Unresponsiveness ≠ Unconsciousness

PubMed Central

Sanders, Robert D.; Tononi, Giulio; Laureys, Steven; Sleigh, Jamie

2012-01-01

Consciousness is subjective experience. During both sleep and anesthesia consciousness is common, evidenced by dreaming. A defining feature of dreaming is that, while conscious, we do not experience our environment – we are disconnected. Besides inducing behavioral unresponsiveness, a key goal of anesthesia is to prevent the experience of surgery (connected consciousness), by inducing either unconsciousness or disconnection of consciousness from the environment. Review of the isolated forearm technique demonstrates that consciousness, connectedness and responsiveness uncouple during anesthesia; in clinical conditions, a median 37% of patients demonstrate connected consciousness. We describe potential neurobiological constructs that can explain this phenomenon: during light anesthesia the subcortical mechanisms subserving spontaneous behavioral responsiveness are disabled but information integration within the corticothalamic network continues to produce consciousness, and unperturbed norepinephrinergic signaling maintains connectedness. These concepts emphasize the need for developing anesthetic regimens and depth of anesthesia monitors that specifically target mechanisms of consciousness, connectedness and responsiveness. PMID:22314293

What is a reflex? A guide for understanding disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Fischer, David B; Truog, Robert D

2015-08-11

Uncertainty in diagnosing disorders of consciousness, and specifically in determining whether consciousness has been lost or retained, poses challenging scientific and ethical questions. Recent neuroimaging-based tests for consciousness have cast doubt on the reliability of behavioral criteria in assessing states of consciousness and generate new questions about the assumptions used in formulating coherent diagnostic criteria. The reflex, a foundational diagnostic tool, offers unique insight into these disorders; behaviors produced by unconscious patients are thought to be purely reflexive, whereas those produced by conscious patients can be volitional. Further investigation, however, reveals that reflexes cannot be reliably distinguished from conscious behaviors on the basis of any generalizable empirical characteristics. Ambiguity between reflexive and conscious behaviors undermines the capacity of the reflex to distinguish between disorders of consciousness and has implications for how these disorders should be conceptualized in future diagnostic criteria. © 2015 American Academy of Neurology.

Intrathecal baclofen: effects on spasticity, pain, and consciousness in disorders of consciousness and locked-in syndrome.

PubMed

Pistoia, Francesca; Sacco, Simona; Sarà, Marco; Franceschini, Marco; Carolei, Antonio

2015-01-01

Disorders of consciousness (DOCs) include coma, vegetative state (VS), and minimally conscious state (MCS). Coma is characterized by impaired wakefulness and consciousness, while VS and MCS are defined by lacking or discontinuous consciousness despite recovered wakefulness. Conversely, locked-in syndrome (LIS) is characterized by quadriplegia and lower cranial nerve paralysis with preserved consciousness. Intrathecal baclofen (ITB) is a useful treatment to improve spasticity both in patients with DOCs and LIS. Moreover, it supports the recovery of consciousness in some patients with VS or MCS. The precise mechanism underlying this recovery has not yet been elucidated. It has been hypothesized that ITB may act by reducing the overload of dysfunctional sensory stimuli reaching the injured brain or by stabilizing the imbalanced circadian rhythms. Although the current indication of ITB is the management of severe spasticity, its potential use in speeding the recovery of consciousness merits further investigation.

A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness.

PubMed

Solms, Mark

2014-06-01

A neuropsychoanalytical approach to the hard problem of consciousness revolves around the distinction between the subject of consciousness and objects of consciousness. In contrast to the mainstream of cognitive science, neuropsychoanalysis prioritizes the subject. The subject of consciousness is the indispensable page upon which consciousness of objects is inscribed. This has implications for our conception of the mental. The subjective being of consciousness is not registered in the classical exteroceptive modalities; it is not merely a cognitive representation, not only a memory trace. Rather, the exteroceptive modalities are registered in the subjective being. Cognitive representations are mental solids embedded within subjectivity, the tangible and visible (etc) properties of which are projected onto reality. It is important to recognize that mental solids (e.g., the body-as-object) are no more real than the subjective being they are inscribed in (the body-as-subject). Moreover, pure subjectivity is not without content or quality. This aspect of consciousness is conventionally described quantitatively as the level of consciousness, or wakefulness. But it feels like something to be awake. The primary modality of this aspect of consciousness is affect. Affect supplies the subjectivity that underpins all consciousness. Some implications of this approach are discussed here, in broad brush strokes.

Why and How. The Future of the Central Questions of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Havlík, Marek; Kozáková, Eva; Horáček, Jiří

2017-01-01

In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the “hard problem” of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem of consciousness will probably never completely disappear because it will always have its most committed supporters. However, there is a good chance that its weight and importance will be highly reduced by empirically tackling consciousness in the near future. We expect that future empirical endeavor of consciousness will be based on a unifying brain theory and will answer the question as to what is the function of conscious experience, which will in turn replace the implications of the hard problem. The candidate of such a unifying brain theory is predictive coding, which will have to explain both perceptual consciousness and conscious mind-wandering in order to become the truly unifying theory of brain functioning. PMID:29075226

The Presence of Consciousness in Absence Seizures

PubMed Central

Bayne, Tim

2011-01-01

This paper examines three respects in which the study of epileptic absence seizures promises to inform our understanding of consciousness. Firstly, it has the potential to bear on debates concerning the behavioural and cognitive functions associated with consciousness. Secondly, it has the potential to illuminate the relationship between background states (or ‘levels’) of consciousness and the contents of consciousness. Thirdly, it has the potential to bear on our understanding of the unity of consciousness. PMID:21447898

There Are Conscious and Unconscious Agendas in the Brain and Both Are Important—Our Will Can Be Conscious as Well as Unconscious

PubMed Central

Deecke, Lüder

2012-01-01

I have been asked to write a few words on consciousness in this editorial issue. My thoughts on consciousness will focus on the relation between consciousness and will. Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon as some people believe—it is not a psychological construct either. Consciousness is a brain function. With deeper thought it is even more than that—a brain state. Writing this, I am in a conscious state, I hope at least. In every day philosophy, a close connection of consciousness with will is ventured, and is expressed in the term “conscious free will”. However, this does not mean that our will is totally determined and not free, be it conscious or unconscious. Total determinists postulate total freedom from nature in order to speak of free will. Absolute freedom from nature is an a priori impossibility; there is no way to escape from nature. However, we have relative freedom, graded freedom, freedom in degrees, enabling us to make responsible decisions and be captains of our own destiny. We are not totally determined. We can upregulate our degrees of freedom by self-management or we can downregulate them by self-mismanagement. In the present communication consciousness and the unconscious are discussed in their various aspects and interactions. PMID:24961200

The quantitative measurement of consciousness during epileptic seizures.

PubMed

Nani, Andrea; Cavanna, Andrea E

2014-01-01

The assessment of consciousness is a fundamental element in the classification of epileptic seizures. It is, therefore, of great importance for clinical practice to develop instruments that enable an accurate and reliable measurement of the alteration of consciousness during seizures. Over the last few years, three psychometric scales have been specifically proposed to measure ictal consciousness: the Ictal Consciousness Inventory (ICI), the Consciousness Seizure Scale (CSS), and the Responsiveness in Epilepsy Scale--versions I and II (RES-I and RES-II). The ICI is a self-report psychometric instrument which retrospectively assesses ictal consciousness along the dimensions of the level/arousal and contents/awareness. The CSS has been used by clinicians to quantify the impairment of consciousness in order to establish correlations with the brain mechanisms underlying alterations of consciousness during temporal lobe seizures. The most recently developed observer-rated instrument is the RES-I, which has been used to assess responsiveness during epileptic seizures in patients undergoing video-EEG. The implementation of standardized psychometric tools for the assessment of ictal consciousness can complement clinical observations and contribute to improve accuracy in seizure classification. © 2013.

Natural Evolution and Human Consciousness

PubMed Central

Holmgren, Jan

2014-01-01

A visual conscious experience is my empirical basis. All that we know comes to us through conscious experiences. Thanks to natural evolution, we have nearly direct perception, and can largely trust the information we attain. There is full integration, with no gaps, of organisms in the continuous world. Human conscious experiences, on the other hand, are discrete. Consciousness has certain limits for its resolution. This is illustrated by the so-called light-cone, with consequences for foundations in physics. Traditional universals are replaced by feels and distributions. Conscious experiences can be ordered within a framework of conceptual spaces. Triple Aspect Monism (TAM) can represent the dynamics of conscious systems. However, to fully represent the creative power of human consciousness, an all-inclusive view is suggested: Multi Aspect Monism (MAM). PMID:24891802

Self-consciousness, friendship quality, and adolescent internalizing problems

PubMed Central

Bowker, Julie C.; Rubin, Kenneth H.

2013-01-01

The correlates between public and private self-consciousness and internalizing difficulties were examined during early adolescence. Friendship quality was assessed as a possible moderator of the relation between self-consciousness and maladjustment. One hundred and thirty-seven young adolescents (N = 87 girls; M age = 13.98 years) reported on their self-consciousness, internalizing problems, and the quality of their best friendship. Results indicated stronger associations between private self-consciousness and internalizing correlates than between public self-consciousness and internalizing problems, suggesting that private self-consciousness may be a stronger risk factor during adolescence. Contrary to expectations, evidence revealed that positive friendship quality may exacerbate some difficulties associated with self-consciousness. Results pertaining to friendship quality add to the growing literature on the ways in which friendships can contribute to adjustment difficulties. PMID:19998530

The Neurogenetic Correlates of Consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grandy, John K.

2013-09-01

The neurogenetic correlates of consciousness (NgCC) is a new field of consciousness studies that focuses on genes that have an effect on or are involved in the continuum of neuron-based consciousness. A framework of consciousness based on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has already been established by Francis Crick and Christof Kock. In this work I propose that there are NgCC underlying the NCC which are both active during the conscious experience. So how are genes involved? There are two significant connections between DNA and neurons that are involved in the conscious experience. First, any brain system can be adversely affected by underlying genetic abnormalities which can be expressed in an individual at birth, in adulthood, or later in life. Second, the DNA molecule does not lay dormant while the neuron runs on autopilot. DNA is active in translating and transcribing RNA and protein products that are utilized during neuron functioning. Without these products being continuously produced by the DNA during a conscious experience the neurons would cease to function correctly and be rendered unable to provide a continuum of human consciousness. Consequently, in addition to NCC, NgCC must be factored in when appreciating a conscious event. In this work I will discuss and explain some NgCC citing several examples.

Social Consciousness, Education and Transformative Activity

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Pavlidis, Periklis

2015-01-01

This paper examines two aspects of social consciousness: consciousness in the sense of knowledge of the objective reality and consciousness in the sense of awareness of oneself as a subject in his/her social ties with other persons-subjects. In the light of such an approach to consciousness in this essay we discuss the importance of education and…

Investigating Adolescents' Critical Consciousness Development through a Character Framework.

PubMed

Seider, Scott; Tamerat, Jalene; Clark, Shelby; Soutter, Madora

2017-06-01

Brazilian philosopher-educator Paulo Freire defined critical consciousness as the ability to engage in reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it. A growing body of research has found that critical consciousness is predictive of a number of important academic and civic outcomes in adolescents from oppressed groups. The present mixed methods study considered the critical consciousness development of 335 adolescents (57% female, 92% African American or Latinx) attending urban secondary schools that sought to foster their students' critical consciousness, but featured five different pedagogical approaches. We hypothesized that considering these adolescents' critical consciousness development through a character lens would highlight ways in which different schooling models contribute differentially to their students' development of the intellectual, performance, and civic dimensions of critical consciousness. Longitudinal analyses revealed significant differences in the critical consciousness development of adolescents attending different schooling models along these dimensions. Interviews with adolescents and field work conducted at their schools offered insight into the programming and practices that may have contributed to these differences in students' critical consciousness development.

Oscillatory Correlates of Visual Consciousness

PubMed Central

Gallotto, Stefano; Sack, Alexander T.; Schuhmann, Teresa; de Graaf, Tom A.

2017-01-01

Conscious experiences are linked to activity in our brain: the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Empirical research on these NCCs covers a wide range of brain activity signals, measures, and methodologies. In this paper, we focus on spontaneous brain oscillations; rhythmic fluctuations of neuronal (population) activity which can be characterized by a range of parameters, such as frequency, amplitude (power), and phase. We provide an overview of oscillatory measures that appear to correlate with conscious perception. We also discuss how increasingly sophisticated techniques allow us to study the causal role of oscillatory activity in conscious perception (i.e., ‘entrainment’). This review of oscillatory correlates of consciousness suggests that, for example, activity in the alpha-band (7–13 Hz) may index, or even causally support, conscious perception. But such results also showcase an increasingly acknowledged difficulty in NCC research; the challenge of separating neural activity necessary for conscious experience to arise (prerequisites) from neural activity underlying the conscious experience itself (substrates) or its results (consequences). PMID:28736543

Intrinsic Functional Connectivity Patterns Predict Consciousness Level and Recovery Outcome in Acquired Brain Injury

PubMed Central

Wu, Xuehai; Zou, Qihong; Hu, Jin; Tang, Weijun; Mao, Ying; Gao, Liang; Zhu, Jianhong; Jin, Yi; Wu, Xin; Lu, Lu; Zhang, Yaojun; Zhang, Yao; Dai, Zhengjia; Gao, Jia-Hong; Weng, Xuchu; Northoff, Georg; Giacino, Joseph T.; He, Yong

2015-01-01

For accurate diagnosis and prognostic prediction of acquired brain injury (ABI), it is crucial to understand the neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss of consciousness. However, there is no consensus on which regions and networks act as biomarkers for consciousness level and recovery outcome in ABI. Using resting-state fMRI, we assessed intrinsic functional connectivity strength (FCS) of whole-brain networks in a large sample of 99 ABI patients with varying degrees of consciousness loss (including fully preserved consciousness state, minimally conscious state, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state, and coma) and 34 healthy control subjects. Consciousness level was evaluated using the Glasgow Coma Scale and Coma Recovery Scale-Revised on the day of fMRI scanning; recovery outcome was assessed using the Glasgow Outcome Scale 3 months after the fMRI scanning. One-way ANOVA of FCS, Spearman correlation analyses between FCS and the consciousness level and recovery outcome, and FCS-based multivariate pattern analysis were performed. We found decreased FCS with loss of consciousness primarily distributed in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PCU), medial prefrontal cortex, and lateral parietal cortex. The FCS values of these regions were significantly correlated with consciousness level and recovery outcome. Multivariate support vector machine discrimination analysis revealed that the FCS patterns predicted whether patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state and coma would regain consciousness with an accuracy of 81.25%, and the most discriminative region was the PCC/PCU. These findings suggest that intrinsic functional connectivity patterns of the human posteromedial cortex could serve as a potential indicator for consciousness level and recovery outcome in individuals with ABI. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Varying degrees of consciousness loss and recovery are commonly observed in acquired brain injury patients, yet the underlying neurobiological mechanisms remain elusive. Using a large sample of patients with varying degrees of consciousness loss, we demonstrate that intrinsic functional connectivity strength in many brain regions, especially in the posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus, significantly correlated with consciousness level and recovery outcome. We further demonstrate that the functional connectivity pattern of these regions can predict patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state and coma would regain consciousness with an accuracy of 81.25%. Our study thus provides potentially important biomarkers of acquired brain injury in clinical diagnosis, prediction of recovery outcome, and decision making for treatment strategies for patients with severe loss of consciousness. PMID:26377477

Impaired Consciousness in Epilepsy

PubMed Central

Blumenfeld, Hal

2013-01-01

Consciousness is essential to normal human life. In epileptic seizures consciousness is often transiently lost making it impossible for the individual to experience or respond. This has huge consequences for safety, productivity, emotional health and quality of life. To prevent impaired consciousness in epilepsy it is necessary to understand the mechanisms leading to brain dysfunction during seizures. Normally the “consciousness system”—a specialized set of cortical-subcortical structures—maintains alertness, attention and awareness. Recent advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology and prospective behavioral testing have shed new light on how epileptic seizures disrupt the consciousness system. Diverse seizure types including absence, generalized tonic-clonic and complex partial seizures converge on the same set of anatomical structures through different mechanisms to disrupt consciousness. Understanding these mechanisms may lead to improved treatment strategies to prevent impaired consciousness and improve quality of life in people with epilepsy. PMID:22898735

[Self-consciousness, consciousness of the other and dementias].

PubMed

Gil, Roger

2007-06-01

Studies of self-consciousness in dementia concern essentially anosognosia or the loss of insight. However, Self-consciousness is multifaceted: it includes awareness of the body, perceptions, one's own history, identity, and one's own projects. Self-consciousness is linked to consciousness of others i.e. to social cognition supported by identification of others, but also by comprehension of facial expression of emotions, comprehension and expression of emotional prosody, pragmatic abilities, ability to infer other's people's mental states, thoughts, and feelings (theory of mind and empathy), knowledge of social norms and rules, social reasoning. The subtypes of dementias (and namely Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia) affect heterogeneously the different aspects of the self-and other-consciousness. Further studies are needed for a better knowledge of the complex relationship between Self-consciousness, social cognition, decision making and neuropsychiatric symptoms and behavioral disturbances occurring in demented patients.

The regulatory function of self-conscious emotion: insights from patients with orbitofrontal damage.

PubMed

Beer, Jennifer S; Heerey, Erin A; Keltner, Dacher; Scabini, Donatella; Knight, Robert T

2003-10-01

Although once considered disruptive, self-conscious emotions are now theorized to be fundamentally involved in the regulation of social behavior. The present study examined the social regulation function of self-conscious emotions by comparing healthy participants with a neuropsychological population--patients with orbitofrontal lesions--characterized by selective regulatory deficits. Orbitofrontal patients and healthy controls participated in a series of tasks designed to assess their social regulation and self-conscious emotions. Another task assessed the ability to infer others' emotional states, an appraisal process involved in self-conscious emotion. Consistent with the theory that self-conscious emotions are important for regulating social behavior, the findings show that deficient behavioral regulation is associated with inappropriate self-conscious emotions that reinforce maladaptive behavior. Additionally, deficient behavioral regulation is associated with impairments in interpreting the self-conscious emotions of others.

Theory of mind and Darwin's legacy.

PubMed

Searle, John

2013-06-18

We do not have an adequate theory of consciousness. Both dualism and materialism are mistaken because they deny consciousness is part of the physical world. False claims include (i) behaviorism, (ii) computationalism, (iii) epiphenomenalism, (iv) the readiness potential, (v) subjectivity, and (vi) materialism. Ontological subjectivity does not preclude epistemic objectivity. Observer relative phenomena are created by consciousness, but consciousness is not itself observer relative. Consciousness consists of feeling, sentience, or awareness with (i) qualitativeness, (ii) ontological subjectivity, (iii) unified conscious field, (iv) intentionality, and (v) intentional causation. All conscious states are caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the brain as higher level features. Efforts to get a detailed scientific account of how brain processes cause consciousness are disappointing. The Darwinian revolution gave us a new form of explanation; two levels were substituted: a causal level, where we specify the mechanism by which the phenotype functions, and a functional level, where we specify the selectional advantage that the phenotype provides. Sociobiology attempted to explain general features of human society, ethics, etc. It failed. For the incest taboo, it confuses inhibition with prohibition. It did not explain the moral force of the taboo. To explain the function of consciousness we cannot ask, "What would be subtracted if we subtracted consciousness but left everything else the same?" We cannot leave everything else the same because consciousness is necessary for higher functions of human and animal life. The unified conscious field gives the organism vastly increased power.

Theory of mind and Darwin’s legacy

PubMed Central

Searle, John

2013-01-01

We do not have an adequate theory of consciousness. Both dualism and materialism are mistaken because they deny consciousness is part of the physical world. False claims include (i) behaviorism, (ii) computationalism, (iii) epiphenomenalism, (iv) the readiness potential, (v) subjectivity, and (vi) materialism. Ontological subjectivity does not preclude epistemic objectivity. Observer relative phenomena are created by consciousness, but consciousness is not itself observer relative. Consciousness consists of feeling, sentience, or awareness with (i) qualitativeness, (ii) ontological subjectivity, (iii) unified conscious field, (iv) intentionality, and (v) intentional causation. All conscious states are caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain, and they are realized in the brain as higher level features. Efforts to get a detailed scientific account of how brain processes cause consciousness are disappointing. The Darwinian revolution gave us a new form of explanation; two levels were substituted: a causal level, where we specify the mechanism by which the phenotype functions, and a functional level, where we specify the selectional advantage that the phenotype provides. Sociobiology attempted to explain general features of human society, ethics, etc. It failed. For the incest taboo, it confuses inhibition with prohibition. It did not explain the moral force of the taboo. To explain the function of consciousness we cannot ask, “What would be subtracted if we subtracted consciousness but left everything else the same?” We cannot leave everything else the same because consciousness is necessary for higher functions of human and animal life. The unified conscious field gives the organism vastly increased power. PMID:23754416

Science of consciousness and the hard problem

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Stapp, H.P.

1996-05-22

Quantum theory is essentially a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter, and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally efficacious and necessary role in brain dynamics. It therefore provides a natural basis, created by scientists, for the science of consciousness. As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing, and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms, as compared to similar organisms that lack consciousness. As a second illustration it is explained how, within the quantum framework, the consciously experienced {open_quotes}I{close_quotes} directs the actionsmore » of a human being. It is concluded that contemporary science already has an adequate framework for incorporating causally efficacious experimential events into the physical universe in a manner that: (1) puts the neural correlates of consciousness into the theory in a well defined way, (2) explains in principle how the effects of consciousness, per se, can enhance the survival prospects of organisms that possess it, (3) allows this survival effect to feed into phylogenetic development, and (4) explains how the consciously experienced {open_quotes}I{close_quotes} can direct human behaviour.« less

Neural correlates of consciousness: what we know and what we have to learn!

PubMed

Calabrò, Rocco Salvatore; Cacciola, Alberto; Bramanti, Placido; Milardi, Demetrio

2015-04-01

Consciousness is a multifaceted concept with two major components: awareness of environment and of self (i.e., the content of consciousness) and wakefulness (i.e., the level of consciousness). Medically speaking, consciousness is the state of the patient's awareness of self and environment and his responsiveness to external stimulation and inner need. A basic understanding of consciousness and its neural correlates is of major importance for all clinicians, especially those involved with patients suffering from altered states of consciousness. To this end, in this review it is shown that consciousness is dependent on the brainstem and thalamus for arousal; that basic cognition is supported by recurrent electrical activity between the cortex and the thalamus at gamma band frequencies; and that some kind of working memory must, at least fleetingly, be present for awareness to occur. New advances in neuroimaging studies are also presented in order to better understand and demonstrate the neurophysiological basis of consciousness. In particular, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have offered the possibility to measure directly and non-invasively normal and severely brain damaged subjects' brain activity, whilst diffusion tensor imaging studies have allowed evaluating white matter integrity in normal subjects and patients with disorder of consciousness.

The Value and Disvalue of Consciousness.

PubMed

Glannon, Walter

2016-10-01

Consciousness defines us as persons. It allows us to have both pleasurable and painful experiences. I present four neurological conditions in the clinical setting to explore how consciousness can be beneficial or harmful to patients: intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients. The ethical significance of consciousness for patients in these conditions depends on two factors: the content of one's experience and whether one can report this content to others. I argue that the value or disvalue of phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to be aware, may depend on its relation to access consciousness, the ability to report or communicate the content of awareness. Phenomenal consciousness can have disvalue when one wants or expects to be unconscious. It can also have disvalue in the absence of access consciousness because it can allow the patient to experience pain and suffer. Technology that enabled neurologically compromised patients to reliably communicate their experience and wishes could benefit and prevent harm to them. More generally, the neurological conditions I discuss raise the question of when and in what respects consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.

Closing in on the constitution of consciousness

PubMed Central

Miller, Steven M.

2014-01-01

The science of consciousness is a nascent and thriving field of research that is founded on identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness. However, I have argued that it is the neural constitution of consciousness that science seeks to understand and that there are no evident strategies for distinguishing the correlates and constitution of (phenomenal) consciousness. Here I review this correlation/constitution distinction problem and challenge the existing foundations of consciousness science. I present the main analyses from a longer paper in press on this issue, focusing on recording, inhibition, stimulation, and combined inhibition/stimulation strategies, including proposal of the Jenga analogy to illustrate why identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness should not be considered the ultimate target of consciousness science. Thereafter I suggest that while combined inhibition and stimulation strategies might identify some constitutive neural activities—indeed minimally sufficient constitutive neural activities—such strategies fail to identify the whole neural constitution of consciousness and thus the correlation/constitution distinction problem is not fully solved. Various clarifications, potential objections and related scientific and philosophical issues are also discussed and I conclude by proposing new foundational claims for consciousness science. PMID:25452738

Consciousness as a useful concept in epilepsy classification

PubMed Central

Blumenfeld, Hal; Meador, Kimford J.

2014-01-01

Summary Impaired consciousness has important practical consequences for people living with epilepsy. Recent pathophysiologic studies show that seizures with impaired level of consciousness always affect widespread cortical networks and subcortical arousal systems. In light of these findings and their clinical significance, efforts are underway to revise the International League Against Epilepsy (ILAE) 2010 report to include impaired consciousness in the classification of seizures. Lüders and colleagues have presented one such effort, which we discuss here. We then propose an alternative classification of impaired consciousness in epilepsy based on functional neuroanatomy. Some seizures involve focal cortical regions and cause selective deficits in the content of consciousness but without impaired overall level of consciousness or awareness. These include focal aware conscious seizures (FACS) with lower order cortical deficits such as somatosensory or visual impairment as well as FACS with higher cognitive deficits including ictal aphasia or isolated epileptic amnesia. Another category applies to seizures with impaired level of consciousness leading to deficits in multiple cognitive domains. For this category, we believe the terms “dyscognitive” or “dialeptic” should be avoided because they may create confusion. Instead we propose that seizures with impaired level of consciousness be described based on underlying pathophysiology. Widespread moderately severe deficits in corticothalamic function are seen in absence seizures and in focal impaired consciousness seizures (FICS), including many temporal lobe seizures and other focal seizures with impaired consciousness. Some simple responses or automatisms may be preserved in these seizures. In contrast, generalized tonic–clonic seizures usually produce widespread severe deficits in corticothalamic function causing loss of all meaningful responses. Further work is needed to understand and prevent impaired consciousness in epilepsy, but the first step is to keep this crucial practical and physiologic aspect of seizures front-and-center in our discussions. PMID:24981294

Consciousness, Cognition and the Cognitive Apparatus in the Vedānta Tradition

PubMed Central

Balasubramanian, R.

2011-01-01

A human being is a complex entity consisting of the Self (also known as Consciousness), mind, senses and the body. The Vedānta tradition holds that the mind, the senses and the body are essentially different from the Self or Consciousness. It is through consciousness that we are able to know the things of the world, making use of the medium of the mind and the senses. Furthermore, the mind, though material, is able to reveal things, borrowing the light from consciousness. From the phenomenological point of view, we have to answer the following questions: how does one know the mind/the mental operations/the cogitations of the mind? Does the mind know itself? Is it possible? There is, again, the problem of the intentionality of consciousness. Is consciousness intentional? According to Vedānta, consciousness by its very nature is not intentional, but it becomes intentional through the mind. The mind or the ego is not part of the consciousness; on the contrary, it is transcendent to consciousness. It is difficult to spell out the relation between consciousness and the mind. How does consciousness, which is totally different from the mind, get related to the mind in such a way that it makes the latter capable of comprehending the things of the world? The Vedānta tradition provides the answer to this question in terms of the knower-known relation. Consciousness is pure light, self-luminous by its very nature, that is, although it reveals other objects, it is not revealed by anything else. When Sartre describes it as nothingness, bereft of even ego, it is to show that it is pure light revealing objects outside it. PMID:21694962

How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will

PubMed Central

Hameroff, Stuart

2012-01-01

Conscious “free will” is problematic because (1) brain mechanisms causing consciousness are unknown, (2) measurable brain activity correlating with conscious perception apparently occurs too late for real-time conscious response, consciousness thus being considered “epiphenomenal illusion,” and (3) determinism, i.e., our actions and the world around us seem algorithmic and inevitable. The Penrose–Hameroff theory of “orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR)” identifies discrete conscious moments with quantum computations in microtubules inside brain neurons, e.g., 40/s in concert with gamma synchrony EEG. Microtubules organize neuronal interiors and regulate synapses. In Orch OR, microtubule quantum computations occur in integration phases in dendrites and cell bodies of integrate-and-fire brain neurons connected and synchronized by gap junctions, allowing entanglement of microtubules among many neurons. Quantum computations in entangled microtubules terminate by Penrose “objective reduction (OR),” a proposal for quantum state reduction and conscious moments linked to fundamental spacetime geometry. Each OR reduction selects microtubule states which can trigger axonal firings, and control behavior. The quantum computations are “orchestrated” by synaptic inputs and memory (thus “Orch OR”). If correct, Orch OR can account for conscious causal agency, resolving problem 1. Regarding problem 2, Orch OR can cause temporal non-locality, sending quantum information backward in classical time, enabling conscious control of behavior. Three lines of evidence for brain backward time effects are presented. Regarding problem 3, Penrose OR (and Orch OR) invokes non-computable influences from information embedded in spacetime geometry, potentially avoiding algorithmic determinism. In summary, Orch OR can account for real-time conscious causal agency, avoiding the need for consciousness to be seen as epiphenomenal illusion. Orch OR can rescue conscious free will. PMID:23091452

Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being.

PubMed

Oakley, David A; Halligan, Peter W

2017-01-01

Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that "consciousness" contains no top-down control processes and that "consciousness" involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view, psychological processing and psychological products are not under the control of consciousness. In particular, we argue that all "contents of consciousness" are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or influenced in any way by the "experience of consciousness." This continuously updated personal narrative arises from selective "internal broadcasting" of outputs from non-conscious executive systems that have access to all forms of cognitive processing, sensory information, and motor control. The personal narrative provides information for storage in autobiographical memory and is underpinned by constructs of self and agency, also created in non-conscious systems. The experience of consciousness is a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative. In this sense, personal awareness is analogous to the rainbow which accompanies physical processes in the atmosphere but exerts no influence over them. Though it is an end-product created by non-conscious executive systems, the personal narrative serves the powerful evolutionary function of enabling individuals to communicate (externally broadcast) the contents of internal broadcasting. This in turn allows recipients to generate potentially adaptive strategies, such as predicting the behavior of others and underlies the development of social and cultural structures, that promote species survival. Consequently, it is the capacity to communicate to others the contents of the personal narrative that confers an evolutionary advantage-not the experience of consciousness (personal awareness) itself.

Consciousness as a useful concept in epilepsy classification.

PubMed

Blumenfeld, Hal; Meador, Kimford J

2014-08-01

Impaired consciousness has important practical consequences for people living with epilepsy. Recent pathophysiologic studies show that seizures with impaired level of consciousness always affect widespread cortical networks and subcortical arousal systems. In light of these findings and their clinical significance, efforts are underway to revise the International League Against Epilepsy (ILAE) 2010 report to include impaired consciousness in the classification of seizures. Lüders and colleagues have presented one such effort, which we discuss here. We then propose an alternative classification of impaired consciousness in epilepsy based on functional neuroanatomy. Some seizures involve focal cortical regions and cause selective deficits in the content of consciousness but without impaired overall level of consciousness or awareness. These include focal aware conscious seizures (FACS) with lower order cortical deficits such as somatosensory or visual impairment as well as FACS with higher cognitive deficits including ictal aphasia or isolated epileptic amnesia. Another category applies to seizures with impaired level of consciousness leading to deficits in multiple cognitive domains. For this category, we believe the terms "dyscognitive" or "dialeptic" should be avoided because they may create confusion. Instead we propose that seizures with impaired level of consciousness be described based on underlying pathophysiology. Widespread moderately severe deficits in corticothalamic function are seen in absence seizures and in focal impaired consciousness seizures (FICS), including many temporal lobe seizures and other focal seizures with impaired consciousness. Some simple responses or automatisms may be preserved in these seizures. In contrast, generalized tonic-clonic seizures usually produce widespread severe deficits in corticothalamic function causing loss of all meaningful responses. Further work is needed to understand and prevent impaired consciousness in epilepsy, but the first step is to keep this crucial practical and physiologic aspect of seizures front-and-center in our discussions. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2014 International League Against Epilepsy.

Appearance concerns among women with neurofibromatosis: examining sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness.

PubMed

Smith, Kelly B; Wang, Daphne L; Plotkin, Scott R; Park, Elyse R

2013-12-01

Neurofibromatosis (NF) 1 and 2 have distinct appearance effects, yet little research has examined patients' appearance concerns. We assessed appearance concerns and self-consciousness, self-esteem, and loneliness among women with NF. Women with NF1 (n = 79) and NF2 (n = 48) completed the Derriford Appearance Scale to assess appearance concerns and sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and UCLA Loneliness Scale. Women's appearance concerns were coded to determine whether they were NF-related and whether psychosocial factors contributed to the concerns. A total of 85% of women reported appearance concerns, many of which were NF-related and attributed to psychosocial factors. Women with NF1 reported significantly more sexual/bodily self-consciousness but similar levels of social self-consciousness compared with women with NF2. Significantly higher sexual/bodily self-consciousness was found among married/cohabiting women regardless of NF group. Compared with general population norms and breast cancer survivors (BCS), women with NF1 reported significantly greater sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness. Women with NF2 reported less sexual/bodily self-consciousness compared with population norms, yet tended to report greater sexual/bodily self-consciousness than BCS. Women with NF2 reported significantly greater social self-consciousness compared with population norms and BCS. For both NF1 and NF2, higher levels of sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness were related to lower self-esteem and higher levels of social self-consciousness to more loneliness. Appearance concerns are prevalent, and social self-consciousness is high, among women with NF1 and NF2. Women with NF1 compared with NF2 experience more sexual/bodily self-consciousness. Providers should assess the impact of NF on women's self-perceptions and address sexual, body image, and social concerns. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Impact of Emotion on Consciousness: Positive Stimuli Enhance Conscious Reportability

PubMed Central

Rømer Thomsen, Kristine; Lou, Hans C.; Joensson, Morten; Hyam, Jonathan A.; Holland, Peter; Parsons, Christine E.; Young, Katherine S.; Møller, Arne; Stein, Alan; Green, Alex L.; Kringelbach, Morten L.; Aziz, Tipu Z.

2011-01-01

Emotion and reward have been proposed to be closely linked to conscious experience, but empirical data are lacking. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) plays a central role in the hedonic dimension of conscious experience; thus potentially a key region in interactions between emotion and consciousness. Here we tested the impact of emotion on conscious experience, and directly investigated the role of the ACC. We used a masked paradigm that measures conscious reportability in terms of subjective confidence and objective accuracy in identifying the briefly presented stimulus in a forced-choice test. By manipulating the emotional valence (positive, neutral, negative) and the presentation time (16 ms, 32 ms, 80 ms) we measured the impact of these variables on conscious and subliminal (i.e. below threshold) processing. First, we tested normal participants using face and word stimuli. Results showed that participants were more confident and accurate when consciously seeing happy versus sad/neutral faces and words. When stimuli were presented subliminally, we found no effect of emotion. To investigate the neural basis of this impact of emotion, we recorded local field potentials (LFPs) directly in the ACC in a chronic pain patient. Behavioural findings were replicated: the patient was more confident and accurate when (consciously) seeing happy versus sad faces, while no effect was seen in subliminal trials. Mirroring behavioural findings, we found significant differences in the LFPs after around 500 ms (lasting 30 ms) in conscious trials between happy and sad faces, while no effect was found in subliminal trials. We thus demonstrate a striking impact of emotion on conscious experience, with positive emotional stimuli enhancing conscious reportability. In line with previous studies, the data indicate a key role of the ACC, but goes beyond earlier work by providing the first direct evidence of interaction between emotion and conscious experience in the human ACC. PMID:21494569

A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness.

PubMed

Toates, Frederick

2006-03-01

Processes comparable in important respects to those underlying human conscious and non-conscious processing can be identified in a range of species and it is argued that these reflect evolutionary precursors of the human processes. A distinction is drawn between two types of processing: (1) stimulus-based and (2) higher-order. For 'higher-order,' in humans the operations of processing are themselves associated with conscious awareness. Conscious awareness sets the context for stimulus-based processing and its end-point is accessible to conscious awareness. However, the mechanics of the translation between stimulus and response proceeds without conscious control. The paper argues that higher-order processing is an evolutionary addition to stimulus-based processing. The model's value is shown for gaining insight into a range of phenomena and their link with consciousness. These include brain damage, learning, memory, development, vision, emotion, motor control, reasoning, the voluntary versus involuntary debate, and mental disorder.

The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness

PubMed Central

2017-01-01

Abstract In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing. PMID:28919670

Consciousness, epilepsy, and emotional qualia.

PubMed

Monaco, Francesco; Mula, Marco; Cavanna, Andrea E

2005-09-01

The last decade has seen a renaissance of consciousness studies, witnessed by the growing number of scientific investigations on this topic. The concept of consciousness is central in epileptology, despite the methodological difficulties concerning its application to the multifaced ictal phenomenology. The authors provide an up-to-date review of the neurological literature on the relationship between epilepsy and consciousness and propose a bidimensional model (level vs contents of consciousness) for the description of seizure-induced alterations of conscious states, according to the findings of recent neuroimaging studies. The neurophysiological correlates of ictal loss and impairment of consciousness are also reviewed. Special attention is paid to the subjective experiential states associated with medial temporal lobe epilepsy. Such ictal phenomenal experiences are suggested as a paradigm for a neuroscientific approach to the apparently elusive philosophical concept of qualia. Epilepsy is confirmed to represent a privileged window over basic neurobiological mechanisms of consciousness.

Stigma consciousness: the psychological legacy of social stereotypes.

PubMed

Pinel, E C

1999-01-01

Whereas past researchers have treated targets of stereotypes as though they have uniform reactions to their stereotyped status (e.g., J. Crocker & B. Major, 1989; C. M. Steele & J. Aronson, 1995), it is proposed here that targets differ in the extent to which they expect to be stereotyped by others (i.e., stigma consciousness). Six studies, 5 of which validate the stigma-consciousness questionnaire (SCQ), are presented. The results suggest that the SCQ is a reliable and valid instrument for detecting differences in stigma consciousness. In addition, scores on the SCQ predict perceptions of discrimination and the ability to generate convincing examples of such discrimination. The final study highlights a behavioral consequence of stigma consciousness: the tendency for people high in stigma consciousness to forgo opportunities to invalidate stereotypes about their group. The relation of stigma consciousness to past research on targets of stereotypes is considered as is the issue of how stigma consciousness may encourage continued stereotyping.

A Heuristic Model of Consciousness with Applications to the Development of Science and Society

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Curreri, Peter A.

2010-01-01

A working model of consciousness is fundamental to understanding of the interactions of the observer in science. This paper examines contemporary understanding of consciousness. A heuristic model of consciousness is suggested that is consistent with psycophysics measurements of bandwidth of consciousness relative to unconscious perception. While the self reference nature of consciousness confers a survival benefit by assuring the all points of view regarding a problem are experienced in sufficiently large population, conscious bandwidth is constrained by design to avoid chaotic behavior. The multiple hypotheses provided by conscious reflection enable the rapid progression of science and technology. The questions of free will and the problem of attention are discussed in relation to the model. Finally the combination of rapid technology growth with the assurance of many unpredictable points of view is considered in respect to contemporary constraints to the development of society.

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

PubMed Central

LeDoux, Joseph E.; Brown, Richard

2017-01-01

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness. PMID:28202735

Imaging neural signatures of consciousness: 'what', 'when', 'where' and 'how' does it work?

PubMed

Sergent, C; Naccache, L

2012-01-01

'What' do we call consciousness? 'When' and 'Where' in the brain do conscious states occur, and 'How' conscious processing and conscious access to a given content work? In the present paper, we present a non-exhaustive overview of each of these 4 major issues, we provide the reader with a brief description of the major difficulties related to these issues, we highlight the current theoretical points of debate, and we advocate for the explanatory power of the "global workspace" model of consciousness (Baars 1989; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene, Changeux et al. 2006) which can accommodate for a fairly large proportion of current experimental findings, and which can be used to reinterpret apparent contradictory findings within a single theoretical framework. Most notably, we emphasize the crucial importance to distinguish genuine neural signatures of conscious access from neural events correlated with consciousness but occurring either before ('upstream') or after ('downstream').

[Altered states of consciousness].

PubMed

Gora, E P

2005-01-01

The review of modern ideas concerning the altered states of consciousness is presented in this article. Various methods of entry into the altered states of consciousness are looked over. It is shown that the altered states of consciousness are insufficiently known, but important aspects of human being existence. The role of investigation of the altered states of consciousness for the creation of integrative scientific conception base is discussed.

[The mind-brain problem (II): about consciousness].

PubMed

Tirapu-Ustarroz, J; Goni-Saez, F

2016-08-16

Consciousness is the result of a series of neurobiological processes in the brain and is, in turn, a feature of the level of its complexity. In fact, being conscious and being aware place us before what Chalmers called the 'soft problem' and the 'hard problem' of consciousness. The first refers to aspects such as wakefulness, attention or knowledge, while the second is concerned with such complex concepts as self-awareness, 'neural self' or social cognition. In this sense it can be said that the concept of consciousness as a unitary thing poses problems of approaching a highly complex reality. We outline the main models that have addressed the topic of consciousness from a neuroscientific perspective. On the one hand, there are the conscious experience models of Crick, Edelman and Tononi, and Llinas, and, on the other, the models and neuronal bases of self-consciousness by authors such as Damasio (core and extended consciousness), Tulving (autonoetic and noetic consciousness and chronesthesia), the problem of qualia (Dennett, Popper, Ramachandran) and the cognit model (Fuster). All the stimuli we receive from the outside world and from our own internal world are converted and processed by the brain so as to integrate them, and from there they become part of our identity. The perception of a dog and being able to recognise it as such or the understanding of our own consciousness are the result of the functioning of brain, neuronal and synaptic structures. The more complex processes of consciousness, such as self-awareness or empathy, are probably emergent brain processes.

Consciousness: individuated information in action

PubMed Central

Jonkisz, Jakub

2015-01-01

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself. PMID:26283987

Towards An Integrative Theory Of Consciousness: Part 2 (An Anthology Of Various Other Models)

PubMed Central

De Sousa, Avinash

2013-01-01

The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed. PMID:23678242

Towards an integrative theory of consciousness: part 2 (an anthology of various other models).

PubMed

De Sousa, Avinash

2013-01-01

The study of consciousness has today moved beyond neurobiology and cognitive models. In the past few years, there has been a surge of research into various newer areas. The present article looks at the non-neurobiological and non-cognitive theories regarding this complex phenomenon, especially ones that self-psychology, self-theory, artificial intelligence, quantum physics, visual cognitive science and philosophy have to offer. Self-psychology has proposed the need to understand the self and its development, and the ramifications of the self for morality and empathy, which will help us understand consciousness better. There have been inroads made from the fields of computer science, machine technology and artificial intelligence, including robotics, into understanding the consciousness of these machines and their implications for human consciousness. These areas are explored. Visual cortex and emotional theories along with their implications are discussed. The phylogeny and evolution of the phenomenon of consciousness is also highlighted, with theories on the emergence of consciousness in fetal and neonatal life. Quantum physics and its insights into the mind, along with the implications of consciousness and physics and their interface are debated. The role of neurophilosophy to understand human consciousness, the functions of such a concept, embodiment, the dark side of consciousness, future research needs and limitations of a scientific theory of consciousness complete the review. The importance and salient features of each theory are discussed along with certain pitfalls, if present. A need for the integration of various theories to understand consciousness from a holistic perspective is stressed.

[Anesthesia and Consciousness].

PubMed

Ogino, Yuichi; Kawamichi, Hiroaki; Saiot, Shigeru

2016-05-01

The mechanism of consciousness and loss of conciousness by general anesthetics are crucial issue for the anesthesiologists. Recent non-invasive brain-imaging technology brings about light to various our emotions and sensations in human brain; however, neural correlate of consciousness is not yet still elucidated. The concept "the seat of the consciousness (is in the subcortical nuclei)" is now completely denied, but instead the consciousness is based on the idea that connectivity and communications across cortical and thalamocortical networks. Anesthetics and sleep disrupt the networks that encompass complexity and integration. The compatibility between complexity and integration is the key feature of the consciousness, which is represented by complex, extensive, communicative and integrative electroencephalograph currents evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation, provoking a single unified conscious experience in us, humans.

Electrical stimulation of a small brain area reversibly disrupts consciousness.

PubMed

Koubeissi, Mohamad Z; Bartolomei, Fabrice; Beltagy, Abdelrahman; Picard, Fabienne

2014-08-01

The neural mechanisms that underlie consciousness are not fully understood. We describe a region in the human brain where electrical stimulation reproducibly disrupted consciousness. A 54-year-old woman with intractable epilepsy underwent depth electrode implantation and electrical stimulation mapping. The electrode whose stimulation disrupted consciousness was between the left claustrum and anterior-dorsal insula. Stimulation of electrodes within 5mm did not affect consciousness. We studied the interdependencies among depth recording signals as a function of time by nonlinear regression analysis (h(2) coefficient) during stimulations that altered consciousness and stimulations of the same electrode at lower current intensities that were asymptomatic. Stimulation of the claustral electrode reproducibly resulted in a complete arrest of volitional behavior, unresponsiveness, and amnesia without negative motor symptoms or mere aphasia. The disruption of consciousness did not outlast the stimulation and occurred without any epileptiform discharges. We found a significant increase in correlation for interactions affecting medial parietal and posterior frontal channels during stimulations that disrupted consciousness compared with those that did not. Our findings suggest that the left claustrum/anterior insula is an important part of a network that subserves consciousness and that disruption of consciousness is related to increased EEG signal synchrony within frontal-parietal networks. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness, Plasticity, and Connectomics: The Role of Intersubjectivity in Human Cognition

PubMed Central

Allen, Micah; Williams, Gary

2011-01-01

Consciousness is typically construed as being explainable purely in terms of either private, raw feels or higher-order, reflective representations. In contrast to this false dichotomy, we propose a new view of consciousness as an interactive, plastic phenomenon open to sociocultural influence. We take up our account of consciousness from the observation of radical cortical neuroplasticity in human development. Accordingly, we draw upon recent research on macroscopic neural networks, including the “default mode,” to illustrate cases in which an individual's particular “connectome” is shaped by encultured social practices that depend upon and influence phenomenal and reflective consciousness. On our account, the dynamically interacting connectivity of these networks bring about important individual differences in conscious experience and determine what is “present” in consciousness. Further, we argue that the organization of the brain into discrete anti-correlated networks supports the phenomenological distinction of prereflective and reflective consciousness, but we emphasize that this finding must be interpreted in light of the dynamic, category-resistant nature of consciousness. Our account motivates philosophical and empirical hypotheses regarding the appropriate time-scale and function of neuroplastic adaptation, the relation of high and low-frequency neural activity to consciousness and cognitive plasticity, and the role of ritual social practices in neural development and cognitive function. PMID:21687435

The biological function of consciousness

PubMed Central

Earl, Brian

2014-01-01

This research is an investigation of whether consciousness—one's ongoing experience—influences one's behavior and, if so, how. Analysis of the components, structure, properties, and temporal sequences of consciousness has established that, (1) contrary to one's intuitive understanding, consciousness does not have an active, executive role in determining behavior; (2) consciousness does have a biological function; and (3) consciousness is solely information in various forms. Consciousness is associated with a flexible response mechanism (FRM) for decision-making, planning, and generally responding in nonautomatic ways. The FRM generates responses by manipulating information and, to function effectively, its data input must be restricted to task-relevant information. The properties of consciousness correspond to the various input requirements of the FRM; and when important information is missing from consciousness, functions of the FRM are adversely affected; both of which indicate that consciousness is the input data to the FRM. Qualitative and quantitative information (shape, size, location, etc.) are incorporated into the input data by a qualia array of colors, sounds, and so on, which makes the input conscious. This view of the biological function of consciousness provides an explanation why we have experiences; why we have emotional and other feelings, and why their loss is associated with poor decision-making; why blindsight patients do not spontaneously initiate responses to events in their blind field; why counter-habitual actions are only possible when the intended action is in mind; and the reason for inattentional blindness. PMID:25140159

System, Subsystem, Hive: Boundary Problems in Computational Theories of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Fekete, Tomer; van Leeuwen, Cees; Edelman, Shimon

2016-01-01

A computational theory of consciousness should include a quantitative measure of consciousness, or MoC, that (i) would reveal to what extent a given system is conscious, (ii) would make it possible to compare not only different systems, but also the same system at different times, and (iii) would be graded, because so is consciousness. However, unless its design is properly constrained, such an MoC gives rise to what we call the boundary problem: an MoC that labels a system as conscious will do so for some—perhaps most—of its subsystems, as well as for irrelevantly extended systems (e.g., the original system augmented with physical appendages that contribute nothing to the properties supposedly supporting consciousness), and for aggregates of individually conscious systems (e.g., groups of people). This problem suggests that the properties that are being measured are epiphenomenal to consciousness, or else it implies a bizarre proliferation of minds. We propose that a solution to the boundary problem can be found by identifying properties that are intrinsic or systemic: properties that clearly differentiate between systems whose existence is a matter of fact, as opposed to those whose existence is a matter of interpretation (in the eye of the beholder). We argue that if a putative MoC can be shown to be systemic, this ipso facto resolves any associated boundary issues. As test cases, we analyze two recent theories of consciousness in light of our definitions: the Integrated Information Theory and the Geometric Theory of consciousness. PMID:27512377

[The moderating effect of self-esteem on the relationship between public self-consciousness, social anxiety and exhibitionism in Japan and South Korea].

PubMed

Cho, Sunyoung; Matsumoto, Yoshiyuki; Kimura, Hiroshi

2009-10-01

This study examined the moderating effect of self-esteem on the relationship between public self-consciousness and social anxiety, and on the relationship between public self-consciousness and exhibitionism in Japan and South Korea. The participants were 213 university students in Japan and 234 university students in Korea. The results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that self-esteem was a moderator of the relationship between public self-consciousness and social anxiety and of the relationship between public self-consciousness and exhibitionism in Korea, but not in Japan. In Korea, public self-consciousness was related to social anxiety for people with low self-esteem, while for people with high self-esteem, public self-consciousness was related to exhibitionism.

Attentional Routes to Conscious Perception

PubMed Central

Chica, Ana B.; Bartolomeo, Paolo

2012-01-01

The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception. PMID:22279440

The Split-Brain Phenomenon Revisited: A Single Conscious Agent with Split Perception.

PubMed

Pinto, Yair; de Haan, Edward H F; Lamme, Victor A F

2017-11-01

The split-brain phenomenon is caused by the surgical severing of the corpus callosum, the main route of communication between the cerebral hemispheres. The classical view of this syndrome asserts that conscious unity is abolished. The left hemisphere consciously experiences and functions independently of the right hemisphere. This view is a cornerstone of current consciousness research. In this review, we first discuss the evidence for the classical view. We then propose an alternative, the 'conscious unity, split perception' model. This model asserts that a split brain produces one conscious agent who experiences two parallel, unintegrated streams of information. In addition to changing our view of the split-brain phenomenon, this new model also poses a serious challenge for current dominant theories of consciousness. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Towards solving the hard problem of consciousness: The varieties of brain resonances and the conscious experiences that they support.

PubMed

Grossberg, Stephen

2017-03-01

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how we experience qualia or phenomenal experiences, such as seeing, hearing, and feeling, and knowing what they are. To solve this problem, a theory of consciousness needs to link brain to mind by modeling how emergent properties of several brain mechanisms interacting together embody detailed properties of individual conscious psychological experiences. This article summarizes evidence that Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, accomplishes this goal. ART is a cognitive and neural theory of how advanced brains autonomously learn to attend, recognize, and predict objects and events in a changing world. ART has predicted that "all conscious states are resonant states" as part of its specification of mechanistic links between processes of consciousness, learning, expectation, attention, resonance, and synchrony. It hereby provides functional and mechanistic explanations of data ranging from individual spikes and their synchronization to the dynamics of conscious perceptual, cognitive, and cognitive-emotional experiences. ART has reached sufficient maturity to begin classifying the brain resonances that support conscious experiences of seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing. Psychological and neurobiological data in both normal individuals and clinical patients are clarified by this classification. This analysis also explains why not all resonances become conscious, and why not all brain dynamics are resonant. The global organization of the brain into computationally complementary cortical processing streams (complementary computing), and the organization of the cerebral cortex into characteristic layers of cells (laminar computing), figure prominently in these explanations of conscious and unconscious processes. Alternative models of consciousness are also discussed. Copyright © 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Conscious experience and episodic memory: hippocampus at the crossroads.

PubMed

Behrendt, Ralf-Peter

2013-01-01

If an instance of conscious experience of the seemingly objective world around us could be regarded as a newly formed event memory, much as an instance of mental imagery has the content of a retrieved event memory, and if, therefore, the stream of conscious experience could be seen as evidence for ongoing formation of event memories that are linked into episodic memory sequences, then unitary conscious experience could be defined as a symbolic representation of the pattern of hippocampal neuronal firing that encodes an event memory - a theoretical stance that may shed light into the mind-body and binding problems in consciousness research. Exceedingly detailed symbols that describe patterns of activity rapidly self-organizing, at each cycle of the θ rhythm, in the hippocampus are instances of unitary conscious experience that jointly constitute the stream of consciousness. Integrating object information (derived from the ventral visual stream and orbitofrontal cortex) with contextual emotional information (from the anterior insula) and spatial environmental information (from the dorsal visual stream), the hippocampus rapidly forms event codes that have the informational content of objects embedded in an emotional and spatiotemporally extending context. Event codes, formed in the CA3-dentate network for the purpose of their memorization, are not only contextualized but also allocentric representations, similarly to conscious experiences of events and objects situated in a seemingly objective and observer-independent framework of phenomenal space and time. Conscious perception, creating the spatially and temporally extending world that we perceive around us, is likely to be evolutionarily related to more fleeting and seemingly internal forms of conscious experience, such as autobiographical memory recall, mental imagery, including goal anticipation, and to other forms of externalized conscious experience, namely dreaming and hallucinations; and evidence pointing to an important contribution of the hippocampus to these conscious phenomena will be reviewed.

Association of Race Consciousness With the Patient–Physician Relationship, Medication Adherence, and Blood Pressure in Urban Primary Care Patients

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

BACKGROUND Race consciousness (the frequency with which one thinks about his or her own race) is a measure that may be useful in assessing whether racial discrimination negatively impacts blood pressure (BP). However, the relation between race consciousness and BP has yet to be empirically tested, especially within the context of the patient–physician relationship and medication adherence. METHODS Race-stratified generalized estimating equations were used to assess the relationship of race consciousness on BP, measures of the patient–physician relationship, and self-reported medication adherence, controlling for patients being nested within physicians and for patient age and sex. RESULTS The mean age of the patients was 61.3 years, 62% were black, and 65% were women. Black patients were more likely to ever think about race than were white patients (49% vs. 21%; P < 0.001). Race-conscious blacks had significantly higher diastolic BP (79.4 vs. 74.5mm Hg; P = 0.004) and somewhat higher systolic BP (138.8 vs. 134.7mm Hg; P = 0.13) than blacks who were not race conscious. Race-conscious whites were more likely to perceive respect from their physician (57.1% vs. 25.8%; P = 0.01) but had lower medication adherence (62.4% vs. 82.9%; P = 0.05) than whites who were not race-conscious. CONCLUSIONS Among blacks, race consciousness was associated with higher diastolic BP. In contrast, among whites, there was no association between race consciousness and BP, but race consciousness was associated with poor ratings of adherence, despite more favorable ratings of the patient–physician relationship. Future work should explore disparities in race consciousness and its impact on health and health-care disparities. PMID:23864583

Individual Effect-Site Concentrations of Propofol are Similar at Loss of Consciousness and at Awakening

PubMed Central

Iwakiri, Hiroko; Nishihara, Noboru; Nagata, Osamu; Matsukawa, Takashi; Ozaki, Makoto; Sessler, Daniel I.

2005-01-01

Reported effect-site concentrations of propofol at loss of consciousness and recovery of consciousness vary widely. Thus, no single concentration based on a population average will prove optimal for individual patients. We therefore tested the hypothesis that individual propofol effect-site concentrations at loss and return of consciousness are similar. Propofol effect-site concentrations at loss and recovery of consciousness were estimated with a target-control infusion system in 20 adults. Propofol effect-site concentrations were gradually increased until the volunteers lost consciousness (no response to verbal stimuli); unconsciousness was maintained for 15 minutes, and the volunteers were then awakened. This protocol was repeated three times in each volunteer. Our major outcomes were the concentration producing unconsciousness and the relationship between the estimated effect-site concentrations at loss and recovery of consciousness. The target effect-site propofol concentration was 2.0 ± 0.9 at loss of consciousness and 1.8 ± 0.7 at return of consciousness (P < 0.001). The average difference between individual effect-site concentrations at return and loss of consciousness was only 0.17 ± 0.32 μg/mL (95% confidence interval for the difference 0.09 to 0.25 μg/mL). Our results thus suggest that individual titration to loss of consciousness is an alternative to dosing propofol on the basis of average population requirements. Implications Propofol can be titrated to the concentration that produces consciousness in individual patients. Provided that the propofol effect-site concentration does not much exceed the concentration initially required to produce unconsciousness, patients can be expected to awaken quickly upon completion of the procedure. PMID:15616062

Different Signal Enhancement Pathways of Attention and Consciousness Underlie Perception in Humans.

PubMed

van Boxtel, Jeroen J A

2017-06-14

It is not yet known whether attention and consciousness operate through similar or largely different mechanisms. Visual processing mechanisms are routinely characterized by measuring contrast response functions (CRFs). In this report, behavioral CRFs were obtained in humans (both males and females) by measuring afterimage durations over the entire range of inducer stimulus contrasts to reveal visual mechanisms behind attention and consciousness. Deviations relative to the standard CRF, i.e., gain functions, describe the strength of signal enhancement, which were assessed for both changes due to attentional task and conscious perception. It was found that attention displayed a response-gain function, whereas consciousness displayed a contrast-gain function. Through model comparisons, which only included contrast-gain modulations, both contrast-gain and response-gain effects can be explained with a two-level normalization model, in which consciousness affects only the first level and attention affects only the second level. These results demonstrate that attention and consciousness can effectively show different gain functions because they operate through different signal enhancement mechanisms. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The relationship between attention and consciousness is still debated. Mapping contrast response functions (CRFs) has allowed (neuro)scientists to gain important insights into the mechanistic underpinnings of visual processing. Here, the influence of both attention and consciousness on these functions were measured and they displayed a strong dissociation. First, attention lowered CRFs, whereas consciousness raised them. Second, attention manifests itself as a response-gain function, whereas consciousness manifests itself as a contrast-gain function. Extensive model comparisons show that these results are best explained in a two-level normalization model in which consciousness affects only the first level, whereas attention affects only the second level. These findings show dissociations between both the computational mechanisms behind attention and consciousness and the perceptual consequences that they induce. Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/375912-11$15.00/0.

Walter Ong, Technology, and the Transformation of Consciousness.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hassett, Michael J.

1996-01-01

Agrees with Walter Ong that technology can serve as a transformer of consciousness and, hence, of writing. Shows how technology can work dialectically with consciousness or thought. Discusses two of the potential implications of this dialectical view of the technology/consciousness/writing relationship. (TB)

Do cortical midline variability and low frequency fluctuations mediate William James' "Stream of Consciousness"? "Neurophenomenal Balance Hypothesis" of "Inner Time Consciousness".

PubMed

Northoff, Georg

2014-11-01

William James famously characterized consciousness by 'stream of consciousness' which describes the temporal continuity and flow of the contents of consciousness in our 'inner time consciousness'. More specifically he distinguished between "substantive parts", the contents of consciousness, and "transitive parts", the linkages between different contents. While much research has recently focused on the substantive parts, the neural mechanisms underlying the transitive parts and their characterization by the balance between 'sensible continuity' and 'continuous change' remain unclear. The aim of this paper is to develop so-called neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about specifically the transitive parts and their two phenomenal hallmark features, sensible continuity and continuous change in 'inner time consciousness'. Based on recent findings, I hypothesize that the cortical midline structures and their high degree of variability and strong low frequency fluctuations play an essential role in mediating the phenomenal balance between sensible continuity and continuous change. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Evolution of consciousness: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia

PubMed Central

Mashour, George A.; Alkire, Michael T.

2013-01-01

Are animals conscious? If so, when did consciousness evolve? We address these long-standing and essential questions using a modern neuroscientific approach that draws on diverse fields such as consciousness studies, evolutionary neurobiology, animal psychology, and anesthesiology. We propose that the stepwise emergence from general anesthesia can serve as a reproducible model to study the evolution of consciousness across various species and use current data from anesthesiology to shed light on the phylogeny of consciousness. Ultimately, we conclude that the neurobiological structure of the vertebrate central nervous system is evolutionarily ancient and highly conserved across species and that the basic neurophysiologic mechanisms supporting consciousness in humans are found at the earliest points of vertebrate brain evolution. Thus, in agreement with Darwin’s insight and the recent “Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in Non-Human Animals,” a review of modern scientific data suggests that the differences between species in terms of the ability to experience the world is one of degree and not kind. PMID:23754370

A new perspective on the functioning of the brain and the mechanisms behind conscious processes

PubMed Central

Keppler, Joachim

2013-01-01

An essential prerequisite for the development of a theory of consciousness is the clarification of the fundamental mechanisms underlying conscious processes. In this article I present an approach that sheds new light on these mechanisms. This approach builds on stochastic electrodynamics (SED), a promising theoretical framework that provides a deeper understanding of quantum systems and reveals the origin of quantum phenomena. I outline the most important concepts and findings of SED and interpret the neurophysiological body of evidence in the context of these findings, indicating that the functioning of the brain rests upon exactly the same principles that are characteristic for quantum systems. On this basis, I construct a new hypothesis on the mechanisms behind conscious processes and discuss the new perspectives this hypothesis opens up for consciousness research. In particular, it offers the possibility of elucidating the relationship between brain and consciousness, of specifying the connection between consciousness and information, and of answering the question of what distinguishes conscious processes from unconscious processes. PMID:23641229

Volitional components of consciousness vary across wakefulness, dreaming and lucid dreaming

PubMed Central

Dresler, Martin; Eibl, Leandra; Fischer, Christian F. J.; Wehrle, Renate; Spoormaker, Victor I.; Steiger, Axel; Czisch, Michael; Pawlowski, Marcel

2014-01-01

Consciousness is a multifaceted concept; its different aspects vary across species, vigilance states, or health conditions. While basal aspects of consciousness like perceptions and emotions are present in many states and species, higher-order aspects like reflective or volitional capabilities seem to be most pronounced in awake humans. Here we assess the experience of volition across different states of consciousness: 10 frequent lucid dreamers rated different aspects of volition according to the Volitional Components Questionnaire for phases of normal dreaming, lucid dreaming, and wakefulness. Overall, experienced volition was comparable for lucid dreaming and wakefulness, and rated significantly higher for both states compared to non-lucid dreaming. However, three subscales showed specific differences across states of consciousness: planning ability was most pronounced during wakefulness, intention enactment most pronounced during lucid dreaming, and self-determination most pronounced during both wakefulness and lucid dreaming. Our data confirm the multifaceted nature of consciousness: different higher-order aspects of consciousness are differentially expressed across different conscious states. PMID:24427149

Volitional components of consciousness vary across wakefulness, dreaming and lucid dreaming.

PubMed

Dresler, Martin; Eibl, Leandra; Fischer, Christian F J; Wehrle, Renate; Spoormaker, Victor I; Steiger, Axel; Czisch, Michael; Pawlowski, Marcel

2014-01-01

Consciousness is a multifaceted concept; its different aspects vary across species, vigilance states, or health conditions. While basal aspects of consciousness like perceptions and emotions are present in many states and species, higher-order aspects like reflective or volitional capabilities seem to be most pronounced in awake humans. Here we assess the experience of volition across different states of consciousness: 10 frequent lucid dreamers rated different aspects of volition according to the Volitional Components Questionnaire for phases of normal dreaming, lucid dreaming, and wakefulness. Overall, experienced volition was comparable for lucid dreaming and wakefulness, and rated significantly higher for both states compared to non-lucid dreaming. However, three subscales showed specific differences across states of consciousness: planning ability was most pronounced during wakefulness, intention enactment most pronounced during lucid dreaming, and self-determination most pronounced during both wakefulness and lucid dreaming. Our data confirm the multifaceted nature of consciousness: different higher-order aspects of consciousness are differentially expressed across different conscious states.

Predictable internal brain dynamics in EEG and its relation to conscious states

PubMed Central

Yoo, Jaewook; Kwon, Jaerock; Choe, Yoonsuck

2014-01-01

Consciousness is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon defying scientific explanation. Part of the reason why this is the case is due to its subjective nature. In our previous computational experiments, to avoid such a subjective trap, we took a strategy to investigate objective necessary conditions of consciousness. Our basic hypothesis was that predictive internal dynamics serves as such a condition. This is in line with theories of consciousness that treat retention (memory), protention (anticipation), and primary impression as the tripartite temporal structure of consciousness. To test our hypothesis, we analyzed publicly available sleep and awake electroencephalogram (EEG) data. Our results show that EEG signals from awake or rapid eye movement (REM) sleep states have more predictable dynamics compared to those from slow-wave sleep (SWS). Since awakeness and REM sleep are associated with conscious states and SWS with unconscious or less consciousness states, these results support our hypothesis. The results suggest an intricate relationship among prediction, consciousness, and time, with potential applications to time perception and neurorobotics. PMID:24917813

Are There Levels of Consciousness?

PubMed

Bayne, Tim; Hohwy, Jakob; Owen, Adrian M

2016-06-01

The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Progress in machine consciousness.

PubMed

Gamez, David

2008-09-01

This paper is a review of the work that has been carried out on machine consciousness. A clear overview of this diverse field is achieved by breaking machine consciousness down into four different areas, which are used to understand its aims, discuss its relationship with other subjects and outline the work that has been carried out so far. The criticisms that have been made against machine consciousness are also covered, along with its potential benefits, and the work that has been done on analysing systems for signs of consciousness. Some of the social and ethical issues raised by machine consciousness are examined at the end of the paper.

Attention versus consciousness in the visual brain: differences in conception, phenomenology, behavior, neuroanatomy, and physiology.

PubMed

Baars, B J

1999-07-01

A common confound between consciousness and attention makes it difficult to think clearly about recent advances in the understanding of the visual brain. Visual consciousness involves phenomenal experience of the visual world, but visual attention is more plausibly treated as a function that selects and maintains the selection of potential conscious contents, often unconsciously. In the same sense, eye movements select conscious visual events, which are not the same as conscious visual experience. According to common sense, visual experience is consciousness, and selective processes are labeled as attention. The distinction is reflected in very different behavioral measures and in very different brain anatomy and physiology. Visual consciousness tends to be associated with the "what" stream of visual feature neurons in the ventral temporal lobe. In contrast, attentional selection and maintenance are mediated by other brain regions, ranging from superior colliculi to thalamus, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate. The author applied the common-sense distinction between attention and consciousness to the theoretical positions of M. I. Posner (1992, 1994) and D. LaBerge (1997, 1998) to show how it helps to clarify the evidence. He concluded that clarity of thought is served by calling a thing by its proper name.

Consciousness in Non-Epileptic Attack Disorder

PubMed Central

Reuber, M.; Kurthen, M.

2011-01-01

Non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) is one of the most important differential diagnoses of epilepsy. Impairment of consciousness is the key feature of non-epileptic attacks (NEAs). The first half of this review summarises the clinical research literature featuring observations relating to consciousness in NEAD. The second half places this evidence in the wider context of the recent discourse on consciousness in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind. We argue that studies of consciousness should not only distinguish between the ‘level’ and ‘content’ of consciousness but also between ‘phenomenal consciousness’ (consciousness of states it somehow “feels to be like”) and ‘access consciousness’ (having certain ‘higher’ cognitive processes at one’s disposal). The existing evidence shows that there is a great intra- and interindividual variability of NEA experience. However, in most NEAs phenomenal experience – and, as a precondition for that experience, vigilance or wakefulness – is reduced to a lesser degree than in those epileptic seizures involving impairment of consciousness. In fact, complete loss of “consciousness” is the exception rather than the rule in NEAs. Patients, as well as external observers, may have a tendency to overestimate impairments of consciousness during the seizures. PMID:21447903

75 FR 73946 - Worker Safety and Health Program: Safety Conscious Work Environment

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-30

... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 10 CFR Part 851 Worker Safety and Health Program: Safety Conscious Work... Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ``Safety-Conscious Work Environment'' guidelines as a model. DOE published.... Second, not only would instituting a ``Safety-Conscious Work Environment'' by regulation be redundant...

Consciousness Counseling: New Roles and New Goals.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Roberts, Thomas Bradford

1979-01-01

Presents a systematic attempt to help counselors operate within the areas of transcendence and states of consciousness. Consciousness counseling recognizes that human experience includes the person and that it also goes beyond the self to include transpersonal experiences. Consciousness counseling recognizes that people experience many states of…

Consciousness weaves our internal view of the outside world.

PubMed

Gur, Moshe

2016-01-01

Low-level consciousness is fundamental to our understanding of the world. Within the conscious field, the constantly changing external visual information is transformed into stable, object-based percepts. Remarkably, holistic objects are perceived while we are cognizant of all of the spatial details comprising the objects and of the relationship between individual elements. This parallel conscious association is unique to the brain. Conscious contributions to motor activity come after our understanding of the world has been established.

Consciousness, brain, neuroplasticity

PubMed Central

Askenasy, Jean; Lehmann, Joseph

2013-01-01

Subjectivity, intentionality, self-awareness and will are major components of consciousness in human beings. Changes in consciousness and its content following different brain processes and malfunction have long been studied. Cognitive sciences assume that brain activities have an infrastructure, but there is also evidence that consciousness itself may change this infrastructure. The two-way influence between brain and consciousness has been at the center of philosophy and less so, of science. This so-called bottom-up and top-down interrelationship is controversial and is the subject of our article. We would like to ask: how does it happen that consciousness may provoke structural changes in the brain? The living brain means continuous changes at the synaptic level with every new experience, with every new process of learning, memorizing or mastering new and existing skills. Synapses are generated and dissolved, while others are preserved, in an ever-changing process of so-called neuroplasticity. Ongoing processes of synaptic reinforcements and decay occur during wakefulness when consciousness is present, but also during sleep when it is mostly absent. We suggest that consciousness influences brain neuroplasticity both during wakefulness as well as sleep in a top-down way. This means that consciousness really activates synaptic flow and changes brain structures and functional organization. The dynamic impact of consciousness on brain never stops despite the relative stationary structure of the brain. Such a process can be a target for medical intervention, e.g., by cognitive training. PMID:23847580

Consciousness: Its Neurobiology and the Major Classes of Impairment

PubMed Central

Goldfine, Andrew M.; Schiff, Nicholas D.

2011-01-01

Summary Normal human consciousness requires brainstem, basal forebrain, and diencephalic areas to support generalized arousal, as well as functioning thalamocortical networks to become aware of, and respond to environmental and internal stimuli. Injury to or disconnection of these interconnected systems, typically from cardiac arrest and traumatic brain injury, can result in disorders of consciousness, including coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and akinetic mutism. Similar brain injuries can also result in loss of motor output out of proportion to consciousness, resulting in misdiagnoses of disorders of consciousness. We review pathology and imaging studies and derive mechanistic models for each of these conditions, to aid in the assessment and prognosis of individual patients. We further suggest how such models may guide the development of target-based treatment algorithms to enhance recovery of consciousness in many of these patient. PMID:22032656

Opposing effects of attention and consciousness on afterimages

PubMed Central

van Boxtel, Jeroen J. A.; Tsuchiya, Naotsugu; Koch, Christof

2010-01-01

The brain's ability to handle sensory information is influenced by both selective attention and consciousness. There is no consensus on the exact relationship between these two processes and whether they are distinct. So far, no experiment has simultaneously manipulated both. We carried out a full factorial 2 × 2 study of the simultaneous influences of attention and consciousness (as assayed by visibility) on perception, correcting for possible concurrent changes in attention and consciousness. We investigated the duration of afterimages for all four combinations of high versus low attention and visible versus invisible. We show that selective attention and visual consciousness have opposite effects: paying attention to the grating decreases the duration of its afterimage, whereas consciously seeing the grating increases the afterimage duration. These findings provide clear evidence for distinctive influences of selective attention and consciousness on visual perception. PMID:20424112

Consciousness and the Invention of Morel

PubMed Central

Perogamvros, Lampros

2013-01-01

A scientific study of consciousness should take into consideration both objective and subjective measures of conscious experiences. To this date, very few studies have tried to integrate third-person data, or data about the neurophysiological correlates of conscious states, with first-person data, or data about subjective experience. Inspired by Morel's invention (Casares, 1940), a literary machine capable of reproducing sensory-dependent external reality, this article suggests that combination of virtual reality techniques and brain reading technologies, that is, decoding of conscious states by brain activity alone, can offer this integration. It is also proposed that the multimodal, simulating, and integrative capacities of the dreaming brain render it an “endogenous” Morel's machine, which can potentially be used in studying consciousness, but not always in a reliable way. Both the literary machine and dreaming could contribute to a better understanding of conscious states. PMID:23467765

Consciousness, Learning and Interlanguage Pragmatics.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schmidt, Richard

A discussion of the ways that consciousness may be involved in learning the principles of second-language discourse and pragmatics draws on current theories of the role of consciousness in human learning in general, with suggestions for extension to the learning of pragmatics. First, research on the degree of consciousness in pragmatic learning…

49 CFR 225.19 - Primary groups of accidents/incidents.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... or loss of consciousness of any person; or (iii) Loss of consciousness; (3) Injury to a railroad... result in death, medical treatment, loss of consciousness, a day away from work, restricted work activity... consciousness; or (iv) Medical treatment; (5) Significant illness of a railroad employee diagnosed by a...

Nonneurocognitive Extended Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wojcik, Kevin; Chemero, Anthony

2012-01-01

One of the attributes necessary for Watson to be considered human is that it must be conscious. From Rachlin's (2012) point of view, that of teleological behaviorism, consciousness refers to the organization of behavioral complexity in which overt behavior is distributed widely over time. Consciousness is something that humans do, or achieve, in…

Consciousness Development for the Learning Organization

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Heaton, Dennis

2017-01-01

Purpose: This paper presents a philosophical and practical discussion of the role of development of consciousness for realization of a learning organization. Consciousness is the capacity to know, the capacity to learn. As the knower is, so is the knowledge. Development of consciousness can lead to more profound and holistic learning and enable…

Biology of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Edelman, Gerald M.; Gally, Joseph A.; Baars, Bernard J.

2010-01-01

The Dynamic Core and Global Workspace hypotheses were independently put forward to provide mechanistic and biologically plausible accounts of how brains generate conscious mental content. The Dynamic Core proposes that reentrant neural activity in the thalamocortical system gives rise to conscious experience. Global Workspace reconciles the limited capacity of momentary conscious content with the vast repertoire of long-term memory. In this paper we show the close relationship between the two hypotheses. This relationship allows for a strictly biological account of phenomenal experience and subjectivity that is consistent with mounting experimental evidence. We examine the constraints on causal analyses of consciousness and suggest that there is now sufficient evidence to consider the design and construction of a conscious artifact. PMID:21713129

[The "bright spot of consciousness"].

PubMed

Simonov, P V

1990-01-01

I.P. Pavlov considered consciousness as an area of optimum excitability moving over the human cerebral cortex depending on the character of performed mental activity. Contemporary methods of computer analysis of electrical activity and brain thermal production have allowed to turn this metaphor into experimentally observed reality. It is shown that preservation of connections of cortical gnostic zones with verbal structures of the left hemisphere is the obligatory condition for consciousness functioning. These data reinforce the determination of consciousness as operation with knowledge, which by means of words, mathematic symbols and art images can be transmitted to other people. Communicative origin of consciousness creates possibility of mental dialogue with oneself, i.e. leads to the appearance of self-consciousness of the personality.

Consciousness and working memory: Current trends and research perspectives.

PubMed

Velichkovsky, Boris B

2017-10-01

Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Subliminal Affect Valence Words Change Conscious Mood Potency but Not Valence: Is This Evidence for Unconscious Valence Affect?

PubMed Central

Shevrin, Howard; Panksepp, Jaak; Brakel, Linda A. W.; Snodgrass, Michael

2012-01-01

Whether or not affect can be unconscious remains controversial. Research claiming to demonstrate unconscious affect fails to establish clearly unconscious stimulus conditions. The few investigations that have established unconscious conditions fail to rule out conscious affect changes. We report two studies in which unconscious stimulus conditions were met and conscious mood changes measured. The subliminal stimuli were positive and negative affect words presented at the objective detection threshold; conscious mood changes were measured with standard manikin valence, potency, and arousal scales. We found and replicated that unconscious emotional stimuli produced conscious mood changes on the potency scale but not on the valence scale. Were positive and negative affects aroused unconsciously, but reflected consciously in potency changes? Or were the valence words unconscious cognitive causes of conscious mood changes being activated without unconscious affect? A thought experiment is offered as a way to resolve this dilemma. PMID:24961258

Brain damage and the moral significance of consciousness.

PubMed

Kahane, Guy; Savulescu, Julian

2009-02-01

Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state suggest that the patients might be conscious. This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides agree that evidence for consciousness gives strong reason to preserve life. We question this assumption. We clarify the widely held but obscure principle that consciousness is morally significant. It is hard to apply this principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of notions of consciousness and that is unclear which of these is assumed by the principle. We suggest that the morally relevant notion is that of phenomenal consciousness and then use our analysis to interpret cases of brain damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral reasons not to preserve a patient's life and, indeed, that these might be stronger when patients retain significant cognitive function.

What is consciousness, and could machines have it?

PubMed

Dehaene, Stanislas; Lau, Hakwan; Kouider, Sid

2017-10-27

The controversial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that undoubtedly possesses it: the human brain. We suggest that the word "consciousness" conflates two different types of information-processing computations in the brain: the selection of information for global broadcasting, thus making it flexibly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitoring of those computations, leading to a subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense). We argue that despite their recent successes, current machines are still mostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain. We review the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they may inspire novel machine architectures. Copyright © 2017, American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Momentary Conscious Pairing Eliminates Unconscious-Stimulus Influences on Task Selection

PubMed Central

Zhou, Fanzhi Anita; Davis, Greg

2012-01-01

Task selection, previously thought to operate only under conscious, voluntary control, can be activated by unconsciously-perceived stimuli. In most cases, such activation is observed for unconscious stimuli that closely resemble other conscious, task-relevant stimuli and hence may simply reflect perceptual activation of consciously established stimulus-task associations. However, other studies have reported ‘direct’ unconscious-stimulus influences on task selection in the absence of any conscious, voluntary association between that stimulus and task (e.g., Zhou and Davis, 2012). In new experiments, described here, these latter influences on cued- and free-choice task selection appear robust and long-lived, yet, paradoxically, are suppressed to undetectable levels following momentary conscious prime-task pairing. Assessing, and rejecting, three intuitive explanations for such suppressive effects, we conclude that conscious prime-task pairing minimizes non-strategic influences of unconscious stimuli on task selection, insulating endogenous choice mechanisms from maladaptive external control. PMID:23050012

Phenomenal and access consciousness in olfaction.

PubMed

Stevenson, Richard J

2009-12-01

Contemporary literature on consciousness, with some exceptions, rarely considers the olfactory system. In this article the characteristics of olfactory consciousness, viewed from the standpoint of the phenomenal (P)/access (A) distinction, are examined relative to the major senses. The review details several qualitative differences in both olfactory P consciousness (shifts in the felt location, universal synesthesia-like and affect-rich experiences, and misperceptions) and A consciousness (recovery from habituation, capacity for conscious processing, access to semantic and episodic memory, learning, attention, and in the serial-unitary nature of olfactory percepts). The basis for these differences is argued to arise from the functions that the olfactory system performs and from the unique neural architecture needed to instantiate them. These data suggest, at a minimum, that P and A consciousness are uniquely configured in olfaction and an argument can be made that the P and A distinction may not hold for this sensory system.

Improving the clinical assessment of consciousness with advances in electrophysiological and neuroimaging techniques

PubMed Central

2010-01-01

In clinical neurology, a comprehensive understanding of consciousness has been regarded as an abstract concept - best left to philosophers. However, times are changing and the need to clinically assess consciousness is increasingly becoming a real-world, practical challenge. Current methods for evaluating altered levels of consciousness are highly reliant on either behavioural measures or anatomical imaging. While these methods have some utility, estimates of misdiagnosis are worrisome (as high as 43%) - clearly this is a major clinical problem. The solution must involve objective, physiologically based measures that do not rely on behaviour. This paper reviews recent advances in physiologically based measures that enable better evaluation of consciousness states (coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked in syndrome). Based on the evidence to-date, electroencephalographic and neuroimaging based assessments of consciousness provide valuable information for evaluation of residual function, formation of differential diagnoses, and estimation of prognosis. PMID:20113490

Dissociation between awareness and spatial coding: evidence from unilateral neglect.

PubMed

Treccani, Barbara; Cubelli, Roberto; Sellaro, Roberta; Umiltà, Carlo; Della Sala, Sergio

2012-04-01

Prevalent theories about consciousness propose a causal relation between lack of spatial coding and absence of conscious experience: The failure to code the position of an object is assumed to prevent this object from entering consciousness. This is consistent with influential theories of unilateral neglect following brain damage, according to which spatial coding of neglected stimuli is defective, and this would keep their processing at the nonconscious level. Contrary to this view, we report evidence showing that spatial coding and consciousness can dissociate. A patient with left neglect, who was not aware of contralesional stimuli, was able to process their color and position. However, in contrast to (ipsilesional) consciously perceived stimuli, color and position of neglected stimuli were processed separately. We propose that individual object features, including position, can be processed without attention and consciousness and that conscious perception of an object depends on the binding of its features into an integrated percept.

Evidence that logical reasoning depends on conscious processing.

PubMed

DeWall, C Nathan; Baumeister, Roy F; Masicampo, E J

2008-09-01

Humans, unlike other animals, are equipped with a powerful brain that permits conscious awareness and reflection. A growing trend in psychological science has questioned the benefits of consciousness, however. Testing a hypothesis advanced by [Lieberman, M. D., Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. (2002). Reflection and reflexion: A social cognitive neuroscience approach to attributional inference. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 199-249], four studies suggested that the conscious, reflective processing system is vital for logical reasoning. Substantial decrements in logical reasoning were found when a cognitive load manipulation preoccupied conscious processing, while hampering the nonconscious system with consciously suppressed thoughts failed to impair reasoning (Experiment 1). Nonconscious activation (priming) of the idea of logical reasoning increased the activation of logic-relevant concepts, but failed to improve logical reasoning performance (Experiments 2a-2c) unless the logical conclusions were largely intuitive and thus not reliant on logical reasoning (Experiment 3). Meanwhile, stimulating the conscious goal of reasoning well led to improvements in reasoning performance (Experiment 4). These findings offer evidence that logical reasoning is aided by the conscious, reflective processing system.

Dental anxiety and personality: investigating the relationship between dental anxiety and self-consciousness.

PubMed

Economou, George C

2003-09-01

This study investigated whether personality plays a role in a condition called dental anxiety. Specifically, the study examined the relationship between dental anxiety (the negative response to the stress elicited from a dental interaction) and self-consciousness (the tendency to evaluate aspects of oneself that are subject to private and public display). The purpose of this study was to identify the characteristics possessed by dentally anxious individuals who face potential health risks because of their avoidance. Sixty York University undergraduate students were recruited by convenience sampling to participate. These subjects completed Corah's Dental Anxiety Scale and the Self-Consciousness Scale. The Self-Consciousness Scale consists of three subscales, including private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety. Results indicated an 0.54 significant correlation between dental anxiety and self-consciousness. The public self-consciousness and social anxiety subscales correlated the most with dental anxiety. Furthermore, the data did not indicate a significant moderating relationship for gender between the two aforementioned variables. These results contribute to the establishment of personality characteristics as one of the dimensions determining dental anxiety.

Consciousness: the radical plasticity thesis.

PubMed

Cleeremans, Axel

2008-01-01

In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends in a graded manner on properties such as its stability in time or its strength. Crucially, these properties are accrued as a result of learning, which is in turn viewed as a mandatory process that always accompanies information processing. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum defined over "quality of representation", such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with quality, and (2) the implication of systems of metarepresentations. A first implication of these ideas is that the main function of consciousness is to make flexible, adaptive control over behavior possible. A second, much more speculative implication, is that we learn to be conscious. This I call the "radical plasticity thesis"--the hypothesis that consciousness emerges in systems capable not only of learning about their environment, but also about their own internal representations of it.

Higher-order awareness, misrepresentation and function

PubMed Central

Rosenthal, David

2012-01-01

Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological states, they have little more in common. One thing they do share is the possibility of misrepresentation; just as metacognitive processing can misrepresent one's cognitive states and abilities, so the HOA in virtue of which one's mental states are conscious can, and sometimes does, misdescribe those states. A striking difference between the two, however, has to do with utility for psychological processing. Metacognition has considerable benefit for psychological processing; in contrast, it is unlikely that there is much, if any, utility to mental states' being conscious over and above the utility those states have when they are not conscious. PMID:22492758

[Beijing college students' self-consciousness: its level, structure and relationship with mental health].

PubMed

Fan, Zhiwei; He, Shuchang

2013-11-01

To investigate Beijing college students' self-consciousness and its relationship with mental health. Convenient samples of 928 college students from five universities in Beijing were inquired and assessed with the self-consciousness scale and the Kessler 10 psychological distress scale. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling were used to analyze the data. College students' scores of self-consciousness did not differ in sex, age, grade and major type. 83.5% of the participants had relatively low scores (10-24) of psychological distress, but those of the students of liberal arts were higher (P < 0.05). The measurement data of self-consciousness supported Mittal and Balasubramanian' s five-factor structure. Self-reflectiveness was positively correlated with depression (P < 0.05). Internal state awareness was negatively associated with both anxiety and depression (P < 0.05). Style consciousness was positively correlated with both of them (P < 0.001). Beijing college students' self-consciousness is relatively high and has a relatively complex structure. While self-reflectiveness and style consciousness have negative effects, internal state awareness is good for mental health.

Consciousness in dreams.

PubMed

Kahn, David; Gover, Tzivia

2010-01-01

This chapter argues that dreaming is an important state of consciousness and that it has many features that complement consciousness in the wake state. The chapter discusses consciousness in dreams and how it comes about. It discusses the changes that occur in the neuromodulatory environment and in the neuronal connectivity of the brain as we fall asleep and begin our night journeys. Dreams evolve from internal sources though the dream may look different than any one of these since something entirely new may emerge through self-organizing processes. The chapter also explores characteristics of dreaming consciousness such as acceptance of implausibility and how that might lead to creative insight. Examples of studies, which have shown creativity in dream sleep, are provided to illustrate important characteristics of dreaming consciousness. The chapter also discusses the dream body and how it relates to our consciousness while dreaming. Differences and similarities between wake, lucid, non-lucid and day dreaming are explored and the chapter concludes with a discussion on what we can learn from each of these expressions of consciousness. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Adaptive Skeletal Muscle Action Requires Anticipation and “Conscious Broadcasting”

PubMed Central

Poehlman, T. Andrew; Jantz, Tiffany K.; Morsella, Ezequiel

2012-01-01

Historically, the conscious and anticipatory processes involved in voluntary action have been associated with the loftiest heights of nervous function. Concepts like mental time travel, “theory of mind,” and the formation of “the self” have been at the center of many attempts to determine the purpose of consciousness. Eventually, more reductionistic accounts of consciousness emerged, proposing rather that conscious states play a much more basic role in nervous function. Though the widely held integration consensus proposes that conscious states integrate information-processing structures and events that would otherwise be independent, Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT) argues that conscious states are necessary for the integration of only certain kinds of information. As revealed in this selective review, this integration is related to what is casually referred to as “voluntary” action, which is intimately related to the skeletal muscle output system. Through a peculiar form of broadcasting, conscious integration often controls and guides action via “ideomotor” mechanisms, where anticipatory processes play a central role. Our selective review covers evidence (including findings from anesthesia research) for the integration consensus, SIT, and ideomotor theory. PMID:23264766

The Role of Attention in Conscious Recollection

PubMed Central

De Brigard, Felipe

2012-01-01

Most research on the relationship between attention and consciousness has been limited to perception. However, perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious states that has not received proper treatment within this discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews compelling evidence indicating that attention may be necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of conscious perception, the kind of attention required during recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention. As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the difference between internal and external attention. Next, evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention during recollection is what makes us conscious of the contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested that internal attention is probably not sufficient for conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues for future research are also mentioned. PMID:22363305

Role of right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex in self-conscious emotional reactivity

PubMed Central

Sollberger, Marc; Seeley, William W.; Rankin, Katherine P.; Ascher, Elizabeth A.; Rosen, Howard J.; Miller, Bruce L.; Levenson, Robert W.

2013-01-01

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment arise when one’s actions fail to meet salient social expectations and are accompanied by marked physiological and behavioral activation. We investigated the neural correlates of self-conscious emotional reactivity in 27 patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a neurodegenerative disease that disrupts self-conscious emotion and targets brain regions critical for emotional functioning early in the disease course, and in 33 healthy older controls. Subjects participated in an embarrassing karaoke task in which they watched a video clip of themselves singing. They also watched a sad film clip; these data were used to control for non-self-conscious emotional reactivity in response to audiovisual stimuli. Using Freesurfer to quantify regional brain volumes from structural magnetic resonance imaging, right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) gray matter volume was the only brain region that was a significant predictor of self-conscious emotion. Smaller pACC volume was associated with attenuated physiological and behavioral self-conscious emotional reactivity, and this relationship was not specific to diagnosis. We argue that these results reflect the significant role that right pACC plays in the visceromotor responding that accompanies self-conscious emotion and that neurodegeneration in this region may underlie the self-conscious emotional decline seen in bvFTD. PMID:22345371

Role of right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex in self-conscious emotional reactivity.

PubMed

Sturm, Virginia E; Sollberger, Marc; Seeley, William W; Rankin, Katherine P; Ascher, Elizabeth A; Rosen, Howard J; Miller, Bruce L; Levenson, Robert W

2013-04-01

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment arise when one's actions fail to meet salient social expectations and are accompanied by marked physiological and behavioral activation. We investigated the neural correlates of self-conscious emotional reactivity in 27 patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a neurodegenerative disease that disrupts self-conscious emotion and targets brain regions critical for emotional functioning early in the disease course, and in 33 healthy older controls. Subjects participated in an embarrassing karaoke task in which they watched a video clip of themselves singing. They also watched a sad film clip; these data were used to control for non-self-conscious emotional reactivity in response to audiovisual stimuli. Using Freesurfer to quantify regional brain volumes from structural magnetic resonance imaging, right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) gray matter volume was the only brain region that was a significant predictor of self-conscious emotion. Smaller pACC volume was associated with attenuated physiological and behavioral self-conscious emotional reactivity, and this relationship was not specific to diagnosis. We argue that these results reflect the significant role that right pACC plays in the visceromotor responding that accompanies self-conscious emotion and that neurodegeneration in this region may underlie the self-conscious emotional decline seen in bvFTD.

Early visual responses predict conscious face perception within and between subjects during binocular rivalry

PubMed Central

Sandberg, Kristian; Bahrami, Bahador; Kanai, Ryota; Barnes, Gareth Robert; Overgaard, Morten; Rees, Geraint

2014-01-01

Previous studies indicate that conscious face perception may be related to neural activity in a large time window around 170-800ms after stimulus presentation, yet in the majority of these studies changes in conscious experience are confounded with changes in physical stimulation. Using multivariate classification on MEG data recorded when participants reported changes in conscious perception evoked by binocular rivalry between a face and a grating, we showed that only MEG signals in the 120-320ms time range, peaking at the M170 around 180ms and the P2m at around 260ms, reliably predicted conscious experience. Conscious perception could not only be decoded significantly better than chance from the sensors that showed the largest average difference, as previous studies suggest, but also from patterns of activity across groups of occipital sensors that individually were unable to predict perception better than chance. Additionally, source space analyses showed that sources in the early and late visual system predicted conscious perception more accurately than frontal and parietal sites, although conscious perception could also be decoded there. Finally, the patterns of neural activity associated with conscious face perception generalized from one participant to another around the times of maximum prediction accuracy. Our work thus demonstrates that the neural correlates of particular conscious contents (here, faces) are highly consistent in time and space within individuals and that these correlates are shared to some extent between individuals. PMID:23281780

Hippocampus Is Place of Interaction between Unconscious and Conscious Memories

PubMed Central

Züst, Marc Alain; Colella, Patrizio; Reber, Thomas Peter; Vuilleumier, Patrik; Hauf, Martinus; Ruch, Simon; Henke, Katharina

2015-01-01

Recent evidence suggests that humans can form and later retrieve new semantic relations unconsciously by way of hippocampus—the key structure also recruited for conscious relational (episodic) memory. If the hippocampus subserves both conscious and unconscious relational encoding/retrieval, one would expect the hippocampus to be place of unconscious-conscious interactions during memory retrieval. We tested this hypothesis in an fMRI experiment probing the interaction between the unconscious and conscious retrieval of face-associated information. For the establishment of unconscious relational memories, we presented subliminal (masked) combinations of unfamiliar faces and written occupations (“actor” or “politician”). At test, we presented the former subliminal faces, but now supraliminally, as cues for the reactivation of the unconsciously associated occupations. We hypothesized that unconscious reactivation of the associated occupation—actor or politician—would facilitate or inhibit the subsequent conscious retrieval of a celebrity’s occupation, which was also actor or politician. Depending on whether the reactivated unconscious occupation was congruent or incongruent to the celebrity’s occupation, we expected either quicker or delayed conscious retrieval process. Conscious retrieval was quicker in the congruent relative to a neutral baseline condition but not delayed in the incongruent condition. fMRI data collected during subliminal face-occupation encoding confirmed previous evidence that the hippocampus was interacting with neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge to support relational encoding. fMRI data collected at test revealed that the facilitated conscious retrieval was paralleled by deactivations in the hippocampus and neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge. We assume that the unconscious reactivation has pre-activated overlapping relational representations in the hippocampus reducing the neural effort for conscious retrieval. This finding supports the notion of synergistic interactions between conscious and unconscious relational memories in a common, cohesive hippocampal-neocortical memory space. PMID:25826338

Over-focused? The relation between patients' inclination for conscious control and single- and dual-task motor performance after stroke.

PubMed

Denneman, R P M; Kal, E C; Houdijk, H; Kamp, J van der

2018-05-01

Many stroke patients are inclined to consciously control their movements. This is thought to negatively affect patients' motor performance, as it disrupts movement automaticity. However, it has also been argued that conscious control may sometimes benefit motor performance, depending on the task or patientś motor or cognitive capacity. To assess whether stroke patients' inclination for conscious control is associated with motor performance, and explore whether the putative association differs as a function of task (single- vs dual) or patientś motor and cognitive capacity. Univariate and multivariate linear regression analysis were used to assess associations between patients' disposition to conscious control (i.e., Conscious Motor Processing subscale of Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale; MSRS-CMP) and single-task (Timed-up-and-go test; TuG) and motor dual-task costs (TuG while tone counting; motor DTC%). We determined whether these associations were influenced by patients' walking speed (i.e., 10-m-walk test) and cognitive capacity (i.e., working memory, attention, executive function). Seventy-eight clinical stroke patients (<6 months post-stroke) participated. Patients' conscious control inclination was not associated with single-task TuG performance. However, patients with a strong inclination for conscious control showed higher motor DTC%. These associations were irrespective of patients' motor and cognitive abilities. Patients' disposition for conscious control was not associated with single task motor performance, but was associated with higher motor dual task costs, regardless of patients' motor or cognitive abilities. Therapists should be aware that patients' conscious control inclination can influence their dual-task performance while moving. Longitudinal studies are required to test whether reducing patients' disposition for conscious control would improve dual-tasking post-stroke. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Transient Modulations of Neural Responses to Heartbeats Covary with Bodily Self-Consciousness.

PubMed

Park, Hyeong-Dong; Bernasconi, Fosco; Bello-Ruiz, Javier; Pfeiffer, Christian; Salomon, Roy; Blanke, Olaf

2016-08-10

Recent research has investigated self-consciousness associated with the multisensory processing of bodily signals (e.g., somatosensory, visual, vestibular signals), a notion referred to as bodily self-consciousness, and these studies have shown that the manipulation of bodily inputs induces changes in bodily self-consciousness such as self-identification. Another line of research has highlighted the importance of signals from the inside of the body (e.g., visceral signals) and proposed that neural representations of internal bodily signals underlie self-consciousness, which to date has been based on philosophical inquiry, clinical case studies, and behavioral studies. Here, we investigated the relationship of bodily self-consciousness with the neural processing of internal bodily signals. By combining electrical neuroimaging, analysis of peripheral physiological signals, and virtual reality technology in humans, we show that transient modulations of neural responses to heartbeats in the posterior cingulate cortex covary with changes in bodily self-consciousness induced by the full-body illusion. Additional analyses excluded that measured basic cardiorespiratory parameters or interoceptive sensitivity traits could account for this finding. These neurophysiological data link experimentally the cortical mapping of the internal body to self-consciousness. What are the brain mechanisms of self-consciousness? Prominent views propose that the neural processing associated with signals from the internal organs (such as the heart and the lung) plays a critical role in self-consciousness. Although this hypothesis dates back to influential views in philosophy and psychology (e.g., William James), definitive experimental evidence supporting this idea is lacking despite its recent impact in neuroscience. In the present study, we show that posterior cingulate activities responding to heartbeat signals covary with changes in participants' conscious self-identification with a body that were manipulated experimentally using virtual reality technology. Our finding provides important neural evidence about the long-standing proposal that self-consciousness is linked to the cortical processing of internal bodily signals. Copyright © 2016 the authors 0270-6474/16/368453-08$15.00/0.

Consciousness and the Prefrontal Parietal Network: Insights from Attention, Working Memory, and Chunking

PubMed Central

Bor, Daniel; Seth, Anil K.

2012-01-01

Consciousness has of late become a “hot topic” in neuroscience. Empirical work has centered on identifying potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), with a converging view that the prefrontal parietal network (PPN) is closely associated with this process. Theoretical work has primarily sought to explain how informational properties of this cortical network could account for phenomenal properties of consciousness. However, both empirical and theoretical research has given less focus to the psychological features that may account for the NCCs. The PPN has also been heavily linked with cognitive processes, such as attention. We describe how this literature is under-appreciated in consciousness science, in part due to the increasingly entrenched assumption of a strong dissociation between attention and consciousness. We argue instead that there is more common ground between attention and consciousness than is usually emphasized: although objects can under certain circumstances be attended to in the absence of conscious access, attention as a content selection and boosting mechanism is an important and necessary aspect of consciousness. Like attention, working memory and executive control involve the interlinking of multiple mental objects and have also been closely associated with the PPN. We propose that this set of cognitive functions, in concert with attention, make up the core psychological components of consciousness. One related process, chunking, exploits logical or mnemonic redundancies in a dataset so that it can be recoded and a given task optimized. Chunking has been shown to activate PPN particularly robustly, even compared with other cognitively demanding tasks, such as working memory or mental arithmetic. It is therefore possible that chunking, as a tool to detect useful patterns within an integrated set of intensely processed (attended) information, has a central role to play in consciousness. Following on from this, we suggest that a key evolutionary purpose of consciousness may be to provide innovative solutions to complex or novel problems. PMID:22416238

Spatial Frequency Tuning during the Conscious and Non-Conscious Perception of Emotional Facial Expressions – An Intracranial ERP Study

PubMed Central

Willenbockel, Verena; Lepore, Franco; Nguyen, Dang Khoa; Bouthillier, Alain; Gosselin, Frédéric

2012-01-01

Previous studies have shown that complex visual stimuli, such as emotional facial expressions, can influence brain activity independently of the observers’ awareness. Little is known yet, however, about the “informational correlates” of consciousness – i.e., which low-level information correlates with brain activation during conscious vs. non-conscious perception. Here, we investigated this question in the spatial frequency (SF) domain. We examined which SFs in disgusted and fearful faces modulate activation in the insula and amygdala over time and as a function of awareness, using a combination of intracranial event-related potentials (ERPs), SF Bubbles (Willenbockel et al., 2010a), and Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Patients implanted with electrodes for epilepsy monitoring viewed face photographs (13° × 7°) that were randomly SF filtered on a trial-by-trial basis. In the conscious condition, the faces were visible; in the non-conscious condition, they were rendered invisible using CFS. The data were analyzed by performing multiple linear regressions on the SF filters from each trial and the transformed ERP amplitudes across time. The resulting classification images suggest that many SFs are involved in the conscious and non-conscious perception of emotional expressions, with SFs between 6 and 10 cycles per face width being particularly important early on. The results also revealed qualitative differences between the awareness conditions for both regions. Non-conscious processing relied on low SFs more and was faster than conscious processing. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that different pathways are employed for the processing of emotional stimuli under different degrees of awareness. The present study represents a first step to mapping how SF information “flows” through the emotion-processing network with a high temporal resolution and to shedding light on the informational correlates of consciousness in general. PMID:23055988

Loss of Consciousness Is Associated with Stabilization of Cortical Activity

PubMed Central

Solovey, Guillermo; Alonso, Leandro M.; Yanagawa, Toru; Fujii, Naotaka; Magnasco, Marcelo O.; Cecchi, Guillermo A.

2015-01-01

What aspects of neuronal activity distinguish the conscious from the unconscious brain? This has been a subject of intense interest and debate since the early days of neurophysiology. However, as any practicing anesthesiologist can attest, it is currently not possible to reliably distinguish a conscious state from an unconscious one on the basis of brain activity. Here we approach this problem from the perspective of dynamical systems theory. We argue that the brain, as a dynamical system, is self-regulated at the boundary between stable and unstable regimes, allowing it in particular to maintain high susceptibility to stimuli. To test this hypothesis, we performed stability analysis of high-density electrocorticography recordings covering an entire cerebral hemisphere in monkeys during reversible loss of consciousness. We show that, during loss of consciousness, the number of eigenmodes at the edge of instability decreases smoothly, independently of the type of anesthetic and specific features of brain activity. The eigenmodes drift back toward the unstable line during recovery of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that stability is an emergent phenomenon dependent on the correlations among activity in different cortical regions rather than signals taken in isolation. These findings support the conclusion that dynamics at the edge of instability are essential for maintaining consciousness and provide a novel and principled measure that distinguishes between the conscious and the unconscious brain. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT What distinguishes brain activity during consciousness from that observed during unconsciousness? Answering this question has proven difficult because neither consciousness nor lack thereof have universal signatures in terms of most specific features of brain activity. For instance, different anesthetics induce different patterns of brain activity. We demonstrate that loss of consciousness is universally and reliably associated with stabilization of cortical dynamics regardless of the specific activity characteristics. To give an analogy, our analysis suggests that loss of consciousness is akin to depressing the damper pedal on the piano, which makes the sounds dissipate quicker regardless of the specific melody being played. This approach may prove useful in detecting consciousness on the basis of brain activity under anesthesia and other settings. PMID:26224868

Loss of Consciousness Is Associated with Stabilization of Cortical Activity.

PubMed

Solovey, Guillermo; Alonso, Leandro M; Yanagawa, Toru; Fujii, Naotaka; Magnasco, Marcelo O; Cecchi, Guillermo A; Proekt, Alex

2015-07-29

What aspects of neuronal activity distinguish the conscious from the unconscious brain? This has been a subject of intense interest and debate since the early days of neurophysiology. However, as any practicing anesthesiologist can attest, it is currently not possible to reliably distinguish a conscious state from an unconscious one on the basis of brain activity. Here we approach this problem from the perspective of dynamical systems theory. We argue that the brain, as a dynamical system, is self-regulated at the boundary between stable and unstable regimes, allowing it in particular to maintain high susceptibility to stimuli. To test this hypothesis, we performed stability analysis of high-density electrocorticography recordings covering an entire cerebral hemisphere in monkeys during reversible loss of consciousness. We show that, during loss of consciousness, the number of eigenmodes at the edge of instability decreases smoothly, independently of the type of anesthetic and specific features of brain activity. The eigenmodes drift back toward the unstable line during recovery of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that stability is an emergent phenomenon dependent on the correlations among activity in different cortical regions rather than signals taken in isolation. These findings support the conclusion that dynamics at the edge of instability are essential for maintaining consciousness and provide a novel and principled measure that distinguishes between the conscious and the unconscious brain. What distinguishes brain activity during consciousness from that observed during unconsciousness? Answering this question has proven difficult because neither consciousness nor lack thereof have universal signatures in terms of most specific features of brain activity. For instance, different anesthetics induce different patterns of brain activity. We demonstrate that loss of consciousness is universally and reliably associated with stabilization of cortical dynamics regardless of the specific activity characteristics. To give an analogy, our analysis suggests that loss of consciousness is akin to depressing the damper pedal on the piano, which makes the sounds dissipate quicker regardless of the specific melody being played. This approach may prove useful in detecting consciousness on the basis of brain activity under anesthesia and other settings. Copyright © 2015 the authors 0270-6474/15/3510866-12$15.00/0.

Contributions of the Ventral Striatum to Conscious Perception: An Intracranial EEG Study of the Attentional Blink.

PubMed

Slagter, Heleen A; Mazaheri, Ali; Reteig, Leon C; Smolders, Ruud; Figee, Martijn; Mantione, Mariska; Schuurman, P Richard; Denys, Damiaan

2017-02-01

The brain is limited in its capacity to consciously process information, necessitating gating of information. While conscious perception is robustly associated with sustained, recurrent interactions between widespread cortical regions, subcortical regions, including the striatum, influence cortical activity. Here, we examined whether the ventral striatum, given its ability to modulate cortical information flow, contributes to conscious perception. Using intracranial EEG, we recorded ventral striatum activity while 7 patients performed an attentional blink task in which they had to detect two targets (T1 and T2) in a stream of distractors. Typically, when T2 follows T1 within 100-500 ms, it is often not perceived (i.e., the attentional blink). We found that conscious T2 perception was influenced and signaled by ventral striatal activity. Specifically, the failure to perceive T2 was foreshadowed by a T1-induced increase in α and low β oscillatory activity as early as 80 ms after T1, indicating that the attentional blink to T2 may be due to very early T1-driven attentional capture. Moreover, only consciously perceived targets were associated with an increase in θ activity between 200 and 400 ms. These unique findings shed new light on the mechanisms that give rise to the attentional blink by revealing that conscious target perception may be determined by T1 processing at a much earlier processing stage than traditionally believed. More generally, they indicate that ventral striatum activity may contribute to conscious perception, presumably by gating cortical information flow. What determines whether we become aware of a piece of information or not? Conscious access has been robustly associated with activity within a distributed network of cortical regions. Using intracranial electrophysiological recordings during an attentional blink task, we tested the idea that the ventral striatum, because of its ability to modulate cortical information flow, may contribute to conscious perception. We find that conscious perception is influenced and signaled by ventral striatal activity. Short-latency (80-140 ms) striatal responses to a first target determined conscious perception of a second target. Moreover, conscious perception of the second target was signaled by longer-latency (200-400 ms) striatal activity. These results suggest that the ventral striatum may be part of a subcortical network that influences conscious experience. Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/371081-09$15.00/0.

Neural correlates of consciousness in patients who have emerged from a minimally conscious state: a cross-sectional multimodal imaging study.

PubMed

Di Perri, Carol; Bahri, Mohamed Ali; Amico, Enrico; Thibaut, Aurore; Heine, Lizette; Antonopoulos, Georgios; Charland-Verville, Vanessa; Wannez, Sarah; Gomez, Francisco; Hustinx, Roland; Tshibanda, Luaba; Demertzi, Athena; Soddu, Andrea; Laureys, Steven

2016-07-01

Between pathologically impaired consciousness and normal consciousness exists a scarcely researched transition zone, referred to as emergence from minimally conscious state, in which patients regain the capacity for functional communication, object use, or both. We investigated neural correlates of consciousness in these patients compared with patients with disorders of consciousness and healthy controls, by multimodal imaging. In this cross-sectional, multimodal imaging study, patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, patients in a minimally conscious state, and patients who had emerged from a minimally conscious state, diagnosed with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised, were recruited from the neurology department of the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Liège, Belgium. Key exclusion criteria were neuroimaging examination in an acute state, sedation or anaesthesia during scanning, large focal brain damage, motion parameters of more than 3 mm in translation and 3° in rotation, and suboptimal segmentation and normalisation. We acquired resting state functional and structural MRI data and (18)F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) PET data; we used seed-based functional MRI (fMRI) analysis to investigate positive default mode network connectivity (within-network correlations) and negative default mode network connectivity (between-network anticorrelations). We correlated FDG-PET brain metabolism with fMRI connectivity. We used voxel-based morphometry to test the effect of anatomical deformations on functional connectivity. We recruited a convenience sample of 58 patients (21 [36%] with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, 24 [41%] in a minimally conscious state, and 13 [22%] who had emerged from a minimally conscious state) and 35 healthy controls between Oct 1, 2009, and Oct 31, 2014. We detected consciousness-level-dependent increases (from unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, minimally conscious state, emergence from minimally conscious state, to healthy controls) for positive and negative default mode network connectivity, brain metabolism, and grey matter volume (p<0·05 false discovery rate corrected for multiple comparisons). Positive default mode network connectivity differed between patients and controls but not among patient groups (F test p<0·0001). Negative default mode network connectivity was only detected in healthy controls and in those who had emerged from a minimally conscious state; patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome or in a minimally conscious state showed pathological between-network positive connectivity (hyperconnectivity; F test p<0·0001). Brain metabolism correlated with positive default mode network connectivity (Spearman's r=0·50 [95% CI 0·26 to 0·61]; p<0·0001) and negative default mode network connectivity (Spearman's r=-0·52 [-0·35 to -0·67); p<0·0001). Grey matter volume did not differ between the studied groups (F test p=0·06). Partial preservation of between-network anticorrelations, which are seemingly of neuronal origin and cannot be solely explained by morphological deformations, characterise patients who have emerged from a minimally conscious state. Conversely, patients with disorders of consciousness show pathological between-network correlations. Apart from a deeper understanding of the neural correlates of consciousness, these findings have clinical implications and might be particularly relevant for outcome prediction and could inspire new therapeutic options. Belgian National Funds for Scientific Research (FNRS), European Commission, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, James McDonnell Foundation, European Space Agency, Mind Science Foundation, French Speaking Community Concerted Research Action, Fondazione Europea di Ricerca Biomedica, University and University Hospital of Liège (Liège, Belgium), and University of Western Ontario (London, ON, Canada). Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

"Binaural Rivalry": Dichotic Listening as a Tool for the Investigation of the Neural Correlate of Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brancucci, Alfredo; Tommasi, Luca

2011-01-01

Since about two decades neuroscientists have systematically faced the problem of consciousness: the aim is to discover the neural activity specifically related to conscious perceptions, i.e. the biological properties of what philosophers call qualia. In this view, a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) is a precise pattern of brain activity…

Conscience and Consciousness: a definition

PubMed Central

Vithoulkas, G; Muresanu, DF

2014-01-01

While consciousness has been examined extensively in its different aspects, like in philosophy, psychiatry, neurophysiology, neuroplasticity, etc., conscience though it is an equal important aspect of the human existence, which remains an unknown to a great degree as an almost transcendental aspect of the human mind. It has not been examined as thoroughly as consciousness and largely remains a “terra incognita" for its neurophysiology, brain topography, etc. Conscience and consciousness are part of a system of information that governs our experience and decision making process. The intent of this paper is to define these terms, to discuss about consciousness from both neurological and quantum physics point of view, the relationship between the dynamics of consciousness and neuroplasticity and to highlight the relationship between conscience, stress and health. PMID:24653768

Conscience and consciousness: a definition.

PubMed

Vithoulkas, G; Muresanu, D F

2014-03-15

While consciousness has been examined extensively in its different aspects, like in philosophy, psychiatry, neurophysiology, neuroplasticity, etc., conscience though it is an equal important aspect of the human existence, which remains an unknown to a great degree as an almost transcendental aspect of the human mind. It has not been examined as thoroughly as consciousness and largely remains a "terra incognita" for its neurophysiology, brain topography, etc. Conscience and consciousness are part of a system of information that governs our experience and decision making process. The intent of this paper is to define these terms, to discuss about consciousness from both neurological and quantum physics point of view, the relationship between the dynamics of consciousness and neuroplasticity and to highlight the relationship between conscience, stress and health.

A model for memory systems based on processing modes rather than consciousness.

PubMed

Henke, Katharina

2010-07-01

Prominent models of human long-term memory distinguish between memory systems on the basis of whether learning and retrieval occur consciously or unconsciously. Episodic memory formation requires the rapid encoding of associations between different aspects of an event which, according to these models, depends on the hippocampus and on consciousness. However, recent evidence indicates that the hippocampus mediates rapid associative learning with and without consciousness in humans and animals, for long-term and short-term retention. Consciousness seems to be a poor criterion for differentiating between declarative (or explicit) and non declarative (or implicit) types of memory. A new model is therefore required in which memory systems are distinguished based on the processing operations involved rather than by consciousness.

[In search for neurophysiological criteria of altered consciousness].

PubMed

Sviderskaia, N E

2002-01-01

Neurophysiological approaches to brain mechanisms of consciousness are discussed. The concept of spatial synchronization of nervous processes developed by M.N. Livanov is applied to neurophysiological analysis of higher brain functions. However, the spatial synchronization of brain potentials is only a condition for information processing and does not represent it as such. This imposes restrictions on conclusions about the neural mechanisms of consciousness. It is more adequate to use the concept of spatial synchronization in views of consciousness as a psychophysiological level along with sub- and superconsciousness in three-level structure of mind according to P.V. Simonov. Forms of consciousness interaction with other levels concern the problem of altered consciousness and may be reflected in various patterns of spatial organization of brain potentials.

The ethical relevance of the unconscious.

PubMed

Farisco, Michele; Evers, Kathinka

2017-12-29

Ethical analyses of disorders of consciousness traditionally focus on residual awareness. Going one step further, this paper explores the potential ethical relevance of the unawareness retained by patients with disorders of consciousness, focusing specifically on the ethical implications of the description of the unconscious provided by recent scientific research. A conceptual methodology is used, based on the review and analysis of relevant scientific literature on the unconscious and the logical argumentation in favour of the ethical conclusions. Two conditions (experiential wellbeing and having interests) that are generally considered critical components in the ethical discussion of patients with disorders of consciousness might arguably be both conscious and unconscious. The unconscious, as well as consciousness, should be taken into account in the ethical discussions of patients with disorders of consciousness.

Stratification of unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain complexity

PubMed Central

Casarotto, Silvia; Comanducci, Angela; Rosanova, Mario; Sarasso, Simone; Fecchio, Matteo; Napolitani, Martino; Pigorini, Andrea; G. Casali, Adenauer; Trimarchi, Pietro D.; Boly, Melanie; Gosseries, Olivia; Bodart, Olivier; Curto, Francesco; Landi, Cristina; Mariotti, Maurizio; Devalle, Guya; Laureys, Steven; Tononi, Giulio

2016-01-01

Objective Validating objective, brain‐based indices of consciousness in behaviorally unresponsive patients represents a challenge due to the impossibility of obtaining independent evidence through subjective reports. Here we address this problem by first validating a promising metric of consciousness—the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI)—in a benchmark population who could confirm the presence or absence of consciousness through subjective reports, and then applying the same index to patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Methods The benchmark population encompassed 150 healthy controls and communicative brain‐injured subjects in various states of conscious wakefulness, disconnected consciousness, and unconsciousness. Receiver operating characteristic curve analysis was performed to define an optimal cutoff for discriminating between the conscious and unconscious conditions. This cutoff was then applied to a cohort of noncommunicative DOC patients (38 in a minimally conscious state [MCS] and 43 in a vegetative state [VS]). Results We found an empirical cutoff that discriminated with 100% sensitivity and specificity between the conscious and the unconscious conditions in the benchmark population. This cutoff resulted in a sensitivity of 94.7% in detecting MCS and allowed the identification of a number of unresponsive VS patients (9 of 43) with high values of PCI, overlapping with the distribution of the benchmark conscious condition. Interpretation Given its high sensitivity and specificity in the benchmark and MCS population, PCI offers a reliable, independently validated stratification of unresponsive patients that has important physiopathological and therapeutic implications. In particular, the high‐PCI subgroup of VS patients may retain a capacity for consciousness that is not expressed in behavior. Ann Neurol 2016;80:718–729 PMID:27717082

Sheaf theoretic formulation for consciousness and qualia and relationship to the idealism of non-dual philosophies.

PubMed

Kafatos, Menas C; Kato, Goro C

2017-12-01

Questions about the nature of reality, whether Consciousness is the fundamental reality in the universe, and what is Consciousness itself, have no answer in systems that assume an external reality independent of Consciousness. Ultimately, the ontological foundation of such systems is the absolute division of subject and object. We advocate instead what we consider to be an approach that is in agreement with the foundation of quantum reality, which is based on Rāmānuja's version of Vedanta philosophy and non-dual Kashmir Śaivism. Quantum mechanics opened the door to consciousness, but it cannot account for consciousness. However, the quantum measurement problem implies that we cannot remove subjective experience from the practice of science. It is then appropriate to seek mathematical formalisms for the workings of consciousness that don't rely on specific interpretations of quantum mechanics. Temporal topos provides such a framework. In the theory of temporal topos, which we outline here, the difference between a subject and an object involves the direction of a morphism in a category. We also note that in the dual category, the direction of the morphism is in the opposite direction compared with the original direction of the original category. The resulting formalism provides powerful ways to address consciousness and qualia, beyond attempts to account for consciousness through physical theories. We also discuss the implications of the mathematics presented here for the convergence of science and non-dualist philosophies, as an emerging science of Consciousness, that may bring out the underlying unity of physics, life and mind. Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jahn, R.G.; Dunne, B.J.

1986-08-01

Theoretical explication of a growing body of empirical data on consciousness-related anomalous phenomena is unlikely to be achieved in terms of known physical processes. Rather, it will first be necessary to formulate the basic role of consciousness in the definition of reality before such anomalous experience can adequately be represented. This paper takes the position that reality is constituted only in the interaction of consciousness with its environment, and therefore that any scheme of conceptual organization developed to represent that reality must reflect the processes of consciousness as well as those of its environment. In this spirit, the concepts andmore » formalisms of elementary quantum mechanics, as originally proposed to explain anomalous atomic-scale physical phenomena, are appropriated via metaphor to represent the general characteristics of consciousness interacting with any environment. More specifically, if consciousness is represented by a quantum mechanical wave function, and its environment by an appropriate potential profile, Schrodinger wave mechanics defines eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that can be associated with the cognitive and emotional experiences of that consciousness in that environment. To articulate this metaphor it is necessary to associate certain aspects of the formalism, such as the coordinate system, the quantum numbers, and even the metric itself, with various impressionistic descriptors of consciousness, such as its intensity, perspective, approach/avoidance attitude, balance between cognitive and emotional activity, and receptive/assertive disposition.« less

The conjunction of non-consciously perceived object identity and spatial position can be retained during a visual short-term memory task.

PubMed

Bergström, Fredrik; Eriksson, Johan

2015-01-01

Although non-consciously perceived information has previously been assumed to be short-lived (< 500 ms), recent findings show that non-consciously perceived information can be maintained for at least 15 s. Such findings can be explained as working memory without a conscious experience of the information to be retained. However, whether or not working memory can operate on non-consciously perceived information remains controversial, and little is known about the nature of such non-conscious visual short-term memory (VSTM). Here we used continuous flash suppression to render stimuli non-conscious, to investigate the properties of non-consciously perceived representations in delayed match-to-sample (DMS) tasks. In Experiment I we used variable delays (5 or 15 s) and found that performance was significantly better than chance and was unaffected by delay duration, thereby replicating previous findings. In Experiment II the DMS task required participants to combine information of spatial position and object identity on a trial-by-trial basis to successfully solve the task. We found that the conjunction of spatial position and object identity was retained, thereby verifying that non-conscious, trial-specific information can be maintained for prospective use. We conclude that our results are consistent with a working memory interpretation, but that more research is needed to verify this interpretation.

Ego and Self: A Synthesis of Theories of Consciousness and Personality.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tatzel, Miriam

Ego and self refer to two ways of being. They are related on the one hand to neurosis and health and on the other hand to rational and intuitive modes of consciousness. The author in this article considers consciousness as it pertains to knowing oneself. She examines how ego, the rational consciousness as applied to oneself, can obstruct…

Evolutionary aspects of self- and world consciousness in vertebrates

PubMed Central

Fabbro, Franco; Aglioti, Salvatore M.; Bergamasco, Massimo; Clarici, Andrea; Panksepp, Jaak

2015-01-01

Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective, neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and neuropsychological data supporting the hypothesis that different levels of self and world representation in vertebrates rely upon (i) a “basal” subcortical system that includes brainstem, hypothalamus and central thalamic nuclei and that may underpin the primary (or anoetic) consciousness likely present in all vertebrates; and (ii) a forebrain system that include the medial and lateral structures of the cerebral hemispheres and may sustain the most sophisticated forms of consciousness [e.g., noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic, reflective knowledge]. We posit a mutual, bidirectional functional influence between these two major brain circuits. We conclude that basic aspects of consciousness like primary self and core self (based on anoetic and noetic consciousness) are present in many species of vertebrates and that, even self-consciousness (autonoetic consciousness) does not seem to be a prerogative of humans and of some non-human primates but may, to a certain extent, be present in some other mammals and birds PMID:25859205

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness.

PubMed

Havlík, Marek

2017-03-01

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. Copyright © 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The claustrum's proposed role in consciousness is supported by the effect and target localization of Salvia divinorum.

PubMed

Stiefel, Klaus M; Merrifield, Alistair; Holcombe, Alex O

2014-01-01

THIS ARTICLE BRINGS TOGETHER THREE FINDINGS AND IDEAS RELEVANT FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS: (I) Crick's and Koch's theory that the claustrum is a "conductor of consciousness" crucial for subjective conscious experience. (II) Subjective reports of the consciousness-altering effects the plant Salvia divinorum, whose primary active ingredient is salvinorin A, a κ-opioid receptor agonist. (III) The high density of κ-opioid receptors in the claustrum. Fact III suggests that the consciousness-altering effects of S. divinorum/salvinorin A (II) are due to a κ-opioid receptor mediated inhibition of primarily the claustrum and, additionally, the deep layers of the cortex, mainly in prefrontal areas. Consistent with Crick and Koch's theory that the claustrum plays a key role in consciousness (I), the subjective effects of S. divinorum indicate that salvia disrupts certain facets of consciousness much more than the largely serotonergic hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Based on this data and on the relevant literature, we suggest that the claustrum does indeed serve as a conductor for certain aspects of higher-order integration of brain activity, while integration of auditory and visual signals relies more on coordination by other areas including parietal cortex and the pulvinar.

A survey to assess the provision of conscious sedation by general dental practitioners in the Republic of Ireland.

PubMed

Fisher, Veronica; Stassen, Leo F A; Nunn, June

2011-01-01

To quantify and qualify how conscious sedation was used in general dental practice before the introduction of formal sedation teaching in the Republic of Ireland. 1. To determine the extent of use of oral, inhalational and intravenous sedation; 2. to determine the training and experience of general dental practitioners providing conscious sedation; 3. to determine the perceived barriers to the practice of conscious sedation; and, 4. to gauge the level of interest in a postgraduate course in conscious sedation. Postal questionnaire sent to one general practitioner in seven, selected randomly from the General Dental Council register, in 2007. Seventy six percent of respondents agreed that the provision of conscious sedation in general dental practice is important. However, the current provision of inhalation and intravenous sedation by respondents is low in comparison to provision in the UK. The main barrier to the use of conscious sedation in general dental practice appears to be lack of availability of training. The data from this study indicated the need for postgraduate training in conscious sedation in Ireland and a need for increased awareness of the Dental Council Code of Practice on sedation.

Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind.

PubMed

Shea, Nicholas

2012-03-01

Block's well-known distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness has generated a large philosophical literature about putative conceptual connections between the two. The scientific literature about whether they come apart in any actual cases is rather smaller. Empirical evidence gathered to date has not settled the issue. Some put this down to a fundamental methodological obstacle to the empirical study of the relation between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. Block (2007) has drawn attention to the methodological puzzle and attempted to answer it. While the evidence Block points to is relevant and important, this paper puts forward a more systematic framework for addressing the puzzle. To give it a label, the approach is to study phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. The approach allows consciousness studies to move beyond initial means of identifying instances of the kind like verbal report, and to find its underlying nature. It is well-recognised that facts about an underlying kind may allow identification of instances of the kind that do not match the initial means of identification (cp. non-liquid samples of water). This paper shows that the same method can be deployed to investigate phenomenal consciousness independently of access consciousness.

It is time to combine the two main traditions in the research on the neural correlates of consciousness: C = L × D

PubMed Central

Bachmann, Talis; Hudetz, Anthony G.

2014-01-01

Research on neural correlates of consciousness has been conducted and carried out mostly from within two relatively autonomous paradigmatic traditions – studying the specific contents of conscious experience and their brain-process correlates and studying the level of consciousness. In the present paper we offer a theoretical integration suggesting that an emphasis has to be put on understanding the mechanisms of consciousness (and not a mere correlates) and in doing this, the two paradigmatic traditions must be combined. We argue that consciousness emerges as a result of interaction of brain mechanisms specialized for representing the specific contents of perception/cognition – the data – and mechanisms specialized for regulating the level of activity of whatever data the content-carrying specific mechanisms happen to represent. Each of these mechanisms are necessary because without the contents there is no conscious experience and without the required level of activity the processed contents remain unconscious. Together the two mechanisms, when activated up to a necessary degree each, provide conditions sufficient for conscious experience to emerge. This proposal is related to pertinent experimental evidence. PMID:25202297

A roadmap for the study of conscious audition and its neural basis

PubMed Central

Cariani, Peter A.; Gutschalk, Alexander

2017-01-01

How and which aspects of neural activity give rise to subjective perceptual experience—i.e. conscious perception—is a fundamental question of neuroscience. To date, the vast majority of work concerning this question has come from vision, raising the issue of generalizability of prominent resulting theories. However, recent work has begun to shed light on the neural processes subserving conscious perception in other modalities, particularly audition. Here, we outline a roadmap for the future study of conscious auditory perception and its neural basis, paying particular attention to how conscious perception emerges (and of which elements or groups of elements) in complex auditory scenes. We begin by discussing the functional role of the auditory system, particularly as it pertains to conscious perception. Next, we ask: what are the phenomena that need to be explained by a theory of conscious auditory perception? After surveying the available literature for candidate neural correlates, we end by considering the implications that such results have for a general theory of conscious perception as well as prominent outstanding questions and what approaches/techniques can best be used to address them. This article is part of the themed issue ‘Auditory and visual scene analysis’. PMID:28044014

Neural correlates of visuospatial consciousness in 3D default space: insights from contralateral neglect syndrome.

PubMed

Jerath, Ravinder; Crawford, Molly W

2014-08-01

One of the most compelling questions still unanswered in neuroscience is how consciousness arises. In this article, we examine visual processing, the parietal lobe, and contralateral neglect syndrome as a window into consciousness and how the brain functions as the mind and we introduce a mechanism for the processing of visual information and its role in consciousness. We propose that consciousness arises from integration of information from throughout the body and brain by the thalamus and that the thalamus reimages visual and other sensory information from throughout the cortex in a default three-dimensional space in the mind. We further suggest that the thalamus generates a dynamic default three-dimensional space by integrating processed information from corticothalamic feedback loops, creating an infrastructure that may form the basis of our consciousness. Further experimental evidence is needed to examine and support this hypothesis, the role of the thalamus, and to further elucidate the mechanism of consciousness. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The effect of claustrum lesions on human consciousness and recovery of function.

PubMed

Chau, Aileen; Salazar, Andres M; Krueger, Frank; Cristofori, Irene; Grafman, Jordan

2015-11-01

Crick and Koch proposed that the claustrum plays a crucial role in consciousness. Their proposal was based on the structure and connectivity of the claustrum that suggested it had a role in coordinating a set of diverse brain functions. Given the few human studies investigating this claim, we decided to study the effects of claustrum lesions on consciousness in 171 combat veterans with penetrating traumatic brain injuries. Additionally, we studied the effects of claustrum lesions and loss of consciousness on long-term cognitive abilities. Claustrum damage was associated with the duration, but not frequency, of loss of consciousness, indicating that the claustrum may have an important role in regaining, but not maintaining, consciousness. Total brain volume loss, but not claustrum lesions, was associated with long-term recovery of neurobehavioral functions. Our findings constrain the current understanding of the neurobehavioral functions of the claustrum and its role in maintaining and regaining consciousness. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation.

PubMed

Haladjian, Harry Haroutioun; Montemayor, Carlos

2016-10-01

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems-these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Conscious and Nonconscious Processes:Distinct Forms of Evidence Accumulation?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dehaene, Stanislas

Among the many brain events evoked by a visual stimulus, which ones are associated specifically with conscious perception, and which merely reflect nonconscious processing? Understanding the neuronal mechanisms of consciousness is a major challenge for cognitive neuroscience. Recently, progress has been achieved by contrasting behavior and brain activation in minimally different experimental conditions, one of which leads to conscious perception whereas the other does not. This chapter reviews briefly this line of research and speculates on its theoretical interpretation. I propose to draw links between evidence accumulation models, which are highly successful in capturing elementary psychophysical decisions, and the conscious/nonconscious dichotomy. In this framework, conscious access would correspond to the crossing of a threshold in evidence accumulation within a distributed global workspace, a set of recurrently connected neurons with long axons that is able to integrate and broadcast back evidence from multiple brain processors. During nonconscious processing, evidence would be accumulated locally within specialized subcircuits, but would fail to reach the threshold needed for global ignition and, therefore, conscious reportability.

The sensory timecourses associated with conscious visual item memory and source memory.

PubMed

Thakral, Preston P; Slotnick, Scott D

2015-09-01

Previous event-related potential (ERP) findings have suggested that during visual item and source memory, nonconscious and conscious sensory (occipital-temporal) activity onsets may be restricted to early (0-800 ms) and late (800-1600 ms) temporal epochs, respectively. In an ERP experiment, we tested this hypothesis by separately assessing whether the onset of conscious sensory activity was restricted to the late epoch during source (location) memory and item (shape) memory. We found that conscious sensory activity had a late (>800 ms) onset during source memory and an early (<200 ms) onset during item memory. In a follow-up fMRI experiment, conscious sensory activity was localized to BA17, BA18, and BA19. Of primary importance, the distinct source memory and item memory ERP onsets contradict the hypothesis that there is a fixed temporal boundary separating nonconscious and conscious processing during all forms of visual conscious retrieval. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Measuring the level and content of consciousness during epileptic seizures: the Ictal Consciousness Inventory.

PubMed

Cavanna, A E; Mula, M; Servo, S; Strigaro, G; Tota, G; Barbagli, D; Collimedaglia, L; Viana, M; Cantello, R; Monaco, F

2008-07-01

Ictal alterations of the level of general awareness and subjective content of consciousness play a pivotal role in the clinical phenomenology of epilepsy, and reflect the pathological involvement of different neurobiological substrates. However, no self-reported measures have been proposed for patients experiencing altered conscious states during seizures. This study describes the development and validation of a new scale for the quantitative assessment of the level and content of ictal consciousness, the Ictal Consciousness Inventory (ICI). The ICI is a 20-item questionnaire generated on the basis of interviews with patients, literature review, and consultation with experts. It was tested on a sample of 110 patients attending three different epilepsy clinics in Northern Italy, who also completed standardized clinical scales. Standard psychometric methods were used to demonstrate that this scale satisfies criteria for acceptability, reliability, and validity. The ICI is proposed as a user-friendly and clinically sound instrument for the measurement of ictal alterations of consciousness in patients with epilepsy.

Organizational culture and a safety-conscious work environment: The mediating role of employee communication satisfaction.

PubMed

Silla, Inmaculada; Navajas, Joaquin; Koves, G Kenneth

2017-06-01

A safety-conscious work environment allows high-reliability organizations to be proactive regarding safety and enables employees to feel free to report any concern without fear of retaliation. Currently, research on the antecedents to safety-conscious work environments is scarce. Structural equation modeling was applied to test the mediating role of employee communication satisfaction in the relationship between constructive culture and a safety-conscious work environment in several nuclear power plants. Employee communication satisfaction partially mediated the positive relationships between a constructive culture and a safety-conscious work environment. Constructive cultures in which cooperation, supportive relationships, individual growth and high performance are encouraged facilitate the establishment of a safety-conscious work environment. This influence is partially explained by increased employee communication satisfaction. Constructive cultures should be encouraged within organizations. In addition, managers should promote communication policies and practices that support a safety-conscious work environment. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd and National Safety Council. All rights reserved.

A theory of working memory without consciousness or sustained activity

PubMed Central

Trübutschek, Darinka; Marti, Sébastien; Ojeda, Andrés; King, Jean-Rémi; Mi, Yuanyuan; Tsodyks, Misha; Dehaene, Stanislas

2017-01-01

Working memory and conscious perception are thought to share similar brain mechanisms, yet recent reports of non-conscious working memory challenge this view. Combining visual masking with magnetoencephalography, we investigate the reality of non-conscious working memory and dissect its neural mechanisms. In a spatial delayed-response task, participants reported the location of a subjectively unseen target above chance-level after several seconds. Conscious perception and conscious working memory were characterized by similar signatures: a sustained desynchronization in the alpha/beta band over frontal cortex, and a decodable representation of target location in posterior sensors. During non-conscious working memory, such activity vanished. Our findings contradict models that identify working memory with sustained neural firing, but are compatible with recent proposals of ‘activity-silent’ working memory. We present a theoretical framework and simulations showing how slowly decaying synaptic changes allow cell assemblies to go dormant during the delay, yet be retrieved above chance-level after several seconds. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.23871.001 PMID:28718763

Non-Conscious Emotional Activation Colors First Impressions: A Regulatory Role for Conscious Awareness

PubMed Central

Lapate, R.C.; Rokers, B.; Li, T.; Davidson, R.J.

2014-01-01

Emotions can color our attitudes toward unrelated objects in the environment. Prior evidence suggests that such emotional coloring is particularly strong when emotion-triggering information escapes conscious awareness. But, is emotional reactivity stronger following non-conscious versus conscious emotional provocation? Or does conscious processing specifically change the association between emotional reactivity and evaluations of unrelated objects? In this study, we independently indexed emotional reactivity and coloring as a function of emotional-stimulus awareness to disentangle these accounts. Specifically, we recorded skin conductance responses (SCRs) to spiders and fearful faces, along with subsequent preferences for novel neutral faces during visually aware and unaware states. Fearful faces increased SCRs comparably in both aware and unaware conditions. Yet, only when visual awareness was precluded did SCRs to fearful faces predict decreased likeability of neutral faces. These findings suggest a regulatory role for conscious awareness in breaking otherwise automatic associations between physiological reactivity and evaluative emotional responses. PMID:24317420

Consciousness isn't all-or-none: Evidence for partial awareness during the attentional blink.

PubMed

Elliott, James C; Baird, Benjamin; Giesbrecht, Barry

2016-02-01

Alternative views of the nature of consciousness posit that awareness of an object is either an all-or-none phenomenon or that awareness can be partial, occurring independently for different levels of representation. The all-or-none hypothesis predicts that when one feature of an object is identified, all other features should be consciously accessible. The partial awareness hypothesis predicts that one feature may reach consciousness while others do not. These competing predictions were tested in two experiments that presented two targets within a central stream of letters. We used the attentional blink evoked by the first target to assess consciousness for two different features of the second target. The results provide evidence that there can be a severe impairment in conscious access to one feature even when another feature is accurately reported. This behavioral evidence supports the partial awareness hypothesis, showing that consciousness of different features of the same object can be dissociated. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness.

PubMed

Tsuchiya, Naotsugu; Wilke, Melanie; Frässle, Stefan; Lamme, Victor A F

2015-12-01

The goal of consciousness research is to reveal the neural basis of phenomenal experience. To study phenomenology, experimenters seem obliged to ask reports from the subjects to ascertain what they experience. However, we argue that the requirement of reports has biased the search for the neural correlates of consciousness over the past decades. More recent studies attempt to dissociate neural activity that gives rise to consciousness from the activity that enables the report; in particular, no-report paradigms have been utilized to study conscious experience in the full absence of any report. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of report-based and no-report paradigms, and ask how these jointly bring us closer to understanding the true neural basis of consciousness. Crown Copyright © 2015. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The evolution of consciousness

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Stapp, H.P.

1996-08-16

It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of an adequate science of consciousness. The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no effect on the behavior, and hence on the survival prospects, of the organisms in which it inheres. Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high-level form found in human beings. In quantum theory, on the other hand, consciousness can be dynamically efficacious: quantum theory does allow consciousness to influence behavior, and thencemore » to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection. However, this evolutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles.« less

Using brain stimulation to disentangle neural correlates of conscious vision

PubMed Central

de Graaf, Tom A.; Sack, Alexander T.

2014-01-01

Research into the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) has blossomed, due to the advent of new and increasingly sophisticated brain research tools. Neuroimaging has uncovered a variety of brain processes that relate to conscious perception, obtained in a range of experimental paradigms. But methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging or electroencephalography do not always afford inference on the functional role these brain processes play in conscious vision. Such empirical NCCs could reflect neural prerequisites, neural consequences, or neural substrates of a conscious experience. Here, we take a closer look at the use of non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) techniques in this context. We discuss and review how NIBS methodology can enlighten our understanding of brain mechanisms underlying conscious vision by disentangling the empirical NCCs. PMID:25295015

Prolonged disturbance of consciousness caused by severe hypophosphatemia: a report of two cases.

PubMed

Murakami, Takaaki; Yoshida, Masanori; Funazo, Tomoko; Matsuda, Yuki; Matsuo, Koji; Nambu, Takuo; Yonemitsu, Shin; Muro, Seiji; Oki, Shogo

2014-01-01

We herein describe two patients with a prolonged disturbance of consciousness due to severe hypophosphatemia. Case one presented with pneumococcal infection and acute exacerbation of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and asthma. Case two presented with diabetic foot infections and diabetic ketoacidosis. Both patients responded to initial therapy for their primary diseases, but consciousness became worse in both cases. Their test results for impaired consciousness revealed severe hypophosphatemia; therefore, phosphate replacement therapy was administered, thus resulting in complete alertness. These cases demonstrate that we should consider the possibility of hypophosphatemia in critically ill patients with an altered consciousness.

A framework for investigating animal consciousness.

PubMed

Droege, Paula; Braithwaite, Victoria A

2015-01-01

An assessment of consciousness in nonverbal animals requires a framework for research that extends testing methods beyond subjective report. This chapter proposes a working definition of consciousness in terms of temporal representation that provides the critical link between internal phenomenology and external behavior and neural structure. Our claim is that consciousness represents the present moment as distinct from the past and the future in order to flexibly respond to stimuli. We discuss behavioral and neural evidence that indicates the capacity for both flexible response and temporal representation, and we illustrate these capacities in fish, a taxonomic group that challenges human intuitions about consciousness.

Electrophysiological evidence for phenomenal consciousness.

PubMed

Revonsuo, Antti; Koivisto, Mika

2010-09-01

Abstract Recent evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) lends support to two central theses in Lamme's theory. The earliest ERP correlate of visual consciousness appears over posterior visual cortex around 100-200 ms after stimulus onset. Its scalp topography and time window are consistent with recurrent processing in the visual cortex. This electrophysiological correlate of visual consciousness is mostly independent of later ERPs reflecting selective attention and working memory functions. Overall, the ERP evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness of a visual stimulus emerges earlier than access consciousness, and that attention and awareness are served by distinct neural processes.

"Paradox of slow frequencies" - Are slow frequencies in upper cortical layers a neural predisposition of the level/state of consciousness (NPC)?

PubMed

Northoff, Georg

2017-09-01

Consciousness research has much focused on faster frequencies like alpha or gamma while neglecting the slower ones in the infraslow (0.001-0.1Hz) and slow (0.1-1Hz) frequency range. These slower frequency ranges have a "bad reputation" though; their increase in power can observed during the loss of consciousness as in sleep, anesthesia, and vegetative state. However, at the same time, slower frequencies have been conceived instrumental for consciousness. The present paper aims to resolve this paradox which I describe as "paradox of slow frequencies". I first show various data that suggest a central role of slower frequencies in integrating faster ones, i.e., "temporo-spatial integration and nestedness". Such "temporo-spatial integration and nestedness" is disrupted during the loss of consciousness as in anesthesia and sleep leading to "temporo-spatial fragmentation and isolation" between slow and fast frequencies. Slow frequencies are supposedly mediated by neural activity in upper cortical layers in higher-order associative regions as distinguished from lower cortical layers that are related to faster frequencies. Taken together, slower and faster frequencies take on different roles for the level/state of consciousness. Faster frequencies by themselves are sufficient and thus a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) while slower frequencies are a necessary non-sufficient condition of possible consciousness, e.g., a neural predisposition of the level/state of consciousness (NPC). This resolves the "paradox of slow frequencies" in that it assigns different roles to slower and faster frequencies in consciousness, i.e., NCC and NPC. Taken as NCC and NPC, fast and slow frequencies including their relation as in "temporo-spatial integration and nestedness" can be considered a first "building bloc" of a future "temporo-spatial theory of consciousness" (TTC) (Northoff, 2013; Northoff, 2014b; Northoff & Huang, 2017). Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence from Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.

PubMed

Fingelkurts, Andrew A; Fingelkurts, Alexander A; Bagnato, Sergio; Boccagni, Cristina; Galardi, Giuseppe

2012-01-01

The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN's role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, EEG operational synchrony analysis [1, 2] was performed in patients with severe brain injuries in vegetative and minimally conscious states to study the strength of DMN operational synchrony as a function of self-consciousness expression. We demonstrated that the strength of DMN EEG operational synchrony was smallest or even absent in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and highest in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. At the same time the process of ecoupling of operations performed by neuronal assemblies that comprise the DMN was highest in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and minimal in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. The DMN's frontal EEG operational module had the strongest decrease in operational synchrony strength as a function of selfconsciousness loss, when compared with the DMN's posterior modules. Based on these results it is suggested that the strength of DMN functional connectivity could mediate the strength of self-consciousness expression. The observed alterations similarly occurred across EEG alpha, beta1 and beta2 frequency oscillations. Presented results suggest that the EEG operational synchrony within DMN may provide an objective and accurate measure for the assessment of signs of self-(un)consciousness in these challenging patient populations. This method therefore, may complement the current diagnostic procedures for patients with severe brain injuries and, hence, the planning of a rational rehabilitation intervention.

DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence from Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States

PubMed Central

Fingelkurts, Andrew A; Fingelkurts, Alexander A; Bagnato, Sergio; Boccagni, Cristina; Galardi, Giuseppe

2012-01-01

The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, EEG operational synchrony analysis [1, 2] was performed in patients with severe brain injuries in vegetative and minimally conscious states to study the strength of DMN operational synchrony as a function of self-consciousness expression. We demonstrated that the strength of DMN EEG operational synchrony was smallest or even absent in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and highest in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. At the same time the process of ecoupling of operations performed by neuronal assemblies that comprise the DMN was highest in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and minimal in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. The DMN’s frontal EEG operational module had the strongest decrease in operational synchrony strength as a function of selfconsciousness loss, when compared with the DMN’s posterior modules. Based on these results it is suggested that the strength of DMN functional connectivity could mediate the strength of self-consciousness expression. The observed alterations similarly occurred across EEG alpha, beta1 and beta2 frequency oscillations. Presented results suggest that the EEG operational synchrony within DMN may provide an objective and accurate measure for the assessment of signs of self-(un)consciousness in these challenging patient populations. This method therefore, may complement the current diagnostic procedures for patients with severe brain injuries and, hence, the planning of a rational rehabilitation intervention. PMID:22905075

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information.

PubMed

Marchetti, Giorgio

2018-02-08

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

Subliminal unconscious conflict alpha power inhibits supraliminal conscious symptom experience.

PubMed

Shevrin, Howard; Snodgrass, Michael; Brakel, Linda A W; Kushwaha, Ramesh; Kalaida, Natalia L; Bazan, Ariane

2013-01-01

Our approach is based on a tri-partite method of integrating psychodynamic hypotheses, cognitive subliminal processes, and psychophysiological alpha power measures. We present ten social phobic subjects with three individually selected groups of words representing unconscious conflict, conscious symptom experience, and Osgood Semantic negative valence words used as a control word group. The unconscious conflict and conscious symptom words, presented subliminally and supraliminally, act as primes preceding the conscious symptom and control words presented as supraliminal targets. With alpha power as a marker of inhibitory brain activity, we show that unconscious conflict primes, only when presented subliminally, have a unique inhibitory effect on conscious symptom targets. This effect is absent when the unconscious conflict primes are presented supraliminally, or when the target is the control words. Unconscious conflict prime effects were found to correlate with a measure of repressiveness in a similar previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). Conscious symptom primes have no inhibitory effect when presented subliminally. Inhibitory effects with conscious symptom primes are present, but only when the primes are supraliminal, and they did not correlate with repressiveness in a previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We conclude that while the inhibition following supraliminal conscious symptom primes is due to conscious threat bias, the inhibition following subliminal unconscious conflict primes provides a neurological blueprint for dynamic repression: it is only activated subliminally by an individual's unconscious conflict and has an inhibitory effect specific only to the conscious symptom. These novel findings constitute neuroscientific evidence for the psychoanalytic concepts of unconscious conflict and repression, while extending neuroscience theory and methods into the realm of personal, psychological meaning.

Consciousness levels one week after admission to a palliative care unit improve survival prediction in advanced cancer patients.

PubMed

Tsai, Jaw-Shiun; Chen, Chao-Hsien; Wu, Chih-Hsun; Chiu, Tai-Yuan; Morita, Tatsuya; Chang, Chin-Hao; Hung, Shou-Hung; Lee, Ya-Ping; Chen, Ching-Yu

2015-02-01

Consciousness is an important factor of survival prediction in advanced cancer patients. However, effects on survival of changes over time in consciousness in advanced cancer patients have not been fully explored. This study evaluated changes in consciousness after admission to a palliative care unit and their correlation with prognosis in terminal cancer patients. This is a prospective observational study. From a palliative care unit in Taiwan, 531 cancer patients (51.8% male) were recruited. Consciousness status was assessed at admission and one week afterwards and recorded as normal or impaired. The mean age was 65.28±13.59 years, and the average survival time was 23.41±37.69 days. Patients with normal consciousness at admission (n=317) had better survival than those with impaired consciousness at admission (n=214): (17.0 days versus 6.0 days, p<0.001). In the analysis on survival within one week after admission, those with normal consciousness at admission had a higher percentage of survival than the impaired (78.9% versus 44.3%, p<0.001). Patients were further classified into four groups according to consciousness levels: (1) normal at admission and one week afterwards, (2) impaired at admission but normal one week afterwards, (3) normal at admission but impaired one week afterwards, and (4) impaired both at admission and one week afterwards. The former two groups had significantly better survival than the latter two groups: (median survival counted from day 7 after admission), 25.5, 27.0, 7.0, and 7.0 days, respectively. Consciousness levels one week after admission should be integrated into survival prediction in advanced cancer patients.

How are different neural networks related to consciousness?

PubMed

Qin, Pengmin; Wu, Xuehai; Huang, Zirui; Duncan, Niall W; Tang, Weijun; Wolff, Annemarie; Hu, Jin; Gao, Liang; Jin, Yi; Wu, Xing; Zhang, Jianfeng; Lu, Lu; Wu, Chunping; Qu, Xiaoying; Mao, Ying; Weng, Xuchu; Zhang, Jun; Northoff, Georg

2015-10-01

We aimed to investigate the roles of different resting-state networks in predicting both the actual level of consciousness and its recovery in brain injury patients. We investigated resting-state functional connectivity within different networks in patients with varying levels of consciousness: unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS; n = 56), minimally conscious state (MCS; n = 29), and patients with brain lesions but full consciousness (BL; n = 48). Considering the actual level of consciousness, we compared the strength of network connectivity among the patient groups. We then checked the presence of connections between specific regions in individual patients and calculated the frequency of this in the different patient groups. Considering the recovery of consciousness, we split the UWS group into 2 subgroups according to recovery: those who emerged from UWS (UWS-E) and those who remained in UWS (UWS-R). The above analyses were repeated on these 2 subgroups. Functional connectivity strength in salience network (SN), especially connectivity between the supragenual anterior cingulate cortex (SACC) and left anterior insula (LAI), was reduced in the unconscious state (UWS) compared to the conscious state (MCS and BL). Moreover, at the individual level, SACC-LAI connectivity was more present in MCS than in UWS. Default-mode network (DMN) connectivity strength, especially between the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and left lateral parietal cortex (LLPC), was reduced in UWS-R compared with UWS-E. Furthermore, PCC-LLPC connectivity was more present in UWS-E than in UWS-R. Our findings show that SN (SACC-LAI) connectivity correlates with behavioral signs of consciousness, whereas DMN (PCC-LLPC) connectivity instead predicts recovery of consciousness. © 2015 American Neurological Association.

Subliminal unconscious conflict alpha power inhibits supraliminal conscious symptom experience

PubMed Central

Shevrin, Howard; Snodgrass, Michael; Brakel, Linda A. W.; Kushwaha, Ramesh; Kalaida, Natalia L.; Bazan, Ariane

2013-01-01

Our approach is based on a tri-partite method of integrating psychodynamic hypotheses, cognitive subliminal processes, and psychophysiological alpha power measures. We present ten social phobic subjects with three individually selected groups of words representing unconscious conflict, conscious symptom experience, and Osgood Semantic negative valence words used as a control word group. The unconscious conflict and conscious symptom words, presented subliminally and supraliminally, act as primes preceding the conscious symptom and control words presented as supraliminal targets. With alpha power as a marker of inhibitory brain activity, we show that unconscious conflict primes, only when presented subliminally, have a unique inhibitory effect on conscious symptom targets. This effect is absent when the unconscious conflict primes are presented supraliminally, or when the target is the control words. Unconscious conflict prime effects were found to correlate with a measure of repressiveness in a similar previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). Conscious symptom primes have no inhibitory effect when presented subliminally. Inhibitory effects with conscious symptom primes are present, but only when the primes are supraliminal, and they did not correlate with repressiveness in a previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We conclude that while the inhibition following supraliminal conscious symptom primes is due to conscious threat bias, the inhibition following subliminal unconscious conflict primes provides a neurological blueprint for dynamic repression: it is only activated subliminally by an individual's unconscious conflict and has an inhibitory effect specific only to the conscious symptom. These novel findings constitute neuroscientific evidence for the psychoanalytic concepts of unconscious conflict and repression, while extending neuroscience theory and methods into the realm of personal, psychological meaning. PMID:24046743

Chasing the Rainbow: The Non-conscious Nature of Being

PubMed Central

Oakley, David A.; Halligan, Peter W.

2017-01-01

Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that “consciousness” contains no top-down control processes and that “consciousness” involves no executive, causal, or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view, psychological processing and psychological products are not under the control of consciousness. In particular, we argue that all “contents of consciousness” are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or influenced in any way by the “experience of consciousness.” This continuously updated personal narrative arises from selective “internal broadcasting” of outputs from non-conscious executive systems that have access to all forms of cognitive processing, sensory information, and motor control. The personal narrative provides information for storage in autobiographical memory and is underpinned by constructs of self and agency, also created in non-conscious systems. The experience of consciousness is a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative. In this sense, personal awareness is analogous to the rainbow which accompanies physical processes in the atmosphere but exerts no influence over them. Though it is an end-product created by non-conscious executive systems, the personal narrative serves the powerful evolutionary function of enabling individuals to communicate (externally broadcast) the contents of internal broadcasting. This in turn allows recipients to generate potentially adaptive strategies, such as predicting the behavior of others and underlies the development of social and cultural structures, that promote species survival. Consequently, it is the capacity to communicate to others the contents of the personal narrative that confers an evolutionary advantage—not the experience of consciousness (personal awareness) itself. PMID:29184516

A narrative method for consciousness research.

PubMed

Díaz, José-Luis

2013-01-01

Some types of first-person narrations of mental processes that constitute phenomenological accounts and texts, such as internal monolog statements, epitomize the best expressions and representations of human consciousness available and therefore may be used to model phenomenological streams of consciousness. The type of autonomous monolog in which an author or narrator declares actual mental processes in a think aloud manner seems particularly suitable for modeling streams of consciousness. A narrative method to extract and depict conscious processes, operations, contents, and states from an acceptable phenomenological text would require three subsequent steps: operational criteria for producing and/or selecting a phenomenological text, a system for detecting text items that are indicative of conscious contents and processes, and a procedure for representing such items in formal dynamic system devices such as Petri nets. The requirements and restrictions of each of these steps are presented, analyzed, and applied to phenomenological texts in the following manner: (1) the relevance of introspective language and narrative analyses to consciousness research and the idea that specific narratives are of paramount interest for such investigation is justified; (2) some of the obstacles and constraints to attain plausible consciousness inferences from narrative texts and the methodological requirements to extract and depict items relevant to consciousness contents and operations from a suitable phenomenological text are examined; (3) a preliminary exercise of the proposed method is used to analyze and chart a classical interior monolog excerpted from James Joyce's Ulysses, a masterpiece of the stream-of-consciousness literary technique and, finally, (4) an inter-subjective evaluation for inter-observer agreement of mental attributions of another phenomenological text (an excerpt from the Intimate Journal of Miguel de Unamuno) is presented using some mathematical tools.

A narrative method for consciousness research

PubMed Central

Díaz, José-Luis

2013-01-01

Some types of first-person narrations of mental processes that constitute phenomenological accounts and texts, such as internal monolog statements, epitomize the best expressions and representations of human consciousness available and therefore may be used to model phenomenological streams of consciousness. The type of autonomous monolog in which an author or narrator declares actual mental processes in a think aloud manner seems particularly suitable for modeling streams of consciousness. A narrative method to extract and depict conscious processes, operations, contents, and states from an acceptable phenomenological text would require three subsequent steps: operational criteria for producing and/or selecting a phenomenological text, a system for detecting text items that are indicative of conscious contents and processes, and a procedure for representing such items in formal dynamic system devices such as Petri nets. The requirements and restrictions of each of these steps are presented, analyzed, and applied to phenomenological texts in the following manner: (1) the relevance of introspective language and narrative analyses to consciousness research and the idea that specific narratives are of paramount interest for such investigation is justified; (2) some of the obstacles and constraints to attain plausible consciousness inferences from narrative texts and the methodological requirements to extract and depict items relevant to consciousness contents and operations from a suitable phenomenological text are examined; (3) a preliminary exercise of the proposed method is used to analyze and chart a classical interior monolog excerpted from James Joyce’s Ulysses, a masterpiece of the stream-of-consciousness literary technique and, finally, (4) an inter-subjective evaluation for inter-observer agreement of mental attributions of another phenomenological text (an excerpt from the Intimate Journal of Miguel de Unamuno) is presented using some mathematical tools. PMID:24265610

Neural Darwinism and consciousness.

PubMed

Seth, Anil K; Baars, Bernard J

2005-03-01

Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the 'dynamic core'). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well.

Consciousness: function and definition.

PubMed

Niedermeyer, E

1994-07-01

The term "consciousness" plays an enormous role in the clinical assessment of patients and also in psychophysiological considerations. It has often been said that consciousness is a term that defies definition. This lack of definability, however, might be more apparent than real. In the multitude of facets, three main components can be singled out: a) vigilance, b) mental contents and c) selective attention. Vigilance, not to be equated with consciousness, is most amenable to electrophysiological studies. The stages of sleep have fairly well standardized EEG correlates, unlike the comatose states. The overflowing wealth of mental contents is constantly adjusted to momentary needs by the mechanism of selective attention. Awareness is a subcomponent and differs from both vigilance and consciousness. Emotionality is particularly important among the variety of further subcomponents. The time factor must be taken into account in order to understand the dynamics and fluctuations of consciousness.

An extension of the extended parallel process model (EPPM) in television health news: the influence of health consciousness on individual message processing and acceptance.

PubMed

Hong, Hyehyun

2011-06-01

The purpose of this study is to examine the role of health consciousness in processing TV news that contains potential health threats and preventive recommendations. Based on the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992), relationships among health consciousness, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived response efficacy, perceived self-efficacy, and message acceptance/rejection were hypothesized. Responses collected from 175 participants after viewing four TV health news stories were analyzed using the bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Results confirmed three mediators (i.e., perceived severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy) in the influence of health consciousness on message acceptance. A negative association found between health consciousness and perceived susceptibility is discussed in relation to characteristics of health conscious individuals and optimistic bias of health risks.

Psychic reality and the nature of consciousness.

PubMed

Fonagy, Peter; Allison, Elizabeth

2016-02-01

In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K. Copyright © 2015 Institute of Psychoanalysis.

Disentangling conscious from unconscious cognitive processing with event-related EEG potentials.

PubMed

Rohaut, B; Naccache, L

By looking for properties of consciousness, cognitive neuroscience studies have dramatically enlarged the scope of unconscious cognitive processing. This emerging knowledge inspired the development of new approaches allowing clinicians to probe and disentangle conscious from unconscious cognitive processes in non-communicating brain-injured patients both in terms of behaviour and brain activity. This information is extremely valuable in order to improve diagnosis and prognosis in such patients both at acute and chronic settings. Reciprocally, the growing observations coming from such patients suffering from disorders of consciousness provide valuable constraints to theoretical models of consciousness. In this review we chose to illustrate these recent developments by focusing on brain signals recorded with EEG at bedside in response to auditory stimuli. More precisely, we present the respective EEG markers of unconscious and conscious processing of two classes of auditory stimuli (sounds and words). We show that in both cases, conscious access to the corresponding representation (e.g.: auditory regularity and verbal semantic content) share a similar neural signature (P3b and P600/LPC) that can be distinguished from unconscious processing occurring during an earlier stage (MMN and N400). We propose a two-stage serial model of processing and discuss how unconscious and conscious signatures can be measured at bedside providing relevant informations for both diagnosis and prognosis of consciousness recovery. These two examples emphasize how fruitful can be the bidirectional approach exploring cognition in healthy subjects and in brain-damaged patients. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

Baseline brain energy supports the state of consciousness.

PubMed

Shulman, Robert G; Hyder, Fahmeed; Rothman, Douglas L

2009-07-07

An individual, human or animal, is defined to be in a conscious state empirically by the behavioral ability to respond meaningfully to stimuli, whereas the loss of consciousness is defined by unresponsiveness. PET measurements of glucose or oxygen consumption show a widespread approximately 45% reduction in cerebral energy consumption with anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness. Because baseline brain energy consumption has been shown by (13)C magnetic resonance spectroscopy to be almost exclusively dedicated to neuronal signaling, we propose that the high level of brain energy is a necessary property of the conscious state. Two additional neuronal properties of the conscious state change with anesthesia. The delocalized fMRI activity patterns in rat brain during sensory stimulation at a higher energy state (close to the awake) collapse to a contralateral somatosensory response at lower energy state (deep anesthesia). Firing rates of an ensemble of neurons in the rat somatosensory cortex shift from the gamma-band range (20-40 Hz) at higher energy state to <10 Hz at lower energy state. With the conscious state defined by the individual's behavior and maintained by high cerebral energy, measurable properties of that state are the widespread fMRI patterns and high frequency neuronal activity, both of which support the extensive interregional communication characteristic of consciousness. This usage of high brain energies when the person is in the "state" of consciousness differs from most studies, which attend the smaller energy increments observed during the stimulations that form the "contents" of that state.

Consciousness as a global property of brain dynamic activity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mateos, D. M.; Wennberg, R.; Guevara, R.; Perez Velazquez, J. L.

2017-12-01

We seek general principles of the structure of the cellular collective activity associated with conscious awareness. Can we obtain evidence for features of the optimal brain organization that allows for adequate processing of stimuli and that may guide the emergence of cognition and consciousness? Analyzing brain recordings in conscious and unconscious states, we followed initially the classic approach in physics when it comes to understanding collective behaviours of systems composed of a myriad of units: the assessment of the number of possible configurations (microstates) that the system can adopt, for which we use a global entropic measure associated with the number of connected brain regions. Having found maximal entropy in conscious states, we then inspected the microscopic nature of the configurations of connections using an adequate complexity measure and found higher complexity in states characterized not only by conscious awareness but also by subconscious cognitive processing, such as sleep stages. Our observations indicate that conscious awareness is associated with maximal global (macroscopic) entropy and with the short time scale (microscopic) complexity of the configurations of connected brain networks in pathological unconscious states (seizures and coma), but the microscopic view captures the high complexity in physiological unconscious states (sleep) where there is information processing. As such, our results support the global nature of conscious awareness, as advocated by several theories of cognition. We thus hope that our studies represent preliminary steps to reveal aspects of the structure of cognition that leads to conscious awareness.

Effects of self-consciousness and social anxiety on self-disclosure among unacquainted individuals: an application of the social relations model.

PubMed

Reno, R R; Kenny, D A

1992-03-01

Recent research has demonstrated a positive relationship between private self-consciousness and the tendency to self-disclose. These studies have relied exclusively upon self-reports of disclosure. In the present study, Kenny's Social Relations Model (Kenny & La Voie, 1984) was employed to examine the relationship between a subject's self-reports and others' reports of a subject's level of self-disclosure and the relationship of these reports to private self-consciousness, as well as the other traits measured by the self-consciousness scale: public self-consciousness and social anxiety. Unacquainted college women (N = 102) participated in one-on-one interactions in a round-robin design. Subject's self-reports of disclosure and their levels of private self-consciousness correlated positively. The partners' reports of an individual's disclosure, however, were not related to the individual's level of private self-consciousness. The discrepancy between these correlations emphasizes the necessity to ground research in personal relationships on interacting pairs and not only on the self-reports of one member. Future research that would explore this difference is discussed. The examination of the self- and partner reports and subjects' levels of public self-consciousness and social anxiety demonstrated that these two traits significantly influence the acquaintance process. Public self-consciousness related positively to subjects' beliefs that they had created consistent impressions upon their partners. Social anxiety correlated negatively with partners' reports of a subject's dyadic involvement and openness.

Researching Reciprocal Leadership: Using the Consciousness Quotient Inventory (CQ-i) as a Pilot Methodology to Explore Leadership with the Context of a School-University Partnership

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Poultney, Val; Fordham, Jon

2018-01-01

This article looks at the potential of using an online self-completing inventory that measures leadership consciousness awareness. The Consciousness Quotient inventory (CQ-i) has been developed to encourage leaders to be more conscious of their ability to be accountable and responsible for their leadership practice. The CQ-i as a method for…

Moving into the wide clinical spectrum of consciousness disorders: Pearls, perils and pitfalls.

PubMed

Calabrò, Rocco Salvatore; Milardi, Demetrio; Cacciola, Alberto; Marra, Angela; Digangi, Giuseppina; Casella, Carmela; Manuli, Alfredo; De Luca, Rosaria; Silvestri, Rosalia; Bramanti, Placido

2016-01-01

The last few years have been characterized by a growing interest of the medical and scientific world for the field of consciousness and its related disorders. Medically speaking, consciousness can be defined as the state of awareness of self and environment and the alertness to external stimulation, besides responsiveness to inner need. Transient loss of consciousness can be due to alterations in cerebral blood flow leading to fainting or syncope, migraine, metabolic dysfunctions, unexpected intracranial pressure increases, epileptic seizures, and sleep disorders. Chronic disorders of consciousness are a tragic success of high-technology treatment, in an attempt to maintain or reestablish brain function, which is to be considered as the main goal of therapeutics. Management of vegetative or a minimally conscious state individuals involves charily getting the right diagnosis with an evidence-based prognosis, also taking into account the medical, ethical, and legal key factors of the ideal treatment. This paper is aimed at exploring the wide spectrum of consciousness disorders and their clinical differential diagnosis, with particular regards to those with a negative impact on patient and their caregiver quality of life, including epilepsy, sleep disorders, and vegetative/minimally conscious state. Copyright © 2016 The Lithuanian University of Health Sciences. Production and hosting by Elsevier Urban & Partner Sp. z o.o. All rights reserved.

Association of medial prefrontal cortex connectivity with consciousness level and its outcome in patients with acquired brain injury.

PubMed

Liu, Xiaoyan; Li, Jingqi; Gao, Jian; Zhou, Zhen; Meng, Fanxia; Pan, Gang; Luo, Benyan

2017-08-01

Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is usually known for participating in virtually all self related processing. However, few have investigated the role of mPFC in modulating conscious awareness. This study aimed to depict the relationship between the mPFC connectivity and the severity and outcome of the disorders of consciousness (DOC) among patients with acquired brain injury. Thirty-four patients with DOC (17 in a minimally conscious state and 17 in an unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state) and 11 healthy controls were recruited, underwent clinical assessment and resting-state functional MRI scan, and were further followed up to evaluate recovery outcome using the Glasgow Outcome Scale. The mPFC connectivity was then analyzed, by comparing DOC patients to healthy controls at baseline, and by comparing "recovered consciousness" and "non-recovered consciousness" patients at follow-up, as identified by graph theory. As a result, enhanced mPFC connectivity against weakened posteromedial cortex connectivity was observed in a minimally conscious state, not in an unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state. Besides, increased mPFC connectivity was significantly associated with consciousness recovery. In conclusion, the mPFC connectivity could possibly serve as a mark to track the severity and outcome of DOC. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The science of consciousness - Basics, models, and visions.

PubMed

Hinterberger, Thilo

2015-12-01

This article presents a few models and aspects of the phenomenon consciousness that are emerging from modern neuroscience and might serve as a basis for scientific discourse in the field of Applied Consciousness Sciences. A first model describes the dynamics of information processing in the brain. The evoked electric brain potentials represent a hierarchical sequence of functions playing an important role in conscious perception. These range from primary processing, attention, pattern recognition, categorization, associations to judgments, and complex thoughts. Most functions seem to be implemented in the brain's neural network operating as a neurobiological computer. Another model treats conscious perception as a process of internalisation leading to the "self" as conscious observer. As a consequence, every conscious perception can be seen as a reduced and already interpreted observation of an inner representation of an outer or imagined "world." Subjective experience thus offers properties which can only be experienced from the inside and cannot be made objective. Basic values of humanity such as responsibility, love, compassion, freedom, and dignity can be derived from these subjective qualities. Therefore, in contrast to the Natural Sciences, the Science of Consciousness additionally is challenged to deal with those subjective qualities, emphasizing the resulting influence on health, social interactions, and the whole society. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Afference copy as a quantitative neurophysiological model for consciousness.

PubMed

Cornelis, Hugo; Coop, Allan D

2014-06-01

Consciousness is a topic of considerable human curiosity with a long history of philosophical analysis and debate. We consider there is nothing particularly complicated about consciousness when viewed as a necessary process of the vertebrate nervous system. Here, we propose a physiological "explanatory gap" is created during each present moment by the temporal requirements of neuronal activity. The gap extends from the time exteroceptive and proprioceptive stimuli activate the nervous system until they emerge into consciousness. During this "moment", it is impossible for an organism to have any conscious knowledge of the ongoing evolution of its environment. In our schematic model, a mechanism of "afference copy" is employed to bridge the explanatory gap with consciously experienced percepts. These percepts are fabricated from the conjunction of the cumulative memory of previous relevant experience and the given stimuli. They are structured to provide the best possible prediction of the expected content of subjective conscious experience likely to occur during the period of the gap. The model is based on the proposition that the neural circuitry necessary to support consciousness is a product of sub/preconscious reflexive learning and recall processes. Based on a review of various psychological and neurophysiological findings, we develop a framework which contextualizes the model and briefly discuss further implications.

An integration of integrated information theory with fundamental physics

PubMed Central

Barrett, Adam B.

2014-01-01

To truly eliminate Cartesian ghosts from the science of consciousness, we must describe consciousness as an aspect of the physical. Integrated Information Theory states that consciousness arises from intrinsic information generated by dynamical systems; however existing formulations of this theory are not applicable to standard models of fundamental physical entities. Modern physics has shown that fields are fundamental entities, and in particular that the electromagnetic field is fundamental. Here I hypothesize that consciousness arises from information intrinsic to fundamental fields. This hypothesis unites fundamental physics with what we know empirically about the neuroscience underlying consciousness, and it bypasses the need to consider quantum effects. PMID:24550877

The "intoxication state of consciousness": a model for alcohol and drug abuse.

PubMed

Galanter, M

1976-06-01

The author describes a model of intoxicant use based on altered states of consciousness and reviews his own and others' research on marijuana to illustrate the utility of this model, which is derived from both introspective reports and observed data. The relationship of social behavior and cognitive functioning to the "intoxication state of consciousness" is discussed. This state of consciousness may have an adaptive value in engendering and stabilizing social cohesion. Possible treatment implications include cognitive labeling of cues that precipitate episodes of abuse, training for moderated drug use while patients are intoxicated, and providing abusers with altered consciousness through other means, such as meditation.

Neural signature of the conscious processing of auditory regularities

PubMed Central

Bekinschtein, Tristan A.; Dehaene, Stanislas; Rohaut, Benjamin; Tadel, François; Cohen, Laurent; Naccache, Lionel

2009-01-01

Can conscious processing be inferred from neurophysiological measurements? Some models stipulate that the active maintenance of perceptual representations across time requires consciousness. Capitalizing on this assumption, we designed an auditory paradigm that evaluates cerebral responses to violations of temporal regularities that are either local in time or global across several seconds. Local violations led to an early response in auditory cortex, independent of attention or the presence of a concurrent visual task, whereas global violations led to a late and spatially distributed response that was only present when subjects were attentive and aware of the violations. We could detect the global effect in individual subjects using functional MRI and both scalp and intracerebral event-related potentials. Recordings from 8 noncommunicating patients with disorders of consciousness confirmed that only conscious individuals presented a global effect. Taken together these observations suggest that the presence of the global effect is a signature of conscious processing, although it can be absent in conscious subjects who are not aware of the global auditory regularities. This simple electrophysiological marker could thus serve as a useful clinical tool. PMID:19164526

Effects of subconscious and conscious emotions on human cue–reward association learning

PubMed Central

Watanabe, Noriya; Haruno, Masahiko

2015-01-01

Life demands that we adapt our behaviour continuously in situations in which much of our incoming information is emotional and unrelated to our immediate behavioural goals. Such information is often processed without our consciousness. This poses an intriguing question of whether subconscious exposure to irrelevant emotional information (e.g. the surrounding social atmosphere) affects the way we learn. Here, we addressed this issue by examining whether the learning of cue-reward associations changes when an emotional facial expression is shown subconsciously or consciously prior to the presentation of a reward-predicting cue. We found that both subconscious (0.027 s and 0.033 s) and conscious (0.047 s) emotional signals increased the rate of learning, and this increase was smallest at the border of conscious duration (0.040 s). These data suggest not only that the subconscious and conscious processing of emotional signals enhances value-updating in cue–reward association learning, but also that the computational processes underlying the subconscious enhancement is at least partially dissociable from its conscious counterpart. PMID:25684237

Measuring consciousness in dreams: the lucidity and consciousness in dreams scale.

PubMed

Voss, Ursula; Schermelleh-Engel, Karin; Windt, Jennifer; Frenzel, Clemens; Hobson, Allan

2013-03-01

In this article, we present results from an interdisciplinary research project aimed at assessing consciousness in dreams. For this purpose, we compared lucid dreams with normal non-lucid dreams from REM sleep. Both lucid and non-lucid dreams are an important contrast condition for theories of waking consciousness, giving valuable insights into the structure of conscious experience and its neural correlates during sleep. However, the precise differences between lucid and non-lucid dreams remain poorly understood. The construction of the Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams scale (LuCiD) was based on theoretical considerations and empirical observations. Exploratory factor analysis of the data from the first survey identified eight factors that were validated in a second survey using confirmatory factor analysis: INSIGHT, CONTROL, THOUGHT, REALISM, MEMORY, DISSOCIATION, NEGATIVE EMOTION, and POSITIVE EMOTION. While all factors are involved in dream consciousness, realism and negative emotion do not differentiate between lucid and non-lucid dreams, suggesting that lucid insight is separable from both bizarreness in dreams and a change in the subjectively experienced realism of the dream. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Establishing consciousness in non-communicative patients: a modern-day version of the Turing test.

PubMed

Stins, John F

2009-03-01

In a recent study of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, [Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006). Detecting awareness in the vegetative state. Science, 313, 1402] claimed that they had demonstrated the presence of consciousness in this patient. This bold conclusion was based on the isomorphy between brain activity in this patient and a set of conscious control subjects, obtained in various imagery tasks. However, establishing consciousness in unresponsive patients is fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the current debate surrounding consciousness in VS patients has parallels in the artificial intelligence (AI) debate as to whether machines can think. Basically, (Owen et al., 2006) used a method analogous to the Turing test to reveal the presence of consciousness, whereas their adversaries adopted a line of reasoning akin to Searle's Chinese room argument. Highlighting the correspondence between these two debates can help to clarify the issues surrounding consciousness in non-communicative agents.

The interpersonal work of dental conscious sedation: A qualitative analysis.

PubMed

Woolley, Stephen M; Chadwick, Barbara; Pugsley, Lesley

2017-08-01

Whilst there is a considerable body of literature examining the pharmacology of conscious sedation, the social tasks required to successfully provide conscious sedation have not been reported. This paper discusses data regarding the interpersonal work integral to effective conscious sedation provision, from a larger qualitative study exploring how patients and clinicians engage with secondary care conscious sedation provided within the UK. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 13 conscious sedation providers and nine patients within UK-based secondary care sedation settings. Digital audio-recordings were transcribed verbatim and subsequently analysed using a constant comparative method within NVivo Data Analysis Software. Four main themes of interpersonal work were reported by participants: displaying care, containing emotions, demonstrating competence and maximizing the effect. This study shows that performing conscious sedation requires more than technical delivery, and involves the projection of attributes in a literal "performance." The importance of managing outward emotional appearance reflects previous dental research. The need to manage outward appearance, and the emotional impact this has, is of relevance to all clinicians. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons A/S. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Diminished self-conscious emotional responding in frontotemporal lobar degeneration patients.

PubMed

Sturm, Virginia E; Ascher, Elizabeth A; Miller, Bruce L; Levenson, Robert W

2008-12-01

Frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) is a neurodegenerative disease that dramatically alters social and emotional behavior. Recent work has suggested that self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment) may be particularly vulnerable to disruption in this disease. Self-conscious emotions require the ability to monitor the self in relation to others. These abilities are thought to be subserved by brain regions (e.g., medial prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and insula) that are particularly vulnerable to damage in FTLD. This study examined emotional responding (expressive behavior, peripheral physiology, and subjective experience) in 24 FTLD patients and 16 cognitively normal control participants using a karaoke task known to elicit self-conscious emotion reliably and a nonemotional control task (isometric handgrip). Results indicated that FTLD patients showed diminished self-conscious emotional behavior (embarrassment and amusement) and diminished physiological responding while watching themselves singing. No differences were found between patients and controls in the nonemotional control task. These findings offer evidence of marked disruption of self-conscious emotional responding in FTLD. Diminished self-conscious emotional responding likely contributes significantly to social inappropriateness and other behavioral abnormalities in FTLD. 2008 APA, all rights reserved

Diminished Self-Conscious Emotional Responding in Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration Patients

PubMed Central

Sturm, Virginia E.; Ascher, Elizabeth A.; Miller, Bruce L.; Levenson, Robert W.

2009-01-01

Frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) is a neurodegenerative disease that dramatically alters social and emotional behavior. Recent work has suggested that self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment) may be particularly vulnerable to disruption in this disease. Self-conscious emotions require the ability to monitor the self in relation to others. These abilities are thought to be subserved by brain regions (e.g., medial prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and insula) that are particularly vulnerable to damage in FTLD. This study examined emotional responding (expressive behavior, peripheral physiology, and subjective experience) in 24 FTLD patients and 16 cognitively normal control participants using a karaoke task known to elicit self-conscious emotion reliably and a nonemotional control task (isometric handgrip). Results indicated that FTLD patients showed diminished self-conscious emotional behavior (embarrassment and amusement) and diminished physiological responding while watching themselves singing. No differences were found between patients and controls in the nonemotional control task. These findings offer evidence of marked disruption of self-conscious emotional responding in FTLD. Diminished self-conscious emotional responding likely contributes significantly to social inappropriateness and other behavioral abnormalities in FTLD. PMID:19102597

Non-Conscious Perception of Emotions in Psychiatric Disorders: The Unsolved Puzzle of Psychopathology.

PubMed

Lee, Seung A; Kim, Chai-Youn; Lee, Seung-Hwan

2016-03-01

Psychophysiological and functional neuroimaging studies have frequently and consistently shown that emotional information can be processed outside of the conscious awareness. Non-conscious processing comprises automatic, uncontrolled, and fast processing that occurs without subjective awareness. However, how such non-conscious emotional processing occurs in patients with various psychiatric disorders requires further examination. In this article, we reviewed and discussed previous studies on the non-conscious emotional processing in patients diagnosed with anxiety disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression, to further understand how non-conscious emotional processing varies across these psychiatric disorders. Although the symptom profile of each disorder does not often overlap with one another, these patients commonly show abnormal emotional processing based on the pathology of their mood and cognitive function. This indicates that the observed abnormalities of emotional processing in certain social interactions may derive from a biased mood or cognition process that precedes consciously controlled and voluntary processes. Since preconscious forms of emotional processing appear to have a major effect on behaviour and cognition in patients with these disorders, further investigation is required to understand these processes and their impact on patient pathology.

Consciousness in dolphins? A review of recent evidence.

PubMed

Harley, Heidi E

2013-06-01

For millennia, dolphins have intrigued humans. Scientific study has confirmed that bottlenose dolphins are large-brained, highly social mammals with an extended developmental period, flexible cognitive capacities, and powerful acoustic abilities including a sophisticated echolocation system. These findings have led some to ask if dolphins experience aspects of consciousness. Recent investigations targeting self-recognition/self-awareness and metacognition, constructs tied to consciousness on some accounts, have analyzed the dolphin's ability to recognize itself in a mirror or on a video as well as to monitor its own knowledge in a perceptual categorization task. The current article reviews this work with dolphins and grapples with some of the challenges in designing, conducting, and interpreting these studies as well as with general issues related to studying consciousness in animals. The existing evidence does not provide a convincing case for consciousness in dolphins. For productive scientific work on consciousness in dolphins (and other animals including humans), we need clearer characterizations of consciousness, better methods for studying it, and appropriate paradigms for interpreting outcomes. A current focus on metamemory in animals offers promise for future discovery in this area.

The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis.

PubMed

Feinberg, Todd E; Mallatt, Jon

2016-07-01

While the philosophical puzzles about "life" that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the "mystery of consciousness" remains unsolved due to multiple "explanatory gaps" between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the "explanatory gaps" between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the "experiential gaps" between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

EEG and EMG responses to emotion-evoking stimuli processed without conscious awareness.

PubMed

Wexler, B E; Warrenburg, S; Schwartz, G E; Janer, L D

1992-12-01

Dichotic stimulus pairs were constructed with one word that was emotionally neutral and another that evoked either negative or positive feelings. Temporal and spectral overlap between the members of each pair was so great that the two words fused into a single auditory percept. Subjects were consciously aware of hearing only one word from most pairs; sometimes the emotion-evoking word was heard consciously, other times the neutral word was heard consciously. Subjects were instructed to let their thoughts wander in response to the word they heard, during which time EEG alpha activity over left and right frontal regions, and muscle activity (EMG) in the corrugator ("frowning") and zygomatic ("smiling") regions were recorded. Both EEG and EMG provided evidence of emotion-specific responses to stimuli that were processed without conscious awareness. Moreover both suggested relatively greater right hemisphere activity with unconscious rather than conscious processing.

Person and consciousness.

PubMed

Crosby, J F

2000-04-01

My interlocuter is Locke with his reduction of person to personal consciousness. This reduction is a main reason preventing people from acknowledging the personhood of the earliest human embryo, which lacks all personal consciousness. I show that Catholic Christians who live the sacramental life of the Church have reason to think that they are, as persons, vastly more than what they experience themselves to be, for they believe that the sacraments work effects in them as persons that can only be believed but that cannot be experienced within themselves in this life. I also show that Christians and non-Christians alike have an experience of moral good and evil in themselves that implies that they are, as moral persons, far more than they find in their conscious self-presence. It is, therefore, natural to think that if my being a person so far exceeds my consciousness, I may well have once existed as person even before the awakening of consciousness.

Alterations in the contents of consciousness in partial epileptic seizures.

PubMed

Johanson, Mirja; Valli, Katja; Revonsuo, Antti; Chaplin, John E; Wedlund, Jan-Eric

2008-08-01

Epilepsy research suffers from a deficiency of systematic studies concerning the phenomenology of the contents of consciousness during seizures, partially because of the lack of suitable research methods. The Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI), a standardized, valid, and reliable questionnaire, was used here to study which dimensions of the contents of consciousness are distorted during partial epileptic seizures compared with baseline. Further, the similarity of the altered pattern of subjective experiences across recurring seizures was also explored. Our results indicate that patients with epilepsy report alterations on most dimensions of the contents of consciousness in conjunction with seizures, but individual seizure experiences remain similar from one seizure to another. The PCI was found suitable for the assessment of subjective experiences during epileptic seizures and could be a valuable tool in providing new information about phenomenal consciousness in epilepsy in both the research and clinical settings.

[Rare consciousness disturbances in toxicological practice: akinetic mutism, somnambulism, locked-in syndrome, and psychogenic coma].

PubMed

Ciszowski, Krzysztof; Mietka-Ciszowska, Aneta

2013-01-01

The toxicity of xenobiotics can result inrare disorders of consciousness, such as akinetic mutism and somnambulism as well as syndromes mimicking consciousness disturbances, such as locked-in syndrome and psychogenic coma. Akinetic mutism is a condition characterized by a lack of spontaneous movements and little or no vocalization. Somnambulism include performing of complex motor activity in an automatic manner during deep sleep, without any awareness of its execution. The locked-in syndrome is a state with quadriplegia coexisting with cranial nerves palsies and mutism, but with fully preserved consciousness. Psychogenic coma is a condition in which the patient has preserved level of consciousness and awareness, but does not communicate with theenvironment and does not exhibit the external manifestations of consciousness. This paper presents the etiology, clinical characteristics, as well as diagnostic and therapeutic issues for the above syndromes.

The relationships among Black consciousness, self-esteem, and academic self-efficacy in African American men.

PubMed

Okech, Allan Prince; Harrington, Rick

2002-03-01

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationships among Black consciousness, self-esteem, and academic self-efficacy in African American men. The participants were 120 African American male college students at a predominantly African American university. The authors administered 3 instruments--the Developmental Inventory of Black Consciousness (DIB-C; J. Milliones, 1980), the M. Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, and R. E. Wood and E. A. Locke's (1987) Academic Self-Efficacy Scale--to test the hypotheses. They used an independent-measures t test and a Pearson r correlation to analyze the data. The results of the study supported the hypotheses under investigation. Significant positive relationships were found between Black consciousness and self-esteem and Black consciousness and academic self-efficacy. The results of the study showed that Black consciousness appears to be an important construct to use in understanding self-esteem and academic self-efficacy in African American men.

Small or big in the eyes of the other: on the developmental psychopathology of self-conscious emotions as shame, guilt, and pride.

PubMed

Muris, Peter; Meesters, Cor

2014-03-01

The self-conscious emotions of guilt, shame, and pride typically occur when people evaluate their own self through the eyes of another person. This article will first of all discuss the nature and function of self-conscious emotions, and describe their developmental course in children and adolescents. Then, a number of variables are discussed that are thought to increase young people's proneness to experience self-conscious emotions. Following this, the empirical evidence on the relationships between guilt, shame, and pride and various types of psychopathology in children and adolescents will be summarized. A model is presented to explain why these self-conscious emotions are associated with a diversity of psychopathological outcomes. Finally, recommendations for clinical practice are made in terms of assessment and interventions targeting the origins and sequelae of self-conscious emotions.

Right Orbitofrontal Cortex Mediates Conscious Olfactory Perception

PubMed Central

Li, Wen; Lopez, Leonardo; Osher, Jason; Howard, James D.; Parrish, Todd B.; Gottfried, Jay A.

2013-01-01

Understanding how the human brain translates sensory impressions into conscious percepts is a key challenge of neuroscience research. Work in this area has overwhelmingly centered on the conscious experience of vision at the exclusion of the other senses—in particular, smell. We hypothesized that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a central substrate for olfactory conscious experience because of its privileged physiological role in odor processing. Combining functional magnetic resonance imaging, peripheral autonomic recordings, and olfactory psychophysics, we studied a case of complete anosmia (smell loss) in a patient with circumscribed traumatic brain injury to the right OFC. Despite a complete absence of conscious olfaction, the patient exhibited robust “blind smell,” as indexed by reliable odor-evoked neural activity in the left OFC and normal autonomic responses to odor hedonics during presentation of stimuli to the left nostril. These data highlight the right OFC’s critical role in subserving human olfactory consciousness. PMID:20817780

Perceptual integration without conscious access

PubMed Central

van Leeuwen, Jonathan; Olivers, Christian N. L.

2017-01-01

The visual system has the remarkable ability to integrate fragmentary visual input into a perceptually organized collection of surfaces and objects, a process we refer to as perceptual integration. Despite a long tradition of perception research, it is not known whether access to consciousness is required to complete perceptual integration. To investigate this question, we manipulated access to consciousness using the attentional blink. We show that, behaviorally, the attentional blink impairs conscious decisions about the presence of integrated surface structure from fragmented input. However, despite conscious access being impaired, the ability to decode the presence of integrated percepts remains intact, as shown through multivariate classification analyses of electroencephalogram (EEG) data. In contrast, when disrupting perception through masking, decisions about integrated percepts and decoding of integrated percepts are impaired in tandem, while leaving feedforward representations intact. Together, these data show that access consciousness and perceptual integration can be dissociated. PMID:28325878

Multimodal neuroimaging investigations of alterations to consciousness: the relationship between absence epilepsy and sleep.

PubMed

Bagshaw, Andrew P; Rollings, David T; Khalsa, Sakh; Cavanna, Andrea E

2014-01-01

The link between epilepsy and sleep is well established on many levels. The focus of the current review is on recent neuroimaging investigations into the alterations of consciousness that are observed during absence seizures and the descent into sleep. Functional neuroimaging provides simultaneous cortical and subcortical recording of activity throughout the brain, allowing a detailed definition and characterization of large-scale brain networks and the interactions between them. This has led to the identification of a set of regions which collectively form the consciousness system, which includes contributions from the default mode network (DMN), ascending arousal systems, and the thalamus. Electrophysiological and neuroimaging investigations have also clearly demonstrated the importance of thalamocortical and corticothalamic networks in the evolution of sleep and absence epilepsy, two phenomena in which the subject experiences an alteration to the conscious state and a disconnection from external input. However, the precise relationship between the consciousness system, thalamocortical networks, and consciousness itself remains to be clarified. One of the fundamental challenges is to understand how distributed brain networks coordinate their activity in order to maintain and implement complex behaviors such as consciousness and how modifications to this network activity lead to alterations in consciousness. By taking into account not only the level of activation of individual brain regions but also their connectivity within specific networks and the activity and connectivity of other relevant networks, a more specific quantification of brain states can be achieved. This, in turn, may provide a more fundamental understanding of the alterations to consciousness experienced in sleep and epilepsy. © 2013.

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual perception: From a plethora of phenomena to general principles

PubMed Central

Kiefer, Markus; Ansorge, Ulrich; Haynes, John-Dylan; Hamker, Fred; Mattler, Uwe; Verleger, Rolf; Niedeggen, Michael

2011-01-01

Psychological and neuroscience approaches have promoted much progress in elucidating the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie phenomenal visual awareness during the last decades. In this article, we provide an overview of the latest research investigating important phenomena in conscious and unconscious vision. We identify general principles to characterize conscious and unconscious visual perception, which may serve as important building blocks for a unified model to explain the plethora of findings. We argue that in particular the integration of principles from both conscious and unconscious vision is advantageous and provides critical constraints for developing adequate theoretical models. Based on the principles identified in our review, we outline essential components of a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception. We propose that awareness refers to consolidated visual representations, which are accessible to the entire brain and therefore globally available. However, visual awareness not only depends on consolidation within the visual system, but is additionally the result of a post-sensory gating process, which is mediated by higher-level cognitive control mechanisms. We further propose that amplification of visual representations by attentional sensitization is not exclusive to the domain of conscious perception, but also applies to visual stimuli, which remain unconscious. Conscious and unconscious processing modes are highly interdependent with influences in both directions. We therefore argue that exactly this interdependence renders a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception valuable. Computational modeling jointly with focused experimental research could lead to a better understanding of the plethora of empirical phenomena in consciousness research. PMID:22253669

A common neural code for similar conscious experiences in different individuals

PubMed Central

Naci, Lorina; Cusack, Rhodri; Anello, Mimma; Owen, Adrian M.

2014-01-01

The interpretation of human consciousness from brain activity, without recourse to speech or action, is one of the most provoking and challenging frontiers of modern neuroscience. We asked whether there is a common neural code that underpins similar conscious experiences, which could be used to decode these experiences in the absence of behavior. To this end, we used richly evocative stimulation (an engaging movie) portraying real-world events to elicit a similar conscious experience in different people. Common neural correlates of conscious experience were quantified and related to measurable, quantitative and qualitative, executive components of the movie through two additional behavioral investigations. The movie’s executive demands drove synchronized brain activity across healthy participants’ frontal and parietal cortices in regions known to support executive function. Moreover, the timing of activity in these regions was predicted by participants’ highly similar qualitative experience of the movie’s moment-to-moment executive demands, suggesting that synchronization of activity across participants underpinned their similar experience. Thus we demonstrate, for the first time to our knowledge, that a neural index based on executive function reliably predicted every healthy individual’s similar conscious experience in response to real-world events unfolding over time. This approach provided strong evidence for the conscious experience of a brain-injured patient, who had remained entirely behaviorally nonresponsive for 16 y. The patient’s executive engagement and moment-to-moment perception of the movie content were highly similar to that of every healthy participant. These findings shed light on the common basis of human consciousness and enable the interpretation of conscious experience in the absence of behavior. PMID:25225384

Avian reflex and electroencephalogram responses in different states of consciousness.

PubMed

Sandercock, Dale A; Auckburally, Adam; Flaherty, Derek; Sandilands, Victoria; McKeegan, Dorothy E F

2014-06-22

Defining states of clinical consciousness in animals is important in veterinary anaesthesia and in studies of euthanasia and welfare assessment at slaughter. The aim of this study was to validate readily observable reflex responses in relation to different conscious states, as confirmed by EEG analysis, in two species of birds under laboratory conditions (35-week-old layer hens (n=12) and 11-week-old turkeys (n=10)). We evaluated clinical reflexes and characterised electroencephalograph (EEG) activity (as a measure of brain function) using spectral analyses in four different clinical states of consciousness: conscious (fully awake), semi-conscious (sedated), unconscious-optimal (general anaesthesia), unconscious-sub optimal (deep hypnotic state), as well as assessment immediately following euthanasia. Jaw or neck muscle tone was the most reliable reflex measure distinguishing between conscious and unconscious states. Pupillary reflex was consistently observed until respiratory arrest. Nictitating membrane reflex persisted for a short time (<1 min) after respiratory arrest and brain death (isoelectric EEG). The results confirm that the nictitating membrane reflex is a conservative measure of death in poultry. Using spectral analyses of the EEG waveforms it was possible to readily distinguish between the different states of clinical consciousness. In all cases, when birds progressed from a conscious to unconscious state; total spectral power (PTOT) significantly increased, whereas median (F50) and spectral edge (F95) frequencies significantly decreased. This study demonstrates that EEG analysis can differentiate between clinical states (and loss of brain function at death) in birds and provides a unique integration of reflex responses and EEG activity. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Extending Gurwitsch's field theory of consciousness.

PubMed

Yoshimi, Jeff; Vinson, David W

2015-07-01

Aron Gurwitsch's theory of the structure and dynamics of consciousness has much to offer contemporary theorizing about consciousness and its basis in the embodied brain. On Gurwitsch's account, as we develop it, the field of consciousness has a variable sized focus or "theme" of attention surrounded by a structured periphery of inattentional contents. As the field evolves, its contents change their status, sometimes smoothly, sometimes abruptly. Inner thoughts, a sense of one's body, and the physical environment are dominant field contents. These ideas can be linked with (and help unify) contemporary theories about the neural correlates of consciousness, inattention, the small world structure of the brain, meta-stable dynamics, embodied cognition, and predictive coding in the brain. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Insights into plant consciousness from neuroscience, physics and mathematics: A role for quasicrystals?

PubMed Central

2012-01-01

There is considerable debate over whether plants are conscious and this, indeed, is an important question. Here I look at developments in neuroscience, physics and mathematics that may impact on this question. Two major concomitants of consciousness in animals are microtubule function and electrical gamma wave synchrony. Both these factors may also play a role in plant consciousness. I show that plants possess aperiodic quasicrystal structures composed of ribosomes that may enable quantum computing, which has been suggested to lie at the core of animal consciousness. Finally I look at whether a microtubule fractal suggests that electric current plays a part in conventional neurocomputing processes in plants. PMID:22899055

Insights into plant consciousness from neuroscience, physics and mathematics: a role for quasicrystals?

PubMed

Gardiner, John

2012-09-01

There is considerable debate over whether plants are conscious and this, indeed, is an important question. Here I look at developments in neuroscience, physics and mathematics that may impact on this question. Two major concomitants of consciousness in animals are microtubule function and electrical gamma wave synchrony. Both these factors may also play a role in plant consciousness. I show that plants possess aperiodic quasicrystal structures composed of ribosomes that may enable quantum computing, which has been suggested to lie at the core of animal consciousness. Finally I look at whether a microtubule fractal suggests that electric current plays a part in conventional neurocomputing processes in plants.

Paradigms for environmentally conscious manufacturing

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Edinbarough, Immanuel A.; Wells, Wayne E.

2004-12-01

There are several stories involving the industries that pledge themselves for the environmentally conscious manufacturing practices. Paradigms for environmentally conscious manufacturing are associated with one of the aspects of environmental quality, protection, resource management, commitment or sustainability. The engineering rules of thumb that can easily be adopted by aspiring companies need identification. The underlying thread that unifies the efforts of environmentally conscious manufacturing companies, in offering the environmentally safe products to the world, is grouped and presented in the paper as paradigms for successful practices. The various ways in which a start up company, that wants to excel in environmentally conscious manufacturing, can position itself based on the paradigms is also discussed in the paper.

Neural correlates of processing "self-conscious" vs. "basic" emotions.

PubMed

Gilead, Michael; Katzir, Maayan; Eyal, Tal; Liberman, Nira

2016-01-29

Self-conscious emotions are prevalent in our daily lives and play an important role in both normal and pathological behavior. Despite their immense significance, the neural substrates that are involved in the processing of such emotions are surprisingly under-studied. In light of this, we conducted an fMRI study in which participants thought of various personal events which elicited feelings of negative and positive self-conscious (i.e., guilt, pride) or basic (i.e., anger, joy) emotions. We performed a conjunction analysis to investigate the neural correlates associated with processing events that are related to self-conscious vs. basic emotions, irrespective of valence. The results show that processing self-conscious emotions resulted in activation within frontal areas associated with self-processing and self-control, namely, the mPFC extending to the dACC, and within the lateral-dorsal prefrontal cortex. Processing basic emotions resulted in activation throughout relatively phylogenetically-ancient regions of the cortex, namely in visual and tactile processing areas and in the insular cortex. Furthermore, self-conscious emotions differentially activated the mPFC such that the negative self-conscious emotion (guilt) was associated with a more dorsal activation, and the positive self-conscious emotion (pride) was associated with a more ventral activation. We discuss how these results shed light on the nature of mental representations and neural systems involved in self-reflective and affective processing. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Return of consciousness during ongoing cardiopulmonary resuscitation: A systematic review.

PubMed

Olaussen, Alexander; Shepherd, Matthew; Nehme, Ziad; Smith, Karen; Bernard, Stephen; Mitra, Biswadev

2015-01-01

Cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) may generate sufficient cerebral perfusion pressure to make the patient conscious. The incidence and management of this phenomenon are not well described. This systematic review aims to identifying cases where CPR-induced consciousness is mentioned in the literature and explore its management options. The databases Medline, PubMed, EMBASE, Cinahl and the Cochrane Library were searched from their commencement to the 8th July 2014. We also searched Google (scholar) for grey literature. We combined MeSH terms and text words for consciousness and CPR, and included studies of all types. The search yielded 1997 unique records, of which 50 abstracts were reviewed. Nine reports, describing 10 patients, were relevant. Six of the patients had CPR performed by mechanical devices, three of these patients were sedated. Four patients arrested in the out-of-hospital setting and six arrested in hospital. There were four survivors. Varying levels of consciousness were described in all reports, including purposeful arm movements, verbal communication, and resuscitation interference. Management strategies directed at consciousness were offered to six patients and included both physical and chemical restraints. CPR-induced consciousness was infrequently reported in the medical literature, and varied in management. Given the increasing use of mechanical CPR, guidelines to identify and manage consciousness during CPR are required. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

A mathematical model of embodied consciousness.

PubMed

Rudrauf, David; Bennequin, Daniel; Granic, Isabela; Landini, Gregory; Friston, Karl; Williford, Kenneth

2017-09-07

We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), which is based on the hypothesis that the spatial field of consciousness (FoC) is structured by a projective geometry and under the control of a process of active inference. The FoC in the PCM combines multisensory evidence with prior beliefs in memory and frames them by selecting points of view and perspectives according to preferences. The choice of projective frames governs how expectations are transformed by consciousness. Violations of expectation are encoded as free energy. Free energy minimization drives perspective taking, and controls the switch between perception, imagination and action. In the PCM, consciousness functions as an algorithm for the maximization of resilience, using projective perspective taking and imagination in order to escape local minima of free energy. The PCM can account for a variety of psychological phenomena: the characteristic spatial phenomenology of subjective experience, the distinctions and integral relationships between perception, imagination and action, the role of affective processes in intentionality, but also perceptual phenomena such as the dynamics of bistable figures and body swap illusions in virtual reality. It relates phenomenology to function, showing the computational advantages of consciousness. It suggests that changes of brain states from unconscious to conscious reflect the action of projective transformations and suggests specific neurophenomenological hypotheses about the brain, guidelines for designing artificial systems, and formal principles for psychology. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Testing Proposed Neuronal Models of Effective Connectivity Within the Cortico-basal Ganglia-thalamo-cortical Loop During Loss of Consciousness.

PubMed

Crone, Julia Sophia; Lutkenhoff, Evan Scott; Bio, Branden Joseph; Laureys, Steven; Monti, Martin Max

2017-04-01

In recent years, a number of brain regions and connectivity patterns have been proposed to be crucial for loss and recovery of consciousness but have not been compared in detail. In a 3 T resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we test the plausibility of these different neuronal models derived from theoretical and empirical knowledge. Specifically, we assess the fit of each model to the dynamic change in effective connectivity between specific cortical and subcortical regions at different consecutive levels of propofol-induced sedation by employing spectral dynamic causal modeling. Surprisingly, our findings indicate that proposed models of impaired consciousness do not fit the observed patterns of effective connectivity. Rather, the data show that loss of consciousness, at least in the context of propofol-induced sedation, is marked by a breakdown of corticopetal projections from the globus pallidus. Effective connectivity between the globus pallidus and the ventral posterior cingulate cortex, present during wakefulness, fades in the transition from lightly sedated to full loss of consciousness and returns gradually as consciousness recovers, thereby, demonstrating the dynamic shift in brain architecture of the posterior cingulate "hub" during changing states of consciousness. These findings highlight the functional role of a previously underappreciated direct pallido-cortical connectivity in supporting consciousness. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Using category theory to assess the relationship between consciousness and integrated information theory.

PubMed

Tsuchiya, Naotsugu; Taguchi, Shigeru; Saigo, Hayato

2016-06-01

One of the most mysterious phenomena in science is the nature of conscious experience. Due to its subjective nature, a reductionist approach is having a hard time in addressing some fundamental questions about consciousness. These questions are squarely and quantitatively tackled by a recently developed theoretical framework, called integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. In particular, IIT proposes that a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS) is identical to conscious experience. However, there has been no principled way to assess the claimed identity. Here, we propose to apply a mathematical formalism, category theory, to assess the proposed identity and suggest that it is important to consider if there exists a proper translation between the domain of conscious experience and that of the MICS. If such translation exists, we postulate that questions in one domain can be answered in the other domain; very difficult questions in the domain of consciousness can be resolved in the domain of mathematics. We claim that it is possible to empirically test if such a functor exists, by using a combination of neuroscientific and computational approaches. Our general, principled and empirical framework allows us to assess the relationship between the domain of consciousness and the domain of mathematical structures, including those suggested by IIT. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Abnormal corticospinal excitability in patients with disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Lapitskaya, Natallia; Gosseries, Olivia; De Pasqua, Victor; Pedersen, Asger Roer; Nielsen, Joergen Feldbaek; de Noordhout, Alain Maertens; Laureys, Steven

2013-07-01

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has been frequently used to explore changes in the human motor cortex in different conditions, while the extent of motor cortex reorganization in patients in vegetative state (VS) (now known as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, UWS) and minimally conscious (MCS) states due to severe brain damage remains largely unknown. It was hypothesized that cortical motor excitability would be decreased and would correlate to the level of consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness. Corticospinal excitability was assessed in 47 patients (24 VS/UWS and 23 MCS) and 14 healthy controls. The test parameters included maximal peak-to-peak M-wave (Mmax), F-wave persistence, peripheral and central motor conduction times, sensory (SEP) and motor evoked (MEP) potential latencies and amplitudes, resting motor threshold (RMT), stimulus/response curves, and short latency afferent inhibition (SAI). TMS measurements were correlated to the level of consciousness (assessed using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised). On average, the patient group had lower Mmax, lower MEP and SEP amplitudes, higher RMTs, narrower stimulus/response curves, and reduced SAI compared to the healthy controls (P < 0.05). The SAI alterations were correlated to the level of consciousness (P < 0.05). The findings demonstrated the impairment of the cortical inhibitory circuits in patients with disorders of consciousness. Moreover, the significant relationship was found between cortical inhibition and clinical consciousness dysfunction. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Visible propagation from invisible exogenous cueing.

PubMed

Lin, Zhicheng; Murray, Scott O

2013-09-20

Perception and performance is affected not just by what we see but also by what we do not see-inputs that escape our awareness. While conscious processing and unconscious processing have been assumed to be separate and independent, here we report the propagation of unconscious exogenous cueing as determined by conscious motion perception. In a paradigm combining masked exogenous cueing and apparent motion, we show that, when an onset cue was rendered invisible, the unconscious exogenous cueing effect traveled, manifesting at uncued locations (4° apart) in accordance with conscious perception of visual motion; the effect diminished when the cue-to-target distance was 8° apart. In contrast, conscious exogenous cueing manifested in both distances. Further evidence reveals that the unconscious and conscious nonretinotopic effects could not be explained by an attentional gradient, nor by bottom-up, energy-based motion mechanisms, but rather they were subserved by top-down, tracking-based motion mechanisms. We thus term these effects mobile cueing. Taken together, unconscious mobile cueing effects (a) demonstrate a previously unknown degree of flexibility of unconscious exogenous attention; (b) embody a simultaneous dissociation and association of attention and consciousness, in which exogenous attention can occur without cue awareness ("dissociation"), yet at the same time its effect is contingent on conscious motion tracking ("association"); and (c) underscore the interaction of conscious and unconscious processing, providing evidence for an unconscious effect that is not automatic but controlled.

Précis of the illusion of conscious will.

PubMed

Wegner, Daniel M

2004-10-01

The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and schizophrenic auditory hallucinations. And in people without disorders, phenomena such as hypnosis, automatic writing, Ouija board spelling, water dowsing, facilitated communication, speaking in tongues, spirit possession, and trance channeling also illustrate anomalies of will--cases when actions occur without will or will occurs without action. This book brings these cases together with research evidence from laboratories in psychology to explore a theory of apparent mental causation. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and appears exclusive of salient alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the action. Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind interprets itself--not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced.

Is Schizophrenia a Disorder of Consciousness? Experimental and Phenomenological Support for Anomalous Unconscious Processing

PubMed Central

Giersch, Anne; Mishara, Aaron L.

2017-01-01

Decades ago, several authors have proposed that disorders in automatic processing lead to intrusive symptoms or abnormal contents in the consciousness of people with schizophrenia. However, since then, studies have mainly highlighted difficulties in patients’ conscious experiencing and processing but rarely explored how unconscious and conscious mechanisms may interact in producing this experience. We report three lines of research, focusing on the processing of spatial frequencies, unpleasant information, and time-event structure that suggest that impairments occur at both the unconscious and conscious level. We argue that focusing on unconscious, physiological and automatic processing of information in patients, while contrasting that processing with conscious processing, is a first required step before understanding how distortions or other impairments emerge at the conscious level. We then indicate that the phenomenological tradition of psychiatry supports a similar claim and provides a theoretical framework helping to understand the relationship between the impairments and clinical symptoms. We base our argument on the presence of disorders in the minimal self in patients with schizophrenia. The minimal self is tacit and non-verbal and refers to the sense of bodily presence. We argue this sense is shaped by unconscious processes, whose alteration may thus affect the feeling of being a unique individual. This justifies a focus on unconscious mechanisms and a distinction from those associated with consciousness. PMID:29033868

Gradations of awareness in a modified sequence learning task.

PubMed

Norman, Elisabeth; Price, Mark C; Duff, Simon C; Mentzoni, Rune A

2007-12-01

We argue performance in the serial reaction time (SRT) task is associated with gradations of awareness that provide examples of fringe consciousness [Mangan, B. (1993b). Taking phenomenology seriously: the "fringe" and its implications for cognitive research. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 89-108, Mangan, B. (2003). The conscious "fringe": Bringing William James up to date. In B. J. Baars, W. P. Banks & J. B. Newman (Eds.), Essential sources in the scientific study of consciousness (pp. 741-759). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.], and address limitations of the traditional SRT procedure, including criticism of exclusion generation tasks. Two experiments are conducted with a modified SRT procedure where irrelevant stimulus attributes obscure the sequence rule. Our modified paradigm, which includes a novel exclusion task, makes it easier to demonstrate a previously controversial influence of response stimulus interval (RSI) on awareness. It also allows identification of participants showing fringe consciousness rather than explicit sequence knowledge, as reflected by dissociations between different awareness measures. The NEO-PI-R variable Openness to Feelings influenced the diversity of subjective feelings reported during two awareness measures, but not the degree of learning and awareness as previously found with traditional SRT tasks [Norman, E., Price, M. C., & Duff, S. C. (2006). Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(4), 723-760.]. This suggests possible distinctions between two components of fringe consciousness.

The Emergence of Primary Anoetic Consciousness in Episodic Memory

PubMed Central

Vandekerckhove, Marie; Bulnes, Luis Carlo; Panksepp, Jaak

2014-01-01

Based on an interdisciplinary perspective, we discuss how primary-process, anoetic forms of consciousness emerge into higher forms of awareness such as knowledge-based episodic knowing and self-aware forms of higher-order consciousness like autonoetic awareness. Anoetic consciousness is defined as the rudimentary state of affective, homeostatic, and sensory-perceptual mental experiences. It can be considered as the autonomic flow of primary-process phenomenal experiences that reflects a fundamental form of first-person “self-experience,” a vastly underestimated primary form of phenomenal consciousness. We argue that this anoetic form of evolutionarily refined consciousness constitutes a critical antecedent that is foundational for all forms of knowledge acquisition via learning and memory, giving rise to a knowledge-based, or noetic, consciousness as well as higher forms of “awareness” or “knowing consciousness” that permits “time-travel” in the brain-mind. We summarize the conceptual advantages of such a multi-tiered neuroevolutionary approach to psychological issues, namely from genetically controlled primary (affective) and secondary (learning and memory), to higher tertiary (developmentally emergent) brain-mind processes, along with suggestions about how affective experiences become more cognitive and object-oriented, allowing the developmental creation of more subtle higher mental processes such as episodic memory which allows the possibility of autonoetic consciousness, namely looking forward and backward at one’s life and its possibilities within the “mind’s eye.” PMID:24427125

Does perceptual learning require consciousness or attention?

PubMed

Meuwese, Julia D I; Post, Ruben A G; Scholte, H Steven; Lamme, Victor A F

2013-10-01

It has been proposed that visual attention and consciousness are separate [Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. Attention and consciousness: Two distinct brain processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 16-22, 2007] and possibly even orthogonal processes [Lamme, V. A. F. Why visual attention and awareness are different. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 12-18, 2003]. Attention and consciousness converge when conscious visual percepts are attended and hence become available for conscious report. In such a view, a lack of reportability can have two causes: the absence of attention or the absence of a conscious percept. This raises an important question in the field of perceptual learning. It is known that learning can occur in the absence of reportability [Gutnisky, D. A., Hansen, B. J., Iliescu, B. F., & Dragoi, V. Attention alters visual plasticity during exposure-based learning. Current Biology, 19, 555-560, 2009; Seitz, A. R., Kim, D., & Watanabe, T. Rewards evoke learning of unconsciously processed visual stimuli in adult humans. Neuron, 61, 700-707, 2009; Seitz, A. R., & Watanabe, T. Is subliminal learning really passive? Nature, 422, 36, 2003; Watanabe, T., Náñez, J. E., & Sasaki, Y. Perceptual learning without perception. Nature, 413, 844-848, 2001], but it is unclear which of the two ingredients-consciousness or attention-is not necessary for learning. We presented textured figure-ground stimuli and manipulated reportability either by masking (which only interferes with consciousness) or with an inattention paradigm (which only interferes with attention). During the second session (24 hr later), learning was assessed neurally and behaviorally, via differences in figure-ground ERPs and via a detection task. Behavioral and neural learning effects were found for stimuli presented in the inattention paradigm and not for masked stimuli. Interestingly, the behavioral learning effect only became apparent when performance feedback was given on the task to measure learning, suggesting that the memory trace that is formed during inattention is latent until accessed. The results suggest that learning requires consciousness, and not attention, and further strengthen the idea that consciousness is separate from attention.

Interdisciplinary Research and Phenomenology as Parallel Processes of Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Arvidson, P. Sven

2016-01-01

There are significant parallels between interdisciplinarity and phenomenology. Interdisciplinary conscious processes involve identifying relevant disciplines, evaluating each disciplinary insight, and creating common ground. In an analogous way, phenomenology involves conscious processes of epoché, reduction, and eidetic variation. Each stresses…

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago

PubMed Central

Feinberg, Todd E.; Mallatt, Jon

2013-01-01

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived from ectodermal placodes and neural crest, transformed primitive reflexive systems into image forming brains that map and perceive the external world and the body's interior. We posit that the minimum requirement for sensory consciousness and qualia is a brain including a forebrain (but not necessarily a developed cerebral cortex/pallium), midbrain, and hindbrain. This brain must also have (1) hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically organized, processing nuclei that extensively integrate the different senses into representations that emerge in upper levels of the neural hierarchy; and (2) a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and contributes to attention, awareness, and neural synchronization. We propose a two-step evolutionary history, in which the optic tectum was the original center of multi-sensory conscious perception (as in fish and amphibians: step 1), followed by a gradual shift of this center to the dorsal pallium or its cerebral cortex (in mammals, reptiles, birds: step 2). We address objections to the hypothesis and call for more studies of fish and amphibians. In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known. PMID:24109460

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.

PubMed

Feinberg, Todd E; Mallatt, Jon

2013-01-01

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived from ectodermal placodes and neural crest, transformed primitive reflexive systems into image forming brains that map and perceive the external world and the body's interior. We posit that the minimum requirement for sensory consciousness and qualia is a brain including a forebrain (but not necessarily a developed cerebral cortex/pallium), midbrain, and hindbrain. This brain must also have (1) hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically organized, processing nuclei that extensively integrate the different senses into representations that emerge in upper levels of the neural hierarchy; and (2) a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and contributes to attention, awareness, and neural synchronization. We propose a two-step evolutionary history, in which the optic tectum was the original center of multi-sensory conscious perception (as in fish and amphibians: step 1), followed by a gradual shift of this center to the dorsal pallium or its cerebral cortex (in mammals, reptiles, birds: step 2). We address objections to the hypothesis and call for more studies of fish and amphibians. In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known.

On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jahn, Robert G.; Dunne, Brenda J.

1986-08-01

Theoretical explication of a growing body of empirical data on consciousness-related anomalous phenomena is unlikely to be achieved in terms of known physical processes. Rather, it will first be necessary to formulate the basic role of consciousness in the definition of reality before such anomalous experience can adequately be represented. This paper takes the position that reality is constituted only in the interaction of consciousness with its environment, and therefore that any scheme of conceptual organization developed to represent that reality must reflect the processes of consciousness as well as those of its environment. In this spirit, the concepts and formalisms of elementary quantum mechanics, as originally proposed to explain anomalous atomic-scale physical phenomena, are appropriated via metaphor to represent the general characteristics of consciousness interacting with any environment. More specifically, if consciousness is represented by a quantum mechanical wave function, and its environment by an appropriate potential profile, Schrödinger wave mechanics defines eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that can be associated with the cognitive and emotional experiences of that consciousness in that environment. To articulate this metaphor it is necessary to associate certain aspects of the formalism, such as the coordinate system, the quantum numbers, and even the metric itself, with various impressionistic descriptors of consciousness, such as its intensity, perspective, approach/avoidance attitude, balance between cognitive and emotional activity, and receptive/assertive disposition. With these established, a number of the generic features of quantum mechanics, such as the wave/particle duality, and the uncertainty, indistinguishability, and exclusion principles, display metaphoric relevance to familiar individual and collective experiences. Similarly, such traditional quantum theoretic exercises as the central force field and atomic structure, covalent molecular bonds, barrier penetration, and quantum statistical collective behavior become useful analogies for representation of a variety of consciousness experiences, both normal and anomalous, and for the design of experiments to study these systematically.

[The neurodynamic core of consciousness and neural Darwinism].

PubMed

Ibáñez, A

In the last decades, the scientific study of consciousness in the scope of the cognitive neurosciences can be considered one of the greatest challenges of contemporary science. The Gerald Edelman theory of consciousness is one of the most promising and controversial perspectives. This theory stands out by its approach to topics usually rejected by other neurophysiologic theories of consciousness, as the case of the neurophysiologic explanation of qualia. The goal of this paper is to review the dynamic core theory of consciousness, presenting the main features of the theory, analyzing the explanation strategies, their empirical extensions, and elaborating some critical considerations about the possibility of the neuroscientific study of qualia. The central and additional theoretical components are analyzed, emphasizing its ontological, restrictive and explanatory assumptions. The properties of conscious phenomena and their cerebral correlates as advanced by the theory are described, and finally its experiments and empirical extensions are examined. The explanatory strategies of the theory are analyzed, based on conceptual isomorphism between the phenomenological properties and the neurophysiological and mathematical measures. Some criticisms could be raised about the limitations of the dynamic core theory, especially regarding its account of the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness or qualia.

Occipital MEG Activity in the Early Time Range (<300 ms) Predicts Graded Changes in Perceptual Consciousness.

PubMed

Andersen, Lau M; Pedersen, Michael N; Sandberg, Kristian; Overgaard, Morten

2016-06-01

Two electrophysiological components have been extensively investigated as candidate neural correlates of perceptual consciousness: An early, occipitally realized component occurring 130-320 ms after stimulus onset and a late, frontally realized component occurring 320-510 ms after stimulus onset. Recent studies have suggested that the late component may not be uniquely related to perceptual consciousness, but also to sensory expectations, task associations, and selective attention. We conducted a magnetoencephalographic study; using multivariate analysis, we compared classification accuracies when decoding perceptual consciousness from the 2 components using sources from occipital and frontal lobes. We found that occipital sources during the early time range were significantly more accurate in decoding perceptual consciousness than frontal sources during both the early and late time ranges. These results are the first of its kind where the predictive values of the 2 components are quantitatively compared, and they provide further evidence for the primary importance of occipital sources in realizing perceptual consciousness. The results have important consequences for current theories of perceptual consciousness, especially theories emphasizing the role of frontal sources. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Neurostimulation to improve level of consciousness in patients with epilepsy.

PubMed

Gummadavelli, Abhijeet; Kundishora, Adam J; Willie, Jon T; Andrews, John P; Gerrard, Jason L; Spencer, Dennis D; Blumenfeld, Hal

2015-06-01

When drug-resistant epilepsy is poorly localized or surgical resection is contraindicated, current neurostimulation strategies such as deep brain stimulation and vagal nerve stimulation can palliate the frequency or severity of seizures. However, despite medical and neuromodulatory therapy, a significant proportion of patients continue to experience disabling seizures that impair awareness, causing disability and risking injury or sudden unexplained death. We propose a novel strategy in which neuromodulation is used not only to reduce seizures but also to ameliorate impaired consciousness when the patient is in the ictal and postictal states. Improving or preventing alterations in level of consciousness may have an effect on morbidity (e.g., accidents, drownings, falls), risk for death, and quality of life. Recent studies may have elucidated underlying networks and mechanisms of impaired consciousness and yield potential novel targets for neuromodulation. The feasibility, benefits, and pitfalls of potential deep brain stimulation targets are illustrated in human and animal studies involving minimally conscious/vegetative states, movement disorders, depth of anesthesia, sleep-wake regulation, and epilepsy. We review evidence that viable therapeutic targets for impaired consciousness associated with seizures may be provided by key nodes of the consciousness system in the brainstem reticular activating system, hypothalamus, basal ganglia, thalamus, and basal forebrain.

Mismatch negativity to the patient's own name in chronic disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Qin, Pengmin; Di, Haibo; Yan, Xiaodan; Yu, Senming; Yu, Dan; Laureys, Steven; Weng, Xuchu

2008-12-19

Previous studies implicated potential value of mismatch negativity (MMN) in predicting recovery of consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC). We have adopted a novel MMN evoked by subject's own name (SON), a self-referential stimulus thought to be powerful in evoking residual brain activity, and examined the correlation between the MMN and recovery of consciousness in patients with chronic (>1 month) DOC. Twelve patients and 12 age-matched healthy controls were investigated. The patients were diagnosed as coma (n=4), vegetative state (VS, n=6), and minimally conscious state (MCS, n=2), mainly based on the JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised. The SON-evoked MMN (SON-MMN) was present in seven patients. Critically, the presence of SON-MMN was significantly correlated with recovery of consciousness. While four of the five patients (three VS and two coma) showing SON-MMN changed to MCS 3 months later, the rest of the patients (three VS and two coma) without SON-MMN failed to show any clinical improvement. Our study thus illustrates that the subject's own name is effective in evoking MMN in patients with DOC, and that SON-MMN has potential prognostic values in predicting recovery of consciousness.

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation

PubMed Central

Raffone, Antonino; Srinivasan, Narayanan; van Leeuwen, Cees

2014-01-01

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAW is controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation. PMID:24639586

Body conscious? Interoceptive awareness, measured by heartbeat perception, is negatively correlated with self-objectification.

PubMed

Ainley, Vivien; Tsakiris, Manos

2013-01-01

'Self-objectification' is the tendency to experience one's body principally as an object, to be evaluated for its appearance rather than for its effectiveness. Within objectification theory, it has been proposed that self-objectification accounts for the poorer interoceptive awareness observed in women, as measured by heartbeat perception. Our study is, we believe, the first specifically to test this relationship. Using a well-validated and reliable heartbeat perception task, we measured interoceptive awareness in women and compared this with their scores on the Self-Objectification Questionnaire, the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Body Consciousness Questionnaire. Interoceptive awareness was negatively correlated with self-objectification. Interoceptive awareness, public body consciousness and private body consciousness together explained 31% of the variance in self-objectification. However, private body consciousness was not significantly correlated with interoceptive awareness, which may explain the many nonsignificant results in self-objectification studies that have used private body consciousness as a measure of body awareness. We propose interoceptive awareness, assessed by heartbeat perception, as a measure of body awareness in self-objectification studies. Our findings have implications for those clinical conditions, in women, which are characterised by self-objectification and low interoceptive awareness, such as eating disorders.

Age and the experience of strong self-conscious emotion.

PubMed

Henry, Julie D; von Hippel, William; Nangle, Matthew R; Waters, Michele

2018-04-01

It remains unclear whether there are age-related changes in the experience of strong self-conscious emotion, such as shame, guilt, pride and embarrassment. Because shame and guilt figure prominently in the aetiology of depressive symptoms and other mental health problems, a better understanding of how age affects the strong experience of these two negative self-conscious emotions is of particular importance. Thirty younger, 30 middle-aged and 30 older adults were compared on standardised cognitive assessments, in addition to an interview-based measure that assessed whether there are age differences in the likelihood of strongly experiencing four different types of self-conscious emotion within the past five years (shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride). The three groups did not differ in their likelihood of reporting an event that strongly elicited the positive self-conscious emotion of pride. However, older adults were more likely to report sources of pride that were other (as opposed to self) focused. Older adults were also less likely to report experiencing events that elicited all three negative self-conscious emotions, in particular, shame. Strong negative self-conscious emotion, and in particular shame, appears to be experienced less by older than younger adults.

Spatiotemporal Dissociation of Brain Activity Underlying Subjective Awareness, Objective Performance and Confidence

PubMed Central

Li, Qi; Hill, Zachary

2014-01-01

Despite intense recent research, the neural correlates of conscious visual perception remain elusive. The most established paradigm for studying brain mechanisms underlying conscious perception is to keep the physical sensory inputs constant and identify brain activities that correlate with the changing content of conscious awareness. However, such a contrast based on conscious content alone would not only reveal brain activities directly contributing to conscious perception, but also include brain activities that precede or follow it. To address this issue, we devised a paradigm whereby we collected, trial-by-trial, measures of objective performance, subjective awareness, and the confidence level of subjective awareness. Using magnetoencephalography recordings in healthy human volunteers, we dissociated brain activities underlying these different cognitive phenomena. Our results provide strong evidence that widely distributed slow cortical potentials (SCPs) correlate with subjective awareness, even after the effects of objective performance and confidence were both removed. The SCP correlate of conscious perception manifests strongly in its waveform, phase, and power. In contrast, objective performance and confidence were both contributed by relatively transient brain activity. These results shed new light on the brain mechanisms of conscious, unconscious, and metacognitive processing. PMID:24647958

Manipulation of the extrastriate frontal loop can resolve visual disability in blindsight patients.

PubMed

Badgaiyan, Rajendra D

2012-12-01

Patients with blindsight are not consciously aware of visual stimuli in the affected field of vision but retain nonconscious perception. This disability can be resolved if nonconsciously perceived information can be brought to their conscious awareness. It can be accomplished by manipulating neural network of visual awareness. To understand this network, we studied the pattern of cortical activity elicited during processing of visual stimuli with or without conscious awareness. The analysis indicated that a re-entrant signaling loop between the area V3A (located in the extrastriate cortex) and the frontal cortex is critical for processing conscious awareness. The loop is activated by visual signals relayed in the primary visual cortex, which is damaged in blindsight patients. Because of the damage, V3A-frontal loop is not activated and the signals are not processed for conscious awareness. These patients however continue to receive visual signals through the lateral geniculate nucleus. Since these signals do not activate the V3A-frontal loop, the stimuli are not consciously perceived. If visual input from the lateral geniculate nucleus is appropriately manipulated and made to activate the V3A-frontal loop, blindsight patients can regain conscious vision. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Pain, dissociation and subliminal self-representations.

PubMed

Bob, Petr

2008-03-01

According to recent evidence, neurophysiological processes coupled to pain are closely related to the mechanisms of consciousness. This evidence is in accordance with findings that changes in states of consciousness during hypnosis or traumatic dissociation strongly affect conscious perception and experience of pain, and markedly influence brain functions. Past research indicates that painful experience may induce dissociated state and information about the experience may be stored or processed unconsciously. Reported findings suggest common neurophysiological mechanisms of pain and dissociation and point to a hypothesis of dissociation as a defense mechanism against psychological and physical pain that substantially influences functions of consciousness. The hypothesis is also supported by findings that information can be represented in the mind/brain without the subject's awareness. The findings of unconsciously present information suggest possible binding between conscious contents and self-functions that constitute self-representational dimensions of consciousness. The self-representation means that certain inner states of own body are interpreted as mental and somatic identity, while other bodily signals, currently not accessible to the dominant interpreter's access are dissociated and may be defined as subliminal self-representations. In conclusion, the neurophysiological aspects of consciousness and its integrative role in the therapy of painful traumatic memories are discussed.

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation.

PubMed

Raffone, Antonino; Srinivasan, Narayanan; van Leeuwen, Cees

2014-05-05

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAW is controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation.

Consciousness, biology and quantum hypotheses

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Baars, Bernard J.; Edelman, David B.

2012-09-01

Natural phenomena are reducible to quantum events in principle, but quantum mechanics does not always provide the best level of analysis. The many-body problem, chaotic avalanches, materials properties, biological organisms, and weather systems are better addressed at higher levels. Animals are highly organized, goal-directed, adaptive, selectionist, information-preserving, functionally redundant, multicellular, quasi-autonomous, highly mobile, reproducing, dissipative systems that conserve many fundamental features over remarkably long periods of time at the species level. Animal brains consist of massive, layered networks of specialized signaling cells with 10,000 communication points per cell, and interacting up to 1000 Hz. Neurons begin to divide and differentiate very early in gestation, and continue to develop until middle age. Waking brains operate far from thermodynamic equilibrium under delicate homeostatic control, making them extremely sensitive to a range of physical and chemical stimuli, highly adaptive, and able to produce a remarkable range of goal-relevant actions. Consciousness is “a difference that makes a difference” at the level of massive neuronal interactions in the most parallel-interactive anatomical structure of the mammalian brain, the cortico-thalamic (C-T) system. Other brain structures are not established to result in direct conscious experiences, at least in humans. However, indirect extra-cortical influences on the C-T system are pervasive. Learning, brain plasticity and major life adaptations may require conscious cognition. While brains evolved over hundreds of millions of years, and individual brains grow over months, years and decades, conscious events appear to have a duty cycle of ∼100 ms, fading after a few seconds. They can of course be refreshed by inner rehearsal, re-visualization, or attending to recurrent stimulus sources. These very distinctive brain events are needed when animals seek out and cope with new, unpredictable and highly valued life events, such as evading predators, gathering critical information, seeking mates and hunting prey. Attentional selection of conscious events can be observed behaviorally in animals showing coordinated receptor orienting, flexible responding, alertness, emotional reactions, seeking, motivation and curiosity, as well as behavioral surprise and cortical and autonomic arousal. Brain events corresponding to attentional selection are prominent and widespread. Attention generally results in conscious experiences, which may be needed to recruit widespread processing resources in the brain. Many neuronal processes never become conscious, such as the balance system of the inner ear. An air traveler may “see” the passenger cabin tilt downward as the plane tilts to descend for a landing. That visual experience occurs even at night, when the traveler has no external frame of spatial reference. The passenger's body tilt with respect to gravity is detected unconsciously via the hair cells of the vestibular canals, which act as liquid accelerometers. However, that sensory activity is not experienced directly. It only becomes conscious via vision and the body senses. The vestibular sense is therefore quite different from visual perception, which “reports” accurately to a conscious field of experience, so that we can point accurately to a bright star on a dark night. Vestibular input is also precise but unconscious. Conscious cognition is therefore a distinct kind of brain event. Many of its features are well established, and must be accounted for by any adequate theory. No non-biological examples are known. Penrose and Hameroff have proposed that consciousness may be viewed as a fundamental problem in quantum physics. Specifically, their ‘orchestrated objective reduction’ (Orch-OR) hypothesis posits that conscious states arise from quantum computations in the microtubules of neurons. However, a number of microtubule-associated proteins are found in both plant and animal cells (like neurons) and plants are not generally considered to be conscious. Current quantum-level proposals do not explain the prominent empirical features of consciousness. Notably, they do not distinguish between closely matched conscious and unconscious brain events, as cognitive-biological theories must. About half of the human brain does not support conscious contents directly, yet neurons in these “unconscious” brain regions contain large numbers of microtubules. QM phenomena are famously observer-dependent, but to the best of our knowledge it has not been shown that they require a conscious observer, as opposed to a particle detector. Conscious humans cannot detect quantum events “as such” without the aid of special instrumentation. Instead, we categorize the wavelengths of light into conscious sensory events that neglect their quantum mechanical properties. In science the burden of proof is on the proposer, and this burden has not yet been met by quantum-level proposals. While in the future we may discover quantum effects that bear distinctively on conscious cognition ‘as such,’ we do not have such evidence today.

Consciousness, biology and quantum hypotheses.

PubMed

Baars, Bernard J; Edelman, David B

2012-09-01

Natural phenomena are reducible to quantum events in principle, but quantum mechanics does not always provide the best level of analysis. The many-body problem, chaotic avalanches, materials properties, biological organisms, and weather systems are better addressed at higher levels. Animals are highly organized, goal-directed, adaptive, selectionist, information-preserving, functionally redundant, multicellular, quasi-autonomous, highly mobile, reproducing, dissipative systems that conserve many fundamental features over remarkably long periods of time at the species level. Animal brains consist of massive, layered networks of specialized signaling cells with 10,000 communication points per cell, and interacting up to 1000 Hz. Neurons begin to divide and differentiate very early in gestation, and continue to develop until middle age. Waking brains operate far from thermodynamic equilibrium under delicate homeostatic control, making them extremely sensitive to a range of physical and chemical stimuli, highly adaptive, and able to produce a remarkable range of goal-relevant actions. Consciousness is "a difference that makes a difference" at the level of massive neuronal interactions in the most parallel-interactive anatomical structure of the mammalian brain, the cortico-thalamic (C-T) system. Other brain structures are not established to result in direct conscious experiences, at least in humans. However, indirect extra-cortical influences on the C-T system are pervasive. Learning, brain plasticity and major life adaptations may require conscious cognition. While brains evolved over hundreds of millions of years, and individual brains grow over months, years and decades, conscious events appear to have a duty cycle of ∼100 ms, fading after a few seconds. They can of course be refreshed by inner rehearsal, re-visualization, or attending to recurrent stimulus sources. These very distinctive brain events are needed when animals seek out and cope with new, unpredictable and highly valued life events, such as evading predators, gathering critical information, seeking mates and hunting prey. Attentional selection of conscious events can be observed behaviorally in animals showing coordinated receptor orienting, flexible responding, alertness, emotional reactions, seeking, motivation and curiosity, as well as behavioral surprise and cortical and autonomic arousal. Brain events corresponding to attentional selection are prominent and widespread. Attention generally results in conscious experiences, which may be needed to recruit widespread processing resources in the brain. Many neuronal processes never become conscious, such as the balance system of the inner ear. An air traveler may "see" the passenger cabin tilt downward as the plane tilts to descend for a landing. That visual experience occurs even at night, when the traveler has no external frame of spatial reference. The passenger's body tilt with respect to gravity is detected unconsciously via the hair cells of the vestibular canals, which act as liquid accelerometers. However, that sensory activity is not experienced directly. It only becomes conscious via vision and the body senses. The vestibular sense is therefore quite different from visual perception, which "reports" accurately to a conscious field of experience, so that we can point accurately to a bright star on a dark night. Vestibular input is also precise but unconscious. Conscious cognition is therefore a distinct kind of brain event. Many of its features are well established, and must be accounted for by any adequate theory. No non-biological examples are known. Penrose and Hameroff have proposed that consciousness may be viewed as a fundamental problem in quantum physics. Specifically, their 'orchestrated objective reduction' (Orch-OR) hypothesis posits that conscious states arise from quantum computations in the microtubules of neurons. However, a number of microtubule-associated proteins are found in both plant and animal cells (like neurons) and plants are not generally considered to be conscious. Current quantum-level proposals do not explain the prominent empirical features of consciousness. Notably, they do not distinguish between closely matched conscious and unconscious brain events, as cognitive-biological theories must. About half of the human brain does not support conscious contents directly, yet neurons in these "unconscious" brain regions contain large numbers of microtubules. QM phenomena are famously observer-dependent, but to the best of our knowledge it has not been shown that they require a conscious observer, as opposed to a particle detector. Conscious humans cannot detect quantum events "as such" without the aid of special instrumentation. Instead, we categorize the wavelengths of light into conscious sensory events that neglect their quantum mechanical properties. In science the burden of proof is on the proposer, and this burden has not yet been met by quantum-level proposals. While in the future we may discover quantum effects that bear distinctively on conscious cognition 'as such,' we do not have such evidence today. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence

PubMed Central

Massimini, Marcello; Postle, Bradley R.; Koch, Christof

2017-01-01

The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenues. Dual Perspectives Companion Paper: Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?, by Brian Odegaard, Robert T. Knight, and Hakwan Lau PMID:28978697

Science, conscience, consciousness.

PubMed

Hennig, Boris

2010-01-01

Descartes' metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness ("conscientia") belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, "consciousness" refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be doing, and of the possibility of a gap between the two.

Visual anticipation biases conscious decision making but not bottom-up visual processing.

PubMed

Mathews, Zenon; Cetnarski, Ryszard; Verschure, Paul F M J

2014-01-01

Prediction plays a key role in control of attention but it is not clear which aspects of prediction are most prominent in conscious experience. An evolving view on the brain is that it can be seen as a prediction machine that optimizes its ability to predict states of the world and the self through the top-down propagation of predictions and the bottom-up presentation of prediction errors. There are competing views though on whether prediction or prediction errors dominate the formation of conscious experience. Yet, the dynamic effects of prediction on perception, decision making and consciousness have been difficult to assess and to model. We propose a novel mathematical framework and a psychophysical paradigm that allows us to assess both the hierarchical structuring of perceptual consciousness, its content and the impact of predictions and/or errors on conscious experience, attention and decision-making. Using a displacement detection task combined with reverse correlation, we reveal signatures of the usage of prediction at three different levels of perceptual processing: bottom-up fast saccades, top-down driven slow saccades and consciousnes decisions. Our results suggest that the brain employs multiple parallel mechanism at different levels of perceptual processing in order to shape effective sensory consciousness within a predicted perceptual scene. We further observe that bottom-up sensory and top-down predictive processes can be dissociated through cognitive load. We propose a probabilistic data association model from dynamical systems theory to model the predictive multi-scale bias in perceptual processing that we observe and its role in the formation of conscious experience. We propose that these results support the hypothesis that consciousness provides a time-delayed description of a task that is used to prospectively optimize real time control structures, rather than being engaged in the real-time control of behavior itself.

Subliminally and Supraliminally Acquired Long-Term Memories Jointly Bias Delayed Decisions.

PubMed

Ruch, Simon; Herbert, Elizabeth; Henke, Katharina

2017-01-01

Common wisdom and scientific evidence suggest that good decisions require conscious deliberation. But growing evidence demonstrates that not only conscious but also unconscious thoughts influence decision-making. Here, we hypothesize that both consciously and unconsciously acquired memories guide decisions. Our experiment measured the influence of subliminally and supraliminally presented information on delayed (30-40 min) decision-making. Participants were presented with subliminal pairs of faces and written occupations for unconscious encoding. Following a delay of 20 min, participants consciously (re-)encoded the same faces now presented supraliminally along with either the same written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite wage-category). To measure decision-making, participants viewed the same faces again (with occupations absent) and decided on the putative income of each person: low, low-average, high-average, or high. Participants were encouraged to decide spontaneously and intuitively. Hence, the decision task was an implicit or indirect test of relational memory. If conscious thought alone guided decisions (= H 0 ), supraliminal information should determine decision outcomes independently of the encoded subliminal information. This was, however, not the case. Instead, both unconsciously and consciously encoded memories influenced decisions: identical unconscious and conscious memories exerted the strongest bias on income decisions, while both incongruous and congruous (i.e., non-identical) subliminally and supraliminally formed memories canceled each other out leaving no bias on decisions. Importantly, the increased decision bias following the formation of identical unconscious and conscious memories and the reduced decision bias following to the formation of non-identical memories were determined relative to a control condition, where conscious memory formation alone could influence decisions. In view of the much weaker representational strength of subliminally vs. supraliminally formed memories, their long-lasting impact on decision-making is noteworthy.

Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness

PubMed Central

Jonkisz, Jakub; Wierzchoń, Michał; Binder, Marek

2017-01-01

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies). PMID:28377738

Subliminally and Supraliminally Acquired Long-Term Memories Jointly Bias Delayed Decisions

PubMed Central

Ruch, Simon; Herbert, Elizabeth; Henke, Katharina

2017-01-01

Common wisdom and scientific evidence suggest that good decisions require conscious deliberation. But growing evidence demonstrates that not only conscious but also unconscious thoughts influence decision-making. Here, we hypothesize that both consciously and unconsciously acquired memories guide decisions. Our experiment measured the influence of subliminally and supraliminally presented information on delayed (30–40 min) decision-making. Participants were presented with subliminal pairs of faces and written occupations for unconscious encoding. Following a delay of 20 min, participants consciously (re-)encoded the same faces now presented supraliminally along with either the same written occupations, occupations congruous to the subliminally presented occupations (same wage-category), or incongruous occupations (opposite wage-category). To measure decision-making, participants viewed the same faces again (with occupations absent) and decided on the putative income of each person: low, low-average, high-average, or high. Participants were encouraged to decide spontaneously and intuitively. Hence, the decision task was an implicit or indirect test of relational memory. If conscious thought alone guided decisions (= H0), supraliminal information should determine decision outcomes independently of the encoded subliminal information. This was, however, not the case. Instead, both unconsciously and consciously encoded memories influenced decisions: identical unconscious and conscious memories exerted the strongest bias on income decisions, while both incongruous and congruous (i.e., non-identical) subliminally and supraliminally formed memories canceled each other out leaving no bias on decisions. Importantly, the increased decision bias following the formation of identical unconscious and conscious memories and the reduced decision bias following to the formation of non-identical memories were determined relative to a control condition, where conscious memory formation alone could influence decisions. In view of the much weaker representational strength of subliminally vs. supraliminally formed memories, their long-lasting impact on decision-making is noteworthy. PMID:28955268

Detecting and interpreting conscious experiences in behaviorally non-responsive patients.

PubMed

Naci, Lorina; Sinai, Leah; Owen, Adrian M

2017-01-15

Decoding the contents of consciousness from brain activity is one of the most challenging frontiers of cognitive neuroscience. The ability to interpret mental content without recourse to behavior is most relevant for understanding patients who may be demonstrably conscious, but entirely unable to speak or move willfully in any way, precluding any systematic investigation of their conscious experience. The lack of consistent behavioral responsivity engenders unique challenges to decoding any conscious experiences these patients may have solely based on their brain activity. For this reason, paradigms that have been successful in healthy individuals cannot serve to interpret conscious mental states in this patient group. Until recently, patient studies have used structured instructions to elicit willful modulation of brain activity according to command, in order to decode the presence of willful brain-based responses in this patient group. In recent work, we have used naturalistic paradigms, such as watching a movie or listening to an audio-story, to demonstrate that a common neural code supports conscious experiences in different individuals. Moreover, we have demonstrated that this code can be used to interpret the conscious experiences of a patient who had remained non-responsive for several years. This approach is easy to administer, brief, and does not require compliance with task instructions. Rather, it engages attention naturally through meaningful stimuli that are similar to the real-world sensory information in a patient's environment. Therefore, it may be particularly suited to probing consciousness and revealing residual brain function in highly impaired, acute, patients in a comatose state, thus helping to improve diagnostication and prognostication for this vulnerable patient group from the critical early stages of severe brain-injury. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness platform: the greatest mystery of all time.

PubMed

Deutsch, Sid

2010-01-01

This article is about the model for a very controversial edifice--the many-sided foundation for consciousness. What I refer to is, undoubtedly, the greatest mystery of all time--why do we have an awareness of our own existence? What is the evolutionary advantage of consciousness? Much of the material printed about consciousness has a religious flavor, with references to the human spirit and/or extrasensory perception, but I will have none of that here. In this study, consciousness is tied in with a platform, not a physical platform, of course, but a conceptual platform. This is because we are most comfortable imagining or visualizing an actual platform that has many connections to various parts of the brain, a sort of an old-fashioned telephone switchboard.

Education for Critical Moral Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mustakova-Possardt, Elena

2004-01-01

This paper proposes a lifespan developmental model of critical moral consciousness and examines its implications for education in childhood, adolescence and adulthood. Mature moral consciousness, central to negotiating the challenges of the 21st century, is characterized by a deepening lifelong integration of moral motivation, agency and critical…

Social Class Dialogues and the Fostering of Class Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Madden, Meredith

2015-01-01

How do critical pedagogies promote undergraduate students' awareness of social class, social class identity, and social class inequalities in education? How do undergraduate students experience class consciousness-raising in the intergroup dialogue classroom? This qualitative study explores undergraduate students' class consciousness-raising in an…

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2012-08-02

... he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the... hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the assistance of another person, or... hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the assistance of another person, or...

78 FR 14406 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

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Hippocampal neural assemblies and conscious remembering.

PubMed

Shirvalkar, Prasad R

2009-05-01

The hippocampal formation is needed to encode episodic memories, which may be consciously recalled at some future time. This review examines recent advances in understanding recollection in the context of spatiotemporally organized relational memory coding and discusses predictions and challenges for future research on conscious remembering.

Implicit Processes, Self-Regulation, and Interventions for Behavior Change.

PubMed

St Quinton, Tom; Brunton, Julie A

2017-01-01

The ability to regulate and subsequently change behavior is influenced by both reflective and implicit processes. Traditional theories have focused on conscious processes by highlighting the beliefs and intentions that influence decision making. However, their success in changing behavior has been modest with a gap between intention and behavior apparent. Dual-process models have been recently applied to health psychology; with numerous models incorporating implicit processes that influence behavior as well as the more common conscious processes. Such implicit processes are theorized to govern behavior non-consciously. The article provides a commentary on motivational and volitional processes and how interventions have combined to attempt an increase in positive health behaviors. Following this, non-conscious processes are discussed in terms of their theoretical underpinning. The article will then highlight how these processes have been measured and will then discuss the different ways that the non-conscious and conscious may interact. The development of interventions manipulating both processes may well prove crucial in successfully altering behavior.

Cross-modal prediction changes the timing of conscious access during the motion-induced blindness.

PubMed

Chang, Acer Y C; Kanai, Ryota; Seth, Anil K

2015-01-01

Despite accumulating evidence that perceptual predictions influence perceptual content, the relations between these predictions and conscious contents remain unclear, especially for cross-modal predictions. We examined whether predictions of visual events by auditory cues can facilitate conscious access to the visual stimuli. We trained participants to learn associations between auditory cues and colour changes. We then asked whether congruency between auditory cues and target colours would speed access to consciousness. We did this by rendering a visual target subjectively invisible using motion-induced blindness and then gradually changing its colour while presenting congruent or incongruent auditory cues. Results showed that the visual target gained access to consciousness faster in congruent than in incongruent trials; control experiments excluded potentially confounding effects of attention and motor response. The expectation effect was gradually established over blocks suggesting a role for extensive training. Overall, our findings show that predictions learned through cross-modal training can facilitate conscious access to visual stimuli. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Probing consciousness with event-related potentials in the vegetative state

PubMed Central

Faugeras, F.; Rohaut, B.; Weiss, N.; Bekinschtein, T.A.; Galanaud, D.; Puybasset, L.; Bolgert, F.; Sergent, C.; Cohen, L.; Dehaene, S.

2011-01-01

Objective: Probing consciousness in noncommunicating patients is a major medical and neuroscientific challenge. While standardized and expert behavioral assessment of patients constitutes a mandatory step, this clinical evaluation stage is often difficult and doubtful, and calls for complementary measures which may overcome its inherent limitations. Several functional brain imaging methods are currently being developed within this perspective, including fMRI and cognitive event-related potentials (ERPs). We recently designed an original rule extraction ERP test that is positive only in subjects who are conscious of the long-term regularity of auditory stimuli. Methods: In the present work, we report the results of this test in a population of 22 patients who met clinical criteria for vegetative state. Results: We identified 2 patients showing this neural signature of consciousness. Interestingly, these 2 patients showed unequivocal clinical signs of consciousness within the 3 to 4 days following ERP recording. Conclusions: Taken together, these results strengthen the relevance of bedside neurophysiological tools to improve diagnosis of consciousness in noncommunicating patients. PMID:21593438

Object memory effects on figure assignment: conscious object recognition is not necessary or sufficient.

PubMed

Peterson, M A; de Gelder, B; Rapcsak, S Z; Gerhardstein, P C; Bachoud-Lévi, A

2000-01-01

In three experiments we investigated whether conscious object recognition is necessary or sufficient for effects of object memories on figure assignment. In experiment 1, we examined a brain-damaged participant, AD, whose conscious object recognition is severely impaired. AD's responses about figure assignment do reveal effects from memories of object structure, indicating that conscious object recognition is not necessary for these effects, and identifying the figure-ground test employed here as a new implicit test of access to memories of object structure. In experiments 2 and 3, we tested a second brain-damaged participant, WG, for whom conscious object recognition was relatively spared. Nevertheless, effects from memories of object structure on figure assignment were not evident in WG's responses about figure assignment in experiment 2, indicating that conscious object recognition is not sufficient for effects of object memories on figure assignment. WG's performance sheds light on AD's performance, and has implications for the theoretical understanding of object memory effects on figure assignment.

Automatic mental associations predict future choices of undecided decision-makers.

PubMed

Galdi, Silvia; Arcuri, Luciano; Gawronski, Bertram

2008-08-22

Common wisdom holds that choice decisions are based on conscious deliberations of the available information about choice options. On the basis of recent insights about unconscious influences on information processing, we tested whether automatic mental associations of undecided individuals bias future choices in a manner such that these choices reflect the evaluations implied by earlier automatic associations. With the use of a computer-based, speeded categorization task to assess automatic mental associations (i.e., associations that are activated unintentionally, difficult to control, and not necessarily endorsed at a conscious level) and self-report measures to assess consciously endorsed beliefs and choice preferences, automatic associations of undecided participants predicted changes in consciously reported beliefs and future choices over a period of 1 week. Conversely, for decided participants, consciously reported beliefs predicted changes in automatic associations and future choices over the same period. These results indicate that decision-makers sometimes have already made up their mind at an unconscious level, even when they consciously indicate that they are still undecided.

Distinct cortical codes and temporal dynamics for conscious and unconscious percepts

PubMed Central

Salti, Moti; Monto, Simo; Charles, Lucie; King, Jean-Remi; Parkkonen, Lauri; Dehaene, Stanislas

2015-01-01

The neural correlates of consciousness are typically sought by comparing the overall brain responses to perceived and unperceived stimuli. However, this comparison may be contaminated by non-specific attention, alerting, performance, and reporting confounds. Here, we pursue a novel approach, tracking the neuronal coding of consciously and unconsciously perceived contents while keeping behavior identical (blindsight). EEG and MEG were recorded while participants reported the spatial location and visibility of a briefly presented target. Multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that considerable information about spatial location traverses the cortex on blindsight trials, but that starting ≈270 ms post-onset, information unique to consciously perceived stimuli, emerges in superior parietal and superior frontal regions. Conscious access appears characterized by the entry of the perceived stimulus into a series of additional brain processes, each restricted in time, while the failure of conscious access results in the breaking of this chain and a subsequent slow decay of the lingering unconscious activity. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.05652.001 PMID:25997100

Toward a Mature Science of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Wiese, Wanja

2018-01-01

In Being No One, Metzinger (2004[2003]) introduces an approach to the scientific study of consciousness that draws on theories and results from different disciplines, targeted at multiple levels of analysis. Descriptions and assumptions formulated at, for instance, the phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological levels of analysis provide different perspectives on the same phenomenon, which can ultimately yield necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of phenomenal representation. In this way, the “method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS)” (as it has been called by Weisberg, 2005) promotes our understanding of consciousness. However, even more than a decade after the first publication of Being No One, we still lack a mature science of consciousness. This paper makes the following meta-theoretical contribution: It analyzes the hurdles an approach such as MICS has yet to overcome and discusses to what extent existing approaches solve the problems left open by MICS. Furthermore, it argues that a unifying theory of different features of consciousness is required to reach a mature science of consciousness. PMID:29896136

A unified 3D default space consciousness model combining neurological and physiological processes that underlie conscious experience

PubMed Central

Jerath, Ravinder; Crawford, Molly W.; Barnes, Vernon A.

2015-01-01

The Global Workspace Theory and Information Integration Theory are two of the most currently accepted consciousness models; however, these models do not address many aspects of conscious experience. We compare these models to our previously proposed consciousness model in which the thalamus fills-in processed sensory information from corticothalamic feedback loops within a proposed 3D default space, resulting in the recreation of the internal and external worlds within the mind. This 3D default space is composed of all cells of the body, which communicate via gap junctions and electrical potentials to create this unified space. We use 3D illustrations to explain how both visual and non-visual sensory information may be filled-in within this dynamic space, creating a unified seamless conscious experience. This neural sensory memory space is likely generated by baseline neural oscillatory activity from the default mode network, other salient networks, brainstem, and reticular activating system. PMID:26379573

Nonconscious semantic processing of emotional words modulates conscious access

PubMed Central

Gaillard, Raphaël; Del Cul, Antoine; Naccache, Lionel; Vinckier, Fabien; Cohen, Laurent; Dehaene, Stanislas

2006-01-01

Whether masked words can be processed at a semantic level remains a controversial issue in cognitive psychology. Although recent behavioral studies have demonstrated masked semantic priming for number words, attempts to generalize this finding to other categories of words have failed. Here, as an alternative to subliminal priming, we introduce a sensitive behavioral method to detect nonconscious semantic processing of words. The logic of this method consists of presenting words close to the threshold for conscious perception and examining whether their semantic content modulates performance in objective and subjective tasks. Our results disclose two independent sources of modulation of the threshold for access to consciousness. First, prior conscious perception of words increases the detection rate of the same words when they are subsequently presented with stronger masking. Second, the threshold for conscious access is lower for emotional words than for neutral ones, even for words that have not been previously consciously perceived, thus implying that written words can receive nonconscious semantic processing. PMID:16648261

Thinking in Black and White: Conscious thought increases racially biased judgments through biased face memory.

PubMed

Strick, Madelijn; Stoeckart, Peter F; Dijksterhuis, Ap

2015-11-01

It is a common research finding that conscious thought helps people to avoid racial discrimination. These three experiments, however, illustrate that conscious thought may increase biased face memory, which leads to increased judgment bias (i.e., preferring White to Black individuals). In Experiments 1 and 2, university students formed impressions of Black and White housemate candidates. They judged the candidates either immediately (immediate decision condition), thought about their judgments for a few minutes (conscious thought condition), or performed an unrelated task for a few minutes (unconscious thought condition). Conscious thinkers and immediate decision-makers showed a stronger face memory bias than unconscious thinkers, and this mediated increased judgment bias, although not all results were significant. Experiment 3 used a new, different paradigm and showed that a Black male was remembered as darker after a period of conscious thought than after a period of unconscious thought. Implications for racial prejudice are discussed. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Quantum effects in the understanding of consciousness.

PubMed

Hameroff, Stuart R; Craddock, Travis J A; Tuszynski, Jack A

2014-06-01

This paper presents a historical perspective on the development and application of quantum physics methodology beyond physics, especially in biology and in the area of consciousness studies. Quantum physics provides a conceptual framework for the structural aspects of biological systems and processes via quantum chemistry. In recent years individual biological phenomena such as photosynthesis and bird navigation have been experimentally and theoretically analyzed using quantum methods building conceptual foundations for quantum biology. Since consciousness is attributed to human (and possibly animal) mind, quantum underpinnings of cognitive processes are a logical extension. Several proposals, especially the Orch OR hypothesis, have been put forth in an effort to introduce a scientific basis to the theory of consciousness. At the center of these approaches are microtubules as the substrate on which conscious processes in terms of quantum coherence and entanglement can be built. Additionally, Quantum Metabolism, quantum processes in ion channels and quantum effects in sensory stimulation are discussed in this connection. We discuss the challenges and merits related to quantum consciousness approaches as well as their potential extensions.

Implicit Processes, Self-Regulation, and Interventions for Behavior Change

PubMed Central

St Quinton, Tom; Brunton, Julie A.

2017-01-01

The ability to regulate and subsequently change behavior is influenced by both reflective and implicit processes. Traditional theories have focused on conscious processes by highlighting the beliefs and intentions that influence decision making. However, their success in changing behavior has been modest with a gap between intention and behavior apparent. Dual-process models have been recently applied to health psychology; with numerous models incorporating implicit processes that influence behavior as well as the more common conscious processes. Such implicit processes are theorized to govern behavior non-consciously. The article provides a commentary on motivational and volitional processes and how interventions have combined to attempt an increase in positive health behaviors. Following this, non-conscious processes are discussed in terms of their theoretical underpinning. The article will then highlight how these processes have been measured and will then discuss the different ways that the non-conscious and conscious may interact. The development of interventions manipulating both processes may well prove crucial in successfully altering behavior. PMID:28337164

Functional neuroanatomy of disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Di Perri, Carol; Stender, Johan; Laureys, Steven; Gosseries, Olivia

2014-01-01

Our understanding of the mechanisms of loss and recovery of consciousness, following severe brain injury or during anesthesia, is changing rapidly. Recent neuroimaging studies have shown that patients with chronic disorders of consciousness and subjects undergoing general anesthesia present a complex dysfunctionality in the architecture of brain connectivity. At present, the global hallmark of impaired consciousness appears to be a multifaceted dysfunctional connectivity pattern with both within-network loss of connectivity in a widespread frontoparietal network and between-network hyperconnectivity involving other regions such as the insula and ventral tegmental area. Despite ongoing efforts, the mechanisms underlying the emergence of consciousness after severe brain injury are not thoroughly understood. Important questions remain unanswered: What triggers the connectivity impairment leading to disorders of consciousness? Why do some patients recover from coma, while others with apparently similar brain injuries do not? Understanding these mechanisms could lead to a better comprehension of brain function and, hopefully, lead to new therapeutic strategies in this challenging patient population. © 2013.

Toward a Mature Science of Consciousness.

PubMed

Wiese, Wanja

2018-01-01

In Being No One , Metzinger (2004[2003]) introduces an approach to the scientific study of consciousness that draws on theories and results from different disciplines, targeted at multiple levels of analysis. Descriptions and assumptions formulated at, for instance, the phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological levels of analysis provide different perspectives on the same phenomenon, which can ultimately yield necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of phenomenal representation. In this way, the "method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS)" (as it has been called by Weisberg, 2005) promotes our understanding of consciousness. However, even more than a decade after the first publication of Being No One , we still lack a mature science of consciousness. This paper makes the following meta-theoretical contribution: It analyzes the hurdles an approach such as MICS has yet to overcome and discusses to what extent existing approaches solve the problems left open by MICS. Furthermore, it argues that a unifying theory of different features of consciousness is required to reach a mature science of consciousness.

"Wanting," "liking," and their relation to consciousness.

PubMed

Anselme, Patrick; Robinson, Mike J F

2016-04-01

Most animal and human behaviors emanate from goal-directedness and pleasure seeking, suggesting that they are primarily under conscious control. However, "wanting" and "liking" are believed to be adaptive core subcortical processes working at an unconscious level and responsible for guiding behavior toward appropriate rewards. Here we examine whether "wanting" is an inherent property of conscious goals and "liking" an intrinsic component of conscious feelings. We argue that "wanting" and "liking" depend on mechanisms acting below the level of consciousness, explaining why individuals often struggle to enhance or refrain their motivations and emotions by means of conscious control. In particular, hyperreactivity of subcortical "wanting" systems has been tied to pathological behaviors such as drug addiction and gambling disorder. In addicts, cognitive processes intended to curb drug-seeking wage a constant battle against subcortical urges to take more drug that often ends in relapse following repeated assaults. Nevertheless, we suggest that in nonpathological contexts, "wanting" and "liking" interact with major cognitive processes to guide goal-directed actions. (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Prostaglandin control of renal circulation in the unanesthetized dog and baboon

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Swain, J. A.; Vatner, S. F.; Heyndrickx, G. R.; Boettcher, D. H.

1975-01-01

Effects of indomethacin and meclofenamate, inhibitors of prostaglandin synthesis, were evaluated in the regulation of renal blood flow in conscious and anesthetized dogs and in tranquilized baboons, instrumented with arterial pressure catheters and renal blood flow probes. Indomethacin, 10 mg/kg, did not alter renal blood flow or resistance significantly in the conscious dog. In the anesthetized dog, however, indomethacin caused a reduction in renal blood flow and an elevation of renal vascular resistance. Meclofenamate, 4 mg/kg, reduced renal flow and increased renal vascular resistance in conscious dogs. In conscious dogs and tranquilized primates, indomethacin and meclofenamate reduced the reactive hyperemia in the renal bed. Methoxamine and angiotensin II infused in graded doses induced significantly greater renal vasoconstriction in conscious dogs in the presence of indomethacin. Thus, in the conscious animal, prostaglandins appear to play only a minor part in the control of renal circulation at rest, but they are of greater importance in mediating the renal responses to reactive hyperemia and to vasoconstriction.

The speed of metacognition: taking time to get to know one's structural knowledge.

PubMed

Mealor, Andy D; Dienes, Zoltan

2013-03-01

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration). Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Head injury and loss of consciousness raise the likelihood of developing and maintaining PTSD symptoms.

PubMed

Roitman, Pablo; Gilad, Moran; Ankri, Yahel L E; Shalev, Arieh Y

2013-12-01

Mild traumatic brain injury has been associated with higher prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The extent to which head injury or loss of consciousness predicts PTSD is unknown. To evaluate the contribution of head injury and loss of consciousness to the occurrence of PTSD, we made a longitudinal evaluation of 1,260 road accident survivors admitted to the emergency department with head injury (n = 287), head injury and loss of consciousness (n = 115), or neither (n = 858). A telephone-administered posttraumatic symptoms scale inferred PTSD and quantified PTSD symptoms at 10 days and 8 months after admission. The study groups had similar heart rate, blood pressure, and pain levels in the emergency department. Survivors with loss of consciousness and head injury had higher prevalence of PTSD and higher levels of PTSD symptoms, suggesting that patients with head injury and loss of consciousness reported in the emergency department are at higher risk for PTSD. Copyright © 2013 International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies.

Dissecting out conscious and unconscious memory (sub)processes within the human medial temporal lobe.

PubMed

Grunwald, T; Pezer, N; Münte, T F; Kurthen, M; Lehnertz, K; Van Roost, D; Fernández, G; Kutas, M; Elger, C E

2003-11-01

The human medial temporal lobe (MTL) system mediates memories that can be consciously recollected. However, the specific natures of the individual contributions of its various subregions to conscious memory processes remain equivocal. Here we show a functional dissociation between the hippocampus proper and the parahippocampal region in conscious and unconscious memory as revealed by invasive recordings of limbic event-related brain potentials recorded during explicit and implicit word recognition: Only hippocampal and not parahippocampal neural activity exhibits a sensitivity to the implicit versus explicit nature of the recognition memory task. Moreover, only within the hippocampus proper do the neural responses to repeated words differ not only from those to new words but also from each other as a function of recognition success. By contrast parahippocampal (rhinal) responses are sensitive to repetition independent of conscious recognition. These findings thus demonstrate that it is the hippocampus proper among the MTL structures that is specifically engaged during conscious memory processes.

Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) gene modulates private self-consciousness and self-flexibility.

PubMed

Wang, Bei; Ru, Wenzhao; Yang, Xing; Yang, Lu; Fang, Pengpeng; Zhu, Xu; Shen, Guomin; Gao, Xiaocai; Gong, Pingyuan

2016-08-01

Dopamine levels in the brain influence human consciousness. Inspired by the role of Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) in inactivating dopamine in the brain, we investigated to what extent COMT could modulate individual's self-consciousness dispositions and self-consistency by genotyping the COMT Val158Met (rs4680) polymorphism and measuring self-consciousness and self-consistency and congruence in a college student population. The results indicated that COMT Val158Met polymorphism significantly modulated the private self-consciousness. The individuals with Val/Val genotype, corresponding to lower dopamine levels in the brain, were more likely to be aware of their feelings and beliefs. The results also indicated that this polymorphism modulated one's self-flexibility. The individuals with Val/Val genotype showed higher levels of stereotype in self-concept compared with those with Met/Met genotype. These findings suggest that COMT is a predictor of the individual differences in self-consciousness and self-flexibility. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Metacognition and Mindfulness: the Role of Fringe Consciousness.

PubMed

Norman, Elisabeth

2017-01-01

The involvement of metacognition in mindfulness is already acknowledged in recent mindfulness models. The focus of the current paper is on how mindfulness may be seen to involve a particular subcategory of metacognitive feeling referred to as fringe consciousness . Fringe feelings are in themselves consciously experienced but have been demonstrated to reflect nonconscious context information and are assumed to play a functional role in metacognitive monitoring and behavioral control. I first address ways in which metaexperiences during mindfulness may be seen as a variety of fringe consciousness. I then turn to how mindfulness practice may change a person's attitude to fringe feelings, which in turn may influence the ease with which currently unconscious cognitive content may be retrieved. Finally, I specifically discuss how feelings of novelty , described by many as characteristic of a mindful state, may be understood within the fringe consciousness framework. I propose that fringe consciousness may be a useful framework for understanding the relationship between cognition and certain forms of subjective feelings during mindfulness.

Subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli activate neural responses in anterior cingulate cortex, fusiform gyrus and insula: a meta-analysis of fMRI studies.

PubMed

Meneguzzo, Paolo; Tsakiris, Manos; Schioth, Helgi B; Stein, Dan J; Brooks, Samantha J

2014-01-01

Non-conscious neural activation may underlie various psychological functions in health and disorder. However, the neural substrates of non-conscious processing have not been entirely elucidated. Examining the differential effects of arousing stimuli that are consciously, versus unconsciously perceived will improve our knowledge of neural circuitry involved in non-conscious perception. Here we conduct preliminary analyses of neural activation in studies that have used both subliminal and supraliminal presentation of the same stimulus. We use Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) to examine functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies that uniquely present the same stimuli subliminally and supraliminally to healthy participants during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We included a total of 193 foci from 9 studies representing subliminal stimulation and 315 foci from 10 studies representing supraliminal stimulation. The anterior cingulate cortex is significantly activated during both subliminal and supraliminal stimulus presentation. Subliminal stimuli are linked to significantly increased activation in the right fusiform gyrus and right insula. Supraliminal stimuli show significantly increased activation in the left rostral anterior cingulate. Non-conscious processing of arousing stimuli may involve primary visual areas and may also recruit the insula, a brain area involved in eventual interoceptive awareness. The anterior cingulate is perhaps a key brain region for the integration of conscious and non-conscious processing. These preliminary data provide candidate brain regions for further study in to the neural correlates of conscious experience.

Restructuring consciousness -the psychedelic state in light of integrated information theory.

PubMed

Gallimore, Andrew R

2015-01-01

The psychological state elicited by the classic psychedelics drugs, such as LSD and psilocybin, is one of the most fascinating and yet least understood states of consciousness. However, with the advent of modern functional neuroimaging techniques, the effect of these drugs on neural activity is now being revealed, although many of the varied phenomenological features of the psychedelic state remain challenging to explain. Integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the foremost contemporary theories of consciousness, providing a mathematical formalization of both the quantity and quality of conscious experience. This theory can be applied to all known states of consciousness, including the psychedelic state. Using the results of functional neuroimaging data on the psychedelic state, the effects of psychedelic drugs on both the level and structure of consciousness can be explained in terms of the conceptual framework of IIT. This new IIT-based model of the psychedelic state provides an explanation for many of its phenomenological features, including unconstrained cognition, alterations in the structure and meaning of concepts and a sense of expanded awareness. This model also suggests that whilst cognitive flexibility, creativity, and imagination are enhanced during the psychedelic state, this occurs at the expense of cause-effect information, as well as degrading the brain's ability to organize, categorize, and differentiate the constituents of conscious experience. Furthermore, the model generates specific predictions that can be tested using a combination of functional imaging techniques, as has been applied to the study of levels of consciousness during anesthesia and following brain injury.

An invisible touch: Body-related multisensory conflicts modulate visual consciousness.

PubMed

Salomon, Roy; Galli, Giulia; Łukowska, Marta; Faivre, Nathan; Ruiz, Javier Bello; Blanke, Olaf

2016-07-29

The majority of scientific studies on consciousness have focused on vision, exploring the cognitive and neural mechanisms of conscious access to visual stimuli. In parallel, studies on bodily consciousness have revealed that bodily (i.e. tactile, proprioceptive, visceral, vestibular) signals are the basis for the sense of self. However, the role of bodily signals in the formation of visual consciousness is not well understood. Here we investigated how body-related visuo-tactile stimulation modulates conscious access to visual stimuli. We used a robotic platform to apply controlled tactile stimulation to the participants' back while they viewed a dot moving either in synchrony or asynchrony with the touch on their back. Critically, the dot was rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Manipulating the visual context by presenting the dot moving on either a body form, or a non-bodily object we show that: (i) conflict induced by synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in a body context is associated with a delayed conscious access compared to asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, (ii) this effect occurs only in the context of a visual body form, and (iii) is not due to detection or response biases. The results indicate that body-related visuo-tactile conflicts impact visual consciousness by facilitating access of non-conflicting visual information to awareness, and that these are sensitive to the visual context in which they are presented, highlighting the interplay between bodily signals and visual experience. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Thalamic stimulation to improve level of consciousness after seizures: evaluation of electrophysiology and behavior.

PubMed

Gummadavelli, Abhijeet; Motelow, Joshua E; Smith, Nicholas; Zhan, Qiong; Schiff, Nicholas D; Blumenfeld, Hal

2015-01-01

Understanding the neural mechanisms that support human consciousness is an important frontier in neuroscience and medicine. We previously developed a rodent model of temporal lobe seizures that recapitulates the human electroencephalography (EEG) signature of ictal and postictal neocortical slow waves associated with behavioral impairments in level of consciousness. The mechanism of slow-wave production in epilepsy may involve suppression of the subcortical arousal systems including the brainstem and intralaminar thalamic nuclei. We hypothesized that intralaminar thalamic stimulation may lead to electrophysiologic and functional rescue from postictal slow waves and behavioral arrest. We electrically stimulated the central lateral thalamic nucleus (a member of the intralaminar nuclei) under anesthesia and after electrically induced hippocampal seizures in anesthetized and in awake-behaving animal model preparations. We demonstrated a proof-of-principle restoration of electrophysiologic and behavioral measures of consciousness by stimulating the intralaminar thalamic nuclei after seizures. We measured decreased cortical slow waves and increased desynchronization and multiunit activity in the cortex with thalamic stimulation following seizures. Functionally, thalamic stimulation produced resumption of exploratory behaviors in the postictal state. Targeting of nodes in the neural circuitry of consciousness has important medical implications. Impaired consciousness with epilepsy has dangerous consequences including decreased school/work performance, social stigmatization, and impaired airway protection. These data suggest a novel therapeutic approach for restoring consciousness after seizures. If paired with responsive neurostimulation, this may allow rapid implementation to improve level of consciousness in patients with epilepsy. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2014 International League Against Epilepsy.

Human Consciousness: Where Is It From and What Is It for

PubMed Central

Kotchoubey, Boris

2018-01-01

Consciousness is not a process in the brain but a kind of behavior that, of course, is controlled by the brain like any other behavior. Human consciousness emerges on the interface between three components of animal behavior: communication, play, and the use of tools. These three components interact on the basis of anticipatory behavioral control, which is common for all complex forms of animal life. All three do not exclusively distinguish our close relatives, i.e., primates, but are broadly presented among various species of mammals, birds, and even cephalopods; however, their particular combination in humans is unique. The interaction between communication and play yields symbolic games, most importantly language; the interaction between symbols and tools results in human praxis. Taken together, this gives rise to a mechanism that allows a creature, instead of performing controlling actions overtly, to play forward the corresponding behavioral options in a “second reality” of objectively (by means of tools) grounded symbolic systems. The theory possesses the following properties: (1) It is anti-reductionist and anti-eliminativist, and yet, human consciousness is considered as a purely natural (biological) phenomenon. (2) It avoids epiphenomenalism and indicates in which conditions human consciousness has evolutionary advantages, and in which it may even be disadvantageous. (3) It allows to easily explain the most typical features of consciousness, such as objectivity, seriality and limited resources, the relationship between consciousness and explicit memory, the feeling of conscious agency, etc. PMID:29740366

What Explains Consciousness? Or…What Consciousness Explains?

PubMed Central

Dulany, Donelson E.

2014-01-01

In this invited commentary I focus on the topic addressed in three papers: De Sousa's (2013[1617]) Toward an Integrative Theory of Consciousness, a monograph with Parts 1 & 2, as well as commentaries by Pereira (2013a[59]) and Hirstein (2013[42]). All three are impressively scholarly and can stand—and shout—on their own. But theory of consciousness? My aim is to slice that topic into the two fundamentally different kinds of theories of consciousness, say what appears to be an ideology, out of behaviourism into cognitivism, now also influencing the quest for an “explanation of consciousness” in cognitive neuroscience. I will then say what can be expected given what we know of the complexity of brain structure, the richness of a conscious “vocabulary”, and current technological limits of brain imaging. This will then turn to the strategy for examining “what consciousness explains”—metatheory, theories, mappings, and a methodology of competitive support, a methodology especially important where there are competing commitments. There are also increasingly common identifications of methodological bias in, along with failures to replicate, studies reporting unconscious controls in decision, social priming—as there have been in perception, learning, problem solving, etc. The literature critique has provided evidence taken as reducing, and in some cases eliminating, a role for conscious controls—a position consistent with that ideology out of behaviourism into cognitivism. It is an ideological position that fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between theoretical and metaphysical assertions. PMID:24891796

Introduction to the fractality principle of consciousness and the sentyon postulate

PubMed Central

Bieberich, Erhard

2013-01-01

Recently, consciousness research has gained much attention. Indeed, the question at stake is significant: why is the brain not just a computing device, but generates a perception from within? Ambitious endeavors trying to simulate the entire human brain assume that the algorithm will do the trick: as soon as we assemble the brain in a computer and increase the number of operations per time, consciousness will emerge by itself. I disagree with this simplistic representation. My argument emerges from the “atomism paradox”: the irreducible space of the consciously perceived world, the endospace is incompatible with the reducible and decomposable architecture of the brain or a computer. I will first discuss the fundamental challenges in current consciousness models and then propose a new model based on the fractality principle: “the whole is in each of its parts”. This new model copes with the atomism paradox by implementing an iterative mapping of information from higher order brain structures to smaller scales on the cellular and molecular level, which I will refer to as “fractalization”. This information fractalization gives rise to a new form of matter that is conscious (“bright matter”). Bright matter is composed of conscious particles or units named “sentyons”. The internal fractality of these sentyons will close a loop (the “psychic loop”) in a recurrent fractal neural network (RFNN) that allows for continuous and complete information transformation and sharing between higher order brain structures and the endpoint substrate of consciousness at the molecular level. PMID:23950765

The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to be Conscious

PubMed Central

Cleeremans, Axel

2011-01-01

In this paper, I explore the idea that consciousness is something that the brain learns to do rather than an intrinsic property of certain neural states and not others. Starting from the idea that neural activity is inherently unconscious, the question thus becomes: How does the brain learn to be conscious? I suggest that consciousness arises as a result of the brain's continuous attempts at predicting not only the consequences of its actions on the world and on other agents, but also the consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-representations that characterize and qualify the target first-order representations. Such learned redescriptions, enriched by the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of conscious experience. Learning and plasticity are thus central to consciousness, to the extent that experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. This is what I call the “Radical Plasticity Thesis.” In a sense thus, this is the enactive perspective, but turned both inwards and (further) outwards. Consciousness involves “signal detection on the mind”; the conscious mind is the brain's (non-conceptual, implicit) theory about itself. I illustrate these ideas through neural network models that simulate the relationships between performance and awareness in different tasks. PMID:21687455

Human Consciousness: Where Is It From and What Is It for.

PubMed

Kotchoubey, Boris

2018-01-01

Consciousness is not a process in the brain but a kind of behavior that, of course, is controlled by the brain like any other behavior. Human consciousness emerges on the interface between three components of animal behavior: communication, play, and the use of tools. These three components interact on the basis of anticipatory behavioral control, which is common for all complex forms of animal life. All three do not exclusively distinguish our close relatives, i.e., primates, but are broadly presented among various species of mammals, birds, and even cephalopods; however, their particular combination in humans is unique. The interaction between communication and play yields symbolic games, most importantly language; the interaction between symbols and tools results in human praxis. Taken together, this gives rise to a mechanism that allows a creature, instead of performing controlling actions overtly, to play forward the corresponding behavioral options in a "second reality" of objectively (by means of tools) grounded symbolic systems. The theory possesses the following properties: (1) It is anti-reductionist and anti-eliminativist, and yet, human consciousness is considered as a purely natural (biological) phenomenon. (2) It avoids epiphenomenalism and indicates in which conditions human consciousness has evolutionary advantages, and in which it may even be disadvantageous. (3) It allows to easily explain the most typical features of consciousness, such as objectivity, seriality and limited resources, the relationship between consciousness and explicit memory, the feeling of conscious agency, etc.

Consciousness and Complexity during Unresponsiveness Induced by Propofol, Xenon, and Ketamine.

PubMed

Sarasso, Simone; Boly, Melanie; Napolitani, Martino; Gosseries, Olivia; Charland-Verville, Vanessa; Casarotto, Silvia; Rosanova, Mario; Casali, Adenauer Girardi; Brichant, Jean-Francois; Boveroux, Pierre; Rex, Steffen; Tononi, Giulio; Laureys, Steven; Massimini, Marcello

2015-12-07

A common endpoint of general anesthetics is behavioral unresponsiveness, which is commonly associated with loss of consciousness. However, subjects can become disconnected from the environment while still having conscious experiences, as demonstrated by sleep states associated with dreaming. Among anesthetics, ketamine is remarkable in that it induces profound unresponsiveness, but subjects often report "ketamine dreams" upon emergence from anesthesia. Here, we aimed at assessing consciousness during anesthesia with propofol, xenon, and ketamine, independent of behavioral responsiveness. To do so, in 18 healthy volunteers, we measured the complexity of the cortical response to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)--an approach that has proven helpful in assessing objectively the level of consciousness irrespective of sensory processing and motor responses. In addition, upon emergence from anesthesia, we collected reports about conscious experiences during unresponsiveness. Both frontal and parietal TMS elicited a low-amplitude electroencephalographic (EEG) slow wave corresponding to a local pattern of cortical activation with low complexity during propofol anesthesia, a high-amplitude EEG slow wave corresponding to a global, stereotypical pattern of cortical activation with low complexity during xenon anesthesia, and a wakefulness-like, complex spatiotemporal activation pattern during ketamine anesthesia. Crucially, participants reported no conscious experience after emergence from propofol and xenon anesthesia, whereas after ketamine they reported long, vivid dreams unrelated to the external environment. These results are relevant because they suggest that brain complexity may be sensitive to the presence of disconnected consciousness in subjects who are considered unconscious based on behavioral responses. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to be Conscious.

PubMed

Cleeremans, Axel

2011-01-01

In this paper, I explore the idea that consciousness is something that the brain learns to do rather than an intrinsic property of certain neural states and not others. Starting from the idea that neural activity is inherently unconscious, the question thus becomes: How does the brain learn to be conscious? I suggest that consciousness arises as a result of the brain's continuous attempts at predicting not only the consequences of its actions on the world and on other agents, but also the consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-representations that characterize and qualify the target first-order representations. Such learned redescriptions, enriched by the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of conscious experience. Learning and plasticity are thus central to consciousness, to the extent that experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. This is what I call the "Radical Plasticity Thesis." In a sense thus, this is the enactive perspective, but turned both inwards and (further) outwards. Consciousness involves "signal detection on the mind"; the conscious mind is the brain's (non-conceptual, implicit) theory about itself. I illustrate these ideas through neural network models that simulate the relationships between performance and awareness in different tasks.

States of Consciousness and State-Specific Sciences

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tart, Charles T.

1972-01-01

Proposes the development of state-specific sciences" to overcome the problems of scientifically studying altered states of consciousness induced by drugs or meditation from the paradigm of the ordinary consciousness state. The requirements of good observation, public nature of the observation, logical theorizing, and testing of theories by…

Connecting Conscious and Unconscious Processing

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cleeremans, Axel

2014-01-01

Consciousness remains a mystery--"a phenomenon that people do not know how to think about--yet" (Dennett, D. C., 1991, p. 21). Here, I consider how the connectionist perspective on information processing may help us progress toward the goal of understanding the computational principles through which conscious and unconscious processing…

Concussion in Motor Vehicle Accidents: The Concussion Identification Index

ClinicalTrials.gov

2016-08-03

Motor Vehicle Accidents; TBI (Traumatic Brain Injury); Brain Contusion; Brain Injuries; Cortical Contusion; Concussion Mild; Cerebral Concussion; Brain Concussion; Accidents, Traffic; Traffic Accidents; Traumatic Brain Injury With Brief Loss of Consciousness; Traumatic Brain Injury With no Loss of Consciousness; Traumatic Brain Injury With Loss of Consciousness

The Role of Gender Consciousness in Challenging Patriarchy.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bierema, Laura L.

2003-01-01

In an action research project, eight women explored their development of gender consciousness, finding that a hidden curriculum taught subordination to the patriarchal system. Connected learning fostered gender consciousness and led to connected action. Action included teaching others about gender issues, making the invisible visible, and adopting…

77 FR 65931 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-10-31

... certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the... had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the assistance of... hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the assistance of another person, or...

77 FR 5870 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-02-06

... certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the... had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the assistance of... hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the assistance of another person, or...

78 FR 56988 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-16

... and certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness... he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the... that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the...

76 FR 21792 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-04-18

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76 FR 66120 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-25

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77 FR 40941 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

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2012-07-11

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77 FR 36333 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

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Detecting number processing and mental calculation in patients with disorders of consciousness using a hybrid brain-computer interface system.

PubMed

Li, Yuanqing; Pan, Jiahui; He, Yanbin; Wang, Fei; Laureys, Steven; Xie, Qiuyou; Yu, Ronghao

2015-12-15

For patients with disorders of consciousness such as coma, a vegetative state or a minimally conscious state, one challenge is to detect and assess the residual cognitive functions in their brains. Number processing and mental calculation are important brain functions but are difficult to detect in patients with disorders of consciousness using motor response-based clinical assessment scales such as the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised due to the patients' motor impairments and inability to provide sufficient motor responses for number- and calculation-based communication. In this study, we presented a hybrid brain-computer interface that combines P300 and steady state visual evoked potentials to detect number processing and mental calculation in Han Chinese patients with disorders of consciousness. Eleven patients with disorders of consciousness who were in a vegetative state (n = 6) or in a minimally conscious state (n = 3) or who emerged from a minimally conscious state (n = 2) participated in the brain-computer interface-based experiment. During the experiment, the patients with disorders of consciousness were instructed to perform three tasks, i.e., number recognition, number comparison, and mental calculation, including addition and subtraction. In each experimental trial, an arithmetic problem was first presented. Next, two number buttons, only one of which was the correct answer to the problem, flickered at different frequencies to evoke steady state visual evoked potentials, while the frames of the two buttons flashed in a random order to evoke P300 potentials. The patients needed to focus on the target number button (the correct answer). Finally, the brain-computer interface system detected P300 and steady state visual evoked potentials to determine the button to which the patients attended, further presenting the results as feedback. Two of the six patients who were in a vegetative state, one of the three patients who were in a minimally conscious state, and the two patients that emerged from a minimally conscious state achieved accuracies significantly greater than the chance level. Furthermore, P300 potentials and steady state visual evoked potentials were observed in the electroencephalography signals from the five patients. Number processing and arithmetic abilities as well as command following were demonstrated in the five patients. Furthermore, our results suggested that through brain-computer interface systems, many cognitive experiments may be conducted in patients with disorders of consciousness, although they cannot provide sufficient behavioral responses.

Consciousness Raising and Christian Worship as Small Group Communication.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Burns, Gary

Consciousness raising movements and charismatic Christian worship display an extraordinary degree of rhetorical similarity. This four-part paper outlines the likenesses of the two groups, indicates where they differ, and focuses on the social and political dimensions of consciousness raising. The first section lists the following similarities…

Intersectional Political Consciousness: Appreciation for Intragroup Differences and Solidarity in Diverse Groups

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Greenwood, Ronni Michelle

2008-01-01

This article introduces an intersectional approach to political consciousness and presents data to demonstrate its importance for predicting solidarity in diverse social change organizations. Women activists (N = 174) completed measures of political consciousness, diversity, and solidarity. As expected, women differed in the degree to which their…

The Role of Consciousness in Second Language Learning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schmidt, Richard W.

1990-01-01

Summarizes recent psychological research and theory on the topic of consciousness, and looks at three questions in second-language learning related to the role of consciousness in input processing. The discussion involves the requirement in learning a second language of subliminal learning, implicit learning, and incidental learning. (142…

Opposite Effects of Working Memory on Subjective Visibility and Priming

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

De Loof, Esther; Verguts, Tom; Fias, Wim; Van Opstal, Filip

2013-01-01

Cognitive theories on consciousness propose a strong link between consciousness and working memory (WM). This link is also present at the neural level: Both consciousness and WM have been implicated in a prefrontal parietal network. However, the link remains empirically unexplored. The present study investigates the relation between consciousness…

Contextualizing How Undergraduate Students Develop toward Critical Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taylor, Kari Brooke

2017-01-01

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine how interactions between undergraduate students and their learning environments influenced their development toward critical consciousness. Critical consciousness represents a complex way of making meaning of one's self in relation to one's social world that is necessary for meeting the…

Fractals and the irreducibility of consciousness in plants and animals

PubMed Central

Gardiner, John

2013-01-01

In both plants and animals consciousness is fractal. Since fractals can only pass information in one direction it is impossible to extrapolate backward to find the rule that governs the fractal. Thus, similarly, it will be impossible to completely determine the rule or rules that govern consciousness. PMID:23759545

Self-Consciousness and Personality Characteristics among Prison Inmates.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

De La Serna, Marcelo; And Others

1986-01-01

Examined the personality characteristics of male prison inmates. Results indicate some personality traits and two clinical syndromes are useful in differentiating prison inmates with high and low scores on measures of private self-consciousness. Suggests persons with high self-consciousness are more suspicious, obsessive-compulsive, and likely to…

Self-Consciousness, Friendship Quality, and Adolescent Internalizing Problems

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bowker, Julie C.; Rubin, Kenneth H.

2009-01-01

The correlates between public and private self-consciousness and internalizing difficulties were examined during early adolescence. Friendship quality was assessed as a possible moderator of the relation between self-consciousness and maladjustment. One hundred and thirty-seven young adolescents (N = 87 girls; M age = 13.98 years) reported on…

For the Love of Words: Fostering Word Consciousness in Young Readers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Graves, Michael F.; Watts-Taffe, Susan

2008-01-01

Recent descriptions of comprehensive vocabulary programs identify fostering word consciousness (getting students really interested in and excited about words) as a crucial component of effective programs. This article defines word consciousness, explains why it is important and how it fits into the curriculum, describes a six-part framework…

The Relationship Between Consciousness, Interaction, and Language Learning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

van Lier, Leo

1998-01-01

Examines the relationship between consciousness, language learning, and social interaction from an ecological perspective. Argues that consciousness and language are integral parts of the human ecology, that is, they can be defined in terms of social activity and relationships among people, as well as in terms of mental operations or cerebral…

Agency and Learning: Some Implications for Educational Technology Theory and Research

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yanchar, Stephen C.; Spackman, Jonathan S.

2012-01-01

Clark (2011) recently reviewed literature on cognitive phenomena such as automaticity, non-conscious processing, and the "illusion of conscious will," concluding that most learning theories and instructional design models are informed by faulty assumptions regarding psychological functioning--namely, that most cognitive activity is conscious and…

The Self-Consciousness Scale: A Discriminant Validity Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Carver, Charles S.; Glass, David C.

1976-01-01

A validity study is conducted of the Self-Consciousness Scale components with male undergraduates. The components, Private and Public Self Consciousness and Social Anxiety did not correlate with any other measures used to establish their validity and thus seem to be independent of other measures tested. (Author/DEP)

Consciousness Lost and Found: Subjective Experiences in an Unresponsive State

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Noreika, Valdas; Jylhankangas, Leila; Moro, Levente; Valli, Katja; Kaskinoro, Kimmo; Aantaa, Riku; Scheinin, Harry; Revonsuo, Antti

2011-01-01

Anesthetic-induced changes in the neural activity of the brain have been recently utilized as a research model to investigate the neural mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness. However, the anesthesiologic definition of consciousness as "responsiveness to the environment" seems to sidestep the possibility that an unresponsive individual may have…

Breathwork as a Therapeutic Modality: An Overview for Counselors

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Young, J. Scott; Cashwell, Craig S.; Giordano, Amanda L.

2010-01-01

Using the breath as a vehicle for accessing psychological material is a topic rarely discussed in the counseling literature, despite the use of conscious engagement with the breath by many spiritual traditions for the purpose of personal transformation. This article describes 3 types of conscious breathing (circular breathing, conscious connected…

The Adolescent Dip in Students' Sustainability Consciousness--Implications for Education for Sustainable Development

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Olsson, Daniel; Gericke, Niklas

2016-01-01

Previous research has shown that interest in and concern about environmental issues tends to decrease in adolescence, but less is known about adolescents' broader consciousness of sustainable development, also including economic and social issues. This study investigates students' sustainability consciousness in the transition to adolescence. This…

77 FR 18302 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-03-27

... that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the... 2011 and certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness... certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the...

76 FR 32012 - Qualification of Drivers; Exemption Applications; Diabetes Mellitus

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-02

... certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the... and certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness... certified that he has had no severe hypoglycemic reactions resulting in loss of consciousness, requiring the...

Consciously Thinking about Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tribus, Myron

2004-01-01

Merker hypothesized that because mobile creatures move around and must constantly readjust their map of the world and because the demands are so great for continually processing information for a map of the world, evolution has created a space in the brain where such preprocessing has been eliminated. This space he calls consciousness with the…

From Consciousness to Technology: The Implications of Wave Periodicity Research for Communication Studies.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cooper, Thomas W.

Attempting to introduce a new viewpoint to communication studies, this speculative and philosophical paper posits technology as an "echo of consciousness." Section one examines technology as a manifestation of attitude, presenting the premise that technologies, consciousness, and systems are not separate components, but products of…

Fractals and the irreducibility of consciousness in plants and animals.

PubMed

Gardiner, John

2013-08-01

In both plants and animals consciousness is fractal. Since fractals can only pass information in one direction it is impossible to extrapolate backward to find the rule that governs the fractal. Thus, similarly, it will be impossible to completely determine the rule or rules that govern consciousness.

Environmental Consciousness, Sustainability, and the Character of Philosophy of Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bonnett, Michael

2017-01-01

This paper argues that education itself, properly understood, is intimately concerned with an individual's being in the world, and therefore is ineluctably environmental. This is guaranteed by the ecstatic nature of consciousness. Furthermore, it is argued that a central dimension of this environment with which ecstatic human consciousness is…

A Survey on Civic Consciousness in Contemporary China

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Huasheng, Tong

2012-01-01

In the current stage of China's modernization construction and social transformation, the cultivation of sound civic consciousness in the context of the servant consciousness lasting for thousands of years is the premise to cultivate citizens with civic rights and responsibilities, the foundation to achieve the modernization of individuals or the…

Conscious Cooperation with the Individuating Adult Learner

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Spear, Stephen B.

2014-01-01

Fundamental to the process of Jungian individuation is the integration of ego consciousness and unconsciousness. For this to occur, the ego must be willing to consciously cooperate with the unconscious, acknowledging and nonjudgmentally accepting the imaginal communications that flow from it. The ego's decision to cooperate with the unconscious is…

A culturally responsive counter-narrative of effective teaching

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gist, Conra D.

2014-12-01

How do you recognize an effective teacher's sociocultural consciousness? Tamara Wallace's and Brenda Brand's argument that sociocultural consciousness is the "brain" of effective culturally responsive instruction for students of color comes at a time when the system of teacher evaluation is being overhauled nationwide. Teacher observation tools are being piloted to develop a common language of effective instruction but often there is little attention given to sociocultural consciousness in these frameworks. This article develops a culturally responsive counter-narrative to explore the complexity of a teacher's racial consciousness during a teaching episode.

Altered States of Consciousness Profile: An Afro-Centric Intrapsychic Evaluation Tool

PubMed Central

Bell, Carl C.; Thompson, Belinda; Shorter-Gooden, Kumea; Mays, Raymond; Shakoor, Bambade

1985-01-01

In an effort to develop an Afro-centric intrapsychic evaluation tool, the Community Mental Health Council, Inc., Altered States of Consciousness Research Team, developed a structured interview used to quantify and qualify the 17 states of consciousness1 that occurred in black control, precare, and aftercare subjects. Differences were noted in the three groups as to the incidence, prevalence, and quality of the various states of consciousness. It was also noted that the profile obtained from the interviews yielded a sharp clinical picture of the subjects' total intrapsychic propensities. PMID:4057274

The chemosensory brain requires a distributed cellular mechanism to harness information and resolve conflicts - is consciousness the forum?

PubMed

Lathe, Richard

2016-01-01

The central nervous system (CNS) evolved from a chemosensory epithelium, but a simple epithelium has limited means to resolve conflicts between early drives (e.g., approach vs. avoid). Understanding the role of "consciousness" as a resolution device, with specific focus on chemosensation and the olfactory system, is of appeal. I argue that consciousness is not the adjudicator, but is instead the forum that brings conflicting (conscious) inputs into a form that allows them to be (unconsciously) compared/contrasted, guiding rational action.

The thinking ape: the enigma of human consciousness.

PubMed

Paulson, Steve; Chalmers, David; Kahneman, Daniel; Santos, Laurie; Schiff, Nicholas

2013-11-01

What is the origin and nature of consciousness? If consciousness is common to humans and animals alike, what are the defining traits of human consciousness? Moderated by Steve Paulson, executive producer and host of To the Best of Our Knowledge, Nobel laureate psychologist Daniel Kahneman, philosopher David Chalmers, expert in primate cognition Laurie Santos, and physician-scientist Nicholas Schiff discuss what it means to be conscious and examine the human capacities displayed in cognitive, aesthetic, and ethical behaviors, with a focus on the place and function of the mind within nature. The following is an edited transcript of the discussion that occurred October 10, 2012, 7:00-8:15 PM, at the New York Academy of Sciences in New York City. © 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.

Neuroethics and Disorders of Consciousness: Discerning Brain States in Clinical Practice and Research.

PubMed

Fins, Joseph J

2016-12-01

Decisions about end-of-life care and participation in clinical research for patients with disorders of consciousness begin with diagnostic discernment. Accurately distinguishing between brain states clarifies clinicians' ethical obligations and responsibilities. Central to this effort is the obligation to provide neuropalliative care for patients in the minimally conscious state who can perceive pain and to restore functional communication through neuroprosthetics, drugs, and rehabilitation to patients with intact but underactivated neural networks. Efforts to bring scientific advances to patients with disorders of consciousness are reviewed, including the investigational use of deep brain stimulation in patients in the minimally conscious state. These efforts help to affirm the civil rights of a population long on the margins. © 2016 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.

The Role of Neuroimaging Techniques in Establishing Diagnosis, Prognosis and Therapy in Disorders of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Gosseries, Olivia; Pistoia, Francesca; Charland-Verville, Vanessa; Carolei, Antonio; Sacco, Simona; Laureys, Steven

2016-01-01

Non-communicative brain damaged patients raise important clinical and scientific issues. Here, we review three major pathological disorders of consciousness: coma, the unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and the minimally conscious state. A number of clinical studies highlight the difficulty in making a correct diagnosis in patients with disorders of consciousness based only on behavioral examinations. The increasing use of neuroimaging techniques allows improving clinical characterization of these patients. Recent neuroimaging studies using positron emission tomography, functional magnetic resonance imaging, electroencephalography and transcranial magnetic stimulation can help assess diagnosis, prognosis, and therapeutic treatment. These techniques, using resting state, passive and active paradigms, also highlight possible dissociations between consciousness and responsiveness, and are facilitating a more accurate understanding of brain function in this challenging population. PMID:27347265

The claustrum’s proposed role in consciousness is supported by the effect and target localization of Salvia divinorum

PubMed Central

Stiefel, Klaus M.; Merrifield, Alistair; Holcombe, Alex O.

2014-01-01

This article brings together three findings and ideas relevant for the understanding of human consciousness: (I) Crick’s and Koch’s theory that the claustrum is a “conductor of consciousness” crucial for subjective conscious experience. (II) Subjective reports of the consciousness-altering effects the plant Salvia divinorum, whose primary active ingredient is salvinorin A, a κ-opioid receptor agonist. (III) The high density of κ-opioid receptors in the claustrum. Fact III suggests that the consciousness-altering effects of S. divinorum/salvinorin A (II) are due to a κ-opioid receptor mediated inhibition of primarily the claustrum and, additionally, the deep layers of the cortex, mainly in prefrontal areas. Consistent with Crick and Koch’s theory that the claustrum plays a key role in consciousness (I), the subjective effects of S. divinorum indicate that salvia disrupts certain facets of consciousness much more than the largely serotonergic hallucinogen lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Based on this data and on the relevant literature, we suggest that the claustrum does indeed serve as a conductor for certain aspects of higher-order integration of brain activity, while integration of auditory and visual signals relies more on coordination by other areas including parietal cortex and the pulvinar. PMID:24624064

Fine-Grained Parcellation of Brain Connectivity Improves Differentiation of States of Consciousness During Graded Propofol Sedation.

PubMed

Liu, Xiaolin; Lauer, Kathryn K; Ward, B Douglas; Roberts, Christopher J; Liu, Suyan; Gollapudy, Suneeta; Rohloff, Robert; Gross, William; Xu, Zhan; Chen, Guangyu; Binder, Jeffrey R; Li, Shi-Jiang; Hudetz, Anthony G

2017-08-01

Conscious perception relies on interactions between spatially and functionally distinct modules of the brain at various spatiotemporal scales. These interactions are altered by anesthesia, an intervention that leads to fading consciousness. Relatively little is known about brain functional connectivity and its anesthetic modulation at a fine spatial scale. Here, we used functional imaging to examine propofol-induced changes in functional connectivity in brain networks defined at a fine-grained parcellation based on a combination of anatomical and functional features. Fifteen healthy volunteers underwent resting-state functional imaging in wakeful baseline, mild sedation, deep sedation, and recovery of consciousness. Compared with wakeful baseline, propofol produced widespread, dose-dependent functional connectivity changes that scaled with the extent to which consciousness was altered. The dominant changes in connectivity were associated with the frontal lobes. By examining node pairs that demonstrated a trend of functional connectivity change between wakefulness and deep sedation, quadratic discriminant analysis differentiated the states of consciousness in individual participants more accurately at a fine-grained parcellation (e.g., 2000 nodes) than at a coarse-grained parcellation (e.g., 116 anatomical nodes). Our study suggests that defining brain networks at a high granularity may provide a superior imaging-based distinction of the graded effect of anesthesia on consciousness.

The natural history of continuing improvement in an individual after a long period of impaired consciousness: The story of I.J.

PubMed

Dhamapurkar, Samira Kashinath; Rose, Anita; Florschutz, Gerhard; Wilson, Barbara A

2016-01-01

Recovery of consciousness and recovery of function among patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness rarely occur. Those patients who do regain consciousness typically remain with severe disability. The aim of this retrospective study is to suggest that continuing improvement is possible in a survivor of catastrophic brain injury after being in a prolonged state of disordered consciousness. This retrospective single case study follows the progress of a 29 year old man, I.J, who sustained a severe traumatic brain injury following an assault in October 2011. He was in a vegetative state for 15 months and in a minimally conscious state for a further 4 months. This was followed by a slow and steady recovery of motor and cognitive functions. At 3 years post-injury I.J is considered to be moderately disabled. He is now living in the community with continuing outpatient support. On the disability rating scale his level of functioning is rated as mildly dependent. This study shows that continuing recovery to a level of moderate disability is possible, even after a prolonged disorder of consciousness. Intense multi-disciplinary long-term rehabilitation and cranioplasty may be contributing factors for such an unexpected recovery.

Traditional and online consumers in China: a preliminary study of their personality traits and decision-making styles.

PubMed

Zhu, Junpeng; Xu, You; Huang, Jingyi; Yeow, Changdar; Wang, Wei

2012-12-01

Population of online consumers increases rapidly, but the decision-making styles of online consumers and psychiatric denominators such as the personality correlates remain unclear. In 196 traditional, and 196 age-, education- and gender-matched online consumers, we have tested the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire (ZKPQ) and the Consumer Style Inventory (CSI). After exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we have defined a five-factor model CSI with 24 items. Online consumers scored lower on ZKPQ Neuroticism-Anxiety and higher on Aggression-Hostility than traditional ones did, and scored higher on CSI Novelty-fashion consciousness and Brand consciousness, and lower on Time consciousness than the traditional consumers did. ZKPQ Neuroticism-Anxiety was positively correlated with CSI Confused by overchoice in both groups, Sociability was positively correlated with Novelty-fashion consciousness and negatively with Time consciousness in traditional group, and Impulsive Sensation Seeking was positively correlated with Novelty-fashion consciousness and Time consciousness in online group. Our study suggests that, regarding the decision-making styles, online consumers display curiosity that lacks security and need other ways to improve their social lives. It also calls further designs to address the contributions of other psychiatric features to the particular decision-making styles in online consumers.

Time rescaling reproduces EEG behavior during transition from propofol anesthesia-induced unconsciousness to consciousness.

PubMed

Boussen, S; Spiegler, A; Benar, C; Carrère, M; Bartolomei, F; Metellus, P; Voituriez, R; Velly, L; Bruder, N; Trébuchon, A

2018-04-16

General anesthesia (GA) is a reversible manipulation of consciousness whose mechanism is mysterious at the level of neural networks leaving space for several competing hypotheses. We recorded electrocorticography (ECoG) signals in patients who underwent intracranial monitoring during awake surgery for the treatment of cerebral tumors in functional areas of the brain. Therefore, we recorded the transition from unconsciousness to consciousness directly on the brain surface. Using frequency resolved interferometry; we studied the intermediate ECoG frequencies (4-40 Hz). In the theoretical study, we used a computational Jansen and Rit neuron model to simulate recovery of consciousness (ROC). During ROC, we found that f increased by a factor equal to 1.62 ± 0.09, and δf varied by the same factor (1.61 ± 0.09) suggesting the existence of a scaling factor. We accelerated the time course of an unconscious EEG trace by an approximate factor 1.6 and we showed that the resulting EEG trace match the conscious state. Using the theoretical model, we successfully reproduced this behavior. We show that the recovery of consciousness corresponds to a transition in the frequency (f, δf) space, which is exactly reproduced by a simple time rescaling. These findings may perhaps be applied to other altered consciousness states.

Divergent neural responses to narrative speech in disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Iotzov, Ivan; Fidali, Brian C; Petroni, Agustin; Conte, Mary M; Schiff, Nicholas D; Parra, Lucas C

2017-11-01

Clinical assessment of auditory attention in patients with disorders of consciousness is often limited by motor impairment. Here, we employ intersubject correlations among electroencephalography responses to naturalistic speech in order to assay auditory attention among patients and healthy controls. Electroencephalographic data were recorded from 20 subjects with disorders of consciousness and 14 healthy controls during of two narrative audio stimuli, presented both forwards and time-reversed. Intersubject correlation of evoked electroencephalography signals were calculated, comparing responses of both groups to those of the healthy control subjects. This analysis was performed blinded and subsequently compared to the diagnostic status of each patient based on the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised. Subjects with disorders of consciousness exhibit significantly lower intersubject correlation than healthy controls during narrative speech. Additionally, while healthy subjects had higher intersubject correlation values in forwards versus backwards presentation, neural responses did not vary significantly with the direction of playback in subjects with disorders of consciousness. Increased intersubject correlation values in the backward speech condition were noted with improving disorder of consciousness diagnosis, both in cross-sectional analysis and in a subset of patients with longitudinal data. Intersubject correlation of neural responses to narrative speech audition differentiates healthy controls from patients and appears to index clinical diagnoses in disorders of consciousness.

Body Conscious? Interoceptive Awareness, Measured by Heartbeat Perception, Is Negatively Correlated with Self-Objectification

PubMed Central

Ainley, Vivien; Tsakiris, Manos

2013-01-01

Background ‘Self-objectification’ is the tendency to experience one's body principally as an object, to be evaluated for its appearance rather than for its effectiveness. Within objectification theory, it has been proposed that self-objectification accounts for the poorer interoceptive awareness observed in women, as measured by heartbeat perception. Our study is, we believe, the first specifically to test this relationship. Methodology/Principal Findings Using a well-validated and reliable heartbeat perception task, we measured interoceptive awareness in women and compared this with their scores on the Self-Objectification Questionnaire, the Self-Consciousness Scale and the Body Consciousness Questionnaire. Interoceptive awareness was negatively correlated with self-objectification. Interoceptive awareness, public body consciousness and private body consciousness together explained 31% of the variance in self-objectification. However, private body consciousness was not significantly correlated with interoceptive awareness, which may explain the many nonsignificant results in self-objectification studies that have used private body consciousness as a measure of body awareness. Conclusions/Significance We propose interoceptive awareness, assessed by heartbeat perception, as a measure of body awareness in self-objectification studies. Our findings have implications for those clinical conditions, in women, which are characterised by self-objectification and low interoceptive awareness, such as eating disorders. PMID:23405173

Distorted temporal consciousness and preserved knowing consciousness in confabulation: a case study.

PubMed

La Corte, Valentina; George, Nathalie; Pradat-Diehl, Pascale; Barba, Gianfranco Dalla

2011-01-01

In this study we describe a patient, TA, who developed a chronic amnesic-confabulatory syndrome, following rupture of a right internal carotid siphon aneurysm. Our aim was to elucidate as fully as possible the nature of TA's impairment and to test the hypothesis of confabulation as reflecting a dysfunction of Temporal Consciousness, i.e., to become aware of something as part of a personal past, present or future. TA's confabulations were present in answers to questions tapping Temporal Consciousness, i.e., autobiographical episodic memory, orientation in time and place, and foresight of personal future. In contrast, confabulations were not observed in answers to questions tapping Knowing Consciousness, i.e., to become aware of something as a meaning or as an element of impersonal knowledge. In fact, he had normal access to semantic knowledge, including foresight of impersonal future. TA's brain MRI showed lesions involving the right hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, fornix, mammillary bodies, and thalamus. Moreover TA showed sub-cortical lesions involving the caudate and putamen nuclei bilaterally, a lesion site not commonly described in amnesic-confabulatory syndrome. We suggest that this pattern of results is better accounted for within the framework of the Memory, Consciousness and Temporality Theory and reflects a specific distortion of Temporal Consciousness.

Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-person approach.

PubMed Central

Gardiner, J M

2001-01-01

Episodic memory is identified with autonoetic consciousness, which gives rise to remembering in the sense of self-recollection in the mental re-enactment of previous events at which one was present. Autonoetic consciousness is distinguished from noetic consciousness, which gives rise to awareness of the past that is limited to feelings of familiarity or knowing. Noetic consciousness is identified not with episodic but with semantic memory, which involves general knowledge. A recently developed approach to episodic memory makes use of 'first-person' reports of remembering and knowing. Studies using this approach have revealed many independent variables that selectively affect remembering and others that selectively affect knowing. These studies can also be interpreted in terms of distinctiveness and fluency of processing. Remembering and knowing do not correspond with degrees of confidence in memory. Nor does remembering always control the memory response. There is evidence that remembering is selectively impaired in various populations, including not only amnesic patients and older adults but also adults with Asperger's syndrome. This first-person approach to episodic memory represents one way in which that most elusive aspect of consciousness, its subjectivity, can be investigated scientifically. The two kinds of conscious experiences can be manipulated experimentally in ways that are systematic, replicable and intelligible theoretically. PMID:11571027

Functional MRI Motor Imagery Tasks to Detect Command Following in Traumatic Disorders of Consciousness.

PubMed

Bodien, Yelena G; Giacino, Joseph T; Edlow, Brian L

2017-01-01

Severe traumatic brain injury impairs arousal and awareness, the two components of consciousness. Accurate diagnosis of a patient's level of consciousness is critical for determining treatment goals, access to rehabilitative services, and prognosis. The bedside behavioral examination, the current clinical standard for diagnosis of disorders of consciousness, is prone to misdiagnosis, a finding that has led to the development of advanced neuroimaging techniques aimed at detection of conscious awareness. Although a variety of paradigms have been used in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to reveal covert consciousness, the relative accuracy of these paradigms in the patient population is unknown. Here, we compare the rate of covert consciousness detection by hand squeezing and tennis playing motor imagery paradigms in 10 patients with traumatic disorders of consciousness [six male, six acute, mean ± SD age = 27.9 ± 9.1 years, one coma, four unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, two minimally conscious without language function, and three minimally conscious with language function, per bedside examination with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)]. We also tested the same paradigms in 10 healthy subjects (nine male, mean ± SD age = 28.5 ± 9.4 years). In healthy subjects, the hand squeezing paradigm detected covert command following in 7/10 and the tennis playing paradigm in 9/10 subjects. In patients who followed commands on the CRS-R, the hand squeezing paradigm detected covert command following in 2/3 and the tennis playing paradigm in 0/3 subjects. In patients who did not follow commands on the CRS-R, the hand squeezing paradigm detected command following in 1/7 and the tennis playing paradigm in 2/7 subjects. The sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy (ACC) of detecting covert command following in patients who demonstrated this behavior on the CRS-R was 66.7, 85.7, and 80% for the hand squeezing paradigm and 0, 71.4, and 50% for the tennis playing paradigm, respectively. Overall, the tennis paradigm performed better than the hand squeezing paradigm in healthy subjects, but in patients, the hand squeezing paradigm detected command following with greater ACC. These findings indicate that current fMRI motor imagery paradigms frequently fail to detect command following and highlight the need for paradigm optimization to improve the accuracy of covert consciousness detection.

Functional MRI Motor Imagery Tasks to Detect Command Following in Traumatic Disorders of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Bodien, Yelena G.; Giacino, Joseph T.; Edlow, Brian L.

2017-01-01

Severe traumatic brain injury impairs arousal and awareness, the two components of consciousness. Accurate diagnosis of a patient’s level of consciousness is critical for determining treatment goals, access to rehabilitative services, and prognosis. The bedside behavioral examination, the current clinical standard for diagnosis of disorders of consciousness, is prone to misdiagnosis, a finding that has led to the development of advanced neuroimaging techniques aimed at detection of conscious awareness. Although a variety of paradigms have been used in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to reveal covert consciousness, the relative accuracy of these paradigms in the patient population is unknown. Here, we compare the rate of covert consciousness detection by hand squeezing and tennis playing motor imagery paradigms in 10 patients with traumatic disorders of consciousness [six male, six acute, mean ± SD age = 27.9 ± 9.1 years, one coma, four unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, two minimally conscious without language function, and three minimally conscious with language function, per bedside examination with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)]. We also tested the same paradigms in 10 healthy subjects (nine male, mean ± SD age = 28.5 ± 9.4 years). In healthy subjects, the hand squeezing paradigm detected covert command following in 7/10 and the tennis playing paradigm in 9/10 subjects. In patients who followed commands on the CRS-R, the hand squeezing paradigm detected covert command following in 2/3 and the tennis playing paradigm in 0/3 subjects. In patients who did not follow commands on the CRS-R, the hand squeezing paradigm detected command following in 1/7 and the tennis playing paradigm in 2/7 subjects. The sensitivity, specificity, and accuracy (ACC) of detecting covert command following in patients who demonstrated this behavior on the CRS-R was 66.7, 85.7, and 80% for the hand squeezing paradigm and 0, 71.4, and 50% for the tennis playing paradigm, respectively. Overall, the tennis paradigm performed better than the hand squeezing paradigm in healthy subjects, but in patients, the hand squeezing paradigm detected command following with greater ACC. These findings indicate that current fMRI motor imagery paradigms frequently fail to detect command following and highlight the need for paradigm optimization to improve the accuracy of covert consciousness detection. PMID:29326648

Subjective and objective characteristics of altered consciousness during epileptic seizures.

PubMed

Campora, Nuria; Kochen, Silvia

2016-02-01

Conscious states are inner states and processes of awareness. These states are by definition subjective. We analyzed subjective and objective characteristics of alteration of consciousness (AOC) during epileptic seizures, including its involvement in both the level of awareness and subjective content of consciousness. We evaluated AOC using the Consciousness Seizure Scale, the Ictal Consciousness Inventory, and a new structured survey developed by our group: the Seizure Perception Survey, which incorporates patients' subjective experiences before and after they watch a video-electroencephalographic recording of their own seizure. We included 35 patients (105 seizures) with drug-resistant epilepsy. Most seizures caused profound AOC. The content of consciousness was lower during temporal seizures with profound AOC. We uncovered a correlation between the subjective perception and objective duration of a seizure using the Seizure Perception Survey regarding memory; the patients had a better recall of ictal onset during wakefulness regardless of the epileptogenic zone, laterality, or magnitude of AOC. Nonetheless, the recovery of memory at the end of a seizure took more time in patients who showed greater AOC, less vivid content of consciousness, or a longer seizure. For 85% of the patients, this was the first time they were able to view their own seizures. The majority of the patients requested to view them again because this procedure allowed them to compare the recordings with their own memories and emotions during a seizure and to verify the real duration of the seizure. Alteration of consciousness is one of the most dramatic clinical manifestations of epilepsy. Usually, practitioners or relatives assume that the patients with AOC may not have any knowledge on their seizures. In this study, however, we found that most patients with AOC had a fairly accurate perception of the duration of a seizure and retained their memory of ictal onset. In contrast, for the majority of the patients, watching their own seizure was an extremely positive experience, and most patients stated that they were surprised as well as glad to view what really happened, without expressing negative opinions. Inclusion of subjective characteristics of AOC into the analysis yielded complete assessment of various dimensions of consciousness and therefore allowed us to gain a more detailed understanding of consciousness. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

[Consciousness and the electroencephalogram].

PubMed

Faber, J; Vladyka, V; Subrt, O

1991-08-01

In the course of 12 years the authors subjected to clinical EEG and stereo-EEG (SEEG) 72 patients (66 epileptics with the diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy and grand mal) and six psychotic patients suffering from schizophrenia. With the exception of five epileptics and two psychotic patients all subjects had epileptic foci in the amygdalohippocampal complex (AHK). After coagulation of these foci marked improvement of the fits and the mental state occurred in half the patients. During EEG and SEEG recording the authors used different activation methods (hyperventilation through the nose and mouth, sleep, listening to music) and above all direct electric stimulation (ES) of one of the AHK. Secondary epileptic foci had, as a rule, more spikes and a lower threshold for ES than primary ones which contained more delta and slow theta waves. The ES led as a rule to an emotional response, such as anxiety and fear, more rarely to illusions, depersonalization and oneiroid hallucinations and twice to a hedonic response of non-sexual character. The purpose of ES was to assess the site from where it is possible to start the original aura or typical parox. The authors considered these foci, consistent with data in the literature, as the leading focus and it was subsequently coagulated. The authors investigated the reactivity and vigility by the patient's response to sound (the patient had to press a button) and by an interview with the patient. It was revealed that in isolated discharges of the spikes and waves in the scalp electrodes, i.e. in the neocortex, reactivity is lacking. In isolated discharges in the AHK the reactivity was satisfactory, but as a rule anxiety developed. It is thus possible to divide consciousness into emotional consciousness with its site in the AHK, i.e. in the limbic system, and rational consciousness which is a function of the neocrotical system. Congenital changes of consciousness such as vigility or sleep are described as "states" of consciousness. The rational or emotional aspect of behaviour is described as "type" of consciousness. Under normal conditions the states of consciousness alternate periodically and are sharply defined, the types of consciousness are closely linked and are difficult to separate. Under pathological conditions the "states" of consciousness differ less markedly and the "types" of consciousness are in dissociation. Thus obnubilation, depersonalization, illusions, pathic affects etc. develop, as a rule as part of the epileptiform or psychotiform syndrome.

Unifying the concept of consciousness across the disciplines: A concept-based, cross-cultural approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jones, Peter N.

The majority of studies concerning consciousness have examined and modeled the concept of consciousness in terms of particular lines of inquiry, a process that has circumscribed the general applicability of any results from such approaches. The purpose of this dissertation was to study consciousness from a concept-based, cross-cultural approach and to attempt to unify the concept across the cultures examined. The 4 cultures are the academic disciplines of philosophy, physics, psychology, and anthropology. Consciousness was examined in terms of how the concept is framed and where the major limitations in each line of inquiry occur. The rationale for examining consciousness as a concept across 4 cultures was to determine whether there was any common component in each line's framing that could be used to unify the concept. The study found that experience itself was the primary unifying factor in each field's framing and that experience was treated as a nonreducible property within each line of inquiry. By taking experience itself (but not subjective experience) as a fundamental property, each culture's concept of consciousness becomes tractable. As such, this dissertation argues that experience should be taken as a fundamental property of the concept. The significance of this analysis is that by taking experience as a fundamental property, it becomes possible to unify the concept across the 4 cultures. This unification is presented as a unity thesis, which is a theory arguing for unification of the concept based on the fundamental of experience. Following this theoretical examination, this paper discusses several key implications of the unity thesis, including implications of the unity thesis for the current status of altered states of consciousness and for the so-called hard and easy problems associated with the concept (at least within Occidental ontology). It is argued that the so-called hard problem does not exist when experience is taken as a fundamental property of ontological reality and that altered states of consciousness are in fact better understood as access states of consciousness based on unity thesis. The dissertation concludes with suggestions for further lines of research.

Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?

PubMed

Tononi, Giulio; Koch, Christof

2015-05-19

The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like to know if consciousness is present: patients with a few remaining islands of functioning cortex, preterm infants, non-mammalian species and machines that are rapidly outperforming people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions. To address these issues, we need not only more data but also a theory of consciousness-one that says what experience is and what type of physical systems can have it. Integrated information theory (IIT) does so by starting from experience itself via five phenomenological axioms: intrinsic existence, composition, information, integration and exclusion. From these it derives five postulates about the properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. The theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of an individual experience (a quale), and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a particular physical system is conscious and of what. Moreover, IIT can explain a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes a number of testable predictions and extrapolates to a number of problematic conditions. The theory holds that consciousness is a fundamental property possessed by physical systems having specific causal properties. It predicts that consciousness is graded, is common among biological organisms and can occur in some very simple systems. Conversely, it predicts that feed-forward networks, even complex ones, are not conscious, nor are aggregates such as groups of individuals or heaps of sand. Also, in sharp contrast to widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies that digital computers, even if their behaviour were to be functionally equivalent to ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would experience next to nothing.

Electroencephalogram signatures of loss and recovery of consciousness from propofol

PubMed Central

Purdon, Patrick L.; Pierce, Eric T.; Mukamel, Eran A.; Prerau, Michael J.; Walsh, John L.; Wong, Kin Foon K.; Salazar-Gomez, Andres F.; Harrell, Priscilla G.; Sampson, Aaron L.; Cimenser, Aylin; Ching, ShiNung; Kopell, Nancy J.; Tavares-Stoeckel, Casie; Habeeb, Kathleen; Merhar, Rebecca; Brown, Emery N.

2013-01-01

Unconsciousness is a fundamental component of general anesthesia (GA), but anesthesiologists have no reliable ways to be certain that a patient is unconscious. To develop EEG signatures that track loss and recovery of consciousness under GA, we recorded high-density EEGs in humans during gradual induction of and emergence from unconsciousness with propofol. The subjects executed an auditory task at 4-s intervals consisting of interleaved verbal and click stimuli to identify loss and recovery of consciousness. During induction, subjects lost responsiveness to the less salient clicks before losing responsiveness to the more salient verbal stimuli; during emergence they recovered responsiveness to the verbal stimuli before recovering responsiveness to the clicks. The median frequency and bandwidth of the frontal EEG power tracked the probability of response to the verbal stimuli during the transitions in consciousness. Loss of consciousness was marked simultaneously by an increase in low-frequency EEG power (<1 Hz), the loss of spatially coherent occipital alpha oscillations (8–12 Hz), and the appearance of spatially coherent frontal alpha oscillations. These dynamics reversed with recovery of consciousness. The low-frequency phase modulated alpha amplitude in two distinct patterns. During profound unconsciousness, alpha amplitudes were maximal at low-frequency peaks, whereas during the transition into and out of unconsciousness, alpha amplitudes were maximal at low-frequency nadirs. This latter phase–amplitude relationship predicted recovery of consciousness. Our results provide insights into the mechanisms of propofol-induced unconsciousness, establish EEG signatures of this brain state that track transitions in consciousness precisely, and suggest strategies for monitoring the brain activity of patients receiving GA. PMID:23487781

A frontal but not parietal neural correlate of auditory consciousness.

PubMed

Brancucci, Alfredo; Lugli, Victor; Perrucci, Mauro Gianni; Del Gratta, Cosimo; Tommasi, Luca

2016-01-01

Hemodynamic correlates of consciousness were investigated in humans during the presentation of a dichotic sequence inducing illusory auditory percepts with features analogous to visual multistability. The sequence consisted of a variation of the original stimulation eliciting the Deutsch's octave illusion, created to maintain a stable illusory percept long enough to allow the detection of the underlying hemodynamic activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Two specular 500 ms dichotic stimuli (400 and 800 Hz) presented in alternation by means of earphones cause an illusory segregation of pitch and ear of origin which can yield up to four different auditory percepts per dichotic stimulus. Such percepts are maintained stable when one of the two dichotic stimuli is presented repeatedly for 6 s, immediately after the alternation. We observed hemodynamic activity specifically accompanying conscious experience of pitch in a bilateral network including the superior frontal gyrus (SFG, BA9 and BA10), medial frontal gyrus (BA6 and BA9), insula (BA13), and posterior lateral nucleus of the thalamus. Conscious experience of side (ear of origin) was instead specifically accompanied by bilateral activity in the MFG (BA6), STG (BA41), parahippocampal gyrus (BA28), and insula (BA13). These results suggest that the neural substrate of auditory consciousness, differently from that of visual consciousness, may rest upon a fronto-temporal rather than upon a fronto-parietal network. Moreover, they indicate that the neural correlates of consciousness depend on the specific features of the stimulus and suggest the SFG-MFG and the insula as important cortical nodes for auditory conscious experience.

Automatic Online Motor Control Is Intact in Parkinson's Disease With and Without Perceptual Awareness.

PubMed

Merritt, Kate E; Seergobin, Ken N; Mendonça, Daniel A; Jenkins, Mary E; Goodale, Melvyn A; MacDonald, Penny A

2017-01-01

In the double-step paradigm, healthy human participants automatically correct reaching movements when targets are displaced. Motor deficits are prominent in Parkinson's disease (PD) patients. In the lone investigation of online motor correction in PD using the double-step task, a recent study found that PD patients performed unconscious adjustments appropriately but seemed impaired for consciously-perceived modifications. Conscious perception of target movement was achieved by linking displacement to movement onset. PD-related bradykinesia disproportionately prolonged preparatory phases for movements to original target locations for patients, potentially accounting for deficits. Eliminating this confound in a double-step task, we evaluated the effect of conscious awareness of trajectory change on online motor corrections in PD. On and off dopaminergic therapy, PD patients ( n = 14) and healthy controls ( n = 14) reached to peripheral visual targets that remained stationary or unexpectedly moved during an initial saccade. Saccade latencies in PD are comparable to controls'. Hence, target displacements occurred at equal times across groups. Target jump size affected conscious awareness, confirmed in an independent target displacement judgment task. Small jumps were subliminal, but large target displacements were consciously perceived. Contrary to the previous result, PD patients performed online motor corrections normally and automatically, irrespective of conscious perception. Patients evidenced equivalent movement durations for jump and stay trials, and trajectories for patients and controls were identical, irrespective of conscious perception. Dopaminergic therapy had no effect on performance. In summary, online motor control is intact in PD, unaffected by conscious perceptual awareness. The basal ganglia are not implicated in online corrective responses.

Automatic Online Motor Control Is Intact in Parkinson’s Disease With and Without Perceptual Awareness

PubMed Central

Seergobin, Ken N.; Mendonça, Daniel A.

2017-01-01

Abstract In the double-step paradigm, healthy human participants automatically correct reaching movements when targets are displaced. Motor deficits are prominent in Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients. In the lone investigation of online motor correction in PD using the double-step task, a recent study found that PD patients performed unconscious adjustments appropriately but seemed impaired for consciously-perceived modifications. Conscious perception of target movement was achieved by linking displacement to movement onset. PD-related bradykinesia disproportionately prolonged preparatory phases for movements to original target locations for patients, potentially accounting for deficits. Eliminating this confound in a double-step task, we evaluated the effect of conscious awareness of trajectory change on online motor corrections in PD. On and off dopaminergic therapy, PD patients (n = 14) and healthy controls (n = 14) reached to peripheral visual targets that remained stationary or unexpectedly moved during an initial saccade. Saccade latencies in PD are comparable to controls’. Hence, target displacements occurred at equal times across groups. Target jump size affected conscious awareness, confirmed in an independent target displacement judgment task. Small jumps were subliminal, but large target displacements were consciously perceived. Contrary to the previous result, PD patients performed online motor corrections normally and automatically, irrespective of conscious perception. Patients evidenced equivalent movement durations for jump and stay trials, and trajectories for patients and controls were identical, irrespective of conscious perception. Dopaminergic therapy had no effect on performance. In summary, online motor control is intact in PD, unaffected by conscious perceptual awareness. The basal ganglia are not implicated in online corrective responses. PMID:29085900

Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?).

PubMed

Friston, Karl

2018-01-01

Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it-the answer is yes. This was my response to a question I was asked to address in a recent AEON piece (https://aeon.co/essays/consciousness-is-not-a-thing-but-a-process-of-inference). What follows is based upon the notes for that essay, with a special focus on self-organization, self-evidencing and self-modeling. I will try to substantiate my (polemic) answer from the perspective of a physicist. In brief, the argument goes as follows: if we want to talk about creatures, like ourselves, then we have to identify the characteristic behaviors they must exhibit. This is fairly easy to do by noting that living systems return to a set of attracting states time and time again. Mathematically, this implies the existence of a Lyapunov function that turns out to be model evidence (i.e., self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (i.e., self-information) in information theory. This means that all biological processes can be construed as performing some form of inference, from evolution through to conscious processing. If this is the case, at what point do we invoke consciousness? The proposal on offer here is that the mind comes into being when self-evidencing has a temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, which grounds inferences about the consequences of my action. On this view, consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-evidencing consequences of what I could do.

Public self-consciousness moderates the link between displacement behaviour and experience of stress in women.

PubMed

Mohiyeddini, Changiz; Bauer, Stephanie; Semple, Stuart

2013-07-01

When stressed, people typically show elevated rates of displacement behaviour--activities such as scratching and face touching that seem irrelevant to the ongoing situation. Growing evidence indicates that displacement behaviour may play a role in regulating stress levels, and thus may represent an important component of the coping response. Recently, we found evidence that this stress-regulating effect of displacement behaviour is found in men but not in women. This sex difference may result from women's higher levels of public self-consciousness, which could inhibit expression of displacement behaviour due to the fear of projecting an inappropriate image. Here, we explored the link between public self-consciousness, displacement behaviour and stress among 62 healthy women (mean age = 26.59 years; SD = 3.61). We first assessed participants' public self-consciousness, and then quantified displacement behaviour, heart rate and cognitive performance during a Trier Social Stress Test (TSST) and used self-report questionnaires to assess the experience of stress afterwards. Public self-consciousness was negatively correlated with rate of displacement behaviour, and positively correlated with both the subjective experience of stress post-TSST and the number of mistakes in the cognitive task. Moderation analyses revealed that for women high in public self-consciousness, high levels of displacement behaviour were associated with higher reported levels of stress and poorer cognitive performance. For women low in public self-consciousness, stress levels and cognitive performance were unrelated to displacement behaviour. Our findings indicate that public self-consciousness is associated with both the expression of displacement behaviour and how such behaviour mediates responses to social stress.

Does increased postural threat lead to more conscious control of posture?

PubMed

Huffman, J L; Horslen, B C; Carpenter, M G; Adkin, A L

2009-11-01

Although it is well established that postural threat modifies postural control, little is known regarding the underlying mechanism(s) responsible for these changes. It is possible that changes in postural control under conditions of elevated postural threat result from a shift to a more conscious control of posture. The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of elevated postural threat on conscious control of posture and to determine the relationship between conscious control and postural control measures. Forty-eight healthy young adults stood on a force plate at two different surface heights: ground level (LOW) and 3.2-m above ground level (HIGH). Centre of pressure measures calculated in the anterior-posterior (AP) direction were mean position (AP-MP), root mean square (AP-RMS) and mean power frequency (AP-MPF). A modified state-specific version of the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale was used to measure conscious motor processing (CMP) and movement self-consciousness (MSC). Balance confidence, fear of falling, perceived stability, and perceived and actual anxiety indicators were also collected. A significant effect of postural threat was found for movement reinvestment as participants reported more conscious control and a greater concern about their posture at the HIGH height. Significant correlations between CMP and MSC with AP-MP were observed as participants who consciously controlled and were more concerned for their posture leaned further away from the platform edge. It is possible that changes in movement reinvestment can influence specific aspects of posture (leaning) but other aspects may be immune to these changes (amplitude and frequency).

Restructuring consciousness –the psychedelic state in light of integrated information theory

PubMed Central

Gallimore, Andrew R.

2015-01-01

The psychological state elicited by the classic psychedelics drugs, such as LSD and psilocybin, is one of the most fascinating and yet least understood states of consciousness. However, with the advent of modern functional neuroimaging techniques, the effect of these drugs on neural activity is now being revealed, although many of the varied phenomenological features of the psychedelic state remain challenging to explain. Integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the foremost contemporary theories of consciousness, providing a mathematical formalization of both the quantity and quality of conscious experience. This theory can be applied to all known states of consciousness, including the psychedelic state. Using the results of functional neuroimaging data on the psychedelic state, the effects of psychedelic drugs on both the level and structure of consciousness can be explained in terms of the conceptual framework of IIT. This new IIT-based model of the psychedelic state provides an explanation for many of its phenomenological features, including unconstrained cognition, alterations in the structure and meaning of concepts and a sense of expanded awareness. This model also suggests that whilst cognitive flexibility, creativity, and imagination are enhanced during the psychedelic state, this occurs at the expense of cause-effect information, as well as degrading the brain's ability to organize, categorize, and differentiate the constituents of conscious experience. Furthermore, the model generates specific predictions that can be tested using a combination of functional imaging techniques, as has been applied to the study of levels of consciousness during anesthesia and following brain injury. PMID:26124719

Acting: An Altered State of Consciousness.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scheiffele, Eberhard

2001-01-01

Uses notions from the field Psychology of Consciousness, including an explanation of how psychologists define and investigate Altered States of Consciousness (ASCs). Argues that actors routinely enter an ASC. Establishes acting as a way to enter an ASC and discusses why theater artists, educators, and advocates need to be aware of both the dangers…

Thinking Ourselves to Liberation?: Advancing Sociopolitical Action in Critical Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Watts, Roderick J.; Hipolito-Delgado, Carlos P.

2015-01-01

Freire advanced critical consciousness as a tool for the liberation of oppressed communities. Based on his ideas, scholars of theory and practice from myriad disciplines have written about how to advance critical consciousness (CC) among oppressed peoples. We reviewed CC theory and practice articles in scholarly journals with the goal of…

The Relationship between Objectified Body Consciousness and Wellness in a Group of College Women

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sinclair, Stacey L.; Myers, Jane E.

2004-01-01

Objectified body consciousness theory provides a framework for understanding young women's negative body experiences and their impact on well-being. This study examined the impact of body surveillance, body shame, and appearance control beliefs, the 3 components of objectified body consciousness, on wellness in college women. Data indicated a…

A Place for Organisational Critical Consciousness: Comparing Two Case Studies of Freirean Nonprofits

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Straubhaar, Rolf

2014-01-01

One of the primary goals of Freirean theory is the achievement of a higher level of political and social consciousness amongst participants in educational programming. Freire himself only loosely defined this sense of consciousness, and interpretations of how this abstract concept might look vary widely. In some organisations, the politically…

Self-Consciousness and Death Cognitions from a Terror Management Perspective

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taubman-Ben-Ari, Orit; Noy, Adi

2010-01-01

Two studies explored the connection between self-consciousness and death cognitions. In Study 1 (n = 56), a positive association was found between accessibility of death-related thoughts and the ruminative dimension of self-consciousness. In Study 2 (n = 212), a mortality salience induction led to higher validation of cultural worldviews (a more…

Altered States of Consciousness and Alcohol.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jones, Ben Morgan; And Others

This document contains the reports of research at a symposium on "Altered States of Consciousness and Alcohol." The participants primarily agreed that alcohol induces an altered state of consciousness similar to other drugs, but that this phenomenon has not been explicitly stated due to the current interest in newer and more novel drugs. The…

The Role of Instruction for Spelling Performance and Spelling Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cordewener, Kim A. H.; Hasselman, Fred; Verhoeven, Ludo; Bosman, Anna M. T.

2018-01-01

This study examined the role of instruction for spelling performance and spelling consciousness in the Dutch language. Spelling consciousness is the ability to reflect on one's spelling and correct errors. A sample of 115 third-grade spellers was assigned to a strategy-instruction, strategic-monitoring, self-monitoring, or control condition…

Exploration of Critical Consciousness and Its Relationship to Teaching Perspectives and Attitudes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Weis, Lisa Kaye Hamling

2012-01-01

This study explored the relationships of educators' levels of critical consciousness, attitudes about poverty and poor people, and teaching perspectives. Critical consciousness was defined by Freire (2000) as the ability of individuals to assess their own identities related to the sociopolitical realities that surround them and critically…

49 CFR 225.19 - Primary groups of accidents/incidents.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... professional even if it does not result in death, medical treatment or loss of consciousness of any person; or (iii) Loss of consciousness; (3) Injury to a railroad employee that results in: (i) A day away from..., loss of consciousness, a day away from work, restricted work activity or job transfer of a railroad...

Meditation, Creativity, and Consciousness: Charting Future Terrain within Higher Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sarath, Ed

2006-01-01

This article explores the role of contemplative practices within an emerging interdisciplinary area that I refer to as "creativity and consciousness studies." Within this new area, consciousness is studied from an "integral" perspective that brings together insights from a range of wisdom traditions and modern science. Meditation is presented as…

Spatial Attention Effects during Conscious and Nonconscious Processing of Visual Features and Objects

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tapia, Evelina; Breitmeyer, Bruno G.; Jacob, Jane; Broyles, Elizabeth C.

2013-01-01

Flanker congruency effects were measured in a masked flanker task to assess the properties of spatial attention during conscious and nonconscious processing of form, color, and conjunctions of these features. We found that (1) consciously and nonconsciously processed colored shape distractors (i.e., flankers) produce flanker congruency effects;…

Observations of Critical Consciousness Development in the Context of Service Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rondini, Ashley C.

2015-01-01

This paper explores dynamics of students' critical consciousness development in the context of a thematically organized service-learning sociology course titled Health, Illness, and Community. The integrated components of the course were designed to cultivate critical consciousness by framing the study of health in terms of social justice issues…

Religious bias among religiously conscious black christians in the United States.

PubMed

Van Camp, Debbie; Sloan, Lloyd Ren; Elbassiouny, Amanda

2014-01-01

Research with White participants has demonstrated religious intergroup bias; however, religious identity may be different for Black Americans. Only religiously conscious Black Christians demonstrated a preference for Christian targets over Muslim and Atheist targets. Future research should consider what factors result in a person becoming conscious of other's religion.

Promoting Word Consciousness to Close the Vocabulary Gap in Young Word Learners

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Neugebauer, Sabina Rak; Gámez, Perla B.; Coyne, Michael D.; McCoach, D. Betsy; Cólon, Ingrid T.; Ware, Sharon

2017-01-01

A proposed avenue for increasing students' vocabulary knowledge and reading comprehension is instruction that promotes students' enthusiasm and attention to words, referred to as "word consciousness". This study seeks to investigate, at the utterance level, whether and how word consciousness talk is used in classrooms with young word…

The Relationship between Object Files and Conscious Perception

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mitroff, S.R.; Scholl, B.J.; Wynn, K.

2005-01-01

Object files (OFs) are hypothesized mid-level representations which mediate our conscious perception of persisting objects-e.g. telling us 'which went where'. Despite the appeal of the OF framework, not previous research has directly explored whether OFs do indeed correspond to conscious percepts. Here we present at least one case wherein…

The Impact of Non-Conscious Knowledge on Educational Technology Research and Design

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Clark, Richard E.

2011-01-01

There are at least three powerful insights for educational technology researchers and designers from recent neuroscience studies of the brain and from cognitive science research findings: First, our brains learn and process two very different types of knowledge; non-conscious, automated, procedural, or implicit knowledge, and conscious,…

Understanding Brain and Consciousness?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vitiello, G.

This is a review of the dissipative quantum model of brain in the form of an extended abstract of recent works addressing to the question of the scientific understanding of brain and consciousness in the frame of quantum field theory. The intrinsic dissipative character of the brain dynamics appears to be a possible root of consciousness mechanisms.

Educational Imperatives of the Evolution of Consciousness: The Integral Visions of Rudolf Steiner and Ken Wilber

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gidley, Jennifer M.

2007-01-01

Rudolf Steiner and Ken Wilber claim that human consciousness is evolving beyond the "formal", abstract, intellectual mode toward a "post-formal", integral mode. Wilber calls this "vision-logic" and Steiner calls it "consciousness/spiritual soul". Both point to the emergence of more complex, dialectical,…

"Machine" consciousness and "artificial" thought: an operational architectonics model guided approach.

PubMed

Fingelkurts, Andrew A; Fingelkurts, Alexander A; Neves, Carlos F H

2012-01-05

Instead of using low-level neurophysiology mimicking and exploratory programming methods commonly used in the machine consciousness field, the hierarchical operational architectonics (OA) framework of brain and mind functioning proposes an alternative conceptual-theoretical framework as a new direction in the area of model-driven machine (robot) consciousness engineering. The unified brain-mind theoretical OA model explicitly captures (though in an informal way) the basic essence of brain functional architecture, which indeed constitutes a theory of consciousness. The OA describes the neurophysiological basis of the phenomenal level of brain organization. In this context the problem of producing man-made "machine" consciousness and "artificial" thought is a matter of duplicating all levels of the operational architectonics hierarchy (with its inherent rules and mechanisms) found in the brain electromagnetic field. We hope that the conceptual-theoretical framework described in this paper will stimulate the interest of mathematicians and/or computer scientists to abstract and formalize principles of hierarchy of brain operations which are the building blocks for phenomenal consciousness and thought. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Breathing and sense of self: visuo-respiratory conflicts alter body self-consciousness.

PubMed

Adler, Dan; Herbelin, Bruno; Similowski, Thomas; Blanke, Olaf

2014-11-01

Bodily self-consciousness depends on the processing of interoceptive and exteroceptive signals. It can be disrupted by inducing signal conflicts. Breathing, at the crossroad between interoception and exteroception, should contribute to bodily self-consciousness. We induced visuo-respiratory conflicts in 17 subjects presented with a virtual body or a parallelepidedal object flashing synchronously or asynchronously with their breathing. A questionnaire detected illusory changes in bodily self-consciousness and breathing agency (the feeling of sensing one's breathing command). Changes in self-location were tested by measuring reaction time during mental ball drop (MBD). Synchronous illumination changed the perceived location of breathing (body: p=0.008 vs. asynchronous; object: p=0.013). It resulted in a significant change in breathing agency, but no changes in self-identification. This was corroborated by prolonged MBD reaction time (body: +0.045s, 95%CI [0.013; 0.08], p=0.007). We conclude that breathing modulates bodily self-consciousness. We also conclude that one can induce the irruption of unattended breathing into consciousness without modifying respiratory mechanics or gas exchange. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Boosting Cognition With Music in Patients With Disorders of Consciousness.

PubMed

Castro, Maïté; Tillmann, Barbara; Luauté, Jacques; Corneyllie, Alexandra; Dailler, Frédéric; André-Obadia, Nathalie; Perrin, Fabien

2015-09-01

Music listening conveys beneficial effects on cognitive processes in both normal and pathologic cerebral functioning. Surprisingly, no quantitative study has evaluated the potential effects of music on cognition and consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the effect of music on cerebral processing in patients with disorders of consciousness. Using bedside electroencephalographic recording, we acquired in 13 patients with disorders of consciousness event-related potentials to the patient's first name after either an excerpt of the patient's preferred music (music condition) or a continuous sound (control condition). The cerebral response to the patient's first name was more often observed in the music condition, than in the control condition. Furthermore, the presence or absence of a discriminative response in the music condition seemed to be associated with a favorable or unfavorable outcome, respectively. These findings demonstrate for the first time that music has a beneficial effect on cognitive processes of patients with disorders of consciousness. The autobiographical characteristics of music, that is, its emotional and personal relevance, probably increase arousal and/or awareness. © The Author(s) 2015.

Resting State Networks and Consciousness

PubMed Central

Heine, Lizette; Soddu, Andrea; Gómez, Francisco; Vanhaudenhuyse, Audrey; Tshibanda, Luaba; Thonnard, Marie; Charland-Verville, Vanessa; Kirsch, Murielle; Laureys, Steven; Demertzi, Athena

2012-01-01

In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia), and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death, coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious state. The reviewed resting state networks were the DMN, left and right executive control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks. We highlight some methodological issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured brains mainly in terms of hypothesis-driven seed-based correlation analysis and data-driven independent components analysis approaches. Finally, we attempt to contextualize our discussion within theoretical frameworks of conscious processes. We think that this “lesion” approach allows us to better determine the necessary conditions under which normal conscious cognition takes place. At the clinical level, we acknowledge the technical merits of the resting state paradigm. Indeed, fast and easy acquisitions are preferable to activation paradigms in clinical populations. Finally, we emphasize the need to validate the diagnostic and prognostic value of fMRI resting state measurements in non-communicating brain damaged patients. PMID:22969735

[Neuropsychological evaluation of children in low conciseness state after a severe traumatic brain injury].

PubMed

Fufaeva, E V; Mikadze, Yu V; Lukyanov, V I

2017-01-01

To follow up patterns of cognitive recovery in children (6-17 years of age) at the first four months after a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI). Seventeen children with TBI (GCS ≤8) were evaluated with the Coma Recovery Scale-R (CRS). Children were stratified into three groups according to their consciousness recovery. Seven children regained their consciousness completely and were assessed by the Luria Neuropsychological Battery test. Six children remained in the minimally conscious state (MCS) and were tested by the adapted procedure of neuropsychological assessment during the first four months. Four children with low level of consciousness were evaluated with CRS. The most destroying functions at the early recovery period were the processing speed (neurodynamics of mental activity), executive functions and memory. Children with the anterior cortex damage had the slowest dynamics of recovery. The slower dynamics of consciousness recovery was combined with severe primary damages of visual gnosis, speech and executive functions according to neuropsychological examination. The positive dynamics of consciousness recovery was combined with early behavioral changes and the greater rate of behavioral changes.

A Possible Physiological Basis for the Discontinuity of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Pockett, Susan; Brennan, Barry J.; Bold, Gary E. J.; Holmes, Mark D.

2011-01-01

A comparison is made between the frequency of local minima in the analytic power (AP) of intracranial EEG (ECoG) from waking and unconscious human subjects and the frequency of putative frames of consciousness reported in earlier psychological literature. In ECoG from unconscious subjects, the frequency of deep minima in AP is found to be a linear function of bandwidth. In contrast, in ECoG from conscious subjects, the bandwidth/minima-frequency curve saturates or plateaus at minima frequencies similar to the frequencies of previously reported frames of consciousness. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that local minima in AP may act as the shutter in a cinematographic model of consciousness. The fact that artificially generated samples of black noise with power spectra similar to ECoG data give similar results in the analyses above suggests that the discontinuous nature of consciousness is not due to some specifically biological factor, but is simply a consequence of the physical properties of the 1/f (aka power law) oscillations that are widely found in nature. PMID:22203811

Unconscious perception: a model-based approach to method and evidence.

PubMed

Snodgrass, Michael; Bernat, Edward; Shevrin, Howard

2004-07-01

Unconscious perceptual effects remain controversial because it is hard to rule out alternative conscious perception explanations for them. We present a novel methodological framework, stressing the centrality of specifying the single-process conscious perception model (i.e., the null hypothesis). Various considerations, including those of SDT (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991), suggest that conscious perception functions hierarchically, in such a way that higher level effects (e.g., semantic priming) should not be possible without lower level discrimination (i.e., detection and identification). Relatedly, alternative conscious perception accounts (as well as the exhaustiveness, null sensitivity, and exclusiveness problems-Reingold & Merikle, 1988, 1990) predict positive relationships between direct and indirect measures. Contrariwise, our review suggests that negative and/or nonmonotonic relationships are found, providing strong evidence for unconscious perception and further suggesting that conscious and unconscious perceptual influences are functionally exclusive (cf. Jones, 1987), in such a way that the former typically override the latter when both are present. Consequently, unconscious perceptual effects manifest reliably only when conscious perception is completely absent, which occurs at the objective detection (but not identification) threshold.

The Impact of Perceptual Load on the Non-Conscious Processing of Fearful Faces

PubMed Central

Wang, Lili; Feng, Chunliang; Mai, Xiaoqin; Jia, Lina; Zhu, Xiangru; Luo, Wenbo; Luo, Yue-jia

2016-01-01

Emotional stimuli can be processed without consciousness. In the current study, we used event-related potentials (ERPs) to assess whether perceptual load influences non-conscious processing of fearful facial expressions. Perceptual load was manipulated using a letter search task with the target letter presented at the fixation point, while facial expressions were presented peripherally and masked to prevent conscious awareness. The letter string comprised six letters (X or N) that were identical (low load) or different (high load). Participants were instructed to discriminate the letters at fixation or the facial expression (fearful or neutral) in the periphery. Participants were faster and more accurate at detecting letters in the low load condition than in the high load condition. Fearful faces elicited a sustained positivity from 250 ms to 700 ms post-stimulus over fronto-central areas during the face discrimination and low-load letter discrimination conditions, but this effect was completely eliminated during high-load letter discrimination. Our findings imply that non-conscious processing of fearful faces depends on perceptual load, and attentional resources are necessary for non-conscious processing. PMID:27149273

Unity of consciousness.

PubMed

Hill, Christopher S

2018-05-29

Although there is much talk in various literatures of streams of consciousness, and most of us have an intuitive understanding of such talk, we are far from having a full grasp of what it is that unifies streams of consciousness, binding together the individual experiences that serve as their constituents. In recent years, discussion of this topic has been principally concerned with synchronic unity of consciousness-the form of unity that is exhibited by momentary states of consciousness, or in other words, by time slices or temporal segments of streams. There are two main questions about synchronic unity. First, what is its scope? Are the simultaneous experiences of a single subject necessarily unified? Generally but not necessarily unified? Sometimes unified? And second, what is the nature of synchronic unity? Is it a fundamental phenomenon, and if not, what are the more basic phenomena that constitute it? This essay reviews recent work on these questions, and provides reasons for preferring some answers to others. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Metaphysics. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Occupational Consciousness.

PubMed

Ramugondo, Elelwani L

2015-10-02

Occupational consciousness refers to ongoing awareness of the dynamics of hegemony and recognition that dominant practices are sustained through what people do every day, with implications for personal and collective health. The emergence of the construct in post-apartheid South Africa signifies the country's ongoing struggle with negotiating long-standing dynamics of power that were laid down during colonialism, and maintained under black majority rule. Consciousness, a key component of the new terminology, is framed from post-colonial perspectives - notably work by Biko and Fanon - and grounded in the philosophy of liberation, in order to draw attention to continuing unequal intersubjective relations that play out through human occupation. The paper also draws important links between occupational consciousness and other related constructs, namely occupational possibilities, occupational choice, occupational apartheid, and collective occupation. The use of the term 'consciousness' in sociology, with related or different meanings, is also explored. Occupational consciousness is then advanced as a critical notion that frames everyday doing as a potentially liberating response to oppressive social structures. This paper advances theorizing as a scholarly practice in occupational science, and could potentially expand inter or transdisciplinary work for critical conceptualizations of human occupation.

Involuntary conscious memory facilitates cued recall performance: further evidence that chaining occurs during voluntary recall.

PubMed

Mace, John H

2009-01-01

Recent studies have shown that conscious recollection of the past occurs spontaneously when subjects voluntarily recall their own past experiences or a list of previously studied words. Naturalistic diary studies and laboratory studies of this phenomenon, often called involuntary conscious memory (ICM), show that it occurs in 2 ways. One is direct ICM retrieval, which occurs when a cue spontaneously triggers a conscious memory; the other is chained ICM retrieval, which occurs when a retrieved conscious memory spontaneously triggers another. Laboratory studies investigating ICM show that chained ICM retrieval occurs on voluntary autobiographical memory tasks. The present results show that chained ICM retrieval also occurs on a voluntary word list memory task (cued recall). These results are among a handful suggesting that ICM retrieval routinely occurs during voluntary recall.

Dynamic Connectivity Patterns in Conscious and Unconscious Brain

PubMed Central

Ma, Yuncong; Hamilton, Christina

2017-01-01

Abstract Brain functional connectivity undergoes dynamic changes from the awake to unconscious states. However, how the dynamics of functional connectivity patterns are linked to consciousness at the behavioral level remains elusive. In this study, we acquired resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging data during wakefulness and graded levels of consciousness in rats. Data were analyzed using a dynamic approach combining the sliding window method and k-means clustering. Our results demonstrate that whole-brain networks contained several quasi-stable patterns that dynamically recurred from the awake state into anesthetized states. Remarkably, two brain connectivity states with distinct spatial similarity to the structure of anatomical connectivity were strongly biased toward high and low consciousness levels, respectively. These results provide compelling neuroimaging evidence linking the dynamics of whole-brain functional connectivity patterns and states of consciousness at the behavioral level. PMID:27846731

[Brain-computer interfaces, Locked-In syndrome, and disorders of consciousness].

PubMed

Lesenfants, Damien; Chatelle, Camille; Laureys, Steven; Noirhomme, Quentin

2015-10-01

Detecting signs of consciousness in patients with severe brain injury constitutes a real challenge for clinicians. The current gold standard in clinical diagnosis is the behavioral scale relying on motor abilities, which are often impaired or nonexistent in these patients. In this context, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) could offer a potential complementary tool to detect signs of consciousness whilst bypassing the usual motor pathway. In addition to complementing behavioral assessments and potentially reducing error rate, BCIs could also serve as a communication tool for paralyzed but conscious patients, e.g., suffering from Locked-In Syndrome. In this paper, we report on recent work conducted by the Coma Science Group on BCI technology, aiming to optimize diagnosis and communication in patients with disorders of consciousness and Locked-In syndrome. © 2015 médecine/sciences – Inserm.

Balancing Fairness and Efficiency: The Impact of Identity-Blind and Identity-Conscious Accountability on Applicant Screening

PubMed Central

Self, William T.; Mitchell, Gregory; Mellers, Barbara A.; Tetlock, Philip E.; Hildreth, J. Angus D.

2015-01-01

This study compared two forms of accountability that can be used to promote diversity and fairness in personnel selections: identity-conscious accountability (holding decision makers accountable for which groups are selected) versus identity-blind accountability (holding decision makers accountable for making fair selections). In a simulated application screening process, undergraduate participants (majority female) sorted applicants under conditions of identity-conscious accountability, identity-blind accountability, or no accountability for an applicant pool in which white males either did or did not have a human capital advantage. Under identity-conscious accountability, participants exhibited pro-female and pro-minority bias, particularly in the white-male-advantage applicant pool. Under identity-blind accountability, participants exhibited no biases and candidate qualifications dominated interview recommendations. Participants exhibited greater resentment toward management under identity-conscious accountability. PMID:26660723

Comparative psychology without consciousness.

PubMed

Carruthers, Peter

2018-06-22

The goal of this paper is to establish the truth of the following conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals-not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conditional turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn't permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Before getting to that argument, however, and in order to motivate the subsequent discussion, some of the virtues of global workspace theory are displayed. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

[The influence of conscious and unconcious perception of emotional acoustic stimuli on time characteristics of respiration].

PubMed

Vaisertreiger, A S-R; Ivanova, V Iu

2014-12-01

A set of physiological studies proves that conscious perception of affective stimuli influence on respiratory activity. Less is known about the effect of unconscious perception of emotional information on human breathing. The aim of current research is to compare time characteristics of respiration during unconscious and conscious perception of emotional stimuli. As emotionally provocative stimuli we used natural vocalizations of 3-month-old infants in different emotional state. Both ways of acoustic presentation--first-order unconscious and second-order conscious stimuli--were applied to the one subject within one experiment with a brief inter-trial interval. A comparative data analysis revealed significant changes in time characteristics of respiration in response to acoustic emotional stimuli perceived either consciously or unconsciously. The differences in respiratory dynamics during two conditions of emotional stimuli perception are discussed.

[Nursing education: integrating gender equity consciousness].

PubMed

Tzeng, Ya-Ling; Shih, Hsin-Hsin; Yang, Ya-Ling

2011-12-01

Gender sensitivity influences the way a nurse handles the nursing process and can influence both patient care and public perception of the nursing profession. Nurses unaware of the influences of gender are unable to perform holistic nursing, the practice of which centers on patient-centered care. Education is essential to promote gender consciousness. Providing scenario-based education to apply gender consciousness can help nursing students integrate gender and nursing care concepts and improve nursing care quality. In addition to raising attention to this important issue, this article makes comprehensive suggestions on how to apply gender concepts in nursing education. These suggestions include requiring instructors to consider and assess their own gender consciousness in order to enhance positive gender consciousness; reviewing teaching materials to identify and remove content tainted by sexual discrimination, and emphasizing gender education in the nursing education curriculum.

The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning

PubMed Central

Bronfman, Zohar Z.; Ginsburg, Simona; Jablonka, Eva

2016-01-01

The minimal state of consciousness is sentience. This includes any phenomenal sensory experience – exteroceptive, such as vision and olfaction; interoceptive, such as pain and hunger; or proprioceptive, such as the sense of bodily position and movement. We propose unlimited associative learning (UAL) as the marker of the evolutionary transition to minimal consciousness (or sentience), its phylogenetically earliest sustainable manifestation and the driver of its evolution. We define and describe UAL at the behavioral and functional level and argue that the structural-anatomical implementations of this mode of learning in different taxa entail subjective feelings (sentience). We end with a discussion of the implications of our proposal for the distribution of consciousness in the animal kingdom, suggesting testable predictions, and revisiting the ongoing debate about the function of minimal consciousness in light of our approach. PMID:28066282

Sigmund Freud and the Crick-Koch hypothesis. A footnote to the history of consciousness studies.

PubMed

Smith, D L

1999-06-01

The author describes Crick and Koch's recently developed theory of the neurophysiological basis of consciousness as synchronised neural oscillations. The thesis that neural oscillations provide the neurophysiological basis for consciousness was anticipated by Sigmund Freud in his 1895 'Project for a scientific psychology'. Freud attempted to solve his neuropsychological 'problem of quality' by means of the hypothesis that information concerning conscious sensory qualities is transmitted through the mental apparatus by means of neural 'periods'. Freud believed that information carried by neural oscillations would proliferate across 'contact-barriers' (synapses) without inhibition. Freud's theory thus appears to imply that synchronised neural oscillations are an important component of the neurophysiological basis of consciousness. It is possible that Freud's thesis was developed in response to the experimental research of the American neuroscientist M. M. Garver.

Pupillometry reveals reduced unconscious emotional reactivity in autism.

PubMed

Nuske, Heather J; Vivanti, Giacomo; Hudry, Kristelle; Dissanayake, Cheryl

2014-09-01

Recent theoretical conceptualisations have suggested that emotion processing impairments in autism stem from disruption to the sub-cortical, rapid emotion-processing system. We argue that a clear way to ascertain whether this system is affected in autism is by measuring unconscious emotional reactivity. Using backwards masking, we presented fearful expressions non-consciously (subliminally) as well as consciously (supraliminally), and measured pupillary responses as an index of emotional reactivity in 19 children with autism and 19 typically developing children, aged 2-5 years. The pupillary responses of the children with autism revealed reduced unconscious emotional reactivity, with no group differences on consciously presented emotion. Together, these results indicate a hyporesponsiveness to non-consciously presented emotion suggesting a fundamental difference in emotion processing in autism, which requires consciousness and more time. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Predicting Visual Consciousness Electrophysiologically from Intermittent Binocular Rivalry

PubMed Central

O’Shea, Robert P.; Kornmeier, Jürgen; Roeber, Urte

2013-01-01

Purpose We sought brain activity that predicts visual consciousness. Methods We used electroencephalography (EEG) to measure brain activity to a 1000-ms display of sine-wave gratings, oriented vertically in one eye and horizontally in the other. This display yields binocular rivalry: irregular alternations in visual consciousness between the images viewed by the eyes. We replaced both gratings with 200 ms of darkness, the gap, before showing a second display of the same rival gratings for another 1000 ms. We followed this by a 1000-ms mask then a 2000-ms inter-trial interval (ITI). Eleven participants pressed keys after the second display in numerous trials to say whether the orientation of the visible grating changed from before to after the gap or not. Each participant also responded to numerous non-rivalry trials in which the gratings had identical orientations for the two eyes and for which the orientation of both either changed physically after the gap or did not. Results We found that greater activity from lateral occipital-parietal-temporal areas about 180 ms after initial onset of rival stimuli predicted a change in visual consciousness more than 1000 ms later, on re-presentation of the rival stimuli. We also found that less activity from parietal, central, and frontal electrodes about 400 ms after initial onset of rival stimuli predicted a change in visual consciousness about 800 ms later, on re-presentation of the rival stimuli. There was no such predictive activity when the change in visual consciousness occurred because the stimuli changed physically. Conclusion We found early EEG activity that predicted later visual consciousness. Predictive activity 180 ms after onset of the first display may reflect adaption of the neurons mediating visual consciousness in our displays. Predictive activity 400 ms after onset of the first display may reflect a less-reliable brain state mediating visual consciousness. PMID:24124536

Consciousness and epilepsy: why are complex-partial seizures complex?

PubMed Central

Englot, Dario J.; Blumenfeld, Hal

2010-01-01

Why do complex-partial seizures in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) cause a loss of consciousness? Abnormal function of the medial temporal lobe is expected to cause memory loss, but it is unclear why profoundly impaired consciousness is so common in temporal lobe seizures. Recent exciting advances in behavioral, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging techniques spanning both human patients and animal models may allow new insights into this old question. While behavioral automatisms are often associated with diminished consciousness during temporal lobe seizures, impaired consciousness without ictal motor activity has also been described. Some have argued that electrographic lateralization of seizure activity to the left temporal lobe is most likely to cause impaired consciousness, but the evidence remains equivocal. Other data correlates ictal consciousness in TLE with bilateral temporal lobe involvement of seizure spiking. Nevertheless, it remains unclear why bilateral temporal seizures should impair responsiveness. Recent evidence has shown that impaired consciousness during temporal lobe seizures is correlated with large-amplitude slow EEG activity and neuroimaging signal decreases in the frontal and parietal association cortices. This abnormal decreased function in the neocortex contrasts with fast polyspike activity and elevated cerebral blood flow in limbic and other subcortical structures ictally. Our laboratory has thus proposed the “network inhibition hypothesis,” in which seizure activity propagates to subcortical regions necessary for cortical activation, allowing the cortex to descend into an inhibited state of unconsciousness during complex-partial temporal lobe seizures. Supporting this hypothesis, recent rat studies during partial limbic seizures have shown that behavioral arrest is associated with frontal cortical slow waves, decreased neuronal firing, and hypometabolism. Animal studies further demonstrate that cortical deactivation and behavioral changes depend on seizure spread to subcortical structures including the lateral septum. Understanding the contributions of network inhibition to impaired consciousness in TLE is an important goal, as recurrent limbic seizures often result in cortical dysfunction during and between epileptic events that adversely affects patients’ quality of life. PMID:19818900

Visual anticipation biases conscious decision making but not bottom-up visual processing

PubMed Central

Mathews, Zenon; Cetnarski, Ryszard; Verschure, Paul F. M. J.

2015-01-01

Prediction plays a key role in control of attention but it is not clear which aspects of prediction are most prominent in conscious experience. An evolving view on the brain is that it can be seen as a prediction machine that optimizes its ability to predict states of the world and the self through the top-down propagation of predictions and the bottom-up presentation of prediction errors. There are competing views though on whether prediction or prediction errors dominate the formation of conscious experience. Yet, the dynamic effects of prediction on perception, decision making and consciousness have been difficult to assess and to model. We propose a novel mathematical framework and a psychophysical paradigm that allows us to assess both the hierarchical structuring of perceptual consciousness, its content and the impact of predictions and/or errors on conscious experience, attention and decision-making. Using a displacement detection task combined with reverse correlation, we reveal signatures of the usage of prediction at three different levels of perceptual processing: bottom-up fast saccades, top-down driven slow saccades and consciousnes decisions. Our results suggest that the brain employs multiple parallel mechanism at different levels of perceptual processing in order to shape effective sensory consciousness within a predicted perceptual scene. We further observe that bottom-up sensory and top-down predictive processes can be dissociated through cognitive load. We propose a probabilistic data association model from dynamical systems theory to model the predictive multi-scale bias in perceptual processing that we observe and its role in the formation of conscious experience. We propose that these results support the hypothesis that consciousness provides a time-delayed description of a task that is used to prospectively optimize real time control structures, rather than being engaged in the real-time control of behavior itself. PMID:25741290

Sensitivity and Specificity of the Coma Recovery Scale--Revised Total Score in Detection of Conscious Awareness.

PubMed

Bodien, Yelena G; Carlowicz, Cecilia A; Chatelle, Camille; Giacino, Joseph T

2016-03-01

To describe the sensitivity and specificity of Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) total scores in detecting conscious awareness. Data were retrospectively extracted from the medical records of patients enrolled in a specialized disorders of consciousness (DOC) program. Sensitivity and specificity analyses were completed using CRS-R-derived diagnoses of minimally conscious state (MCS) or emerged from minimally conscious state (EMCS) as the reference standard for conscious awareness and the total CRS-R score as the test criterion. A receiver operating characteristic curve was constructed to demonstrate the optimal CRS-R total cutoff score for maximizing sensitivity and specificity. Specialized DOC program. Patients enrolled in the DOC program (N=252, 157 men; mean age, 49y; mean time from injury, 48d; traumatic etiology, n=127; nontraumatic etiology, n=125; diagnosis of coma or vegetative state, n=70; diagnosis of MCS or EMCS, n=182). Not applicable. Sensitivity and specificity of CRS-R total scores in detecting conscious awareness. A CRS-R total score of 10 or higher yielded a sensitivity of .78 for correct identification of patients in MCS or EMCS, and a specificity of 1.00 for correct identification of patients who did not meet criteria for either of these diagnoses (ie, were diagnosed with vegetative state or coma). The area under the curve in the receiver operating characteristic curve analysis is .98. A total CRS-R score of 10 or higher provides strong evidence of conscious awareness but resulted in a false-negative diagnostic error in 22% of patients who demonstrated conscious awareness based on CRS-R diagnostic criteria. A cutoff score of 8 provides the best balance between sensitivity and specificity, accurately classifying 93% of cases. The optimal total score cutoff will vary depending on the user's objective. Copyright © 2016 American Congress of Rehabilitation Medicine. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Wundt, Vygotsky and Bandura: a cultural-historical science of consciousness in three acts.

PubMed

Ferrari, Michel; Robinson, David K; Yasnitsky, Anton

2010-01-01

This article looks at three historical efforts to coordinate the scientific study of biological and cultural aspects of human consciousness into a single comprehensive theory of human development that includes the evolution of the human body, cultural evolution and personal development: specifically, the research programs of Wilhelm Wundt, Lev Vygotsky and Albert Bandura. The lack of historical relations between these similar efforts is striking, and suggests that the effort to promote cultural and personal sources of consciousness arises as a natural foil to an overemphasis on the biological basis of consciousness, sometimes associated with biological determinism.

Quantum-holographic and classical Hopfield-like associative nnets: implications for modeling two cognitive modes of consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rakovic, D.; Dugic, M.

2005-05-01

Quantum bases of consciousness are considered with psychosomatic implications of three front lines of psychosomatic medicine (hesychastic spirituality, holistic Eastern medicine, and symptomatic Western medicine), as well as cognitive implications of two modes of individual consciousness (quantum-coherent transitional and altered states, and classically reduced normal states) alongside with conditions of transformations of one mode into another (considering consciousness quantum-coherence/classical-decoherence acupuncture system/nervous system interaction, direct and reverse, with and without threshold limits, respectively) - by using theoretical methods of associative neural networks and quantum neural holography combined with quantum decoherence theory.

Emotional consciousness: a neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience.

PubMed

Thagard, Paul; Aubie, Brandon

2008-09-01

This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional consciousness, including differentiation, integration, intensity, valence, and change.

Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions

PubMed Central

Boly, Melanie; Seth, Anil K.; Wilke, Melanie; Ingmundson, Paul; Baars, Bernard; Laureys, Steven; Edelman, David B.; Tsuchiya, Naotsugu

2013-01-01

This joint article reflects the authors' personal views regarding noteworthy advances in the neuroscience of consciousness in the last 10 years, and suggests what we feel may be promising future directions. It is based on a small conference at the Samoset Resort in Rockport, Maine, USA, in July of 2012, organized by the Mind Science Foundation of San Antonio, Texas. Here, we summarize recent advances in our understanding of subjectivity in humans and other animals, including empirical, applied, technical, and conceptual insights. These include the evidence for the importance of fronto-parietal connectivity and of “top-down” processes, both of which enable information to travel across distant cortical areas effectively, as well as numerous dissociations between consciousness and cognitive functions, such as attention, in humans. In addition, we describe the development of mental imagery paradigms, which made it possible to identify covert awareness in non-responsive subjects. Non-human animal consciousness research has also witnessed substantial advances on the specific role of cortical areas and higher order thalamus for consciousness, thanks to important technological enhancements. In addition, much progress has been made in the understanding of non-vertebrate cognition relevant to possible conscious states. Finally, major advances have been made in theories of consciousness, and also in their comparison with the available evidence. Along with reviewing these findings, each author suggests future avenues for research in their field of investigation. PMID:24198791

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses

PubMed Central

2017-01-01

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the “mind-body problem”) has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness. PMID:29118218

[Recovery of consciousness: process-oriented approach].

PubMed

Gusarova, S B

2014-01-01

Traditionally psychological neurorehabilitation of neurosurgical patients is provided subject to availability of clear consciousness and minimal potential to communicate verbally. Cognitive and emotional disorders, problems in social adaptation, neurotic syndromes are normally targets in such cases. We work with patients having survived severe brain damage being in different states of consciousness: vegetative state, minimal state of consciousness, mutism, confusion, posttraumatic Korsaroff syndrom. Psychologist considers recovery of consciousness as the target besides traditional tasks. Construction of communication with patient is central part of such job, where the patient remains unable to contact verbally, yet it is impossible to consider potential aphasia. This is a non-verbal "dialogue" with patient created by psychologist with gradual development and involving other people and objects of environment. Inline with modern neuroscientific achievements demonstrating ability to recognize by patients with severe brain injury (A. Owen, S. Laureys, M. Monti, M. Coleman, A. Soddu, M. Boly and others) we base upon psychological science, on psychotherapeutic approaches containing instruments inevitable to work with patients in altered states of consciousness and creation of non-verbal communication with patient (Jung, Reich, Alexander, Lowen, Keleman, Arnold and Amy Mindell, S. Tomandl, D. Boadella, A. Längle, P. Levin etc). This article will include 15 years of experience to apply Process-oriented approach by A. Mindell to recovery of consciousness of neurosurgical patients based on work with "minimal signals" (micro moves, breath, mimic reactions etc.), principle of feedback, psychosomatic resonance, empathy.

Feasibility of an EEG-based brain-computer interface in the intensive care unit.

PubMed

Chatelle, Camille; Spencer, Camille A; Cash, Sydney S; Hochberg, Leigh R; Edlow, Brian L

2018-05-09

We tested the feasibility of deploying a commercially available EEG-based brain-computer interface (BCI) in the intensive care unit (ICU) to detect consciousness in patients with acute disorders of consciousness (DoC) or locked-in syndrome (LIS). Ten patients (9 DoC, 1 LIS) and 10 healthy subjects (HS) were enrolled. The BCI utilized oddball auditory evoked potentials, vibrotactile evoked potentials (VTP) and motor imagery (MoI) to assess consciousness. We recorded the assessment completion rate and the time required for assessment, and we calculated the sensitivity and specificity of each paradigm for detecting behavioral signs of consciousness. All 10 patients completed the assessment, 9 of whom required less than 1 h. The LIS patient reported fatigue before the end of the session. The HS and LIS patient showed more consistent BCI responses than DoC patients, but overall there was no association between BCI responses and behavioral signs of consciousness. The system is feasible to deploy in the ICU and may confirm consciousness in acute LIS, but it was unreliable in acute DoC. The accuracy of the paradigms for detecting consciousness must be improved and the duration of the protocol should be shortened before this commercially available BCI is ready for clinical implementation in the ICU in patients with acute DoC. Copyright © 2018 International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Understanding schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness: biological correlates and translational implications from quantum theory perspectives.

PubMed

Venkatasubramanian, Ganesan

2015-04-30

From neurophenomenological perspectives, schizophrenia has been conceptualized as "a disorder with heterogeneous manifestations that can be integrally understood to involve fundamental perturbations in consciousness". While these theoretical constructs based on consciousness facilitate understanding the 'gestalt' of schizophrenia, systematic research to unravel translational implications of these models is warranted. To address this, one needs to begin with exploration of plausible biological underpinnings of "perturbed consciousness" in schizophrenia. In this context, an attractive proposition to understand the biology of consciousness is "the orchestrated object reduction (Orch-OR) theory" which invokes quantum processes in the microtubules of neurons. The Orch-OR model is particularly important for understanding schizophrenia especially due to the shared 'scaffold' of microtubules. The initial sections of this review focus on the compelling evidence to support the view that "schizophrenia is a disorder of consciousness" through critical summary of the studies that have demonstrated self-abnormalities, aberrant time perception as well as dysfunctional intentional binding in this disorder. Subsequently, these findings are linked with 'Orch-OR theory' through the research evidence for aberrant neural oscillations as well as microtubule abnormalities observed in schizophrenia. Further sections emphasize the applicability and translational implications of Orch-OR theory in the context of schizophrenia and elucidate the relevance of quantum biology to understand the origins of this puzzling disorder as "fundamental disturbances in consciousness".

Critical consciousness, racial and gender discrimination, and HIV disease markers in African American women with HIV.

PubMed

Kelso, Gwendolyn A; Cohen, Mardge H; Weber, Kathleen M; Dale, Sannisha K; Cruise, Ruth C; Brody, Leslie R

2014-07-01

Critical consciousness, the awareness of social oppression, is important to investigate as a buffer against HIV disease progression in HIV-infected African American women in the context of experiences with discrimination. Critical consciousness comprises several dimensions, including social group identification, discontent with distribution of social power, rejection of social system legitimacy, and a collective action orientation. The current study investigated self-reported critical consciousness as a moderator of perceived gender and racial discrimination on HIV viral load and CD4+ cell count in 67 African American HIV-infected women. Higher critical consciousness was found to be related to higher likelihood of having CD4+ counts over 350 and lower likelihood of detectable viral load when perceived racial discrimination was high, as revealed by multiple logistic regressions that controlled for highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) adherence. Multiple linear regressions showed that at higher levels of perceived gender and racial discrimination, women endorsing high critical consciousness had a larger positive difference between nadir CD4+ (lowest pre-HAART) and current CD4+ count than women endorsing low critical consciousness. These findings suggest that raising awareness of social oppression to promote joining with others to enact social change may be an important intervention strategy to improve HIV outcomes in African American HIV-infected women who report experiencing high levels of gender and racial discrimination.

EEG entropy measures indicate decrease of cortical information processing in Disorders of Consciousness.

PubMed

Thul, Alexander; Lechinger, Julia; Donis, Johann; Michitsch, Gabriele; Pichler, Gerald; Kochs, Eberhard F; Jordan, Denis; Ilg, Rüdiger; Schabus, Manuel

2016-02-01

Clinical assessments that rely on behavioral responses to differentiate Disorders of Consciousness are at times inapt because of some patients' motor disabilities. To objectify patients' conditions of reduced consciousness the present study evaluated the use of electroencephalography to measure residual brain activity. We analyzed entropy values of 18 scalp EEG channels of 15 severely brain-damaged patients with clinically diagnosed Minimally-Conscious-State (MCS) or Unresponsive-Wakefulness-Syndrome (UWS) and compared the results to a sample of 24 control subjects. Permutation entropy (PeEn) and symbolic transfer entropy (STEn), reflecting information processes in the EEG, were calculated for all subjects. Participants were tested on a modified active own-name paradigm to identify correlates of active instruction following. PeEn showed reduced local information content in the EEG in patients, that was most pronounced in UWS. STEn analysis revealed altered directed information flow in the EEG of patients, indicating impaired feed-backward connectivity. Responses to auditory stimulation yielded differences in entropy measures, indicating reduced information processing in MCS and UWS. Local EEG information content and information flow are affected in Disorders of Consciousness. This suggests local cortical information capacity and feedback information transfer as neural correlates of consciousness. The utilized EEG entropy analyses were able to relate to patient groups with different Disorders of Consciousness. Copyright © 2015 International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Critical Consciousness, Racial and Gender Discrimination, and HIV Disease Markers in African American Women with HIV

PubMed Central

Kelso, Gwendolyn A.; Cohen, Mardge H.; Weber, Kathleen M.; Dale, Sannisha K.; Cruise, Ruth C.; Brody, Leslie R.

2014-01-01

Critical consciousness, the awareness of social oppression, is important to investigate as a buffer against HIV disease progression in HIV-infected African American women in the context of experiences with discrimination. Critical consciousness comprises several dimensions, including social group identification, discontent with distribution of social power, rejection of social system legitimacy, and a collective action orientation. The current study investigated self-reported critical consciousness as a moderator of perceived gender and racial discrimination on HIV viral load and CD4+ cell count in 67 African American HIV-infected women. Higher critical consciousness was found to be related to higher likelihood of having CD4+ counts over 350 and lower likelihood of detectable viral load when perceived racial discrimination was high, as revealed by multiple logistic regressions that controlled for highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) adherence. Multiple linear regressions showed that at higher levels of perceived gender and racial discrimination, women endorsing high critical consciousness had a larger positive difference between nadir CD4+ (lowest pre-HAART) and current CD4+ count than women endorsing low critical consciousness. These findings suggest that raising awareness of social oppression to promote joining with others to enact social change may be an important intervention strategy to improve HIV outcomes in African American HIV-infected women who report experiencing high levels of gender and racial discrimination. PMID:24077930

Civic Consciousness Development of Youth in the Context of Educational Reforms: The US Experience

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kovalchuk, Vasyl

2015-01-01

The article analyzes the experience of patriotic education and civic consciousness of youth in the United States. The author shares his experience of training under the programme "Civic consciousness development of youth in the context of educational reforms" of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). It has been found that…

Deceiving Oneself about Being in Control: Conscious Detection of Changes in Visuomotor Coupling

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Knoblich, Gunther; Kircher, Tilo T. J.

2004-01-01

Previous research has demonstrated that compensatory movements for changes in visuomotor coupling often are not consciously detected. But what factors affect the conscious detection of such changes? This issue was addressed in 4 experiments. Participants carried out a drawing task in which the relative velocity between the actual movement and its…

Music and Consciousness: A Continuing Project

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Clarke, David; Clarke, Eric

2014-01-01

If there is a topic on which the humanities might make a distinctive claim, it is that of consciousness--an essential aspect of human being. And within the humanities, music might make its own claims in relation to both consciousness and being human. To investigate this connection, David Clarke and Eric Clarke brought together a wide variety of…

What Does Quantum Physics Have to Do with Behavior Disorders?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Center, David B.

This paper argues that human agency as a causal factor in behavior must be considered in any model of behavior and behavior disorders. Since human agency is historically tied to the issue of consciousness, to argue that consciousness plays a causal role in behavior requires a plausible explanation of consciousness. This paper proposes that…

Dissociating Consciousness from Inhibitory Control: Evidence for Unconsciously Triggered Response Inhibition in the Stop-Signal Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

van Gaal, Simon; Ridderinkhof, K. Richard; van den Wildenberg, Wery P. M.; Lamme, Victor A. F.

2009-01-01

Theories about the functional relevance of consciousness commonly posit that higher order cognitive control functions, such as response inhibition, require consciousness. To test this assertion, the authors designed a masked stop-signal paradigm to examine whether response inhibition could be triggered and initiated by masked stop signals, which…

Determination of Consciousness and Awareness of the Public in Lefka about the Cyprus Mining Corporation (CMC)

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gündüz, Serife; Erbulut, Can; Öznacar, Behcet; Bastas, Mert

2016-01-01

Supporting the increase of environmental consciousness with environmental education is always important in order to make healthy recommendations specific to the countries. Aim of this study is to determine the awareness and consciousness of the local community against the environmental pollution caused by the CMC mine by survey technique. 123…

Memory Systems Do Not Divide on Consciousness: Reinterpreting Memory in Terms of Activation and Binding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Reder, Lynne M.; Park, Heekyeong; Kieffaber, Paul D.

2009-01-01

There is a popular hypothesis that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks reflects 2 distinct memory systems. Explicit memory is said to store those experiences that can be consciously recollected, and implicit memory is said to store experiences and affect subsequent behavior but to be unavailable to conscious awareness. Although this…

A Study of First-Generation African American and Latino Undergraduates Developing Sociopolitical Consciousness in Introductory Sociology Classes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Castillo-Montoya, Milagros

2013-01-01

This study examines the development of first-generation African American and Latino college students' sociopolitical consciousness in the context of their learning of sociology as a component of their liberal education studies. Given the paucity of research on how college students develop sociopolitical consciousness, this study addresses: (1) the…

How Consciousness-Raising Affects Intonation and Facilitates Reading Comprehension

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shariati, Mohammad

2007-01-01

This paper reports on an investigation about the relation between a student's conscious awareness of the structure of a sentence and the degree of his/her intonation accuracy as well as his/her reading comprehension. The research was done based on the hypothesis that: "if the students are made conscious of the infrastructure of lengthy…

The Frontal Lobes and Theory of Mind: Developmental Concepts from Adult Focal Lesion Research

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Stuss, Donald T.; Anderson, Vicki

2004-01-01

The primary objective in this paper is to present a framework to understand the structure of consciousness. We argue that consciousness has been difficult to define because there are different kinds of consciousness, hierarchically organized, which need to be differentiated. Our framework is based on evidence from adult focal lesion research. The…

Conscious Thought Is for Facilitating Social and Cultural Interactions: How Mental Simulations Serve the Animal-Culture Interface

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Baumeister, Roy F.; Masicampo, E. J.

2010-01-01

Five empirically based critiques have undermined the standard assumption that conscious thought is primarily for input (obtaining information from the natural environment) or output (the direct control of action). Instead, we propose that conscious thought is for internal processing, to facilitate downstream interaction with the social and…

Insights on consciousness from taste memory research.

PubMed

Gallo, Milagros

2016-01-01

Taste research in rodents supports the relevance of memory in order to determine the content of consciousness by modifying both taste perception and later action. Associated with this issue is the fact that taste and visual modalities share anatomical circuits traditionally related to conscious memory. This challenges the view of taste memory as a type of non-declarative unconscious memory.

Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry.

PubMed

Hameroff, S

2001-04-01

What is consciousness? Conventional approaches see it as an emergent property of complex interactions among individual neurons; however these approaches fail to address enigmatic features of consciousness. Accordingly, some philosophers have contended that "qualia," or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being composed of "occasions of experience." To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of spacetime--as described by Einstein's general theory of relativity, and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter--as described by quantum theory. Roger Penrose has proposed a new physics of objective reduction: "OR," which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline. Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific "objective" criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness which distinguishes our minds from classical computers. Each OR is taken as an instantaneous event--the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental spacetime--and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead "occasion of experience." How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate a quantum computational OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal micro-tubules within the brain's neurons. In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule subunit proteins ("tubulins") within certain brain neurons, remain coherent, and recruit more superposed tubulins until a mass-time-energy threshold (related to quantum gravity) is reached. At that point, self-collapse, or objective reduction (OR), abruptly occurs. We equate the pre-reduction, coherent superposition ("quantum computing") phase with pre-conscious processes, and each instantaneous (and non-computable) OR, or self-collapse, with a discrete conscious event. Sequences of OR events give rise to a "stream" of consciousness. Microtubule-associated proteins can "tune" the quantum oscillations of the coherent superposed states; the OR is thus self-organized, or "orchestrated" ("Orch OR"). Each Orch OR event selects (non-computably) microtubule subunit states which regulate synaptic/neural functions using classical signaling. The quantum gravity threshold for self-collapse is relevant to consciousness, according to our arguments, because macroscopic superposed quantum states each have their own spacetime geometries. These geometries are also superposed, and in some way "separated," but when sufficiently separated, the superposition of spacetime geometries becomes significantly unstable and reduces to a single universe state. Quantum gravity determines the limits of the instability; we contend that the actual choice of state made by Nature is non-computable. Thus each Orch OR event is a self-selection of spacetime geometry, coupled to the brain through microtubules and other biomolecules. If conscious experience is intimately connected with the very physics underlying spacetime structure, then Orch OR in microtubules indeed provides us with a completely new and uniquely promising perspective on the difficult problems of consciousness.

The "serendipitous brain": Low expectancy and timing uncertainty of conscious events improve awareness of unconscious ones (evidence from the Attentional Blink).

PubMed

Lasaponara, Stefano; Dragone, Alessio; Lecce, Francesca; Di Russo, Francesco; Doricchi, Fabrizio

2015-10-01

To anticipate upcoming sensory events, the brain picks-up and exploits statistical regularities in the sensory environment. However, it is untested whether cumulated predictive knowledge about consciously seen stimuli improves the access to awareness of stimuli that usually go unseen. To explore this issue, we exploited the Attentional Blink (AB) effect, where conscious processing of a first visual target (T1) hinders detection of early following targets (T2). We report that timing uncertainty and low expectancy about the occurrence of consciously seen T2s presented outside the AB period, improve detection of early and otherwise often unseen T2s presented inside the AB. Recording of high-resolution Event Related Potentials (ERPs) and the study of their intracranial sources showed that the brain achieves this improvement by initially amplifying and extending the pre-conscious storage of T2s' traces signalled by the N2 wave originating in the extra-striate cortex. This enhancement in the N2 wave is followed by specific changes in the latency and amplitude of later components in the P3 wave (P3a and P3b), signalling access of the sensory trace to the network of parietal and frontal areas modulating conscious processing. These findings show that the interaction between conscious and unconscious processing changes adaptively as a function of the probabilistic properties of the sensory environment and that the combination of an active attentional state with loose probabilistic and temporal expectancies on forthcoming conscious events favors the emergence to awareness of otherwise unnoticed visual events. This likely provides an insight on the attentional conditions that predispose an active observer to unexpected "serendipitous" findings. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

PubMed Central

2016-01-01

Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene. This article is part of the themed issue ‘The major synthetic evolutionary transitions’. PMID:27431526

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective.

PubMed

Verschure, Paul F M J

2016-08-19

Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene.This article is part of the themed issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'. © 2016 The Author(s).

Consciousness of Unification: The Mind-Matter Phallacy Bites the Dust

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Beichler, James E.

A complete theoretical model of how consciousness arises in neural nets can be developed based on a mixed quantum/classical basis. Both mind and consciousness are multi-leveled scalar and vector electromagnetic complexity patterns, respectively, which emerge within all living organisms through the process of evolution. Like life, the mind and consciousness patterns extend throughout living organisms (bodies), but the neural nets and higher level groupings that distinguish higher levels of consciousness only exist in the brain so mind and consciousness have been traditionally associated with the brain alone. A close study of neurons and neural nets in the brain shows that the microtubules within axons are classical bio-magnetic inductors that emit and absorb electromagnetic pulses from each other. These pulses establish interference patterns that influence the quantized vector potential patterns of interstitial water molecules within the neurons as well as create the coherence within neurons and neural nets that scientists normally associate with more complex memories, thought processes and streams of thought. Memory storage and recall are guided by the microtubules and the actual memory patterns are stored as magnetic vector potential complexity patterns in the points of space at the quantum level occupied by the water molecules. This model also accounts for the plasticity of the brain and implies that mind and consciousness, like life itself, are the result of evolutionary processes. However, consciousness can evolve independent of an organism's birth genetics once it has evolved by normal bottom-up genetic processes and thus force a new type of top-down evolution on living organisms and species as a whole that can be explained by expanding the laws of thermodynamics to include orderly systems.

Self-consciousness concept and assessment in self-report measures

PubMed Central

DaSilveira, Amanda; DeSouza, Mariane L.; Gomes, William B.

2015-01-01

This study examines how self-consciousness is defined and assessed using self-report questionnaires (Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS), Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, Self-Absorption Scale, Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire, and Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale). Authors of self-report measures suggest that self-consciousness can be distinguished by its private/public aspects, its adaptive/maladaptive applied characteristics, and present/past experiences. We examined these claims in a study using 602 young adults to whom the aforementioned scales were administered. Data were analyzed as follows: (1) correlation analysis to find simple associations between the measures; (2) factorial analysis using Oblimin rotation of total scores provided from the scales; and (3) factorial analysis considering the 102 items of the scales all together. It aimed to clarify relational patterns found in the correlations between SCSs, and to identify possible latent constructs behind these scales. Results support the adaptive/maladaptive aspects of self-consciousness, as well as distinguish to some extent public aspects from private ones. However, some scales that claimed to be theoretically derived from the concept of Private Self-Consciousness correlated with some of its public self-aspects. Overall, our findings suggest that while self-reflection measures tend to tap into past experiences and judged concepts that were already processed by the participants’ inner speech and thoughts, the Awareness measure derived from Mindfulness Scale seems to be related to a construct associated with present experiences in which one is aware of without any further judgment or logical/rational symbolization. This sub-scale seems to emphasize the role that present experiences have in self-consciousness, and it is argued that such a concept refers to what has been studied by phenomenology and psychology over more than 100 years: the concept of pre-reflective self-conscious. PMID:26191030

Automated EEG entropy measurements in coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state

PubMed Central

Gosseries, Olivia; Schnakers, Caroline; Ledoux, Didier; Vanhaudenhuyse, Audrey; Bruno, Marie-Aurélie; Demertzi, Athéna; Noirhomme, Quentin; Lehembre, Rémy; Damas, Pierre; Goldman, Serge; Peeters, Erika; Moonen, Gustave; Laureys, Steven

Summary Monitoring the level of consciousness in brain-injured patients with disorders of consciousness is crucial as it provides diagnostic and prognostic information. Behavioral assessment remains the gold standard for assessing consciousness but previous studies have shown a high rate of misdiagnosis. This study aimed to investigate the usefulness of electroencephalography (EEG) entropy measurements in differentiating unconscious (coma or vegetative) from minimally conscious patients. Left fronto-temporal EEG recordings (10-minute resting state epochs) were prospectively obtained in 56 patients and 16 age-matched healthy volunteers. Patients were assessed in the acute (≤1 month post-injury; n=29) or chronic (>1 month post-injury; n=27) stage. The etiology was traumatic in 23 patients. Automated online EEG entropy calculations (providing an arbitrary value ranging from 0 to 91) were compared with behavioral assessments (Coma Recovery Scale-Revised) and outcome. EEG entropy correlated with Coma Recovery Scale total scores (r=0.49). Mean EEG entropy values were higher in minimally conscious (73±19; mean and standard deviation) than in vegetative/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome patients (45±28). Receiver operating characteristic analysis revealed an entropy cut-off value of 52 differentiating acute unconscious from minimally conscious patients (sensitivity 89% and specificity 90%). In chronic patients, entropy measurements offered no reliable diagnostic information. EEG entropy measurements did not allow prediction of outcome. User-independent time-frequency balanced spectral EEG entropy measurements seem to constitute an interesting diagnostic – albeit not prognostic – tool for assessing neural network complexity in disorders of consciousness in the acute setting. Future studies are needed before using this tool in routine clinical practice, and these should seek to improve automated EEG quantification paradigms in order to reduce the remaining false negative and false positive findings. PMID:21693085

Cortical localization of phase and amplitude dynamics predicting access to somatosensory awareness.

PubMed

Hirvonen, Jonni; Palva, Satu

2016-01-01

Neural dynamics leading to conscious sensory perception have remained enigmatic in despite of large interest. Human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have revealed that a co-activation of sensory and frontoparietal areas is crucial for conscious sensory perception in the several second time-scale of BOLD signal fluctuations. Electrophysiological recordings with magneto- and electroencephalography (MEG and EEG) and intracranial EEG (iEEG) have shown that event related responses (ERs), phase-locking of neuronal activity, and oscillation amplitude modulations in sub-second timescales are greater for consciously perceived than for unperceived stimuli. The cortical sources of ER and oscillation dynamics predicting the conscious perception have, however, remained unclear because these prior studies have utilized MEG/EEG sensor-level analyses or iEEG with limited neuroanatomical coverage. We used a somatosensory detection task, magnetoencephalography (MEG), and cortically constrained source reconstruction to identify the cortical areas where ERs, local poststimulus amplitudes and phase-locking of neuronal activity are predictive of the conscious access of somatosensory information. We show here that strengthened ERs, phase-locking to stimulus onset (SL), and induced oscillations amplitude modulations all predicted conscious somatosensory perception, but the most robust and widespread of these was SL that was sustained in low-alpha (6-10 Hz) band. The strength of SL and to a lesser extent that of ER predicted conscious perception in the somatosensory, lateral and medial frontal, posterior parietal, and in the cingulate cortex. These data suggest that a rapid phase-reorganization and concurrent oscillation amplitude modulations in these areas play an instrumental role in the emergence of a conscious percept. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Self-consciousness concept and assessment in self-report measures.

PubMed

DaSilveira, Amanda; DeSouza, Mariane L; Gomes, William B

2015-01-01

This study examines how self-consciousness is defined and assessed using self-report questionnaires (Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS), Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, Self-Absorption Scale, Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire, and Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale). Authors of self-report measures suggest that self-consciousness can be distinguished by its private/public aspects, its adaptive/maladaptive applied characteristics, and present/past experiences. We examined these claims in a study using 602 young adults to whom the aforementioned scales were administered. Data were analyzed as follows: (1) correlation analysis to find simple associations between the measures; (2) factorial analysis using Oblimin rotation of total scores provided from the scales; and (3) factorial analysis considering the 102 items of the scales all together. It aimed to clarify relational patterns found in the correlations between SCSs, and to identify possible latent constructs behind these scales. Results support the adaptive/maladaptive aspects of self-consciousness, as well as distinguish to some extent public aspects from private ones. However, some scales that claimed to be theoretically derived from the concept of Private Self-Consciousness correlated with some of its public self-aspects. Overall, our findings suggest that while self-reflection measures tend to tap into past experiences and judged concepts that were already processed by the participants' inner speech and thoughts, the Awareness measure derived from Mindfulness Scale seems to be related to a construct associated with present experiences in which one is aware of without any further judgment or logical/rational symbolization. This sub-scale seems to emphasize the role that present experiences have in self-consciousness, and it is argued that such a concept refers to what has been studied by phenomenology and psychology over more than 100 years: the concept of pre-reflective self-conscious.

Role Modeling and Regional Health Care Intensity: U.S. Medical Student Attitudes Toward and Experiences With Cost-Conscious Care.

PubMed

Leep Hunderfund, Andrea N; Dyrbye, Liselotte N; Starr, Stephanie R; Mandrekar, Jay; Naessens, James M; Tilburt, Jon C; George, Paul; Baxley, Elizabeth G; Gonzalo, Jed D; Moriates, Christopher; Goold, Susan D; Carney, Patricia A; Miller, Bonnie M; Grethlein, Sara J; Fancher, Tonya L; Reed, Darcy A

2017-05-01

To examine medical student attitudes toward cost-conscious care and whether regional health care intensity is associated with reported exposure to physician role-modeling behaviors related to cost-conscious care. Students at 10 U.S. medical schools were surveyed in 2015. Thirty-five items assessed attitudes toward, perceived barriers to and consequences of, and observed physician role-modeling behaviors related to cost-conscious care (using scales for cost-conscious and potentially wasteful behaviors; Cronbach alphas of 0.82 and 0.81, respectively). Regional health care intensity was measured using Dartmouth Atlas End-of-Life Chronic Illness Care data: ratio of physician visits per decedent compared with the U.S. average, ratio of specialty to primary care physician visits per decedent, and hospital care intensity index. Of 5,992 students invited, 3,395 (57%) responded. Ninety percent (2,640/2,932) agreed physicians have a responsibility to contain costs. However, 48% (1,1416/2,960) thought ordering a test is easier than explaining why it is unnecessary, and 58% (1,685/2,928) agreed ordering fewer tests will increase the risk of malpractice litigation. In adjusted linear regression analyses, students in higher-health-care-intensity regions reported observing significantly fewer cost-conscious role-modeling behaviors: For each one-unit increase in the three health care intensity measures, scores on the 21-point cost-conscious role-modeling scale decreased by 4.4 (SE 0.7), 3.2 (0.6), and 3.9 (0.6) points, respectively (all P < .001). Medical students endorse barriers to cost-conscious care and encounter conflicting role-modeling behaviors, which are related to regional health care intensity. Enhancing role modeling in the learning environment may help prepare future physicians to address health care costs.

Conscious Leadership.

PubMed

Ward, Suzanne F; Haase, Beth

2016-11-01

Health care leaders need to use leadership methodologies that support safe patient care, satisfy employees, and improve the bottom line. Conscious leaders help create desirable personal and professional life experiences for themselves using specific tools that include mindfulness, context, and the observer-self, and they strive to help their employees learn to use these tools as well. In perioperative nursing, conscious leaders create an environment in which nurses are supported in their aim to provide the highest level of patient care and in which transformations are encouraged to take place; this environment ultimately promotes safety, contributes to fulfilling and meaningful work, and enhances a facility's financial viability. This article discusses some of the key concepts behind conscious leadership, how perioperative leaders can reach and maintain expanded consciousness, and how they can best assist their staff members in their own evolution to a more mindful state. Copyright © 2016 AORN, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

More Than Meets the Eye: Toward a Post-Materialist Model of Consciousness.

PubMed

Brabant, Olivier

2016-01-01

Commonly accepted models of human consciousness have substantial shortcomings, in the sense that they cannot account for the entire scope of human experiences. The goal of this article is to describe a model with higher explanatory power, by integrating ideas from psychology and quantum mechanics. In the first part, the need for a paradigm change will be justified by presenting three types of phenomena that challenge the materialistic view of consciousness. The second part is about proposing an alternative view of reality and mind-matter manifestation that is able to accommodate these phenomena. Finally, the ideas from the previous parts will be combined with the psychological concepts developed by Frederic W. H. Myers. The result is a more comprehensive model of human consciousness that offers a novel perspective on altered states of consciousness, genius, and mental health. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Knowledge applied to new domains: the unconscious succeeds where the conscious fails.

PubMed

Scott, Ryan B; Dienes, Zoltan

2010-03-01

A common view holds that consciousness is needed for knowledge acquired in one domain to be applied in a novel domain. We present evidence for the opposite; where the transfer of knowledge is achieved only in the absence of conscious awareness. Knowledge of artificial grammars was examined where training and testing occurred in different vocabularies or modalities. In all conditions grammaticality judgments attributed to random selection showed above-chance accuracy (60%), while those attributed to conscious decisions did not. Participants also rated each string's familiarity and performed a perceptual task assessing fluency. Familiarity was predicted by repetition structure and was thus related to grammaticality. Fluency, though increasing familiarity, was unrelated to grammaticality. While familiarity predicted all judgments only those attributed to random selection showed a significant additional contribution of grammaticality, deriving primarily from chunk novelty. In knowledge transfer, as in visual perception (Marcel, 1993), the unconscious may outperform the conscious.

Conscious thought beats deliberation without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when you are an expert

PubMed Central

Schmidt, Henk G.; Rikers, Remy M. J. P.; Custers, Eugene J. F. M.; Splinter, Ted A. W.; van Saase, Jan L. C. M.

2010-01-01

Contrary to what common sense makes us believe, deliberation without attention has recently been suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations than deliberation with attention. Based on differences between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions after consciously thinking about complex problems whereas novices may benefit from deliberation-without-attention. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed complex and routine problems under three conditions, an immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions: conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention. Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-without-attention improved novices’ decisions, but only in simple problems. Experts benefit from consciously thinking about complex problems; for novices thinking does not help in those cases. PMID:20354726

Night and day variations of sleep in patients with disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Wislowska, Malgorzata; Del Giudice, Renata; Lechinger, Julia; Wielek, Tomasz; Heib, Dominik P J; Pitiot, Alain; Pichler, Gerald; Michitsch, Gabriele; Donis, Johann; Schabus, Manuel

2017-03-21

Brain injuries substantially change the entire landscape of oscillatory dynamics and render detection of typical sleep patterns difficult. Yet, sleep is characterized not only by specific EEG waveforms, but also by its circadian organization. In the present study we investigated whether brain dynamics of patients with disorders of consciousness systematically change between day and night. We recorded ~24 h EEG at the bedside of 18 patients diagnosed to be vigilant but unaware (Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome) and 17 patients revealing signs of fluctuating consciousness (Minimally Conscious State). The day-to-night changes in (i) spectral power, (ii) sleep-specific oscillatory patterns and (iii) signal complexity were analyzed and compared to 26 healthy control subjects. Surprisingly, the prevalence of sleep spindles and slow waves did not systematically vary between day and night in patients, whereas day-night changes in EEG power spectra and signal complexity were revealed in minimally conscious but not unaware patients.

Conscious thought beats deliberation without attention in diagnostic decision-making: at least when you are an expert.

PubMed

Mamede, Sílvia; Schmidt, Henk G; Rikers, Remy M J P; Custers, Eugene J F M; Splinter, Ted A W; van Saase, Jan L C M

2010-11-01

Contrary to what common sense makes us believe, deliberation without attention has recently been suggested to produce better decisions in complex situations than deliberation with attention. Based on differences between cognitive processes of experts and novices, we hypothesized that experts make in fact better decisions after consciously thinking about complex problems whereas novices may benefit from deliberation-without-attention. These hypotheses were confirmed in a study among doctors and medical students. They diagnosed complex and routine problems under three conditions, an immediate-decision condition and two delayed conditions: conscious thought and deliberation-without-attention. Doctors did better with conscious deliberation when problems were complex, whereas reasoning mode did not matter in simple problems. In contrast, deliberation-without-attention improved novices' decisions, but only in simple problems. Experts benefit from consciously thinking about complex problems; for novices thinking does not help in those cases.

Paradigm shift in consciousness research: the child's self-awareness and abnormalities in autism, ADHD and schizophrenia.

PubMed

Lou, Hans C

2012-02-01

Self-awareness is a pivotal component of any conscious experience and conscious self-regulation of behaviour. A paralimbic network is active, specific and causal in self-awareness. Its regions interact by gamma synchrony. Gamma synchrony develops throughout infancy, childhood and adolescence into adulthood and is regulated by dopamine and other neurotransmitters via GABA interneurons. Major derailments of this network and self-awareness occur in developmental disorders of conscious self-regulation like autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and schizophrenia. Recent research on conscious experience is no longer limited to the study of neural 'correlations' but is increasingly lending itself to the study of causality. This paradigm shift opens new perspectives for understanding the neural mechanisms of the developing self and the causal effects of their disturbance in developmental disorders. © 2011 The Author(s)/Acta Paediatrica © 2011 Foundation Acta Paediatrica.

Structural qualia: a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

PubMed

Loorits, Kristjan

2014-01-01

The hard problem of consciousness has been often claimed to be unsolvable by the methods of traditional empirical sciences. It has been argued that all the objects of empirical sciences can be fully analyzed in structural terms but that consciousness is (or has) something over and above its structure. However, modern neuroscience has introduced a theoretical framework in which also the apparently non-structural aspects of consciousness, namely the so called qualia or qualitative properties, can be analyzed in structural terms. That framework allows us to see qualia as something compositional with internal structures that fully determine their qualitative nature. Moreover, those internal structures can be identified which certain neural patterns. Thus consciousness as a whole can be seen as a complex neural pattern that misperceives some of its own highly complex structural properties as monadic and qualitative. Such neural pattern is analyzable in fully structural terms and thereby the hard problem is solved.

Structural qualia: a solution to the hard problem of consciousness

PubMed Central

Loorits, Kristjan

2014-01-01

The hard problem of consciousness has been often claimed to be unsolvable by the methods of traditional empirical sciences. It has been argued that all the objects of empirical sciences can be fully analyzed in structural terms but that consciousness is (or has) something over and above its structure. However, modern neuroscience has introduced a theoretical framework in which also the apparently non-structural aspects of consciousness, namely the so called qualia or qualitative properties, can be analyzed in structural terms. That framework allows us to see qualia as something compositional with internal structures that fully determine their qualitative nature. Moreover, those internal structures can be identified which certain neural patterns. Thus consciousness as a whole can be seen as a complex neural pattern that misperceives some of its own highly complex structural properties as monadic and qualitative. Such neural pattern is analyzable in fully structural terms and thereby the hard problem is solved. PMID:24672510

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues.

PubMed

Farisco, Michele; Kotaleski, Jeanette H; Evers, Kathinka

2018-01-01

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.

Functional neuroimaging applications for assessment and rehabilitation planning in patients with disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Giacino, Joseph T; Hirsch, Joy; Schiff, Nicholas; Laureys, Steven

2006-12-01

To describe the theoretic framework, design, and potential clinical applications of functional neuroimaging protocols in patients with disorders of consciousness. Recent published literature and authors' own work. Studies using functional neuroimaging techniques to investigate cognitive processing in patients diagnosed with vegetative and minimally conscious state. Not applicable. Positron-emission tomography activation studies suggest that the vegetative state represents a global disconnection syndrome in which higher order association cortices are functionally disconnected from primary cortical areas. In contrast, patterns of activation in functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of patients in the minimally conscious state show preservation of large-scale cortical networks associated with language and visual processing. Novel applications of functional neuroimaging in patients with disorders of consciousness may aid in differential diagnosis, prognostic assessment and identification of pathophysiologic mechanisms. Improvements in patient characterization may, in turn, provide new opportunities for restoration of function through interventional neuromodulation.

Visual perception from the perspective of a representational, non-reductionistic, level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness

PubMed Central

Overgaard, Morten; Mogensen, Jesper

2014-01-01

This article proposes a new model to interpret seemingly conflicting evidence concerning the correlation of consciousness and neural processes. Based on an analysis of research of blindsight and subliminal perception, the reorganization of elementary functions and consciousness framework suggests that mental representations consist of functions at several different levels of analysis, including truly localized perceptual elementary functions and perceptual algorithmic modules, which are interconnections of the elementary functions. We suggest that conscious content relates to the ‘top level’ of analysis in a ‘situational algorithmic strategy’ that reflects the general state of an individual. We argue that conscious experience is intrinsically related to representations that are available to guide behaviour. From this perspective, we find that blindsight and subliminal perception can be explained partly by too coarse-grained methodology, and partly by top-down enhancing of representations that normally would not be relevant to action. PMID:24639581

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues

PubMed Central

Farisco, Michele; Kotaleski, Jeanette H.; Evers, Kathinka

2018-01-01

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain’s operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs. PMID:29740372

The Astrocentric Hypothesis: proposed role of astrocytes in consciousness and memory formation.

PubMed

Robertson, James M

2002-01-01

Consciousness is self-awareness. This process is closely associated with attention and working memory, a special form of short-term memory, which is vital when solving explicit task. Edelman has equated consciousness as the "remembered present" to highlight the importance of this form of memory (G.M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, Basic Books, New York, 1992). The majority of other memories are recollections of past events that are encoded, stored, and brought back into consciousness if appropriate for solving new problems. Encoding prior experiences into memories is based on the salience of each event (A.R. Damasio, Descartes' Error, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1994; G.M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, Basic Books, New York, 1992). It is proposed that protoplasmic astrocytes bind attended sensory information into consciousness and store encoded memories. This conclusion is supported by research conducted by gliobiologist over the past 15 years. Copyright 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd.

Converging Intracranial Markers of Conscious Access

PubMed Central

Gaillard, Raphaël; Dehaene, Stanislas; Adam, Claude; Clémenceau, Stéphane; Hasboun, Dominique; Baulac, Michel; Cohen, Laurent; Naccache, Lionel

2009-01-01

We compared conscious and nonconscious processing of briefly flashed words using a visual masking procedure while recording intracranial electroencephalogram (iEEG) in ten patients. Nonconscious processing of masked words was observed in multiple cortical areas, mostly within an early time window (<300 ms), accompanied by induced gamma-band activity, but without coherent long-distance neural activity, suggesting a quickly dissipating feedforward wave. In contrast, conscious processing of unmasked words was characterized by the convergence of four distinct neurophysiological markers: sustained voltage changes, particularly in prefrontal cortex, large increases in spectral power in the gamma band, increases in long-distance phase synchrony in the beta range, and increases in long-range Granger causality. We argue that all of those measures provide distinct windows into the same distributed state of conscious processing. These results have a direct impact on current theoretical discussions concerning the neural correlates of conscious access. PMID:19296722

Development links psychological causes to evolutionary explanations.

PubMed

Fedyk, Mark; Kushnir, Tamar

2014-04-01

Our conscious abilities are learned in environments that have evolved to support them. This insight provides an alternative way of framing Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) provocative hypothesis. To understand the conflict between unconscious goals and consciousness, we can study the emergence of conscious thought and control in childhood. These developmental processes are also central to the best available current evolutionary theories.

Effect of Gender on Students' Emotion with Gender-Related Public Self-Consciousness as a Moderator in Mixed-Gender Physical Education Classes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moon, Minkwon; Jeon, Hyunsoo; Kwon, Sungho

2016-01-01

The present study investigates whether gender-related public self-consciousness moderates the relationship between students' gender and emotions in mixed-gender physical education classes. The Positive and Negative Affect Scales and the Gender-related Public Self-Consciousness Scale were administered to 380 middle-school students in South Korea.…

Historical Consciousness as a Pedagogical Device in the Production of the Responsible Citizen

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Friedrich, Daniel

2010-01-01

One of the most relevant strategies that shapes the education of the citizenry can be found in the formation of a historical consciousness. Yet the very idea of "historical consciousness" as a skill to be taught cannot be taken for granted. In order to disrupt the educational common sense, I will analyze the ways in which historical consciousness…

Why Spirituality Deserves a Central Place in Liberal Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Astin, Alexander W.

2004-01-01

One of the most remarkable things about the human consciousness is that each of us has the capacity to observe our thoughts and feelings as they arise in our consciousness. Why shouldn?t cultivating this ability to observe one?s own mind in action,becoming more self aware or simply more "conscious" be one of the central purposes of education? Even…

Effects of Art/Design Education on Meta-Esthetics Consciousness of Fine Arts Students

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tataroglu, Eylem

2015-01-01

The objectives of the present study were to determine the consciousness and sensitivity levels of Fine Arts students about the meta-esthetics as a consumer and producer and to determine the effects of the courses they took on their meta-esthetic consciousness. The research universe was composed of fine art faculties of the foundation universities…

A Peculiar Sensation: Double Consciousness and the Lived Experiences of African American Art Historians at Predominately White Institutions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Swaidan, Christina Michelle

2010-01-01

Double consciousness is the identity conflict of being Black and being an American (Du Bois, 1903). Double consciousness leads to "identity confusion and inherent contradictions in the collective psyche of people of African descent" (Benjamin, 2005, p. 21.). This study employed grounded theory to collect and analyze the data that emerged from the…

Do We Know What We're Simulating? Information Loss on Transferring Unconscious Perceptual Simulation to Conscious Imagery

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Connell, Louise; Lynott, Dermot

2016-01-01

Perceptual simulations are unconscious and automatic, whereas perceptual imagery is conscious and deliberate, but it is unclear how easily one can transfer perceptual information from unconscious to conscious awareness. We investigated whether it is possible to be aware of what one is mentally representing; that is, whether it is possible to…

Self-conscious robotic system design process--from analysis to implementation.

PubMed

Chella, Antonio; Cossentino, Massimo; Seidita, Valeria

2011-01-01

Developing robotic systems endowed with self-conscious capabilities means realizing complex sub-systems needing ad-hoc software engineering techniques for their modelling, analysis and implementation. In this chapter the whole process (from analysis to implementation) to model the development of self-conscious robotic systems is presented and the new created design process, PASSIC, supporting each part of it, is fully illustrated.

Replication and Pedagogy in the History of Psychology V: The Metronome and Wilhelm Wundt's Search for the Components of Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ayala, Christopher; Borawski, Steven; Miller, Jonathon

2008-01-01

Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) believed that consciousness was represented by the interconnection of psychical processes comprised of temporal elements and compounds. To explore these processes, Wundt used a metronome to measure the amount of information that passed into consciousness across time. The current project replicated some of his procedures,…

Gender differences in body consciousness and substance use among high-risk adolescents.

PubMed

Black, David Scott; Sussman, Steve; Unger, Jennifer; Pokhrel, Pallav; Sun, Ping

2010-08-01

This study explores the association between private and public body consciousness and past 30-day cigarette, alcohol, marijuana, and hard drug use among adolescents. Self-reported data from alterative high school students in California were analyzed (N = 976) using multilevel regression models to account for student clustering within schools. Separate regression analyses were conducted for males and females. Both cross-sectional baseline data and one-year longitudinal prediction models indicated that body consciousness is associated with specific drug use categories differentially by gender. Findings suggest that body consciousness accounts for additional variance in substance use etiology not explained by previously recognized dispositional variables.

The interconnectivity of mind, brain, and behavior in altered states of consciousness: focus on shamanism.

PubMed

Wright, P A

1995-07-01

This paper examines possible interconnections between mind, brain, and behavior in the area of shamanism and altered states of consciousness. It offers a neurophysiological theory of shamanic altered states of consciousness that integrates theories by Mandell, Persinger, Prince, Winkelman, and Wright. Topics include the shamanic call and temporal lobe phenomena, possible neurological correlates of shamanic ecstasy, and the neurophysiological roles of endorphins, plant substances, and genetic factors in shamanic altered states of consciousness. The difficulty of developing such a theory because of the complexity of human physiology and psychological experience and because of the paucity of neurophysiological data from the field is acknowledged.

Exploring self-conscious emotions in individuals with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

PubMed

Harrison, Samantha L; Robertson, Noelle; Goldstein, Roger S; Brooks, Dina

2017-02-01

This study aimed to explore the extent to which self-conscious emotions are expressed, to explore any associations with adverse health outcomes, and to compare self-conscious emotions in individuals with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) to healthy controls. A two-stage mixed-methods study design was employed. Interviews with 15 individuals with COPD informed the choice of questionnaires to assess self-conscious emotions which were completed by individuals with COPD and healthy controls. Five overarching themes were abstracted: grief, spectrum of blame, concern about the view of others, concealment, and worry about the future. The questionnaires were completed by 70 patients (mean( SD) age 70.8(9.4) years, forced expiratory volume in one second predicted 40.5(18.8), 44% male) and 61 healthy controls (mean( SD) age 62.2(12.9) years, 34% male]. Self-conscious emotions were associated with reduced mastery, heightened emotions, and elevated anxiety and depression (all p < 0.001). Individuals with COPD reported lower self-compassion, higher shame, and less pride than healthy controls (all p ≤ 0.01). There is a need to increase awareness of self-conscious emotions in individuals with COPD. Therapies to target such emotions may improve mastery, emotions, and psychological symptoms.

Unconscious relational encoding depends on hippocampus

PubMed Central

Duss, Simone B.; Reber, Thomas P.; Hänggi, Jürgen; Schwab, Simon; Wiest, Roland; Müri, René M.; Brugger, Peter; Gutbrod, Klemens

2014-01-01

Textbooks divide between human memory systems based on consciousness. Hippocampus is thought to support only conscious encoding, while neocortex supports both conscious and unconscious encoding. We tested whether processing modes, not consciousness, divide between memory systems in three neuroimaging experiments with 11 amnesic patients (mean age = 45.55 years, standard deviation = 8.74, range = 23–60) and 11 matched healthy control subjects. Examined processing modes were single item versus relational encoding with only relational encoding hypothesized to depend on hippocampus. Participants encoded and later retrieved either single words or new relations between words. Consciousness of encoding was excluded by subliminal (invisible) word presentation. Amnesic patients and controls performed equally well on the single item task activating prefrontal cortex. But only the controls succeeded on the relational task activating the hippocampus, while amnesic patients failed as a group. Hence, unconscious relational encoding, but not unconscious single item encoding, depended on hippocampus. Yet, three patients performed normally on unconscious relational encoding in spite of amnesia capitalizing on spared hippocampal tissue and connections to language cortex. This pattern of results suggests that processing modes divide between memory systems, while consciousness divides between levels of function within a memory system. PMID:25273998

Cognitive algorithms: dynamic logic, working of the mind, evolution of consciousness and cultures

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perlovsky, Leonid I.

2007-04-01

The paper discusses evolution of consciousness driven by the knowledge instinct, a fundamental mechanism of the mind which determines its higher cognitive functions. Dynamic logic mathematically describes the knowledge instinct. It overcomes past mathematical difficulties encountered in modeling intelligence and relates it to mechanisms of concepts, emotions, instincts, consciousness and unconscious. The two main aspects of the knowledge instinct are differentiation and synthesis. Differentiation is driven by dynamic logic and proceeds from vague and unconscious states to more crisp and conscious states, from less knowledge to more knowledge at each hierarchical level of the mind. Synthesis is driven by dynamic logic operating in a hierarchical organization of the mind; it strives to achieve unity and meaning of knowledge: every concept finds its deeper and more general meaning at a higher level. These mechanisms are in complex relationship of symbiosis and opposition, which leads to complex dynamics of evolution of consciousness and cultures. Modeling this dynamics in a population leads to predictions for the evolution of consciousness, and cultures. Cultural predictive models can be compared to experimental data and used for improvement of human conditions. We discuss existing evidence and future research directions.

Intelligence as it relates to conscious and unconscious memory influences.

PubMed

Joordens, Steve; Walsh, Darlene; Mantonakis, Antonia

2013-09-01

We examine the relationship between a measure of intelligence and estimates of conscious and unconscious memory influences derived using Jacoby's (Jacoby, L. L. [1991]. A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541.) process-dissociation procedure. We find a positive relationship between intelligence and conscious memory, and no relationship between intelligence and unconscious influences once the impact of conscious influences are removed (Experiment 1). We also find that when participants cannot engage in conscious strategies, such as when there is insufficient time for learning, the relationships observed in Experiment 1 are eliminated (Experiments 2A and 2B). Our results support the notion that individual differences in intelligence reflect differences in conscious strategic processes (Karis, D., Fabiani, M., & Donchin, E. [1984]. "P300" and memory: Individual differences in the von Restorff effect. Cognitive Psychology, 16, 177-216.) and not differences in mental speed (Eysenck, H. J. (1984). Intelligence versus behavior. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 290-291; Jensen, A. R. [1982]. Bias in mental testing. New York, NY: Free Press). PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved

How should functional imaging of patients with disorders of consciousness contribute to their clinical rehabilitation needs?

PubMed Central

Laureys, Steven; Giacino, Joseph T.; Schiff, Nicholas D.; Schabus, Manuel; Owen, Adrian M.

2010-01-01

Purpose of review We discuss the problems of evidence-based neurorehabilitation in disorders of consciousness, and recent functional neuroimaging data obtained in the vegetative state and minimally conscious state. Recent findings Published data are insufficient to make recommendations for or against any of the neurorehabilitative treatments in vegetative state and minimally conscious state patients. Electrophysiological and functional imaging studies have been shown to be useful in measuring residual brain function in noncommunicative brain-damaged patients. Despite the fact that such studies could in principle allow an objective quantification of the putative cerebral effect of rehabilitative treatment in the vegetative state and minimally conscious state, they have so far not been used in this context. Summary Without controlled studies and careful patient selection criteria it will not be possible to evaluate the potential of therapeutic interventions in disorders of consciousness. There also is a need to elucidate the neurophysiological effects of such treatments. Integration of multimodal neuroimaging techniques should eventually improve our ability to disentangle differences in outcome on the basis of underlying mechanisms and better guide our therapeutic options in the challenging patient populations encountered following severe acute brain damage. PMID:17102688

Non-conscious processes in changing health-related behaviour: a conceptual analysis and framework

PubMed Central

Hollands, Gareth J.; Marteau, Theresa M.; Fletcher, Paul C.

2016-01-01

ABSTRACT Much of the global burden of non-communicable disease is caused by unhealthy behaviours that individuals enact even when informed of their health-harming consequences. A key insight is that these behaviours are not predominantly driven by deliberative conscious decisions, but occur directly in response to environmental cues and without necessary representation of their consequences. Consequently, interventions that target non-conscious rather than conscious processes to change health behaviour may have significant potential, but this important premise remains largely untested. This is in part due to the lack of a practicable conceptual framework that can be applied to better describe and assess these interventions. We propose a framework for describing or categorising interventions to change health behaviour by the degree to which their effects may be considered non-conscious. Potential practical issues with applying such a framework are discussed, as are the implications for further research to inform the testing and development of interventions. A pragmatic means of conceptualising interventions targeted at non-conscious processes is a necessary prelude to testing the potency of such interventions. This can ultimately inform the development of interventions with the potential to shape healthier behaviours across populations. PMID:26745243

Negative Body Attitudes and Sexual Dissatisfaction in Men: The Mediating Role of Body Self-Consciousness During Physical Intimacy.

PubMed

van den Brink, Femke; Vollmann, Manja; Sternheim, Lot C; Berkhout, Lotte J; Zomerdijk, Renée A; Woertman, Liesbeth

2018-04-01

Previous research indicated that negative attitudes about the body and appearance are common among men and demonstrated that negative body attitudes are associated with negative sexual experiences. The present study investigated the association between body attitudes and sexual dissatisfaction and the mediating role of body self-consciousness during physical intimacy. In a cross-sectional design, 201 Dutch men completed an online survey regarding body attitudes toward muscularity, body fat, height, and genitals, body self-consciousness during physical intimacy, and sexual dissatisfaction. Hypotheses were tested using correlation analyses and a mediation analysis with body attitudes as predictors, body self-consciousness as mediator, and sexual dissatisfaction as outcome. Correlation analyses showed that negative body attitudes and body self-consciousness during physical intimacy were significantly related to sexual dissatisfaction. The mediation analysis revealed that negative attitudes toward muscularity, body fat, and genitals had indirect effects on sexual dissatisfaction through body self-consciousness during physical intimacy. Negative attitudes toward genitals additionally had a direct effect on sexual dissatisfaction. These findings indicate that body image interventions focused on male body attitudes may be beneficial in improving men's body image, which may ultimately increase sexual satisfaction.

Dissociable brain mechanisms underlying the conscious and unconscious control of behavior.

PubMed

van Gaal, Simon; Lamme, Victor A F; Fahrenfort, Johannes J; Ridderinkhof, K Richard

2011-01-01

Cognitive control allows humans to overrule and inhibit habitual responses to optimize performance in challenging situations. Contradicting traditional views, recent studies suggest that cognitive control processes can be initiated unconsciously. To further capture the relation between consciousness and cognitive control, we studied the dynamics of inhibitory control processes when triggered consciously versus unconsciously in a modified version of the stop task. Attempts to inhibit an imminent response were often successful after unmasked (visible) stop signals. Masked (invisible) stop signals rarely succeeded in instigating overt inhibition but did trigger slowing down of response times. Masked stop signals elicited a sequence of distinct ERP components that were also observed on unmasked stop signals. The N2 component correlated with the efficiency of inhibitory control when elicited by unmasked stop signals and with the magnitude of slowdown when elicited by masked stop signals. Thus, the N2 likely reflects the initiation of inhibitory control, irrespective of conscious awareness. The P3 component was much reduced in amplitude and duration on masked versus unmasked stop trials. These patterns of differences and similarities between conscious and unconscious cognitive control processes are discussed in a framework that differentiates between feedforward and feedback connections in yielding conscious experience.

Non-conscious processes in changing health-related behaviour: a conceptual analysis and framework.

PubMed

Hollands, Gareth J; Marteau, Theresa M; Fletcher, Paul C

2016-12-01

Much of the global burden of non-communicable disease is caused by unhealthy behaviours that individuals enact even when informed of their health-harming consequences. A key insight is that these behaviours are not predominantly driven by deliberative conscious decisions, but occur directly in response to environmental cues and without necessary representation of their consequences. Consequently, interventions that target non-conscious rather than conscious processes to change health behaviour may have significant potential, but this important premise remains largely untested. This is in part due to the lack of a practicable conceptual framework that can be applied to better describe and assess these interventions. We propose a framework for describing or categorising interventions to change health behaviour by the degree to which their effects may be considered non-conscious. Potential practical issues with applying such a framework are discussed, as are the implications for further research to inform the testing and development of interventions. A pragmatic means of conceptualising interventions targeted at non-conscious processes is a necessary prelude to testing the potency of such interventions. This can ultimately inform the development of interventions with the potential to shape healthier behaviours across populations.

Exploring Cultural Differences in the Recognition of the Self-Conscious Emotions.

PubMed

Chung, Joanne M; Robins, Richard W

2015-01-01

Recent research suggests that the self-conscious emotions of embarrassment, shame, and pride have distinct, nonverbal expressions that can be recognized in the United States at above-chance levels. However, few studies have examined the recognition of these emotions in other cultures, and little research has been conducted in Asia. Consequently the cross-cultural generalizability of self-conscious emotions has not been firmly established. Additionally, there is no research that examines cultural variability in the recognition of the self-conscious emotions. Cultural values and exposure to Western culture have been identified as contributors to variability in recognition rates for the basic emotions; we sought to examine this for the self-conscious emotions using the University of California, Davis Set of Emotion Expressions (UCDSEE). The present research examined recognition of the self-conscious emotion expressions in South Korean college students and found that recognition rates were very high for pride, low but above chance for shame, and near zero for embarrassment. To examine what might be underlying the recognition rates we found in South Korea, recognition of self-conscious emotions and several cultural values were examined in a U.S. college student sample of European Americans, Asian Americans, and Asian-born individuals. Emotion recognition rates were generally similar between the European Americans and Asian Americans, and higher than emotion recognition rates for Asian-born individuals. These differences were not explained by cultural values in an interpretable manner, suggesting that exposure to Western culture is a more important mediator than values.

Dental aesthetics, self-awareness, and oral health-related quality of life in young adults.

PubMed

Klages, Ulrich; Bruckner, Aladàr; Zentner, Andrej

2004-10-01

The aim of the present study was to explore the putative relationship between dental aesthetics and oral health-related quality of life (OHRQoL), taking into consideration the potential direct and moderating influence of private and public self-consciousness. The subjects of this cross-sectional survey were 148 university students. Dental aesthetics were assessed by means of the aesthetic component (AC) of the Index of Orthodontic Treatment Need (IOTN). OHRQoL was estimated using a modification of the scales 'social appearance concern' and 'appearance disapproval', and a novel dental self-confidence scale. In addition, the private and public self-consciousness scales were used. Two-factor analyses of variance were carried out with high and low levels of dental aesthetics and private and public self-consciousness as the independent variables and the OHRQoL scales as the dependent variables. It was found that dental aesthetics had a direct effect on all OHRQoL scale values. Private self-consciousness was related to social appearance concern, while public self-consciousness was associated with both social appearance concern and appearance disapproval. An interaction effect was identified which showed that the impact of dental aesthetics on social appearance concern was stronger in respondents with high private and public self-consciousness than in low scoring subjects. The findings of the study suggest that minor differences in dental aesthetics may have a significant effect on perceived OHRQoL. This effect was more significant in subjects with high self-consciousness.

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses.

PubMed

Storm, Johan F; Boly, Mélanie; Casali, Adenauer G; Massimini, Marcello; Olcese, Umberto; Pennartz, Cyriel M A; Wilke, Melanie

2017-11-08

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the "mind-body problem") has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness. Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/3710882-12$15.00/0.

Perceived efficacy, conscious fear of death and intentions to tan: not all fear appeals are created equal.

PubMed

Cooper, Douglas P; Goldenberg, Jamie L; Arndt, Jamie

2014-02-01

According to the terror management health model, conscious thoughts of death motivate productive health behaviours when the targeted behaviour is perceived as an effective route for mitigating the threat and removing death-related thought from focal awareness. The present study thus examined whether messages manipulating the efficacy of a health behaviour moderate health outcomes when participants are presented with a fear appeal that makes death thought conscious. A 3 (fear appeal: cancer vs. appearance vs. neutral) × 2 (delay vs. no delay) × 2 (effective vs. non-effective) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted. Beach patrons were randomly assigned to a cancer, appearance, or neutral-threat fear appeal followed by a delay or no delay. Subsequently, they read messages highlighting the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of sun protection behaviours and reported their intentions to engage in those behaviours. When fear appeals primed conscious thoughts of death, framing sun protection as ineffective decreased sun protection intentions relative to framing sun protection as effective. In contrast, fear appeals that did not consciously prime death, or appeals followed by a delay that allowed thoughts of death to fade from consciousness, did not interact with efficacy messages. The findings revealed that messages impacting sun protection efficacy moderated sun protection intentions only when death was conscious. The findings have implications for understanding the conditions that render certain fear appeals, and accompanying messages of efficacy, more influential than others. © 2013 The British Psychological Society.

The Structure of Conscious Bodily Self-Perception during Full-Body Illusions

PubMed Central

Dobricki, Martin; de la Rosa, Stephan

2013-01-01

Previous research suggests that bodily self-identification, bodily self-localization, agency, and the sense of being present in space are critical aspects of conscious full-body self-perception. However, none of the existing studies have investigated the relationship of these aspects to each other, i.e., whether they can be identified to be distinguishable components of the structure of conscious full-body self-perception. Therefore, the objective of the present investigation is to elucidate the structure of conscious full-body self-perception. We performed two studies in which we stroked the back of healthy individuals for three minutes while they watched the back of a distant virtual body being synchronously stroked with a virtual stick. After visuo-tactile stimulation, participants assessed changes in their bodily self-perception with a custom made self-report questionnaire. In the first study, we investigated the structure of conscious full-body self-perception by analyzing the responses to the questionnaire by means of multidimensional scaling combined with cluster analysis. In the second study, we then extended the questionnaire and validated the stability of the structure of conscious full-body self-perception found in the first study within a larger sample of individuals by performing a principle components analysis of the questionnaire responses. The results of the two studies converge in suggesting that the structure of conscious full-body self-perception consists of the following three distinct components: bodily self-identification, space-related self-perception (spatial presence), and agency. PMID:24376765

The structure of conscious bodily self-perception during full-body illusions.

PubMed

Dobricki, Martin; de la Rosa, Stephan

2013-01-01

Previous research suggests that bodily self-identification, bodily self-localization, agency, and the sense of being present in space are critical aspects of conscious full-body self-perception. However, none of the existing studies have investigated the relationship of these aspects to each other, i.e., whether they can be identified to be distinguishable components of the structure of conscious full-body self-perception. Therefore, the objective of the present investigation is to elucidate the structure of conscious full-body self-perception. We performed two studies in which we stroked the back of healthy individuals for three minutes while they watched the back of a distant virtual body being synchronously stroked with a virtual stick. After visuo-tactile stimulation, participants assessed changes in their bodily self-perception with a custom made self-report questionnaire. In the first study, we investigated the structure of conscious full-body self-perception by analyzing the responses to the questionnaire by means of multidimensional scaling combined with cluster analysis. In the second study, we then extended the questionnaire and validated the stability of the structure of conscious full-body self-perception found in the first study within a larger sample of individuals by performing a principle components analysis of the questionnaire responses. The results of the two studies converge in suggesting that the structure of conscious full-body self-perception consists of the following three distinct components: bodily self-identification, space-related self-perception (spatial presence), and agency.

Near-death experience: arising from the borderlands of consciousness in crisis.

PubMed

Nelson, Kevin R

2014-11-01

Brain activity explains the essential features of near-death experience, including the perceptions of envelopment by light, out-of-body, and meeting deceased loved ones or spiritual beings. To achieve their fullest expression, such near-death experiences require a confluence of events and draw upon more than a single physiological or biochemical system, or one anatomical structure. During impaired cerebral blood flow from syncope or cardiac arrest that commonly precedes near-death, the boundary between consciousness and unconsciousness is often indistinct and a person may enter a borderland and be far more aware than is appreciated by others. Consciousness can also come and go if blood flow rises and falls across a crucial threshold. During crisis the brain's prime biologic purpose to keep itself alive lies at the heart of many spiritual experiences and inextricably binds them to the primal brain. Brain ischemia can disrupt the physiological balance between conscious states by leading the brainstem to blend rapid eye movement (REM) and waking into another borderland of consciousness during near-death. Evidence converges from many points to support this notion, including the observation that the majority of people with a near-death experience possess brains predisposed to fusing REM and waking consciousness into an unfamiliar reality, and are as likely to have out-of-body experience while blending REM and waking consciousness as they are to have out-of-body experience during near-death. © 2014 New York Academy of Sciences.

Is Your Gut Conscious? Is an Extraterrestrial?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vos Post, Jonathan

2011-10-01

This paper speculates on questions intending to be taken scientifically rather than metaphysically: "Can the human gut (enteric nervous system) be conscious?"; "Can your immune system think?"; "Could consciousness be coded in DNA?"; "What do we mean when asserting that an Extraterrestrial is Thinking, or is Conscious? We explore through reference to theory, experiment, and computational models by Christof Koch (Caltech), Barbara Wold (Caltech), and Stuart Kauffman (University of Calgary, Tampere University of Technology, Santa Fe Institute). We use a tentative new definition of thinking, designed to be applicable for humans, cetecea, corvids, artificial intelligences, and extraterrestrial intelligences of any substrate (i.e. Life as We Do Not Know It): "Thinking is the occurrence, transformation, and storage in a mind or brain (or simulation thereof) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another, such as thoughts, concept, percepts, ideas, impressions, notions, rules, schemas, images, phantasms, or subpersonal representations." We use the framework for Consciousness developed by Francis Crick and Christof Koch. We try to describe scientific goals, but discuss Philosophy sufficient to avoid naïve philosophical category errors (thus are careful not to conflate thought, consciousness, and language) Penrose, Hameroff, and Kauffman speculate (differently) that CNS consciousness is a macroscopic quantum phenomenon. Might intestinal, immune system, or genetic regulatory network dynamics exhibit emergent cooperative quantum effects? The speculations are in the context of Evolution by Natural Selection, presumed to operate throughout the Cosmos, and recent work in the foundations of Computational Biology and Quantum Mechanics.

[The use of conscious sedation versus general anesthesia in modern dentistry: rising ethical dilemmas].

PubMed

Ayalon, S; Gozal, Y; Kaufman, E

2004-10-01

Conscious sedation and general anesthesia have been in the use of the dental profession since the first half of the 19th century. Although seemingly appealing to use due to alleviation of pain and anxiety induced by the dental treatment, the alteration of consciousness level of dental patients is not without risk. Morbidity and mortality due to dental treatment performed under general anesthesia were investigated at the last decades of the 20th century. The mortality rates found in these investigations were surprisingly high comparing to researches of morbidity and mortality due to other medical procedures, performed under general anesthesia. Therefore, although general anesthesia is sometimes the only way to treat certain patients, maintaining strict indications for dental treatment under general anesthesia is necessary. Conscious sedation was found as a safer alternative for achieving a level of consciousness enabling dental treatment in those patients who are unable to receive treatment in normal dental clinic settings. We therefore believe that conscious sedation should be the golden standard for the treatment of those patients. The practicing of dentistry in patients who have need of dental treatment under special settings such as general anesthesia and sedation raises ethical dilemmas to the caregiver. The following review will summarize the available data on morbidity and mortality due to dental treatment given under general anesthesia and conscious sedation. The ethical questions arising from their practicing will be discussed and some answers shall be proposed.

Volitional chewing with a conscious effort alters and facilitates swallowing during feeding sequence.

PubMed

Furuya, J; Hara, A; Nomura, T; Kondo, H

2014-03-01

The key objective of mastication is to form a food bolus suitable for smooth swallowing. However, chewing is usually performed without a conscious effort. Poor bolus formation can cause pharyngeal residue and suffocation in elderly individuals with reduced swallowing function. Therefore, chewing with a conscious effort may help the bolus to more easily pass the pharynx. This study aimed to clarify the impact of mastication with a conscious effort on the feeding sequence. Subjects included 25 dentulous volunteers who were informed and provided written consent. Lateral videofluoroscopy was performed during the feeding of solid agar jelly under two conditions: chewing naturally in their usual manner (without volition) and chewing with a conscious effort (with volition). Temporal evaluation was performed for mastication, stage II transport (STII), swallow onset and oropharyngeal transit time. Moreover, bolus volume at swallow onset and subjective evaluation of swallowing easiness were measured. Volitional chewing with a conscious effort lengthened the duration of the chewing sequence before and after STII and delayed the swallow onset despite the fact that the bolus volume in the vallecula and hypopharynx (HYP) had significantly increased. Furthermore, with volition, the bolus transit time from swallow onset in the oral cavity, upper oropharynx and HYP was reduced, and subjective evaluation of swallowing easiness demonstrated significant improvement. These results suggest that volitional chewing with a conscious effort can alter bolus transport and swallowing, resulting in easier swallowing. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Exploring Cultural Differences in the Recognition of the Self-Conscious Emotions

PubMed Central

Chung, Joanne M.; Robins, Richard W.

2015-01-01

Recent research suggests that the self-conscious emotions of embarrassment, shame, and pride have distinct, nonverbal expressions that can be recognized in the United States at above-chance levels. However, few studies have examined the recognition of these emotions in other cultures, and little research has been conducted in Asia. Consequently the cross-cultural generalizability of self-conscious emotions has not been firmly established. Additionally, there is no research that examines cultural variability in the recognition of the self-conscious emotions. Cultural values and exposure to Western culture have been identified as contributors to variability in recognition rates for the basic emotions; we sought to examine this for the self-conscious emotions using the University of California, Davis Set of Emotion Expressions (UCDSEE). The present research examined recognition of the self-conscious emotion expressions in South Korean college students and found that recognition rates were very high for pride, low but above chance for shame, and near zero for embarrassment. To examine what might be underlying the recognition rates we found in South Korea, recognition of self-conscious emotions and several cultural values were examined in a U.S. college student sample of European Americans, Asian Americans, and Asian-born individuals. Emotion recognition rates were generally similar between the European Americans and Asian Americans, and higher than emotion recognition rates for Asian-born individuals. These differences were not explained by cultural values in an interpretable manner, suggesting that exposure to Western culture is a more important mediator than values. PMID:26309215

Subliminally and consciously induced cognitive conflicts interact at several processing levels.

PubMed

Stock, Ann-Kathrin; Friedrich, Julia; Beste, Christian

2016-12-01

Controlled behavior is susceptible to conflicts that can emerge from subliminal or consciously processed information. While research suggests that both sources of conflicting information may interact in their modulation of controlled behavior, it has remained unclear which cognitive sub-processes involved in controlled behavior are affected by this interaction; i.e., at which processing level subliminally and consciously induced response conflicts interact in modulating controlled behavior. Moreover, we investigated whether this interaction of subliminally and consciously induced response conflicts was due to a nexus between the two types of conflict like a common cognitive process or factor. For this, n = 38 healthy young subjects completed a paradigm which combines subliminal primes and consciously perceived flankers while an electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. We show that the interaction of subliminal and conscious sources of conflict is not restricted to the response selection level (N2) but can already be shown at the earliest stages of perceptual and attentional processing (P1). While the degree of early attentional processing of subliminal information seems to depend on the absence of consciously perceived response conflicts, conflicts during the stage of response selection may be either reduced or enhanced by subliminal priming. Moreover, the results showed that even though the two different sources of conflict interact at the response selection level, they clearly originate from two distinct processes that interact before they detrimentally affect cognitive control. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Intrinsic Brain Activity in Altered States of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Boly, M.; Phillips, C.; Tshibanda, L.; Vanhaudenhuyse, A.; Schabus, M.; Dang-Vu, T.T.; Moonen, G.; Hustinx, R.; Maquet, P.; Laureys, S.

2010-01-01

Spontaneous brain activity has recently received increasing interest in the neuroimaging community. However, the value of resting-state studies to a better understanding of brain–behavior relationships has been challenged. That altered states of consciousness are a privileged way to study the relationships between spontaneous brain activity and behavior is proposed, and common resting-state brain activity features observed in various states of altered consciousness are reviewed. Early positron emission tomography studies showed that states of extremely low or high brain activity are often associated with unconsciousness. However, this relationship is not absolute, and the precise link between global brain metabolism and awareness remains yet difficult to assert. In contrast, voxel-based analyses identified a systematic impairment of associative frontoparieto–cingulate areas in altered states of consciousness, such as sleep, anesthesia, coma, vegetative state, epileptic loss of consciousness, and somnambulism. In parallel, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have identified structured patterns of slow neuronal oscillations in the resting human brain. Similar coherent blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) systemwide patterns can also be found, in particular in the default-mode network, in several states of unconsciousness, such as coma, anesthesia, and slow-wave sleep. The latter results suggest that slow coherent spontaneous BOLD fluctuations cannot be exclusively a reflection of conscious mental activity, but may reflect default brain connectivity shaping brain areas of most likely interactions in a way that transcends levels of consciousness, and whose functional significance remains largely in the dark. PMID:18591474

Star fruit (Averrhoa carambola) intoxication: an important cause of consciousness disturbance in patients with renal failure.

PubMed

Chang, Chin-Tung; Chen, Yung-Chang; Fang, Ji-Tseng; Huang, Chiu-Ching

2002-05-01

Star fruit intoxication is a rare cause of consciousness disturbance in patients with renal failure. Most cases in the literature are uremic patients on maintenance dialysis. We present a patient with chronic renal failure, who was not on dialysis program yet, suffered from star fruit intoxication with presentation of consciousness disturbance and successfully managed by a session of hemodialysis.

Language and Cognition Interaction Neural Mechanisms

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-06-01

cognition and consciousness,” in Neurodynamics of Cognition and Consciousness, L. Perlovsky and R. Kozma, Eds., Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, 2007. [31] L...115, 1987. [43] L. I. Perlovsky, “Neural dynamic logic of consciousness: the knowledge instinct,” in Neurodynamics of Higher-Level Cognition and...Brain, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 2000. [58] L. I. Perlovsky and R. Kozma, Eds., Neurodynamics of Higher- Level Cognition and

Cortical Neural Synchronization Underlies Primary Visual Consciousness of Qualia: Evidence from Event-Related Potentials

PubMed Central

Babiloni, Claudio; Marzano, Nicola; Soricelli, Andrea; Cordone, Susanna; Millán-Calenti, José Carlos; Del Percio, Claudio; Buján, Ana

2016-01-01

This article reviews three experiments on event-related potentials (ERPs) testing the hypothesis that primary visual consciousness (stimulus self-report) is related to enhanced cortical neural synchronization as a function of stimulus features. ERP peak latency and sources were compared between “seen” trials and “not seen” trials, respectively related and unrelated to the primary visual consciousness. Three salient features of visual stimuli were considered (visuospatial, emotional face expression, and written words). Results showed the typical visual ERP components in both “seen” and “not seen” trials. There was no statistical difference in the ERP peak latencies between the “seen” and “not seen” trials, suggesting a similar timing of the cortical neural synchronization regardless the primary visual consciousness. In contrast, ERP sources showed differences between “seen” and “not seen” trials. For the visuospatial stimuli, the primary consciousness was related to higher activity in dorsal occipital and parietal sources at about 400 ms post-stimulus. For the emotional face expressions, there was greater activity in parietal and frontal sources at about 180 ms post-stimulus. For the written letters, there was higher activity in occipital, parietal and temporal sources at about 230 ms post-stimulus. These results hint that primary visual consciousness is associated with an enhanced cortical neural synchronization having entirely different spatiotemporal characteristics as a function of the features of the visual stimuli and possibly, the relative qualia (i.e., visuospatial, face expression, and words). In this framework, the dorsal visual stream may be synchronized in association with the primary consciousness of visuospatial and emotional face contents. Analogously, both dorsal and ventral visual streams may be synchronized in association with the primary consciousness of linguistic contents. In this line of reasoning, the ensemble of the cortical neural networks underpinning the single visual features would constitute a sort of multi-dimensional palette of colors, shapes, regions of the visual field, movements, emotional face expressions, and words. The synchronization of one or more of these cortical neural networks, each with its peculiar timing, would produce the primary consciousness of one or more of the visual features of the scene. PMID:27445750

Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?

PubMed Central

Tononi, Giulio; Koch, Christof

2015-01-01

The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like to know if consciousness is present: patients with a few remaining islands of functioning cortex, preterm infants, non-mammalian species and machines that are rapidly outperforming people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions. To address these issues, we need not only more data but also a theory of consciousness—one that says what experience is and what type of physical systems can have it. Integrated information theory (IIT) does so by starting from experience itself via five phenomenological axioms: intrinsic existence, composition, information, integration and exclusion. From these it derives five postulates about the properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. The theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of an individual experience (a quale), and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a particular physical system is conscious and of what. Moreover, IIT can explain a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes a number of testable predictions and extrapolates to a number of problematic conditions. The theory holds that consciousness is a fundamental property possessed by physical systems having specific causal properties. It predicts that consciousness is graded, is common among biological organisms and can occur in some very simple systems. Conversely, it predicts that feed-forward networks, even complex ones, are not conscious, nor are aggregates such as groups of individuals or heaps of sand. Also, in sharp contrast to widespread functionalist beliefs, IIT implies that digital computers, even if their behaviour were to be functionally equivalent to ours, and even if they were to run faithful simulations of the human brain, would experience next to nothing. PMID:25823865

Global workspace dynamics: cortical "binding and propagation" enables conscious contents.

PubMed

Baars, Bernard J; Franklin, Stan; Ramsoy, Thomas Zoega

2013-01-01

A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub of binding and propagation in a population of loosely coupled signaling elements. In computational applications, GW architectures recruit many distributed, specialized agents to cooperate in resolving focal ambiguities. In the brain, conscious experiences may reflect a GW function. For animals, the natural world is full of unpredictable dangers and opportunities, suggesting a general adaptive pressure for brains to resolve focal ambiguities quickly and accurately. GW theory aims to understand the differences between conscious and unconscious brain events. In humans and related species the cortico-thalamic (C-T) core is believed to underlie conscious aspects of perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing (FOK), felt emotions, visual imagery, working memory, and executive control. Alternative theoretical perspectives are also discussed. The C-T core has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are unitary and internally consistent at any given moment. Over time, conscious contents constitute a very large, open set. This suggests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be localized in a single anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a functional hub - a dynamic capacity for binding and propagation of neural signals over multiple task-related networks, a kind of neuronal cloud computing. In this view, conscious contents can arise in any region of the C-T core when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium. The resulting conscious gestalt may ignite an any-to-many broadcast, lasting ∼100-200 ms, and trigger widespread adaptation in previously established networks. To account for the great range of conscious contents over time, the theory suggests an open repertoire of binding coalitions that can broadcast via theta/gamma or alpha/gamma phase coupling, like radio channels competing for a narrow frequency band. Conscious moments are thought to hold only 1-4 unrelated items; this small focal capacity may be the biological price to pay for global access. Visuotopic maps in cortex specialize in features like color, retinal size, motion, object identity, and egocentric/allocentric framing, so that a binding coalition for the sight of a rolling billiard ball in nearby space may resonate among activity maps of LGN, V1-V4, MT, IT, as well as the dorsal stream. Spatiotopic activity maps can bind into coherent gestalts using adaptive resonance (reentry). Single neurons can join a dominant coalition by phase tuning to regional oscillations in the 4-12 Hz range. Sensory percepts may bind and broadcast from posterior cortex, while non-sensory FOKs may involve prefrontal and frontotemporal areas. The anatomy and physiology of the hippocampal complex suggest a GW architecture as well. In the intact brain the hippocampal complex may support conscious event organization as well as episodic memory storage.

Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical “Binding and Propagation” Enables Conscious Contents

PubMed Central

Baars, Bernard J.; Franklin, Stan; Ramsoy, Thomas Zoega

2013-01-01

A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub of binding and propagation in a population of loosely coupled signaling elements. In computational applications, GW architectures recruit many distributed, specialized agents to cooperate in resolving focal ambiguities. In the brain, conscious experiences may reflect a GW function. For animals, the natural world is full of unpredictable dangers and opportunities, suggesting a general adaptive pressure for brains to resolve focal ambiguities quickly and accurately. GW theory aims to understand the differences between conscious and unconscious brain events. In humans and related species the cortico-thalamic (C-T) core is believed to underlie conscious aspects of perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing (FOK), felt emotions, visual imagery, working memory, and executive control. Alternative theoretical perspectives are also discussed. The C-T core has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are unitary and internally consistent at any given moment. Over time, conscious contents constitute a very large, open set. This suggests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be localized in a single anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a functional hub – a dynamic capacity for binding and propagation of neural signals over multiple task-related networks, a kind of neuronal cloud computing. In this view, conscious contents can arise in any region of the C-T core when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium. The resulting conscious gestalt may ignite an any-to-many broadcast, lasting ∼100–200 ms, and trigger widespread adaptation in previously established networks. To account for the great range of conscious contents over time, the theory suggests an open repertoire of binding1 coalitions that can broadcast via theta/gamma or alpha/gamma phase coupling, like radio channels competing for a narrow frequency band. Conscious moments are thought to hold only 1–4 unrelated items; this small focal capacity may be the biological price to pay for global access. Visuotopic maps in cortex specialize in features like color, retinal size, motion, object identity, and egocentric/allocentric framing, so that a binding coalition for the sight of a rolling billiard ball in nearby space may resonate among activity maps of LGN, V1-V4, MT, IT, as well as the dorsal stream. Spatiotopic activity maps can bind into coherent gestalts using adaptive resonance (reentry). Single neurons can join a dominant coalition by phase tuning to regional oscillations in the 4–12 Hz range. Sensory percepts may bind and broadcast from posterior cortex, while non-sensory FOKs may involve prefrontal and frontotemporal areas. The anatomy and physiology of the hippocampal complex suggest a GW architecture as well. In the intact brain the hippocampal complex may support conscious event organization as well as episodic memory storage. PMID:23974723

A role for the anterior insular cortex in the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness.

PubMed

Michel, Matthias

2017-03-01

According to the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, consciousness results from the global broadcast of information throughout the brain. The global neuronal workspace is mainly constituted by a fronto-parietal network. The anterior insular cortex is part of this global neuronal workspace, but the function of this region has not yet been defined within the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness. In this review, I hypothesize that the anterior insular cortex implements a cross-modal priority map, the function of which is to determine priorities for the processing of information and subsequent entrance in the global neuronal workspace. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Predicting soccer matches after unconscious and conscious thought as a function of expertise.

PubMed

Dijksterhuis, Ap; Bos, Maarten W; van der Leij, Andries; van Baaren, Rick B

2009-11-01

In two experiments, we investigated the effects of expertise and mode of thought on the accuracy of people's predictions. Both experts and nonexperts predicted the results of soccer matches after conscious thought, after unconscious thought, or immediately. In Experiment 1, experts who thought unconsciously outperformed participants in all other conditions. Whereas unconscious thinkers showed a correlation between expertise and accuracy of prediction, no such relation was observed for conscious thinkers or for immediate decision makers. In Experiment 2, this general pattern was replicated. In addition, experts who thought unconsciously were better at applying diagnostic information than experts who thought consciously or who decided immediately. The results are consistent with unconscious-thought theory.

Cajal and consciousness. Introduction.

PubMed

Marijuán, P C

2001-04-01

One hundred years after Santiago Ramón Cajal established the bases of modern neuroscience in his masterpiece Textura del sistema nervioso del hombre y de los vertebrados, the question is stated again: What is the status of consciousness today? The responses in this book, by contemporary leading figures of neuroscience, evolution, molecular biology, computer science, and quantum physics, collectively compose a fascinating conceptual landscape. Both the evolutionary emergence of consciousness and its development towards the highest level may be analyzed by a wealth of new theories and hypotheses, including Cajal's prescient ones. Some noticeable gaps remain, however. Celebrating the centennial of Textura is a timely occasion to reassess how close--and how far--our system of the sciences is to explaining consciousness.

Renal sympathetic nerve activity measured by norepinephrine spillover rate in response to changes in blood pressure in conscious rabbits.

PubMed

Sano, N; Way, D; McGrath, B P

1989-04-01

1. Renal sympathetic nerve activity (RSNA) in response to changes in mean arterial pressure (MAP) was examined by measuring renal norepinephrine (NE) spillover rate in conscious rabbits. 2. A chronic renal vein catheter was implanted for sampling renal venous blood without stress in conscious animals. 3. RSNA estimated by renal NE spillover rate significantly increased in response to moderate falls in MAP produced by sodium nitroprusside (SNP) infusion and decreased in response to moderate rises in MAP produced by phenylephrine (PE) infusion. 4. The NE spillover method is sufficiently sensitive to detect responses of RSNA to physiological stimuli in conscious rabbits.

Conscious, but not unconscious, logo priming of brands and related words.

PubMed

Brintazzoli, Gigliola; Soetens, Eric; Deroost, Natacha; Van den Bussche, Eva

2012-06-01

This study assessed whether real-life stimulus material can elicit conscious and unconscious priming. A typical masked priming paradigm was used, with brand logo primes. We used a rigorous method to assess participants' awareness of the subliminal information. Our results show that shortly presented and masked brand logos (e.g., logo of McDonald's) have the power to prime their brand names (e.g., "McDonald's") and, remarkably, words associated to the brand (e.g., "hamburger"). However, this only occurred when the logos could be categorized clearly above the consciousness threshold. Once the primes were presented close to the consciousness threshold, no subliminal influences on behavior were observed. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

On the Science of Consciousness: Epistemological Reflections and Clinical Implications.

PubMed

Facco, Enrico; Lucangeli, Daniela; Tressoldi, Patrizio

Consciousness has been one of the most important and tantalizing issues ever since the origin of philosophy and medicine. The concept of consciousness and the so-called "hard problem" (i.e., the mind-brain relationship) are highly complex topics that have yet to be elucidated, involving the realms of both science and philosophy with profound epistemological implications. In the lively debate on the foundations of the science of consciousness there are several potential biases of an essentially philosophical nature, such as those related to the paradigm and axioms adopted, and the ostensible logical contradiction between monism and dualism. Their origin dates back largely to Descartes' thinking and the birth of the new sciences as a compromise with the Inquisition, but they have been handed down through the Enlightenment and Positivism. A proper investigation of consciousness and the world of subjectivity demands a careful reflection on the paradigm of scientific medicine to identify possible flaws and overcome the limits of the mechanistic-reductionist approach. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Whistles, bells, and cogs in machines: Thomas Huxley and epiphenomenalism.

PubMed

Greenwood, John

2010-01-01

In this paper I try to shed some historical light upon the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, by focusing on the version of epiphenomenalism championed by Thomas Huxley, which is often treated as a classic statement of the doctrine. I argue that it is doubtful if Huxley held any form of metaphysical epiphenomenalism, and that he held a more limited form of empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness but not with respect to mentality per se. Contrary to what is conventionally supposed, Huxley's empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness was not simply based upon the demonstration of the neurophysiological basis of conscious mentality, or derived from the extension of mechanistic and reflexive principles of explanation to encompass all forms of animal and human behavior, but was based upon the demonstration of purposive and coordinated animal and human behavior in the absence of consciousness. Given Huxley's own treatment of mentality, his characterization of animals and humans as "conscious automata" was not well chosen.

Perceiving a story outside of conscious awareness: When we infer narrative attributes from subliminal sequential stimuli.

PubMed

Kawakami, Naoaki; Yoshida, Fujio

2015-05-01

Perceiving a story behind successive movements plays an important role in our lives. From a general perspective, such higher mental activity would seem to depend on conscious processes. Using a subliminal priming paradigm, we demonstrated that such story perception occurs without conscious awareness. In the experiments, participants were subliminally presented with sequential pictures that represented a story in which one geometrical figure was chased by the other figure, and in which one fictitious character defeated the other character in a tug-of-war. Although the participants could not report having seen the pictures, their automatic mental associations (i.e., associations that are activated unintentionally, difficult to control, and not necessarily endorsed at a conscious level) were shifted to line up with the story. The results suggest that story perception operates outside of conscious awareness. Implications for research on the unconscious were also briefly discussed. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Using group consciousness theories to understand political activism: case studies of Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Ingo Hasselbach.

PubMed

Duncan, Lauren E

2010-12-01

I describe and integrate several theories of group consciousness and collective action, along with 3 case studies of political activists. I have 2 goals: (1) to use the theories to help us understand something puzzling about each life and (2) to use the cases to complicate and expand the theories. Barack Obama's case raises the question of how someone with a politicized Black identity evolved into a politician working for all oppressed people and complicates racial identity development theory. Hillary Clinton's case raises the question of how a middle-class White girl raised in a conservative family became a prominent Democratic Party politician and complicates group consciousness theories by demonstrating the importance of generation and personality. Ingo Hasselbach's (a former German neo-Nazi leader) case illustrates relative deprivation theory and raises the question of whether theories developed to explain subordinate group consciousness can be applied to movements of dominant group consciousness. © 2010 The Author. Journal of Personality © 2010, Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

How to integrate dreaming into a general theory of consciousness--a critical review of existing positions and suggestions for future research.

PubMed

Windt, Jennifer M; Noreika, Valdas

2011-12-01

In this paper, we address the different ways in which dream research can contribute to interdisciplinary consciousness research. As a second global state of consciousness aside from wakefulness, dreaming is an important contrast condition for theories of waking consciousness. However, programmatic suggestions for integrating dreaming into broader theories of consciousness, for instance by regarding dreams as a model system of standard or pathological wake states, have not yielded straightforward results. We review existing proposals for using dreaming as a model system, taking into account concerns about the concept of modeling and the adequacy and practical feasibility of dreaming as a model system. We conclude that existing modeling approaches are premature and rely on controversial background assumptions. Instead, we suggest that contrastive analysis of dreaming and wakefulness presents a more promising strategy for integrating dreaming into a broader research context and solving many of the problems involved in the modeling approach. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness as a graded and an all-or-none phenomenon: A conceptual analysis.

PubMed

Windey, Bert; Cleeremans, Axel

2015-09-01

The issue whether consciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon has been and continues to be a debate. Both contradictory accounts are supported by solid evidence. Starting from a level of processing framework allowing for states of partial awareness, here we further elaborate our view that visual experience, as it is most often investigated in the literature, is both graded and all-or-none. Low-level visual experience is graded, whereas high-level visual experience is all-or-none. We then present a conceptual analysis starting from the notion that consciousness is a general concept. We specify a number of different subconcepts present in the literature on consciousness, and outline how each of them may be seen as either graded, all-or-none, or both. We argue that such specifications are necessary to lead to a detailed and integrated understanding of how consciousness should be conceived of as graded and all-or-none. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness, unconsciousness and death in the context of slaughter. Part I. Neurobiological mechanisms underlying stunning and killing.

PubMed

Terlouw, Claudia; Bourguet, Cécile; Deiss, Véronique

2016-08-01

This review describes the neurobiological mechanisms that are relevant for the stunning and killing process of animals in the abattoir. The mechanisms underlying the loss of consciousness depend on the technique used: mechanical, electrical or gas stunning. Direct exsanguination (without prior stun) causes also a loss of consciousness before inducing death. The underlying mechanisms may involve cerebral anoxia or ischemia, or the depolarisation, acidification and/or the destruction of brain neurons. These effects may be caused by shock waves, electrical fields, the reduction or arrest of the cerebral blood circulation, increased levels of CO2 or low levels of O2 in the inhaled air, or the mechanical destruction of neurons. The targeted brain structures are the reticular formation, the ascending reticular activating system or thalamus, or the cerebral hemispheres in a general manner. Some of the techniques, when properly used, induce an immediate loss of consciousness; other techniques a progressive loss of consciousness. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Bottom-Up and Top-Down Mechanisms of General Anesthetics Modulate Different Dimensions of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Mashour, George A.; Hudetz, Anthony G.

2017-01-01

There has been controversy regarding the precise mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, with two salient approaches that have emerged within systems neuroscience. One prominent approach is the “bottom up” paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating sleep-wake nuclei and neural circuits in the brainstem and diencephalon that have evolved to control arousal states. Another approach is the “top-down” paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating the cortical and thalamocortical circuits involved in the integration of neural information. In this article, we synthesize these approaches by mapping bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of general anesthetics to two distinct but inter-related dimensions of consciousness: level and content. We show how this explains certain empirical observations regarding the diversity of anesthetic drug effects. We conclude with a more nuanced discussion of how levels and contents of consciousness interact to generate subjective experience and what this implies for the mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. PMID:28676745

Socialization and Selection Effects in the Association between Weight Conscious Peer Groups and Thin-Ideal Internalization: A Co-Twin Control Study

PubMed Central

Burt, S. Alexandra; O’Connor, Shannon; Thompson, J. Kevin; Klump, Kelly L.

2016-01-01

Affiliation with weight conscious peer groups is theorized to increase thin-ideal internalization through socialization processes. However, selection effects could contribute if genetic and/or environmental predispositions lead to affiliation with weight conscious peers. Co-twin control methodology was used to examine socialization and selection effects in 614 female twins (ages 8–15) from the Michigan State University Twin Registry (MSUTR). Thin-ideal internalization and peer group characteristics were assessed via self-report questionnaires. Results suggested the presence of both socialization and selection effects. In terms of socialization, twins who reported increased exposure to weight conscious peers relative to their co-twins had elevated thin-ideal internalization scores, regardless of zygosity. However, associations between weight conscious peers and thin-ideal internationalization within twin pairs were attenuated, suggesting that genetic and shared environmental selection effects also contribute. Findings significantly extend previous work by confirming the presence of socialization processes and highlighting selection processes to be examined in future longitudinal research. PMID:26859605

Human Development IX: A Model of the Wholeness of Man, His Consciousness, and Collective Consciousness

PubMed Central

Ventegodt, Søren; Hermansen, Tyge Dahl; Flensborg-Madsen, Trine; Rald, Erik; Nielsen, Maj Lyck; Merrick, Joav

2006-01-01

In this paper we look at the rational and the emotional interpretation of reality in the human brain and being, and discuss the representation of the brain-mind (ego), the body-mind (Id), and the outer world in the human wholeness (the I or “soul”). Based on this we discuss a number of factors including the coherence between perception, attention and consciousness, and the relation between thought, fantasies, visions and dreams. We discuss and explain concepts as intent, will, morals and ethics. The Jungian concept of the human collective conscious and unconscious is also analyzed. We also hypothesis on the nature of intuition and consider the source of religious experience of man. These phenomena are explained based on the concept of deep quantum chemistry and infinite dancing fractal spirals making up the energetic backbone of the world. In this paper we consider man as a real wholeness and debate the concepts of subjectivity, consciousness and intent that can be deduced from such a perspective. PMID:17115085

Complete unconscious control: Using (in)action primes to demonstrate completely unconscious activation of inhibitory control mechanisms

PubMed Central

Hepler, Justin; Albarracin, Dolores

2018-01-01

Although robust evidence indicates that action initiation can occur unconsciously and unintentionally, the literature on action inhibition suggests that inhibition requires both conscious thought and intentionality. In prior research demonstrating automatic inhibition in response to unconsciously processed stimuli, the unconscious stimuli had previously been consciously associated with an inhibitory response within the context of the experiment, and participants had consciously formed a goal to activate inhibition processes when presented with the stimuli (because task instructions required participants to engage in inhibition when the stimuli occurred). Therefore, prior work suggests that some amount of conscious thought and intentionality are required for inhibitory control. In the present research, we recorded event-related potentials during two go/no-go experiments in which participants were subliminally primed with general action/inaction concepts that had never been consciously associated with task-specific responses. We provide the first demonstration that inhibitory control processes can be modulated completely unconsciously and unintentionally. PMID:23747649