Industry Studies 2004: Biotechnology

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-01-01

for biological agent research, development, and production are available on the open market. Since biological weapons are relatively cheap, easy to...growing concern is that non-state actors will acquire and use a biological weapon , the “poor man’s nuclear weapon .” Such action is extremely difficult...to detect and counter. International Protocols and the Need to Control Agents and Technologies - The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

78 FR 55326 - Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-10

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8460] Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 AGENCY: Bureau of...(d) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, as amended...

Chemical and biological warfare. Should defenses be researched and deployed?

PubMed

Orient, J M

1989-08-04

The threat of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction has intensified because of improved delivery systems and advances in chemistry, genetics, and other sciences. Possible US responses to this threat include deterrence, defenses, and/or disarmament, including a reaffirmation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which is now in jeopardy. This article discusses the history of chemical and biological warfare, existing and potential weapons, the proliferation of weapons and delivery systems, ways to prevent the use of these weapons, and ways to protect populations from their effects.

Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations.

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-01-01

chemical, biological and nuclear weapons continues. Despite the reduction of world tensions, almost every industrial nation will be armed with a range...of conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. Most of these weapons will have been supplied to them by the EC, the United States, and China before...weapons and delivery systems as well as chemical and biological weapons to build or increase their arsenals. The combined effect of new found economic

The Need For Continued Development Of Ricin Countermeasures

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-01-01

ricin was code named compound W and considered for weapon - ization during the US offensive Biological Warfare Program [3]. The US intelligence community...similarly maintained that ricin is more compatible with a tool of assassination instead of a weapon of mass destruc- tion [42]. However, Radosavljevic...Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Bio - logical Warfare, vol. 6, Monthly Review Press, New York, NY, USA, 1969. [4] M. A. Poli, C. Roy, K. D. Huebner, D. R

In Their Own Words: Voices of Jihad

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-01-01

the tyranny of nature.’ The shrines of such a culture are huge factories and cinemas , chemical laboratories and dance halls and power stations. The...priests of such a worship are bankers and engineers, cinema stars and indus- trialists and aviators. The inevitable result of this state of affairs...weapon.” Based on U.S. and Japanese biological weapons programs from World War II, it showed “how to inject carrier animals, like rats, with the virus

Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

PubMed

Prockop, Leon D

2006-11-01

The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

Environmental Effects of Weapons Technology, A Scientists' Institute for Public Information Workbook.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McClintock, Michael; And Others

This collection of articles includes a general account of the environmental effects of modern weapons technology, a selection of news reports demonstrating the peacetime hazards of chemical and biological weapons, data on the physiological effects of the most common chemical weapons, a discussion of the hazards of biological weapons, a report of…

JPRS Report, China, Handbook of Military Knowledge for Commanders

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-03-07

Chemical and Biological Weapons Chapter I Nuclear Weapons (178) A. Summary Statement on Nuclear Weapons (178) 1. Basic Principles of Nuclear...199) 1. Basic Principles of Protection Against Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons* (199) 2. Maior Actions For Protection Against Nuclear...people’s bodies through the digestive tract. Skin contact. Biological warfare agents may enter the body directly through the skin , mucous membranes or

Agroterrorism, Biological Crimes, and Biological Warfare Targeting Animal Agriculture

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wilson, Terry M.; Logan-Henfrey, Linda; Weller, Richard E.

2000-04-12

There is a rising level of concern that agriculture might be targeted for economic sabotage by terrorists. Knowledge gathered about the Soviet Union biological weapons program and Iraq following the Gulf War, confirmed that animals and agricultural crops were targets of bioweapon development. These revelations are particularly disturbing in light of the fact that both countries are States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention that entered into force in 1975. The potential for misusing biotechnology to create more virulent pathogens and the lack of international means to detect unethical uses of new technologies to create destructive bioweapons ismore » of increasing concern. Disease outbreaks, whether naturally occurring or intentionally, involving agricultural pathogens that destroy livestock and crops would have a profound impact on a country's infrastructure, economy and export markets. This chapter deals with the history of agroterrorism, biological crimes and biological warfare directed toward animal agriculture, specifically, horses, cattle, swine, sheep, goats, and poultry.« less

Resolution of the Korean War biological warfare allegations.

PubMed

Leitenberg, M

1998-01-01

Recently acquired documents from the former Soviet Union prove that the accusations of United States use of biological weapons during the Korean conflict were fraudulent. The article discusses the history of the allegations of biological weapons use by the United States during the Korean conflict. It also considers the basis for making false allegations of biological weapons utilization.

The weapon potential of a microbe.

PubMed

Casadevall, Arturo; Pirofski, Liise-anne

2004-06-01

The designation of a microbe as a potential biological weapon poses the vexing question of how such a decision is made given the many pathogenic microbes that cause disease. Analysis of the properties of microbes that are currently considered biological weapons against humans revealed no obvious relationship to virulence, except that all are pathogenic for humans. Notably, the weapon potential of a microbe rather than its pathogenic properties or virulence appeared to be the major consideration when categorizing certain agents as biological weapons. In an effort to standardize the assessment of the risk that is posed by microbes as biological warfare agents using the basic principles of microbial communicability (defined here as a parameter of transmission) and virulence, a simple formula is proposed for estimating the weapon potential of a microbe.

Anthrax: a continuing concern in the era of bioterrorism

PubMed Central

2005-01-01

Anthrax, a potentially fatal infection, is a virulent and highly contagious disease. It is caused by a gram-positive, toxigenic, spore-forming bacillus: Bacillus anthracis. For centuries, anthrax has caused disease in animals and, although uncommonly, in humans throughout the world. Descriptions of this naturally occurring disease begin in antiquity. Anthrax is primarily a disease of herbivores, which are infected by ingestion of spores from the soil. With the advent of modern microbiology, Pasteur developed the first successful anthrax vaccine in 1881. The incidence of the disease has continually decreased since the late 19th century, and animal vaccination programs drastically reduced the animal mortality from the disease. However, anthrax spores continue to be documented in soil samples from throughout the world. Research on anthrax as a biological weapon began more than 80 years ago, and today at least 17 nations are believed to have offensive biological weapons programs that include anthrax. Recent events in the USA have shown how society is affected by both hoax and real threats of anthrax bioweapons. This fourth article in the series on weapons of biowarfare/bioterrorism summarizes the historical background of anthrax as well as clinical and laboratory information useful for bioterrorism preparedness. PMID:16200179

For support of USAMRMC Biological Weapons Convention, treaty and statement implementation activities. Final report, 1 March 1996-28 February 1997

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fox, J.

Program of work to provide support to the Biological Arms Control Treaty Office (BACTO) of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command (USAMRMC), in the development of Army and U.S. Government negotiation, implementation and compliance policies and preparations regarding potential verification and confidence measures for the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and related biological weapons agreements. Support services provided included the preparation of Army installations and commands for implementation of visits pursuant to the U.S./UK/Russian Trilateral Statement on BW. Support included site assistance visit, development of required facility documentation and briefings, identification of additional facilities potentially subject to access,more » and support to DOD development of guidelines, procedures, documentation, and other materials for the conduct of visits. Specific tasks under this contract included: identification and delineation of `Military Biological Facilities` and related activities at Army installations; development of visit implementation documentation for the Army; assessment of potentially at-risk equities and sensitivities at relevant facilities; facility staff training and preparation; and review and modification of facility inputs to annual BWC Confidence Building Measure Declarations. Also supported the provision of timely and critical technical support to the Joint Staff and OSD in the development of DoD negotiation biological arms control positions.« less

Biological weapons preparedness: the role of physicians.

PubMed

Cherry, C L; Kainer, M A; Ruff, T A

2003-01-01

The real risk posed by biological weapons was demonstrated with the distribution of anthrax spores via the USA postal service in 2001. This review outlines the central roles of physicians in optimizing biopreparedness in Australia, including maintaining awareness of the risk, promptly recognizing an event, notifying appropriate authorities upon suspicion of an event, and instituting appropriate management. Management aspects covered include appropriate diagnostic tests, infection control procedures, and empirical therapy of agents considered possible biological weapons. The critical role of physicians as public health advocates working to prevent the use of biological weapons is also outlined.

78 FR 74218 - Imposition of Additional Sanctions on Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-10

... Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 AGENCY: Bureau of International... determination was made that the Government of Syria used chemical weapons in violation of international law or lethal chemical weapons against its own nationals. Notice of this determination was published on...

Recognizing the real threat of biological terror.

PubMed

Wenzel, Richard P

2002-01-01

Weapons of mass destruction can be used to harm and terrorize populations. Such weapons include those with chemical, nuclear or biological properties. Obviously computer viruses can add additional barriers to a quick response. The most effective, least costly and greatest threats are biologicals. Biological terror is not new, and biological weapons have been used for centuries. However, as a result of modern technology, the risks are greater now and the outcomes more terrible. Today they include live pathogens, various toxins, and theoretically "bioregulators"--biochemicals affecting cell signaling. Altered cell signaling could be used to induce apoptosis-cell death, or a heightened outpouring of cytokines mimicking overwhelming sepsis, or even an intracellular, biochemical "strike" causing cellular paralysis. Biological weaponeers now have the frightening ability to alter the genetic makeup of pathogens, rendering them resistant not only to available antibiotic therapy but also to currently effective vaccines. In dark corners of some fringe groups, bioweaponeers are searching for the capability of designing pathogens that target specific races, by virtue of discriminating ligands (1). The resulting morbidity and mortality from use of any biological weapons will be accompanied by chaos, governmental and social instability, panic, an extraordinary utilization of available resources, and an ongoing epidemic of sleepless nights (2,3). Herein I will review some of the issues and some of the currently available biological weapons. The major goal is to highlight the clinical presentations of patients with infections that could be used as biological weapons.

Proliferation: Threat and Response

DTIC Science & Technology

1997-11-01

primary agent, the Defense Technology capabilities also contribute to ongoing efforts to Security Administration ( DTSA ). These efforts are focus and...Special Weapons Agency Organization DTSA Defense Technology Security BW Biological Weapons Administration BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons EPCI Enhanced

Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens

DOEpatents

Mariella Jr., Raymond P.

2004-09-07

A system for detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens uses a detector system, an electrostatic precipitator or scrubber, a circulation system, and a control. The precipitator or scrubber is activated in response to a signal from the detector upon the detection of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens.

Biotechnology: Genetically Engineered Pathogens (The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series No. 53)

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-06-01

ENGINEERED PATHOGENS ....... 8 Binary biological weapons ...the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons , along with ballistic missile...and individuals, given the opportunity to employ biological weapons , will most likely use it to inflict harm and terror on the United States and its

15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

Biosecurity: Addressing the Threats of Bioterrorism and Infectious Diseases

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-22

threats. Discussion: Biological threats can be divided into the intentional use of biological weapons as a form of terrorist attack and the natural...level, the Biological Weapon Convention (BWC) and World Health Organization (WHO) continue to act as key platforms to synchronize efforts to counter...outbreak. 5 2.1 BIOTERRORISM According to the United Nations, " Biological weapons are devices which disseminate disease-causing organisms or poisons

Medical Engagement: Beyond the MEDCAP

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-04-16

threat faced by the possibility of the spread of biological weapons that could potentially impact the US. In response to the threat of biological ...spread and potential use of weaponized biological material improves the capacity to respond to such outbreaks as pandemic influenza,9 and is an...on the greater social order, (5) they may serve as a catalyst for regional instability, and (6) the threat posed by biological weapons use during

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. July 2006 - December 2006

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-12-01

and Biological Safety Eleventh Chemical Weapons Convention Better International Controls Needed to Prevent Bioterrorism Human Biomonitoring for...Environmental Cooperation to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons ...scanning reports.] [September 2006. Military Implications, Sources] Chemical and Biological Safey Eleventh Chemical Weapons Convention The 11th

Chemical-biological defense remote sensing: what's happening

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carrico, John P.

1998-08-01

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to be a serious threat to the security of the US. Proliferation of chemical and biological (CB) weapons is particularly disturbing, and the threats posed can be devastating. Critical elements of the US efforts to reduce and counter WMD proliferation include: (1) the location and characterization of WMD facilities and capabilities worldwide; (2) the ability to rapidly detect and identify the use of CB weapons for expeditious warning and reporting on the battlefield; and (3) the capability to mitigate deleterious consequences of a CB incident through effective protective and medical treatment measures. Remote sensing has been touted as a key technology in these efforts. Historically, the role of remote sensing in CB defense has been to provide early warning of an attack from an extended distance. However, additional roles for remote sensing in CB defense, as well as applications in related missions, are possible and should be pursued. This paper examines what has been happening in remote sensing over the past decade to address needs in this area. Accomplishments, emerging technologies, programmatic issues, and opportunities for the future are covered. The Department of Defence chemical- biological, the Department of Energy's Chemical Analysis by Laser Interrogation of Proliferation Effluents, and other agency related programs are examined. Also, the status of remote sensing in the commercial market arena for environmental monitoring, its relevance to the WMD counterproliferation program, and opportunities for technology transfer are discussed. A course of action for the future is recommended.

Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1999.

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-01-01

chemical and biological weapons technology in Africa. However, there remains much to be done: - • Terrorism: The economic and political weakness of many...OPERATIONAL GOAL: Counter the proliferation of missile technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological Weapons . Levels of cooperation with our...34 terrorism; chemical, biological , nuclear, or radiological weapons . 6. Enhance CT cooperation through the establishment of legal instruments like mutual

75 FR 62916 - Re-Delegation by the Under Secretary of State to the Director, Office of Chemical and Biological...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-13

... State to the Director, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs, of the Functions and... Secretary of State by the laws of the United States, including by Section 101 of the Chemical Weapons...-delegate to the Director, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs, Bureau of Arms Control, [[Page...

Biological Weapons Attribution: A Primer

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-01

attacks are very difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the unique restrictions the international environment places on BW attribution, and...provides a basic epistemological framework for analysis for successful BW attribution, detailing the nature , methods, and limits of current BW...difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the unique restrictions the international environment places on BW attribution, and (3) the

Chemical and biological weapons in the 'new wars'.

PubMed

Ilchmann, Kai; Revill, James

2014-09-01

The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

Patient care in a biological safety level-4 (BSL-4) environment.

PubMed

Marklund, LeRoy A

2003-06-01

The greatest threats to America's public health include accidental importation of deadly diseases by international travelers and the release of biologic weapons by our adversaries. The greatest failure is unpreparedness because international travel and dispersion of biologic agents by our enemies are inevitable. An effective medical defense program is the recommended deterrent against these threats. The United States has a federal response plan in place that includes patient care and patient transport by using the highest level of biologic containment: BSL-4. The DoD has the capability to provide intensive care for victims infected with highly infectious yet unknown biologic agents in an environment that protects the caregiver while allowing scientists to study the characteristics of these new agents and assess the effectiveness of treatment. Army critical care nurses are vital in the biologic medical defense against unidentified infectious diseases, accidental occupational exposures, or intentional dispersion of weaponized biologic agents. Research that carefully advances healthcare using BSL-4 technology addresses the challenges of the human element of BSL-4 containment patient care, and BSL-4 patient transport enhances our nation's ability to address the emerging biologic threats we confront in the future.

Chemical weapons: documented use and compounds on the horizon.

PubMed

Bismuth, Chantal; Borron, Stephen W; Baud, Frederic J; Barriot, Patrick

2004-04-01

Man's inhumanity to man is expressed through a plethora of tools of modern warfare and terror. The use of chemical and biological weapons with the goals of assault, demoralisation and lethality has been documented in recent history, both on the battlefield and in urban terror against civilians. A general review of a few of the currently employed chemical weapons and biological toxins, along with a look at potential chemical weapons and tools of counter-terrorism, follows. While these weapons are fearsome elements, the dangers should be viewed in the context of the widespread availability and efficacy of conventional weapons.

COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH: IN-SITU MITIGATION OF MERCURY CONTAMINATED GROUNDWATER IN KAZAKHSTAN

EPA Science Inventory

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) OIA receives funding from the U.S. State Department's Bio-Chem Redirect program to engage former Soviet biological and chemical weapons scientists in civilian research in environmental monitoring and remediation. Scientists in t...

77 FR 27208 - Renewal of Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-09

... national defense, geopolitical and national security affairs, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear physics... Defense (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs), independent advice and recommendations on: a. Reducing the threat to the United States, its military forces, and its allies and partners posed by nuclear...

Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-01-10

because of its potential relevance to biological weapons of mass destruction. Whether the current method of only using classification to limit the...terrorist groups in developing weapons of mass destruction. In 2000, researchers at the Co-operative Research Centre for the Biological Control of Pest...development of chemical, biological , or nuclear weapons is not made accessible to terrorists or countries of proliferation concern. The resolution

2012 Review on the Extension of the AMedP-8(C) Methodology to New Agents, Materials, and Conditions

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-10-01

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to estimate casualties from chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft...chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons . The final draft documenting this methodology was published by IDA in 2009 and was...from Battlefield Exposure to Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents and Nuclear Weapon Effects. IDA Document D- 4465. Alexandria, VA: IDA

[Biological and toxin terrorism weapons].

PubMed

Bokan, Slavko

2003-03-01

The use of biological agents and toxins in warfare and terrorism has a long history. Human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins can cause disease and can be used as a threat to humans, animals and staple crops. The same is true for biological agents. Although the use of biological agents and toxins in military conflicts has been a concern of military communities for many years, several recent events have increased the awareness of terrorist use of these weapons against civilian population. A Mass Casualty Biological (Toxin) Weapon (MCBTW) is any biological and toxin weapon capable of causing death or disease on a large scale, such that the military or civilian infrastructure of the state or organization being attacked is overwhelmed. A militarily significant (or terrorist) weapon is any weapon capable of affecting, directly or indirectly, that is physically or psychologically, the outcome of a military operation. Although many biological agents such as toxins and bioregulators can be used to cause diseases, there are only a few that can truly threaten civilian populations on a large scale. Bioregulators or modulators are biochemical compounds, such as peptides, that occur naturally in organisms. They are new class of weapons that can damage nervous system, alter moods, trigger psychological changes and kill. The potential military or terrorist use of bioregulators is similar to that of toxins. Some of these compounds are several hundred times more potent than traditional chemical warfare agents. Important features and military advantages of new bioregulators are novel sites of toxic action; rapid and specific effects; penetration of protective filters and equipment, and militarily effective physical incapacitation. This overview of biological agents and toxins is largely intended to help healthcare providers on all levels to make decisions in protecting general population from these agents.

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. Summarizing Environmental Security Monthly Scanning, July 2006-June 2007

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-01

if used on the battlefield. Clarification of what chemicals will be allowed under the treaty’s exception is needed. “The biological weapons threat... biological , and chemical weapons countermeasures include: • adoption of amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material...to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Kyoto

Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2010

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-11-23

represent the more research-oriented part of the RDT&E program. Budget activities 6.4 and 6.5 focus on the development of specific weapon systems or...to fund developmental testing of the BioWatch Generation 3 biological agent detection system. The Administration requested these funds for the...Acquisition, and Operations 800 826 825 844 856 Border and Maritime 33 40 40 40 44 Chemical and Biological 200 207 222 207 207 Command, Control, and

International Environmental Law and Naval War Newport paper no. 15

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-12-01

Conference, which adopted the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environ- mental...187 • Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological ( Biological ) and Toxin Weapons , and on their...1 Journal of Armed Conflict Law, 125 (1996). —————. “The Regulation of Biological and Chemical Weapons .” In Fox, H. and Meyer, M., Effective

A proposal for the classification of biological weapons sensu lato.

PubMed

Rozsa, Lajos

2014-12-01

Due to historical and legislation reasons, the category of bioweapons is rather poorly defined. Authors often disagree on involving or excluding agents like hormones, psychochemicals, certain plants and animals (such as weeds or pests) or synthetic organisms. Applying a wide definition apparently threatens by eroding the regime of international legislation, while narrow definitions abandon several important issues. Therefore, I propose a category of 'biological weapons sensu lato' (BWsl) that is defined here as any tool of human aggression whose acting principle is based on disciplines of biology including particularly microbiology, epidemiology, medical biology, physiology, psychology, pharmacology and ecology, but excluding those based on inorganic agents. Synthetically produced equivalents (not necessarily exact copies) and mock weapons are also included. This definition does not involve any claim to subject all these weapons to international legislation but serves a purely scholarly purpose. BWsl may be properly categorized on the base of the magnitude of the human population potentially targeted (4 levels: individuals, towns, countries, global) and the biological nature of the weapons' intended effects (4 levels: agricultural-ecological agents, and non-pathogenic, pathogenic, or lethal agents against humans).

Neurotoxic Weapons and Syndromes.

PubMed

Carota, Antonio; Calabrese, Pasquale; Bogousslavsky, Julien

2016-01-01

The modern era of chemical and biological warfare began in World War I with the large-scale production and use of blistering and choking agents (chlorine, phosgene and mustard gases) in the battlefield. International treaties (the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention) banned biological and chemical weapons. However, several countries are probably still engaged in their development. Hence, there is risk of these weapons being used in the future. This chapter will focus on neurotoxic weapons (e.g. nerve agents, chemical and biological neurotoxins, psychostimulants), which act specifically or preeminently on the central nervous system and/or the neuromuscular junction. Deeply affecting the function of the nervous system, these agents either have incapacitating effects or cause clusters of casualties who manifest primary symptoms of encephalopathy, seizures, muscle paralysis and respiratory failure. The neurologist should be prepared both to notice patterns of symptoms and signs that are sufficiently consistent to raise the alarm of neurotoxic attacks and to define specific therapeutic interventions. Additionally, extensive knowledge on neurotoxic syndromes should stimulate scientific research to produce more effective antidotes and antibodies (which are still lacking for most neurotoxic weapons) for rapid administration in aerosolized forms in the case of terrorist or warfare scenarios. © 2016 S. Karger AG, Basel.

Morality of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-04-01

effects from biological weapons may not be apparent until after a battle . However, these weapons can do great damage to civilians, even if...justify. Ultimately, even though some chemical and biological weapons are non-lethal, Francis Harbour warns against callously using these agents due to...In this case, the United States had justly entered World War II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, meeting the criteria of just cause and

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 9, 2011 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

International Environmental Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions During International Armed Conflict

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-12-01

Biological Weapons Convention and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environ- mental Modification Techniques...of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological ( Biological ) and Toxin Weapons , and on their Destruction, Lon- don/Washington...125 (1996). —————. “The Regulation of Biological and Chemical Weapons .” In Fox, H. and Meyer, M., Effective Compliance. Armed Conflict and the New Law

75 FR 68671 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-08

... the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of... Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 75... [[Page 68673

3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...

3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 3 The President 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...

76 FR 70317 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-10

... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...--Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

77 FR 66513 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-11-05

... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President issued Executive Order 13094 amending Executive... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk, Ethics, and Design

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-12-20

civilians, such as most biological or chemical weapons —and perhaps even many modes of ‘cyberattacks’ on computer networks [Rowe, 2008]. ▌51...disproportionately—similar in effect to landmines as well as nuclear, biological , and chemical weapons —are hence immoral to deploy. Whether or not...little cover from attacks, to clearing roads and seas of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to surveying damage from biochemical weapons , to

Global Operations and Biometrics: Next Generation Capabilities and Policy Implications

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-04-01

could help identify individuals likely to have handled certain chemical, biological or radiological precursor substances associated with weapons of...or biologic weapon production or storage site. See U.S. Department of the Army, Site Exploitation Operations, Army Field Manual FM 3-90.15...and nuclear) forces and shifting increasingly toward the non-nation state actors organized as networked violent extremists, often seeking weapons of

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-07

and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands , Mongolia, Panama, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines... toxin weapons, mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons production facilities, and seeks to control the production and international transfer...and transfer of biological weapons, as well as biological agents and toxins . It also bans “equipment or means of delivery designed to use such

Educating the Army of 2010: A Strategic Plan

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-02-20

States have been identified by futurist John Naisbitt, in his books Megatrends : Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives and Megatrends 2000. Several...information and equipment. - The proliferation of weapons will continue, including chemical, biological , and nuclear weapons. Despite the reduction of...conventional systems as well as biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology will be more common, both as a source of

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons...

[Scientific progress and new biological weapons].

PubMed

Berche, Patrick

2006-02-01

The biological weapons are different from conventional weapons, because living germs hold an extraordinary and predictable potential for multiplication, propagation and genetic variation during their dissemination in a susceptible population. Only natural pathogens (1rst generation weapons) have been used in the past (smallpox virus, plague, anthrax, toxins...). However, new threats are emerging, due to the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and its exponential worldwide diffusion. It is possible to synthesize microorganisms from in silico sequences widely diffused on Internet (poliovirus, influenza...), thus resulting in the accessibility of very dangerous virus confined today in high-security laboratories (virus Ebola...). It is possible also to "improve" pathogens by genetic manipulations, becoming more resistant or virulent (2nd generation weapons). Finally, one can now create de novo new pathogens by molecular breeding (DNA shuffling), potentially highly dangerous for naive populations (3rd generation weapons). Making biological weapons does not require too much technological resources and appears accessible to terrorists, due to low cost and easy use. Although the destructive consequences are difficult to predict, the psychological and social damages should be considerable, because of the highly emotional burden in the population associated to the transgression by man of a taboo of life.

Chemical and biological weapons: new questions, new answers.

PubMed Central

Hood, E

1999-01-01

The words "chemical and biological weapons" (CBW) send a shiver down most spines these days. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a massive nuclear confrontation appears remote, so today many popular doomsday scenarios center on the aggressive use of chemical or biological warfare by rogue nations or terrorist groups. As exaggerated as some of the accounts are, with CBW cast as the latest unseen, unstoppable enemy, the threat posed by these weapons is all too real, and growing. Images p931-a PMID:10585899

Biological weapons and bioterrorism in the first years of the twenty-first century.

PubMed

Leitenberg, Milton

2002-09-01

This paper evaluates four recent developments in biological-weapons politics and bioterrorism. First is American opposition to finalization of a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention; second, a successful attempt at mass-casualty terrorism; third, an ongoing investigation into the bioterrorist capabilities of the al Qaeda network; and, fourth, a series of fatal anthrax attacks in the United States. The first of these evaluations is informed by interviews conducted between 2000 and 2002 with policy principals in the United States and elsewhere.

78 FR 67289 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-11-12

... economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President... November 7, 2013 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of...

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Luke, S J

2011-12-20

This report describes a path forward for implementing information barriers in a future generic biological arms-control verification regime. Information barriers have become a staple of discussion in the area of arms control verification approaches for nuclear weapons and components. Information barriers when used with a measurement system allow for the determination that an item has sensitive characteristics without releasing any of the sensitive information. Over the last 15 years the United States (with the Russian Federation) has led on the development of information barriers in the area of the verification of nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The work of themore » US and the Russian Federation has prompted other states (e.g., UK and Norway) to consider the merits of information barriers for possible verification regimes. In the context of a biological weapons control verification regime, the dual-use nature of the biotechnology will require protection of sensitive information while allowing for the verification of treaty commitments. A major question that has arisen is whether - in a biological weapons verification regime - the presence or absence of a weapon pathogen can be determined without revealing any information about possible sensitive or proprietary information contained in the genetic materials being declared under a verification regime. This study indicates that a verification regime could be constructed using a small number of pathogens that spans the range of known biological weapons agents. Since the number of possible pathogens is small it is possible and prudent to treat these pathogens as analogies to attributes in a nuclear verification regime. This study has determined that there may be some information that needs to be protected in a biological weapons control verification regime. To protect this information, the study concludes that the Lawrence Livermore Microbial Detection Array may be a suitable technology for the detection of the genetic information associated with the various pathogens. In addition, it has been determined that a suitable information barrier could be applied to this technology when the verification regime has been defined. Finally, the report posits a path forward for additional development of information barriers in a biological weapons verification regime. This path forward has shown that a new analysis approach coined as Information Loss Analysis might need to be pursued so that a numerical understanding of how information can be lost in specific measurement systems can be achieved.« less

Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jenkins, Bonnie

1997-01-01

Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

Belief in exposure to chemical and biological agents in Persian Gulf War soldiers.

PubMed

Stuart, John A; Ursano, Robert J; Fullerton, Carol S; Wessely, Simon

2008-02-01

This is the first longitudinal cohort study of Persian Gulf War US soldiers to examine belief in exposure to chemical and biological weapons before and shortly after combat. A longitudinal sample of n = 1250 male Persian Gulf War US Army soldiers were surveyed 3 to 4 months before and 6 to 10 months after the 1991 War. Six to 10 months after combat, 4.6% of the cohort believed they had been exposed to chemical and biological weapons. Adjusting for demographics only, those who reported a greater number of combat exposures (odds ratio, OR: 18.8), or higher combat stress (OR: 12.27) were more likely to believe they were exposed. Adjusting for all variables soldiers who reported higher combat stress continued to be most likely (OR: 6.58) to believe they had been exposed to chemical and biological weapons. Individuals reporting higher combat stress are at substantially greater risk of reporting they have been exposed to chemical or biological weapons.

Project Coast: eugenics in apartheid South Africa.

PubMed

Singh, Jerome Amir

2008-03-01

It is a decade since the exposure of Project Coast, apartheid South Africa's covert chemical and biological warfare program. In that time, attention has been focused on several aspects of the program, particularly the production of narcotics and poisons for use against anti-apartheid activists and the proliferation of both chemical and biological weapons. The eugenic dimension of Project Coast has, by contrast, received scant attention. It is time to revisit the testimony that brought the suggestion of eugenic motives to light, reflect on some of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's findings and search for lessons that can be taken from this troubled chapter in South Africa's history.

Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2010

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-01-12

the RDT&E program. Budget activities 6.4 and 6.5 focus on the development of specific weapon systems or components (e.g., the Joint Strike Fighter or...Service 16 The House bill would have provided $15 million to the S&T Directorate to fund developmental testing of the BioWatch Generation 3 biological ...Acquisition, and Operations 800 826 825 844 856 Border and Maritime 33 40 40 40 44 Chemical and Biological 200 207 222 207 207 Command, Control, and

Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2010

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-10-22

and represent the more research-oriented part of the RDT&E program. Budget activities 6.4 and 6.5 focus on the development of specific weapon ...Institute (HSI), which was funded as a separate item in FY2009. The House bill would provide $15 million more than the request for chemical and biological ...132 142 142 143 R&D, Acquisition, and Operations 692 800 826 825 844 Border and Maritime 25 33 40 40 40 Chemical and Biological 208 200 207 222

8 CFR 204.10 - Petitions by, or for, certain scientists of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Baltic...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass destruction, or who are working on nuclear, chemical, biological, or other high-technology defense projects, as... production of ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass...

8 CFR 204.10 - Petitions by, or for, certain scientists of the Commonwealth of Independent States or the Baltic...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass destruction, or who are working on nuclear, chemical, biological, or other high-technology defense projects, as... production of ballistic missiles, nuclear, biological, chemical, or other high-technology weapons of mass...

Dismantling Terrorism: Developing Actionable Solutions for Today’s Plague of Violence

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-11-01

Press, 2006. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear Biological and Chemical Arms, Stockholm, Sweden...Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radioloqical, Chemical , and Biological. Hoboken: Wiley-Interscience, 2004. (U 793 .L36 2004) Martin, Gus, ed...electronic. Pita, Rene. "Assessing AI-Qaeda’s Chemical Threat." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20.3 (Fall 2007): 480

Take Russia to 'task' on bioweapons transparency.

PubMed

Zilinskas, Raymond A

2012-06-06

In the run-up to his reelection, Russian president Vladimir Putin outlined 28 tasks to be undertaken by his administration, including one that commanded the development of weapons based on “genetic principles.” Political pressure must be applied by governments and professional societies to ensure that there is not a modern reincarnation of the Soviet biological warfare program.

President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-10-01

President’s decision. During the NSC deliberations, Nixon observed that the public perception of the BW issue was “very important.” In particular, it...important decisions,” Nixon intoned , “have been taken as an initiative toward peace. Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of

Laser safety research and modeling for high-energy laser systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Smith, Peter A.; Montes de Oca, Cecilia I.; Kennedy, Paul K.; Keppler, Kenneth S.

2002-06-01

The Department of Defense has an increasing number of high-energy laser weapons programs with the potential to mature in the not too distant future. However, as laser systems with increasingly higher energies are developed, the difficulty of the laser safety problem increases proportionally, and presents unique safety challenges. The hazard distance for the direct beam can be in the order of thousands of miles, and radiation reflected from the target may also be hazardous over long distances. This paper details the Air Force Research Laboratory/Optical Radiation Branch (AFRL/HEDO) High-Energy Laser (HEL) safety program, which has been developed to support DOD HEL programs by providing critical capability and knowledge with respect to laser safety. The overall aim of the program is to develop and demonstrate technologies that permit safe testing, deployment and use of high-energy laser weapons. The program spans the range of applicable technologies, including evaluation of the biological effects of high-energy laser systems, development and validation of laser hazard assessment tools, and development of appropriate eye protection for those at risk.

Assessing the Effects of Organizational Changes within the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the Nuclear Mission

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-09-01

School of Engineering and Management Air Force Institute of Technology Air University Air Education and Training Command In Partial...chemical and biological defense programs for OSD and his/her official title was changed to Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical...weapons program was no longer the true 27 focus in this office. The current title of this office is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear

Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

PubMed

Anderson, Peter D

2012-04-01

The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

The ROK Army’s Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-02-01

produced large amounts of biological and chemical weapons. In addition, North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missile technology and export...process. 6. Security and safe disposal of WMD. This includes research, production and storage facilities for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons...Publishers, 1989. Naisbitt, John . Megatrends Asia: Eight Asian Megatrends That Are Reshaping Our World, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1996. The New

Disaster preparedness, pediatric considerations in primary blast injury, chemical, and biological terrorism

PubMed Central

Hamele, Mitchell; Poss, William Bradley; Sweney, Jill

2014-01-01

Both domestic and foreign terror incidents are an unfortunate outgrowth of our modern times from the Oklahoma City bombings, Sarin gas attacks in Japan, the Madrid train bombing, anthrax spores in the mail, to the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. The modalities used to perpetrate these terrorist acts range from conventional weapons to high explosives, chemical weapons, and biological weapons all of which have been used in the recent past. While these weapons platforms can cause significant injury requiring critical care the mechanism of injury, pathophysiology and treatment of these injuries are unfamiliar to many critical care providers. Additionally the pediatric population is particularly vulnerable to these types of attacks. In the event of a mass casualty incident both adult and pediatric critical care practitioners will likely be called upon to care for children and adults alike. We will review the presentation, pathophysiology, and treatment of victims of blast injury, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. The focus will be on those injuries not commonly encountered in critical care practice, primary blast injuries, category A pathogens likely to be used in terrorist incidents, and chemical weapons including nerve agents, vesicants, pulmonary agents, cyanide, and riot control agents with special attention paid to pediatric specific considerations. PMID:24834398

Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Part I: Medical aspects of nuclear warfare.

PubMed

Kasthuri, A S; Pradhan, A B; Dham, S K; Bhalla, I P; Paul, J S

1990-04-01

Casualties in earlier wars were due much more to diseases than to weapons. Mention has been made in history of the use of biological agents in warfare, to deny the enemy food and water and to cause disease. In the first world war chemical agents were used to cause mass casualties. Nuclear weapons were introduced in the second world war. Several countries are now involved in developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems, for the mass annihilation of human beings, animals and plants, and to destroy the economy of their enemies. Recently, natural calamities and accidents in nuclear, chemical and biological laboratories and industries have caused mass instantaneous deaths in civilian population. The effects of future wars will not be restricted to uniformed persons. It is time that physicians become aware of the destructive potential of these weapons. Awareness, immediate protective measures and first aid will save a large number of persons. This series of articles will outline the medical aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems in three parts. Part I will deal with the biological effects of a nuclear explosion. The short and long term effects due to blast, heat and associated radiation are highlighted. In Part II, the role of biological agents which cause commoner or new disease patterns is mentioned. Some of the accidents from biological warfare laboratories are a testimony to its potential deleterious effects. Part III deals with medical aspects of chemical warfare agents, which in view of their mass effects can overwhelm the existing medical resources, both civilian and military.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Professional Development of Officers Study. Volume 5 - Policy Impact Analysis

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-02-21

Megatrends : Ten New Directions Trans-. performance measures. This portion of the re- forming Our Lives by John Naisbitt. port describes how the Futures Team...involved development or progress). (2 01) in an armed conflict in which chemical or biolog - -- 6-ABILITIES/REQTS MATCH-An accurate ical weapons are...orical w ePDS"-"RX odl lease of nuclear, chemical or biological weapon(s) ,.-. -nPDOS INTERAX Model.USSR. ~~11-2-1

A World 2010: A New Order of Nations

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-01-01

chemical and biological ) and nuclear weapons continues. Despite the reduction of world tensions, almost every industrial nation will be armed with a...34 Engineering: electronics, civil, mechanical, metallurgical * Life: biological , medical, behavioral, social The advanced industrial societies of Hong...a very modest nuclear capability. There is a good chance that most nations, if they have nuclear weapons, will have either chemical or biological

Biological Weapons -- Still a Relevant Threat

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-22

destruction in general, and biological weapons in particular. The IHS Janes: Defence and Security Intelligence & Analysis website notes that a number of...responder capabilities, and intelligence agency inputs. There needs, as well, to be continued research and development of sensor technologies, which...Mass Destruction – Radiological, Chemical and Biological,‖ 109 10 Mark, J. Carson; Taylor, Theodore; Eyster, Eugene; Maraman, William; Wechsler

Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC)

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-09-01

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD, defined as nuclear, chemical , and biological) and weapons of mass effect (WME, defined as other high... Chemical Weapons • Scoping Study for a U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogued 5 • U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue • Implications of Indian Tactical...of Chemical Weapons : Strategic Dialogue, Research, and Report Performer: Arizona State University (ASU) Principal Investigator: Orde Kittrie Cost

Personnel Attrition Rates in Historical Land Combat Operations: Susceptibility and Vulnerability of Major Anatomical Regions

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-08-01

effectiveness , estimate personnel attr;i"on, perform studies and analyses. or assess protective equipment for personnel. i II CAA-RP-93-3 DEPARTMENT OF THE...weapons or weapons effects that are difficult to localize are excluded from the 1-1 CAA-RP-93-3 scope of this paper Some examples of the types of weapons...or weapon effects excluded atr" .;i,nical weapons (encompassing war gases and other toxic substances, flame weapons. and biological agents), nuclear

Intergovernmental Unity of Effort in Support of Biological Threat Prevention

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-09-01

jurisdictional barriers (such as time delays in developing decisions and implementing large scale action) are tangible. Connecting the “dots” of awareness...groups are developing the capability and the intention to deliver biological weapons of mass destruction. Four coalitions of governments were studied...Intelligence sources from around the globe report that terrorist groups are developing the capability and the intention to deliver biological weapons

Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

PubMed Central

Pitschmann, Vladimír

2014-01-01

This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

PubMed

Pitschmann, Vladimír

2014-06-04

This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kevin Larry Young

2009-05-01

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testingmore » capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.« less

Historical precedence and technical requirements of biological weapons use : a threat assessment.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Estes, Daniel P.; Vogel, Kathleen Margaret; Gaudioso, Jennifer Marie

2004-05-01

The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of bioterrorism incidents over the past century, butmore » states and substate actors have struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event.« less

Arms Control without Arms Control: The Failure of the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol and a New Paradigm for Fighting the Threat of Biological Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-03-01

www.fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/intro.htm. 15 Steve Sternberg, “Building the Ultimate BioWeapon,” USA Today, November 14, 2001, 9D. 16 Maura Lerner...Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the successor to UNSCOM, see Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, “Why Iraq Will Defeat Arms Inspectors,” New York Times...5; Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, supra. 130 Milhollin & Motz, supra, note 128. 131 Zelicoff, supra note 120. 132 Peter Sleven, “US Drops Bid to

Balancing Scientific Publication and National Security Concerns: Issues for Congress

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-07-09

Zilinskas and J.B. Tucker, “Limiting the Contribution of the Open Scientific Literature to the Biological Weapons Threat,” Journal of Homeland...been used to inhibit its spread. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have increased scrutiny of nonconventional weapons , including weapons of mass destruction...Andrew Card to determine if government-owned information, especially that regarding weapons of mass destruction, was being inappropriately disclosed

Non-Lethal Weapons Program

Science.gov Websites

), 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), practice non-lethal control techniques during a non-lethal Skip to main content (Press Enter). Toggle navigation Non-Lethal Weapons Program Search Search JNLWP: Search Search JNLWP: Search Non-Lethal Weapons Program U.S. Department of Defense Non-Lethal

Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

Science.gov Websites

Safety & Security Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional service in the national interest & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Twitter YouTube Flickr RSS Top Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons at Sandia Safety & Security

Sandia National Laboratories: Careers: Special Programs

Science.gov Websites

Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

Chemical Demilitarization Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA)

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-12-01

Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA) is performing a portion of the chemical warfare materiel elimination mission. In 1996, Congress and the...Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) RCS: DD-A&T(Q&A)823-243 Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA) As...Date Assigned: December 19, 2010 Program Information Program Name Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on 21st Century Defense Technology Strategies, Volume 2,

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-03-01

national security. The focus should include improved intelligence on development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their means of...Chemical/ Biological /Nuclear Anti-Terrorism" site provides a variety of links to related materials, (http://www.mindspring.com/~nbcnco) The roots of...vital commercial supplies, and perhaps even the general population with biological or chemical weapons. Accustomed to a qualitative as well as

Pulsed Electric Fields for Biological Weapons Defense

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-30

multifunctional biological transporters and near - infrared agents for selective cancer cell destruction. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102, 11600-5. 45. Heller, D. A...controlled biochemical manipulation. Nanotechnology 14,551-556. 47. Cherukuri, P., Bachilo, S. M., Litovsky, S. H., and Weisman, R. B. (2004). Near - infrared ...Pulsed Electric Fields for Biological Weapons Defense AFOSR Grant No. FA9550-05-1-0081 P.I. Martin Gundersen atrophaeus and isolates from dental patients

75 FR 78154 - Updated Statements of Legal Authority To Reflect Continuation of Emergency Declared in Executive...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-12-15

... proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the means of delivering such weapons. That... November 6, 2009, Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, with citation to the... practice and procedure, Chemicals, Exports, Foreign trade, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 0...

Sandia National Laboratories: Community Involvement: Volunteer Programs

Science.gov Websites

Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

36th ATLANTA EXECUTIVE SEMINAR

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-04-04

Elimination of Chemical Weapons Program. In addition, he is responsible for appointing, managing, and evaluating program executive officers as well as...little can be spared.” The National Commission of Fiscal responsibility, The Moment, December 2010 Slide 14 Congressional Weapon System Concerns ...Acquisition and Technology (A&T), and the Defense Acquisition Board on acquisition/procurement strategies for all major weapon systems programs

The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Alexander, Archibald S.; And Others

This book is composed of four papers prepared to illuminate the problem areas which might arise if the policies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other measures to limit chemical and biological weapons are ratified by the United States Senate. The papers included are: Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; The Use of Herbicides in War: A…

Experimental manipulation reveals a trade-off between weapons and testes.

PubMed

Somjee, U; Miller, C W; Tatarnic, N J; Simmons, L W

2018-01-01

Theory predicts a trade-off between sexually selected weapons used to secure mates and post-copulatory traits used to maximize fertilization success. However, individuals that have a greater capacity to acquire resources from the environment may invest more in both pre- and post-copulatory traits, and trade-offs may not be readily apparent. Here, we manipulate the phenotype of developing individuals to examine allocation trade-offs between weapons and testes in Mictis profana (Hemiptera: Coreidae), a species where the hind legs are sexually selected weapons used in contests over access to females. We experimentally prevented males from developing weapons by inducing them to autotomize their hind legs before the final moult to adulthood. We compared trait expression in this group to males where autotomy was induced in the mid-legs, which are presumably not under sexual selection to the same extent. We found males without weapons invested proportionally more in testes mass than those with their mid-legs removed. Males that developed to adulthood without weapons did not differ from the mid-leg removal group in other traits potentially under precopulatory sexual selection, other post-copulatory traits or naturally selected traits. In addition, a sample of adult males from the same population in the wild revealed a positive correlation between investment in testes and weapons. Our study presents a critical contribution to a growing body of literature suggesting the allocation of resources to pre- and post-copulatory sexual traits is influenced by a resource allocation trade-off and that this trade-off may only be revealed with experimental manipulation. © 2017 European Society For Evolutionary Biology. Journal of Evolutionary Biology © 2017 European Society For Evolutionary Biology.

The tale of the shrinking weapon: seasonal changes in nutrition affect weapon size and sexual dimorphism, but not contemporary evolution.

PubMed

Miller, C W; McDonald, G C; Moore, A J

2016-11-01

Sexually selected traits are often highly variable in size within populations due to their close link with the physical condition of individuals. Nutrition has a large impact on physical condition, and thus, any seasonal changes in nutritional quality are predicted to alter the average size of sexually selected traits as well as the degree of sexual dimorphism in populations. However, although traits affected by mate choice are well studied, we have a surprising lack of knowledge of how natural variation in nutrition affects the expression of sexually selected weapons and sexual dimorphism. Further, few studies explicitly test for differences in the heritability and mean-scaled evolvability of sexually selected traits across conditions. We studied Narnia femorata (Hemiptera: Coreidae), an insect where males use their hind legs as weapons and the femurs are enlarged, to understand the extent to which weapon expression, sexual dimorphism and evolvability change across the actual range of nutrition available in the wild. We found that insects raised on a poor diet (cactus without fruit) are nearly monomorphic, whereas those raised on a high-quality diet (cactus with ripe fruit) are distinctly sexually dimorphic via the expression of large hind leg weapons in males. Contrary to our expectations, we found little evidence of a potential for evolutionary change for any trait measured. Thus, although we show weapons are highly condition dependent, and changes in weapon expression and dimorphism could alter evolutionary dynamics, our populations are unlikely to experience further evolutionary changes under current conditions. © 2016 European Society For Evolutionary Biology. Journal of Evolutionary Biology © 2016 European Society For Evolutionary Biology.

Designing an effective microbial forensics program for law enforcement and national security purposes.

PubMed

Murch, Randall S

2014-06-01

Forensic capabilities that provide lead information, and investigative, intelligence, prosecution and policy decision support can be invaluable for responding to and resolving bioterrorism events. Attributing biological attacks through scientific and other resources and processes is an important goal, for which science can be instrumental. Some even believe that having effective microbial forensics capabilities along with others can even deter adversaries from using biological weapons. For those nations that do not have such or wish to integrate or upgrade capabilities, thoughtful analysis and consideration of certain design principles will increase the likelihood that success will be attained.

Religious and Philosophical Justifications for War: A Synthesis of Selected Literature

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Martzen, E

The Critical Issues Forum (CIF) is a cooperative education program supported in part by the Department of Energy's Defense Programs. The Science and Technology Education Program (STEP) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory manages one component of this program. CIF engages high school students and teachers regarding issues of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, and international security. These issues are viewed in light of their scientific, economic, socio-cultural, and political/geopolitical influences and implications. This year CIF's focus is on chemical and biological weapons (CBW). CBW is becoming more of a threat today than ever before. Many countriesmore » are developing these weapons. CBW also presents certain ethical dilemmas for many individuals, especially if those individuals feel it is their religious duty to use or avoid the use of such weapons. Religion has become an important determining factor in international security because many cultures, and even governments make decisions based on religious traditions. This paper is an attempt to look at these religions and philosophical traditions with an emphasis on views of ''just war''. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to promote awareness about religion's influence on international security issues. This paper was written by Cadet Ernst ''Mitch'' Martzen, AFROTC. He is an intern with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Science and Technology Education Program, under the guidance of Dr. Stephen C. Sesko, the director of LLNL's CIF program. Every major religion and ethical system has developed a societal concept of ''just war''. Today, the world's largest religions include Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Each faith lays claim to a heritage rich with thousands of years of history, and the power of great minds to support its ethical and moral beliefs. These religions have each developed separate and distinct beliefs regarding warfare. Whether those beliefs were developed through formal theological discourse, or through the dialogue in scriptures, they are valid and necessary today because they affect contemporary political action. Even today, many religious societies base their willingness to fight on the just war ethic that they hold.« less

Conflict Without Casualties: Non-Lethal Weapons in Irregular Warfare

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-09-01

the body,” and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, bans the use of chemical and biological weapons .11 On 8 April 1975, President Ford issued Executive...E Funding – PE 63851M) (accessed 15 December 2006). The American Journal of Bioethics . “Medical Ethics and Non-Lethal Weapons .” Bioethics.net...CASUALTIES: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE by Richard L. Scott September 2007 Thesis Advisor: Robert McNab Second Reader

The United States Army Medical Department Journal. October-December 2007

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-12-01

weapons assembly/disassembly and functions check; individual chemical, biological , radiological, nuclear and high-explosive defense; and the operation of...the 40 Army Warrior Tasks and 11 Battle Drills, to include advanced land navigation training; weapons familiarization and qualification; convoy...operations; chemical, biological , radiological, nuclear and high- explosive defense; and squad and platoon-patrol exercises in both woodland and urban

Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-10-25

States has signed such agreements with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands , Mongolia...Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group...biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes.” The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not

The United States Army 1996 Modernization Plan.

DTIC Science & Technology

1996-03-08

and a cadre of operations, intelligence, fire support, air defense, and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare personnel. As required, ARSPACE will...aerial and stand-off chemical and biological detection systems. " Decontamination improvements include Modular Decontamination System fielding in the near... Chemical . As many as 25 nations are producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Weapons systems from mortars to missiles can deliver chemical warfare (CW

High Tech Decision Making in the Airpower Age

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-05-01

Note (About Question 1): Current World "All possible question(issues) for further breakup" Break up of the former Soviet Union Megatrends ...nukes, chemical & biological weapons) - also delivery vehicles (for sale on the open market) - advanced conventional weaponry - active/passive...costly to enemy in terms of rebuilding infrastructure, equipment -need to develop countermeasure -may violate the Biological Weapons convention

Preparedness and response to bioterrorism.

PubMed

Spencer, R C; Lightfoot, N F

2001-08-01

As we enter the 21st century the threats of biological warfare and bioterrorism (so called asymmetric threats) appear to be more real than ever before. Historical evidence suggests that biological weapons have been used, with varying degrees of success, for many centuries. Despite the international agreements to ban such weapons, namely the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there is no effective international mechanism for challenging either the development of biological weapons or their use. Advances in technology and the rise of fundamentalist terror groups combine to present a significant threat to western democracies. A timely and definitive response to this threat will require co-operation between governments on a scale never seen before. There is a need for proper planning, good communication between various health, home office, defence and intelligence agencies and sufficient financial support for a realistic state of preparedness. The Department of Health has produced guidelines for responding to real or suspected incidents and the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) has produced detailed protocols to inform the actions required by microbiologists and consultants in communicable disease control. These protocols will be published on the Department of Health and PHLS web sites. Copyright 2001 The British Infection Society.

Undergraduate teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism at medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland: results of a cross-sectional study.

PubMed

Green, Stephen T; Cladi, Lorenzo; Morris, Paul; Forde, Donall

2013-06-20

To determine if individual undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be relevant issues and if they figure them in their future plans. A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland. All identified undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012 and December 2012. Numerical data and free text feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate teaching. Of the 38 medical schools approached, 34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire (89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it. 6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%) had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34 (11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK's General Medical Council) did not request teaching on bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or argued that the curriculum was too congested already. 4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised radiation. This study provides evidence that at the present time there is little teaching at the undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless there were to be high-level policy guidance.

Undergraduate teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism at medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland: results of a cross-sectional study

PubMed Central

Green, Stephen T; Cladi, Lorenzo; Morris, Paul; Forde, Donall

2013-01-01

Objective To determine if individual undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be relevant issues and if they figure them in their future plans. Design A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland. Setting All identified undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012 and December 2012. Outcome measures Numerical data and free text feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate teaching. Results Of the 38 medical schools approached, 34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire (89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it. 6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%) had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34 (11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK's General Medical Council) did not request teaching on bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or argued that the curriculum was too congested already. 4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised radiation. Conclusions This study provides evidence that at the present time there is little teaching at the undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless there were to be high-level policy guidance. PMID:23794539

Physics through the 1990s: Scientific interfaces and technological applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1986-01-01

The volume examines the scientific interfaces and technological applications of physics. Twelve areas are dealt with: biological physics-biophysics, the brain, and theoretical biology; the physics-chemistry interface-instrumentation, surfaces, neutron and synchrotron radiation, polymers, organic electronic materials; materials science; geophysics-tectonics, the atmosphere and oceans, planets, drilling and seismic exploration, and remote sensing; computational physics-complex systems and applications in basic research; mathematics-field theory and chaos; microelectronics-integrated circuits, miniaturization, future trends; optical information technologies-fiber optics and photonics; instrumentation; physics applications to energy needs and the environment; national security-devices, weapons, and arms control; medical physics-radiology, ultrasonics, MNR, and photonics. An executive summary and many chapters contain recommendations regarding funding, education, industry participation, small-group university research and large facility programs, government agency programs, and computer database needs.

Common tester platform concept.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hurst, Michael James

This report summarizes the results of a case study on the doctrine of a common tester platform, a concept of a standardized platform that can be applicable across the broad spectrum of testing requirements throughout the various stages of a weapons program, as well as across the various weapons programs. The common tester concept strives to define an affordable, next-generation design that will meet testing requirements with the flexibility to grow and expand; supporting the initial development stages of a weapons program through to the final production and surveillance stages. This report discusses a concept investing key leveraging technologies andmore » operational concepts combined with prototype tester-development experiences and practical lessons learned gleaned from past weapons programs.« less

Joint Force Quarterly. Issue 58, 3rd Quarter

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-06-01

rise to concerns over the future security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Anticipating the possibility of loosely controlled nuclear weapons inside...broader Cooperative Threat Reduction program—an unprecedented effort to reduce nuclear dangers by secur- ing or eliminating Russian weapons systems and...volume is about applications of the biological sciences, here called “biologi- cally inspired innovations,” to the military. Rather than treating

Physical Security Modeling for the Shipboard Nuclear Weapons Security Program,

DTIC Science & Technology

1982-04-01

I AOA1IR 396 NAVAL SURFACE WEAPONS CENTER SILVER SPRING MO F/G 15/3 PHYSICAL SECURITY MODELING FOR THE SHIPROARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS SE--ETEEU) APR A2 E ...WEAPONS SECURITY )PROGRAM 0% BY E . G. JACOUES D. L BARTUSEK R. W. MONROE M. S. SCHWARTZ WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT 1 APRIL 1982 A4pm lvW for p uic r...ASSIPICATIO N O F Tb IS PAGE t’W "mu Dat e E DLeT R)....... t READ W~STRUCTIoNs’ REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFORE COMPLETNG FORM4 . REPiQRT NUM1e[i ja. VT

The health hazard assessment process in support of joint weapon system acquisitions.

PubMed

Kluchinsky, Timothy A; Jokel, Charles R; Cambre, John V; Goddard, Donald E; Batts, Robert W

2013-01-01

Since 1981, the Army's HHA Program has provided an invaluable service to combat developers and materiel program managers by providing recommendations designed to eliminate or control health hazards associated with materiel and weapon systems. The program has consistently strived to improve its services by providing more meaningful and efficient assistance to the acquisition community. In the uncertain fiscal times ahead, the Army's HHA Program will continue to provide valuable and cost-effective solutions to mitigate the health risks of weapons systems.

15 CFR 752.8 - SCL application review process.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... weapons, or missiles; (3) The types of assurances against design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear or chemical and biological weapons, or missiles that are included in the ICP; (4) The...

15 CFR 752.8 - SCL application review process.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... weapons, or missiles; (3) The types of assurances against design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear or chemical and biological weapons, or missiles that are included in the ICP; (4) The...

15 CFR 752.8 - SCL application review process.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... weapons, or missiles; (3) The types of assurances against design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear or chemical and biological weapons, or missiles that are included in the ICP; (4) The...

15 CFR 752.8 - SCL application review process.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... weapons, or missiles; (3) The types of assurances against design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of nuclear or chemical and biological weapons, or missiles that are included in the ICP; (4) The...

Modernizing confidence-building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention.

PubMed

Koblentz, Gregory D; Chevrier, Marie Isabelle

2011-09-01

The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an opportunity to modernize the treaty to better address the challenges of the 21st century. The key to this modernization is to redesign the treaty's Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), the only formal mechanism for increasing transparency and demonstrating compliance with the treaty, to address changes in the global scientific, health, and security environments since the end of the Cold War. The scope of the CBMs should be expanded beyond state-run biological warfare programs to encompass a broader array of threats to global security, such as biological terrorism, laboratory accidents, dual-use research, and disease pandemics. Modernizing the CBM mechanism to take into account these new risks would extend the transparency-enhancing benefits of CBMs to a range of new and important topics, such as biosafety, laboratory biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight; make the CBMs and the treaty itself more relevant to the concerns and priorities of more states; and build on progress made during the recent series of intersessional meetings. To accomplish this, the CBMs need to be revised to shift their focus from hardware, the dual-use capabilities relevant to the treaty, to software, the political and legal institutions that govern the development and use of these capabilities. A more modern CBM mechanism should encourage greater participation in the confidence-building process, improve international cooperation against the full spectrum of biological risks, and promote the goal of universal membership in the treaty.

USAF/SCEEE Graduate Student Summer Research Program (1984). Program Management Report. Volume 1.

DTIC Science & Technology

1984-10-01

AFRL -TN-87, Air Force . Weapons Laboratory , Kirtland Air Foce...Mexico Research Location: Air Force Weapons Laboratory , NTATT, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, NM 87117 .. USAF Research Contact: Dr. Carl E. Baum...Albuquerque, NM 87131 ... Research Location: Air Force Weapons Laboratory Kirtland Air Force Base Albuquerque, New Mexico 87117 USAF

Institutional plan FY 1999--FY 2004

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1998-10-01

Los Alamos has a well-defined and nationally important mission: to reduce the global nuclear danger. This central national security mission consists of four main elements: stockpile stewardship, nuclear materials management, nonproliferation and arms control, and cleanup of the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons activities. The Laboratory provides support for and ensures confidence in the nation`s nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. This challenge requires the Laboratory to continually hone its scientific acumen and technological capabilities to perform this task reliably using an interdisciplinary approach and advanced experimental and modeling techniques. In the last two National Defense Authorization Acts, Congress identified themore » need to protect the nation from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their potential use by terrorists. Los Alamos is applying multidisciplinary science and engineering skills to address these problems. In addition, the Laboratory`s critical programmatic roles in stockpile stewardship and threat reduction are complemented by its waste management operations and environmental restoration work. Information on specific programs is available in Section 2 of this document.« less

Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers on Stun? Potential Stratetgic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-08-01

improve our ability to verify compliance with the treaty’s global ban on biological weapons and would put national security and confidential business ...he was Assistant Professor of Aeronautics at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, where he was also instructor pilot in the T - 41 flight-screening...fielded on a greater scale are explored. The ability of non-lethal weapons to positively influence the global war on terrorism is also assessed. It

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. November 2006 Report

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-11-01

should follow this development for potential improved environmental biological weapons surveillance systems. Source: Researchers use laser...Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons came into force on 12 November 2006, almost three...potentials for nanotech weapons , create unique problems of proliferation, health effects, environmental impacts, and post-conflict cleanups that are

Ethics and Leadership: Integration or Disharmony

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-03-01

recent studies confirm that chemical, biological and several varieties of remote weapons could also become much more deadly and easier to conceal...include the expansion of terrorism and guerrilla warfare, the use of new weapons , new forms of political associations, and new moral and political...specific weapons , but, as with many aspects of the law, existing standards are inadequate for contemporary technologies and circumstances.൸

Remediation of Groundwater Contaminated by Nuclear Waste

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Parker, Jack; Palumbo, Anthony

2008-07-01

A Workshop on Accelerating Development of Practical Field-Scale Bioremediation Models; An Online Meeting, 23 January to 20 February 2008; A Web-based workshop sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy Environmental Remediation Sciences Program (DOE/ERSP) was organized in early 2008 to assess the state of the science and knowledge gaps associated with the use of computer models to facilitate remediation of groundwater contaminated by wastes from Cold War era nuclear weapons development and production. Microbially mediated biological reactions offer a potentially efficient means to treat these sites, but considerable uncertainty exists in the coupled biological, chemical, and physical processes and their mathematical representation.

[The variola virus as a biological weapon].

PubMed

Mlinarić-Galinović, Gordana; Turković, Branko; Brudnjak, Zvonimir; Gjenero-Margan, Ira

2003-01-01

In view of the threat of use of the variola virus as a biological weapon, the interest of medical and other public in this causative agent that was eradicated in the wild at the end of the 1970s has increased. The paper gives an outline of the current knowledge on biological properties of the variola virus, and on the epidemiology, pathogenesis, clinical picture and prophylaxis of the disease caused by this virus. Descriptions of two sudden smallpox epidemics (Germany in 1970 and former Yugoslavia in 1972) could illustrate the potential of the smallpox virus as a biological weapon in bioterrorism and biological warfare. In fact, this virus can spread very readily through aerosol, which may lead to explosive epidemics. Not having been immunised, our population aged less than 25 years totally lacks the immunity. Older individuals are likely to have a low residual specific immunity to the agent. The only way to prevent a smallpox epidemic is by vaccination and patient isolation. A rapid smallpox diagnostics and prompt vaccination of all contacts is of utmost importance in stopping the outbreak.

76 FR 36986 - Export Controls for High Performance Computers: Wassenaar Arrangement Agreement Implementation...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-24

... regimes and is working on becoming a member of the regimes. Albania and Croatia are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. In...

Weapons used by juveniles and adult offenders in U.S. parricide cases.

PubMed

Heide, Kathleen M; Petee, Thomas A

2007-11-01

In recent decades, attention has focused on juveniles who kill their parents. Research has indicated that increases in juvenile homicide have been associated with the availability of firearms, but little is known about the weapons juveniles use to kill their parents and whether their weapon usage is different from that of adult children who kill their parents. This article uses Supplementary Homicide Report data for the 24-year period 1976 to 1999 to investigate weapons selected by parricide offenders to kill biological mothers and fathers. Significant differences were found in the weapons used in matricide and patricide incidents and in the weapons selected by juvenile and adult offenders. A comparison with an earlier study by Heide revealed that weapon usage in parricide events is stable. Differences found in both studies between weapons used to kill parents and offender age are consistent with a physical strength hypothesis proposed by Heide in 1993.

Cooperative global security programs modeling & simulation.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Briand, Daniel

2010-05-01

The national laboratories global security programs implement sustainable technical solutions for cooperative nonproliferation, arms control, and physical security systems worldwide. To help in the development and execution of these programs, a wide range of analytical tools are used to model, for example, synthetic tactical environments for assessing infrastructure protection initiatives and tactics, systematic approaches for prioritizing nuclear and biological threat reduction opportunities worldwide, and nuclear fuel cycle enrichment and spent fuel management for nuclear power countries. This presentation will describe how these models are used in analyses to support the Obama Administration's agenda and bilateral/multinational treaties, and ultimately, to reducemore » weapons of mass destruction and terrorism threats through international technical cooperation.« less

WMD Forecasting in Historical and Contemporary Perspective

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-01

a nuclear weapon; Use of a nuclear weapon; Withdrawal from the NPT; Emergence of a nuclear-exports grey market; Widespread dissemination of...Many studies saw technology diffusion and the globalization of commerce as ineluctable forces that contribute to the spread of nuclear (and other...engineering diffuses , the spread of biological weapon capabilities among state actors can be expected to expand in advanced and developing states. This

Academe and the Threat of Biological Terrorism

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Atlas, Ronald M.; Weller, Richard E.

1999-04-03

A legally binding protocol to monitor compliance with Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) could have a substantial impact on academia. This is because of the large number of academic sites, and the complexity of activities and business relationships found in academia. Several hundred academic institutions could be required to file declarations, depending upon the specific''triggers'' adopted by the Ad Hoc Group to the BWC. Activities at academic sites that might''trigger'' a requirement for declaration include: biological defense, working with listed agents or toxins, production capacity, biopesticide research, vaccine production, high (BL3) biological containment, and aerobiology. The management structure ofmore » academic institutions will make it difficult for them to scrupulously comply with declaration requirements. A major educational program will be required to ensure academic compliance with any mandatory measures adopted to strengthen the BWC.« less

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cook, Donald

2016-03-01

Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be required to assess many changes at once, or confidence in these weapons would be reduced. The strategy and details of the U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Program will be described in this talk. In brief, the strategy is to reduce the number of weapons in the stockpile while increasing confidence in the weapons that remain and, where possible, increase their safety, increase their security, and reduce their nuclear material quantities and yields. A number of ``myths'' pertaining to nuclear weapons, the SSP, and the Stockpile Life Extension Program will be explored.

Application of a Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Weapon Target Assignment

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-02-01

25] A . Turan , “Techniques for the Allocation of Resources Under Uncertainty,” Middle Eastern Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, 2012. [26] K...UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Application of a Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Weapon Target Assignment Lloyd Hammond Weapons and...optimisation techniques to support the decision making process. This report documents the methodology used to identify, develop and assess a

Your Career and Nuclear Weapons: A Guide for Young Scientists and Engineers.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Albrecht, Andreas; And Others

This four-part booklet examines various issues related to nuclear weapons and how they will affect an individual working as a scientist or engineer. It provides information about the history of nuclear weapons, about the weapons industry which produces them, and about new weapons programs. Issues are raised so that new or future graduates may make…

10 CFR 784.6 - National security considerations for waiver of certain sensitive inventions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... or under any Government contract or subcontract of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy, a...) under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy...

10 CFR 784.6 - National security considerations for waiver of certain sensitive inventions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... or under any Government contract or subcontract of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy defense activities of the Department of Energy, a...) under the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program or the nuclear weapons programs or other atomic energy...

The Soldier-Cyborg Transformation: A Framework for Analysis of Social and Ethical Issues of Future Warfare

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-05-26

attitude about the use of chemical and biologic weapons , one must question the deterrent value of WMD. With perhaps the 19 exception of nuclear...ENHANCING, TRANSFORMING AND TRANSCENDING 1 TRENDS AND PREDICTIONS ABOUT FUTURE WARFARE 3 CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS 8 THE BIOLOGIC SHIFT 10 STRATEGIC...without widespread loss of life. Thus, low lethality weapons and distant applications of precisely- applied force are mandatory to make future

Biological Weapons and Modern Warfare

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-04-01

every preparation for reducing Its effectiveness and thereby reduce the likelihood of Its use. In order to plan such preparation, It is advantageous to...attack rates could be maximized and the forces using the weapon protected from its effects . In today’s climate, BW agents are also attractive weapons...questions about the agreement’s true effectiveness . Verification of compliance was not addressed. D. World War It: Events during and following World War

The Rollback of South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-04-01

Weapons and on Their Destruction (the BWC). 1974-1975 —Détente“ between South Africa and Zambia leads to cease-fire and SAP withdrawal from Rhodesia...to UNITA and leads to isolation of South Africa in Angola. vii February 1976 Defense Minister P.W. Botha delivers a speech to the South African...1977, leading to a call for more effective crowd control CBW agents. 1976-1979 War in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) intensifies and leads to accusations of

Good Bugs, Bad Bugs: A Modern Approach for Detecting Offensive Biological Weapons Research

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-01

Michael Moodie is a consultant to CTNSP who has worked for more than 15 years on chemical and biological weapons issues in government and the ... the superstructure of the Convention and yet turn a blind eye to problems with the foundation itself. He then went on to state publicly that the ...Tunisia; a trilateral forum with Brazil, India, and South Africa fosters dialogue on critical biotechnology issues;6 the Economic Cooperation

The role of the Biological Weapons Convention in disease surveillance and response.

PubMed

Enemark, Christian

2010-11-01

This article assesses the role and significance of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with respect to infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks. Increasingly, the BWC is being used as a platform for addressing infectious disease threats arising naturally as well as traditional concerns about malicious dissemination of pathogenic microorganisms. The latter have long had a place on the security agenda, but natural disease outbreaks too are now being partially 'securitized' through the use of the BWC as a forum for exchanging information and ideas on disease surveillance and response. The article focuses on two prominent issues discussed at recent meetings of BWC member states: enhancing capacity for disease surveillance and response; and responding to allegations of biological weapons use and investigating outbreaks deemed suspicious. It concludes, firstly, that the BWC supports the efforts of international health organizations to enhance disease surveillance and response capacity worldwide. And secondly, that the BWC, rather than the World Health Organization (WHO), is the appropriate institution to deal with biological weapons allegations and investigations of suspicious outbreaks. The overall message is that securitization in the health sphere cuts both ways. Adding a security dimension (BW) alongside the task of detecting and responding to naturally occurring disease outbreaks is beneficial, but requiring a non-security organization (the WHO) to assume a security role would be counterproductive.

Biological Effects of Directed Energy

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dayton, Thomas; Beason, Charles; Hitt, M. K.; Rogers, Walter; Cook, Michael

2002-11-01

This Final Report summarizes the biological effects research conducted by Veridian Engineering personnel under contract F41624-96-C-9009 in support of the Air Force Research Laboratory's Radio Frequency Radiation Branch from April 1997 to April 2002. Biological effects research and consultation were provided in five major areas: Active Denial System (also known as Vehicle Mounted Active Denial System), radio frequency radiation (RFR) health and safety, non-lethal weapon biological effects research, the newly formed Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Human Effects Center of Excellence, and Biotechnology. The report is organized by research efforts within the major research areas, providing title, objective, a brief description, relevance to the AF or DoD, funding, and products.

Method development for comprehensive extraction and analysis of marine toxins: Liquid-liquid extraction and tandem liquid chromatography separations coupled to electrospray tandem mass spectrometry

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wunschel, David S.; Valenzuela, Blandina R.; Kaiser, Brooke L. Deatherage

Toxins from biological sources are recognized as potential chemical weapon threats, with saxitoxin and ricin listed by the chemical weapons convention (CWC) as schedule one agents (CWC reference). These two toxins represent a metabolite (saxitoxin) and protein (ricin) from algal and plant sources, respectively. An array of toxins have been listed as "select agents" by the Health and Human Services (HHS) select agent program, including ricin, abrin, saxitoxin, tetrodotoxin, specific paralytic alpha conotoxin peptides, T-2 toxin, diacetoxyscirpenols, botulinum toxins, and staphylococcal enterotoxins [1]. The quantities of these toxins dictate whether they are considered select agents with federal oversight of theirmore » storage and use. While this list captures some of the naturally occurring toxins that may pose a threat to the public, there are a number of other naturally occurring toxins that may also be a concern.« less

10 CFR 1045.15 - Classification and declassification presumptions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... experimental physics, engineering, materials science, biology and medicine; (2) Magnetic confinement fusion... the application of the criteria in § 1045.16 indicates otherwise: (1) Detailed designs, specifications... design and analysis of nuclear weapons; (3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage...

10 CFR 1045.15 - Classification and declassification presumptions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... experimental physics, engineering, materials science, biology and medicine; (2) Magnetic confinement fusion... the application of the criteria in § 1045.16 indicates otherwise: (1) Detailed designs, specifications... design and analysis of nuclear weapons; (3) Vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons to sabotage...

Resource Management in Peace and War

DTIC Science & Technology

1990-04-01

the relatively uncon- strained use of available military forces and weapons, including nuclear, chemical, biological , or other weapons capable of...The Zero-Sum Solution, 1985 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), p. 333. 50. John Naisbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 1984), pp. 53-60. 51

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-10

2009. 143 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in...Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 144 Martellini, 2008. Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons...urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it

Turkey’s Response to Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-12-01

categories of unconventional weapons and was prepared to invest enormous financial and human resources to achieve this goal. 5 Iraqi attempts to seek...Ministry of Defense White Paper of 2001 defines “Religious Fundementalism ” among the internal threats directed against Turkey’s security in the post...Therefore, Syria will likely continue to develop an extensive chemical and biological weapons arsenal and will also invest in upgrading the accuracy of

Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, and START III

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Speed, R.D.

2000-06-20

Early in the Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of ''extended nuclear deterrence'' to protect its allies by threatening a nuclear strike against any state that attacks these allies. This threat can (in principle) be used to try to deter an enemy attack using conventional weapons or one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The credibility of a nuclear threat has long been subject to debate and is dependent on many complex geopolitical factors, not the least of which is the military capabilities of the opposing sides. The ending of the Cold War has led to a significantmore » decrease in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. START II, which was recently ratified by the Russian Duma, will (if implemented) reduce the number deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 3500, compared to a level of over 11,000 at the end of the Cold War in 1991. The tentative limit established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for START III would reduce the strategic force level to 2000-2500. However, the Russians (along with a number of arms control advocates) now argue that the level should be reduced even further--to 1500 warheads or less. The conventional view is that ''deep cuts'' in nuclear weapons are necessary to discourage nuclear proliferation. Thus, as part of the bargain to get the non-nuclear states to agree to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States pledged to work towards greater reductions in strategic forces. Without movement in the direction of deep cuts, it is thought by many analysts that some countries may decide to build their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was part of the rationale India used to justify its own nuclear weapons program. However, there is also some concern that deep cuts (to 1500 or lower) in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could have the opposite effect. The fear is that such cuts might undermine extended deterrence and cause a crisis in confidence among U.S. allies to such an extent that they could seek nuclear weapons of their own to protect themselves.« less

Sandia National Laboratories: News

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Sandia National Laboratories: Locations

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Sandia National Laboratories: Careers

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Sandia National Laboratories: Mission

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Sandia National Laboratories: Research

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Sandia National Laboratories:

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Sandia National Laboratories: Feedback

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High-energy laser weapons: technology overview

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perram, Glen P.; Marciniak, Michael A.; Goda, Matthew

2004-09-01

High energy laser (HEL) weapons are ready for some of today"s most challenging military applications. For example, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program is designed to defend against Theater Ballistic Missiles in a tactical war scenario. Similarly, the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program is currently testing a laser to defend against rockets and other tactical weapons. The Space Based Laser (SBL), Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) and Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) programs promise even greater applications for laser weapons. This technology overview addresses both strategic and tactical roles for HEL weapons on the modern battlefield and examines current technology limited performance of weapon systems components, including various laser device types, beam control systems, atmospheric propagation, and target lethality issues. The characteristics, history, basic hardware, and fundamental performance of chemical lasers, solid state lasers and free electron lasers are summarized and compared. The elements of beam control, including the primary aperture, fast steering mirror, deformable mirrors, wavefront sensors, beacons and illuminators will be discussed with an emphasis on typical and required performance parameters. The effects of diffraction, atmospheric absorption, scattering, turbulence and thermal blooming phenomenon on irradiance at the target are described. Finally, lethality criteria and measures of weapon effectiveness are addressed. The primary purpose of the presentation is to define terminology, establish key performance parameters, and summarize technology capabilities.

Nuclear weapons modernizations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kristensen, Hans M.

2014-05-01

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework

DTIC Science & Technology

1999-06-01

U.S. and its allies on the battlefield, but a credible threat to employ chemical or biological weapons in pursuit of national objectives would give...injury. 18 Instrumentalities that produce them are weapons. There is little debate about whether the use of chemicals or biologicals falls...282. 50 For an interesting projection of factors likely to affect the use of force in the future, see Anthony D’Amato, Megatrends in the Use of

Future Enablers: Air Force Smart Weapons in the 2040s

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-04-01

it is designed to have the same explosive effect as a 2,000 pound warhead. 136 The penetration ability of warheads has improved as well. The GBU - 39 ...Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions : Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs, 12. 26 US Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike... Acquisitions : Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs, 65. 29 Ibid. 30 Kathleen Miller, Tony Capaccio, and Danielle Ivory, “F-35 Fighter Too Big to Kill as

Recoil Considerations for Shoulder-Fired Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-01

Fired Weapons 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) Bruce P. Burns 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 62616AH80...the textbook. This research was supported in part by an appointment to the Knowledge Preservation Program at ARL administered by the Oak Ridge...endurance to operate. Doubtless one had to learn how to master the recoil loads posed by the weapon, and virtually every successful German

Sandia National Laboratories: Search Results

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Sandia National Laboratories: Social Media

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Sandia National Laboratories: Visiting Research Scholars

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Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia

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Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Biodefense

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Sandia National Laboratories: Privacy and Security

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Sandia National Laboratories: Sandia Digital Media

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Sandia National Laboratories: Cooperative Monitoring Center

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Sandia National Laboratories: Research: Bioscience

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Sandia National Laboratories: Integrated Military Systems

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Image Gallery

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Environmental Management System Pollution Prevention History 60 impacts Diversity Locations Facts & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers

Smallpox and biological warfare: the case for abandoning vaccination of military personnel.

PubMed Central

Capps, L; Vermund, S H; Johnsen, C

1986-01-01

Smallpox was officially declared eradicated from the world in 1980. Earlier, in 1972, over 50 nations signed the Biological Weapons Convention renouncing this entire category of weapons. Despite this international agreement, both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to vaccinate their military troops against smallpox, thus implying that each fears the other might still use it in biological warfare. Vaccination is not a harmless procedure, and vaccinia infections continue to be reported in troops and their contacts. Negotiating an end to the vaccination of troops would be a final step in ending the fear of smallpox. PMID:2944401

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.9 - Anti-terrorism: Syria.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... will generally be denied: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons... fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997. (xi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xii) Concealed...

Air and Space Power Journal. Volume 22, Number 4, Winter 2008

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-01-01

otherwise be illegal. en- sign Florencio J. Yuzon, “Deliberate environmental Modi- fication through the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons ...of war. His land- mark book Ideas and Weapons , published in 1953, analyzes the evolution of weaponry be- tween World War I and World War II, notably...it could opt to use nuclear weapons against India? How can a government prove that a foreign government (India) is the cause of internal problems

Driving Technological Surprise: DARPA’s Mission in a Changing World

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-04-01

a plethora of new weapons and techniques in the hands of many types of actors can and do threaten our way of life and endanger our democracy in...global affairs. And a look into the future only adds uncertainty. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction...electronic device is likely to get to the Warfighter when a prime contractor incorporates it into a weapon system development contract. In some cases, the

State-of-the-art in biosafety and biosecurity in European countries.

PubMed

Bielecka, Anna; Mohammadi, Ali Akbar

2014-06-01

The terms biosafety and biosecurity are widely used in different concepts and refer not only to protection of human beings and their surrounding environment against hazardous biological agent, but also to global disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the biosafety and biosecurity issues should be considered interdisciplinary based on multilateral agreements against proliferation of biological weapons, public health and environmental protection. This publication presents information on both, international and national biosafety and biosecurity legislation. Status of national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, penalization issues and measures to account for and secure production, use, storage of particularly dangerous pathogens or activities involving humans, plants and animals where infection may pose a risk have been analyzed. Safety and security measures in laboratories have been studied. Moreover, dual-use technology and measures of secure transport of biohazard materials have been also taken into account. In addition, genetic engineering regulations, biosecurity activities in laboratories and code of conducts have been investigated, as well.

Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Environmental Reports

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Sandia National Laboratories: Sandia National Laboratories: News: Events

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Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia: Environmental Responsibility

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Sandia National Laboratories: About Sandia: Community Involvement

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: HPC Reports

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Search Sandia Publications

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Sandia National Laboratories: Working with Sandia: Small Business

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Sandia National Laboratories: Microsystems Science & Technology Center

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Strategic Plan

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Sandia National Laboratories: Employee & Retiree Resources: Technical

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Sandia National Laboratories: Z Pulsed Power Facility

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Sandia National Laboratories: Advanced Simulation and Computing

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Sandia National Laboratories: News: Publications: Annual Report

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Sandia National Laboratories: Employee & Retiree Resources: Remote Access

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Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: International

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Guidebook for preparation of aircraft-system survivability requirements for procurement documents. Final report, October 1975-October 1976

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Morrow, J.J.; Burris, R.A.; Watson, D.J.

1977-05-01

This report is intended to provide guidelines for the preparation of procurements specifications for aircraft survivability enhancement equipment, for the survivability/vulnerability (S/V) tasks associated with the procurement of a total aircraft system or its relate subsystems, and also for the modification of current fleet aircraft to their related subsystems. It is intended that these S/V procurement guidelines be applied to the procurement of all military aircraft, aircraft subsystems, and aircraft componenets which can either lose their functional capability of have their performance degraded as a result of interactions with the damage mechanisms of threat weapons. The guidelines should be appliedmore » to preliminary design programs, to production programs, and to programs that will retrofit or modify existing systems. These guidelines include general requirements statements for the establishment of an S/V program, requirements statements for reducing the susceptibility of the system to the threat weapons, and requirements for the reduction of vulnerability to nonnuclear, nuclear, and laser weapon effects. Requirements for S/V assessments and the verification of vulnerability levels and survival enhancement features are also included. Although nuclear and laser weapon effects are included, the major emphasis is on the reduction of susceptibility and vulnerability to conventional weapons and the establishment of the S/V program.« less

Nuclear weapons modernizations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kristensen, Hans M.

This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludesmore » that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.« less

15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents... on the CCL, chemical detection systems controlled by 1A004.c for detecting chemical warfare agents... used in the production of chemical weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents. (vii) Equipment and...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Vanderwiel, Scott A; Wilson, Alyson G; Graves, Todd L

Both the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DOE) maintain weapons stockpiles: items like bullets, missiles and bombs that have already been produced and are being stored until needed. Ideally, these stockpiles maintain high reliability over time. To assess reliability, a surveillance program is implemented, where units are periodically removed from the stockpile and tested. The most definitive tests typically destroy the weapons so a given unit is tested only once. Surveillance managers need to decide how many units should be tested, how often they should be tested, what tests should be done, and how themore » resulting data are used to estimate the stockpile's current and future reliability. These issues are particularly critical from a planning perspective: given what has already been observed and our understanding of the mechanisms of stockpile aging, what is an appropriate and cost-effective surveillance program? Surveillance programs are costly, broad, and deep, especially in the DOE, where the US nuclear weapons surveillance program must 'ensure, through various tests, that the reliability of nuclear weapons is maintained' in the absence of full-system testing (General Accounting Office, 1996). The DOE program consists primarily of three types of tests: nonnuclear flight tests, that involve the actual dropping or launching of a weapon from which the nuclear components have been removed; and nonnuclear and nuclear systems laboratory tests, which detect defects due to aging, manufacturing, and design of the nonnuclear and nuclear portions of the weapons. Fully integrated analysis of the suite of nuclear weapons surveillance data is an ongoing area of research (Wilson et al., 2007). This paper introduces a simple model that captures high-level features of stockpile reliability over time and can be used to answer broad policy questions about surveillance programs. Our intention is to provide a framework that generates tractable answers that integrate expert knowledge and high-level summaries of surveillance data to allow decision-making about appropriate trade-offs between the cost of data and the precision of stockpile reliability estimates.« less

Weapons and Minority Youth Violence.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Northrop, Daphne; Hamrick, Kim

Weapons violence is a major public health problem that especially impacts minority youth. Interventions designed to reduce weapon use by youth are categorized as educational/behavioral change, legal, and technological/environmental. Few educational programs currently exist, but those that do largely concern firearm safety courses, public…

22 CFR 121.1 - General. The United States Munitions List.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

...) Firearms or other weapons (e.g. insurgency-counterinsurgency, close assault weapons systems) having a... IV. * (d) Kinetic energy weapon systems specifically designed or modified for destruction or... physical test models. (i) Autoloading systems for electronic programming of projectile function for the...

Sandia National Laboratories: What Sandia Looks For In Our Suppliers

Science.gov Websites

Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

Sandia National Laboratories: Working with Sandia: What Does Sandia Buy?

Science.gov Websites

Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Technology Robotics R&D 100 Awards Laboratory Directed Research & Development Technology Deployment Centers Audit Sandia's Economic Impact Licensing & Technology Transfer Browse Technology Portfolios

Proposals for chemical weapons during the American Civil War.

PubMed

Hasegawa, Guy R

2008-05-01

Proposals for chemical weapons that arose during the American Civil War are described. Most incendiary and all biological agents are excluded. The described proposals appeared primarily in periodicals or letters to government officials on both sides. The weapons were usually meant to temporarily disable enemy combatants, but some might have been lethal, and Civil War caregivers were ill-prepared to deal with the weapons' effects. Evidently, none of the proposed weapons were used. In only one instance was use against civilians mentioned. Among the agents most commonly proposed were cayenne pepper or other plant-based irritants such as black pepper, snuff, mustard, and veratria. Other suggested agents included chloroform, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic compounds, sulfur, and acids. Proponents usually suggested that the chemicals be included in explosive artillery projectiles. Less commonly proposed vehicles of delivery included fire engines, kites, and manned balloons. Some of the proposed weapons have modern counterparts.

The Banning of Chemical Weapons: Tantalus Revisited.

DTIC Science & Technology

1983-04-14

of Chemical and Biological Warfare, by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman. Chemical and Engineering News, Vol. 60, No. 47, 22 November 1982, p. 34. 3...1 AD-A127 792 THE BANNING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: TANTALUS REVISITED(U) 1/1 IARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA F N DUREL 14 APR 8 UNCLASSIFIED F/G 15/2...number) Since the mid-ninetenth century, nations have sought to limit the u.s Of chemical weapons with varying degrees of success. On-going

Chemical warfare agents

PubMed Central

Ganesan, K.; Raza, S. K.; Vijayaraghavan, R.

2010-01-01

Among the Weapons of Mass Destruction, chemical warfare (CW) is probably one of the most brutal created by mankind in comparison with biological and nuclear warfare. Chemical weapons are inexpensive and are relatively easy to produce, even by small terrorist groups, to create mass casualties with small quantities. The characteristics of various CW agents, general information relevant to current physical as well as medical protection methods, detection equipment available and decontamination techniques are discussed in this review article. A brief note on Chemical Weapons Convention is also provided. PMID:21829312

An Analysis of the Brain Drain Phenomenon in the Field of Development of Chemical and Biological Weapons in Russia During the 1990s

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-06-01

business or whatever sort of work that will allow them to make money . It has been estimated that for each scientist who emigrated abroad, another ten left...Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Sudan Yes No Yes No No No No No 28 In accordance with the statement by John Lauder , Special Assistant to the Director of...hostile policy towards democratic countries, and first and foremost, towards the United States [ Lauder ]. The precise status of Iraq’s CBW programs

Quarterly technical progress report, February 1, 1996--April 30, 1996

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

This report from the Amarillo National REsource Center for PLutonium provides research highlights and provides information regarding the public dissemination of information. The center is a a scientific resource for information regarding the issues of the storage, disposition, potential utilization and transport of plutonium, high explosives, and other hazardous materials generated from nuclear weapons dismantlement. The center responds to informational needs and interpretation of technical and scientific data raised by interested parties and advisory groups. Also, research efforts are carried out on remedial action programs and biological/agricultural studies.

Bioethics, bioweapons and the microbiologist.

PubMed

Anaya-Velázquez, Fernando

2002-01-01

The analysis of behavior of man in the field of biology is carried out through bioethics, considered the science of the survival. In the microbiology, there are numerous discoveries related with pathogenic microorganisms, including those that can be used as weapons in a biological war or in an attack considered bioterrorism. The scientist involved in microbiology can participate with his knowledge in the development and improvement of bioweapons, however from the point of view of bioethics it is not acceptable that he works in an investigation related with these topics, because the defense research can evolve in offensive one. The war is an antisurvival activity, therefore it is not acceptable. In the same way, the biological weapons composed with virus, fungi or alive bacteria, or with toxins from them, neither they are morally accepted. After the terrorist attacks with anthrax in the United States in 2001, the world scientific community in the field of microbiology should show against the use of the microorganisms like bioweapons, at the time of promoting the idea that the responsible use for the microorganisms is a moral imperative for all microbiologists around the world, since the biological weapons are a threat for the human life.

Sandia National Laboratories: Directed-energy tech receives funding to

Science.gov Websites

Accomplishments Energy Stationary Power Earth Science Transportation Energy Energy Research Global Security WMD & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Cyber & Infrastructure Security Global Security Remote Sensing & Verification Research Research

Naval War College. Volume 60, Number 2, Spring 2007

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-01-01

attacks of grave conse- quences. The aspiration of this small-wars force element is to prevent even one nuclear, biological , or chemical weapon attack...153 Preventive Attack and Weapons of Mass...Default screen Bioethics and Armed Conflict: Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War, by Michael L. Gross reviewed by Arthur M. Smith, MD

2035 Biodeterrence: Problems and Promises for Biodefense

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-02-17

7 How are Bioweapons Different from other Weapons...the nature of biological threats and how dual-use research, their formidable attributes, and their WMD potential make them a threat the United...its objective to prevent an attack or at least greatly mitigate the effects of an attack. How are Bioweapons Different from other Weapons? The

Nuclear Weapon Tests and their Consequences,

DTIC Science & Technology

Nuclear weapon research, specifically nuclear bomb tests, and the deleterious effects of heightened radioactivity levels on the world’s biology, are...Soviet Union is discussed. The effects of the U.S.A. bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the U.S.A. bomb test of March 1, 1954, and listed as

Kirtland Operations progress report, April--June 1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia's weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to othermore » federal agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from April to June 1991.« less

Kirtland Operations progress report, October--December 1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia's weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to othermore » federal agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from October to December 1991.« less

The Feed Materials Program of the Manhattan Project: A Foundational Component of the Nuclear Weapons Complex

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Reed, B. Cameron

2014-12-01

The feed materials program of the Manhattan Project was responsible for procuring uranium-bearing ores and materials and processing them into forms suitable for use as source materials for the Project's uranium-enrichment factories and plutonium-producing reactors. This aspect of the Manhattan Project has tended to be overlooked in comparison with the Project's more dramatic accomplishments, but was absolutely vital to the success of those endeavors: without appropriate raw materials and the means to process them, nuclear weapons and much of the subsequent cold war would never have come to pass. Drawing from information available in Manhattan Engineer District Documents, this paper examines the sources and processing of uranium-bearing materials used in making the first nuclear weapons and how the feed materials program became a central foundational component of the postwar nuclear weapons complex.

Development of Hybrid Computer Programs for AAFSS/COBRA/COIN Weapons Effectiveness Studies. Volume I. Simulating Aircraft Maneuvers and Weapon Firing Runs.

DTIC Science & Technology

for the game. Subsequent duels , flown with single armed escorts, calculated reduction in losses and damage states. For the study, hybrid computer...6) a duel between a ground weapon, armed escort, and formation of lift aircraft. (Author)

Environmental Assessment for Selection and Operation of the Proposed Field Research Centers for the Natural and Accelerated Bioremediation Research (NABIR) Program

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

N /A

2000-04-18

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Biological and Environmental Research (OBER), within the Office of Science (SC), proposes to add a Field Research Center (FRC) component to the existing Natural and Accelerated Bioremediation Research (NABIR) Program. The NABIR Program is a ten-year fundamental research program designed to increase the understanding of fundamental biogeochemical processes that would allow the use of bioremediation approaches for cleaning up DOE's contaminated legacy waste sites. An FRC would be integrated with the existing and future laboratory and field research and would provide a means of examining the fundamental biogeochemical processes that influence bioremediationmore » under controlled small-scale field conditions. The NABIR Program would continue to perform fundamental research that might lead to promising bioremediation technologies that could be demonstrated by other means in the future. For over 50 years, DOE and its predecessor agencies have been responsible for the research, design, and production of nuclear weapons, as well as other energy-related research and development efforts. DOE's weapons production and research activities generated hazardous, mixed, and radioactive waste products. Past disposal practices have led to the contamination of soils, sediments, and groundwater with complex and exotic mixtures of compounds. This contamination and its associated costs and risks represents a major concern to DOE and the public. The high costs, long duration, and technical challenges associated with remediating the subsurface contamination at DOE sites present a significant need for fundamental research in the biological, chemical, and physical sciences that will contribute to new and cost-effective solutions. One possible low-cost approach for remediating the subsurface contamination of DOE sites is through the use of a technology known as bioremediation. Bioremediation has been defined as the use of microorganisms to biodegrade or biotransform hazardous organic contaminants to environmentally safe levels in soils, subsurface materials, water, sludges, and residues.. While bioremediation technology is promising, DOE managers and non-DOE scientists have recognized that the fundamental scientific information needed to develop effective bioremediation technologies for cleanup of the legacy waste sites is lacking in many cases. DOE believes that field-based research is needed to realize the full potential of bioremediation. The Department of Energy faces a unique set of challenges associated with cleaning up waste at its former weapons production and research sites. These sites contain complex mixtures of contaminants in the subsurface, including radioactive compounds. In many cases, the fundamental field-based scientific information needed to develop safe and effective remediation and cleanup technologies is lacking. DOE needs fundamental research on the use of microorganisms and their products to assist DOE in the decontamination and cleanup of its legacy waste sites. The existing NABIR program to-date has focused on fundamental scientific research in the laboratory. Because subsurface hydrologic and geologic conditions at contaminated DOE sites cannot easily be duplicated in a laboratory, however, the DOE needs a field component to permit existing and future laboratory research results to be field-tested on a small scale in a controlled outdoor setting. Such field-testing needs to be conducted under actual legacy waste field conditions representative of those that DOE is most in need of remediating. Ideally, these field conditions should be as representative as practicable of the types of subsurface contamination conditions that resulted from legacy wastes from the nuclear weapons program activities. They should also be representative of the types of hydrologic and geologic conditions that exist across the DOE complex.« less

Laboratory Directed Research and Development FY2010 Annual Report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jackson, K J

2011-03-22

A premier applied-science laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has at its core a primary national security mission - to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing, and to prevent and counter the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, and biological. The Laboratory uses the scientific and engineering expertise and facilities developed for its primary mission to pursue advanced technologies to meet other important national security needs - homeland defense, military operations, and missile defense, for example - that evolve in response to emerging threats. For broader nationalmore » needs, LLNL executes programs in energy security, climate change and long-term energy needs, environmental assessment and management, bioscience and technology to improve human health, and for breakthroughs in fundamental science and technology. With this multidisciplinary expertise, the Laboratory serves as a science and technology resource to the U.S. government and as a partner with industry and academia. This annual report discusses the following topics: (1) Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation; (2) Biological Sciences; (3) Chemistry; (4) Earth and Space Sciences; (5) Energy Supply and Use; (6) Engineering and Manufacturing Processes; (7) Materials Science and Technology; Mathematics and Computing Science; (8) Nuclear Science and Engineering; and (9) Physics.« less

Seventy Years of Computing in the Nuclear Weapons Program

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Archer, Billy Joe

Los Alamos has continuously been on the forefront of scientific computing since it helped found the field. This talk will explore the rich history of computing in the Los Alamos weapons program. The current status of computing will be discussed, as will the expectations for the near future.

Personal and Family Survival. Civil Defense Adult Education; Teacher's Manual.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Office of Civil Defense (DOD), Washington, DC.

A manual intended as an instructor's aid in presenting a Civil Defense Adult Education Course is presented. It contains 10 lesson plans: Course Introduction, Modern Weapons and Radioactive Fallout (Effects), Modern Weapons and Radioactive Fallout (Protection), National Civil Defense Program, National Shelter Program (Community Shelters), National…

National health and medical services response to incidents of chemical and biological terrorism.

PubMed

Tucker, J B

1997-08-06

In response to the growing threat of terrorism with chemical and biological weapons, the US government has developed a national concept of operations for emergency health and medical services response. This capability was developed and tested for the first time during the Atlanta Olympic Games in the summer of 1996. In the event of a chemical or biological terrorist incident that exceeded local and state-level response capabilities, federal agencies would provide specialized teams and equipment to help manage the consequences of the attack and treat, decontaminate, and evacuate casualties. The US Congress has also established a Domestic Preparedness Program that provides for enhanced training of local first-responders and the formation of metropolitan medical strike teams in major cities around the country. While these national response capabilities are promising, their implementation to date has been problematic and their ultimate effectiveness is uncertain.

[Biological weapons--an old menace in new circumstances].

PubMed

Bartůnĕk, P

2001-12-06

Biological weapons were conceived for years by the world community only as a potential evil. A fundamental change of opinions regarding their real menace occurred only after the premeditated criminal attack on the USA on September 11, 2001. It was logical that publicists for mall types of media demanded from representatives of the state administration of the Czech Republic information how out country is prepared for this type of danger. Their reactions were hesitant and in a way reflect a certain chaos associated with the reorganization of the army and at the same time unpreparedness of civil defence. To a certain extent all this can be conceived as the consequence of the fundamental transformation of our society and thus it may be excused to a certain extent. Nevertheless it is obvious that not even the most advanced countries are quite clear as regards defence against the horror of biological weapons. Evidence to this effect is the following document, devoted to the problem in the USA, major parts of which we reproduce from the prestigious periodical The England Journal of Medicine.

A Bacillus anthracis Genome Sequence from the Sverdlovsk 1979 Autopsy Specimens

PubMed Central

Sahl, Jason W.; Pearson, Talima; Okinaka, Richard; Schupp, James M.; Gillece, John D.; Heaton, Hannah; Birdsell, Dawn; Hepp, Crystal; Fofanov, Viacheslav; Noseda, Ramón; Fasanella, Antonio; Hoffmaster, Alex; Wagner, David M.

2016-01-01

ABSTRACT Anthrax is a zoonotic disease that occurs naturally in wild and domestic animals but has been used by both state-sponsored programs and terrorists as a biological weapon. A Soviet industrial production facility in Sverdlovsk, USSR, proved deficient in 1979 when a plume of spores was accidentally released and resulted in one of the largest known human anthrax outbreaks. In order to understand this outbreak and others, we generated a Bacillus anthracis population genetic database based upon whole-genome analysis to identify all single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) across a reference genome. Phylogenetic analysis has defined three major clades (A, B, and C), B and C being relatively rare compared to A. The A clade has numerous subclades, including a major polytomy named the trans-Eurasian (TEA) group. The TEA radiation is a dominant evolutionary feature of B. anthracis, with many contemporary populations having resulted from a large spatial dispersal of spores from a single source. Two autopsy specimens from the Sverdlovsk outbreak were deep sequenced to produce draft B. anthracis genomes. This allowed the phylogenetic placement of the Sverdlovsk strain into a clade with two Asian live vaccine strains, including the Russian Tsiankovskii strain. The genome was examined for evidence of drug resistance manipulation or other genetic engineering, but none was found. The Soviet Sverdlovsk strain genome is consistent with a wild-type strain from Russia that had no evidence of genetic manipulation during its industrial production. This work provides insights into the world’s largest biological weapons program and provides an extensive B. anthracis phylogenetic reference. PMID:27677796

Red China’s Capitalist Bomb: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-01-01

developed an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) but did not deploy it. ERWs, better known as “ neutron bombs,” are specialized nuclear weapons with...contemporary systems of concern. An ERW is a specialized nuclear weapon optimized to produce prompt radiation. Such a device emits neutrons with high...Council stated that China mastered “in succession the neutron bomb design technology and the nuclear weapon miniaturization technology.”10 This statement

Design and implementation of a nuclear weapons management system submodule: Shipboard security force system. Master's thesis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Settlemyer, S.R.

1991-09-01

The Nuclear Weapons Management System combines the strengths of an expert system with the flexibility of a database management system to assist the Weapons Officer, Security Officer, and the Personnel Reliability Program Officer in the performance of administrative duties associated with the nuclear weapons programs in the United States Navy. This thesis examines the need for, and ultimately the design of, a system that will assist the Security Officer in administrative duties associated with the Shipboard Self Defense Force. This system, designed and coded utilizing dBASE IV, can be implemented as a stand alone system. Furthermore, it interfaces with themore » expert system submodule that handles the PRP screening process.« less

Taking a stand against nuclear proliferation: the pediatrician's role.

PubMed

Newman, Thomas B

2008-05-01

Nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the health of children. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which for almost 40 years has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, is in danger of unraveling. At the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, 180 countries, including the United States, agreed on 13 practical steps to implement Article VI of the treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has acted in contravention of several of those disarmament steps, with announced plans to develop new nuclear weapons and to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for decades to come. Pediatricians, working individually and through organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, can educate the public and elected officials regarding the devastating and irremediable effects of nuclear weapons on children and the need for policies that comply with and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than undermining it. For the children of the world, our goal must be a nuclear weapons convention (similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions) that would prohibit these weapons globally.

ASC FY17 Implementation Plan, Rev. 1

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hamilton, P. G.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational capabilities to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computationalmore » resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resources, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions.« less

[Bioterrorism--a public and health threat].

PubMed

Jezek, Z

2000-11-01

In recent years the fear of bioterrorism, of secret modernization and dissemination of biological weapons is increasing. Facts detected recently in Iran, Japan and the former Soviet Union provide evidence that there are countries and dissident groups which have access to modern technology of cultivation of dangerous pathogens as well as motivation for their use in acts of terrorism or war. The menace of biological terrorism is nowadays, as compared with the past, much greater. The most feared candidates as regards production of biological weapons are the pathogens of smallpox, anthrax and plague. The author discusses the serious character of possible events associated with terrorist dissemination of these pathogens. It is much esier to produce and use biological weapons than to create effective systems of defence against them. The menace of bioterrorism and bioweapons must not be exaggerated nor underestimated. The possible terrorist use of bioweapons is real. At present even the most advanced industrial countries cannot quarantee effective protection of their populations. Fortunately they are however aware of their present vulnerability. Our society is not equipped to cope with bioterrorism. Preparation and reinforcement of the health services, in particular of sections specialized in the control of infectious diseases is an effective step to divert the sequelae and suffering associated with terrorist use of biological agents. It is essential to be prepared. This calls for time and funds which unfortunately are not plentiful.

75 FR 25159 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Preservation of Tooling for Major Defense...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-05-07

... Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. Section 815 requires acquisition plans for major weapons systems to... hardware for major defense acquisition programs through the end of the service life of the related weapons... affects all contracts for major weapons that will require special tooling associated with the production...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lakamp, M.A.

The United States has adopted a policy of calculated ambiguity regarding the role of nuclear weapons in response to a potential chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attack. Many factors affect decisions about the role nuclear weapons play in US counterproliferation strategy. This thesis describes the policy of calculated ambiguity and offers some observations about its prospects and pitfalls. The thesis presents evidence that suggests nuclear weapons could play a positive role in the US counterproliferation strategy, at least in some circumstances. It also explains how such a role could conflict with the US nonproliferation strategy. Such a role would alsomore » violate the nuclear taboo and be seen by a majority of countries as illegal and immoral. The United States has chosen a policy of calculated ambiguity in an attempt to retain the deterrent value of nuclear weapons without paying the political, legal, and moral costs of explicit reliance on nuclear weapons to deter the use of CBW. This may have short-term benefits, but ultimately may damage the national interest.« less

76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-07

..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

Kirtland Operations progress report, October--December 1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG&G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia`s weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to other federalmore » agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from October to December 1991.« less

Kirtland Operations progress report, April--June 1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG&G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy`s (DOE`s) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia`s weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to other federalmore » agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these programs from April to June 1991.« less

Science and Technology Policy: Issues for the 109th Congress

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-09-01

biological weapons . In May 2004, several higher education organizations released a combined statement on the impact of the new visa policies on higher...9 Chemical, Biological , Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism Countermeasures R&D...Quality Chemical, Biological , Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism Countermeasures R&D Federal chemical, biological , radiological, and nuclear (CBRN

Youths carrying a weapon or using a weapon in a fight: what makes the difference?

PubMed

Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-André; Berchtold, André; Akré, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

2009-04-01

The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were divided into those who had used it in a fight and those who had not. Individual, family, school and social factors were analyzed using bivariate and stepwise multivariate analysis. For both genders, delinquent behavior and being victim of physical violence were associated with weapon carrying. For males, quarreling while intoxicated, being an apprentice, being sensation seekers, having a tattoo, having a poor relationship with parents and practicing unsafe sex were also related to weapon carrying. Compared with weapon carriers, female weapon users were more likely to be regular smokers. Male weapon users were foreign born, urban and apprentices; had poor school connectedness; practiced unsafe sex and quarreled while intoxicated. Carrying a weapon is a relatively frequent behavior among youths in Switzerland and a sizeable proportion of weapon carriers have used it in a fight. Weapon carrying should be part of the clinical assessment and preventive counseling of adolescents. Preventive programs specific for at-risk youth groups need to be developed.

[Bio-terrorism, bio-defense, bioethics].

PubMed

Kottow, Miguel

2003-01-01

The terrorist attacks launched on September 11, 2001, ignited fear of further aggression with biological weapons, leading to a discourse and allocation of resources for both defensive and dissuasive/ offensive use in order to counteract such threats. Many such measures involved the investigation and production of biological agents, and the public health field has been called upon to participate in these strategic efforts. Participation by health programs is in moral contradiction with military tactics and should be limited to protecting the health of the purportedly threatened population, in itself a difficult task due to the numerous imponderable factors. The additional resources being made available to public health are largely conditioned on their strategic military application, leaving traditional public health care in its chronic state of insufficient funding and non-egalitarian allocation.

King has no clothes: The role of the military in responding to a terrorist chemical/biological attack. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Osterman, J.L.

1996-06-14

The United States has begun a program of counterproliferation in order to preempt the use of WMD by such elements, however, the ability to respond to the terrorist employment of biological/chemical weapons is absent. Given the structure, capability and technical expertise in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DoD) will be tasked to conduct the response to such an incident. The geographical Commander in Chief (CINC) and the appointed Joint Task Force (JTF) commander will ultimately be assigned the response mission. Planning, training and coordination is required to developmore » a force capable of responding in a timely and coordinated manner.« less

Effects of a youth substance use prevention program on stealing, fighting, and weapon use.

PubMed

Nieri, Tanya; Apkarian, Jacob; Kulis, Stephen; Marsiglia, Flavio Francisco

2015-02-01

Using a sample of sixth graders in 11 public schools in a large Southwestern city, this longitudinal study examined how a model substance use prevention program, keepin' it REAL, that was implemented in 7th grade, influenced three other problem behaviors (fighting, weapon use, stealing), measured in 8th grade. Using a non-equivalent control group design, we compared 259 students in the intervention to 322 students in a treatment-as-usual condition. At baseline, 37% of the sample reported fighting in the last 30 days; 31% reported stealing in the last 30 days, and 16% reported using a weapon in the last 30 days. Regression analyses adjusted for students nested in schools through multi-level modeling and for missing data through multiple imputation. We found that at posttest the rates of all three behaviors were lower in the intervention group than the control group at posttest: 35 versus 37% got into a fight in the last 30 days; 24 versus 31% stole something in the last 30 days; and 16 versus 25% used a weapon in the last 30 days. The program impact for fighting and stealing was not statistically significant and involved minimal effect sizes. The program impact for weapon use was not statistically significant but had an effect size comparable to that for other problem behavior interventions. Promoting positive development via life skills may be a key to broadening program impact.

Effects of a youth substance use prevention program on stealing, fighting, and weapon use

PubMed Central

Nieri, Tanya; Apkarian, Jacob; Kulis, Stephen; Marsiglia, Flavio Francisco

2014-01-01

Using a sample of sixth graders in 11 public schools in a large Southwestern city, this longitudinal study examined how a model substance use prevention program, keepin’ it REAL, that was implemented in 7th grade, influenced three other problem behaviors (fighting, weapon use, stealing), measured in 8th grade. Using a non-equivalent control group design, we compared 259 students in the intervention to 322 students in a treatment-as-usual condition. At baseline, 37% of the sample reported fighting in the last 30 days; 31% reported stealing in the last 30 days, and 16% reported using a weapon in the last 30 days. Regression analyses adjusted for students nested in schools through multi-level modeling and for missing data through multiple imputation. We found that at posttest the rates of all three behaviors were lower in the intervention group than the control group at posttest: 35% versus 37% got into a fight in the last 30 days; 24% versus 31% stole something in the last 30 days; and 16% versus 25% used a weapon in the last 30 days. The program impact for fighting and stealing was not statistically significant and involved minimal effect sizes. The program impact for weapon use was not statistically significant but had an effect size comparable to that for other problem behavior interventions. Promoting positive development via life skills may be a key to broadening program impact. PMID:25352527

History of the development and use of biological weapons.

PubMed

Marty, A M

2001-09-01

The United States began its BW program based on intelligence information and a very thorough evaluation of that information by a panel of scientists, engineers, medical personnel from a variety of areas including the military, other government agencies, industry, and the academic community. Initial efforts were directed toward defense against BW, but it soon became clear defense required a knowledge of offensive capabilities. The initial offensive studies started with a definition of what infectious organisms were available, how they could grow in quantities to support a munitions program, what kind of facilities were required, and where they could be positioned. Further studies were then initiated to design and evaluate testing sites and methodologies to evaluate the weapons. During all of these phases, concurrent medical and safety programs were studied, emphasized, and implemented. These studies resulted in the development of a number of vaccines, toxoids, treatments, therapies, and facility personnel management. The US program had one of the lowest, if not the lowest, personnel lost time because of personnel infections. The overall conclusion was that BW, offensive and defensive, was possible, and efficiencies could be obtained. The work accomplished by this group of very dedicated military and civilian personnel at military installations, universities, research institutes, and industrial organizations presented truly a combined operation with numerous achievements. Many of the detailed achievements were published in the open scientific, peer-reviewed journals, and many patents were obtained. The current defensive program is breaking new scientific ground and there is evidence indicating that very rapid detection and identification of BW agents is possible and will be instrumented.

Proliferation: Threat and response

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

1996-04-01

During the height of the Cold War, the Russian physicist Andre Sakharov said, `Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.` The end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of global nuclear war, but today a new threat is rising from the global spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Hostile groups and nations have tried - or have been able - to obtain these weapons, the technology, and homegrown ability to make them or ballistic missiles that can deliver the massive annihilation, poison, and death of thesemore » weapons hundreds of miles away. For rogue nations, these weapons are a ticket to power, stature, and confidence in regional war.« less

Major weapon system environmental life-cycle cost estimating for Conservation, Cleanup, Compliance and Pollution Prevention (C3P2)

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hammond, Wesley; Thurston, Marland; Hood, Christopher

1995-01-01

The Titan 4 Space Launch Vehicle Program is one of many major weapon system programs that have modified acquisition plans and operational procedures to meet new, stringent environmental rules and regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) mandate to reduce the use of ozone depleting chemicals (ODC's) is just one of the regulatory changes that has affected the program. In the last few years, public environmental awareness, coupled with stricter environmental regulations, has created the need for DOD to produce environmental life-cycle cost estimates (ELCCE) for every major weapon system acquisition program. The environmental impact of the weapon system must be assessed and budgeted, considering all costs, from cradle to grave. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has proposed that organizations consider Conservation, Cleanup, Compliance and Pollution Prevention (C(sup 3)P(sup 2)) issues associated with each acquisition program to assess life-cycle impacts and costs. The Air Force selected the Titan 4 system as the pilot program for estimating life-cycle environmental costs. The estimating task required participants to develop an ELCCE methodology, collect data to test the methodology and produce a credible cost estimate within the DOD C(sup 3)P(sup 2) definition. The estimating methodology included using the Program Office weapon system description and work breakdown structure together with operational site and manufacturing plant visits to identify environmental cost drivers. The results of the Titan IV ELCCE process are discussed and expanded to demonstrate how they can be applied to satisfy any life-cycle environmental cost estimating requirement.

Cooperative Threat Reduction: Cooperation Threat Reduction Program Liquid Propellant Disposition Project

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

2002-09-01

This audit is one in a series of audits the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested. As part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, DoD agreed to assist the Russian Federation in disposing of its liquid rocket propellant. Public Law 102-228 (section 2551 NOTE, title 22, United States Code), the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 designates DoD as the executive agent for the CTR Program. Specific objectives of the act are to destroy chemical, nuclear, and other weapons; transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy), under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, develops, coordinates, and oversees implementation of policy for the CTR Program. The CTR Directorate, Defense Threat Reduction Agency operates the program.

Temperate bacterial viruses as double-edged swords in bacterial warfare.

PubMed

Gama, João Alves; Reis, Ana Maria; Domingues, Iolanda; Mendes-Soares, Helena; Matos, Ana Margarida; Dionisio, Francisco

2013-01-01

It has been argued that bacterial cells may use their temperate viruses as biological weapons. For instance, a few bacterial cells among a population of lysogenic cells could release the virus and kill susceptible non-lysogenic competitors, while their clone mates would be immune. Because viruses replicate inside their victims upon infection, this process would amplify their number in the arena. Sometimes, however, temperate viruses spare recipient cells from death by establishing themselves in a dormant state inside cells. This phenomenon is called lysogenization and, for some viruses such as the λ virus, the probability of lysogenization increases with the multiplicity of infection. Therefore, the amplification of viruses leads to conflicting predictions about the efficacy of temperate viruses as biological weapons: amplification can increase the relative advantage of clone mates of lysogens but also the likelihood of saving susceptible cells from death, because the probability of lysogenization is higher. To test the usefulness of viruses as biological weapons, we performed competition experiments between lysogenic Escherichia coli cells carrying the λ virus and susceptible λ-free E. coli cells, either in a structured or unstructured habitat. In structured and sometimes in unstructured habitats, the λ virus qualitatively behaved as a "replicating toxin". However, such toxic effect of λ viruses ceased after a few days of competition. This was due to the fact that many of initially susceptible cells became lysogenic. Massive lysogenization of susceptible cells occurred precisely under the conditions where the amplification of the virus was substantial. From then on, these cells and their descendants became immune to the λ virus. In conclusion, if at short term bacterial cells may use temperate viruses as biological weapons, after a few days only the classical view of temperate bacterial viruses as parasitic agents prevails.

Temperate Bacterial Viruses as Double-Edged Swords in Bacterial Warfare

PubMed Central

Gama, João Alves; Reis, Ana Maria; Domingues, Iolanda; Mendes-Soares, Helena; Matos, Ana Margarida; Dionisio, Francisco

2013-01-01

It has been argued that bacterial cells may use their temperate viruses as biological weapons. For instance, a few bacterial cells among a population of lysogenic cells could release the virus and kill susceptible non-lysogenic competitors, while their clone mates would be immune. Because viruses replicate inside their victims upon infection, this process would amplify their number in the arena. Sometimes, however, temperate viruses spare recipient cells from death by establishing themselves in a dormant state inside cells. This phenomenon is called lysogenization and, for some viruses such as the λ virus, the probability of lysogenization increases with the multiplicity of infection. Therefore, the amplification of viruses leads to conflicting predictions about the efficacy of temperate viruses as biological weapons: amplification can increase the relative advantage of clone mates of lysogens but also the likelihood of saving susceptible cells from death, because the probability of lysogenization is higher. To test the usefulness of viruses as biological weapons, we performed competition experiments between lysogenic Escherichia coli cells carrying the λ virus and susceptible λ-free E. coli cells, either in a structured or unstructured habitat. In structured and sometimes in unstructured habitats, the λ virus qualitatively behaved as a “replicating toxin”. However, such toxic effect of λ viruses ceased after a few days of competition. This was due to the fact that many of initially susceptible cells became lysogenic. Massive lysogenization of susceptible cells occurred precisely under the conditions where the amplification of the virus was substantial. From then on, these cells and their descendants became immune to the λ virus. In conclusion, if at short term bacterial cells may use temperate viruses as biological weapons, after a few days only the classical view of temperate bacterial viruses as parasitic agents prevails. PMID:23536852

The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brooks, Linton F.

2007-03-01

This paper will examine our plans for the future of the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to ``transform'' the stockpile and supporting infrastructure. We proceed from the premise that the United States will need a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is working. Today's stockpile---comprised of legacy warheads left over from the Cold War---is safe and reliable. That said, we see increased risk, absent nuclear testing, in assuring the long-term safety and reliability of our current stockpile. Nor is today's nuclear weapons complex sufficiently ``responsive'' to fixing technical problems in the stockpile, or to potential adverse geopolitical change. Our task is to work to ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise, including the stockpile and supporting infrastructure, meets long-term national security needs. Our approach is to develop and field replacement warheads for the legacy stockpile---so-called Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW)---as a means to transform both the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure.

Naval Directed-Energy Weapons - No Longer a Future Weapon Concept

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-01-01

DE efforts. High-Energy Laser Weapons HEL weapon systems have been envisioned for a great many years, to include be- ing referred to as Martian “Heat...PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES... ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S

Amarillo National Resource Center for plutonium. Work plan progress report, November 1, 1995--January 31, 1996

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cluff, D.

1996-04-01

The Center operates under a cooperative agreement between DOE and the State of Texas and is directed and administered by an education consortium. Its programs include developing peaceful uses for the materials removed from dismantled weapons, studying effects of nuclear materials on environment and public health, remedying contaminated soils and water, studying storage, disposition, and transport of Pu, HE, and other hazardous materials removed from weapons, providing research and counsel to US in carrying out weapons reductions in cooperation with Russia, and conducting a variety of education and training programs.

Kirtland Operations progress report, January--March 1991

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

Kirtland Operations (KO) is an integral part of EG G Energy Measurements, Inc., whose primary mission is to support the US Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs in weapons development and testing and in nuclear safeguards and security. KO performs much of its work in close coordination with and often at the technical direction of Sandia National Laboratories. In addition to aiding Sandia's weapons programs, KO provides a wide spectrum of technical support to other Sandia activities, particularly their safeguards, security, and treaty verification programs. Support is also provided to other elements of the Department of Energy community and to othermore » federal agencies, primarily in weapons testing and safeguards. This report documents our support to these porgrams from January to March 1991.« less

Biological and chemical terrorism: strategic plan for preparedness and response. Recommendations of the CDC Strategic Planning Workgroup.

PubMed

2000-04-21

The U.S. national civilian vulnerability to the deliberate use of biological and chemical agents has been highlighted by recognition of substantial biological weapons development programs and arsenals in foreign countries, attempts to acquire or possess biological agents by militants, and high-profile terrorist attacks. Evaluation of this vulnerability has focused on the role public health will have detecting and managing the probable covert biological terrorist incident with the realization that the U.S. local, state, and federal infrastructure is already strained as a result of other important public health problems. In partnership with representatives for local and state health departments, other federal agencies, and medical and public health professional associations, CDC has developed a strategic plan to address the deliberate dissemination of biological or chemical agents. The plan contains recommendations to reduce U.S. vulnerability to biological and chemical terrorism--preparedness planning, detection and surveillance, laboratory analysis, emergency response, and communication systems. Training and research are integral components for achieving these recommendations. Success of the plan hinges on strengthening the relationships between medical and public health professionals and on building new partnerships with emergency management, the military, and law enforcement professionals.

Advanced Simulation & Computing FY15 Implementation Plan Volume 2, Rev. 0.5

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill; Matzen, M. Keith

2014-09-16

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is a single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the surety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational enhancements to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities andmore » computational resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. As the program approaches the end of its second decade, ASC is intently focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), quantify critical margins and uncertainties, and resolve increasingly difficult analyses needed for the SSP. Where possible, the program also enables the use of high-performance simulation and computing tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and counternuclear terrorism.« less

Future Foreign Perceptions of Chemical Weapons Utility

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-10-01

Iraq’s and Syria’s nuclear weapons programs, and the specter of such action may have precipitated Libya to abandon its program. North Korea and Iran ...declared as such. Today, only seven states have not acceded to the CWC: Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar , North Korea , Somalia, and Syria.1 Of those...seven, Syria and North Korea most evidently maintain active offensive CW programs. Of CWC state par- ties, the United States has expressed compliance

Challenges to Leadership: Responding to Biological Threats

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-10-01

incident leadership suitable for a biological crisis.   1                                                              1 One useful survey, limited to...and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the...end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear

Chemical and Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on Strategic Trade Controls

DOE PAGES

Carrera, Julie A.; Castiglioni, Andrew J.; Heine, Peter M.

2017-04-01

The use of contract manufacturing services in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries has grown significantly in recent years, but the potential for such service providers to be exploited for chemical or biological weapons proliferation has garnered relatively little attention, despite the role of contract manufacturers in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Here, we examine the dual-use potential and global spread of chemical and biological contract manufacturing and their ramifications for related strategic trade controls (STCs). Hundreds of providers of dual-use contract services were found worldwide, but they were primarily located in jurisdictions with comprehensive STC regulations. This thenmore » provides some degree of protection against their misuse. However, the results outlined below also suggest that chemical and biological contract manufacturers are a critical community to target for STC outreach activities and efforts to increase industry compliance. Targeted outreach would help prevent contract manufacturing service providers from unwittingly contributing to the production and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.« less

Chemical and Biological Contract Manufacturing Services: Potential Proliferation Concerns and Impacts on Strategic Trade Controls

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Carrera, Julie A.; Castiglioni, Andrew J.; Heine, Peter M.

The use of contract manufacturing services in the chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries has grown significantly in recent years, but the potential for such service providers to be exploited for chemical or biological weapons proliferation has garnered relatively little attention, despite the role of contract manufacturers in the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network. Here, we examine the dual-use potential and global spread of chemical and biological contract manufacturing and their ramifications for related strategic trade controls (STCs). Hundreds of providers of dual-use contract services were found worldwide, but they were primarily located in jurisdictions with comprehensive STC regulations. This thenmore » provides some degree of protection against their misuse. However, the results outlined below also suggest that chemical and biological contract manufacturers are a critical community to target for STC outreach activities and efforts to increase industry compliance. Targeted outreach would help prevent contract manufacturing service providers from unwittingly contributing to the production and proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.« less

IMPROVED TECHNNOLOGY TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Richardson, J H

2005-07-20

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (collectively known as weapons of mass destruction, or WMD) and the potential acquisition and use of WMD against the world by terrorists are extremely serious threats to international security. These threats are complex and interrelated. There are myriad routes to weapons of mass destruction--many different starting materials, material sources, and production processes. There are many possible proliferators--threshold countries, rogue states, state-sponsored or transnational terrorists groups, domestic terrorists, and even international crime organizations. Motives for acquiring and using WMD are similarly wide ranging--from a desire to change the regional power balance, deny accessmore » to a strategic area, or alter international policy to extortion, revenge, or hate. Because of the complexity of this threat landscape, no single program, technology, or capability--no silver bullet--can solve the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem. An integrated program is needed that addresses the WMD proliferation and terrorism problem from end to end, from prevention to detection, reversal, and response, while avoiding surprise at all stages, with different activities directed specifically at different types of WMD and proliferators. Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. The radiation properties of nuclear materials, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), make the detection of smuggled nuclear materials technically difficult. A number of efforts are under way to devise improved detector materials and instruments and to identify novel signatures that could be detected. Key applications of this work include monitoring for radioactive materials at choke points, searching for nuclear materials, and developing instruments for response personnel.« less

AFWL Standards for Scientific and Technical Reports.

DTIC Science & Technology

1980-04-01

Air Force Weapons Laboratory , Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, under...PROGRAM ELEMEN T PROJECT TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS Air Force Weapons Laboratory (SUR) Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 87117 62601F/99930000 I. CONTROLLING...OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12 REPORT DATE Air Force Weapons Laboratory (SUR) April 1980 Kirtland Air Force Base, NM 87117 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 72

Civil Defense, U. S. A.: A Programmed Orientation to Civil Defense. Unit 2. Nuclear Weapons Effects and Shelter.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DOD), Battle Creek, MI.

Basic information about nuclear weapons is presented so that their effects can be meaningfully related to the defensive countermeasures which will be most effective against them. Major topics include: (1) Explosive power of nuclear weapons, (2) Major effects of nuclear explosions, (3) Two basic types of nuclear explosions, (4) Contrast between air…

The Creation of a Contagious H5N1 Influenza Virus: Implications for the Education of Life Scientists

PubMed Central

Novossiolova, Tatyana; Minehata, Masamichi; Dando, Malcolm

2012-01-01

The paper contends that the ongoing controversy surrounding the creation of a contagious H5N1 influenza virus has already exposed the severe limitations of the possibility of preventing the hostile misuse of the life sciences by dint of oversight of proposals and publications. It further argues that in order to prevent the potential wholesale militarisation of the life sciences, it is essential that life scientists become aware of their responsibilities within the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and actively contribute their expertise to strengthening the biological weapons non-proliferation regime . PMID:22984642

Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I

PubMed Central

Fitzgerald, Gerard J.

2008-01-01

The first large-scale use of a traditional weapon of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or nuclear) involved the successful deployment of chemical weapons during World War I (1914–1918). Historians now refer to the Great War as the chemist’s war because of the scientific and engineering mobilization efforts by the major belligerents. The development, production, and deployment of war gases such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard created a new and complex public health threat that endangered not only soldiers and civilians on the battlefield but also chemical workers on the home front involved in the large-scale manufacturing processes. The story of chemical weapons research and development during that war provides useful insights for current public health practitioners faced with a possible chemical weapons attack against civilian or military populations. PMID:18356568

Chemical warfare and medical response during World War I.

PubMed

Fitzgerald, Gerard J

2008-04-01

The first large-scale use of a traditional weapon of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or nuclear) involved the successful deployment of chemical weapons during World War I (1914-1918). Historians now refer to the Great War as the chemist's war because of the scientific and engineering mobilization efforts by the major belligerents. The development, production, and deployment of war gases such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard created a new and complex public health threat that endangered not only soldiers and civilians on the battlefield but also chemical workers on the home front involved in the large-scale manufacturing processes. The story of chemical weapons research and development during that war provides useful insights for current public health practitioners faced with a possible chemical weapons attack against civilian or military populations.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

McCoy, Michel; Archer, Bill; Hendrickson, Bruce

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) is an integrated technical program for maintaining the safety, surety, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. The SSP uses nuclear test data, computational modeling and simulation, and experimental facilities to advance understanding of nuclear weapons. It includes stockpile surveillance, experimental research, development and engineering programs, and an appropriately scaled production capability to support stockpile requirements. This integrated national program requires the continued use of experimental facilities and programs, and the computational capabilities to support these programs. The Advanced Simulation and Computing Program (ASC) is a cornerstone of the SSP, providing simulation capabilities and computationalmore » resources that support annual stockpile assessment and certification, study advanced nuclear weapons design and manufacturing processes, analyze accident scenarios and weapons aging, and provide the tools to enable stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) and the resolution of Significant Finding Investigations (SFIs). This requires a balance of resource, including technical staff, hardware, simulation software, and computer science solutions. ASC is now focused on increasing predictive capabilities in a three-dimensional (3D) simulation environment while maintaining support to the SSP. The program continues to improve its unique tools for solving progressively more difficult stockpile problems (sufficient resolution, dimensionality, and scientific details), and quantifying critical margins and uncertainties. Resolving each issue requires increasingly difficult analyses because the aging process has progressively moved the stockpile further away from the original test base. Where possible, the program also enables the use of high performance computing (HPC) and simulation tools to address broader national security needs, such as foreign nuclear weapon assessments and counter nuclear terrorism.« less

Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress. Annual Report 2009

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-01-01

Department of Defense (DoD) concerns around traumatic exposure to war, operations other than war, weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters...consequences resulting from the traumatic impact of: 1) the possibility, or actual use, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during combat, acts of...simulation exercises dealing with chemical and biological terrorism. This early work generated an unprecedented body of research, including a

Liar! Liar! Deception Detection in 2035

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-04-01

identify differences in tone, expression, behavior, and voluntary and involuntary biological responses to the questions. While existing technology does...was further shocked when he opened the door to discover two large police officers with weapons drawn standing in the doorway shouting instructions...series of picture of the community, people who were present in the bank, stores in the area, pictures of weapons including one that matches the

JPRS Report, Proliferation Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

1991-08-08

from its processing plant at Valindaba, and fuel-fabrication plants at Valindaba and Pelindaba. where fuel rods for use at the Koeberg nuclear-power...construction of the fourth one. The pulsed reactor uses special elements of nuclear fuel The site of the proposed fourth nuclear power plant can enabling...chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.] AFRICA SOUTH AFRICA Civilian Uses for

Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program Accountability and Financial Management

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-05-01

United States General Accounting Office PAQ Report to Congressional Committees May 2000 CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSAL Improvements Needed in Program...warfare materiel, and former production facilities and identify and locate buried chemical warfare materiel. Alternative Technologies and Approaches...production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. These items are described in table 1. Table 1: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Category

Competition Among Near-Substitutable Systems

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-09-01

the context of the dominant “Weapon System Franchise ” model of competition for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). Competition between near...leading to the award of a franchise . AoAs or other cost-effectiveness analyses can be pivotal in bringing attention to near-substitute systems. However...dominant ?Weapon System Franchise ? model of competition for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). Competition between near-substitutes can occur

From Alamogordo to the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Friedlander, Michael

2008-04-01

After W.W.II., the U.S. continued its program for the development of nuclear weapons. Winds carried radioactive debris far beyond the Nevada test site, and these fission products were deposited by rain, to enter the human food chain. The isotopes of greatest concern were Sr90 and I131, that, after ingestion, become concentrated in bone and thyroid respectively. There was a growing public anxiety about possible heath hazards posed by radiation from this fallout. In March 1958, the Greater St. Louis Citizens' Committee for Nuclear Information (C.N.I.) was formed. Among the leaders of C.N.I. were E. U. Condon and Barry Commoner. The aim of C.N.I. was ``to collect and distribute in the widest possible manner information which the public requires to understand the present and future problems which arise from potential large-scale use of nuclear weapons in war; testing of nuclear weapons; and nonmilitary uses of nuclear energy.'' In accordance with its objectives, members of C.N.I. gave many nontechnical talks, where we described the various forms of radiation and what was then known about the biological effects of radiation. Some of our members testified at Congressional committee hearings. We published a newsletter, initially titled Nuclear Information, and later Scientist and Citizen. In this presentation, I will describe some of the activities of this idealistic organization.

Issues Identified in 21 Recently Published Major Weapon System Reports

DTIC Science & Technology

1980-06-12

reports. This re- ^*-< port consolidates the summaries and high - er lights the issues in those reports. c @_2£/ 8 Uj 4fC2^ "ttDuirt1 This...Ground Weapon Systems program 77 The High Speed Antiradiation Missile may not be the answer to the services’ lethal defense suppression...generally applies to exceedingly high -cost programs that tend to disrupt the procurement expectations for other programs and result in compromises

Research and development program, fiscal year 1966

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1964-04-01

The biomedical program of the Laboratory of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Biology for FY 1966 is conducted within the scope of the following categories: Somatic Effects of Radiation; Combating Detrimental Effects of Radiation; Molecular and Cellular Level Studies; Environmental Radiation Studies; Radiological and Health Physics and Instrumentation; Chemical Toxicity; Cancer Research; and Selected Beneficial Applications. The overall objectives of the Laboratory within these areas of the Biology and Medicine program may be summarized as follows: (1) investigation of the effects of ionizing radiation on living organisms and systems of biological significance; (2) investigation of the dynamic aspects of physiological andmore » biochemical processes in man, animals and plants and how these processes are modified by radiation and related pathological states; (3) the assessment and study of the immediate and long term consequences of the operation or detonation of nuclear devices on the fauna, and flora in man's environment and on man; (4) the development of methods of minimizing or preventing the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation; (5) research in, and development of, beneficial uses of ionizing radiation and radioactive substances in medicine and biology; (6) research in the development of new and more efficient radiation detection devices; (7) research, including field studies, as mutually agreed upon by the Commission and the University, in connection with the conduct of weapon tests and biomedical and civil effects experiments at such tests conducted at continental and overseas test sites; and (8) the conduct of training and educational activities in the biological and medical aspects of radiation and related fields.« less

The bioscience revolution & the biological weapons threat: levers & interventions

PubMed Central

D'Agostino, Mark; Martin, Greg

2009-01-01

In December 2008, the US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, released a report, World At Risk. The Report points to the fact that, not only is the use of a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist attack before the end of 2013, more likely than not, but also to the fact that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use biological weapons than nuclear. This paper examines the recommendations of the report in the context of the historic and geopolitical changes, in particular globalization. The authors highlight the "dual-use" dilemma, as described in the report, as the paradoxical use of technology developed for the benefit of mankind being used for sinister purposes. The mitigation of such a threat lies in broad stakeholder involvement and cooperation, including non-state actors, governments and the bio-tech industry itself. The importance of vigilance measures within the life science community is emphasized and, the authors propose, could include a web-based didactic course in bioterrorism and weapons of mass destruction identification. The site could outline safety protocols, have detailed disaster management tutorials, and could be specifically tailored for different subsets of industry and health professionals. The paper concludes with an endorsement of a multi-pronged approach including strong international guidelines and intelligence cooperation and preparatory measures such as the wide-spread use of detection systems as well as diagnostic decision support systems for bioterrorism detection at the local level. PMID:19220910

History of chemical and biological warfare agents.

PubMed

Szinicz, L

2005-10-30

Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents.

Issues in chemical and biological terrorism.

PubMed

Salem, Harry

2003-01-01

This manuscript describes the overview presented at the 23rd Annual Meeting of the American College of Toxicology in 2002. Although it is recognized that weapons of mass destruction that can be used against our military and civilian populations include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents, this overview is limited primarily to chemical and biological (CB) agents. The issues of CB terrorism are discussed in terms of When, What, How, and Who. The US Army has been providing chemical and biological solutions since 1917, and has since 1996 applied these solutions to homeland defense and domestic preparedness. The use of chemical and biological agents as terrorist weapons both in the United States and elsewhere in the world is reviewed. The CB threat spectrum is presented, as is the further categorization of biological threat agents by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In addition, the CB agents considered to be a potential threat to our water supply are also presented. These are agents that are water soluble, stable, and resistant to water treatment and/or disinfection. The overview concludes with the chronological accomplishments of ECBC since 1917.

The motivation for biological aggression is an inherent and common aspect of the human behavioural repertoire.

PubMed

Rózsa, Lajos

2009-02-01

According to a widespread opinion shared by the vast majority of historians, instances of aggression using pathogen weapons constitute extremely rare events in human history. Similarly, students of human behaviour tend to believe that their science plays no role in explaining this phenomenon, which is held to be exceptional and abnormal. Contrary to this dominant view, I argue that Hamiltonian spite - like Hamiltonian altruism - is an inherent part of the human behavioural repertoire and it includes the use of pathogens for spiteful purposes. This paradigm is supported by the following observations. The use of pathogens as weapons emerged far before the scientific understanding of the nature of infections and epidemics, though it has been underrepresented in written history ever since. It is also present in our expectations concerning the likely behaviour of an enemy and it is also a frequent component of threats. Several languages appear to bear linguistic references to our motivation for biological aggression in profanity. Finally, given that wartime epidemics kill people at a rate comparable to (or exceeding) that of mechanical weapons, all wars fought in recorded history incorporated an element of aggression through biological means. On the basis of these arguments, I claim that the motivation for biological aggression is an inherent and common aspect of past and present human behaviour.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

O'Brien, K H

Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this processmore » of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start with an improved vision of the future stockpile and enterprise, and find a path that moves us toward that future. The goal of this approach is to achieve a more affordable, sustainable, and responsive enterprise. In order to transform the enterprise in this way, the SSP warhead designs that drive the enterprise must change. Designs that emphasize manufacturability, certifiability, and increased safety and security can enable enterprise transformation. It is anticipated that such warheads can be certified and sustained with high confidence without nuclear testing. The SSP provides the tools to provide such designs, and can develop replacement designs and produce them for the stockpile. The Cold War currency of optimizing warhead yield-to-weight can be replaced by SSP designs optimizing margin-to-uncertainty. The immediate challenge facing the nuclear weapons enterprise is to find a credible path that leads to this vision of the future stockpile and enterprise. Reliable warheads within a sustainable enterprise can best be achieved by shifting from a program of legacy-warhead refurbishment to one of warhead replacement. The nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons enterprise must transform together to achieve this vision. The current Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program represents an approach that can begin this process of transformation. If the RRW program succeeds, the designs, manufacturing complex, and certification strategy can evolve together and in so doing come up with a more cost-efficient solution that meets today's and tomorrow's national security requirements.« less

Nukes in the Post-Cold War Era A View of the World from Inside the US Nuclear Weapons Program

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wood, Blake Philip

Why do we have nuclear weapons? What is in the US stockpile, how is it deployed and controlled, and how it has changed over the years? What is in the “nuclear weapons complex” and what does each lab and plant do? How do the DOE/NNSA Design Labs interact with the Intelligence Community? How does the US stockpile, NW complex, and NW policy compare with those of other countries? What is easy and hard about designing nuclear weapons?

Product Definition Data (PDD) Current Environment Report

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1989-05-01

The objective of the Air Force Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (CALS) Program is to improve weapon system reliability, supportability and maintainability, and to reduce the cost of weapon system acquisition and logistics support. As ...

Teaching with the News: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Choices for the 21st Century.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Inst. for International Studies.

In October 2002 North Korea admitted that it had been operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of international treaties and the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea also appeared to be taking steps to begin production of nuclear weapons and, according to U.S. officials, may have a missile that can hit…

BB and pellet guns--toys or deadly weapons?

PubMed

Harris, W; Luterman, A; Curreri, P W

1983-07-01

BB and pellet weapons are not included in gun control laws and are often sold as children's toys. Injuries caused by these weapons have been considered trivial unless they involve vulnerable surface organs such as the eye. The purpose of this study was to review the management of six cases of pellet or BB gun injuries that required abdominal exploration at the University of South Alabama Medical Center from January 1980 through June 1982. Five of the six patients had significant internal injuries including perforations of the stomach, jejunum, liver, and pancreas. The ballistics of pneumatic weapons are reviewed. The muzzle velocities of many of these weapons necessitate that wounds caused by these weapons be handled with the same principles as for any small-caliber, low-velocity (less than 1,200 feet/second) weapons. Public education programs are urgently needed to educate parents as to the potential danger involved in purchasing these weapons for unsupervised use as toys by children.

A Sandia weapon review bulletin : defense programs, Autumn 1992.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Not Available

1992-09-01

Topics in this issue: (1) Focal Point and STEP. Sandia National Laboratories has always focused its advanced weapon development not only on future weapon needs, but also on the engineering and manufacturing sciences needed to meet them. Both areas are changing dramatically. As the nation dismantles many of its warheads, it becomes essential that those that remain are increasingly reliable, secure, capable, and safe. And as development resources diminish, it becomes vital that they are applied to the most critical technologies in a disciplined manner. The mission of the Focal Point program and the Stockpile Transition Enabling Program (STEP) ismore » to develop processes for meeting these challenges. Focal Point offers a decision-making process for allocating Sandia's resources to meets its defense programs strategic goals. (2) Defense Programs news in brief. (3) Dismantling the nuclear stockpile. (4) W88/MK5: Arming, Fuzing, and Firing system meets all requirements and goals. (5) The Common Radar Fuze. (6) Insertable-explosive arming of firing sets. (7) Preparing for fewer underground tests.« less

BACTERIAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE—The Current Status

PubMed Central

Coggins, Cecil H.

1960-01-01

For fourteen years public attention has been focused so sharply on atomic weapons as to lose sight of other, less spectacular but equally significant advances in the art of warfare. In the shadows cast by brilliant research in nuclear physics are hidden startling advances in the field of chemical and biological weapons. These weapons, as now developed, are not only capable of producing mass casualties quite comparable with those of atomic bombs, but they also possess certain advantages which may make them the weapons of choice for an unscrupulous enemy. If war should come, it is the medical profession which will have the sole responsibility for protecting the citizens of California against these weapons, and we can therefore delay no longer in acquainting ourselves with their potentialities and characteristics. In this task, we are working under two serious handicaps. The first is that our classical medical training affords little appreciation of the real danger, and the second is the cloak of secrecy surrounding the entire subject. PMID:18732324

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-02-10

agreements to address U.S. security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear ...era nuclear , chemical, and biological weapons. Through these cooperative efforts, the United States now allocates more than $1 billion each year to...spread of nuclear weapons. This regime, although suffering from some setbacks in recent years in Iran and North Korea, includes formal treaties

Cloning and Expressing Recombinant Protective Antigen Domains of B. anthracis

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-09-01

future predictive modeling toolkits. 1 1. Introduction The use of Bacillus anthracis as a bio - weapon in the United States in 2001 affirmed the need...for improved sensing and detection of biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Protective Antigen (PA) protein of Bacillus anthracis is the...Cloning and Expressing Recombinant Protective Antigen Domains of B. anthracis by Deborah A. Sarkes, Joshua M. Kogot, Irene Val-Addo

Director`s series on proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bailey, K.C.; Price, M.E.

1994-10-17

This series is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Essays contained in this document include: Key issues on NPT renewal and extension, Africa and nuclear nonproliferation, Kenya`s views on the NPT, Prospects for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, effects of a special nuclear weapon materials cut-off convention, and The UK view of NPT renewal.

A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Donohue, Nathan

The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Assessing the Transnational Threat," Strategic Forum, No. 136, (March 1998), March 29, 2012, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/forum136.htm.

Development of a software tool to support chemical and biological terrorism intelligence analysis

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hunt, Allen R.; Foreman, William

1997-01-01

AKELA has developed a software tool which uses a systems analytic approach to model the critical processes which support the acquisition of biological and chemical weapons by terrorist organizations. This tool has four major components. The first is a procedural expert system which describes the weapon acquisition process. It shows the relationship between the stages a group goes through to acquire and use a weapon, and the activities in each stage required to be successful. It applies to both state sponsored and small group acquisition. An important part of this expert system is an analysis of the acquisition process which is embodied in a list of observables of weapon acquisition activity. These observables are cues for intelligence collection The second component is a detailed glossary of technical terms which helps analysts with a non- technical background understand the potential relevance of collected information. The third component is a linking capability which shows where technical terms apply to the parts of the acquisition process. The final component is a simple, intuitive user interface which shows a picture of the entire process at a glance and lets the user move quickly to get more detailed information. This paper explains e each of these five model components.

Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Acton, James

2016-03-01

U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

[The experiments conducted by Japanese on human guinea pigs, and the use of biological weapons during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945)].

PubMed

Sabbatani, Sergio

2014-09-01

Starting from the end of the nineteenth century, and during the first four decades of the past century, Japan showed considerable military expansion, on the back of a pan-Asiatic and imperialistic ideology, comparable only to those expressed by Wilhelmian and Nazi Germany. This growth led to Japan playing an extremely important role in the Asia-Pacific continent, which unavoidably brought the country onto a collision course with the British Empire and the United States of America. The Japanese general Shiro Ishii, who had undoubted organisational abilities but also a propensity for crimes against mankind, starting from the end of the 1920s and during the subsequent decade, under the suggestion of a military physician, developed a research programme to obtain biological weapons, since he was aware of the lack of raw materials, technology and scientific background in nuclear weapons. This project was taken forward despite Japan's ratification of the Geneva protocol, undersigned by 70 nations, which posed strict limits to the use of both biological and chemical weapons. In actual fact, the protocol allowed these weapons for defensive purposes, and permitted their experimental development. The research programme, developed with the support of the high command of the Japanese army and certainly known by the Emperor (Tenno) Hirohito, had its operative basis from the year 1932 in the satellite state of Manchukuo, but later and paralleling the increased, aggressive behaviour towards China and the English and American colonies during World War II, spread towards other Asian provinces occupied by the Japanese armies, with other operative units. In these dedicated bases, which were true concentration camps, numerous experiments were carried out on human guinea pigs, frequently concluding with vivisection. Among others, experiments of freezing, thirst, hunger, loss of blood, wounding with firearms, and bone fractures, were performed, as well as the inoculation of microorganisms (including Yersinia pestis, Vibrio cholerae, Richettsia typhi, and Salmonella typhi), and spores of Bacillus anthracis. With regard to infectious diseases, the objective was to establish the most effective models for the use of biological weapons, taking into consideration the features of territories and populations to be placed under attack. It has been estimated that over 100,000 people suffered in such experiments, and according to the authors who studied these facts on the basis of original documentation, approximately 540,000 subjects lost their lives in China and Korea due to epidemics caused by the Japanese between 1937 and 1945.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Science.gov Websites

Sciences Protection Sciences Science to Defeat WMD Science to Secure WMD Chemical/Biological Technologies of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear instruction. Watch Read DTRA leadership meet with How Butterflies Can Detect Deadly Chemical Weapon Agents May 2 Changing World Situation Requires

Prospects for improved detection of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wuest, Craig R.; Hart, Brad; Slezak, Thomas R.

2012-07-31

Acquisition and use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons continue to be a major focus of concern form the security apparatus of nation states because of their potential for mass casualties when used by a determined adversary.

Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-04-07

ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear

Irans Nuclear Program: Tehrans Compliance with International Obligations

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-03-03

ratified the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Article III of the treaty requires non-nuclear- weapon states-parties 1 to accept...concern that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons . Tehran’s construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities is currently the main source...uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons . HEU can also be used as fuel in certain types of nuclear

A feasibility study of the destruction of chemical weapons by photocatalytic oxidation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hitchman, M.L.; Spackman, A.R.; Yusta, F.J.

1997-01-01

The destruction of existing arsenals or deposits of chemical weapons is an important obstacle on the way to the successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention which was opened for signature in 1993. Many approaches have been proposed and none can be seen as panacea. Each has its merits and shortcomings. In this paper we review the different technologies and propose a new one, photocatalytic oxidation, which has the potential to fill an important gap; a cheap, small, mobile facility for chemical warfare agents which are difficult to transport or are deposited in a remote area. We report some relevantmore » experimental results with this technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. After many years of negotiation, a convention banning the production, possession and use of chemical weapons was opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. The convention, once it is ratified, will provide a framework and a program for the destruction of chemical weapons by the nations party to it. The framework will cover such topics as definitions of terminology, general rules of verification and verification measures, level of destruction of chemical weapons, activities not prohibited under the convention, and investigations in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. The program will require that countries with chemical weapons shall start their destruction not later than one year after they have ratified the convention, and that they shall complete it within a ten year period. For this period involved countries are required to declare their plans for destruction. These plans have to include a time schedule for the destruction process, an inventory of equipment and buildings to be destroyed, proposed measures for verification, safety measures to be observed during destruction, specification of the types of chemical weapons and the type and quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed, and specification of the destruction method. 38 refs.« less

ASK Talks With Judy Stokley

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Stokley, Judy

2002-01-01

In the summer of 1997, Judy Stokley took over as Program Director of the Air-to-Air Joint System Project Office (JSPO) at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. As the JSPO Program Director, she directed much of her attention to reforming the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile (AMRAAM) program, which had been operational since 1991 and was presently being produced for the Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and many international customers. Upon careful analysis of the program, she found it rife with problems. Two of the most pressing included a bloated Average Unit Procurement Cost and an Air Force mandated draw down plan that had not been met. In this interview, following her presentation at the Fourth NASA Masters Forum of Program and Project Managers in Dallas last February, Stokley discusses some of the difficulties she experienced in carrying out the AMRAAM reforms. Stokley is presently Air Force Program Executive Officer for Weapons in Washington, D.C. She is responsible for the cost, schedule, and technical performance of a portfolio of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons programs. These programs represent the leading edge of weapons technology, including developing the next generation of precision-guided munitions -- 'smart' bombs -- and air superiority missiles.

Iran's growing nuclear weapons program: A catalyst for regional instability in the Middle East. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Deyermond, J.J.

1993-03-10

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States as well as other nations around the world now find themselves in a state of political, economic, and military transition. While the US and other nations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran are undergoing significant increases in military spending. This increase has been primarily in the area of conventional forces, however there is growing evidence that Iran is also attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability as well. This study examines Iran's nuclear weapons program in detail, and Tehran's increasing ability to emerge as a regional power in themore » Middle East.« less

From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats.

PubMed

Koblentz, Gregory D

2012-01-01

The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, was held in Geneva in December 2011. On 7 December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became the highest-ranking US government official to address a BWC meeting. Secretary Clinton told the assembled delegation that ‘we view the risk of bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority’. At the same time, she warned that a large-scale disease outbreak ‘could cripple an already fragile global economy’. Secretary Clinton's speech reflected a new understanding that the range of biological threats to international security has expanded from state-sponsored biological warfare programmes to include biological terrorism, dual-use research and naturally occurring infectious diseases such as pandemics. Recognizing these changes, President Barack Obama released a new national strategy for countering biological threats in 2009. This strategy represents a shift in thinking away from the George W. Bush administration's focus on biodefence, which emphasized preparing for and responding to biological weapon attacks, to the concept of biosecurity, which includes measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. The Obama administration's biosecurity strategy seeks to reduce the global risk of naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks through prevention, international cooperation, and maximizing synergies between health and security. The biosecurity strategy is closely aligned with the Obama administration's broader approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes the pragmatic use of smart power, multilateralism and engagement to further the national interest. This article describes the Obama administration's biosecurity strategy; highlights elements of continuity and change from the policies of the Bush administration; discusses how it fits into Obama's broader foreign policy agenda; and analyses critical issues that will have to be addressed in order to implement the strategy successfully.

Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yaffe, Michael David

On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of roles lobbied the US President to deploy the long-range weapons being developed by the Defense Department. In the course of deliberations, political preferences suppressed military considerations of deterrence and only a small portion of the original modernization program was implemented.

Defense Acquisitions. Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-03-01

Selected Weapon Programs March 2007 GAO-07-406SP Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for...unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 What GAO Found United States Government Accountability Office Why GAO Did This...Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR) 93 JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS) 95 Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) 97

Subsystem Testing and Flight Test Instrumentation.

DTIC Science & Technology

1981-04-01

systems has made the job of the tester increasingly difficult. These systems are being " , designed to accomplish the entire spectrum of tasks from pure...52 destinations, targets, and avoidance areas. The software program also allows the aircrew to designate two weapon delivery programs from the...The basic design dW objective of the system is to provide an increased capability for weapons delivery against preplanned targets when operating at high

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mian, Zia

India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also formore » nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.« less

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mian, Zia

2014-05-01

India and Pakistan launched their respective nuclear programs in the 1940s and 1950s with considerable foreign technical support, especially from the United States Atoms for Peace Program. The technology and training that was acquired served as the platform for later nuclear weapon development efforts that included nuclear weapon testing in 1974 and in 1998 by India, and also in 1998 by Pakistan - which had illicitly acquired uranium enrichment technology especially from Europe and received assistance from China. As of 2013, both India and Pakistan were continuing to produce fissile material for weapons, in the case of India also for nuclear naval fuel, and were developing a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles. International efforts to restrain the South Asian nuclear build-up have been largely set aside over the past decade as Pakistani support became central for the U.S. war in Afghanistan and as U.S. geopolitical and economic interests in supporting the rise of India, in part as a counter to China, led to India being exempted both from U.S non-proliferation laws and international nuclear trade guidelines. In the absence of determined international action and with Pakistan blocking the start of talks on a fissile material cutoff treaty, nuclear weapon programs in South Asia are likely to keep growing for the foreseeable future.

On the Materials Science of Nature's Arms Race.

PubMed

Liu, Zengqian; Zhang, Zhefeng; Ritchie, Robert O

2018-06-05

Biological material systems have evolved unique combinations of mechanical properties to fulfill their specific function through a series of ingenious designs. Seeking lessons from Nature by replicating the underlying principles of such biological materials offers new promise for creating unique combinations of properties in man-made systems. One case in point is Nature's means of attack and defense. During the long-term evolutionary "arms race," naturally evolved weapons have achieved exceptional mechanical efficiency with a synergy of effective offense and persistence-two characteristics that often tend to be mutually exclusive in many synthetic systems-which may present a notable source of new materials science knowledge and inspiration. This review categorizes Nature's weapons into ten distinct groups, and discusses the unique structural and mechanical designs of each group by taking representative systems as examples. The approach described is to extract the common principles underlying such designs that could be translated into man-made materials. Further, recent advances in replicating the design principles of natural weapons at differing lengthscales in artificial materials, devices and tools to tackle practical problems are revisited, and the challenges associated with biological and bioinspired materials research in terms of both processing and properties are discussed. © 2018 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-01

security concerns. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s...Russian relationship. At the same time, however, the two sides began to cooperate on securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear , chemical, and biological...former Soviet Union. The United States is also a leader of an international regime that attempts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. This regime

Non-Lethal Weaponry: A Framework for Future Integration

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-04-01

community, but was widely popularized by John Naisbitt in his 1982 work, Megatrends . In short, it asserts that much may be learned about a dynamic, but...Notes 1 John Naisbitt, Megatrends : Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives (New York, NY: Warner Books, Inc., 1982), 3-5. 2 Robert J. Bunker...lethals by opponents of biological and chemical weapons. The use of chemical agents…is seen as a Trojan Horse to circumvent the Chemical Weapons

Challenges associated with the behaviour of radioactive particles in the environment.

PubMed

Salbu, Brit; Kashparov, Valery; Lind, Ole Christian; Garcia-Tenorio, Rafael; Johansen, Mathew P; Child, David P; Roos, Per; Sancho, Carlos

2018-06-01

A series of different nuclear sources associated with the nuclear weapon and fuel cycles have contributed to the release of radioactive particles to the environment. Following nuclear weapon tests, safety tests, conventional destruction of weapons, reactor explosions and fires, a major fraction of released refractory radionuclides such as uranium (U) and plutonium (Pu) were present as entities ranging from sub microns to fragments. Furthermore, radioactive particles and colloids have been released from reprocessing facilities and civil reactors, from radioactive waste dumped at sea, and from NORM sites. Thus, whenever refractory radionuclides are released to the environment following nuclear events, radioactive particles should be expected. Results from many years of research have shown that particle characteristics such as elemental composition depend on the source, while characteristics such as particle size distribution, structure, and oxidation state influencing ecosystem transfer depend also on the release scenarios. When radioactive particles are deposited in the environment, weathering processes occur and associated radionuclides are subsequently mobilized, changing the apparent K d . Thus, particles retained in soils or sediments are unevenly distributed, and dissolution of radionuclides from particles may be partial. For areas affected by particle contamination, the inventories can therefore be underestimated, and impact and risk assessments may suffer from unacceptable large uncertainties if radioactive particles are ignored. To integrate radioactive particles into environmental impact assessments, key challenges include the linking of particle characteristics to specific sources, to ecosystem transfer, and to uptake and retention in biological systems. To elucidate these issues, the EC-funded COMET and RATE projects and the IAEA Coordinated Research Program on particles have revisited selected contaminated sites and archive samples. This COMET position paper summarizes new knowledge on key sources that have contributed to particle releases, including particle characteristics based on advanced techniques, with emphasis on particle weathering processes as well as on heterogeneities in biological samples to evaluate potential uptake and retention of radioactive particles. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-09

Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial Irradiation Source in Transport ,” in Pakistan’s Nuclear Future, 2008...gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment...technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other

Competitive Advantage, Uncertainty, and Weapons Procurement: Striking Balance for the Future

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-05-02

position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE , UNCERTAINTY, AND WEAPONS PROCUREMENT: STRIKING...Competitive Advantage , Uncertainty, and Weapons Procurement: Striking Balance for the Future 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d...the right balance of investments all leading to a sustained competitive advantage . This paper presents an analysis of how effective this overhaul has

Leveraging success: applying Interagency Lessons learned to the Joint Air Delivered Nuclear Weapons Acquisition Process

DTIC Science & Technology

Effective coordination and communication between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DoD) is necessary to ensure that the... nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective without nuclear testing. The science-based Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP) is the...method used to sustain and maintain the nuclear stockpile throughout the weapons life cycle. A comprehensive review was conducted of the joint

Is this the time for a high-energy laser weapon program?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kiel, David H.

2013-02-01

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has made large investments weaponizing laser technology for air defense. Despite billions of dollars spent, there has not been a successful transition of a high-energy laser (HEL) weapon from the lab to the field. Is the dream of a low-cost-per-shot, deep-magazine, speed-of-light HEL weapon an impossible dream or a set of technologies that are ready to emerge on the modern battlefield? Because of the rapid revolution taking place in modern warfare that is making conventional defensive weapons very expensive relative to the offensive weapons systems, the pull for less expensive air defense may necessitate a HEL weapon system. Also, due to the recent technological developments in solid-state lasers (SSL), especially fiber lasers, used throughout manufacturing for cutting and welding, a HEL weapon finally may be able to meet all the requirements of ease of use, sustainability, and reliability. Due to changes in warfare and SSL technology advances, the era of HEL weapons isn't over; it may be just starting if DoD takes an evolutionary approach to fielding a HEL weapon. The U.S. Navy, with its large ships and their available electric power, should lead the way.

49 CFR 33.38 - Limitations on placing rated orders.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... priority rating authority, see § 33.41); or (vi) Any items related to the development of chemical or biological warfare capabilities or the production of chemical or biological weapons, unless such development... commercial fertilizer (Resource agency with jurisdiction—Department of Agriculture); (ii) All forms of energy...

49 CFR 33.38 - Limitations on placing rated orders.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... priority rating authority, see § 33.41); or (vi) Any items related to the development of chemical or biological warfare capabilities or the production of chemical or biological weapons, unless such development... commercial fertilizer (Resource agency with jurisdiction—Department of Agriculture); (ii) All forms of energy...

49 CFR 33.38 - Limitations on placing rated orders.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... priority rating authority, see § 33.41); or (vi) Any items related to the development of chemical or biological warfare capabilities or the production of chemical or biological weapons, unless such development... commercial fertilizer (Resource agency with jurisdiction—Department of Agriculture); (ii) All forms of energy...

Access to war weapons and injury prevention activities among children in Croatia.

PubMed Central

Kopjar, B; Wiik, J; Wickizer, T M; Bulajic-Kopjar, B; Mujki-Klaric, A

1996-01-01

To investigate the exposure of children in Croatia to war weapons, we surveyed random samples of children (n=986) aged 11 to 16 years and of parents (1469) of children aged 7 to 16 years in April 1994 in four war-affected districts in Croatia. The children's survey indicated that 57% of the boys and 36% of the girls had access to weapons at home, at some other place, or at both. Eighteen percent of the boys and 5% of the girls reported playing with weapons. The parents' survey showed that 68% of the households possessed weapons, with 19% of the children having access to weapons at home. Influenced by preliminary findings of these surveys, the Croatian government modified its national campaign (one partially supported by international aid) to prevent war-related injuries among children. This study demonstrates the feasibility of scientific evaluation of humanitarian aid programs. PMID:8604767

Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Francis, S.

1992-01-01

This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950's. (FI)

Race horses vs work horses: Competition between the nuclear weapons labs in the 1950s

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Francis, S.

1992-06-01

This document provides a discussion of the missions and research programs of Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and details the competition between the two nuclear weapons laboratories in the 1950`s. (FI)

Interagency Federal Laboratory Review Final Report

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-05-15

technology. DOE labs have made unique contributions to national security since the days of the Manhattan Project , in designing, developing, and...Weapons Responsibility Most of DOE’s large multi-program laboratories had their origin in the Manhattan Project , to develop nuclear weapons during and

Biological effects of cesium-137 injected in beagle dogs of different ages

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nikula, K.J.; Muggenburg, B.A.; Griffith, W.C.

1995-12-01

The toxicity of cesium-137 ({sup 137}Cs) in the Beagle dog was investigated at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) as part of a program to evaluate the biological effects of internally deposited radionuclides. The toxicity and health effects of {sup 137}Cs are important to understand because {sup 137}Cs is produced in large amounts in light-water nuclear reactors. Large quantities of cesium radioisotopes have entered the human food chain as a result of atmospheric nuclear weapons test, and additional cesium radioisotopes were released during the Chernobyl accident. Although the final analyses are not complete, three findings are significant: older dogs dies significantlymore » earlier than juvenile and young adult dogs; greater occurrence of sarcomas in the cesium-137 injected dogs; the major nonneoplastic effect in dogs surviving beyond 52 d appears to be testicular atrophy.« less

Leo Szilard Lectureship Award Talk: Nuclear disarmament after the cold war

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Podvig, Pavel

2008-04-01

Now that the cold war is long over, our thinking of nuclear weapons and the role that they play in international security has undergone serious changes. The emphasis has shifted from superpower confrontation to nuclear proliferation, spread of weapon materials, and to the dangers of countries developing nuclear weapon capability under a cover of a civilian program. At the same time, the old cold-war dangers, while receded, have not disappeared completely. The United States and Russia keep maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, some of them in very high degree of readiness. This situation presents a serious challenge that the international community has to deal with. Although Russia and the United States are taking some steps to reduce their nuclear arsenals, the traditional arms control process has stalled -- the last treaty that was signed in 2002 does not place serious limits on strategic forces of either side. The START Treaty, which provides a framework for verification and transparency in reduction of nuclear arsenals, will expire at the end of 2009. Little effort has been undertaken to extend the treaty or renegotiate it. Moreover, in recent years Russia has stepped up the efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces. The United States has resisted joining the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and has been working on controversial new nuclear weapon development programs. The U.S. missile defense program makes the dialogue between Russia and the United States even more difficult. The reluctance of Russia and the United States to engage in a discussion about drastic reductions of their nuclear forces undermines the case of nuclear nonproliferation and seriously complicated their effort to contain the spread of nuclear weapon technologies and expertise. One of the reasons for the current lack of progress in nuclear disarmament is the contradiction between the diminished role that nuclear weapons play in security of nuclear weapon states and the inertia of cold-war institutions that are involved in their development and support. Dealing with this contradiction would require development of new mechanisms of cooperation between nuclear weapons states and their strong commitment to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. One important area of cooperation is development of a framework that would prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology at the time when increasing number of countries is turning toward expanded use of nuclear power to cover their energy needs.

Australian Aerodynamic Design Codes for Aerial Tow Bodies.

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-08-27

HTP -1, which deals with aerial targets, it was recognised that there was a need for a complete and well docL mented approach for their aerodynamic and...circular cables cannot be assessed with the programs in their present form. 10. none of the programs are well documented and user’s manuals are not...National Leader ANL TTCP HTP -1 Weapons Systems Research Laboratory Director Superintendent - Weapons Division - Combat Systems Division Navy Office Navy

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Status

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-11-25

wave software, and neutron sources, which could be useful for developing nuclear weapons.44 In addition, ElBaradei’s May 2008 report notes that...Intelligence stated that the Bureau continues to stand by this estimate. 77 The time frame described in the 2007 NIE is the same as one described in a... standing with the IAEA has ever used this tactic. North Korea restarted its nuclear weapons program after announcing its withdrawal from the NPT in

Counterproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-04-01

nuclear weapons program in 1941 and renamed the program the Manhattan Project in 1942.6 The mammoth efforts of the Manhattan Project resulted in the...killing or mortally wounding up to 130,000 Japanese.11 While the scientists of the Manhattan Project were awestruck at the first nuclear blast in New...remove great danger for us.”12 Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall, two scientists on the Manhattan Project , had been previously recruited to spy for the

The Effectiveness of Concurrent Design on the Cost and Schedule Performance of Defense Weapons System Acquisitions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Robertson, Randolph B.

This study investigates the impact of concurrent design on the cost growth and schedule growth of US Department of Defense Major Defense Acquisition Systems (MDAPs). It is motivated by the question of whether employment of concurrent design in the development of a major weapon system will produce better results in terms of cost and schedule than traditional serial development methods. Selected Acquisition Reports were used to determine the cost and schedule growth of MDAPs as well as the degree of concurrency employed. Two simple linear regression analyses were used to determine the degree to which cost growth and schedule growth vary with concurrency. The results were somewhat surprising in that for major weapon systems the utilization of concurrency as it was implemented in the programs under study was shown to have no effect on cost performance, and that performance to development schedule, one of the purported benefits of concurrency, was actually shown to deteriorate with increases in concurrency. These results, while not an indictment of the concept of concurrency, indicate that better practices and methods are needed in the implementation of concurrency in major weapon systems. The findings are instructive to stakeholders in the weapons acquisition process in their consideration of whether and how to employ concurrent design strategies in their planning of new weapons acquisition programs.

Coding ethical behaviour: the challenges of biological weapons.

PubMed

Rappert, Brian

2003-10-01

Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have increased significantly. With this has come an expansion of those activities in civil society deemed as potential sites for applying security controls. This paper examines the assumptions and implications of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration can take place between security and openness in civilian biomedical research through devising professional codes of conduct for scientists. Future attempts to establish such codes must find a way of reconciling or at least addressing dilemmatic and tension-ridden issues about the appropriateness of research; a topic that raises fundamental questions about the position of science within society.

Medical experimentation concerning chemical and biological weapons for mass destruction.

PubMed

Deutsch, Erwin

2003-04-01

This article is the text of a speech originally presented at the Second World Conference on Medical Ethics at Gijon, Spain, on 2 October 2002 under the title "Medical Experimentation Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons for Mass Destruction: Clinical Design for New Smallpox Vaccines: Ethical and Legal Aspects." Experimentation on vaccines such as smallpox is subject to the usual ethical rules such as the need for informed consent. However, the participants will not often be at risk of catching the disease but expose themselves by taking part in the experimentation. Professor Deutsch explores the implications of this, including the position of vulnerable groups such as children, those with mental handicaps, and those acting under orders such as the miliary, the policy and fire officers.

Milk inhibits the biological activity of ricin

USDA-ARS?s Scientific Manuscript database

Ricin is a highly toxic protein produced by the castor plant Ricinus communis. The toxin is relatively easy to isolate and can be used as a biological weapon. There is great interest in identifying effective inhibitors for ricin. In this study, we demonstrated by three independent assays that compon...

Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Destruction

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-05-01

the potential of massive destruction from nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for nearly half a century during the Cold War. The principle...on limited aspects of a single modality—whether biological, chemical, nuclear , or radiological. Concerns such as detection, defeat, or consequence...as difficult and dangerous as possible and to minimize the likelihood that he will achieve his goals. The worst forms of WMD— nuclear and, in some

Evolution of Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism and Roles of Political Parties: Case Studies of Japan and Germany

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-01

concerned. However, the political crisis engenered by the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic shaped conditions calling for revision of the German security...to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Second, Germany admitted the U.S. military presence and bore some of the direct costs of same...voice for removing nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons of mass destruction in line with the peace movement. Similarly, it demanded greatly

The Ring of Gyges: Anonymity and Technological Advance’s Effect on the Deterrence of Non-State Actors in 2035

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-02-16

year of 1944 (the year of highest Manhattan Project expenditures). Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World: A History of the...technological developments in the biological sciences may provide 39 A case in point is the Manhattan ... Project undertaken by the United States to produce the first atomic weapon. A huge national effort was required to create the first atomic weapon in

Agents of Bioterrorism: Curriculum and Pedagogy in an Online Masters Course

PubMed Central

Page, Eric J.; Gray, Joshua P.

2014-01-01

The Agents of Bioterrorism course (BSBD 640, University of Maryland University College) is a graduate level course created in response to an elevated need for scientists working in the field of medical countermeasures to biological and chemical weapons in the years following 9/11. Students read and evaluate assigned current primary literature articles investigating medical countermeasures at each stage of development. In addition, students learn concepts of risk assessment, comparing and ranking several agents of terror. Student learning is assessed through a variety of assignments. A term paper focuses on a lesser known weapon of terror, with students recommending the best countermeasure in development and delivering a risk assessment comparing their agent to other major weapons of terror discussed throughout the semester. Similarly, a group project on an assigned major weapon of terror (anthrax, plague, smallpox, vesicants, or nerve agent) focuses more heavily on evaluating primary literature and concluding which countermeasure(s) in development are the best. Students complete the course with a fundamental understanding of the mechanism of action of many biological agents, information literacy for the medical literature available at PubMed and the primary scientific literature, and a basic understanding of the role of the government in biodefense research. This paper describes the pedagogical approaches used to teach this course and how they might be adopted for other courses. PMID:25089297

Agents of Bioterrorism: Curriculum and Pedagogy in an Online Masters Course.

PubMed

Page, Eric J; Gray, Joshua P

2014-01-10

The Agents of Bioterrorism course (BSBD 640, University of Maryland University College) is a graduate level course created in response to an elevated need for scientists working in the field of medical countermeasures to biological and chemical weapons in the years following 9/11. Students read and evaluate assigned current primary literature articles investigating medical countermeasures at each stage of development. In addition, students learn concepts of risk assessment, comparing and ranking several agents of terror. Student learning is assessed through a variety of assignments. A term paper focuses on a lesser known weapon of terror, with students recommending the best countermeasure in development and delivering a risk assessment comparing their agent to other major weapons of terror discussed throughout the semester. Similarly, a group project on an assigned major weapon of terror (anthrax, plague, smallpox, vesicants, or nerve agent) focuses more heavily on evaluating primary literature and concluding which countermeasure(s) in development are the best. Students complete the course with a fundamental understanding of the mechanism of action of many biological agents, information literacy for the medical literature available at PubMed and the primary scientific literature, and a basic understanding of the role of the government in biodefense research. This paper describes the pedagogical approaches used to teach this course and how they might be adopted for other courses.

Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Adams, Marvin

2011-04-01

As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

Names and Weapons.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kauffman, Charles

1989-01-01

Traces the theoretical significance of using names as titles for situations, and applies this analysis to the United States' intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Argues that the names given to ICBMs preserve their utility as weapons by linking them to the myths of the nineteenth-century western frontier. (MM)

31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 537.327 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 548.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

31 CFR 549.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. ...

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-12-19

full scope” life extension program for the B61 bomb, the weapon that is currently deployed in Europe, “to ensure its functionality with the F-35...This life extension program will consolidate four versions of the B61 bomb, including the B61 -3 and B61 - 4 that are currently deployed in Europe, into...one version, the B61 -12. Reports indicate that this new version will reuse the nuclear components of the older bombs, but will include enhanced

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-01-03

NPR also indicated that the United States would conduct a “full scope” life extension program for the B61 bomb, the weapon that is currently deployed...in Europe, “to ensure its functionality with the F-35.” This life extension program will consolidate four versions of the B61 bomb, including the B61 ...3 and B61 - 4 that are currently deployed in Europe, into one version, the B61 -12. Reports indicate that this new version will reuse the nuclear

Getting Beyond Getting Ready for Pandemic Influenza

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-01-01

more information, see: http://homeland.house.gov/Hearings/index.asp?ID=89. “…Emerging biological threats such as pandemic influenza or weaponized ...which we have no immediately available cure. Work is clearly underway to prepare for such a biological event.10 However, despite the fact that...Nation to fully withstand the impact of such a devastating widespread biological event. Pandemic influenza would destroy the security of our

Flight Control Requirements for Weapon Delivery. Volume 1. Development of the Terminal Aerial Weapon Delivery Simulation (TAWDS) Programs and Their Use in Formulating Flying Qualities Guidelines for Manually Coupled Aircraft Weapon Delivery Systems

DTIC Science & Technology

1976-03-01

Altitudo Abow TKi«f (ft) Tar|«tAt SüLiVil TartatiiatSomaAltituda Abow Soa Laval Bomb Ground Rania (ft) Altitudt Abow SwLawl (ft) Bomb Ground... Rania (ft) Error in Bomb Ground (Un|« No Pj/Po (ft) (mils) (ft) (mite) 400 500 500 400 400 400 1000 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 5.109

Weapon System Management to Directorate of Logistics Management Systems Requirements (XRB) DCS/Plans and Programs Air Force Logistics Command Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio 45433.

DTIC Science & Technology

1982-05-14

Attachment 2 contains the reports and lessons learned which resulted from the Level II Weapon System Management activities. Attachment 3 contains the reports...and lessons learned which resulted from the Level III Weapon System Management activities. _____ r. Air Force Logistics Command Attn: Col. McConnell 2...May 14, 1982 Attachment 4 contains the plans and lessons learned which resulted from the RCC Evaluation activities. I am pleased to deliver these

U.S. Marine Corps FY 82 Exploratory Development Program.

DTIC Science & Technology

1982-01-25

1. It is requested that the cover of the reference be pen changed to reflect "FY 82" vice "FY 81". DISTRIBUTION: By direction (see attached pages) i4...Falls Church, VA 22041 3 Marine Corps Liaison Officer Naval Weapons Center China Lake, CA 93555 Marine Corps Liaison Officer HQ MASSTER Ft. Hood, TX...Center, Hawaii Lab P. 0. Box 997 Kaihua, Hawaii 96734 Mr. Paul H. Amundson Code 3304 Naval Weapons Center China Lake, CA 93555 Naval Surface Weapons

Operator’s and Programer’s Guide to the Analysis of Force Potential System (AFPSYS)

DTIC Science & Technology

1984-11-01

on-type preference and allocation scheme that may preclude some pairings of weapon types. There may be too few weapons of some types to generate a...multiple weapons. 2. Sets a flag to prevent generating a firing time for shooters with a zero PK. 3. Sets a flag to prevent generating a firing time for...anticipation of later generalization of the scheme for determining the factors corresponding to Blue and Red measures and countermeasures. However, as of

Investigation and Remediation Records Concerning Incidents of Weapons Discharges by Private Security Contractors Can Be Improved

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-07-28

Incidents of Weapons Discharges by Private Security Contractors Can Be Improved 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6...for Iraq Reconstruction,400 Army Navy Drive,Arlington,VA,22202-4704 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S...Defense’s (DoD) oversight of incidents involving the firing—or discharge —of weapons reported from May 2008 through February 2009 by its PSCs

What Are the Legal and Policy Implications of Conducting Preemption and Interdiction Against a Weapons of Mass Destruction?

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-01-01

Manhattan project , gaseous diffusion plant, or even a weapons program. It will be used heavily in chapters 4 and 5. Both The Making of the Atomic Bomb...requirement for secrecy surrounding the Manhattan project and the lingering requirement for secrecy regarding nuclear weapons design. The application to the...another MANHATTAN Project ” to produce a nuclear device (McPhee 1973, 123-4, 136). Scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project maintain that

31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 542.304 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 594.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 588.312 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

Multiscale modeling of nerve agent hydrolysis mechanisms: a tale of two Nobel Prizes

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Field, Martin J.; Wymore, Troy W.

2014-10-01

The 2013 Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded for the development of multiscale models for complex chemical systems, whereas the 2013 Peace Prize was given to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for their efforts to eliminate chemical warfare agents. This review relates the two by introducing the field of multiscale modeling and highlighting its application to the study of the biological mechanisms by which selected chemical weapon agents exert their effects at an atomic level.

The current state of bioterrorist attack surveillance and preparedness in the US

PubMed Central

Grundmann, Oliver

2014-01-01

The use of biological agents as weapons to disrupt established structures, such as governments and especially larger urban populations, has been prevalent throughout history. Following the anthrax letters sent to various government officials in the fall of 2001, the US has been investing in prevention, surveillance, and preparation for a potential bioterrorism attack. Additional funding authorized since 2002 has assisted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Environmental Protection Agency to invest in preventative research measures as well as preparedness programs, such as the Laboratory Response Network, Hospital Preparedness Program, and BioWatch. With both sentinel monitoring systems and epidemiological surveillance programs in place for metropolitan areas, the immediate threat of a large-scale bioterrorist attack may be limited. However, early detection is a crucial factor to initiate immediate response measures to prevent further spread following dissemination of a biological agent. Especially in rural areas, an interagency approach to train health care workers and raise awareness for the general public remain primary tasks, which is an ongoing challenge. Risk-management approaches in responding to dissemination of biological agents, as well as appropriate decontamination measures that reduce the probability of further contamination, have been provided, and suggest further investments in preparedness and surveillance. Ongoing efforts to improve preparedness and response to a bioterrorist attack are crucial to further reduce morbidity, mortality, and economic impact on public health. PMID:25328421

31 CFR 547.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

..., or any other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 546.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

...; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false documentation or..., tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR 6465, Feb...

31 CFR 543.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR...

31 CFR 546.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

...; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false documentation or..., tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR 6465, Feb...

31 CFR 546.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

...; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false documentation or..., tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR 6465, Feb...

31 CFR 547.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

..., or any other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

31 CFR 595.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [78 FR...

31 CFR 543.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR...

31 CFR 595.317 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [78 FR...

31 CFR 543.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents; explosives; false..., formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded instructions. [77 FR...

31 CFR 547.313 - Financial, material, or technological support.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

..., or any other transmission of value; weapons or related materiel; chemical or biological agents..., diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals, or other recorded...

28 CFR 13.2 - Policy.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...

28 CFR 13.2 - Policy.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...

28 CFR 13.2 - Policy.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...

28 CFR 13.2 - Policy.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...

28 CFR 13.2 - Policy.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Policy. 13.2 Section 13.2 Judicial Administration DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS REWARDS REGULATIONS § 13.2... material or atomic weapons. The broad scope of this program is to help guard against the loss or diversion...

Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

2014-10-28

A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

Materials for Children about Nuclear War.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Eiss, Harry

President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1987 budget was an attempt to increase dramatically spending on national defense, on nuclear weapons, while cutting back on social programs. The increases for almost all nuclear weapons indicate the Administration of the United States saw its major responsibility as one of providing a strong military, one centered on…

Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility

Science.gov Websites

4:17 How DARHT Works The weapons programs at Los Alamos have one principal mission: ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons in our nation's enduring stockpile. One critical completed a successful two-axis, multiframe hydrotest. Two additional successful tests-one of which was

Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

ScienceCinema

None

2018-01-16

A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

Worker training for new threats: a proposed framework.

PubMed

Mitchell, Clifford S; Doyle, Mary L; Moran, John B; Lippy, Bruce; Hughes, Joseph T; Lum, Max; Agnew, Jacqueline

2004-11-01

In an effort to identify health and safety training needs for various groups of workers related to weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and high yield explosives (CBRNE), a conference, "Worker Training in a New Era: Responding to New Threats," was held at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in October 2002. Two questions were addressed: Which general skills and knowledge are common to all workers who might be exposed to terrorist threats from CBRNE weapons? What are the particular skills and knowledge relevant to these threats that are specific to workers in different sectors? Thirteen core components for pre- and post-event training were identified. Pre-event training applies to all workers. Post-event training applies to selected personnel including first responders, skilled support personnel, and other workers involved in these operations. Recommendations to improve worker safety training related to preparedness include: identify specific competencies for worker pre- and post-event training; coordinate Federal policy on worker training for CBRNE hazards; adopt federal guidelines or standards on worker training for new CBRNE threats, based on the competencies and coordinated Federal policy; conduct an inventory of training programs and other resources that could be used or adapted for use for new threats; and develop new training content and methods for pre- and post-event training to address specific competencies. Given the possibility for the introduction of CBRNE threats into the workplace, all workers need some training in the potential hazards involved: the individual worker's specific role in an emergency; incident command; activation of the emergency notification system; use of personal protective equipment (PPE); and safe evacuation of the workplace. While some occupational sectors have developed effective training related to these new threats, there is a need to develop, implement, and evaluate training programs across many different sectors of the workforce. Copyright 2004 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Control and Visualization of a Shear Layer Over a Weapons Bay

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schmit, Ryan; Raman, Ganesh; Lourenco, Luis; Kibens, Valdis

2005-11-01

In July 2005, the AFRL program Flow Control Analysis Development (FlowCAD) tested the High Frequency Excitation Active Flow Control for Supersonic Weapons Release (HIFEX) generic weapons bay model in the Boeing's Polysonic windtunnel facility. The 10% scaled weapons bay with an L/D of 5 was tested at Mach 1.82. Several flow control devices were tested, including: the goalpost, a wedge and pin configuration, and the splash jet, to determine their effectiveness at reducing the sound pressure levels inside the weapons bay. The results show the wedge and splash jet are equally effective at reducing the peak Rossiter tone by 20 dB. The main objective of this test was to visualize the shear layer over the weapons bay cavity. By examining the cavity shear layer with a 10 kHz Focused Schlieren system the effects from the flow control devices can be understood to produce a more effective flow control device in the future.

Deciding to Buy: Civil-Military Relations and Major Weapons Programs

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-11-01

did not have direct jurisdiction over shipbuilding for the Navy, meaning that others would have to carry the banner. Despite a dozen bills in 1964...Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to keep abreast of these costs. The programs included airplanes in the Air Force inventory , like the A-10, the...Air Force’s ability to modernize the rest of 52 the inventory .153 In addition, given that the SRAM was the primary B-1 weapon, the costs should take

Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-12-19

Undistributed ISFF-Funded Equipment 105 17. Iraqi Army Maintenance Program 107 18. Class IX Material Management 115 Part V – Medical Sustainability 123...database and are subsequently forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons...be forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program

Biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction: updated clinical therapeutic countermeasures since 2003.

PubMed

Pettineo, Christopher; Aitchison, Robert; Leikin, Scott M; Vogel, Stephen N; Leikin, Jerrold B

2009-01-01

The objective of this article is to provide updated treatment options for bioterrorism agents. This updated synopsis includes recent clinical cases and treatment recommendations that have arisen in the last 5 years. The decontamination, treatment, and disposition of these biologic and chemical agents are presented alphabetically by agent type: biologic, chemical, and radiologic/nuclear. The information provided outlines only new treatment options since 2003.

Nuclear, biological, and chemical combined injuries and countermeasures on the battlefield.

PubMed

Knudson, Gregory B; Elliott, Thomas B; Brook, Itzhak; Shoemaker, Michael O; Pastel, Ross H; Lowy, Robert J; King, Gregory L; Herzig, Thomas C; Landauer, Michael R; Wilson, Scott A; Peacock, Susan J; Bouhaouala, S Samy; Jackson, William E; Ledney, G David

2002-02-01

The Armed Forces Radiobiological Research Institute (AFRRI) has developed a research program to determine the major health risks from exposure to ionizing radiation in combination with biological and chemical warfare agents and to assess the extent to which exposure to ionizing radiation compromises the effectiveness of protective drugs, vaccines, and other biological and chemical warfare prophylactic and treatment strategies. AFRRI's Defense Technology Objective MD22 supports the development of treatment modalities and studies to assess the mortality rates for combined injuries from exposure to ionizing radiation and Bacillus anthracis, and research to provide data for casualty prediction models that assess the health consequences of combined exposures. In conjunction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, our research data are contributing to the development of casualty prediction models that estimate mortality and incapacitation in an environment of radiation exposure plus other weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, the AFFRI research program assesses the effects of ionizing radiation exposure in combination with B. anthracis, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus, Shigella sonnei, nerve agents, and mustard as well as their associated treatments and vaccines. In addition, the long-term psychological effects of radiation combined with nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) injuries are being evaluated. We are also assessing the effectiveness of gamma photons and high-speed neutrons and electrons for neutralizing biological and chemical warfare agents. New protocols based on our NBC bioeffects experiments will enable U.S. armed forces to accomplish military operations in NBC environments while optimizing both survival and military performance. Preserving combatants' health in an NBC environment will improve warfighting operations and mission capabilities.

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kovac, Jeffrey

1997-07-01

Leonard A. Cole. W. H. Freeman: New York, 1997. 250 pp. ISBN 0-7167-2950-4. $22.95 hc. The Eleventh Plague begins with a recitation of the ten plagues brought down upon Egypt, part of the Passover Seder celebrated each spring by Jews all over the world. Spring is also the anniversary of the first use of chemical weapons. On April 22, 1915, German soldiers released chlorine gas from 5,739 cylinders installed along the battle line at Ypres in southeastern Belgium. Germany achieved complete surprise. The gas drifted across no man's land, causing widespread terror and creating ten thousand serious casualties and five thousand deaths. Chlorine, of course, was a poor weapon, easily neutralized, but German scientists, including future Nobel laureates Fritz Haber, Otto Hahn, and James Franck, and the German chemical industry created ever more dangerous chemical weapons, culminating with the introduction of mustard gas in 1917. Despite cries of moral outrage, the Allies countered with their own chemical weapons efforts. The eleventh plague had been unleashed.

Report of a Workshop in Nuclear Forces and Nonproliferation held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2009-01-01

The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Review and the 2010 Conference (RevCon) of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The issues discussed are at the heart of the debate on nuclear policy issues such asfuture nuclear weapons requirements and nonproliferation, but also the stockpile stewardship program and infrastructure modernization. The workshop discussions reflected the importance of the NPRfor defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21s1 century threats and providing guidancemore » that will shape NNSA and DoD programs. They also highlighted its importancefor NPT diplomacy. The discussion noted the report of the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, and the expectation that the NPR would likely reflect its consensus to a large degree (although the Administration was not bound by the report). There was widespread support for developing thefoundationsfor a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. The discussion also revealed a convergence of views, but no consensus, on a number of important issues, including the diminished role but continued importance of nuclear weapons; the need to take action to ensure the sustainability of the stockpile, and the recapitalization of the infrastructure and expertise; and the need to take action to promote nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives.« less

Legacy System Improvements for the Objective Force

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-08-14

Less Than 11 lbs • M249 Short Barrel/ Buttstock •Reduced size/length • Com Remotely Op Wpn Sys •Fire Under Armor w/o Turret • IAV Program Spt •Primary...concepts being evaluated Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station(CROWS) Benefits: • Permits under armor operation of crew served weapons for suppression of

Tonopah Test Range Flight Test

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

From a distance, the drop of a mock nuclear weapon — containing only non-nuclear components — was a mere puff of dust rising from a dry lake bed at Nevada’s Tonopah Test Range. However, it marked the start of a new series of test flights vital to the nation’s B61-12 weapon refurbishment program.

Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Adams, Marvin L., E-mail: mladams@tamu.edu

2014-05-09

The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doingmore » this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.« less

Bridging the health security divide: department of defense support for the global health security agenda.

PubMed

Moudy, Robin M; Ingerson-Mahar, Michael; Kanter, Jordan; Grant, Ashley M; Fisher, Dara R; Jones, Franca R

2014-01-01

In 2011, President Obama addressed the United Nations General Assembly and urged the global community to come together to prevent, detect, and fight every kind of biological danger, whether a pandemic, terrorist threat, or treatable disease. Over the past decade, the United States and key international partners have addressed these dangers through a variety of programs and strategies aimed at developing and enhancing countries' capacity to rapidly detect, assess, report, and respond to acute biological threats. Despite our collective efforts, however, an increasingly interconnected world presents heightened opportunities for human, animal, and zoonotic diseases to emerge and spread globally. Further, the technical capabilities required to develop biological agents into a weapon are relatively low. The launch of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) provides an opportunity for the international community to enhance the linkages between the health and security sectors, accelerating global efforts to prevent avoidable epidemics and bioterrorism, detect threats early, and respond rapidly and effectively to biological threats. The US Department of Defense (DoD) plays a key role in achieving GHSA objectives through its force health protection, threat reduction, and biodefense efforts at home and abroad. This article focuses on GHSA activities conducted in the DoD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense.

[The role of the biological damaging factor in the explosive injury].

PubMed

Popov, V L; Kadochnikov, D S; Minaeva, P V

2015-01-01

This article describes the specific features of the action of the biological damaging factors on the human organism associated with the explosive injury. Both the direct action of the damaging agents contained in the biological weapons and their secondary effects in the form of systemic and local infectious complications of the inflicted wounds are considered. The criteria for the evaluation of the degree of harm to the health of the victims of explosion attributable to the action of the biological damaging factor are proposed.

The CCTC Quick-Reacting General War Gaming System (QUICK) Program Maintenance Manual. Volume 3. Weapon Allocation Subsystem

DTIC Science & Technology

1978-04-15

12. (Part 2 of 2) 70 B1 Calculate Revised I! Allocation Error [: Estimates For Each Attribute Category] Skip Change of tltipliers - No _ D-Do For All A...passing Onl to tilt next target , thlt current Value Of the target weight is revised . Altecr every two to four targets , the Laigrange multipliers art...delete a weapon, a new set of variables is delivered by WADOUT, and STALL uses this revised in- formation to decide whether more weapons should be added

Water System Security and Resilience in Homeland Security Research

EPA Pesticide Factsheets

EPA's water security research provides tools needed to improve infrastructure security and to recover from an attack or contamination incident involving chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) agents or weapons.

Applying Science and Technology to Combat WMD Terrorism

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wuest, C R; Werne, R W; Colston, B W

2006-05-04

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This papermore » provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.« less

Applying science and technology to combat WMD terrorism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wuest, Craig R.; Werne, Roger W.; Colston, Billy W.; Hartmann-Siantar, Christine L.

2006-05-01

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing and fielding advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons. The science, technology, and integrated systems we provide are informed by and developed with key partners and end users. LLNL's long-standing role as one of the two principle U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratories has led to significant resident expertise for health effects of exposure to radiation, radiation detection technologies, characterization of radioisotopes, and assessment and response capabilities for terrorist nuclear weapons use. This paper provides brief overviews of a number of technologies developed at LLNL that are being used to address national security needs to confront the growing threats of CBRNE terrorism.

Physics Division progress report, January 1, 1984-September 30, 1986

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Keller, W.E.

1987-10-01

This report provides brief accounts of significant progress in development activities and research results achieved by Physics Division personnel during the period January 1, 1984, through September 31, 1986. These efforts are representative of the three main areas of experimental research and development in which the Physics Division serves Los Alamos National Laboratory's and the Nation's needs in defense and basic sciences: (1) defense physics, including the development of diagnostic methods for weapons tests, weapon-related high-energy-density physics, and programs supporting the Strategic Defense Initiative; (2) laser physics and applications, especially to high-density plasmas; and (3) fundamental research in nuclear andmore » particle physics, condensed-matter physics, and biophysics. Throughout the report, emphasis is placed on the design, construction, and application of a variety of advanced, often unique, instruments and instrument systems that maintain the Division's position at the leading edge of research and development in the specific fields germane to its mission. A sampling of experimental systems of particular interest would include the relativistic electron-beam accelerator and its applications to high-energy-density plasmas; pulsed-power facilities; directed energy weapon devices such as free-electron lasers and neutral-particle-beam accelerators; high-intensity ultraviolet and x-ray beam lines at the National Synchrotron Light Source (at Brookhaven National Laboratory); the Aurora KrF ultraviolet laser system for projected use as an inertial fusion driver; antiproton physics facility at CERN; and several beam developments at the Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility for studying nuclear, condensed-matter, and biological physics, highlighted by progress in establishing the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Center.« less

Environmental Detection of Clandestine Nuclear Weapon Programs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kemp, R. Scott

2016-06-01

Environmental sensing of nuclear activities has the potential to detect nuclear weapon programs at early stages, deter nuclear proliferation, and help verify nuclear accords. However, no robust system of detection has been deployed to date. This can be variously attributed to high costs, technical limitations in detector technology, simple countermeasures, and uncertainty about the magnitude or behavior of potential signals. In this article, current capabilities and promising opportunities are reviewed. Systematic research in a variety of areas could improve prospects for detecting covert nuclear programs, although the potential for countermeasures suggests long-term verification of nuclear agreements will need to rely on methods other than environmental sensing.

The proliferation of aerospace weapons technology: Ballistic missiles and the case of Brazil

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vossen, Terrence John

1993-04-01

The rationale behind the development of ballistic missile production in Brazil is examined by exploring the political, military, and economic determinants of ballistic missile demand in that country. To ascertain how Brazil developed missile production capabilities, the contributions of aerospace industries in industrialized states, the Brazilian space program, trade between less-developed countries, and illicit trade in missile technology are assessed. It is argued that missile development increasingly became a function of economic as opposed to security considerations, and that technologies transferred from developed country aerospace firms and Brazil's space program were primarily responsible for the creation of production capabilities. It is also contended that the proliferation of missile technology to Brazil was consistent with the workings of a system evident in the aerospace weapons technology market that sustains the horizontal spread of weapons production capabilities.

Nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula: The present and the future. Final report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kang, S.

1994-04-01

Forty years after they were divided by the Cold War, South and North Korea are closer to reunification than ever before. However, North Korea's nuclear weapons program might cause South Koreans to be much less sure about reunification. Today the Cold War is over, but the Korean peninsula is still divided into two Koreas despite the new era of reconciliation. Since December 1991 when a non-aggression pact was signed barring nuclear weapons, North Korea has pursued its nuclear weapon development. In March 1993, North Korea declared its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has been refusing amore » full inspection of its nuclear program. North Korea's nuclear issue is an international issue today. This paper discusses 'what threat we have today' and 'what should be done in the future.'.« less

Advanced Technology and Mitigation (ATDM) SPARC Re-Entry Code Fiscal Year 2017 Progress and Accomplishments for ECP.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Crozier, Paul; Howard, Micah; Rider, William J.

The SPARC (Sandia Parallel Aerodynamics and Reentry Code) will provide nuclear weapon qualification evidence for the random vibration and thermal environments created by re-entry of a warhead into the earth’s atmosphere. SPARC incorporates the innovative approaches of ATDM projects on several fronts including: effective harnessing of heterogeneous compute nodes using Kokkos, exascale-ready parallel scalability through asynchronous multi-tasking, uncertainty quantification through Sacado integration, implementation of state-of-the-art reentry physics and multiscale models, use of advanced verification and validation methods, and enabling of improved workflows for users. SPARC is being developed primarily for the Department of Energy nuclear weapon program, with additional developmentmore » and use of the code is being supported by the Department of Defense for conventional weapons programs.« less

Fusion of radar and ultrasound sensors for concealed weapons detection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Felber, Franklin S.; Davis, Herbert T., III; Mallon, Charles E.; Wild, Norbert C.

1996-06-01

An integrated radar and ultrasound sensor, capable of remotely detecting and imaging concealed weapons, is being developed. A modified frequency-agile, mine-detection radar is intended to specify with high probability of detection at ranges of 1 to 10 m which individuals in a moving crowd may be concealing metallic or nonmetallic weapons. Within about 1 to 5 m, the active ultrasound sensor is intended to enable a user to identify a concealed weapon on a moving person with low false-detection rate, achieved through a real-time centimeter-resolution image of the weapon. The goal for sensor fusion is to have the radar acquire concealed weapons at long ranges and seamlessly hand over tracking data to the ultrasound sensor for high-resolution imaging on a video monitor. We have demonstrated centimeter-resolution ultrasound images of metallic and non-metallic weapons concealed on a human at ranges over 1 m. Processing of the ultrasound images includes filters for noise, frequency, brightness, and contrast. A frequency-agile radar has been developed by JAYCOR under the U.S. Army Advanced Mine Detection Radar Program. The signature of an armed person, detected by this radar, differs appreciably from that of the same person unarmed.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Laughlin, Gary L.

The International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security (IHNS) Program Management Unit (PMU) oversees a broad portfolio of Sandia’s programs in areas ranging from global nuclear security to critical asset protection. We use science and technology, innovative research, and global engagement to counter threats, reduce dangers, and respond to disasters. The PMU draws on the skills of scientists and engineers from across Sandia. Our programs focus on protecting US government installations, safeguarding nuclear weapons and materials, facilitating nonproliferation activities, securing infrastructures, countering chemical and biological dangers, and reducing the risk of terrorist threats. We conduct research in risk and threat analysis, monitoringmore » and detection, decontamination and recovery, and situational awareness. We develop technologies for verifying arms control agreements, neutralizing dangerous materials, detecting intruders, and strengthening resiliency. Our programs use Sandia’s High-Performance Computing resources for predictive modeling and simulation of interdependent systems, for modeling dynamic threats and forecasting adaptive behavior, and for enabling decision support and processing large cyber data streams. In this report, we highlight four advanced computation projects that illustrate the breadth of the IHNS mission space.« less

Stinging plants: as future bio-weapon.

PubMed

Gupta, Sanjay Mohan; Kumar, Kamal

2016-09-01

In the present opinion paper, we have been introducing for the first time the stinging plants and/or their biological toxins as novel bio-threat agents that may be used for the development of bio-weapons for self-defence purpose. The selected studied stinging plants are having dual role as nutraceutical and ethno-pharmacological uses apart from their less explored stinging property. However, future detailed work is required for identification and characterization of the precise stinging chemical components that will be used for the formulation of novel bio-warfare agents for self-defence purpose.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Flax, A.

The growing number of short- to medium-range ballistic missiles (SMBMs) in the inventories of many smaller states that have had recent or less recent armed conflicts with one another has been a source of concern to many countries. Inevitably this concern over ballistic missiles had been linked to their use as delivery vehicles for {open_quotes}weapons of mass destruction{close_quotes}, a category that now includes nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. But it can be argued that this categorization is not particularly useful as a point of departure for discussions of ballistic missile defense (BMD) against SMBMs.

The Hidden Complexity of Biological "Dirty Bombs": Implications for Special Operations Medical Personnel.

PubMed

Washington, Michael A; Blythe, Jauchia

The recent capture of a terrorist in Belgium carrying explosives, fecal matter, and animal tissue may indicate a shift from conventional weapons to crude bacteriological preparations as instruments of terror. It is important to note that although such weapons lack technological sophistication, bacteria are inherently complex, unpredictable, and undetectable in the field. Therefore, it is important that Special Operations medical personnel understand the complications that such seemingly simple devices can add to the treatment of casualties in the field and subsequent evaluation in the clinic. 2016.

Report of Investigation: The Presence of Biological and Chemical Warfare Materiel at AFMC Bases within the United States

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-06-01

knew nothing of the BW/CW work done on the base in the 40’ s and 50’ s . 461 History of the Armament Development and Test Center, Appendix B, 1 July 1970...technical report has been reviewed and is approved for publication. FOR THE DIRECTOR ALBERT S . TORdGIAN, Lt Col, US Deputy Chief, Deployment and Su...Office of History , Air Force Materiel Command Air Force Systems Command Air Force Special Weapons Center Air Force Weapons Laboratory Air Materiel

75 FR 1020 - Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Based Upon the Accession of Albania and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-01-08

...--Commerce Country Chart [Reason for control] Countries Chemical & biological Nuclear National Security Missile Regional Stability Firearms Crime control Anti-terrorism weapons nonproliferation Tech convention...

Glanders: an overview of infection in humans.

PubMed

Van Zandt, Kristopher E; Greer, Marek T; Gelhaus, H Carl

2013-09-03

Glanders is a highly contagious and often fatal zoonotic disease, primarily of solipds. In the developed world, glanders has been eradicated. However, prior use of B. mallei as a biological weapon and its high mortality in inhalation animal studies has affirmed B. mallei as a biodefense concern. This threat requires the development of new glanders medical countermeasures (MCMs), as there is a lack of an effective vaccine and lengthy courses of multiple antibiotics needed to eradicate B. mallei. Here, we present a literature review of human glanders in which we discuss the clinical epidemiology and risk factors, potential routes of exposure, symptoms, the incubation period, and specific diagnostics. This review focuses on pulmonary glanders, as this is the most likely outcome of a biological weapons attack. Additionally, we outline current treatment regimens and propose a clinical definition of human pulmonary glanders infection.

Glanders: an overview of infection in humans

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

Glanders is a highly contagious and often fatal zoonotic disease, primarily of solipds. In the developed world, glanders has been eradicated. However, prior use of B. mallei as a biological weapon and its high mortality in inhalation animal studies has affirmed B. mallei as a biodefense concern. This threat requires the development of new glanders medical countermeasures (MCMs), as there is a lack of an effective vaccine and lengthy courses of multiple antibiotics needed to eradicate B. mallei. Here, we present a literature review of human glanders in which we discuss the clinical epidemiology and risk factors, potential routes of exposure, symptoms, the incubation period, and specific diagnostics. This review focuses on pulmonary glanders, as this is the most likely outcome of a biological weapons attack. Additionally, we outline current treatment regimens and propose a clinical definition of human pulmonary glanders infection. PMID:24004906

Nuclear weapons modernization: Plans, programs, and issues for Congress

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Woolf, Amy F.

2017-11-01

The United States is currently recapitalizing each delivery system in its "nuclear triad" and refurbishing many of the warheads carried by those systems. The plans for these modernization programs have raised a number of questions, both within Congress and among analysts in the nuclear weapons and arms control communities, about the costs associated with the programs and the need to recapitalize each leg of the triad at the same time. This paper covers four distinct issues. It begins with a brief review of the planned modernization programs, then addresses questions about why the United States is pursuing all of these modernization programs at this time. It then reviews the debate about how much these modernization programs are likely to cost in the next decade and considers possible changes that might reduce the cost. It concludes with some comments about congressional views on the modernization programs and prospects for continuing congressional support in the coming years.

Biological agents with potential for misuse: a historical perspective and defensive measures.

PubMed

Bhalla, Deepak K; Warheit, David B

2004-08-15

Biological and chemical agents capable of producing serious illness or mortality have been used in biowarfare from ancient times. Use of these agents has progressed from crude forms in early and middle ages, when snakes and infected cadavers were used as weapons in battles, to sophisticated preparations for use during and after the second World War. Cults and terrorist organizations have attempted the use of biological agents with an aim to immobilize populations or cause serious harm. The reasons for interest in these agents by individuals and organizations include relative ease of acquisition, potential for causing mass casualty or panic, modest financing requirement, availability of technology, and relative ease of delivery. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has classified Critical Biological Agents into three major categories. This classification was based on several criteria, which include severity of impact on human health, potential for delivery in a weapon, capacity to cause panic and special needs for development, and stockpiling of medication. Agents that could cause the greatest harm following deliberate use were placed in category A. Category B included agents capable of producing serious harm and significant mortality but of lower magnitude than category A agents. Category C included emerging pathogens that could be developed for mass dispersion in future and their potential as a major health threat. A brief description of the category A bioagents is included and the pathophysiology of two particularly prominent agents, namely anthrax and smallpox, is discussed in detail. The potential danger from biological agents and their ever increasing threat to human populations have created a need for developing technologies for their early detection, for developing treatment strategies, and for refinement of procedures to ensure survival of affected individuals so as to attain the ultimate goal of eliminating the threat from intentional use of these agents. International treaties limiting development and proliferation of weapons and continuing development of defense strategies and safe guards against agents of concern are important elements of plans for eliminating this threat.

77 FR 42482 - Materials Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-07-19

... Bureau of Industry and Security senior management. 3. Discussion on the role of the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention. 4. Report on Composite Working Group and other working...

Protect and Defend: Adequacy of the Department of Defense Role Prescribed in the Federal Response to a Chemical or Biological Attack Against the Homeland

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-05-31

fermenters , centrifuges, driers, milling equipment, and safety products-- for a biological weapon is the least difficult barrier for a terrorist to...number of people with biotechnical training but also an increase in the availability of tools, supplies, and equipment such as fermenters and...108 A biological production facility would include fermenters , milling equipment, centrifuges, and drivers. This is the same equipment needed to

Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

ScienceCinema

Dattelbaum, Dana

2018-02-14

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- and small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.

Army requirements for micro and nanotechnology-based sensors in weapons health and battlefield environmental monitoring applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ruffin, Paul; Brantley, Christina; Edwards, Eugene; Hutcheson, Guilford

2006-03-01

The Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) and the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) have initiated a joint advanced technology demonstration program entitled "Prognostics/Diagnostics for the Future Force (PDFF)" with a key objective of developing low or no power embedded sensor suites for harsh environmental monitoring. The most critical challenge of the program is to specify requirements for the embedded sensor suites which will perform on-board diagnostics, maintain a history of sensor data, and forecast weapon health. The authors are currently collaborating with the PDFF program managers and potential customers to quantify the requirements for remotely operated, micro/nano-technology-based sensors for a host of candidate weapon systems. After requirements are finalized, current micro/nanotechnology-based temperature, humidity, g-shock, vibration and chemical sensors for monitoring the out-gassing of weapons propellant, as well as hazardous gaseous species on the battlefield and in urban environments will be improved to meet the full requirements of the PDFF program. In this paper, performance requirements such as power consumption, reliability, maintainability, survivability, size, and cost, along with the associated technical challenges for micro/nanotechnology-based sensor systems operating in military environments, are discussed. In addition, laboratory results from the design and testing of a wireless sensor array, which was developed using a thin film of functionalized carbon nanotube materials, are presented. Conclusions from the research indicate that the detection of bio-hazardous materials is possible using passive and active wireless sensors based on monitoring the reflected phase from the sensor.

The evolution of a health hazard assessment database management system for military weapons, equipment, and materiel.

PubMed

Murnyak, George R; Spencer, Clark O; Chaney, Ann E; Roberts, Welford C

2002-04-01

During the 1970s, the Army health hazard assessment (HHA) process developed as a medical program to minimize hazards in military materiel during the development process. The HHA Program characterizes health hazards that soldiers and civilians may encounter as they interact with military weapons and equipment. Thus, it is a resource for medical planners and advisors to use that can identify and estimate potential hazards that soldiers may encounter as they train and conduct missions. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine administers the program, which is integrated with the Army's Manpower and Personnel Integration program. As the HHA Program has matured, an electronic database has been developed to record and monitor the health hazards associated with military equipment and systems. The current database tracks the results of HHAs and provides reporting designed to assist the HHA Program manager in daily activities.

B-70 Aircraft Study. Volume 2

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1972-01-01

Volume 2 of the final report on the B-70 aircraft study is presented here. The B-70 Program, at the onset, was a full weapon system capable of sustained Mach 3 flight for the major portion of its design missions. The weapon system was to enter the SAC inventory as an RS-70 with the first intercontinental resonnaissance/bomber wing scheduled to go operational in July, 1964. After several redirections, a two XB-70 air vehicle program emerged with its prime objective being to demonstrate the technical feasibility of sustained Mach 3 flight. This section describes the original Weapon System 110A concepts, the evolution of the RS-70 design, and the XB-70 air vehicles which demonstrated the design, fabrication, and technical feasibility of long range Mach 3 flights at high altitude. The data presented shows that a very large step forward in the state-of-the-art of manned aircraft design was achieved during the B-70 development program and that advances were made and incorporated in every area, including design, materials application, and manufacturing techniques.

Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS) AN/PAS-13 diffractive optics designed for producibility

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Anderson, J. Steven; Chen, Chungte W.; Spande, Robert A.

1993-01-01

The Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS) program is a manportable 3-5 micrometer forward-looking-infrared (FLIR) rifle sight. The manportable nature requires that the optics modules be lightweight, low cost and compact while maximizing performance. These objectives were met with diffractive optics. TWS promises to be the first FLIR sensor to incorporate kinoform surfaces in full scale production.

The Development of a Model for Construction of Criterion Referenced System Achievement Tests for the Strategic Weapon System Training Program.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cantor, Jeffrey A.; Hobson, Edward N.

The development of a test design methodology used to construct a criterion-referenced System Achievement Test (CR-SAT) for selected Naval enlisted classification (NEC) in the Strategic Weapon System (SWS) of the United States Navy is described. Subject matter experts, training data analysts and educational specialists developed a comprehensive…

JPRS Report, East Europe

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-12-14

situation in the world healthier, particularly for the program to liquidate nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction. During the...make preparations for extensive discussions with the aim of radically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional weap- ons...liquidat- ing two classes of nuclear arms as a historic step which will create preconditions for limiting the feverish arms race and for better

Life of War, Death of the Rest: The Shining Path of Cormac McCarthy's Thermonuclear America

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Blackmore, Tim

2009-01-01

The Bush Administration's quiet resumption of, or initiation of new, nuclear weapons programs aimed militarizing space, and erecting a missile defense shield that would have the effect of rolling back 19 years of solid detente, has gone largely unnoticed over the last eight years. Weapons makers, government officials and politicians have expressed…

An Iranium bomb?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Albright, D.

1995-07-01

This year, the nuclear proliferation spotlight has swung away from Iraq and North Korea, only to focus on Iran. Western intelligence agencies have assembled a substantial body of evidence suggesting that, although Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is secretly pursuing a broad, organized effort to develop nuclear weapons. US officials say that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear technologies that are not consistent with a strictly peaceful program. Intelligence agencies have detected procurement patterns that point to a weapons program. Iran has a multifaceted strategy to develop options to make nuclear weapons: Iran has sought, with limitedmore » success, to buy nuclear power and research facilities from many countries, particularly China and Russia; Iran has shopped quietly in many countries, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe, for a wide range of nuclear-related or dual-use nuclear items that might enable it to put together facilities to enrich uranium, separate plutonium, and make nuclear weapons. There is little public information about how effective this clandestine shopping has been or which countries have been contacted; There is no evidence that Iran has bought any fissile material - but not for wont of trying, and the matter continues to be scrutinized very closely.« less

The Anti-Satellite (ASAT) Weapon Problem And Congress

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Treglio, James R.

1984-08-01

An amendment to the 1984 Defense Authorization Act prevents testing against objects in space of an American F-15 launched anti-satellite weapon until the President certifies that the testing is necessary to prevent harm to the national security, and that he is willing to negotiate an ASAT treaty with the Soviet Union. This extraordinary action by the Congress was taken because many members of Congress feared that the weapon was being developed without due consideration for its impact on arms control, that temporary technical superiority was being given greater importance than the long-term security of the nation. This increased Congressional scrutiny could have an impact on future weapons development programs. "Now a crucial moment is really coming: Either the interested parties will sit down at the negotiating table without delay to begin drawing up a treaty prohibiting the placement in space of weapons of any kind, or the arms race will spill over into space." YURI ANDROPOV, April 28, 1983, in response to petition from American Scientists.

Consistent morals

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cohen, Howard; Amini, Ehsan; Herrera, Julio

2014-04-01

In reply to a physicsworld.com blog post about a talk by Amy Smithson, a non-proliferation expert, in which she criticized scientists who work on nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (“A question of responsibility”, 16 February, http://ow.ly/ulIWu).

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

...-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract..., triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989. (6) The...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract..., triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989. (6) The...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...-by-case basis or other applicable licensing policies that were in effect prior to the contract..., triethanolamine, diisopropylamine, sodium sulfide, and N,N-diethylethanolamine is December 12, 1989. (6) The...

Can an attribution assessment be made for Yellow Rain? Systematic reanalysis in a chemical-and-biological-weapons use investigation.

PubMed

Katz, Rebecca; Singer, Burton

2007-03-01

In intelligence investigations, such as those into reports of chemical- or biological-weapons (CBW) use, evidence may be difficult to assemble and, once assembled, to weigh. We propose a methodology for such investigations and then apply it to a large body of recently declassified evidence to determine the extent to which an attribution can now be made in the Yellow Rain case. Our analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that CBW were used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although a definitive judgment cannot be made. The proposed methodology, while resource-intensive, allows evidence to be assembled and analyzed in a transparent manner so that assumptions and rationale for decisions can be challenged by external critics. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions, emphasizing the use of evolving information-extraction (IE) technologies, a sub-field of artificial intelligence (AI).

Advances in neuroscience and the biological and toxin weapons convention.

PubMed

Dando, Malcolm

2011-01-01

This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse.

Advances in Neuroscience and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

PubMed Central

Dando, Malcolm

2011-01-01

This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse. PMID:21350673

Anthrax: A disease of biowarfare and public health importance

PubMed Central

Goel, Ajay Kumar

2015-01-01

Bioterrorism has received a lot of attention in the first decade of this century. Biological agents are considered attractive weapons for bioterrorism as these are easy to obtain, comparatively inexpensive to produce and exhibit widespread fear and panic than the actual potential of physical damage. Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis), the etiologic agent of anthrax is a Gram positive, spore forming, non-motile bacterium. This is supposed to be one of the most potent BW agents because its spores are extremely resistant to natural conditions and can survive for several decades in the environment. B. anthracis spores enter the body through skin lesion (cutaneous anthrax), lungs (pulmonary anthrax), or gastrointestinal route (gastrointestinal anthrax) and germinate, giving rise to the vegetative form. Anthrax is a concern of public health also in many countries where agriculture is the main source of income including India. Anthrax has been associated with human history for a very long time and regained its popularity after Sept 2001 incidence in United States. The present review article describes the history, biology, life cycle, pathogenicity, virulence, epidemiology and potential of B. anthracis as biological weapon. PMID:25610847

Improving performance of HVAC systems to reduce exposure to aerosolized infectious agents in buildings; recommendations to reduce risks posed by biological attacks.

PubMed

Hitchcock, Penny J; Mair, Michael; Inglesby, Thomas V; Gross, Jonathan; Henderson, D A; O'Toole, Tara; Ahern-Seronde, Joa; Bahnfleth, William P; Brennan, Terry; Burroughs, H E Barney; Davidson, Cliff; Delp, William; Ensor, David S; Gomory, Ralph; Olsiewski, Paula; Samet, Jonathan M; Smith, William M; Streifel, Andrew J; White, Ronald H; Woods, James E

2006-01-01

The prospect of biological attacks is a growing strategic threat. Covert aerosol attacks inside a building are of particular concern. In the summer of 2005, the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center convened a Working Group to determine what steps could be taken to reduce the risk of exposure of building occupants after an aerosol release of a biological weapon. The Working Group was composed of subject matter experts in air filtration, building ventilation and pressurization, air conditioning and air distribution, biosecurity, building design and operation, building decontamination and restoration, economics, medicine, public health, and public policy. The group focused on functions of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems in commercial or public buildings that could reduce the risk of exposure to deleterious aerosols following biological attacks. The Working Group's recommendations for building owners are based on the use of currently available, off-the-shelf technologies. These recommendations are modest in expense and could be implemented immediately. It is also the Working Group's judgment that the commitment and stewardship of a lead government agency is essential to secure the necessary financial and human resources and to plan and build a comprehensive, effective program to reduce exposure to aerosolized infectious agents in buildings.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE RUSSIAN HEALTH STUDIES PROGRAM AND UPDATED RESEARCH FINDINGS

PubMed Central

Fountos, Barrett N.

2017-01-01

Abstract Recognized for conducting cutting-edge science in the field of radiation health effects research, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Russian Health Studies Program has continued to generate excitement and enthusiasm throughout its 23-year mission to assess worker and public health risks from radiation exposure resulting from nuclear weapons production activities in the former Soviet Union. The three goals of the Program are to: (1) clarify the relationship between health effects and chronic, low-to-medium dose radiation exposure; (2) estimate the cancer risks from exposure to gamma, neutron, and alpha radiation; and (3) provide information to the national and international organizations that determine radiation protection standards and practices. Research sponsored by DOE's Russian Health Studies Program is conducted under the authority of the Joint Coordinating Committee for Radiation Effects Research (JCCRER), a bi-national committee representing Federal agencies in the United States and the Russian Federation. Signed in 1994, the JCCRER Agreement established the legal basis for the collaborative research between USA and Russian scientists to determine the risks associated with working at or living near Russian former nuclear weapons production sites. The products of the Program are peer-reviewed publications on cancer risk estimates from worker and community exposure to ionizing radiation following the production of nuclear weapons in Russia. The scientific return on investment has been substantial. Through 31 December 2015, JCCRER researchers have published 299 peer-reviewed publications. To date, the research has focused on the Mayak Production Association (Mayak) in Ozersk, Russia, which is the site of the first Soviet nuclear weapons production facility, and people in surrounding communities along the Techa River. There are five current projects in the Russian Health Studies Program: two radiation epidemiology studies; two historical dose reconstruction studies and a worker biorepository. National and international standard-setting organizations use cancer risk estimates computed from epidemiological and historical dose reconstruction studies to validate or revise radiation protection standards. An overview of the most important research results will be presented. PMID:27885077

Comparative Proteomics of Tandem Mass Spectrometry Analyses for Bacterial Strains Identification and Differentiation

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-02-01

risk, bio -terrorism utility, Homeland Security, agricultural monitoring, quality of foodstuffs, environmental monitoring, and biological warfare agents...CAL19717 Putative surface antigen CAL21872 Putative sigma 54 modulation protein NP_395233 Plasminogen activator protease precursor CAL19882 OMP...S. (2005). Chemical and biological weapons : current concepts for future defenses. Johns Hopkins APL Tech. Digest, 26, 321-333. Dworzanski, J.P

The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-06-01

substantial improvements are al- lowed under the rubric of life extension. Other states are not so constrained and may find different ways to develop pure...The foregoing capabilities do not involve genetic manipulation or bioen- gineering; they utilize longstanding biological knowledge and processes. More...sophisticated understanding of biological systems (genomic and proteomic infor- mation) and processes ( genetic modification, bioengineering) for

Handshake with the Dragon: Engaging China in the Biological Weapons Convention

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-06-01

modest pharmaceutical or fermentation industry could easily and cheaply produce BTW. Mass-production methods for growing bacterial cultures that are...widely used in the commercial production of yogurt , yeast, and beer are the same used to make pathogens and toxins.45 These technical developments have...Production Although biological agents can be grown in ordinary laboratory flasks, efficient production requires specialized fermenters . Until

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

NONE

Although the Cold War has ended, the threat of proliferation with chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads continues. Two factors further increase the threat from these weapons of mass destruction: knowledge of missile technology has spread extensively, and, in recent years, many countries - some of them unfriendly to the US and its allies - have obtained short- and intermediate-range missiles. The threat posed by such missiles was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War. Thus, the need to protect US and allied forces from these weapons has never been greater. When nuclear-tipped defensive missiles, such as Sprint and Spartan, were phasedmore » out years ago, the US turned for its defense to kinetic-energy {open_quotes}kill{close_quotes} interceptors - missiles that destroy an enemy missile by striking it with lethal force and accuracy at some point in its trajectory. The Patriot missile is probably the best-known kinetic-energy (KE) interceptor in the US defensive arsenal. To counter the spreading threat of proliferation, LLNL and other laboratories have been participating in a joint program funded by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), within the Department of Defense, to develop defensive missile systems. Participants are designing, testing, and certifying KE interceptors to defend against current and future missile threats. These research efforts are described.« less

Coping with mass destruction: United States power projection in the nuclear and chemical third world. Monograph report

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cheek, G.H.

1993-05-14

This monograph explores the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World, their operational impact on power projection forces, and the viability of deterrence in the future. It concludes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may have grave consequences for the power projection forces in the future; simple assumptions of non-use, reliance on our nuclear deterrent or protective measures may give us a false sense of security. Proper analysis of operational vulnerabilities will be essential for future power projection. Proliferation of operational delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction continues despite treaties and the best intentionsmore » of world leaders. Weapons of mass destruction are becoming more common throughout the world and chemical and biological weapons continue to become more and more lethal. These trends are creating a multipolar world, which history has shown to be the most unstable. This unstable world will be the environment for future power projection. Deterrence in this environment is without precedent other than the Cold War paradigm. It is questionable whether deterrence will transfer outside this paradigm as Third World nations do not have the experience, balance of power, infrastructure or political stability needed to make the concept viable. Possession of weapons of mass destruction may even allow these nations to deter entry of US power projection forces into certain regions as deterrence is a two way concept. While deterrence is still an essential part of US National Strategy to prevent war, reliance on it to prevent use of weapons of mass destruction in the midst of a conflict may prove to be a false hope.« less

Should bioengineering graduates seek employment in the defense industry?

PubMed

Johnson, Arthur T

2014-01-01

They say that the difference between a mechanical engineer and a civil engineer is that the mechanical engineer develops weapons whereas a civil engineer designs targets. The implication is that some engineers are involved with building peaceful infrastructure whereas others contribute to destruction. This brings to mind the question: what is the proper role for engineers in the creation of weapons and defenses against them? In particular, should engineers specializing in biology or medicine be involved in the defense industry? After all, bioengineers are supposed to be builders or healers rather than warriors or destroyers.

Post-Cold War Science and Technology at Los Alamos

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Browne, John C.

2002-04-01

Los Alamos National Laboratory serves the nation through the development and application of leading-edge science and technology in support of national security. Our mission supports national security by: ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile; reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction in support of counter terrorism and homeland defense; and solving national energy, environment, infrastructure, and health security problems. We require crosscutting fundamental and advanced science and technology research to accomplish our mission. The Stockpile Stewardship Program develops and applies, advanced experimental science, computational simulation, and technology to ensure the safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. This effort in itself is a grand challenge. However, the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, reminded us of the importance of robust and vibrant research and development capabilities to meet new and evolving threats to our national security. Today through rapid prototyping we are applying new, innovative, science and technology for homeland defense, to address the threats of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons globally. Synergistically, with the capabilities that we require for our core mission, we contribute in many other areas of scientific endeavor. For example, our Laboratory has been part of the NASA effort on mapping water on the moon and NSF/DOE projects studying high-energy astrophysical phenomena, understanding fundamental scaling phenomena of life, exploring high-temperature superconductors, investigating quantum information systems, applying neutrons to condensed-matter and nuclear physics research, developing large-scale modeling and simulations to understand complex phenomena, and exploring nanoscience that bridges the atomic to macroscopic scales. In this presentation, I will highlight some of these post-cold war science and technology advances including our national security contributions, and discuss some of challenges for Los Alamos in the future.

The Gulf War's impact on ballistic missile defense systems

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Likourezos, G.

1993-01-01

During Desert Storm the United States and its allies had an overwhelming advantage over the Iraqi armed forces. Nonetheless, the Iraqis managed to strike Israel and Saudi Arabia with Scud missiles. Because of the changing political climate and the expanding transfer of technology among nations, there is great concern by the US Government about missile proliferation and the ability of any country to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The US Government tried to downplay this concern for many years until the recent events in the Middle East affirmed its seriousness. The truth is that every year countries once thought tomore » pose no international threat are acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Moreover, state-sponsored terrorist organizations could conceivably acquire these weapons in the future. In response to these concerns and in light of the lessons learned from the Gulf War, President George Bush in January 1991 redirected the SDI Program to concentrate on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, rather than from an all-out nuclear missile attack by the Soviet Union. The Patriot air defense system, after knocking out Iraqi Scuds in the Gulf War with a near perfect record, appears for now to be the working model for the development of advanced ballistic missile defense systems - direct-kill missiles and projectiles instead of laser and particle beams. Even though the Patriot's use in Desert Storm has been argued by some to have been militarily insignificant, it has managed to change the viewpoint of many political and scientific leaders into believing that ballistic missile defense systems are needed to defend peaceful population centers and military installations from missile strikes like the ones on Israel and Saudi Arabia. 18 refs.« less

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Uribe, Eva C; Sandoval, M Analisa; Sandoval, Marisa N

2009-01-01

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to accessmore » to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.« less

Stockpile Stewardship at Los Alamos(U)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Webster, Robert B.

2012-06-29

Stockpile stewardship is the retention of nuclear weapons in the stockpile beyond their original design life. These older weapons have potential changes inconsistent with the original design intent and military specifications. The Stockpile Stewardship Program requires us to develop high-fidelity, physics-based capabilities to predict, assess, certify and design nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test. Each year, the Lab Directors are required to provide an assessment of the safety, security, and reliability our stockpile to the President of the United States. This includes assessing whether a need to return to testing exists. This is a talk to provide an overviewmore » of Stockpile Stewardship's scientific requirements and how stewardship has changed in the absence of nuclear testing. The talk is adapted from an HQ talk to the War college, and historical unclassified talks on weapon's physics.« less

Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dattelbaum, Dana

2014-11-03

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- andmore » small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.« less

Gender differences in the relative impact of physical and relational bullying on adolescent injury and weapon carrying.

PubMed

Dukes, Richard L; Stein, Judith A; Zane, Jazmin I

2010-12-01

Using structural equation modeling, concurrent associations were assessed among physical bullying, relational bullying, physical victimization, relational victimization, injury and weapon carrying using data from the population of 1300 adolescent girls and 1362 adolescent boys in grades 7-12 in a Colorado school district. For both genders, being a relational bully was a significantly stronger predictor of weapon carrying than being a physical bully, and both bullying types were significant predictors of more weapon carrying. For both genders, being a victim of physical bullying, a victim of relational bullying, or being a relational bully significantly predicted more injury. In latent means comparisons, adolescent girls reported more relational victimization and adolescent boys reported more physical bullying and victimization, more weapon carrying, and more injury. The relative strength of relational bullying on weapon carrying, and the health-related consequences of bullying on interpersonal violence and injury support concerted efforts in schools to mitigate these behaviors. Attention to differences related to age and gender also is indicated in the design of bullying mitigation programs. Copyright © 2010 Society for the Study of School Psychology. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Mobile and stationary laser weapon demonstrators of Rheinmetall Waffe Munition

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ludewigt, K.; Riesbeck, Th.; Baumgärtel, Th.; Schmitz, J.; Graf, A.; Jung, M.

2014-10-01

For some years Rheinmetall Waffe Munition has successfully developed, realised and tested a variety of versatile high energy laser (HEL) weapon systems for air- and ground-defence scenarios like C-RAM, UXO clearing. By employing beam superimposition technology and a modular laser weapon concept, the total optical power has been successively increased. Stationary weapon platforms and now military mobile vehicles were equipped with high energy laser effectors. Our contribution summarises the most recent development stages of Rheinmetalls high energy laser weapon program. We present three different vehicle based HEL demonstrators: the 5 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Track V integrated in an M113 tank, the 20 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Wheel XX integrated in a multirole armoured vehicle GTK Boxer 8x8 and the 50 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Container L integrated in a reinforced container carried by an 8x8 truck. As a highlight, a stationary 30 kW Laser Weapon Demonstrator shows the capability to defeat saturated attacks of RAM targets and unmanned aerial vehicles. 2013 all HEL demonstrators were tested in a firing campaign at the Rheinmetall testing centre in Switzerland. Major results of these tests are presented.

Biosecurity management recommendations for rinderpest laboratories

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brodsky, Benjamin H; Caskey, Susan Adele; Arndt, William

2014-10-01

Rinderpest is a virus that can affect cattle and other even toes ungulates; evidence of outbreaks from over 10,000 years ago highlights the potential impact of this virus. During the 18th century, Rinderpest caused huge losses in cattle throughout Europe. Starting in the mid 1900’s vaccination efforts seemed feasible and work was initiated to vaccinate large populations of cattle. Walter Plowright received numerous awards for updating the Rinderpest vaccine which many believed would be the key to eradication. Vaccination of the disease lead to a massive drop in outbreaks and the last confirmed case of Rinderpest in Asia was inmore » 2000 and in Africa in 2001.1 At this point, Rinderpest has been declared eradicated from nature. However, stocks of the virus are still in many laboratories.2 Rinderpest was investigated as a biological weapon agent during the Second World War. However, following WWII, rinderpest was not considered a high risk as a biological weapon as there was no direct military advantage. Now, with the concern of the use of biological agents as weapons in acts of terrorism, concern regarding rinderpest has resurfaced. Since the eradication of this virus, cattle populations are highly susceptibility to the virus and the economic impacts would be significant. This paper will discuss the specific nature of the terrorism risks associated with rinderpest; and based upon those risks provide recommendations regarding biosecurity management. The biosecurity management measures will be defined in a manner to align with the CWA 15793: the laboratory biorisk management document.« less

Violence Related Behaviors and Weapon Carrying Among Hispanic Adolescents: Results from the National Youth Risk Behavior Survey, 2001-2015.

PubMed

Khubchandani, Jagdish; Price, James H

2018-04-01

Hispanic youths are disproportionately represented in gangs in the United States, are more likely to drink alcohol at younger ages, and to live in poverty; all are risks for violence and weapon carrying. No studies to date have assessed violence related behaviors and weapon carrying in Hispanic youth over an extended period. This study utilized the national Youth Risk Behavior Surveys from 2001 to 2015 to assess trends in violence related behaviors and weapon carrying of Hispanic adolescents. Our analyses found both physical fighting and fighting on school property had statistically significant reductions from 2001 to 2015 for Hispanic females and their suicide attempts increased from 2009 to 2015. Hispanic males had statistically significant decreasing trends for: being in a physical fight in the past year, being bullied on school property, being in a physical fight on school property within the past year; threatened or injured with a weapon on school property in the past year; and having attempted suicide in the past year. Hispanic females and males had two groups of items highly predictive of weapon carrying behaviors: alcohol, tobacco, and other drug use and violent risk behaviors. Both female and male students who made mostly A's or B's in school were significantly less likely (about half as likely) to carry weapons. This data could be used to identify Hispanic adolescents at higher risk for weapon carrying and used as a basis for enriching programs to improve academic success of Hispanic adolescents.

Long-Term Implications of the 2016 Future Years Defense Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-01-01

operation and maintenance activities; acquisition includes research, development, test, and evaluation as well as procurement of weapon systems and other...group includes procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). Appropriations for procurement fund the purchase of new weapon...and Evaluation Military Construction Family Housing OCO Funding Actual FYDP Period Beyond the FYDP PeriodDoD’s Estimates For 2017 through 2020 DoD

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-06-26

145 Abdul Mannan, “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan: Sabotage of a Spent Fuel Cask or a Commercial ...Pakistan’s Civil Nuclear Program.” Some analysts argue that spent nuclear fuel is more vulnerable when being transported . 146 Martellini, 2008. 147...produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s

Assessment of the DoD Embedded Media Program

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-09-01

Classified and Sensitive Information ................... VII-22 3. Weapons Systems Video, Gun Camera Video, and Lipstick Cameras...Weapons Systems Video, Gun Camera Video, and Lipstick Cameras A SECDEF and CJCS message to commanders stated, “Put in place mechanisms and processes...of public communication activities.”126 The 10 February 2003 PAG stated, “Use of lipstick and helmet-mounted cameras on combat sorties is approved

Combating terrorism : threat and risk assessments can help prioritize and target program investments

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1998-04-01

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 established the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici (NLD) domestic preparedness program. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was requested to review implementation of the NLD program. Specifically, the GAO ...

Stockpile Stewardship: How We Ensure the Nuclear Deterrent Without Testing

ScienceCinema

None

2018-01-16

In the 1990s, the U.S. nuclear weapons program shifted emphasis from developing new designs to dismantling thousands of existing weapons and maintaining a much smaller enduring stockpile. The United States ceased underground nuclear testing, and the Department of Energy created the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without full-scale testing. This video gives a behind the scenes look at a set of unique capabilities at Lawrence Livermore that are indispensable to the Stockpile Stewardship Program: high performance computing, the Superblock category II nuclear facility, the JASPER a two stage gas gun, the High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF), the National Ignition Facility (NIF), and the Site 300 contained firing facility.

Sandia Dynamic Materials Program Strategic Plan.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Flicker, Dawn Gustine; Benage, John F.; Desjarlais, Michael P.

2017-05-01

Materials in nuclear and conventional weapons can reach multi-megabar pressures and 1000s of degree temperatures on timescales ranging from microseconds to nanoseconds. Understanding the response of complex materials under these conditions is important for designing and assessing changes to nuclear weapons. In the next few decades, a major concern will be evaluating the behavior of aging materials and remanufactured components. The science to enable the program to underwrite decisions quickly and confidently on use, remanufacturing, and replacement of these materials will be critical to NNSA’s new Stockpile Responsiveness Program. Material response is also important for assessing the risks posed bymore » adversaries or proliferants. Dynamic materials research, which refers to the use of high-speed experiments to produce extreme conditions in matter, is an important part of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.« less

High energy laser demonstrators for defense applications

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jung, M.; Riesbeck, Th.; Schmitz, J.; Baumgärtel, Th.; Ludewigt, K.; Graf, A.

2017-01-01

Rheinmetall Waffe Munition has worked since 30 years in the area of High Energy Laser (HEL) for defence applications, starting from pulsed CO2 to pulsed glass rods lasers. In the last decade Rheinmetall Waffe Munition changed to diode pumped solid state laser (DPSSL) technology and has successfully developed, realised and tested a variety of versatile HEL weapon demonstrators for air- and ground defence scenarios like countering rocket, artillery, mortar, missile (RAMM), unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and unexploded ordnances clearing. By employing beam superimposing technology and a modular laser weapon concept, the total optical power has been successively increased. Stationary weapon platforms, military vehicles and naval platforms have been equipped with high energy laser effectors. The contribution gives a summary of the most recent development stages of Rheinmetalls HEL weapon program. In addition to the stationary 30 kW laser weapon demonstrator, we present vehicle based HEL demonstrators: the 5 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Track V, the 20 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Wheel XX and the 50 kW class Mobile HEL Effector Container L and the latest 10 kW HEL effector integrated in the naval weapon platform MLG 27. We describe the capabilities of these demonstrators against different potential targets. Furthermore, we will show the capability of the 30 kW stationary Laser Weapon Demonstrator integrated into an existing ground based air defence system to defeat saturated attacks of RAMM and UAS targets.

A New Approach to Evaluating the Risk–Benefit Equation for Dual-Use and Gain-of-Function Research of Concern

PubMed Central

Imperiale, Michael J.; Casadevall, Arturo

2018-01-01

In the twenty-first century, biology faces a problem that has previously vexed other disciplines such as physics, namely the prospect that its knowledge domain could be used to generate biological agents with altered properties that enhanced their weapon potential. Biological weapons bring the additional dimension that these could be self-replicating, easy to manufacture and synthesized with commonly available expertise. This resulted in increasing concern about the type of research done and communicated, despite the fact that such research often has direct societal benefits, bringing the dual-use dilemma to biology. The conundrum of dual use research of concern was crystallized by the so-called “gain-of-function” type of experiments in which avian influenza viruses were endowed with new properties in the laboratory such as increased virulence and the capacity for mammalian transmission. After more than a decade of intensive discussion and controversy involving biological experiments with dual-use potential, there is no consensus on the issue except for the need to carry out such experiments in the safest conditions possible. In this essay, we review the topic with the hindsight of several years and suggest that instead of prescribing prohibitions and experimental limitations the focus should be on the importance of scientific questions at hand. We posit that the importance of a scientific question for medical and scientific progress provides a benchmark to determine the acceptable level of risk in biological experimentation. PMID:29568736

Compliance with Community Mitigation and Interventions in Pandemic Influenza: A Community Policing Strategy

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-09-01

Monica Schoch-Spana of the Bloomberg School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University, in an article for the journal Confronting Biological Weapons ...Joseph Barbera et al., “Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological Terrorism in the United States,” JAMA 286 (2001), http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint...divergent practices. Mark Rothstein and others, writing for the Institute of Bioethics at the University of

The Illogic of the Biological Weapons Taboo

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-01-01

strategic approach to arms control is consistent with well- known theo­ ries of international relations (IR). Most prominently, many realists have long ...strike retaliatory systems, such as long -range bomber forces or nuclear-armed submarines. Schelling and Halperin also argued that arms control can...of biological pathogens—bacteria, viruses, fungi and toxins—to kill or incapacitate one’s enemies has a long pedigree that includes not only Scythian

Guide to U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Effects Data

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-12-01

biological warfare agents, and radiation dosimeters . XRD- 163 identifies the test location of each 4-6 biological sample. Reports containing the results...along with position of the animals at the time of the detonation. Vycor Glass Gamma Ray Dosimeters XRD-176 A rugged new dosimeter capable of measuring...gamma doses on animals exposed to high levels of radiation was employed during Able. Dosimeter readings, locations, and animal condition are reported

Insect-gene-activity detection system for chemical and biological warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mackie, Ryan S.; Schilling, Amanda S.; Lopez, Arturo M.; Rayms-Keller, Alfredo

2002-02-01

Detection of multiple chemical and biological weapons (CBW) agents and/or complex mixtures of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) is imperative for both the commercial and military sectors. In a military scenario, a multi-CBW attack would create confusion, thereby delaying decontamination and therapeutic efforts. In the commercial sector, polluted sites invariably contain a mixture of TIC. Novel detection systems capable of detecting CBW and TIC are sorely needed. While it may be impossible to build a detector capable of discriminating all the possible combinations of CBW, a detection system capable of statistically predicting the most likely composition of a given mixture is within the reach of current emerging technologies. Aquatic insect-gene activity may prove to be a sensitive, discriminating, and elegant paradigm for the detection of CBW and TIC. We propose to systematically establish the expression patterns of selected protein markers in insects exposed to specific mixtures of chemical and biological warfare agents to generate a library of biosignatures of exposure. The predicting capabilities of an operational library of biosignatures of exposures will allow the detection of emerging novel or genetically engineered agents, as well as complex mixtures of chemical and biological weapons agents. CBW and TIC are discussed in the context of war, terrorism, and pollution.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hallenbeck, R.A.; Gill, J.M.; Murray, B.L.

The March seminar, ``Military and Diplomatic Roles and Options`` for managing and responding to proliferation, featured three presentations: the military and diplomatic implications of preemptive force as a counterproliferation option; an in-depth assessment of the threat posed by biological weapons; and, a new proposed US counterproliferation policy.