A frontal but not parietal neural correlate of auditory consciousness.

PubMed

Brancucci, Alfredo; Lugli, Victor; Perrucci, Mauro Gianni; Del Gratta, Cosimo; Tommasi, Luca

2016-01-01

Hemodynamic correlates of consciousness were investigated in humans during the presentation of a dichotic sequence inducing illusory auditory percepts with features analogous to visual multistability. The sequence consisted of a variation of the original stimulation eliciting the Deutsch's octave illusion, created to maintain a stable illusory percept long enough to allow the detection of the underlying hemodynamic activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Two specular 500 ms dichotic stimuli (400 and 800 Hz) presented in alternation by means of earphones cause an illusory segregation of pitch and ear of origin which can yield up to four different auditory percepts per dichotic stimulus. Such percepts are maintained stable when one of the two dichotic stimuli is presented repeatedly for 6 s, immediately after the alternation. We observed hemodynamic activity specifically accompanying conscious experience of pitch in a bilateral network including the superior frontal gyrus (SFG, BA9 and BA10), medial frontal gyrus (BA6 and BA9), insula (BA13), and posterior lateral nucleus of the thalamus. Conscious experience of side (ear of origin) was instead specifically accompanied by bilateral activity in the MFG (BA6), STG (BA41), parahippocampal gyrus (BA28), and insula (BA13). These results suggest that the neural substrate of auditory consciousness, differently from that of visual consciousness, may rest upon a fronto-temporal rather than upon a fronto-parietal network. Moreover, they indicate that the neural correlates of consciousness depend on the specific features of the stimulus and suggest the SFG-MFG and the insula as important cortical nodes for auditory conscious experience.

Closing in on the constitution of consciousness

PubMed Central

Miller, Steven M.

2014-01-01

The science of consciousness is a nascent and thriving field of research that is founded on identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness. However, I have argued that it is the neural constitution of consciousness that science seeks to understand and that there are no evident strategies for distinguishing the correlates and constitution of (phenomenal) consciousness. Here I review this correlation/constitution distinction problem and challenge the existing foundations of consciousness science. I present the main analyses from a longer paper in press on this issue, focusing on recording, inhibition, stimulation, and combined inhibition/stimulation strategies, including proposal of the Jenga analogy to illustrate why identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness should not be considered the ultimate target of consciousness science. Thereafter I suggest that while combined inhibition and stimulation strategies might identify some constitutive neural activities—indeed minimally sufficient constitutive neural activities—such strategies fail to identify the whole neural constitution of consciousness and thus the correlation/constitution distinction problem is not fully solved. Various clarifications, potential objections and related scientific and philosophical issues are also discussed and I conclude by proposing new foundational claims for consciousness science. PMID:25452738

Neural correlates of consciousness: a definition of the dorsal and ventral streams and their relation to phenomenology.

PubMed

Vakalopoulos, Costa

2005-01-01

The paper presents a hypothesis for a neural correlate of consciousness. A proposal is made that both the dorsal and ventral streams must be concurrently active to generate conscious awareness and that V1 (striate cortex) provides a serial link between them. An argument is presented against a true extrastriate communication between the dorsal and ventral streams. Secondly, a detailed theory is developed for the structure of the visual hierarchy. Premotor theory states that each organism-object interaction can be described by the two quantitative measures of torque and change in joint position served by the basal ganglia and cerebellum, respectively. This leads to a component theory of motor efference copy providing a fundamental tool for categorizing dorsal and ventral stream networks. The rationale for this is that the dorsal stream specifies spatial coordinates of the external world, which can be coded by the reafference of changes in joint position. The ventral stream is concerned with object recognition and is coded for by forces exerted on the world during a developmental exploratory phase of the organism. The proposed pathways for a component motor efference copy from both the cerebellum and basal ganglia converge on the thalamus and modulate thalamocortical projections via the thalamic reticular nucleus. The origin of the corticopontine projections, which are a massive pathway for cortical information to reach the cerebellum, coincides with the area typically considered as part of the dorsal stream, whereas the entire cortex projects to the striatum. This adds empirical support for a new conceptualization of the visual streams. The model also presents a solution to the binding problem of a neural correlate of consciousness, that is, how a distributed neural network synchronizes its activity during a cognitive event. It represents a reinterpretation of the current status of the visual hierarchy.

"Paradox of slow frequencies" - Are slow frequencies in upper cortical layers a neural predisposition of the level/state of consciousness (NPC)?

PubMed

Northoff, Georg

2017-09-01

Consciousness research has much focused on faster frequencies like alpha or gamma while neglecting the slower ones in the infraslow (0.001-0.1Hz) and slow (0.1-1Hz) frequency range. These slower frequency ranges have a "bad reputation" though; their increase in power can observed during the loss of consciousness as in sleep, anesthesia, and vegetative state. However, at the same time, slower frequencies have been conceived instrumental for consciousness. The present paper aims to resolve this paradox which I describe as "paradox of slow frequencies". I first show various data that suggest a central role of slower frequencies in integrating faster ones, i.e., "temporo-spatial integration and nestedness". Such "temporo-spatial integration and nestedness" is disrupted during the loss of consciousness as in anesthesia and sleep leading to "temporo-spatial fragmentation and isolation" between slow and fast frequencies. Slow frequencies are supposedly mediated by neural activity in upper cortical layers in higher-order associative regions as distinguished from lower cortical layers that are related to faster frequencies. Taken together, slower and faster frequencies take on different roles for the level/state of consciousness. Faster frequencies by themselves are sufficient and thus a neural correlate of consciousness (NCC) while slower frequencies are a necessary non-sufficient condition of possible consciousness, e.g., a neural predisposition of the level/state of consciousness (NPC). This resolves the "paradox of slow frequencies" in that it assigns different roles to slower and faster frequencies in consciousness, i.e., NCC and NPC. Taken as NCC and NPC, fast and slow frequencies including their relation as in "temporo-spatial integration and nestedness" can be considered a first "building bloc" of a future "temporo-spatial theory of consciousness" (TTC) (Northoff, 2013; Northoff, 2014b; Northoff & Huang, 2017). Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keeping time: could quantum beating in microtubules be the basis for the neural synchrony related to consciousness?

PubMed

Craddock, Travis J A; Priel, Avner; Tuszynski, Jack A

2014-06-01

This paper discusses the possibility of quantum coherent oscillations playing a role in neuronal signaling. Consciousness correlates strongly with coherent neural oscillations, however the mechanisms by which neurons synchronize are not fully elucidated. Recent experimental evidence of quantum beats in light-harvesting complexes of plants (LHCII) and bacteria provided a stimulus for seeking similar effects in important structures found in animal cells, especially in neurons. We argue that microtubules (MTs), which play critical roles in all eukaryotic cells, possess structural and functional characteristics that are consistent with quantum coherent excitations in the aromatic groups of their tryptophan residues. Furthermore we outline the consequences of these findings on neuronal processes including the emergence of consciousness.

Neural representation of consciously imperceptible speech sound differences.

PubMed

Allen, J; Kraus, N; Bradlow, A

2000-10-01

The concept of subliminal perception has been a subject of interest and controversy for decades. Of interest in the present investigation was whether a neurophysiologic index of stimulus change could be elicited to speech sound contrasts that were consciously indiscriminable. The stimuli were chosen on the basis of each individual subject's discrimination threshold. The speech stimuli (which varied along an F3 onset frequency continuum from /da/ to /ga/) were synthesized so that the acoustical properties of the stimuli could be tightly controlled. Subthreshold and suprathreshold stimuli were chosen on the basis of behavioral ability demonstrated during psychophysical testing. A significant neural representation of stimulus change, reflected by the mismatch negativity response, was obtained in all but 1 subject in response to subthreshold stimuli. Grand average responses differed significantly from responses obtained in a control condition consisting of physiologic responses elicited by physically identical stimuli. Furthermore, responses to suprathreshold stimuli (close to threshold) did not differ significantly from subthreshold responses with respect to latency, amplitude, or area. These results suggest that neural representation of consciously imperceptible stimulus differences occurs and that this representation occurs at a preattentive level.

The olfactory system as the gateway to the neural correlates of consciousness

PubMed Central

Merrick, Christina; Godwin, Christine A.; Geisler, Mark W.; Morsella, Ezequiel

2014-01-01

How consciousness is generated by the nervous system remains one of the greatest mysteries in science. Investigators from diverse fields have begun to unravel this puzzle by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes. In this way, it has been revealed that the two kinds of processes differ in terms of the underlying neural events and associated cognitive mechanisms. We propose that, for several reasons, the olfactory system provides a unique portal through which to examine this contrast. For this purpose, the olfactory system is beneficial in terms of its (a) neuroanatomical aspects, (b) phenomenological and cognitive/mechanistic properties, and (c) neurodynamic (e.g., brain oscillations) properties. In this review, we discuss how each of these properties and aspects of the olfactory system can illuminate the contrast between conscious and unconscious processing in the brain. We conclude by delineating the most fruitful avenues of research and by entertaining hypotheses that, in order for an olfactory content to be conscious, that content must participate in a network that is large-scale, both in terms of the neural systems involved and the scope of information integration. PMID:24454300

Probing consciousness with event-related potentials in the vegetative state

PubMed Central

Faugeras, F.; Rohaut, B.; Weiss, N.; Bekinschtein, T.A.; Galanaud, D.; Puybasset, L.; Bolgert, F.; Sergent, C.; Cohen, L.; Dehaene, S.

2011-01-01

Objective: Probing consciousness in noncommunicating patients is a major medical and neuroscientific challenge. While standardized and expert behavioral assessment of patients constitutes a mandatory step, this clinical evaluation stage is often difficult and doubtful, and calls for complementary measures which may overcome its inherent limitations. Several functional brain imaging methods are currently being developed within this perspective, including fMRI and cognitive event-related potentials (ERPs). We recently designed an original rule extraction ERP test that is positive only in subjects who are conscious of the long-term regularity of auditory stimuli. Methods: In the present work, we report the results of this test in a population of 22 patients who met clinical criteria for vegetative state. Results: We identified 2 patients showing this neural signature of consciousness. Interestingly, these 2 patients showed unequivocal clinical signs of consciousness within the 3 to 4 days following ERP recording. Conclusions: Taken together, these results strengthen the relevance of bedside neurophysiological tools to improve diagnosis of consciousness in noncommunicating patients. PMID:21593438

An invisible touch: Body-related multisensory conflicts modulate visual consciousness.

PubMed

Salomon, Roy; Galli, Giulia; Łukowska, Marta; Faivre, Nathan; Ruiz, Javier Bello; Blanke, Olaf

2016-07-29

The majority of scientific studies on consciousness have focused on vision, exploring the cognitive and neural mechanisms of conscious access to visual stimuli. In parallel, studies on bodily consciousness have revealed that bodily (i.e. tactile, proprioceptive, visceral, vestibular) signals are the basis for the sense of self. However, the role of bodily signals in the formation of visual consciousness is not well understood. Here we investigated how body-related visuo-tactile stimulation modulates conscious access to visual stimuli. We used a robotic platform to apply controlled tactile stimulation to the participants' back while they viewed a dot moving either in synchrony or asynchrony with the touch on their back. Critically, the dot was rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression. Manipulating the visual context by presenting the dot moving on either a body form, or a non-bodily object we show that: (i) conflict induced by synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation in a body context is associated with a delayed conscious access compared to asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, (ii) this effect occurs only in the context of a visual body form, and (iii) is not due to detection or response biases. The results indicate that body-related visuo-tactile conflicts impact visual consciousness by facilitating access of non-conflicting visual information to awareness, and that these are sensitive to the visual context in which they are presented, highlighting the interplay between bodily signals and visual experience. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hippocampal neural assemblies and conscious remembering.

PubMed

Shirvalkar, Prasad R

2009-05-01

The hippocampal formation is needed to encode episodic memories, which may be consciously recalled at some future time. This review examines recent advances in understanding recollection in the context of spatiotemporally organized relational memory coding and discusses predictions and challenges for future research on conscious remembering.

The neural monitoring of visceral inputs, rather than attention, accounts for first-person perspective in conscious vision.

PubMed

Tallon-Baudry, Catherine; Campana, Florence; Park, Hyeong-Dong; Babo-Rebelo, Mariana

2018-05-01

Why should a scientist whose aim is to unravel the neural mechanisms of perception consider brain-body interactions seriously? Brain-body interactions have traditionally been associated with emotion, effort, or stress, but not with the "cold" processes of perception and attention. Here, we review recent experimental evidence suggesting a different picture: the neural monitoring of bodily state, and in particular the neural monitoring of the heart, affects visual perception. The impact of spontaneous fluctuations of neural responses to heartbeats on visual detection is as large as the impact of explicit manipulations of spatial attention in perceptual tasks. However, we propose that the neural monitoring of visceral inputs plays a specific role in conscious perception, distinct from the role of attention. The neural monitoring of organs such as the heart or the gut would generate a subject-centered reference frame, from which the first-person perspective inherent to conscious perception can develop. In this view, conscious perception results from the integration of visual content with first-person perspective. Copyright © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Emotional consciousness: a neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience.

PubMed

Thagard, Paul; Aubie, Brandon

2008-09-01

This paper proposes a theory of how conscious emotional experience is produced by the brain as the result of many interacting brain areas coordinated in working memory. These brain areas integrate perceptions of bodily states of an organism with cognitive appraisals of its current situation. Emotions are neural processes that represent the overall cognitive and somatic state of the organism. Conscious experience arises when neural representations achieve high activation as part of working memory. This theory explains numerous phenomena concerning emotional consciousness, including differentiation, integration, intensity, valence, and change.

Consciousness, information integration, and the brain.

PubMed

Tononi, Giulio

2005-01-01

Clinical observations have established that certain parts of the brain are essential for consciousness whereas other parts are not. For example, different areas of the cerebral cortex contribute different modalities and submodalities of consciousness, whereas the cerebellum does not, despite having even more neurons. It is also well established that consciousness depends on the way the brain functions. For example, consciousness is much reduced during slow wave sleep and generalized seizures, even though the levels of neural activity are comparable or higher than in wakefulness. To understand why this is so, empirical observations on the neural correlates of consciousness need to be complemented by a principled theoretical approach. Otherwise, it is unlikely that we could ever establish to what extent consciousness is present in neurological conditions such as akinetic mutism, psychomotor seizures, or sleepwalking, and to what extent it is present in newborn babies and animals. A principled approach is provided by the information integration theory of consciousness. This theory claims that consciousness corresponds to a system's capacity to integrate information, and proposes a way to measure such capacity. The information integration theory can account for several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness, including: (i) the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; (ii) the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; (iii) the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures; and (iv) the time requirements on neural interactions that support consciousness.

Dissociation between the neural correlates of conscious face perception and visual attention.

PubMed

Navajas, Joaquin; Nitka, Aleksander W; Quian Quiroga, Rodrigo

2017-08-01

Given the higher chance to recognize attended compared to unattended stimuli, the specific neural correlates of these two processes, attention and awareness, tend to be intermingled in experimental designs. In this study, we dissociated the neural correlates of conscious face perception from the effects of visual attention. To do this, we presented faces at the threshold of awareness and manipulated attention through the use of exogenous prestimulus cues. We show that the N170 component, a scalp EEG marker of face perception, was modulated independently by attention and by awareness. An earlier P1 component was not modulated by either of the two effects and a later P3 component was indicative of awareness but not of attention. These claims are supported by converging evidence from (a) modulations observed in the average evoked potentials, (b) correlations between neural and behavioral data at the single-subject level, and (c) single-trial analyses. Overall, our results show a clear dissociation between the neural substrates of attention and awareness. Based on these results, we argue that conscious face perception is triggered by a boost in face-selective cortical ensembles that can be modulated by, but are still independent from, visual attention. © 2017 Society for Psychophysiological Research.

Neural correlates of consciousness: what we know and what we have to learn!

PubMed

Calabrò, Rocco Salvatore; Cacciola, Alberto; Bramanti, Placido; Milardi, Demetrio

2015-04-01

Consciousness is a multifaceted concept with two major components: awareness of environment and of self (i.e., the content of consciousness) and wakefulness (i.e., the level of consciousness). Medically speaking, consciousness is the state of the patient's awareness of self and environment and his responsiveness to external stimulation and inner need. A basic understanding of consciousness and its neural correlates is of major importance for all clinicians, especially those involved with patients suffering from altered states of consciousness. To this end, in this review it is shown that consciousness is dependent on the brainstem and thalamus for arousal; that basic cognition is supported by recurrent electrical activity between the cortex and the thalamus at gamma band frequencies; and that some kind of working memory must, at least fleetingly, be present for awareness to occur. New advances in neuroimaging studies are also presented in order to better understand and demonstrate the neurophysiological basis of consciousness. In particular, recent functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have offered the possibility to measure directly and non-invasively normal and severely brain damaged subjects' brain activity, whilst diffusion tensor imaging studies have allowed evaluating white matter integrity in normal subjects and patients with disorder of consciousness.

Neural correlates of consciousness in patients who have emerged from a minimally conscious state: a cross-sectional multimodal imaging study.

PubMed

Di Perri, Carol; Bahri, Mohamed Ali; Amico, Enrico; Thibaut, Aurore; Heine, Lizette; Antonopoulos, Georgios; Charland-Verville, Vanessa; Wannez, Sarah; Gomez, Francisco; Hustinx, Roland; Tshibanda, Luaba; Demertzi, Athena; Soddu, Andrea; Laureys, Steven

2016-07-01

Between pathologically impaired consciousness and normal consciousness exists a scarcely researched transition zone, referred to as emergence from minimally conscious state, in which patients regain the capacity for functional communication, object use, or both. We investigated neural correlates of consciousness in these patients compared with patients with disorders of consciousness and healthy controls, by multimodal imaging. In this cross-sectional, multimodal imaging study, patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, patients in a minimally conscious state, and patients who had emerged from a minimally conscious state, diagnosed with the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised, were recruited from the neurology department of the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire de Liège, Belgium. Key exclusion criteria were neuroimaging examination in an acute state, sedation or anaesthesia during scanning, large focal brain damage, motion parameters of more than 3 mm in translation and 3° in rotation, and suboptimal segmentation and normalisation. We acquired resting state functional and structural MRI data and (18)F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) PET data; we used seed-based functional MRI (fMRI) analysis to investigate positive default mode network connectivity (within-network correlations) and negative default mode network connectivity (between-network anticorrelations). We correlated FDG-PET brain metabolism with fMRI connectivity. We used voxel-based morphometry to test the effect of anatomical deformations on functional connectivity. We recruited a convenience sample of 58 patients (21 [36%] with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, 24 [41%] in a minimally conscious state, and 13 [22%] who had emerged from a minimally conscious state) and 35 healthy controls between Oct 1, 2009, and Oct 31, 2014. We detected consciousness-level-dependent increases (from unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, minimally conscious state, emergence from minimally conscious state, to healthy controls) for

Lateral Information Processing by Spiking Neurons: A Theoretical Model of the Neural Correlate of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Ebner, Marc; Hameroff, Stuart

2011-01-01

Cognitive brain functions, for example, sensory perception, motor control and learning, are understood as computation by axonal-dendritic chemical synapses in networks of integrate-and-fire neurons. Cognitive brain functions may occur either consciously or nonconsciously (on “autopilot”). Conscious cognition is marked by gamma synchrony EEG, mediated largely by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions, sideways connections in input/integration layers. Gap-junction-connected neurons define a sub-network within a larger neural network. A theoretical model (the “conscious pilot”) suggests that as gap junctions open and close, a gamma-synchronized subnetwork, or zone moves through the brain as an executive agent, converting nonconscious “auto-pilot” cognition to consciousness, and enhancing computation by coherent processing and collective integration. In this study we implemented sideways “gap junctions” in a single-layer artificial neural network to perform figure/ground separation. The set of neurons connected through gap junctions form a reconfigurable resistive grid or sub-network zone. In the model, outgoing spikes are temporally integrated and spatially averaged using the fixed resistive grid set up by neurons of similar function which are connected through gap-junctions. This spatial average, essentially a feedback signal from the neuron's output, determines whether particular gap junctions between neurons will open or close. Neurons connected through open gap junctions synchronize their output spikes. We have tested our gap-junction-defined sub-network in a one-layer neural network on artificial retinal inputs using real-world images. Our system is able to perform figure/ground separation where the laterally connected sub-network of neurons represents a perceived object. Even though we only show results for visual stimuli, our approach should generalize to other modalities. The system demonstrates a moving sub-network zone of synchrony, within which

Lateral information processing by spiking neurons: a theoretical model of the neural correlate of consciousness.

PubMed

Ebner, Marc; Hameroff, Stuart

2011-01-01

Cognitive brain functions, for example, sensory perception, motor control and learning, are understood as computation by axonal-dendritic chemical synapses in networks of integrate-and-fire neurons. Cognitive brain functions may occur either consciously or nonconsciously (on "autopilot"). Conscious cognition is marked by gamma synchrony EEG, mediated largely by dendritic-dendritic gap junctions, sideways connections in input/integration layers. Gap-junction-connected neurons define a sub-network within a larger neural network. A theoretical model (the "conscious pilot") suggests that as gap junctions open and close, a gamma-synchronized subnetwork, or zone moves through the brain as an executive agent, converting nonconscious "auto-pilot" cognition to consciousness, and enhancing computation by coherent processing and collective integration. In this study we implemented sideways "gap junctions" in a single-layer artificial neural network to perform figure/ground separation. The set of neurons connected through gap junctions form a reconfigurable resistive grid or sub-network zone. In the model, outgoing spikes are temporally integrated and spatially averaged using the fixed resistive grid set up by neurons of similar function which are connected through gap-junctions. This spatial average, essentially a feedback signal from the neuron's output, determines whether particular gap junctions between neurons will open or close. Neurons connected through open gap junctions synchronize their output spikes. We have tested our gap-junction-defined sub-network in a one-layer neural network on artificial retinal inputs using real-world images. Our system is able to perform figure/ground separation where the laterally connected sub-network of neurons represents a perceived object. Even though we only show results for visual stimuli, our approach should generalize to other modalities. The system demonstrates a moving sub-network zone of synchrony, within which the contents of

Neural signatures of conscious and unconscious emotional face processing in human infants.

PubMed

Jessen, Sarah; Grossmann, Tobias

2015-03-01

Human adults can process emotional information both with and without conscious awareness, and it has been suggested that the two processes rely on partly distinct brain mechanisms. However, the developmental origins of these brain processes are unknown. In the present event-related brain potential (ERP) study, we examined the brain responses of 7-month-old infants in response to subliminally (50 and 100 msec) and supraliminally (500 msec) presented happy and fearful facial expressions. Our results revealed that infants' brain responses (Pb and Nc) over central electrodes distinguished between emotions irrespective of stimulus duration, whereas the discrimination between emotions at occipital electrodes (N290 and P400) only occurred when faces were presented supraliminally (above threshold). This suggests that early in development the human brain not only discriminates between happy and fearful facial expressions irrespective of conscious perception, but also that, similar to adults, supraliminal and subliminal emotion processing relies on distinct neural processes. Our data further suggest that the processing of emotional facial expressions differs across infants depending on their behaviorally shown perceptual sensitivity. The current ERP findings suggest that distinct brain processes underpinning conscious and unconscious emotion perception emerge early in ontogeny and can therefore be seen as a key feature of human social functioning. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

It is time to combine the two main traditions in the research on the neural correlates of consciousness: C = L × D

PubMed Central

Bachmann, Talis; Hudetz, Anthony G.

2014-01-01

Research on neural correlates of consciousness has been conducted and carried out mostly from within two relatively autonomous paradigmatic traditions – studying the specific contents of conscious experience and their brain-process correlates and studying the level of consciousness. In the present paper we offer a theoretical integration suggesting that an emphasis has to be put on understanding the mechanisms of consciousness (and not a mere correlates) and in doing this, the two paradigmatic traditions must be combined. We argue that consciousness emerges as a result of interaction of brain mechanisms specialized for representing the specific contents of perception/cognition – the data – and mechanisms specialized for regulating the level of activity of whatever data the content-carrying specific mechanisms happen to represent. Each of these mechanisms are necessary because without the contents there is no conscious experience and without the required level of activity the processed contents remain unconscious. Together the two mechanisms, when activated up to a necessary degree each, provide conditions sufficient for conscious experience to emerge. This proposal is related to pertinent experimental evidence. PMID:25202297

Dissociative States and Neural Complexity

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bob, Petr; Svetlak, Miroslav

2011-01-01

Recent findings indicate that neural mechanisms of consciousness are related to integration of distributed neural assemblies. This neural integration is particularly vulnerable to past stressful experiences that can lead to disintegration and dissociation of consciousness. These findings suggest that dissociation could be described as a level of…

Electrophysiological evidence for phenomenal consciousness.

PubMed

Revonsuo, Antti; Koivisto, Mika

2010-09-01

Abstract Recent evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) lends support to two central theses in Lamme's theory. The earliest ERP correlate of visual consciousness appears over posterior visual cortex around 100-200 ms after stimulus onset. Its scalp topography and time window are consistent with recurrent processing in the visual cortex. This electrophysiological correlate of visual consciousness is mostly independent of later ERPs reflecting selective attention and working memory functions. Overall, the ERP evidence supports the view that phenomenal consciousness of a visual stimulus emerges earlier than access consciousness, and that attention and awareness are served by distinct neural processes.

Oscillatory Correlates of Visual Consciousness

PubMed Central

Gallotto, Stefano; Sack, Alexander T.; Schuhmann, Teresa; de Graaf, Tom A.

2017-01-01

Conscious experiences are linked to activity in our brain: the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Empirical research on these NCCs covers a wide range of brain activity signals, measures, and methodologies. In this paper, we focus on spontaneous brain oscillations; rhythmic fluctuations of neuronal (population) activity which can be characterized by a range of parameters, such as frequency, amplitude (power), and phase. We provide an overview of oscillatory measures that appear to correlate with conscious perception. We also discuss how increasingly sophisticated techniques allow us to study the causal role of oscillatory activity in conscious perception (i.e., ‘entrainment’). This review of oscillatory correlates of consciousness suggests that, for example, activity in the alpha-band (7–13 Hz) may index, or even causally support, conscious perception. But such results also showcase an increasingly acknowledged difficulty in NCC research; the challenge of separating neural activity necessary for conscious experience to arise (prerequisites) from neural activity underlying the conscious experience itself (substrates) or its results (consequences). PMID:28736543

Conscious Action/Zombie Action

PubMed Central

Shepherd, Joshua

2015-01-01

Abstract I argue that the neural realizers of experiences of trying (that is, experiences of directing effort towards the satisfaction of an intention) are not distinct from the neural realizers of actual trying (that is, actual effort directed towards the satisfaction of an intention). I then ask how experiences of trying might relate to the perceptual experiences one has while acting. First, I assess recent zombie action arguments regarding conscious visual experience, and I argue that contrary to what some have claimed, conscious visual experience plays a causal role for action control in some circumstances. Second, I propose a multimodal account of the experience of acting. According to this account, the experience of acting is (at the very least) a temporally extended, co‐conscious collection of agentive and perceptual experiences, functionally integrated and structured both by multimodal perceptual processing as well as by what an agent is, at the time, trying to do. PMID:27667859

Bioinorganic Life and Neural Activity: Toward a Chemistry of Consciousness?

PubMed

Chang, Christopher J

2017-03-21

Identifying what elements are required for neural activity as potential path toward consciousness, which represents life with the state or quality of awareness, is a "Holy Grail" of chemistry. As life itself arises from coordinated interactions between elements across the periodic table, the majority of which are metals, new approaches for analysis, binding, and control of these primary chemical entities can help enrich our understanding of inorganic chemistry in living systems in a context that is both universal and personal.

From sensation to perception: Using multivariate classification of visual illusions to identify neural correlates of conscious awareness in space and time.

PubMed

Hogendoorn, Hinze

2015-01-01

An important goal of cognitive neuroscience is understanding the neural underpinnings of conscious awareness. Although the low-level processing of sensory input is well understood in most modalities, it remains a challenge to understand how the brain translates such input into conscious awareness. Here, I argue that the application of multivariate pattern classification techniques to neuroimaging data acquired while observers experience perceptual illusions provides a unique way to dissociate sensory mechanisms from mechanisms underlying conscious awareness. Using this approach, it is possible to directly compare patterns of neural activity that correspond to the contents of awareness, independent from changes in sensory input, and to track these neural representations over time at high temporal resolution. I highlight five recent studies using this approach, and provide practical considerations and limitations for future implementations.

Neural Mechanisms Underlying Conscious and Unconscious Gaze-Triggered Attentional Orienting in Autism Spectrum Disorder

PubMed Central

Sato, Wataru; Kochiyama, Takanori; Uono, Shota; Yoshimura, Sayaka; Toichi, Motomi

2017-01-01

Impaired joint attention represents the core clinical feature of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Behavioral studies have suggested that gaze-triggered attentional orienting is intact in response to supraliminally presented eyes but impaired in response to subliminally presented eyes in individuals with ASD. However, the neural mechanisms underlying conscious and unconscious gaze-triggered attentional orienting remain unclear. We investigated this issue in ASD and typically developing (TD) individuals using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. The participants viewed cue stimuli of averted or straight eye gaze direction presented either supraliminally or subliminally and then localized a target. Reaction times were shorter when eye-gaze cues were directionally valid compared with when they were neutral under the supraliminal condition in both groups; the same pattern was found in the TD group but not the ASD group under the subliminal condition. The temporo–parieto–frontal regions showed stronger activation in response to averted eyes than to straight eyes in both groups under the supraliminal condition. The left amygdala was more activated while viewing averted vs. straight eyes in the TD group than in the ASD group under the subliminal condition. These findings provide an explanation for the neural mechanisms underlying the impairment in unconscious but not conscious gaze-triggered attentional orienting in individuals with ASD and suggest possible neurological and behavioral interventions to facilitate their joint attention behaviors. PMID:28701942

Consciousness, Plasticity, and Connectomics: The Role of Intersubjectivity in Human Cognition

PubMed Central

Allen, Micah; Williams, Gary

2011-01-01

Consciousness is typically construed as being explainable purely in terms of either private, raw feels or higher-order, reflective representations. In contrast to this false dichotomy, we propose a new view of consciousness as an interactive, plastic phenomenon open to sociocultural influence. We take up our account of consciousness from the observation of radical cortical neuroplasticity in human development. Accordingly, we draw upon recent research on macroscopic neural networks, including the “default mode,” to illustrate cases in which an individual's particular “connectome” is shaped by encultured social practices that depend upon and influence phenomenal and reflective consciousness. On our account, the dynamically interacting connectivity of these networks bring about important individual differences in conscious experience and determine what is “present” in consciousness. Further, we argue that the organization of the brain into discrete anti-correlated networks supports the phenomenological distinction of prereflective and reflective consciousness, but we emphasize that this finding must be interpreted in light of the dynamic, category-resistant nature of consciousness. Our account motivates philosophical and empirical hypotheses regarding the appropriate time-scale and function of neuroplastic adaptation, the relation of high and low-frequency neural activity to consciousness and cognitive plasticity, and the role of ritual social practices in neural development and cognitive function. PMID:21687435

Neural signature of the conscious processing of auditory regularities

PubMed Central

Bekinschtein, Tristan A.; Dehaene, Stanislas; Rohaut, Benjamin; Tadel, François; Cohen, Laurent; Naccache, Lionel

2009-01-01

Can conscious processing be inferred from neurophysiological measurements? Some models stipulate that the active maintenance of perceptual representations across time requires consciousness. Capitalizing on this assumption, we designed an auditory paradigm that evaluates cerebral responses to violations of temporal regularities that are either local in time or global across several seconds. Local violations led to an early response in auditory cortex, independent of attention or the presence of a concurrent visual task, whereas global violations led to a late and spatially distributed response that was only present when subjects were attentive and aware of the violations. We could detect the global effect in individual subjects using functional MRI and both scalp and intracerebral event-related potentials. Recordings from 8 noncommunicating patients with disorders of consciousness confirmed that only conscious individuals presented a global effect. Taken together these observations suggest that the presence of the global effect is a signature of conscious processing, although it can be absent in conscious subjects who are not aware of the global auditory regularities. This simple electrophysiological marker could thus serve as a useful clinical tool. PMID:19164526

A chronometric functional sub-network in the thalamo-cortical system regulates the flow of neural information necessary for conscious cognitive processes.

PubMed

León-Domínguez, Umberto; Vela-Bueno, Antonio; Froufé-Torres, Manuel; León-Carrión, Jose

2013-06-01

The thalamo-cortical system has been defined as a neural network associated with consciousness. While there seems to be wide agreement that the thalamo-cortical system directly intervenes in vigilance and arousal, a divergence of opinion persists regarding its intervention in the control of other cognitive processes necessary for consciousness. In the present manuscript, we provide a review of recent scientific findings on the thalamo-cortical system and its role in the control and regulation of the flow of neural information necessary for conscious cognitive processes. We suggest that the axis formed by the medial prefrontal cortex and different thalamic nuclei (reticular nucleus, intralaminar nucleus, and midline nucleus), represents a core component for consciousness. This axis regulates different cerebral structures which allow basic cognitive processes like attention, arousal and memory to emerge. In order to produce a synchronized coherent response, neural communication between cerebral structures must have exact timing (chronometry). Thus, a chronometric functional sub-network within the thalamo-cortical system keeps us in an optimal and continuous functional state, allowing high-order cognitive processes, essential to awareness and qualia, to take place. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The neural basis of attaining conscious awareness of sad mood.

PubMed

Smith, Ryan; Braden, B Blair; Chen, Kewei; Ponce, Francisco A; Lane, Richard D; Baxter, Leslie C

2015-09-01

The neural processes associated with becoming aware of sad mood are not fully understood. We examined the dynamic process of becoming aware of sad mood and recovery from sad mood. Sixteen healthy subjects underwent fMRI while participating in a sadness induction task designed to allow for variable mood induction times. Individualized regressors linearly modeled the time periods during the attainment of self-reported sad and baseline "neutral" mood states, and the validity of the linearity assumption was further tested using independent component analysis. During sadness induction the dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal cortices, and anterior insula exhibited a linear increase in the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal until subjects became aware of a sad mood and then a subsequent linear decrease as subjects transitioned from sadness back to the non-sadness baseline condition. These findings extend understanding of the neural basis of conscious emotional experience.

A framework for investigating animal consciousness.

PubMed

Droege, Paula; Braithwaite, Victoria A

2015-01-01

An assessment of consciousness in nonverbal animals requires a framework for research that extends testing methods beyond subjective report. This chapter proposes a working definition of consciousness in terms of temporal representation that provides the critical link between internal phenomenology and external behavior and neural structure. Our claim is that consciousness represents the present moment as distinct from the past and the future in order to flexibly respond to stimuli. We discuss behavioral and neural evidence that indicates the capacity for both flexible response and temporal representation, and we illustrate these capacities in fish, a taxonomic group that challenges human intuitions about consciousness.

Why the Brain Knows More than We Do: Non-Conscious Representations and Their Role in the Construction of Conscious Experience

PubMed Central

Dresp-Langley, Birgitta

2011-01-01

Scientific studies have shown that non-conscious stimuli and representations influence information processing during conscious experience. In the light of such evidence, questions about potential functional links between non-conscious brain representations and conscious experience arise. This article discusses neural model capable of explaining how statistical learning mechanisms in dedicated resonant circuits could generate specific temporal activity traces of non-conscious representations in the brain. How reentrant signaling, top-down matching, and statistical coincidence of such activity traces may lead to the progressive consolidation of temporal patterns that constitute the neural signatures of conscious experience in networks extending across large distances beyond functionally specialized brain regions is then explained. PMID:24962683

Are neural correlates of visual consciousness retinotopic?

PubMed

ffytche, Dominic H; Pins, Delphine

2003-11-14

Some visual neurons code what we see, their defining characteristic being a response profile which mirrors conscious percepts rather than veridical sensory attributes. One issue yet to be resolved is whether, within a given cortical area, conscious visual perception relates to diffuse activity across the entire population of such cells or focal activity within the sub-population mapping the location of the perceived stimulus. Here we investigate the issue in the human brain with fMRI, using a threshold stimulation technique to dissociate perceptual from non-perceptual activity. Our results point to a retinotopic organisation of perceptual activity in early visual areas, with independent perceptual activations for different regions of visual space.

A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness

PubMed Central

LeDoux, Joseph E.; Brown, Richard

2017-01-01

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness. PMID:28202735

Phenomenal and access consciousness in olfaction.

PubMed

Stevenson, Richard J

2009-12-01

Contemporary literature on consciousness, with some exceptions, rarely considers the olfactory system. In this article the characteristics of olfactory consciousness, viewed from the standpoint of the phenomenal (P)/access (A) distinction, are examined relative to the major senses. The review details several qualitative differences in both olfactory P consciousness (shifts in the felt location, universal synesthesia-like and affect-rich experiences, and misperceptions) and A consciousness (recovery from habituation, capacity for conscious processing, access to semantic and episodic memory, learning, attention, and in the serial-unitary nature of olfactory percepts). The basis for these differences is argued to arise from the functions that the olfactory system performs and from the unique neural architecture needed to instantiate them. These data suggest, at a minimum, that P and A consciousness are uniquely configured in olfaction and an argument can be made that the P and A distinction may not hold for this sensory system.

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses

PubMed Central

2017-01-01

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the “mind-body problem”) has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness. PMID:29118218

Disentangling conscious from unconscious cognitive processing with event-related EEG potentials.

PubMed

Rohaut, B; Naccache, L

By looking for properties of consciousness, cognitive neuroscience studies have dramatically enlarged the scope of unconscious cognitive processing. This emerging knowledge inspired the development of new approaches allowing clinicians to probe and disentangle conscious from unconscious cognitive processes in non-communicating brain-injured patients both in terms of behaviour and brain activity. This information is extremely valuable in order to improve diagnosis and prognosis in such patients both at acute and chronic settings. Reciprocally, the growing observations coming from such patients suffering from disorders of consciousness provide valuable constraints to theoretical models of consciousness. In this review we chose to illustrate these recent developments by focusing on brain signals recorded with EEG at bedside in response to auditory stimuli. More precisely, we present the respective EEG markers of unconscious and conscious processing of two classes of auditory stimuli (sounds and words). We show that in both cases, conscious access to the corresponding representation (e.g.: auditory regularity and verbal semantic content) share a similar neural signature (P3b and P600/LPC) that can be distinguished from unconscious processing occurring during an earlier stage (MMN and N400). We propose a two-stage serial model of processing and discuss how unconscious and conscious signatures can be measured at bedside providing relevant informations for both diagnosis and prognosis of consciousness recovery. These two examples emphasize how fruitful can be the bidirectional approach exploring cognition in healthy subjects and in brain-damaged patients. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

[Anesthesia and Consciousness].

PubMed

Ogino, Yuichi; Kawamichi, Hiroaki; Saiot, Shigeru

2016-05-01

The mechanism of consciousness and loss of conciousness by general anesthetics are crucial issue for the anesthesiologists. Recent non-invasive brain-imaging technology brings about light to various our emotions and sensations in human brain; however, neural correlate of consciousness is not yet still elucidated. The concept "the seat of the consciousness (is in the subcortical nuclei)" is now completely denied, but instead the consciousness is based on the idea that connectivity and communications across cortical and thalamocortical networks. Anesthetics and sleep disrupt the networks that encompass complexity and integration. The compatibility between complexity and integration is the key feature of the consciousness, which is represented by complex, extensive, communicative and integrative electroencephalograph currents evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation, provoking a single unified conscious experience in us, humans.

General and specific consciousness: a first-order representationalist approach

PubMed Central

Mehta, Neil; Mashour, George A.

2013-01-01

It is widely acknowledged that a complete theory of consciousness should explain general consciousness (what makes a state conscious at all) and specific consciousness (what gives a conscious state its particular phenomenal quality). We defend first-order representationalism, which argues that consciousness consists of sensory representations directly available to the subject for action selection, belief formation, planning, etc. We provide a neuroscientific framework for this primarily philosophical theory, according to which neural correlates of general consciousness include prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and non-specific thalamic nuclei, while neural correlates of specific consciousness include sensory cortex and specific thalamic nuclei. We suggest that recent data support first-order representationalism over biological theory, higher-order representationalism, recurrent processing theory, information integration theory, and global workspace theory. PMID:23882231

Biology of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Edelman, Gerald M.; Gally, Joseph A.; Baars, Bernard J.

2010-01-01

The Dynamic Core and Global Workspace hypotheses were independently put forward to provide mechanistic and biologically plausible accounts of how brains generate conscious mental content. The Dynamic Core proposes that reentrant neural activity in the thalamocortical system gives rise to conscious experience. Global Workspace reconciles the limited capacity of momentary conscious content with the vast repertoire of long-term memory. In this paper we show the close relationship between the two hypotheses. This relationship allows for a strictly biological account of phenomenal experience and subjectivity that is consistent with mounting experimental evidence. We examine the constraints on causal analyses of consciousness and suggest that there is now sufficient evidence to consider the design and construction of a conscious artifact. PMID:21713129

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses.

PubMed

Storm, Johan F; Boly, Mélanie; Casali, Adenauer G; Massimini, Marcello; Olcese, Umberto; Pennartz, Cyriel M A; Wilke, Melanie

2017-11-08

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the "mind-body problem") has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness. Copyright © 2017 the authors 0270-6474/17/3710882-12$15.00/0.

Early visual responses predict conscious face perception within and between subjects during binocular rivalry

PubMed Central

Sandberg, Kristian; Bahrami, Bahador; Kanai, Ryota; Barnes, Gareth Robert; Overgaard, Morten; Rees, Geraint

2014-01-01

Previous studies indicate that conscious face perception may be related to neural activity in a large time window around 170-800ms after stimulus presentation, yet in the majority of these studies changes in conscious experience are confounded with changes in physical stimulation. Using multivariate classification on MEG data recorded when participants reported changes in conscious perception evoked by binocular rivalry between a face and a grating, we showed that only MEG signals in the 120-320ms time range, peaking at the M170 around 180ms and the P2m at around 260ms, reliably predicted conscious experience. Conscious perception could not only be decoded significantly better than chance from the sensors that showed the largest average difference, as previous studies suggest, but also from patterns of activity across groups of occipital sensors that individually were unable to predict perception better than chance. Additionally, source space analyses showed that sources in the early and late visual system predicted conscious perception more accurately than frontal and parietal sites, although conscious perception could also be decoded there. Finally, the patterns of neural activity associated with conscious face perception generalized from one participant to another around the times of maximum prediction accuracy. Our work thus demonstrates that the neural correlates of particular conscious contents (here, faces) are highly consistent in time and space within individuals and that these correlates are shared to some extent between individuals. PMID:23281780

Progression from Vegetative to Minimally Conscious State Is Associated with Changes in Brain Neural Response to Passive Tasks: A Longitudinal Single-Case Functional MRI Study.

PubMed

Tomaiuolo, Francesco; Cecchetti, Luca; Gibson, Raechelle M; Logi, Fiammetta; Owen, Adrian M; Malasoma, Franco; Cozza, Sabino; Pietrini, Pietro; Ricciardi, Emiliano

2016-07-01

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) may be adopted as a complementary tool for bedside observation in the disorders of consciousness (DOC). However, the diagnostic value of this technique is still debated because of the lack of accuracy in determining levels of consciousness within a single patient. Recently, Giacino and colleagues (2014) hypothesized that a longitudinal fMRI evaluation may provide a more informative assessment in the detection of residual awareness. The aim of this study was to measure the correspondence between clinically defined level of awareness and neural responses within a single DOC patient. We used a follow-up fMRI design in combination with a passive speech-processing task. Patient's consciousness was measured through time by using the Coma Recovery Scale. The patient progressed from a vegetative state (VS) to a minimally conscious state (MCS). Patient's task-related neural responses mirrored the clinical change from a VS to an MCS. Specifically, while in an MCS, but not a VS, the patient showed a selective recruitment of the left angular gyrus when he listened to a native speech narrative, as compared to the reverse presentation of the same stimulus. Furthermore, the patient showed an increased response in the language-related brain network and a greater deactivation in the default mode network following his progression to an MCS. Our findings indicate that longitudinal assessment of brain responses to passive stimuli can contribute to the definition of the clinical status in individual patients with DOC and represents an adequate counterpart of the bedside assessment during the diagnostic decision-making process. (JINS, 2016, 22, 620-630).

Converging Intracranial Markers of Conscious Access

PubMed Central

Gaillard, Raphaël; Dehaene, Stanislas; Adam, Claude; Clémenceau, Stéphane; Hasboun, Dominique; Baulac, Michel; Cohen, Laurent; Naccache, Lionel

2009-01-01

We compared conscious and nonconscious processing of briefly flashed words using a visual masking procedure while recording intracranial electroencephalogram (iEEG) in ten patients. Nonconscious processing of masked words was observed in multiple cortical areas, mostly within an early time window (<300 ms), accompanied by induced gamma-band activity, but without coherent long-distance neural activity, suggesting a quickly dissipating feedforward wave. In contrast, conscious processing of unmasked words was characterized by the convergence of four distinct neurophysiological markers: sustained voltage changes, particularly in prefrontal cortex, large increases in spectral power in the gamma band, increases in long-distance phase synchrony in the beta range, and increases in long-range Granger causality. We argue that all of those measures provide distinct windows into the same distributed state of conscious processing. These results have a direct impact on current theoretical discussions concerning the neural correlates of conscious access. PMID:19296722

[The neurodynamic core of consciousness and neural Darwinism].

PubMed

Ibáñez, A

In the last decades, the scientific study of consciousness in the scope of the cognitive neurosciences can be considered one of the greatest challenges of contemporary science. The Gerald Edelman theory of consciousness is one of the most promising and controversial perspectives. This theory stands out by its approach to topics usually rejected by other neurophysiologic theories of consciousness, as the case of the neurophysiologic explanation of qualia. The goal of this paper is to review the dynamic core theory of consciousness, presenting the main features of the theory, analyzing the explanation strategies, their empirical extensions, and elaborating some critical considerations about the possibility of the neuroscientific study of qualia. The central and additional theoretical components are analyzed, emphasizing its ontological, restrictive and explanatory assumptions. The properties of conscious phenomena and their cerebral correlates as advanced by the theory are described, and finally its experiments and empirical extensions are examined. The explanatory strategies of the theory are analyzed, based on conceptual isomorphism between the phenomenological properties and the neurophysiological and mathematical measures. Some criticisms could be raised about the limitations of the dynamic core theory, especially regarding its account of the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness or qualia.

Consciousness Lost and Found: Subjective Experiences in an Unresponsive State

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Noreika, Valdas; Jylhankangas, Leila; Moro, Levente; Valli, Katja; Kaskinoro, Kimmo; Aantaa, Riku; Scheinin, Harry; Revonsuo, Antti

2011-01-01

Anesthetic-induced changes in the neural activity of the brain have been recently utilized as a research model to investigate the neural mechanisms of phenomenal consciousness. However, the anesthesiologic definition of consciousness as "responsiveness to the environment" seems to sidestep the possibility that an unresponsive individual may have…

Dissecting out conscious and unconscious memory (sub)processes within the human medial temporal lobe.

PubMed

Grunwald, T; Pezer, N; Münte, T F; Kurthen, M; Lehnertz, K; Van Roost, D; Fernández, G; Kutas, M; Elger, C E

2003-11-01

The human medial temporal lobe (MTL) system mediates memories that can be consciously recollected. However, the specific natures of the individual contributions of its various subregions to conscious memory processes remain equivocal. Here we show a functional dissociation between the hippocampus proper and the parahippocampal region in conscious and unconscious memory as revealed by invasive recordings of limbic event-related brain potentials recorded during explicit and implicit word recognition: Only hippocampal and not parahippocampal neural activity exhibits a sensitivity to the implicit versus explicit nature of the recognition memory task. Moreover, only within the hippocampus proper do the neural responses to repeated words differ not only from those to new words but also from each other as a function of recognition success. By contrast parahippocampal (rhinal) responses are sensitive to repetition independent of conscious recognition. These findings thus demonstrate that it is the hippocampus proper among the MTL structures that is specifically engaged during conscious memory processes.

Attentional Routes to Conscious Perception

PubMed Central

Chica, Ana B.; Bartolomeo, Paolo

2012-01-01

The relationships between spatial attention and conscious perception are currently the object of intense debate. Recent evidence of double dissociations between attention and consciousness cast doubt on the time-honored concept of attention as a gateway to consciousness. Here we review evidence from behavioral, neurophysiologic, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging experiments, showing that distinct sorts of spatial attention can have different effects on visual conscious perception. While endogenous, or top-down attention, has weak influence on subsequent conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli, exogenous, or bottom-up forms of spatial attention appear instead to be a necessary, although not sufficient, step in the development of reportable visual experiences. Fronto-parietal networks important for spatial attention, with peculiar inter-hemispheric differences, constitute plausible neural substrates for the interactions between exogenous spatial attention and conscious perception. PMID:22279440

A unified 3D default space consciousness model combining neurological and physiological processes that underlie conscious experience

PubMed Central

Jerath, Ravinder; Crawford, Molly W.; Barnes, Vernon A.

2015-01-01

The Global Workspace Theory and Information Integration Theory are two of the most currently accepted consciousness models; however, these models do not address many aspects of conscious experience. We compare these models to our previously proposed consciousness model in which the thalamus fills-in processed sensory information from corticothalamic feedback loops within a proposed 3D default space, resulting in the recreation of the internal and external worlds within the mind. This 3D default space is composed of all cells of the body, which communicate via gap junctions and electrical potentials to create this unified space. We use 3D illustrations to explain how both visual and non-visual sensory information may be filled-in within this dynamic space, creating a unified seamless conscious experience. This neural sensory memory space is likely generated by baseline neural oscillatory activity from the default mode network, other salient networks, brainstem, and reticular activating system. PMID:26379573

Consciousness, the brain, and spacetime geometry.

PubMed

Hameroff, S

2001-04-01

What is consciousness? Conventional approaches see it as an emergent property of complex interactions among individual neurons; however these approaches fail to address enigmatic features of consciousness. Accordingly, some philosophers have contended that "qualia," or an experiential medium from which consciousness is derived, exists as a fundamental component of reality. Whitehead, for example, described the universe as being composed of "occasions of experience." To examine this possibility scientifically, the very nature of physical reality must be re-examined. We must come to terms with the physics of spacetime--as described by Einstein's general theory of relativity, and its relation to the fundamental theory of matter--as described by quantum theory. Roger Penrose has proposed a new physics of objective reduction: "OR," which appeals to a form of quantum gravity to provide a useful description of fundamental processes at the quantum/classical borderline. Within the OR scheme, we consider that consciousness occurs if an appropriately organized system is able to develop and maintain quantum coherent superposition until a specific "objective" criterion (a threshold related to quantum gravity) is reached; the coherent system then self-reduces (objective reduction: OR). We contend that this type of objective self-collapse introduces non-computability, an essential feature of consciousness which distinguishes our minds from classical computers. Each OR is taken as an instantaneous event--the climax of a self-organizing process in fundamental spacetime--and a candidate for a conscious Whitehead "occasion of experience." How could an OR process occur in the brain, be coupled to neural activities, and account for other features of consciousness? We nominate a quantum computational OR process with the requisite characteristics to be occurring in cytoskeletal micro-tubules within the brain's neurons. In this model, quantum-superposed states develop in microtubule

DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence from Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States.

PubMed

Fingelkurts, Andrew A; Fingelkurts, Alexander A; Bagnato, Sergio; Boccagni, Cristina; Galardi, Giuseppe

2012-01-01

The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN's role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, EEG operational synchrony analysis [1, 2] was performed in patients with severe brain injuries in vegetative and minimally conscious states to study the strength of DMN operational synchrony as a function of self-consciousness expression. We demonstrated that the strength of DMN EEG operational synchrony was smallest or even absent in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and highest in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. At the same time the process of ecoupling of operations performed by neuronal assemblies that comprise the DMN was highest in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and minimal in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. The DMN's frontal EEG operational module had the strongest decrease in operational synchrony strength as a function of selfconsciousness loss, when compared with the DMN's posterior modules. Based on these results it is suggested that the strength of DMN functional connectivity could mediate the strength of self-consciousness expression. The observed alterations similarly occurred across EEG alpha, beta1 and beta2 frequency oscillations. Presented results suggest that the EEG operational synchrony within DMN may provide an objective and accurate measure for the assessment of signs of self-(un)consciousness in these challenging patient populations. This method therefore, may complement the current diagnostic procedures for

DMN Operational Synchrony Relates to Self-Consciousness: Evidence from Patients in Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States

PubMed Central

Fingelkurts, Andrew A; Fingelkurts, Alexander A; Bagnato, Sergio; Boccagni, Cristina; Galardi, Giuseppe

2012-01-01

The default mode network (DMN) has been consistently activated across a wide variety of self-related tasks, leading to a proposal of the DMN’s role in self-related processing. Indeed, there is limited fMRI evidence that the functional connectivity within the DMN may underlie a phenomenon referred to as self-awareness. At the same time, none of the known studies have explicitly investigated neuronal functional interactions among brain areas that comprise the DMN as a function of self-consciousness loss. To fill this gap, EEG operational synchrony analysis [1, 2] was performed in patients with severe brain injuries in vegetative and minimally conscious states to study the strength of DMN operational synchrony as a function of self-consciousness expression. We demonstrated that the strength of DMN EEG operational synchrony was smallest or even absent in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and highest in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. At the same time the process of ecoupling of operations performed by neuronal assemblies that comprise the DMN was highest in patients in vegetative state, intermediate in patients in minimally conscious state and minimal in healthy fully self-conscious subjects. The DMN’s frontal EEG operational module had the strongest decrease in operational synchrony strength as a function of selfconsciousness loss, when compared with the DMN’s posterior modules. Based on these results it is suggested that the strength of DMN functional connectivity could mediate the strength of self-consciousness expression. The observed alterations similarly occurred across EEG alpha, beta1 and beta2 frequency oscillations. Presented results suggest that the EEG operational synchrony within DMN may provide an objective and accurate measure for the assessment of signs of self-(un)consciousness in these challenging patient populations. This method therefore, may complement the current diagnostic procedures

A Plastic Temporal Brain Code for Conscious State Generation

PubMed Central

Dresp-Langley, Birgitta; Durup, Jean

2009-01-01

Consciousness is known to be limited in processing capacity and often described in terms of a unique processing stream across a single dimension: time. In this paper, we discuss a purely temporal pattern code, functionally decoupled from spatial signals, for conscious state generation in the brain. Arguments in favour of such a code include Dehaene et al.'s long-distance reverberation postulate, Ramachandran's remapping hypothesis, evidence for a temporal coherence index and coincidence detectors, and Grossberg's Adaptive Resonance Theory. A time-bin resonance model is developed, where temporal signatures of conscious states are generated on the basis of signal reverberation across large distances in highly plastic neural circuits. The temporal signatures are delivered by neural activity patterns which, beyond a certain statistical threshold, activate, maintain, and terminate a conscious brain state like a bar code would activate, maintain, or inactivate the electronic locks of a safe. Such temporal resonance would reflect a higher level of neural processing, independent from sensorial or perceptual brain mechanisms. PMID:19644552

Hippocampus Is Place of Interaction between Unconscious and Conscious Memories

PubMed Central

Züst, Marc Alain; Colella, Patrizio; Reber, Thomas Peter; Vuilleumier, Patrik; Hauf, Martinus; Ruch, Simon; Henke, Katharina

2015-01-01

Recent evidence suggests that humans can form and later retrieve new semantic relations unconsciously by way of hippocampus—the key structure also recruited for conscious relational (episodic) memory. If the hippocampus subserves both conscious and unconscious relational encoding/retrieval, one would expect the hippocampus to be place of unconscious-conscious interactions during memory retrieval. We tested this hypothesis in an fMRI experiment probing the interaction between the unconscious and conscious retrieval of face-associated information. For the establishment of unconscious relational memories, we presented subliminal (masked) combinations of unfamiliar faces and written occupations (“actor” or “politician”). At test, we presented the former subliminal faces, but now supraliminally, as cues for the reactivation of the unconsciously associated occupations. We hypothesized that unconscious reactivation of the associated occupation—actor or politician—would facilitate or inhibit the subsequent conscious retrieval of a celebrity’s occupation, which was also actor or politician. Depending on whether the reactivated unconscious occupation was congruent or incongruent to the celebrity’s occupation, we expected either quicker or delayed conscious retrieval process. Conscious retrieval was quicker in the congruent relative to a neutral baseline condition but not delayed in the incongruent condition. fMRI data collected during subliminal face-occupation encoding confirmed previous evidence that the hippocampus was interacting with neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge to support relational encoding. fMRI data collected at test revealed that the facilitated conscious retrieval was paralleled by deactivations in the hippocampus and neocortical storage sites of semantic knowledge. We assume that the unconscious reactivation has pre-activated overlapping relational representations in the hippocampus reducing the neural effort for conscious

The Merit of Synesthesia for Consciousness Research

PubMed Central

van Leeuwen, Tessa M.; Singer, Wolf; Nikolić, Danko

2015-01-01

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which additional perceptual experiences are elicited by sensory stimuli or cognitive concepts. Synesthetes possess a unique type of phenomenal experiences not directly triggered by sensory stimulation. Therefore, for better understanding of consciousness it is relevant to identify the mental and physiological processes that subserve synesthetic experience. In the present work we suggest several reasons why synesthesia has merit for research on consciousness. We first review the research on the dynamic and rapidly growing field of the studies of synesthesia. We particularly draw attention to the role of semantics in synesthesia, which is important for establishing synesthetic associations in the brain. We then propose that the interplay between semantics and sensory input in synesthesia can be helpful for the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, especially when making use of ambiguous stimuli for inducing synesthesia. Finally, synesthesia-related alterations of brain networks and functional connectivity can be of merit for the study of consciousness. PMID:26696921

Sleep in disorders of consciousness

PubMed Central

Cologan, Victor; Schabus, Manvel; Ledoux, Didier; Moonen, Gustave; Maquet, Pierre; Laureys, Steven

2010-01-01

SUMMARY From a behavioral as well as neurobiological point of view, sleep and consciousness are intimately connected. A better understanding of sleep cycles and sleep architecture of patients suffering from disorders of consciousness (DOC) might therefore improve the clinical care for these patients as well as our understanding of the neural correlations of consciousness. Defining sleep in severely brain-injured patients is however problematic as both their electrophysiological and sleep patterns differ in many ways from healthy individuals. This paper discusses the concepts involved in the study of sleep of patients suffering from DOC and critically assesses the applicability of standard sleep criteria in these patients. The available literature on comatose and vegetative states as well as that on locked-in and related states following traumatic or non-traumatic severe brain injury will be reviewed. A wide spectrum of sleep disturbances ranging from almost normal patterns to severe loss and architecture disorganization are reported in cases of DOC and some patterns correlate with diagnosis and prognosis. At the present time the interactions of sleep and consciousness in brain-injured patients are a little studied subject but, the authors suggest, a potentially very interesting field of research. PMID:19524464

Impact of Emotion on Consciousness: Positive Stimuli Enhance Conscious Reportability

PubMed Central

Rømer Thomsen, Kristine; Lou, Hans C.; Joensson, Morten; Hyam, Jonathan A.; Holland, Peter; Parsons, Christine E.; Young, Katherine S.; Møller, Arne; Stein, Alan; Green, Alex L.; Kringelbach, Morten L.; Aziz, Tipu Z.

2011-01-01

Emotion and reward have been proposed to be closely linked to conscious experience, but empirical data are lacking. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) plays a central role in the hedonic dimension of conscious experience; thus potentially a key region in interactions between emotion and consciousness. Here we tested the impact of emotion on conscious experience, and directly investigated the role of the ACC. We used a masked paradigm that measures conscious reportability in terms of subjective confidence and objective accuracy in identifying the briefly presented stimulus in a forced-choice test. By manipulating the emotional valence (positive, neutral, negative) and the presentation time (16 ms, 32 ms, 80 ms) we measured the impact of these variables on conscious and subliminal (i.e. below threshold) processing. First, we tested normal participants using face and word stimuli. Results showed that participants were more confident and accurate when consciously seeing happy versus sad/neutral faces and words. When stimuli were presented subliminally, we found no effect of emotion. To investigate the neural basis of this impact of emotion, we recorded local field potentials (LFPs) directly in the ACC in a chronic pain patient. Behavioural findings were replicated: the patient was more confident and accurate when (consciously) seeing happy versus sad faces, while no effect was seen in subliminal trials. Mirroring behavioural findings, we found significant differences in the LFPs after around 500 ms (lasting 30 ms) in conscious trials between happy and sad faces, while no effect was found in subliminal trials. We thus demonstrate a striking impact of emotion on conscious experience, with positive emotional stimuli enhancing conscious reportability. In line with previous studies, the data indicate a key role of the ACC, but goes beyond earlier work by providing the first direct evidence of interaction between emotion and conscious experience in the human ACC. PMID

Slow cortical potentials and "inner time consciousness" - A neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about the "width of present".

PubMed

Northoff, Georg

2016-05-01

William James postulated a "stream of consciousness" that presupposes temporal continuity. The neuronal mechanisms underlying the construction of such temporal continuity remain unclear, however, in my contribution, I propose a neuro-phenomenal hypothesis that is based on slow cortical potentials and their extension of the present moment as described in the phenomenal term of "width of present". More specifically, I focus on the way the brain's neural activity needs to be encoded in order to make possible the "stream of consciousness." This leads us again to the low-frequency fluctuations of the brain's neural activity and more specifically to slow cortical potentials (SCPs). Due to their long phase duration as low-frequency fluctuations, SCPs can integrate different stimuli and their associated neural activity from different regions in one converging region. Such integration may be central for consciousness to occur, as it was recently postulated by He and Raichle. They leave open, however, the question of the exact neuronal mechanisms, like the encoding strategy, that make possible the association of the otherwise purely neuronal SCP with consciousness and its phenomenal features. I hypothesize that SCPs allow for linking and connecting different discrete points in physical time by encoding their statistically based temporal differences rather than the single discrete time points by themselves. This presupposes difference-based coding rather than stimulus-based coding. The encoding of such statistically based temporal differences makes it possible to "go beyond" the merely physical features of the stimuli; that is, their single discrete time points and their conduction delays (as related to their neural processing in the brain). This, in turn, makes possible the constitution of "local temporal continuity" of neural activity in one particular region. The concept of "local temporal continuity" signifies the linkage and integration of different discrete time points

Sigmund Freud and the Crick-Koch hypothesis. A footnote to the history of consciousness studies.

PubMed

Smith, D L

1999-06-01

The author describes Crick and Koch's recently developed theory of the neurophysiological basis of consciousness as synchronised neural oscillations. The thesis that neural oscillations provide the neurophysiological basis for consciousness was anticipated by Sigmund Freud in his 1895 'Project for a scientific psychology'. Freud attempted to solve his neuropsychological 'problem of quality' by means of the hypothesis that information concerning conscious sensory qualities is transmitted through the mental apparatus by means of neural 'periods'. Freud believed that information carried by neural oscillations would proliferate across 'contact-barriers' (synapses) without inhibition. Freud's theory thus appears to imply that synchronised neural oscillations are an important component of the neurophysiological basis of consciousness. It is possible that Freud's thesis was developed in response to the experimental research of the American neuroscientist M. M. Garver.

Visual consciousness and bodily self-consciousness.

PubMed

Faivre, Nathan; Salomon, Roy; Blanke, Olaf

2015-02-01

In recent years, consciousness has become a central topic in cognitive neuroscience. This review focuses on the relation between bodily self-consciousness - the feeling of being a subject in a body - and visual consciousness - the subjective experience associated with the perception of visual signals. Findings from clinical and experimental work have shown that bodily self-consciousness depends on specific brain networks and is related to the integration of signals from multiple sensory modalities including vision. In addition, recent experiments have shown that visual consciousness is shaped by the body, including vestibular, tactile, proprioceptive, and motor signals. Several lines of evidence suggest reciprocal relationships between vision and bodily signals, indicating that a comprehensive understanding of visual and bodily self-consciousness requires studying them in unison.

Free will as relative freedom with conscious component.

PubMed

Hájícek, P

2009-03-01

The general notion of relative freedom is introduced. It is a kind of freedom that is observed everywhere in nature. In biology, incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by Popper's trial-and-error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neuron connections. After the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness, free will is defined as a conscious version of relative freedom. The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phenomenon that agrees with our experience.

Measuring consciousness in dreams: the lucidity and consciousness in dreams scale.

PubMed

Voss, Ursula; Schermelleh-Engel, Karin; Windt, Jennifer; Frenzel, Clemens; Hobson, Allan

2013-03-01

In this article, we present results from an interdisciplinary research project aimed at assessing consciousness in dreams. For this purpose, we compared lucid dreams with normal non-lucid dreams from REM sleep. Both lucid and non-lucid dreams are an important contrast condition for theories of waking consciousness, giving valuable insights into the structure of conscious experience and its neural correlates during sleep. However, the precise differences between lucid and non-lucid dreams remain poorly understood. The construction of the Lucidity and Consciousness in Dreams scale (LuCiD) was based on theoretical considerations and empirical observations. Exploratory factor analysis of the data from the first survey identified eight factors that were validated in a second survey using confirmatory factor analysis: INSIGHT, CONTROL, THOUGHT, REALISM, MEMORY, DISSOCIATION, NEGATIVE EMOTION, and POSITIVE EMOTION. While all factors are involved in dream consciousness, realism and negative emotion do not differentiate between lucid and non-lucid dreams, suggesting that lucid insight is separable from both bizarreness in dreams and a change in the subjectively experienced realism of the dream. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Bottom-Up and Top-Down Mechanisms of General Anesthetics Modulate Different Dimensions of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Mashour, George A.; Hudetz, Anthony G.

2017-01-01

There has been controversy regarding the precise mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, with two salient approaches that have emerged within systems neuroscience. One prominent approach is the “bottom up” paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating sleep-wake nuclei and neural circuits in the brainstem and diencephalon that have evolved to control arousal states. Another approach is the “top-down” paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating the cortical and thalamocortical circuits involved in the integration of neural information. In this article, we synthesize these approaches by mapping bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of general anesthetics to two distinct but inter-related dimensions of consciousness: level and content. We show how this explains certain empirical observations regarding the diversity of anesthetic drug effects. We conclude with a more nuanced discussion of how levels and contents of consciousness interact to generate subjective experience and what this implies for the mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness. PMID:28676745

Bottom-Up and Top-Down Mechanisms of General Anesthetics Modulate Different Dimensions of Consciousness.

PubMed

Mashour, George A; Hudetz, Anthony G

2017-01-01

There has been controversy regarding the precise mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness, with two salient approaches that have emerged within systems neuroscience. One prominent approach is the "bottom up" paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating sleep-wake nuclei and neural circuits in the brainstem and diencephalon that have evolved to control arousal states. Another approach is the "top-down" paradigm, which argues that anesthetics suppress consciousness by modulating the cortical and thalamocortical circuits involved in the integration of neural information. In this article, we synthesize these approaches by mapping bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of general anesthetics to two distinct but inter-related dimensions of consciousness: level and content. We show how this explains certain empirical observations regarding the diversity of anesthetic drug effects. We conclude with a more nuanced discussion of how levels and contents of consciousness interact to generate subjective experience and what this implies for the mechanisms of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness.

Structural qualia: a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.

PubMed

Loorits, Kristjan

2014-01-01

The hard problem of consciousness has been often claimed to be unsolvable by the methods of traditional empirical sciences. It has been argued that all the objects of empirical sciences can be fully analyzed in structural terms but that consciousness is (or has) something over and above its structure. However, modern neuroscience has introduced a theoretical framework in which also the apparently non-structural aspects of consciousness, namely the so called qualia or qualitative properties, can be analyzed in structural terms. That framework allows us to see qualia as something compositional with internal structures that fully determine their qualitative nature. Moreover, those internal structures can be identified which certain neural patterns. Thus consciousness as a whole can be seen as a complex neural pattern that misperceives some of its own highly complex structural properties as monadic and qualitative. Such neural pattern is analyzable in fully structural terms and thereby the hard problem is solved.

Structural qualia: a solution to the hard problem of consciousness

PubMed Central

Loorits, Kristjan

2014-01-01

The hard problem of consciousness has been often claimed to be unsolvable by the methods of traditional empirical sciences. It has been argued that all the objects of empirical sciences can be fully analyzed in structural terms but that consciousness is (or has) something over and above its structure. However, modern neuroscience has introduced a theoretical framework in which also the apparently non-structural aspects of consciousness, namely the so called qualia or qualitative properties, can be analyzed in structural terms. That framework allows us to see qualia as something compositional with internal structures that fully determine their qualitative nature. Moreover, those internal structures can be identified which certain neural patterns. Thus consciousness as a whole can be seen as a complex neural pattern that misperceives some of its own highly complex structural properties as monadic and qualitative. Such neural pattern is analyzable in fully structural terms and thereby the hard problem is solved. PMID:24672510

Consciousness of Unification: The Mind-Matter Phallacy Bites the Dust

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Beichler, James E.

A complete theoretical model of how consciousness arises in neural nets can be developed based on a mixed quantum/classical basis. Both mind and consciousness are multi-leveled scalar and vector electromagnetic complexity patterns, respectively, which emerge within all living organisms through the process of evolution. Like life, the mind and consciousness patterns extend throughout living organisms (bodies), but the neural nets and higher level groupings that distinguish higher levels of consciousness only exist in the brain so mind and consciousness have been traditionally associated with the brain alone. A close study of neurons and neural nets in the brain shows that the microtubules within axons are classical bio-magnetic inductors that emit and absorb electromagnetic pulses from each other. These pulses establish interference patterns that influence the quantized vector potential patterns of interstitial water molecules within the neurons as well as create the coherence within neurons and neural nets that scientists normally associate with more complex memories, thought processes and streams of thought. Memory storage and recall are guided by the microtubules and the actual memory patterns are stored as magnetic vector potential complexity patterns in the points of space at the quantum level occupied by the water molecules. This model also accounts for the plasticity of the brain and implies that mind and consciousness, like life itself, are the result of evolutionary processes. However, consciousness can evolve independent of an organism's birth genetics once it has evolved by normal bottom-up genetic processes and thus force a new type of top-down evolution on living organisms and species as a whole that can be explained by expanding the laws of thermodynamics to include orderly systems.

Natural and Artificial Intelligence, Language, Consciousness, Emotion, and Anticipation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dubois, Daniel M.

2010-11-01

The classical paradigm of the neural brain as the seat of human natural intelligence is too restrictive. This paper defends the idea that the neural ectoderm is the actual brain, based on the development of the human embryo. Indeed, the neural ectoderm includes the neural crest, given by pigment cells in the skin and ganglia of the autonomic nervous system, and the neural tube, given by the brain, the spinal cord, and motor neurons. So the brain is completely integrated in the ectoderm, and cannot work alone. The paper presents fundamental properties of the brain as follows. Firstly, Paul D. MacLean proposed the triune human brain, which consists to three brains in one, following the species evolution, given by the reptilian complex, the limbic system, and the neo-cortex. Secondly, the consciousness and conscious awareness are analysed. Thirdly, the anticipatory unconscious free will and conscious free veto are described in agreement with the experiments of Benjamin Libet. Fourthly, the main section explains the development of the human embryo and shows that the neural ectoderm is the whole neural brain. Fifthly, a conjecture is proposed that the neural brain is completely programmed with scripts written in biological low-level and high-level languages, in a manner similar to the programmed cells by the genetic code. Finally, it is concluded that the proposition of the neural ectoderm as the whole neural brain is a breakthrough in the understanding of the natural intelligence, and also in the future design of robots with artificial intelligence.

A TMS Study of the Ventral Projections from V1 with Implications for the Finding of Neural Correlates of Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Overgaard, Morten; Nielsen, Jorgen Feldbaek; Fuglsang-Frederiksen, Anders

2004-01-01

The study of subliminal perception in normal and brain lesioned subjects has long been of interest to scholars studying the neural mechanisms behind conscious vision. Using brief durations and a developed methodology of introspective reporting, we present an experiment with visual stimuli that gives rise to little or no subliminal perception under…

Electrical stimulation of a small brain area reversibly disrupts consciousness.

PubMed

Koubeissi, Mohamad Z; Bartolomei, Fabrice; Beltagy, Abdelrahman; Picard, Fabienne

2014-08-01

The neural mechanisms that underlie consciousness are not fully understood. We describe a region in the human brain where electrical stimulation reproducibly disrupted consciousness. A 54-year-old woman with intractable epilepsy underwent depth electrode implantation and electrical stimulation mapping. The electrode whose stimulation disrupted consciousness was between the left claustrum and anterior-dorsal insula. Stimulation of electrodes within 5mm did not affect consciousness. We studied the interdependencies among depth recording signals as a function of time by nonlinear regression analysis (h(2) coefficient) during stimulations that altered consciousness and stimulations of the same electrode at lower current intensities that were asymptomatic. Stimulation of the claustral electrode reproducibly resulted in a complete arrest of volitional behavior, unresponsiveness, and amnesia without negative motor symptoms or mere aphasia. The disruption of consciousness did not outlast the stimulation and occurred without any epileptiform discharges. We found a significant increase in correlation for interactions affecting medial parietal and posterior frontal channels during stimulations that disrupted consciousness compared with those that did not. Our findings suggest that the left claustrum/anterior insula is an important part of a network that subserves consciousness and that disruption of consciousness is related to increased EEG signal synchrony within frontal-parietal networks. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Body-related self-conscious emotions relate to physical activity motivation and behavior in men.

PubMed

Castonguay, Andree L; Pila, Eva; Wrosch, Carsten; Sabiston, Catherine M

2015-05-01

The aim of this study was to examine the associations between the body-related self-conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and pride and physical activity motivation and behavior among adult males. Specifically, motivation regulations (external, introjected, indentified, intrinsic) were examined as possible mediators between each of the body-related self-conscious emotions and physical activity behavior. A cross-sectional study was conducted with adult men (N = 152; Mage = 23.72, SD = 10.92 years). Participants completed a questionnaire assessing body-related shame, guilt, authentic pride, hubristic pride, motivational regulations, and leisure-time physical activity. In separate multiple mediation models, body-related shame was positively associated with external and introjected regulations and negatively correlated with intrinsic regulation. Guilt was positively linked to external, introjected, and identified regulations. Authentic pride was negatively related to external regulation and positively correlated with both identified and intrinsic regulations and directly associated with physical activity behavior. Hubristic pride was positively associated with intrinsic regulation. Overall, there were both direct and indirect effects via motivation regulations between body-related self-conscious emotions and physical activity (R(2) shame = .15, guilt = .16, authentic pride = .18, hubristic pride = .16). These findings highlight the importance of targeting and understanding self-conscious emotions contextualized to the body and links to motivation and positive health behavior among men. © The Author(s) 2014.

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago

PubMed Central

Feinberg, Todd E.; Mallatt, Jon

2013-01-01

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived from ectodermal placodes and neural crest, transformed primitive reflexive systems into image forming brains that map and perceive the external world and the body's interior. We posit that the minimum requirement for sensory consciousness and qualia is a brain including a forebrain (but not necessarily a developed cerebral cortex/pallium), midbrain, and hindbrain. This brain must also have (1) hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically organized, processing nuclei that extensively integrate the different senses into representations that emerge in upper levels of the neural hierarchy; and (2) a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and contributes to attention, awareness, and neural synchronization. We propose a two-step evolutionary history, in which the optic tectum was the original center of multi-sensory conscious perception (as in fish and amphibians: step 1), followed by a gradual shift of this center to the dorsal pallium or its cerebral cortex (in mammals, reptiles, birds: step 2). We address objections to the hypothesis and call for more studies of fish and amphibians. In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known. PMID

The evolutionary and genetic origins of consciousness in the Cambrian Period over 500 million years ago.

PubMed

Feinberg, Todd E; Mallatt, Jon

2013-01-01

Vertebrates evolved in the Cambrian Period before 520 million years ago, but we do not know when or how consciousness arose in the history of the vertebrate brain. Here we propose multiple levels of isomorphic or somatotopic neural representations as an objective marker for sensory consciousness. All extant vertebrates have these, so we deduce that consciousness extends back to the group's origin. The first conscious sense may have been vision. Then vision, coupled with additional sensory systems derived from ectodermal placodes and neural crest, transformed primitive reflexive systems into image forming brains that map and perceive the external world and the body's interior. We posit that the minimum requirement for sensory consciousness and qualia is a brain including a forebrain (but not necessarily a developed cerebral cortex/pallium), midbrain, and hindbrain. This brain must also have (1) hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically organized, processing nuclei that extensively integrate the different senses into representations that emerge in upper levels of the neural hierarchy; and (2) a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and contributes to attention, awareness, and neural synchronization. We propose a two-step evolutionary history, in which the optic tectum was the original center of multi-sensory conscious perception (as in fish and amphibians: step 1), followed by a gradual shift of this center to the dorsal pallium or its cerebral cortex (in mammals, reptiles, birds: step 2). We address objections to the hypothesis and call for more studies of fish and amphibians. In our view, the lamprey has all the neural requisites and is likely the simplest extant vertebrate with sensory consciousness and qualia. Genes that pattern the proposed elements of consciousness (isomorphism, neural crest, placodes) have been identified in all vertebrates. Thus, consciousness is in the genes, some of which are already known.

The Neurogenetic Correlates of Consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grandy, John K.

2013-09-01

The neurogenetic correlates of consciousness (NgCC) is a new field of consciousness studies that focuses on genes that have an effect on or are involved in the continuum of neuron-based consciousness. A framework of consciousness based on the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) has already been established by Francis Crick and Christof Kock. In this work I propose that there are NgCC underlying the NCC which are both active during the conscious experience. So how are genes involved? There are two significant connections between DNA and neurons that are involved in the conscious experience. First, any brain system can be adversely affected by underlying genetic abnormalities which can be expressed in an individual at birth, in adulthood, or later in life. Second, the DNA molecule does not lay dormant while the neuron runs on autopilot. DNA is active in translating and transcribing RNA and protein products that are utilized during neuron functioning. Without these products being continuously produced by the DNA during a conscious experience the neurons would cease to function correctly and be rendered unable to provide a continuum of human consciousness. Consequently, in addition to NCC, NgCC must be factored in when appreciating a conscious event. In this work I will discuss and explain some NgCC citing several examples.

A theory of working memory without consciousness or sustained activity

PubMed Central

Trübutschek, Darinka; Marti, Sébastien; Ojeda, Andrés; King, Jean-Rémi; Mi, Yuanyuan; Tsodyks, Misha; Dehaene, Stanislas

2017-01-01

Working memory and conscious perception are thought to share similar brain mechanisms, yet recent reports of non-conscious working memory challenge this view. Combining visual masking with magnetoencephalography, we investigate the reality of non-conscious working memory and dissect its neural mechanisms. In a spatial delayed-response task, participants reported the location of a subjectively unseen target above chance-level after several seconds. Conscious perception and conscious working memory were characterized by similar signatures: a sustained desynchronization in the alpha/beta band over frontal cortex, and a decodable representation of target location in posterior sensors. During non-conscious working memory, such activity vanished. Our findings contradict models that identify working memory with sustained neural firing, but are compatible with recent proposals of ‘activity-silent’ working memory. We present a theoretical framework and simulations showing how slowly decaying synaptic changes allow cell assemblies to go dormant during the delay, yet be retrieved above chance-level after several seconds. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.23871.001 PMID:28718763

Brain activations during judgments of positive self-conscious emotion and positive basic emotion: pride and joy.

PubMed

Takahashi, Hidehiko; Matsuura, Masato; Koeda, Michihiko; Yahata, Noriaki; Suhara, Tetsuya; Kato, Motoichiro; Okubo, Yoshiro

2008-04-01

We aimed to investigate the neural correlates associated with judgments of a positive self-conscious emotion, pride, and elucidate the difference between pride and a basic positive emotion, joy, at the neural basis level using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Study of the neural basis associated with pride might contribute to a better understanding of the pride-related behaviors observed in neuropsychiatric disorders. Sixteen healthy volunteers were studied. The participants read sentences expressing joy or pride contents during the scans. Pride conditions activated the right posterior superior temporal sulcus and left temporal pole, the regions implicated in the neural substrate of social cognition or theory of mind. However, against our prediction, we did not find brain activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, a region responsible for inferring others' intention or self-reflection. Joy condition produced activations in the ventral striatum and insula/operculum, the key nodes of processing of hedonic or appetitive stimuli. Our results support the idea that pride is a self-conscious emotion, requiring the ability to detect the intention of others. At the same time, judgment of pride might require less self-reflection compared with those of negative self-conscious emotions such as guilt or embarrassment.

The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to be Conscious.

PubMed

Cleeremans, Axel

2011-01-01

In this paper, I explore the idea that consciousness is something that the brain learns to do rather than an intrinsic property of certain neural states and not others. Starting from the idea that neural activity is inherently unconscious, the question thus becomes: How does the brain learn to be conscious? I suggest that consciousness arises as a result of the brain's continuous attempts at predicting not only the consequences of its actions on the world and on other agents, but also the consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-representations that characterize and qualify the target first-order representations. Such learned redescriptions, enriched by the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of conscious experience. Learning and plasticity are thus central to consciousness, to the extent that experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. This is what I call the "Radical Plasticity Thesis." In a sense thus, this is the enactive perspective, but turned both inwards and (further) outwards. Consciousness involves "signal detection on the mind"; the conscious mind is the brain's (non-conceptual, implicit) theory about itself. I illustrate these ideas through neural network models that simulate the relationships between performance and awareness in different tasks.

Extending Gurwitsch's field theory of consciousness.

PubMed

Yoshimi, Jeff; Vinson, David W

2015-07-01

Aron Gurwitsch's theory of the structure and dynamics of consciousness has much to offer contemporary theorizing about consciousness and its basis in the embodied brain. On Gurwitsch's account, as we develop it, the field of consciousness has a variable sized focus or "theme" of attention surrounded by a structured periphery of inattentional contents. As the field evolves, its contents change their status, sometimes smoothly, sometimes abruptly. Inner thoughts, a sense of one's body, and the physical environment are dominant field contents. These ideas can be linked with (and help unify) contemporary theories about the neural correlates of consciousness, inattention, the small world structure of the brain, meta-stable dynamics, embodied cognition, and predictive coding in the brain. Published by Elsevier Inc.

Neuronal integration in visual cortex elevates face category tuning to conscious face perception

PubMed Central

Fahrenfort, Johannes J.; Snijders, Tineke M.; Heinen, Klaartje; van Gaal, Simon; Scholte, H. Steven; Lamme, Victor A. F.

2012-01-01

The human brain has the extraordinary capability to transform cluttered sensory input into distinct object representations. For example, it is able to rapidly and seemingly without effort detect object categories in complex natural scenes. Surprisingly, category tuning is not sufficient to achieve conscious recognition of objects. What neural process beyond category extraction might elevate neural representations to the level where objects are consciously perceived? Here we show that visible and invisible faces produce similar category-selective responses in the ventral visual cortex. The pattern of neural activity evoked by visible faces could be used to decode the presence of invisible faces and vice versa. However, only visible faces caused extensive response enhancements and changes in neural oscillatory synchronization, as well as increased functional connectivity between higher and lower visual areas. We conclude that conscious face perception is more tightly linked to neural processes of sustained information integration and binding than to processes accommodating face category tuning. PMID:23236162

Predictive Feedback and Conscious Visual Experience

PubMed Central

Panichello, Matthew F.; Cheung, Olivia S.; Bar, Moshe

2012-01-01

The human brain continuously generates predictions about the environment based on learned regularities in the world. These predictions actively and efficiently facilitate the interpretation of incoming sensory information. We review evidence that, as a result of this facilitation, predictions directly influence conscious experience. Specifically, we propose that predictions enable rapid generation of conscious percepts and bias the contents of awareness in situations of uncertainty. The possible neural mechanisms underlying this facilitation are discussed. PMID:23346068

Does perceptual learning require consciousness or attention?

PubMed

Meuwese, Julia D I; Post, Ruben A G; Scholte, H Steven; Lamme, Victor A F

2013-10-01

It has been proposed that visual attention and consciousness are separate [Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. Attention and consciousness: Two distinct brain processes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 16-22, 2007] and possibly even orthogonal processes [Lamme, V. A. F. Why visual attention and awareness are different. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 12-18, 2003]. Attention and consciousness converge when conscious visual percepts are attended and hence become available for conscious report. In such a view, a lack of reportability can have two causes: the absence of attention or the absence of a conscious percept. This raises an important question in the field of perceptual learning. It is known that learning can occur in the absence of reportability [Gutnisky, D. A., Hansen, B. J., Iliescu, B. F., & Dragoi, V. Attention alters visual plasticity during exposure-based learning. Current Biology, 19, 555-560, 2009; Seitz, A. R., Kim, D., & Watanabe, T. Rewards evoke learning of unconsciously processed visual stimuli in adult humans. Neuron, 61, 700-707, 2009; Seitz, A. R., & Watanabe, T. Is subliminal learning really passive? Nature, 422, 36, 2003; Watanabe, T., Náñez, J. E., & Sasaki, Y. Perceptual learning without perception. Nature, 413, 844-848, 2001], but it is unclear which of the two ingredients-consciousness or attention-is not necessary for learning. We presented textured figure-ground stimuli and manipulated reportability either by masking (which only interferes with consciousness) or with an inattention paradigm (which only interferes with attention). During the second session (24 hr later), learning was assessed neurally and behaviorally, via differences in figure-ground ERPs and via a detection task. Behavioral and neural learning effects were found for stimuli presented in the inattention paradigm and not for masked stimuli. Interestingly, the behavioral learning effect only became apparent when performance feedback was given on the task to measure learning

Beyond Relation: A Critical Exploration of "Relational Consciousness" for Spiritual Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wills, Ruth

2012-01-01

This paper takes a philosophical view of the spiritual concept "relational consciousness" first proposed by Rebecca Nye in 1998. I will consider the "relational" aspect of spirituality through the ontology of Heidegger and the dialogical relationship "I and Thou" of Martin Buber, examining the problems that contingency and mediation within…

Consciousness, cognition and brain networks: New perspectives.

PubMed

Aldana, E M; Valverde, J L; Fábregas, N

2016-10-01

A detailed analysis of the literature on consciousness and cognition mechanisms based on the neural networks theory is presented. The immune and inflammatory response to the anesthetic-surgical procedure induces modulation of neuronal plasticity by influencing higher cognitive functions. Anesthetic drugs can cause unconsciousness, producing a functional disruption of cortical and thalamic cortical integration complex. The external and internal perceptions are processed through an intricate network of neural connections, involving the higher nervous activity centers, especially the cerebral cortex. This requires an integrated model, formed by neural networks and their interactions with highly specialized regions, through large-scale networks, which are distributed throughout the brain collecting information flow of these perceptions. Functional and effective connectivity between large-scale networks, are essential for consciousness, unconsciousness and cognition. It is what is called the "human connectome" or map neural networks. Copyright © 2014 Sociedad Española de Anestesiología, Reanimación y Terapéutica del Dolor. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights reserved.

The Radical Plasticity Thesis: How the Brain Learns to be Conscious

PubMed Central

Cleeremans, Axel

2011-01-01

In this paper, I explore the idea that consciousness is something that the brain learns to do rather than an intrinsic property of certain neural states and not others. Starting from the idea that neural activity is inherently unconscious, the question thus becomes: How does the brain learn to be conscious? I suggest that consciousness arises as a result of the brain's continuous attempts at predicting not only the consequences of its actions on the world and on other agents, but also the consequences of activity in one cerebral region on activity in other regions. By this account, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to redescribe its own activity to itself, so developing systems of meta-representations that characterize and qualify the target first-order representations. Such learned redescriptions, enriched by the emotional value associated with them, form the basis of conscious experience. Learning and plasticity are thus central to consciousness, to the extent that experiences only occur in experiencers that have learned to know they possess certain first-order states and that have learned to care more about certain states than about others. This is what I call the “Radical Plasticity Thesis.” In a sense thus, this is the enactive perspective, but turned both inwards and (further) outwards. Consciousness involves “signal detection on the mind”; the conscious mind is the brain's (non-conceptual, implicit) theory about itself. I illustrate these ideas through neural network models that simulate the relationships between performance and awareness in different tasks. PMID:21687455

[In search for neurophysiological criteria of altered consciousness].

PubMed

Sviderskaia, N E

2002-01-01

Neurophysiological approaches to brain mechanisms of consciousness are discussed. The concept of spatial synchronization of nervous processes developed by M.N. Livanov is applied to neurophysiological analysis of higher brain functions. However, the spatial synchronization of brain potentials is only a condition for information processing and does not represent it as such. This imposes restrictions on conclusions about the neural mechanisms of consciousness. It is more adequate to use the concept of spatial synchronization in views of consciousness as a psychophysiological level along with sub- and superconsciousness in three-level structure of mind according to P.V. Simonov. Forms of consciousness interaction with other levels concern the problem of altered consciousness and may be reflected in various patterns of spatial organization of brain potentials.

The consciousness state space (CSS)—a unifying model for consciousness and self

PubMed Central

Berkovich-Ohana, Aviva; Glicksohn, Joseph

2014-01-01

Every experience, those we are aware of and those we are not, is embedded in a subjective timeline, is tinged with emotion, and inevitably evokes a certain sense of self. Here, we present a phenomenological model for consciousness and selfhood which relates time, awareness, and emotion within one framework. The consciousness state space (CSS) model is a theoretical one. It relies on a broad range of literature, hence has high explanatory and integrative strength, and helps in visualizing the relationship between different aspects of experience. Briefly, it is suggested that all phenomenological states fall into two categories of consciousness, core and extended (CC and EC, respectively). CC supports minimal selfhood that is short of temporal extension, its scope being the here and now. EC supports narrative selfhood, which involves personal identity and continuity across time, as well as memory, imagination and conceptual thought. The CSS is a phenomenological space, created by three dimensions: time, awareness and emotion. Each of the three dimensions is shown to have a dual phenomenological composition, falling within CC and EC. The neural spaces supporting each of these dimensions, as well as CC and EC, are laid out based on the neuroscientific literature. The CSS dynamics include two simultaneous trajectories, one in CC and one in EC, typically antagonistic in normal experiences. However, this characteristic behavior is altered in states in which a person experiences an altered sense of self. Two examples are laid out, flow and meditation. The CSS model creates a broad theoretical framework with explanatory and unificatory power. It constructs a detailed map of the consciousness and selfhood phenomenology, which offers constraints for the science of consciousness. We conclude by outlining several testable predictions raised by the CSS model. PMID:24808870

The self and its resting state in consciousness: an investigation of the vegetative state.

PubMed

Huang, Zirui; Dai, Rui; Wu, Xuehai; Yang, Zhi; Liu, Dongqiang; Hu, Jin; Gao, Liang; Tang, Weijun; Mao, Ying; Jin, Yi; Wu, Xing; Liu, Bin; Zhang, Yao; Lu, Lu; Laureys, Steven; Weng, Xuchu; Northoff, Georg

2014-05-01

Recent studies have demonstrated resting-state abnormalities in midline regions in vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state patients. However, the functional implications of these resting-state abnormalities remain unclear. Recent findings in healthy subjects have revealed a close overlap between the neural substrate of self-referential processing and the resting-state activity in cortical midline regions. As such, we investigated task-related neural activity during active self-referential processing and various measures of resting-state activity in 11 patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) and 12 healthy control subjects. Overall, the results revealed that DOC patients exhibited task-specific signal changes in anterior and posterior midline regions, including the perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). However, the degree of signal change was significantly lower in DOC patients compared with that in healthy subjects. Moreover, reduced signal differentiation in the PACC predicted the degree of consciousness in DOC patients. Importantly, the same midline regions (PACC and PCC) in DOC patients also exhibited severe abnormalities in the measures of resting-state activity, that is functional connectivity and the amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations. Taken together, our results provide the first evidence of neural abnormalities in both the self-referential processing and the resting state in midline regions in DOC patients. This novel finding has important implications for clinical utility and general understanding of the relationship between the self, the resting state, and consciousness. Copyright © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Toward physics of the mind: Concepts, emotions, consciousness, and symbols

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perlovsky, Leonid I.

2006-03-01

Mathematical approaches to modeling the mind since the 1950s are reviewed, including artificial intelligence, pattern recognition, and neural networks. I analyze difficulties faced by these algorithms and neural networks and relate them to the fundamental inconsistency of logic discovered by Gödel. Mathematical discussions are related to those in neurobiology, psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Higher cognitive functions are reviewed including concepts, emotions, instincts, understanding, imagination, intuition, consciousness. Then, I describe a mathematical formulation, unifying the mind mechanisms in a psychologically and neuro-biologically plausible system. A mechanism of the knowledge instinct drives our understanding of the world and serves as a foundation for higher cognitive functions. This mechanism relates aesthetic emotions and perception of beauty to “everyday” functioning of the mind. The article reviews mechanisms of human symbolic ability. I touch on future directions: joint evolution of the mind, language, consciousness, and cultures; mechanisms of differentiation and synthesis; a manifold of aesthetic emotions in music and differentiated instinct for knowledge. I concentrate on elucidating the first principles; review aspects of the theory that have been proven in laboratory research, relationships between the mind and brain; discuss unsolved problems, and outline a number of theoretical predictions, which will have to be tested in future mathematical simulations and neuro-biological research.

Science of consciousness and the hard problem

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Stapp, H.P.

1996-05-22

Quantum theory is essentially a rationally coherent theory of the interaction of mind and matter, and it allows our conscious thoughts to play a causally efficacious and necessary role in brain dynamics. It therefore provides a natural basis, created by scientists, for the science of consciousness. As an illustration it is explained how the interaction of brain and consciousness can speed up brain processing, and thereby enhance the survival prospects of conscious organisms, as compared to similar organisms that lack consciousness. As a second illustration it is explained how, within the quantum framework, the consciously experienced {open_quotes}I{close_quotes} directs the actionsmore » of a human being. It is concluded that contemporary science already has an adequate framework for incorporating causally efficacious experimential events into the physical universe in a manner that: (1) puts the neural correlates of consciousness into the theory in a well defined way, (2) explains in principle how the effects of consciousness, per se, can enhance the survival prospects of organisms that possess it, (3) allows this survival effect to feed into phylogenetic development, and (4) explains how the consciously experienced {open_quotes}I{close_quotes} can direct human behaviour.« less

"Wanting," "liking," and their relation to consciousness.

PubMed

Anselme, Patrick; Robinson, Mike J F

2016-04-01

Most animal and human behaviors emanate from goal-directedness and pleasure seeking, suggesting that they are primarily under conscious control. However, "wanting" and "liking" are believed to be adaptive core subcortical processes working at an unconscious level and responsible for guiding behavior toward appropriate rewards. Here we examine whether "wanting" is an inherent property of conscious goals and "liking" an intrinsic component of conscious feelings. We argue that "wanting" and "liking" depend on mechanisms acting below the level of consciousness, explaining why individuals often struggle to enhance or refrain their motivations and emotions by means of conscious control. In particular, hyperreactivity of subcortical "wanting" systems has been tied to pathological behaviors such as drug addiction and gambling disorder. In addicts, cognitive processes intended to curb drug-seeking wage a constant battle against subcortical urges to take more drug that often ends in relapse following repeated assaults. Nevertheless, we suggest that in nonpathological contexts, "wanting" and "liking" interact with major cognitive processes to guide goal-directed actions. (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Neural synchronization as a hypothetical explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious.

PubMed

Ceylan, Mehmet Emin; Dönmez, Aslıhan; Ünsalver, Barış Önen; Evrensel, Alper

2016-02-01

Cognitive scientists have tried to explain the neural mechanisms of unconscious mental states such as coma, epileptic seizures, and anesthesia-induced unconsciousness. However these types of unconscious states are different from the psychoanalytic unconscious. In this review, we aim to present our hypothesis about the neural correlates underlying psychoanalytic unconscious. To fulfill this aim, we firstly review the previous explanations about the neural correlates of conscious and unconscious mental states, such as brain oscillations, synchronicity of neural networks, and cognitive binding. By doing so, we hope to lay a neuroscientific ground for our hypothesis about neural correlates of psychoanalytic unconscious; parallel but unsynchronized neural networks between different layers of consciousness and unconsciousness. Next, we propose a neuroscientific mechanism about how the repressed mental events reach the conscious awareness; the lock of neural synchronization between two mental layers of conscious and unconscious. At the last section, we will discuss the data about schizophrenia as a clinical example of our proposed hypothesis. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Right Orbitofrontal Cortex Mediates Conscious Olfactory Perception

PubMed Central

Li, Wen; Lopez, Leonardo; Osher, Jason; Howard, James D.; Parrish, Todd B.; Gottfried, Jay A.

2013-01-01

Understanding how the human brain translates sensory impressions into conscious percepts is a key challenge of neuroscience research. Work in this area has overwhelmingly centered on the conscious experience of vision at the exclusion of the other senses—in particular, smell. We hypothesized that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is a central substrate for olfactory conscious experience because of its privileged physiological role in odor processing. Combining functional magnetic resonance imaging, peripheral autonomic recordings, and olfactory psychophysics, we studied a case of complete anosmia (smell loss) in a patient with circumscribed traumatic brain injury to the right OFC. Despite a complete absence of conscious olfaction, the patient exhibited robust “blind smell,” as indexed by reliable odor-evoked neural activity in the left OFC and normal autonomic responses to odor hedonics during presentation of stimuli to the left nostril. These data highlight the right OFC’s critical role in subserving human olfactory consciousness. PMID:20817780

Direct electrical stimulation of human cortex evokes high gamma activity that predicts conscious somatosensory perception

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Muller, Leah; Rolston, John D.; Fox, Neal P.; Knowlton, Robert; Rao, Vikram R.; Chang, Edward F.

2018-04-01

Objective. Direct electrical stimulation (DES) is a clinical gold standard for human brain mapping and readily evokes conscious percepts, yet the neurophysiological changes underlying these percepts are not well understood. Approach. To determine the neural correlates of DES, we stimulated the somatosensory cortex of ten human participants at frequency-amplitude combinations that both elicited and failed to elicit conscious percepts, meanwhile recording neural activity directly surrounding the stimulation site. We then compared the neural activity of perceived trials to that of non-perceived trials. Main results. We found that stimulation evokes distributed high gamma activity, which correlates with conscious perception better than stimulation parameters themselves. Significance. Our findings suggest that high gamma activity is a reliable biomarker for perception evoked by both natural and electrical stimuli.

What is consciousness, and could machines have it?

PubMed

Dehaene, Stanislas; Lau, Hakwan; Kouider, Sid

2017-10-27

The controversial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that undoubtedly possesses it: the human brain. We suggest that the word "consciousness" conflates two different types of information-processing computations in the brain: the selection of information for global broadcasting, thus making it flexibly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitoring of those computations, leading to a subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense). We argue that despite their recent successes, current machines are still mostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain. We review the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they may inspire novel machine architectures. Copyright © 2017, American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Do cortical midline variability and low frequency fluctuations mediate William James' "Stream of Consciousness"? "Neurophenomenal Balance Hypothesis" of "Inner Time Consciousness".

PubMed

Northoff, Georg

2014-11-01

William James famously characterized consciousness by 'stream of consciousness' which describes the temporal continuity and flow of the contents of consciousness in our 'inner time consciousness'. More specifically he distinguished between "substantive parts", the contents of consciousness, and "transitive parts", the linkages between different contents. While much research has recently focused on the substantive parts, the neural mechanisms underlying the transitive parts and their characterization by the balance between 'sensible continuity' and 'continuous change' remain unclear. The aim of this paper is to develop so-called neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about specifically the transitive parts and their two phenomenal hallmark features, sensible continuity and continuous change in 'inner time consciousness'. Based on recent findings, I hypothesize that the cortical midline structures and their high degree of variability and strong low frequency fluctuations play an essential role in mediating the phenomenal balance between sensible continuity and continuous change. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

[What is impaired consciousness? Revisiting impaired consciousness as psychiatric concept].

PubMed

Kanemoto, Kousuke

2004-01-01

For decades, psychiatrists have considered that concepts of impaired consciousness in the study of psychiatry were inconsistent with those applied in the field of neurology, in which the usefulness of the concept of consciousness has long been seriously doubted. Gloor concluded that the concept of consciousness does not further the understanding of seizure mechanisms or brain function, which is the current representative opinion of most epileptologists. Loss of consciousness tends to be reduced to aggregates of individual impairments of higher cognitive functions, and the concept of consciousness is preferably avoided by neurologists by assigning various behavioral disturbances during disturbed consciousness to particular neuropsychological centers. In contrast, psychiatrists, especially those in Europe, are more likely to include phenomena involving problems related to phenomenological intentionality in impaired consciousness. For the present study, we first divided consciousness into vigilance and recursive consciousness, and then attempted to determine what kind of impaired consciousness would be an ideal candidate to represent pure disturbance of recursive consciousness. Then, 4 patients, 1 each with pure amnestic states followed immediately by complex partial seizures, an akinetic mutistic state caused by absence status, and mental diplopia as a manifestation of postictal psychosis, as well as a patient with Alzheimer's disease who gracefully performed Japanese tea ceremony, were studied. Based on our findings, we concluded that impaired consciousness as a generic term in general medicine does not indicate any unitary entity corresponding to some well-demarcated physiological function or constitute a base from which recursive consciousness emerges as a superstructure. From that, we stressed that a pure form of impairment of recursive consciousness could occur without the impaired consciousness named generically in general medicine. Second, following

Effect of Explicit Evaluation on Neural Connectivity Related to Listening to Unfamiliar Music

PubMed Central

Liu, Chao; Brattico, Elvira; Abu-jamous, Basel; Pereira, Carlos S.; Jacobsen, Thomas; Nandi, Asoke K.

2017-01-01

People can experience different emotions when listening to music. A growing number of studies have investigated the brain structures and neural connectivities associated with perceived emotions. However, very little is known about the effect of an explicit act of judgment on the neural processing of emotionally-valenced music. In this study, we adopted the novel consensus clustering paradigm, called binarisation of consensus partition matrices (Bi-CoPaM), to study whether and how the conscious aesthetic evaluation of the music would modulate brain connectivity networks related to emotion and reward processing. Participants listened to music under three conditions – one involving a non-evaluative judgment, one involving an explicit evaluative aesthetic judgment, and one involving no judgment at all (passive listening only). During non-evaluative attentive listening we obtained auditory-limbic connectivity whereas when participants were asked to decide explicitly whether they liked or disliked the music excerpt, only two clusters of intercommunicating brain regions were found: one including areas related to auditory processing and action observation, and the other comprising higher-order structures involved with visual processing. Results indicate that explicit evaluative judgment has an impact on the neural auditory-limbic connectivity during affective processing of music. PMID:29311874

The temporal structure of resting-state brain activity in the medial prefrontal cortex predicts self-consciousness.

PubMed

Huang, Zirui; Obara, Natsuho; Davis, Henry Hap; Pokorny, Johanna; Northoff, Georg

2016-02-01

Recent studies have demonstrated an overlap between the neural substrate of resting-state activity and self-related processing in the cortical midline structures (CMS). However, the neural and psychological mechanisms mediating this so-called "rest-self overlap" remain unclear. To investigate the neural mechanisms, we estimated the temporal structure of spontaneous/resting-state activity, e.g. its long-range temporal correlations or self-affinity across time as indexed by the power-law exponent (PLE). The PLE was obtained in resting-state activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) in 47 healthy subjects by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We performed correlation analyses of the PLE and Revised Self-Consciousness Scale (SCSR) scores, which enabled us to access different dimensions of self-consciousness and specified rest-self overlap in a psychological regard. The PLE in the MPFC's resting-state activity correlated with private self-consciousness scores from the SCSR. Conversely, we found no correlation between the PLE and the other subscales of the SCSR (public, social) or between other resting-state measures, including functional connectivity, and the SCSR subscales. This is the first evidence for the association between the scale-free dynamics of resting-state activity in the CMS and the private dimension of self-consciousness. This finding implies the relationship of especially the private dimension of self with the temporal structure of resting-state activity. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Quantum-holographic and classical Hopfield-like associative nnets: implications for modeling two cognitive modes of consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rakovic, D.; Dugic, M.

2005-05-01

Quantum bases of consciousness are considered with psychosomatic implications of three front lines of psychosomatic medicine (hesychastic spirituality, holistic Eastern medicine, and symptomatic Western medicine), as well as cognitive implications of two modes of individual consciousness (quantum-coherent transitional and altered states, and classically reduced normal states) alongside with conditions of transformations of one mode into another (considering consciousness quantum-coherence/classical-decoherence acupuncture system/nervous system interaction, direct and reverse, with and without threshold limits, respectively) - by using theoretical methods of associative neural networks and quantum neural holography combined with quantum decoherence theory.

Resting state activity and the "stream of consciousness" in schizophrenia--neurophenomenal hypotheses.

PubMed

Northoff, Georg

2015-01-01

Schizophrenia is a multifaceted disorder with various symptoms including auditory hallucinations, egodisturbances, passivity phenomena, and delusions. Recent neurobiological approaches have focused on, especially, the abnormal contents of consciousness, the "substantive parts" as James said, to associate them with the neural mechanisms related to sensory, motor, and cognitive functions, and the brain's underlying stimulus-induced or task-evoked activity. This leaves open, however, the neural mechanisms that provide the temporal linkage or glue between the various contents, the transitive parts that makes possible the "stream of consciousness." Interestingly, schizophrenic patients seem to suffer from abnormalities specifically in the "transitive parts" when they experience contents as temporally disconnected or fragmented which in phenomenological psychiatry has been described as "temporal fragmentation." The aim of this article is to develop so-called neurophenomenal hypothesis about the direct relationship between phenomenal features of the "stream of consciousness," the "transitive parts," and the specific neuronal mechanisms in schizophrenia as based on healthy subjects. Rather than emphasizing stimulus-induced and task-evoked activity and sensory and lateral prefrontal cortical regions as in neurocognitive approaches with their focus on the "substantive parts," the focus shifts here to the brain's intrinsic activity, its resting state activity, which may account for the temporal linkage or glue between the contents of consciousness, the transitive parts. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Using ERPs for assessing the (sub) conscious perception of noise.

PubMed

Porbadnigk, Anne K; Antons, Jan-N; Blankertz, Benjamin; Treder, Matthias S; Schleicher, Robert; Moller, Sebastian; Curio, Gabriel

2010-01-01

In this paper, we investigate the use of event-related potentials (ERPs) as a quantitative measure for quality assessment of disturbed audio signals. For this purpose, we ran an EEG study (N=11) using an oddball paradigm, during which subjects were presented with the phoneme /a/, superimposed with varying degrees of signal-correlated noise. Based on this data set, we address the question to which degree the degradation of the auditory stimuli is reflected on a neural level, even if the disturbance is below the threshold of conscious perception. For those stimuli that are consciously recognized as being disturbed, we suggest the use of the amplitude and latency of the P300 component for assessing the level of disturbance. For disturbed stimuli for which the noise is not perceived consciously, we show for two subjects that a classifier based on shrinkage LDA can be applied successfully to single out stimuli, for which the noise was presumably processed subconsciously.

Different effects of executive and visuospatial working memory on visual consciousness.

PubMed

De Loof, Esther; Poppe, Louise; Cleeremans, Axel; Gevers, Wim; Van Opstal, Filip

2015-11-01

Consciousness and working memory are two widely studied cognitive phenomena. Although they have been closely tied on a theoretical and neural level, empirical work that investigates their relation is largely lacking. In this study, the relationship between visual consciousness and different working memory components is investigated by using a dual-task paradigm. More specifically, while participants were performing a visual detection task to measure their visual awareness threshold, they had to concurrently perform either an executive or visuospatial working memory task. We hypothesized that visual consciousness would be hindered depending on the type and the size of the load in working memory. Results showed that maintaining visuospatial content in working memory hinders visual awareness, irrespective of the amount of information maintained. By contrast, the detection threshold was progressively affected under increasing executive load. Interestingly, increasing executive load had a generic effect on detection speed, calling into question whether its obstructing effect is specific to the visual awareness threshold. Together, these results indicate that visual consciousness depends differently on executive and visuospatial working memory.

[The mind-brain problem (II): about consciousness].

PubMed

Tirapu-Ustarroz, J; Goni-Saez, F

2016-08-16

Consciousness is the result of a series of neurobiological processes in the brain and is, in turn, a feature of the level of its complexity. In fact, being conscious and being aware place us before what Chalmers called the 'soft problem' and the 'hard problem' of consciousness. The first refers to aspects such as wakefulness, attention or knowledge, while the second is concerned with such complex concepts as self-awareness, 'neural self' or social cognition. In this sense it can be said that the concept of consciousness as a unitary thing poses problems of approaching a highly complex reality. We outline the main models that have addressed the topic of consciousness from a neuroscientific perspective. On the one hand, there are the conscious experience models of Crick, Edelman and Tononi, and Llinas, and, on the other, the models and neuronal bases of self-consciousness by authors such as Damasio (core and extended consciousness), Tulving (autonoetic and noetic consciousness and chronesthesia), the problem of qualia (Dennett, Popper, Ramachandran) and the cognit model (Fuster). All the stimuli we receive from the outside world and from our own internal world are converted and processed by the brain so as to integrate them, and from there they become part of our identity. The perception of a dog and being able to recognise it as such or the understanding of our own consciousness are the result of the functioning of brain, neuronal and synaptic structures. The more complex processes of consciousness, such as self-awareness or empathy, are probably emergent brain processes.

Occupational Consciousness.

PubMed

Ramugondo, Elelwani L

2015-10-02

Occupational consciousness refers to ongoing awareness of the dynamics of hegemony and recognition that dominant practices are sustained through what people do every day, with implications for personal and collective health. The emergence of the construct in post-apartheid South Africa signifies the country's ongoing struggle with negotiating long-standing dynamics of power that were laid down during colonialism, and maintained under black majority rule. Consciousness, a key component of the new terminology, is framed from post-colonial perspectives - notably work by Biko and Fanon - and grounded in the philosophy of liberation, in order to draw attention to continuing unequal intersubjective relations that play out through human occupation. The paper also draws important links between occupational consciousness and other related constructs, namely occupational possibilities, occupational choice, occupational apartheid, and collective occupation. The use of the term 'consciousness' in sociology, with related or different meanings, is also explored. Occupational consciousness is then advanced as a critical notion that frames everyday doing as a potentially liberating response to oppressive social structures. This paper advances theorizing as a scholarly practice in occupational science, and could potentially expand inter or transdisciplinary work for critical conceptualizations of human occupation.

Neural Basis of Visual Distraction

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kim, So-Yeon; Hopfinger, Joseph B.

2010-01-01

The ability to maintain focus and avoid distraction by goal-irrelevant stimuli is critical for performing many tasks and may be a key deficit in attention-related problems. Recent studies have demonstrated that irrelevant stimuli that are consciously perceived may be filtered out on a neural level and not cause the distraction triggered by…

Evidence for consciousness-related anomalies in random physical systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Radin, Dean I.; Nelson, Roger D.

1989-12-01

Speculations about the role of consciousness in physical systems are frequently observed in the literature concerned with the interpretation of quantum mechanics. While only three experimental investigations can be found on this topic in physics journals, more than 800 relevant experiments have been reported in the literature of parapsychology. A well-defined body of empirical evidence from this domain was reviewed using meta-analytic techniques to assess methodological quality and overall effect size. Results showed effects conforming to chance expectation in control conditions and unequivocal non-chance effects in experimental conditions. This quantitative literature review agrees with the findings of two earlier reviews, suggesting the existence of some form of consciousness-related anomaly in random physical systems.

Perspectives on the neuroscience of cognition and consciousness.

PubMed

Werner, Gerhard

2007-01-01

The origin and current use of the concepts of computation, representation and information in Neuroscience are examined and conceptual flaws are identified which vitiate their usefulness for addressing the problem of the neural basis of Cognition and Consciousness. In contrast, a convergence of views is presented to support the characterization of the Nervous System as a complex dynamical system operating in a metastable regime, and capable of evolving to configurations and transitions in phase space with potential relevance for Cognition and Consciousness.

Visual perception from the perspective of a representational, non-reductionistic, level-dependent account of perception and conscious awareness

PubMed Central

Overgaard, Morten; Mogensen, Jesper

2014-01-01

This article proposes a new model to interpret seemingly conflicting evidence concerning the correlation of consciousness and neural processes. Based on an analysis of research of blindsight and subliminal perception, the reorganization of elementary functions and consciousness framework suggests that mental representations consist of functions at several different levels of analysis, including truly localized perceptual elementary functions and perceptual algorithmic modules, which are interconnections of the elementary functions. We suggest that conscious content relates to the ‘top level’ of analysis in a ‘situational algorithmic strategy’ that reflects the general state of an individual. We argue that conscious experience is intrinsically related to representations that are available to guide behaviour. From this perspective, we find that blindsight and subliminal perception can be explained partly by too coarse-grained methodology, and partly by top-down enhancing of representations that normally would not be relevant to action. PMID:24639581

Body Consciousness, Illness-Related Impairment, and Patient Adherence in Hemodialysis.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Christensen, Alan J.; And Others

1996-01-01

Examined the joint effects of private body consciousness (PBC) and degree of illness-related physical impairment on treatment regimen adherence in a sample of 52 hemodialysis patients. Predicted the effect of PBC on adherence would vary as a function of patients' level of illness-related physical impairment. Results are discussed in terms of…

The science of consciousness - Basics, models, and visions.

PubMed

Hinterberger, Thilo

2015-12-01

This article presents a few models and aspects of the phenomenon consciousness that are emerging from modern neuroscience and might serve as a basis for scientific discourse in the field of Applied Consciousness Sciences. A first model describes the dynamics of information processing in the brain. The evoked electric brain potentials represent a hierarchical sequence of functions playing an important role in conscious perception. These range from primary processing, attention, pattern recognition, categorization, associations to judgments, and complex thoughts. Most functions seem to be implemented in the brain's neural network operating as a neurobiological computer. Another model treats conscious perception as a process of internalisation leading to the "self" as conscious observer. As a consequence, every conscious perception can be seen as a reduced and already interpreted observation of an inner representation of an outer or imagined "world." Subjective experience thus offers properties which can only be experienced from the inside and cannot be made objective. Basic values of humanity such as responsibility, love, compassion, freedom, and dignity can be derived from these subjective qualities. Therefore, in contrast to the Natural Sciences, the Science of Consciousness additionally is challenged to deal with those subjective qualities, emphasizing the resulting influence on health, social interactions, and the whole society. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Towards solving the hard problem of consciousness: The varieties of brain resonances and the conscious experiences that they support.

PubMed

Grossberg, Stephen

2017-03-01

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how we experience qualia or phenomenal experiences, such as seeing, hearing, and feeling, and knowing what they are. To solve this problem, a theory of consciousness needs to link brain to mind by modeling how emergent properties of several brain mechanisms interacting together embody detailed properties of individual conscious psychological experiences. This article summarizes evidence that Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, accomplishes this goal. ART is a cognitive and neural theory of how advanced brains autonomously learn to attend, recognize, and predict objects and events in a changing world. ART has predicted that "all conscious states are resonant states" as part of its specification of mechanistic links between processes of consciousness, learning, expectation, attention, resonance, and synchrony. It hereby provides functional and mechanistic explanations of data ranging from individual spikes and their synchronization to the dynamics of conscious perceptual, cognitive, and cognitive-emotional experiences. ART has reached sufficient maturity to begin classifying the brain resonances that support conscious experiences of seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing. Psychological and neurobiological data in both normal individuals and clinical patients are clarified by this classification. This analysis also explains why not all resonances become conscious, and why not all brain dynamics are resonant. The global organization of the brain into computationally complementary cortical processing streams (complementary computing), and the organization of the cerebral cortex into characteristic layers of cells (laminar computing), figure prominently in these explanations of conscious and unconscious processes. Alternative models of consciousness are also discussed. Copyright © 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Why and How. The Future of the Central Questions of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Havlík, Marek; Kozáková, Eva; Horáček, Jiří

2017-01-01

In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the “hard problem” of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem of consciousness will probably never completely disappear because it will always have its most committed supporters. However, there is a good chance that its weight and importance will be highly reduced by empirically tackling consciousness in the near future. We expect that future empirical endeavor of consciousness will be based on a unifying brain theory and will answer the question as to what is the function of conscious experience, which will in turn replace the implications of the hard problem. The candidate of such a unifying brain theory is predictive coding, which will have to explain both perceptual consciousness and conscious mind-wandering in order to become the truly unifying theory of brain functioning. PMID:29075226

Paradigm shift in consciousness research: the child's self-awareness and abnormalities in autism, ADHD and schizophrenia.

PubMed

Lou, Hans C

2012-02-01

Self-awareness is a pivotal component of any conscious experience and conscious self-regulation of behaviour. A paralimbic network is active, specific and causal in self-awareness. Its regions interact by gamma synchrony. Gamma synchrony develops throughout infancy, childhood and adolescence into adulthood and is regulated by dopamine and other neurotransmitters via GABA interneurons. Major derailments of this network and self-awareness occur in developmental disorders of conscious self-regulation like autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and schizophrenia. Recent research on conscious experience is no longer limited to the study of neural 'correlations' but is increasingly lending itself to the study of causality. This paradigm shift opens new perspectives for understanding the neural mechanisms of the developing self and the causal effects of their disturbance in developmental disorders. © 2011 The Author(s)/Acta Paediatrica © 2011 Foundation Acta Paediatrica.

Language and Cognition Interaction Neural Mechanisms

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-06-01

cognition and consciousness,” in Neurodynamics of Cognition and Consciousness, L. Perlovsky and R. Kozma, Eds., Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, 2007. [31] L...115, 1987. [43] L. I. Perlovsky, “Neural dynamic logic of consciousness: the knowledge instinct,” in Neurodynamics of Higher-Level Cognition and...Brain, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, USA, 2000. [58] L. I. Perlovsky and R. Kozma, Eds., Neurodynamics of Higher- Level Cognition and

Occipital MEG Activity in the Early Time Range (<300 ms) Predicts Graded Changes in Perceptual Consciousness.

PubMed

Andersen, Lau M; Pedersen, Michael N; Sandberg, Kristian; Overgaard, Morten

2016-06-01

Two electrophysiological components have been extensively investigated as candidate neural correlates of perceptual consciousness: An early, occipitally realized component occurring 130-320 ms after stimulus onset and a late, frontally realized component occurring 320-510 ms after stimulus onset. Recent studies have suggested that the late component may not be uniquely related to perceptual consciousness, but also to sensory expectations, task associations, and selective attention. We conducted a magnetoencephalographic study; using multivariate analysis, we compared classification accuracies when decoding perceptual consciousness from the 2 components using sources from occipital and frontal lobes. We found that occipital sources during the early time range were significantly more accurate in decoding perceptual consciousness than frontal sources during both the early and late time ranges. These results are the first of its kind where the predictive values of the 2 components are quantitatively compared, and they provide further evidence for the primary importance of occipital sources in realizing perceptual consciousness. The results have important consequences for current theories of perceptual consciousness, especially theories emphasizing the role of frontal sources. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

EEG entropy measures indicate decrease of cortical information processing in Disorders of Consciousness.

PubMed

Thul, Alexander; Lechinger, Julia; Donis, Johann; Michitsch, Gabriele; Pichler, Gerald; Kochs, Eberhard F; Jordan, Denis; Ilg, Rüdiger; Schabus, Manuel

2016-02-01

Clinical assessments that rely on behavioral responses to differentiate Disorders of Consciousness are at times inapt because of some patients' motor disabilities. To objectify patients' conditions of reduced consciousness the present study evaluated the use of electroencephalography to measure residual brain activity. We analyzed entropy values of 18 scalp EEG channels of 15 severely brain-damaged patients with clinically diagnosed Minimally-Conscious-State (MCS) or Unresponsive-Wakefulness-Syndrome (UWS) and compared the results to a sample of 24 control subjects. Permutation entropy (PeEn) and symbolic transfer entropy (STEn), reflecting information processes in the EEG, were calculated for all subjects. Participants were tested on a modified active own-name paradigm to identify correlates of active instruction following. PeEn showed reduced local information content in the EEG in patients, that was most pronounced in UWS. STEn analysis revealed altered directed information flow in the EEG of patients, indicating impaired feed-backward connectivity. Responses to auditory stimulation yielded differences in entropy measures, indicating reduced information processing in MCS and UWS. Local EEG information content and information flow are affected in Disorders of Consciousness. This suggests local cortical information capacity and feedback information transfer as neural correlates of consciousness. The utilized EEG entropy analyses were able to relate to patient groups with different Disorders of Consciousness. Copyright © 2015 International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Afference copy as a quantitative neurophysiological model for consciousness.

PubMed

Cornelis, Hugo; Coop, Allan D

2014-06-01

Consciousness is a topic of considerable human curiosity with a long history of philosophical analysis and debate. We consider there is nothing particularly complicated about consciousness when viewed as a necessary process of the vertebrate nervous system. Here, we propose a physiological "explanatory gap" is created during each present moment by the temporal requirements of neuronal activity. The gap extends from the time exteroceptive and proprioceptive stimuli activate the nervous system until they emerge into consciousness. During this "moment", it is impossible for an organism to have any conscious knowledge of the ongoing evolution of its environment. In our schematic model, a mechanism of "afference copy" is employed to bridge the explanatory gap with consciously experienced percepts. These percepts are fabricated from the conjunction of the cumulative memory of previous relevant experience and the given stimuli. They are structured to provide the best possible prediction of the expected content of subjective conscious experience likely to occur during the period of the gap. The model is based on the proposition that the neural circuitry necessary to support consciousness is a product of sub/preconscious reflexive learning and recall processes. Based on a review of various psychological and neurophysiological findings, we develop a framework which contextualizes the model and briefly discuss further implications.

Consciousness and body image: lessons from phantom limbs, Capgras syndrome and pain asymbolia.

PubMed Central

Ramachandran, V S

1998-01-01

Words such as 'consciousness' and 'self' actually encompass a number of distinct phenomena that are loosely lumped together. The study of neurological syndromes allows us to explore the neural mechanisms that might underlie different aspects of self, such as body image and emotional responses to sensory stimuli, and perhaps even laughter and humour. Mapping the 'functional logic' of the many different attributes of human nature on to specific neural circuits in the brain offers the best hope of understanding how the activity of neurons gives rise to conscious experience. We consider three neurological syndromes (phantom limbs, Capgras delusion and pain asymbolia) to illustrate this idea. PMID:9854257

Thalamic stimulation to improve level of consciousness after seizures: evaluation of electrophysiology and behavior.

PubMed

Gummadavelli, Abhijeet; Motelow, Joshua E; Smith, Nicholas; Zhan, Qiong; Schiff, Nicholas D; Blumenfeld, Hal

2015-01-01

Understanding the neural mechanisms that support human consciousness is an important frontier in neuroscience and medicine. We previously developed a rodent model of temporal lobe seizures that recapitulates the human electroencephalography (EEG) signature of ictal and postictal neocortical slow waves associated with behavioral impairments in level of consciousness. The mechanism of slow-wave production in epilepsy may involve suppression of the subcortical arousal systems including the brainstem and intralaminar thalamic nuclei. We hypothesized that intralaminar thalamic stimulation may lead to electrophysiologic and functional rescue from postictal slow waves and behavioral arrest. We electrically stimulated the central lateral thalamic nucleus (a member of the intralaminar nuclei) under anesthesia and after electrically induced hippocampal seizures in anesthetized and in awake-behaving animal model preparations. We demonstrated a proof-of-principle restoration of electrophysiologic and behavioral measures of consciousness by stimulating the intralaminar thalamic nuclei after seizures. We measured decreased cortical slow waves and increased desynchronization and multiunit activity in the cortex with thalamic stimulation following seizures. Functionally, thalamic stimulation produced resumption of exploratory behaviors in the postictal state. Targeting of nodes in the neural circuitry of consciousness has important medical implications. Impaired consciousness with epilepsy has dangerous consequences including decreased school/work performance, social stigmatization, and impaired airway protection. These data suggest a novel therapeutic approach for restoring consciousness after seizures. If paired with responsive neurostimulation, this may allow rapid implementation to improve level of consciousness in patients with epilepsy. Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2014 International League Against Epilepsy.

Neural Dynamic Logic of Consciousness: The Knowledge Instinct

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-09-07

have the drive for positive stimulation , regardless of the satisfaction of drives such as hunger [i]; David Berlyne emphasized curiosity as a desire...and stimulates differentiation. The simplest modification of eq.(9), accounting for influence of synthesis is dD/dt = aS. (13) These equations...perception (when it is usually subliminal )? Can we measure aesthetic emotions during more complex cognition (when it is more conscious)? Does brain

Consciousness in dreams.

PubMed

Kahn, David; Gover, Tzivia

2010-01-01

This chapter argues that dreaming is an important state of consciousness and that it has many features that complement consciousness in the wake state. The chapter discusses consciousness in dreams and how it comes about. It discusses the changes that occur in the neuromodulatory environment and in the neuronal connectivity of the brain as we fall asleep and begin our night journeys. Dreams evolve from internal sources though the dream may look different than any one of these since something entirely new may emerge through self-organizing processes. The chapter also explores characteristics of dreaming consciousness such as acceptance of implausibility and how that might lead to creative insight. Examples of studies, which have shown creativity in dream sleep, are provided to illustrate important characteristics of dreaming consciousness. The chapter also discusses the dream body and how it relates to our consciousness while dreaming. Differences and similarities between wake, lucid, non-lucid and day dreaming are explored and the chapter concludes with a discussion on what we can learn from each of these expressions of consciousness. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Neural correlates of visuospatial consciousness in 3D default space: insights from contralateral neglect syndrome.

PubMed

Jerath, Ravinder; Crawford, Molly W

2014-08-01

One of the most compelling questions still unanswered in neuroscience is how consciousness arises. In this article, we examine visual processing, the parietal lobe, and contralateral neglect syndrome as a window into consciousness and how the brain functions as the mind and we introduce a mechanism for the processing of visual information and its role in consciousness. We propose that consciousness arises from integration of information from throughout the body and brain by the thalamus and that the thalamus reimages visual and other sensory information from throughout the cortex in a default three-dimensional space in the mind. We further suggest that the thalamus generates a dynamic default three-dimensional space by integrating processed information from corticothalamic feedback loops, creating an infrastructure that may form the basis of our consciousness. Further experimental evidence is needed to examine and support this hypothesis, the role of the thalamus, and to further elucidate the mechanism of consciousness. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A Neural Network Approach to fMRI Binocular Visual Rivalry Task Analysis

PubMed Central

Bertolino, Nicola; Ferraro, Stefania; Nigri, Anna; Bruzzone, Maria Grazia; Ghielmetti, Francesco; Leonardi, Matilde; Agostino Parati, Eugenio; Grazia Bruzzone, Maria; Franceschetti, Silvana; Caldiroli, Dario; Sattin, Davide; Giovannetti, Ambra; Pagani, Marco; Covelli, Venusia; Ciaraffa, Francesca; Vela Gomez, Jesus; Reggiori, Barbara; Ferraro, Stefania; Nigri, Anna; D'Incerti, Ludovico; Minati, Ludovico; Andronache, Adrian; Rosazza, Cristina; Fazio, Patrik; Rossi, Davide; Varotto, Giulia; Panzica, Ferruccio; Benti, Riccardo; Marotta, Giorgio; Molteni, Franco

2014-01-01

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether artificial neural networks (ANN) are able to decode participants’ conscious experience perception from brain activity alone, using complex and ecological stimuli. To reach the aim we conducted pattern recognition data analysis on fMRI data acquired during the execution of a binocular visual rivalry paradigm (BR). Twelve healthy participants were submitted to fMRI during the execution of a binocular non-rivalry (BNR) and a BR paradigm in which two classes of stimuli (faces and houses) were presented. During the binocular rivalry paradigm, behavioral responses related to the switching between consciously perceived stimuli were also collected. First, we used the BNR paradigm as a functional localizer to identify the brain areas involved the processing of the stimuli. Second, we trained the ANN on the BNR fMRI data restricted to these regions of interest. Third, we applied the trained ANN to the BR data as a ‘brain reading’ tool to discriminate the pattern of neural activity between the two stimuli. Fourth, we verified the consistency of the ANN outputs with the collected behavioral indicators of which stimulus was consciously perceived by the participants. Our main results showed that the trained ANN was able to generalize across the two different tasks (i.e. BNR and BR) and to identify with high accuracy the cognitive state of the participants (i.e. which stimulus was consciously perceived) during the BR condition. The behavioral response, employed as control parameter, was compared with the network output and a statistically significant percentage of correspondences (p-value <0.05) were obtained for all subjects. In conclusion the present study provides a method based on multivariate pattern analysis to investigate the neural basis of visual consciousness during the BR phenomenon when behavioral indicators lack or are inconsistent, like in disorders of consciousness or sedated patients. PMID:25121595

From Emotions to Consciousness – A Neuro-Phenomenal and Neuro-Relational Approach

PubMed Central

Northoff, Georg

2012-01-01

The James–Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and instrumental, i.e., modulatory role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings. This implies that the environment itself is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. I call this the relational concept of emotional feeling. The present paper discusses recent data from neuroimaging that investigate emotions in relation to interoceptive processing and the brain’s intrinsic activity. These data show the intrinsic linkage of interoceptive stimulus processing to both exteroceptive stimuli and the brain’s intrinsic activity. This is possible only if the differences between intrinsic activity and intero- and exteroceptive stimuli is encoded into neural activity. Such relational coding makes possible the assignment of subjective and affective features to the otherwise objective and non-affective stimulus. I therefore consider emotions to be intrinsically affective and subjective as it is manifest in emotional feelings. The relational approach thus goes together with what may be described as neuro-phenomenal approach. Such neuro-phenomenal approach does not only inform emotions and emotional feeling but is also highly relevant to better understand the neuronal mechanisms underlying consciousness in general. PMID:22969736

[Neurological aspects related to altered consciousness states associated with spirituality].

PubMed

Valiente-Barroso, Carlos; García-García, Emilio

2010-08-16

Religiosity in the human being constitutes a universal and present phenomenon in all their evolution, extending times and cultures. The spirituality, like a base of the human religious dimension, and not strictly identified with this one, implies, among others manifestations, intense subjective experiences that, sometimes, can derive in altered consciousness states. To review some of the most outstanding phenomena that constitute consciousness alteration related to experiences of spiritual nature, trying to explain the neurological framework that justifies them. We analyze the connection that takes place between peculiar expressions of religious and mystical exacerbation with respect to some forms of epilepsy, distinguishing between distinct manifestations from those based on its appearance moment within the epileptic moment (ictal, postictal and interictal periods). Later on, we present the most important psychoactive substances, also used in ritual contexts, with capacity to bring about ecstasies experiences. Affirming the possibility of including the religious fact and their manifestations within the scientific argument, we tentatively propose the neurological foundations that underlie to these exceptional consciousness states to associate to the spirituality. They are involved in many occasions in the clinical practice requiring of being known and considered as a deeper investigation, which continues clarifying all these aims.

Trauma-related dissociation and altered states of consciousness: a call for clinical, treatment, and neuroscience research

PubMed Central

Lanius, Ruth A.

2015-01-01

The primary aim of this commentary is to describe trauma-related dissociation and altered states of consciousness in the context of a four-dimensional model that has recently been proposed (Frewen & Lanius, 2015). This model categorizes symptoms of trauma-related psychopathology into (1) those that occur within normal waking consciousness and (2) those that are dissociative and are associated with trauma-related altered states of consciousness (TRASC) along four dimensions: (1) time; (2) thought; (3) body; and (4) emotion. Clinical applications and future research directions relevant to each dimension are discussed. Conceptualizing TRASC across the dimensions of time, thought, body, and emotion has transdiagnostic implications for trauma-related disorders described in both the Diagnostic Statistical Manual and the International Classifications of Diseases. The four-dimensional model provides a framework, guided by existing models of dissociation, for future research examining the phenomenological, neurobiological, and physiological underpinnings of trauma-related dissociation. PMID:25994026

Consciousness, brain, neuroplasticity

PubMed Central

Askenasy, Jean; Lehmann, Joseph

2013-01-01

Subjectivity, intentionality, self-awareness and will are major components of consciousness in human beings. Changes in consciousness and its content following different brain processes and malfunction have long been studied. Cognitive sciences assume that brain activities have an infrastructure, but there is also evidence that consciousness itself may change this infrastructure. The two-way influence between brain and consciousness has been at the center of philosophy and less so, of science. This so-called bottom-up and top-down interrelationship is controversial and is the subject of our article. We would like to ask: how does it happen that consciousness may provoke structural changes in the brain? The living brain means continuous changes at the synaptic level with every new experience, with every new process of learning, memorizing or mastering new and existing skills. Synapses are generated and dissolved, while others are preserved, in an ever-changing process of so-called neuroplasticity. Ongoing processes of synaptic reinforcements and decay occur during wakefulness when consciousness is present, but also during sleep when it is mostly absent. We suggest that consciousness influences brain neuroplasticity both during wakefulness as well as sleep in a top-down way. This means that consciousness really activates synaptic flow and changes brain structures and functional organization. The dynamic impact of consciousness on brain never stops despite the relative stationary structure of the brain. Such a process can be a target for medical intervention, e.g., by cognitive training. PMID:23847580

Disconnecting Consciousness: Is There a Common Anesthetic End Point?

PubMed

Hudetz, Anthony G; Mashour, George A

2016-11-01

A quest for a systems-level neuroscientific basis of anesthetic-induced loss and return of consciousness has been in the forefront of research for the past 2 decades. Recent advances toward the discovery of underlying mechanisms have been achieved using experimental electrophysiology, multichannel electroencephalography, magnetoencephalography, and functional magnetic resonance imaging. By the careful dosing of various volatile and IV anesthetic agents to the level of behavioral unresponsiveness, both specific and common changes in functional and effective connectivity across large-scale brain networks have been discovered and interpreted in the context of how the synthesis of neural information might be affected during anesthesia. The results of most investigations to date converge toward the conclusion that a common neural correlate of anesthetic-induced unresponsiveness is a consistent depression or functional disconnection of lateral frontoparietal networks, which are thought to be critical for consciousness of the environment. A reduction in the repertoire of brain states may contribute to the anesthetic disruption of large-scale information integration leading to unconsciousness. In future investigations, a systematic delineation of connectivity changes with multiple anesthetics using the same experimental design, and the same analytical method will be desirable. The critical neural events that account for the transition between responsive and unresponsive states should be assessed at similar anesthetic doses just below and above the loss or return of responsiveness. There will also be a need to identify a robust, sensitive, and reliable measure of information transfer. Ultimately, finding a behavior-independent measure of subjective experience that can track covert cognition in unresponsive subjects and a delineation of causal factors versus correlated events will be essential to understand the neuronal basis of human consciousness and unconsciousness.

Sample Entropy Analysis of EEG Signals via Artificial Neural Networks to Model Patients' Consciousness Level Based on Anesthesiologists Experience

PubMed Central

Jiang, George J. A.; Fan, Shou-Zen; Abbod, Maysam F.; Huang, Hui-Hsun; Lan, Jheng-Yan; Tsai, Feng-Fang; Chang, Hung-Chi; Yang, Yea-Wen; Chuang, Fu-Lan; Chiu, Yi-Fang; Jen, Kuo-Kuang; Wu, Jeng-Fu; Shieh, Jiann-Shing

2015-01-01

Electroencephalogram (EEG) signals, as it can express the human brain's activities and reflect awareness, have been widely used in many research and medical equipment to build a noninvasive monitoring index to the depth of anesthesia (DOA). Bispectral (BIS) index monitor is one of the famous and important indicators for anesthesiologists primarily using EEG signals when assessing the DOA. In this study, an attempt is made to build a new indicator using EEG signals to provide a more valuable reference to the DOA for clinical researchers. The EEG signals are collected from patients under anesthetic surgery which are filtered using multivariate empirical mode decomposition (MEMD) method and analyzed using sample entropy (SampEn) analysis. The calculated signals from SampEn are utilized to train an artificial neural network (ANN) model through using expert assessment of consciousness level (EACL) which is assessed by experienced anesthesiologists as the target to train, validate, and test the ANN. The results that are achieved using the proposed system are compared to BIS index. The proposed system results show that it is not only having similar characteristic to BIS index but also more close to experienced anesthesiologists which illustrates the consciousness level and reflects the DOA successfully. PMID:25738152

Consciousness: a neural capacity for objectivity, especially pronounced in humans

PubMed Central

Dijker, Anton J. M.

2014-01-01

Consciousness tends to be viewed either as subjective experience of sensations and feelings, or as perception and internal representation of objects. This paper argues that neither view sufficiently acknowledges that consciousness may refer to the brain’s most adaptive property: its capacity to produce states of objectivity. It is proposed that this capacity relies on multiple sensorimotor networks for internally representing objects and their properties in terms of expectancies, as well as on motivational and motor mechanisms involved in exploration, play, and care for vulnerable living and non-living objects. States of objectivity are associated with a very special phenomenal aspect; the experience that subjective aspects are absent and one is “just looking” at the world as it really is and can be. However, these states are normally closely preceded and followed by (and tend to be combined or fused with) sensations and feelings which are caused by activation of sensory and motivational mechanisms. A capacity for objectivity may have evolved in different species and can be conceived as a common basis for other elusive psychological properties such as intelligence, conscience, and esthetic experience; all three linked to crucial behaviors in human evolution such as tool making, cooperation, and art. The brain’s pervasive tendency to objectify may be responsible for wrongly equating consciousness with feelings and wrongly opposing it to well-learned or habitual (“unconscious”) patterns of perception and behavior. PMID:24672506

Consciousness and the Prefrontal Parietal Network: Insights from Attention, Working Memory, and Chunking

PubMed Central

Bor, Daniel; Seth, Anil K.

2012-01-01

Consciousness has of late become a “hot topic” in neuroscience. Empirical work has centered on identifying potential neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs), with a converging view that the prefrontal parietal network (PPN) is closely associated with this process. Theoretical work has primarily sought to explain how informational properties of this cortical network could account for phenomenal properties of consciousness. However, both empirical and theoretical research has given less focus to the psychological features that may account for the NCCs. The PPN has also been heavily linked with cognitive processes, such as attention. We describe how this literature is under-appreciated in consciousness science, in part due to the increasingly entrenched assumption of a strong dissociation between attention and consciousness. We argue instead that there is more common ground between attention and consciousness than is usually emphasized: although objects can under certain circumstances be attended to in the absence of conscious access, attention as a content selection and boosting mechanism is an important and necessary aspect of consciousness. Like attention, working memory and executive control involve the interlinking of multiple mental objects and have also been closely associated with the PPN. We propose that this set of cognitive functions, in concert with attention, make up the core psychological components of consciousness. One related process, chunking, exploits logical or mnemonic redundancies in a dataset so that it can be recoded and a given task optimized. Chunking has been shown to activate PPN particularly robustly, even compared with other cognitively demanding tasks, such as working memory or mental arithmetic. It is therefore possible that chunking, as a tool to detect useful patterns within an integrated set of intensely processed (attended) information, has a central role to play in consciousness. Following on from this, we suggest that a key

Contemplative Neuroscience as an Approach to Volitional Consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Thompson, Evan

This chapter presents a methodological approach to volitional consciousness for cognitive neuroscience based on studying the voluntary self-generation and self-regulation of mental states in meditation. Called contemplative neuroscience, this approach views attention, awareness, and emotion regulation as flexible and trainable skills, and works with experimental participants who have undergone training in contemplative practices designed to hone these skills. Drawing from research on the dynamical neural correlates of contemplative mental states and theories of large-scale neural coordination dynamics, I argue for the importance of global system causation in brain activity and present an "interventionist" approach to intentional causation.

Abnormal medial prefrontal cortex activity in heavy cannabis users during conscious emotional evaluation.

PubMed

Wesley, Michael J; Lile, Joshua A; Hanlon, Colleen A; Porrino, Linda J

2016-03-01

Long-term heavy cannabis users (cannabis users) who are not acutely intoxicated have diminished subconscious neural responsiveness to affective stimuli. This study sought to determine if abnormal processing extends to the conscious evaluation of emotional stimuli. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to examine brain activity as cannabis users (N = 16) and non-cannabis-using controls (N = 17) evaluated and categorized standardized International Affective Picture System (IAPS) stimuli. Individual judgments were used to isolate activity during the evaluation of emotional (i.e., emotional evaluation) or neutral (i.e., neutral evaluation) stimuli. Within- and between-group analyses were performed. Both groups judged the same stimuli as emotional and had activations in visual, midbrain, and middle cingulate cortices during emotional evaluation, relative to neutral. Within-group analyses also revealed amygdalar and inferior frontal gyrus activations in controls, but not cannabis users, and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) deactivations in cannabis users, but not controls, during emotional evaluation, relative to neutral. Between-group comparisons found that mPFC activity during positive and negative evaluation was significantly hypoactive in cannabis users, relative to controls. Abnormal neural processing of affective content extends to the level of consciousness in cannabis users. The hypoactive mPFC responses observed resembles the attenuated mPFC responses found during increased non-affective cognitive load in prior research. These findings suggest that abnormal mPFC singling in cannabis users during emotional evaluation might be associated with increased non-affective cognitive load.

The role of body-related self-conscious emotions in motivating women's physical activity.

PubMed

Sabiston, Catherine M; Brunet, Jennifer; Kowalski, Kent C; Wilson, Philip M; Mack, Diane E; Crocker, Peter R E

2010-08-01

The purpose of this study was to test a model where body-related self-conscious emotions of shame, guilt, and pride were associated with physical activity regulations and behavior. Adult women (N = 389; M age = 29.82, SD = 15.20 years) completed a questionnaire assessing body-related pride, shame, and guilt, motivational regulations, and leisure-time physical activity. The hypothesized measurement and structural models were deemed adequate, as was a revised model examining shame-free guilt and guilt-free shame. In the revised structural model, body-related pride was positively significantly related to identified and intrinsic regulations. Body-related shame-free guilt was significantly associated with external, introjected, and identified regulations. Body-related guilt-free shame was significantly positively related to external and introjected regulation, and negatively associated with intrinsic regulation. Identified and intrinsic regulations were significantly positively related to physical activity (R2 = .62). These findings highlight the importance of targeting and understanding the realm of body-related self-conscious emotions and the associated links to regulations and physical activity behavior.

Neuroethics and Disorders of Consciousness: Discerning Brain States in Clinical Practice and Research.

PubMed

Fins, Joseph J

2016-12-01

Decisions about end-of-life care and participation in clinical research for patients with disorders of consciousness begin with diagnostic discernment. Accurately distinguishing between brain states clarifies clinicians' ethical obligations and responsibilities. Central to this effort is the obligation to provide neuropalliative care for patients in the minimally conscious state who can perceive pain and to restore functional communication through neuroprosthetics, drugs, and rehabilitation to patients with intact but underactivated neural networks. Efforts to bring scientific advances to patients with disorders of consciousness are reviewed, including the investigational use of deep brain stimulation in patients in the minimally conscious state. These efforts help to affirm the civil rights of a population long on the margins. © 2016 American Medical Association. All Rights Reserved.

The clinical relevance of the duration of loss of consciousness provoked by tilt testing.

PubMed

Zyśko, Dorota; Gajek, Jacek; Kozluk, Edward; Agrawal, Anil Kumar; Smereka, Jacek; Checiński, Igor

2010-04-01

The authors assessed the relationships between the duration of loss of consciousness (dLOC) during tilt testing-induced syncope (TTS) and demographics, medical history as well as tilt testing results. Previous research focused on the relevance of the type of neurocardiogenic reaction during TTS. The importance of dLOC has not been assessed so far. The study was carried out in 274 patients with suspected neurally mediated syncope and total loss of consciousness during tilt testing. The syncope burden, demographics, and data regarding spontaneous syncope orTTS were compared between group I with dLOC > or =47 seconds and group 2 with dLOC <47 seconds. Medical history revealed that patients in group I had more syncopal spells, more frequent syncope-related traumatic injuries, urine incontinence, jerking movements and typical vasovagal history than in group 2. Moreover, group I patients had more frequently a cardioinhibitory type of reaction and a shorter active phase duration. In addition, they manifested more frequent accompanying cerebral hypoperfusion signs and reproduction of symptoms during TTS than patients in group 2. The loss of consciousness during tilt testing-induced syncope differs in terms of duration among patients with neurally mediated syncope. The dLOC during TTS is associated with medical history and tilt-testing data which confirm the vasovagal aetiology of spontaneous events. The longer dLOC suggests deeper cerebral haemodynamic disturbances during either spontaneous or provoked syncope.

Neural correlates of the essence of conscious conflict: fMRI of sustaining incompatible intentions.

PubMed

Gray, Jeremy R; Bargh, John A; Morsella, Ezequiel

2013-09-01

The study of intrapsychic conflict has long been central to many key theories about the control of behavior. More recently, by focusing on the nature of conflicting processes in the brain, investigators have revealed great insights about controlled versus automatic processes and the nature of self-control. Despite these advances, many theories of cognitive control or self-control remain agnostic about the function of subjective awareness (i.e., basic consciousness). Why people consciously experience some conflicts in the nervous system but not others remains a mystery. One hypothesis is that people become conscious only of conflicts involving competition for the control of skeletal muscle. To test one aspect of this larger hypothesis, in the present study, 14 participants were trained to introspect the feeling of conflict (the urge to make an error during a Stroop color-word interference task) and then were asked to introspect in the same way while sustaining simple compatible and incompatible intentions during fMRI scanning (to move a finger left or right). As predicted, merely sustaining incompatible skeletomotor intentions prior to their execution produced stronger systematic changes in subjective experience than sustaining compatible intentions, as indicated by self-report ratings obtained in the scanner. Similar ratings held for a modified Stroop-like task when contrasting incompatible versus compatible trials also during fMRI scanning. We use subjective ratings as the basis of parametric analyses of fMRI data, focusing a priori on the brain regions involved in action-related urges (e.g., parietal cortex) and cognitive control (e.g., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, lateral PFC). The results showed that subjective conflict from sustaining incompatible intentions was consistently related to activity in the left post-central gyrus.

Untangling Brain-Wide Dynamics in Consciousness by Cross-Embedding

PubMed Central

Tajima, Satohiro; Yanagawa, Toru; Fujii, Naotaka; Toyoizumi, Taro

2015-01-01

Brain-wide interactions generating complex neural dynamics are considered crucial for emergent cognitive functions. However, the irreducible nature of nonlinear and high-dimensional dynamical interactions challenges conventional reductionist approaches. We introduce a model-free method, based on embedding theorems in nonlinear state-space reconstruction, that permits a simultaneous characterization of complexity in local dynamics, directed interactions between brain areas, and how the complexity is produced by the interactions. We demonstrate this method in large-scale electrophysiological recordings from awake and anesthetized monkeys. The cross-embedding method captures structured interaction underlying cortex-wide dynamics that may be missed by conventional correlation-based analysis, demonstrating a critical role of time-series analysis in characterizing brain state. The method reveals a consciousness-related hierarchy of cortical areas, where dynamical complexity increases along with cross-area information flow. These findings demonstrate the advantages of the cross-embedding method in deciphering large-scale and heterogeneous neuronal systems, suggesting a crucial contribution by sensory-frontoparietal interactions to the emergence of complex brain dynamics during consciousness. PMID:26584045

Intelligence as it relates to conscious and unconscious memory influences.

PubMed

Joordens, Steve; Walsh, Darlene; Mantonakis, Antonia

2013-09-01

We examine the relationship between a measure of intelligence and estimates of conscious and unconscious memory influences derived using Jacoby's (Jacoby, L. L. [1991]. A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-541.) process-dissociation procedure. We find a positive relationship between intelligence and conscious memory, and no relationship between intelligence and unconscious influences once the impact of conscious influences are removed (Experiment 1). We also find that when participants cannot engage in conscious strategies, such as when there is insufficient time for learning, the relationships observed in Experiment 1 are eliminated (Experiments 2A and 2B). Our results support the notion that individual differences in intelligence reflect differences in conscious strategic processes (Karis, D., Fabiani, M., & Donchin, E. [1984]. "P300" and memory: Individual differences in the von Restorff effect. Cognitive Psychology, 16, 177-216.) and not differences in mental speed (Eysenck, H. J. (1984). Intelligence versus behavior. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 7, 290-291; Jensen, A. R. [1982]. Bias in mental testing. New York, NY: Free Press). PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved

Role of right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex in self-conscious emotional reactivity

PubMed Central

Sollberger, Marc; Seeley, William W.; Rankin, Katherine P.; Ascher, Elizabeth A.; Rosen, Howard J.; Miller, Bruce L.; Levenson, Robert W.

2013-01-01

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment arise when one’s actions fail to meet salient social expectations and are accompanied by marked physiological and behavioral activation. We investigated the neural correlates of self-conscious emotional reactivity in 27 patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a neurodegenerative disease that disrupts self-conscious emotion and targets brain regions critical for emotional functioning early in the disease course, and in 33 healthy older controls. Subjects participated in an embarrassing karaoke task in which they watched a video clip of themselves singing. They also watched a sad film clip; these data were used to control for non-self-conscious emotional reactivity in response to audiovisual stimuli. Using Freesurfer to quantify regional brain volumes from structural magnetic resonance imaging, right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) gray matter volume was the only brain region that was a significant predictor of self-conscious emotion. Smaller pACC volume was associated with attenuated physiological and behavioral self-conscious emotional reactivity, and this relationship was not specific to diagnosis. We argue that these results reflect the significant role that right pACC plays in the visceromotor responding that accompanies self-conscious emotion and that neurodegeneration in this region may underlie the self-conscious emotional decline seen in bvFTD. PMID:22345371

Role of right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex in self-conscious emotional reactivity.

PubMed

Sturm, Virginia E; Sollberger, Marc; Seeley, William W; Rankin, Katherine P; Ascher, Elizabeth A; Rosen, Howard J; Miller, Bruce L; Levenson, Robert W

2013-04-01

Self-conscious emotions such as embarrassment arise when one's actions fail to meet salient social expectations and are accompanied by marked physiological and behavioral activation. We investigated the neural correlates of self-conscious emotional reactivity in 27 patients with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), a neurodegenerative disease that disrupts self-conscious emotion and targets brain regions critical for emotional functioning early in the disease course, and in 33 healthy older controls. Subjects participated in an embarrassing karaoke task in which they watched a video clip of themselves singing. They also watched a sad film clip; these data were used to control for non-self-conscious emotional reactivity in response to audiovisual stimuli. Using Freesurfer to quantify regional brain volumes from structural magnetic resonance imaging, right pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC) gray matter volume was the only brain region that was a significant predictor of self-conscious emotion. Smaller pACC volume was associated with attenuated physiological and behavioral self-conscious emotional reactivity, and this relationship was not specific to diagnosis. We argue that these results reflect the significant role that right pACC plays in the visceromotor responding that accompanies self-conscious emotion and that neurodegeneration in this region may underlie the self-conscious emotional decline seen in bvFTD.

Disconnecting Consciousness: Is There a Common Anesthetic End-Point?

PubMed Central

Hudetz, Anthony G.; Mashour, George A.

2016-01-01

A quest for a systems-level neuroscientific basis of anesthetic-induced loss and return of consciousness has been in the forefront of research of the last two decades. Recent advances toward the discovery of underlying mechanisms have been achieved using experimental electrophysiology, multichannel electroencephalography, magnetoencephalography, and functional magnetic resonance imaging. By the careful dosing of various volatile and IV anesthetic agents to the level of behavioral unresponsiveness, both specific and common changes in functional and effective connectivity across large-scale brain networks have been discovered and interpreted in the context of how the synthesis of neural information might be affected during anesthesia. The results of most investigations to date converge toward the conclusion that a common neural correlate of anesthetic-induced unresponsiveness is a consistent depression or functional disconnection of lateral frontoparietal networks, which are thought to be critical for consciousness of the environment. A reduction in the repertoire of brain states may contribute to the anesthetic disruption of large-scale information integration leading to unconsciousness. In future investigations, a systematic delineation of connectivity changes with multiple anesthetics using the same experimental design and the same analytical method will be desirable. The critical neural events that account for the transition between responsive and unresponsive states should be assessed at similar anesthetic doses just below and above the loss or return of responsiveness. There will also be a need to identify a robust, sensitive, and reliable measure of information transfer. Ultimately, finding a behavior-independent measure of subjective experience that can track covert cognition in unresponsive subjects and a delineation of causal factors vs. correlated events will be essential to understand the neuronal basis of human consciousness and unconsciousness. PMID

Distinct cortical codes and temporal dynamics for conscious and unconscious percepts

PubMed Central

Salti, Moti; Monto, Simo; Charles, Lucie; King, Jean-Remi; Parkkonen, Lauri; Dehaene, Stanislas

2015-01-01

The neural correlates of consciousness are typically sought by comparing the overall brain responses to perceived and unperceived stimuli. However, this comparison may be contaminated by non-specific attention, alerting, performance, and reporting confounds. Here, we pursue a novel approach, tracking the neuronal coding of consciously and unconsciously perceived contents while keeping behavior identical (blindsight). EEG and MEG were recorded while participants reported the spatial location and visibility of a briefly presented target. Multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that considerable information about spatial location traverses the cortex on blindsight trials, but that starting ≈270 ms post-onset, information unique to consciously perceived stimuli, emerges in superior parietal and superior frontal regions. Conscious access appears characterized by the entry of the perceived stimulus into a series of additional brain processes, each restricted in time, while the failure of conscious access results in the breaking of this chain and a subsequent slow decay of the lingering unconscious activity. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.05652.001 PMID:25997100

Intuitive Intelligence, Self-regulation, and Lifting Consciousness

PubMed Central

Zayas, Maria

2014-01-01

This article explores the role of the heart in emotional experience, as well as how learning to shift the rhythms of the heart into a more coherent state makes it possible to establish a new inner baseline reference that allows access to our heart’s intuitive capacities and deeper wisdom. The nature and types of intuition and the connection between intuition and compassionate action are discussed. It is suggested that increased effectiveness in self-regulatory capacity and the resultant reorganization of memories sustained in the neural architecture facilitates a stable and integrated experience of self in relationship to others and to the environment, otherwise known as consciousness. The implications of meeting the increasingly complex demands of life with greater love, compassion, and kindness, thereby lifting consciousness, are considered. PMID:24808982

Predictable internal brain dynamics in EEG and its relation to conscious states

PubMed Central

Yoo, Jaewook; Kwon, Jaerock; Choe, Yoonsuck

2014-01-01

Consciousness is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon defying scientific explanation. Part of the reason why this is the case is due to its subjective nature. In our previous computational experiments, to avoid such a subjective trap, we took a strategy to investigate objective necessary conditions of consciousness. Our basic hypothesis was that predictive internal dynamics serves as such a condition. This is in line with theories of consciousness that treat retention (memory), protention (anticipation), and primary impression as the tripartite temporal structure of consciousness. To test our hypothesis, we analyzed publicly available sleep and awake electroencephalogram (EEG) data. Our results show that EEG signals from awake or rapid eye movement (REM) sleep states have more predictable dynamics compared to those from slow-wave sleep (SWS). Since awakeness and REM sleep are associated with conscious states and SWS with unconscious or less consciousness states, these results support our hypothesis. The results suggest an intricate relationship among prediction, consciousness, and time, with potential applications to time perception and neurorobotics. PMID:24917813

Global workspace dynamics: cortical "binding and propagation" enables conscious contents.

PubMed

Baars, Bernard J; Franklin, Stan; Ramsoy, Thomas Zoega

2013-01-01

A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub of binding and propagation in a population of loosely coupled signaling elements. In computational applications, GW architectures recruit many distributed, specialized agents to cooperate in resolving focal ambiguities. In the brain, conscious experiences may reflect a GW function. For animals, the natural world is full of unpredictable dangers and opportunities, suggesting a general adaptive pressure for brains to resolve focal ambiguities quickly and accurately. GW theory aims to understand the differences between conscious and unconscious brain events. In humans and related species the cortico-thalamic (C-T) core is believed to underlie conscious aspects of perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing (FOK), felt emotions, visual imagery, working memory, and executive control. Alternative theoretical perspectives are also discussed. The C-T core has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are unitary and internally consistent at any given moment. Over time, conscious contents constitute a very large, open set. This suggests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be localized in a single anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a functional hub - a dynamic capacity for binding and propagation of neural signals over multiple task-related networks, a kind of neuronal cloud computing. In this view, conscious contents can arise in any region of the C-T core when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium. The resulting conscious gestalt may ignite an any-to-many broadcast, lasting ∼100-200 ms, and trigger widespread adaptation in previously established networks. To account for the great range of conscious contents over time, the theory suggests an open repertoire of binding coalitions that can broadcast via theta/gamma or alpha/gamma phase coupling, like radio channels competing for a narrow frequency band. Conscious moments are thought to hold only 1-4 unrelated items; this small

A Neural Region of Abstract Working Memory

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cowan, Nelson; Li, Dawei; Moffitt, Amanda; Becker, Theresa M.; Martin, Elizabeth A.; Saults, J. Scott; Christ, Shawn E.

2011-01-01

Over 350 years ago, Descartes proposed that the neural basis of consciousness must be a brain region in which sensory inputs are combined. Using fMRI, we identified at least one such area for working memory, the limited information held in mind, described by William James as the trailing edge of consciousness. Specifically, a region in the left…

Fish do not feel pain and its implications for understanding phenomenal consciousness.

PubMed

Key, Brian

Phenomenal consciousness or the subjective experience of feeling sensory stimuli is fundamental to human existence. Because of the ubiquity of their subjective experiences, humans seem to readily accept the anthropomorphic extension of these mental states to other animals. Humans will typically extrapolate feelings of pain to animals if they respond physiologically and behaviourally to noxious stimuli. The alternative view that fish instead respond to noxious stimuli reflexly and with a limited behavioural repertoire is defended within the context of our current understanding of the neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of mental states. Consequently, a set of fundamental properties of neural tissue necessary for feeling pain or experiencing affective states in vertebrates is proposed. While mammals and birds possess the prerequisite neural architecture for phenomenal consciousness, it is concluded that fish lack these essential characteristics and hence do not feel pain.

Neural correlates of admiration and compassion

PubMed Central

Immordino-Yang, Mary Helen; McColl, Andrea; Damasio, Hanna; Damasio, Antonio

2009-01-01

In an fMRI experiment, participants were exposed to narratives based on true stories designed to evoke admiration and compassion in 4 distinct categories: admiration for virtue (AV), admiration for skill (AS), compassion for social/psychological pain (CSP), and compassion for physical pain (CPP). The goal was to test hypotheses about recruitment of homeostatic, somatosensory, and consciousness-related neural systems during the processing of pain-related (compassion) and non-pain-related (admiration) social emotions along 2 dimensions: emotions about other peoples' social/psychological conditions (AV, CSP) and emotions about others' physical conditions (AS, CPP). Consistent with theoretical accounts, the experience of all 4 emotions engaged brain regions involved in interoceptive representation and homeostatic regulation, including anterior insula, anterior cingulate, hypothalamus, and mesencephalon. However, the study also revealed a previously undescribed pattern within the posteromedial cortices (the ensemble of precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and retrosplenial region), an intriguing territory currently known for its involvement in the default mode of brain operation and in self-related/consciousness processes: emotions pertaining to social/psychological and physical situations engaged different networks aligned, respectively, with interoceptive and exteroceptive neural systems. Finally, within the anterior insula, activity correlated with AV and CSP peaked later and was more sustained than that associated with CPP. Our findings contribute insights on the functions of the posteromedial cortices and on the recruitment of the anterior insula in social emotions concerned with physical versus psychological pain. PMID:19414310

Neural correlates of admiration and compassion.

PubMed

Immordino-Yang, Mary Helen; McColl, Andrea; Damasio, Hanna; Damasio, Antonio

2009-05-12

In an fMRI experiment, participants were exposed to narratives based on true stories designed to evoke admiration and compassion in 4 distinct categories: admiration for virtue (AV), admiration for skill (AS), compassion for social/psychological pain (CSP), and compassion for physical pain (CPP). The goal was to test hypotheses about recruitment of homeostatic, somatosensory, and consciousness-related neural systems during the processing of pain-related (compassion) and non-pain-related (admiration) social emotions along 2 dimensions: emotions about other peoples' social/psychological conditions (AV, CSP) and emotions about others' physical conditions (AS, CPP). Consistent with theoretical accounts, the experience of all 4 emotions engaged brain regions involved in interoceptive representation and homeostatic regulation, including anterior insula, anterior cingulate, hypothalamus, and mesencephalon. However, the study also revealed a previously undescribed pattern within the posteromedial cortices (the ensemble of precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, and retrosplenial region), an intriguing territory currently known for its involvement in the default mode of brain operation and in self-related/consciousness processes: emotions pertaining to social/psychological and physical situations engaged different networks aligned, respectively, with interoceptive and exteroceptive neural systems. Finally, within the anterior insula, activity correlated with AV and CSP peaked later and was more sustained than that associated with CPP. Our findings contribute insights on the functions of the posteromedial cortices and on the recruitment of the anterior insula in social emotions concerned with physical versus psychological pain.

Effects of self-consciousness and social anxiety on self-disclosure among unacquainted individuals: an application of the social relations model.

PubMed

Reno, R R; Kenny, D A

1992-03-01

Recent research has demonstrated a positive relationship between private self-consciousness and the tendency to self-disclose. These studies have relied exclusively upon self-reports of disclosure. In the present study, Kenny's Social Relations Model (Kenny & La Voie, 1984) was employed to examine the relationship between a subject's self-reports and others' reports of a subject's level of self-disclosure and the relationship of these reports to private self-consciousness, as well as the other traits measured by the self-consciousness scale: public self-consciousness and social anxiety. Unacquainted college women (N = 102) participated in one-on-one interactions in a round-robin design. Subject's self-reports of disclosure and their levels of private self-consciousness correlated positively. The partners' reports of an individual's disclosure, however, were not related to the individual's level of private self-consciousness. The discrepancy between these correlations emphasizes the necessity to ground research in personal relationships on interacting pairs and not only on the self-reports of one member. Future research that would explore this difference is discussed. The examination of the self- and partner reports and subjects' levels of public self-consciousness and social anxiety demonstrated that these two traits significantly influence the acquaintance process. Public self-consciousness related positively to subjects' beliefs that they had created consistent impressions upon their partners. Social anxiety correlated negatively with partners' reports of a subject's dyadic involvement and openness.

Promoting the use of personally relevant stimuli for investigating patients with disorders of consciousness

PubMed Central

Perrin, Fabien; Castro, Maïté; Tillmann, Barbara; Luauté, Jacques

2015-01-01

Sensory stimuli are used to evaluate and to restore cognitive functions and consciousness in patients with a disorder of consciousness (DOC) following a severe brain injury. Although sophisticated protocols can help assessing higher order cognitive functions and awareness, one major drawback is their lack of sensitivity. The aim of the present review is to show that stimulus selection is crucial for an accurate evaluation of the state of patients with disorders of consciousness as it determines the levels of processing that the patient can have with stimulation from his/her environment. The probability to observe a behavioral response or a cerebral response is increased when her/his personal history and/or her/his personal preferences are taken into account. We show that personally relevant stimuli (i.e., with emotional, autobiographical, or self-related characteristics) are associated with clearer signs of perception than are irrelevant stimuli in patients with DOC. Among personally relevant stimuli, music appears to be a promising clinical tool as it boosts perception and cognition in patients with DOC and could also serve as a prognostic tool. We suggest that the effect of music on cerebral processes in patients might reflect the music’s capacity to act both on the external and internal neural networks supporting consciousness. PMID:26284020

Abnormal Medial Prefrontal Cortex Activity in Heavy Cannabis Users During Conscious Emotional Evaluation

PubMed Central

Lile, Joshua A.; Hanlon, Colleen A.; Porrino, Linda J.

2015-01-01

Rationale Long-term heavy cannabis users (cannabis users) who are not acutely intoxicated have diminished subconscious neural responsiveness to affective stimuli. Objective This study sought to determine if abnormal processing extends to the conscious evaluation of emotional stimuli. Methods Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) was used to examine brain activity as cannabis users (N=16) and non-cannabis using controls (N=17) evaluated and categorized standardized International Affective Picture System (IAPS) stimuli. Individual judgments were used to isolate activity during the evaluation of emotional (i.e., emotional evaluation) or neutral (i.e., neutral evaluation) stimuli. Within- and between-group analyses were performed. Results Both groups judged the same stimuli as emotional and had activations in visual, midbrain, and middle cingulate cortices during emotional evaluation, relative to neutral. Within-group analyses also revealed amygdalar and inferior frontal gyrus activations in controls, but not cannabis users, and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) deactivations in cannabis users, but not controls, during emotional evaluation, relative to neutral. Between-group comparisons found that mPFC activity during positive and negative evaluation was significantly hypoactive in cannabis users, relative to controls. Conclusions Abnormal neural processing of affective content extends to the level of consciousness in cannabis users. The hypoactive mPFC responses observed resembles the attenuated mPFC responses found during increased non-affective cognitive load in prior research. These findings suggest that abnormal mPFC singling in cannabis users during emotional evaluation might be associated with increased non-affective cognitive load. PMID:26690589

Subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli activate neural responses in anterior cingulate cortex, fusiform gyrus and insula: a meta-analysis of fMRI studies.

PubMed

Meneguzzo, Paolo; Tsakiris, Manos; Schioth, Helgi B; Stein, Dan J; Brooks, Samantha J

2014-01-01

Non-conscious neural activation may underlie various psychological functions in health and disorder. However, the neural substrates of non-conscious processing have not been entirely elucidated. Examining the differential effects of arousing stimuli that are consciously, versus unconsciously perceived will improve our knowledge of neural circuitry involved in non-conscious perception. Here we conduct preliminary analyses of neural activation in studies that have used both subliminal and supraliminal presentation of the same stimulus. We use Activation Likelihood Estimation (ALE) to examine functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies that uniquely present the same stimuli subliminally and supraliminally to healthy participants during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We included a total of 193 foci from 9 studies representing subliminal stimulation and 315 foci from 10 studies representing supraliminal stimulation. The anterior cingulate cortex is significantly activated during both subliminal and supraliminal stimulus presentation. Subliminal stimuli are linked to significantly increased activation in the right fusiform gyrus and right insula. Supraliminal stimuli show significantly increased activation in the left rostral anterior cingulate. Non-conscious processing of arousing stimuli may involve primary visual areas and may also recruit the insula, a brain area involved in eventual interoceptive awareness. The anterior cingulate is perhaps a key brain region for the integration of conscious and non-conscious processing. These preliminary data provide candidate brain regions for further study in to the neural correlates of conscious experience.

Positive mood enhances reward-related neural activity

PubMed Central

Nusslock, Robin

2016-01-01

Although behavioral research has shown that positive mood leads to desired outcomes in nearly every major life domain, no studies have directly examined the effects of positive mood on the neural processes underlying reward-related affect and goal-directed behavior. To address this gap, participants in the present fMRI study experienced either a positive (n = 20) or neutral (n = 20) mood induction and subsequently completed a monetary incentive delay task that assessed reward and loss processing. Consistent with prediction, positive mood elevated activity specifically during reward anticipation in corticostriatal neural regions that have been implicated in reward processing and goal-directed behavior, including the nucleus accumbens, caudate, lateral orbitofrontal cortex and putamen, as well as related paralimbic regions, including the anterior insula and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These effects were not observed during reward outcome, loss anticipation or loss outcome. Critically, this is the first study to report that positive mood enhances reward-related neural activity. Our findings have implications for uncovering the neural mechanisms by which positive mood enhances goal-directed behavior, understanding the malleability of reward-related neural activity, and developing targeted treatments for psychiatric disorders characterized by deficits in reward processing. PMID:26833919

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues.

PubMed

Farisco, Michele; Kotaleski, Jeanette H; Evers, Kathinka

2018-01-01

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain's operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs.

Medial prefrontal cortex and the emergence of self-conscious emotion in adolescence

PubMed Central

Somerville, Leah H.; Jones, Rebecca M.; Ruberry, Erika J.; Dyke, Jonathan P.; Glover, Gary; Casey, BJ

2013-01-01

In the present study, we examined the relationship between developmental modulation of socioaffective brain systems and adolescents’ preoccupation with social evaluation. Child, adolescent, and adult participants viewed cues indicating that a camera was alternately off, warming up, or projecting their image to a peer during the acquisition of behavioral-, autonomic-, and neural-response (functional MRI) data. Believing that a peer was actively watching them was sufficient to induce self-conscious emotion that was stronger in adolescents than in children and adults. Autonomic arousal was uniquely heightened in adolescents. These behavioral patterns were paralleled by emergent engagement of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and striatum-MPFC connectivity during adolescence, which are thought to promote adolescent-motivated social behavior. These findings demonstrate that adolescents’ self-consciousness is related to age-dependent sensitivity of brain systems critical to socioaffective processes. Further, unique interactions between the MPFC and striatum may provide a mechanism by which social-evaluation contexts influence adolescent behavior. PMID:23804962

Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious reward incentives during cued task-switching.

PubMed

Capa, Rémi L; Bouquet, Cédric A; Dreher, Jean-Claude; Dufour, André

2013-01-01

Motivation is often thought to interact consciously with executive control, although recent studies have indicated that motivation can also be unconscious. To date, however, the effects of unconscious motivation on high-order executive control functions have not been explored. Only a few studies using subliminal stimuli (i.e., those not related to motivation, such as an arrow to prime a response) have reported short-lived effects on high-order executive control functions. Here, building on research on unconscious motivation, in which a behavior of perseverance is induced to attain a goal, we hypothesized that subliminal motivation can have long-lasting effects on executive control processes. We investigated the impact of unconscious/conscious monetary reward incentives on evoked potentials and neural activity dynamics during cued task-switching performance. Participants performed long runs of task-switching. At the beginning of each run, a reward (50 cents or 1 cent) was displayed, either subliminally or supraliminally. Participants earned the reward contingent upon their correct responses to each trial of the run. A higher percentage of runs was achieved with higher (conscious and unconscious) than lower rewards, indicating that unconscious high rewards have long-lasting behavioral effects. Event-related potential (ERP) results indicated that unconscious and conscious rewards influenced preparatory effort in task preparation, as suggested by a greater fronto-central contingent negative variation (CNV) starting at cue-onset. However, a greater parietal P3 associated with better reaction times (RTs) was observed only under conditions of conscious high reward, suggesting a larger amount of working memory invested during task performance. Together, these results indicate that unconscious and conscious motivations are similar at early stages of task-switching preparation but differ during task performance. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical “Binding and Propagation” Enables Conscious Contents

PubMed Central

Baars, Bernard J.; Franklin, Stan; Ramsoy, Thomas Zoega

2013-01-01

A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub of binding and propagation in a population of loosely coupled signaling elements. In computational applications, GW architectures recruit many distributed, specialized agents to cooperate in resolving focal ambiguities. In the brain, conscious experiences may reflect a GW function. For animals, the natural world is full of unpredictable dangers and opportunities, suggesting a general adaptive pressure for brains to resolve focal ambiguities quickly and accurately. GW theory aims to understand the differences between conscious and unconscious brain events. In humans and related species the cortico-thalamic (C-T) core is believed to underlie conscious aspects of perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing (FOK), felt emotions, visual imagery, working memory, and executive control. Alternative theoretical perspectives are also discussed. The C-T core has many anatomical hubs, but conscious percepts are unitary and internally consistent at any given moment. Over time, conscious contents constitute a very large, open set. This suggests that a brain-based GW capacity cannot be localized in a single anatomical hub. Rather, it should be sought in a functional hub – a dynamic capacity for binding and propagation of neural signals over multiple task-related networks, a kind of neuronal cloud computing. In this view, conscious contents can arise in any region of the C-T core when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium. The resulting conscious gestalt may ignite an any-to-many broadcast, lasting ∼100–200 ms, and trigger widespread adaptation in previously established networks. To account for the great range of conscious contents over time, the theory suggests an open repertoire of binding1 coalitions that can broadcast via theta/gamma or alpha/gamma phase coupling, like radio channels competing for a narrow frequency band. Conscious moments are thought to hold only 1–4 unrelated items; this

Theories of Impaired Consciousness in Epilepsy

PubMed Central

Yu, Lissa; Blumenfeld, Hal

2015-01-01

Although the precise mechanisms for control of consciousness are not fully understood, emerging data show that conscious information processing depends on the activation of certain networks in the brain and that the impairment of consciousness is related to abnormal activity in these systems. Epilepsy can lead to transient impairment of consciousness, providing a window into the mechanisms necessary for normal consciousness. Thus, despite differences in behavioral manifestations, cause, and electrophysiology, generalized tonic–clonic, absence, and partial seizures engage similar anatomical structures and pathways. We review prior concepts of impaired consciousness in epilepsy, focusing especially on temporal lobe complex partial seizures, which are a common and debilitating form of epileptic unconsciousness. We discuss a “network inhibition hypothesis” in which focal temporal lobe seizure activity disrupts normal cortical–subcortical interactions, leading to depressed neocortical function and impaired consciousness. This review of the major prior theories of impaired consciousness in epilepsy allows us to put more recent data into context and to reach a better understanding of the mechanisms important for normal consciousness. PMID:19351355

Neural reactivation links unconscious thought to decision-making performance

PubMed Central

Bursley, James K.; Satpute, Ajay B.

2013-01-01

Brief periods of unconscious thought (UT) have been shown to improve decision making compared with making an immediate decision (ID). We reveal a neural mechanism for UT in decision making using blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging. Participants (N = 33) encoded information on a set of consumer products (e.g. 48 attributes describing four different cars), and we manipulated whether participants (i) consciously thought about this information (conscious thought), (ii) completed a difficult 2-back working memory task (UT) or (iii) made an immediate decision about the consumer products (ID) in a within-subjects blocked design. To differentiate UT neural activity from 2-back working memory neural activity, participants completed an independent 2-back task and this neural activity was subtracted from neural activity occurring during the UT 2-back task. Consistent with a neural reactivation account, we found that the same regions activated during the encoding of complex decision information (right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left intermediate visual cortex) continued to be activated during a subsequent 2-min UT period. Moreover, neural reactivation in these regions was predictive of subsequent behavioral decision-making performance after the UT period. These results provide initial evidence for post-encoding unconscious neural reactivation in facilitating decision making. PMID:23314012

Neural reactivation links unconscious thought to decision-making performance.

PubMed

Creswell, John David; Bursley, James K; Satpute, Ajay B

2013-12-01

Brief periods of unconscious thought (UT) have been shown to improve decision making compared with making an immediate decision (ID). We reveal a neural mechanism for UT in decision making using blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging. Participants (N = 33) encoded information on a set of consumer products (e.g. 48 attributes describing four different cars), and we manipulated whether participants (i) consciously thought about this information (conscious thought), (ii) completed a difficult 2-back working memory task (UT) or (iii) made an immediate decision about the consumer products (ID) in a within-subjects blocked design. To differentiate UT neural activity from 2-back working memory neural activity, participants completed an independent 2-back task and this neural activity was subtracted from neural activity occurring during the UT 2-back task. Consistent with a neural reactivation account, we found that the same regions activated during the encoding of complex decision information (right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and left intermediate visual cortex) continued to be activated during a subsequent 2-min UT period. Moreover, neural reactivation in these regions was predictive of subsequent behavioral decision-making performance after the UT period. These results provide initial evidence for post-encoding unconscious neural reactivation in facilitating decision making.

Large-Scale Brain Simulation and Disorders of Consciousness. Mapping Technical and Conceptual Issues

PubMed Central

Farisco, Michele; Kotaleski, Jeanette H.; Evers, Kathinka

2018-01-01

Modeling and simulations have gained a leading position in contemporary attempts to describe, explain, and quantitatively predict the human brain’s operations. Computer models are highly sophisticated tools developed to achieve an integrated knowledge of the brain with the aim of overcoming the actual fragmentation resulting from different neuroscientific approaches. In this paper we investigate the plausibility of simulation technologies for emulation of consciousness and the potential clinical impact of large-scale brain simulation on the assessment and care of disorders of consciousness (DOCs), e.g., Coma, Vegetative State/Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome, Minimally Conscious State. Notwithstanding their technical limitations, we suggest that simulation technologies may offer new solutions to old practical problems, particularly in clinical contexts. We take DOCs as an illustrative case, arguing that the simulation of neural correlates of consciousness is potentially useful for improving treatments of patients with DOCs. PMID:29740372

Homing in on consciousness: Why is a dream conscious?

PubMed

Porte, Helene Sophrin

2016-01-01

Morsella et al. argue convincingly that consciousness is for adaptive voluntary action. What, then, is consciousness in a dream for? Two prior questions present themselves. In a dream, how do contents get into the conscious field? What are the properties of consciousness in a dream?

The Value and Disvalue of Consciousness.

PubMed

Glannon, Walter

2016-10-01

Consciousness defines us as persons. It allows us to have both pleasurable and painful experiences. I present four neurological conditions in the clinical setting to explore how consciousness can be beneficial or harmful to patients: intraoperative awareness, prolonged disorders of consciousness, locked-in syndrome, and the effects of narcotics and sedation on terminally ill patients. The ethical significance of consciousness for patients in these conditions depends on two factors: the content of one's experience and whether one can report this content to others. I argue that the value or disvalue of phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to be aware, may depend on its relation to access consciousness, the ability to report or communicate the content of awareness. Phenomenal consciousness can have disvalue when one wants or expects to be unconscious. It can also have disvalue in the absence of access consciousness because it can allow the patient to experience pain and suffer. Technology that enabled neurologically compromised patients to reliably communicate their experience and wishes could benefit and prevent harm to them. More generally, the neurological conditions I discuss raise the question of when and in what respects consciousness is preferable to unconsciousness.

Minimally conscious state or cortically mediated state?

PubMed

Naccache, Lionel

2018-04-01

Durable impairments of consciousness are currently classified in three main neurological categories: comatose state, vegetative state (also recently coined unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) and minimally conscious state. While the introduction of minimally conscious state, in 2002, was a major progress to help clinicians recognize complex non-reflexive behaviours in the absence of functional communication, it raises several problems. The most important issue related to minimally conscious state lies in its criteria: while behavioural definition of minimally conscious state lacks any direct evidence of patient's conscious content or conscious state, it includes the adjective 'conscious'. I discuss this major problem in this review and propose a novel interpretation of minimally conscious state: its criteria do not inform us about the potential residual consciousness of patients, but they do inform us with certainty about the presence of a cortically mediated state. Based on this constructive criticism review, I suggest three proposals aiming at improving the way we describe the subjective and cognitive state of non-communicating patients. In particular, I present a tentative new classification of impairments of consciousness that combines behavioural evidence with functional brain imaging data, in order to probe directly and univocally residual conscious processes.

[Self-consciousness, consciousness of the other and dementias].

PubMed

Gil, Roger

2007-06-01

Studies of self-consciousness in dementia concern essentially anosognosia or the loss of insight. However, Self-consciousness is multifaceted: it includes awareness of the body, perceptions, one's own history, identity, and one's own projects. Self-consciousness is linked to consciousness of others i.e. to social cognition supported by identification of others, but also by comprehension of facial expression of emotions, comprehension and expression of emotional prosody, pragmatic abilities, ability to infer other's people's mental states, thoughts, and feelings (theory of mind and empathy), knowledge of social norms and rules, social reasoning. The subtypes of dementias (and namely Alzheimer's disease and frontotemporal dementia) affect heterogeneously the different aspects of the self-and other-consciousness. Further studies are needed for a better knowledge of the complex relationship between Self-consciousness, social cognition, decision making and neuropsychiatric symptoms and behavioral disturbances occurring in demented patients.

Detecting and interpreting conscious experiences in behaviorally non-responsive patients.

PubMed

Naci, Lorina; Sinai, Leah; Owen, Adrian M

2017-01-15

Decoding the contents of consciousness from brain activity is one of the most challenging frontiers of cognitive neuroscience. The ability to interpret mental content without recourse to behavior is most relevant for understanding patients who may be demonstrably conscious, but entirely unable to speak or move willfully in any way, precluding any systematic investigation of their conscious experience. The lack of consistent behavioral responsivity engenders unique challenges to decoding any conscious experiences these patients may have solely based on their brain activity. For this reason, paradigms that have been successful in healthy individuals cannot serve to interpret conscious mental states in this patient group. Until recently, patient studies have used structured instructions to elicit willful modulation of brain activity according to command, in order to decode the presence of willful brain-based responses in this patient group. In recent work, we have used naturalistic paradigms, such as watching a movie or listening to an audio-story, to demonstrate that a common neural code supports conscious experiences in different individuals. Moreover, we have demonstrated that this code can be used to interpret the conscious experiences of a patient who had remained non-responsive for several years. This approach is easy to administer, brief, and does not require compliance with task instructions. Rather, it engages attention naturally through meaningful stimuli that are similar to the real-world sensory information in a patient's environment. Therefore, it may be particularly suited to probing consciousness and revealing residual brain function in highly impaired, acute, patients in a comatose state, thus helping to improve diagnostication and prognostication for this vulnerable patient group from the critical early stages of severe brain-injury. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The "id" knows more than the "ego" admits: neuropsychoanalytic and primal consciousness perspectives on the interface between affective and cognitive neuroscience.

PubMed

Solms, Mark; Panksepp, Jaak

2012-04-17

It is commonly believed that consciousness is a higher brain function. Here we consider the likelihood, based on abundant neuroevolutionary data that lower brain affective phenomenal experiences provide the "energy" for the developmental construction of higher forms of cognitive consciousness. This view is concordant with many of the theoretical formulations of Sigmund Freud. In this reconceptualization, all of consciousness may be dependent on the original evolution of affective phenomenal experiences that coded survival values. These subcortical energies provided a foundation that could be used for the epigenetic construction of perceptual and other higher forms of consciousness. From this perspective, perceptual experiences were initially affective at the primary-process brainstem level, but capable of being elaborated by secondary learning and memory processes into tertiary-cognitive forms of consciousness. Within this view, although all individual neural activities are unconscious, perhaps along with secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, the primal sub-neocortical networks of emotions and other primal affects may have served as the sentient scaffolding for the construction of resolved perceptual and higher mental activities within the neocortex. The data supporting this neuro-psycho-evolutionary vision of the emergence of mind is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalytical models.

The vestibular system: a spatial reference for bodily self-consciousness

PubMed Central

Pfeiffer, Christian; Serino, Andrea; Blanke, Olaf

2014-01-01

Self-consciousness is the remarkable human experience of being a subject: the “I”. Self-consciousness is typically bound to a body, and particularly to the spatial dimensions of the body, as well as to its location and displacement in the gravitational field. Because the vestibular system encodes head position and movement in three-dimensional space, vestibular cortical processing likely contributes to spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness. We review here recent data showing vestibular effects on first-person perspective (the feeling from where “I” experience the world) and self-location (the feeling where “I” am located in space). We compare these findings to data showing vestibular effects on mental spatial transformation, self-motion perception, and body representation showing vestibular contributions to various spatial representations of the body with respect to the external world. Finally, we discuss the role for four posterior brain regions that process vestibular and other multisensory signals to encode spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness: temporoparietal junction, parietoinsular vestibular cortex, ventral intraparietal region, and medial superior temporal region. We propose that vestibular processing in these cortical regions is critical in linking multisensory signals from the body (personal and peripersonal space) with external (extrapersonal) space. Therefore, the vestibular system plays a critical role for neural representations of spatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness. PMID:24860446

Effect of Gender on Students' Emotion with Gender-Related Public Self-Consciousness as a Moderator in Mixed-Gender Physical Education Classes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moon, Minkwon; Jeon, Hyunsoo; Kwon, Sungho

2016-01-01

The present study investigates whether gender-related public self-consciousness moderates the relationship between students' gender and emotions in mixed-gender physical education classes. The Positive and Negative Affect Scales and the Gender-related Public Self-Consciousness Scale were administered to 380 middle-school students in South Korea.…

Restructuring consciousness -the psychedelic state in light of integrated information theory.

PubMed

Gallimore, Andrew R

2015-01-01

The psychological state elicited by the classic psychedelics drugs, such as LSD and psilocybin, is one of the most fascinating and yet least understood states of consciousness. However, with the advent of modern functional neuroimaging techniques, the effect of these drugs on neural activity is now being revealed, although many of the varied phenomenological features of the psychedelic state remain challenging to explain. Integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the foremost contemporary theories of consciousness, providing a mathematical formalization of both the quantity and quality of conscious experience. This theory can be applied to all known states of consciousness, including the psychedelic state. Using the results of functional neuroimaging data on the psychedelic state, the effects of psychedelic drugs on both the level and structure of consciousness can be explained in terms of the conceptual framework of IIT. This new IIT-based model of the psychedelic state provides an explanation for many of its phenomenological features, including unconstrained cognition, alterations in the structure and meaning of concepts and a sense of expanded awareness. This model also suggests that whilst cognitive flexibility, creativity, and imagination are enhanced during the psychedelic state, this occurs at the expense of cause-effect information, as well as degrading the brain's ability to organize, categorize, and differentiate the constituents of conscious experience. Furthermore, the model generates specific predictions that can be tested using a combination of functional imaging techniques, as has been applied to the study of levels of consciousness during anesthesia and following brain injury.

Introduction to the fractality principle of consciousness and the sentyon postulate

PubMed Central

Bieberich, Erhard

2013-01-01

Recently, consciousness research has gained much attention. Indeed, the question at stake is significant: why is the brain not just a computing device, but generates a perception from within? Ambitious endeavors trying to simulate the entire human brain assume that the algorithm will do the trick: as soon as we assemble the brain in a computer and increase the number of operations per time, consciousness will emerge by itself. I disagree with this simplistic representation. My argument emerges from the “atomism paradox”: the irreducible space of the consciously perceived world, the endospace is incompatible with the reducible and decomposable architecture of the brain or a computer. I will first discuss the fundamental challenges in current consciousness models and then propose a new model based on the fractality principle: “the whole is in each of its parts”. This new model copes with the atomism paradox by implementing an iterative mapping of information from higher order brain structures to smaller scales on the cellular and molecular level, which I will refer to as “fractalization”. This information fractalization gives rise to a new form of matter that is conscious (“bright matter”). Bright matter is composed of conscious particles or units named “sentyons”. The internal fractality of these sentyons will close a loop (the “psychic loop”) in a recurrent fractal neural network (RFNN) that allows for continuous and complete information transformation and sharing between higher order brain structures and the endpoint substrate of consciousness at the molecular level. PMID:23950765

Conscious, but not unconscious, logo priming of brands and related words.

PubMed

Brintazzoli, Gigliola; Soetens, Eric; Deroost, Natacha; Van den Bussche, Eva

2012-06-01

This study assessed whether real-life stimulus material can elicit conscious and unconscious priming. A typical masked priming paradigm was used, with brand logo primes. We used a rigorous method to assess participants' awareness of the subliminal information. Our results show that shortly presented and masked brand logos (e.g., logo of McDonald's) have the power to prime their brand names (e.g., "McDonald's") and, remarkably, words associated to the brand (e.g., "hamburger"). However, this only occurred when the logos could be categorized clearly above the consciousness threshold. Once the primes were presented close to the consciousness threshold, no subliminal influences on behavior were observed. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The rise of machine consciousness: studying consciousness with computational models.

PubMed

Reggia, James A

2013-08-01

Efforts to create computational models of consciousness have accelerated over the last two decades, creating a field that has become known as artificial consciousness. There have been two main motivations for this controversial work: to develop a better scientific understanding of the nature of human/animal consciousness and to produce machines that genuinely exhibit conscious awareness. This review begins by briefly explaining some of the concepts and terminology used by investigators working on machine consciousness, and summarizes key neurobiological correlates of human consciousness that are particularly relevant to past computational studies. Models of consciousness developed over the last twenty years are then surveyed. These models are largely found to fall into five categories based on the fundamental issue that their developers have selected as being most central to consciousness: a global workspace, information integration, an internal self-model, higher-level representations, or attention mechanisms. For each of these five categories, an overview of past work is given, a representative example is presented in some detail to illustrate the approach, and comments are provided on the contributions and limitations of the methodology. Three conclusions are offered about the state of the field based on this review: (1) computational modeling has become an effective and accepted methodology for the scientific study of consciousness, (2) existing computational models have successfully captured a number of neurobiological, cognitive, and behavioral correlates of conscious information processing as machine simulations, and (3) no existing approach to artificial consciousness has presented a compelling demonstration of phenomenal machine consciousness, or even clear evidence that artificial phenomenal consciousness will eventually be possible. The paper concludes by discussing the importance of continuing work in this area, considering the ethical issues it raises

There Are Conscious and Unconscious Agendas in the Brain and Both Are Important—Our Will Can Be Conscious as Well as Unconscious

PubMed Central

Deecke, Lüder

2012-01-01

I have been asked to write a few words on consciousness in this editorial issue. My thoughts on consciousness will focus on the relation between consciousness and will. Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon as some people believe—it is not a psychological construct either. Consciousness is a brain function. With deeper thought it is even more than that—a brain state. Writing this, I am in a conscious state, I hope at least. In every day philosophy, a close connection of consciousness with will is ventured, and is expressed in the term “conscious free will”. However, this does not mean that our will is totally determined and not free, be it conscious or unconscious. Total determinists postulate total freedom from nature in order to speak of free will. Absolute freedom from nature is an a priori impossibility; there is no way to escape from nature. However, we have relative freedom, graded freedom, freedom in degrees, enabling us to make responsible decisions and be captains of our own destiny. We are not totally determined. We can upregulate our degrees of freedom by self-management or we can downregulate them by self-mismanagement. In the present communication consciousness and the unconscious are discussed in their various aspects and interactions. PMID:24961200

Paradox in AI - AI 2.0: The Way to Machine Consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Palensky, Peter; Bruckner, Dietmar; Tmej, Anna; Deutsch, Tobias

Artificial Intelligence, the big promise of the last millennium, has apparently made its way into our daily lives. Cell phones with speech control, evolutionary computing in data mining or power grids, optimized via neural network, show its applicability in industrial environments. The original expectation of true intelligence and thinking machines lies still ahead of us. Researchers are, however, optimistic as never before. This paper tries to compare the views, challenges and approaches of several disciplines: engineering, psychology, neuroscience, philosophy. It gives a short introduction to Psychoanalysis, discusses the term consciousness, social implications of intelligent machines, related theories, and expectations and shall serve as a starting point for first attempts of combining these diverse thoughts.

A Neural Mechanism for Nonconscious Activation of Conditioned Placebo and Nocebo Responses.

PubMed

Jensen, Karin B; Kaptchuk, Ted J; Chen, Xiaoyan; Kirsch, Irving; Ingvar, Martin; Gollub, Randy L; Kong, Jian

2015-10-01

Fundamental aspects of human behavior operate outside of conscious awareness. Yet, theories of conditioned responses in humans, such as placebo and nocebo effects on pain, have a strong emphasis on conscious recognition of contextual cues that trigger the response. Here, we investigated the neural pathways involved in nonconscious activation of conditioned pain responses, using functional magnetic resonance imaging in healthy participants. Nonconscious compared with conscious activation of conditioned placebo analgesia was associated with increased activation of the orbitofrontal cortex, a structure with direct connections to affective brain regions and basic reward processing. During nonconscious nocebo, there was increased activation of the thalamus, amygdala, and hippocampus. In contrast to previous assumptions about conditioning in humans, our results show that conditioned pain responses can be elicited independently of conscious awareness and our results suggest a hierarchical activation of neural pathways for nonconscious and conscious conditioned responses. Demonstrating that the human brain has a nonconscious mechanism for responding to conditioned cues has major implications for the role of associative learning in behavioral medicine and psychiatry. Our results may also open up for novel approaches to translational animal-to-human research since human consciousness and animal cognition is an inherent paradox in all behavioral science. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press.

Event-related brain potential correlates of two states of conscious awareness in memory

PubMed Central

Düzel, Emrah; Yonelinas, Andrew P.; Mangun, George R.; Heinze, Hans-Jochen; Tulving, Endel

1997-01-01

We report an event-related potential (ERP) experiment of human recognition memory that explored the relation between conscious awareness and electrophysiological activity of the brain. We recorded ERPs from healthy adults while they made “remember” and “know” recognition judgments about previously seen words. These two kinds of judgments reflect “autonoetic” and “noetic” awareness, respectively. The ERP effects differed between the two kinds of awareness while they were similar for “true” and “false” recognition. Noetic awareness was associated with a temporoparietal positivity in the N400 range (325–600 ms) and a late (600–1,000 ms) frontocentral negativity, whereas autonoetic awareness was associated with a widespread, late, bifrontal and left parietotemporal (600–1000 ms) positivity. In the very late (1,300–1,900 ms) time window, a right frontal positivity was observed for both remember and know judgments of both true and false targets. These results provide physiological evidence for two types of conscious awareness in episodic memory retrieval. PMID:9159185

Consciousness in Non-Epileptic Attack Disorder

PubMed Central

Reuber, M.; Kurthen, M.

2011-01-01

Non-epileptic attack disorder (NEAD) is one of the most important differential diagnoses of epilepsy. Impairment of consciousness is the key feature of non-epileptic attacks (NEAs). The first half of this review summarises the clinical research literature featuring observations relating to consciousness in NEAD. The second half places this evidence in the wider context of the recent discourse on consciousness in neuroscience and the philosophy of mind. We argue that studies of consciousness should not only distinguish between the ‘level’ and ‘content’ of consciousness but also between ‘phenomenal consciousness’ (consciousness of states it somehow “feels to be like”) and ‘access consciousness’ (having certain ‘higher’ cognitive processes at one’s disposal). The existing evidence shows that there is a great intra- and interindividual variability of NEA experience. However, in most NEAs phenomenal experience – and, as a precondition for that experience, vigilance or wakefulness – is reduced to a lesser degree than in those epileptic seizures involving impairment of consciousness. In fact, complete loss of “consciousness” is the exception rather than the rule in NEAs. Patients, as well as external observers, may have a tendency to overestimate impairments of consciousness during the seizures. PMID:21447903

Artificial consciousness and the consciousness-attention dissociation.

PubMed

Haladjian, Harry Haroutioun; Montemayor, Carlos

2016-10-01

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems-these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness

PubMed Central

Barron, Andrew B.; Klein, Colin

2016-01-01

How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience. In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated and egocentric representation of the world from the animal’s perspective is sufficient for subjective experience. Structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions. Therefore, we argue the insect brain also supports a capacity for subjective experience. In both vertebrates and insects this form of behavioral control system evolved as an efficient solution to basic problems of sensory reafference and true navigation. The brain structures that support subjective experience in vertebrates and insects are very different from each other, but in both cases they are basal to each clade. Hence we propose the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian. PMID:27091981

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation

PubMed Central

Raffone, Antonino; Srinivasan, Narayanan; van Leeuwen, Cees

2014-01-01

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAW is controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation. PMID:24639586

The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation.

PubMed

Raffone, Antonino; Srinivasan, Narayanan; van Leeuwen, Cees

2014-05-05

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAW is controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation.

ERPS to Monitor Non-conscious Mentation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Donchin, E.

1984-01-01

Event Related Brain Potentials (or ERPs) are extracted from the EEG that can be recorded between a pair of electrodes placed on a person's scalp. The EEG is recorded as a continual fluctuation in voltage. It is the results of the integration of the potential fields generated by a multitude of neuronal ensembles that are active as the brain goes about its business. Within this ongoing signal it is possible to distinguish voltage fluctuations that are triggered in neural structures by the occurrence of specific events. This activity, evoked as it is by an external event, is known as the Evoked, or Event Related, Potential. The ERPs provide a unique opportunity to monitor non-conscious mentation. The inferences that can be based on ERP data are described and the limits of these inferences are emphasized. This, however, will not be an exhaustive review of the use of ERPs in Engineering Psychology. The application, its scope, and its limitations will be illustrated by means of one example. This example is preceded by a brief technical introduction to the methodology used in the study of ERPs. The manner in which ERPs are used to study cognition is described.

Restructuring consciousness –the psychedelic state in light of integrated information theory

PubMed Central

Gallimore, Andrew R.

2015-01-01

The psychological state elicited by the classic psychedelics drugs, such as LSD and psilocybin, is one of the most fascinating and yet least understood states of consciousness. However, with the advent of modern functional neuroimaging techniques, the effect of these drugs on neural activity is now being revealed, although many of the varied phenomenological features of the psychedelic state remain challenging to explain. Integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the foremost contemporary theories of consciousness, providing a mathematical formalization of both the quantity and quality of conscious experience. This theory can be applied to all known states of consciousness, including the psychedelic state. Using the results of functional neuroimaging data on the psychedelic state, the effects of psychedelic drugs on both the level and structure of consciousness can be explained in terms of the conceptual framework of IIT. This new IIT-based model of the psychedelic state provides an explanation for many of its phenomenological features, including unconstrained cognition, alterations in the structure and meaning of concepts and a sense of expanded awareness. This model also suggests that whilst cognitive flexibility, creativity, and imagination are enhanced during the psychedelic state, this occurs at the expense of cause-effect information, as well as degrading the brain's ability to organize, categorize, and differentiate the constituents of conscious experience. Furthermore, the model generates specific predictions that can be tested using a combination of functional imaging techniques, as has been applied to the study of levels of consciousness during anesthesia and following brain injury. PMID:26124719

Self-consciousness, friendship quality, and adolescent internalizing problems

PubMed Central

Bowker, Julie C.; Rubin, Kenneth H.

2013-01-01

The correlates between public and private self-consciousness and internalizing difficulties were examined during early adolescence. Friendship quality was assessed as a possible moderator of the relation between self-consciousness and maladjustment. One hundred and thirty-seven young adolescents (N = 87 girls; M age = 13.98 years) reported on their self-consciousness, internalizing problems, and the quality of their best friendship. Results indicated stronger associations between private self-consciousness and internalizing correlates than between public self-consciousness and internalizing problems, suggesting that private self-consciousness may be a stronger risk factor during adolescence. Contrary to expectations, evidence revealed that positive friendship quality may exacerbate some difficulties associated with self-consciousness. Results pertaining to friendship quality add to the growing literature on the ways in which friendships can contribute to adjustment difficulties. PMID:19998530

Emotion-Related Consciousness Detection in Patients With Disorders of Consciousness Through an EEG-Based BCI System.

PubMed

Pan, Jiahui; Xie, Qiuyou; Huang, Haiyun; He, Yanbin; Sun, Yuping; Yu, Ronghao; Li, Yuanqing

2018-01-01

For patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), such as vegetative state (VS) and minimally conscious state (MCS), detecting and assessing the residual cognitive functions of the brain remain challenging. Emotion-related cognitive functions are difficult to detect in patients with DOC using motor response-based clinical assessment scales such as the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) because DOC patients have motor impairments and are unable to provide sufficient motor responses for emotion-related communication. In this study, we proposed an EEG-based brain-computer interface (BCI) system for emotion recognition in patients with DOC. Eight patients with DOC (5 VS and 3 MCS) and eight healthy controls participated in the BCI-based experiment. During the experiment, two movie clips flashed (appearing and disappearing) eight times with a random interstimulus interval between flashes to evoke P300 potentials. The subjects were instructed to focus on the crying or laughing movie clip and to count the flashes of the corresponding movie clip cued by instruction. The BCI system performed online P300 detection to determine which movie clip the patients responsed to and presented the result as feedback. Three of the eight patients and all eight healthy controls achieved online accuracies based on P300 detection that were significantly greater than chance level. P300 potentials were observed in the EEG signals from the three patients. These results indicated the three patients had abilities of emotion recognition and command following. Through spectral analysis, common spatial pattern (CSP) and differential entropy (DE) features in the delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma frequency bands were employed to classify the EEG signals during the crying and laughing movie clips. Two patients and all eight healthy controls achieved offline accuracies significantly greater than chance levels in the spectral analysis. Furthermore, stable topographic distribution patterns of CSP

Neural correlates of conscious self-regulation of emotion.

PubMed

Beauregard, M; Lévesque, J; Bourgouin, P

2001-09-15

A fundamental question about the relationship between cognition and emotion concerns the neural substrate underlying emotional self-regulation. To address this issue, brain activation was measured in normal male subjects while they either responded in a normal manner to erotic film excerpts or voluntarily attempted to inhibit the sexual arousal induced by viewing erotic stimuli. Results demonstrated that the sexual arousal experienced, in response to the erotic film excerpts, was associated with activation in "limbic" and paralimbic structures, such as the right amygdala, right anterior temporal pole, and hypothalamus. In addition, the attempted inhibition of the sexual arousal generated by viewing the erotic stimuli was associated with activation of the right superior frontal gyrus and right anterior cingulate gyrus. No activation was found in limbic areas. These findings reinforce the view that emotional self-regulation is normally implemented by a neural circuit comprising various prefrontal regions and subcortical limbic structures. They also suggest that humans have the capacity to influence the electrochemical dynamics of their brains, by voluntarily changing the nature of the mind processes unfolding in the psychological space.

Loss of consciousness is related to hyper-correlated gamma-band activity in anesthetized macaques and sleeping humans.

PubMed

Bola, Michał; Barrett, Adam B; Pigorini, Andrea; Nobili, Lino; Seth, Anil K; Marchewka, Artur

2018-02-15

Loss of consciousness can result from a wide range of causes, including natural sleep and pharmacologically induced anesthesia. Important insights might thus come from identifying neuronal mechanisms of loss and re-emergence of consciousness independent of a specific manipulation. Therefore, to seek neuronal signatures of loss of consciousness common to sleep and anesthesia we analyzed spontaneous electrophysiological activity recorded in two experiments. First, electrocorticography (ECoG) acquired from 4 macaque monkeys anesthetized with different anesthetic agents (ketamine, medetomidine, propofol) and, second, stereo-electroencephalography (sEEG) from 10 epilepsy patients in different wake-sleep stages (wakefulness, NREM, REM). Specifically, we investigated co-activation patterns among brain areas, defined as correlations between local amplitudes of gamma-band activity. We found that resting wakefulness was associated with intermediate levels of gamma-band coupling, indicating neither complete dependence, nor full independence among brain regions. In contrast, loss of consciousness during NREM sleep and propofol anesthesia was associated with excessively correlated brain activity, as indicated by a robust increase of number and strength of positive correlations. However, such excessively correlated brain signals were not observed during REM sleep, and were present only to a limited extent during ketamine anesthesia. This might be related to the fact that, despite suppression of behavioral responsiveness, REM sleep and ketamine anesthesia often involve presence of dream-like conscious experiences. We conclude that hyper-correlated gamma-band activity might be a signature of loss of consciousness common across various manipulations and independent of behavioral responsiveness. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Neural relativity principle

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Koulakov, Alexei

Olfaction is the final frontier of our senses - the one that is still almost completely mysterious to us. Despite extensive genetic and perceptual data, and a strong push to solve the neural coding problem, fundamental questions about the sense of smell remain unresolved. Unlike vision and hearing, where relatively straightforward relationships between stimulus features and neural responses have been foundational to our understanding sensory processing, it has been difficult to quantify the properties of odorant molecules that lead to olfactory percepts. In a sense, we do not have olfactory analogs of ``red'', ``green'' and ``blue''. The seminal work of Linda Buck and Richard Axel identified a diverse family of about 1000 receptor molecules that serve as odorant sensors in the nose. However, the properties of smells that these receptors detect remain a mystery. I will review our current understanding of the molecular properties important to the olfactory system. I will also describe a theory that explains how odorant identity can be preserved despite substantial changes in the odorant concentration.

On the Character of Consciousness

PubMed Central

Annila, Arto

2016-01-01

The human brain is a particularly demanding system to infer its nature from observations. Thus, there is on one hand plenty of room for theorizing and on the other hand a pressing need for a rigorous theory. We apply statistical mechanics of open systems to describe the brain as a hierarchical system in consuming free energy in least time. This holistic tenet accounts for cellular metabolism, neuronal signaling, cognitive processes all together, or any other process by a formal equation of motion that extends down to the ultimate precision of one quantum of action. According to this general thermodynamic theory cognitive processes are no different by their operational and organizational principle from other natural processes. Cognition too will emerge and evolve along path-dependent and non-determinate trajectories by consuming free energy in least time to attain thermodynamic balance within the nervous system itself and with its surrounding systems. Specifically, consciousness can be ascribed to a natural process that integrates various neural networks for coherent consumption of free energy, i.e., for meaningful deeds. The whole hierarchy of integrated systems can be formally summed up to thermodynamic entropy. The holistic tenet provides insight to the character of consciousness also by acknowledging awareness in other systems at other levels of nature's hierarchy. PMID:27065819

On the Character of Consciousness.

PubMed

Annila, Arto

2016-01-01

The human brain is a particularly demanding system to infer its nature from observations. Thus, there is on one hand plenty of room for theorizing and on the other hand a pressing need for a rigorous theory. We apply statistical mechanics of open systems to describe the brain as a hierarchical system in consuming free energy in least time. This holistic tenet accounts for cellular metabolism, neuronal signaling, cognitive processes all together, or any other process by a formal equation of motion that extends down to the ultimate precision of one quantum of action. According to this general thermodynamic theory cognitive processes are no different by their operational and organizational principle from other natural processes. Cognition too will emerge and evolve along path-dependent and non-determinate trajectories by consuming free energy in least time to attain thermodynamic balance within the nervous system itself and with its surrounding systems. Specifically, consciousness can be ascribed to a natural process that integrates various neural networks for coherent consumption of free energy, i.e., for meaningful deeds. The whole hierarchy of integrated systems can be formally summed up to thermodynamic entropy. The holistic tenet provides insight to the character of consciousness also by acknowledging awareness in other systems at other levels of nature's hierarchy.

Neural correlates of exposure to subliminal and supraliminal sexual cues.

PubMed

Gillath, Omri; Canterberry, Melanie

2012-11-01

Sexual arousal is thought to be the result of two levels of processing: conscious and unconscious. Whereas some research exists on the neural correlates related with conscious exposure to sexual stimuli, there are no parallel data regarding unconscious or subliminal exposure to such stimuli. In the present study, we therefore compared brain activation of 39 participants (20 women) as they were exposed to supraliminal vs subliminal sexual stimuli. Supraliminal exposure was associated with greater activation in areas that were previously associated with sexual arousal (e.g. caudate nucleus and thalamus) as well as areas that were previously associated with control (e.g. orbitofrontal cortex and cingulate cortex). In contrast, subliminal exposure was mainly related to activation in areas previously associated with sexual arousal. Men and women exhibited theoretically meaningful differences in patterns of activation associated with supra- and subliminal exposure. Findings are discussed with regard to sexual arousal and regulatory processes.

The measurement of consciousness: a framework for the scientific study of consciousness

PubMed Central

Gamez, David

2014-01-01

Scientists studying consciousness are attempting to identify correlations between measurements of consciousness and the physical world. Consciousness can only be measured through first-person reports, which raises problems about the accuracy of first-person reports, the possibility of non-reportable consciousness and the causal closure of the physical world. Many of these issues could be resolved by assuming that consciousness is entirely physical or functional. However, this would sacrifice the theory-neutrality that is a key attraction of a correlates-based approach to the study of consciousness. This paper puts forward a different solution that uses a framework of definitions and assumptions to explain how consciousness can be measured. This addresses the problems associated with first-person reports and avoids the issues with the causal closure of the physical world. This framework is compatible with most of the current theories of consciousness and it leads to a distinction between two types of correlates of consciousness. PMID:25071677

A Deeper Look at the “Neural Correlate of Consciousness”

PubMed Central

Fink, Sascha Benjamin

2016-01-01

A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer depends on our operationalization of “NCC.” Chalmers (2000) shaped the widely accepted operationalization according to which an NCC is a neural system with a state which is minimally sufficient (but not necessary) for an experience. A deeper look at this operationalization reveals why it might be unsatisfactory: (i) it is not an operationalization of a correlate for occurring experiences, but of the capacity to experience; (ii) it is unhelpful for certain cases which are used to motivate a search for neural correlates of consciousness; (iii) it does not mirror the usage of “NCC” by scientists who seek for unique correlates; (iv) it hardly allows for a form of comparative testing of hypotheses, namely experimenta crucis. Because of these problems (i–iv), we ought to amend or improve on Chalmers's operationalization. Here, I present an alternative which avoids these problems. This “NCC2.0” also retains some benefits of Chalmers's operationalization, namely being compatible with contributions from extended, embedded, enacted, or embodied accounts (4E-accounts) and allowing for the possibility of non-biological or artificial experiencers. PMID:27507950

What Explains Consciousness? Or…What Consciousness Explains?

PubMed Central

Dulany, Donelson E.

2014-01-01

In this invited commentary I focus on the topic addressed in three papers: De Sousa's (2013[1617]) Toward an Integrative Theory of Consciousness, a monograph with Parts 1 & 2, as well as commentaries by Pereira (2013a[59]) and Hirstein (2013[42]). All three are impressively scholarly and can stand—and shout—on their own. But theory of consciousness? My aim is to slice that topic into the two fundamentally different kinds of theories of consciousness, say what appears to be an ideology, out of behaviourism into cognitivism, now also influencing the quest for an “explanation of consciousness” in cognitive neuroscience. I will then say what can be expected given what we know of the complexity of brain structure, the richness of a conscious “vocabulary”, and current technological limits of brain imaging. This will then turn to the strategy for examining “what consciousness explains”—metatheory, theories, mappings, and a methodology of competitive support, a methodology especially important where there are competing commitments. There are also increasingly common identifications of methodological bias in, along with failures to replicate, studies reporting unconscious controls in decision, social priming—as there have been in perception, learning, problem solving, etc. The literature critique has provided evidence taken as reducing, and in some cases eliminating, a role for conscious controls—a position consistent with that ideology out of behaviourism into cognitivism. It is an ideological position that fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between theoretical and metaphysical assertions. PMID:24891796

Non-conscious processes in changing health-related behaviour: a conceptual analysis and framework.

PubMed

Hollands, Gareth J; Marteau, Theresa M; Fletcher, Paul C

2016-12-01

Much of the global burden of non-communicable disease is caused by unhealthy behaviours that individuals enact even when informed of their health-harming consequences. A key insight is that these behaviours are not predominantly driven by deliberative conscious decisions, but occur directly in response to environmental cues and without necessary representation of their consequences. Consequently, interventions that target non-conscious rather than conscious processes to change health behaviour may have significant potential, but this important premise remains largely untested. This is in part due to the lack of a practicable conceptual framework that can be applied to better describe and assess these interventions. We propose a framework for describing or categorising interventions to change health behaviour by the degree to which their effects may be considered non-conscious. Potential practical issues with applying such a framework are discussed, as are the implications for further research to inform the testing and development of interventions. A pragmatic means of conceptualising interventions targeted at non-conscious processes is a necessary prelude to testing the potency of such interventions. This can ultimately inform the development of interventions with the potential to shape healthier behaviours across populations.

Non-conscious processes in changing health-related behaviour: a conceptual analysis and framework

PubMed Central

Hollands, Gareth J.; Marteau, Theresa M.; Fletcher, Paul C.

2016-01-01

ABSTRACT Much of the global burden of non-communicable disease is caused by unhealthy behaviours that individuals enact even when informed of their health-harming consequences. A key insight is that these behaviours are not predominantly driven by deliberative conscious decisions, but occur directly in response to environmental cues and without necessary representation of their consequences. Consequently, interventions that target non-conscious rather than conscious processes to change health behaviour may have significant potential, but this important premise remains largely untested. This is in part due to the lack of a practicable conceptual framework that can be applied to better describe and assess these interventions. We propose a framework for describing or categorising interventions to change health behaviour by the degree to which their effects may be considered non-conscious. Potential practical issues with applying such a framework are discussed, as are the implications for further research to inform the testing and development of interventions. A pragmatic means of conceptualising interventions targeted at non-conscious processes is a necessary prelude to testing the potency of such interventions. This can ultimately inform the development of interventions with the potential to shape healthier behaviours across populations. PMID:26745243

A network approach to assessing cognition in disorders of consciousness(e–Pub ahead of print)(CME)

PubMed Central

Rodriguez Moreno, D.; Schiff, N.D.; Giacino, J.; Kalmar, K.; Hirsch, J.

2010-01-01

Objective: Conventional assessments of consciousness rely on motor responses to indicate awareness. However, overt behaviors may be absent or ambiguous in patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC) resulting in underrating capacity for cognition. fMRI during a silent picture-naming task was evaluated as an indicator of command following when conventional methods are not sufficient. Methods: A total of 10 patients with and without conventional evidence of awareness, who met diagnostic criteria for the minimally conscious state (MCS) (n = 5), vegetative state (VS) (n = 3), emerged from MCS (EMCS) (n = 1), and locked-in syndrome (LIS) (n = 1), participated in this observational fMRI study. Results: The LIS and EMCS patients engaged a complete network of essential language-related regions during the object-naming task. The MCS and 2 of the VS patients demonstrated both complete and partial preservation of the object-naming system. Patients who engaged a complete network scored highest on the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised. Conclusions: This study supports the view that fMRI during object naming can elicit brain activations in patients with DOC similar to those observed in healthy subjects during command following, and patients can be stratified by completeness of the engaged neural system. These results suggest that activity of the language network may serve as an indicator of high-level cognition and possibly volitional processes that cannot be discerned through conventional behavioral assessment alone. GLOSSARY BA = Brodmann area; BOLD = blood oxygenation level–dependent; CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale-Revised; DOC = disorders of consciousness; EMCS = emerged from minimally conscious state; GFi(d) = dorsal inferior frontal gyrus; GFi(v) = ventral inferior frontal gyrus; hrf = hemodynamic response function; LIS = locked-in syndrome; MCS = minimally conscious state; preSMA = pre-supplementary motor area; STG = superior temporal gyrus; VS = vegetative state. PMID

Anaesthetic Tricaine Acts Preferentially on Neural Voltage-Gated Sodium Channels and Fails to Block Directly Evoked Muscle Contraction

PubMed Central

Attili, Seetharamaiah; Hughes, Simon M.

2014-01-01

Movements in animals arise through concerted action of neurons and skeletal muscle. General anaesthetics prevent movement and cause loss of consciousness by blocking neural function. Anaesthetics of the amino amide-class are thought to act by blockade of voltage-gated sodium channels. In fish, the commonly used anaesthetic tricaine methanesulphonate, also known as 3-aminobenzoic acid ethyl ester, metacaine or MS-222, causes loss of consciousness. However, its role in blocking action potentials in distinct excitable cells is unclear, raising the possibility that tricaine could act as a neuromuscular blocking agent directly causing paralysis. Here we use evoked electrical stimulation to show that tricaine efficiently blocks neural action potentials, but does not prevent directly evoked muscle contraction. Nifedipine-sensitive L-type Cav channels affecting movement are also primarily neural, suggesting that muscle Nav channels are relatively insensitive to tricaine. These findings show that tricaine used at standard concentrations in zebrafish larvae does not paralyse muscle, thereby diminishing concern that a direct action on muscle could mask a lack of general anaesthesia. PMID:25090007

Music and Consciousness: A Continuing Project

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Clarke, David; Clarke, Eric

2014-01-01

If there is a topic on which the humanities might make a distinctive claim, it is that of consciousness--an essential aspect of human being. And within the humanities, music might make its own claims in relation to both consciousness and being human. To investigate this connection, David Clarke and Eric Clarke brought together a wide variety of…

A neural model of normal and abnormal learning and memory consolidation: adaptively timed conditioning, hippocampus, amnesia, neurotrophins, and consciousness.

PubMed

Franklin, Daniel J; Grossberg, Stephen

2017-02-01

How do the hippocampus and amygdala interact with thalamocortical systems to regulate cognitive and cognitive-emotional learning? Why do lesions of thalamus, amygdala, hippocampus, and cortex have differential effects depending on the phase of learning when they occur? In particular, why is the hippocampus typically needed for trace conditioning, but not delay conditioning, and what do the exceptions reveal? Why do amygdala lesions made before or immediately after training decelerate conditioning while those made later do not? Why do thalamic or sensory cortical lesions degrade trace conditioning more than delay conditioning? Why do hippocampal lesions during trace conditioning experiments degrade recent but not temporally remote learning? Why do orbitofrontal cortical lesions degrade temporally remote but not recent or post-lesion learning? How is temporally graded amnesia caused by ablation of prefrontal cortex after memory consolidation? How are attention and consciousness linked during conditioning? How do neurotrophins, notably brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF), influence memory formation and consolidation? Is there a common output path for learned performance? A neural model proposes a unified answer to these questions that overcome problems of alternative memory models.

Aneurysmal subarachnoid hemorrhage causes injury of the ascending reticular activating system: relation to consciousness.

PubMed

Jang, S H; Kim, H S

2015-04-01

Little is known about the pathogenetic mechanism of impaired consciousness following subarachnoid hemorrhage. Using diffusion tensor imaging, we attempted to investigate the presence of injury of the lower portion of the ascending reticular activating system between the pontine reticular formation and the intralaminar thalamic nuclei, and the relation between this injury and consciousness level in patients with SAH. We recruited 24 consecutive patients with spontaneous SAH following aneurysmal rupture and 21 healthy control subjects. Consciousness level was rated by using the Glasgow Coma Scale. Using diffusion tensor tractography, we reconstructed the lower portion of the ascending reticular activating system between the pontine reticular formation and the intralaminar thalamic nuclei. Values of fractional anisotropy, apparent diffusion coefficient, and tract number of the ascending reticular activating system were measured. A significant difference in the tract number was observed between the patient and control groups (P < .05); however, there was no significant difference in terms of fractional anisotropy and apparent diffusion coefficient values (P > .05). In addition, regarding the tract number of the patient group, the Glasgow Coma Scale showed strong positive correlations with the tract number on the more affected side (r = 0.890, P < .05), the less affected side (r = 0.798, P < .05), and both sides (r = 0.919, P < .05), respectively. We found injury of the lower portion of the ascending reticular activating system between the pontine reticular formation and the thalamus in patients with SAH. In addition, we observed a close association between injury of the lower portion of the ascending reticular activating system and impaired consciousness in patients with SAH. © 2015 by American Journal of Neuroradiology.

Time rescaling reproduces EEG behavior during transition from propofol anesthesia-induced unconsciousness to consciousness.

PubMed

Boussen, S; Spiegler, A; Benar, C; Carrère, M; Bartolomei, F; Metellus, P; Voituriez, R; Velly, L; Bruder, N; Trébuchon, A

2018-04-16

General anesthesia (GA) is a reversible manipulation of consciousness whose mechanism is mysterious at the level of neural networks leaving space for several competing hypotheses. We recorded electrocorticography (ECoG) signals in patients who underwent intracranial monitoring during awake surgery for the treatment of cerebral tumors in functional areas of the brain. Therefore, we recorded the transition from unconsciousness to consciousness directly on the brain surface. Using frequency resolved interferometry; we studied the intermediate ECoG frequencies (4-40 Hz). In the theoretical study, we used a computational Jansen and Rit neuron model to simulate recovery of consciousness (ROC). During ROC, we found that f increased by a factor equal to 1.62 ± 0.09, and δf varied by the same factor (1.61 ± 0.09) suggesting the existence of a scaling factor. We accelerated the time course of an unconscious EEG trace by an approximate factor 1.6 and we showed that the resulting EEG trace match the conscious state. Using the theoretical model, we successfully reproduced this behavior. We show that the recovery of consciousness corresponds to a transition in the frequency (f, δf) space, which is exactly reproduced by a simple time rescaling. These findings may perhaps be applied to other altered consciousness states.

The “Id” Knows More than the “Ego” Admits: Neuropsychoanalytic and Primal Consciousness Perspectives on the Interface Between Affective and Cognitive Neuroscience

PubMed Central

Solms, Mark; Panksepp, Jaak

2012-01-01

It is commonly believed that consciousness is a higher brain function. Here we consider the likelihood, based on abundant neuroevolutionary data that lower brain affective phenomenal experiences provide the “energy” for the developmental construction of higher forms of cognitive consciousness. This view is concordant with many of the theoretical formulations of Sigmund Freud. In this reconceptualization, all of consciousness may be dependent on the original evolution of affective phenomenal experiences that coded survival values. These subcortical energies provided a foundation that could be used for the epigenetic construction of perceptual and other higher forms of consciousness. From this perspective, perceptual experiences were initially affective at the primary-process brainstem level, but capable of being elaborated by secondary learning and memory processes into tertiary-cognitive forms of consciousness. Within this view, although all individual neural activities are unconscious, perhaps along with secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, the primal sub-neocortical networks of emotions and other primal affects may have served as the sentient scaffolding for the construction of resolved perceptual and higher mental activities within the neocortex. The data supporting this neuro-psycho-evolutionary vision of the emergence of mind is discussed in relation to classical psychoanalytical models. PMID:24962770

Stigma consciousness: the psychological legacy of social stereotypes.

PubMed

Pinel, E C

1999-01-01

Whereas past researchers have treated targets of stereotypes as though they have uniform reactions to their stereotyped status (e.g., J. Crocker & B. Major, 1989; C. M. Steele & J. Aronson, 1995), it is proposed here that targets differ in the extent to which they expect to be stereotyped by others (i.e., stigma consciousness). Six studies, 5 of which validate the stigma-consciousness questionnaire (SCQ), are presented. The results suggest that the SCQ is a reliable and valid instrument for detecting differences in stigma consciousness. In addition, scores on the SCQ predict perceptions of discrimination and the ability to generate convincing examples of such discrimination. The final study highlights a behavioral consequence of stigma consciousness: the tendency for people high in stigma consciousness to forgo opportunities to invalidate stereotypes about their group. The relation of stigma consciousness to past research on targets of stereotypes is considered as is the issue of how stigma consciousness may encourage continued stereotyping.

Recovery of consciousness and an injured ascending reticular activating system in a patient who survived cardiac arrest: A case report.

PubMed

Jang, Sung Ho; Hyun, Yi Ji; Lee, Han Do

2016-06-01

We report on a patient who survived cardiac arrest and showed recovery of consciousness and an injured ARAS at the early stage of hypoxic-ischemic brain injury (HI- BI) for 3 weeks, which was demonstrated by diffusion tensor tractography (DTT).A 52-year-old male patient who had suffered cardiac arrest caused by acute coronary syndrome was resuscitated immediately by a layman and paramedics for ∼25 minutes. He was then transferred immediately to the emergency room of a local medical center. When starting rehabilitation at 2 weeks after onset, his consciousness was impaired, with a Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) score of 8 and Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (GRS-R) score of 8. He underwent comprehensive rehabilitative therapy, including drugs for recovery of consciousness. He recovered well and rapidly so that his consciousness had recovered to full scores in terms of GCS:15 and GRS-R:23 at 5 weeks after onset.The left lower dorsal and right lower ventral ARAS had become thicker on 5-week DTT compared with 2-week DTT (Fig. 1B). Regarding the change of neural connectivity of the thalamic ILN, increased neural connectivity to the basal forebrain and prefrontal cortex was observed in both hemispheres on 5-week DTT compared with 2-week DTT.Recovery of an injured ARAS was demonstrated in a patient who survived cardiac arrest and his consciousness showed rapid and good recovery for 3 weeks at the early stage of HI-BI.

Trauma-Related Altered States of Consciousness: Exploring the 4-D Model

PubMed Central

Frewen, Paul A.; Lanius, Ruth A.

2014-01-01

Frewen and Lanius (in press) recently articulated a 4-D model as a framework for classifying symptoms of posttraumatic stress into those that potentially occur within normal waking consciousness (NWC) versus those that intrinsically represent dissociative experiences of trauma-related altered states of consciousness (TRASC). Four dimensions were specified: time-memory, thought, body, and emotion. The 4-D model further hypothesizes that in traumatized persons, symptoms of TRASC, compared with NWC forms of distress, will be (a) observed less frequently; (b) less intercorrelated, especially as measured as moment-to-moment states; (c) observed more frequently in people with high dissociative symptomatology as measured independently; and (d) observed more often in people who have experienced repeated traumatization, particularly early developmental trauma. The aim of the present research was to begin to evaluate these 4 predictions of the 4-D model. Within a sample of 74 women with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) primarily due to histories of childhood trauma, as well as within a 2nd sample of 504 undergraduates (384 females), the 1st 2 hypotheses of the 4-D model were supported. In addition, within the PTSD sample, the 3rd hypothesis was supported. However, inconsistent with the 4th hypothesis, severity of childhood trauma history was not strongly associated with TRASC. We conclude that the hypotheses articulated by the 4-D model were generally supported, although further research in different trauma-related disorders is needed, and the role of childhood trauma history in the etiology of TRASC requires further research. PMID:24650122

Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation in Patients with Prolonged Disorders of Consciousness: Combined Behavioral and Event-Related Potential Evidence.

PubMed

Zhang, Ye; Song, Weiqun; Du, Jubao; Huo, Su; Shan, Guixiang; Li, Ran

2017-01-01

The electrophysiological evidence supporting the therapeutic efficacy of multiple transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) sessions on consciousness improvement in patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness (DOCs) has not been firmly established. To assess the effects of repeated tDCS in patients with prolonged DOCs by Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) score and event-related potential (ERP). Using a sham-controlled randomized double-blind design, 26 patients were randomly assigned to either a real [five vegetative state (VS) and eight minimally conscious state (MCS) patients] or sham (six VS and seven MCS patients) stimulation group. The patients in the real stimulation group underwent 20 anodal tDCS sessions of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) over 10 consecutive working days. The CRS-R score and P300 amplitude and latency in a hierarchical cognitive assessment were recorded to evaluate the consciousness level before tDCS and immediately after the 20 sessions. The intra-group CRS-R analysis revealed a clinically significant improvement in the MCS patients in the real stimulation group. The inter-group CRS-R analysis showed a significant difference in CRS-R between VS and MCS patients at baseline in both the real and sham stimulation groups. The intra-group ERP analysis revealed a significant increase in P300 amplitude after tDCS in the MCS patients in the real stimulation group, but no significant differences in P300 latency. For the inter-group ERP analysis, we observed significant differences regarding the presence of P300 at baseline between the VS and MCS patients in both groups. The repeated anodal tDCS of the left DLPFC could produce clinically significant improvements in MCS patients. The observed tDCS-related consciousness improvements might be related to improvements in attention resource allocation (reflected by the P300 amplitude). The findings support the use of tDCS in clinical practice and ERP might serve as an

Neural correlates of exposure to subliminal and supraliminal sexual cues

PubMed Central

Canterberry, Melanie

2012-01-01

Sexual arousal is thought to be the result of two levels of processing: conscious and unconscious. Whereas some research exists on the neural correlates related with conscious exposure to sexual stimuli, there are no parallel data regarding unconscious or subliminal exposure to such stimuli. In the present study, we therefore compared brain activation of 39 participants (20 women) as they were exposed to supraliminal vs subliminal sexual stimuli. Supraliminal exposure was associated with greater activation in areas that were previously associated with sexual arousal (e.g. caudate nucleus and thalamus) as well as areas that were previously associated with control (e.g. orbitofrontal cortex and cingulate cortex). In contrast, subliminal exposure was mainly related to activation in areas previously associated with sexual arousal. Men and women exhibited theoretically meaningful differences in patterns of activation associated with supra- and subliminal exposure. Findings are discussed with regard to sexual arousal and regulatory processes. PMID:22006991

Emotion-Related Consciousness Detection in Patients With Disorders of Consciousness Through an EEG-Based BCI System

PubMed Central

Pan, Jiahui; Xie, Qiuyou; Huang, Haiyun; He, Yanbin; Sun, Yuping; Yu, Ronghao; Li, Yuanqing

2018-01-01

For patients with disorders of consciousness (DOC), such as vegetative state (VS) and minimally conscious state (MCS), detecting and assessing the residual cognitive functions of the brain remain challenging. Emotion-related cognitive functions are difficult to detect in patients with DOC using motor response-based clinical assessment scales such as the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) because DOC patients have motor impairments and are unable to provide sufficient motor responses for emotion-related communication. In this study, we proposed an EEG-based brain-computer interface (BCI) system for emotion recognition in patients with DOC. Eight patients with DOC (5 VS and 3 MCS) and eight healthy controls participated in the BCI-based experiment. During the experiment, two movie clips flashed (appearing and disappearing) eight times with a random interstimulus interval between flashes to evoke P300 potentials. The subjects were instructed to focus on the crying or laughing movie clip and to count the flashes of the corresponding movie clip cued by instruction. The BCI system performed online P300 detection to determine which movie clip the patients responsed to and presented the result as feedback. Three of the eight patients and all eight healthy controls achieved online accuracies based on P300 detection that were significantly greater than chance level. P300 potentials were observed in the EEG signals from the three patients. These results indicated the three patients had abilities of emotion recognition and command following. Through spectral analysis, common spatial pattern (CSP) and differential entropy (DE) features in the delta, theta, alpha, beta, and gamma frequency bands were employed to classify the EEG signals during the crying and laughing movie clips. Two patients and all eight healthy controls achieved offline accuracies significantly greater than chance levels in the spectral analysis. Furthermore, stable topographic distribution patterns of CSP

Interoceptive awareness moderates neural activity during decision-making.

PubMed

Werner, Natalie S; Schweitzer, Nicola; Meindl, Thomas; Duschek, Stefan; Kambeitz, Joseph; Schandry, Rainer

2013-12-01

The current study examined the relationship between conscious perception of somatic feedback (interoceptive awareness) and neural responses preceding decision-making. Previous research has suggested that decision-making is influenced by body signals from the periphery or the central representation of the periphery. Using event-related fMRI, participants whose interoceptive awareness was assessed using a heartbeat perception paradigm performed the Iowa Gambling Task. The results show a positive relationship between the degree of interoceptive awareness and selection related activity in the right anterior insula and the left postcentral gyrus. Neural activity within the right anterior insula was associated with decision-making performance only in individuals with accurate but not in those with non-accurate interoceptive awareness. These findings support the role of somatic feedback in decision-making processes. They indicate that the right anterior insula holds a representation of somatic markers and that these are more strongly processed with increased interoceptive awareness. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A mathematical model of embodied consciousness.

PubMed

Rudrauf, David; Bennequin, Daniel; Granic, Isabela; Landini, Gregory; Friston, Karl; Williford, Kenneth

2017-09-07

We introduce a mathematical model of embodied consciousness, the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM), which is based on the hypothesis that the spatial field of consciousness (FoC) is structured by a projective geometry and under the control of a process of active inference. The FoC in the PCM combines multisensory evidence with prior beliefs in memory and frames them by selecting points of view and perspectives according to preferences. The choice of projective frames governs how expectations are transformed by consciousness. Violations of expectation are encoded as free energy. Free energy minimization drives perspective taking, and controls the switch between perception, imagination and action. In the PCM, consciousness functions as an algorithm for the maximization of resilience, using projective perspective taking and imagination in order to escape local minima of free energy. The PCM can account for a variety of psychological phenomena: the characteristic spatial phenomenology of subjective experience, the distinctions and integral relationships between perception, imagination and action, the role of affective processes in intentionality, but also perceptual phenomena such as the dynamics of bistable figures and body swap illusions in virtual reality. It relates phenomenology to function, showing the computational advantages of consciousness. It suggests that changes of brain states from unconscious to conscious reflect the action of projective transformations and suggests specific neurophenomenological hypotheses about the brain, guidelines for designing artificial systems, and formal principles for psychology. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Weight-related actual and ideal self-states, discrepancies, and shame, guilt, and pride: examining associations within the process model of self-conscious emotions.

PubMed

Castonguay, Andree L; Brunet, Jennifer; Ferguson, Leah; Sabiston, Catherine M

2012-09-01

The aim of this study was to examine the associations between women's actual:ideal weight-related self-discrepancies and experiences of weight-related shame, guilt, and authentic pride using self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) and self-conscious emotion (Tracy & Robins, 2004) theories as guiding frameworks. Participants (N=398) completed self-report questionnaires. Main analyses involved polynomial regressions, followed by the computation and evaluation of response surface values. Actual and ideal weight self-states were related to shame (R2 = .35), guilt (R2 = .25), and authentic pride (R2 = .08). When the discrepancy between actual and ideal weights increased, shame and guilt also increased, while authentic pride decreased. Findings provide partial support for self-discrepancy theory and the process model of self-conscious emotions. Experiencing weight-related self-discrepancies may be important cognitive appraisals related to shame, guilt, and authentic pride. Further research is needed exploring the relations between self-discrepancies and a range of weight-related self-conscious emotions. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Ultra-slow mechanical stimulation of olfactory epithelium modulates consciousness by slowing cerebral rhythms in humans.

PubMed

Piarulli, A; Zaccaro, A; Laurino, M; Menicucci, D; De Vito, A; Bruschini, L; Berrettini, S; Bergamasco, M; Laureys, S; Gemignani, A

2018-04-26

The coupling between respiration and neural activity within olfactory areas and hippocampus has recently been unambiguously demonstrated, its neurophysiological basis sustained by the well-assessed mechanical sensitivity of the olfactory epithelium. We herein hypothesize that this coupling reverberates to the whole brain, possibly modulating the subject's behavior and state of consciousness. The olfactory epithelium of 12 healthy subjects was stimulated with periodical odorless air-delivery (frequency 0.05 Hz, 8 s on, 12 off). Cortical electrical activity (High Density-EEG) and perceived state of consciousness have been studied. The stimulation induced i) an enhancement of delta-theta EEG activity over the whole cortex mainly involving the Limbic System and Default Mode Network structures, ii) a reversal of the overall information flow directionality from wake-like postero-anterior to NREM sleep-like antero-posterior, iii) the perception of having experienced an Altered State of Consciousness. These findings could shed further light via a neurophenomenological approach on the links between respiration, cerebral activity and subjective experience, suggesting a plausible neurophysiological basis for interpreting altered states of consciousness induced by respiration-based meditative practices.

Neural Dynamics Underlying Event-Related Potentials

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Shah, Ankoor S.; Bressler, Steven L.; Knuth, Kevin H.; Ding, Ming-Zhou; Mehta, Ashesh D.; Ulbert, Istvan; Schroeder, Charles E.

2003-01-01

There are two opposing hypotheses about the brain mechanisms underlying sensory event-related potentials (ERPs). One holds that sensory ERPs are generated by phase resetting of ongoing electroencephalographic (EEG) activity, and the other that they result from signal averaging of stimulus-evoked neural responses. We tested several contrasting predictions of these hypotheses by direct intracortical analysis of neural activity in monkeys. Our findings clearly demonstrate evoked response contributions to the sensory ERP in the monkey, and they suggest the likelihood that a mixed (Evoked/Phase Resetting) model may account for the generation of scalp ERPs in humans.

Environmentally conscious patent histories

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Crouch, Dennis D.; Crouch, Henry L.

2004-02-01

There is a need for investigators, legislators, and business leaders to understand the magnitude of innovation and discovery in the field of environmentally conscious technologies (ECTs). Knowledge of the "big picture" is important to providing a national and global account of actual environmental stewardship over the last twenty-five years. A recitation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) supported Acts which have been enacted into law reveals one facet of the multifaceted dynamic of environmental consciousness. The popular discussion and debate, as well as partisan lobbying, which created the political forces leading to environmentally conscious legislation is another facet. A third facet is the corporate response to the threats and opportunities predicted by CEO"s and others through environmental scanning. This paper examines changes in environmentally conscious inventive effort by comparing data from United States Patents issued from 1976 through 2003. Patents are useful tool for measuring technological innovation because they are publicly available records of innovative activity. Although not all inventions result in patent applications, the monopoly rights granted on the invention give the inventor a strong incentive to obtain patents on any viable product or process. Among the results, we found a significant increase in patents relating to environmentally conscious products and processes during the period in question. Specifically, a dramatic increase in patent activity was seen for the decade of the 1990"s. Surprisingly, the patenting rate from 2000 to 2003 seems to have stabilized. Additionally public discussion of ECTs appears to have a positive impact on patent filings.

Self-conscious emotions and criminal offending.

PubMed

Tibbetts, Stephen G

2003-08-01

This study examined the relation of personality traits--shame-proneness, guilt-proneness, and pride--on offending behavior. Using survey data from a sample of 224 college students, the construct and criterion-related validity of scales of the Shame Proneness Scale, the Test of Self-conscious Affect, and the Personality Feelings Questionnaire-2 were assessed. Regression analyses showed that self-conscious emotions are important in the etiology of criminal offending. Specifically, rated pride was positively correlated with self-reported criminal activity, whereas ratings of guilt were negatively associated with offending. The relation of shame with criminality varied depending on the type of measure used to indicate proneness to shame.

Neural Alterations in Acquired Age-Related Hearing Loss

PubMed Central

Mudar, Raksha A.; Husain, Fatima T.

2016-01-01

Hearing loss is one of the most prevalent chronic health conditions in older adults. Growing evidence suggests that hearing loss is associated with reduced cognitive functioning and incident dementia. In this mini-review, we briefly examine literature on anatomical and functional alterations in the brains of adults with acquired age-associated hearing loss, which may underlie the cognitive consequences observed in this population, focusing on studies that have used structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging, diffusion tensor imaging, and event-related electroencephalography. We discuss structural and functional alterations observed in the temporal and frontal cortices and the limbic system. These neural alterations are discussed in the context of common cause, information-degradation, and sensory-deprivation hypotheses, and we suggest possible rehabilitation strategies. Although, we are beginning to learn more about changes in neural architecture and functionality related to age-associated hearing loss, much work remains to be done. Understanding the neural alterations will provide objective markers for early identification of neural consequences of age-associated hearing loss and for evaluating benefits of intervention approaches. PMID:27313556

The neural correlates of dreaming

PubMed Central

Siclari, F.; Baird, B.; Perogamvros, L.; Bernardi, G.; LaRocque, J. J.; Riedner, B.; Boly, M.; Postle, B. R.; Tononi, G.

2017-01-01

Consciousness never fades during wake. However, if awakened from sleep, sometimes we report dreams and sometimes no experiences. Traditionally, dreaming has been identified with REM sleep, characterized by a wake-like, globally ‘activated’, high-frequency EEG. However, dreaming also occurs in NREM sleep, characterized by prominent low-frequency activity. This challenges our understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep. Using high-density EEG, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming within NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, reports of dream experience were associated with a local decrease in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical regions. High-frequency activity within these regions correlated with specific dream contents. Monitoring this posterior ‘hot zone’ predicted whether an individual reported dreaming or the absence of experiences during NREM sleep in real time, suggesting that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep. PMID:28394322

The neural correlates of dreaming.

PubMed

Siclari, Francesca; Baird, Benjamin; Perogamvros, Lampros; Bernardi, Giulio; LaRocque, Joshua J; Riedner, Brady; Boly, Melanie; Postle, Bradley R; Tononi, Giulio

2017-06-01

Consciousness never fades during waking. However, when awakened from sleep, we sometimes recall dreams and sometimes recall no experiences. Traditionally, dreaming has been identified with rapid eye-movement (REM) sleep, characterized by wake-like, globally 'activated', high-frequency electroencephalographic activity. However, dreaming also occurs in non-REM (NREM) sleep, characterized by prominent low-frequency activity. This challenges our understanding of the neural correlates of conscious experiences in sleep. Using high-density electroencephalography, we contrasted the presence and absence of dreaming in NREM and REM sleep. In both NREM and REM sleep, reports of dream experience were associated with local decreases in low-frequency activity in posterior cortical regions. High-frequency activity in these regions correlated with specific dream contents. Monitoring this posterior 'hot zone' in real time predicted whether an individual reported dreaming or the absence of dream experiences during NREM sleep, suggesting that it may constitute a core correlate of conscious experiences in sleep.

Non-conscious processing of motion coherence can boost conscious access.

PubMed

Kaunitz, Lisandro; Fracasso, Alessio; Lingnau, Angelika; Melcher, David

2013-01-01

Research on the scope and limits of non-conscious vision can advance our understanding of the functional and neural underpinnings of visual awareness. Here we investigated whether distributed local features can be bound, outside of awareness, into coherent patterns. We used continuous flash suppression (CFS) to create interocular suppression, and thus lack of awareness, for a moving dot stimulus that varied in terms of coherence with an overall pattern (radial flow). Our results demonstrate that for radial motion, coherence favors the detection of patterns of moving dots even under interocular suppression. Coherence caused dots to break through the masks more often: this indicates that the visual system was able to integrate low-level motion signals into a coherent pattern outside of visual awareness. In contrast, in an experiment using meaningful or scrambled biological motion we did not observe any increase in the sensitivity of detection for meaningful patterns. Overall, our results are in agreement with previous studies on face processing and with the hypothesis that certain features are spatiotemporally bound into coherent patterns even outside of attention or awareness.

Nonneurocognitive Extended Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wojcik, Kevin; Chemero, Anthony

2012-01-01

One of the attributes necessary for Watson to be considered human is that it must be conscious. From Rachlin's (2012) point of view, that of teleological behaviorism, consciousness refers to the organization of behavioral complexity in which overt behavior is distributed widely over time. Consciousness is something that humans do, or achieve, in…

Brain damage and the moral significance of consciousness.

PubMed

Kahane, Guy; Savulescu, Julian

2009-02-01

Neuroimaging studies of brain-damaged patients diagnosed as in the vegetative state suggest that the patients might be conscious. This might seem to raise no new ethical questions given that in related disputes both sides agree that evidence for consciousness gives strong reason to preserve life. We question this assumption. We clarify the widely held but obscure principle that consciousness is morally significant. It is hard to apply this principle to difficult cases given that philosophers of mind distinguish between a range of notions of consciousness and that is unclear which of these is assumed by the principle. We suggest that the morally relevant notion is that of phenomenal consciousness and then use our analysis to interpret cases of brain damage. We argue that enjoyment of consciousness might actually give stronger moral reasons not to preserve a patient's life and, indeed, that these might be stronger when patients retain significant cognitive function.

A temporal dissociation of subliminal versus supraliminal fear perception: an event-related potential study.

PubMed

Liddell, Belinda J; Williams, Leanne M; Rathjen, Jennifer; Shevrin, Howard; Gordon, Evian

2004-04-01

Current theories of emotion suggest that threat-related stimuli are first processed via an automatically engaged neural mechanism, which occurs outside conscious awareness. This mechanism operates in conjunction with a slower and more comprehensive process that allows a detailed evaluation of the potentially harmful stimulus (LeDoux, 1998). We drew on the Halgren and Marinkovic (1995) model to examine these processes using event-related potentials (ERPs) within a backward masking paradigm. Stimuli used were faces with fear and neutral (as baseline control) expressions, presented above (supraliminal) and below (subliminal) the threshold for conscious detection. ERP data revealed a double dissociation for the supraliminal versus subliminal perception of fear. In the subliminal condition, responses to the perception of fear stimuli were enhanced relative to neutral for the N2 "excitatory" component, which is thought to represent orienting and automatic aspects of face processing. By contrast, supraliminal perception of fear was associated with relatively enhanced responses for the late P3 "inhibitory" component, implicated in the integration of emotional processes. These findings provide evidence in support of Halgren and Marinkovic's temporal model of emotion processing, and indicate that the neural mechanisms for appraising signals of threat may be initiated, not only automatically, but also without the need for conscious detection of these signals.

Adaptive Skeletal Muscle Action Requires Anticipation and “Conscious Broadcasting”

PubMed Central

Poehlman, T. Andrew; Jantz, Tiffany K.; Morsella, Ezequiel

2012-01-01

Historically, the conscious and anticipatory processes involved in voluntary action have been associated with the loftiest heights of nervous function. Concepts like mental time travel, “theory of mind,” and the formation of “the self” have been at the center of many attempts to determine the purpose of consciousness. Eventually, more reductionistic accounts of consciousness emerged, proposing rather that conscious states play a much more basic role in nervous function. Though the widely held integration consensus proposes that conscious states integrate information-processing structures and events that would otherwise be independent, Supramodular Interaction Theory (SIT) argues that conscious states are necessary for the integration of only certain kinds of information. As revealed in this selective review, this integration is related to what is casually referred to as “voluntary” action, which is intimately related to the skeletal muscle output system. Through a peculiar form of broadcasting, conscious integration often controls and guides action via “ideomotor” mechanisms, where anticipatory processes play a central role. Our selective review covers evidence (including findings from anesthesia research) for the integration consensus, SIT, and ideomotor theory. PMID:23264766

Impaired Consciousness in Epilepsy

PubMed Central

Blumenfeld, Hal

2013-01-01

Consciousness is essential to normal human life. In epileptic seizures consciousness is often transiently lost making it impossible for the individual to experience or respond. This has huge consequences for safety, productivity, emotional health and quality of life. To prevent impaired consciousness in epilepsy it is necessary to understand the mechanisms leading to brain dysfunction during seizures. Normally the “consciousness system”—a specialized set of cortical-subcortical structures—maintains alertness, attention and awareness. Recent advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology and prospective behavioral testing have shed new light on how epileptic seizures disrupt the consciousness system. Diverse seizure types including absence, generalized tonic-clonic and complex partial seizures converge on the same set of anatomical structures through different mechanisms to disrupt consciousness. Understanding these mechanisms may lead to improved treatment strategies to prevent impaired consciousness and improve quality of life in people with epilepsy. PMID:22898735

Neural plasticity and its initiating conditions in tinnitus.

PubMed

Roberts, L E

2018-03-01

Deafferentation caused by cochlear pathology (which can be hidden from the audiogram) activates forms of neural plasticity in auditory pathways, generating tinnitus and its associated conditions including hyperacusis. This article discusses tinnitus mechanisms and suggests how these mechanisms may relate to those involved in normal auditory information processing. Research findings from animal models of tinnitus and from electromagnetic imaging of tinnitus patients are reviewed which pertain to the role of deafferentation and neural plasticity in tinnitus and hyperacusis. Auditory neurons compensate for deafferentation by increasing their input/output functions (gain) at multiple levels of the auditory system. Forms of homeostatic plasticity are believed to be responsible for this neural change, which increases the spontaneous and driven activity of neurons in central auditory structures in animals expressing behavioral evidence of tinnitus. Another tinnitus correlate, increased neural synchrony among the affected neurons, is forged by spike-timing-dependent neural plasticity in auditory pathways. Slow oscillations generated by bursting thalamic neurons verified in tinnitus animals appear to modulate neural plasticity in the cortex, integrating tinnitus neural activity with information in brain regions supporting memory, emotion, and consciousness which exhibit increased metabolic activity in tinnitus patients. The latter process may be induced by transient auditory events in normal processing but it persists in tinnitus, driven by phantom signals from the auditory pathway. Several tinnitus therapies attempt to suppress tinnitus through plasticity, but repeated sessions will likely be needed to prevent tinnitus activity from returning owing to deafferentation as its initiating condition.

Non-conscious visual cues related to affect and action alter perception of effort and endurance performance

PubMed Central

Blanchfield, Anthony; Hardy, James; Marcora, Samuele

2014-01-01

The psychobiological model of endurance performance proposes that endurance performance is determined by a decision-making process based on perception of effort and potential motivation. Recent research has reported that effort-based decision-making during cognitive tasks can be altered by non-conscious visual cues relating to affect and action. The effects of these non-conscious visual cues on effort and performance during physical tasks are however unknown. We report two experiments investigating the effects of subliminal priming with visual cues related to affect and action on perception of effort and endurance performance. In Experiment 1 thirteen individuals were subliminally primed with happy or sad faces as they cycled to exhaustion in a counterbalanced and randomized crossover design. A paired t-test (happy vs. sad faces) revealed that individuals cycled significantly longer (178 s, p = 0.04) when subliminally primed with happy faces. A 2 × 5 (condition × iso-time) ANOVA also revealed a significant main effect of condition on rating of perceived exertion (RPE) during the time to exhaustion (TTE) test with lower RPE when subjects were subliminally primed with happy faces (p = 0.04). In Experiment 2, a single-subject randomization tests design found that subliminal priming with action words facilitated a significantly longer TTE (399 s, p = 0.04) in comparison to inaction words. Like Experiment 1, this greater TTE was accompanied by a significantly lower RPE (p = 0.03). These experiments are the first to show that subliminal visual cues relating to affect and action can alter perception of effort and endurance performance. Non-conscious visual cues may therefore influence the effort-based decision-making process that is proposed to determine endurance performance. Accordingly, the findings raise notable implications for individuals who may encounter such visual cues during endurance competitions, training, or health related exercise. PMID:25566014

Spatial Frequency Tuning during the Conscious and Non-Conscious Perception of Emotional Facial Expressions – An Intracranial ERP Study

PubMed Central

Willenbockel, Verena; Lepore, Franco; Nguyen, Dang Khoa; Bouthillier, Alain; Gosselin, Frédéric

2012-01-01

Previous studies have shown that complex visual stimuli, such as emotional facial expressions, can influence brain activity independently of the observers’ awareness. Little is known yet, however, about the “informational correlates” of consciousness – i.e., which low-level information correlates with brain activation during conscious vs. non-conscious perception. Here, we investigated this question in the spatial frequency (SF) domain. We examined which SFs in disgusted and fearful faces modulate activation in the insula and amygdala over time and as a function of awareness, using a combination of intracranial event-related potentials (ERPs), SF Bubbles (Willenbockel et al., 2010a), and Continuous Flash Suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Patients implanted with electrodes for epilepsy monitoring viewed face photographs (13° × 7°) that were randomly SF filtered on a trial-by-trial basis. In the conscious condition, the faces were visible; in the non-conscious condition, they were rendered invisible using CFS. The data were analyzed by performing multiple linear regressions on the SF filters from each trial and the transformed ERP amplitudes across time. The resulting classification images suggest that many SFs are involved in the conscious and non-conscious perception of emotional expressions, with SFs between 6 and 10 cycles per face width being particularly important early on. The results also revealed qualitative differences between the awareness conditions for both regions. Non-conscious processing relied on low SFs more and was faster than conscious processing. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that different pathways are employed for the processing of emotional stimuli under different degrees of awareness. The present study represents a first step to mapping how SF information “flows” through the emotion-processing network with a high temporal resolution and to shedding light on the informational correlates of

Self-organized dynamical complexity in human wakefulness and sleep: different critical brain-activity feedback for conscious and unconscious states.

PubMed

Allegrini, Paolo; Paradisi, Paolo; Menicucci, Danilo; Laurino, Marco; Piarulli, Andrea; Gemignani, Angelo

2015-09-01

Criticality reportedly describes brain dynamics. The main critical feature is the presence of scale-free neural avalanches, whose auto-organization is determined by a critical branching ratio of neural-excitation spreading. Other features, directly associated to second-order phase transitions, are: (i) scale-free-network topology of functional connectivity, stemming from suprathreshold pairwise correlations, superimposable, in waking brain activity, with that of ferromagnets at Curie temperature; (ii) temporal long-range memory associated to renewal intermittency driven by abrupt fluctuations in the order parameters, detectable in human brain via spatially distributed phase or amplitude changes in EEG activity. Herein we study intermittent events, extracted from 29 night EEG recordings, including presleep wakefulness and all phases of sleep, where different levels of mentation and consciousness are present. We show that while critical avalanching is unchanged, at least qualitatively, intermittency and functional connectivity, present during conscious phases (wakefulness and REM sleep), break down during both shallow and deep non-REM sleep. We provide a theory for fragmentation-induced intermittency breakdown and suggest that the main difference between conscious and unconscious states resides in the backwards causation, namely on the constraints that the emerging properties at large scale induce to the lower scales. In particular, while in conscious states this backwards causation induces a critical slowing down, preserving spatiotemporal correlations, in dreamless sleep we see a self-organized maintenance of moduli working in parallel. Critical avalanches are still present, and establish transient auto-organization, whose enhanced fluctuations are able to trigger sleep-protecting mechanisms that reinstate parallel activity. The plausible role of critical avalanches in dreamless sleep is to provide a rapid recovery of consciousness, if stimuli are highly arousing.

Self-organized dynamical complexity in human wakefulness and sleep: Different critical brain-activity feedback for conscious and unconscious states

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Allegrini, Paolo; Paradisi, Paolo; Menicucci, Danilo; Laurino, Marco; Piarulli, Andrea; Gemignani, Angelo

2015-09-01

Criticality reportedly describes brain dynamics. The main critical feature is the presence of scale-free neural avalanches, whose auto-organization is determined by a critical branching ratio of neural-excitation spreading. Other features, directly associated to second-order phase transitions, are: (i) scale-free-network topology of functional connectivity, stemming from suprathreshold pairwise correlations, superimposable, in waking brain activity, with that of ferromagnets at Curie temperature; (ii) temporal long-range memory associated to renewal intermittency driven by abrupt fluctuations in the order parameters, detectable in human brain via spatially distributed phase or amplitude changes in EEG activity. Herein we study intermittent events, extracted from 29 night EEG recordings, including presleep wakefulness and all phases of sleep, where different levels of mentation and consciousness are present. We show that while critical avalanching is unchanged, at least qualitatively, intermittency and functional connectivity, present during conscious phases (wakefulness and REM sleep), break down during both shallow and deep non-REM sleep. We provide a theory for fragmentation-induced intermittency breakdown and suggest that the main difference between conscious and unconscious states resides in the backwards causation, namely on the constraints that the emerging properties at large scale induce to the lower scales. In particular, while in conscious states this backwards causation induces a critical slowing down, preserving spatiotemporal correlations, in dreamless sleep we see a self-organized maintenance of moduli working in parallel. Critical avalanches are still present, and establish transient auto-organization, whose enhanced fluctuations are able to trigger sleep-protecting mechanisms that reinstate parallel activity. The plausible role of critical avalanches in dreamless sleep is to provide a rapid recovery of consciousness, if stimuli are highly arousing.

Xenomelia: a social neuroscience view of altered bodily self-consciousness.

PubMed

Brugger, Peter; Lenggenhager, Bigna; Giummarra, Melita J

2013-01-01

Xenomelia, the "foreign limb syndrome," is characterized by the non-acceptance of one or more of one's own extremities and the resulting desire for elective limb amputation or paralysis. Formerly labeled "body integrity identity disorder" (BIID), the condition was originally considered a psychological or psychiatric disorder, but a brain-centered Zeitgeist and a rapidly growing interest in the neural underpinnings of bodily self-consciousness has shifted the focus toward dysfunctional central nervous system circuits. The present article outlays both mind-based and brain-based views highlighting their shortcomings. We propose that full insight into what should be conceived a "xenomelia spectrum disorder" will require interpretation of individual symptomatology in a social context. A proper social neuroscience of xenomelia respects the functional neuroanatomy of corporeal awareness, but also acknowledges the brain's plasticity in response to an individual's history, which is lived against a cultural background. This integrated view of xenomelia will promote the subfield of consciousness research concerned with the unity of body and self.

Nociception, pain, consciousness, and society: A plea for constrained use of pain-related terminologies.

PubMed

Apkarian, A Vania

2018-06-08

This focus article addresses the issue of the proper use of terminology in pain research. A review and some revisions on the definitions of pain and nociception, in relation to consciousness is presented. From a behavioral viewpoint, it is argued that pain is a conscious assessment of the failure of the organism to protect the body from injury (actual or potential); while continuously-ongoing sub/pre-conscious nociceptive processes protect the body from injuries. Thus, pain perception/behavior requires a subjective ability to evaluate the environment and form coordinated responses. Yet, too often our literature conflates the two concepts, resulting in a confusion that impacts on society. The issue is especially topical as the US Senate has been voting a bill called: Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act. The title of the bill itself does not make sense, if we adhere to the strict definitions commonly accepted in our field. Thus, this article concludes with a plea to properly constrain the narrative with which we describe our research, and minimize potential abuse of the science of pain for political interests. Perspective The focus article goes over the classic definitions of pain and nociception; incorporates novel concepts recently advances as to their functional differentiation; and is a plea for our research and clinical society to adhere to the proper use of these terms to minimize misinterpretation by society at large. Copyright © 2018. Published by Elsevier Inc.

A dual-process model of defense against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: an extension of terror management theory.

PubMed

Pyszczynski, T; Greenberg, J; Solomon, S

1999-10-01

Distinct defensive processes are activated by conscious and nonconscious but accessible thoughts of death. Proximal defenses, which entail suppressing death-related thoughts or pushing the problem of death into the distant future by denying one's vulnerability, are rational, threat-focused, and activated when thoughts of death are in current focal attention. Distal terror management defenses, which entail maintaining self-esteem and faith in one's cultural worldview, function to control the potential for anxiety that results from knowing that death is inevitable. These defenses are experiential, are not related to the problem of death in any semantic or logical way, and are increasingly activated as the accessibility of death-related thoughts increases, up to the point at which such thoughts enter consciousness and proximal threat-focused defenses are initiated. Experimental evidence for this analysis is presented.

Understanding schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness: biological correlates and translational implications from quantum theory perspectives.

PubMed

Venkatasubramanian, Ganesan

2015-04-30

From neurophenomenological perspectives, schizophrenia has been conceptualized as "a disorder with heterogeneous manifestations that can be integrally understood to involve fundamental perturbations in consciousness". While these theoretical constructs based on consciousness facilitate understanding the 'gestalt' of schizophrenia, systematic research to unravel translational implications of these models is warranted. To address this, one needs to begin with exploration of plausible biological underpinnings of "perturbed consciousness" in schizophrenia. In this context, an attractive proposition to understand the biology of consciousness is "the orchestrated object reduction (Orch-OR) theory" which invokes quantum processes in the microtubules of neurons. The Orch-OR model is particularly important for understanding schizophrenia especially due to the shared 'scaffold' of microtubules. The initial sections of this review focus on the compelling evidence to support the view that "schizophrenia is a disorder of consciousness" through critical summary of the studies that have demonstrated self-abnormalities, aberrant time perception as well as dysfunctional intentional binding in this disorder. Subsequently, these findings are linked with 'Orch-OR theory' through the research evidence for aberrant neural oscillations as well as microtubule abnormalities observed in schizophrenia. Further sections emphasize the applicability and translational implications of Orch-OR theory in the context of schizophrenia and elucidate the relevance of quantum biology to understand the origins of this puzzling disorder as "fundamental disturbances in consciousness".

Insights on consciousness from taste memory research.

PubMed

Gallo, Milagros

2016-01-01

Taste research in rodents supports the relevance of memory in order to determine the content of consciousness by modifying both taste perception and later action. Associated with this issue is the fact that taste and visual modalities share anatomical circuits traditionally related to conscious memory. This challenges the view of taste memory as a type of non-declarative unconscious memory.

The Role of Consciousness in Second Language Learning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schmidt, Richard W.

1990-01-01

Summarizes recent psychological research and theory on the topic of consciousness, and looks at three questions in second-language learning related to the role of consciousness in input processing. The discussion involves the requirement in learning a second language of subliminal learning, implicit learning, and incidental learning. (142…

Contextualizing How Undergraduate Students Develop toward Critical Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taylor, Kari Brooke

2017-01-01

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine how interactions between undergraduate students and their learning environments influenced their development toward critical consciousness. Critical consciousness represents a complex way of making meaning of one's self in relation to one's social world that is necessary for meeting the…

Self-Consciousness, Friendship Quality, and Adolescent Internalizing Problems

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bowker, Julie C.; Rubin, Kenneth H.

2009-01-01

The correlates between public and private self-consciousness and internalizing difficulties were examined during early adolescence. Friendship quality was assessed as a possible moderator of the relation between self-consciousness and maladjustment. One hundred and thirty-seven young adolescents (N = 87 girls; M age = 13.98 years) reported on…

Conscious Leadership.

PubMed

Ward, Suzanne F; Haase, Beth

2016-11-01

Health care leaders need to use leadership methodologies that support safe patient care, satisfy employees, and improve the bottom line. Conscious leaders help create desirable personal and professional life experiences for themselves using specific tools that include mindfulness, context, and the observer-self, and they strive to help their employees learn to use these tools as well. In perioperative nursing, conscious leaders create an environment in which nurses are supported in their aim to provide the highest level of patient care and in which transformations are encouraged to take place; this environment ultimately promotes safety, contributes to fulfilling and meaningful work, and enhances a facility's financial viability. This article discusses some of the key concepts behind conscious leadership, how perioperative leaders can reach and maintain expanded consciousness, and how they can best assist their staff members in their own evolution to a more mindful state. Copyright © 2016 AORN, Inc. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Quantum effects in the understanding of consciousness.

PubMed

Hameroff, Stuart R; Craddock, Travis J A; Tuszynski, Jack A

2014-06-01

This paper presents a historical perspective on the development and application of quantum physics methodology beyond physics, especially in biology and in the area of consciousness studies. Quantum physics provides a conceptual framework for the structural aspects of biological systems and processes via quantum chemistry. In recent years individual biological phenomena such as photosynthesis and bird navigation have been experimentally and theoretically analyzed using quantum methods building conceptual foundations for quantum biology. Since consciousness is attributed to human (and possibly animal) mind, quantum underpinnings of cognitive processes are a logical extension. Several proposals, especially the Orch OR hypothesis, have been put forth in an effort to introduce a scientific basis to the theory of consciousness. At the center of these approaches are microtubules as the substrate on which conscious processes in terms of quantum coherence and entanglement can be built. Additionally, Quantum Metabolism, quantum processes in ion channels and quantum effects in sensory stimulation are discussed in this connection. We discuss the challenges and merits related to quantum consciousness approaches as well as their potential extensions.

[Altered states of consciousness].

PubMed

Gora, E P

2005-01-01

The review of modern ideas concerning the altered states of consciousness is presented in this article. Various methods of entry into the altered states of consciousness are looked over. It is shown that the altered states of consciousness are insufficiently known, but important aspects of human being existence. The role of investigation of the altered states of consciousness for the creation of integrative scientific conception base is discussed.

Consciousness, Cognition and the Cognitive Apparatus in the Vedānta Tradition

PubMed Central

Balasubramanian, R.

2011-01-01

A human being is a complex entity consisting of the Self (also known as Consciousness), mind, senses and the body. The Vedānta tradition holds that the mind, the senses and the body are essentially different from the Self or Consciousness. It is through consciousness that we are able to know the things of the world, making use of the medium of the mind and the senses. Furthermore, the mind, though material, is able to reveal things, borrowing the light from consciousness. From the phenomenological point of view, we have to answer the following questions: how does one know the mind/the mental operations/the cogitations of the mind? Does the mind know itself? Is it possible? There is, again, the problem of the intentionality of consciousness. Is consciousness intentional? According to Vedānta, consciousness by its very nature is not intentional, but it becomes intentional through the mind. The mind or the ego is not part of the consciousness; on the contrary, it is transcendent to consciousness. It is difficult to spell out the relation between consciousness and the mind. How does consciousness, which is totally different from the mind, get related to the mind in such a way that it makes the latter capable of comprehending the things of the world? The Vedānta tradition provides the answer to this question in terms of the knower-known relation. Consciousness is pure light, self-luminous by its very nature, that is, although it reveals other objects, it is not revealed by anything else. When Sartre describes it as nothingness, bereft of even ego, it is to show that it is pure light revealing objects outside it. PMID:21694962

Consciousness and working memory: Current trends and research perspectives.

PubMed

Velichkovsky, Boris B

2017-10-01

Working memory has long been thought to be closely related to consciousness. However, recent empirical studies show that unconscious content may be maintained within working memory and that complex cognitive computations may be performed on-line. This promotes research on the exact relationships between consciousness and working memory. Current evidence for working memory being a conscious as well as an unconscious process is reviewed. Consciousness is shown to be considered a subset of working memory by major current theories of working memory. Evidence for unconscious elements in working memory is shown to come from visual masking and attentional blink paradigms, and from the studies of implicit working memory. It is concluded that more research is needed to explicate the relationship between consciousness and working memory. Future research directions regarding the relationship between consciousness and working memory are discussed. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Person and consciousness.

PubMed

Crosby, J F

2000-04-01

My interlocuter is Locke with his reduction of person to personal consciousness. This reduction is a main reason preventing people from acknowledging the personhood of the earliest human embryo, which lacks all personal consciousness. I show that Catholic Christians who live the sacramental life of the Church have reason to think that they are, as persons, vastly more than what they experience themselves to be, for they believe that the sacraments work effects in them as persons that can only be believed but that cannot be experienced within themselves in this life. I also show that Christians and non-Christians alike have an experience of moral good and evil in themselves that implies that they are, as moral persons, far more than they find in their conscious self-presence. It is, therefore, natural to think that if my being a person so far exceeds my consciousness, I may well have once existed as person even before the awakening of consciousness.

Consciousness: a unique way of processing information.

PubMed

Marchetti, Giorgio

2018-02-08

In this article, I argue that consciousness is a unique way of processing information, in that: it produces information, rather than purely transmitting it; the information it produces is meaningful for us; the meaning it has is always individuated. This uniqueness allows us to process information on the basis of our personal needs and ever-changing interactions with the environment, and consequently to act autonomously. Three main basic cognitive processes contribute to realize this unique way of information processing: the self, attention and working memory. The self, which is primarily expressed via the central and peripheral nervous systems, maps our body, the environment, and our relations with the environment. It is the primary means by which the complexity inherent to our composite structure is reduced into the "single voice" of a unique individual. It provides a reference system that (albeit evolving) is sufficiently stable to define the variations that will be used as the raw material for the construction of conscious information. Attention allows for the selection of those variations in the state of the self that are most relevant in the given situation. Attention originates and is deployed from a single locus inside our body, which represents the center of the self, around which all our conscious experiences are organized. Whatever is focused by attention appears in our consciousness as possessing a spatial quality defined by this center and the direction toward which attention is focused. In addition, attention determines two other features of conscious experience: periodicity and phenomenal quality. Self and attention are necessary but not sufficient for conscious information to be produced. Complex forms of conscious experiences, such as the various modes of givenness of conscious experience and the stream of consciousness, need a working memory mechanism to assemble the basic pieces of information selected by attention.

Caring for the Past: On Relationality and Historical Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Chinnery, Ann

2013-01-01

Over the past 20 years, there has been a shift in history education away from a view of history as the pursuit of an objective, universal story about the past toward "historical consciousness," which seeks to cultivate an understanding of the past as something that makes moral demands on us here and now. According to Roger Simon,…

Progress in machine consciousness.

PubMed

Gamez, David

2008-09-01

This paper is a review of the work that has been carried out on machine consciousness. A clear overview of this diverse field is achieved by breaking machine consciousness down into four different areas, which are used to understand its aims, discuss its relationship with other subjects and outline the work that has been carried out so far. The criticisms that have been made against machine consciousness are also covered, along with its potential benefits, and the work that has been done on analysing systems for signs of consciousness. Some of the social and ethical issues raised by machine consciousness are examined at the end of the paper.

Stable Isotopes, Quantum Computing and Consciousness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Berezin, Alexander A.

2000-10-01

Recent proposals of quantum computing/computers (QC) based on nuclear spins suggest that consciousness (CON) activity may be related (assisted) to subset of C13 atoms incorporated randomly, or quasirandomly, in neural structures. Consider two DNA chains. Even if they are completely identical chemically (same sequence of codons), patterns of 12C and 13C isotopes in them are different (possible origin of personal individuality). Perhaps it is subsystem of nuclear spins of 13C "sublattice" which forms dynamical system capable of QC and on which CON is "spanned". Some issues related to this hypothesis are: (1) existence of CON-driven positional correlations among C13 atoms, (2) motion (hopping) of C13 via enhanced neutron tunneling, cf. quantum "anti Zeno-effect", (3) possible optimization of concentration of QC-active C13 atoms above their standard isotopic abundance, (4) characteristic time-scales for operation of C13-based QC (perrhaps, broad range of scales), (5) reflection of QC dynamics of C13 on CON, (6) possibility that C13-based QC operates "above" level of "regular" CON (perhaps, Jungian sub/super-CON), (7) isotopicity as connector to universal Library of Patterns ("Platonic World"), (8) self-stabilization of coherence in C13 (sub)system. Some of this questions are, in principle, experimentally addressable through shifting of isotopic abundances.

Age-Related Changes in 1/f Neural Electrophysiological Noise

PubMed Central

Kramer, Mark A.; Case, John; Lepage, Kyle Q.; Tempesta, Zechari R.; Knight, Robert T.; Gazzaley, Adam

2015-01-01

Aging is associated with performance decrements across multiple cognitive domains. The neural noise hypothesis, a dominant view of the basis of this decline, posits that aging is accompanied by an increase in spontaneous, noisy baseline neural activity. Here we analyze data from two different groups of human subjects: intracranial electrocorticography from 15 participants over a 38 year age range (15–53 years) and scalp EEG data from healthy younger (20–30 years) and older (60–70 years) adults to test the neural noise hypothesis from a 1/f noise perspective. Many natural phenomena, including electrophysiology, are characterized by 1/f noise. The defining characteristic of 1/f is that the power of the signal frequency content decreases rapidly as a function of the frequency (f) itself. The slope of this decay, the noise exponent (χ), is often <−1 for electrophysiological data and has been shown to approach white noise (defined as χ = 0) with increasing task difficulty. We observed, in both electrophysiological datasets, that aging is associated with a flatter (more noisy) 1/f power spectral density, even at rest, and that visual cortical 1/f noise statistically mediates age-related impairments in visual working memory. These results provide electrophysiological support for the neural noise hypothesis of aging. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Understanding the neurobiological origins of age-related cognitive decline is of critical scientific, medical, and public health importance, especially considering the rapid aging of the world's population. We find, in two separate human studies, that 1/f electrophysiological noise increases with aging. In addition, we observe that this age-related 1/f noise statistically mediates age-related working memory decline. These results significantly add to this understanding and contextualize a long-standing problem in cognition by encapsulating age-related cognitive decline within a neurocomputational model of 1/f noise

Neuro-cognitive mechanisms of conscious and unconscious visual perception: From a plethora of phenomena to general principles

PubMed Central

Kiefer, Markus; Ansorge, Ulrich; Haynes, John-Dylan; Hamker, Fred; Mattler, Uwe; Verleger, Rolf; Niedeggen, Michael

2011-01-01

Psychological and neuroscience approaches have promoted much progress in elucidating the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie phenomenal visual awareness during the last decades. In this article, we provide an overview of the latest research investigating important phenomena in conscious and unconscious vision. We identify general principles to characterize conscious and unconscious visual perception, which may serve as important building blocks for a unified model to explain the plethora of findings. We argue that in particular the integration of principles from both conscious and unconscious vision is advantageous and provides critical constraints for developing adequate theoretical models. Based on the principles identified in our review, we outline essential components of a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception. We propose that awareness refers to consolidated visual representations, which are accessible to the entire brain and therefore globally available. However, visual awareness not only depends on consolidation within the visual system, but is additionally the result of a post-sensory gating process, which is mediated by higher-level cognitive control mechanisms. We further propose that amplification of visual representations by attentional sensitization is not exclusive to the domain of conscious perception, but also applies to visual stimuli, which remain unconscious. Conscious and unconscious processing modes are highly interdependent with influences in both directions. We therefore argue that exactly this interdependence renders a unified model of conscious and unconscious visual perception valuable. Computational modeling jointly with focused experimental research could lead to a better understanding of the plethora of empirical phenomena in consciousness research. PMID:22253669

An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence

PubMed Central

Seth, Anil K.; Suzuki, Keisuke; Critchley, Hugo D.

2011-01-01

We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence and its disturbances. The model is based on interoceptive prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical predictive coding and dopaminergic signaling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex (AIC) in interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of psychiatric disorders of presence, specifically depersonalization/derealization disorder. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by autonomic control signals and, indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model connects presence to agency by allowing that predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the AIC as the likely locus of key neural comparator mechanisms. Our model integrates a broad range of previously disparate evidence, makes predictions for conjoint manipulations of agency and presence, offers a new view of emotion as interoceptive inference, and represents a step toward a mechanistic account of a fundamental phenomenological property of consciousness. PMID:22291673

Cortical sources of visual evoked potentials during consciousness of executive processes.

PubMed

Babiloni, Claudio; Vecchio, Fabrizio; Iacoboni, Marco; Buffo, Paola; Eusebi, Fabrizio; Rossini, Paolo Maria

2009-03-01

What is the timing of cortical activation related to consciousness of visuo-spatial executive functions? Electroencephalographic data (128 channels) were recorded in 13 adults. Cue stimulus briefly appeared on right or left (equal probability) monitor side for a period, inducing about 50% of recognitions. It was then masked and followed (2 s) by a central visual go stimulus. Left (right) mouse button had to be clicked after right (left) cue stimulus. This "inverted" response indexed executive processes. Afterward, subjects said "seen" if they had detected the cue stimulus or "not seen" when it was missed. Sources of event-related potentials (ERPs) were estimated by LORETA software. The inverted responses were about 95% in seen trials and about 60% in not seen trials. Cue stimulus evoked frontal-parietooccipital potentials, having the same peak latencies in the seen and not seen data. Maximal difference in amplitude of the seen and not seen ERPs was detected at about +300-ms post-stimulus (P3). P3 sources were higher in amplitude in the seen than not seen trials in dorsolateral prefrontal, premotor and parietooccipital areas. This was true in dorsolateral prefrontal and premotor cortex even when percentage of the inverted responses and reaction time were paired in the seen and not seen trials. These results suggest that, in normal subjects, the primary consciousness enhances the efficacy of visuo-spatial executive processes and is sub-served by a late (100- to 400-ms post-stimulus) enhancement of the neural synchronization in frontal areas.

[Beijing college students' self-consciousness: its level, structure and relationship with mental health].

PubMed

Fan, Zhiwei; He, Shuchang

2013-11-01

To investigate Beijing college students' self-consciousness and its relationship with mental health. Convenient samples of 928 college students from five universities in Beijing were inquired and assessed with the self-consciousness scale and the Kessler 10 psychological distress scale. Confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling were used to analyze the data. College students' scores of self-consciousness did not differ in sex, age, grade and major type. 83.5% of the participants had relatively low scores (10-24) of psychological distress, but those of the students of liberal arts were higher (P < 0.05). The measurement data of self-consciousness supported Mittal and Balasubramanian' s five-factor structure. Self-reflectiveness was positively correlated with depression (P < 0.05). Internal state awareness was negatively associated with both anxiety and depression (P < 0.05). Style consciousness was positively correlated with both of them (P < 0.001). Beijing college students' self-consciousness is relatively high and has a relatively complex structure. While self-reflectiveness and style consciousness have negative effects, internal state awareness is good for mental health.

Difference, Explanation, Certainty and Terror: A View from a Londoner about the Formation of Children's Spirituality as Relational Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Johnson, Helen

2006-01-01

The manner in which we relate and behave towards one another can be analysed in political and social terms. Significantly, in the examination of children's spirituality, the concept of relational consciousness has revealed how early we become aware of people and phenomena beyond ourselves. But our desire to relate and behave reasonably towards…

Appearance concerns among women with neurofibromatosis: examining sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness.

PubMed

Smith, Kelly B; Wang, Daphne L; Plotkin, Scott R; Park, Elyse R

2013-12-01

Neurofibromatosis (NF) 1 and 2 have distinct appearance effects, yet little research has examined patients' appearance concerns. We assessed appearance concerns and self-consciousness, self-esteem, and loneliness among women with NF. Women with NF1 (n = 79) and NF2 (n = 48) completed the Derriford Appearance Scale to assess appearance concerns and sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and UCLA Loneliness Scale. Women's appearance concerns were coded to determine whether they were NF-related and whether psychosocial factors contributed to the concerns. A total of 85% of women reported appearance concerns, many of which were NF-related and attributed to psychosocial factors. Women with NF1 reported significantly more sexual/bodily self-consciousness but similar levels of social self-consciousness compared with women with NF2. Significantly higher sexual/bodily self-consciousness was found among married/cohabiting women regardless of NF group. Compared with general population norms and breast cancer survivors (BCS), women with NF1 reported significantly greater sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness. Women with NF2 reported less sexual/bodily self-consciousness compared with population norms, yet tended to report greater sexual/bodily self-consciousness than BCS. Women with NF2 reported significantly greater social self-consciousness compared with population norms and BCS. For both NF1 and NF2, higher levels of sexual/bodily and social self-consciousness were related to lower self-esteem and higher levels of social self-consciousness to more loneliness. Appearance concerns are prevalent, and social self-consciousness is high, among women with NF1 and NF2. Women with NF1 compared with NF2 experience more sexual/bodily self-consciousness. Providers should assess the impact of NF on women's self-perceptions and address sexual, body image, and social concerns. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Segregating the neural correlates of physical and perceived change in auditory input using the change deafness effect.

PubMed

Puschmann, Sebastian; Weerda, Riklef; Klump, Georg; Thiel, Christiane M

2013-05-01

Psychophysical experiments show that auditory change detection can be disturbed in situations in which listeners have to monitor complex auditory input. We made use of this change deafness effect to segregate the neural correlates of physical change in auditory input from brain responses related to conscious change perception in an fMRI experiment. Participants listened to two successively presented complex auditory scenes, which consisted of six auditory streams, and had to decide whether scenes were identical or whether the frequency of one stream was changed between presentations. Our results show that physical changes in auditory input, independent of successful change detection, are represented at the level of auditory cortex. Activations related to conscious change perception, independent of physical change, were found in the insula and the ACC. Moreover, our data provide evidence for significant effective connectivity between auditory cortex and the insula in the case of correctly detected auditory changes, but not for missed changes. This underlines the importance of the insula/anterior cingulate network for conscious change detection.

The brain network reflecting bodily self-consciousness: a functional connectivity study

PubMed Central

Ionta, Silvio; Martuzzi, Roberto; Salomon, Roy

2014-01-01

Several brain regions are important for processing self-location and first-person perspective, two important aspects of bodily self-consciousness. However, the interplay between these regions has not been clarified. In addition, while self-location and first-person perspective in healthy subjects are associated with bilateral activity in temporoparietal junction (TPJ), disturbed self-location and first-person perspective result from damage of only the right TPJ. Identifying the involved brain network and understanding the role of hemispheric specializations in encoding self-location and first-person perspective, will provide important information on system-level interactions neurally mediating bodily self-consciousness. Here, we used functional connectivity and showed that right and left TPJ are bilaterally connected to supplementary motor area, ventral premotor cortex, insula, intraparietal sulcus and occipitotemporal cortex. Furthermore, the functional connectivity between right TPJ and right insula had the highest selectivity for changes in self-location and first-person perspective. Finally, functional connectivity revealed hemispheric differences showing that self-location and first-person perspective modulated the connectivity between right TPJ, right posterior insula, and right supplementary motor area, and between left TPJ and right anterior insula. The present data extend previous evidence on healthy populations and clinical observations in neurological deficits, supporting a bilateral, but right-hemispheric dominant, network for bodily self-consciousness. PMID:24396007

Unity of consciousness.

PubMed

Hill, Christopher S

2018-05-29

Although there is much talk in various literatures of streams of consciousness, and most of us have an intuitive understanding of such talk, we are far from having a full grasp of what it is that unifies streams of consciousness, binding together the individual experiences that serve as their constituents. In recent years, discussion of this topic has been principally concerned with synchronic unity of consciousness-the form of unity that is exhibited by momentary states of consciousness, or in other words, by time slices or temporal segments of streams. There are two main questions about synchronic unity. First, what is its scope? Are the simultaneous experiences of a single subject necessarily unified? Generally but not necessarily unified? Sometimes unified? And second, what is the nature of synchronic unity? Is it a fundamental phenomenon, and if not, what are the more basic phenomena that constitute it? This essay reviews recent work on these questions, and provides reasons for preferring some answers to others. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Metaphysics. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Natural Evolution and Human Consciousness

PubMed Central

Holmgren, Jan

2014-01-01

A visual conscious experience is my empirical basis. All that we know comes to us through conscious experiences. Thanks to natural evolution, we have nearly direct perception, and can largely trust the information we attain. There is full integration, with no gaps, of organisms in the continuous world. Human conscious experiences, on the other hand, are discrete. Consciousness has certain limits for its resolution. This is illustrated by the so-called light-cone, with consequences for foundations in physics. Traditional universals are replaced by feels and distributions. Conscious experiences can be ordered within a framework of conceptual spaces. Triple Aspect Monism (TAM) can represent the dynamics of conscious systems. However, to fully represent the creative power of human consciousness, an all-inclusive view is suggested: Multi Aspect Monism (MAM). PMID:24891802

Consciousness in dolphins? A review of recent evidence.

PubMed

Harley, Heidi E

2013-06-01

For millennia, dolphins have intrigued humans. Scientific study has confirmed that bottlenose dolphins are large-brained, highly social mammals with an extended developmental period, flexible cognitive capacities, and powerful acoustic abilities including a sophisticated echolocation system. These findings have led some to ask if dolphins experience aspects of consciousness. Recent investigations targeting self-recognition/self-awareness and metacognition, constructs tied to consciousness on some accounts, have analyzed the dolphin's ability to recognize itself in a mirror or on a video as well as to monitor its own knowledge in a perceptual categorization task. The current article reviews this work with dolphins and grapples with some of the challenges in designing, conducting, and interpreting these studies as well as with general issues related to studying consciousness in animals. The existing evidence does not provide a convincing case for consciousness in dolphins. For productive scientific work on consciousness in dolphins (and other animals including humans), we need clearer characterizations of consciousness, better methods for studying it, and appropriate paradigms for interpreting outcomes. A current focus on metamemory in animals offers promise for future discovery in this area.

Conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness: two dimensions of personality that influence laparoscopic training.

PubMed

Malhotra, Neha; Poolton, Jamie M; Wilson, Mark R; Fan, Joe K M; Masters, Rich S W

2014-01-01

Identifying personality factors that account for individual differences in surgical training and performance has practical implications for surgical education. Movement-specific reinvestment is a potentially relevant personality factor that has a moderating effect on laparoscopic performance under time pressure. Movement-specific reinvestment has 2 dimensions, which represent an individual's propensity to consciously control movements (conscious motor processing) or to consciously monitor their 'style' of movement (movement self-consciousness). This study aimed at investigating the moderating effects of the 2 dimensions of movement-specific reinvestment in the learning and updating (cross-handed technique) of laparoscopic skills. Medical students completed the Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale, a psychometric assessment tool that evaluates the conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness dimensions of movement-specific reinvestment. They were then trained to a criterion level of proficiency on a fundamental laparoscopic skills task and were tested on a novel cross-handed technique. Completion times were recorded for early-learning, late-learning, and cross-handed trials. Propensity for movement self-consciousness but not conscious motor processing was a significant predictor of task completion times both early (p = 0.036) and late (p = 0.002) in learning, but completion times during the cross-handed trials were predicted by the propensity for conscious motor processing (p = 0.04) rather than movement self-consciousness (p = 0.21). Higher propensity for movement self-consciousness is associated with slower performance times on novel and well-practiced laparoscopic tasks. For complex surgical techniques, however, conscious motor processing plays a more influential role in performance than movement self-consciousness. The findings imply that these 2 dimensions of movement-specific reinvestment have a differential influence in the learning and updating

Attention and Conscious Perception in the Hypothesis Testing Brain

PubMed Central

Hohwy, Jakob

2012-01-01

Conscious perception and attention are difficult to study, partly because their relation to each other is not fully understood. Rather than conceiving and studying them in isolation from each other it may be useful to locate them in an independently motivated, general framework, from which a principled account of how they relate can then emerge. Accordingly, these mental phenomena are here reviewed through the prism of the increasingly influential predictive coding framework. On this framework, conscious perception can be seen as the upshot of prediction error minimization and attention as the optimization of precision expectations during such perceptual inference. This approach maps on well to a range of standard characteristics of conscious perception and attention, and can be used to interpret a range of empirical findings on their relation to each other. PMID:22485102

Vegetative versus minimally conscious states: a study using TMS-EEG, sensory and event-related potentials.

PubMed

Ragazzoni, Aldo; Pirulli, Cornelia; Veniero, Domenica; Feurra, Matteo; Cincotta, Massimo; Giovannelli, Fabio; Chiaramonti, Roberta; Lino, Mario; Rossi, Simone; Miniussi, Carlo

2013-01-01

Differential diagnoses between vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS, respectively) are frequently incorrect. Hence, further research is necessary to improve the diagnostic accuracy at the bedside. The main neuropathological feature of VS is the diffuse damage of cortical and subcortical connections. Starting with this premise, we used electroencephalography (EEG) recordings to evaluate the cortical reactivity and effective connectivity during transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in chronic VS or MCS patients. Moreover, the TMS-EEG data were compared with the results from standard somatosensory-evoked potentials (SEPs) and event-related potentials (ERPs). Thirteen patients with chronic consciousness disorders were examined at their bedsides. A group of healthy volunteers served as the control group. The amplitudes (reactivity) and scalp distributions (connectivity) of the cortical potentials evoked by TMS (TEPs) of the primary motor cortex were measured. Short-latency median nerve SEPs and auditory ERPs were also recorded. Reproducible TEPs were present in all control subjects in both the ipsilateral and the contralateral hemispheres relative to the site of the TMS. The amplitudes of the ipsilateral and contralateral TEPs were reduced in four of the five MCS patients, and the TEPs were bilaterally absent in one MCS patient. Among the VS patients, five did not manifest ipsilateral or contralateral TEPs, and three of the patients exhibited only ipsilateral TEPs with reduced amplitudes. The SEPs were altered in five VS and two MCS patients but did not correlate with the clinical diagnosis. The ERPs were impaired in all patients and did not correlate with the clinical diagnosis. These TEP results suggest that cortical reactivity and connectivity are severely impaired in all VS patients, whereas in most MCS patients, the TEPs are preserved but with abnormal features. Therefore, TEPs may add valuable information to the current clinical and

Vegetative versus Minimally Conscious States: A Study Using TMS-EEG, Sensory and Event-Related Potentials

PubMed Central

Ragazzoni, Aldo; Pirulli, Cornelia; Veniero, Domenica; Feurra, Matteo; Cincotta, Massimo; Giovannelli, Fabio; Chiaramonti, Roberta; Lino, Mario; Rossi, Simone; Miniussi, Carlo

2013-01-01

Differential diagnoses between vegetative and minimally conscious states (VS and MCS, respectively) are frequently incorrect. Hence, further research is necessary to improve the diagnostic accuracy at the bedside. The main neuropathological feature of VS is the diffuse damage of cortical and subcortical connections. Starting with this premise, we used electroencephalography (EEG) recordings to evaluate the cortical reactivity and effective connectivity during transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in chronic VS or MCS patients. Moreover, the TMS-EEG data were compared with the results from standard somatosensory-evoked potentials (SEPs) and event-related potentials (ERPs). Thirteen patients with chronic consciousness disorders were examined at their bedsides. A group of healthy volunteers served as the control group. The amplitudes (reactivity) and scalp distributions (connectivity) of the cortical potentials evoked by TMS (TEPs) of the primary motor cortex were measured. Short-latency median nerve SEPs and auditory ERPs were also recorded. Reproducible TEPs were present in all control subjects in both the ipsilateral and the contralateral hemispheres relative to the site of the TMS. The amplitudes of the ipsilateral and contralateral TEPs were reduced in four of the five MCS patients, and the TEPs were bilaterally absent in one MCS patient. Among the VS patients, five did not manifest ipsilateral or contralateral TEPs, and three of the patients exhibited only ipsilateral TEPs with reduced amplitudes. The SEPs were altered in five VS and two MCS patients but did not correlate with the clinical diagnosis. The ERPs were impaired in all patients and did not correlate with the clinical diagnosis. These TEP results suggest that cortical reactivity and connectivity are severely impaired in all VS patients, whereas in most MCS patients, the TEPs are preserved but with abnormal features. Therefore, TEPs may add valuable information to the current clinical and

Human Development IX: A Model of the Wholeness of Man, His Consciousness, and Collective Consciousness

PubMed Central

Ventegodt, Søren; Hermansen, Tyge Dahl; Flensborg-Madsen, Trine; Rald, Erik; Nielsen, Maj Lyck; Merrick, Joav

2006-01-01

In this paper we look at the rational and the emotional interpretation of reality in the human brain and being, and discuss the representation of the brain-mind (ego), the body-mind (Id), and the outer world in the human wholeness (the I or “soul”). Based on this we discuss a number of factors including the coherence between perception, attention and consciousness, and the relation between thought, fantasies, visions and dreams. We discuss and explain concepts as intent, will, morals and ethics. The Jungian concept of the human collective conscious and unconscious is also analyzed. We also hypothesis on the nature of intuition and consider the source of religious experience of man. These phenomena are explained based on the concept of deep quantum chemistry and infinite dancing fractal spirals making up the energetic backbone of the world. In this paper we consider man as a real wholeness and debate the concepts of subjectivity, consciousness and intent that can be deduced from such a perspective. PMID:17115085

Are the Neural Correlates of Consciousness in the Front or in the Back of the Cerebral Cortex? Clinical and Neuroimaging Evidence

PubMed Central

Massimini, Marcello; Postle, Bradley R.; Koch, Christof

2017-01-01

The role of the frontal cortex in consciousness remains a matter of debate. In this Perspective, we will critically review the clinical and neuroimaging evidence for the involvement of the front versus the back of the cortex in specifying conscious contents and discuss promising research avenues. Dual Perspectives Companion Paper: Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?, by Brian Odegaard, Robert T. Knight, and Hakwan Lau PMID:28978697

Consumers' environmental and ethical consciousness and the use of the related food products information: The role of perceived consumer effectiveness.

PubMed

Ghvanidze, Sophie; Velikova, Natalia; Dodd, Tim H; Oldewage-Theron, Wilna

2016-12-01

Consumers can be important active contributors to a sustainable society by selecting food choices that are both healthy and produced respecting environmental and socially ethical standards. The current study investigates five consumer behavioural factors - namely, perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE); environmental conscious behaviour; concerns for ethical food production; health conscious lifestyle; and healthy dietary patterns. The key interest of the study lies in exploring the moderating role of PCE - the extent to which the consumer believes that his/her own efforts can make a difference - in these interrelationships. The empirical analysis was conducted through an online survey of food consumers implemented in three markets - the US, the UK and Germany. Findings indicate that for individuals with higher levels of PCE, who are environmental conscious and ethically concerned, information on food labels relating to environmental and social issues represents value by itself. Interestingly, health and nutrition information on food labels was not perceived valuable by consumers with high PCE. The predictive effects of various socio-demographic variables on PCE, consumer environmental and health consciousness are discussed. Cross-cultural differences are also outlined. The results of this research may contribute to the development of environmental policies and communication strategies of the food industry to enhance perceived consumer effectiveness among consumers. Improved PCE, in turn, may catalyze consumers' environmental behaviour and ethical concerns in relation to consumption of food products with environmental and social information. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Ego and Self: A Synthesis of Theories of Consciousness and Personality.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tatzel, Miriam

Ego and self refer to two ways of being. They are related on the one hand to neurosis and health and on the other hand to rational and intuitive modes of consciousness. The author in this article considers consciousness as it pertains to knowing oneself. She examines how ego, the rational consciousness as applied to oneself, can obstruct…

Science, conscience, consciousness.

PubMed

Hennig, Boris

2010-01-01

Descartes' metaphysics lays the foundation for the special sciences, and the notion of consciousness ("conscientia") belongs to metaphysics rather than to psychology. I argue that as a metaphysical notion, "consciousness" refers to an epistemic version of moral conscience. As a consequence, the activity on which science is based turns out to be conscientious thought. The consciousness that makes science possible is a double awareness: the awareness of what one is thinking, of what one should be doing, and of the possibility of a gap between the two.

The evolution of consciousness

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Stapp, H.P.

1996-08-16

It is argued that the principles of classical physics are inimical to the development of an adequate science of consciousness. The problem is that insofar as the classical principles are valid consciousness can have no effect on the behavior, and hence on the survival prospects, of the organisms in which it inheres. Thus within the classical framework it is not possible to explain in natural terms the development of consciousness to the high-level form found in human beings. In quantum theory, on the other hand, consciousness can be dynamically efficacious: quantum theory does allow consciousness to influence behavior, and thencemore » to evolve in accordance with the principles of natural selection. However, this evolutionary requirement places important constraints upon the details of the formulation of the quantum dynamical principles.« less

Object of desire self-consciousness theory.

PubMed

Bogaert, Anthony F; Brotto, Lori A

2014-01-01

In this article, the authors discuss the construct of object of desire self-consciousness, the perception that one is romantically and sexually desirable in another's eyes. The authors discuss the nature of the construct, variations in its expression, and how it may function as part of a self-schemata or script related to romance and sexuality. The authors suggest that object of desire self-consciousness may be an adaptive, evolved psychological mechanism allowing sexual and romantic tactics suitable to one's mate value. The authors also suggest that it can act as a signal that one has high mate value in the sexual marketplace. The authors then review literature (e.g., on fantasies, on sexual activity preferences, on sexual dysfunctions, on language) suggesting that object of desire self-consciousness plays a particularly important role in heterosexual women's sexual/romantic functioning and desires.

Consciousness, epilepsy, and emotional qualia.

PubMed

Monaco, Francesco; Mula, Marco; Cavanna, Andrea E

2005-09-01

The last decade has seen a renaissance of consciousness studies, witnessed by the growing number of scientific investigations on this topic. The concept of consciousness is central in epileptology, despite the methodological difficulties concerning its application to the multifaced ictal phenomenology. The authors provide an up-to-date review of the neurological literature on the relationship between epilepsy and consciousness and propose a bidimensional model (level vs contents of consciousness) for the description of seizure-induced alterations of conscious states, according to the findings of recent neuroimaging studies. The neurophysiological correlates of ictal loss and impairment of consciousness are also reviewed. Special attention is paid to the subjective experiential states associated with medial temporal lobe epilepsy. Such ictal phenomenal experiences are suggested as a paradigm for a neuroscientific approach to the apparently elusive philosophical concept of qualia. Epilepsy is confirmed to represent a privileged window over basic neurobiological mechanisms of consciousness.

The biological function of consciousness

PubMed Central

Earl, Brian

2014-01-01

This research is an investigation of whether consciousness—one's ongoing experience—influences one's behavior and, if so, how. Analysis of the components, structure, properties, and temporal sequences of consciousness has established that, (1) contrary to one's intuitive understanding, consciousness does not have an active, executive role in determining behavior; (2) consciousness does have a biological function; and (3) consciousness is solely information in various forms. Consciousness is associated with a flexible response mechanism (FRM) for decision-making, planning, and generally responding in nonautomatic ways. The FRM generates responses by manipulating information and, to function effectively, its data input must be restricted to task-relevant information. The properties of consciousness correspond to the various input requirements of the FRM; and when important information is missing from consciousness, functions of the FRM are adversely affected; both of which indicate that consciousness is the input data to the FRM. Qualitative and quantitative information (shape, size, location, etc.) are incorporated into the input data by a qualia array of colors, sounds, and so on, which makes the input conscious. This view of the biological function of consciousness provides an explanation why we have experiences; why we have emotional and other feelings, and why their loss is associated with poor decision-making; why blindsight patients do not spontaneously initiate responses to events in their blind field; why counter-habitual actions are only possible when the intended action is in mind; and the reason for inattentional blindness. PMID:25140159

Consciousness: individuated information in action

PubMed Central

Jonkisz, Jakub

2015-01-01

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself. PMID:26283987

Maladaptive Neural Synchrony in Tinnitus: Origin and Restoration

PubMed Central

Eggermont, Jos J.; Tass, Peter A.

2015-01-01

Tinnitus is the conscious perception of sound heard in the absence of physical sound sources external or internal to the body, reflected in aberrant neural synchrony of spontaneous or resting-state brain activity. Neural synchrony is generated by the nearly simultaneous firing of individual neurons, of the synchronization of membrane-potential changes in local neural groups as reflected in the local field potentials, resulting in the presence of oscillatory brain waves in the EEG. Noise-induced hearing loss, often resulting in tinnitus, causes a reorganization of the tonotopic map in auditory cortex and increased spontaneous firing rates and neural synchrony. Spontaneous brain rhythms rely on neural synchrony. Abnormal neural synchrony in tinnitus appears to be confined to specific frequency bands of brain rhythms. Increases in delta-band activity are generated by deafferented/deprived neuronal networks resulting from hearing loss. Coordinated reset (CR) stimulation was developed in order to specifically counteract such abnormal neuronal synchrony by desynchronization. The goal of acoustic CR neuromodulation is to desynchronize tinnitus-related abnormal delta-band oscillations. CR neuromodulation does not require permanent stimulus delivery in order to achieve long-lasting desynchronization or even a full-blown anti-kindling but may have cumulative effects, i.e., the effect of different CR epochs separated by pauses may accumulate. Unlike other approaches, acoustic CR neuromodulation does not intend to reduce tinnitus-related neuronal activity by employing lateral inhibition. The potential efficacy of acoustic CR modulation was shown in a clinical proof of concept trial, where effects achieved in 12 weeks of treatment delivered 4–6 h/day persisted through a preplanned 4-week therapy pause and showed sustained long-term effects after 10 months of therapy, leading to 75% responders. PMID:25741316

[Functional pathophysiology of consciousness].

PubMed

Jellinger, Kurt A

2009-01-01

from important somatic and sensory pathways and acts as a control system of neuronal activities of the cerebral cortex. The principal function of the ARAS is to focus our alertness on specific stimuli or internal processes, which run via complex neuronal cell groups and numerous neurotransmitters that influence various aspects of consciousness and wakefulness. Stimulation of the ARAS produces an arousal reaction as the electric correlate of consciousness; its destruction causes coma and related states. The highest level are cortical (prefrontal and association) networks for recognition, motor activity, longterm memory and attention, the left hemisphere being considered as the dominant one. Different levels of consciousness are distinguished: 1. hyperalertness, 2. alertness (normal state of wakefulness), 3. somnolence or lethargy, 4. obtundation with tendency to fall asleep, 5. stupor, 6. coma and its subtypes, like akinetic mutism, apallic syndrome or persistent vegative state, locked-in syndrome, delirium, and catatonia. They are caused by damages in various functional levels of the brain, by psychogenic factors or experimentally, and are accompanied by characteristic neurological and psychiatric disorders. The relevant morphological lesions can be detected by electrophysiological and imaging studies. The bases of functional anatomy and pathophysiology of consciousness, its cognitive aspects and its major disorders, their causes and functional substrates with reference to sleep and both spontaneous and iatrogenic disorders of consciousness are critically summarized.

A Heuristic Model of Consciousness with Applications to the Development of Science and Society

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Curreri, Peter A.

2010-01-01

A working model of consciousness is fundamental to understanding of the interactions of the observer in science. This paper examines contemporary understanding of consciousness. A heuristic model of consciousness is suggested that is consistent with psycophysics measurements of bandwidth of consciousness relative to unconscious perception. While the self reference nature of consciousness confers a survival benefit by assuring the all points of view regarding a problem are experienced in sufficiently large population, conscious bandwidth is constrained by design to avoid chaotic behavior. The multiple hypotheses provided by conscious reflection enable the rapid progression of science and technology. The questions of free will and the problem of attention are discussed in relation to the model. Finally the combination of rapid technology growth with the assurance of many unpredictable points of view is considered in respect to contemporary constraints to the development of society.

Neural correlates of consciousness during general anesthesia using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).

PubMed

Bonhomme, V; Boveroux, P; Brichant, J F; Laureys, S; Boly, M

2012-01-01

This paper reviews the current knowledge about the mechanisms of anesthesia-induced alteration of consciousness. It is now evident that hypnotic anesthetic agents have specific brain targets whose function is hierarchically altered in a dose-dependent manner. Higher order networks, thought to be involved in mental content generation, as well as sub-cortical networks involved in thalamic activity regulation seems to be affected first by increasing concentrations of hypnotic agents that enhance inhibitory neurotransmission. Lower order sensory networks are preserved, including thalamo-cortical connectivity into those networks, even at concentrations that suppress responsiveness, but cross-modal sensory interactions are inhibited. Thalamo-cortical connectivity into the consciousness networks decreases with increasing concentrations of those agents, and is transformed into an anti-correlated activity between the thalamus and the cortex for the deepest levels of sedation, when the subject is non responsive. Future will tell us whether these brain function alterations are also observed with hypnotic agents that mainly inhibit excitatory neurotransmission. The link between the observations made using fMRI and the identified biochemical targets of hypnotic anesthetic agents still remains to be identified.

Suppressed neural complexity during ketamine- and propofol-induced unconsciousness.

PubMed

Wang, Jisung; Noh, Gyu-Jeong; Choi, Byung-Moon; Ku, Seung-Woo; Joo, Pangyu; Jung, Woo-Sung; Kim, Seunghwan; Lee, Heonsoo

2017-07-13

Ketamine and propofol have distinctively different molecular mechanisms of action and neurophysiological features, although both induce loss of consciousness. Therefore, identifying a common feature of ketamine- and propofol-induced unconsciousness would provide insight into the underlying mechanism of losing consciousness. In this study we search for a common feature by applying the concept of type-II complexity, and argue that neural complexity is essential for a brain to maintain consciousness. To test this hypothesis, we show that complexity is suppressed during loss of consciousness induced by ketamine or propofol. We analyzed the randomness (type-I complexity) and complexity (type-II complexity) of electroencephalogram (EEG) signals before and after bolus injection of ketamine or propofol. For the analysis, we use Mean Information Gain (MIG) and Fluctuation Complexity (FC), which are information-theory-based measures that quantify disorder and complexity of dynamics respectively. Both ketamine and propofol reduced the complexity of the EEG signal, but ketamine increased the randomness of the signal and propofol decreased it. The finding supports our claim and suggests EEG complexity as a candidate for a consciousness indicator. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Conscious experience and episodic memory: hippocampus at the crossroads.

PubMed

Behrendt, Ralf-Peter

2013-01-01

If an instance of conscious experience of the seemingly objective world around us could be regarded as a newly formed event memory, much as an instance of mental imagery has the content of a retrieved event memory, and if, therefore, the stream of conscious experience could be seen as evidence for ongoing formation of event memories that are linked into episodic memory sequences, then unitary conscious experience could be defined as a symbolic representation of the pattern of hippocampal neuronal firing that encodes an event memory - a theoretical stance that may shed light into the mind-body and binding problems in consciousness research. Exceedingly detailed symbols that describe patterns of activity rapidly self-organizing, at each cycle of the θ rhythm, in the hippocampus are instances of unitary conscious experience that jointly constitute the stream of consciousness. Integrating object information (derived from the ventral visual stream and orbitofrontal cortex) with contextual emotional information (from the anterior insula) and spatial environmental information (from the dorsal visual stream), the hippocampus rapidly forms event codes that have the informational content of objects embedded in an emotional and spatiotemporally extending context. Event codes, formed in the CA3-dentate network for the purpose of their memorization, are not only contextualized but also allocentric representations, similarly to conscious experiences of events and objects situated in a seemingly objective and observer-independent framework of phenomenal space and time. Conscious perception, creating the spatially and temporally extending world that we perceive around us, is likely to be evolutionarily related to more fleeting and seemingly internal forms of conscious experience, such as autobiographical memory recall, mental imagery, including goal anticipation, and to other forms of externalized conscious experience, namely dreaming and hallucinations; and evidence pointing to

Automated EEG entropy measurements in coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and minimally conscious state

PubMed Central

Gosseries, Olivia; Schnakers, Caroline; Ledoux, Didier; Vanhaudenhuyse, Audrey; Bruno, Marie-Aurélie; Demertzi, Athéna; Noirhomme, Quentin; Lehembre, Rémy; Damas, Pierre; Goldman, Serge; Peeters, Erika; Moonen, Gustave; Laureys, Steven

Summary Monitoring the level of consciousness in brain-injured patients with disorders of consciousness is crucial as it provides diagnostic and prognostic information. Behavioral assessment remains the gold standard for assessing consciousness but previous studies have shown a high rate of misdiagnosis. This study aimed to investigate the usefulness of electroencephalography (EEG) entropy measurements in differentiating unconscious (coma or vegetative) from minimally conscious patients. Left fronto-temporal EEG recordings (10-minute resting state epochs) were prospectively obtained in 56 patients and 16 age-matched healthy volunteers. Patients were assessed in the acute (≤1 month post-injury; n=29) or chronic (>1 month post-injury; n=27) stage. The etiology was traumatic in 23 patients. Automated online EEG entropy calculations (providing an arbitrary value ranging from 0 to 91) were compared with behavioral assessments (Coma Recovery Scale-Revised) and outcome. EEG entropy correlated with Coma Recovery Scale total scores (r=0.49). Mean EEG entropy values were higher in minimally conscious (73±19; mean and standard deviation) than in vegetative/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome patients (45±28). Receiver operating characteristic analysis revealed an entropy cut-off value of 52 differentiating acute unconscious from minimally conscious patients (sensitivity 89% and specificity 90%). In chronic patients, entropy measurements offered no reliable diagnostic information. EEG entropy measurements did not allow prediction of outcome. User-independent time-frequency balanced spectral EEG entropy measurements seem to constitute an interesting diagnostic – albeit not prognostic – tool for assessing neural network complexity in disorders of consciousness in the acute setting. Future studies are needed before using this tool in routine clinical practice, and these should seek to improve automated EEG quantification paradigms in order to reduce the remaining false

Neural crest specification and migration independently require NSD3-related lysine methyltransferase activity

PubMed Central

Jacques-Fricke, Bridget T.; Gammill, Laura S.

2014-01-01

Neural crest precursors express genes that cause them to become migratory, multipotent cells, distinguishing them from adjacent stationary neural progenitors in the neurepithelium. Histone methylation spatiotemporally regulates neural crest gene expression; however, the protein methyltransferases active in neural crest precursors are unknown. Moreover, the regulation of methylation during the dynamic process of neural crest migration is unclear. Here we show that the lysine methyltransferase NSD3 is abundantly and specifically expressed in premigratory and migratory neural crest cells. NSD3 expression commences before up-regulation of neural crest genes, and NSD3 is necessary for expression of the neural plate border gene Msx1, as well as the key neural crest transcription factors Sox10, Snail2, Sox9, and FoxD3, but not gene expression generally. Nevertheless, only Sox10 histone H3 lysine 36 dimethylation requires NSD3, revealing unexpected complexity in NSD3-dependent neural crest gene regulation. In addition, by temporally limiting expression of a dominant negative to migratory stages, we identify a novel, direct requirement for NSD3-related methyltransferase activity in neural crest migration. These results identify NSD3 as the first protein methyltransferase essential for neural crest gene expression during specification and show that NSD3-related methyltransferase activity independently regulates migration. PMID:25318671

A hybrid model based on neural networks for biomedical relation extraction.

PubMed

Zhang, Yijia; Lin, Hongfei; Yang, Zhihao; Wang, Jian; Zhang, Shaowu; Sun, Yuanyuan; Yang, Liang

2018-05-01

Biomedical relation extraction can automatically extract high-quality biomedical relations from biomedical texts, which is a vital step for the mining of biomedical knowledge hidden in the literature. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) and convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are two major neural network models for biomedical relation extraction. Neural network-based methods for biomedical relation extraction typically focus on the sentence sequence and employ RNNs or CNNs to learn the latent features from sentence sequences separately. However, RNNs and CNNs have their own advantages for biomedical relation extraction. Combining RNNs and CNNs may improve biomedical relation extraction. In this paper, we present a hybrid model for the extraction of biomedical relations that combines RNNs and CNNs. First, the shortest dependency path (SDP) is generated based on the dependency graph of the candidate sentence. To make full use of the SDP, we divide the SDP into a dependency word sequence and a relation sequence. Then, RNNs and CNNs are employed to automatically learn the features from the sentence sequence and the dependency sequences, respectively. Finally, the output features of the RNNs and CNNs are combined to detect and extract biomedical relations. We evaluate our hybrid model using five public (protein-protein interaction) PPI corpora and a (drug-drug interaction) DDI corpus. The experimental results suggest that the advantages of RNNs and CNNs in biomedical relation extraction are complementary. Combining RNNs and CNNs can effectively boost biomedical relation extraction performance. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness, intentionality, and community: Unitary perspectives and research.

PubMed

Zahourek, Rothlyn P; Larkin, Dorothy M

2009-01-01

Consciousness and intentionality often have been related and studied together. These concepts also are readily viewed and understood for practice, research, and education in a unitary paradigm. How these ideas relate to community is less known. Considering the expansion of our capacity for communication through the World Wide Web and other technologic advances and appreciating recent research on the nonlocal character of intentionality and consciousness, it is more apparent how concepts of community can be seen in the same unitary context. The authors address these issues and review relevant nursing research.

Consciousness: function and definition.

PubMed

Niedermeyer, E

1994-07-01

The term "consciousness" plays an enormous role in the clinical assessment of patients and also in psychophysiological considerations. It has often been said that consciousness is a term that defies definition. This lack of definability, however, might be more apparent than real. In the multitude of facets, three main components can be singled out: a) vigilance, b) mental contents and c) selective attention. Vigilance, not to be equated with consciousness, is most amenable to electrophysiological studies. The stages of sleep have fairly well standardized EEG correlates, unlike the comatose states. The overflowing wealth of mental contents is constantly adjusted to momentary needs by the mechanism of selective attention. Awareness is a subcomponent and differs from both vigilance and consciousness. Emotionality is particularly important among the variety of further subcomponents. The time factor must be taken into account in order to understand the dynamics and fluctuations of consciousness.

Consciousness, Functional Networks and Delirium Screening.

PubMed

Eeles, Eamonn; Burianova, Hana; Pandy, Shaun; Pinsker, Donna

2017-01-01

Consciousness, the medium of sentient thought, requires integrity of functional networks and their connectivity. In health, they function as a co-operative but mutually exclusive paradigm of introspection versus external awareness subserved via the Default Mode Network and Task Positive State, respectively. Higher thinking in the conscious state is then segregated according to need. There is research evidence to suggest that functional networks may be impacted in disorders of consciousness and conceptual support for a mechanistic role in delirium. This potentially central aspect of delirium manifestation is relatively unexplored. This article describes the role of disrupted functional networks in delirium. How this relates to current understanding of delirium neurobiology and the ramifications for clinical diagnosis is discussed. A review of the role of functional networks, particularly DMN and TPN, has been undertaken with respect to health and delirium. An exploration of how symptoms of delirium may be related to functional network aberrancy has been undertaken. Implications for research and clinical practice in delirium have been presented. In delirium, a disturbance of consciousness, the DMN is pathologically co-activated and functional cortical connectivity is compromised. The clinical correlate is of an experiential singularity where internal and external drivers become indistinguishable, reality and delusion merge and the notion of self is effaced. Our group propose that functional network disruption in conjunction with cortical disconnectivity is central to the mechanism of delirium. Clinical tools may exploit the neurobiology of delirium to improve its diagnosis and an example of such a simple screening instrument (SQeeC) is provided. Functional networks are critically disrupted in delirium and may be central to clinical features. A better understanding of the neurobiology of delirium will generate research opportunities with potential for therapeutic

Single-trial analysis of the neural correlates of speech quality perception.

PubMed

Porbadnigk, Anne K; Treder, Matthias S; Blankertz, Benjamin; Antons, Jan-Niklas; Schleicher, Robert; Möller, Sebastian; Curio, Gabriel; Müller, Klaus-Robert

2013-10-01

Assessing speech quality perception is a challenge typically addressed in behavioral and opinion-seeking experiments. Only recently, neuroimaging methods were introduced, which were used to study the neural processing of quality at group level. However, our electroencephalography (EEG) studies show that the neural correlates of quality perception are highly individual. Therefore, it became necessary to establish dedicated machine learning methods for decoding subject-specific effects. The effectiveness of our methods is shown by the data of an EEG study that investigates how the quality of spoken vowels is processed neurally. Participants were asked to indicate whether they had perceived a degradation of quality (signal-correlated noise) in vowels, presented in an oddball paradigm. We find that the P3 amplitude is attenuated with increasing noise. Single-trial analysis allows one to show that this is partly due to an increasing jitter of the P3 component. A novel classification approach helps to detect trials with presumably non-conscious processing at the threshold of perception. We show that this approach uncovers a non-trivial confounder between neural hits and neural misses. The combined use of EEG signals and machine learning methods results in a significant 'neural' gain in sensitivity (in processing quality loss) when compared to standard behavioral evaluation; averaged over 11 subjects, this amounts to a relative improvement in sensitivity of 35%.

How Consciousness-Raising Affects Intonation and Facilitates Reading Comprehension

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shariati, Mohammad

2007-01-01

This paper reports on an investigation about the relation between a student's conscious awareness of the structure of a sentence and the degree of his/her intonation accuracy as well as his/her reading comprehension. The research was done based on the hypothesis that: "if the students are made conscious of the infrastructure of lengthy…

Are There Levels of Consciousness?

PubMed

Bayne, Tim; Hohwy, Jakob; Owen, Adrian M

2016-06-01

The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly influential role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of consciousness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global states. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Am I Self-Conscious? (Or Does Self-Organization Entail Self-Consciousness?).

PubMed

Friston, Karl

2018-01-01

Is self-consciousness necessary for consciousness? The answer is yes. So there you have it-the answer is yes. This was my response to a question I was asked to address in a recent AEON piece (https://aeon.co/essays/consciousness-is-not-a-thing-but-a-process-of-inference). What follows is based upon the notes for that essay, with a special focus on self-organization, self-evidencing and self-modeling. I will try to substantiate my (polemic) answer from the perspective of a physicist. In brief, the argument goes as follows: if we want to talk about creatures, like ourselves, then we have to identify the characteristic behaviors they must exhibit. This is fairly easy to do by noting that living systems return to a set of attracting states time and time again. Mathematically, this implies the existence of a Lyapunov function that turns out to be model evidence (i.e., self-evidence) in Bayesian statistics or surprise (i.e., self-information) in information theory. This means that all biological processes can be construed as performing some form of inference, from evolution through to conscious processing. If this is the case, at what point do we invoke consciousness? The proposal on offer here is that the mind comes into being when self-evidencing has a temporal thickness or counterfactual depth, which grounds inferences about the consequences of my action. On this view, consciousness is nothing more than inference about my future; namely, the self-evidencing consequences of what I could do.

[Some implications of the "consciousness and brain" problem].

PubMed

Ivanitskiĭ, A M; Ivanitskiĭ, G A

2009-10-01

Three issues are discussed: the possible mechanism of subjective events, the rhythmic coding of thinking operations and the possible brain basis of understanding. 1. Several approaches have been developed to explain how subjective experience emerges from brain activity. One of them is the return of the nervous impulses to the sites of their primary projections, providing a synthesis of sensory information with memory and motivation. Support for the existence of such a mechanism stems from studies upon the brain activity that underlies perception (visual and somatosensory) and thought (verbal and imaginative). The cortical centers for information synthesis have been found. For perception, these are located in projection areas: for thinking,--in frontal and temporal-parietal associative cortex. Closely related ideas were also developed by G. Edelman in his re-entry theory of consciousness. Both theories emphasize the key role of memory and motivation in the origin of conscious function. 2. Rearrangements of EEC rhythms underlie mental functions. Certain rhythmical patterns are related with definite types of mental activity. The dependence of one upon the other is rather pronounced and expressive, so it becomes possible to recognize the type of mental operation being performed in mind with few seconds of the ongoing EEG, provided that the analysis of rhythms is accomplished using an artificial neural network. 3. It is commonly recognized that the computer, in contrast to the living brain, can calculate, yet cannot understand. Comprehension implies the comparison of new and old information that requires the ability to search for associations, group similar objects together, and distinguish different objects one from another. However, these functions may also be implemented on a computer. Still, it is believed that computers perform these complicated operations without genuine understanding. Evidently, comprehension additionally has to be based upon some biologically

Four-Dimensional Graded Consciousness

PubMed Central

Jonkisz, Jakub; Wierzchoń, Michał; Binder, Marek

2017-01-01

Both the multidimensional phenomenon and the polysemous notion of consciousness continue to prove resistant to consistent measurement and unambiguous definition. This is hardly surprising, given that there is no agreement even as regards the most fundamental issues they involve. One of the basic disagreements present in the continuing debate about consciousness pertains to its gradational nature. The general aim of this article is to show how consciousness might be graded and multidimensional at the same time. We therefore focus on the question of what it is, exactly, that is or could be graded in cases of consciousness, and how we can measure it. Ultimately, four different gradable aspects of consciousness will be described: quality, abstractness, complexity and usefulness, which belong to four different dimensions, these being understood, respectively, as phenomenal, semantic, physiological, and functional. Consequently, consciousness may be said to vary with respect to phenomenal quality, semantic abstraction, physiological complexity, and functional usefulness. It is hoped that such a four-dimensional approach will help to clarify and justify claims about the hierarchical nature of consciousness. The approach also proves explanatorily advantageous, as it enables us not only to draw attention to certain new and important differences in respect of subjective measures of awareness and to justify how a given creature may be ranked higher in one dimension of consciousness and lower in terms of another, but also allows for innovative explanations of a variety of well-known phenomena (amongst these, the interpretations of blindsight and locked-in syndrome will be briefly outlined here). Moreover, a 4D framework makes possible many predictions and hypotheses that may be experimentally tested (We point out a few such possibilities pertaining to interdimensional dependencies). PMID:28377738

Functional MRI of the Olfactory System in Conscious Dogs

PubMed Central

Jia, Hao; Pustovyy, Oleg M.; Waggoner, Paul; Beyers, Ronald J.; Schumacher, John; Wildey, Chester; Barrett, Jay; Morrison, Edward; Salibi, Nouha; Denney, Thomas S.; Vodyanoy, Vitaly J.; Deshpande, Gopikrishna

2014-01-01

We depend upon the olfactory abilities of dogs for critical tasks such as detecting bombs, landmines, other hazardous chemicals and illicit substances. Hence, a mechanistic understanding of the olfactory system in dogs is of great scientific interest. Previous studies explored this aspect at the cellular and behavior levels; however, the cognitive-level neural substrates linking them have never been explored. This is critical given the fact that behavior is driven by filtered sensory representations in higher order cognitive areas rather than the raw odor maps of the olfactory bulb. Since sedated dogs cannot sniff, we investigated this using functional magnetic resonance imaging of conscious dogs. We addressed the technical challenges of head motion using a two pronged strategy of behavioral training to keep dogs' head as still as possible and a single camera optical head motion tracking system to account for residual jerky movements. We built a custom computer-controlled odorant delivery system which was synchronized with image acquisition, allowing the investigation of brain regions activated by odors. The olfactory bulb and piriform lobes were commonly activated in both awake and anesthetized dogs, while the frontal cortex was activated mainly in conscious dogs. Comparison of responses to low and high odor intensity showed differences in either the strength or spatial extent of activation in the olfactory bulb, piriform lobes, cerebellum, and frontal cortex. Our results demonstrate the viability of the proposed method for functional imaging of the olfactory system in conscious dogs. This could potentially open up a new field of research in detector dog technology. PMID:24466054

Self-consciousness concept and assessment in self-report measures

PubMed Central

DaSilveira, Amanda; DeSouza, Mariane L.; Gomes, William B.

2015-01-01

This study examines how self-consciousness is defined and assessed using self-report questionnaires (Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS), Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, Self-Absorption Scale, Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire, and Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale). Authors of self-report measures suggest that self-consciousness can be distinguished by its private/public aspects, its adaptive/maladaptive applied characteristics, and present/past experiences. We examined these claims in a study using 602 young adults to whom the aforementioned scales were administered. Data were analyzed as follows: (1) correlation analysis to find simple associations between the measures; (2) factorial analysis using Oblimin rotation of total scores provided from the scales; and (3) factorial analysis considering the 102 items of the scales all together. It aimed to clarify relational patterns found in the correlations between SCSs, and to identify possible latent constructs behind these scales. Results support the adaptive/maladaptive aspects of self-consciousness, as well as distinguish to some extent public aspects from private ones. However, some scales that claimed to be theoretically derived from the concept of Private Self-Consciousness correlated with some of its public self-aspects. Overall, our findings suggest that while self-reflection measures tend to tap into past experiences and judged concepts that were already processed by the participants’ inner speech and thoughts, the Awareness measure derived from Mindfulness Scale seems to be related to a construct associated with present experiences in which one is aware of without any further judgment or logical/rational symbolization. This sub-scale seems to emphasize the role that present experiences have in self-consciousness, and it is argued that such a concept refers to what has been studied by phenomenology and psychology over more than 100 years: the concept of pre-reflective self-conscious. PMID:26191030

Self-consciousness concept and assessment in self-report measures.

PubMed

DaSilveira, Amanda; DeSouza, Mariane L; Gomes, William B

2015-01-01

This study examines how self-consciousness is defined and assessed using self-report questionnaires (Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS), Self-Reflection and Insight Scale, Self-Absorption Scale, Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire, and Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale). Authors of self-report measures suggest that self-consciousness can be distinguished by its private/public aspects, its adaptive/maladaptive applied characteristics, and present/past experiences. We examined these claims in a study using 602 young adults to whom the aforementioned scales were administered. Data were analyzed as follows: (1) correlation analysis to find simple associations between the measures; (2) factorial analysis using Oblimin rotation of total scores provided from the scales; and (3) factorial analysis considering the 102 items of the scales all together. It aimed to clarify relational patterns found in the correlations between SCSs, and to identify possible latent constructs behind these scales. Results support the adaptive/maladaptive aspects of self-consciousness, as well as distinguish to some extent public aspects from private ones. However, some scales that claimed to be theoretically derived from the concept of Private Self-Consciousness correlated with some of its public self-aspects. Overall, our findings suggest that while self-reflection measures tend to tap into past experiences and judged concepts that were already processed by the participants' inner speech and thoughts, the Awareness measure derived from Mindfulness Scale seems to be related to a construct associated with present experiences in which one is aware of without any further judgment or logical/rational symbolization. This sub-scale seems to emphasize the role that present experiences have in self-consciousness, and it is argued that such a concept refers to what has been studied by phenomenology and psychology over more than 100 years: the concept of pre-reflective self-conscious.

Age and the experience of strong self-conscious emotion.

PubMed

Henry, Julie D; von Hippel, William; Nangle, Matthew R; Waters, Michele

2018-04-01

It remains unclear whether there are age-related changes in the experience of strong self-conscious emotion, such as shame, guilt, pride and embarrassment. Because shame and guilt figure prominently in the aetiology of depressive symptoms and other mental health problems, a better understanding of how age affects the strong experience of these two negative self-conscious emotions is of particular importance. Thirty younger, 30 middle-aged and 30 older adults were compared on standardised cognitive assessments, in addition to an interview-based measure that assessed whether there are age differences in the likelihood of strongly experiencing four different types of self-conscious emotion within the past five years (shame, guilt, embarrassment and pride). The three groups did not differ in their likelihood of reporting an event that strongly elicited the positive self-conscious emotion of pride. However, older adults were more likely to report sources of pride that were other (as opposed to self) focused. Older adults were also less likely to report experiencing events that elicited all three negative self-conscious emotions, in particular, shame. Strong negative self-conscious emotion, and in particular shame, appears to be experienced less by older than younger adults.

High-frequency neural activity predicts word parsing in ambiguous speech streams

PubMed Central

Basirat, Anahita; Azizi, Leila; van Wassenhove, Virginie

2016-01-01

During speech listening, the brain parses a continuous acoustic stream of information into computational units (e.g., syllables or words) necessary for speech comprehension. Recent neuroscientific hypotheses have proposed that neural oscillations contribute to speech parsing, but whether they do so on the basis of acoustic cues (bottom-up acoustic parsing) or as a function of available linguistic representations (top-down linguistic parsing) is unknown. In this magnetoencephalography study, we contrasted acoustic and linguistic parsing using bistable speech sequences. While listening to the speech sequences, participants were asked to maintain one of the two possible speech percepts through volitional control. We predicted that the tracking of speech dynamics by neural oscillations would not only follow the acoustic properties but also shift in time according to the participant's conscious speech percept. Our results show that the latency of high-frequency activity (specifically, beta and gamma bands) varied as a function of the perceptual report. In contrast, the phase of low-frequency oscillations was not strongly affected by top-down control. Whereas changes in low-frequency neural oscillations were compatible with the encoding of prelexical segmentation cues, high-frequency activity specifically informed on an individual's conscious speech percept. PMID:27605528

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective

PubMed Central

2016-01-01

Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene. This article is part of the themed issue ‘The major synthetic evolutionary transitions’. PMID

Synthetic consciousness: the distributed adaptive control perspective.

PubMed

Verschure, Paul F M J

2016-08-19

Understanding the nature of consciousness is one of the grand outstanding scientific challenges. The fundamental methodological problem is how phenomenal first person experience can be accounted for in a third person verifiable form, while the conceptual challenge is to both define its function and physical realization. The distributed adaptive control theory of consciousness (DACtoc) proposes answers to these three challenges. The methodological challenge is answered relative to the hard problem and DACtoc proposes that it can be addressed using a convergent synthetic methodology using the analysis of synthetic biologically grounded agents, or quale parsing. DACtoc hypothesizes that consciousness in both its primary and secondary forms serves the ability to deal with the hidden states of the world and emerged during the Cambrian period, affording stable multi-agent environments to emerge. The process of consciousness is an autonomous virtualization memory, which serializes and unifies the parallel and subconscious simulations of the hidden states of the world that are largely due to other agents and the self with the objective to extract norms. These norms are in turn projected as value onto the parallel simulation and control systems that are driving action. This functional hypothesis is mapped onto the brainstem, midbrain and the thalamo-cortical and cortico-cortical systems and analysed with respect to our understanding of deficits of consciousness. Subsequently, some of the implications and predictions of DACtoc are outlined, in particular, the prediction that normative bootstrapping of conscious agents is predicated on an intentionality prior. In the view advanced here, human consciousness constitutes the ultimate evolutionary transition by allowing agents to become autonomous with respect to their evolutionary priors leading to a post-biological Anthropocene.This article is part of the themed issue 'The major synthetic evolutionary transitions'. © 2016 The

Objects of consciousness

PubMed Central

Hoffman, Donald D.; Prakash, Chetan

2014-01-01

Current models of visual perception typically assume that human vision estimates true properties of physical objects, properties that exist even if unperceived. However, recent studies of perceptual evolution, using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms, reveal that natural selection often drives true perceptions to extinction when they compete with perceptions tuned to fitness rather than truth: Perception guides adaptive behavior; it does not estimate a preexisting physical truth. Moreover, shifting from evolutionary biology to quantum physics, there is reason to disbelieve in preexisting physical truths: Certain interpretations of quantum theory deny that dynamical properties of physical objects have definite values when unobserved. In some of these interpretations the observer is fundamental, and wave functions are compendia of subjective probabilities, not preexisting elements of physical reality. These two considerations, from evolutionary biology and quantum physics, suggest that current models of object perception require fundamental reformulation. Here we begin such a reformulation, starting with a formal model of consciousness that we call a “conscious agent.” We develop the dynamics of interacting conscious agents, and study how the perception of objects and space-time can emerge from such dynamics. We show that one particular object, the quantum free particle, has a wave function that is identical in form to the harmonic functions that characterize the asymptotic dynamics of conscious agents; particles are vibrations not of strings but of interacting conscious agents. This allows us to reinterpret physical properties such as position, momentum, and energy as properties of interacting conscious agents, rather than as preexisting physical truths. We sketch how this approach might extend to the perception of relativistic quantum objects, and to classical objects of macroscopic scale. PMID:24987382

The concept of relative non-locality: theoretical implications in consciousness research.

PubMed

Neppe, Vernon M; Close, Edward R

2015-01-01

We argue that "non-local" events require further descriptors for us to understand the degree of non-locality, what the framework of the observer describing it is, and where we humans are located relative to the ostensible non-locality. This suggests three critical factors: Relative to, from the framework of, and a hierarchy of "to what degree?" "Non-locality" without the prefix "relative" compromises its description by making it an absolute: We must scientifically ensure that, qualitatively, we can describe events that correspond with each other-like with like-and differentiate these events from those that are hierarchically dissimilar. Recognition of these levels of "relative non-locality" is important: Non-locality from "the general framework of" the infinite, or mystic or near-death experient, markedly differs theoretically from "relative to our sentient reality in three dimensions of space in the present moment (3S-1t)". Specific events may be described "relative to" our living 3S-1t reality, but conceptualized differently from the framework of observers in altered states of consciousness experiencing higher dimensions. Hierarchical questions to ask would include IMMEDIACY PRINCIPLE: We also propose that events happening immediately, not even requiring light speed, are fundamental properties of non-local time involving more dimensions than just 3S-1t. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Intrathecal baclofen: effects on spasticity, pain, and consciousness in disorders of consciousness and locked-in syndrome.

PubMed

Pistoia, Francesca; Sacco, Simona; Sarà, Marco; Franceschini, Marco; Carolei, Antonio

2015-01-01

Disorders of consciousness (DOCs) include coma, vegetative state (VS), and minimally conscious state (MCS). Coma is characterized by impaired wakefulness and consciousness, while VS and MCS are defined by lacking or discontinuous consciousness despite recovered wakefulness. Conversely, locked-in syndrome (LIS) is characterized by quadriplegia and lower cranial nerve paralysis with preserved consciousness. Intrathecal baclofen (ITB) is a useful treatment to improve spasticity both in patients with DOCs and LIS. Moreover, it supports the recovery of consciousness in some patients with VS or MCS. The precise mechanism underlying this recovery has not yet been elucidated. It has been hypothesized that ITB may act by reducing the overload of dysfunctional sensory stimuli reaching the injured brain or by stabilizing the imbalanced circadian rhythms. Although the current indication of ITB is the management of severe spasticity, its potential use in speeding the recovery of consciousness merits further investigation.

[Consciousness and the electroencephalogram].

PubMed

Faber, J; Vladyka, V; Subrt, O

1991-08-01

In the course of 12 years the authors subjected to clinical EEG and stereo-EEG (SEEG) 72 patients (66 epileptics with the diagnosis of psychomotor epilepsy and grand mal) and six psychotic patients suffering from schizophrenia. With the exception of five epileptics and two psychotic patients all subjects had epileptic foci in the amygdalohippocampal complex (AHK). After coagulation of these foci marked improvement of the fits and the mental state occurred in half the patients. During EEG and SEEG recording the authors used different activation methods (hyperventilation through the nose and mouth, sleep, listening to music) and above all direct electric stimulation (ES) of one of the AHK. Secondary epileptic foci had, as a rule, more spikes and a lower threshold for ES than primary ones which contained more delta and slow theta waves. The ES led as a rule to an emotional response, such as anxiety and fear, more rarely to illusions, depersonalization and oneiroid hallucinations and twice to a hedonic response of non-sexual character. The purpose of ES was to assess the site from where it is possible to start the original aura or typical parox. The authors considered these foci, consistent with data in the literature, as the leading focus and it was subsequently coagulated. The authors investigated the reactivity and vigility by the patient's response to sound (the patient had to press a button) and by an interview with the patient. It was revealed that in isolated discharges of the spikes and waves in the scalp electrodes, i.e. in the neocortex, reactivity is lacking. In isolated discharges in the AHK the reactivity was satisfactory, but as a rule anxiety developed. It is thus possible to divide consciousness into emotional consciousness with its site in the AHK, i.e. in the limbic system, and rational consciousness which is a function of the neocrotical system. Congenital changes of consciousness such as vigility or sleep are described as "states" of consciousness

Non-Conscious Emotional Activation Colors First Impressions: A Regulatory Role for Conscious Awareness

PubMed Central

Lapate, R.C.; Rokers, B.; Li, T.; Davidson, R.J.

2014-01-01

Emotions can color our attitudes toward unrelated objects in the environment. Prior evidence suggests that such emotional coloring is particularly strong when emotion-triggering information escapes conscious awareness. But, is emotional reactivity stronger following non-conscious versus conscious emotional provocation? Or does conscious processing specifically change the association between emotional reactivity and evaluations of unrelated objects? In this study, we independently indexed emotional reactivity and coloring as a function of emotional-stimulus awareness to disentangle these accounts. Specifically, we recorded skin conductance responses (SCRs) to spiders and fearful faces, along with subsequent preferences for novel neutral faces during visually aware and unaware states. Fearful faces increased SCRs comparably in both aware and unaware conditions. Yet, only when visual awareness was precluded did SCRs to fearful faces predict decreased likeability of neutral faces. These findings suggest a regulatory role for conscious awareness in breaking otherwise automatic associations between physiological reactivity and evaluative emotional responses. PMID:24317420

Brain networks predict metabolism, diagnosis and prognosis at the bedside in disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Chennu, Srivas; Annen, Jitka; Wannez, Sarah; Thibaut, Aurore; Chatelle, Camille; Cassol, Helena; Martens, Géraldine; Schnakers, Caroline; Gosseries, Olivia; Menon, David; Laureys, Steven

2017-08-01

in these patients. These metrics could also identify patients in whom further assessment is warranted using neuroimaging or conventional clinical evaluation. Finally, by providing objective characterization of states of consciousness, repeated assessments of network metrics could help track individual patients longitudinally, and also assess their neural responses to therapeutic and pharmacological interventions. © The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Guarantors of Brain.

Age-Related Changes to the Neural Correlates of Social Evaluation

PubMed Central

Cassidy, Brittany S.; Shih, Joanne Y.; Gutchess, Angela H.

2012-01-01

Recent work suggests the existence of a specialized neural system underlying social processing that may be relatively spared with age, unlike pervasive aging-related decline occurring in many cognitive domains. We investigated how neural mechanisms underlying social evaluation are engaged with age, and how age-related changes to socioemotional goals affect recruitment of regions within this network. In a functional MRI study, fifteen young and fifteen older adults formed behavior-based impressions of individuals. They also responded to a prompt that was interpersonally meaningful, social but interpersonally irrelevant, or non-social. Both age groups engaged regions implicated in mentalizing and impression formation when making social relative to non-social evaluations, including dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortices, precuneus, and temporoparietal junction. Older adults had increased activation over young in right temporal pole when making social relative to non-social evaluations, suggesting reliance on past experiences when evaluating others. Young had greater activation than old in posterior cingulate gyrus when making interpersonally irrelevant, compared to interpersonally meaningful, evaluations, potentially reflecting enhanced valuation of this information. The findings demonstrate the age-related preservation of the neural correlates underlying social evaluation, and suggest that functioning in these regions might be mediated by age-related changes in socioemotional goals. PMID:22439896

Consciousness: the radical plasticity thesis.

PubMed

Cleeremans, Axel

2008-01-01

In this chapter, I sketch a conceptual framework which takes it as a starting point that conscious and unconscious cognition are rooted in the same set of interacting learning mechanisms and representational systems. On this view, the extent to which a representation is conscious depends in a graded manner on properties such as its stability in time or its strength. Crucially, these properties are accrued as a result of learning, which is in turn viewed as a mandatory process that always accompanies information processing. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum defined over "quality of representation", such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with quality, and (2) the implication of systems of metarepresentations. A first implication of these ideas is that the main function of consciousness is to make flexible, adaptive control over behavior possible. A second, much more speculative implication, is that we learn to be conscious. This I call the "radical plasticity thesis"--the hypothesis that consciousness emerges in systems capable not only of learning about their environment, but also about their own internal representations of it.

Consciously Thinking about Consciousness

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tribus, Myron

2004-01-01

Merker hypothesized that because mobile creatures move around and must constantly readjust their map of the world and because the demands are so great for continually processing information for a map of the world, evolution has created a space in the brain where such preprocessing has been eliminated. This space he calls consciousness with the…

Neural Correlates of Subliminal Language Processing

PubMed Central

Axelrod, Vadim; Bar, Moshe; Rees, Geraint; Yovel, Galit

2015-01-01

Language is a high-level cognitive function, so exploring the neural correlates of unconscious language processing is essential for understanding the limits of unconscious processing in general. The results of several functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have suggested that unconscious lexical and semantic processing is confined to the posterior temporal lobe, without involvement of the frontal lobe—the regions that are indispensable for conscious language processing. However, previous studies employed a similarly designed masked priming paradigm with briefly presented single and contextually unrelated words. It is thus possible, that the stimulation level was insufficiently strong to be detected in the high-level frontal regions. Here, in a high-resolution fMRI and multivariate pattern analysis study we explored the neural correlates of subliminal language processing using a novel paradigm, where written meaningful sentences were suppressed from awareness for extended duration using continuous flash suppression. We found that subjectively and objectively invisible meaningful sentences and unpronounceable nonwords could be discriminated not only in the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), but critically, also in the left middle frontal gyrus. We conclude that frontal lobes play a role in unconscious language processing and that activation of the frontal lobes per se might not be sufficient for achieving conscious awareness. PMID:24557638

Transient and sustained neural responses to death-related linguistic cues

PubMed Central

Shi, Zhenhao

2013-01-01

Recent research showed that perception of death-related vs death-unrelated linguistic cues produced increased frontoparietal activity but decreased insular activity. This study investigated (i) whether the increased frontoparietal and decreased insular activities are, respectively, associated with transient trial-specific processes of death-related linguistic cues and sustained death-related thought during death-relevance judgments on linguistic cues and (ii) whether the neural activity underlying death-related thought can predict individuals’ dispositional death anxiety. Participants were presented with death-related/unrelated words, life-related/unrelated words, and negative-valence/neutral words in separate sessions. Participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging while performing death-relevance, life-relevance, and valence judgments on the words, respectively. The contrast of death-related vs death-unrelated words during death-relevance judgments revealed transient increased activity in the left inferior parietal lobule, the right frontal eye field, and the right superior parietal lobule. The contrast of death-relevance judgments vs life-relevance/valence judgments showed decreased activity in the bilateral insula. The sustained insular activity was correlated with dispositional death anxiety, but only in those with weak transient frontoparietal responses to death-related words. Our results dissociate the transient and sustained neural responses to death-related linguistic cues and suggest that the combination of the transient and sustained neural activities can predict dispositional death anxiety. PMID:22422804

Chemical-induced disease relation extraction via convolutional neural network.

PubMed

Gu, Jinghang; Sun, Fuqing; Qian, Longhua; Zhou, Guodong

2017-01-01

This article describes our work on the BioCreative-V chemical-disease relation (CDR) extraction task, which employed a maximum entropy (ME) model and a convolutional neural network model for relation extraction at inter- and intra-sentence level, respectively. In our work, relation extraction between entity concepts in documents was simplified to relation extraction between entity mentions. We first constructed pairs of chemical and disease mentions as relation instances for training and testing stages, then we trained and applied the ME model and the convolutional neural network model for inter- and intra-sentence level, respectively. Finally, we merged the classification results from mention level to document level to acquire the final relations between chemical and disease concepts. The evaluation on the BioCreative-V CDR corpus shows the effectiveness of our proposed approach. http://www.biocreative.org/resources/corpora/biocreative-v-cdr-corpus/. © The Author(s) 2017. Published by Oxford University Press.

Diminished Self-Conscious Emotional Responding in Frontotemporal Lobar Degeneration Patients

PubMed Central

Sturm, Virginia E.; Ascher, Elizabeth A.; Miller, Bruce L.; Levenson, Robert W.

2009-01-01

Frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) is a neurodegenerative disease that dramatically alters social and emotional behavior. Recent work has suggested that self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment) may be particularly vulnerable to disruption in this disease. Self-conscious emotions require the ability to monitor the self in relation to others. These abilities are thought to be subserved by brain regions (e.g., medial prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and insula) that are particularly vulnerable to damage in FTLD. This study examined emotional responding (expressive behavior, peripheral physiology, and subjective experience) in 24 FTLD patients and 16 cognitively normal control participants using a karaoke task known to elicit self-conscious emotion reliably and a nonemotional control task (isometric handgrip). Results indicated that FTLD patients showed diminished self-conscious emotional behavior (embarrassment and amusement) and diminished physiological responding while watching themselves singing. No differences were found between patients and controls in the nonemotional control task. These findings offer evidence of marked disruption of self-conscious emotional responding in FTLD. Diminished self-conscious emotional responding likely contributes significantly to social inappropriateness and other behavioral abnormalities in FTLD. PMID:19102597

Conscience and consciousness: a definition.

PubMed

Vithoulkas, G; Muresanu, D F

2014-03-15

While consciousness has been examined extensively in its different aspects, like in philosophy, psychiatry, neurophysiology, neuroplasticity, etc., conscience though it is an equal important aspect of the human existence, which remains an unknown to a great degree as an almost transcendental aspect of the human mind. It has not been examined as thoroughly as consciousness and largely remains a "terra incognita" for its neurophysiology, brain topography, etc. Conscience and consciousness are part of a system of information that governs our experience and decision making process. The intent of this paper is to define these terms, to discuss about consciousness from both neurological and quantum physics point of view, the relationship between the dynamics of consciousness and neuroplasticity and to highlight the relationship between conscience, stress and health.

[The "bright spot of consciousness"].

PubMed

Simonov, P V

1990-01-01

I.P. Pavlov considered consciousness as an area of optimum excitability moving over the human cerebral cortex depending on the character of performed mental activity. Contemporary methods of computer analysis of electrical activity and brain thermal production have allowed to turn this metaphor into experimentally observed reality. It is shown that preservation of connections of cortical gnostic zones with verbal structures of the left hemisphere is the obligatory condition for consciousness functioning. These data reinforce the determination of consciousness as operation with knowledge, which by means of words, mathematic symbols and art images can be transmitted to other people. Communicative origin of consciousness creates possibility of mental dialogue with oneself, i.e. leads to the appearance of self-consciousness of the personality.

Age-related Neural Differences in Affiliation and Isolation

PubMed Central

Beadle, Janelle N.; Yoon, Carolyn; Gutchess, Angela H.

2012-01-01

While previous aging studies have focused on particular components of social perception (e.g., theory of mind, self-referencing), little is known about age-related differences specifically for the neural basis of perception of affiliation and isolation. This study investigates age-related similarities and differences in the neural basis of affiliation and isolation. Participants viewed images of affiliation (groups engaged in social interaction), and isolation (lone individuals), as well as non-social stimuli (e.g., landscapes) while making pleasantness judgments and undergoing functional neuroimaging (BOLD fMRI). Results indicated age-related similarities in response to affiliation and isolation in recruitment of regions involved in theory of mind and self-referencing (e.g. temporal pole, medial prefrontal cortex). Yet, age-related differences also emerged in response to affiliation and isolation in regions implicated in theory of mind as well as self-referencing. Specifically, in response to isolation versus affiliation images, older adults showed greater recruitment than younger adults of the temporal pole, a region that is important for retrieval of personally-relevant memories utilized to understand others’ mental states. Furthermore, in response to images of affiliation versus isolation, older adults showed greater recruitment than younger adults of the precuneus, a region implicated in self-referencing. We suggest that age-related divergence in neural activation patterns underlying judgments of scenes depicting isolation versus affiliation may indicate that older adults’ theory of mind processes are driven by retrieval of isolation-relevant information. Moreover, older adults’ greater recruitment of the precuneus for affiliation versus isolation suggests that the positivity bias for emotional information may extend to social information involving affiliation. PMID:22371086

Prestimulus EEG Power Predicts Conscious Awareness But Not Objective Visual Performance

PubMed Central

Veniero, Domenica

2017-01-01

Abstract Prestimulus oscillatory neural activity has been linked to perceptual outcomes during performance of psychophysical detection and discrimination tasks. Specifically, the power and phase of low frequency oscillations have been found to predict whether an upcoming weak visual target will be detected or not. However, the mechanisms by which baseline oscillatory activity influences perception remain unclear. Recent studies suggest that the frequently reported negative relationship between α power and stimulus detection may be explained by changes in detection criterion (i.e., increased target present responses regardless of whether the target was present/absent) driven by the state of neural excitability, rather than changes in visual sensitivity (i.e., more veridical percepts). Here, we recorded EEG while human participants performed a luminance discrimination task on perithreshold stimuli in combination with single-trial ratings of perceptual awareness. Our aim was to investigate whether the power and/or phase of prestimulus oscillatory activity predict discrimination accuracy and/or perceptual awareness on a trial-by-trial basis. Prestimulus power (3–28 Hz) was inversely related to perceptual awareness ratings (i.e., higher ratings in states of low prestimulus power/high excitability) but did not predict discrimination accuracy. In contrast, prestimulus oscillatory phase did not predict awareness ratings or accuracy in any frequency band. These results provide evidence that prestimulus α power influences the level of subjective awareness of threshold visual stimuli but does not influence visual sensitivity when a decision has to be made regarding stimulus features. Hence, we find a clear dissociation between the influence of ongoing neural activity on conscious awareness and objective performance. PMID:29255794

Over-focused? The relation between patients' inclination for conscious control and single- and dual-task motor performance after stroke.

PubMed

Denneman, R P M; Kal, E C; Houdijk, H; Kamp, J van der

2018-05-01

Many stroke patients are inclined to consciously control their movements. This is thought to negatively affect patients' motor performance, as it disrupts movement automaticity. However, it has also been argued that conscious control may sometimes benefit motor performance, depending on the task or patientś motor or cognitive capacity. To assess whether stroke patients' inclination for conscious control is associated with motor performance, and explore whether the putative association differs as a function of task (single- vs dual) or patientś motor and cognitive capacity. Univariate and multivariate linear regression analysis were used to assess associations between patients' disposition to conscious control (i.e., Conscious Motor Processing subscale of Movement-Specific Reinvestment Scale; MSRS-CMP) and single-task (Timed-up-and-go test; TuG) and motor dual-task costs (TuG while tone counting; motor DTC%). We determined whether these associations were influenced by patients' walking speed (i.e., 10-m-walk test) and cognitive capacity (i.e., working memory, attention, executive function). Seventy-eight clinical stroke patients (<6 months post-stroke) participated. Patients' conscious control inclination was not associated with single-task TuG performance. However, patients with a strong inclination for conscious control showed higher motor DTC%. These associations were irrespective of patients' motor and cognitive abilities. Patients' disposition for conscious control was not associated with single task motor performance, but was associated with higher motor dual task costs, regardless of patients' motor or cognitive abilities. Therapists should be aware that patients' conscious control inclination can influence their dual-task performance while moving. Longitudinal studies are required to test whether reducing patients' disposition for conscious control would improve dual-tasking post-stroke. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Discerning measures of conscious brain processes associated with superior early motor performance: Capacity, coactivation, and character.

PubMed

van Duijn, Tina; Buszard, Tim; Hoskens, Merel C J; Masters, Rich S W

2017-01-01

This study explored the relationship between working memory (WM) capacity, corticocortical communication (EEG coherence), and propensity for conscious control of movement during the performance of a complex far-aiming task. We were specifically interested in the role of these variables in predicting motor performance by novices. Forty-eight participants completed (a) an assessment of WM capacity (an adapted Rotation Span task), (b) a questionnaire that assessed the propensity to consciously control movement (the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale), and (c) a hockey push-pass task. The hockey push-pass task was performed in a single task (movement only) condition and a combined task (movement plus decision) condition. Electroencephalography (EEG) was used to examine brain activity during the single task. WM capacity best predicted single task performance. WM capacity in combination with T8-Fz coherence (between the visuospatial and motor regions of the brain) best predicted combined task performance. We discuss the implied roles of visuospatial information processing capacity, neural coactivation, and propensity for conscious processing during performance of complex motor tasks. © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Obesity-related differences in neural correlates of force control.

PubMed

Mehta, Ranjana K; Shortz, Ashley E

2014-01-01

Greater body segment mass due to obesity has shown to impair gross and fine motor functions and reduce balance control. While recent studies suggest that obesity may be linked with altered brain functions involved in fine motor tasks, this association is not well investigated. The purpose of this study was to examine the neural correlates of motor performance in non-obese and obese adults during force control of two upper extremity muscles. Nine non-obese and eight obese young adults performed intermittent handgrip and elbow flexion exertions at 30% of their respective muscle strengths for 4 min. Functional near infrared spectroscopy was employed to measure neural activity in the prefrontal cortex bilaterally, joint steadiness was computed using force fluctuations, and ratings of perceived exertions (RPEs) were obtained to assess perceived effort. Obesity was associated with higher force fluctuations and lower prefrontal cortex activation during handgrip exertions, while RPE scores remained similar across both groups. No obesity-related differences in neural activity, force fluctuation, or RPE scores were observed during elbow flexion exertions. The study is one of the first to examine obesity-related differences on prefrontal cortex activation during force control of the upper extremity musculature. The study findings indicate that the neural correlates of motor activity in the obese may be muscle-specific. Future work is warranted to extend the investigation to monitoring multiple motor-function related cortical regions and examining obesity differences with different task parameters (e.g., longer duration, increased precision demands, larger muscles, etc.).

Dogs cannot bark: event-related brain responses to true and false negated statements as indicators of higher-order conscious processing.

PubMed

Herbert, Cornelia; Kübler, Andrea

2011-01-01

The present study investigated event-related brain potentials elicited by true and false negated statements to evaluate if discrimination of the truth value of negated information relies on conscious processing and requires higher-order cognitive processing in healthy subjects across different levels of stimulus complexity. The stimulus material consisted of true and false negated sentences (sentence level) and prime-target expressions (word level). Stimuli were presented acoustically and no overt behavioral response of the participants was required. Event-related brain potentials to target words preceded by true and false negated expressions were analyzed both within group and at the single subject level. Across the different processing conditions (word pairs and sentences), target words elicited a frontal negativity and a late positivity in the time window from 600-1000 msec post target word onset. Amplitudes of both brain potentials varied as a function of the truth value of the negated expressions. Results were confirmed at the single-subject level. In sum, our results support recent suggestions according to which evaluation of the truth value of a negated expression is a time- and cognitively demanding process that cannot be solved automatically, and thus requires conscious processing. Our paradigm provides insight into higher-order processing related to language comprehension and reasoning in healthy subjects. Future studies are needed to evaluate if our paradigm also proves sensitive for the detection of consciousness in non-responsive patients.

Emotion identification and aging: Behavioral and neural age-related changes.

PubMed

Gonçalves, Ana R; Fernandes, Carina; Pasion, Rita; Ferreira-Santos, Fernando; Barbosa, Fernando; Marques-Teixeira, João

2018-05-01

Aging is known to alter the processing of facial expressions of emotion (FEE), however the impact of this alteration is less clear. Additionally, there is little information about the temporal dynamics of the neural processing of facial affect. We examined behavioral and neural age-related changes in the identification of FEE using event-related potentials. Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between behavioral/neural responses and neuropsychological functioning. To this purpose, 30 younger adults, 29 middle-aged adults and 26 older adults identified FEE. The behavioral results showed a similar performance between groups. The neural results showed no significant differences between groups for the P100 component and an increased N170 amplitude in the older group. Furthermore, a pattern of asymmetric activation was evident in the N170 component. Results also suggest deficits in facial feature decoding abilities, reflected by a reduced N250 amplitude in older adults. Neuropsychological functioning predicts P100 modulation, but does not seem to influence emotion identification ability. The findings suggest the existence of a compensatory function that would explain the age-equivalent performance in emotion identification. The study may help future research addressing behavioral and neural processes involved on processing of FEE in neurodegenerative conditions. Copyright © 2018 International Federation of Clinical Neurophysiology. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Social Consciousness, Education and Transformative Activity

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Pavlidis, Periklis

2015-01-01

This paper examines two aspects of social consciousness: consciousness in the sense of knowledge of the objective reality and consciousness in the sense of awareness of oneself as a subject in his/her social ties with other persons-subjects. In the light of such an approach to consciousness in this essay we discuss the importance of education and…

Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective-reduction proposal for human consciousness is not biologically feasible.

PubMed

McKemmish, Laura K; Reimers, Jeffrey R; McKenzie, Ross H; Mark, Alan E; Hush, Noel S

2009-08-01

Penrose and Hameroff have argued that the conventional models of a brain function based on neural networks alone cannot account for human consciousness, claiming that quantum-computation elements are also required. Specifically, in their Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Orch OR) model [R. Penrose and S. R. Hameroff, J. Conscious. Stud. 2, 99 (1995)], it is postulated that microtubules act as quantum processing units, with individual tubulin dimers forming the computational elements. This model requires that the tubulin is able to switch between alternative conformational states in a coherent manner, and that this process be rapid on the physiological time scale. Here, the biological feasibility of the Orch OR proposal is examined in light of recent experimental studies on microtubule assembly and dynamics. It is shown that the tubulins do not possess essential properties required for the Orch OR proposal, as originally proposed, to hold. Further, we consider also recent progress in the understanding of the long-lived coherent motions in biological systems, a feature critical to Orch OR, and show that no reformation of the proposal based on known physical paradigms could lead to quantum computing within microtubules. Hence, the Orch OR model is not a feasible explanation of the origin of consciousness.

Consciousness, Learning and Interlanguage Pragmatics.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schmidt, Richard

A discussion of the ways that consciousness may be involved in learning the principles of second-language discourse and pragmatics draws on current theories of the role of consciousness in human learning in general, with suggestions for extension to the learning of pragmatics. First, research on the degree of consciousness in pragmatic learning…

Job satisfaction in relation to energy resource consciousness and perceptions of energy utilization in selected Illinois manufacturing firms

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Haynes, T.S.

1986-01-01

This study was developed through a synthesis and review of literature and research related to the current status of job satisfaction, energy resources, and perceptions of how energy is utilized in the manufacturing work environment. This synthesis and review revolved around several proven contributing factors of job satisfaction, such as age, education, and challenge from work itself. Quality of work life programs and their components are discussed in relation to their impact on job satisfaction. The nature of energy resource utilization is traced back through history with an emphasis on the limitations of current resources and options for the future.more » The review highlights the current debate over what should be the future path of energy resource development. The concept of satisfaction of human needs is reviewed and related to job satisfaction and energy resources. The purpose of this research study was to contribute to the understanding of how perceptions of energy resources relate to job satisfaction. Results of the study indicated that there were no significant differences between an individual's energy resource consciousness and perceptions of energy utilization in the work place, energy resource consciousness and job satisfaction, and job satisfaction and perceptions of energy utilization in the workplace.« less

Self-Consciousness and Death Cognitions from a Terror Management Perspective

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Taubman-Ben-Ari, Orit; Noy, Adi

2010-01-01

Two studies explored the connection between self-consciousness and death cognitions. In Study 1 (n = 56), a positive association was found between accessibility of death-related thoughts and the ruminative dimension of self-consciousness. In Study 2 (n = 212), a mortality salience induction led to higher validation of cultural worldviews (a more…

Conscience and Consciousness: a definition

PubMed Central

Vithoulkas, G; Muresanu, DF

2014-01-01

While consciousness has been examined extensively in its different aspects, like in philosophy, psychiatry, neurophysiology, neuroplasticity, etc., conscience though it is an equal important aspect of the human existence, which remains an unknown to a great degree as an almost transcendental aspect of the human mind. It has not been examined as thoroughly as consciousness and largely remains a “terra incognita" for its neurophysiology, brain topography, etc. Conscience and consciousness are part of a system of information that governs our experience and decision making process. The intent of this paper is to define these terms, to discuss about consciousness from both neurological and quantum physics point of view, the relationship between the dynamics of consciousness and neuroplasticity and to highlight the relationship between conscience, stress and health. PMID:24653768

Dissociable endogenous and exogenous attention in disorders of consciousness.

PubMed

Chennu, Srivas; Finoia, Paola; Kamau, Evelyn; Monti, Martin M; Allanson, Judith; Pickard, John D; Owen, Adrian M; Bekinschtein, Tristan A

2013-01-01

Recent research suggests that despite the seeming inability of patients in vegetative and minimally conscious states to generate consistent behaviour, some might possess covert awareness detectable with functional neuroimaging. These findings motivate further research into the cognitive mechanisms that might support the existence of consciousness in these states of profound neurological dysfunction. One of the key questions in this regard relates to the nature and capabilities of attention in patients, known to be related to but distinct from consciousness. Previous assays of the electroencephalographic P300 marker of attention have demonstrated its presence and potential clinical value. Here we analysed data from 21 patients and 8 healthy volunteers collected during an experimental task designed to engender exogenous or endogenous attention, indexed by the P3a and P3b components, respectively, in response to a pair of word stimuli presented amongst distractors. Remarkably, we found that the early, bottom-up P3a and the late, top-down P3b could in fact be dissociated in a patient who fitted the behavioural criteria for the vegetative state. In juxtaposition with healthy volunteers, the patient's responses suggested the presence of a relatively high level of attentional abilities despite the absence of any behavioural indications thereof. Furthermore, we found independent evidence of covert command following in the patient, as measured by functional neuroimaging during tennis imagery. Three other minimally conscious patients evidenced non-discriminatory bottom-up orienting, but no top-down engagement of selective attentional control. Our findings present a persuasive case for dissociable attentional processing in behaviourally unresponsive patients, adding to our understanding of the possible levels and applications of consequent conscious awareness.

Rhythms of Consciousness: Binocular Rivalry Reveals Large-Scale Oscillatory Network Dynamics Mediating Visual Perception

PubMed Central

Doesburg, Sam M.; Green, Jessica J.; McDonald, John J.; Ward, Lawrence M.

2009-01-01

Consciousness has been proposed to emerge from functionally integrated large-scale ensembles of gamma-synchronous neural populations that form and dissolve at a frequency in the theta band. We propose that discrete moments of perceptual experience are implemented by transient gamma-band synchronization of relevant cortical regions, and that disintegration and reintegration of these assemblies is time-locked to ongoing theta oscillations. In support of this hypothesis we provide evidence that (1) perceptual switching during binocular rivalry is time-locked to gamma-band synchronizations which recur at a theta rate, indicating that the onset of new conscious percepts coincides with the emergence of a new gamma-synchronous assembly that is locked to an ongoing theta rhythm; (2) localization of the generators of these gamma rhythms reveals recurrent prefrontal and parietal sources; (3) theta modulation of gamma-band synchronization is observed between and within the activated brain regions. These results suggest that ongoing theta-modulated-gamma mechanisms periodically reintegrate a large-scale prefrontal-parietal network critical for perceptual experience. Moreover, activation and network inclusion of inferior temporal cortex and motor cortex uniquely occurs on the cycle immediately preceding responses signaling perceptual switching. This suggests that the essential prefrontal-parietal oscillatory network is expanded to include additional cortical regions relevant to tasks and perceptions furnishing consciousness at that moment, in this case image processing and response initiation, and that these activations occur within a time frame consistent with the notion that conscious processes directly affect behaviour. PMID:19582165

Distorted temporal consciousness and preserved knowing consciousness in confabulation: a case study.

PubMed

La Corte, Valentina; George, Nathalie; Pradat-Diehl, Pascale; Barba, Gianfranco Dalla

2011-01-01

In this study we describe a patient, TA, who developed a chronic amnesic-confabulatory syndrome, following rupture of a right internal carotid siphon aneurysm. Our aim was to elucidate as fully as possible the nature of TA's impairment and to test the hypothesis of confabulation as reflecting a dysfunction of Temporal Consciousness, i.e., to become aware of something as part of a personal past, present or future. TA's confabulations were present in answers to questions tapping Temporal Consciousness, i.e., autobiographical episodic memory, orientation in time and place, and foresight of personal future. In contrast, confabulations were not observed in answers to questions tapping Knowing Consciousness, i.e., to become aware of something as a meaning or as an element of impersonal knowledge. In fact, he had normal access to semantic knowledge, including foresight of impersonal future. TA's brain MRI showed lesions involving the right hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, fornix, mammillary bodies, and thalamus. Moreover TA showed sub-cortical lesions involving the caudate and putamen nuclei bilaterally, a lesion site not commonly described in amnesic-confabulatory syndrome. We suggest that this pattern of results is better accounted for within the framework of the Memory, Consciousness and Temporality Theory and reflects a specific distortion of Temporal Consciousness.

The Moral Insignificance of Self‐consciousness

PubMed Central

2017-01-01

Abstract In this paper, I examine the claim that self‐consciousness is highly morally significant, such that the fact that an entity is self‐conscious generates strong moral reasons against harming or killing that entity. This claim is apparently very intuitive, but I argue it is false. I consider two ways to defend this claim: one indirect, the other direct. The best‐known arguments relevant to self‐consciousness's significance take the indirect route. I examine them and argue that (a) in various ways they depend on unwarranted assumptions about self‐consciousness's functional significance, and (b) once these assumptions are undermined, motivation for these arguments dissipates. I then consider the direct route to self‐consciousness's significance, which depends on claims that self‐consciousness has intrinsic value or final value. I argue what intrinsic or final value self‐consciousness possesses is not enough to generate strong moral reasons against harming or killing. PMID:28919670

Pure state consciousness and its local reduction to neuronal space

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Duggins, A. J.

2013-01-01

The single neuronal state can be represented as a vector in a complex space, spanned by an orthonormal basis of integer spike counts. In this model a scalar element of experience is associated with the instantaneous firing rate of a single sensory neuron over repeated stimulus presentations. Here the model is extended to composite neural systems that are tensor products of single neuronal vector spaces. Depiction of the mental state as a vector on this tensor product space is intended to capture the unity of consciousness. The density operator is introduced as its local reduction to the single neuron level, from which the firing rate can again be derived as the objective correlate of a subjective element. However, the relational structure of perceptual experience only emerges when the non-local mental state is considered. A metric of phenomenal proximity between neuronal elements of experience is proposed, based on the cross-correlation function of neurophysiology, but constrained by the association of theoretical extremes of correlation/anticorrelation in inseparable 2-neuron states with identical and opponent elements respectively.

A systematic review of the neural bases of psychotherapy for anxiety and related disorders

PubMed Central

Brooks, Samantha J.; Stein, Dan J.

2015-01-01

Brain imaging studies over two decades have delineated the neural circuitry of anxiety and related disorders, particularly regions involved in fear processing and in obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The neural circuitry of fear processing involves the amygdala, anterior cingulate, and insular cortex, while cortico-striatal-thalamic circuitry plays a key role in obsessive-compulsive disorder. More recently, neuroimaging studies have examined how psychotherapy for anxiety and related disorders impacts on these neural circuits. Here we conduct a systematic review of the findings of such work, which yielded 19 functional magnetic resonance imaging studies examining the neural bases of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) in 509 patients with anxiety and related disorders. We conclude that, although each of these related disorders is mediated by somewhat different neural circuitry, CBT may act in a similar way to increase prefrontal control of subcortical structures. These findings are consistent with an emphasis in cognitive-affective neuroscience on the potential therapeutic value of enhancing emotional regulation in various psychiatric conditions. PMID:26487807

A systematic review of the neural bases of psychotherapy for anxiety and related disorders.

PubMed

Brooks, Samantha J; Stein, Dan J

2015-09-01

Brain imaging studies over two decades have delineated the neural circuitry of anxiety and related disorders, particularly regions involved in fear processing and in obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The neural circuitry of fear processing involves the amygdala, anterior cingulate, and insular cortex, while cortico-striatal-thalamic circuitry plays a key role in obsessive-compulsive disorder. More recently, neuroimaging studies have examined how psychotherapy for anxiety and related disorders impacts on these neural circuits. Here we conduct a systematic review of the findings of such work, which yielded 19 functional magnetic resonance imaging studies examining the neural bases of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) in 509 patients with anxiety and related disorders. We conclude that, although each of these related disorders is mediated by somewhat different neural circuitry, CBT may act in a similar way to increase prefrontal control of subcortical structures. These findings are consistent with an emphasis in cognitive-affective neuroscience on the potential therapeutic value of enhancing emotional regulation in various psychiatric conditions.

Measuring the level and content of consciousness during epileptic seizures: the Ictal Consciousness Inventory.

PubMed

Cavanna, A E; Mula, M; Servo, S; Strigaro, G; Tota, G; Barbagli, D; Collimedaglia, L; Viana, M; Cantello, R; Monaco, F

2008-07-01

Ictal alterations of the level of general awareness and subjective content of consciousness play a pivotal role in the clinical phenomenology of epilepsy, and reflect the pathological involvement of different neurobiological substrates. However, no self-reported measures have been proposed for patients experiencing altered conscious states during seizures. This study describes the development and validation of a new scale for the quantitative assessment of the level and content of ictal consciousness, the Ictal Consciousness Inventory (ICI). The ICI is a 20-item questionnaire generated on the basis of interviews with patients, literature review, and consultation with experts. It was tested on a sample of 110 patients attending three different epilepsy clinics in Northern Italy, who also completed standardized clinical scales. Standard psychometric methods were used to demonstrate that this scale satisfies criteria for acceptability, reliability, and validity. The ICI is proposed as a user-friendly and clinically sound instrument for the measurement of ictal alterations of consciousness in patients with epilepsy.

Comparative psychology without consciousness.

PubMed

Carruthers, Peter

2018-06-22

The goal of this paper is to establish the truth of the following conditional: if a global workspace theory of phenomenal consciousness is correct, and is fully reductive in nature, then we should stop asking questions about consciousness in nonhuman animals-not because those questions are too hard to answer, but because there are no substantive facts to discover. The argument in support of this conditional turns on the idea that while global broadcasting is all-or-nothing in the human mind, it is framed in terms that imply gradations across species. Yet our concept of phenomenal consciousness doesn't permit mental states to be to some degree conscious. Before getting to that argument, however, and in order to motivate the subsequent discussion, some of the virtues of global workspace theory are displayed. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness, biology and quantum hypotheses

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Baars, Bernard J.; Edelman, David B.

2012-09-01

Natural phenomena are reducible to quantum events in principle, but quantum mechanics does not always provide the best level of analysis. The many-body problem, chaotic avalanches, materials properties, biological organisms, and weather systems are better addressed at higher levels. Animals are highly organized, goal-directed, adaptive, selectionist, information-preserving, functionally redundant, multicellular, quasi-autonomous, highly mobile, reproducing, dissipative systems that conserve many fundamental features over remarkably long periods of time at the species level. Animal brains consist of massive, layered networks of specialized signaling cells with 10,000 communication points per cell, and interacting up to 1000 Hz. Neurons begin to divide and differentiate very early in gestation, and continue to develop until middle age. Waking brains operate far from thermodynamic equilibrium under delicate homeostatic control, making them extremely sensitive to a range of physical and chemical stimuli, highly adaptive, and able to produce a remarkable range of goal-relevant actions. Consciousness is “a difference that makes a difference” at the level of massive neuronal interactions in the most parallel-interactive anatomical structure of the mammalian brain, the cortico-thalamic (C-T) system. Other brain structures are not established to result in direct conscious experiences, at least in humans. However, indirect extra-cortical influences on the C-T system are pervasive. Learning, brain plasticity and major life adaptations may require conscious cognition. While brains evolved over hundreds of millions of years, and individual brains grow over months, years and decades, conscious events appear to have a duty cycle of ∼100 ms, fading after a few seconds. They can of course be refreshed by inner rehearsal, re-visualization, or attending to recurrent stimulus sources. These very distinctive brain events are needed when animals seek out and cope with new

Consciousness, biology and quantum hypotheses.

PubMed

Baars, Bernard J; Edelman, David B

2012-09-01

Natural phenomena are reducible to quantum events in principle, but quantum mechanics does not always provide the best level of analysis. The many-body problem, chaotic avalanches, materials properties, biological organisms, and weather systems are better addressed at higher levels. Animals are highly organized, goal-directed, adaptive, selectionist, information-preserving, functionally redundant, multicellular, quasi-autonomous, highly mobile, reproducing, dissipative systems that conserve many fundamental features over remarkably long periods of time at the species level. Animal brains consist of massive, layered networks of specialized signaling cells with 10,000 communication points per cell, and interacting up to 1000 Hz. Neurons begin to divide and differentiate very early in gestation, and continue to develop until middle age. Waking brains operate far from thermodynamic equilibrium under delicate homeostatic control, making them extremely sensitive to a range of physical and chemical stimuli, highly adaptive, and able to produce a remarkable range of goal-relevant actions. Consciousness is "a difference that makes a difference" at the level of massive neuronal interactions in the most parallel-interactive anatomical structure of the mammalian brain, the cortico-thalamic (C-T) system. Other brain structures are not established to result in direct conscious experiences, at least in humans. However, indirect extra-cortical influences on the C-T system are pervasive. Learning, brain plasticity and major life adaptations may require conscious cognition. While brains evolved over hundreds of millions of years, and individual brains grow over months, years and decades, conscious events appear to have a duty cycle of ∼100 ms, fading after a few seconds. They can of course be refreshed by inner rehearsal, re-visualization, or attending to recurrent stimulus sources. These very distinctive brain events are needed when animals seek out and cope with new

Diminished self-conscious emotional responding in frontotemporal lobar degeneration patients.

PubMed

Sturm, Virginia E; Ascher, Elizabeth A; Miller, Bruce L; Levenson, Robert W

2008-12-01

Frontotemporal lobar degeneration (FTLD) is a neurodegenerative disease that dramatically alters social and emotional behavior. Recent work has suggested that self-conscious emotions (e.g., embarrassment) may be particularly vulnerable to disruption in this disease. Self-conscious emotions require the ability to monitor the self in relation to others. These abilities are thought to be subserved by brain regions (e.g., medial prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and insula) that are particularly vulnerable to damage in FTLD. This study examined emotional responding (expressive behavior, peripheral physiology, and subjective experience) in 24 FTLD patients and 16 cognitively normal control participants using a karaoke task known to elicit self-conscious emotion reliably and a nonemotional control task (isometric handgrip). Results indicated that FTLD patients showed diminished self-conscious emotional behavior (embarrassment and amusement) and diminished physiological responding while watching themselves singing. No differences were found between patients and controls in the nonemotional control task. These findings offer evidence of marked disruption of self-conscious emotional responding in FTLD. Diminished self-conscious emotional responding likely contributes significantly to social inappropriateness and other behavioral abnormalities in FTLD. 2008 APA, all rights reserved

Brain. Conscious and Unconscious Mechanisms of Cognition, Emotions, and Language

PubMed Central

Perlovsky, Leonid; Ilin, Roman

2012-01-01

Conscious and unconscious brain mechanisms, including cognition, emotions and language are considered in this review. The fundamental mechanisms of cognition include interactions between bottom-up and top-down signals. The modeling of these interactions since the 1960s is briefly reviewed, analyzing the ubiquitous difficulty: incomputable combinatorial complexity (CC). Fundamental reasons for CC are related to the Gödel’s difficulties of logic, a most fundamental mathematical result of the 20th century. Many scientists still “believed” in logic because, as the review discusses, logic is related to consciousness; non-logical processes in the brain are unconscious. CC difficulty is overcome in the brain by processes “from vague-unconscious to crisp-conscious” (representations, plans, models, concepts). These processes are modeled by dynamic logic, evolving from vague and unconscious representations toward crisp and conscious thoughts. We discuss experimental proofs and relate dynamic logic to simulators of the perceptual symbol system. “From vague to crisp” explains interactions between cognition and language. Language is mostly conscious, whereas cognition is only rarely so; this clarifies much about the mind that might seem mysterious. All of the above involve emotions of a special kind, aesthetic emotions related to knowledge and to cognitive dissonances. Cognition-language-emotional mechanisms operate throughout the hierarchy of the mind and create all higher mental abilities. The review discusses cognitive functions of the beautiful, sublime, music. PMID:24961270

High-frequency neural activity predicts word parsing in ambiguous speech streams.

PubMed

Kösem, Anne; Basirat, Anahita; Azizi, Leila; van Wassenhove, Virginie

2016-12-01

During speech listening, the brain parses a continuous acoustic stream of information into computational units (e.g., syllables or words) necessary for speech comprehension. Recent neuroscientific hypotheses have proposed that neural oscillations contribute to speech parsing, but whether they do so on the basis of acoustic cues (bottom-up acoustic parsing) or as a function of available linguistic representations (top-down linguistic parsing) is unknown. In this magnetoencephalography study, we contrasted acoustic and linguistic parsing using bistable speech sequences. While listening to the speech sequences, participants were asked to maintain one of the two possible speech percepts through volitional control. We predicted that the tracking of speech dynamics by neural oscillations would not only follow the acoustic properties but also shift in time according to the participant's conscious speech percept. Our results show that the latency of high-frequency activity (specifically, beta and gamma bands) varied as a function of the perceptual report. In contrast, the phase of low-frequency oscillations was not strongly affected by top-down control. Whereas changes in low-frequency neural oscillations were compatible with the encoding of prelexical segmentation cues, high-frequency activity specifically informed on an individual's conscious speech percept. Copyright © 2016 the American Physiological Society.

Perceptual integration without conscious access

PubMed Central

van Leeuwen, Jonathan; Olivers, Christian N. L.

2017-01-01

The visual system has the remarkable ability to integrate fragmentary visual input into a perceptually organized collection of surfaces and objects, a process we refer to as perceptual integration. Despite a long tradition of perception research, it is not known whether access to consciousness is required to complete perceptual integration. To investigate this question, we manipulated access to consciousness using the attentional blink. We show that, behaviorally, the attentional blink impairs conscious decisions about the presence of integrated surface structure from fragmented input. However, despite conscious access being impaired, the ability to decode the presence of integrated percepts remains intact, as shown through multivariate classification analyses of electroencephalogram (EEG) data. In contrast, when disrupting perception through masking, decisions about integrated percepts and decoding of integrated percepts are impaired in tandem, while leaving feedforward representations intact. Together, these data show that access consciousness and perceptual integration can be dissociated. PMID:28325878

Nonpolitical Images Evoke Neural Predictors of Political Ideology

PubMed Central

Ahn, Woo-Young; Kishida, Kenneth T.; Gu, Xiaosi; Lohrenz, Terry; Harvey, Ann; Alford, John R.; Smith, Kevin B.; Yaffe, Gideon; Hibbing, John R.; Dayan, Peter; Montague, P. Read

2014-01-01

Summary Political ideologies summarize dimensions of life that define how a person organizes their public and private behavior, including their attitudes associated with sex, family, education, and personal autonomy [1, 2]. Despite the abstract nature of such sensibilities, fundamental features of political ideology have been found to be deeply connected to basic biological mechanisms [3–7] that may serve to defend against environmental challenges like contamination and physical threat [8–12]. These results invite the provocative claim that neural responses to nonpolitical stimuli (like contaminated food or physical threats) should be highly predictive of abstract political opinions (like attitudes toward gun control and abortion) [13]. We applied a machine-learning method to fMRI data to test the hypotheses that brain responses to emotionally evocative images predict individual scores on a standard political ideology assay. Disgusting images, especially those related to animal-reminder disgust (e.g., mutilated body), generate neural responses that are highly predictive of political orientation even though these neural predictors do not agree with participants’ conscious rating of the stimuli. Images from other affective categories do not support such predictions. Remarkably, brain responses to a single disgusting stimulus were sufficient to make accurate predictions about an individual subject’s political ideology. These results provide strong support for the idea that fundamental neural processing differences that emerge under the challenge of emotionally evocative stimuli may serve to structure political beliefs in ways formerly unappreciated. PMID:25447997

Nonpolitical images evoke neural predictors of political ideology.

PubMed

Ahn, Woo-Young; Kishida, Kenneth T; Gu, Xiaosi; Lohrenz, Terry; Harvey, Ann; Alford, John R; Smith, Kevin B; Yaffe, Gideon; Hibbing, John R; Dayan, Peter; Montague, P Read

2014-11-17

Political ideologies summarize dimensions of life that define how a person organizes their public and private behavior, including their attitudes associated with sex, family, education, and personal autonomy. Despite the abstract nature of such sensibilities, fundamental features of political ideology have been found to be deeply connected to basic biological mechanisms that may serve to defend against environmental challenges like contamination and physical threat. These results invite the provocative claim that neural responses to nonpolitical stimuli (like contaminated food or physical threats) should be highly predictive of abstract political opinions (like attitudes toward gun control and abortion). We applied a machine-learning method to fMRI data to test the hypotheses that brain responses to emotionally evocative images predict individual scores on a standard political ideology assay. Disgusting images, especially those related to animal-reminder disgust (e.g., mutilated body), generate neural responses that are highly predictive of political orientation even though these neural predictors do not agree with participants' conscious rating of the stimuli. Images from other affective categories do not support such predictions. Remarkably, brain responses to a single disgusting stimulus were sufficient to make accurate predictions about an individual subject's political ideology. These results provide strong support for the idea that fundamental neural processing differences that emerge under the challenge of emotionally evocative stimuli may serve to structure political beliefs in ways formerly unappreciated. Copyright © 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Consciousness, Psychology, and Education: A Speculative Essay.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

1980

This monograph explores implications of the psychology of consciousness for education. The psychology of consciousness encompasses the relationships among behavior, experience, and states of consciousness. It is interpreted to include different states of consciousness, paranormal phenomena, mystical experiences, dreams, psychic healing, and other…

Neural Sensitivity to Absolute and Relative Anticipated Reward in Adolescents

PubMed Central

Vaidya, Jatin G.; Knutson, Brian; O'Leary, Daniel S.; Block, Robert I.; Magnotta, Vincent

2013-01-01

Adolescence is associated with a dramatic increase in risky and impulsive behaviors that have been attributed to developmental differences in neural processing of rewards. In the present study, we sought to identify age differences in anticipation of absolute and relative rewards. To do so, we modified a commonly used monetary incentive delay (MID) task in order to examine brain activity to relative anticipated reward value (neural sensitivity to the value of a reward as a function of other available rewards). This design also made it possible to examine developmental differences in brain activation to absolute anticipated reward magnitude (the degree to which neural activity increases with increasing reward magnitude). While undergoing fMRI, 18 adolescents and 18 adult participants were presented with cues associated with different reward magnitudes. After the cue, participants responded to a target to win money on that trial. Presentation of cues was blocked such that two reward cues associated with $.20, $1.00, or $5.00 were in play on a given block. Thus, the relative value of the $1.00 reward varied depending on whether it was paired with a smaller or larger reward. Reflecting age differences in neural responses to relative anticipated reward (i.e., reference dependent processing), adults, but not adolescents, demonstrated greater activity to a $1 reward when it was the larger of the two available rewards. Adults also demonstrated a more linear increase in ventral striatal activity as a function of increasing absolute reward magnitude compared to adolescents. Additionally, reduced ventral striatal sensitivity to absolute anticipated reward (i.e., the difference in activity to medium versus small rewards) correlated with higher levels of trait Impulsivity. Thus, ventral striatal activity in anticipation of absolute and relative rewards develops with age. Absolute reward processing is also linked to individual differences in Impulsivity. PMID:23544046

On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jahn, R.G.; Dunne, B.J.

1986-08-01

Theoretical explication of a growing body of empirical data on consciousness-related anomalous phenomena is unlikely to be achieved in terms of known physical processes. Rather, it will first be necessary to formulate the basic role of consciousness in the definition of reality before such anomalous experience can adequately be represented. This paper takes the position that reality is constituted only in the interaction of consciousness with its environment, and therefore that any scheme of conceptual organization developed to represent that reality must reflect the processes of consciousness as well as those of its environment. In this spirit, the concepts andmore » formalisms of elementary quantum mechanics, as originally proposed to explain anomalous atomic-scale physical phenomena, are appropriated via metaphor to represent the general characteristics of consciousness interacting with any environment. More specifically, if consciousness is represented by a quantum mechanical wave function, and its environment by an appropriate potential profile, Schrodinger wave mechanics defines eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that can be associated with the cognitive and emotional experiences of that consciousness in that environment. To articulate this metaphor it is necessary to associate certain aspects of the formalism, such as the coordinate system, the quantum numbers, and even the metric itself, with various impressionistic descriptors of consciousness, such as its intensity, perspective, approach/avoidance attitude, balance between cognitive and emotional activity, and receptive/assertive disposition.« less

Tracking the recovery of consciousness from coma

PubMed Central

Laureys, Steven; Boly, Mélanie; Maquet, Pierre

2006-01-01

Predicting the chances of recovery of consciousness and communication in patients who survive their coma but transit in a vegetative state or minimally conscious state (MCS) remains a major challenge for their medical caregivers. Very few studies have examined the slow neuronal changes underlying functional recovery of consciousness from severe chronic brain damage. A case study in this issue of the JCI reports an extraordinary recovery of functional verbal communication and motor function in a patient who remained in MCS for 19 years (see the related article beginning on page 2005). Diffusion tensor MRI showed increased fractional anisotropy (assumed to reflect myelinated fiber density) in posteromedial cortices, encompassing cuneus and precuneus. These same areas showed increased glucose metabolism as studied by PET scanning, likely reflecting the neuronal regrowth paralleling the patient’s clinical recovery. This case shows that old dogmas need to be oppugned, as recovery with meaningful reduction in disability continued in this case for nearly 2 decades after extremely severe traumatic brain injury. PMID:16823480

Consciousness and the Invention of Morel

PubMed Central

Perogamvros, Lampros

2013-01-01

A scientific study of consciousness should take into consideration both objective and subjective measures of conscious experiences. To this date, very few studies have tried to integrate third-person data, or data about the neurophysiological correlates of conscious states, with first-person data, or data about subjective experience. Inspired by Morel's invention (Casares, 1940), a literary machine capable of reproducing sensory-dependent external reality, this article suggests that combination of virtual reality techniques and brain reading technologies, that is, decoding of conscious states by brain activity alone, can offer this integration. It is also proposed that the multimodal, simulating, and integrative capacities of the dreaming brain render it an “endogenous” Morel's machine, which can potentially be used in studying consciousness, but not always in a reliable way. Both the literary machine and dreaming could contribute to a better understanding of conscious states. PMID:23467765

Avian reflex and electroencephalogram responses in different states of consciousness.

PubMed

Sandercock, Dale A; Auckburally, Adam; Flaherty, Derek; Sandilands, Victoria; McKeegan, Dorothy E F

2014-06-22

Defining states of clinical consciousness in animals is important in veterinary anaesthesia and in studies of euthanasia and welfare assessment at slaughter. The aim of this study was to validate readily observable reflex responses in relation to different conscious states, as confirmed by EEG analysis, in two species of birds under laboratory conditions (35-week-old layer hens (n=12) and 11-week-old turkeys (n=10)). We evaluated clinical reflexes and characterised electroencephalograph (EEG) activity (as a measure of brain function) using spectral analyses in four different clinical states of consciousness: conscious (fully awake), semi-conscious (sedated), unconscious-optimal (general anaesthesia), unconscious-sub optimal (deep hypnotic state), as well as assessment immediately following euthanasia. Jaw or neck muscle tone was the most reliable reflex measure distinguishing between conscious and unconscious states. Pupillary reflex was consistently observed until respiratory arrest. Nictitating membrane reflex persisted for a short time (<1 min) after respiratory arrest and brain death (isoelectric EEG). The results confirm that the nictitating membrane reflex is a conservative measure of death in poultry. Using spectral analyses of the EEG waveforms it was possible to readily distinguish between the different states of clinical consciousness. In all cases, when birds progressed from a conscious to unconscious state; total spectral power (PTOT) significantly increased, whereas median (F50) and spectral edge (F95) frequencies significantly decreased. This study demonstrates that EEG analysis can differentiate between clinical states (and loss of brain function at death) in birds and provides a unique integration of reflex responses and EEG activity. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Neural Correlates of Subliminal Language Processing.

PubMed

Axelrod, Vadim; Bar, Moshe; Rees, Geraint; Yovel, Galit

2015-08-01

Language is a high-level cognitive function, so exploring the neural correlates of unconscious language processing is essential for understanding the limits of unconscious processing in general. The results of several functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have suggested that unconscious lexical and semantic processing is confined to the posterior temporal lobe, without involvement of the frontal lobe-the regions that are indispensable for conscious language processing. However, previous studies employed a similarly designed masked priming paradigm with briefly presented single and contextually unrelated words. It is thus possible, that the stimulation level was insufficiently strong to be detected in the high-level frontal regions. Here, in a high-resolution fMRI and multivariate pattern analysis study we explored the neural correlates of subliminal language processing using a novel paradigm, where written meaningful sentences were suppressed from awareness for extended duration using continuous flash suppression. We found that subjectively and objectively invisible meaningful sentences and unpronounceable nonwords could be discriminated not only in the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), but critically, also in the left middle frontal gyrus. We conclude that frontal lobes play a role in unconscious language processing and that activation of the frontal lobes per se might not be sufficient for achieving conscious awareness. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press.

Paradigms for environmentally conscious manufacturing

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Edinbarough, Immanuel A.; Wells, Wayne E.

2004-12-01

There are several stories involving the industries that pledge themselves for the environmentally conscious manufacturing practices. Paradigms for environmentally conscious manufacturing are associated with one of the aspects of environmental quality, protection, resource management, commitment or sustainability. The engineering rules of thumb that can easily be adopted by aspiring companies need identification. The underlying thread that unifies the efforts of environmentally conscious manufacturing companies, in offering the environmentally safe products to the world, is grouped and presented in the paper as paradigms for successful practices. The various ways in which a start up company, that wants to excel in environmentally conscious manufacturing, can position itself based on the paradigms is also discussed in the paper.

The Presence of Consciousness in Absence Seizures

PubMed Central

Bayne, Tim

2011-01-01

This paper examines three respects in which the study of epileptic absence seizures promises to inform our understanding of consciousness. Firstly, it has the potential to bear on debates concerning the behavioural and cognitive functions associated with consciousness. Secondly, it has the potential to illuminate the relationship between background states (or ‘levels’) of consciousness and the contents of consciousness. Thirdly, it has the potential to bear on our understanding of the unity of consciousness. PMID:21447898

Neurocognitive processes of linguistic cues related to death.

PubMed

Han, Shihui; Qin, Jungang; Ma, Yina

2010-10-01

Consciousness of the finiteness of one's personal existence influences human thoughts and behaviors tremendously. However, the neural substrates underlying the processing of death-related information remain unclear. The current study addressed this issue by scanning 20 female adults, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, in a modified Stroop task that required naming colors of death-related, negative-valence, and neutral-valence words. We found that, while both death-related and negative-valence words increased activity in the precuneus/posterior cingulate and lateral frontal cortex relative to neutral-valence words, the neural correlate of the processing of death-related words was characterized by decreased activity in bilateral insula relative to both negative-valence and neutral-valence words. Moreover, the decreased activity in the left insula correlated with subjective ratings of death relevance of death-related words and the decreased activity in the right insula correlated with subjective ratings of arousal induced by death-related words. Our fMRI findings suggest that, while both death-related and negative-valence words are associated with enhanced arousal and emotion regulation, the processing of linguistic cues related to death is associated with modulations of the activity in the insula that mediates neural representation of the sentient self. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The sensory timecourses associated with conscious visual item memory and source memory.

PubMed

Thakral, Preston P; Slotnick, Scott D

2015-09-01

Previous event-related potential (ERP) findings have suggested that during visual item and source memory, nonconscious and conscious sensory (occipital-temporal) activity onsets may be restricted to early (0-800 ms) and late (800-1600 ms) temporal epochs, respectively. In an ERP experiment, we tested this hypothesis by separately assessing whether the onset of conscious sensory activity was restricted to the late epoch during source (location) memory and item (shape) memory. We found that conscious sensory activity had a late (>800 ms) onset during source memory and an early (<200 ms) onset during item memory. In a follow-up fMRI experiment, conscious sensory activity was localized to BA17, BA18, and BA19. Of primary importance, the distinct source memory and item memory ERP onsets contradict the hypothesis that there is a fixed temporal boundary separating nonconscious and conscious processing during all forms of visual conscious retrieval. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Objectified body consciousness in relation to recovery from an eating disorder.

PubMed

Fitzsimmons-Craft, Ellen E; Bardone-Cone, Anna M; Kelly, Kathleen A

2011-12-01

In Western society, the feminine body has been positioned as an object to be looked at and sexually gazed upon; thus, females often learn to view themselves as objects to be observed (i.e., objectified body consciousness (OBC)). This study examined the relation between OBC and eating disorder recovery by comparing its components across non-eating disorder controls, fully recovered, partially recovered, and active eating disorder cases. Results revealed that non-eating disorder controls and fully recovered individuals had similarly low levels of two components of OBC, body surveillance and body shame. Partially recovered individuals looked more similar to those with an active eating disorder on these constructs. The third component of OBC, control beliefs, and a conceptually similar construct, weight/shape self-efficacy, did not differ across groups. Results provide support for the importance of measuring aspects of self-objectification, particularly body surveillance and body shame, across the course of an eating disorder. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Objectified Body Consciousness in Relation to Recovery from an Eating Disorder

PubMed Central

Fitzsimmons, Ellen E.; Bardone-Cone, Anna M.; Kelly, Kathleen A.

2011-01-01

In Western society, the feminine body has been positioned as an object to be looked at and sexually gazed upon; thus, females often learn to view themselves as objects to be observed (i.e., objectified body consciousness (OBC)). This study examined the relation between OBC and eating disorder recovery by comparing its components across non-eating disorder controls, fully recovered, partially recovered, and active eating disorder cases. Results revealed that non-eating disorder controls and fully recovered individuals had similarly low levels of two components of OBC, body surveillance and body shame. Partially recovered individuals looked more similar to those with an active eating disorder on these constructs. The third component of OBC, control beliefs, and a conceptually similar construct, weight/shape self-efficacy, did not differ across groups. Results provide support for the importance of measuring aspects of self-objectification, particularly body surveillance and body shame, across the course of an eating disorder. PMID:22051364

Perceptual awareness and its neural basis: bridging experimental and theoretical paradigms

PubMed Central

Raffone, Antonino; Srinivasan, Narayanan; van Leeuwen, Cees

2014-01-01

Understanding consciousness is a major scientific challenge of our times, and perceptual awareness is an integral part of that challenge. This Theme Issue aims to provide a timely focus on crucial insights from leading scientists on perceptual awareness and its neural basis. The issue refers to key research questions and findings in perceptual awareness research and aims to be a catalyst for further research, by bringing together the state-of-the-art. It shows how bridges are being built between empirical and theoretical research and proposes new directions for the study of multisensory awareness and the role of the states of the body therein. In this introduction, we highlight crucial problems that have characterized the development of the study of perceptual awareness. We then provide an overview of major experimental and theoretical paradigms related to perceptual awareness and its neural basis. Finally, we present an overview of the Theme Issue, with reference to the contributed articles and their relationships. PMID:24639576

Dynamics of Propofol-Induced Loss of Consciousness Across Primate Neocortex.

PubMed

Ishizawa, Yumiko; Ahmed, Omar J; Patel, Shaun R; Gale, John T; Sierra-Mercado, Demetrio; Brown, Emery N; Eskandar, Emad N

2016-07-20

The precise neural mechanisms underlying transitions between consciousness and anesthetic-induced unconsciousness remain unclear. Here, we studied intracortical neuronal dynamics leading to propofol-induced unconsciousness by recording single-neuron activity and local field potentials directly in the functionally interconnecting somatosensory (S1) and frontal ventral premotor (PMv) network during a gradual behavioral transition from full alertness to loss of consciousness (LOC) and on through a deeper anesthetic level. Macaque monkeys were trained for a behavioral task designed to determine the trial-by-trial alertness and neuronal response to tactile and auditory stimulation. We show that disruption of coherent beta oscillations between S1 and PMv preceded, but did not coincide with, the LOC. LOC appeared to correspond to pronounced but brief gamma-/high-beta-band oscillations (lasting ∼3 min) in PMv, followed by a gamma peak in S1. We also demonstrate that the slow oscillations appeared after LOC in S1 and then in PMv after a delay, together suggesting that neuronal dynamics are very different across S1 versus PMv during LOC. Finally, neurons in both S1 and PMv transition from responding to bimodal (tactile and auditory) stimulation before LOC to only tactile modality during unconsciousness, consistent with an inhibition of multisensory integration in this network. Our results show that propofol-induced LOC is accompanied by spatiotemporally distinct oscillatory neuronal dynamics across the somatosensory and premotor network and suggest that a transitional state from wakefulness to unconsciousness is not a continuous process, but rather a series of discrete neural changes. How information is processed by the brain during awake and anesthetized states and, crucially, during the transition is not clearly understood. We demonstrate that neuronal dynamics are very different within an interconnecting cortical network (primary somatosensory and frontal premotor area

Human consciousness and its relationship to social neuroscience: A novel hypothesis

PubMed Central

Graziano, Michael S. A.; Kastner, Sabine

2011-01-01

A common modern view of consciousness is that it is an emergent property of the brain, perhaps caused by neuronal complexity, and perhaps with no adaptive value. Exactly what emerges, how it emerges, and from what specific neuronal process, is in debate. One possible explanation of consciousness, proposed here, is that it is a construct of the social perceptual machinery. Humans have specialized neuronal machinery that allows us to be socially intelligent. The primary role for this machinery is to construct models of other people’s minds thereby gaining some ability to predict the behavior of other individuals. In the present hypothesis, awareness is a perceptual reconstruction of attentional state; and the machinery that computes information about other people’s awareness is the same machinery that computes information about our own awareness. The present article brings together a variety of lines of evidence including experiments on the neural basis of social perception, on hemispatial neglect, on the out-of-body experience, on mirror neurons, and on the mechanisms of decision-making, to explore the possibility that awareness is a construct of the social machinery in the brain. PMID:22121395

Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account.

PubMed

Tononi, G

2012-01-01

presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and about the relational structure of concepts within a quale. It also explores the relationship between the temporal grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally, it summarizes how IIT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how various aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.

Integrated information theory of consciousness: an updated account.

PubMed

Tononi, G

2012-12-01

information integration and related quantities, the article presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and about the relational structure of concepts within a qua/e. It also explores the relationship between the temporal grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally, it summarizes how liT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how various aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.

Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?

PubMed

Tononi, Giulio; Koch, Christof

2015-05-19

The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like to know if consciousness is present: patients with a few remaining islands of functioning cortex, preterm infants, non-mammalian species and machines that are rapidly outperforming people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions. To address these issues, we need not only more data but also a theory of consciousness-one that says what experience is and what type of physical systems can have it. Integrated information theory (IIT) does so by starting from experience itself via five phenomenological axioms: intrinsic existence, composition, information, integration and exclusion. From these it derives five postulates about the properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. The theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of an individual experience (a quale), and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a particular physical system is conscious and of what. Moreover, IIT can explain a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes a number of testable predictions and extrapolates to a number of problematic conditions. The theory holds that consciousness is a fundamental property possessed by physical systems having specific causal properties. It predicts that consciousness is graded, is common among biological organisms and can occur in some very simple systems. Conversely, it predicts that feed-forward networks, even complex ones, are not conscious, nor are aggregates such as groups of individuals

Different Signal Enhancement Pathways of Attention and Consciousness Underlie Perception in Humans.

PubMed

van Boxtel, Jeroen J A

2017-06-14

It is not yet known whether attention and consciousness operate through similar or largely different mechanisms. Visual processing mechanisms are routinely characterized by measuring contrast response functions (CRFs). In this report, behavioral CRFs were obtained in humans (both males and females) by measuring afterimage durations over the entire range of inducer stimulus contrasts to reveal visual mechanisms behind attention and consciousness. Deviations relative to the standard CRF, i.e., gain functions, describe the strength of signal enhancement, which were assessed for both changes due to attentional task and conscious perception. It was found that attention displayed a response-gain function, whereas consciousness displayed a contrast-gain function. Through model comparisons, which only included contrast-gain modulations, both contrast-gain and response-gain effects can be explained with a two-level normalization model, in which consciousness affects only the first level and attention affects only the second level. These results demonstrate that attention and consciousness can effectively show different gain functions because they operate through different signal enhancement mechanisms. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The relationship between attention and consciousness is still debated. Mapping contrast response functions (CRFs) has allowed (neuro)scientists to gain important insights into the mechanistic underpinnings of visual processing. Here, the influence of both attention and consciousness on these functions were measured and they displayed a strong dissociation. First, attention lowered CRFs, whereas consciousness raised them. Second, attention manifests itself as a response-gain function, whereas consciousness manifests itself as a contrast-gain function. Extensive model comparisons show that these results are best explained in a two-level normalization model in which consciousness affects only the first level, whereas attention affects only the second level

Consciousness Development for the Learning Organization

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Heaton, Dennis

2017-01-01

Purpose: This paper presents a philosophical and practical discussion of the role of development of consciousness for realization of a learning organization. Consciousness is the capacity to know, the capacity to learn. As the knower is, so is the knowledge. Development of consciousness can lead to more profound and holistic learning and enable…

Multichannel Convolutional Neural Network for Biological Relation Extraction.

PubMed

Quan, Chanqin; Hua, Lei; Sun, Xiao; Bai, Wenjun

2016-01-01

The plethora of biomedical relations which are embedded in medical logs (records) demands researchers' attention. Previous theoretical and practical focuses were restricted on traditional machine learning techniques. However, these methods are susceptible to the issues of "vocabulary gap" and data sparseness and the unattainable automation process in feature extraction. To address aforementioned issues, in this work, we propose a multichannel convolutional neural network (MCCNN) for automated biomedical relation extraction. The proposed model has the following two contributions: (1) it enables the fusion of multiple (e.g., five) versions in word embeddings; (2) the need for manual feature engineering can be obviated by automated feature learning with convolutional neural network (CNN). We evaluated our model on two biomedical relation extraction tasks: drug-drug interaction (DDI) extraction and protein-protein interaction (PPI) extraction. For DDI task, our system achieved an overall f -score of 70.2% compared to the standard linear SVM based system (e.g., 67.0%) on DDIExtraction 2013 challenge dataset. And for PPI task, we evaluated our system on Aimed and BioInfer PPI corpus; our system exceeded the state-of-art ensemble SVM system by 2.7% and 5.6% on f -scores.

Psychopathy and Affect Consciousness in Young Criminal Offenders

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Holmqvist, Rolf

2008-01-01

A key characteristic of psychopathy is the individual's problematic relation to certain affects, particularly shame. Previous research has studied relations between expressed shame and psychopathy. In this study, the author analyzes potential associations between psychopathy and consciousness of feelings (i.e., participants' ability to recognize…

A narrative method for consciousness research

PubMed Central

Díaz, José-Luis

2013-01-01

Some types of first-person narrations of mental processes that constitute phenomenological accounts and texts, such as internal monolog statements, epitomize the best expressions and representations of human consciousness available and therefore may be used to model phenomenological streams of consciousness. The type of autonomous monolog in which an author or narrator declares actual mental processes in a think aloud manner seems particularly suitable for modeling streams of consciousness. A narrative method to extract and depict conscious processes, operations, contents, and states from an acceptable phenomenological text would require three subsequent steps: operational criteria for producing and/or selecting a phenomenological text, a system for detecting text items that are indicative of conscious contents and processes, and a procedure for representing such items in formal dynamic system devices such as Petri nets. The requirements and restrictions of each of these steps are presented, analyzed, and applied to phenomenological texts in the following manner: (1) the relevance of introspective language and narrative analyses to consciousness research and the idea that specific narratives are of paramount interest for such investigation is justified; (2) some of the obstacles and constraints to attain plausible consciousness inferences from narrative texts and the methodological requirements to extract and depict items relevant to consciousness contents and operations from a suitable phenomenological text are examined; (3) a preliminary exercise of the proposed method is used to analyze and chart a classical interior monolog excerpted from James Joyce’s Ulysses, a masterpiece of the stream-of-consciousness literary technique and, finally, (4) an inter-subjective evaluation for inter-observer agreement of mental attributions of another phenomenological text (an excerpt from the Intimate Journal of Miguel de Unamuno) is presented using some mathematical tools

A narrative method for consciousness research.

PubMed

Díaz, José-Luis

2013-01-01

Some types of first-person narrations of mental processes that constitute phenomenological accounts and texts, such as internal monolog statements, epitomize the best expressions and representations of human consciousness available and therefore may be used to model phenomenological streams of consciousness. The type of autonomous monolog in which an author or narrator declares actual mental processes in a think aloud manner seems particularly suitable for modeling streams of consciousness. A narrative method to extract and depict conscious processes, operations, contents, and states from an acceptable phenomenological text would require three subsequent steps: operational criteria for producing and/or selecting a phenomenological text, a system for detecting text items that are indicative of conscious contents and processes, and a procedure for representing such items in formal dynamic system devices such as Petri nets. The requirements and restrictions of each of these steps are presented, analyzed, and applied to phenomenological texts in the following manner: (1) the relevance of introspective language and narrative analyses to consciousness research and the idea that specific narratives are of paramount interest for such investigation is justified; (2) some of the obstacles and constraints to attain plausible consciousness inferences from narrative texts and the methodological requirements to extract and depict items relevant to consciousness contents and operations from a suitable phenomenological text are examined; (3) a preliminary exercise of the proposed method is used to analyze and chart a classical interior monolog excerpted from James Joyce's Ulysses, a masterpiece of the stream-of-consciousness literary technique and, finally, (4) an inter-subjective evaluation for inter-observer agreement of mental attributions of another phenomenological text (an excerpt from the Intimate Journal of Miguel de Unamuno) is presented using some mathematical tools.

Exploration of Critical Consciousness and Its Relationship to Teaching Perspectives and Attitudes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Weis, Lisa Kaye Hamling

2012-01-01

This study explored the relationships of educators' levels of critical consciousness, attitudes about poverty and poor people, and teaching perspectives. Critical consciousness was defined by Freire (2000) as the ability of individuals to assess their own identities related to the sociopolitical realities that surround them and critically…

Dynamic Neural Processing of Linguistic Cues Related to Death

PubMed Central

Ma, Yina; Qin, Jungang; Han, Shihui

2013-01-01

Behavioral studies suggest that humans evolve the capacity to cope with anxiety induced by the awareness of death’s inevitability. However, the neurocognitive processes that underlie online death-related thoughts remain unclear. Our recent functional MRI study found that the processing of linguistic cues related to death was characterized by decreased neural activity in human insular cortex. The current study further investigated the time course of neural processing of death-related linguistic cues. We recorded event-related potentials (ERP) to death-related, life-related, negative-valence, and neutral-valence words in a modified Stroop task that required color naming of words. We found that the amplitude of an early frontal/central negativity at 84–120 ms (N1) decreased to death-related words but increased to life-related words relative to neutral-valence words. The N1 effect associated with death-related and life-related words was correlated respectively with individuals’ pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward life. Death-related words also increased the amplitude of a frontal/central positivity at 124–300 ms (P2) and of a frontal/central positivity at 300–500 ms (P3). However, the P2 and P3 modulations were observed for both death-related and negative-valence words but not for life-related words. The ERP results suggest an early inverse coding of linguistic cues related to life and death, which is followed by negative emotional responses to death-related information. PMID:23840787

Dynamic neural processing of linguistic cues related to death.

PubMed

Liu, Xi; Shi, Zhenhao; Ma, Yina; Qin, Jungang; Han, Shihui

2013-01-01

Behavioral studies suggest that humans evolve the capacity to cope with anxiety induced by the awareness of death's inevitability. However, the neurocognitive processes that underlie online death-related thoughts remain unclear. Our recent functional MRI study found that the processing of linguistic cues related to death was characterized by decreased neural activity in human insular cortex. The current study further investigated the time course of neural processing of death-related linguistic cues. We recorded event-related potentials (ERP) to death-related, life-related, negative-valence, and neutral-valence words in a modified Stroop task that required color naming of words. We found that the amplitude of an early frontal/central negativity at 84-120 ms (N1) decreased to death-related words but increased to life-related words relative to neutral-valence words. The N1 effect associated with death-related and life-related words was correlated respectively with individuals' pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward life. Death-related words also increased the amplitude of a frontal/central positivity at 124-300 ms (P2) and of a frontal/central positivity at 300-500 ms (P3). However, the P2 and P3 modulations were observed for both death-related and negative-valence words but not for life-related words. The ERP results suggest an early inverse coding of linguistic cues related to life and death, which is followed by negative emotional responses to death-related information.

Adult Palatum as a Novel Source of Neural Crest-Related Stem Cells

PubMed Central

Widera, Darius; Zander, Christin; Heidbreder, Meike; Kasperek, Yvonne; Noll, Thomas; Seitz, Oliver; Saldamli, Belma; Sudhoff, Holger; Sader, Robert; Kaltschmidt, Christian; Kaltschmidt, Barbara

2009-01-01

Somatic neural and neural crest stem cells are promising sources for cellular therapy of several neurodegenerative diseases. However, because of practical considerations such as inadequate accessibility of the source material, the application of neural crest stem cells is strictly limited. The secondary palate is a highly regenerative and heavily innervated tissue, which develops embryonically under direct contribution of neural crest cells. Here, we describe for the first time the presence of nestin-positive neural crest-related stem cells within Meissner corpuscles and Merkel cell-neurite complexes located in the hard palate of adult Wistar rats. After isolation, palatal neural crest-related stem cells (pNC-SCs) were cultivated in the presence of epidermal growth factor and fibroblast growth factor under serum-free conditions, resulting in large amounts of neurospheres. We used immunocytochemical techniques and reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction to assess the expression profile of pNC-SCs. In addition to the expression of neural crest stem cell markers such as Nestin, Sox2, and p75, we detected the expression of Klf4, Oct4, and c-Myc. pNC-SCs differentiated efficiently into neuronal and glial cells. Finally, we investigated the potential expression of stemness markers within the human palate. We identified expression of stem cell markers nestin and CD133 and the transcription factors needed for reprogramming of somatic cells into pluripotent cells: Sox2, Oct4, Klf4, and c-Myc. These data show that cells isolated from palatal rugae form neurospheres, are highly plastic, and express neural crest stem cell markers. In addition, pNC-SCs may have the ability to differentiate into functional neurons and glial cells, serving as a starting point for therapeutic studies. Stem Cells 2009;27:1899–1910 PMID:19544446

Understanding Brain and Consciousness?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vitiello, G.

This is a review of the dissipative quantum model of brain in the form of an extended abstract of recent works addressing to the question of the scientific understanding of brain and consciousness in the frame of quantum field theory. The intrinsic dissipative character of the brain dynamics appears to be a possible root of consciousness mechanisms.

Preserved consciousness in vegetative and minimal conscious states: systematic review and meta-analysis.

PubMed

Kondziella, Daniel; Friberg, Christian K; Frokjaer, Vibe G; Fabricius, Martin; Møller, Kirsten

2016-05-01

Active, passive and resting state paradigms using functional MRI (fMRI) or EEG may reveal consciousness in the vegetative (VS) and the minimal conscious state (MCS). A meta-analysis was performed to assess the prevalence of preserved consciousness in VS and MCS as revealed by fMRI and EEG, including command following (active paradigms), cortical functional connectivity elicited by external stimuli (passive paradigms) and default mode networks (resting state). Studies were selected from multiple indexing databases until February 2015 and evaluated using the Quality Assessment of Diagnostic Accuracy Studies-2. 37 studies were identified, including 1041 patients (mean age 43 years, range 16-89; male/female 2.1:1; 39.5% traumatic brain injuries). MCS patients were more likely than VS patients to follow commands during active paradigms (32% vs 14%; OR 2.85 (95% CI 1.90 to 4.27; p<0.0001)) and to show preserved functional cortical connectivity during passive paradigms (55% vs 26%; OR 3.53 (95% CI 2.49 to 4.99; p<0.0001)). Passive paradigms suggested preserved consciousness more often than active paradigms (38% vs 24%; OR 1.98 (95% CI 1.54 to 2.54; p<0.0001)). Data on resting state paradigms were insufficient for statistical evaluation. In conclusion, active paradigms may underestimate the degree of consciousness as compared to passive paradigms. While MCS patients show signs of preserved consciousness more frequently in both paradigms, roughly 15% of patients with a clinical diagnosis of VS are able to follow commands by modifying their brain activity. However, there remain important limitations at the single-subject level; for example, patients from both categories may show command following despite negative passive paradigms. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/

Boosting Cognition With Music in Patients With Disorders of Consciousness.

PubMed

Castro, Maïté; Tillmann, Barbara; Luauté, Jacques; Corneyllie, Alexandra; Dailler, Frédéric; André-Obadia, Nathalie; Perrin, Fabien

2015-09-01

Music listening conveys beneficial effects on cognitive processes in both normal and pathologic cerebral functioning. Surprisingly, no quantitative study has evaluated the potential effects of music on cognition and consciousness in patients with disorders of consciousness. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the effect of music on cerebral processing in patients with disorders of consciousness. Using bedside electroencephalographic recording, we acquired in 13 patients with disorders of consciousness event-related potentials to the patient's first name after either an excerpt of the patient's preferred music (music condition) or a continuous sound (control condition). The cerebral response to the patient's first name was more often observed in the music condition, than in the control condition. Furthermore, the presence or absence of a discriminative response in the music condition seemed to be associated with a favorable or unfavorable outcome, respectively. These findings demonstrate for the first time that music has a beneficial effect on cognitive processes of patients with disorders of consciousness. The autobiographical characteristics of music, that is, its emotional and personal relevance, probably increase arousal and/or awareness. © The Author(s) 2015.

EEG and EMG responses to emotion-evoking stimuli processed without conscious awareness.

PubMed

Wexler, B E; Warrenburg, S; Schwartz, G E; Janer, L D

1992-12-01

Dichotic stimulus pairs were constructed with one word that was emotionally neutral and another that evoked either negative or positive feelings. Temporal and spectral overlap between the members of each pair was so great that the two words fused into a single auditory percept. Subjects were consciously aware of hearing only one word from most pairs; sometimes the emotion-evoking word was heard consciously, other times the neutral word was heard consciously. Subjects were instructed to let their thoughts wander in response to the word they heard, during which time EEG alpha activity over left and right frontal regions, and muscle activity (EMG) in the corrugator ("frowning") and zygomatic ("smiling") regions were recorded. Both EEG and EMG provided evidence of emotion-specific responses to stimuli that were processed without conscious awareness. Moreover both suggested relatively greater right hemisphere activity with unconscious rather than conscious processing.

Age-Related Reversals in Neural Recruitment across Memory Retrieval Phases

PubMed Central

Kensinger, Elizabeth A.

2017-01-01

Over the last several decades, neuroimaging research has identified age-related neural changes that occur during cognitive tasks. These changes are used to help researchers identify functional changes that contribute to age-related impairments in cognitive performance. One commonly reported example of such a change is an age-related decrease in the recruitment of posterior sensory regions coupled with an increased recruitment of prefrontal regions across multiple cognitive tasks. This shift is often described as a compensatory recruitment of prefrontal regions due to age-related sensory-processing deficits in posterior regions. However, age is not only associated with spatial shifts in recruitment, but also with temporal shifts, in which younger and older adults recruit the same neural region at different points in a task trial. The current study examines the possible contribution of temporal modifications in the often-reported posterior–anterior shift. Participants, ages 19–85, took part in a memory retrieval task with a protracted retrieval trial consisting of an initial memory search phase and a subsequent detail elaboration phase. Age-related neural patterns during search replicated prior reports of age-related decreases in posterior recruitment and increases in prefrontal recruitment. However, during the later elaboration phase, the same posterior regions were associated with age-related increases in activation. Further, ROI and functional connectivity results suggest that these posterior regions function similarly during search and elaboration. These results suggest that the often-reported posterior–anterior shift may not reflect the inability of older adults to engage in sensory processing, but rather a change in when they recruit this processing. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The current study provides evidence that the often-reported posterior–anterior shift in aging may not reflect a global sensory-processing deficit, as has often been reported, but

Impaired consciousness in partial seizures is bimodally distributed.

PubMed

Cunningham, Courtney; Chen, William C; Shorten, Andrew; McClurkin, Michael; Choezom, Tenzin; Schmidt, Christian P; Chu, Victoria; Bozik, Anne; Best, Cameron; Chapman, Melissa; Furman, Moran; Detyniecki, Kamil; Giacino, Joseph T; Blumenfeld, Hal

2014-05-13

To investigate whether impaired consciousness in partial seizures can usually be attributed to specific deficits in the content of consciousness or to a more general decrease in the overall level of consciousness. Prospective testing during partial seizures was performed in patients with epilepsy using the Responsiveness in Epilepsy Scale (n = 83 partial seizures, 30 patients). Results were compared with responsiveness scores in a cohort of patients with severe traumatic brain injury evaluated with the JFK Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (n = 552 test administrations, 184 patients). Standardized testing during partial seizures reveals a bimodal scoring distribution, such that most patients were either fully impaired or relatively spared in their ability to respond on multiple cognitive tests. Seizures with impaired performance on initial test items remained consistently impaired on subsequent items, while other seizures showed spared performance throughout. In the comparison group, we found that scores of patients with brain injury were more evenly distributed across the full range in severity of impairment. Partial seizures can often be cleanly separated into those with vs without overall impaired responsiveness. Results from similar testing in a comparison group of patients with brain injury suggest that the bimodal nature of Responsiveness in Epilepsy Scale scores is not a result of scale bias but may be a finding unique to partial seizures. These findings support a model in which seizures either propagate or do not propagate to key structures that regulate overall arousal and thalamocortical function. Future investigations are needed to relate these behavioral findings to the physiology underlying impaired consciousness in partial seizures.

Resting State Networks and Consciousness

PubMed Central

Heine, Lizette; Soddu, Andrea; Gómez, Francisco; Vanhaudenhuyse, Audrey; Tshibanda, Luaba; Thonnard, Marie; Charland-Verville, Vanessa; Kirsch, Murielle; Laureys, Steven; Demertzi, Athena

2012-01-01

In order to better understand the functional contribution of resting state activity to conscious cognition, we aimed to review increases and decreases in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) functional connectivity under physiological (sleep), pharmacological (anesthesia), and pathological altered states of consciousness, such as brain death, coma, vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, and minimally conscious state. The reviewed resting state networks were the DMN, left and right executive control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks. We highlight some methodological issues concerning resting state analyses in severely injured brains mainly in terms of hypothesis-driven seed-based correlation analysis and data-driven independent components analysis approaches. Finally, we attempt to contextualize our discussion within theoretical frameworks of conscious processes. We think that this “lesion” approach allows us to better determine the necessary conditions under which normal conscious cognition takes place. At the clinical level, we acknowledge the technical merits of the resting state paradigm. Indeed, fast and easy acquisitions are preferable to activation paradigms in clinical populations. Finally, we emphasize the need to validate the diagnostic and prognostic value of fMRI resting state measurements in non-communicating brain damaged patients. PMID:22969735

Cajal and consciousness. Introduction.

PubMed

Marijuán, P C

2001-04-01

One hundred years after Santiago Ramón Cajal established the bases of modern neuroscience in his masterpiece Textura del sistema nervioso del hombre y de los vertebrados, the question is stated again: What is the status of consciousness today? The responses in this book, by contemporary leading figures of neuroscience, evolution, molecular biology, computer science, and quantum physics, collectively compose a fascinating conceptual landscape. Both the evolutionary emergence of consciousness and its development towards the highest level may be analyzed by a wealth of new theories and hypotheses, including Cajal's prescient ones. Some noticeable gaps remain, however. Celebrating the centennial of Textura is a timely occasion to reassess how close--and how far--our system of the sciences is to explaining consciousness.

Paradox and Cross Purposes in Recent Work on Consciousness.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Block, Ned

2001-01-01

Functionalists about consciousness identify consciousness with a role; physicalists identify consciousness with an implementer of that role. The global workspace theory of consciousness fits the functionalist perspective, but the physicalist sees consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility. (Author)

Distant supervision for neural relation extraction integrated with word attention and property features.

PubMed

Qu, Jianfeng; Ouyang, Dantong; Hua, Wen; Ye, Yuxin; Li, Ximing

2018-04-01

Distant supervision for neural relation extraction is an efficient approach to extracting massive relations with reference to plain texts. However, the existing neural methods fail to capture the critical words in sentence encoding and meanwhile lack useful sentence information for some positive training instances. To address the above issues, we propose a novel neural relation extraction model. First, we develop a word-level attention mechanism to distinguish the importance of each individual word in a sentence, increasing the attention weights for those critical words. Second, we investigate the semantic information from word embeddings of target entities, which can be developed as a supplementary feature for the extractor. Experimental results show that our model outperforms previous state-of-the-art baselines. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Convolutional neural networks for event-related potential detection: impact of the architecture.

PubMed

Cecotti, H

2017-07-01

The detection of brain responses at the single-trial level in the electroencephalogram (EEG) such as event-related potentials (ERPs) is a difficult problem that requires different processing steps to extract relevant discriminant features. While most of the signal and classification techniques for the detection of brain responses are based on linear algebra, different pattern recognition techniques such as convolutional neural network (CNN), as a type of deep learning technique, have shown some interests as they are able to process the signal after limited pre-processing. In this study, we propose to investigate the performance of CNNs in relation of their architecture and in relation to how they are evaluated: a single system for each subject, or a system for all the subjects. More particularly, we want to address the change of performance that can be observed between specifying a neural network to a subject, or by considering a neural network for a group of subjects, taking advantage of a larger number of trials from different subjects. The results support the conclusion that a convolutional neural network trained on different subjects can lead to an AUC above 0.9 by using an appropriate architecture using spatial filtering and shift invariant layers.

Subjective and objective characteristics of altered consciousness during epileptic seizures.

PubMed

Campora, Nuria; Kochen, Silvia

2016-02-01

Conscious states are inner states and processes of awareness. These states are by definition subjective. We analyzed subjective and objective characteristics of alteration of consciousness (AOC) during epileptic seizures, including its involvement in both the level of awareness and subjective content of consciousness. We evaluated AOC using the Consciousness Seizure Scale, the Ictal Consciousness Inventory, and a new structured survey developed by our group: the Seizure Perception Survey, which incorporates patients' subjective experiences before and after they watch a video-electroencephalographic recording of their own seizure. We included 35 patients (105 seizures) with drug-resistant epilepsy. Most seizures caused profound AOC. The content of consciousness was lower during temporal seizures with profound AOC. We uncovered a correlation between the subjective perception and objective duration of a seizure using the Seizure Perception Survey regarding memory; the patients had a better recall of ictal onset during wakefulness regardless of the epileptogenic zone, laterality, or magnitude of AOC. Nonetheless, the recovery of memory at the end of a seizure took more time in patients who showed greater AOC, less vivid content of consciousness, or a longer seizure. For 85% of the patients, this was the first time they were able to view their own seizures. The majority of the patients requested to view them again because this procedure allowed them to compare the recordings with their own memories and emotions during a seizure and to verify the real duration of the seizure. Alteration of consciousness is one of the most dramatic clinical manifestations of epilepsy. Usually, practitioners or relatives assume that the patients with AOC may not have any knowledge on their seizures. In this study, however, we found that most patients with AOC had a fairly accurate perception of the duration of a seizure and retained their memory of ictal onset. In contrast, for the

On the quantum mechanics of consciousness, with application to anomalous phenomena

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jahn, Robert G.; Dunne, Brenda J.

1986-08-01

Theoretical explication of a growing body of empirical data on consciousness-related anomalous phenomena is unlikely to be achieved in terms of known physical processes. Rather, it will first be necessary to formulate the basic role of consciousness in the definition of reality before such anomalous experience can adequately be represented. This paper takes the position that reality is constituted only in the interaction of consciousness with its environment, and therefore that any scheme of conceptual organization developed to represent that reality must reflect the processes of consciousness as well as those of its environment. In this spirit, the concepts and formalisms of elementary quantum mechanics, as originally proposed to explain anomalous atomic-scale physical phenomena, are appropriated via metaphor to represent the general characteristics of consciousness interacting with any environment. More specifically, if consciousness is represented by a quantum mechanical wave function, and its environment by an appropriate potential profile, Schrödinger wave mechanics defines eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that can be associated with the cognitive and emotional experiences of that consciousness in that environment. To articulate this metaphor it is necessary to associate certain aspects of the formalism, such as the coordinate system, the quantum numbers, and even the metric itself, with various impressionistic descriptors of consciousness, such as its intensity, perspective, approach/avoidance attitude, balance between cognitive and emotional activity, and receptive/assertive disposition. With these established, a number of the generic features of quantum mechanics, such as the wave/particle duality, and the uncertainty, indistinguishability, and exclusion principles, display metaphoric relevance to familiar individual and collective experiences. Similarly, such traditional quantum theoretic exercises as the central force field and atomic structure, covalent

Genomic instantiation of consciousness in neurons through a biophoton field theory.

PubMed

Cacha, Lleuvelyn A; Poznanski, Roman R

2014-06-01

attributable to the resultant effect of specifying qualia from the metabolic energy field that is transported in macromolecular proteins throughout specific networks of neurons that are constantly transforming into more stable associable representations as molecular solitons. The metastability of subjective experiences based on resonant dynamics occurs when bottom-up patterns of neocortical excitatory activity are matched with top-down expectations as adaptive dynamic pressures. These dynamics of on-going activity patterns influenced by the environment and selected as the preferred subjective experience in terms of a functional field through functional interactions and biological laws are realized as subjectivity and actualized through functional integration as qualia. It is concluded that interactionism and not information processing is the key in understanding how consciousness bridges the explanatory gap between subjective experiences and their neural correlates in the transcendental brain.

Consciousness: here, there and everywhere?

PubMed Central

Tononi, Giulio; Koch, Christof

2015-01-01

The science of consciousness has made great strides by focusing on the behavioural and neuronal correlates of experience. However, while such correlates are important for progress to occur, they are not enough if we are to understand even basic facts, for example, why the cerebral cortex gives rise to consciousness but the cerebellum does not, though it has even more neurons and appears to be just as complicated. Moreover, correlates are of little help in many instances where we would like to know if consciousness is present: patients with a few remaining islands of functioning cortex, preterm infants, non-mammalian species and machines that are rapidly outperforming people at driving, recognizing faces and objects, and answering difficult questions. To address these issues, we need not only more data but also a theory of consciousness—one that says what experience is and what type of physical systems can have it. Integrated information theory (IIT) does so by starting from experience itself via five phenomenological axioms: intrinsic existence, composition, information, integration and exclusion. From these it derives five postulates about the properties required of physical mechanisms to support consciousness. The theory provides a principled account of both the quantity and the quality of an individual experience (a quale), and a calculus to evaluate whether or not a particular physical system is conscious and of what. Moreover, IIT can explain a range of clinical and laboratory findings, makes a number of testable predictions and extrapolates to a number of problematic conditions. The theory holds that consciousness is a fundamental property possessed by physical systems having specific causal properties. It predicts that consciousness is graded, is common among biological organisms and can occur in some very simple systems. Conversely, it predicts that feed-forward networks, even complex ones, are not conscious, nor are aggregates such as groups of

Missing piece of the puzzle in the science of consciousness: Resting state and endogenous correlates of consciousness.

PubMed

Havlík, Marek

2017-03-01

Consciousness still stands as one of the most interesting and the most elusive problems of neuroscience. Finding its correlates is the first step toward its satisfactory explanation. Several theories have proposed its correlates but none of them seem to be generally accepted even though most of them share some very similar elements. These elements are the activity of the thalamus, which is considered by some as the central region for consciousness, and gamma synchronization, which should be the general principal for the emergence of conscious experience. However, all of these proposed theories share one characteristic and that is that they do not take into consideration the recently discovered endogenous activity of the brain, which is generally associated with the default mode network. Although the activity of this large scale brain network is in correlation with various levels of consciousness it is still missing in discussions of consciousness. This review recognizes the importance of endogenous activity and points out the important discoveries of endogenous activity that could be an important step toward a satisfactory explanation of consciousness. Copyright © 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The quantitative measurement of consciousness during epileptic seizures.

PubMed

Nani, Andrea; Cavanna, Andrea E

2014-01-01

The assessment of consciousness is a fundamental element in the classification of epileptic seizures. It is, therefore, of great importance for clinical practice to develop instruments that enable an accurate and reliable measurement of the alteration of consciousness during seizures. Over the last few years, three psychometric scales have been specifically proposed to measure ictal consciousness: the Ictal Consciousness Inventory (ICI), the Consciousness Seizure Scale (CSS), and the Responsiveness in Epilepsy Scale--versions I and II (RES-I and RES-II). The ICI is a self-report psychometric instrument which retrospectively assesses ictal consciousness along the dimensions of the level/arousal and contents/awareness. The CSS has been used by clinicians to quantify the impairment of consciousness in order to establish correlations with the brain mechanisms underlying alterations of consciousness during temporal lobe seizures. The most recently developed observer-rated instrument is the RES-I, which has been used to assess responsiveness during epileptic seizures in patients undergoing video-EEG. The implementation of standardized psychometric tools for the assessment of ictal consciousness can complement clinical observations and contribute to improve accuracy in seizure classification. © 2013.

Triple-aspect monism: physiological, mental unconscious and conscious aspects of brain activity.

PubMed

Pereira, Alfredo

2014-06-01

Brain activity contains three fundamental aspects: (a) The physiological aspect, covering all kinds of processes that involve matter and/or energy; (b) the mental unconscious aspect, consisting of dynamical patterns (i.e., frequency, amplitude and phase-modulated waves) embodied in neural activity. These patterns are variously operated (transmitted, stored, combined, matched, amplified, erased, etc), forming cognitive and emotional unconscious processes and (c) the mental conscious aspect, consisting of feelings experienced in the first-person perspective and cognitive functions grounded in feelings, as memory formation, selection of the focus of attention, voluntary behavior, aesthetical appraisal and ethical judgment. Triple-aspect monism (TAM) is a philosophical theory that provides a model of the relation of the three aspects. Spatially distributed neuronal dendritic potentials generate amplitude-modulated waveforms transmitted to the extracellular medium and adjacent astrocytes, prompting the formation of large waves in the astrocyte network, which are claimed to both integrate distributed information and instantiate feelings. According to the valence of the feeling, the large wave feeds back on neuronal synapses, modulating (reinforcing or depressing) cognitive and behavioral functions.

Human Consciousness: Where Is It From and What Is It for

PubMed Central