Mousa, J.; Nicolaou, C.; Ptochos, F.; Razis, P. A.; Rykaczewski, H.; Bodlak, M.; Finger, M.; Finger, M., Jr.; Assran, Y.; El Sawy, M.; Elgammal, S.; Ellithi Kamel, A.; Mahmoud, M. A.; Calpas, B.; Kadastik, M.; Murumaa, M.; Raidal, M.; Tiko, A.; Veelken, C.; Eerola, P.; Pekkanen, J.; Voutilainen, M.; Härkönen, J.; Karimäki, V.; Kinnunen, R.; Lampén, T.; Lassila-Perini, K.; Lehti, S.; Lindén, T.; Luukka, P.; Mäenpää, T.; Peltola, T.; Tuominen, E.; Tuominiemi, J.; Tuovinen, E.; Wendland, L.; Talvitie, J.; Tuuva, T.; Besancon, M.; Couderc, F.; Dejardin, M.; Denegri, D.; Fabbro, B.; Faure, J. L.; Favaro, C.; Ferri, F.; Ganjour, S.; Givernaud, A.; Gras, P.; Hamel de Monchenault, G.; Jarry, P.; Locci, E.; Machet, M.; Malcles, J.; Rander, J.; Rosowsky, A.; Titov, M.; Zghiche, A.; Antropov, I.; Baffioni, S.; Beaudette, F.; Busson, P.; Cadamuro, L.; Chapon, E.; Charlot, C.; Dahms, T.; Davignon, O.; Filipovic, N.; Florent, A.; Granier de Cassagnac, R.; Lisniak, S.; Mastrolorenzo, L.; Miné, P.; Naranjo, I. N.; Nguyen, M.; Ochando, C.; Ortona, G.; Paganini, P.; Pigard, P.; Regnard, S.; Salerno, R.; Sauvan, J. B.; Sirois, Y.; Strebler, T.; Yilmaz, Y.; Zabi, A.; Agram, J.-L.; Andrea, J.; Aubin, A.; Bloch, D.; Brom, J.-M.; Buttignol, M.; Chabert, E. C.; Chanon, N.; Collard, C.; Conte, E.; Coubez, X.; Fontaine, J.-C.; Gelé, D.; Goerlach, U.; Goetzmann, C.; Le Bihan, A.-C.; Merlin, J. A.; Skovpen, K.; Van Hove, P.; Gadrat, S.; Beauceron, S.; Bernet, C.; Boudoul, G.; Bouvier, E.; Carrillo Montoya, C. A.; Chierici, R.; Contardo, D.; Courbon, B.; Depasse, P.; El Mamouni, H.; Fan, J.; Fay, J.; Gascon, S.; Gouzevitch, M.; Ille, B.; Lagarde, F.; Laktineh, I. B.; Lethuillier, M.; Mirabito, L.; Pequegnot, A. L.; Perries, S.; Ruiz Alvarez, J. D.; Sabes, D.; Sgandurra, L.; Sordini, V.; Vander Donckt, M.; Verdier, P.; Viret, S.; Toriashvili, T.; Tsamalaidze, Z.; Autermann, C.; Beranek, S.; Edelhoff, M.; Feld, L.; Heister, A.; Kiesel, M. K.; Klein, K.; Lipinski, M.; Ostapchuk, A.; Preuten, M.; Raupach, F.; Schael, S.; Schulte, J. F.; Verlage, T.; Weber, H.; Wittmer, B.; Zhukov, V.; Ata, M.; Brodski, M.; Dietz-Laursonn, E.; Duchardt, D.; Endres, M.; Erdmann, M.; Erdweg, S.; Esch, T.; Fischer, R.; Güth, A.; Hebbeker, T.; Heidemann, C.; Hoepfner, K.; Klingebiel, D.; Knutzen, S.; Kreuzer, P.; Merschmeyer, M.; Meyer, A.; Millet, P.; Olschewski, M.; Padeken, K.; Papacz, P.; Pook, T.; Radziej, M.; Reithler, H.; Rieger, M.; Scheuch, F.; Sonnenschein, L.; Teyssier, D.; Thüer, S.; Cherepanov, V.; Erdogan, Y.; Flügge, G.; Geenen, H.; Geisler, M.; Hoehle, F.; Kargoll, B.; Kress, T.; Kuessel, Y.; Künsken, A.; Lingemann, J.; Nehrkorn, A.; Nowack, A.; Nugent, I. M.; Pistone, C.; Pooth, O.; Stahl, A.; Aldaya Martin, M.; Asin, I.; Bartosik, N.; Behnke, O.; Behrens, U.; Bell, A. J.; Borras, K.; Burgmeier, A.; Campbell, A.; Choudhury, S.; Costanza, F.; Diez Pardos, C.; Dolinska, G.; Dooling, S.; Dorland, T.; Eckerlin, G.; Eckstein, D.; Eichhorn, T.; Flucke, G.; Gallo, E.; Garay Garcia, J.; Geiser, A.; Gizhko, A.; Gunnellini, P.; Hauk, J.; Hempel, M.; Jung, H.; Kalogeropoulos, A.; Karacheban, O.; Kasemann, M.; Katsas, P.; Kieseler, J.; Kleinwort, C.; Korol, I.; Lange, W.; Leonard, J.; Lipka, K.; Lobanov, A.; Lohmann, W.; Mankel, R.; Marfin, I.; Melzer-Pellmann, I.-A.; Meyer, A. B.; Mittag, G.; Mnich, J.; Mussgiller, A.; Naumann-Emme, S.; Nayak, A.; Ntomari, E.; Perrey, H.; Pitzl, D.; Placakyte, R.; Raspereza, A.; Roland, B.; Sahin, M. Ö.; Saxena, P.; Schoerner-Sadenius, T.; Schröder, M.; Seitz, C.; Spannagel, S.; Trippkewitz, K. D.; Walsh, R.; Wissing, C.; Blobel, V.; Centis Vignali, M.; Draeger, A. R.; Erfle, J.; Garutti, E.; Goebel, K.; Gonzalez, D.; Görner, M.; Haller, J.; Hoffmann, M.; Höing, R. S.; Junkes, A.; Klanner, R.; Kogler, R.; Kovalchuk, N.; Lapsien, T.; Lenz, T.; Marchesini, I.; Marconi, D.; Meyer, M.; Nowatschin, D.; Ott, J.; Pantaleo, F.; Peiffer, T.; Perieanu, A.; Pietsch, N.; Poehlsen, J.; Rathjens, D.; Sander, C.; Scharf, C.; Schettler, H.; Schleper, P.; Schlieckau, E.; Schmidt, A.; Schwandt, J.; Sola, V.; Stadie, H.; Steinbrück, G.; Tholen, H.; Troendle, D.; Usai, E.; Vanelderen, L.; Vanhoefer, A.; Vormwald, B.; Akbiyik, M.; Barth, C.; Baus, C.; Berger, J.; Böser, C.; Butz, E.; Chwalek, T.; Colombo, F.; De Boer, W.; Descroix, A.; Dierlamm, A.; Fink, S.; Frensch, F.; Friese, R.; Giffels, M.; Gilbert, A.; Haitz, D.; Hartmann, F.; Heindl, S. M.; Husemann, U.; Katkov, I.; Kornmayer, A.; Lobelle Pardo, P.; Maier, B.; Mildner, H.; Mozer, M. U.; Müller, T.; Müller, Th.; Plagge, M.; Quast, G.; Rabbertz, K.; Röcker, S.; Roscher, F.; Sieber, G.; Simonis, H. J.; Stober, F. M.; Ulrich, R.; Wagner-Kuhr, J.; Wayand, S.; Weber, M.; Weiler, T.; Wöhrmann, C.; Wolf, R.; Anagnostou, G.; Daskalakis, G.; Geralis, T.; Giakoumopoulou, V. A.; Kyriakis, A.; Loukas, D.; Psallidas, A.; Topsis-Giotis, I.; Agapitos, A.; Kesisoglou, S.; Panagiotou, A.; Saoulidou, N.; Tziaferi, E.; Evangelou, I.; Flouris, G.; Foudas, C.; Kokkas, P.; Loukas, N.; Manthos, N.; Papadopoulos, I.; Paradas, E.; Strologas, J.; Bencze, G.; Hajdu, C.; Hazi, A.; Hidas, P.; Horvath, D.; Sikler, F.; Veszpremi, V.; Vesztergombi, G.; Zsigmond, A. J.; Beni, N.; Czellar, S.; Karancsi, J.; Molnar, J.; Szillasi, Z.; Bartók, M.; Makovec, A.; Raics, P.; Trocsanyi, Z. L.; Ujvari, B.; Mal, P.; Mandal, K.; Sahoo, D. K.; Sahoo, N.; Swain, S. K.; Bansal, S.; Beri, S. B.; Bhatnagar, V.; Chawla, R.; Gupta, R.; Bhawandeep, U.; Kalsi, A. K.; Kaur, A.; Kaur, M.; Kumar, R.; Mehta, A.; Mittal, M.; Singh, J. B.; Walia, G.; Kumar, Ashok; Bhardwaj, A.; Choudhary, B. C.; Garg, R. B.; Kumar, A.; Malhotra, S.; Naimuddin, M.; Nishu, N.; Ranjan, K.; Sharma, R.; Sharma, V.; Bhattacharya, S.; Chatterjee, K.; Dey, S.; Dutta, S.; Jain, Sa.; Majumdar, N.; Modak, A.; Mondal, K.; Mukherjee, S.; Mukhopadhyay, S.; Roy, A.; Roy, D.; Chowdhury, S. Roy; Sarkar, S.; Sharan, M.; Abdulsalam, A.; Chudasama, R.; Dutta, D.; Jha, V.; Kumar, V.; Mohanty, A. K.; Pant, L. M.; Shukla, P.; Topkar, A.; Aziz, T.; Banerjee, S.; Bhowmik, S.; Chatterjee, R. M.; Dewanjee, R. K.; Dugad, S.; Ganguly, S.; Ghosh, S.; Guchait, M.; Gurtu, A.; Kole, G.; Kumar, S.; Mahakud, B.; Maity, M.; Majumder, G.; Mazumdar, K.; Mitra, S.; Mohanty, G. B.; Parida, B.; Sarkar, T.; Sur, N.; Sutar, B.; Wickramage, N.; Chauhan, S.; Dube, S.; Kothekar, K.; Sharma, S.; Bakhshiansohi, H.; Behnamian, H.; Etesami, S. M.; Fahim, A.; Goldouzian, R.; Khakzad, M.; Najafabadi, M. Mohammadi; Naseri, M.; Paktinat Mehdiabadi, S.; Rezaei Hosseinabadi, F.; Safarzadeh, B.; Zeinali, M.; Felcini, M.; Grunewald, M.; Abbrescia, M.; Calabria, C.; Caputo, C.; Colaleo, A.; Creanza, D.; Cristella, L.; De Filippis, N.; De Palma, M.; Fiore, L.; Iaselli, G.; Maggi, G.; Maggi, M.; Miniello, G.; My, S.; Nuzzo, S.; Pompili, A.; Pugliese, G.; Radogna, R.; Ranieri, A.; Selvaggi, G.; Silvestris, L.; Venditti, R.; Verwilligen, P.; Abbiendi, G.; Battilana, C.; Benvenuti, A. C.; Bonacorsi, D.; Braibant-Giacomelli, S.; Brigliadori, L.; Campanini, R.; Capiluppi, P.; Castro, A.; Cavallo, F. R.; Chhibra, S. S.; Codispoti, G.; Cuffiani, M.; Dallavalle, G. M.; Fabbri, F.; Fanfani, A.; Fasanella, D.; Giacomelli, P.; Grandi, C.; Guiducci, L.; Marcellini, S.; Masetti, G.; Montanari, A.; Navarria, F. L.; Perrotta, A.; Rossi, A. M.; Rovelli, T.; Siroli, G. P.; Tosi, N.; Travaglini, R.; Cappello, G.; Chiorboli, M.; Costa, S.; Di Mattia, A.; Giordano, F.; Potenza, R.; Tricomi, A.; Tuve, C.; Barbagli, G.; Ciulli, V.; Civinini, C.; D'Alessandro, R.; Focardi, E.; Gonzi, S.; Gori, V.; Lenzi, P.; Meschini, M.; Paoletti, S.; Sguazzoni, G.; Tropiano, A.; Viliani, L.; Benussi, L.; Bianco, S.; Fabbri, F.; Piccolo, D.; Primavera, F.; Calvelli, V.; Ferro, F.; Lo Vetere, M.; Monge, M. R.; Robutti, E.; Tosi, S.; Brianza, L.; Dinardo, M. E.; Fiorendi, S.; Gennai, S.; Gerosa, R.; Ghezzi, A.; Govoni, P.; Malvezzi, S.; Manzoni, R. A.; Marzocchi, B.; Menasce, D.; Moroni, L.; Paganoni, M.; Pedrini, D.; Ragazzi, S.; Redaelli, N.; Tabarelli de Fatis, T.; Buontempo, S.; Cavallo, N.; Di Guida, S.; Esposito, M.; Fabozzi, F.; Iorio, A. O. M.; Lanza, G.; Lista, L.; Meola, S.; Merola, M.; Paolucci, P.; Sciacca, C.; Thyssen, F.; Bacchetta, N.; Bellato, M.; Benato, L.; Bisello, D.; Boletti, A.; Carlin, R.; Checchia, P.; Dall'Osso, M.; Dosselli, U.; Gasparini, F.; Gasparini, U.; Gozzelino, A.; Lacaprara, S.; Margoni, M.; Meneguzzo, A. T.; Montecassiano, F.; Passaseo, M.; Pazzini, J.; Pegoraro, M.; Pozzobon, N.; Simonetto, F.; Torassa, E.; Tosi, M.; Vanini, S.; Ventura, S.; Zanetti, M.; Zotto, P.; Zucchetta, A.; Zumerle, G.; Braghieri, A.; Magnani, A.; Montagna, P.; Ratti, S. P.; Re, V.; Riccardi, C.; Salvini, P.; Vai, I.; Vitulo, P.; Alunni Solestizi, L.; Biasini, M.; Bilei, G. M.; Ciangottini, D.; Fanò, L.; Lariccia, P.; Mantovani, G.; Menichelli, M.; Saha, A.; Santocchia, A.; Androsov, K.; Azzurri, P.; Bagliesi, G.; Bernardini, J.; Boccali, T.; Castaldi, R.; Ciocci, M. A.; Dell'Orso, R.; Donato, S.; Fedi, G.; Foà, L.; Giassi, A.; Grippo, M. T.; Ligabue, F.; Lomtadze, T.; Martini, L.; Messineo, A.; Palla, F.; Rizzi, A.; Savoy-Navarro, A.; Serban, A. T.; Spagnolo, P.; Tenchini, R.; Tonelli, G.; Venturi, A.; Verdini, P. G.; Barone, L.; Cavallari, F.; D'imperio, G.; Del Re, D.; Diemoz, M.; Gelli, S.; Jorda, C.; Longo, E.; Margaroli, F.; Meridiani, P.; Organtini, G.; Paramatti, R.; Preiato, F.; Rahatlou, S.; Rovelli, C.; Santanastasio, F.; Traczyk, P.; Amapane, N.; Arcidiacono, R.; Argiro, S.; Arneodo, M.; Bellan, R.; Biino, C.; Cartiglia, N.; Costa, M.; Covarelli, R.; Degano, A.; Demaria, N.; Finco, L.; Kiani, B.; Mariotti, C.; Maselli, S.; Migliore, E.; Monaco, V.; Monteil, E.; Obertino, M. M.; Pacher, L.; Pastrone, N.; Pelliccioni, M.; Pinna Angioni, G. L.; Ravera, F.; Romero, A.; Ruspa, M.; Sacchi, R.; Solano, A.; Staiano, A.; Tamponi, U.; Belforte, S.; Candelise, V.; Casarsa, M.; Cossutti, F.; Della Ricca, G.; Gobbo, B.; La Licata, C.; Marone, M.; Schizzi, A.; Zanetti, A.; Kropivnitskaya, A.; Nam, S. K.; Kim, D. H.; Kim, G. N.; Kim, M. S.; Kong, D. J.; Lee, S.; Oh, Y. D.; Sakharov, A.; Son, D. C.; Brochero Cifuentes, J. A.; Kim, H.; Kim, T. J.; Song, S.; Choi, S.; Go, Y.; Gyun, D.; Hong, B.; Jo, M.; Kim, H.; Kim, Y.; Lee, B.; Lee, K.; Lee, K. S.; Lee, S.; Park, S. K.; Roh, Y.; Yoo, H. D.; Choi, M.; Kim, H.; Kim, J. H.; Lee, J. S. H.; Park, I. C.; Ryu, G.; Ryu, M. S.; Choi, Y.; Goh, J.; Kim, D.; Kwon, E.; Lee, J.; Yu, I.; Dudenas, V.; Juodagalvis, A.; Vaitkus, J.; Ahmed, I.; Ibrahim, Z. A.; Komaragiri, J. R.; Ali, M. A. B. Md; Mohamad Idris, F.; Abdullah, W. A. T. Wan; Yusli, M. N.; Casimiro Linares, E.; Castilla-Valdez, H.; De La Cruz-Burelo, E.; Heredia-De La Cruz, I.; Hernandez-Almada, A.; Lopez-Fernandez, R.; Sanchez-Hernandez, A.; Carrillo Moreno, S.; Vazquez Valencia, F.; Pedraza, I.; Salazar Ibarguen, H. A.; Morelos Pineda, A.; Krofcheck, D.; Butler, P. H.; Ahmad, A.; Ahmad, M.; Hassan, Q.; Hoorani, H. R.; Khan, W. A.; Khurshid, T.; Shoaib, M.; Bialkowska, H.; Bluj, M.; Boimska, B.; Frueboes, T.; Górski, M.; Kazana, M.; Nawrocki, K.; Romanowska-Rybinska, K.; Szleper, M.; Zalewski, P.; Brona, G.; Bunkowski, K.; Byszuk, A.; Doroba, K.; Kalinowski, A.; Kierzkowski, K.; Konecki, M.; Krolikowski, J.; Misiura, M.; Oklinski, W.; Olszewski, M.; Pozniak, K.; Walczak, M.; Zabolotny, W.; Bargassa, P.; Silva, C. Beirão Da Cruz E.; Di Francesco, A.; Faccioli, P.; Ferreira Parracho, P. 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W.; Cox, B.; Francis, B.; Goodell, J.; Hirosky, R.; Ledovskoy, A.; Li, H.; Lin, C.; Neu, C.; Sinthuprasith, T.; Sun, X.; Wang, Y.; Wolfe, E.; Wood, J.; Xia, F.; Clarke, C.; Harr, R.; Karchin, P. E.; Kottachchi Kankanamge Don, C.; Lamichhane, P.; Sturdy, J.; Belknap, D. A.; Carlsmith, D.; Cepeda, M.; Dasu, S.; Dodd, L.; Duric, S.; Gomber, B.; Grothe, M.; Hall-Wilton, R.; Herndon, M.; Hervé, A.; Klabbers, P.; Lanaro, A.; Levine, A.; Long, K.; Loveless, R.; Mohapatra, A.; Ojalvo, I.; Perry, T.; Pierro, G. A.; Polese, G.; Ruggles, T.; Sarangi, T.; Savin, A.; Sharma, A.; Smith, N.; Smith, W. H.; Taylor, D.; Woods, N.

    2017-01-01

    This paper describes the CMS trigger system and its performance during Run 1 of the LHC. The trigger system consists of two levels designed to select events of potential physics interest from a GHz (MHz) interaction rate of proton-proton (heavy ion) collisions. The first level of the trigger is implemented in hardware, and selects events containing detector signals consistent with an electron, photon, muon, τ lepton, jet, or missing transverse energy. A programmable menu of up to 128 object-based algorithms is used to select events for subsequent processing. The trigger thresholds are adjusted to the LHC instantaneous luminosity during data taking in order to restrict the output rate to 100 kHz, the upper limit imposed by the CMS readout electronics. The second level, implemented in software, further refines the purity of the output stream, selecting an average rate of 400 Hz for offline event storage. The objectives, strategy and performance of the trigger system during the LHC Run 1 are described.

  20. Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

    SciTech Connect

    Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

    1982-07-01

    Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States.

  1. Working Toward Robust Process Monitoring for Safeguards Applications

    SciTech Connect

    Krichinsky, Alan M; Bell, Lisa S; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Laughter, Mark D; Miller, Paul; Pickett, Chris A; Richardson, Dave; Rowe, Nathan C; Younkin, James R

    2010-01-01

    New safeguards technologies allow continuous monitoring of plant processes. Efforts to deploy these technologies, as described in a preponderance of literature, typically have consisted of case studies attempting to prove their efficacy in proof-of-principle installations. While the enhanced safeguards capabilities of continuous monitoring have been established, studies thus far have not addressed such challenges as manipulation of a system by a host nation. To prevent this and other such vulnerabilities, one technology, continuous load cell monitoring, was reviewed. This paper will present vulnerabilities as well as mitigation strategies that were identified.

  2. Agricultural Wastes.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jewell, W. J.; Switzenbaum, M. S.

    1978-01-01

    Presents a literature review of agricultural wastes, covering publications of 1976-77. Some of the areas covered are: (1) water characteristics and impacts; (2) waste treatment; (3) reuse of agricultural wastes; and (4) nonpoint pollution sources. A list of 150 references is also presented. (HM)

  3. VOCATIONAL AGRICULTURE.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    California State Dept. of Education, Sacramento. Research Coordinating Unit.

    TO ASSIST THOSE WHO MAKE DECISIONS RELATING TO EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN AGRICULTURE, RECENT RESEARCH IN VOCATIONAL AGRICULTURE IS SUMMARIZED. A 1963 STUDY TREATS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORK EXPERIENCE AND STUDENT CHARACTERISTICS, PLANS, AND ASPIRATIONS. STUDIES ON POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION CONCERN GUIDELINES FOR TECHNICIAN PROGRAMS, JUSTIFICATION…

  4. Safeguards and security research and development progress report, October 1993--September 1994

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R.

    1995-08-01

    This report describes the activities carried out by the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R&D) program from October 1993 through September 1994. The activities presented in the first part of the report were directed primarily to domestic US safeguards applications and were, for the most part, sponsored by the Department of Energy`s Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS, NN-50). The activities described in Part 2, International Safeguards, were supported by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/OACN, NN-40). Part 3 describes several safeguards or safeguards-related activities that have other sponsors. The final part of the report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos safeguards R&D reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were published or presented in 1994.

  5. 13 CFR 107.506 - Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    .../Internal controls. 107.506 Section 107.506 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION... Safeguarding Licensee's assets/Internal controls. You must adopt a plan to safeguard your assets and monitor... your control procedures....

  6. 77 FR 76089 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-26

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR... Committee on Reactor Safeguards. BILLING CODE 7590-01-P...

  7. 78 FR 3474 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-01-16

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels... Committee on Reactor Safeguards. BILLING CODE 7590-01-P...

  8. 78 FR 29159 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-05-17

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels; Notice of Meeting The ACRS Subcommittee on Materials, Metallurgy & Reactor Fuels.... Cayetano Santos, Chief, Technical Support Branch, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. BILLING...

  9. Microfabricated triggered vacuum switch

    DOEpatents

    Roesler, Alexander W.; Schare, Joshua M.; Bunch, Kyle

    2010-05-11

    A microfabricated vacuum switch is disclosed which includes a substrate upon which an anode, cathode and trigger electrode are located. A cover is sealed over the substrate under vacuum to complete the vacuum switch. In some embodiments of the present invention, a metal cover can be used in place of the trigger electrode on the substrate. Materials used for the vacuum switch are compatible with high vacuum, relatively high temperature processing. These materials include molybdenum, niobium, copper, tungsten, aluminum and alloys thereof for the anode and cathode. Carbon in the form of graphitic carbon, a diamond-like material, or carbon nanotubes can be used in the trigger electrode. Channels can be optionally formed in the substrate to mitigate against surface breakdown.

  10. INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

    SciTech Connect

    Trond Bjornard PhD; Joseph Alexander; Robert Bean; Brian Castle; Scott DeMuth, Ph.D.; Phillip Durst; Michael Ehinger; Prof. Michael Golay, Ph.D.; Kevin Hase, Ph.D.; David J. Hebditch, DPhil; John Hockert, Ph.D.; Bruce Meppen; James Morgan; Jerry Phillips, Ph.D., PE

    2009-02-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and

  11. Triggered Nanoparticles as Therapeutics

    PubMed Central

    Kim, Chang Soo; Duncan, Bradley; Creran, Brian; Rotello, Vincent M.

    2013-01-01

    Summary Drug delivery systems (DDSs) face several challenges including site-specific delivery, stability, and the programmed release of drugs. Engineered nanoparticle (NP) surfaces with responsive moieties can enhance the efficacy of DDSs for in vitro and in vivo systems. This triggering process can be achieved through both endogenous (biologically controlled release) and exogenous (external stimuli controlled release) activation. In this review, we will highlight recent examples of the use of triggered release strategies of engineered nanomaterials for in vitro and in vivo applications. PMID:24159362

  12. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Safeguards and Security quarterly progress report ending March 31, 1996

    SciTech Connect

    Davis, B.; Davis, G.; Johnson, D.; Mansur, D.L.; Ruhter, W.D.; Strait, R.S.

    1996-04-01

    LLNL carries out safeguards and security activities for DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) and other organizations within and outside DOE. LLNL is supporting OSS in 6 areas: safeguards technology, safeguards and materials accountability, computer security--distributed systems, complex-wide access control, standardization of security systems, and information technology and security center. This report describes the activities in each of these areas.

  13. Nuclear safeguards research and development. Program status report, October 1980-January 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.

    1981-11-01

    This report presents the status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development Program pursued by the Energy, Chemistry-Materials Science, and Operational Security/Safeguards Divisions of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards systems. Also discussed are training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  14. An experimental comparison of triggered and random pulse train uncertainties

    SciTech Connect

    Henzlova, Daniela; Menlove, Howard O; Swinhoe, Martyn T

    2010-01-01

    In this paper we present an experimental comparison of signal-triggered and randomly triggered based analysis algorithms of neutron multiplicity data. Traditional shift register type signal-triggered multiplicity analysis of singles, doubles and triples rates is compared with analysis using randomly triggered gates. Two methods of random gate generation are explored - non-overlapping gates (Feyrunan approach) and periodic overlapping gates (fast accidentals). Using californium sources with low, medium and high rate in combination with AmLi sources (as a surrogate for plutonium) we investigate relative standard deviation (RSD) of data in order to determine if there are parameter spaces in which one of the measurement methods should be preferred. Neutron correlation analysis is a commonly used NDA technique to assay plutonium mass. The data can be collected in two distinct ways: using signal-triggered or randomly triggered counting gates. Analysis algorithms were developed for both approaches to determine singles (S), doubles (D) and triples (7) rates from the measured sample. Currently the most commonly implemented technique to collect neutron coincidence data utilizes shift register based electronics. Shift register uses signal-triggered counting gates to generate foreground multiplicity distribution of correlated+accidental events and a random gate (opened after a predefined long delay following the signal trigger) to generate background multiplicity distribution of accidental events. Modern shift registers include fast accidental option to sample data with a fixed clock frequency. This way a set of overlapping gates is used to generate background multiplicity distributions in order to improve the measurement precision. In parallel to shift register approach the Feynman variance technique is frequently used, which utilizes set of consecutive non-overlapping gates. In general, different user communities (e.g. safeguards, nuclear material accountancy, emergency

  15. Trigger Circuit for Marx Generators

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2001-02-08

    A trigger circuit is provided for a trigger system for a Marx generator column. The column includes a plurality of metal electrode pairs wherein the...electrode (trigatron) spark gap switch forming the first spark gap of the Marx generator column. The triggering circuit includes a trigger

  16. 32 CFR Appendix A to Part 310 - Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    .... Risk Management and Safeguarding Standards 1. Establish administrative, technical, and physical... SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DOD PRIVACY PROGRAM Pt. 310, App. A Appendix A to Part 310... proper safeguarding procedures. D. Physical Safeguards 1. For all unclassified facilities, areas,...

  17. 32 CFR Appendix A to Part 310 - Safeguarding Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    .... Risk Management and Safeguarding Standards 1. Establish administrative, technical, and physical... SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (CONTINUED) PRIVACY PROGRAM DOD PRIVACY PROGRAM Pt. 310, App. A Appendix A to Part 310... proper safeguarding procedures. D. Physical Safeguards 1. For all unclassified facilities, areas,...

  18. 76 FR 33179 - Petition Requesting Safeguards for Glass Fronts of Gas Vented Fireplaces

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-06-08

    ... COMMISSION 16 CFR 1460 Petition Requesting Safeguards for Glass Fronts of Gas Vented Fireplaces AGENCY: U.S... to require safeguards for glass fronts of gas vented fireplaces. We invite written comments... rulemaking to require safeguards for glass fronts of gas vented fireplaces. We are docketing this request...

  19. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Safeguarding information in systems of... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in systems of records. (a) Safeguards appropriate for a NASA system of records shall be developed by...

  20. 14 CFR 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding information in systems of records. (a) Safeguards appropriate for a NASA system of records shall be developed by...

  1. 42 CFR 431.305 - Types of information to be safeguarded.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Types of information to be safeguarded. 431.305... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS STATE ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATION Safeguarding Information on Applicants and Recipients § 431.305 Types of information to be safeguarded. (a) The agency...

  2. 75 FR 65038 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-21

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Procedures for Meetings Background This notice describes...'s) Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act... Federal Register Notice, care of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear...

  3. 45 CFR 1182.15 - Institute responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and..., physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and automatic..., physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and...

  4. 45 CFR 1182.15 - Institute responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and..., physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and automatic..., physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual and...

  5. Agricultural Energy Practices. Agriculture Energy.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Crank, Ron

    This instructional unit is one of 10 developed by students on various energy-related areas that deals specifically with agricultural energy practices. Its objective is for the student to be able to discuss energy use and conservation of resources in the production of agricultural products. Some topics covered are basic uses of direct energy in…

  6. Agriculture Education. Agricultural Metal Working.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Stuttgart Public Schools, AR.

    This curriculum guide is designed for group instruction of secondary agricultural education students enrolled in one or two semester-long courses in agricultural metal working. The guide presents units of study in the following areas: (1) oxyacetylene welding, (2) arc welding, (3) sheet metal, (4) blueprint reading for welders and (5) job…

  7. AIDS radio triggers.

    PubMed

    Elias, A M

    1991-07-01

    In April 1991, the Ethnic Communities' Council of NSW was granted funding under the Community AIDS Prevention and Education Program through the Department of Community Services and Health, to produce a series of 6x50 second AIDS radio triggers with a 10-second tag line for further information. The triggers are designed to disseminate culturally-sensitive information about HIV/AIDS in English, Italian, Greek, Spanish, Khmer, Turkish, Macedonian, Serbo-Croatian, Arabic, Cantonese, and Vietnamese, with the goal of increasing awareness and decreasing the degree of misinformation about HIV/AIDS among people of non-English-speaking backgrounds through radio and sound. The 6 triggers cover the denial that AIDS exists in the community, beliefs that words and feelings do not protect one from catching HIV, encouraging friends to be compassionate, compassion within the family, AIDS information for a young audience, and the provision of accurate and honest information on HIV/AIDS. The triggers are slated to be completed by the end of July 1991 and will be broadcast on all possible community, ethnic, and commercial radio networks across Australia. They will be available upon request in composite form with an information kit for use by health care professionals and community workers.

  8. Triggered plasma opening switch

    DOEpatents

    Mendel, Clifford W.

    1988-01-01

    A triggerable opening switch for a very high voltage and current pulse includes a transmission line extending from a source to a load and having an intermediate switch section including a plasma for conducting electrons between transmission line conductors and a magnetic field for breaking the plasma conduction path and magnetically insulating the electrons when it is desired to open the switch.

  9. 44 CFR 6.6 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 44 Emergency Management and Assistance 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Safeguarding systems of records. 6.6 Section 6.6 Emergency Management and Assistance FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY..., training, special qualification, and skills, performance appraisals, and conduct, shall be stored in...

  10. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ..., reports, punched cards, magnetic tapes, disks, and on-line computer storage. The safeguards must be in... disclosure where use is made of identifiable personal data in testing of computer programs; (5) Control the flow of data into, through, and from agency computer operations; (6) Adequately protect...

  11. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., reports, punched cards, magnetic tapes, disks, and on-line computer storage. The safeguards must be in... disclosure where use is made of identifiable personal data in testing of computer programs; (5) Control the flow of data into, through, and from agency computer operations; (6) Adequately protect...

  12. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ..., reports, punched cards, magnetic tapes, disks, and on-line computer storage. The safeguards must be in... disclosure where use is made of identifiable personal data in testing of computer programs; (5) Control the flow of data into, through, and from agency computer operations; (6) Adequately protect...

  13. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ..., reports, punched cards, magnetic tapes, disks, and on-line computer storage. The safeguards must be in... disclosure where use is made of identifiable personal data in testing of computer programs; (5) Control the flow of data into, through, and from agency computer operations; (6) Adequately protect...

  14. 5 CFR 293.107 - Special safeguards for automated records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ..., reports, punched cards, magnetic tapes, disks, and on-line computer storage. The safeguards must be in... disclosure where use is made of identifiable personal data in testing of computer programs; (5) Control the flow of data into, through, and from agency computer operations; (6) Adequately protect...

  15. 46 CFR 503.59 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Information Security Program § 503.59 Safeguarding classified information. (a) All classified information... security; (2) Takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or... security check; (2) To protect the classified information in accordance with the provisions of...

  16. Getting the Facts Straight about Education Data. Safeguarding Data

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Data Quality Campaign, 2014

    2014-01-01

    Education data can empower educators, students, parents, and policymakers with the information they need to make the best decisions to improve student achievement, information that can move the nation toward an education system in which every student graduates prepared for college and career. Safeguarding the privacy of student data is a critical…

  17. Process monitoring in support of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Ehinger, M.H.; Wachter, J.W.; Hebble, T.L.; Kerr, H.T.

    1987-08-01

    A review of previous efforts in process monitoring for safeguards was conducted. Previous efforts touched on various concepts and a few specific applications, but none was comprehensive in addressing all aspects of a process monitoring application for safeguards. This report develops prototypical process monitoring concepts that can be incorporated into the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) general safeguards approach for fuel reprocessing plants. This effort considers existing approaches, recognizing limitations and needed improvements. Prototypical process monitoring applications are developed and proposed for implementation and demonstration in the Integrated Equipment Test facility, which is located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The specific information needed to accomplish the process monitoring objectives are defined, and the mechanics for obtaining that information are described. Effort is given to the identification and assessment of potential impacts and benefits associated with process monitoring concepts, with particular attention to IAEA, state, and plant operator interests. The historical development of process monitoring is described and the implications of using process monitoring in international safeguards are discussed. Specific process process monitoring applications for demonstration in the IET facility are developed in Sects. 6 through 14. 1 fig.

  18. 21 CFR 312.88 - Safeguards for patient safety.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... within parts 50, 56, 312, 314, and 600 of this chapter designed to ensure the safety of clinical testing... (part 56 of this chapter). These safeguards further include the review of animal studies prior to initial human testing (§ 312.23), and the monitoring of adverse drug experiences through the...

  19. Indiana Department of Education Notice of Procedural Safeguards

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Indiana Department of Education, 2010

    2010-01-01

    As the parent of a child who has or may have a disability, the federal and state laws give them certain rights--called procedural safeguards. If they would like a more detailed explanation of these rights, they should contact the principal of their child's school, a school administrator, their local special education director, or any of the…

  20. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian D

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  1. 34 CFR 300.504 - Procedural safeguards notice.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2011-07-01 2010-07-01 true Procedural safeguards notice. 300.504 Section 300.504 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education (Continued) OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ASSISTANCE TO STATES FOR THE EDUCATION...

  2. 34 CFR 300.504 - Procedural safeguards notice.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Procedural safeguards notice. 300.504 Section 300.504 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education (Continued) OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ASSISTANCE TO STATES FOR THE EDUCATION...

  3. 34 CFR 300.504 - Procedural safeguards notice.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Procedural safeguards notice. 300.504 Section 300.504 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education (Continued) OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ASSISTANCE TO STATES FOR THE EDUCATION...

  4. 34 CFR 300.504 - Procedural safeguards notice.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Procedural safeguards notice. 300.504 Section 300.504 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education (Continued) OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ASSISTANCE TO STATES FOR THE EDUCATION...

  5. 34 CFR 300.504 - Procedural safeguards notice.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 34 Education 2 2014-07-01 2013-07-01 true Procedural safeguards notice. 300.504 Section 300.504 Education Regulations of the Offices of the Department of Education (Continued) OFFICE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ASSISTANCE TO STATES FOR THE EDUCATION...

  6. Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Nilsson, A. ); Elborn, M. ); Grahn, P. )

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon.

  7. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union

    SciTech Connect

    Erkkila, B.

    1995-12-31

    This article is a discussion of the safeguarding of nuclear materials in the states of the former Soviet Union. Several issues have been identified and improvements are being pursued at many facilities. These issues include: (1) improvements to existing computerized accounting systems, (2) access control, and (3) control of material movement.

  8. The Los Alamos nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation technology development program

    SciTech Connect

    Smith, H.A. Jr.; Menlove, H.O.; Reilly, T.D.; Bosler, G.E.; Hakkila, E.A.; Eccleston, G.W.

    1994-04-01

    For nearly three decades, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed and implemented nuclear measurement technology and training in support of national and international nuclear safeguards. This paper outlines the major elements of those technologies and highlights some of the latest developments.

  9. 5 CFR 293.106 - Safeguarding information about individuals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding information about individuals. 293.106 Section 293.106 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.106...

  10. 5 CFR 293.106 - Safeguarding information about individuals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding information about individuals. 293.106 Section 293.106 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.106...

  11. 5 CFR 293.106 - Safeguarding information about individuals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Safeguarding information about individuals. 293.106 Section 293.106 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.106...

  12. 5 CFR 293.106 - Safeguarding information about individuals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Safeguarding information about individuals. 293.106 Section 293.106 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS PERSONNEL RECORDS Basic Policies on Maintenance of Personnel Records § 293.106...

  13. 5 CFR 293.106 - Safeguarding information about individuals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 5 Administrative Personnel 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Safeguarding information about... information about individuals. (a) To ensure the security and confidentiality of personnel records, in... information in personnel records from unauthorized access, use, modification, destruction, or disclosure. As...

  14. 75 FR 57302 - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Public Meeting

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-20

    ... COMMISSION Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Public Meeting In accordance with the purposes of Sections 29 and 182b of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. 2039, 2232b), the Advisory Committee on Reactor... Associated with the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) Design Certification Application...

  15. Project Report on Development of a Safeguards Approach for Pyroprocessing

    SciTech Connect

    Robert Bean

    2010-09-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory has undertaken an effort to develop a standard safeguards approach for international commercial pyroprocessing facilities. This report details progress for the fiscal year 2010 effort. A component by component diversion pathway analysis has been performed, and has led to insight on the mitigation needs and equipment development needed for a valid safeguards approach. The effort to develop an in-hot cell detection capability led to the digital cloud chamber, and more importantly, the significant potential scientific breakthrough of the inverse spectroscopy algorithm, including the ability to identify energy and spatial location of gamma ray emitting sources with a single, non-complex, stationary radiation detector system. Curium measurements were performed on historical and current samples at the FCF to attempt to determine the utility of using gross neutron counting for accountancy measurements. A solid cost estimate of equipment installation at FCF has been developed to guide proposals and cost allocations to use FCF as a test bed for safeguards measurement demonstrations. A combined MATLAB and MCNPX model has been developed to perform detector placement calculations around the electrorefiner. Early harvesting has occurred wherein the project team has been requested to provide pyroprocessing technology and safeguards short courses.

  16. 41 CFR 101-28.306-5 - Safeguards.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...-Customer Supply Centers § 101-28.306-5 Safeguards. Agencies shall establish internal controls to ensure that the customer access codes assigned for their accounts are properly protected. It is by use of... all orders filled by the CSC with the exception of orders picked up at the CSC by the customer....

  17. 46 CFR 503.59 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... Information Security Program § 503.59 Safeguarding classified information. (a) All classified information... security; (2) Takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or... security check; (2) To protect the classified information in accordance with the provisions of...

  18. 46 CFR 503.59 - Safeguarding classified information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... Information Security Program § 503.59 Safeguarding classified information. (a) All classified information... security; (2) Takes appropriate steps to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure or... security check; (2) To protect the classified information in accordance with the provisions of...

  19. Role for Federal Government in Safeguarding Student Data Privacy

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Barnes, Khaliah; Kowalski, Paige

    2016-01-01

    Unsurprisingly, schools, companies, and others that have amassed student information have been unable to adequately safeguard it. They simply cannot keep up with all the data they have collected and have routinely experienced data breaches. These breaches have compromised grades, student financial information, Social Security numbers, and even…

  20. 45 CFR 400.27 - Safeguarding and sharing of information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 2 2013-10-01 2012-10-01 true Safeguarding and sharing of information. 400.27 Section 400.27 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT...

  1. 45 CFR 400.27 - Safeguarding and sharing of information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 2 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Safeguarding and sharing of information. 400.27 Section 400.27 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT...

  2. 45 CFR 400.27 - Safeguarding and sharing of information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 2 2014-10-01 2012-10-01 true Safeguarding and sharing of information. 400.27 Section 400.27 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT...

  3. 45 CFR 400.27 - Safeguarding and sharing of information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 45 Public Welfare 2 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Safeguarding and sharing of information. 400.27 Section 400.27 Public Welfare Regulations Relating to Public Welfare OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT...

  4. Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

    SciTech Connect

    Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

    1986-02-01

    The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

  5. The US Support program to IAEA Safeguards - 2008

    SciTech Connect

    Pepper,S.

    2008-06-09

    The U.S. Support Program to IAEA Safeguards (USSP) was established in 1977 to provide technical assistance to the IAEA Department of Safeguards. Since that time the U.S. Department of State has provided funding of over $200 million and over 900 tasks have been completed by USSP contractors on behalf of the KEA. The USSP is directed by a U.S. interagency subcommittee known as the Subgroup on Safeguards Technical Support (SSTS) and is managed by the International Safeguards Project Office (ISPO) at Brookhaven National Laboratory. In recent years, the SSTS and ISPO have identified priorities to guide the process of determining which IAEA requests are aligned with US. policy and will be funded. The USSP priorities are reviewed and updated prior to the USSP Annual Review Meeting which is hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each spring in Vienna, Austria. This paper will report on the 2008 USSP priorities and be an introduction for a session which will consist of four papers on USSP priorities and four other papers related to USSP activities.

  6. A GRADUATE CERTIFICATE PROGRAM IN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS TECHNOLOGY.

    SciTech Connect

    FISHBONE, L.; SISKIND, B.; PEPPER, S.

    2005-07-10

    While there are a number of university graduate-education programs that address non-proliferation and safeguards policy issues; there are none in the United States that train students in the specific technical aspects of nuclear safeguards. Formal education of this kind is necessary to sustain the flow of technically trained individuals to diverse programs in safeguards, nonproliferation, and national security. In response to this need, the University of Missouri-Columbia, with assistance from Brookhaven National Laboratory, is initiating a Graduate Certificate Program in Nuclear Safeguards Technology: Students seeking advanced degrees in a variety of technical areas will complete a required sequence of courses in order to receive the certification. Required course work covers topics such as Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC&A), Physical Protection (PP); nuclear measurements, and a variety of other relevant subjects. Laboratory-based instruction will be included which will utilize the University of Missouri Research Reactor(MURR). MURR is the largest university-based research reactor and has extensive laboratory resources including a Canberra Aquila MPC&A Operational Monitoring demonstration system.

  7. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Analysis of Probability of Detection of Plausible Diversion Scenarios at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants Using Advanced Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Hase, Kevin R.; Hawkins Erpenbeck, Heather; Boyer, Brian D.

    2012-07-10

    Over the last decade, efforts by the safeguards community, including inspectorates, governments, operators and owners of centrifuge facilities, have given rise to new possibilities for safeguards approaches in enrichment plants. Many of these efforts have involved development of new instrumentation to measure uranium mass and uranium-235 enrichment and inspection schemes using unannounced and random site inspections. We have chosen select diversion scenarios and put together a reasonable system of safeguards equipment and safeguards approaches and analyzed the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed safeguards approach by predicting the probability of detection of diversion in the chosen safeguards approaches. We analyzed the effect of redundancy in instrumentation, cross verification of operator instrumentation by inspector instrumentation, and the effects of failures or anomalous readings on verification data. Armed with these esults we were able to quantify the technical cost benefit of the addition of certain instrument suites and show the promise of these new systems.

  8. Agricultural Geophysics

    Technology Transfer Automated Retrieval System (TEKTRAN)

    The four geophysical methods predominantly used for agricultural purposes are resistivity, electromagnetic induction, ground penetrating radar (GPR), and time domain reflectometry (TDR). Resistivity and electromagnetic induction methods are typically employed to map lateral variations of apparent so...

  9. Agriculture Sectors

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    The Agriculture sectors comprise establishments primarily engaged in growing crops, raising animals, and harvesting fish and other animals. Find information on compliance, enforcement and guidance on EPA laws and regulations on the NAICS 111 & 112 sectors.

  10. Agricultural Microbiology.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Brill, Winston J.

    1981-01-01

    Elucidates strategies for applying microbiological techniques to traditional agricultural practices. Discusses the manipulation of microorganisms that live with plants and also the problems involved in the introduction of new genes into crop plants by recombinant DNA methods. (CS)

  11. Assess How Changes in Fuel Cycle Operation Impact Safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Tobin, Stephen Joseph; Adigun, Babatunde John; Fugate, Michael Lynn; Trellue, Holly Renee; Sprinkle, James K.

    2016-10-31

    In this report two research topics of interest to Concepts and Approaches are investigated. The motivation of joining them into one project is that both require (1) the simulation of fuel irradiation in a reactor and (2) the transport of gamma and neutron irradiation from the fuel to safeguards detectors. In the next two subsections the merits of each of the two safeguards applications are further introduced. Given the cumulative impact of the enhancements listed above, it is not surprising that both fuel assembly design and fuel assembly irradiation optimization have improved over the past 50+ years. The purpose of the research summarized in this sub-­section is to investigate what, if any, consequence this evolution in reactor operation might have for nuclear safeguards. It is anticipated that the burnup and isotopics of the spent fuel should exhibit less variation over the decades as reactor operators irradiate each assembly to the optimum amount. In contrast, older spent fuel is anticipated to vary more in burnup and resulting isotopics for a given initial enrichment. Continuing with this thesis, modern fuel should be more uniform in composition, and thus, measured safeguards results should be easier to interpret than results from older spent fuel. With spent fuel ponds filling up, interim and long-­term storage of spent fuel will need to be addressed. Additionally after long periods of storage, spent fuel is no longer self-­protecting and as such the IAEA will categorize it as more attractive; in approximately 20 years many of the assemblies from early commercial cores will no longer be considered self-­protecting. This study will assess how more recent changes in the reactor operation could impact the interpretation of safeguards measurements.

  12. Agricultural Waste.

    PubMed

    Shu, Huajie; Zhang, Panpan; Chang, Chein-Chi; Wang, Renqing; Zhang, Shuping

    2015-10-01

    The management and disposal of agricultural waste are drawn more and more attention because of the increasing yields and negative effects on the environment. However, proper treatments such as converting abundant biomass wastes into biogas through anaerobic digestion technology, can not only avoid the negative impacts, but also convert waste into available resources. This review summarizes the studies of nearly two hundred scholars from the following four aspects: the characterization, reuse, treatment, and management of agricultural waste.

  13. Agriculture: About EPA's National Agriculture Center

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    EPA's National Agriculture Center (Ag Center), with the support of the United States Department of Agriculture, serves growers, livestock producers, other agribusinesses, and agricultural information/education providers.

  14. Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections. Final report: Recommended observational skills training for IAEA safeguards inspections

    SciTech Connect

    Toquam, J.L.; Morris, F.A.

    1994-09-01

    This is the second of two reports prepared to assist the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or Agency) in enhancing the effectiveness of its international safeguards inspections through inspector training in {open_quotes}Observational Skills{close_quotes}. The first (Phase 1) report was essentially exploratory. It defined Observational Skills broadly to include all appropriate cognitive, communications, and interpersonal techniques that have the potential to help IAEA safeguards inspectors function more effectively. It identified 10 specific Observational Skills components, analyzed their relevance to IAEA safeguards inspections, and reviewed a variety of inspection programs in the public and private sectors that provide training in one or more of these components. The report concluded that while it should be possible to draw upon these other programs in developing Observational Skills training for IAEA inspectors, the approaches utilized in these programs will likely require significant adaption to support the specific job requirements, policies, and practices that define the IAEA inspector`s job. The overall objective of this second (Phase 2) report is to provide a basis for the actual design and delivery of Observational Skills training to IAEA inspectors. The more specific purposes of this report are to convey a fuller understanding of the potential application of Observational Skills to the inspector`s job, describe inspector perspectives on the relevance and importance of particular Observational Skills, identify the specific Observational Skill components that are most important and relevant to enhancing safeguards inspections, and make recommendations as to Observational Skills training for the IAEA`s consideration in further developing its Safeguards training program.

  15. Optically triggered infrared photodetector.

    PubMed

    Ramiro, Íñigo; Martí, Antonio; Antolín, Elisa; López, Esther; Datas, Alejandro; Luque, Antonio; Ripalda, José M; González, Yolanda

    2015-01-14

    We demonstrate a new class of semiconductor device: the optically triggered infrared photodetector (OTIP). This photodetector is based on a new physical principle that allows the detection of infrared light to be switched ON and OFF by means of an external light. Our experimental device, fabricated using InAs/AlGaAs quantum-dot technology, demonstrates normal incidence infrared detection in the 2-6 μm range. The detection is optically triggered by a 590 nm light-emitting diode. Furthermore, the detection gain is achieved in our device without an increase of the noise level. The novel characteristics of OTIPs open up new possibilities for third generation infrared imaging systems ( Rogalski, A.; Antoszewski, J.; Faraone, L. J. Appl. Phys. 2009, 105 (9), 091101).

  16. Trigger developments for ARA

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lu, Ming-Yuan

    2013-04-01

    The Askaryan Radio Array (ARA) is a planned large-scale neutrino detector at the South Pole aiming at observing ultra-high-energy cosmogenic neutrinos via detecting radio Cherenkov radiation from neutrinos' interaction with Antarctic ice. By the end of the austral summer of 2012/13 three detector stations have been deployed at depths of up to 200 m. A prototype detector station has been taking data for two years. The final array is planned to consist of 37 stations with a 200 km^2 coverage, and provide high sensitivity in the range of 10 PeV to 10 EeV. In order to increase the discover potential of the stations, advanced triggering schemes are in development which take into account the topology of signal events. Here a brief status and the triggering schemes in development will be presented, and based on simulations their improvements to ARA neutrino sensitivity will be discussed.

  17. Neural networks for triggering

    SciTech Connect

    Denby, B. ); Campbell, M. ); Bedeschi, F. ); Chriss, N.; Bowers, C. ); Nesti, F. )

    1990-01-01

    Two types of neural network beauty trigger architectures, based on identification of electrons in jets and recognition of secondary vertices, have been simulated in the environment of the Fermilab CDF experiment. The efficiencies for B's and rejection of background obtained are encouraging. If hardware tests are successful, the electron identification architecture will be tested in the 1991 run of CDF. 10 refs., 5 figs., 1 tab.

  18. GLAST's GBM Burst Trigger

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Band, D.; Briggs, M.; Connaughton, V.; Kippen, M.; Preece, R.

    2003-01-01

    The GLAST Burst Monitor (GBM) will detect and localize bursts for the GLAST mission, and provide the spectral and temporal context in the traditional 10 keV to 25 MeV band for the high energy observations by the Large Area Telescope (LAT). The GBM will use traditional rate triggers in up to three energy bands, and on a variety of timescales between 16 ms and 16 s.

  19. Development of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy instrumentatin for safeguards applications

    SciTech Connect

    Barefield Il, James E; Clegg, Samuel M; Le, Loan A; Lopez, Leon N

    2010-01-01

    In September 2006, a Technical Meeting on Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards was held at IAEA headquarters (HQ). One of the principal recommendations from this meeting was the need to 'pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials.' Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications. This meeting was held at IAEA HQ from July 7-11,2008 and hosted by the Novel Technologies Unit (NTU). The meeting was attended by 12 LIBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. After a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts were in agreement that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. The needs of the IAEA inspectors were grouped in the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activity in a Hot Cell; (3) Verifying status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. Under the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Los Alamos National Laboratory is exploring three potential applications of LIBS for international safeguards. As part of this work, we are developing: (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements

  20. Safeguarding a Lunar Rover with Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Test

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Furlong, Michael; Dille, Michael; Wong, Uland; Nefian, Ara

    2016-01-01

    The virtual bumper is a safeguarding mechanism for autonomous and remotely operated robots. In this paper we take a new approach to the virtual bumper system by using an old statistical test. By using a modified version of Wald's sequential probability ratio test we demonstrate that we can reduce the number of false positive reported by the virtual bumper, thereby saving valuable mission time. We use the concept of sequential probability ratio to control vehicle speed in the presence of possible obstacles in order to increase certainty about whether or not obstacles are present. Our new algorithm reduces the chances of collision by approximately 98 relative to traditional virtual bumper safeguarding without speed control.

  1. Used fuel extended storage security and safeguards by design roadmap

    SciTech Connect

    Durbin, Samuel G.; Lindgren, Eric Richard; Jones, Robert; Ketusky, Edward; England, Jeffrey; Scherer, Carolynn; Sprinkle, James; Miller, Michael.; Rauch, Eric; Scaglione, John; Dunn, T.

    2016-05-01

    In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is safely and securely stored in spent fuel pools and dry storage casks. The available capacity in spent fuel pools across the nuclear fleet has nearly reached a steady state value. The excess SNF continues to be loaded in dry storage casks. Fuel is expected to remain in dry storage for periods beyond the initial dry cask certification period of 20 years. Recent licensing renewals have approved an additional 40 years. This report identifies the current requirements and evaluation techniques associated with the safeguards and security of SNF dry cask storage. A set of knowledge gaps is identified in the current approaches. Finally, this roadmap identifies known knowledge gaps and provides a research path to deliver the tools and models needed to close the gaps and allow the optimization of the security and safeguards approaches for an interim spent fuel facility over the lifetime of the storage site.

  2. Changes to criminal records checks used to safeguard vulnerable patients.

    PubMed

    Griffith, Richard; Tengnah, Cassam

    2012-07-01

    The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 is introducing changes to the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks carried out on those people who work with vulnerable groups. The new law is the coalition Government's response to the criticism of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Group Act 2006. It will merge the CRB and Independent Safeguarding Authority into a new Disclosure and Barring Service and will enhance the rights of applicants to challenge the CRB's right to disclose non-conviction information as part of an enhanced criminal records check. In the first of two articles on the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, Richard Griffith and Cassam Tengnah discuss the current framework for disclosing criminal records and the impact of the changes on district nurses applying for new posts.

  3. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog. Second edition

    SciTech Connect

    Auerbach, C.

    1985-04-01

    This catalog contains entries on new developments and on items listed in BNL 51450, which have either been carried over unchanged or been updated. More than 70 entries were deleted because of either obsolescence, insufficient interest in terms of safeguards, or lack of documentable development activities in recent years. Some old listings as well as new material was consolidated into more generic entries. As in the earlier document, the emphasis is on devices and instruments that are either in field use at this time or under active development. A few items such as NDA reference materials, instrument vans and certain shipping containers are included because they are important adjuncts to optimum utilization of safeguards instrumentation. This catalog does not include devices for physical protection. As was the case with its predecessor, most of the material in this catalog originated in the US and Canada; a few contributions came from member states of the European Community.

  4. Using Highly Interactive Virtual Environments for Safeguards Activities

    SciTech Connect

    Weil, Bradley S; Alcala, Benjamin S; Alcala, Scott; Eipeldauer, Mary D; Weil, Logan B

    2010-01-01

    Highly interactive virtual environment (HIVE) is a term that refers to interactive educational simulations, serious games and virtual worlds. Studies indicate that learning with the aid of interactive environments produces better retention and depth of knowledge by promoting improved trainee engagement and understanding. Virtual reality or three dimensional (3D) visualization is often used to promote the understanding of something when personal observation, photographs, drawings, and/or sketches are not possible or available. Subjects and situations, either real or hypothetical, can be developed using a 3D model. Models can be tailored to the audience allowing safeguards and security features to be demonstrated for educational purposes in addition to engineering evaluation and performance analysis. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has begun evaluating the feasibility of HIVEs for improving safeguards activities such as training, mission planning, and evaluating worker task performance. This paper will discuss the development workflow of HIVEs and present some recent examples.

  5. Biometric Data Safeguarding Technologies Analysis and Best Practices

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-12-01

    19794-4:2005 (Type A Level 1 as defined in ISO/IEC 29109-1:2009), test asssertions of internal consistency by checking the types of values that may be...Biometric Data Safeguarding Technologies Analysis and Best Practices Study Report Raj Nanavati International Biometric Group...Practices Study Report Prepared by: International Biometric Group Scientific Authority: Pierre Meunier DRDC Centre for Security Science

  6. DEVELOPMENT OF A CANDLE FILTER FAILURE SAFEGUARD DEVICE

    SciTech Connect

    G.J. Bruck; E.E. Smeltzer; Z.N. Sanjana

    2002-06-06

    Development, testing and optimization of advanced metal and ceramic, barrier and fiber safeguard devices (SGDs) is described. Metal barrier devices are found prone to manufacturing defects and premature blinding. Fiber devices are found to be satisfactory if fine fibers are used. Durable alloys are identified for both oxidation and gasification conditions. Ceramic honeycomb SGDs were found to perform as excellent barrier devices. Optimization has shown such devices to be durable. Field testing of ceramic honeycomb SGDs from two different manufacturers is being pursued.

  7. AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    FARQUHAR, R.N.

    AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION HAS LONG EMPHASIZED TECHNICAL ADVISORY SERVICE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FARM PRODUCTION AND FARM LIFE. ONLY IN TASMANIA HAS FARM MANAGEMENT BEEN STRESSED. DEMANDS FOR THE WHOLE-FARM APPROACH HAVE PRODUCED A TREND TOWARD GENERALISM FOR DISTRICT OFFICERS IN MOST STATES. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,…

  8. Agricultural Biodiversity.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Postance, Jim

    1998-01-01

    The extinction of farm animals and crops is rarely brought up during discussions of endangered species and biodiversity; however, the loss of diversity in crops and livestock threatens the sustainability of agriculture. Presents three activities: (1) "The Colors of Diversity"; (2) "Biodiversity among Animals"; and (3) "Heirloom Plants." Discusses…

  9. Safeguarding children: the benefits of a peer-review process.

    PubMed

    Morris-Thompson, Trish; Shepherd, Janet; Rogers, Maggie; Ladbury, Briony; Kirk, Catherine; Marks-Maran, Di

    Nurses in hospitals and in the community are increasingly taking a leading role in safeguarding children. NHS London established a Safeguarding Improvement Team (SIT) in 2009. The SIT project was designed as a one-off activity to raise performance related to safeguarding children in London. This article presents a peer-review process that was established by NHS London and implemented across the 31 PCTs across London. This article presents the peer-review process methodology and a summary of the findings from the SIT visits. Feedback was requested from participants about participants' perceptions of the peer-review process immediately after the SIT visits and again, several months after the completion of all SIT visits. Findings show that the peer-review process was of value, both organisationally and professionally, and the process itself led to identification of good practice as well as gaps in existing practices. The non-threatening nature of the peer-review process was particularly valued, as was the feedback offered by the review teams.

  10. Nuclear Safeguards and Security Education at Russian Universities

    SciTech Connect

    Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Butler, Gilbert W.; Duncan, Cristen L.

    2008-05-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy is assisting key Russian universities in developing safeguards and security degree programs to prepare the next generation of specialists who will be responsible for protecting nuclear material from illicit use. These programs include course and laboratory work in nuclear material measurements, vulnerability analysis, exterior and interior sensors, and legal aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) has graduated nine classes of master’s students, most of who are working in government agencies, research organizations, or pursuing their PhD. With DOE support, MEPhI has also established a 5½-year engineering degree program in safeguards and security. This is a hands-on degree that more closely meets the needs of nuclear facilities. The first class graduated in February 2007, marking a major milestone in Russian nonproliferation education. A second engineering degree program has been established at Tomsk Polytechnic University and is designed to reach those students east of the Ural Mountains, where many nuclear facilities are located. The first class will graduate in February 2009. This paper describes current development of these education programs, new initiatives, and sustainability efforts to ensure their continued viability after DOE support ends. The paper also describes general nonproliferation education activities supported by DOE that complement the more technical safeguards and security education programs.

  11. Framework for fuel-cycle approaches to IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1986-10-01

    In order to compare several nuclear-safeguards verification approaches to one another and to the conventional facility-oriented approach, we establish a framework of the classes of information routinely verifiable by IAEA safeguards inspections. For each facility type within a State nuclear fuel cycle, the classes include flow data, inventory data, and shipper and receiver data. By showing which classes of information are verified for each facility type within three fuel cycles of different complexity, we distinguish the inspection approaches from one anoter and exhibit their fuel-cycle dependence, i.e., their need for sets of safeguards inspection activities different from those required under the facility-oriented approach at similar facilities in fuel cycles of differing complexity. Tables V-1, V-2, and V-3 graphically depict these relations and give a qualitative summary of the relative effectiveness and effort requirements of the approaches classified. The zone, information-correlation, diversion-assumption-change, and randomization-over-facilities approaches depend intrinsically on the complexity of the fuel cycle: their very definition implies fuel-cycle dependence. The approaches involving randomization over activities and goal relaxations do not have such dependence.

  12. SAFEGUARD: An Assured Safety Net Technology for UAS

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Dill, Evan T.; Young, Steven D.; Hayhurst, Kelly J.

    2016-01-01

    As demands increase to use unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for a broad spectrum of commercial applications, regulatory authorities are examining how to safely integrate them without loss of safety or major disruption to existing airspace operations. This work addresses the development of the Safeguard system as an assured safety net technology for UAS. The Safeguard system monitors and enforces conformance to a set of rules defined prior to flight (e.g., geospatial stay-out or stay-in regions, speed limits, altitude limits). Safeguard operates independently of the UAS autopilot and is strategically designed in a way that can be realized by a small set of verifiable functions to simplify compliance with regulatory standards for commercial aircraft. A framework is described that decouples the system from any other devices on the UAS as well as introduces complementary positioning source(s) for applications that require integrity and availability beyond what the Global Positioning System (GPS) can provide. Additionally, the high level logic embedded within the software is presented, as well as the steps being taken toward verification and validation (V&V) of proper functionality. Next, an initial prototype implementation of the described system is disclosed. Lastly, future work including development, testing, and system V&V is summarized.

  13. Determining information management needs for enhanced international safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Badalamente, R.V.; DeLand, S.M.; Whiteson, R.; Anzelon, G.

    1994-08-01

    The Safeguards Information Management System initiative is a program of the Department of Energy`s (DOE) Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation aimed at supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA) efforts to strengthen safeguards through the enhancement of information management capabilities. The DOE hopes to provide the IAEA with the ability to correlate and analyze data from existing and new sources of information, including publicly available information, information on imports and exports, design information, environmental monitoring data, and non-safeguards information. The first step in this effort is to identify and define IAEA requirements. In support of this, we have created a users` requirements document based on interviews with IAEA staff that describes the information management needs of the end user projected by the IAEA, including needs for storage, retrieval, analysis, communication, and visualization of data. Also included are characteristics of the end user and attributes of the current environment. This paper describes our efforts to obtain the required information. We discuss how to accurately represent user needs and involve users for an international organization with a multi-cultural user population. We describe our approach, our experience in setting up and conducting the interviews and brainstorming sessions, and a brief discussion of what we learned.

  14. Improved safeguards and security of a national resource

    SciTech Connect

    Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Rinard, P.M.; Metzler, J.F.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1994-07-01

    Initiatives by the President and the Secretary of Energy to reduce the quantity of nuclear materials in the nation`s strategic reserve are increasing the quantity of materials to be held in long-term storage until a final disposition option is imposed. These excess materials will be available for third-party inspection and verification to provide assurance that declared materials are not being diverted for weapons production. These protection systems must be capable of detecting unauthorized attempts to gain access to or control of the materials and information. Facility designs can incorporate new concepts and techniques that will minimize impact on operations and significantly reduce lifetime operational and infrastructure costs from safeguards and security requirements. The safeguards and security systems will be coupled with other facility systems such as safety, emergency preparedness, and process control to enhance public, worker, and environmental protection; protect nuclear materials, related information, and technology; and mitigate or prevent accidents and sabotage involving the nuclear materials. This paper will discuss the application of proven, state-of-the-art safeguards, physical security, computer/information security, and materials assay systems that can be combined to provide a cost-effective, efficient means for monitoring and protecting these materials.

  15. Subnanosecond trigger system for ETA

    SciTech Connect

    Cook, E.G.; Lauer, E.J.; Reginato, L.L.; Rogers D.; Schmidt, J.A.

    1980-05-30

    A high-voltage trigger system capable of triggering 30, 250 kV spark gaps; each with less than +- 1 ns jitter has been constructed. In addition to low jitter rates, the trigger system must be capable of delivering the high voltage pulses to the spark gaps either simultaneously or sequentially as determined by other system requirements. The trigger system consists of several stages of pulse amplification culminating in 160 kV pulses having 30 ns risetime. The trigger system is described and test data provided.

  16. A Radiation-Triggered Surveillance System for UF6 Cylinder Monitoring

    SciTech Connect

    Curtis, Michael M.; Myjak, Mitchell J.

    2016-09-23

    This report provides background information and representative scenarios for testing a prototype radiation-triggered surveillance system at an operating facility that handles uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders. The safeguards objective is to trigger cameras using radiation, or radiation and motion, rather than motion alone, to reduce significantly the number of image files generated by a motion-triggered system. The authors recommend the use of radiation-triggered surveillance at all facilities where cylinder paths are heavily traversed by personnel. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has begun using surveillance cameras in the feed and withdrawal areas of gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). The cameras generate imagery using elapsed time or motion, but this creates problems in areas occupied 24/7 by personnel. Either motion-or-interval-based triggering generates thousands of review files over the course of a month. Since inspectors must review the files to verify operator material-flow-declarations, a plethora of files significantly extends the review process. The primary advantage of radiation-triggered surveillance is the opportunity to obtain full-time cylinder throughput verification versus what presently amounts to part-time verification. Cost savings should be substantial, as the IAEA presently uses frequent unannounced inspections to verify cylinder-throughput declarations. The use of radiation-triggered surveillance allows the IAEA to implement less frequent unannounced inspections for the purpose of flow verification, but its principal advantage is significantly shorter and more effective inspector video reviews.

  17. Protons Trigger Mitochondrial Flashes.

    PubMed

    Wang, Xianhua; Zhang, Xing; Huang, Zhanglong; Wu, Di; Liu, Beibei; Zhang, Rufeng; Yin, Rongkang; Hou, Tingting; Jian, Chongshu; Xu, Jiejia; Zhao, Yan; Wang, Yanru; Gao, Feng; Cheng, Heping

    2016-07-26

    Emerging evidence indicates that mitochondrial flashes (mitoflashes) are highly conserved elemental mitochondrial signaling events. However, which signal controls their ignition and how they are integrated with other mitochondrial signals and functions remain elusive. In this study, we aimed to further delineate the signal components of the mitoflash and determine the mitoflash trigger mechanism. Using multiple biosensors and chemical probes as well as label-free autofluorescence, we found that the mitoflash reflects chemical and electrical excitation at the single-organelle level, comprising bursting superoxide production, oxidative redox shift, and matrix alkalinization as well as transient membrane depolarization. Both electroneutral H(+)/K(+) or H(+)/Na(+) antiport and matrix proton uncaging elicited immediate and robust mitoflash responses over a broad dynamic range in cardiomyocytes and HeLa cells. However, charge-uncompensated proton transport, which depolarizes mitochondria, caused the opposite effect, and steady matrix acidification mildly inhibited mitoflashes. Based on a numerical simulation, we estimated a mean proton lifetime of 1.42 ns and diffusion distance of 2.06 nm in the matrix. We conclude that nanodomain protons act as a novel, to our knowledge, trigger of mitoflashes in energized mitochondria. This finding suggests that mitoflash genesis is functionally and mechanistically integrated with mitochondrial energy metabolism.

  18. The Use of Performance Metrics for the Assessment of Safeguards Effectiveness at the State Level

    SciTech Connect

    Bachner K. M.; George Anzelon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Yana Feldman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA Mark Goodman,Department of State, Washington, DC Dunbar Lockwood, National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington, DC Jonathan B. Sanborn, JBS Consulting, LLC, Arlington, VA.

    2016-07-24

    In the ongoing evolution of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the state level, many safeguards implementation principles have been emphasized: effectiveness, efficiency, non-discrimination, transparency, focus on sensitive materials, centrality of material accountancy for detecting diversion, independence, objectivity, and grounding in technical considerations, among others. These principles are subject to differing interpretations and prioritizations and sometimes conflict. This paper is an attempt to develop metrics and address some of the potential tradeoffs inherent in choices about how various safeguards policy principles are implemented. The paper carefully defines effective safeguards, including in the context of safeguards approaches that take account of the range of state-specific factors described by the IAEA Secretariat and taken note of by the Board in September 2014, and (2) makes use of performance metrics to help document, and to make transparent, how safeguards implementation would meet such effectiveness requirements.

  19. Safeguards and security research and development: Program status report, February-July 1981

    SciTech Connect

    Henry, C.N.; Walton, R.B.

    1982-04-01

    This report, one of a series of biannual progress reports, describes the status of research and development in the Safeguards and Security Program at Los Alamos from February-July 1981. Most work covered here is sponsored by the Office of Safeguards and Security of the Department of Energy; however, project activities that are technically closely related to nuclear safeguards and security also are included where appropriate for conveying information useful to the nuclear community. The report comprises four major subject areas: Security Development and Support; Nuclear Materials Measurement and Engineering; Nuclear Facility Safeguards Support; and International Safeguards, Technology Transfer, and Training. Some technical topics included in the subject areas are computer and informational security, chemical and nondestructive analysis of nuclear materials, process modeling and analysis, nuclear materials accounting systems, evaluation of prototype measurement instrumentation and procedures in nuclear facilities, design and consultation for facilities, technical exchange, training courses, and international safeguards.

  20. Gravity triggered neutrino condensates

    SciTech Connect

    Barenboim, Gabriela

    2010-11-01

    In this work we use the Schwinger-Dyson equations to study the possibility that an enhanced gravitational attraction triggers the formation of a right-handed neutrino condensate, inducing dynamical symmetry breaking and generating a Majorana mass for the right-handed neutrino at a scale appropriate for the seesaw mechanism. The composite field formed by the condensate phase could drive an early epoch of inflation. We find that to the lowest order, the theory does not allow dynamical symmetry breaking. Nevertheless, thanks to the large number of matter fields in the model, the suppression by additional powers in G of higher order terms can be compensated, boosting them up to their lowest order counterparts. This way chiral symmetry can be broken dynamically and the infrared mass generated turns out to be in the expected range for a successful seesaw scenario.

  1. U.S. Department of Energy`s International Safeguards Program

    SciTech Connect

    Sheely, K.B.

    1993-12-31

    Since 1978 the United States Department of Energy`s (DOE) International Safeguards Program has conducted policy analysis, strategies and technology development, international cooperation and training to support the formulation and implementation of international safeguards. The end of the Gulf War (1991), the end of the Cold War (1992), and the trend towards regionalization of safeguards has led to increased US and international attention to the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation and the need for significantly greater support to nonproliferation policy making and implementation activities. As a result, DOE`s International Safeguards Program has undergone substantial growth and has continued to focus its resources on the priority issues which are part of today`s and tomorrow`s world. In order to effectively and efficiently conduct and manage these activities the International Safeguards Program has developed and continues to refine and implement a strategic plan. This plan provides guidance for the activities conducted by support organizations and makes the program objectives and activities more transparent to other interested parties. The Strategic Plan centralizes into one document the mission, priorities, resources, activities, and operating procedures of DOE`s International Safeguards Program. The International Safeguards Program provides technical leadership in the formulation and implementation of the US nonproliferation policy concerning the IAEA, international safeguards, physical protection, and nuclear safeguards inspection activities.

  2. Waste management safeguards project: History of and recommendations for development activities in support of safeguards of final disposal of spent fuel

    SciTech Connect

    Moran, B.W.

    1994-02-16

    Coordinated safeguards assessment and development activities in support of the U.S. Civilian Radioactive Waste Management System (CRWMS) and international safeguards objectives were initiated in Fiscal Year 1987. Initial technical support activities were performed at the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM); however, as the priority of support activities changed, direction for the support tasks was transferred to the U.S. Department of State (State), the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE/IS-40), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The direction for technical support activities was established at the International Atomic Energy Agency`s (IAEA`s) advisory group meeting and subsequent consultants` meetings on safeguards related to the final disposal of nuclear material contained in waste and spent fuel. Task directions for the development of international safeguards in support of the final disposal of spent fuel are currently being provided by DOE/IS-40. A summary of safeguards activities performed by the Waste Management Safeguards Project is provided. Systems for design information verification for spent fuel consolidation and conditioning operations are needed immediately. Safeguards approaches for maintaining continuity of knowledge of spent fuel processed at the conditioning facility and for verification of the final disposal package will be needed within three years. Systems for design information verification of the repository facilities will be needed by the end of the decade.

  3. The CMS High Level Trigger

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Trocino, Daniele

    2014-06-01

    The CMS experiment has been designed with a two-level trigger system: the Level-1 Trigger, implemented in custom-designed electronics, and the High-Level Trigger (HLT), a streamlined version of the CMS offline reconstruction software running on a computer farm. A software trigger system requires a tradeoff between the complexity of the algorithms running with the available computing power, the sustainable output rate, and the selection efficiency. We present the performance of the main triggers used during the 2012 data taking, ranging from simple single-object selections to more complex algorithms combining different objects, and applying analysis-level reconstruction and selection. We discuss the optimisation of the trigger and the specific techniques to cope with the increasing LHC pile-up, reducing its impact on the physics performance.

  4. Developing a model policy on youth employment in agriculture.

    PubMed

    Miller, Mary E; Lee, Barbara C

    2014-01-01

    The goal of this project was to develop a model policy that agricultural employers could adopt specific to youth employment, including age-appropriate assignments, training needs for adolescent workers, ideal supervision, and mentoring by adult workers. Methods included discussions at a national conference of agricultural employers, a survey of employers' perspectives on young workers, forming a task force to draft a model policy, and finalizing the policy document. The process resulted in a template that can be used by agricultural employers for immediate adoption, or to be customized and adapted for their unique company. Given new trends in agriculture to use certification systems, safety audits, and voluntary safety standards in addition to the regulatory process, there is value in having a voluntary "best practice" model policy that can be adopted in settings where safeguarding young farm workers is a priority.

  5. 7 CFR 249.24 - Data safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF... authority) that administer food, nutrition, or other assistance programs that serve persons categorically... of establishing the eligibility of SFMNP applicants and participants for food, nutrition, or...

  6. 7 CFR 249.24 - Data safeguarding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF... authority) that administer food, nutrition, or other assistance programs that serve persons categorically... of establishing the eligibility of SFMNP applicants and participants for food, nutrition, or...

  7. Nuclear Safeguards Considerations For The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)

    SciTech Connect

    Phillip Casey Durst; David Beddingfield; Brian Boyer; Robert Bean; Michael Collins; Michael Ehinger; David Hanks; David L. Moses; Lee Refalo

    2009-10-01

    High temperature reactors (HTRs) have been considered since the 1940s, and have been constructed and demonstrated in the United Kingdom (Dragon), United States (Peach Bottom and Fort Saint Vrain), Japan (HTTR), Germany (AVR and THTR-300), and have been the subject of conceptual studies in Russia (VGM). The attraction to these reactors is that they can use a variety of reactor fuels, including abundant thorium, which upon reprocessing of the spent fuel can produce fissile U-233. Hence, they could extend the stocks of available uranium, provided the fuel is reprocessed. Another attractive attribute is that HTRs typically operate at a much higher temperature than conventional light water reactors (LWRs), because of the use of pyrolytic carbon and silicon carbide coated (TRISO) fuel particles embedded in ceramic graphite. Rather than simply discharge most of the unused heat from the working fluid in the power plant to the environment, engineers have been designing reactors for 40 years to recover this heat and make it available for district heating or chemical conversion plants. Demonstrating high-temperature nuclear energy conversion was the purpose behind Fort Saint Vrain in the United States, THTR-300 in Germany, HTTR in Japan, and HTR-10 and HTR-PM, being built in China. This resulted in nuclear reactors at least 30% or more thermodynamically efficient than conventional LWRs, especially if the waste heat can be effectively utilized in chemical processing plants. A modern variant of high temperature reactors is the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR). Originally developed in the United States and Germany, it is now being redesigned and marketed by the Republic of South Africa and China. The team examined historical high temperature and high temperature gas reactors (HTR and HTGR) and reviewed safeguards considerations for this reactor. The following is a preliminary report on this topic prepared under the ASA-100 Advanced Safeguards Project in support of the NNSA Next

  8. Defining the needs for gas centrifuge enrichment plants advanced safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Boyer, Brian David; Erpenbeck, Heather H; Miller, Karen A; Swinhoe, Martyn T; Ianakiev, Kiril; Marlow, Johnna B

    2010-04-05

    Current safeguards approaches used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs) need enhancement in order to verify declared low-enriched (LEU) production, detect undeclared LEU production and detect highly enriched uranium (HEU) production with adequate detection probability using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques. At present inspectors use attended systems, systems needing the presence of an inspector for operation, during inspections to verify the mass and {sup 235}U enrichment of declared UF{sub 6} containers used in the process of enrichment at GCEPs. In verifying declared LEU production, the inspectors also take samples for off-site destructive assay (DA) which provide accurate data, with 0.1% to 0.5% measurement uncertainty, on the enrichment of the UF{sub 6} feed, tails, and product. However, taking samples of UF{sub 6} for off-site analysis is a much more labor and resource intensive exercise for the operator and inspector. Furthermore, the operator must ship the samples off-site to the IAEA laboratory which delays the timeliness of results and interruptions to the continuity of knowledge (CofK) of the samples during their storage and transit. This paper contains an analysis of possible improvements in unattended and attended NDA systems such as process monitoring and possible on-site analysis of DA samples that could reduce the uncertainty of the inspector's measurements and provide more effective and efficient IAEA GCEPs safeguards. We also introduce examples advanced safeguards systems that could be assembled for unattended operation.

  9. Radiation detectors as surveillance monitors for IAEA safeguards

    SciTech Connect

    Fehlau, P.E.; Dowdy, E.J.

    1980-10-01

    Radiation detectors used for personnel dosimetry are examined for use under IAEA Safeguards as monitors to confirm the passage or nonpassage (YES/NO) of plutonium-bearing nuclear material at barrier penetrations declared closed. In this application where backgrounds are ill defined, no advantage is found for a particular detector type because of intrinsic efficiency. Secondary considerations such as complexity, ease of tamper-proofing, and ease of readout are used to recommend specific detector types for routine monitoring and for data-base measurements. Recommendations are made for applications, data acquisition, and instrument development.

  10. Strengthening IAEA safeguards in an era of nuclear cooperation

    SciTech Connect

    Hooper, R.

    1995-11-01

    Since the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed a remarkable series of events demonstrating that universal adherence to the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are no longer utopian dreams. The author reviews the actions of various countries to terminate or reduce nuclear weapons programs and those that are resisting the non-proliferation efforts. The author addresses efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard declared nuclear material more cost-effectively and deal with the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities.

  11. Emerging national space launch programs: Economics and safeguards

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chow, Brian G.

    Most ballistic missile nonproliferation studies have focused on trends in the numbers and performance of missiles and the resulting security threats. This report concentrates on the economic viability of emerging national space launch programs and the prospects for imposing effective safeguards against the use of space launch technology for military missiles. For the convenience of discussion in this report, a reference to ballistic missiles hereafter means surface-to-surface guided ballistic missiles only. Space launch vehicles (SLV's) are surface-to-space ballistic missiles, and they will be referred to explicitly as 'space launch vehicles' or 'space launchers'. Surface-to-surface unguided ballistic missiles will be referred to as 'rockets.'

  12. Materials management in an internationally safeguarded fuels reprocessing plant

    SciTech Connect

    Hakkila, E.A.; Baker, A.L.; Cobb, D.D.

    1980-04-01

    The following appendices are included: aqueous reprocessing and conversion technology, reference facilities, process design and operating features relevant to materials accounting, operator's safeguards system structure, design principles of dynamic materials accounting systems, modeling and simulation approach, optimization of measurement control, aspects of international verification problem, security and reliability of materials measurement and accounting system, estimation of in-process inventory in solvent-extraction contactors, conventional measurement techniques, near-real-time measurement techniques, isotopic correlation techniques, instrumentation available to IAEA inspectors, and integration of materials accounting and containment and surveillance. (DLC)

  13. Financial incentives for healthy behavior: ethical safeguards for behavioral economics.

    PubMed

    Lunze, Karsten; Paasche-Orlow, Michael K

    2013-06-01

    Economic incentives to promote healthy behavior are becoming increasingly common and have been suggested as an approach to decreasing healthcare costs. Ethical concerns about programs with such incentives are that they may contribute to inequities, be coercive, interfere with therapeutic relationships, undermine personal responsibility for health, and decrease social solidarity. Additionally, they may be a source of stigma or discrimination, promote dependence, and be unfair for those already engaged in targeted health behaviors or those who cannot fulfill the incentivized behaviors. Incentive programs need to incorporate appropriate safeguards to monitor these risks and support fairness in offering economic incentives to promote healthy behavior.

  14. The TOTEM modular trigger system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bagliesi, M. G.; Berretti, M.; Cecchi, R.; Greco, V.; Lami, S.; Latino, G.; Oliveri, E.; Pedreschi, E.; Scribano, A.; Spinella, F.; Turini, N.

    2010-05-01

    The TOTEM experiment will measure the total cross-section with the luminosity independent method and study elastic and diffractive scattering at the LHC. We are developing a modular trigger system, based on programmable logic, that will select meaningful events within 2.5 μs. The trigger algorithm is based on a tree structure in order to obtain information compression. The trigger primitive is generated directly on the readout chip, VFAT, that has a specific fast output that gives low resolution hits information. In two of the TOTEM detectors, Roman Pots and T2, a coincidence chip will perform track recognition directly on the detector readout boards, while for T1 the hits are transferred from the VFATs to the trigger hardware. Starting from more than 2000 bits delivered by the detector electronics, we extract, in a first step, six trigger patterns of 32 LVDS signals each; we build, then, on a dedicated board, a 1-bit (L1) trigger signal for the TOTEM experiment and 16 trigger bits to the CMS experiment global trigger system for future common data taking.

  15. Triggering requirements for SSC physics

    SciTech Connect

    Gilchriese, M.G.D.

    1989-04-01

    Some aspects of triggering requirements for high P{sub T} physics processes at the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) are described. A very wide range of trigger types will be required to enable detection of the large number of potential physics signatures possible at the SSC. Although in many cases trigger rates are not now well understood, it is possible to conclude that the ability to trigger on transverse energy, number and energy of jets, number and energy of leptons (electrons and muons), missing energy and combinations of these will be required. An SSC trigger system must be both highly flexible and redundant to ensure reliable detection of many new physics processes at the SSC.

  16. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring.

    SciTech Connect

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-10-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  17. Application of safeguards technology in DOE's environmental restoration program

    SciTech Connect

    Eccleston, G.W.; Baker, M.P.; Hansen, W.R.; Lucas, M.C.; Markin, J.T.; Phillips, J.R.

    1990-01-01

    During the last two decades, the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has supported the research and development of safeguards systems analysis methodologies and nondestructive assay (NDS) technology for characterizing, monitoring, and accounting nuclear materials. This paper discusses methodologies and NDA instrumentation developed by the DOE/OSS program that could be applied in the Environmental Restoration Program. NDA instrumentation could be used for field measurements during site characterization and to monitor nuclear materials, heavy metals, and other hazardous materials during site remediation. Systems methodologies can minimize the expenditure of resources and help specify appropriate combinations of NDA instrumentation and chemical analyses to characterize a variety of materials quickly and reduce personnel exposure in hazardous environments. A training program is available to teach fundamental and advanced principles and approaches to characterize and quantify nuclear materials properly and to organize and analyze measurement information for decision making. The ability to characterize the overall volume and distribution of materials at a waste site is difficult because of the inhomogeneous distribution of materials, the requirement for extreme sensitivity, and the lack of resources to collect and chemically analyze a sufficient number of samples. Using a systems study approach based on statistical sampling, the resources necessary to characterize a site can be enhanced by appropriately combining in situ and field NDA measurements with laboratory analyses. 35 refs., 1 figs., 2 tabs.

  18. New Measures to Safeguard Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

    SciTech Connect

    Whitaker, Jr., James; Garner, James R; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Gilligan, Kimberly V; Younkin, James R; Hooper, David A; Henkel, James J; Krichinsky, Alan M

    2011-01-01

    As Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) increase in separative work unit (SWU) capacity, the current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) model safeguards approach needs to be strengthened. New measures to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approach are being investigated that will be mutually beneficial to the facility operators and the IAEA. One of the key concepts being studied for application at future GCEPs is embracing joint use equipment for process monitoring of load cells at feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. A mock F/W system was built at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to generate and collect F/W data from an analogous system. The ORNL system has been used to collect data representing several realistic normal process and off-normal (including diversion) scenarios. Emphasis is placed on the novelty of the analysis of data from the sensors as well as the ability to build information out of raw data, which facilitates a more effective and efficient verification process. This paper will provide a progress report on recent accomplishments and next steps.

  19. LANL Safeguards and Security Assurance Program. Revision 6

    SciTech Connect

    1995-04-03

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Assurance Program provides a continuous quality improvement approach to ensure effective, compliant S and S program implementation throughout the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any issues identified through the various internal and external assessments are documented, tracked and closed using the Safeguards and Security Issue Management Program. The Laboratory utilizes an integrated S and S systems approach to protect US Department of Energy (DOE) interests from theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM), sabotage, espionage, loss or theft of classified/controlled matter or government property, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable impacts on national security, health and safety of employees and the public, and the environment. This document explains the basis, scope, and conduct of the S and S process to include: self-assessments, issue management, risk assessment, and root cause analysis. It also provides a discussion of S and S topical areas, roles and responsibilities, process flow charts, minimum requirements, methodology, terms, and forms.

  20. Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory. FY 1993

    SciTech Connect

    Not Available

    1993-06-01

    The Safeguards and Security Technology Development Directory is published annually by the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) of the US Department of Energy (DOE), and is Intended to inform recipients of the full scope of the OSS R&D program. It is distributed for use by DOE headquarters personnel, DOE program offices, DOE field offices, DOE operating contractors, national laboratories, other federal agencies, and foreign governments. Chapters 1 through 7 of the Directory provide general information regarding the Technology Development Program, including the mission, program description, organizational roles and responsibilities, technology development lifecycle, requirements analysis, program formulation, the task selection process, technology development infrastructure, technology transfer activities, and current research and development tasks. These chapters are followed by a series of appendices which contain more specific information on aspects of the Program. Appendix A is a summary of major technology development accomplishments made during FY 1992. Appendix B lists S&S technology development reports issued during FY 1992 which reflect work accomplished through the OSS Technology Development Program and other relevant activities outside the Program. Finally, Appendix C summarizes the individual task statements which comprise the FY 1993 Technology Development Program.

  1. Advanced Safeguards Technology Demonstration at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

    SciTech Connect

    Orton, Christopher R.; Schwantes, Jon M.; Bryan, Samuel A.; Levitskaia, Tatiana G.; Duckworth, Douglas C.; Douglas, Matthew; Farmer, O. T.; Fraga, Carlos G.; Lehn, Scott A.; Liezers, Martin; Peper, Shane M.; Christensen, Richard

    2008-10-01

    The IAEA has established international safeguards standards for fissionable materials at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time frame. It is, therefore, necessary to confirm proper operational performance to verify facilities operate under adequate safeguard-declared conditions. This verification can be achieved by employing monitoring equipment. Online real time monitoring of the flowsheet radiochemical streams provides a unique capability to rapidly identify deviations from normal operating conditions. Flowsheet monitoring technologies being developed at PNNL include three integrated systems: Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor, spectroscopy-based monitor (UV-vis-NIR and Raman spectrometers), and Electrochemically Modulated Separations (EMS). The MIP Monitor is designed to identify off-normal conditions in process streams using gamma spectroscopy and pattern recognition software. The spectroscopic monitoring continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals. EMS provides an on-line means for pre-separating and pre-concentrating elements of interest out of complex matrices prior to detection. PNNL is preparing to test these multi-parametric technologies using different samples of dissolved spent fuel and aqueous and organic phases of the PUREX and UREX flowsheets. We will report our on-going efforts with specific focus given to quantifying sensitivity of the MIP Monitor and UV-Vis and Raman spectrometers to detect minor changes in major process variables.

  2. International Internships in Nuclear Safeguards and Security: Challenges and Successes

    SciTech Connect

    Duncan, Cristen L.; Heinberg, Cynthia L.; Killinger, Mark H.; Goodey, Kent O.; Kryuchkov, Eduard F.; Geraskin, Nikolai I.; Silaev, Maxim E.; Sokova, Elena K.; Ford, David G.

    2010-04-20

    All students in the Russian safeguards and security degree programs at the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI and Tomsk Polytechnic University, sponsored by the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Education Project, take part in a domestic internship at a Russian enterprise or facility. In addition, a select few students are placed in an international internship. These internships provide students with a better view of how MPC&A and nonproliferation in general are addressed outside of Russia. The possibility of an international internship is a significant incentive for students to enroll in the safeguards and security degree programs. The U.S. members of the MPC&A Education Project team interview students who have been nominated by their professors. These students must have initiative and reasonable English skills. The project team and professors then select students to be tentatively placed in various international internships during the summer or fall of their final year of study. Final arrangements are then made with the host organizations. This paper describes the benefits of the joint United States/Russia cooperation for next-generation workforce development, some of the international internships that have been carried out, the benefits of these international internships, and lessons learned in implementing them.

  3. Safeguarding Ecosystem Services: A Methodological Framework to Buffer the Joint Effect of Habitat Configuration and Climate Change

    PubMed Central

    Giannini, Tereza C.; Tambosi, Leandro R.; Acosta, André L.; Jaffé, Rodolfo; Saraiva, Antonio M.; Imperatriz-Fonseca, Vera L.; Metzger, Jean Paul

    2015-01-01

    Ecosystem services provided by mobile agents are increasingly threatened by the loss and modification of natural habitats and by climate change, risking the maintenance of biodiversity, ecosystem functions, and human welfare. Research oriented towards a better understanding of the joint effects of land use and climate change over the provision of specific ecosystem services is therefore essential to safeguard such services. Here we propose a methodological framework, which integrates species distribution forecasts and graph theory to identify key conservation areas, which if protected or restored could improve habitat connectivity and safeguard ecosystem services. We applied the proposed framework to the provision of pollination services by a tropical stingless bee (Melipona quadrifasciata), a key pollinator of native flora from the Brazilian Atlantic Forest and important agricultural crops. Based on the current distribution of this bee and that of the plant species used to feed and nest, we projected the joint distribution of bees and plants in the future, considering a moderate climate change scenario (following IPPC). We then used this information, the bee’s flight range, and the current mapping of Atlantic Forest remnants to infer habitat suitability and quantify local and regional habitat connectivity for 2030, 2050 and 2080. Our results revealed north to south and coastal to inland shifts in the pollinator distribution during the next 70 years. Current and future connectivity maps unraveled the most important corridors, which if protected or restored, could facilitate the dispersal and establishment of bees during distribution shifts. Our results also suggest that coffee plantations from eastern São Paulo and southern Minas Gerais States could suffer a pollinator deficit in the future, whereas pollination services seem to be secured in southern Brazil. Landowners and governmental agencies could use this information to implement new land use schemes

  4. Safeguarding Ecosystem Services: A Methodological Framework to Buffer the Joint Effect of Habitat Configuration and Climate Change.

    PubMed

    Giannini, Tereza C; Tambosi, Leandro R; Acosta, André L; Jaffé, Rodolfo; Saraiva, Antonio M; Imperatriz-Fonseca, Vera L; Metzger, Jean Paul

    2015-01-01

    Ecosystem services provided by mobile agents are increasingly threatened by the loss and modification of natural habitats and by climate change, risking the maintenance of biodiversity, ecosystem functions, and human welfare. Research oriented towards a better understanding of the joint effects of land use and climate change over the provision of specific ecosystem services is therefore essential to safeguard such services. Here we propose a methodological framework, which integrates species distribution forecasts and graph theory to identify key conservation areas, which if protected or restored could improve habitat connectivity and safeguard ecosystem services. We applied the proposed framework to the provision of pollination services by a tropical stingless bee (Melipona quadrifasciata), a key pollinator of native flora from the Brazilian Atlantic Forest and important agricultural crops. Based on the current distribution of this bee and that of the plant species used to feed and nest, we projected the joint distribution of bees and plants in the future, considering a moderate climate change scenario (following IPPC). We then used this information, the bee's flight range, and the current mapping of Atlantic Forest remnants to infer habitat suitability and quantify local and regional habitat connectivity for 2030, 2050 and 2080. Our results revealed north to south and coastal to inland shifts in the pollinator distribution during the next 70 years. Current and future connectivity maps unraveled the most important corridors, which if protected or restored, could facilitate the dispersal and establishment of bees during distribution shifts. Our results also suggest that coffee plantations from eastern São Paulo and southern Minas Gerais States could suffer a pollinator deficit in the future, whereas pollination services seem to be secured in southern Brazil. Landowners and governmental agencies could use this information to implement new land use schemes. Overall

  5. 20 CFR 603.9 - What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false What safeguards and security requirements... DISCLOSURE OF STATE UC INFORMATION Confidentiality and Disclosure Requirements § 603.9 What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information? (a) In general. For disclosures of confidential...

  6. 20 CFR 603.9 - What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false What safeguards and security requirements... DISCLOSURE OF STATE UC INFORMATION Confidentiality and Disclosure Requirements § 603.9 What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information? (a) In general. For disclosures of confidential...

  7. 20 CFR 603.9 - What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false What safeguards and security requirements... DISCLOSURE OF STATE UC INFORMATION Confidentiality and Disclosure Requirements § 603.9 What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information? (a) In general. For disclosures of confidential...

  8. 20 CFR 603.9 - What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 20 Employees' Benefits 3 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false What safeguards and security requirements... DISCLOSURE OF STATE UC INFORMATION Confidentiality and Disclosure Requirements § 603.9 What safeguards and security requirements apply to disclosed information? (a) In general. For disclosures of confidential...

  9. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE Physical Protection § 72.186 Change to physical security and safeguards... may, without prior Commission approval, make changes to the physical security plan, guard...

  10. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE Physical Protection § 72.186 Change to physical security and safeguards... may, without prior Commission approval, make changes to the physical security plan, guard...

  11. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE Physical Protection § 72.186 Change to physical security and safeguards... may, without prior Commission approval, make changes to the physical security plan, guard...

  12. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE Physical Protection § 72.186 Change to physical security and safeguards... may, without prior Commission approval, make changes to the physical security plan, guard...

  13. 10 CFR 72.186 - Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Change to physical security and safeguards contingency... GREATER THAN CLASS C WASTE Physical Protection § 72.186 Change to physical security and safeguards... may, without prior Commission approval, make changes to the physical security plan, guard...

  14. 41 CFR 51-9.101-5 - Safeguarding systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Safeguarding systems of records. 51-9.101-5 Section 51-9.101-5 Public Contracts and Property Management Other Provisions Relating... ACT RULES 9.1-General Policy § 51-9.101-5 Safeguarding systems of records. The Executive...

  15. 5 CFR 735.202 - What are the restrictions on conduct that safeguard the examination process?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... safeguard the examination process? 735.202 Section 735.202 Administrative Personnel OFFICE OF PERSONNEL... of Conduct § 735.202 What are the restrictions on conduct that safeguard the examination process? (a) An employee shall not, with or without compensation, teach, lecture, or write for the purpose of...

  16. Improving Transparency in the Reporting of Safeguards Implementation: FY11 Update

    SciTech Connect

    Toomey, Christopher; Odlaug, Christopher S.; Wyse, Evan T.

    2011-09-30

    In 2008, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) has not kept pace with the evolution of safeguards and provided the IAEA with a set of recommendations for improvement. The SIR is the primary mechanism for providing an overview of safeguards implementation in a given year and reporting on the annual safeguards findings and conclusions drawn by the Secretariat. As the IAEA transitions to State-level safeguards approaches, SIR reporting must adapt to reflect these evolutionary changes. This evolved report will better reflect the IAEA's transition to a more qualitative and information-driven approach, based upon State-as-a-whole considerations. This paper applies SAGSI's recommendations to the development of multiple models for an evolved SIR and finds that an SIR repurposed as a 'safeguards portal' could significantly enhance information delivery, clarity, and transparency. In addition, this paper finds that the 'portal concept' also appears to have value as a standardized information presentation and analysis platform for use by Country Officers, for continuity of knowledge purposes, and the IAEA Secretariat in the safeguards conclusion process. Accompanying this paper is a fully functional prototype of the 'portal' concept, built using commercial software and IAEA Annual Report data and available for viewing at http://safeguardsportal.pnnl.gov.

  17. 45 CFR 1182.15 - Institute responsibility for maintaining adequate technical, physical, and security safeguards to...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... record systems. These security safeguards shall apply to all systems in which identifiable personal data... data and automated systems shall be adequately trained in the security and privacy of personal data. (4... technical, physical, and security safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure or destruction of manual...

  18. 6 CFR 29.7 - Safeguarding of Protected Critical Infrastructure Information.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 6 Domestic Security 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Safeguarding of Protected Critical Infrastructure Information. 29.7 Section 29.7 Domestic Security DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY PROTECTED CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION § 29.7 Safeguarding of Protected...

  19. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    SciTech Connect

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  20. 14 CFR § 1212.605 - Safeguarding information in systems of records.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Safeguarding information in systems of... the system manager in a written plan approved by the Center Security Officer or Center Information... ADMINISTRATION PRIVACY ACT-NASA REGULATIONS Instructions for NASA Employees § 1212.605 Safeguarding...