Sample records for chemical weapons assessment

  1. [Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

    PubMed

    Nakamura, Katsumi

    2005-10-01

    Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

  2. Technology resource document for the assembled chemical weapons assessment environmental impact statement. Vol. 4 : assembled systems for weapons destruction at Pueblo Chemical Depot.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kimmell, T.; Folga, S., Frey, G.; Molberg, J.

    2001-04-30

    This volume of the Technical Resource Document (TRD) for the ''Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Design, Construction and Operation of One or More Pilot Test Facilities for Assembled Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies at One or More Sites'' (PMACWA 2001c) pertains to the destruction of assembled chemical weapons (ACW) stored at Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD), located outside Pueblo, Colorado. This volume presents technical and process information on each of the destruction technologies applicable to treatment of the specific ACW stored at PCD. The destruction technologies described are those that have been demonstrated during Phase I of the Assembled Chemical Weaponsmore » Assessment (ACWA) demonstration process (see Volume 1).« less

  3. Technology resource document for the assembled chemical weapons assessment environmental impact statement. Vol. 5 : assembled systems for weapons destruction at Blue Grass Army Depot.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kimmell, T.; Folga, S., Frey, G.; Molberg, J.

    2001-05-02

    This volume of the Technical Resource Document (TRD) for the ''Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Design, Construction and Operation of One or More Pilot Test Facilities for Assembled Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies at One or More Sites'' (PMACWA 2001g) pertains to the destruction of assembled chemical weapons (ACW) stored in the U.S. Army's unitary chemical stockpile at Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), located outside Richmond, Kentucky. This volume presents technical and process information on each of the destruction technologies applicable to treatment of the specific ACW stored at BGAD. The destruction technologies described are those that have been demonstratedmore » as part of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) selection process (see Volume 1).« less

  4. Chemical Demilitarization Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-12-01

    Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA) is performing a portion of the chemical warfare materiel elimination mission. In 1996, Congress and the...Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) RCS: DD-A&T(Q&A)823-243 Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil-ACWA) As...Date Assigned: December 19, 2010 Program Information Program Name Chemical Demilitarization-Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (Chem Demil

  5. Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

    PubMed Central

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-01-01

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

  6. Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

    PubMed

    Pitschmann, Vladimír

    2014-06-04

    This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

  7. Potential Applicability of Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Technologies to RCRA Waste Streams and Contaminated Media (PDF)

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    This report provides an evaluation of the potential applicability of Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA) technologies to RCRA waste streams and contaminated media found at RCRA and Superfund sites.

  8. Bugs and gas: Agreements banning chemical and biological weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mikulak, Robert P.

    2017-11-01

    The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.

  9. Syria’s Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-09-12

    chemical weapons, explaining that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would...Damascus used or lost control of its chemical weapons, explaining that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving...do further work to establish a definitive judgment as to whether or not the red line has been crossed and to inform our decision-making about what to

  10. Options for the destruction of chemical weapons and management of the associated risks.

    PubMed

    Manley, Ron G

    2006-09-01

    The destruction of chemical weapons is a hazardous operation. The degree of hazard posed, however, is not uniform and is dependent on the specific chemical agent and the configuration of the weapon or bulk storage vessel in which it is contained. For example, a highly volatile nerve agent in an explosively configured munition, such as a rocket, poses a very different hazard from that of a bulk storage container of viscous mustard gas. Equally the handling of recovered, often highly corroded, World War (WW)I or WWII chemical munitions will pose a very different hazard from that associated with dealing with modern chemical weapons stored under the appropriate conditions. Over the years, a number of technologies have been developed for the destruction of chemical weapons. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. None of them provide a universal solution to the problem. When assessing options for the destruction of these weapons and the management of the associated risks, therefore, it is important to give due consideration and weight to these differences. To ensure that the destruction technology selected takes due account of them and that the resulting overall risk assessment accurately reflects the actual risks involved.

  11. Worldwide governmental efforts to locate and destroy chemical weapons and weapons materials: minimizing risk in transport and destruction.

    PubMed

    Trapp, Ralf

    2006-09-01

    The article gives an overview on worldwide efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the context of the implementation of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It highlights the objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency set up in The Hague to implement the CWC, and provides an overview of the present status of implementation of the CWC requirements with respect to chemical weapons (CW) destruction under strict international verification. It addresses new requirements that result from an increased threat that terrorists might attempt to acquire or manufacture CW or related materials. The article provides an overview of risks associated with CW and their elimination, from storage or recovery to destruction. It differentiates between CW in stockpile and old/abandoned CW, and gives an overview on the factors and key processes that risk assessment, management, and communication need to address. This discussion is set in the overall context of the CWC that requires the completion of the destruction of all declared CW stockpiles by 2012 at the latest.

  12. 15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or... REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY-CCL BASED CONTROLS § 742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention). States... Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  13. 15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or... REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY-CCL BASED CONTROLS § 742.18 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention). States... Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC...

  14. Chemical weapons: documented use and compounds on the horizon.

    PubMed

    Bismuth, Chantal; Borron, Stephen W; Baud, Frederic J; Barriot, Patrick

    2004-04-01

    Man's inhumanity to man is expressed through a plethora of tools of modern warfare and terror. The use of chemical and biological weapons with the goals of assault, demoralisation and lethality has been documented in recent history, both on the battlefield and in urban terror against civilians. A general review of a few of the currently employed chemical weapons and biological toxins, along with a look at potential chemical weapons and tools of counter-terrorism, follows. While these weapons are fearsome elements, the dangers should be viewed in the context of the widespread availability and efficacy of conventional weapons.

  15. Technology resource document for the assembled chemical weapons assessment environmental impact statement. Vol. 2 : assembled systems for weapons destruction at Anniston Army Depot.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kimmell, T.; Folga, S., Frey, G.; Molberg, J.

    2001-05-04

    This volume of the Technical Resource Document (TRD) for the ''Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Design, Construction and Operation of One or More Pilot Test Facilities for Assembled Chemical Weapons Destruction Technologies at One or More Sites'' (PMACWA 2001g) pertains to the destruction of assembled chemical weapons (ACW) stored at Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), located outside Anniston, Alabama. This volume presents technical and process information on each of the destruction technologies applicable to treatment of the specific ACW stored at ANAD. The destruction technologies described are those that have been demonstrated as part of the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessmentmore » (ACWA) selection process (see Volume 1).« less

  16. The Banning of Chemical Weapons: Tantalus Revisited.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1983-04-14

    of Chemical and Biological Warfare, by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman. Chemical and Engineering News, Vol. 60, No. 47, 22 November 1982, p. 34. 3...1 AD-A127 792 THE BANNING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS: TANTALUS REVISITED(U) 1/1 IARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA F N DUREL 14 APR 8 UNCLASSIFIED F/G 15/2...number) Since the mid-ninetenth century, nations have sought to limit the u.s Of chemical weapons with varying degrees of success. On-going

  17. Chemical and biological weapons in the 'new wars'.

    PubMed

    Ilchmann, Kai; Revill, James

    2014-09-01

    The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

  18. Emergency management of chemical weapons injuries.

    PubMed

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-02-01

    The potential for chemical weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Classes of chemical weapons include nerve agents, vesicants (blister agents), choking agents, incapacitating agents, riot control agents, blood agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. The nerve agents work by blocking the actions of acetylcholinesterase leading to a cholinergic syndrome. Nerve agents include sarin, tabun, VX, cyclosarin, and soman. The vesicants include sulfur mustard and lewisite. The vesicants produce blisters and also damage the upper airways. Choking agents include phosgene and chlorine gas. Choking agents cause pulmonary edema. Incapacitating agents include fentanyl and its derivatives and adamsite. Riot control agents include Mace and pepper spray. Blood agents include cyanide. The mechanism of toxicity for cyanide is blocking oxidative phosphorylation. Toxic industrial chemicals include agents such as formaldehyde, hydrofluoric acid, and ammonia.

  19. 77 FR 59891 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-01

    ... Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Declaration and Report Handbook and Forms AGENCY: Bureau of Industry.... Abstract The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international arms control treaty. II. Method of Collection Submitted...

  20. 78 FR 55326 - Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-09-10

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8460] Determinations Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 AGENCY: Bureau of...(d) of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, as amended...

  1. Responding to chemical weapons violations in Syria: legal, health, and humanitarian recommendations.

    PubMed

    Brooks, Julia; Erickson, Timothy B; Kayden, Stephanie; Ruiz, Raul; Wilkinson, Stephen; Burkle, Frederick M

    2018-01-01

    The repeated use of prohibited chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict poses serious health, humanitarian, and security threats to civilians, healthcare personnel, and first responders. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons constitutes a clear and egregious violation of international law-likely amounting to a war crime-for which continued impunity is setting a dangerous precedent in relation to current and future conflicts. This debate article calls upon concerned states, organizations, and individuals to respond urgently and unequivocally to this serious breach of international legal and humanitarian norms. Based on health, humanitarian, and legal findings, this article calls for concrete action to: 1) reduce the risk of chemical weapons being used in current and future conflicts; 2) review and support the preparedness equipment and antidote supplies of first responders, humanitarian organizations, and military forces operating in Syria; 3) support international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the prohibition on chemical weapons, including through criminal accountability; 4) support civilian victims of chemical weapons attacks, including refugees; and 5) re-commit to the complete elimination of chemical weapons in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), a comprehensive treaty that bans chemical weapons and requires their complete destruction. All involved states and organizations should take urgent steps to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable victims of conflict, including victims of chemical weapons attacks in Syria, and to reinforce international law in the face of such serious violations.

  2. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  3. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  4. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  5. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  6. 48 CFR 225.7005 - Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Restriction on certain chemical weapons antidote. 225.7005 Section 225.7005 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE... on certain chemical weapons antidote. ...

  7. Sea-dumped chemical weapons: environmental risk, occupational hazard.

    PubMed

    Greenberg, M I; Sexton, K J; Vearrier, D

    2016-01-01

    Chemical weapons dumped into the ocean for disposal in the twentieth century pose a continuing environmental and human health risk. In this review we discuss locations, quantity, and types of sea-dumped chemical weapons, related environmental concerns, and human encounters with sea-dumped chemical weapons. We utilized the Ovid (http://ovidsp.tx.ovid.com) and PubMed (http://www.pubmed.org) search engines to perform MEDLINE searches for the terms 'sea-dumped chemical weapons', 'chemical warfare agents', and 'chemical munitions'. The searches returned 5863 articles. Irrelevant and non-English articles were excluded. A review of the references for these articles yielded additional relevant sources, with a total of 64 peer-reviewed articles cited in this paper. History and geography of chemical weapons dumping at sea: Hundreds of thousands of tons of chemical munitions were disposed off at sea following World War II. European, Russian, Japanese, and United States coasts are the areas most affected worldwide. Several areas in the Baltic and North Seas suffered concentrated large levels of dumping, and these appear to be the world's most studied chemical warfare agent marine dumping areas. Chemical warfare agents: Sulfur mustard, Lewisite, and the nerve agents appear to be the chemical warfare agents most frequently disposed off at sea. Multiple other type of agents including organoarsenicals, blood agents, choking agents, and lacrimators were dumped at sea, although in lesser volumes. Environmental concerns: Numerous geohydrologic variables contribute to the rate of release of chemical agents from their original casings, leading to difficult and inexact modeling of risk of release into seawater. Sulfur mustard and the organoarsenicals are the most environmentally persistent dumped chemical agents. Sulfur mustard in particular has a propensity to form a solid or semi-solid lump with a polymer coating of breakdown products, and can persist in this state on the ocean floor

  8. Proposals for chemical weapons during the American Civil War.

    PubMed

    Hasegawa, Guy R

    2008-05-01

    Proposals for chemical weapons that arose during the American Civil War are described. Most incendiary and all biological agents are excluded. The described proposals appeared primarily in periodicals or letters to government officials on both sides. The weapons were usually meant to temporarily disable enemy combatants, but some might have been lethal, and Civil War caregivers were ill-prepared to deal with the weapons' effects. Evidently, none of the proposed weapons were used. In only one instance was use against civilians mentioned. Among the agents most commonly proposed were cayenne pepper or other plant-based irritants such as black pepper, snuff, mustard, and veratria. Other suggested agents included chloroform, chlorine, hydrogen cyanide, arsenic compounds, sulfur, and acids. Proponents usually suggested that the chemicals be included in explosive artillery projectiles. Less commonly proposed vehicles of delivery included fire engines, kites, and manned balloons. Some of the proposed weapons have modern counterparts.

  9. A feasibility study of the destruction of chemical weapons by photocatalytic oxidation

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hitchman, M.L.; Spackman, A.R.; Yusta, F.J.

    1997-01-01

    The destruction of existing arsenals or deposits of chemical weapons is an important obstacle on the way to the successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention which was opened for signature in 1993. Many approaches have been proposed and none can be seen as panacea. Each has its merits and shortcomings. In this paper we review the different technologies and propose a new one, photocatalytic oxidation, which has the potential to fill an important gap; a cheap, small, mobile facility for chemical warfare agents which are difficult to transport or are deposited in a remote area. We report some relevantmore » experimental results with this technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. After many years of negotiation, a convention banning the production, possession and use of chemical weapons was opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. The convention, once it is ratified, will provide a framework and a program for the destruction of chemical weapons by the nations party to it. The framework will cover such topics as definitions of terminology, general rules of verification and verification measures, level of destruction of chemical weapons, activities not prohibited under the convention, and investigations in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. The program will require that countries with chemical weapons shall start their destruction not later than one year after they have ratified the convention, and that they shall complete it within a ten year period. For this period involved countries are required to declare their plans for destruction. These plans have to include a time schedule for the destruction process, an inventory of equipment and buildings to be destroyed, proposed measures for verification, safety measures to be observed during destruction, specification of the types of chemical weapons and the type and quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed, and specification of the destruction method. 38 refs.« less

  10. Toxic industrial chemicals and chemical weapons: exposure, identification, and management by syndrome.

    PubMed

    Tomassoni, Anthony J; French, Robert N E; Walter, Frank G

    2015-02-01

    Toxidromes aid emergency care providers in the context of the patient presenting with suspected poisoning, unexplained altered mental status, unknown hazardous materials or chemical weapons exposure, or the unknown overdose. The ability to capture an adequate chemical exposure history and to recognize toxidromes may reduce dependence on laboratory tests, speed time to delivery of specific antidote therapy, and improve selection of supportive care practices tailored to the etiologic agent. This article highlights elements of the exposure history and presents selected toxidromes that may be caused by toxic industrial chemicals and chemical weapons. Specific antidotes for toxidromes and points regarding their use, and special supportive measures, are presented. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  11. Detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens

    DOEpatents

    Mariella Jr., Raymond P.

    2004-09-07

    A system for detection and treatment of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens uses a detector system, an electrostatic precipitator or scrubber, a circulation system, and a control. The precipitator or scrubber is activated in response to a signal from the detector upon the detection of chemical weapons and/or biological pathogens.

  12. Chemical and biological weapons: new questions, new answers.

    PubMed Central

    Hood, E

    1999-01-01

    The words "chemical and biological weapons" (CBW) send a shiver down most spines these days. With the end of the Cold War, the possibility of a massive nuclear confrontation appears remote, so today many popular doomsday scenarios center on the aggressive use of chemical or biological warfare by rogue nations or terrorist groups. As exaggerated as some of the accounts are, with CBW cast as the latest unseen, unstoppable enemy, the threat posed by these weapons is all too real, and growing. Images p931-a PMID:10585899

  13. 15 CFR 745.2 - End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 745.2 Section 745.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations... EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS § 745.2 End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Note: The End-Use Certificate requirement of...

  14. 15 CFR 745.2 - End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 745.2 Section 745.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations... EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS § 745.2 End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Note: The End-Use Certificate requirement of...

  15. 15 CFR 745.2 - End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 745.2 Section 745.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations... EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS § 745.2 End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Note: The End-Use Certificate requirement of...

  16. 15 CFR 745.2 - End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 745.2 Section 745.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations... EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS § 745.2 End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Note: The End-Use Certificate requirement of...

  17. 28 CFR 552.25 - Use of less-than-lethal weapons, including chemical agents.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Use of less-than-lethal weapons... Use of less-than-lethal weapons, including chemical agents. (a) The Warden may authorize the use of less-than-lethal weapons, including those containing chemical agents, only when the situation is such...

  18. 28 CFR 552.25 - Use of less-than-lethal weapons, including chemical agents.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Use of less-than-lethal weapons... Use of less-than-lethal weapons, including chemical agents. (a) The Warden may authorize the use of less-than-lethal weapons, including those containing chemical agents, only when the situation is such...

  19. 28 CFR 552.25 - Use of less-than-lethal weapons, including chemical agents.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Use of less-than-lethal weapons... Use of less-than-lethal weapons, including chemical agents. (a) The Warden may authorize the use of less-than-lethal weapons, including those containing chemical agents, only when the situation is such...

  20. 77 FR 75145 - Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-19

    ... the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals (Including Schedule 1 Chemicals Produced as Intermediates) Through Calendar Year... Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA) and...

  1. Hazards of chemical weapons release during war: new perspectives.

    PubMed Central

    Reutter, S

    1999-01-01

    The two major threat classes of chemical weapons are mustard gas and the nerve agents, and this has not changed in over 50 years. Both types are commonly called gases, but they are actually liquids that are not remarkably volatile. These agents were designed specifically to harm people by any route of exposure and to be effective at low doses. Mustard gas was used in World War I, and the nerve agents were developed shortly before, during, and after World War II. Our perception of the potency of chemical weapons has changed, as well as our concern over potential effects of prolonged exposures to low doses and potential target populations that include women and children. Many of the toxicologic studies and human toxicity estimates for both mustard and nerve agents were designed for the purpose of quickly developing maximal casualties in the least sensitive male soldier. The "toxicity" of the chemical weapons has not changed, but our perception of "toxicity" has. PMID:10585902

  2. [New approaches to early diagnosis of chronic organophosphorus chemicals intoxication in workers at chemical weapons extermination objects].

    PubMed

    Babakov, V N; Goncharov, N V; Radilov, A S; Glashkina, E P; Podol'skaia, E P; Ermolaeva, E E; Shilov, V V; Prokof'eva, D S; Voĭtenko, N G; Egorov, N A

    2009-01-01

    Mass spectrum analysis revealed differences in general contents of low-molecular peptides spectrums in chemical weapons extermination object staffers, in comparison with the reference group. Findings are that serum paraoxonase activity in chemical weapons extermination object staffers in significantly increased.

  3. Aum Shinrikyo's Chemical and Biological Weapons: More Than Sarin.

    PubMed

    Tu, A T

    2014-07-01

    The radical religious group Aum Shinrikyo was founded in Japan in the 1980s and grew rapidly in the 1990s. Aum members perpetrated a mass murder in Matsumoto City in 1994, where they used sarin as a chemical weapon to poison approximately 500 civilians. On March 20, 1995, Aum deployed sarin in an even larger terrorist attack on the Tokyo Subway System, which poisoned some 6,000 people. After the Tokyo Subway attack, the Japanese Police arrested the sect's senior members. From 2005 through 2011, 13 of these senior members were sentenced to death. In this article, aspects of Aum's chemical and biological terrorism are reviewed. Sarin production efforts by the sect are described, including how the degradation product of sarin in soil, methylphosphonic acid, enabled the detection of sarin production sites. Also, Aum's chemical-warfare agents other than sarin are described, as are its biological weapons. The author was permitted by the Japanese government to interview Dr. Tomomasa Nakagawa, one of the senior members of Aum Shinrikyo. From Dr. Nakagawa the author obtained valuable inside information about Aum's chemical and biological weapons programs. Copyright © 2014 Central Police University.

  4. Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

    PubMed

    Prockop, Leon D

    2006-11-01

    The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

  5. 15 CFR 742.2 - Proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... in ECCN 1C350 (precursor and intermediate chemicals used in the production of chemical warfare agents... on the CCL, chemical detection systems controlled by 1A004.c for detecting chemical warfare agents... used in the production of chemical weapons precursors or chemical warfare agents. (vii) Equipment and...

  6. Detecting Chemical Weapons: Threats, Requirements, Solutions, and Future Challenges

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Boso, Brian

    2011-03-01

    Although chemicals have been reportedly used as weapons for thousands of years, it was not until 1915 at Ypres, France that an industrial chemical, chlorine, was used in World War I as an offensive weapon in significant quantity, causing mass casualties. From that point until today the development, detection, production and protection from chemical weapons has be an organized endeavor of many of the world's armed forces and in more recent times, non-governmental terrorist organizations. The number of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) has steadily increased as research into more toxic substances continued for most of the 20 th century. Today there are over 70 substances including harassing agents like tear gas, incapacitating agents, and lethal agents like blister, blood, chocking, and nerve agents. The requirements for detecting chemical weapons vary depending on the context in which they are encountered and the concept of operation of the organization deploying the detection equipment. The US DoD, for example, has as a requirement, that US forces be able to continue their mission, even in the event of a chemical attack. This places stringent requirements on detection equipment. It must be lightweight (<2 lbs), detect a large array of chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals, detect and warn at concentration levels and time duration to prevent acute health effects, meet military ruggedness specifications and work over a wide range of temperature and humidity, and have a very high probability of detection with a similarly low probability of false positives. The current technology of choice to meet these stringent requirements is Ion Mobility Spectrometry. Many technologies are capable of detecting chemicals at the trace levels required and have been extensively developed for this application, including, but not limited to: mass spectroscopy, IR spectroscopy, RAMAN spectroscopy, MEMs micro-cantilever sensors, surface acoustic wave sensors, differential

  7. 75 FR 69630 - Impact of Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial Activities Involving...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-15

    ... Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals, Including Production of Schedule 1 Chemicals as Intermediates, Through Calendar Year 2010 AGENCY: Bureau of... (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention...

  8. [Prospects in getting accordance between chemical analytic control means and medical technical requirements to safety system concerning chemical weapons destruction].

    PubMed

    Rembovskiĭ, V R; Mogilenkova, L A; Savel'eva, E I

    2005-01-01

    The major unit monitoring chemical weapons destruction objects is a system of chemical analyticcontrol over the technologic process procedures and possibility of environment and workplace pollution withtoxicchemicals and their destruction products. At the same time, physical and chemical control means meet sanitary and hygienic requirements incompletely. To provide efficient control, internationally recognized approaches should be adapted to features of Russian system monitoring pollution of chemical weapons destruction objects with toxic chemicals.

  9. 78 FR 74218 - Imposition of Additional Sanctions on Syria Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-10

    ... Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 AGENCY: Bureau of International... determination was made that the Government of Syria used chemical weapons in violation of international law or lethal chemical weapons against its own nationals. Notice of this determination was published on...

  10. 15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.6 Relationship between the... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Relationship between the Chemical...

  11. 2006, REMOTE SENSING AND GIS IN THE REMEDIATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTAMINATION IN AN URBAN LANDSCAPE

    EPA Science Inventory

    This presentation will document the use of historical imagery, GIS, photogrammetry and hyperspectral remote sensing in locating and removing chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas, Phosgene, Ricin, and Lewisite from the environment and establishing a risk assessment methodology for...

  12. The Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Alexander, Archibald S.; And Others

    This book is composed of four papers prepared to illuminate the problem areas which might arise if the policies of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other measures to limit chemical and biological weapons are ratified by the United States Senate. The papers included are: Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; The Use of Herbicides in War: A…

  13. [On necessity to modify biochemical methods for detecting organophosphorus componds in chemical weapons extinction objects (review of literature)].

    PubMed

    Prokofieva, D S; Shmurak, V I; Sadovnikov, S V; Gontcharov, N V

    2015-01-01

    The article covers problems of biochemical methods assessing organophosphorus toxic compounds in objects of chemical weapons extinction. The authors present results of works developing new, more specific and selective biochemical methods.

  14. Effects of a chemical weapons incineration plant on red-tailed tropicbirds

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Schreiber, E.A.; Doherty, P.F.; Schenk, G.A.

    2001-01-01

    From 1990 to 2000, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) incinerated part of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll, central Pacific Ocean, which also is a National Wildlife Refuge and home to approximately a half-million breeding seabirds. The effect on wildlife of incineration of these weapons is unknown. Using a multi-strata mark-recapture analysis, we investigated the effects of JACADS on reproductive success, survival, and movement probabilities of red-tailed tropicbirds (Phaethon rubricauda) nesting both downwind and upwind of the incineration site. We found no effect of chemical incineration on these tropicbird demographic parameters over the 8 years of our study. An additional 3 years of monitoring tropicbird demography will take place, post-incineration.

  15. Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in Program Accountability and Financial Management

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2000-05-01

    United States General Accounting Office PAQ Report to Congressional Committees May 2000 CHEMICAL WEAPONS DISPOSAL Improvements Needed in Program...warfare materiel, and former production facilities and identify and locate buried chemical warfare materiel. Alternative Technologies and Approaches...production facilities, and buried chemical warfare materiel. These items are described in table 1. Table 1: Nonstockpile Chemical Materiel Category

  16. United States initiative for chemical weapons arms control. Master`s thesis, 2 August 1995-7 June 1996

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Scott, R.D.

    1996-06-07

    This research investigates the US policy initiative renouncing the employment of chemical weapons (CW). The focus of the research is to determine if such an initiative will achieve the national objective for implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). If the initiative does not meet the national objective are there feasible options for the United States Government (USG). In 1993, the USG established a policy banning the use of chemical weapons. This act may have won the battle for the moral high ground, but it will not deter nor eliminate the use of chemical weapons worldwide. The relative ease bymore » which a nation can take various combinations of chemical compounds and produce a lethal chemical agent makes deterrence and/or complete elimination virtually impossible. The US should continue to employ the elements of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy regarding nonproliferation inclusive of a proven deterrent-CW. No use of CW or any weapon of mass destruction is best, but until the CWC is ratified a deterrent should be maintained by the US.« less

  17. Emergency preparedness among people living near US army chemical weapons sites after September 11, 2001.

    PubMed

    Williams, Bryan L; Magsumbol, Melina S

    2007-09-01

    We examined trust in the army and perceptions of emergency preparedness among residents living near the Anniston, Ala, and Richmond, Ky, US Army chemical weapons stockpile sites shortly after September 11, 2001. Residents (n = 655) living near the 2 sites who participated in a cross-sectional population were relatively unprepared in the event of a chemical emergency. The events of September 11 gave rise to concerns regarding the security of stored chemical weapons and the sites' vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Although residents expressed trust in the army to manage chemical weapons safely, only a few expressed a desire to actively participate in site decisions. Compliance with procedures during emergencies could be seriously limited, putting residents in these sites at higher levels of risk of exposure to chemical hazards than nonresidents.

  18. Emergency Preparedness Among People Living Near US Army Chemical Weapons Sites After September 11, 2001

    PubMed Central

    Williams, Bryan L.; Magsumbol, Melina S.

    2007-01-01

    We examined trust in the army and perceptions of emergency preparedness among residents living near the Anniston, Ala, and Richmond, Ky, US Army chemical weapons stockpile sites shortly after September 11, 2001. Residents (n = 655) living near the 2 sites who participated in a cross-sectional population were relatively unprepared in the event of a chemical emergency. The events of September 11 gave rise to concerns regarding the security of stored chemical weapons and the sites’ vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Although residents expressed trust in the army to manage chemical weapons safely, only a few expressed a desire to actively participate in site decisions. Compliance with procedures during emergencies could be seriously limited, putting residents in these sites at higher levels of risk of exposure to chemical hazards than nonresidents. PMID:17666684

  19. [In-hospital management of victims of chemical weapons of mass destruction].

    PubMed

    Barelli, Alessandro; Gargano, Flavio; Proietti, Rodolfo

    2005-01-01

    Emergency situations caused by chemical weapons of mass destruction add a new dimension of risk to those handling and treating casualties. The fundamental difference between a hazardous materials incident and conventional emergencies is the potential for risk from contamination to health care professionals, patients, equipment and facilities of the Emergency Department. Accurate and specific guidance is needed to describe the procedures to be followed by emergency medical personnel to safely care for a patient, as well as to protect equipment and people. This review is designed to familiarize readers with the concepts, terminology and key operational considerations that affect the in-hospital management of incidents by chemical weapons.

  20. 76 FR 6087 - Draft Weapons Safety Assessment on the Use of Enhanced Weapons; Notice of Availability and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-02-03

    ... holders, and other stakeholders on a draft guidance document entitled ``Weapons Safety Assessment'' (WSA... weapons under the NRC's proposed rule titled ``Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security.... You should not include any site-specific security information in your comments. Federal rulemaking Web...

  1. 15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

  2. 15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

  3. 15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

  4. 15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

  5. 15 CFR 744.4 - Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... biological weapons end-uses. 744.4 Section 744.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce... ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CONTROL POLICY: END-USER AND END-USE BASED § 744.4 Restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses. (a) General prohibition. In addition to the license requirements for...

  6. Non-Lethal Chemical Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2003-04-01

    effects include stupor, confusion, and confabulation with concrete and panoramic illusions and hallucinations , and regression to automatic “phantom...scientifically feasible.” (Federation of American Scientists Article, 2) Opponents of non-lethal weapons contend that because certain individuals...3000.3) According to the Federation of American Scientists , these weapons can be placed into two main categories: incapacitants (including military

  7. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

  8. Weapons Retrieved After the Implementation of Emergency Department Metal Detection.

    PubMed

    Malka, S Terez; Chisholm, Robin; Doehring, Marla; Chisholm, Carey

    2015-09-01

    Several high-profile violent incidents have occurred within emergency departments (EDs). There are no recent studies reporting the effectiveness of ED metal detection. Our aim was to assess the effect of metal detection on ED weapons retrieval. In September 2011, a metal detector was installed at the entrance of an urban, high-volume teaching hospital ED. The security company recorded retrieved firearms, knives, chemical sprays, and other weapons. We performed qualitative analysis of weapons retrieval data for a 26-month period. A total of 5877 weapons were retrieved, an average of 218 per month: 268 firearms, 4842 knives, 512 chemical sprays, and 275 other weapons, such as brass knuckles, stun guns, and box cutters. The number of retrieved guns decreased from 2012 to 2013 (from 182 to 47), despite an increase in metal detection hours from 8 h per day to 16 h per day. The number of retrieved knives, chemical sprays, and other weapons increased. Recovered knives increased from 2062 in 2012 to 2222 in 2013, chemical sprays increased from 170 to 305, and other weapons increased from 51 to 201. A large number of weapons were retrieved after the initiation of metal detection in the ED entrance. Increasing hours of metal detection increased the number of retrieved knives, chemical sprays, and other weapons. Retrieved firearms decreased after increasing metal detection hours. Metal detection in the ED entrance is effective in reducing entrance of weapons into the ED. Metal detectors may offer additional benefit in reducing attempts to enter with firearms. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. Acute and Long-Term Impact of Chemical Weapons: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War.

    PubMed

    Haines, D D; Fox, S C

    2014-07-01

    Chemical weapons have given the human experience of warfare a uniquely terrifying quality that has inspired a general repugnance and led to periodic attempts to ban their use. Nevertheless, since ancient times, toxic agents have been consistently employed to kill and terrorize target populations. The evolution of these weapons is examined here in ways that may allow military, law enforcement, and scientific professionals to gain a perspective on conditions that, in the past, have motivated their use - both criminally and as a matter of national policy during military campaigns. Special emphasis is placed on the genocidal use of chemical weapons by the regime of Saddam Hussein, both against Iranians and on Kurdish citizens of his own country, during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88. The historical development of chemical weapons use is summarized to show how progressively better insight into biochemistry and physiology was adapted to this form of warfare. Major attributes of the most frequently used chemical agents and a description of how they affected military campaigns are explained. Portions of this review describing chemical-casualty care devote particular focus to Iranian management of neurotoxic (nerve) agent casualties due to the unique nature of this experience. Both nerve and blistering "mustard" agents were used extensively against Iranian forces. However, Iran is the only nation in history to have sustained large-scale attacks with neurotoxic weapons. For this reason, an understanding of the successes and failures of countermeasures to nerve-agent use developed by the Iranian military are particularly valuable for future civil defense and military planning. A detailed consideration of these strategies is therefore considered. Finally, the outcomes of clinical research into severe chronic disease triggered by mustard-agent exposure are examined in the context of the potential of these outcomes to determine the etiology of illness among US and Allied veterans

  10. TSARINA: A computer model for assessing conventional and chemical attacks on air bases

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Emerson, D.E.; Wegner, L.H.

    This Note describes the latest version of the TSARINA (TSAR INputs using AIDA) airbase damage assessment computer program that has been developed to estimate the on-base concentration of toxic agents that would be deposited by a chemical attack and to assess losses to various on-base resources from conventional attacks, as well as the physical damage to runways, taxiways, buildings, and other facilities. Although the model may be used as a general-purpose, complex-target damage assessment model, its primary role in intended to be in support of the TSAR (Theater Simulation of Airbase Resources) aircraft sortie generation simulation program. When used withmore » TSAR, multiple trials of a multibase airbase-attack campaign can be assessed with TSARINA, and the impact of those attacks on sortie generation can be derived using the TSAR simulation model. TSARINA, as currently configured, permits damage assessments of attacks on an airbase (or other) complex that is compassed of up to 1000 individual targets (buildings, taxiways, etc,), and 2500 packets of resources. TSARINA determines the actual impact points (pattern centroids for CBUs and container burst point for chemical weapons) by Monte Carlo procedures-i.e., by random selections from the appropriate error distributions. Uncertainties in wind velocity and heading are also considered for chemical weapons. Point-impact weapons that impact within a specified distance of each target type are classed as hits, and estimates of the damage to the structures and to the various classes of support resources are assessed using cookie-cutter weapon-effects approximations.« less

  11. Vulnerability assessment of a space based weapon platform electronic system exposed to a thermonuclear weapon detonation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Perez, C. L.; Johnson, J. O.

    Rapidly changing world events, the increased number of nations with inter-continental ballistic missile capability, and the proliferation of nuclear weapon technology will increase the number of nuclear threats facing the world today. Monitoring these nation's activities and providing an early warning and/or intercept system via reconnaissance and surveillance satellites and space based weapon platforms is a viable deterrent against a surprise nuclear attack. However, the deployment of satellite and weapon platform assets in space will subject the sensitive electronic equipment to a variety of natural and man-made radiation environments. These include Van Allen Belt protons and electrons; galactic and solar flare protons; and neutrons, gamma rays, and x-rays from intentionally detonated fission and fusion weapons. In this paper, the MASH vl.0 code system is used to estimate the dose to the critical electronics components of an idealized space based weapon platform from neutron and gamma-ray radiation emitted from a thermonuclear weapon detonation in space. Fluence and dose assessments were performed for the platform fully loaded, and in several stages representing limited engagement scenarios. The results indicate vulnerabilities to the Command, Control, and Communication bay instruments from radiation damage for a nuclear weapon detonation for certain source/platform orientations. The distance at which damage occurs will depend on the weapon yield (n,(gamma)/kiloton) and size (kilotons).

  12. Synthesis of reference compounds related to Chemical Weapons Convention for verification and drug development purposes – a Brazilian endeavour

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cavalcante, S. F. A.; de Paula, R. L.; Kitagawa, D. A. S.; Barcellos, M. C.; Simas, A. B. C.; Granjeiro, J. M.

    2018-03-01

    This paper deals with challenges that Brazilian Army Organic Synthesis Laboratory has been going through to access reference compounds related to the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to support verification analysis and for research of novel antidotes. Some synthetic procedures to produce the chemicals, as well as Quality Assurance issues and a brief introduction of international agreements banning chemical weapons are also presented.

  13. 76 FR 76935 - Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-09

    ... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security [Docket No. 111130706-1686-01] Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals Through Calendar Year 2011; Impact of Adding Salts of CWC ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals to ``Schedule 1...

  14. [Consequences learned from the use of chemical weapons during the First World War for the modern military medicine].

    PubMed

    Belskikh, A N; Basharin, V A; Chepur, S V; Khalimov, Yu Sh; Markizova, N F

    2015-08-01

    The article describes the way medical service dealed with problems resulted from the use of chemical weapons during the First World War (1914-1918). It was revealed that many of the abovementioned problems remain unsolved up to the present moment. It is stated the existence of the threat of use of chemical weapons in modem military conflicts, which expands the area of responsibility for medical chemical protection. The authors proved necessity and algorithm of the training system, considered as a part of medical protection in case of adverse factors of chemical nature.

  15. Neurotoxic Weapons and Syndromes.

    PubMed

    Carota, Antonio; Calabrese, Pasquale; Bogousslavsky, Julien

    2016-01-01

    The modern era of chemical and biological warfare began in World War I with the large-scale production and use of blistering and choking agents (chlorine, phosgene and mustard gases) in the battlefield. International treaties (the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention) banned biological and chemical weapons. However, several countries are probably still engaged in their development. Hence, there is risk of these weapons being used in the future. This chapter will focus on neurotoxic weapons (e.g. nerve agents, chemical and biological neurotoxins, psychostimulants), which act specifically or preeminently on the central nervous system and/or the neuromuscular junction. Deeply affecting the function of the nervous system, these agents either have incapacitating effects or cause clusters of casualties who manifest primary symptoms of encephalopathy, seizures, muscle paralysis and respiratory failure. The neurologist should be prepared both to notice patterns of symptoms and signs that are sufficiently consistent to raise the alarm of neurotoxic attacks and to define specific therapeutic interventions. Additionally, extensive knowledge on neurotoxic syndromes should stimulate scientific research to produce more effective antidotes and antibodies (which are still lacking for most neurotoxic weapons) for rapid administration in aerosolized forms in the case of terrorist or warfare scenarios. © 2016 S. Karger AG, Basel.

  16. Analytical technique to address terrorist threats by chemical weapons of mass destruction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dempsey, Patrick M.

    1997-01-01

    Terrorism is no longer an issue without effect on the American mind. We now live with the same concerns and fears that have been commonplace in other developed and third world countries for a long time. Citizens of other countries have long lived with the specter of terrorism and now the U.S. needs to be concerned and prepared for terrorist activities.T he terrorist has the ability to cause great destructive effects by focusing their effort on unaware and unprepared civilian populations. Attacks can range from simple explosives to sophisticated nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Intentional chemical releases of hazardous chemicals or chemical warfare agents pose a great threat because of their ready availability and/or ease of production, and their ability to cause widespread damage. As this battlefront changes from defined conflicts and enemies to unnamed terrorists, we must implement the proper analytical tools to provide a fast and efficient response. Each chemical uses in a terrorists weapon leaves behind a chemical signature that can be used to identify the materials involved and possibly lead investigators to the source and to those responsible. New tools to provide fast and accurate detection for battlefield chemical and biological agent attack are emerging. Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is one of these tools that has found increasing use by the military to respond to chemical agent attacks. As the technology becomes smaller and more portable, it can be used by law enforcement personnel to identify suspected terrorist releases and to help prepare the response; define contaminated areas for evacuation and safety concerns, identify the proper treatment of exposed or affected civilians, and suggest decontamination and cleanup procedures.

  17. (+/-)-catechin: chemical weapon, antioxidant, or stress regulator?

    PubMed

    Chobot, Vladimir; Huber, Christoph; Trettenhahn, Guenter; Hadacek, Franz

    2009-08-01

    (+/-)-Catechin is a flavan-3-ol that occurs in the organs of many plant species, especially fruits. Health-beneficial effects have been studied extensively, and notable toxic effects have not been found. In contrast, (+/-)-catechin has been implicated as a 'chemical weapon' that is exuded by the roots of Centaurea stoebe, an invasive knapweed of northern America. Recently, this hypothesis has been rejected based on (+/-)-catechin's low phytotoxicity, instability at pH levels higher than 5, and poor recovery from soil. In the current study, (+/-)-catechin did not inhibit the development of white and black mustard to an extent that was comparable to the highly phytotoxic juglone, a naphthoquinone that is allegedly responsible for the allelopathy of the walnut tree. At high stress levels, caused by sub-lethal methanol concentrations in the medium, and a 12 h photoperiod, (+/-)-catechin even attenuated growth retardation. A similar effect was observed when (+/-)-catechin was assayed for brine shrimp mortality. Higher concentrations reduced the mortality caused by toxic concentrations of methanol. Further, when (+/-)-catechin was tested in variants of the deoxyribose degradation assay, it was an efficient scavenger of reactive oxygen species (ROS) when they were present in higher concentrations. This antioxidant effect was enhanced when iron was chelated directly by (+/-)-catechin. Conversely, if iron was chelated to EDTA, pro-oxidative effects were demonstrated at higher concentrations; in this case (+/-)-catechin reduced molecular oxygen and iron to reagents required by the Fenton reaction to produce hydroxyl radicals. A comparison of cyclic voltammograms of (+/-)-catechin with the phytotoxic naphthoquinone juglone indicated similar redox-cycling properties for both compounds although juglone required lower electrochemical potentials to enter redox reactions. In buffer solutions, (+/-)-catechin remained stable at pH 3.6 (vacuole) and decomposed at pH 7.4 (cytoplasm

  18. 77 FR 22559 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-04-16

    ... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the Export Administration Regulations AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce, as part of its...

  19. Reducing health risk assigned to organic emissions from a chemical weapons incinerator.

    PubMed

    Laman, David M; Weiler, B Douglas; Skeen, Rodney S

    2013-03-01

    Organic emissions from a chemical weapons incinerator have been characterized with an improved set of analytical methods to reduce the human health risk assigned to operations of the facility. A gas chromatography/mass selective detection method with substantially reduced detection limits has been used in conjunction with scanning electron microscopy/energy dispersive X-ray spectrometry and Fourier transform infrared microscopy to improve the speciation of semi-volatile and non-volatile organics emitted from the incinerator. The reduced detection limits have allowed a significant reduction in the assumed polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) and aminobiphenyl (ABP) emission rates used as inputs to the human health risk assessment for the incinerator. A mean factor of 17 decrease in assigned human health risk is realized for six common local exposure scenarios as a result of the reduced PAH and ABP detection limits.

  20. [Changes in functional state during occupational activities in workers at objects for chemical weapons destruction].

    PubMed

    2010-01-01

    The authors studied functional state before and after the working shift in workers at objects for chemical weapons destruction, analyzed changes in central and peripheral hemodynamics parameters, vegetative regulation of heart rhythm, stabilographic and psychophysiologic values.

  1. REMOTE SENSING AND GIS IN THE REMEDIATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTAMINATION IN AN URBAN LANDSCAPE

    EPA Science Inventory

    During World War I, The American University in Washington D.C. was used by the U.S. Army as an experiment station for the development and testing of a variety of battlefield munitions including chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas, Phosgene, Ricin and Lewisite. After the end of t...

  2. Warranties for Weapons: Theory and Initial Assessment.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1987-04-01

    the warranty on the C-17 air vehicle.2 This warranty calls for the field measurement of some five maintainability parameters, redesign and retrofit of...NOTE N-2479-AF Warranties for Weapons: Theory and Initial Assessment James P. Stucker, Giles K. Smith April 1987 Prepared for The United States Air Force...cost, schedule, performance, and reliability? The Air Force and the other Services currently are spending a lot of money and effort specifying

  3. Youths Carrying a Weapon or Using a Weapon in a Fight: What Makes the Difference?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-Andre; Berchtold, Andre; Akre, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were…

  4. Youths carrying a weapon or using a weapon in a fight: what makes the difference?

    PubMed

    Thurnherr, Judit; Michaud, Pierre-André; Berchtold, André; Akré, Christina; Suris, Joan-Carles

    2009-04-01

    The objective of this study was to characterize weapon-carrying adolescents and to assess whether weapon carriers differ from weapon users. Data were drawn from a cross-sectional school-based survey of 7548 adolescents aged 16-20 years in Switzerland. Youths carrying a weapon were compared with those who do not. Subsequently, weapon carriers were divided into those who had used it in a fight and those who had not. Individual, family, school and social factors were analyzed using bivariate and stepwise multivariate analysis. For both genders, delinquent behavior and being victim of physical violence were associated with weapon carrying. For males, quarreling while intoxicated, being an apprentice, being sensation seekers, having a tattoo, having a poor relationship with parents and practicing unsafe sex were also related to weapon carrying. Compared with weapon carriers, female weapon users were more likely to be regular smokers. Male weapon users were foreign born, urban and apprentices; had poor school connectedness; practiced unsafe sex and quarreled while intoxicated. Carrying a weapon is a relatively frequent behavior among youths in Switzerland and a sizeable proportion of weapon carriers have used it in a fight. Weapon carrying should be part of the clinical assessment and preventive counseling of adolescents. Preventive programs specific for at-risk youth groups need to be developed.

  5. Environmental Effects of Weapons Technology, A Scientists' Institute for Public Information Workbook.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    McClintock, Michael; And Others

    This collection of articles includes a general account of the environmental effects of modern weapons technology, a selection of news reports demonstrating the peacetime hazards of chemical and biological weapons, data on the physiological effects of the most common chemical weapons, a discussion of the hazards of biological weapons, a report of…

  6. Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-09-01

    Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD, defined as nuclear, chemical , and biological) and weapons of mass effect (WME, defined as other high... Chemical Weapons • Scoping Study for a U.S.-Israel Strategic Dialogued 5 • U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue • Implications of Indian Tactical...of Chemical Weapons : Strategic Dialogue, Research, and Report Performer: Arizona State University (ASU) Principal Investigator: Orde Kittrie Cost

  7. Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jenkins, Bonnie

    1997-01-01

    Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

  8. The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Stern, J.E.

    This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed Second, how can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat to national sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement. The first danger is that the agreementmore » will be so minimalist that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that the treaty will have such a weak enforcement mechanism that although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relative ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the [open quotes]balance of terror.[close quotes] The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.« less

  9. The control of chemical weapons: A strategic analysis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Stern, J.E.

    This thesis develops an analytical framework for optimal design of a ban on chemical weapons (CW). The thesis addresses two principal questions: first, could it be in the interest of individual states to adopt a CW ban, even if compliance by adversaries cannot be presupposed? Second, how compliance by adverse can designers of the treaty maximize incentives to accede and to national comply, but simultaneously minimize the threat sovereignty, including the risk of giving up a deterrent stockpile, and the risk that sensitive information would be revealed during inspections? Three problems can plague any disarmament agreement will be so minimalistmore » that although all countries may adhere to it, it will have little effect on international behavior. The second danger is that weak enforcement mechanism that the treaty will have such a although nations may accede, they may not comply under conditions of international stress. The third danger is that the terms of the arrangement will be so onerous that few nations will agree to adopt it in the first place. This thesis develops a framework for thinking about how to strike the proper balance between these competing concerns. A salient characteristic of CW is the relative ease with which they can be produced in secret. The dissertation analyzes the effectiveness of inspection procedures of varying intrusiveness, and investigates the risks to sensitive government and industrial facilities. The thesis concludes with an analysis of the extent to which a ban on a single weapon could enhance the stability of the ``balance of terror.`` The author makes specific policy recommendations about how to set the optimal level of enforcement so that the ban is likely to succeed, and thus become more than a symbolic gesture.« less

  10. [Medical aspects of common non-lethal weapons].

    PubMed

    Kunz, Sebastian Niko; Grove, Christina; Monticelli, Fabio

    2014-03-01

    The development and provision of non-lethal weapons (NLW) allow military and law enforcement personnel to exploit gradual engagement in countering potentially hazardous threats. Chemical, kinetic and electrical weapons systems are used to curb violence in civilian crowds. With inappropriate usage, these technologies can cause potentially fatal injuries that are not only of clinical, but also of legal relevance. In this context, the practicing physician is faced with treatment as well as assessment issues of new forms of injuries. In order to assure medical care and to be able to draw competent expert's conclusions, a detailed knowledge of the medical effects of these NLW is necessary. The review at hand presents today's most popular NLW and gives an overview of their possible injury potential and required treatments.

  11. Historical precedence and technical requirements of biological weapons use : a threat assessment.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Estes, Daniel P.; Vogel, Kathleen Margaret; Gaudioso, Jennifer Marie

    2004-05-01

    The threat from biological weapons is assessed through both a comparative historical analysis of the patterns of biological weapons use and an assessment of the technological hurdles to proliferation and use that must be overcome. The history of biological weapons is studied to learn how agents have been acquired and what types of states and substate actors have used agents. Substate actors have generally been more willing than states to use pathogens and toxins and they have focused on those agents that are more readily available. There has been an increasing trend of bioterrorism incidents over the past century, butmore » states and substate actors have struggled with one or more of the necessary technological steps. These steps include acquisition of a suitable agent, production of an appropriate quantity and form, and effective deployment. The technological hurdles associated with the steps present a real barrier to producing a high consequence event. However, the ever increasing technological sophistication of society continually lowers the barriers, resulting in a low but increasing probability of a high consequence bioterrorism event.« less

  12. Implementing the chemical weapons convention: The nuts and bolts of compliance

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Tanzman, E.A.

    This paper is a presentation prepared for the American Bar Association in which the author discusses the issue of rights to privacy in the United States in the face of implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention inspections. The author points out that there are no clear precedents in law which deal with all the issues which will result from international inspections for verification which are required by the treaty. In particular as inspections tread on the issue of personal rights or private property there is a fairly ill defined legal area which needs to be developed to allow such inspections inmore » the face of constitutional guarantees.« less

  13. Medical experimentation concerning chemical and biological weapons for mass destruction.

    PubMed

    Deutsch, Erwin

    2003-04-01

    This article is the text of a speech originally presented at the Second World Conference on Medical Ethics at Gijon, Spain, on 2 October 2002 under the title "Medical Experimentation Concerning Chemical and Biological Weapons for Mass Destruction: Clinical Design for New Smallpox Vaccines: Ethical and Legal Aspects." Experimentation on vaccines such as smallpox is subject to the usual ethical rules such as the need for informed consent. However, the participants will not often be at risk of catching the disease but expose themselves by taking part in the experimentation. Professor Deutsch explores the implications of this, including the position of vulnerable groups such as children, those with mental handicaps, and those acting under orders such as the miliary, the policy and fire officers.

  14. 2007 Joint Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Conference and Exhibition - Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-06-27

    Selected CB Defense Systems SHAPESENSE Joint Warning and Reporting Network JSLIST CB Protected Shelter Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program Joint Effects...military can operate in any environment, unconstrained by chemical or biological weapons. 21 SHIELD SUSTAIN Selected CB Defense Systems SHAPESENSE Joint...28070625_JCBRN_Conference_Reeves UNCLASSIFIED Decontamination Vision Strippable Barriers Self-Decontaminating Fabrics/Coatings Reduce Logistics Burden

  15. Chemical Demilitarization - Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment (ACWA): Root Cause Analysis

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-07-01

    BGCAPP, supercritical water oxidation (SCWO) will subject the hydrolysate to very high temperatures and pressures, breaking it down into carbon dioxide ...ANS. The resulting hydrolysates from both the chemical and energetic process are then broken down into carbon dioxide , water and salts in the SCWO...Cutter Machine RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation RSM Rocket Shear Machine SAR Selected Acquisition Report SCWO Supercritical Water

  16. [Life quality parameters in prenosologic evaluation of health state in residents of protective measures area near objects of storage and destruction of chemical weapons].

    PubMed

    Filippov, V L; Nechaeva, E N

    2014-01-01

    The article presents results of life quality assessment and subjective evaluation data on health state, used for prenosologic evaluation of health state in residents of protective measures area near objects of storage and destruction of chemical weapons. Considering specific features of residence near potentially dangerous objects, the authors conducted qualitative evaluation of satisfaction with various life facets, with taking into account the objects specificity, established correlation between life quality and self-evaluation of health with factors influencing public health state.

  17. Bioterrorism: toxins as weapons.

    PubMed

    Anderson, Peter D

    2012-04-01

    The potential for biological weapons to be used in terrorism is a real possibility. Biological weapons include infectious agents and toxins. Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms. Toxins relevant to bioterrorism include ricin, botulinum, Clostridium perfrigens epsilson toxin, conotoxins, shigatoxins, saxitoxins, tetrodotoxins, mycotoxins, and nicotine. Toxins have properties of biological and chemical weapons. Unlike pathogens, toxins do not produce an infection. Ricin causes multiorgan toxicity by blocking protein synthesis. Botulinum blocks acetylcholine in the peripheral nervous system leading to muscle paralysis. Epsilon toxin damages cell membranes. Conotoxins block potassium and sodium channels in neurons. Shigatoxins inhibit protein synthesis and induce apoptosis. Saxitoxin and tetrodotoxin inhibit sodium channels in neurons. Mycotoxins include aflatoxins and trichothecenes. Aflatoxins are carcinogens. Trichothecenes inhibit protein and nucleic acid synthesis. Nicotine produces numerous nicotinic effects in the nervous system.

  18. [Anniversary of the medical department of the Federal Office for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons].

    PubMed

    Kuz'menko, I E

    2013-01-01

    The article is devoted to the process of formation and development of CW destruction management system and medical support of professional activities of personnel. Founders of Medical department of the Federal Directorate for Safe Storage and Destruction of Chemical Weapons are presented. Main principles and ways of working of medical department in specific conditions are covered.

  19. Can an attribution assessment be made for Yellow Rain? Systematic reanalysis in a chemical-and-biological-weapons use investigation.

    PubMed

    Katz, Rebecca; Singer, Burton

    2007-03-01

    In intelligence investigations, such as those into reports of chemical- or biological-weapons (CBW) use, evidence may be difficult to assemble and, once assembled, to weigh. We propose a methodology for such investigations and then apply it to a large body of recently declassified evidence to determine the extent to which an attribution can now be made in the Yellow Rain case. Our analysis strongly supports the hypothesis that CBW were used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although a definitive judgment cannot be made. The proposed methodology, while resource-intensive, allows evidence to be assembled and analyzed in a transparent manner so that assumptions and rationale for decisions can be challenged by external critics. We conclude with a discussion of future research directions, emphasizing the use of evolving information-extraction (IE) technologies, a sub-field of artificial intelligence (AI).

  20. On-matrix derivatization extraction of chemical weapons convention relevant alcohols from soil.

    PubMed

    Chinthakindi, Sridhar; Purohit, Ajay; Singh, Varoon; Dubey, D K; Pardasani, Deepak

    2013-10-11

    Present study deals with the on-matrix derivatization-extraction of aminoalcohols and thiodiglycols, which are important precursors and/or degradation products of VX analogues and vesicants class of chemical warfare agents (CWAs). The method involved hexamethyldisilazane (HMDS) mediated in situ silylation of analytes on the soil. Subsequent extraction and gas chromatography-mass spectrometry analysis of derivatized analytes offered better recoveries in comparison to the procedure recommended by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Various experimental conditions such as extraction solvent, reagent and catalyst amount, reaction time and temperature were optimized. Best recoveries of analytes ranging from 45% to 103% were obtained with DCM solvent containing 5%, v/v HMDS and 0.01%, w/v iodine as catalyst. The limits of detection (LOD) and limit of quantification (LOQ) with selected analytes ranged from 8 to 277 and 21 to 665ngmL(-1), respectively, in selected ion monitoring mode. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  1. [The development of neurotoxic agents as chemical weapons during the National Socialist period in Germany].

    PubMed

    López-Muñoz, F; Alamo, C; Guerra, J A; García-García, P

    The discovery and development of the so-called 'nerve agents' (neurotoxic substances to be used as weapons) took place in the Third Reich, largely thanks to the vast amount of progress being made in pharmacology in Germany at that time, both in academic and industrial terms. Furthermore, successive National Socialist governments set up a collaborative network made up of the academia, the chemical industry and military chiefs that also favoured this line of research. The first neurotoxic substance to be incorporated into the category of 'chemical warfare agent' did so almost wholly by chance. As part of the work being carried out on organophosphate-type pesticides and insecticides, Gerald Schrader, a chemist at the I.G. Farben company, synthesised tabun (ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate) and an incident involving accidental contamination of laboratory staff with this substance highlighted its potential toxicity. The same group of researchers later synthesised another substance with the same properties, sarin (isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate). Both agents were studied for use as chemical weapons by Wolfgang Wirth. At the same time, a group led by Richard Kuhn, who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1938, synthesised pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate, otherwise known as soman. Pharmacological studies confirmed that the neurotoxic mechanism of action of these substances was the irreversible inhibition of the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, which is responsible for metabolising acetylcholine. Results also showed that an excess of this neurotransmitter led to a continuous over-stimulation of the cholinergic (nicotinic and muscarinic) receptors, which is what triggers the appearance of the wide range of symptoms of poisoning and their swift fatal effect.

  2. 3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 3 The President 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...

  3. 3 CFR - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 3 The President 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of... Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order... of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...

  4. Geochemistry of chemical weapon breakdown products on the seafloor: 1,4-thioxane in seawater.

    PubMed

    Zhang, Xin; Hester, Keith C; Mancillas, Oscar; Peltzer, Edward T; Walz, Peter M; Brewer, Peter G

    2009-02-01

    The long-term fate of chemical weapon debris disposed of in the ocean some 50 years ago, now sinking into marine sediments and leaking into the ocean environment, is poorly known. Direct evidence exists showing chemical weapon agents actively being released on the sea floor with detrimental effects including harm to marine life. Thus there is strong interest in determining the fate and lifetime of these materials, their decomposition products, and the affected zones around these sites. Here we study the geochemical properties of a mustard gas breakdown product, 1,4-thioxane (TO), using Raman spectroscopy. We show that TO forms a hydrate with a help-gas (a second guest added to stabilize the hydrate), such as methane or hydrogen sulfide, with the hydrate stability regime some 10 degrees C above pure methane hydrate. The temperature, pressure, and reducing conditions required for hydrate formation commonly occur at known disposal sites. The TO solubility was measured in seawater and found to vary from 0.65 to 0.63 mol/kg water between 4.5 and 25.0 degrees C. Similar to other hydrate systems, the TO solubility decreased in the presence of hydrate. A low solubility in water coupled with its ability to form a hydrate within marine sediments can greatly decrease molecular mobility and increase its lifetime. These results demonstrate how unanticipated reactions with marine sediments can occur, and how little is known of the processes controlling the environmental science of these materials.

  5. PRESENTED 03/01/2006: 2006 REMOTE SENSING AND GIS IN THE REMEDIATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTAMINATION IN AN URBAN LANDSCAPE

    EPA Science Inventory

    During World War 1, The American University in Washington, DC was used by the U.S. Army as an experiment station for the development and testing of a variety of battlefield munitions including chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas, Phosgene, Ricin and Lewisite

  6. Assessing State Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Using Bayesian Network Analysis of Social Factors

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Coles, Garill A.; Brothers, Alan J.; Olson, Jarrod

    A Bayesian network (BN) model of social factors can support proliferation assessments by estimating the likelihood that a state will pursue a nuclear weapon. Social factors including political, economic, nuclear capability, security, and national identity and psychology factors may play as important a role in whether a State pursues nuclear weapons as more physical factors. This paper will show how using Bayesian reasoning on a generic case of a would-be proliferator State can be used to combine evidence that supports proliferation assessment. Theories and analysis by political scientists can be leveraged in a quantitative and transparent way to indicate proliferationmore » risk. BN models facilitate diagnosis and inference in a probabilistic environment by using a network of nodes and acyclic directed arcs between the nodes whose connections, or absence of, indicate probabilistic relevance, or independence. We propose a BN model that would use information from both traditional safeguards and the strengthened safeguards associated with the Additional Protocol to indicate countries with a high risk of proliferating nuclear weapons. This model could be used in a variety of applications such a prioritization tool and as a component of state safeguards evaluations. This paper will discuss the benefits of BN reasoning, the development of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s (PNNL) BN state proliferation model and how it could be employed as an analytical tool.« less

  7. Conflict Without Casualties: Non-Lethal Weapons in Irregular Warfare

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-09-01

    the body,” and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, bans the use of chemical and biological weapons .11 On 8 April 1975, President Ford issued Executive...E Funding – PE 63851M) (accessed 15 December 2006). The American Journal of Bioethics . “Medical Ethics and Non-Lethal Weapons .” Bioethics.net...CASUALTIES: NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN IRREGULAR WARFARE by Richard L. Scott September 2007 Thesis Advisor: Robert McNab Second Reader

  8. 75 FR 68671 - Continuation of Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-08

    ... the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of... Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential Documents #0; #0; #0;#0;Federal Register / Vol. 75... [[Page 68673

  9. GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A.; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

    2016-09-01

    A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process.

  10. GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer.

    PubMed

    Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

    2016-09-01

    A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process. Graphical Abstract ᅟ.

  11. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 9, 2011 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

  12. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... to Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential Documents Notice of November 1, 2012 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On... United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass...

  13. 22 CFR 103.11 - Payment of final assessment.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Payment of final assessment. 103.11 Section 103.11 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON...

  14. Nuclear Weapons: DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to Nuclear Forces

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-09-01

    NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOD Assessed the Need for Each Leg of the Strategic Triad and Considered Other Reductions to... Nuclear Forces Report to Congressional Requesters September 2016 GAO-16-740 United States Government Accountability Office United States...Government Accountability Office Highlights of GAO-16-740, a report to congressional requesters September 2016 NUCLEAR WEAPONS DOD Assessed

  15. 3 CFR - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Presidential Documents Other Presidential... Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, the President... chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998...

  16. Public Health, Law, and Local Control: Destruction of the US Chemical Weapons Stockpile

    PubMed Central

    Greenberg, Michael R.

    2003-01-01

    Destruction of US chemical weapons has begun at one of the 8 sites in the continental United States, was completed on Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean, and is scheduled to begin in at least 3 other locations during the upcoming year. About 25% of the stockpile and 38% of the munitions had been destroyed as of December 31, 2002. However, the program has become controversial with regard to choice of technology, emergency management, and cost. This controversy is in large part due to efforts by some state and local governments and activist groups to play a more central role in a decisionmaking process that was once fully controlled by the US Army. PMID:12893599

  17. 76 FR 70317 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-11-10

    ... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of...--Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction #0; #0; #0; Presidential... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

  18. 77 FR 66513 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-11-05

    ... proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President issued Executive Order 13094 amending Executive... the National Emergency With Respect to Weapons of Mass Destruction On November 14, 1994, by Executive...

  19. Future Foreign Perceptions of Chemical Weapons Utility

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-10-01

    Iraq’s and Syria’s nuclear weapons programs, and the specter of such action may have precipitated Libya to abandon its program. North Korea and Iran ...declared as such. Today, only seven states have not acceded to the CWC: Angola, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar , North Korea , Somalia, and Syria.1 Of those...seven, Syria and North Korea most evidently maintain active offensive CW programs. Of CWC state par- ties, the United States has expressed compliance

  20. Quality of life in chemical warfare survivors with ophthalmologic injuries: the first results form Iran Chemical Warfare Victims Health Assessment Study

    PubMed Central

    Mousavi, Batool; Soroush, Mohammad Reza; Montazeri, Ali

    2009-01-01

    Background Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988). The aim of this study was to assess the health related quality of life (HRQOL) in people who had ophthalmologic complications due to the sulfur mustard gas exposure during the war. Methods The Veterans and Martyrs Affair Foundation (VMAF) database indicated that there were 196 patients with severe ophthalmologic complications due to chemical weapons exposure. Of these, those who gave consent (n = 147) entered into the study. Quality of life was measured using the 36-item Short Form Health Survey (SF-36) and scores were compared to those of the general public. In addition logistic regression analysis was performed to indicate variables that contribute to physical and mental health related quality of life. Results The mean age of the patients was 44.8 (SD = 8.7) ranging from 21 to 75 years. About one-third of the cases (n= 50) reported exposure to chemical weapons more than once. The mean exposure duration to sulfur mustard gas was 21.6 years (SD = 1.2). The lowest scores on the SF-36 subscales were found to be: the role physical and the general health. Quality of life in chemical warfare victims who had ophthalmologic problems was significantly lower than the general public (P < 0.001). The results obtained from logistic regression analysis indicated that those who did not participate in sport activities suffer from a poorer physical health (OR = 2.93, 95% CI = 1.36 to 6.30, P = 0.006). The analysis also showed that poor mental health was associated with longer time since exposure (OR = 1.58, 95% CI = 1.04 to 2.39, P = 0.03) and lower education (OR = 3.03, 95% CI = 1.21 to 7.56, P = 0.01). Conclusion The study findings suggest that chemical warfare victims with ophthalmologic complications suffer from poor health related quality of life. It seems that the need for provision of health and support for this population is urgent. In addition, further research

  1. Quality of life in chemical warfare survivors with ophthalmologic injuries: the first results form Iran Chemical Warfare Victims Health Assessment Study.

    PubMed

    Mousavi, Batool; Soroush, Mohammad Reza; Montazeri, Ali

    2009-01-19

    Iraq used chemical weapons extensively against the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). The aim of this study was to assess the health related quality of life (HRQOL) in people who had ophthalmologic complications due to the sulfur mustard gas exposure during the war. The Veterans and Martyrs Affair Foundation (VMAF) database indicated that there were 196 patients with severe ophthalmologic complications due to chemical weapons exposure. Of these, those who gave consent (n = 147) entered into the study. Quality of life was measured using the 36-item Short Form Health Survey (SF-36) and scores were compared to those of the general public. In addition logistic regression analysis was performed to indicate variables that contribute to physical and mental health related quality of life. The mean age of the patients was 44.8 (SD = 8.7) ranging from 21 to 75 years. About one-third of the cases (n= 50) reported exposure to chemical weapons more than once. The mean exposure duration to sulfur mustard gas was 21.6 years (SD = 1.2). The lowest scores on the SF-36 subscales were found to be: the role physical and the general health. Quality of life in chemical warfare victims who had ophthalmologic problems was significantly lower than the general public (P < 0.001). The results obtained from logistic regression analysis indicated that those who did not participate in sport activities suffer from a poorer physical health (OR = 2.93, 95% CI = 1.36 to 6.30, P = 0.006). The analysis also showed that poor mental health was associated with longer time since exposure (OR = 1.58, 95% CI = 1.04 to 2.39, P = 0.03) and lower education (OR = 3.03, 95% CI = 1.21 to 7.56, P = 0.01). The study findings suggest that chemical warfare victims with ophthalmologic complications suffer from poor health related quality of life. It seems that the need for provision of health and support for this population is urgent. In addition, further research is necessary to measure health related

  2. Database for chemical weapons detection: first results

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bellecci, C.; Gaudio, P.; Gelfusa, M.; Martellucci, S.; Richetta, M.; Ventura, P.; Antonucci, A.; Pasquino, F.; Ricci, V.; Sassolini, A.

    2008-10-01

    The quick increase of terrorism and asymmetric war is leading towards new needs involving defense and security. Nowadays we have to fight several kind of threats and use of chemical weapons against civil or military objectives is one of the most dangerous. For this reason it is necessary to find equipment, know-how and information that are useful in order to detect and identify dangerous molecules as quickly and far away as possible, so to minimize damage. Lidar/Dial are some of the most powerful optical technologies. Dial technology use two different wavelengths, in order to measure concentration profile of an investigated molecule. For this reason it is needed a "fingerprint" database which consists of an exhaustive collection of absorption coefficients data so to identify each molecule avoiding confusion with interfering ones. Nowadays there is not such a collection of data in scientific and technical literature. We used an FT-IR spectrometer and a CO2 laser source for absorption spectroscopy measurements using cells filled with the investigated molecules. The CO2 source is the transmitter of our DIAL facility. In this way we can make a proper "fingerprint" database necessary to identify dangerous molecules. The CO2 laser has been chosen because it is eye safe and, mainly, because it covers a spectral band where there is good absorption for this kind of molecules. In this paper IR spectra of mustard will be presented and compared to other substances which may interfere producing a false alarm. Methodology, experimental setup and first results are described.

  3. High-energy laser weapons: technology overview

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Perram, Glen P.; Marciniak, Michael A.; Goda, Matthew

    2004-09-01

    High energy laser (HEL) weapons are ready for some of today"s most challenging military applications. For example, the Airborne Laser (ABL) program is designed to defend against Theater Ballistic Missiles in a tactical war scenario. Similarly, the Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program is currently testing a laser to defend against rockets and other tactical weapons. The Space Based Laser (SBL), Advanced Tactical Laser (ATL) and Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) programs promise even greater applications for laser weapons. This technology overview addresses both strategic and tactical roles for HEL weapons on the modern battlefield and examines current technology limited performance of weapon systems components, including various laser device types, beam control systems, atmospheric propagation, and target lethality issues. The characteristics, history, basic hardware, and fundamental performance of chemical lasers, solid state lasers and free electron lasers are summarized and compared. The elements of beam control, including the primary aperture, fast steering mirror, deformable mirrors, wavefront sensors, beacons and illuminators will be discussed with an emphasis on typical and required performance parameters. The effects of diffraction, atmospheric absorption, scattering, turbulence and thermal blooming phenomenon on irradiance at the target are described. Finally, lethality criteria and measures of weapon effectiveness are addressed. The primary purpose of the presentation is to define terminology, establish key performance parameters, and summarize technology capabilities.

  4. Chemical warfare agents

    PubMed Central

    Ganesan, K.; Raza, S. K.; Vijayaraghavan, R.

    2010-01-01

    Among the Weapons of Mass Destruction, chemical warfare (CW) is probably one of the most brutal created by mankind in comparison with biological and nuclear warfare. Chemical weapons are inexpensive and are relatively easy to produce, even by small terrorist groups, to create mass casualties with small quantities. The characteristics of various CW agents, general information relevant to current physical as well as medical protection methods, detection equipment available and decontamination techniques are discussed in this review article. A brief note on Chemical Weapons Convention is also provided. PMID:21829312

  5. The weapon potential of a microbe.

    PubMed

    Casadevall, Arturo; Pirofski, Liise-anne

    2004-06-01

    The designation of a microbe as a potential biological weapon poses the vexing question of how such a decision is made given the many pathogenic microbes that cause disease. Analysis of the properties of microbes that are currently considered biological weapons against humans revealed no obvious relationship to virulence, except that all are pathogenic for humans. Notably, the weapon potential of a microbe rather than its pathogenic properties or virulence appeared to be the major consideration when categorizing certain agents as biological weapons. In an effort to standardize the assessment of the risk that is posed by microbes as biological warfare agents using the basic principles of microbial communicability (defined here as a parameter of transmission) and virulence, a simple formula is proposed for estimating the weapon potential of a microbe.

  6. Microsynthesis and electron ionization mass spectral studies of O(S)-alkyl N,N-dimethyl alkylphosphono(thiolo)thionoamidates for Chemical Weapons Convention verification.

    PubMed

    Saeidian, Hamdollah; Babri, Mehran; Abdoli, Morteza; Sarabadani, Mansour; Ashrafi, Davood; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi

    2012-12-15

    The availability of mass spectra and interpretation skills are essential for unambiguous identification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-related chemicals. The O(S)-alkyl N,N-dimethyl alkylphosphono(thiolo)thionoamidates are included in the list of scheduled CWC-related compounds, but there are very few spectra from these compounds in the literature. This paper examines these spectra and their mass spectral fragmentation routes. The title chemicals were prepared through microsynthetic protocols and were analyzed using electron ionization mass spectrometry with gas chromatography as a MS-inlet system. Structures of fragments were confirmed using analysis of fragment ions of deuterated analogs, tandem mass spectrometry and density functional theory (DFT) calculations. Mass spectrometric studies revealed some interesting fragmentation pathways during the ionization process, such as alkene and amine elimination and McLafferty-type rearrangements. The most important fragmentation route of the chemicals is the thiono-thiolo rearrangement. DFT calculations are used to support MS results and to reveal relative preference formation of fragment ions. The retention indices (RIs) of all the studied compounds are also reported. Mass spectra of the synthesized compounds were investigated with the aim to enrich the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Central Analytical Database (OCAD) which may be used for detection and identification of CWC-related chemicals during on-site inspection and/or off-site analysis such as OPCW proficiency tests. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  7. Preface: Chemical Forensics

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Fraga, Carlos G.

    This virtual special issue is devoted to chemical forensics, a developing scientific discipline that aims to provide information to support the attribution of a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source. This process is carried out through the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Source information is critical in investigations of incidents of chemicals used for illicit or nefarious purposes, especially when toxic chemicals are used as weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international disarmamentmore » treaty that entered into force in 1997, prohibits the use of chemicals as weapons. This treaty has 192 States Parties (the countries who have joined the treaty) encompassing more than 98% of the global population and landmass, yet chemical attacks have continued to increase since this treaty was opened for signature to the governments of the world in 1993. The first notorious use of a chemical weapon since 1993 was by the Aum Shinrikyo cult whose sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 killed 13 and drove another 6,000 to seek medical treatment. More recently, over 160 alleged chemical attacks have been reported in Syria and Iraq with both governments and terrorist groups being accused, and casualties numbering in the thousands. Additionally, recent high profile nerve agent poisoning of dissidents from North Korea and Russia illustrate a willingness to use chemical threat agents (CTAs) with impunity. Given the threat posed by those that choose to use CTAs as weapons, there is a dire need for advancements in chemical forensics that can be used in investigations and inquiries to help find and hold to account, the perpetrators of chemical attacks.« less

  8. Preface: Chemical Forensics

    DOE PAGES

    Fraga, Carlos G.

    2018-04-22

    This virtual special issue is devoted to chemical forensics, a developing scientific discipline that aims to provide information to support the attribution of a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source. This process is carried out through the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Source information is critical in investigations of incidents of chemicals used for illicit or nefarious purposes, especially when toxic chemicals are used as weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international disarmamentmore » treaty that entered into force in 1997, prohibits the use of chemicals as weapons. This treaty has 192 States Parties (the countries who have joined the treaty) encompassing more than 98% of the global population and landmass, yet chemical attacks have continued to increase since this treaty was opened for signature to the governments of the world in 1993. The first notorious use of a chemical weapon since 1993 was by the Aum Shinrikyo cult whose sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 killed 13 and drove another 6,000 to seek medical treatment. More recently, over 160 alleged chemical attacks have been reported in Syria and Iraq with both governments and terrorist groups being accused, and casualties numbering in the thousands. Additionally, recent high profile nerve agent poisoning of dissidents from North Korea and Russia illustrate a willingness to use chemical threat agents (CTAs) with impunity. Given the threat posed by those that choose to use CTAs as weapons, there is a dire need for advancements in chemical forensics that can be used in investigations and inquiries to help find and hold to account, the perpetrators of chemical attacks.« less

  9. Zero Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security Enterprise Modernization

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-01-01

    national security strategy. For the first time since the Manhattan Project , the United States was no longer building nuclear weapons and was in fact...50 to 60 years to the Manhattan Project and are on the verge of catastrophic failure. Caustic chemicals and processes have sped up the corrosion and...day, the United States must fund the long-term modernization effort of the entire enter­ prise. Notes 1. Nuclear Weapon Archive, “The Manhattan

  10. Anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress in Iranian survivors of chemical warfare.

    PubMed

    Hashemian, Farnoosh; Khoshnood, Kaveh; Desai, Mayur M; Falahati, Farahnaz; Kasl, Stanislav; Southwick, Steven

    2006-08-02

    In the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, extensive use of chemical weapons resulted in high rates of morbidity and mortality. While much is known about the physical consequences of chemical warfare, there is a paucity of information about the long-term effects of chemical attacks on mental health. To assess the long-term psychological impact of chemical warfare on a civilian population. Cross-sectional randomized survey conducted in July 2004 of 153 civilians in 3 towns exposed to warfare in northwestern Iran: Oshnaviyeh (low-intensity conventional warfare), Rabat (high-intensity conventional warfare), and Sardasht (both high-intensity conventional warfare and chemical weapons). Full or partial posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis, anxiety symptoms, and depressive symptoms were assessed using Farsi versions of the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale, Hamilton Scale for Anxiety, and Beck Depression Inventory, respectively. Overall participation rate was 93%. Respondents had a mean age of 45 years and were all of Kurdish ethnicity. Among individuals exposed to both high-intensity warfare and chemical weapons, prevalence rates for lifetime PTSD, current PTSD, major anxiety symptoms, and severe depressive symptoms were 59%, 33%, 65%, and 41%, respectively. Among the low-intensity warfare group, the corresponding rates were 8%, 2%, 18%, and 6%, respectively, while intermediate rates were found among those exposed to high-intensity warfare but not to chemical weapons (31%, 8%, 26%, and 12%, respectively). Compared with individuals exposed to low-intensity warfare, those exposed to both high-intensity warfare and chemical weapons were at higher risk for lifetime PTSD (odds ratio [OR], 18.6; 95% confidence interval [CI], 5.8-59.4), current PTSD (OR, 27.4; 95% CI, 3.4-218.2), increased anxiety symptoms (OR, 14.6; 95% CI, 6.0-35.6), and increased depressive symptoms (OR, 7.2; 95% CI, 3.3-15.9). Exposure to high-intensity warfare but not to chemical weapons was also

  11. 78 FR 67289 - Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-12

    ... economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, the President... November 7, 2013 Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of...

  12. Estimates of radiological risk from depleted uranium weapons in war scenarios.

    PubMed

    Durante, Marco; Pugliese, Mariagabriella

    2002-01-01

    Several weapons used during the recent conflict in Yugoslavia contain depleted uranium, including missiles and armor-piercing incendiary rounds. Health concern is related to the use of these weapons, because of the heavy-metal toxicity and radioactivity of uranium. Although chemical toxicity is considered the more important source of health risk related to uranium, radiation exposure has been allegedly related to cancers among veterans of the Balkan conflict, and uranium munitions are a possible source of contamination in the environment. Actual measurements of radioactive contamination are needed to assess the risk. In this paper, a computer simulation is proposed to estimate radiological risk related to different exposure scenarios. Dose caused by inhalation of radioactive aerosols and ground contamination induced by Tomahawk missile impact are simulated using a Gaussian plume model (HOTSPOT code). Environmental contamination and committed dose to the population resident in contaminated areas are predicted by a food-web model (RESRAD code). Small values of committed effective dose equivalent appear to be associated with missile impacts (50-y CEDE < 5 mSv), or population exposure by water-independent pathways (50-y CEDE < 80 mSv). The greatest hazard is related to the water contamination in conditions of effective leaching of uranium in the groundwater (50-y CEDE < 400 mSv). Even in this worst case scenario, the chemical toxicity largely predominates over radiological risk. These computer simulations suggest that little radiological risk is associated to the use of depleted uranium weapons.

  13. [Biological and toxin terrorism weapons].

    PubMed

    Bokan, Slavko

    2003-03-01

    The use of biological agents and toxins in warfare and terrorism has a long history. Human, animal and plant pathogens and toxins can cause disease and can be used as a threat to humans, animals and staple crops. The same is true for biological agents. Although the use of biological agents and toxins in military conflicts has been a concern of military communities for many years, several recent events have increased the awareness of terrorist use of these weapons against civilian population. A Mass Casualty Biological (Toxin) Weapon (MCBTW) is any biological and toxin weapon capable of causing death or disease on a large scale, such that the military or civilian infrastructure of the state or organization being attacked is overwhelmed. A militarily significant (or terrorist) weapon is any weapon capable of affecting, directly or indirectly, that is physically or psychologically, the outcome of a military operation. Although many biological agents such as toxins and bioregulators can be used to cause diseases, there are only a few that can truly threaten civilian populations on a large scale. Bioregulators or modulators are biochemical compounds, such as peptides, that occur naturally in organisms. They are new class of weapons that can damage nervous system, alter moods, trigger psychological changes and kill. The potential military or terrorist use of bioregulators is similar to that of toxins. Some of these compounds are several hundred times more potent than traditional chemical warfare agents. Important features and military advantages of new bioregulators are novel sites of toxic action; rapid and specific effects; penetration of protective filters and equipment, and militarily effective physical incapacitation. This overview of biological agents and toxins is largely intended to help healthcare providers on all levels to make decisions in protecting general population from these agents.

  14. Project update: evaluating the community health legacy of WWI chemical weapons testing.

    PubMed

    Fox, Mary A

    2014-10-01

    The Spring Valley community of Washington, District of Columbia, was built on the site of a World War I chemical weapons lab where testing activities had distributed arsenic to surface soil and waste disposal had resulted in localized subsurface contamination. In previous work, findings were suggestive of potential site-related health issues, although no evidence of cancer clustering was found. In follow-up, we updated the community health assessment and explored time trends for several arsenic-related cancers. Health indicators continue to be very good in Spring Valley. For all major causes of mortality, Spring Valley rates were lower than United States (US) rates with most substantially lower (20-80 %); rates for heart diseases, Alzheimer's, and essential hypertension and related kidney disease were only slightly lower than US rates (3-8 %). Incidence and mortality rates for the selected cancers in the Spring Valley area were lower than US rates. Small non-statistically significant increasing time trends were observed in Spring Valley for incidence of two arsenic-related cancers: bladder and lung and bronchus. A moderate statistically significant increasing rate trend was observed for lung and bronchus cancer mortality in Spring Valley (p < 0.01). Lung and bronchus cancer mortality rates were also increasing in the Chevy Chase community, the local comparison area closely matched to Spring Valley on important demographic variables, suggesting that the observed increases may not be site-related. A full profile of common cancer site rates and trends for both study areas was suggested to better understand the rate trend findings but no epidemiological study was recommended.

  15. Fragmentation pathways of O-alkyl methylphosphonothionocyanidates in the gas phase: toward unambiguous structural characterization of chemicals in the Chemical Weapons Convention framework.

    PubMed

    Saeidian, Hamid; Babri, Mehran; Ashrafi, Davood; Sarabadani, Mansour; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi

    2013-08-01

    The electron-impact (EI) mass spectra of a series of O-alkyl methylphosphonothionocyanidates were studied for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) purposes. General EI fragmentation pathways were constructed and discussed, and collision-induced dissociation studies of the major EI ions were performed to confirm proposed fragment structures by analyzing fragment ions of deuterated analogs and by use of density functional theory (DFT) calculations. Thiono-thiolo rearrangement, McLafferty-type rearrangement, and a previously unknown intramolecular electrophilic aromatic substitution reaction were observed and confirmed. The study also focused on differentiation of isomeric compounds. Retention indices for all compounds, and an electrophilicity index for several compounds, are reported and interpreted.

  16. Chemical warfare, past and future. Study project

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Tzihor, A.

    1992-05-15

    World War I was arena for the first use of chemical warfare. The enormous tactical success brought about by this first time use of chemical weapons caused the continued development of more sophisticated tactics and weapons in this category of unconventional warfare. This phenomenon has carried through to today. However, at present, because of technological developments, the global economic situation, and political factors, coupled with the inability of the western world to control the proliferation of chemical weapons, a situation weapon of mass destruction. Recent use by Iraq against Kurdish civilian indicates that chemical warfare is no longer limited tomore » the battlefield. The western nations have a need to understand the risk. This paper conducts an analysis of past lessons and the factors which will affect the use of chemical warfare in the future. From this analysis, the paper reaches conclusions concerning the significant threat chemical weapons pose for the entire world in the not too distant future.« less

  17. The Navy's high-energy laser weapon system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cook, Joung R.; Albertine, John R.

    1997-05-01

    Over the past 25 years, in an attempt to develop a speed-of- light hard-kill weapon system, the U.S. Navy has successfully reduced megawatt-class chemical laser and high power beam control technologies to engineering practice. This Navy program was established during the cold war era when defending naval battle group was the primary concern of the U.S. Navy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, an urgent and challenging issue facing the U.S. Navy is the self-defense against cruise missile in a littoral battlefield environment against threats originating from shore and/or scattered low- value platforms. This fundamental shift in the battlefield environment and engagement configuration profoundly affected the basic performance requirements placed on potential shipboard high energy laser weapon systems (HELWS). In a littoral maritime environment, thermal blooming limits atmospheric propagation of an HEL beam, and thus limits the weapon's effectiveness. This paper identifies and discusses the technical issues associated with HELWS requirements in this new environment. It also discuses the collateral capabilities that enhance and complement the performance of other weapon and sensor systems onboard ship. This paper concludes that the HELWS using a free electron laser (FEL) offers a unique weapon option for our warships in facing the new defense challenges of the future.

  18. The weapons effect.

    PubMed

    Benjamin, Arlin James; Bushman, Brad J

    2018-02-01

    In some societies, weapons are plentiful and highly visible. This review examines recent trends in research on the weapons effect, which is the finding that the mere presence of weapons can prime people to behave aggressively. The General Aggression Model provides a theoretical framework to explain why the weapons effect occurs. This model postulates that exposure to weapons increases aggressive thoughts and hostile appraisals, thus explaining why weapons facilitate aggressive behavior. Data from meta-analytic reviews are consistent with the General Aggression Model. These findings have important practical as well as theoretical implications. They suggest that the link between weapons and aggression is very strong in semantic memory, and that merely seeing a weapon can make people more aggressive. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  19. [On new screening biomarker to evaluate health state in personnel engaged into chemical weapons extinction].

    PubMed

    Voitenko, N G; Garniuk, V V; Prokofieva, D S; Gontcharov, N V

    2015-01-01

    The work was aimed to find new screeding parameters (biomarkers) for evaluation of health state of workers engaged into enterprises with hazardous work conditions, as exemplified by "Maradykovskyi" object of chemical weapons extinction. Analysis of 27 serum cytokines was conducted in donors and the object personnel with various work conditions. Findings are statistically significant increase of serum eotaxin in the personnel of "dirty" zone, who are regularly exposed to toxic agents in individual filter protective means over the working day. For screening detection of health disorders in the object personnel, the authors suggested new complex biomarker--ratio Eotaxin* IFNγ/TNFα that demonstrates 67.9% sensitivity and 87.5% specificity in differentiating the "dirty" zone personnel and other staffers.

  20. Reality theory: A means to control the public`s fear of chemical weapons use. Research report

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pate, B.E.

    1997-04-01

    On 20 March 1995 terrorists released the chemical nerve agent sarin into the Tokyo subway system, killing 10 commuters and changing the public`s attitude about the most basic aspect of their lives: the air they breathe and the daily ritual of their commute to work. This is the new threat the United States must face: terrorism and its attack on the will of the people forcing governments to yield to the terrorists` position. Yet there is a different public response in warfare compared with a peacetime terrorist attack. This paper examines the psychological response of people in wartime and appliesmore » this description to chemical weapons use in war and in peace. The public`s response can be predicted if one uses reality theory, a concept leaders can use to mitigate responses that would prevent the execution of national strategy.« less

  1. 15 CFR 710.4 - Overview of scheduled chemicals and examples of affected industries.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... Schedule 2 chemicals may be useful in the production of chemical weapons, they also have legitimate uses in... may be useful in the production of chemical weapons, they also have legitimate uses in areas such as...

  2. Microelectronics Status Analysis and Secondary Part Procureability Assessment of the THAAD Weapon System

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1999-10-01

    Technical Report 5-20448 & 5- 20449 Contract No. DAAH01-98-D-R001 Delivery Order No. 34 Microelectronics Status Analysis and Secondary Part...Procureability Assessment of the THAAD Weapon System. (5-20448 & 5- 20449 ) Final Technical Report for Period 21 January 1999 through 30 September 1999...Huntsville Huntsville, AL 35899 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 5-20448 & 5- 20449 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY

  3. Chemical Munitions Search & Assessment-An evaluation of the dumped munitions problem in the Baltic Sea

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bełdowski, Jacek; Klusek, Zygmunt; Szubska, Marta; Turja, Raisa; Bulczak, Anna I.; Rak, Daniel; Brenner, Matthias; Lang, Thomas; Kotwicki, Lech; Grzelak, Katarzyna; Jakacki, Jaromir; Fricke, Nicolai; Östin, Anders; Olsson, Ulf; Fabisiak, Jacek; Garnaga, Galina; Nyholm, Jenny Rattfelt; Majewski, Piotr; Broeg, Katja; Söderström, Martin; Vanninen, Paula; Popiel, Stanisław; Nawała, Jakub; Lehtonen, Kari; Berglind, Rune; Schmidt, Beata

    2016-06-01

    Chemical Munitions Search & Assessment (CHEMSEA) project has performed studies on chemical weapon (CW) detection, sediment pollution and spreading as well as biological effects of chemical warfare agents (CWAs) dumped in the Baltic Sea. Results suggest that munitions containing CWAs are more scattered on the seafloor than suspected, and previously undocumented dumpsite was discovered in Gdansk Deep. Pollution of sediments with CWA degradation products was local and close to the detected objects; however the pollution range was larger than predicted with theoretical models. Bottom currents observed in the dumpsites were strong enough for sediment re-suspension, and contributed to the transport of polluted sediments. Diversity and density of the faunal communities were poor at the dumping sites in comparison to the reference area, although the direct effects of CWA on benthos organisms were difficult to determine due to hypoxic or even anoxic conditions near the bottom. Equally, the low oxygen might have affected the biological effects assessed in cod and caged blue mussels. Nonetheless, both species showed significantly elevated molecular and cellular level responses at contaminated sites compared to reference sites.

  4. Correlates of weapon carrying in school among adolescents in three countries.

    PubMed

    Stickley, Andrew; Koyanagi, Ai; Koposov, Roman; Blatný, Marek; Hrdlička, Michal; Schwab-Stone, Mary; Ruchkin, Vladislav

    2015-01-01

    To determine the factors associated with weapon carrying in school among Czech, Russian, and US adolescents. Logistic regression was used to analyze data drawn from the Social and Health Assessment (SAHA). Violent behavior (perpetration / victimization) was linked to adolescent weapon carrying in all countries. Substance use was associated with weapon carrying among boys in all countries. Greater parental warmth reduced the odds for weapon carrying among Czech and Russian adolescents. Associating with delinquent peers was important for weapon carrying only among US adolescents. Factors associated with weapon carrying in school vary among countries although violent behavior and substance use may be associated with weapon carrying across countries.

  5. The effect of chemical weapons incineration on the survival rates of Red-tailed Tropicbirds

    USGS Publications Warehouse

    Schreiber, E.A.; Schenk, G.A.; Doherty, P.F.

    2001-01-01

    In 1992, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS) began incinerating U.S. chemical weapons stockpiles on Johnston Atoll (Pacific Ocean) where about 500,000 seabirds breed, including Red-tailed Tropicbirds (Phaethon rubricauda). We hypothesized that survival rates of birds were lower in those nesting downwind of the incinerator smokestack compared to those upwind, and that birds might move away from the area. From 1992 - 2000 we monitored survival and movements between areas upwind and downwind from the JACADS facility. We used a multi-strata mark recapture approach to model survival, probability of recapture and movement. Probability of recapture was significantly higher for birds in downwind areas (owing to greater recapture effort) and thus was an important 'nuisance' parameter to take into account in modeling. We found no differences in survival between birds nesting upwind ( 0.8588) and downwind (0.8550). There was no consistent difference in movement rates between upwind or downwind areas from year to year: differences found may be attributed to differing vegetation growth and human activities between the areas. Our results suggest that JACADS has had no documentable influence on the survival and year to year movement of Red-tailed Tropicbirds.

  6. Flexible weapons architecture design

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pyant, William C., III

    Present day air-delivered weapons are of a closed architecture, with little to no ability to tailor the weapon for the individual engagement. The closed architectures require weaponeers to make the target fit the weapon instead of fitting the individual weapons to a target. The concept of a flexible weapons aims to modularize weapons design using an open architecture shell into which different modules are inserted to achieve the desired target fractional damage while reducing cost and civilian casualties. This thesis shows that the architecture design factors of damage mechanism, fusing, weapons weight, guidance, and propulsion are significant in enhancing weapon performance objectives, and would benefit from modularization. Additionally, this thesis constructs an algorithm that can be used to design a weapon set for a particular target class based on these modular components.

  7. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    2014-05-01

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludes that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.

  8. Performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Pei; Liu, Min; Su, Yu; Zhang, Ke

    2014-12-01

    High energy laser weapons are ready for some of today's most challenging military applications. Based on the analysis of the main tactical/technical index and combating process of high energy laser weapon, a performance calculation and simulation system of high energy laser weapon was established. Firstly, the index decomposition and workflow of high energy laser weapon was proposed. The entire system was composed of six parts, including classical target, platform of laser weapon, detect sensor, tracking and pointing control, laser atmosphere propagation and damage assessment module. Then, the index calculation modules were designed. Finally, anti-missile interception simulation was performed. The system can provide reference and basis for the analysis and evaluation of high energy laser weapon efficiency.

  9. Nuclear weapons modernizations

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kristensen, Hans M.

    This article reviews the nuclear weapons modernization programs underway in the world's nine nuclear weapons states. It concludes that despite significant reductions in overall weapons inventories since the end of the Cold War, the pace of reductions is slowing - four of the nuclear weapons states are even increasing their arsenals, and all the nuclear weapons states are busy modernizing their remaining arsenals in what appears to be a dynamic and counterproductive nuclear competition. The author questions whether perpetual modernization combined with no specific plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons is consistent with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and concludesmore » that new limits on nuclear modernizations are needed.« less

  10. Chemical Emergencies

    MedlinePlus

    When a hazardous chemical has been released, it may harm people's health. Chemical releases can be unintentional, as in the case of an ... the case of a terrorist attack with a chemical weapon. Some hazardous chemicals have been developed by ...

  11. Turkey’s Response to Threats of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2001-12-01

    categories of unconventional weapons and was prepared to invest enormous financial and human resources to achieve this goal. 5 Iraqi attempts to seek...Ministry of Defense White Paper of 2001 defines “Religious Fundementalism ” among the internal threats directed against Turkey’s security in the post...Therefore, Syria will likely continue to develop an extensive chemical and biological weapons arsenal and will also invest in upgrading the accuracy of

  12. Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Turbiville, G.H.

    One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons ismore » the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.« less

  13. Biological Weapons -- Still a Relevant Threat

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-03-22

    destruction in general, and biological weapons in particular. The IHS Janes: Defence and Security Intelligence & Analysis website notes that a number of...responder capabilities, and intelligence agency inputs. There needs, as well, to be continued research and development of sensor technologies, which...Mass Destruction – Radiological, Chemical and Biological,‖ 109 10 Mark, J. Carson; Taylor, Theodore; Eyster, Eugene; Maraman, William; Wechsler

  14. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variationsmore » among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less

  15. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; Shuh, D. K.; Knight, K. B.; Eppich, G. R.; Holliday, K. S.

    2016-05-01

    Nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. We find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. The resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.

  16. Mass spectral analysis of N-oxides of Chemical Weapons Convention related aminoethanols under electrospray ionization conditions.

    PubMed

    Sridhar, L; Karthikraj, R; Murty, M R V S; Raju, N Prasada; Vairamani, M; Prabhakar, S

    2011-02-28

    N,N'-Dialkylaminoethanols are the hydrolyzed products or precursors of chemical warfare agents such as V-agents and nitrogen mustards, and they are prone to undergo oxidation in environmental matrices or during decontamination processes. Consequently, screening of the oxidized products of aminoethanols in aqueous samples is an important task in the verification of chemical weapons convention-related chemicals. Here we report the successful characterization of the N-oxides of N,N'-dialkylaminoethanols, alkyl diethanolamines, and triethanolamine using positive ion electrospray ionization mass spectrometry. The collision-induced dissociation (CID) spectra of the [M+H](+) and [M+Na](+) ions show diagnostic product ions that enable the unambiguous identification of the studied N-oxides, including those of isomeric compounds. The proposed fragmentation pathways are supported by high-resolution mass spectrometry data and product/precursor ion spectra. The CID spectra of [M+H](+) ions included [MH-CH(4)O(2)](+) as the key product ion, in addition to a distinctive alkene loss that allowed us to recognize the alkyl group attached to the nitrogen. The [M+Na](+) ions show characteristic product ions due to the loss of groups (R) attached to nitrogen either as a radical (R) or as a molecule [R+H or (R-H)] after hydrogen migration. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  17. History of Laser Weapon Research

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-01-01

    designed to damage, disable, or destroy targets with little or no collateral damage. Airborne Laser (ABL) (CO2) Chemical Oxygen The ABL C-130H aircraft ...mirrors. Weapons systems based on lasers and “ray guns,” long a staple of science fiction, have captured the imagination of people everywhere. But...waves (millimeters to centimeters), with wavelengths 10,000 times longer than lasers. Diffraction of any electromagnetic radia- tion beam is based

  18. Damage assessment of long-range rocket system by electromagnetic pulse weapon

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cao, Lingyu; Liu, Guoqing; Li, Jinming

    2017-08-01

    This paper analyzes the damage mechanism and characteristics of electromagnetic pulse weapon, establishes the index system of survivability of long-range rocket launcher system, and uses AHP method to establish the combat effectiveness model of long-range rocket missile system. According to the damage mechanism and characteristics of electromagnetic pulse weapon, the damage effect of the remote rocket system is established by using the exponential method to realize the damage efficiency of the remote rocket system.

  19. Chemical Warfare and Medical Response During World War I

    PubMed Central

    Fitzgerald, Gerard J.

    2008-01-01

    The first large-scale use of a traditional weapon of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or nuclear) involved the successful deployment of chemical weapons during World War I (1914–1918). Historians now refer to the Great War as the chemist’s war because of the scientific and engineering mobilization efforts by the major belligerents. The development, production, and deployment of war gases such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard created a new and complex public health threat that endangered not only soldiers and civilians on the battlefield but also chemical workers on the home front involved in the large-scale manufacturing processes. The story of chemical weapons research and development during that war provides useful insights for current public health practitioners faced with a possible chemical weapons attack against civilian or military populations. PMID:18356568

  20. Chemical warfare and medical response during World War I.

    PubMed

    Fitzgerald, Gerard J

    2008-04-01

    The first large-scale use of a traditional weapon of mass destruction (chemical, biological, or nuclear) involved the successful deployment of chemical weapons during World War I (1914-1918). Historians now refer to the Great War as the chemist's war because of the scientific and engineering mobilization efforts by the major belligerents. The development, production, and deployment of war gases such as chlorine, phosgene, and mustard created a new and complex public health threat that endangered not only soldiers and civilians on the battlefield but also chemical workers on the home front involved in the large-scale manufacturing processes. The story of chemical weapons research and development during that war provides useful insights for current public health practitioners faced with a possible chemical weapons attack against civilian or military populations.

  1. Armed Kids, Armed Adults? Weapon Carrying From Adolescence to Adulthood

    PubMed Central

    Wallace, Lacey N.

    2016-01-01

    While much existing research has examined either juvenile or adult weapon carrying, this study assesses whether carrying a weapon to school as a juvenile is predictive of bringing a handgun to school or work in adulthood. Data are drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. Results show a decline in weapon carrying behavior over time. However, youth who report school weapon carrying in adolescence are much more likely to report carrying a handgun to school or work in adulthood. Findings also demonstrate that victimization, rather than offending behavior, is predictive of adulthood handgun carrying at school and work. PMID:28018135

  2. Chemical Risk Assessment

    EPA Science Inventory

    This course is aimed at providing an overview of the fundamental guiding principles and general methods used in chemical risk assessment. Chemical risk assessment is a complex and ever-evolving process. These principles and methods have been organized by the National Research Cou...

  3. Autonomous bio-chemical decontaminator (ABCD) against weapons of mass destruction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hyacinthe, Berg P.

    2006-05-01

    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the use of such elements pose an eminent asymmetric threat with disastrous consequences to the national security of any nation. In particular, the use of biochemical warfare agents against civilians and unprotected troops in international conflicts or by terrorists against civilians is considered as a very peculiar threat. Accordingly, taking a quarantine-before-inhalation approach to biochemical warfare, the author introduces the notion of autonomous biochemical decontamination against WMD. In the unfortunate event of a biochemical attack, the apparatus proposed herein is intended to automatically detect, identify, and more importantly neutralize a biochemical threat. Along with warnings concerning a cyber-WMD nexus, various sections cover discussions on human senses and computer sensors, corroborating evidence related to detection and neutralization of chemical toxins, and cyber-assisted olfaction in stand alone, peer-to-peer, and network settings. In essence, the apparatus can be used in aviation and mass transit security to initiate mass decontamination by dispersing a decontaminant aerosol or to protect the public water supply against a potential bioterrorist attack. Future effort may involve a system-on-chip (SoC) embodiment of this apparatus that allows a safer environment for the emerging phenomenon of cyber-assisted olfaction and morph cell phones into ubiquitous sensors/decontaminators. Although this paper covers mechanisms and protocols to avail a neutralizing substance, further research will need to explore the substance's various pharmacological profiles and potential side effects.

  4. Long-term pulmonary complications of chemical weapons exposure in former poison gas factory workers.

    PubMed

    Nishimura, Yoshifumi; Iwamoto, Hiroshi; Ishikawa, Nobuhisa; Hattori, Noboru; Horimasu, Yasushi; Ohshimo, Shinichiro; Fujitaka, Kazunori; Kondo, Keiichi; Hamada, Hironobu; Awai, Kazuo; Kohno, Nobuoki

    2016-07-01

    Sulfur mustard (SM) and lewisite are vesicant chemical warfare agents that can cause skin blistering and chronic lung complications. During 1929-1945, a Japanese factory produced poisonous gases, which included SM, lewisite and other chemical weapons. The aim of this study was to investigate the chest computed tomography (CT) findings among long-term survivors who worked at this factory. During 2009-2012, we evaluated chest CT findings from 346 long-term survivors who worked at the poison gas factory. Skin lesions were used as an indicator of significant exposure to vesicant agents. Among the 346 individuals, 53 (15%) individuals experienced skin lesions while working at the factory, and chest CT revealed abnormal findings in 179 individuals (52%). Emphysema was the most common CT finding and was observed in 75 individuals (22%), while honeycombing was observed in 8 individuals (2%). Emphysema and honeycombing were more prevalent among individuals with skin lesions, compared to individuals without skin lesions. Multivariate analyses revealed significant associations between the presence of emphysema and skin lesions (p = 0.008). Among individuals who never smoked, individuals with skin lesions (n = 26) exhibited a significantly higher rate of emphysema, compared to individuals without skin lesions (n = 200) (35% versus 7%, respectively; p < 0.001). Among the long-term survivors who worked at the poison gas factory, a history of skin lesions was associated with the presence of emphysema, even among never smokers, which suggests that emphysema might be a long-term complication of exposure to chemical warfare agents.

  5. Defense Acquisitions. Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-03-01

    Selected Weapon Programs March 2007 GAO-07-406SP Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for...unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 What GAO Found United States Government Accountability Office Why GAO Did This...Joint Tactical Radio System Ground Mobile Radio (JTRS GMR) 93 JTRS Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit (JTRS HMS) 95 Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) 97

  6. Future Enablers: Air Force Smart Weapons in the 2040s

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-04-01

    it is designed to have the same explosive effect as a 2,000 pound warhead. 136 The penetration ability of warheads has improved as well. The GBU - 39 ...Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions : Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs, 12. 26 US Government Accountability Office, Joint Strike... Acquisitions : Assessment of Selected Weapons Programs, 65. 29 Ibid. 30 Kathleen Miller, Tony Capaccio, and Danielle Ivory, “F-35 Fighter Too Big to Kill as

  7. Chemical and biological warfare. Should defenses be researched and deployed?

    PubMed

    Orient, J M

    1989-08-04

    The threat of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction has intensified because of improved delivery systems and advances in chemistry, genetics, and other sciences. Possible US responses to this threat include deterrence, defenses, and/or disarmament, including a reaffirmation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which is now in jeopardy. This article discusses the history of chemical and biological warfare, existing and potential weapons, the proliferation of weapons and delivery systems, ways to prevent the use of these weapons, and ways to protect populations from their effects.

  8. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.

    We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. Wemore » find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less

  9. Chemical speciation of U, Fe, and Pu in melt glass from nuclear weapons testing

    DOE PAGES

    Pacold, J. I.; Lukens, W. W.; Booth, C. H.; ...

    2016-05-18

    We report that nuclear weapons testing generates large volumes of glassy materials that influence the transport of dispersed actinides in the environment and may carry information on the composition of the detonated device. We determine the oxidation state of U and Fe (which is known to buffer the oxidation state of actinide elements and to affect the redox state of groundwater) in samples of melt glass collected from three U.S. nuclear weapons tests. For selected samples, we also determine the coordination geometry of U and Fe, and we report the oxidation state of Pu from one melt glass sample. Wemore » find significant variations among the melt glass samples and, in particular, find a clear deviation in one sample from the expected buffering effect of Fe(II)/Fe(III) on the oxidation state of uranium. In the first direct measurement of Pu oxidation state in a nuclear test melt glass, we obtain a result consistent with existing literature that proposes Pu is primarily present as Pu(IV) in post-detonation material. In addition, our measurements imply that highly mobile U(VI) may be produced in significant quantities when melt glass is quenched rapidly following a nuclear detonation, though these products may remain immobile in the vitrified matrices. The observed differences in chemical state among the three samples show that redox conditions can vary dramatically across different nuclear test conditions. The local soil composition, associated device materials, and the rate of quenching are all likely to affect the final redox state of the glass. Lastly, the resulting variations in glass chemistry are significant for understanding and interpreting debris chemistry and the later environmental mobility of dispersed material.« less

  10. Morality of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Case Study of the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-04-01

    effects from biological weapons may not be apparent until after a battle . However, these weapons can do great damage to civilians, even if...justify. Ultimately, even though some chemical and biological weapons are non-lethal, Francis Harbour warns against callously using these agents due to...In this case, the United States had justly entered World War II after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, meeting the criteria of just cause and

  11. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

  12. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

  13. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

  14. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

  15. 32 CFR 234.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 234.10 Section 234.10 National Defense... PENTAGON RESERVATION § 234.10 Weapons. (a) Except as otherwise authorized under this section, the following are prohibited: (1) Possessing a weapon. (2) Carrying a weapon. (3) Using a weapon. (b) This section...

  16. Non-Lethal Weapons: Setting Our Phasers on Stun? Potential Stratetgic Blessings and Curses of Non-Lethal Weapons on the Battlefield

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2003-08-01

    improve our ability to verify compliance with the treaty’s global ban on biological weapons and would put national security and confidential business ...he was Assistant Professor of Aeronautics at the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, where he was also instructor pilot in the T - 41 flight-screening...fielded on a greater scale are explored. The ability of non-lethal weapons to positively influence the global war on terrorism is also assessed. It

  17. Numerical Simulation of Chemical Weapon Detonations

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1996-08-01

    Engineers , is currently involved in the location, removal, and demilitarization of stockpiled and non-stockpiled chemical munitions. To support the...U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , is currently involved in the location, removal, and demilitarization of stockpiled and non-stockpiled chemical munitions...Length 6" As part of the development of a chemical agent confinement structure for use by the Huntsville Corps of Engineers , SwRI performed arena tests on

  18. Perceived popularity of adolescents who use weapons in violence and adolescents who only carry weapons.

    PubMed

    Wallace, Lacey N

    2017-01-01

    Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed.

  19. Epidemiological findings of major chemical attacks in the Syrian war are consistent with civilian targeting: a short report.

    PubMed

    Rodriguez-Llanes, Jose M; Guha-Sapir, Debarati; Schlüter, Benjamin-Samuel; Hicks, Madelyn Hsiao-Rei

    2018-01-01

    Evidence of use of toxic gas chemical weapons in the Syrian war has been reported by governmental and non-governmental international organizations since the war started in March 2011. To date, the profiles of victims of the largest chemical attacks in Syria remain unknown. In this study, we used descriptive epidemiological analysis to describe demographic characteristics of victims of the largest chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian war. We analysed conflict-related, direct deaths from chemical weapons recorded in non-government-controlled areas by the Violation Documentation Center, occurring from March 18, 2011 to April 10, 2017, with complete information on the victim's date and place of death, cause and demographic group. 'Major' chemical weapons events were defined as events causing ten or more direct deaths. As of April 10, 2017, a total of 1206 direct deaths meeting inclusion criteria were recorded in the dataset from all chemical weapons attacks regardless of size. Five major chemical weapons attacks caused 1084 of these documented deaths. Civilians comprised the majority ( n  = 1058, 97.6%) of direct deaths from major chemical weapons attacks in Syria and combatants comprised a minority of 2.4% ( n  = 26). In the first three major chemical weapons attacks, which occurred in 2013, children comprised 13%-14% of direct deaths, ranging in numbers from 2 deaths among 14 to 117 deaths among 923. Children comprised higher proportions of direct deaths in later major chemical weapons attacks, forming 21% ( n  = 7) of 33 deaths in the 2016 major attack and 34.8% ( n  = 32) of 92 deaths in the 2017 major attack. Our finding of an extreme disparity in direct deaths from major chemical weapons attacks in Syria, with 97.6% of victims being civilians and only 2.4% being combatants provides evidence that major chemical weapons attacks were indiscriminate or targeted civilians directly; both violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Identifying and

  20. Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2017-02-21

    missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs . In contrast with the longer-range “strategic” nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy...States sought to deploy dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs at bases on the territories of NATO members in eastern Europe. Neither NATO, as an...ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs . The United States deployed these weapons with its troops in the field, aboard aircraft, on

  1. Identification of nuclear weapons

    DOEpatents

    Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

    1987-04-10

    A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

  2. The health hazard assessment process in support of joint weapon system acquisitions.

    PubMed

    Kluchinsky, Timothy A; Jokel, Charles R; Cambre, John V; Goddard, Donald E; Batts, Robert W

    2013-01-01

    Since 1981, the Army's HHA Program has provided an invaluable service to combat developers and materiel program managers by providing recommendations designed to eliminate or control health hazards associated with materiel and weapon systems. The program has consistently strived to improve its services by providing more meaningful and efficient assistance to the acquisition community. In the uncertain fiscal times ahead, the Army's HHA Program will continue to provide valuable and cost-effective solutions to mitigate the health risks of weapons systems.

  3. Perceived popularity of adolescents who use weapons in violence and adolescents who only carry weapons

    PubMed Central

    Wallace, Lacey N.

    2017-01-01

    Prior research has found that persistently delinquent youth or more violent youth were less popular than their less delinquent peers (Young, 2013). However, recent research has also found that weapon carrying is associated with being more popular in adolescence (Dijkstra et al., 2010). The present paper examines the perceived popularity of adolescents who carry weapons in comparison to those who both carry and use weapons in acts of violence or threatened violence. Data consist of two waves from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health. Analyses use OLS regression with lagged predictors. This paper found no differences in number of friends between weapon carriers and weapon users. However, among both male and female gang members, those who did not use or carry weapons (abstainers) named significantly fewer friends than weapon users. Among females, weapon abstainers both named and were named by significantly more people than weapon users. These differences were not observed for males. Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed. PMID:29104446

  4. Long-term retrievability and safeguards for immobilized weapons plutonium in geologic storage

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Peterson, P.F.

    1996-05-01

    If plutonium is not ultimately used as an energy source, the quantity of excess weapons plutonium (w-Pu) that would go into a US repository will be small compared to the quantity of plutonium contained in the commercial spent fuel in the repository, and the US repository(ies) will likely be only one (or two) locations out of many around the world where commercial spent fuel will be stored. Therefore excess weapons plutonium creates a small perturbation to the long-term (over 200,000 yr) global safeguard requirements for spent fuel. There are details in the differences between spent fuel and immobilized w-Pu wastemore » forms (i.e. chemical separation methods, utility for weapons, nuclear testing requirements), but these are sufficiently small to be unlikely to play a significant role in any US political decision to rebuild weapons inventories, or to change the long-term risks of theft by subnational groups.« less

  5. Application of a Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Weapon Target Assignment

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-02-01

    25] A . Turan , “Techniques for the Allocation of Resources Under Uncertainty,” Middle Eastern Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, 2012. [26] K...UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Application of a Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Weapon Target Assignment Lloyd Hammond Weapons and...optimisation techniques to support the decision making process. This report documents the methodology used to identify, develop and assess a

  6. Determination of mustard and lewisite related compounds in abandoned chemical weapons (Yellow shells) from sources in China and Japan.

    PubMed

    Hanaoka, Shigeyuki; Nomura, Koji; Wada, Takeharu

    2006-01-06

    Knowledge of the states of the contents in chemical munitions that Japanese Imperial Forces abandoned at the end of World War II in Japan and China is gravely lacking. To unearth and recover these chemical weapons and detoxify the contents safely, it is essential to establish analytical procedures to definitely determine the CWA contents. We established such a procedure and applied it to the analysis of chemicals in the abandoned shells. Yellow shells are known to contain sulfur mustard, lewisite, or a mixture of both. Lewisite was analyzed without thiol derivatization, because it and its decomposition products yield the same substances in the derivatization. Analysis using our new procedure showed that both mustard and lewisite remained as the major components after the long abandonment of nearly 60 years. The content of mustard was 43% and that of lewisite 55%. The viscous material found was suggested to be mostly oligomers of mustard. Comparison of the components in the Yellow agents with mustard recovered in both Japan and China showed a difference in the impurities between the CWAs produced by the former Imperial navy and those by the former Imperial army.

  7. A different kind of weapon focus: simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness.

    PubMed

    Taylor, J Eric T; Witt, Jessica K; Pratt, Jay

    2017-01-01

    Attentional allocation is flexibly altered by action-related priorities. Given that tools - and specifically weapons - can affect attentional allocation, we asked whether training with a weapon or holding a weapon during search would affect change detection. In three experiments, participants searched for changes to agents, shootable objects, or environments in the popular flicker paradigm. Participants trained with a simulated weapon or watched a video from the same training perspective and then searched for changes while holding a weapon or a control object. Results show an effect of training, highlighting the importance of sensorimotor experience for the action-relevant allocation of attention, and a possible interaction between training and the object held during search. Simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness. This result has implications for the interaction between tool use and attentional allocation.

  8. Blinding laser weapons.

    PubMed

    Peters, A

    1996-01-01

    At its October 1995 Review Conference, the Convention on Conventional Weapons added a protocol banning the use and transfer of blinding laser weapons. The background to, and significance and limitations of this ban are discussed.

  9. Joint chemical agent detector (JCAD): the future of chemical agent detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Laljer, Charles E.

    2003-08-01

    The Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) has continued development through 2002. The JCAD has completed Contractor Validation Testing (CVT) that included chemical warfare agent testing, environmental testing, electromagnetic interferent testing, and platform integration validation. The JCAD provides state of the art chemical warfare agent detection capability to military and homeland security operators. Intelligence sources estimate that over twenty countries have active chemical weapons programs. The spread of weapons of mass destruction (and the industrial capability for manufacture of these weapons) to third world nations and terrorist organizations has greatly increased the chemical agent threat to U.S. interests. Coupled with the potential for U.S. involvement in localized conflicts in an operational or support capacity, increases the probability that the military Joint Services may encounter chemical agents anywhere in the world. The JCAD is a small (45 in3), lightweight (2 lb.) chemical agent detector for vehicle interiors, aircraft, individual personnel, shipboard, and fixed site locations. The system provides a common detection component across multi-service platforms. This common detector system will allow the Joint Services to use the same operational and support concept for more efficient utilization of resources. The JCAD detects, identifies, quantifies, and warns of the presence of chemical agents prior to onset of miosis. Upon detection of chemical agents, the detector provides local and remote audible and visual alarms to the operators. Advance warning will provide the vehicle crew and other personnel in the local area with the time necessary to protect themselves from the lethal effects of chemical agents. The JCAD is capable of being upgraded to protect against future chemical agent threats. The JCAD provides the operator with the warning necessary to survive and fight in a chemical warfare agent threat environment.

  10. Weapons in the lives of battered women.

    PubMed

    Sorenson, Susan B; Wiebe, Douglas J

    2004-08-01

    We assessed weapon use in intimate partner violence and perspectives on hypothetical firearm policies. We conducted structured in-person interviews with 417 women in 67 battered women's shelters. Words, hands/fists, and feet were the most common weapons used against and by battered women. About one third of the battered women had a firearm in the home. In two thirds of these households, the intimate partner used the gun(s) against the woman, usually threatening to shoot/kill her (71.4%) or to shoot at her (5.1%). Most battered women thought spousal notification/consultation regarding gun purchase would be useful and that a personalized firearm ("smart gun") in the home would make things worse. A wide range of objects are used as weapons against intimate partners. Firearms, especially handguns, are more common in the homes of battered women than in households in the general population.

  11. Chemical or biological terrorist attacks: an analysis of the preparedness of hospitals for managing victims affected by chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction.

    PubMed

    Bennett, Russell L

    2006-03-01

    The possibility of a terrorist attack employing the use of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on American soil is no longer an empty threat, it has become a reality. A WMD is defined as any weapon with the capacity to inflict death and destruction on such a massive scale that its very presence in the hands of hostile forces is a grievous threat. Events of the past few years including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the use of planes as guided missiles directed into the Pentagon and New York's Twin Towers in 2001 (9/11) and the tragic incidents involving twentythree people who were infected and five who died as a result of contact with anthrax-laced mail in the Fall of 2001, have well established that the United States can be attacked by both domestic and international terrorists without warning or provocation. In light of these actions, hospitals have been working vigorously to ensure that they would be "ready" in the event of another terrorist attack to provide appropriate medical care to victims. However, according to a recent United States General Accounting Office (GAO) nationwide survey, our nation's hospitals still are not prepared to manage mass causalities resulting from chemical or biological WMD. Therefore, there is a clear need for information about current hospital preparedness in order to provide a foundation for systematic planning and broader discussions about relative cost, probable effectiveness, environmental impact and overall societal priorities. Hence, the aim of this research was to examine the current preparedness of hospitals in the State of Mississippi to manage victims of terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological WMD. All acute care hospitals in the State were selected for inclusion in this study. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were utilized for data collection and analysis. Six hypotheses were tested. Using a questionnaire

  12. 12. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. AFTER SEGREGATION, ...

    Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

    12. VIEW OF A SITE RETURN WEAPONS COMPONENT. AFTER SEGREGATION, PLUTONIUM MATERIALS WERE EITHER RETURNED TO THE BUILDING 776 FOUNDRY WHERE THEY WERE CAST INTO FEED INGOTS, OR UNDERWENT CHEMICAL RECOVERY FOR PURIFICATION. (8/7/62) - Rocky Flats Plant, Plutonium Fabrication, Central section of Plant, Golden, Jefferson County, CO

  13. Guns in Intimate Partner Violence: Comparing Incidents by Type of Weapon.

    PubMed

    Sorenson, Susan B

    2017-03-01

    The goal of this study was to assess the frequency, nature, and outcome of weapon use in intimate partner violence (IPV) and to assess compliance with related gun policies. Data were drawn from forms police are mandated to complete at the scene of IPV in the fifth largest U.S. city during 2013. Proportions were calculated and odds ratios were adjusted for demographic and contextual characteristics and a Bonferroni correction for multiple statistical tests was applied. Of the 35,413 incidents, 6,573 involved hands, fists, or feet, and 1,866 involved external weapons of which 576 were guns. Most incidents were male-on-female: 63.4% (no weapon), 77.4% (bodily weapon), 50.2% (nongun external weapon), and 79.5% (gun). Guns were used most often to threaten the partner (69.1%). When a gun (vs. bodily or nongun external weapon) was used, IPV victims were less likely to have visible injuries (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 0.64 and 0.23, respectively)-offenders were less likely to have pushed or shoved, grabbed, punched, or kicked the victim-but (victims) were more likely to be frightened (AOR = 3.13 and 1.49, respectively). Weapon use of any type by an intimate partner is associated with a wide range of violent offender behavior and multiple negative outcomes for victims. The use of a gun has implications that include, but go beyond, physical injury of the victim. Documentation of the enforcement of state law regarding gun removal merits improvement, which has important implications for the evaluation of policies designed to keep guns out of the hands of abusers.

  14. Guns in Intimate Partner Violence: Comparing Incidents by Type of Weapon

    PubMed Central

    2017-01-01

    Abstract Objective: The goal of this study was to assess the frequency, nature, and outcome of weapon use in intimate partner violence (IPV) and to assess compliance with related gun policies. Methods: Data were drawn from forms police are mandated to complete at the scene of IPV in the fifth largest U.S. city during 2013. Proportions were calculated and odds ratios were adjusted for demographic and contextual characteristics and a Bonferroni correction for multiple statistical tests was applied. Results: Of the 35,413 incidents, 6,573 involved hands, fists, or feet, and 1,866 involved external weapons of which 576 were guns. Most incidents were male-on-female: 63.4% (no weapon), 77.4% (bodily weapon), 50.2% (nongun external weapon), and 79.5% (gun). Guns were used most often to threaten the partner (69.1%). When a gun (vs. bodily or nongun external weapon) was used, IPV victims were less likely to have visible injuries (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 0.64 and 0.23, respectively)—offenders were less likely to have pushed or shoved, grabbed, punched, or kicked the victim—but (victims) were more likely to be frightened (AOR = 3.13 and 1.49, respectively). Conclusions: Weapon use of any type by an intimate partner is associated with a wide range of violent offender behavior and multiple negative outcomes for victims. The use of a gun has implications that include, but go beyond, physical injury of the victim. Documentation of the enforcement of state law regarding gun removal merits improvement, which has important implications for the evaluation of policies designed to keep guns out of the hands of abusers. PMID:28134571

  15. U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cook, Donald

    2016-03-01

    Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be

  16. How EPA Assesses Chemical Safety

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    EPA's existing chemicals programs address pollution prevention, risk assessment, hazard and exposure assessment and/or characterization, and risk management for chemicals substances in commercial use.

  17. Physician Beliefs about Physical and Mental Competency of Patients Applying for Concealed Weapon Permits.

    PubMed

    Goldstein, Adam O; Viera, Anthony J; Pierson, John; Barnhouse, Kathy K; Tulsky, James A; Richman, Barak D

    2015-06-01

    Law enforcement officials have asked health care providers to evaluate patient applications for concealed weapon permits. The current study was designed to examine physician beliefs regarding competency to carry a concealed weapon for patients with specific physical and mental conditions. Among 222 North Carolina physicians who participated in this survey (40% response rate), large variation and uncertainty existed for determining competency. Physicians most frequently chose mild dementia, post-traumatic stress disorder, and recent depression as conditions that would render a patient not competent to carry a concealed weapon. Male physicians and those owning a gun were more likely to deem a patient competent. Almost a third of physicians were unsure about competence for most conditions. Physicians asked to assess competency of patients to carry a concealed weapon have quite disparate views on competency and little confidence in their decisions. If physicians are expected to assess patient competence to carry a concealed weapon, more objective criteria and training are needed. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  18. DoD Weapon System Acquisition Reform Product Support Assessment

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-11-01

    can be best effected by working through the Defense Acquisition University, the Logistics Functional IPT, the Acquisition Management Functional... WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Department of Defense,Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,Technology and...each year in product support. Reformed stewardship—driven by improving product support and achieving more cost- effective weapon system readiness

  19. Major weapon system environmental life-cycle cost estimating for Conservation, Cleanup, Compliance and Pollution Prevention (C3P2)

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Hammond, Wesley; Thurston, Marland; Hood, Christopher

    1995-01-01

    The Titan 4 Space Launch Vehicle Program is one of many major weapon system programs that have modified acquisition plans and operational procedures to meet new, stringent environmental rules and regulations. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) mandate to reduce the use of ozone depleting chemicals (ODC's) is just one of the regulatory changes that has affected the program. In the last few years, public environmental awareness, coupled with stricter environmental regulations, has created the need for DOD to produce environmental life-cycle cost estimates (ELCCE) for every major weapon system acquisition program. The environmental impact of the weapon system must be assessed and budgeted, considering all costs, from cradle to grave. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has proposed that organizations consider Conservation, Cleanup, Compliance and Pollution Prevention (C(sup 3)P(sup 2)) issues associated with each acquisition program to assess life-cycle impacts and costs. The Air Force selected the Titan 4 system as the pilot program for estimating life-cycle environmental costs. The estimating task required participants to develop an ELCCE methodology, collect data to test the methodology and produce a credible cost estimate within the DOD C(sup 3)P(sup 2) definition. The estimating methodology included using the Program Office weapon system description and work breakdown structure together with operational site and manufacturing plant visits to identify environmental cost drivers. The results of the Titan IV ELCCE process are discussed and expanded to demonstrate how they can be applied to satisfy any life-cycle environmental cost estimating requirement.

  20. 15 CFR 710.4 - Overview of scheduled chemicals and examples of affected industries.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Overview of scheduled chemicals and...

  1. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-07-12

    done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses nuclear weapon...future, but there are no plans to do so.’”7 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by...opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic felt that

  2. Weapons injuries during and after periods of conflict: retrospective analysis.

    PubMed Central

    Meddings, D. R.

    1997-01-01

    OBJECTIVE: To assess the relative frequency of weapon injuries during conflict and after periods of conflict in the absence of disarmament. DESIGN: Retrospective analysis of a database of war wounds. SETTING: Region with a protracted conflict between rival combatant groups and a subsequent transition to the uncontested military authority of a single power. SUBJECTS: 2332 people who received weapons injuries during the conflict or post-conflict periods and were admitted to hospital within 24 hours of injury. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Percentage change in mean monthly admission rate by weapon type between conflict and post-conflict periods; annual incidence of injury by weapon type during conflict and post-conflict periods; percentage change in annual incidence by weapon type between conflict and post-conflict periods. RESULTS: Mean monthly admission rates for injuries from fragmentation munitions decreased by 8% between conflict and post-conflict periods and by 23% for injuries from mines and 32% for gunshot injuries. The decline in admissions for all injuries was 23%. After adjustment for population growth over the study period, declines in annual incidence were 22% for fragmentation munitions injuries, 34% for mine injuries, and 40% for gunshot injuries. The decline in incidence for all injuries was 33%. In-hospital mortality from weapons related injuries increased from 2.5% to 6.1% (P < 0.001) between conflict and post-conflict periods. CONCLUSIONS: In this setting, continued availability of weapons is associated with increased mortality and a level of injuries from weapons that is only somewhat reduced from that observed during a period of conflict. PMID:9418089

  3. Cardiac fibrillation risk of Taser weapons.

    PubMed

    Leitgeb, Norbert

    2014-06-01

    The debate on potential health hazards associated with delivering electric discharges to incapacitated subjects, in particular on whether electric discharge weapons are lethal, less lethal or non-lethal, is still controversial. The cardiac fibrillation risks of Taser weapons X26 and X3 have been investigated by measuring the delivered high-tension pulses in dependence on load impedance. Excitation thresholds and sinus-to-Taser conversion factors have been determined by numerical modeling of endocardial, myocardial, and epicardial cells. Detailed quantitative assessment of cardiac electric exposure has been performed by numerical simulation at the normal-weighted anatomical model NORMAN. The impact of anatomical variation has been quantified at an overweight model (Visible Man), both with a spatial resolution of 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxels. Spacing and location of dart electrodes were systematically varied and the worst-case position determined. Based on volume-weighted cardiac exposure assessment, the fibrillation probability of the worst-case hit was determined to 30% (Taser X26) and 9% (Taser X3). The overall risk assessment of Taser application accounting for realistic spatial hit distributions was derived from training sessions of police officers under realistic scenarios and by accounting for the influence of body (over-)weight as well as gender. The analysis of the results showed that the overall fibrillation risk of Taser use is not negligible. It is higher at Taser X26 than at Taser X3 and amounts to about 1% for Europeans with an about 20% higher risk for Asians. Results demonstrate that enhancement as well as further reduction of fibrillation risk depends on responsible use or abuse of Taser weapons.

  4. The Architecture of Chemical Alternatives Assessment.

    PubMed

    Geiser, Kenneth; Tickner, Joel; Edwards, Sally; Rossi, Mark

    2015-12-01

    Chemical alternatives assessment is a method rapidly developing for use by businesses, governments, and nongovernment organizations seeking to substitute chemicals of concern in production processes and products. Chemical alternatives assessment is defined as a process for identifying, comparing, and selecting safer alternatives to chemicals of concern (including those in materials, processes, or technologies) on the basis of their hazards, performance, and economic viability. The process is intended to provide guidance for assuring that chemicals of concern are replaced with safer alternatives that are not likely to be later regretted. Conceptually, the assessment methods are developed from a set of three foundational pillars and five common principles. Based on a number of emerging alternatives assessment initiatives, in this commentary, we outline a chemical alternatives assessment blueprint structured around three broad steps: Scope, Assessment, and Selection and Implementation. Specific tasks and tools are identified for each of these three steps. While it is recognized that on-going practice will further refine and develop the method and tools, it is important that the structure of the assessment process remain flexible, adaptive, and focused on the substitution of chemicals of concern with safer alternatives. © 2015 Society for Risk Analysis.

  5. 75 FR 62916 - Re-Delegation by the Under Secretary of State to the Director, Office of Chemical and Biological...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-13

    ... State to the Director, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs, of the Functions and... Secretary of State by the laws of the United States, including by Section 101 of the Chemical Weapons...-delegate to the Director, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Affairs, Bureau of Arms Control, [[Page...

  6. The morality of weapons research.

    PubMed

    Forge, John

    2004-07-01

    I ask whether weapons research is ever justified. Weapons research is identified as the business of the engineer. It is argued that the engineer has responsibility for the uses to which the tools that he designs can be put, and that responsibility extends to the use of weapons. It is maintained that there are no inherently defensive weapons, and hence there is no such thing as 'defensive' weapons research. The issue then is what responsibilities as a professional the engineer has in regard to such research. An account is given to ground the injunction not to provide the means to harm as a duty for the engineers. This account is not, however, absolutist, and as such it allows justifiable exceptions. The answer to my question is thus not that weapons research is never justified but there must be a strong assurance that the results will only be used as a just means in a just cause.

  7. Domestic Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1989-10-01

    regulations can be used for treaty comliance; identify producers of certain treaty chemicals and present case studies on two such chemicals; review and...discuss the protocol limitations of using existing statutes for the reporting requirements through case studies of two chemicals for which reporting...requirements or requ.lations can be used to facilitate domestic implementation, studies the domestic implmentation procedures and experience gained fron the

  8. Stinging plants: as future bio-weapon.

    PubMed

    Gupta, Sanjay Mohan; Kumar, Kamal

    2016-09-01

    In the present opinion paper, we have been introducing for the first time the stinging plants and/or their biological toxins as novel bio-threat agents that may be used for the development of bio-weapons for self-defence purpose. The selected studied stinging plants are having dual role as nutraceutical and ethno-pharmacological uses apart from their less explored stinging property. However, future detailed work is required for identification and characterization of the precise stinging chemical components that will be used for the formulation of novel bio-warfare agents for self-defence purpose.

  9. Chemical or Biological Terrorist Attacks: An Analysis of the Preparedness of Hospitals for Managing Victims Affected by Chemical or Biological Weapons of Mass Destruction

    PubMed Central

    Bennett, Russell L.

    2006-01-01

    The possibility of a terrorist attack employing the use of chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on American soil is no longer an empty threat, it has become a reality. A WMD is defined as any weapon with the capacity to inflict death and destruction on such a massive scale that its very presence in the hands of hostile forces is a grievous threat. Events of the past few years including the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the use of planes as guided missiles directed into the Pentagon and New York’s Twin Towers in 2001 (9/11) and the tragic incidents involving twenty-three people who were infected and five who died as a result of contact with anthrax-laced mail in the Fall of 2001, have well established that the United States can be attacked by both domestic and international terrorists without warning or provocation. In light of these actions, hospitals have been working vigorously to ensure that they would be “ready” in the event of another terrorist attack to provide appropriate medical care to victims. However, according to a recent United States General Accounting Office (GAO) nationwide survey, our nation’s hospitals still are not prepared to manage mass causalities resulting from chemical or biological WMD. Therefore, there is a clear need for information about current hospital preparedness in order to provide a foundation for systematic planning and broader discussions about relative cost, probable effectiveness, environmental impact and overall societal priorities. Hence, the aim of this research was to examine the current preparedness of hospitals in the State of Mississippi to manage victims of terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological WMD. All acute care hospitals in the State were selected for inclusion in this study. Both quantitative and qualitative methods were utilized for data collection and analysis. Six hypotheses were tested. Using a

  10. Reducing weapon-carrying among urban American Indian young people.

    PubMed

    Bearinger, Linda H; Pettingell, Sandra L; Resnick, Michael D; Potthoff, Sandra J

    2010-07-01

    To examine the likelihood of weapon-carrying among urban American Indian young people, given the presence of salient risk and protective factors. The study used data from a confidential, self-report Urban Indian Youth Health Survey with 200 forced-choice items examining risk and protective factors and social, contextual, and demographic information. Between 1995 and 1998, 569 American Indian youths, aged 9-15 years, completed surveys administered in public schools and an after-school program. Using logistic regression, probability profiles compared the likelihood of weapon-carrying, given the combinations of salient risk and protective factors. In the final models, weapon-carrying was associated significantly with one risk factor (substance use) and two protective factors (school connectedness, perceiving peers as having prosocial behavior attitudes/norms). With one risk factor and two protective factors, in various combinations in the models, the likelihood of weapon carrying ranged from 4% (with two protective factors and no risk factor in the model) to 80% of youth (with the risk factor and no protective factors in the model). Even in the presence of the risk factor, the two protective factors decreased the likelihood of weapon-carrying to 25%. This analysis highlights the importance of protective factors in comprehensive assessments and interventions for vulnerable youth. In that the risk factor and two protective factors significantly related to weapon-carrying are amenable to intervention at both individual and population-focused levels, study findings offer a guide for prioritizing strategies for decreasing weapon-carrying among urban American Indian young people. Copyright (c) 2010 Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  11. Making weapons, talking peace

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    York, H.F.

    The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961,more » the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle.« less

  12. Do Weapons Facilitate Adolescent Delinquency? An Examination of Weapon Carrying and Delinquency Among Adolescents.

    PubMed

    Emmert, Amanda D; Hall, Gina Penly; Lizotte, Alan J

    2018-03-01

    This article examines whether weapon carrying influences the frequency and variety of violent, property, and drug delinquency adolescents commit through fixed-effects analyses of data from the Rochester Youth Development Study (RYDS). We conclude that weapon carrying contributes to violent, substance, and property delinquency, and delinquent behaviors learned during weapon carrying continue to affect substance and property delinquency long after carrying has ceased.

  13. Musculoskeletal colloquialisms based on weapons.

    PubMed

    Agrawal, Anuj

    2017-01-01

    Eponyms and colloquialisms are commonly used in orthopaedic literature and convey a great deal of information in a concise fashion. Several orthopaedic conditions have characteristic clinical or radiologic appearances, mimicking the appearance of certain arms or weapons. Most of these are easy to memorise and recognise, provided the orthopaedic surgeon is aware of the colloquialism and familiar with the appearance of the weapon on which it is based. Unfortunately, many such colloquialisms are based on traditional weapons no longer in current use, and their appearances are not familiar to most orthopaedists, creating confusion and difficulty in understanding them. In this paper, we have reviewed the musculoskeletal colloquialisms based on weapons, including a brief description of the weapon with illustrations, highlighting the importance of the colloquialism in diagnosis or treatment of musculoskeletal conditions.

  14. The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Immele, John D; Wagner, Richard L

    2009-01-01

    US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weaponsmore » policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in time. We will begin to

  15. Application of cation-exchange solid-phase extraction for the analysis of amino alcohols from water and human plasma for verification of Chemical Weapons Convention.

    PubMed

    Kanaujia, Pankaj K; Tak, Vijay; Pardasani, Deepak; Gupta, A K; Dubey, D K

    2008-03-28

    The analysis of nitrogen containing amino alcohols, which are the precursors and degradation products of nitrogen mustards and nerve agent VX, constitutes an important aspect for verifying the compliance to the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention). This work devotes on the development of solid-phase extraction method using silica- and polymer-based SCX (strong cation-exchange) and MCX (mixed-mode strong cation-exchange) cartridges for N,N-dialkylaminoethane-2-ols and alkyl N,N-diethanolamines, from water. The extracted analytes were analyzed by GC-MS (gas chromatography-mass spectrometry) in the full scan and selected ion monitoring modes. The extraction efficiencies of SCX and MCX cartridges were compared, and results revealed that SCX performed better. Extraction parameters, such as loading capacity, extraction solvent, its volume, and washing solvent were optimized. Best recoveries were obtained using 2 mL methanol containing 10% NH(4)OH and limits of detection could be achieved up to 5 x 10(-3) microg mL(-1) in the selected ion monitoring mode and 0.01 microg mL(-1) in full scan mode. The method was successfully employed for the detection and identification of amino alcohol present in water sample sent by Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the official proficiency tests. The method was also applied to extract the analytes from human plasma. The SCX cartridge showed good recoveries of amino alcohols from human plasma after protein precipitation.

  16. Substance Abuse, Parenting Styles, and Aggression: An Exploratory Study of Weapon Carrying Students.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Corvo, Kenneth; Williams, Kimberly

    2000-01-01

    Study represents one of the first undertaken exclusively with students who brought weapons to school. Questions examined measures of student and family relationships, as well as attitudes and behavior among students caught with weapons at school. Findings support the need for substance abuse assessments and family interventions that strengthen…

  17. Wounds and weapons.

    PubMed

    Vogel, H; Dootz, B

    2007-08-01

    X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

  18. Computational modeling of blast exposure associated with recoilless weapons combat training

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wiri, S.; Ritter, A. C.; Bailie, J. M.; Needham, C.; Duckworth, J. L.

    2017-11-01

    Military personnel are exposed to blast as part of routine combat training with shoulder-fired recoilless rifles. These weapons fire large-caliber ammunitions capable of disabling structures and uparmored vehicles (e.g., tanks). Scientific, medical, and military leaders are beginning to recognize the blast overpressure from these shoulder-fired weapons may result in acute and even long-term physiological effects to military personnel. However, the back blast generated from the Carl Gustav and Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon (SMAW) shoulder-fired weapons on the weapon operator has not been quantified. By quantifying and modeling the full-body blast exposure from these weapons, better injury correlations can be constructed. Blast exposure data from the Carl Gustav and SMAW were used to calibrate a propellant burn source term for computational simulations of blast exposure on operators of these shoulder-mounted weapon systems. A propellant burn model provided the source term for each weapon to capture blast effects. Blast data from personnel-mounted gauges during weapon firing were used to create initial, high-fidelity 3D computational fluid dynamic simulations using SHAMRC (Second-order Hydrodynamic Automatic Mesh Refinement Code). These models were then improved upon using data collected from static blast sensors positioned around the military personnel while weapons were utilized in actual combat training. The final simulation models for both the Carl Gustav and SMAW were in good agreement with the data collected from the personnel-mounted and static pressure gauges. Using the final simulation results, contour maps were created for peak overpressure and peak overpressure impulse experienced by military personnel firing the weapon as well as those assisting with firing of those weapons. Reconstruction of the full-body blast loading enables a more accurate assessment of the cause of potential mechanisms of injury due to air blast even for subjects not

  19. The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kovac, Jeffrey

    1997-07-01

    Leonard A. Cole. W. H. Freeman: New York, 1997. 250 pp. ISBN 0-7167-2950-4. $22.95 hc. The Eleventh Plague begins with a recitation of the ten plagues brought down upon Egypt, part of the Passover Seder celebrated each spring by Jews all over the world. Spring is also the anniversary of the first use of chemical weapons. On April 22, 1915, German soldiers released chlorine gas from 5,739 cylinders installed along the battle line at Ypres in southeastern Belgium. Germany achieved complete surprise. The gas drifted across no man's land, causing widespread terror and creating ten thousand serious casualties and five thousand deaths. Chlorine, of course, was a poor weapon, easily neutralized, but German scientists, including future Nobel laureates Fritz Haber, Otto Hahn, and James Franck, and the German chemical industry created ever more dangerous chemical weapons, culminating with the introduction of mustard gas in 1917. Despite cries of moral outrage, the Allies countered with their own chemical weapons efforts. The eleventh plague had been unleashed.

  20. Difficult Decisions: Chemical Warfare.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Slesnick, Irwin L.; Miller, John A.

    1988-01-01

    Gives the background history and chemistry of modern day chemical warfare from World War I to the present. Provides discussion questions to stimulate deeper thinking on the issue. Contains a discussion activity called "Can New Chemical Weapons Lead to Humane Warfare?" (CW)

  1. Disaster preparedness, pediatric considerations in primary blast injury, chemical, and biological terrorism

    PubMed Central

    Hamele, Mitchell; Poss, William Bradley; Sweney, Jill

    2014-01-01

    Both domestic and foreign terror incidents are an unfortunate outgrowth of our modern times from the Oklahoma City bombings, Sarin gas attacks in Japan, the Madrid train bombing, anthrax spores in the mail, to the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. The modalities used to perpetrate these terrorist acts range from conventional weapons to high explosives, chemical weapons, and biological weapons all of which have been used in the recent past. While these weapons platforms can cause significant injury requiring critical care the mechanism of injury, pathophysiology and treatment of these injuries are unfamiliar to many critical care providers. Additionally the pediatric population is particularly vulnerable to these types of attacks. In the event of a mass casualty incident both adult and pediatric critical care practitioners will likely be called upon to care for children and adults alike. We will review the presentation, pathophysiology, and treatment of victims of blast injury, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. The focus will be on those injuries not commonly encountered in critical care practice, primary blast injuries, category A pathogens likely to be used in terrorist incidents, and chemical weapons including nerve agents, vesicants, pulmonary agents, cyanide, and riot control agents with special attention paid to pediatric specific considerations. PMID:24834398

  2. Extraction and derivatization of chemical weapons convention relevant aminoalcohols on magnetic cation-exchange resins.

    PubMed

    Singh, Varoon; Garg, Prabhat; Chinthakindi, Sridhar; Tak, Vijay; Dubey, Devendra Kumar

    2014-02-14

    Analysis and identification of nitrogen containing aminoalcohols is an integral part of the verification analysis of chemical weapons convention (CWC). This study was aimed to develop extraction and derivatization of aminoalcohols of CWC relevance by using magnetic dispersive solid-phase extraction (MDSPE) in combination with on-resin derivatization (ORD). For this purpose, sulfonated magnetic cation-exchange resins (SMRs) were prepared using magnetite nanoparticles as core, styrene and divinylbenzene as polymer coat and sulfonic acid as acidic cation exchanger. SMRs were successfully employed as extractant for targeted basic analytes. Adsorbed analytes were derivatized with hexamethyldisilazane (HMDS) on the surface of extractant. Derivatized (silylated) compounds were analyzed by GC-MS in SIM and full scan mode. The linearity of the method ranged from 5 to 200ngmL(-1). The LOD and LOQ ranged from 2 to 6ngmL(-1) and 5 to 19ngmL(-1) respectively. The relative standard deviation for intra-day repeatability and inter-day intermediate precision ranged from 5.1% to 6.6% and 0.2% to 7.6% respectively. Recoveries of analytes from spiked water samples from different sources varied from 28.4% to 89.3%. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  3. Biological and Chemical Security

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Fitch, P J

    2002-12-19

    The LLNL Chemical & Biological National Security Program (CBNP) provides science, technology and integrated systems for chemical and biological security. Our approach is to develop and field advanced strategies that dramatically improve the nation's capabilities to prevent, prepare for, detect, and respond to terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons. Recent events show the importance of civilian defense against terrorism. The 1995 nerve gas attack in Tokyo's subway served to catalyze and focus the early LLNL program on civilian counter terrorism. In the same year, LLNL began CBNP using Laboratory-Directed R&D investments and a focus on biodetection. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Defensemore » Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, passed in 1996, initiated a number of U.S. nonproliferation and counter-terrorism programs including the DOE (now NNSA) Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (also known as CBNP). In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security was formed. The NNSA CBNP and many of the LLNL CBNP activities are being transferred as the new Department becomes operational. LLNL has a long history in national security including nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In biology, LLNL had a key role in starting and implementing the Human Genome Project and, more recently, the Microbial Genome Program. LLNL has over 1,000 scientists and engineers with relevant expertise in biology, chemistry, decontamination, instrumentation, microtechnologies, atmospheric modeling, and field experimentation. Over 150 LLNL scientists and engineers work full time on chemical and biological national security projects.« less

  4. Air weapon fatalities.

    PubMed Central

    Milroy, C M; Clark, J C; Carter, N; Rutty, G; Rooney, N

    1998-01-01

    AIMS: To describe characteristics of a series of people accidentally and deliberately killed by air powered weapons. METHODS: Five cases of fatal airgun injury were identified by forensic pathologists and histopathologists. The circumstances surrounding the case, radiological examination, and pathological findings are described. The weapon characteristics are also reported. RESULTS: Three of the victims were adult men, one was a 16 year old boy, and one an eight year old child. Four of the airguns were .22 air rifles, the other a .177 air rifle. Two committed suicide, one person shooting himself in the head, the other in the chest. In both cases the guns were fired at contact range. Three of the cases were classified as accidents: in two the pellet penetrated into the head and in one the chest. CONCLUSIONS: One person each year dies from an air powered weapon injury in the United Kingdom. In addition there is considerable morbidity from airgun injuries. Fatalities and injuries are most commonly accidents, but deliberately inflicted injuries occur. Airguns are dangerous weapons when inappropriately handled and should not be considered as toys. Children should not play with airguns unsupervised. Images PMID:9797730

  5. Chemical burns as assault injuries in Jamaica.

    PubMed

    Branday, J; Arscott, G D; Smoot, E C; Williams, G D; Fletcher, P R

    1996-03-01

    A three-fold greater incidence of chemical burn injuries in Jamaican hospitals, compared to burn centres in other industrial countries, underscores the problem of the use of common chemicals for assault weapons in this country. With the increased availability of guns for personal use, many Jamaicans learned the value of carrying household chemicals such as sulphuric acid from batteries or sodium hydroxide obtained from cleaning supplies. Chemicals carried in a container, such as one might carry mace, afforded a means of defence among the lower socioeconomic groups who could not afford handguns. This use of dangerous chemicals for defensive weapons has extended to the use of chemicals for assault. The pattern of chemical injury differs significantly from most reports in the literature in both prevalence and aetiology. This review was prepared to examine these injuries with a view to planning strategies for prevention.

  6. No weapons in the weapons lab

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Trebino, Rick

    2010-03-01

    I spent 12 years working at a top-secret nuclear-weapons lab that had its own dedicated force of heavily armed security guards. Of course, security-related incidents were rare, so the guards' main challenge was simply staying awake.

  7. Analysis of chemical weapons decontamination waste from old ton containers from Johnston Atoll using multiple analytical methods

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Creasy, W.R.; Brickhouse, M.D.; Morrisse, K.M.

    1999-07-01

    Decontamination waste from chemical weapons (CW) agents has been stored in ton containers on Johnston Atoll since 1971. The waste was recently sampled and analyzed to determine its chemical composition in preparation for future cleanups. Due to the range of products and analytical requirements, multiple chromatographic and spectroscopic methods were necessary, including gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS), gas chromatography/atomic emission detection (GC/AED), liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry (LC/MS), capillary electrophoresis (CE), and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy (NMR). The samples were screened for residual agents. No residual sarin (GB) or VX was found to detection limits of 20 ng/mL, but 3% of the samplesmore » contained residual sulfur mustard (HD) at < 140 ng/mL. Decontamination products of agents were identified. The majority (74%) of the ton containers were documented correctly, in that the observed decontamination products were in agreement with the labeled agent type, but for a number of the containers, the contents were not in agreement with the labels. In addition, arsenic compounds that are decontamination products of the agent lewisite (L) were observed in a few ton containers, suggesting that lewisite was originally present but not documented. This study was a prototype to demonstrate the level of effort required to characterize old bulk CW-related waste.« less

  8. Zirconia ceramics for excess weapons plutonium waste

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gong, W. L.; Lutze, W.; Ewing, R. C.

    2000-01-01

    We synthesized a zirconia (ZrO 2)-based single-phase ceramic containing simulated excess weapons plutonium waste. ZrO 2 has large solubility for other metallic oxides. More than 20 binary systems A xO y-ZrO 2 have been reported in the literature, including PuO 2, rare-earth oxides, and oxides of metals contained in weapons plutonium wastes. We show that significant amounts of gadolinium (neutron absorber) and yttrium (additional stabilizer of the cubic modification) can be dissolved in ZrO 2, together with plutonium (simulated by Ce 4+, U 4+ or Th 4+) and impurities (e.g., Ca, Mg, Fe, Si). Sol-gel and powder methods were applied to make homogeneous, single-phase zirconia solid solutions. Pu waste impurities were completely dissolved in the solid solutions. In contrast to other phases, e.g., zirconolite and pyrochlore, zirconia is extremely radiation resistant and does not undergo amorphization. Baddeleyite (ZrO 2) is suggested as the natural analogue to study long-term radiation resistance and chemical durability of zirconia-based waste forms.

  9. Why Sexually Selected Weapons Are Not Ornaments.

    PubMed

    McCullough, Erin L; Miller, Christine W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2016-10-01

    The elaboration and diversification of sexually selected weapons remain poorly understood. We argue that progress in this topic has been hindered by a strong bias in sexual selection research, and a tendency for weapons to be conflated with ornaments used in mate choice. Here, we outline how male-male competition and female choice are distinct mechanisms of sexual selection, and why weapons and ornaments are fundamentally different types of traits. We call for research on the factors contributing to weapon divergence, the potential for male-male competition to drive speciation, and the specific use of weapons in the context of direct fights versus displays. Given that weapons are first and foremost fighting structures, biomechanical approaches are an especially promising direction for understanding weapon design. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  10. Audit of sharp weapon deaths in metropolis of Karachi--an autopsy based study.

    PubMed

    Mirza, Farhat Hussain; Hasan, Qudsia; Memon, Akhtar Amin; Adil, Syeda Ezz-e-Rukhshan

    2010-01-01

    Sharp weapons are one of the most violent and abhorrent means of deaths. This study assesses the frequency of sharp weapon deaths in Karachi. This was a cross sectional study, and involves the deaths by sharp weapons autopsied in Karachi during Mar 2008-Feb 2009. This study reports that the frequency of sharp weapon deaths in Karachi is similar to some other studies conducted in different regions of Pakistan, yet it is very high as the population of Karachi is way more than any other metropolis of Pakistan. Our study reported that out of 2090 medico-legal deaths in Karachi during the study period, 91 deaths were due to sharp weapons, including 73 (80.2%) males and 18 (19.8%) females. 100% of the deaths were homicides, so none were suicides. Deaths were more frequent in age group ranging from 20-39 years (59.3%). Sharp weapon deaths continue to be a means of quite a number of deaths in Karachi. Such violence depicts intolerant and frustrated nature of the citizens.

  11. Sandia National Laboratories: National Security Missions: Nuclear Weapons:

    Science.gov Websites

    Safety & Security Sandia National Laboratories Exceptional service in the national interest & Figures Programs Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons Safety & Security Weapons Science & Twitter YouTube Flickr RSS Top Nuclear Weapons About Nuclear Weapons at Sandia Safety & Security

  12. Space Law and Weapons in Space

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mosteshar, Sa'id

    2017-07-01

    Although legal principles to govern space were discussed as early as the mid-1950s, they were not formalized until the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 was adopted and came into force. The Outer Space Treaty establishes a number of principles affecting the placement of weapons in outer space. In particular, it provides for the peaceful use of earth's moon along with other celestial bodies and prohibits the testing of any types of weapons on such bodies. More generally the OST forbids the placement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space. In addition, there are a number of disarmament treaties and agreements emanating from the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Conference on Disarmament that are relevant to weapons in space. One of the fundamental question that arises is what constitutes a weapon and does its placement in space breach the requirement that outer space be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. For example, does a satellite used to control and direct an armed drone breach the peaceful use provision of the OST? There may be risks that without international norms governments and sub-state groups may acquire and use armed drones in ways that threaten regional stability, laws of war, and the role of domestic rule of law in decisions to use force. The nature of weapons and other questions of laws affecting the placement of weapons in space, as well as the use of space assets for non-peaceful purposes, are thus of real significance when considering space law and weapons in space. Examining the characteristics that render a space object a weapon and the role of intent and perception in the issues that arise become essential aspects to consider. This also necessitates examining dual-use systems common to many space systems and operations.

  13. Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William

    1998-12-01

    Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the

  14. Building Foundations for Nuclear Security Enterprise Analysis Utilizing Nuclear Weapon Data

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Josserand, Terry Michael; Young, Leone; Chamberlin, Edwin Phillip

    The Nuclear Security Enterprise, managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration - a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy - has been associated with numerous assessments with respect to the estimating, management capabilities, and practices pertaining to nuclear weapon modernization efforts. This report identifies challenges in estimating and analyzing the Nuclear Security Enterprise through an analysis of analogous timeframe conditions utilizing two types of nuclear weapon data - (1) a measure of effort and (2) a function of time. The analysis of analogous timeframe conditions that utilizes only two types of nuclear weapon data yields four summary observations thatmore » estimators and analysts of the Nuclear Security Enterprise will find useful.« less

  15. Micro-chemical and micro-structural investigation of archaeological bronze weapons from the Ayanis fortress (lake Van, Eastern Anatolia, Turkey)

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Faraldi, F.; Çilingirǒglu, A.; Angelini, E.; Riccucci, C.; De Caro, T.; Batmaz, A.; Mezzi, A.; Caschera, D.; Cortese, B.

    2013-12-01

    Bronze weapons (VII cen BC) found during the archaeological excavation of the Ayanis fortress (lake Van, eastern Anatolia, Turkey) are investigated in order to determine their chemical composition and metallurgical features as well as to identify the micro-chemical and micro-structural nature of the corrosion products grown during long-term burial. Small fragments were sampled from the artefacts and analysed by means of the combined use of optical microscopy (OM), X-ray diffraction (XRD), X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS), scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and energy dispersive spectrometry (EDS). The results show that the bronze artefacts have been manufactured by using alloys with a controlled and refined chemical composition demonstrating the high level metallurgical competence and skill of the Urartian craftsmen and artists. Furthermore, the micro-structural and metallurgical investigations evidence the presence of equiaxed grains in the matrix, indicating that the artefact were produced by repeated cycles of mechanical shaping and thermal annealing treatments to restore the alloy ductility. From the degradation point of view, the results show the structures and the chemical composition of the stratified corrosion layers (i.e. the patina) where the copper or tin depletion phenomenon is commonly observed with the surface enrichment of some elements coming from the burial soil, mainly Cl, which is related to the high concentration of chlorides in the Ayanis soil. The results reveal also that another source of degradation is the inter-granular corrosion phenomenon likely increased by the metallurgical features of the alloys caused by the high temperature manufacturing process that induces crystallisation and segregation phenomena along the grain boundaries.

  16. Naval Directed-Energy Weapons - No Longer a Future Weapon Concept

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2012-01-01

    DE efforts. High-Energy Laser Weapons HEL weapon systems have been envisioned for a great many years, to include be- ing referred to as Martian “Heat...PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES... ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S

  17. Packaging and delivery of chemical weapons: a defensive trojan horse stratagem in chromodorid nudibranchs.

    PubMed

    Carbone, Marianna; Gavagnin, Margherita; Haber, Markus; Guo, Yue-Wei; Fontana, Angelo; Manzo, Emiliano; Genta-Jouve, Gregory; Tsoukatou, Maria; Rudman, William B; Cimino, Guido; Ghiselin, Michael T; Mollo, Ernesto

    2013-01-01

    Storage of secondary metabolites with a putative defensive role occurs in the so-called mantle dermal formations (MDFs) that are located in the more exposed parts of the body of most and very likely all members of an entire family of marine mollusks, the chromodorid nudibranchs (Gastropoda: Opisthobranchia). Given that these structures usually lack a duct system, the mechanism for exudation of their contents remains unclear, as does their adaptive significance. One possible explanation could be that they are adapted so as to be preferentially attacked by predators. The nudibranchs might offer packages containing highly repugnant chemicals along with parts of their bodies to the predators, as a defensive variant of the strategic theme of the Trojan horse. We detected, by quantitative (1)H-NMR, extremely high local concentrations of secondary metabolites in the MDFs of six species belonging to five chromodorid genera. The compounds were purified by chromatographic methods and subsequently evaluated for their feeding deterrent properties, obtaining dose-response curves. We found that only distasteful compounds are accumulated in the reservoirs at concentrations that far exceed the values corresponding to maximum deterrent activity in the feeding assays. Other basic evidence, both field and experimental, has been acquired to elucidate the kind of damage that the predators can produce on both the nudibranchs' mantles and the MDFs. As a result of a long evolutionary process that has progressively led to the accumulation of defensive chemical weapons in localized anatomical structures, the extant chromodorid nudibranchs remain in place when molested, retracting respiratory and chemosensory organs, but offering readily accessible parts of their body to predators. When these parts are masticated or wounded by predators, breakage of the MDFs results in the release of distasteful compounds at extremely high concentration in a way that maximizes their repugnant impact.

  18. Packaging and Delivery of Chemical Weapons: A Defensive Trojan Horse Stratagem in Chromodorid Nudibranchs

    PubMed Central

    Carbone, Marianna; Gavagnin, Margherita; Haber, Markus; Guo, Yue-Wei; Fontana, Angelo; Manzo, Emiliano; Genta-Jouve, Gregory; Tsoukatou, Maria; Rudman, William B.; Cimino, Guido; Ghiselin, Michael T.; Mollo, Ernesto

    2013-01-01

    Background Storage of secondary metabolites with a putative defensive role occurs in the so-called mantle dermal formations (MDFs) that are located in the more exposed parts of the body of most and very likely all members of an entire family of marine mollusks, the chromodorid nudibranchs (Gastropoda: Opisthobranchia). Given that these structures usually lack a duct system, the mechanism for exudation of their contents remains unclear, as does their adaptive significance. One possible explanation could be that they are adapted so as to be preferentially attacked by predators. The nudibranchs might offer packages containing highly repugnant chemicals along with parts of their bodies to the predators, as a defensive variant of the strategic theme of the Trojan horse. Methodology and Principal Findings We detected, by quantitative 1H-NMR, extremely high local concentrations of secondary metabolites in the MDFs of six species belonging to five chromodorid genera. The compounds were purified by chromatographic methods and subsequently evaluated for their feeding deterrent properties, obtaining dose-response curves. We found that only distasteful compounds are accumulated in the reservoirs at concentrations that far exceed the values corresponding to maximum deterrent activity in the feeding assays. Other basic evidence, both field and experimental, has been acquired to elucidate the kind of damage that the predators can produce on both the nudibranchs' mantles and the MDFs. Significance As a result of a long evolutionary process that has progressively led to the accumulation of defensive chemical weapons in localized anatomical structures, the extant chromodorid nudibranchs remain in place when molested, retracting respiratory and chemosensory organs, but offering readily accessible parts of their body to predators. When these parts are masticated or wounded by predators, breakage of the MDFs results in the release of distasteful compounds at extremely high

  19. Direct sampling of chemical weapons in water by photoionization mass spectrometry.

    PubMed

    Syage, Jack A; Cai, Sheng-Suan; Li, Jianwei; Evans, Matthew D

    2006-05-01

    The vulnerability of water supplies to toxic contamination calls for fast and effective means for screening water samples for multiple threats. We describe the use of photoionization (PI) mass spectrometry (MS) for high-speed, high-throughput screening and molecular identification of chemical weapons (CW) threats and other hazardous compounds. The screening technology can detect a wide range of compounds at subacute concentrations with no sample preparation and a sampling cycle time of approximately 45 s. The technology was tested with CW agents VX, GA, GB, GD, GF, HD, HN1, and HN3, in addition to riot agents and precursors. All are sensitively detected and give simple PI mass spectra dominated by the parent ion. The target application of the PI MS method is as a routine, real-time early warning system for CW agents and other hazardous compounds in air and in water. In this work, we also present comprehensive measurements for water analysis and report on the system detection limits, linearity, quantitation accuracy, and false positive (FP) and false negative rates for concentrations at subacute levels. The latter data are presented in the form of receiver operating characteristic curves of the form of detection probability P(D) versus FP probability P(FP). These measurements were made using the CW surrogate compounds, DMMP, DEMP, DEEP, and DIMP. Method detection limits (3sigma) obtained using a capillary injection method yielded 1, 6, 3, and 2 ng/mL, respectively. These results were obtained using 1-microL injections of water samples without any preparation, corresponding to mass detection limits of 1, 6, 3, and 2 pg, respectively. The linear range was about 3-4 decades and the dynamic range about 4-5 decades. The relative standard deviations were generally <10% at CW subacute concentrations levels.

  20. Enhanced chemical weapon warning via sensor fusion

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Flaherty, Michael; Pritchett, Daniel; Cothren, Brian; Schwaiger, James

    2011-05-01

    Torch Technologies Inc., is actively involved in chemical sensor networking and data fusion via multi-year efforts with Dugway Proving Ground (DPG) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The objective of these efforts is to develop innovative concepts and advanced algorithms that enhance our national Chemical Warfare (CW) test and warning capabilities via the fusion of traditional and non-traditional CW sensor data. Under Phase I, II, and III Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) contracts with DPG, Torch developed the Advanced Chemical Release Evaluation System (ACRES) software to support non real-time CW sensor data fusion. Under Phase I and II SBIRs with DTRA in conjunction with the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), Torch is using the DPG ACRES CW sensor data fuser as a framework from which to develop the Cloud state Estimation in a Networked Sensor Environment (CENSE) data fusion system. Torch is currently developing CENSE to implement and test innovative real-time sensor network based data fusion concepts using CW and non-CW ancillary sensor data to improve CW warning and detection in tactical scenarios.

  1. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander or...

  2. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander or...

  3. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander or...

  4. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander or...

  5. 48 CFR 25.301-3 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons. 25.301-3 Section... FOREIGN ACQUISITION Contracts Performed Outside the United States 25.301-3 Weapons. The contracting officer shall follow agency procedures and the weapons policy established by the combatant commander or...

  6. Belief in exposure to chemical and biological agents in Persian Gulf War soldiers.

    PubMed

    Stuart, John A; Ursano, Robert J; Fullerton, Carol S; Wessely, Simon

    2008-02-01

    This is the first longitudinal cohort study of Persian Gulf War US soldiers to examine belief in exposure to chemical and biological weapons before and shortly after combat. A longitudinal sample of n = 1250 male Persian Gulf War US Army soldiers were surveyed 3 to 4 months before and 6 to 10 months after the 1991 War. Six to 10 months after combat, 4.6% of the cohort believed they had been exposed to chemical and biological weapons. Adjusting for demographics only, those who reported a greater number of combat exposures (odds ratio, OR: 18.8), or higher combat stress (OR: 12.27) were more likely to believe they were exposed. Adjusting for all variables soldiers who reported higher combat stress continued to be most likely (OR: 6.58) to believe they had been exposed to chemical and biological weapons. Individuals reporting higher combat stress are at substantially greater risk of reporting they have been exposed to chemical or biological weapons.

  7. 15 CFR 719.21 - Payment of final assessment.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Payment of final assessment. 719.21 Section 719.21 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

  8. 15 CFR 719.21 - Payment of final assessment.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Payment of final assessment. 719.21 Section 719.21 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

  9. Global strike hypersonic weapons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Lewis, Mark J.

    2017-11-01

    Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.

  10. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

  11. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

  12. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

  13. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

  14. 36 CFR 2.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 2.4... PROTECTION, PUBLIC USE AND RECREATION § 2.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in... prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or net (iii) Using a weapon...

  15. Weapons in Schools. NSSC Resource Paper.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Butterfield, George E., Ed.; Turner, Brenda, Ed.

    More than ever, our public school system must confront weapons in schools and become aware of steadily rising statistics on youth homicide and suicide. This report delineates the problem, discusses why children carry weapons to school, and outlines strategies for keeping weapons out of schools and for improving school safety. Although some…

  16. [Use of chemical war gases at the Russian-German front during the First World War].

    PubMed

    Budko, A A; Ivanovskii, Yu V

    2016-02-01

    The First World War was notable for the widespread use of machine military hardware and absolutely new type of weapon--chemical weapon. As a result of the first gas attack by chlorine undertaken by the German army against the Russian armies on May, 31st, 1915, heavy poisonings have received 9100 people, 6000 of them died. Chemical attack of Germany against Russia was limited by the use chemical gases of suffocating action: chlorine, bromine,phosgene and diphosgene. It is not known exactly, how many times Germany attacked Russian positions with use of chemical gases. On available data, in the First World War from application by German of the chemical weapon Russia has suffered more, than any other of the at war countries: from five hundred thousand poisoned have died nearby 66,000 people. In turn, having received in the order the chemical weapon of own manufacture, Russian army itself tried to attack in the German armies. It is authentically known only about several cases of application dy Russian of fighting poison gases, and in all cases of loss of germen were insignificant.

  17. Testing three explanations of the emergence of weapon carrying in peer context: the roles of aggression, victimization, and the social network.

    PubMed

    Dijkstra, Jan Kornelis; Gest, Scott D; Lindenberg, Siegwart; Veenstra, René; Cillessen, Antonius H N

    2012-04-01

    To examine the relative contribution of weapon carrying of peers, aggression, and victimization to weapon carrying of male and female adolescents over time. Data were derived from a population-based sample of male (N = 224) and female (N = 244) adolescents followed from grade 10 (M age = 15.5) to grade 11 (M age = 16.5). Peer networks were derived from best friend nominations. Self-reports were used to assess weapon carrying. Aggression and victimization were assessed using both self- and peer-reports. Use of dynamic social network modeling (SIENA) allowed prediction of weapon carrying in grade 11 as a function of weapon carrying of befriended peers, aggression, and victimization in grade 10, while selection processes and structural network effects (reciprocity and transitivity) were controlled for. Peer influence processes accounted for changes in weapon carrying over time. Self-reported victimization decreased weapon carrying 1 year later. Peer-reported victimization increased the likelihood of weapon carrying, particularly for highly aggressive adolescents. Boys were more likely to carry weapons than girls, but the processes associated with weapon carrying did not differ for boys and girls. These findings revealed that, in this population-based sample, weapon carrying of best friends, as well as aggression, contributed to the proliferation of weapons in friendship networks, suggesting processes of peer contagion as well as individual vulnerability to weapon carrying. Copyright © 2012 Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  18. Toward a nuclear weapons free world?

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Maaranen, S.A.

    Doubts about the wisdom of relying on nuclear weapons are as old as nuclear weapons themselves. But despite this questioning, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the indispensable element of American (indeed Western) security during the Cold War. By the 1970s and 1980s, however, discontent was growing about the intense US-Soviet nuclear arms competition, as it failed to provide any enduring improvement in security; rather, it was seen as creating ever greater risks and dangers. Arms control negotiations and limitations, adopted as a means to regulate the technical competition, may also have relieved some of the political pressures andmore » dangers. But the balance of terror, and the fears of it, continued. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under President Reagan was a very different approach to escaping from the precarious protection of nuclear weapons, in that it sought a way to continue to defend the US and the West, but without the catastrophic risks of mutual deterrence. As such, SDI connoted unhappiness with the precarious nuclear balance and, for many, with nuclear weapons in general. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the sudden end of the Cold War seemed to offer a unique opportunity to fashion a new, more peaceful world order that might allow for fading away of nuclear weapons. Scholars have foreseen two different paths to a nuclear free world. The first is a fundamental improvement in the relationships between states such that nuclear weapons are no longer needed. The second path is through technological development, e.g., missile defenses which could provide effective protection against nuclear attacks. The paper discusses nuclear weapon policy in the US, views of other nuclear states, the future of nuclear weapons, and issues in a less-nuclear world.« less

  19. Weapons of mass destruction, WMD.

    PubMed

    Vogel, H

    2007-08-01

    Since the invasion into Iraq in 2003, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), have come to general notice; they include today chemical, biological, and atomic/nuclear weapons, (CW, BW, and AW). Radiological findings shall be described. X-ray findings of victims of WMD are described. From CW, own observations are reported. Examples of (possible) X-ray findings of victims of BW are described. AW may induce radiation disease. Exposure to sulfur-lost induces severe bronchitis; if the radiograph shows pulmonary infiltrations, the prognosis is bad; a late consequence maybe bronchiectasis. BW can be based on bacteria, virus or toxins. An approach of the X-ray findings for BW victims is based on the assumption that the disease induced by BW has the same (or a similar) clinic and radiology as that induced by the original microorganism or by the unchanged toxism. This approximation may have its limits, if the germ or toxin has been modified. In survivors of AW, the radiology is probably that of victims of thermal radiation and blast. WMD seem to be a real or a possible threat. They can be used in war, in terrorist attacks, in crime, and in action of secret services. In case that WMD are employed, X-ray diagnostic will be used to evaluate the prognosis (triage) and the risk of infection.

  20. Proliferation of nuclear weapons: opportunities for control and abolition.

    PubMed

    Sidel, Victor W; Levy, Barry S

    2007-09-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. "Horizontal" proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. "Vertical" proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation--and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons--involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large.

  1. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Their Purpose and Placement

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-06-01

    War II, nuclear scientists argued against the development of fusion weapons .3 In the 1970s, politicians debated the use of neutron bombs, weapons ...Tactical Nuclear Weapons : Their Purpose and Placement BY EDWARD G. FERGUSON A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE...This study answers the question -- Why does America have tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe today? – treating America and the North

  2. Fragmentation pathways and structural characterization of organophosphorus compounds related to the Chemical Weapons Convention by electron ionization and electrospray ionization tandem mass spectrometry.

    PubMed

    Hosseini, Seyed Esmaeil; Saeidian, Hamid; Amozadeh, Ali; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi; Babri, Mehran

    2016-12-30

    For unambiguous identification of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-related chemicals in environmental samples, the availability of mass spectra, interpretation skills and rapid microsynthesis of suspected chemicals are essential requirements. For the first time, the electron ionization single quadrupole and electrospray ionization tandem mass spectra of a series of O-alkyl N-[bis(dimethylamino)methylidene]-P-methylphosphonamidates (Scheme 1, cpd 4) were studied for CWC verification purposes. O-Alkyl N-[bis(dimethylamino)methylidene]-P-methylphosphonamidates were prepared through a microsynthetic method and were analyzed using electron ionization and electrospray ionization mass spectrometry with gas and liquid chromatography, respectively, as MS-inlet systems. General EI and ESI fragmentation pathways were proposed and discussed, and collision-induced dissociation studies of the protonated derivatives of these compounds were performed to confirm proposed fragment ion structures by analyzing mass spectra of deuterated analogs. Mass spectrometric studies revealed some interesting fragmentation pathways during the ionization process, such as McLafferty rearrangement, hydrogen rearrangement and a previously unknown intramolecular electrophilic aromatic substitution reaction. The EI and ESI fragmentation routes of the synthesized compounds 4 were investigated with the aim of detecting and identifying CWC-related chemicals during on-site inspection and/or off-site analysis and toxic chemical destruction monitoring. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  3. Non-Lethal Weapons Program

    Science.gov Websites

    ), 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), practice non-lethal control techniques during a non-lethal Skip to main content (Press Enter). Toggle navigation Non-Lethal Weapons Program Search Search JNLWP: Search Search JNLWP: Search Non-Lethal Weapons Program U.S. Department of Defense Non-Lethal

  4. Chemical Risk Assessment: Traditional vs Public Health ...

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    Preventing adverse health impacts from exposures to environmental chemicals is fundamental to protecting individual and public health. When done efficiently and properly, chemical risk assessment enables risk management actions that minimize the incidence and impacts of environmentally-induced diseases related to chemical exposure. However, traditional chemical risk assessment is faced with multiple challenges with respect to predicting and preventing disease in human populations, and epidemiological studies increasingly report observations of adverse health effects at exposure levels predicted from animal studies to be safe for humans. This discordance reinforces concerns about the adequacy of contemporary risk assessment practices (Birnbaum, Burke, & Jones, 2016) for protecting public health. It is becoming clear that to protect public health more effectively, future risk assessments will need to use the full range of available data, draw on innovative methods to integrate diverse data streams, and consider health endpoints that also reflect the range of subtle effects and morbidities observed in human populations. Given these factors, there is a need to reframe chemical risk assessment to be more clearly aligned with the public health goal of minimizing environmental exposures associated with disease. Preventing adverse health impacts from exposures to environmental chemicals is fundamental to protecting individual and public health. Chemical risk assessments

  5. Distinguishing among weapons offenders, drug offenders, and weapons and drug offenders based on childhood predictors and adolescent correlates.

    PubMed

    Stephens, Skye; Day, David M

    2013-07-01

    Weapons and drug offences incur a large cost to society and tend to be strongly associated. Improved understanding of their antecedents could inform targeted early intervention and prevention programmes. This study aimed to examine differences in criminal careers, childhood predictors and adolescent correlates among weapons-only offenders, drugs-only offenders and a versatile group of weapons + drugs offenders. We conducted a longitudinal records study of 455 young Canadians charged with drug and/or weapons offences who started their offending in late childhood/early adolescence. Consistent with expectation, differences emerged in their criminal careers as the versatile group had a longer criminal career and desisted from offending at a later age than weapons-only offenders. Against prediction, weapons-only offenders experienced the greatest number of childhood predictors and adolescent correlates. The three offending groups could be differentiated on offending trajectories and developmental factors.In making links between past events and later behaviour, life-course criminology may inform development of effective early intervention and prevention strategies.As weapons-only offenders experience the greatest level of adversity in childhood and adolescence, they may benefit most (of these three groups) from early intervention and prevention programmes.A reduction in weapon carrying and use might be achieved by early identification of children risk factors (e.g. family adversity) and appropriate intervention. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  6. Health impacts of chemical irritants used for crowd control: a systematic review of the injuries and deaths caused by tear gas and pepper spray.

    PubMed

    Haar, Rohini J; Iacopino, Vincent; Ranadive, Nikhil; Weiser, Sheri D; Dandu, Madhavi

    2017-10-19

    Chemical irritants used in crowd control, such as tear gases and pepper sprays, are generally considered to be safe and to cause only transient pain and lacrimation. However, there are numerous reports that use and misuse of these chemicals may cause serious injuries. We aimed to review documented injuries from chemical irritants to better understand the morbidity and mortality associated with these weapons. We conducted a systematic review using PRISMA guidelines to identify injuries, permanent disabilities, and deaths from chemical irritants worldwide between January 1, 1990 and March 15, 2015. We reviewed injuries to different body systems, injury severity, and potential risk factors for injury severity. We also assessed region, context and quality of each included article. We identified 31 studies from 11 countries. These reported on 5131 people who suffered injuries, two of whom died and 58 of whom suffered permanent disabilities. Out of 9261 total injuries, 8.7% were severe and required professional medical management, while 17% were moderate and 74.3% were minor. Severe injuries occurred to all body systems, with the majority of injuries impacting the skin and eyes. Projectile munition trauma caused 231 projectile injuries, with 63 (27%) severe injuries, including major head injury and vision loss. Potentiating factors for more severe injury included environmental conditions, prolonged exposure time, and higher quantities of chemical agent in enclosed spaces. Although chemical weapons may have a limited role in crowd control, our findings demonstrate that they have significant potential for misuse, leading to unnecessary morbidity and mortality. A nuanced understanding of the health impacts of chemical weapons and mitigating factors is imperative to avoiding indiscriminate use of chemical weapons and associated health consequences.

  7. Weapon Involvement in the Victimization of Children.

    PubMed

    Mitchell, Kimberly J; Hamby, Sherry L; Turner, Heather A; Shattuck, Anne; Jones, Lisa M

    2015-07-01

    To report the prevalence of weapons involved in the victimization of youth with particular emphasis on weapons with a "high lethality risk" and how such exposure fits into the broader victimization and life experiences of children and adolescents. Data were collected as part of the Second National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence, a nationally representative telephone survey of youth ages 2 to 17 years and caregivers (N = 4114) conducted in 2011. Estimates from the Second National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence indicate that almost 14 million youth, ages 2–17, in the United States have been exposed to violence involving a weapon in their lifetimes as witnesses or victims,or .1 in 5 children in this age group [corrected]. More than 2 million youth in the United States (1 in 33) have been directly assaulted in incidents where the high lethality risk weapons of guns and knives were used. Differences were noted between victimizations involving higher and lower lethality risk weapons as well as between any weapon involvement versus none. Poly-victims, youth with 7 or more victimization types, were particularly likely to experience victimization with any weapon, as well as victimization with a highly lethal weapon compared with nonpoly-victims. Findings add to the field's broadening conceptualization of youth victimization highlighting the potentially highly consequential risk factor of weapon exposure as a component of victimization experiences on the mental health of youth. Further work on improving gun safety practices and taking steps to reduce children's exposure to weapon-involved violence is warranted to reduce this problem. Copyright © 2015 by the American Academy of Pediatrics.

  8. Veteran Transfer Students and Concealed Weapons on Campus

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Pesetski, Christine; Ofstein, Jennifer; Outlaw, Stacy; Brooks, Racheal

    2014-01-01

    This case details the challenges faced by various members of a 4-year university regarding Kathryn, a non-traditional transfer student and military veteran who recently returned from a traumatic deployment in Afghanistan. Precisely, this study identifies ambiguities pertaining to (a) threat assessment, (b) university weapons policies, (c) transfer…

  9. Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD): the future of chemical agent detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Laljer, Charles E.; Owen, Jeffery L.

    2002-06-01

    The Joint Chemical Agent Detector (JCAD) will provide state of the art chemical warfare agent detection capability to ground vehicle operators. Intelligence sources estimate that over twenty counties have active chemical weapons programs. The spread of chemical weapons to third world nations, coupled with the potential for US involvement in these areas in an operational or support capacity, increases the probability that the Joint Services may encounter chemical agents and toxic industrial materials anywhere in the world. Currently, fielded chemical agent detectors are bulky, labor intensive, and subject to false readings. No legacy detector is sensitive enough to provide detection and warning of the low dose hazards associated with miosis contamination. The JCAD will provide a small, lightweight chemical agent detector for vehicle interiors, aircraft, individual personnel, shipboard, and fixed site locations. The system provides a common detection components across multi-service platforms. This common detector system will allow the Joint Services to use the same operational and support concept for more efficient utilization of resources. The JCAD will detect, identify, quantify, and warn of the presence of chemical agents prior to onset of miosis. Upon detection of chemical agents, the detector will provide local and remote audible and visual alarms to the operators. Advance warning will provide the vehicle crew with the time necessary to protect themselves from the lethal effects of chemical agents. The JCAD will also be capable of being upgraded to protect against future chemical agent threats. The JCAD will provide the vehicle operators with the warning necessary to survive and fight in a chemical warfare agent threat environment.

  10. [Modern pneumatic weapons and injuries they cause].

    PubMed

    Kozachenko, I N

    2013-01-01

    The data on the history of development and further improvement of pneumatic weapons are presented with special reference to specific features of different types and varieties of these weapons, cartridges for them, and the sphere of their application. Investigations into peculiarities of damages caused by high-capacity pneumatic weapons to the objects of forensic medical expertise affected from different distances are reviewed. Results of forensic medical expertise and clinical studies on the structure of body injuries inflicted by gunshots from pneumatic weapons to the human body are discussed. The author emphasizes the necessity of developing up-to-date terminology and classification of gunshot injuries caused by shooting from pneumatic weapons.

  11. A Chemical Activity Approach to Exposure and Risk Assessment of Chemicals

    EPA Science Inventory

    To support the goals articulated in the vision for exposure and risk assessment in the twenty-first century, we highlight the application of a thermodynamic chemical activity approach for the exposure and risk assessment of chemicals in the environment. The present article descri...

  12. Weapon Carrying Among Victims of Bullying.

    PubMed

    Pham, Tammy B; Schapiro, Lana E; John, Majnu; Adesman, Andrew

    2017-12-01

    To examine, in a large, nationally representative sample of high school students, the association between bullying victimization and carrying weapons to school and to determine to what extent past experience of 1, 2, or 3 additional indicators of peer aggression increases the likelihood of weapon carrying by victims of bullying (VoBs). National data from the 2015 Youth Risk Behavior Survey were analyzed for grades 9 to 12 ( N = 15 624). VoB groups were determined by self-report of being bullied at school and additional adverse experiences: fighting at school, being threatened or injured at school, and skipping school out of fear for one's safety. Weapon carrying was measured by a dichotomized (ie, ≥1 vs 0) report of carrying a gun, knife, or club on school property. VoB groups were compared with nonvictims with respect to weapon carrying by logistic regression adjusting for sex, grade, and race/ethnicity. When surveyed, 20.2% of students reported being a VoB in the past year, and 4.1% reported carrying a weapon to school in the past month. VoBs experiencing 1, 2, or 3 additional risk factors were successively more likely to carry weapons to school. The subset of VoBs who experienced all 3 additional adverse experiences were more likely to carry weapons to school compared with nonvictims (46.4% vs 2.5%, P < .001). Pediatricians should recognize that VoBs, especially those who have experienced 1 or more indicators of peer aggression in conjunction, are at substantially increased risk of weapon carrying. Copyright © 2017 by the American Academy of Pediatrics.

  13. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition

    PubMed Central

    Sidel, Victor W.; Levy, Barry S.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a particularly destructive threat. Prevention of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons is urgently important to public health. “Horizontal” proliferation refers to nation-states or nonstate entities that do not have, but are acquiring, nuclear weapons or developing the capability and materials for producing them. “Vertical” proliferation refers to nation-states that do possess nuclear weapons and are increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, improving the technical sophistication or reliability of their weapons, or developing new weapons. Because nation-states or other entities that wish to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons need methods for delivering those weapons, proliferation of delivery mechanisms must also be prevented. Controlling proliferation—and ultimately abolishing nuclear weapons—involves national governments, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental and professional organizations, and society at large. PMID:17666690

  14. Living with nuclear weapons

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Carnesale, A.; Doty, P.; Hoffmann, S.

    1983-01-01

    At Harvard President Derek Bok's request, six Harvard professors explain nuclear arms issues to help citizens understand all sides of the national security debates. The goal is to encourage public participation in policy formulation. The book emphasizes that escapism will not improve security; that idealistic plans to eliminate nuclear weapons are a form of escapism. Learning to live with nuclear weapons, they suggest, requires an understanding of the current nuclear predicament and the implications of alternative weapons and policy choices. After reviewing these matters, they emphasize that informed persons will continue to disagree, but that knowledge will improve understanding andmore » appreciation of their differences and improve the quality of policy debates. 54 references, 5 figures, 2 tables. (DCK)« less

  15. Cutaneous chemical burns: assessment and early management.

    PubMed

    Gnaneswaran, Neiraja; Perera, Eshini; Perera, Marlon; Sawhney, Raja

    2015-03-01

    Chemical burns are common and may cause significant physical, psychological, social and economic burden. Despite a wide variety of potentially harmful chemicals, important general principals may be drawn in the assessment and initial management of such injuries. Early treatment of chemical burns is crucial and may reduce the period of resulting morbidity. This article reviews the assessment and management of cutaneous chemical burns. Assessment of the patient should be rapid and occur in conjunction with early emergency management. Rapid history and pri-mary and secondary survey may be required to exclude systemic side effects of the injury. Depth of wound assessment is difficult given that necrosis caused by various chemicals can continue despite cessation of exposure. Early management should be conducted with consideration of clinician's safety, and appropriate precautions should be taken. Excluding specific situations and chemical exposure, copious irrigation with water remains the mainstay of early management. Referral to a centre of higher acuity may be required for expert evaluation.

  16. Systematic review in chemical risk assessment - A chemical industry perspective.

    PubMed

    Pease, Camilla K; Gentry, Robinan P

    2016-01-01

    This commentary provides a perspective from the chemicals industry on the potential usefulness of systematic review approaches in chemical risk assessment. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  17. [The urgency of the application of the medical sanitary passport in the system for chemical safety in the areas of location of high-risk chemical facilities in the Russian Federation].

    PubMed

    Kombarova, M Iu; Radilov, A S; Dulov, S A

    2012-01-01

    The main provisions concerning the need for a creation of medical and sanitary passport for territories in the protective measures zones (PMZ) of storage facilities and facilities for the destruction of chemical weapons (FDCW) are presented in the article. The assessment of results of certification of the territory of PMZ and FDCW in "Maradykovsky" in the Kirov region has been done.

  18. Gas chromatography-mass spectrometric studies of O-alkyl O-2-(N,N-dialkylamino) ethyl alkylphosphonites(phosphonates) for chemical weapons convention verification.

    PubMed

    Saeidian, Hamid; Babri, Mehran; Ramezani, Atefeh; Ashrafi, Davood; Sarabadani, Mansour; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi

    2013-01-01

    The electron ionization (EI) mass spectra of a series of O-alkyl O-2-(N,N-dialkylaminolethyl alkylphosphonites(phosphonates), which are precursors of nerve agents, were studied for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification. General El fragmentation pathways were constructed and discussed. Proposed fragment structures were confirmed through analyzing fragment ions of deuterated analogs and density functional theory (DFT) calculations. The observed fragment ions are due to different fragmentation pathways such as hydrogen and McLafferty+1 rearrangements, alkene, amine and alkoxy elimination by alpha- or beta-cleavage process. Fragment ions distinctly allow unequivocal identification of the interested compounds including those of isomeric compounds. The presence and abundance of fragment ions were found to depend on the size and structure of the alkyl group attached to nitrogen, phosphorus and oxygen atoms.

  19. Childhood maltreatment and threats with weapons.

    PubMed

    Casiano, Hygiea; Mota, Natalie; Afifi, Tracie O; Enns, Murray W; Sareen, Jitender

    2009-11-01

    The relationship between childhood maltreatment and future threats with weapons is unknown. We examined data from the nationally representative National Comorbidity Survey Replication (n = 5692) and conducted multiple logistic regression analyses to determine the association between childhood maltreatment and lifetime behavior of threatening others with a gun or other weapon. After adjusting for sociodemographic variables, physical abuse, sexual abuse, and witnessing domestic violence were significantly associated with threats made with a gun (adjusted odds ratios [AOR] ranging between 3.38 and 4.07) and other weapons (AOR ranging between 2.16 and 2.83). The greater the number of types of maltreatment experienced, the stronger the association with lifetime threats made to others with guns and any weapons. Over 94% of respondents who experienced maltreatment and made threats reported that the maltreatment occurred prior to threatening others with weapons. Prevention efforts that reduce exposure to maltreatment may reduce violent behavior in later life.

  20. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or...

  1. 36 CFR 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 1002... AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap or...

  2. Violent Behaviors, Weapon Carrying, and Firearm Homicide Trends in African American Adolescents, 2001-2015.

    PubMed

    Khubchandani, Jagdish; Price, James H

    2018-04-07

    African American youths have the highest risk for firearm and other weapon related homicides. This study utilized the national Youth Risk Behavior Surveys from 2001 to 2015 to assess trends in violence related behaviors and weapon carrying of African American adolescents. Our analyses found statistically significant reductions in physical fighting and weapon carrying among African American male adolescents from 2007 to 2015. Planning suicide increased in both male and female African American adolescents since 2007. In addition, the number of firearm homicides increased in African American males. African American females and males had groups of items highly predictive of weapon carrying behaviors: alcohol, tobacco, and other drug use and violent risk behaviors. Both female and male students who made mostly A's or B's in school were significantly less likely to carry weapons in and out of school. Our findings indicate that firearm homicides have increased in African American adolescents, but weapon carrying in school going adolescents has significantly declined. School engagement and satisfactory school performance seems to have a significant protective effect on firearm homicides and violent behavior risks in African American adolescents.

  3. Correlates of weapon carrying among high school students in the United States

    PubMed Central

    Muula, Adamson S; Rudatsikira, Emmanuel; Siziya, Seter

    2008-01-01

    Background Deaths and injuries arising from interpersonal violence among adolescents are major public health concerns in the United States. The bearing of weapons among adolescents is a critical factor in many of these deaths and injuries. Methods A secondary analysis of the 2005 United States Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System Survey data was carried out to examine the variables associated with self-reported history of weapon carrying on school property among high school students. We used logistic regression analysis to assess the associations. Results Of the 13,707 respondents who participated in the survey, 10.2% of males and 2.6% of females reported carrying a weapon on school property. In multivariate logistic regression analysis, males were more likely to report having carried a weapon than females (odds ratio (OR) = 5.58; 95% confidence interval (CI) [4.23, 7.62]). Self-reported race/ethnicity was also associated with weapon carrying. Other variables positively associated with weapon carrying at school were substance use (OR = 1.77; 95% CI [1.16, 2.68]), depression (OR = 1.44; 95% CI [1.10, 1.89]), suicidal ideation (OR = 1.64; 95% CI [1.23, 2.19]), having had property stolen or deliberately damaged at school (OR = 1.55; 95% CI [1.21, 1.98]), having been raped (OR = 1.70; 95% CI [1.22, 2.37]), having been threatened or injured with a weapon on school property (OR = 2.19; 95% CI [1.63, 2.95]), and having engaged in physical fighting (OR = 2.02; 95% CI [1.56, 2.63]). Conclusion This research identifies factors that are associated with weapon bearing among adolescents in the United States. These factors may be important in the design of interventions aimed at improving school safety and adolescent health. PMID:18605995

  4. Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1987-06-12

    Arsenal, Edgewood Arsenal, and Dugway Proving Ground . (2) The Army has transferred agent fram certain munitions into other containers or munitions...Aberdeen Proving Ground , Maryland (Historical Volume). - ~ - - - - -.. , 27. Sea Dump of 700 Tons of Lewisite and Mustard , NAD, Concord, California, 1958... Proving Ground , Maryland (Historical Volumes). 42. SITREP File, SFTCM II, 1980; Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS) Historical File; Information

  5. [Scientific progress and new biological weapons].

    PubMed

    Berche, Patrick

    2006-02-01

    The biological weapons are different from conventional weapons, because living germs hold an extraordinary and predictable potential for multiplication, propagation and genetic variation during their dissemination in a susceptible population. Only natural pathogens (1rst generation weapons) have been used in the past (smallpox virus, plague, anthrax, toxins...). However, new threats are emerging, due to the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and its exponential worldwide diffusion. It is possible to synthesize microorganisms from in silico sequences widely diffused on Internet (poliovirus, influenza...), thus resulting in the accessibility of very dangerous virus confined today in high-security laboratories (virus Ebola...). It is possible also to "improve" pathogens by genetic manipulations, becoming more resistant or virulent (2nd generation weapons). Finally, one can now create de novo new pathogens by molecular breeding (DNA shuffling), potentially highly dangerous for naive populations (3rd generation weapons). Making biological weapons does not require too much technological resources and appears accessible to terrorists, due to low cost and easy use. Although the destructive consequences are difficult to predict, the psychological and social damages should be considerable, because of the highly emotional burden in the population associated to the transgression by man of a taboo of life.

  6. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized for...

  7. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any person...

  8. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  9. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any person...

  10. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No person...

  11. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  12. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized for...

  13. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any person...

  14. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No person...

  15. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No person...

  16. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized for...

  17. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504... GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  18. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No person...

  19. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11... FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives...

  20. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized for...

  1. 36 CFR 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 520... Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall any person...

  2. 7 CFR 502.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 502.13 Section 502.13....13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on BARC property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as officially authorized for...

  3. 7 CFR 500.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 500.12 Section 500.12... OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL ARBORETUM Conduct on U.S. National Arboreturm Property § 500.12 Weapons and... weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for authorized official purposes. (b) No person...

  4. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-07-10

    continued...) The complex could contain explosions up to 500 pounds of explosive and associated plutonium. Another SCE, “ Unicorn ,” is to be conducted...scheduled for FY2006, as noted below. SCEs try to determine if radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon performance. Several SCEs...Richardson called SCEs “a key part of our scientific program to provide new tools and data that assess age -related complications and maintain the reliability

  5. Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare. Part I: Medical aspects of nuclear warfare.

    PubMed

    Kasthuri, A S; Pradhan, A B; Dham, S K; Bhalla, I P; Paul, J S

    1990-04-01

    Casualties in earlier wars were due much more to diseases than to weapons. Mention has been made in history of the use of biological agents in warfare, to deny the enemy food and water and to cause disease. In the first world war chemical agents were used to cause mass casualties. Nuclear weapons were introduced in the second world war. Several countries are now involved in developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems, for the mass annihilation of human beings, animals and plants, and to destroy the economy of their enemies. Recently, natural calamities and accidents in nuclear, chemical and biological laboratories and industries have caused mass instantaneous deaths in civilian population. The effects of future wars will not be restricted to uniformed persons. It is time that physicians become aware of the destructive potential of these weapons. Awareness, immediate protective measures and first aid will save a large number of persons. This series of articles will outline the medical aspects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapon systems in three parts. Part I will deal with the biological effects of a nuclear explosion. The short and long term effects due to blast, heat and associated radiation are highlighted. In Part II, the role of biological agents which cause commoner or new disease patterns is mentioned. Some of the accidents from biological warfare laboratories are a testimony to its potential deleterious effects. Part III deals with medical aspects of chemical warfare agents, which in view of their mass effects can overwhelm the existing medical resources, both civilian and military.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

  6. Risk Assessment for Emergency Planning Related to Nuclear Weapons Accidents

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1985-09-25

    accidents is higher than many of the other accidents, several reviewers thought it appropriate to evaluate these accidents in more detail. In particular, it...consequences is presented in Table 2-5. The plutonium releases in the 1F-3F gram range are due to plutonium burning in Type A weapons, while the higher ...explosion given a tanker casualty varies from 0.05 (in harbor) to 0.16 (at pier) to 0.19 (at sea). Although these numbers are somewhat higher than the

  7. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-05-24

    remain current. It indicated plans to reduce the time between a decision to conduct a nuclear test and the test itself, which has been done. Critics ...over the Summit,” Manila Bulletin, August 27, 2005. Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons...force, seek the opportunity to design and build new nuclear weapons, and abandon a ten-year-old moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.”8 Another critic

  8. Weapons and Minority Youth Violence.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Northrop, Daphne; Hamrick, Kim

    Weapons violence is a major public health problem that especially impacts minority youth. Interventions designed to reduce weapon use by youth are categorized as educational/behavioral change, legal, and technological/environmental. Few educational programs currently exist, but those that do largely concern firearm safety courses, public…

  9. 15 CFR 745.1 - Advance notification and annual report of all exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to other States...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS... Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) not less than 30 days in advance of every export of a Schedule 1... of all exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to other States Parties. 745.1 Section 745.1 Commerce and...

  10. Psychological effects of chemical weapons: a follow-up study of First World War veterans.

    PubMed

    Jones, E; Everitt, B; Ironside, S; Palmer, I; Wessely, S

    2008-10-01

    Chemical weapons exercise an enduring and often powerful psychological effect. This had been recognized during the First World War when it was shown that the symptoms of stress mimicked those of mild exposure to gas. Debate about long-term effects followed the suggestion that gassing triggered latent tuberculosis. A random sample of 103 First World War servicemen awarded a war pension for the effects of gas, but without evidence of chronic respiratory pathology, were subjected to cluster analysis using 25 common symptoms. The consistency of symptom reporting was also investigated across repeated follow-ups. Cluster analysis identified four groups: one (n=56) with a range of somatic symptoms, a second (n=30) with a focus on the respiratory system, a third (n=12) with a predominance of neuropsychiatric symptoms, and a fourth (n=5) with a narrow band of symptoms related to the throat and breathing difficulties. Veterans from the neuropsychiatric cluster had multiple diagnoses including neurasthenia and disordered action of the heart, and reported many more symptoms than those in the three somatic clusters. Mild or intermittent respiratory disorders in the post-war period supported beliefs about the damaging effects of gas in the three somatic clusters. By contrast, the neuropsychiatric group did not report new respiratory illnesses. For this cluster, the experience of gassing in a context of extreme danger may have been responsible for the intensity of their symptoms, which showed no sign of diminution over the 12-year follow-up.

  11. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  12. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as...

  13. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as...

  14. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  15. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...

  16. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as...

  17. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as...

  18. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes. ...

  19. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...

  20. 7 CFR 501.12 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 501.12 Section 501.12... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON U.S. MEAT ANIMAL RESEARCH CENTER, CLAY CENTER, NEBRASKA § 501.12 Weapons... arrows, darts, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except as...

  1. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...

  2. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  3. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes. ...

  4. 15 CFR 265.39 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 265.39 Section..., GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, AND BOULDER AND FORT COLLINS, COLORADO Buildings and Grounds § 265.39 Weapons and... dangerous or deadly weapons or materials, or explosives, either openly or concealed, without the written...

  5. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes. ...

  6. 31 CFR 91.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 91.13 Section... GROUNDS § 91.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the property shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes. ...

  7. 31 CFR 700.11 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 700.11 Section... ENFORCEMENT TRAINING CENTER (FLETC) BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 700.11 Weapons and explosives. No person, while on the property, shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or...

  8. BB and pellet guns--toys or deadly weapons?

    PubMed

    Harris, W; Luterman, A; Curreri, P W

    1983-07-01

    BB and pellet weapons are not included in gun control laws and are often sold as children's toys. Injuries caused by these weapons have been considered trivial unless they involve vulnerable surface organs such as the eye. The purpose of this study was to review the management of six cases of pellet or BB gun injuries that required abdominal exploration at the University of South Alabama Medical Center from January 1980 through June 1982. Five of the six patients had significant internal injuries including perforations of the stomach, jejunum, liver, and pancreas. The ballistics of pneumatic weapons are reviewed. The muzzle velocities of many of these weapons necessitate that wounds caused by these weapons be handled with the same principles as for any small-caliber, low-velocity (less than 1,200 feet/second) weapons. Public education programs are urgently needed to educate parents as to the potential danger involved in purchasing these weapons for unsupervised use as toys by children.

  9. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing...

  10. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing...

  11. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing...

  12. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing...

  13. 32 CFR 1903.10 - Weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 6 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons. 1903.10 Section 1903.10 National Defense Other Regulations Relating to National Defense CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONDUCT ON AGENCY INSTALLATIONS § 1903.10 Weapons. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, knowingly possessing...

  14. Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Thoughts, Angry Feelings, Hostile Appraisals, and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapons Effect Literature.

    PubMed

    Benjamin, Arlin J; Kepes, Sven; Bushman, Brad J

    2017-09-01

    Guns are associated with aggression. A landmark 1967 study showed that simply seeing a gun can increase aggression-called the "weapons effect." This meta-analysis integrates the findings of weapons effect studies conducted from 1967 to 2017. It includes 162 effect-size estimates from 78 independent studies involving 7,668 participants. The theoretical framework used to explain the weapons effect was the General Aggression Model (GAM), which proposes three routes to aggression-cognitive, affective, and arousal. The GAM also proposes that hostile appraisals can facilitate aggression. As predicted by the GAM, the mere presence of weapons increased aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals, and aggression, suggesting a cognitive route from weapons to aggression. Weapons did not significantly increase angry feelings. Only one study tested the effects of weapons on arousal. These findings also contribute to the debate about social priming by showing that incidental exposure to a stimulus (weapon) can affect subsequent related behavior (aggression).

  15. Characterising the online weapons trafficking on cryptomarkets.

    PubMed

    Rhumorbarbe, Damien; Werner, Denis; Gilliéron, Quentin; Staehli, Ludovic; Broséus, Julian; Rossy, Quentin

    2018-02-01

    Weapons related webpages from nine cryptomarkets were manually duplicated in February 2016. Information about the listings (i.e. sales proposals) and vendors' profiles were extracted to draw an overview of the actual online trafficking of weapons. Relationships between vendors were also inferred through the analysis of online digital traces and content similarities. Weapons trafficking is mainly concentrated on two major cryptomarkets. Besides, it accounts for a very small proportion of the illicit trafficking on cryptomarkets compared to the illicit drugs trafficking. Among all weapon related listings (n=386), firearms only account for approximately 25% of sales proposal since the proportion of non-lethal and melee weapons is important (around 46%). Based on the recorded pseudonyms, a total of 96 vendor profiles were highlighted. Some pseudonyms were encountered on several cryptomarkets, suggesting that some vendors may manage accounts on different markets. This hypothesis was strengthened by comparing pseudonyms to online traces such as PGP keys, images and profiles descriptions. Such a method allowed to estimate more accurately the number of vendors offering weapons across cryptomarkets. Finally, according to the gathered data, the extent of the weapons trafficking on the cryptomarkets appear to be limited compared to other illicit goods. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  16. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or explosives...

  17. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or explosives...

  18. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or items...

  19. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or items...

  20. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or explosives...

  1. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or explosives...

  2. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or items...

  3. 7 CFR 503.13 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 503.13 Section 503.13... OF AGRICULTURE CONDUCT ON PLUM ISLAND ANIMAL DISEASE CENTER § 503.13 Weapons and explosives. No person while in or on the PIADC shall carry firearms or other dangerous or deadly weapons or explosives...

  4. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping... AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons or parts thereof, explosives or items...

  5. Undergraduate teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism at medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland: results of a cross-sectional study.

    PubMed

    Green, Stephen T; Cladi, Lorenzo; Morris, Paul; Forde, Donall

    2013-06-20

    To determine if individual undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be relevant issues and if they figure them in their future plans. A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland. All identified undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012 and December 2012. Numerical data and free text feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate teaching. Of the 38 medical schools approached, 34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire (89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it. 6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%) had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34 (11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK's General Medical Council) did not request teaching on bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or argued that the curriculum was too congested already. 4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised radiation. This study provides evidence that at the present time there is little teaching at the undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless there were to be high-level policy guidance.

  6. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor unless...

  7. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or...

  8. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor unless...

  9. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor unless...

  10. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor unless...

  11. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or...

  12. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or...

  13. 25 CFR 11.444 - Carrying concealed weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2012-04-01 2011-04-01 true Carrying concealed weapons. 11.444 Section 11.444 Indians... ORDER CODE Criminal Offenses § 11.444 Carrying concealed weapons. A person who goes about in public places armed with a dangerous weapon concealed upon his or her person is guilty of a misdemeanor unless...

  14. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2014-01-01 2013-01-01 true Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or...

  15. 4 CFR 25.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 4 Accounts 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Weapons and explosives. 25.14 Section 25.14 Accounts... AND ON ITS GROUNDS § 25.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while entering or in the GAO Building or on its grounds shall carry or possess firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, explosives or...

  16. A rubber-covered ceramic weapon reduces the incidence of dental trauma in recruits during combat basic training.

    PubMed

    Becker, Talia; Ashkenazi, Malka

    2011-10-01

    The effect of a rubber-covered ceramic weapon was assessed on the incidence of dental trauma during basic training, since soldiers are more at risk of impact from a personal weapon. Dental files of soldiers (n = 4,542), who completed 8 months of training during 2008, were analyzed for incidence and type of dental trauma from a personal weapon. A rubber-covered ceramic weapon (n = 2,972) or a conventional one (n = 1,570, control) was used. Dental trauma was 0.4% per 8 months (0.6% per year) from the ceramic weapon and 1.5% per 8 months (2.3% per year) from the conventional one (p<0.001). The most prevalent type of injury was a simple/noncomplicated crown fracture (82% in study group, 75% in control group). The ceramic weapon significantly reduced dental trauma by diminishing the impact while in direct contact with the teeth or by absorbing and/or distributing the impact force. In conclusion, when possible a rubber-covered ceramic weapon should be preferred for basic combat training.

  17. Optimization of Aimpoints for Coordinate Seeking Weapons

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-09-01

    aiming) and independent ( ballistic ) errors are taken into account, before utilizing each of the three damage functions representing the weapon. A Monte...characteristics such as the radius of the circle containing the weapon aimpoint, impact angle, dependent (aiming) and independent ( ballistic ) errors are taken...Dependent (Aiming) Error .................................8 2. Single Weapon Independent ( Ballistic ) Error .............................9 3

  18. New Weapons and the Arms Race

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tsipis, Kosta

    1983-10-01

    In speaking about technologies that could further animate the weapons competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R., it would be useful to distinguish between technologies that have already been incorporated into specific weapons systems, and new technologies that are of a generic nature, can be used in a variety of applications, adn can best be described by the tasks that they can perform rather than any specific weapons application. Let me begin with the latter class.

  19. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-08-16

    Unicorn ,” is to be conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical shaft configuration similar to an underground nuclear test, not in a tunnel, to exercise...operational readiness.42 It is scheduled for FY2006, as noted below. SCEs try to determine if radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon...Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson called SCEs “a key part of our scientific program to provide new tools and data that assess age -related complications

  20. Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2006-11-15

    Unicorn ,” was conducted in a “down-hole” or vertical CRS-18 58 “Nanos Tours Nevada Test Site,” Daily Newsbulletin, Los Alamos National Laboratory...radioactive decay of aged plutonium would degrade weapon performance. Several SCEs have been used to support certification of the W88 pit. (A pit is the...tools and data that assess age -related complications and maintain the reliability and safety of the nation’s nuclear deterrent.”59 As they produce no

  1. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

  2. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

  3. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

  4. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

  5. 32 CFR 552.104 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552... RESERVATIONS AND NATIONAL CEMETERIES REGULATIONS AFFECTING MILITARY RESERVATIONS Firearms and Weapons § 552.104 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives or other devices defined in...

  6. Integrating workplace exposure databases for occupational medicine services and epidemiologic studies at a former nuclear weapons facility.

    PubMed

    Ruttenber, A J; McCrea, J S; Wade, T D; Schonbeck, M F; LaMontagne, A D; Van Dyke, M V; Martyny, J W

    2001-02-01

    We outline methods for integrating epidemiologic and industrial hygiene data systems for the purpose of exposure estimation, exposure surveillance, worker notification, and occupational medicine practice. We present examples of these methods from our work at the Rocky Flats Plant--a former nuclear weapons facility that fabricated plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons and is now being decontaminated and decommissioned. The weapons production processes exposed workers to plutonium, gamma photons, neutrons, beryllium, asbestos, and several hazardous chemical agents, including chlorinated hydrocarbons and heavy metals. We developed a job exposure matrix (JEM) for estimating exposures to 10 chemical agents in 20 buildings for 120 different job categories over a production history spanning 34 years. With the JEM, we estimated lifetime chemical exposures for about 12,000 of the 16,000 former production workers. We show how the JEM database is used to estimate cumulative exposures over different time periods for epidemiological studies and to provide notification and determine eligibility for a medical screening program developed for former workers. We designed an industrial hygiene data system for maintaining exposure data for current cleanup workers. We describe how this system can be used for exposure surveillance and linked with the JEM and databases on radiation doses to develop lifetime exposure histories and to determine appropriate medical monitoring tests for current cleanup workers. We also present time-line-based graphical methods for reviewing and correcting exposure estimates and reporting them to individual workers.

  7. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

  8. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

  9. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

  10. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

  11. 32 CFR 552.130 - Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. 552..., Ammunition and Other Dangerous Weapons on Fort Gordon § 552.130 Disposition of confiscated/seized weapons. All weapons, ammunition, explosives, or other devices defined in this subpart, that are confiscated...

  12. Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology Evaluation and Training Range

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Kevin Larry Young

    2009-05-01

    The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a long history for providing technology evaluation and training for military and other federal level Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) response agencies. Currently there are many federal organizations and commercial companies developing technologies related to detecting, assessing, mitigating and protecting against hazards associated with a WMD event. Unfortunately, very few locations exist within the United States where WMD response technologies are realistically field tested and evaluated using real chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials. This is particularly true with biological and radiological hazards. Related to this lack of adequate WMD, multi-hazard technology testingmore » capability is the shortage of locations where WMD response teams can train using actual chemical, biological, and radiological material or highly realistic simulates. In response to these technology evaluation and training needs, the INL has assembled a consortium of subject matter experts from existing programs and identified dedicated resources for the purpose of establishing an all-hazards, WMD technology evaluation and training range. The author describes the challenges associated with creating the all-hazards WMD technology evaluation and training range and lists the technical, logistical and financial benefits of an all-hazards technology evaluation and training range. Current resources and capabilities for conducting all-hazard technology evaluation and training at the INL are identified. Existing technology evaluation and training programs at the INL related to radiological, biological and chemical hazards are highlighted, including successes and lessons learned. Finally, remaining gaps in WMD technology evaluation and training capabilities are identified along with recommendations for closing those gaps.« less

  13. Armed and attentive: holding a weapon can bias attentional priorities in scene viewing.

    PubMed

    Biggs, Adam T; Brockmole, James R; Witt, Jessica K

    2013-11-01

    The action-specific perception hypothesis (Witt, Current Directions in Psychological Science 20: 201-206, 2011) claims that the environment is represented with respect to potential interactions for objects present within said environment. This investigation sought to extend the hypothesis beyond perceptual mechanisms and assess whether action-specific potential could alter attentional allocation. To do so, we examined a well-replicated attention bias in the weapon focus effect (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, Law and Human Behaviour 1, 55-62, 1987), which represents the tendency for observers to attend more to weapons than to neutral objects. Our key manipulation altered the anticipated action-specific potential of observers by providing them a firearm while they freely viewed scenes with and without weapons present. We replicated the original weapon focus effect using modern eye tracking and confirmed that the increase in time looking at weapons comes at a cost of less time spent looking at faces. Additionally, observers who held firearms while viewing the various scenes showed a general bias to look at faces over objects, but only if the firearm was in a readily usable position (i.e., pointed at the scenes rather than holstered at one's side). These two effects, weapon focus and the newly found bias to look more at faces when armed, canceled out one another without interacting. This evidence confirms that the action capabilities of the observer alter more than just perceptual mechanisms and that holding a weapon can change attentional priorities. Theoretical and real-world implications are discussed.

  14. 48 CFR 217.173 - Multiyear contracts for weapon systems.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... weapon systems. 217.173 Section 217.173 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Mulityear Contracting 217.173 Multiyear contracts for weapon systems. As authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2306b(h... contract for— (a) A weapon system and associated items, services, and logistics support for a weapon system...

  15. Military laser weapons: current controversies.

    PubMed

    Seet, B; Wong, T Y

    2001-09-01

    Military laser weapons systems are becoming indispensable in most modern armies. These lasers have undergone many stages of development, and have outpaced research on eye protection measures, which continue to have inherent limitations. Eye injuries caused by military lasers are increasingly reported, leading to speculation that these would become an important cause of blinding in modern conflicts. As part of the effort to ban inhumane weapons, international laws have been passed to restrict the proliferation of such blinding weapons. However, there are controversies concerning the interpretation, implementation and effectiveness of these laws. The ophthalmic community can play a greater role in highlighting ocular morbidity from military lasers, and in preventing their further proliferation.

  16. Chemical Analysis of the Dyes Used in Navy Green and Yellow Colored Smokes .

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1986-01-31

    RD-RI69 478 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DYES USED IN NAVY OREEN AND 11 YELLOW COLORED SNOKES(U) NAVAL WEAPONS SUP POR T CENTER CRANE IN APPLIED SCIENCES...NWSC/CR/RDTR-271 00 CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DYES USED IN NAVY GREEN AND YELLOW COLORED SMOKES Anton Chin Naval Weapons Support Center Applied Sciences...62765 SF65-559 559-691 20392 TITLE (Iint/ude Sec uritE C/assitication) CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DYES USED IN NAVY GREEN AND YELLOW COLORED SMOKES 1.1

  17. DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-04-27

    destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act. Assured nuclear weapons safety, security, and control remain of...DOD INSTRUCTION 5210.42 DOD NUCLEAR WEAPONS PERSONNEL RELIABILITY ASSURANCE Originating Component: Office of the Under Secretary of...from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. Reissues and renames: DoD Instruction 5210.42, “ Nuclear Weapons Personnel

  18. Exposure Assessment of Chemicals from Packaging Materials

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Poças, Maria De Fátima; Hogg, Timothy

    A variety of chemicals may enter our food supply, by means of intentional or unintentional addition, at different stages of the food chain. These chemicals include food additives, pesticide residues, environmental contaminants, mycotox-ins, flavoring substances, and micronutrients. Packaging systems and other food-contact materials are also a source of chemicals contaminating food products and beverages. Monitoring exposure to these chemicals has become an integral part of ensuring the safety of the food supply. Within the context of the risk analysis approach and more specifically as an integral part of risk assessment procedures, the exercise known as exposure assessment is crucial in providing data to allow sound judgments concerning risks to human health. The exercise of obtaining this data is part of the process of revealing sources of contamination and assessing the effectiveness of strategies for minimizing the risk from chemical contamination in the food supply (Lambe, 2002).

  19. 36 CFR § 1002.4 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons, traps and nets. Â... USE AND RECREATION § 1002.4 Weapons, traps and nets. (a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following are prohibited: (i) Possessing a weapon, trap or net. (ii) Carrying a weapon, trap...

  20. Weapon use increases the severity of domestic violence but neither weapon use nor firearm access increases the risk or severity of recidivism.

    PubMed

    Folkes, Stephanie E F; Hilton, N Zoe; Harris, Grant T

    2013-04-01

    Use of weapons is a risk factor for domestic violence severity, especially lethality. It is not clear, however, whether access to firearms itself increases assault severity, or whether it is characteristic of a subgroup of offenders who are more likely to commit severe and repeated domestic assault. This reanalysis of 1,421 police reports of domestic violence by men found that 6% used a weapon during the assault and 8% had access to firearms. We expected that firearm use would be rare compared to other weapons and that actual weapon use rather than firearm access would increase the severity of domestic assaults. Firearm access was associated with assault severity, but this was mostly attributable to use of nonfirearm weapons. Weapon use was associated with older age, lower education, and relationship history as well as to assault severity. Victims were most concerned about future assaults following threats and actual injuries. Although firearm access and weapon use were related to actuarial risk of domestic violence recidivism, neither predicted the occurrence or severity of recidivism. We conclude that, consistent with previous research in the United States and Canada, firearm use in domestic violence is uncommon even among offenders with known firearm access. Weapon use is characteristic of a subgroup of offenders who commit more severe domestic violence, and seizure of weapons may be an effective intervention.

  1. Virtual enterprise model for the electronic components business in the Nuclear Weapons Complex

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Ferguson, T.J.; Long, K.S.; Sayre, J.A.

    1994-08-01

    The electronic components business within the Nuclear Weapons Complex spans organizational and Department of Energy contractor boundaries. An assessment of the current processes indicates a need for fundamentally changing the way electronic components are developed, procured, and manufactured. A model is provided based on a virtual enterprise that recognizes distinctive competencies within the Nuclear Weapons Complex and at the vendors. The model incorporates changes that reduce component delivery cycle time and improve cost effectiveness while delivering components of the appropriate quality.

  2. Chemical Mixtures Health Risk Assessment: Overview of Exposure Assessment, Whole Mixtures Assessments; Basic Concepts

    EPA Science Inventory

    This problems-based, half-day, introductory workshop focuses on methods to assess health risks posed by exposures to chemical mixtures in the environment. Chemical mixtures health risk assessment methods continue to be developed and evolve to address concerns over health risks f...

  3. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...

  4. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...

  5. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...

  6. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...

  7. 32 CFR 552.125 - Disposition of confiscated weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Disposition of confiscated weapons. 552.125..., Ammunition, and Explosives-Fort Lewis, Washington § 552.125 Disposition of confiscated weapons. Commanders will maintain confiscated weapons in the unit arms room pending final disposition. They will provide...

  8. Biological Weapons Attribution: A Primer

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-06-01

    attacks are very difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the unique restrictions the international environment places on BW attribution, and...provides a basic epistemological framework for analysis for successful BW attribution, detailing the nature , methods, and limits of current BW...difficult: (1) the nature of biological weapons, (2) the unique restrictions the international environment places on BW attribution, and (3) the

  9. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required...

  10. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required...

  11. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required...

  12. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required...

  13. 49 CFR 1544.219 - Carriage of accessible weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Carriage of accessible weapons. 1544.219 Section...: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS Operations § 1544.219 Carriage of accessible weapons. (a... weapons, do not apply to a law enforcement officer (LEO) aboard a flight for which screening is required...

  14. Objective, Quantitative, Data-Driven Assessment of Chemical Probes.

    PubMed

    Antolin, Albert A; Tym, Joseph E; Komianou, Angeliki; Collins, Ian; Workman, Paul; Al-Lazikani, Bissan

    2018-02-15

    Chemical probes are essential tools for understanding biological systems and for target validation, yet selecting probes for biomedical research is rarely based on objective assessment of all potential compounds. Here, we describe the Probe Miner: Chemical Probes Objective Assessment resource, capitalizing on the plethora of public medicinal chemistry data to empower quantitative, objective, data-driven evaluation of chemical probes. We assess >1.8 million compounds for their suitability as chemical tools against 2,220 human targets and dissect the biases and limitations encountered. Probe Miner represents a valuable resource to aid the identification of potential chemical probes, particularly when used alongside expert curation. Copyright © 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  15. Integrating Exposure into Chemical Alternatives Assessment ...

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    Most alternatives assessments (AA) published to date are largely hazard-based rankings, and as such may not represent a fully informed consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of possible alternatives. With an assessment goal of identifying an alternative chemical that is more sustainable, other attributes beyond hazard are also important, including exposure, risk, life-cycle impacts, performance, cost, and social responsibility. Building on the 2014 recommendations by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to improve AA decisions by including comparative exposure assessment, the HESISustainable Chemical Alternatives Technical Committee, which consists of scientists from academia, industry, government, and NGOs, has developed a qualitative comparative exposure approach. Conducting such a comparison can screen for alternatives that are expected to have a higher exposure potential, which could trigger a higher-tiered, more quantitative exposure assessment on the alternatives being considered. This talk will demonstrate an approach for including chemical- and product-related exposure information in a qualitative AA comparison. Starting from existing hazard AAs, a series of four chemical-product application scenarios were examined to test the concept, to understand the effort required, and to determine the value of exposure data in AA decision-making. The group has developed a classification approach for ingredient and product parameters to support compariso

  16. Air gun wounding and current UK laws controlling air weapons.

    PubMed

    Bruce-Chwatt, Robert Michael

    2010-04-01

    Air weapons whether rifles or pistols are, potentially, lethal weapons. The UK legislation is complex and yet little known to the public. Hunting with air weapons and the laws controlling those animals that are permitted to be shot with air weapons is even more labyrinthine due to the legal power limitations on the possession of air weapons. Still relatively freely available by mail order or on the Internet, an increasing number of deaths have been reported from the misuse of air weapons or accidental discharges. Ammunition for air weapons has become increasingly sophisticated, effective and therefore increasingly dangerous if misused, though freely available being a mere projectile without a concomitant cartridge containing a propellant and an initiator.

  17. 36 CFR § 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. § 504... REGULATIONS GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either...

  18. Violence Related Behaviors and Weapon Carrying Among Hispanic Adolescents: Results from the National Youth Risk Behavior Survey, 2001-2015.

    PubMed

    Khubchandani, Jagdish; Price, James H

    2018-04-01

    Hispanic youths are disproportionately represented in gangs in the United States, are more likely to drink alcohol at younger ages, and to live in poverty; all are risks for violence and weapon carrying. No studies to date have assessed violence related behaviors and weapon carrying in Hispanic youth over an extended period. This study utilized the national Youth Risk Behavior Surveys from 2001 to 2015 to assess trends in violence related behaviors and weapon carrying of Hispanic adolescents. Our analyses found both physical fighting and fighting on school property had statistically significant reductions from 2001 to 2015 for Hispanic females and their suicide attempts increased from 2009 to 2015. Hispanic males had statistically significant decreasing trends for: being in a physical fight in the past year, being bullied on school property, being in a physical fight on school property within the past year; threatened or injured with a weapon on school property in the past year; and having attempted suicide in the past year. Hispanic females and males had two groups of items highly predictive of weapon carrying behaviors: alcohol, tobacco, and other drug use and violent risk behaviors. Both female and male students who made mostly A's or B's in school were significantly less likely (about half as likely) to carry weapons. This data could be used to identify Hispanic adolescents at higher risk for weapon carrying and used as a basis for enriching programs to improve academic success of Hispanic adolescents.

  19. Assessing Chemical Process Sustainability with GREENSCOPE

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    GREENSCOPE is a sustainability assessment tool used to evaluate and assist in the design of chemical processes. The goal is to minimize resource use, prevent or reduce releases, and increase the economic feasibility of a chemical process.

  20. Carol Anne Bond v the United States of America: how a woman scorned threatened the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    PubMed

    Muldoon, Anna; Kornblet, Sarah; Katz, Rebecca

    2011-09-01

    The case of Carol Anne Bond v the United States of America stemmed from a domestic dispute when Ms. Bond attempted to retaliate against her best friend by attacking her with chemical agents. What has emerged is a much greater issue--a test of standing on whether a private citizen can challenge the Tenth Amendment. Instead of being prosecuted in state court for assault, Ms. Bond was charged and tried in district court under a federal criminal statute passed as part of implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Ms. Bond's argument rests on the claim that the statute exceeded the federal government's enumerated powers in criminalizing her behavior and violated the Constitution, while the government contends legislation implementing treaty obligations is well within its purview. This question remains unanswered because there is dispute among the lower courts as to whether Ms. Bond, as a citizen, even has the right to challenge an amendment guaranteeing states rights when a state is not a party to the action. The Supreme Court heard the case on February 22, 2011, and, if it decides to grant Ms. Bond standing to challenge her conviction, the case will be returned to the lower courts. Should the court decide Ms. Bond has the standing to challenge her conviction and further questions the constitutionality of the law, it would be a significant blow to implementation of the CWC in the U.S. and the effort of the federal government to ensure we are meeting our international obligations.

  1. 76 FR 41371 - Impact of Reducing the Mixture Concentration Threshold for Commercial Schedule 3 Chemical...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-07-13

    ...The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact of amending the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) to reduce the concentration level at which the CWCR exempt certain mixtures containing Schedule 3 chemicals from the declaration requirements that apply to Schedule 3 chemical production and the reporting requirements that apply to exports and imports of Schedule 3 chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). BIS is considering amending the CWCR declaration requirements that apply to the production of Schedule 3 chemicals to conform with the low concentration exemption adopted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2003, which applies when the concentration of any single Schedule 3 chemical in a mixture is ``30% or less,'' by weight or volume (whichever yields the lesser percent). Currently, the CWCR do not require the quantity of a Schedule 3 chemical contained in a mixture to be counted for declaration or reporting purposes if the concentration of the Schedule 3 chemical in the mixture is ``less than 80%'' by volume or weight (whichever yields the lesser percent). The current low concentration level was implemented in accordance with requirements set forth in the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA). Accordingly, publication and implementation of regulatory changes affecting this low concentration exemption level would be contingent upon amendment of the CWCIA by the Congress. In addition, consistent with U.S. national discretion, BIS is considering amending the CWCR reporting requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 3 chemicals by reducing the low concentration exemption that applies to certain mixtures containing Schedule 3 chemicals from the current low concentration level of ``less than 80%'' of a Schedule 3 chemical by volume or weight (whichever yields the lesser percent) to a concentration of ``30% or less.''

  2. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a...

  3. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a...

  4. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a...

  5. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 8 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears, gigs...

  6. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears, gigs...

  7. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears, gigs...

  8. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a...

  9. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears, gigs...

  10. 36 CFR 13.30 - Weapons, traps and nets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Weapons, traps and nets. 13... INTERIOR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM UNITS IN ALASKA General Provisions § 13.30 Weapons, traps and nets. (a... of this chapter, the following are prohibited— (1) Possessing a weapon, trap, or net; (2) Carrying a...

  11. 36 CFR § 520.15 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Weapons and explosives. § 520... § 520.15 Weapons and explosives. No person while on the premises shall carry firearms, other dangerous or deadly weapons, or explosives, either openly or concealed, except for official purposes, nor shall...

  12. 50 CFR 27.43 - Weapons other than firearms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons other than firearms. 27.43 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM PROHIBITED ACTS Disturbing Violations: With Weapons § 27.43 Weapons other than firearms. The use or possession of cross bows, bows and arrows, air guns, spears, gigs...

  13. Victimization and health risk factors among weapon-carrying youth.

    PubMed

    Stayton, Catherine; McVeigh, Katharine H; Olson, E Carolyn; Perkins, Krystal; Kerker, Bonnie D

    2011-11-01

    To compare health risks of 2 subgroups of weapon carriers: victimized and nonvictimized youth. 2003-2007 NYC Youth Risk Behavior Surveys were analyzed using bivariate analyses and multinomial logistic regression. Among NYC teens, 7.5% reported weapon carrying without victimization; 6.9% reported it with victimization. Both subgroups were more likely than non-weapon carriers to binge drink, use marijuana, smoke, fight, and have multiple sex partners; weapon carriers with victimization also experienced persistent sadness and attempted suicide. Subgroups of weapon carriers have distinct profiles. Optimal response should pair disciplinary action with screening for behavioral and mental health concerns and victimization.

  14. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2012-10-01 2011-10-01 true Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  15. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  16. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  17. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  18. 43 CFR 15.11 - Explosives and dangerous weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Explosives and dangerous weapons. 15.11 Section 15.11 Public Lands: Interior Office of the Secretary of the Interior KEY LARGO CORAL REEF PRESERVE... other kind of weapon potentially harmful to the reef structure. The use of such weapons from beyond the...

  19. Undergraduate teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism at medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland: results of a cross-sectional study

    PubMed Central

    Green, Stephen T; Cladi, Lorenzo; Morris, Paul; Forde, Donall

    2013-01-01

    Objective To determine if individual undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be relevant issues and if they figure them in their future plans. Design A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland. Setting All identified undergraduate schools of medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012 and December 2012. Outcome measures Numerical data and free text feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate teaching. Results Of the 38 medical schools approached, 34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire (89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it. 6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%) had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34 (11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK's General Medical Council) did not request teaching on bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or argued that the curriculum was too congested already. 4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised radiation. Conclusions This study provides evidence that at the present time there is little teaching at the undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism, chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless there were to be high-level policy guidance. PMID

  20. Chemical Risk Assessment: Traditional vs Public Health Perspectives

    PubMed Central

    Axelrad, Daniel A.; Bahadori, Tina; Bussard, David; Cascio, Wayne E.; Deener, Kacee; Dix, David; Thomas, Russell S.; Kavlock, Robert J.; Burke, Thomas A.

    2017-01-01

    Preventing adverse health effects of environmental chemical exposure is fundamental to protecting individual and public health. When done efficiently and properly, chemical risk assessment enables risk management actions that minimize the incidence and effects of environmentally induced diseases related to chemical exposure. However, traditional chemical risk assessment is faced with multiple challenges with respect to predicting and preventing disease in human populations, and epidemiological studies increasingly report observations of adverse health effects at exposure levels predicted from animal studies to be safe for humans. This discordance reinforces concerns about the adequacy of contemporary risk assessment practices for protecting public health. It is becoming clear that to protect public health more effectively, future risk assessments will need to use the full range of available data, draw on innovative methods to integrate diverse data streams, and consider health endpoints that also reflect the range of subtle effects and morbidities observed in human populations. Considering these factors, there is a need to reframe chemical risk assessment to be more clearly aligned with the public health goal of minimizing environmental exposures associated with disease. PMID:28520487

  1. Psychological markers underlying murder weapon profile: a quantitative study.

    PubMed

    Kamaluddin, M R; Othman, A; Ismail, K H; Mat Saat, G A

    2017-12-01

    The horrific nature of murder using different types of weapons has been an important focal point of many criminological studies. Weapons that are used in murders seem to play dominant roles in murder investigations as they may provide information leading to arrest. The established factors for weapon usage include environmental context, demography and availability of weapons. However, there is insufficient research attention on the psychological functioning of murderers for particular weapon usage. In light of this, the current study seeks to narrow this gap of information by identifying the influences of psychological traits on weapon usage among a sample of male murderers. The present cross-sectional study was conducted among 71 male murderers incarcerated in 11 prisons within Peninsular Malaysia. The selection of the sample was based on predetermined selection criteria using a purposive sampling method. A guided self-administered questionnaire comprising sociodemography variables and four Malay validated psychometric instruments: Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire-40-Cross-Culture, Self-control Scale, "How I Think" Questionnaire and Aggression Questionnaire; was used. Independent sample t-test was performed to establish the mean score differences of psychological traits between the murderers who used single and multiple weapons while Kruskal-Wallis tests were carried out to ascertain the differences between the specific types of weapons used among the murderers. Following this, one-way ANOVA was carried out to ascertain the psychological trait differences among the murderers according to the different sources of weapon. Results indicated specific psychological traits influenced the number(s), source(s) and type(s) of weapon used in committing murder. The findings have implications for the psychological profiling of unknown murderers within the Malaysian context.

  2. Color image fusion for concealed weapon detection

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Toet, Alexander

    2003-09-01

    Recent advances in passive and active imaging sensor technology offer the potential to detect weapons that are concealed underneath a person's clothing or carried along in bags. Although the concealed weapons can sometimes easily be detected, it can be difficult to perceive their context, due to the non-literal nature of these images. Especially for dynamic crowd surveillance purposes it may be impossible to rapidly asses with certainty which individual in the crowd is the one carrying the observed weapon. Sensor fusion is an enabling technology that may be used to solve this problem. Through fusion the signal of the sensor that depicts the weapon can be displayed in the context provided by a sensor of a different modality. We propose an image fusion scheme in which non-literal imagery can be fused with standard color images such that the result clearly displays the observed weapons in the context of the original color image. The procedure is such that the relevant contrast details from the non-literal image are transferred to the color image without altering the original color distribution of this image. The result is a natural looking color image that fluently combines all details from both input sources. When an observer who performs a dynamic crowd surveillance task, detects a weapon in the scene, he will also be able to quickly determine which person in the crowd is actually carrying the observed weapon (e.g. "the man with the red T-shirt and blue jeans"). The method is illustrated by the fusion of thermal 8-12 μm imagery with standard RGB color images.

  3. BACTERIAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE—The Current Status

    PubMed Central

    Coggins, Cecil H.

    1960-01-01

    For fourteen years public attention has been focused so sharply on atomic weapons as to lose sight of other, less spectacular but equally significant advances in the art of warfare. In the shadows cast by brilliant research in nuclear physics are hidden startling advances in the field of chemical and biological weapons. These weapons, as now developed, are not only capable of producing mass casualties quite comparable with those of atomic bombs, but they also possess certain advantages which may make them the weapons of choice for an unscrupulous enemy. If war should come, it is the medical profession which will have the sole responsibility for protecting the citizens of California against these weapons, and we can therefore delay no longer in acquainting ourselves with their potentialities and characteristics. In this task, we are working under two serious handicaps. The first is that our classical medical training affords little appreciation of the real danger, and the second is the cloak of secrecy surrounding the entire subject. PMID:18732324

  4. History of chemical and biological warfare agents.

    PubMed

    Szinicz, L

    2005-10-30

    Chemical and biological warfare agents constitute a low-probability, but high-impact risk both to the military and to the civilian population. The use of hazardous materials of chemical or biological origin as weapons and for homicide has been documented since ancient times. The first use of chemicals in terms of weapons of mass destruction goes back to World War I, when on April 22, 1915 large amounts of chlorine were released by German military forces at Ypres, Belgium. Until around the 1970s of the 20th century, the awareness of the threat by chemical and biological agents had been mainly confined to the military sector. In the following time, the development of increasing range delivery systems by chemical and biological agents possessors sensitised public attention to the threat emanating from these agents. Their proliferation to the terrorists field during the 1990s with the expanding scale and globalisation of terrorist attacks suggested that these agents are becoming an increasing threat to the whole world community. The following article gives a condensed overview on the history of use and development of the more prominent chemical and biological warfare agents.

  5. Biological Weapons and Modern Warfare

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1991-04-01

    every preparation for reducing Its effectiveness and thereby reduce the likelihood of Its use. In order to plan such preparation, It is advantageous to...attack rates could be maximized and the forces using the weapon protected from its effects . In today’s climate, BW agents are also attractive weapons...questions about the agreement’s true effectiveness . Verification of compliance was not addressed. D. World War It: Events during and following World War

  6. Environmental genotoxicity assessment along the transport routes of chemical munitions leading to the dumping areas in the Baltic Sea.

    PubMed

    Baršienė, Janina; Butrimavičienė, Laura; Grygiel, Włodzimierz; Stunžėnas, Virmantas; Valskienė, Roberta; Greiciūnaitė, Janina; Stankevičiūtė, Milda

    2016-02-15

    The frequencies of micronuclei (MN), nuclear buds (NB) and nuclear buds on filament (NBf) were examined in 660 specimens of herring (Clupea harengus) collected in 2009-2014 at 65 study stations located mainly along the chemical munition transport routes in the Baltic Sea. The frequency of nuclear abnormalities was strongly increased in herring caught at four stations located close to chemical munition dumping sites, or CWAs - substances (chemical warfare agents) in sediments. Significant increase of MN, NB and NBf was observed in fish caught November 2010-2013 compared to 2009. The most significantly increased genotoxicity responses were recorded in fish caught at stations along CW (chemical weapons) transport routes, close to the Bornholm CW dumping area, in zones with CWAs in sediments and with oil-gas platforms. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  7. Carrying weapons and intent to harm among Victorian secondary school students in 1999 and 2009.

    PubMed

    Hemphill, Sheryl A; Tollit, Michelle A; Romaniuk, Helena; Williams, Joanne; Toumbourou, John W; Bond, Lyndal; Patton, George C

    2013-12-16

    To examine comparable survey data across 10 years to assess whether rates of self-reported weapon carrying and intent to harm others have increased as suggested in reported trends in violent offences. Population-based surveys administered to Victorian secondary school students in 1999 (8984 students) and 2009 (10 273 students) attending government, Catholic and independent schools. Student self-reports of carrying a weapon and attacking someone with the intent to harm in the past 12 months. In both surveys, about 15.0% of students reported carrying a weapon and about 7.0% reported attacking someone with intent to harm in the past 12 months, with higher rates among boys than girls. There was no change over time in the rates of students carrying weapons or attacking someone with the intent to harm, after controlling for demographic variables. In contrast to media portrayals and reported trends in violent offences, rates of students carrying weapons and attacking others with intent to harm have not changed between 1999 and 2009. These findings underline the importance of having national population-based data to regularly monitor the rates of these and related behaviours among young Australians.

  8. Nuclear Weapons, Psychology, and International Relations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Dougherty, James E.

    1976-01-01

    Fear of nuclear energy, nuclear weapons, and nuclear was is widespread among the peoples of the world. However, to what extent do the fears (both rational and irrational) of policy-making elites and political masses produce actual effects upon the behavior of governments (who, after all, control the use of nuclear weapons)? (Author/RK)

  9. The applicability of chemical alternatives assessment for engineered nanomaterials.

    PubMed

    Hjorth, Rune; Hansen, Steffen Foss; Jacobs, Molly; Tickner, Joel; Ellenbecker, Michael; Baun, Anders

    2017-01-01

    The use of alternatives assessment to substitute hazardous chemicals with inherently safer options is gaining momentum worldwide as a legislative and corporate strategy to minimize consumer, occupational, and environmental risks. Engineered nanomaterials represent an interesting case for alternatives assessment approaches, because they can be considered both emerging "chemicals" of concern, as well as potentially safer alternatives to hazardous chemicals. However, comparing the hazards of nanomaterials to traditional chemicals or to other nanomaterials is challenging, and critical elements in chemical hazard and exposure assessment may have to be fundamentally altered to sufficiently address nanomaterials. The aim of this paper is to assess the overall applicability of alternatives assessment methods for nanomaterials and to outline recommendations to enhance their use in this context. The present paper focuses on the adaptability of existing hazard and exposure assessment approaches to engineered nanomaterials as well as strategies to design inherently safer nanomaterials. We argue that alternatives assessment for nanomaterials is complicated by the sheer number of nanomaterials possible. As a result, the inclusion of new data tools that can efficiently and effectively evaluate nanomaterials as substitutes is needed to strengthen the alternatives assessment process. However, we conclude that with additional tools to enhance traditional hazard and exposure assessment modules of alternatives assessment, such as the use of mechanistic toxicity screens and control banding tools, alternatives assessment can be adapted to evaluate engineered nanomaterials as potential substitutes for chemicals of concern and to ensure safer nanomaterials are incorporated in the design of new products. Integr Environ Assess Manag 2017;13:177-187. © 2016 SETAC. © 2016 SETAC.

  10. Bullying and weapon carrying: a meta-analysis.

    PubMed

    van Geel, Mitch; Vedder, Paul; Tanilon, Jenny

    2014-08-01

    Studies suggest that adolescents involved in bullying are more likely to carry weapons than their uninvolved peers. To use meta-analyses to determine whether victims, bullies, and bully-victims are more likely to carry weapons than uninvolved peers. PsycINFO, ERIC, MEDLINE, LILACS, EMBASE, and Dissertation Abstracts International were searched for relevant publications (1950 through January 2014). The reference list of a review article and reference lists of retrieved articles were checked for further relevant studies. Studies were included if they provided an effect size comparing the weapon carrying of adolescent victims, bullies, or bully-victims with that of uninvolved peers. Studies that included individuals older than 21 years were excluded, as were studies that focused on incarcerated youth or youth diagnosed as having a psychopathologic condition. Studies were coded independently by 2 of us. The agreement rate was 93%. Effect sizes were coded that compared victims, bullies, or bully-victims with uninvolved peers. Meta-analyses were based on 22 studies for victims (n = 257 179), 15 studies for bullies (n = 236 145), and 8 studies for bully-victims (n = 199 563). This study focused on weapon carrying among adolescents. Hypotheses were formulated before the study. Victims (odds ratio, 1.97; 95% CI, 1.62-2.39), bullies (3.25; 2.72-3.89), and bully-victims (4.95; 3.77-6.50) were more likely to carry weapons than uninvolved peers. Analyses provided no indication of publication bias. Studies conducted in the United States found stronger relations between being a bully-victim and weapon carrying (odds ratio, 7.84; 95% CI, 6.02-10.21) than studies from other countries (3.62; 2.30-5.68; Q1 = 8.401; P = .004). Involvement in bullying as a victim, bully, or bully-victim is related to weapon carrying.

  11. Good Bugs, Bad Bugs: A Modern Approach for Detecting Offensive Biological Weapons Research

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-09-01

    Michael Moodie is a consultant to CTNSP who has worked for more than 15 years on chemical and biological weapons issues in government and the ... the superstructure of the Convention and yet turn a blind eye to problems with the foundation itself. He then went on to state publicly that the ...Tunisia; a trilateral forum with Brazil, India, and South Africa fosters dialogue on critical biotechnology issues;6 the Economic Cooperation

  12. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

  13. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

  14. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

  15. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals no. Supplement no... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement no. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

  16. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

  17. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

  18. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

  19. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

  20. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

  1. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

  2. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

  3. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

  4. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

  5. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

  6. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

  7. Fluorescent sensors for the detection of chemical warfare agents.

    PubMed

    Burnworth, Mark; Rowan, Stuart J; Weder, Christoph

    2007-01-01

    Along with biological and nuclear threats, chemical warfare agents are some of the most feared weapons of mass destruction. Compared to nuclear weapons they are relatively easy to access and deploy, which makes them in some aspects a greater threat to national and global security. A particularly hazardous class of chemical warfare agents are the nerve agents. Their rapid and severe effects on human health originate in their ability to block the function of acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme that is vital to the central nervous system. This article outlines recent activities regarding the development of molecular sensors that can visualize the presence of nerve agents (and related pesticides) through changes of their fluorescence properties. Three different sensing principles are discussed: enzyme-based sensors, chemically reactive sensors, and supramolecular sensors. Typical examples are presented for each class and different fluorescent sensors for the detection of chemical warfare agents are summarized and compared.

  8. What Are Nuclear Weapons For?

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Drell, Sidney

    2007-03-01

    Through the decades of the Cold War the prospect of a nuclear holocaust was all too real. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, that threat to civilization as we know it had receded. But today we face a grave new danger, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile or unstable governments and terrorists. What can and should we be doing to meet this challenge and prevent the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into very dangerous hands? Are there any reasons for us to still retain thousands of nuclear warheads in our arsenals? What are they for? Can we rekindle the bold vision of a world free of nuclear weapons that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev brought to their remarkable summit meeting at Reykjavik twenty years ago, and define practical steps toward achieving such a goal?

  9. Clinical Considerations in the Assessment of Adolescent Chemical Dependency.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Winters, Ken

    1990-01-01

    Discusses relevant research findings of clinical assessment of adolescent chemical dependency so that service providers can better address these concerns. Three major issues are discussed: the definition of adolescent chemical dependency, clinical domains of assessment (chemical use problem severity, precipitating and perpetuating risk factors,…

  10. 15 CFR 712.2 - Restrictions on activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.2 Section 712.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.2 Restrictions on activities involving...

  11. 15 CFR 712.2 - Restrictions on activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.2 Section 712.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.2 Restrictions on activities involving...

  12. 15 CFR 712.2 - Restrictions on activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.2 Section 712.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.2 Restrictions on activities involving...

  13. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons...

  14. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons...

  15. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons...

  16. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons...

  17. 31 CFR 0.215 - Possession of weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Possession of weapons and explosives... OF THE TREASURY EMPLOYEE RULES OF CONDUCT Rules of Conduct § 0.215 Possession of weapons and explosives. (a) Employees shall not possess firearms, explosives, or other dangerous or deadly weapons...

  18. Chemical facility vulnerability assessment project.

    PubMed

    Jaeger, Calvin D

    2003-11-14

    Sandia National Laboratories, under the direction of the Office of Science and Technology, National Institute of Justice, conducted the chemical facility vulnerability assessment (CFVA) project. The primary objective of this project was to develop, test and validate a vulnerability assessment methodology (VAM) for determining the security of chemical facilities against terrorist or criminal attacks (VAM-CF). The project also included a report to the Department of Justice for Congress that in addition to describing the VAM-CF also addressed general observations related to security practices, threats and risks at chemical facilities and chemical transport. In the development of the VAM-CF Sandia leveraged the experience gained from the use and development of VAs in other areas and the input from the chemical industry and Federal agencies. The VAM-CF is a systematic, risk-based approach where risk is a function of the severity of consequences of an undesired event, the attack potential, and the likelihood of adversary success in causing the undesired event. For the purpose of the VAM-CF analyses Risk is a function of S, L(A), and L(AS), where S is the severity of consequence of an event, L(A) is the attack potential and L(AS) likelihood of adversary success in causing a catastrophic event. The VAM-CF consists of 13 basic steps. It involves an initial screening step, which helps to identify and prioritize facilities for further analysis. This step is similar to the prioritization approach developed by the American Chemistry Council (ACC). Other steps help to determine the components of the risk equation and ultimately the risk. The VAM-CF process involves identifying the hazardous chemicals and processes at a chemical facility. It helps chemical facilities to focus their attention on the most critical areas. The VAM-CF is not a quantitative analysis but, rather, compares relative security risks. If the risks are deemed too high, recommendations are developed for

  19. Techniques to evaluate the importance of common cause degradation on reliability and safety of nuclear weapons.

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Darby, John L.

    2011-05-01

    As the nuclear weapon stockpile ages, there is increased concern about common degradation ultimately leading to common cause failure of multiple weapons that could significantly impact reliability or safety. Current acceptable limits for the reliability and safety of a weapon are based on upper limits on the probability of failure of an individual item, assuming that failures among items are independent. We expanded the current acceptable limits to apply to situations with common cause failure. Then, we developed a simple screening process to quickly assess the importance of observed common degradation for both reliability and safety to determine if furthermore » action is necessary. The screening process conservatively assumes that common degradation is common cause failure. For a population with between 100 and 5000 items we applied the screening process and conclude the following. In general, for a reliability requirement specified in the Military Characteristics (MCs) for a specific weapon system, common degradation is of concern if more than 100(1-x)% of the weapons are susceptible to common degradation, where x is the required reliability expressed as a fraction. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon subsystem if more than 0.1% of the population is susceptible to common degradation. Common degradation is of concern for the safety of a weapon component or overall weapon system if two or more components/weapons in the population are susceptible to degradation. Finally, we developed a technique for detailed evaluation of common degradation leading to common cause failure for situations that are determined to be of concern using the screening process. The detailed evaluation requires that best estimates of common cause and independent failure probabilities be produced. Using these techniques, observed common degradation can be evaluated for effects on reliability and safety.« less

  20. Meteorological and intelligence evidence of long-distance transit of chemical weapons fallout from bombing early in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

    PubMed

    Tuite, James J; Haley, Robert W

    2013-01-01

    Coalition bombings on the night of 18-19 January 1991, early in the Gulf War, targeted the Iraqi chemical weapons infrastructure. On 19 January 1991, nerve agent alarms sounded within Coalition positions hundreds of kilometers to the south, and the trace presence of sarin vapor was identified by multiple technologies. Considering only surface dispersion of plumes from explosions, officials concluded that the absence of casualties around bombed sites precluded long-distance transit of debris to US troop positions to explain the alarms and detections. Consequently, they were discounted as false positives, and low-level nerve agent exposure early in the air war was disregarded in epidemiologic investigations of chronic illnesses. Newly assembled evidence indicates that plumes from those nighttime bombings of Iraqi chemical facilities would have traversed the stable nocturnal boundary layer and penetrated the residual layer where they would be susceptible to rapid transit by supergeostrophic winds. This explanation is supported by plume height predictions, available weather charts, weather satellite images showing transit of a hot air mass, effects of solar mixing of atmospheric layers, and observations of a stationary weather front and thermal inversion in the region. Current evidence supports long-distance transit. Epidemiologic studies of chronic postwar illness should be reassessed using veterans' reports of hearing nerve agent alarms as the measure of exposure. Copyright © 2012 S. Karger AG, Basel.

  1. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Prohibition against carriage of weapons... Flight Operations § 135.119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an aircraft being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon...

  2. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Prohibition against carriage of weapons... Flight Operations § 135.119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an aircraft being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon...

  3. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Prohibition against carriage of weapons... Flight Operations § 135.119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an aircraft being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon...

  4. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Prohibition against carriage of weapons... Flight Operations § 135.119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an aircraft being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon...

  5. 14 CFR 135.119 - Prohibition against carriage of weapons.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Prohibition against carriage of weapons... Flight Operations § 135.119 Prohibition against carriage of weapons. No person may, while on board an aircraft being operated by a certificate holder, carry on or about that person a deadly or dangerous weapon...

  6. Space weapon technology and policy

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hitchens, Theresa

    2017-11-01

    The military use of space, including in support of nuclear weapons infrastructure, has greatly increased over the past 30 years. In the current era, rising geopolitical tensions between the United States and Russia and China have led to assumptions in all three major space powers that warfighting in space now is inevitable, and possible because of rapid technological advancements. New capabilities for disrupting and destroying satellites include radio-frequency jamming, the use of lasers, maneuverable space objects and more capable direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons. This situation, however, threatens international security and stability among nuclear powers. There is a continuing and necessary role for diplomacy, especially the establishment of normative rules of behavior, to reduce risks of misperceptions and crisis escalation, including up to the use of nuclear weapons. U.S. policy and strategy should seek a balance between traditional military approaches to protecting its space assets and diplomatic tools to create a more secure space environment.

  7. Issues in chemical and biological terrorism.

    PubMed

    Salem, Harry

    2003-01-01

    This manuscript describes the overview presented at the 23rd Annual Meeting of the American College of Toxicology in 2002. Although it is recognized that weapons of mass destruction that can be used against our military and civilian populations include chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents, this overview is limited primarily to chemical and biological (CB) agents. The issues of CB terrorism are discussed in terms of When, What, How, and Who. The US Army has been providing chemical and biological solutions since 1917, and has since 1996 applied these solutions to homeland defense and domestic preparedness. The use of chemical and biological agents as terrorist weapons both in the United States and elsewhere in the world is reviewed. The CB threat spectrum is presented, as is the further categorization of biological threat agents by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In addition, the CB agents considered to be a potential threat to our water supply are also presented. These are agents that are water soluble, stable, and resistant to water treatment and/or disinfection. The overview concludes with the chronological accomplishments of ECBC since 1917.

  8. Biological weapons preparedness: the role of physicians.

    PubMed

    Cherry, C L; Kainer, M A; Ruff, T A

    2003-01-01

    The real risk posed by biological weapons was demonstrated with the distribution of anthrax spores via the USA postal service in 2001. This review outlines the central roles of physicians in optimizing biopreparedness in Australia, including maintaining awareness of the risk, promptly recognizing an event, notifying appropriate authorities upon suspicion of an event, and instituting appropriate management. Management aspects covered include appropriate diagnostic tests, infection control procedures, and empirical therapy of agents considered possible biological weapons. The critical role of physicians as public health advocates working to prevent the use of biological weapons is also outlined.

  9. Animal-Free Chemical Safety Assessment

    PubMed Central

    Loizou, George D.

    2016-01-01

    The exponential growth of the Internet of Things and the global popularity and remarkable decline in cost of the mobile phone is driving the digital transformation of medical practice. The rapidly maturing digital, non-medical world of mobile (wireless) devices, cloud computing and social networking is coalescing with the emerging digital medical world of omics data, biosensors and advanced imaging which offers the increasingly realistic prospect of personalized medicine. Described as a potential “seismic” shift from the current “healthcare” model to a “wellness” paradigm that is predictive, preventative, personalized and participatory, this change is based on the development of increasingly sophisticated biosensors which can track and measure key biochemical variables in people. Additional key drivers in this shift are metabolomic and proteomic signatures, which are increasingly being reported as pre-symptomatic, diagnostic and prognostic of toxicity and disease. These advancements also have profound implications for toxicological evaluation and safety assessment of pharmaceuticals and environmental chemicals. An approach based primarily on human in vivo and high-throughput in vitro human cell-line data is a distinct possibility. This would transform current chemical safety assessment practice which operates in a human “data poor” to a human “data rich” environment. This could also lead to a seismic shift from the current animal-based to an animal-free chemical safety assessment paradigm. PMID:27493630

  10. Test and Evaluation Management Guide, Fifth Edition

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-01-01

    determine if a weapon will be useful in combat), chemical weapons testing involves two types of chemical tests—chemical mixing and biotoxicity . Chemical...mixing tests are conducted to obtain in- formation on the binary chemical reaction. Biotoxicity tests are performed to assess the potency of the agent

  11. 32 CFR 552.124 - Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2011-07-01 2009-07-01 true Transportation of privately owned weapons and... owned weapons and ammunition. (a) Privately owned firearms and ammunition will be transported in the following manner: (1) Weapons, other than weapons being transported into Fort Lewis for the first time, may...

  12. 32 CFR 552.124 - Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2012-07-01 2009-07-01 true Transportation of privately owned weapons and... owned weapons and ammunition. (a) Privately owned firearms and ammunition will be transported in the following manner: (1) Weapons, other than weapons being transported into Fort Lewis for the first time, may...

  13. 32 CFR 552.124 - Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Transportation of privately owned weapons and... owned weapons and ammunition. (a) Privately owned firearms and ammunition will be transported in the following manner: (1) Weapons, other than weapons being transported into Fort Lewis for the first time, may...

  14. 32 CFR 552.124 - Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Transportation of privately owned weapons and... owned weapons and ammunition. (a) Privately owned firearms and ammunition will be transported in the following manner: (1) Weapons, other than weapons being transported into Fort Lewis for the first time, may...

  15. 32 CFR 552.124 - Transportation of privately owned weapons and ammunition.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 32 National Defense 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Transportation of privately owned weapons and... owned weapons and ammunition. (a) Privately owned firearms and ammunition will be transported in the following manner: (1) Weapons, other than weapons being transported into Fort Lewis for the first time, may...

  16. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Hart, Mark

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."

  17. 46 CFR 386.23 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... 46 Shipping 8 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Weapons and explosives. 386.23 Section 386.23 Shipping MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS GOVERNING PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS AT THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY § 386.23 Weapons and explosives. No person...

  18. Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reisner, Jon; D'Angelo, Gennaro; Koo, Eunmo; Even, Wesley; Hecht, Matthew; Hunke, Elizabeth; Comeau, Darin; Bos, Randall; Cooley, James

    2018-03-01

    We present a multiscale study examining the impact of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons on global climate. Our models investigate multiple phases of the effects of nuclear weapons usage, including growth and rise of the nuclear fireball, ignition and spread of the induced firestorm, and comprehensive Earth system modeling of the oceans, land, ice, and atmosphere. This study follows from the scenario originally envisioned by Robock, Oman, Stenchikov, et al. (2007, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-2003-2007), based on the analysis of Toon et al. (2007, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-7-1973-2007), which assumes a regional exchange between India and Pakistan of fifty 15 kt weapons detonated by each side. We expand this scenario by modeling the processes that lead to production of black carbon, in order to refine the black carbon forcing estimates of these previous studies. When the Earth system model is initiated with 5 × 109 kg of black carbon in the upper troposphere (approximately from 9 to 13 km), the impact on climate variables such as global temperature and precipitation in our simulations is similar to that predicted by previously published work. However, while our thorough simulations of the firestorm produce about 3.7 × 109 kg of black carbon, we find that the vast majority of the black carbon never reaches an altitude above weather systems (approximately 12 km). Therefore, our Earth system model simulations conducted with model-informed atmospheric distributions of black carbon produce significantly lower global climatic impacts than assessed in prior studies, as the carbon at lower altitudes is more quickly removed from the atmosphere. In addition, our model ensembles indicate that statistically significant effects on global surface temperatures are limited to the first 5 years and are much smaller in magnitude than those shown in earlier works. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect. We find that the effects on global surface temperatures

  19. Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapons exchange: An improved assessment based on detailed source calculations

    DOE PAGES

    Reisner, Jon Michael; D'Angelo, Gennaro; Koo, Eunmo; ...

    2018-02-13

    In this paper, we present a multi-scale study examining the impact of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons on global climate. Our models investigate multiple phases of the effects of nuclear weapons usage, including growth and rise of the nuclear fireball, ignition and spread of the induced firestorm, and comprehensive Earth system modeling of the oceans, land, ice, and atmosphere. This study follows from the scenario originally envisioned by Robock et al. (2007a), based on the analysis of Toon et al. (2007), which assumes a regional exchange between India and Pakistan of fifty 15-kiloton weapons detonated by each side. Wemore » expand this scenario by modeling the processes that lead to production of black carbon, in order to refine the black carbon forcing estimates of these previous studies. When the Earth system model is initiated with 5 × 10 9 kg of black carbon in the upper troposphere (approximately 9 to 13 km), the impact on climate variables such as global temperature and precipitation in our simulations is similar to that predicted by previously published work. However, while our thorough simulations of the firestorm produce about 3.7 × 10 9 kg of black carbon, we find that the vast majority of the black carbon never reaches an altitude above weather systems (approximately 12 km). Therefore, our Earth system model simulations conducted with model-informed atmospheric distributions of black carbon produce significantly lower global climatic impacts than assessed in prior studies, as the carbon at lower altitudes is more quickly removed from the atmosphere. In addition, our model ensembles indicate that statistically significant effects on global surface temperatures are limited to the first 5 years and are much smaller in magnitude than those shown in earlier works. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect. We find that the effects on global surface temperatures are not uniform and are concentrated primarily around the highest arctic

  20. Climate impact of a regional nuclear weapons exchange: An improved assessment based on detailed source calculations

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Reisner, Jon Michael; D'Angelo, Gennaro; Koo, Eunmo

    In this paper, we present a multi-scale study examining the impact of a regional exchange of nuclear weapons on global climate. Our models investigate multiple phases of the effects of nuclear weapons usage, including growth and rise of the nuclear fireball, ignition and spread of the induced firestorm, and comprehensive Earth system modeling of the oceans, land, ice, and atmosphere. This study follows from the scenario originally envisioned by Robock et al. (2007a), based on the analysis of Toon et al. (2007), which assumes a regional exchange between India and Pakistan of fifty 15-kiloton weapons detonated by each side. Wemore » expand this scenario by modeling the processes that lead to production of black carbon, in order to refine the black carbon forcing estimates of these previous studies. When the Earth system model is initiated with 5 × 10 9 kg of black carbon in the upper troposphere (approximately 9 to 13 km), the impact on climate variables such as global temperature and precipitation in our simulations is similar to that predicted by previously published work. However, while our thorough simulations of the firestorm produce about 3.7 × 10 9 kg of black carbon, we find that the vast majority of the black carbon never reaches an altitude above weather systems (approximately 12 km). Therefore, our Earth system model simulations conducted with model-informed atmospheric distributions of black carbon produce significantly lower global climatic impacts than assessed in prior studies, as the carbon at lower altitudes is more quickly removed from the atmosphere. In addition, our model ensembles indicate that statistically significant effects on global surface temperatures are limited to the first 5 years and are much smaller in magnitude than those shown in earlier works. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect. We find that the effects on global surface temperatures are not uniform and are concentrated primarily around the highest arctic

  1. Field Artillery Cannon Weapons Systems and Ammunition Handbook.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1983-02-01

    ground. I (2) When the weapon is emplaced on uneven terrain, the equalizing support rotates on the horizontal pivot pin, placing the tilting parts of the...intervisible. g. Direct fire-Fire from a weapon that is laid by sighting directly on the target. h. Cant-The tilting of the trunnions of the weapon...locking handle bends or breaks because excess mucle is applied. The screws vibrate loose and are lost because somebody forgets to check them for

  2. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed Central

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-01-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war. PMID:6668585

  3. Nuclear weapons and medicine: some ethical dilemmas.

    PubMed

    Haines, A; de B White, C; Gleisner, J

    1983-12-01

    The enormous destructive power of present stocks of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to public health in human history. Technical changes in weapons design are leading to an increased emphasis on the ability to fight a nuclear war, eroding the concept of deterrence based on mutually assured destruction and increasing the risk of nuclear war. Medical planning and civil defence preparations for nuclear war have recently been increased in several countries although there is little evidence that they will be of significant value in the aftermath of a nuclear conflict. These developments have raised new ethical dilemmas for those in health professions. If there is any risk of use of weapons of mass destruction, then support for deterrence with these weapons as a policy for national or global security appears to be incompatible with basic principles of medical ethics and international law. The primary medical responsibility under such circumstances is to participate in attempts to prevent nuclear war.

  4. The nuclear weapons free world . We already live in

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Antonini, R.

    We do live in a nuclear weapons free world, already. After a long debate about nuclear weapons the situation today is such that, officially, no governement is in favor of them. The reason is to be found in the strongest moral stigma on nuclear weapons. Moreover the vast majority of the most influencial people share this view.

  5. Structural adaptations to diverse fighting styles in sexually selected weapons

    PubMed Central

    McCullough, Erin L.; Tobalske, Bret W.; Emlen, Douglas J.

    2014-01-01

    The shapes of sexually selected weapons differ widely among species, but the drivers of this diversity remain poorly understood. Existing explanations suggest weapon shapes reflect structural adaptations to different fighting styles, yet explicit tests of this hypothesis are lacking. We constructed finite element models of the horns of different rhinoceros beetle species to test whether functional specializations for increased performance under species-specific fighting styles could have contributed to the diversification of weapon form. We find that horns are both stronger and stiffer in response to species-typical fighting loads and that they perform more poorly under atypical fighting loads, which suggests weapons are structurally adapted to meet the functional demands of fighting. Our research establishes a critical link between weapon form and function, revealing one way male–male competition can drive the diversification of animal weapons. PMID:25201949

  6. Structural adaptations to diverse fighting styles in sexually selected weapons.

    PubMed

    McCullough, Erin L; Tobalske, Bret W; Emlen, Douglas J

    2014-10-07

    The shapes of sexually selected weapons differ widely among species, but the drivers of this diversity remain poorly understood. Existing explanations suggest weapon shapes reflect structural adaptations to different fighting styles, yet explicit tests of this hypothesis are lacking. We constructed finite element models of the horns of different rhinoceros beetle species to test whether functional specializations for increased performance under species-specific fighting styles could have contributed to the diversification of weapon form. We find that horns are both stronger and stiffer in response to species-typical fighting loads and that they perform more poorly under atypical fighting loads, which suggests weapons are structurally adapted to meet the functional demands of fighting. Our research establishes a critical link between weapon form and function, revealing one way male-male competition can drive the diversification of animal weapons.

  7. Insect-gene-activity detection system for chemical and biological warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mackie, Ryan S.; Schilling, Amanda S.; Lopez, Arturo M.; Rayms-Keller, Alfredo

    2002-02-01

    Detection of multiple chemical and biological weapons (CBW) agents and/or complex mixtures of toxic industrial chemicals (TIC) is imperative for both the commercial and military sectors. In a military scenario, a multi-CBW attack would create confusion, thereby delaying decontamination and therapeutic efforts. In the commercial sector, polluted sites invariably contain a mixture of TIC. Novel detection systems capable of detecting CBW and TIC are sorely needed. While it may be impossible to build a detector capable of discriminating all the possible combinations of CBW, a detection system capable of statistically predicting the most likely composition of a given mixture is within the reach of current emerging technologies. Aquatic insect-gene activity may prove to be a sensitive, discriminating, and elegant paradigm for the detection of CBW and TIC. We propose to systematically establish the expression patterns of selected protein markers in insects exposed to specific mixtures of chemical and biological warfare agents to generate a library of biosignatures of exposure. The predicting capabilities of an operational library of biosignatures of exposures will allow the detection of emerging novel or genetically engineered agents, as well as complex mixtures of chemical and biological weapons agents. CBW and TIC are discussed in the context of war, terrorism, and pollution.

  8. Detection and classification of concealed weapons using a magnetometer-based portal

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kotter, Dale K.; Roybal, Lyle G.; Polk, Robert E.

    2002-08-01

    A concealed weapons detection technology was developed through the support of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to provide a non intrusive means for rapid detection, location, and archiving of data (including visual) of potential suspects and weapon threats. This technology, developed by the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), has been applied in a portal style weapons detection system using passive magnetic sensors as its basis. This paper will report on enhancements to the weapon detection system to enable weapon classification and to discriminate threats from non-threats. Advanced signal processing algorithms were used to analyze the magnetic spectrum generated when a person passes through a portal. These algorithms analyzed multiple variables including variance in the magnetic signature from random weapon placement and/or orientation. They perform pattern recognition and calculate the probability that the collected magnetic signature correlates to a known database of weapon versus non-weapon responses. Neural networks were used to further discriminate weapon type and identify controlled electronic items such as cell phones and pagers. False alarms were further reduced by analyzing the magnetic detector response by using a Joint Time Frequency Analysis digital signal processing technique. The frequency components and power spectrum for a given sensor response were derived. This unique fingerprint provided additional information to aid in signal analysis. This technology has the potential to produce major improvements in weapon detection and classification.

  9. Open-area concealed-weapon detection system

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pati, P.; Mather, P.

    2011-06-01

    Concealed Weapon Detection (CWD) has become a significant challenge to present day security needs; individuals carrying weapons into airplanes, schools, and secured establishments are threat to public security. Although controlled screening, of people for concealed weapons, has been employed in many establishments, procedures and equipment are designed to work in restricted environments like airport passport control, military checkpoints, hospitals, school and university entrance. Furthermore, screening systems do not effectively decipher between threat and non-threat metal objects, thus leading to high rate of false alarms which can become a liability to daily operational needs of establishments. Therefore, the design and development of a new CWD system to operate in a large open area environment with large numbers of people reduced incidences of false alarms and increased location accuracy is essential.

  10. 36 CFR 504.14 - Weapons and explosives.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Weapons and explosives. 504.14 Section 504.14 Parks, Forests, and Public Property SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS § 504.14 Weapons and explosives. No person while on...

  11. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 745 - Schedules of Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedules of Chemicals No. Supplement... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 745—Schedules of Chemicals C.A.S. Registry No. Schedule 1 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me...

  12. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 745 - Schedules of Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedules of Chemicals No. Supplement... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 745—Schedules of Chemicals C.A.S. Registry No. Schedule 1 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me...

  13. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 745 - Schedules of Chemicals

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedules of Chemicals No. Supplement... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 745—Schedules of Chemicals C.A.S. Registry No. Schedule 1 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me...

  14. Screening adolescents in the emergency department for weapon carriage.

    PubMed

    Cunningham, Rebecca M; Resko, Stella M; Harrison, Stephanie Roahen; Zimmerman, Marc; Stanley, Rachel; Chermack, Stephen T; Walton, Maureen A

    2010-02-01

    The objective was to describe the prevalence and correlates of past-year weapon involvement among adolescents seeking care in an inner-city emergency department (ED). This cross-sectional study administered a computerized survey to all eligible adolescents (age 14-18 years), 7 days a week, who were seeking care over an 18-month period at an inner-city Level 1 ED. Validated measures were administered, including measures of demographics, sexual activity, substance use, injury, violent behavior, weapon carriage, and/or weapon use. Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) regression models were used to identify correlates of the occurrence and past-year frequency of these weapons variables. Adolescents (n = 2069, 86% response rate) completed the computerized survey. Fifty-five percent were female; 56.5% were African American. In the past year, 20% of adolescents reported knife or razor carriage, 7% reported gun carriage, and 6% pulled a knife or gun on someone. Although gun carriage was more frequent among males, females were as likely to carry a knife or pull a weapon in the past year. One-fifth of all adolescents seeking care in this inner-city ED have carried a weapon. Understanding weapon carriage among teens seeking ED care is a critical first step to future ED-based injury prevention initiatives. (c) 2010 by the Society for Academic Emergency Medicine.

  15. Intrasexually selected weapons.

    PubMed

    Rico-Guevara, Alejandro; Hurme, Kristiina J

    2018-06-20

    We propose a practical concept that distinguishes the particular kind of weaponry that has evolved to be used in combat between individuals of the same species and sex, which we term intrasexually selected weapons (ISWs). We present a treatise of ISWs in nature, aiming to understand their distinction and evolution from other secondary sex traits, including from 'sexually selected weapons', and from sexually dimorphic and monomorphic weaponry. We focus on the subset of secondary sex traits that are the result of same-sex combat, defined here as ISWs, provide not previously reported evolutionary patterns, and offer hypotheses to answer questions such as: why have only some species evolved weapons to fight for the opposite sex or breeding resources? We examined traits that seem to have evolved as ISWs in the entire animal phylogeny, restricting the classification of ISW to traits that are only present or enlarged in adults of one of the sexes, and are used as weapons during intrasexual fights. Because of the absence of behavioural data and, in many cases, lack of sexually discriminated series from juveniles to adults, we exclude the fossil record from this review. We merge morphological, ontogenetic, and behavioural information, and for the first time thoroughly review the tree of life to identify separate evolution of ISWs. We found that ISWs are only found in bilateral animals, appearing independently in nematodes, various groups of arthropods, and vertebrates. Our review sets a reference point to explore other taxa that we identify with potential ISWs for which behavioural or morphological studies are warranted. We establish that most ISWs come in pairs, are located in or near the head, are endo- or exoskeletal modifications, are overdeveloped structures compared with those found in females, are modified feeding structures and/or locomotor appendages, are most common in terrestrial taxa, are frequently used to guard females, territories, or both, and are also used

  16. Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to Weapons of Mass Destruction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-05-01

    the potential of massive destruction from nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for nearly half a century during the Cold War. The principle...on limited aspects of a single modality—whether biological, chemical, nuclear , or radiological. Concerns such as detection, defeat, or consequence...as difficult and dangerous as possible and to minimize the likelihood that he will achieve his goals. The worst forms of WMD— nuclear and, in some

  17. Analyses of battle casualties by weapon type aboard U.S. Navy warships.

    PubMed

    Blood, C G

    1992-03-01

    The number of casualties was determined for 513 incidents involving U.S. Navy warships sunk or damaged during World War II. Ship type and weapon were significant factors in determining the numbers of wounded and killed. Multiple weapon attacks and kamikazes yielded more wounded in action than other weapon types. Multiple weapons and torpedos resulted in a higher incidence of killed in action than other weapons. Penetrating wounds and burns were the most prominent injury types. Kamikaze attacks yielded significantly more burns than incidents involving bombs, gunfire, torpedos, mines, and multiple weapons. Mine explosions were responsible for more strains, sprains, and dislocations than the other weapon types.

  18. Integrated modeling systems to assess exposure and toxicity of chemicals in support of aquatic ecological risk assessment of methodologically challenging chemicals

    EPA Science Inventory

    From an exposure assessment perspective, persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic chemicals (PBTs) are some of the most challenging chemicals facing environmental decision makers today. Due to their general physico-chemical properties [e.g., high octanol-water partition coefficien...

  19. Computation of Weapons Systems Effectiveness

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2013-09-01

    denoted as SSPD2. SSPD = SSPD1 ∗ PNM + SSPD2 ∗ PHIT (5.13) PNM and PHIT are the weighing factors used to balance the direct hits and Gaussian miss...distribution unique for guided weapons. The addition of PNM and PHIT can be equal to or smaller than 1 due to the presence of the outliers gross...weapons to represent a zero miss distance for the PHIT component. SSPD2 Computation for Blast Effect SSPD2x = normcdf � LET 2 , 0,0� − normcdf(−LET 2

  20. Uncrackable code for nuclear weapons

    ScienceCinema

    Hart, Mark

    2018-05-11

    Mark Hart, a scientist and engineer in Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) Defense Technologies Division, has developed a new approach for ensuring nuclear weapons and their components can't fall prey to unauthorized use. The beauty of his approach: Let the weapon protect itself. "Using the random process of nuclear radioactive decay is the gold standard of random number generators," said Mark Hart. "You’d have a better chance of winning both Mega Millions and Powerball on the same day than getting control of IUC-protected components."