Sample records for continuous double auction

  1. Ergodic Transition in a Simple Model of the Continuous Double Auction

    PubMed Central

    Radivojević, Tijana; Anselmi, Jonatha; Scalas, Enrico

    2014-01-01

    We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the ergodic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe a heteroskedastic behavior in the logarithmic returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two different regimes can be seen. PMID:24558377

  2. Ergodic transition in a simple model of the continuous double auction.

    PubMed

    Radivojević, Tijana; Anselmi, Jonatha; Scalas, Enrico

    2014-01-01

    We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the ergodic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe a heteroskedastic behavior in the logarithmic returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two different regimes can be seen.

  3. A Good Beginning Makes a Good Market: The Effect of Different Market Opening Structures on Market Quality

    PubMed Central

    Hinterleitner, Gernot; Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike

    2015-01-01

    This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only improves market efficiency and liquidity at the beginning of the trading day when compared to the stand-alone continuous double auction, but also causes positive spillover effects on subsequent trading. Concerning the design of the opening call auction, we find no significant differences between the transparent and nontransparent specification with respect to opening prices and liquidity. In the course of subsequent continuous trading, however, market quality is slightly higher after a nontransparent call auction. PMID:26351653

  4. A Good Beginning Makes a Good Market: The Effect of Different Market Opening Structures on Market Quality.

    PubMed

    Hinterleitner, Gernot; Leopold-Wildburger, Ulrike; Mestel, Roland; Palan, Stefan

    2015-01-01

    This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only improves market efficiency and liquidity at the beginning of the trading day when compared to the stand-alone continuous double auction, but also causes positive spillover effects on subsequent trading. Concerning the design of the opening call auction, we find no significant differences between the transparent and nontransparent specification with respect to opening prices and liquidity. In the course of subsequent continuous trading, however, market quality is slightly higher after a nontransparent call auction.

  5. Low-traffic limit and first-passage times for a simple model of the continuous double auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Scalas, Enrico; Rapallo, Fabio; Radivojević, Tijana

    2017-11-01

    We consider a simplified model of the continuous double auction where prices are integers varying from 1 to N with limit orders and market orders, but quantity per order limited to a single share. For this model, the order process is equivalent to two M / M / 1 queues. We study the behavior of the auction in the low-traffic limit where limit orders are immediately matched by market orders. In this limit, the distribution of prices can be computed exactly and gives a reasonable approximation of the price distribution when the ratio between the rate of order arrivals and the rate of order executions is below 1 / 2. This is further confirmed by the analysis of the first-passage time in 1 or N.

  6. From Walras’ auctioneer to continuous time double auctions: a general dynamic theory of supply and demand

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Donier, J.; Bouchaud, J.-P.

    2016-12-01

    In standard Walrasian auctions, the price of a good is defined as the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Since both curves are generically regular, the response to small perturbations is linearly small. However, a crucial ingredient is absent of the theory, namely transactions themselves. What happens after they occur? To answer the question, we develop a dynamic theory for supply and demand based on agents with heterogeneous beliefs. When the inter-auction time is infinitely long, the Walrasian mechanism is recovered. When transactions are allowed to happen in continuous time, a peculiar property emerges: close to the price, supply and demand vanish quadratically, which we empirically confirm on the Bitcoin. This explains why price impact in financial markets is universally observed to behave as the square root of the excess volume. The consequences are important, as they imply that the very fact of clearing the market makes prices hypersensitive to small fluctuations.

  7. Investor structure and the price-volume relationship in a continuous double auction market: An agent-based modeling perspective

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhang, Wei; Bi, Zhengzheng; Shen, Dehua

    2017-02-01

    This paper investigates the impact of investor structure on the price-volume relationship by simulating a continuous double auction market. Connected with the underlying mechanisms of the price-volume relationship, i.e., the Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis (MDH) and the Sequential Information Arrival Hypothesis (SIAH), the simulation results show that: (1) there exists a strong lead-lag relationship between the return volatility and trading volume when the number of informed investors is close to the number of uninformed investors in the market; (2) as more and more informed investors entering the market, the lead-lag relationship becomes weaker and weaker, while the contemporaneous relationship between the return volatility and trading volume becomes more prominent; (3) when the informed investors are in absolute majority, the market can achieve the new equilibrium immediately. Therefore, we can conclude that the investor structure is a key factor in affecting the price-volume relationship.

  8. Evaluation of PersianCAT Agent's Accepting Policy in Continuous Double Auction, Participant in CAT 2007 Competition

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Honari, Sina; Fos-Hati, Amin; Ebadi, Mojtaba; Gomrokchi, Maziar

    As there is a growing tendency towards online auctions, online Multi Agent Systems for economic activities like stock exchanges is more in demand. CAT (CATallactics) competition has produced a great opportunity for researchers since 2007 to put their theories into practice in a real-time economic-based competition, combining traders and brokers. As one of participants, we evaluated our new accepting policy by putting it to challenge. In this paper we give a general overview of one of our policies in the market.

  9. Influence of individual rationality on continuous double auction markets with networked traders

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhang, Junhuan

    2018-04-01

    This paper investigates the influence of individual rationality of buyers and sellers on continuous double auction market outcomes in terms of the proportion of boundedly-rational buyers and sellers. The individual rationality is discussed in a social network artificial stock market model by embedding network formation and information set. Traders automatically select the most profitable trading strategy based on individual and social learning of the profits and trading strategies of themselves and their neighbors, and submit orders to markets. The results show that (i) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a higher market price, higher sellers' profits and a higher market efficiency; (ii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational sellers induces a lower number of trades and lower buyers' profits; (iii) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces a lower market price, a lower number of trades, and lower sellers' profits; (iv) a higher proportion of boundedly-rational buyers induces higher buyers' profits and a higher market efficiency.

  10. Social Choice in a Computer-Assisted Simulation

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Thavikulwat, Precha

    2009-01-01

    Pursuing a line of inquiry suggested by Crookall, Martin, Saunders, and Coote, the author applied, within the framework of design science, an optimal-design approach to incorporate into a computer-assisted simulation two innovative social choice processes: the multiple period double auction and continuous voting. Expectations that the…

  11. A Greedy Double Auction Mechanism for Grid Resource Allocation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ding, Ding; Luo, Siwei; Gao, Zhan

    To improve the resource utilization and satisfy more users, a Greedy Double Auction Mechanism(GDAM) is proposed to allocate resources in grid environments. GDAM trades resources at discriminatory price instead of uniform price, reflecting the variance in requirements for profits and quantities. Moreover, GDAM applies different auction rules to different cases, over-demand, over-supply and equilibrium of demand and supply. As a new mechanism for grid resource allocation, GDAM is proved to be strategy-proof, economically efficient, weakly budget-balanced and individual rational. Simulation results also confirm that GDAM outperforms the traditional one on both the total trade amount and the user satisfaction percentage, specially as more users are involved in the auction market.

  12. Adaptive Sniping for Volatile and Stable Continuous Double Auction Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Toft, I. E.; Bagnall, A. J.

    This paper introduces a new adaptive sniping agent for the Continuous Double Auction. We begin by analysing the performance of the well known Kaplan sniper in two extremes of market conditions. We generate volatile and stable market conditions using the well known Zero Intelligence-Constrained agent and a new zero-intelligence agent Small Increment (SI). ZI-C agents submit random but profitable bids/offers and cause high volatility in prices and individual trader performance. Our new zero-intelligence agent, SI, makes small random adjustments to the outstanding bid/offer and hence is more cautious than ZI-C. We present results for SI in self-play and then analyse Kaplan in volatile and stable markets. We demonstrate that the non-adaptive Kaplan sniper can be configured to suit either market conditions, but no single configuration is performs well across both market types. We believe that in a dynamic auction environment where current or future market conditions cannot be predicted a viable sniping strategy should adapt its behaviour to suit prevailing market conditions. To this end, we propose the Adaptive Sniper (AS) agent for the CDA. AS traders classify sniping opportunities using a statistical model of market activity and adjust their classification thresholds using a Widrow-Hoff adapted search. Our AS agent requires little configuration, and outperforms the original Kaplan sniper in volatile and stable markets, and in a mixed trader type scenario that includes adaptive strategies from the literature.

  13. Efficient Double Auction Mechanisms in the Energy Grid with Connected and Islanded Microgrids

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Faqiry, Mohammad Nazif

    The future energy grid is expected to operate in a decentralized fashion as a network of autonomous microgrids that are coordinated by a Distribution System Operator (DSO), which should allocate energy to them in an efficient manner. Each microgrid operating in either islanded or grid-connected mode may be considered to manage its own resources. This can take place through auctions with individual units of the microgrid as the agents. This research proposes efficient auction mechanisms for the energy grid, with is-landed and connected microgrids. The microgrid level auction is carried out by means of an intermediate agent called an aggregator. The individual consumer and producer units are modeled as selfish agents. With the microgrid in islanded mode, two aggregator-level auction classes are analyzed: (i) price-heterogeneous, and (ii) price homogeneous. Under the price heterogeneity paradigm, this research extends earlier work on the well-known, single-sided Kelly mechanism to double auctions. As in Kelly auctions, the proposed algorithm implements the bidding without using any agent level private infor-mation (i.e. generation capacity and utility functions). The proposed auction is shown to be an efficient mechanism that maximizes the social welfare, i.e. the sum of the utilities of all the agents. Furthermore, the research considers the situation where a subset of agents act as a coalition to redistribute the allocated energy and price using any other specific fairness criterion. The price homogeneous double auction algorithm proposed in this research ad-dresses the problem of price-anticipation, where each agent tries to influence the equilibri-um price of energy by placing strategic bids. As a result of this behavior, the auction's efficiency is lowered. This research proposes a novel approach that is implemented by the aggregator, called virtual bidding, where the efficiency can be asymptotically maximized, even in the presence of price anticipatory bidders. Next, an auction mechanism for the energy grid, with multiple connected mi-crogrids is considered. A globally efficient bi-level auction algorithm is proposed. At the upper-level, the algorithm takes into account physical grid constraints in allocating energy to the microgrids. It is implemented by the DSO as a linear objective quadratic constraint problem that allows price heterogeneity across the aggregators. In parallel, each aggrega-tor implements its own lower-level price homogeneous auction with virtual bidding. The research concludes with a preliminary study on extending the DSO level auc-tion to multi-period day-ahead scheduling. It takes into account storage units and conven-tional generators that are present in the grid by formulating the auction as a mixed inte-ger linear programming problem.

  14. Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market

    PubMed Central

    2016-01-01

    The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85. PMID:27031110

  15. Understanding Financial Market States Using an Artificial Double Auction Market.

    PubMed

    Yim, Kyubin; Oh, Gabjin; Kim, Seunghwan

    2016-01-01

    The ultimate value of theories describing the fundamental mechanisms behind asset prices in financial systems is reflected in the capacity of such theories to understand these systems. Although the models that explain the various states of financial markets offer substantial evidence from the fields of finance, mathematics, and even physics, previous theories that attempt to address the complexities of financial markets in full have been inadequate. We propose an artificial double auction market as an agent-based model to study the origin of complex states in financial markets by characterizing important parameters with an investment strategy that can cover the dynamics of the financial market. The investment strategies of chartist traders in response to new market information should reduce market stability based on the price fluctuations of risky assets. However, fundamentalist traders strategically submit orders based on fundamental value and, thereby stabilize the market. We construct a continuous double auction market and find that the market is controlled by the proportion of chartists, Pc. We show that mimicking the real state of financial markets, which emerges in real financial systems, is given within the range Pc = 0.40 to Pc = 0.85; however, we show that mimicking the efficient market hypothesis state can be generated with values less than Pc = 0.40. In particular, we observe that mimicking a market collapse state is created with values greater than Pc = 0.85, at which point a liquidity shortage occurs, and the phase transition behavior is described at Pc = 0.85.

  16. A False-name-Proof Double Auction Protocol for Arbitrary Evaluation Values

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Sakurai, Yuko; Yokoo, Makoto

    We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategy-proofness by incorporating the possibility of false-name bids, e.g., bids submitted using multiple e-mail addresses. An existing protocol called TPD protocol is false-name-proof but can handle only the cases where marginal utilities of each agent always decrease, while our new GTPD protocol can handle arbitrary evaluation values. When marginal utilities can increase, some bids cannot be divided into a single unit (e.g., an all-or-nothing bid). Due to the existence of such indivisible bids, meeting supply/demand becomes difficult. Furthermore, a seller/buyer can submit a false-name-bid by pretending to be a potential buyer/seller to manipulate allocations and payments. In the GTPD protocol, the auctioneer is required to absorb the supply-demand imbalance up to a given upper-bound. Also, the GTPD incorporate a new false-name-proof one-sided auction protocol that is guaranteed to sell/buy a certain number of units. Simulation results show that when the threshold price is set appropriately, this protocol can obtain a good social surplus, and the number of absorbed units is much smaller than the given upper-bound.

  17. Combinatorial Market Processing for Multilateral Coordination

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2005-09-01

    8 In the classical auction theory literature, most of the attention is focused on one-sided, single-item auctions [86]. There is now a growing body of...Programming in Infinite-dimensional Spaces: Theory and Applications, Wiley, 1987. [3] K. J. Arrow, “An extension of the basic theorems of classical ...Commodities, Princeton University Press, 1969. [43] D. Friedman and J. Rust, The Double Auction Market: Institutions, Theories, and Evidence, Addison

  18. Simple stochastic order-book model of swarm behavior in continuous double auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ichiki, Shingo; Nishinari, Katsuhiro

    2015-02-01

    In this study, we present a simple stochastic order-book model for investors' swarm behaviors seen in the continuous double auction mechanism, which is employed by major global exchanges. Our study shows a characteristic called 'fat tail' seen in the data obtained from our model that incorporates the investors' swarm behaviors. Our model captures two swarm behaviors: one is investors' behavior to follow a trend in the historical price movement, and another is investors' behavior to send orders that contradict a trend in the historical price movement. In order to capture the features of influence by the swarm behaviors, from price data derived from our simulations using these models, we analyzed the price movement range, that is, how much the price is moved when it is continuously moved in a single direction. Depending on the type of swarm behavior, we saw a difference in the cumulative frequency distribution of this price movement range. In particular, for the model of investors who followed a trend in the historical price movement, we saw the power law in the tail of the cumulative frequency distribution of this price movement range. In addition, we analyzed the shape of the tail of the cumulative frequency distribution. The result demonstrated that one of the reasons the trend following of price occurs is that orders temporarily swarm on the order book in accordance with past price trends.

  19. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 14 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

  20. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 14 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

  1. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 14 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

  2. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 14 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales. This section provides guidance on the sale of all inventory property by auction, except FSA real...

  3. 7 CFR 1955.148 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... complexity of the sale. When the services of a professional auctioneer are advisable, the services will be... 7 Agriculture 14 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Auction sales. 1955.148 Section 1955.148 Agriculture... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property General § 1955.148 Auction sales...

  4. Double Your Pleasure, Double Your Funds.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    McCall, Miles; Sitton, Bob

    1999-01-01

    Discusses a variety of fun activities that college and universities can develop as alumni fund-raising events: a golf tournament; scholarship auctions (silent, on-the-spot, live televised, and live); charitable raffles; duck dashes; themed banquets; and a tuition raffle. (MSE)

  5. Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Auctions

    PubMed Central

    Chatterjee, Krishnendu; Reiter, Johannes G.; Nowak, Martin A.

    2011-01-01

    Many scenarios in the living world, where individual organisms compete for winning positions (or resources), have properties of auctions. Here we study the evolution of bids in biological auctions. For each auction n individuals are drawn at random from a population of size N. Each individual makes a bid which entails a cost. The winner obtains a benefit of a certain value. Costs and benefits are translated into reproductive success (fitness). Therefore, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We compare two types of auctions. In “biological all-pay auctions” the costs are the bid for every participating individual. In “biological second price all-pay auctions” the cost for everyone other than the winner is the bid, but the cost for the winner is the second highest bid. Second price all-pay auctions are generalizations of the “war of attrition” introduced by Maynard Smith. We study evolutionary dynamics in both types of auctions. We calculate pairwise invasion plots and evolutionarily stable distributions over the continuous strategy space. We find that the average bid in second price all-pay auctions is higher than in all-pay auctions, but the average cost for the winner is similar in both auctions. In both cases the average bid is a declining function of the number of participants, n. The more individuals participate in an auction the smaller is the chance of winning, and thus expensive bids must be avoided. PMID:22120126

  6. 49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

  7. 49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

  8. 49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

  9. 49 CFR 599.402 - Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... 49 Transportation 7 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Requirements and limitations for salvage auctions that are consigned trade-in vehicles under the CARS program. 599.402 Section 599.402 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued) NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (CONTINUED)...

  10. The predictive power of zero intelligence in financial markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Farmer, J. Doyne; Patelli, Paolo; Zovko, Ilija I.

    2005-02-01

    Standard models in economics stress the role of intelligent agents who maximize utility. However, there may be situations where constraints imposed by market institutions dominate strategic agent behavior. We use data from the London Stock Exchange to test a simple model in which minimally intelligent agents place orders to trade at random. The model treats the statistical mechanics of order placement, price formation, and the accumulation of revealed supply and demand within the context of the continuous double auction and yields simple laws relating order-arrival rates to statistical properties of the market. We test the validity of these laws in explaining cross-sectional variation for 11 stocks. The model explains 96% of the variance of the gap between the best buying and selling prices (the spread) and 76% of the variance of the price diffusion rate, with only one free parameter. We also study the market impact function, describing the response of quoted prices to the arrival of new orders. The nondimensional coordinates dictated by the model approximately collapse data from different stocks onto a single curve. This work is important from a practical point of view, because it demonstrates the existence of simple laws relating prices to order flows and, in a broader context, suggests there are circumstances where the strategic behavior of agents may be dominated by other considerations. double auction market | market microstructure | agent-based models

  11. 41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

  12. 41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

  13. 41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

  14. 41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

  15. 41 CFR 102-38.95 - What is an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false What is an auction? 102-38.95 Section 102-38.95 Public Contracts and Property Management Federal Property Management Regulations System (Continued) FEDERAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION PERSONAL PROPERTY 38-SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY...

  16. 49 CFR 599.201 - Identification of salvage auctions and disposal facilities.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... facilities. 599.201 Section 599.201 Transportation Other Regulations Relating to Transportation (Continued... and Disposal Facilities § 599.201 Identification of salvage auctions and disposal facilities. (a... disposal facility identified in paragraph (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section. (2) A disposal facility listed...

  17. Bidding Agents That Perpetrate Auction Fraud

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Trevathan, Jarrod; McCabe, Alan; Read, Wayne

    This paper presents a software bidding agent that inserts fake bids on the seller's behalf to inflate an auction's price. This behaviour is referred to as shill bidding. Shill bidding is strictly prohibited by online auctioneers, as it defrauds unsuspecting buyers by forcing them to pay more for the item. The malicious bidding agent was constructed to aid in developing shill detection techniques. We have previously documented a simple shill bidding agent that incrementally increases the auction price until it reaches the desired profit target, or it becomes too risky to continue bidding. This paper presents an adaptive shill bidding agent which when used over a series of auctions with substitutable items, can revise its strategy based on bidding behaviour in past auctions. The adaptive agent applies a novel prediction technique referred to as the Extremum Consistency (EC) algorithm, to determine the optimal price to aspire for. The EC algorithm has successfully been used in handwritten signature verification for determining the maximum and minimum values in an input stream. The agent's ability to inflate the price has been tested in a simulated marketplace and experimental results are presented.

  18. TACtic- A Multi Behavioral Agent for Trading Agent Competition

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Khosravi, Hassan; Shiri, Mohammad E.; Khosravi, Hamid; Iranmanesh, Ehsan; Davoodi, Alireza

    Software agents are increasingly being used to represent humans in online auctions. Such agents have the advantages of being able to systematically monitor a wide variety of auctions and then make rapid decisions about what bids to place in what auctions. They can do this continuously and repetitively without losing concentration. To provide a means of evaluating and comparing (benchmarking) research methods in this area the trading agent competition (TAC) was established. This paper describes the design, of TACtic. Our agent uses multi behavioral techniques at the heart of its decision making to make bidding decisions in the face of uncertainty, to make predictions about the likely outcomes of auctions, and to alter the agent's bidding strategy in response to the prevailing market conditions.

  19. Continuous-Time Random Walk with multi-step memory: an application to market dynamics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gubiec, Tomasz; Kutner, Ryszard

    2017-11-01

    An extended version of the Continuous-Time Random Walk (CTRW) model with memory is herein developed. This memory involves the dependence between arbitrary number of successive jumps of the process while waiting times between jumps are considered as i.i.d. random variables. This dependence was established analyzing empirical histograms for the stochastic process of a single share price on a market within the high frequency time scale. Then, it was justified theoretically by considering bid-ask bounce mechanism containing some delay characteristic for any double-auction market. Our model appeared exactly analytically solvable. Therefore, it enables a direct comparison of its predictions with their empirical counterparts, for instance, with empirical velocity autocorrelation function. Thus, the present research significantly extends capabilities of the CTRW formalism. Contribution to the Topical Issue "Continuous Time Random Walk Still Trendy: Fifty-year History, Current State and Outlook", edited by Ryszard Kutner and Jaume Masoliver.

  20. 78 FR 16743 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BOX Options Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-03-18

    ... interests of investors to have lower Auction Transaction costs for non-Professional, Public Customers, and that the BOX fee structure will continue to attract this customer order flow to these auction... simple fact that price improvement occurs in the PIP. Since the PIP began in 2004, customers have...

  1. Design Implications of Real-Time Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Investigation

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Sanyal, Pallab

    2009-01-01

    Information Technology (IT) has spawned the growth of novel and innovative market mechanisms (such as online auctions) and associated businesses (such as eBay and Priceline) that were not feasible without the capabilities and reach of these modern information technologies. Previous studies on designing trading mechanisms for online markets…

  2. On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Constantin, Florin; Parkes, David C.

    In a dynamic market, being able to update one's value based on information available to other bidders currently in the market can be critical to having profitable transactions. This is nicely captured by the model of interdependent values (IDV): a bidder's value can explicitly depend on the private information of other bidders. In this paper we present preliminary results about the revenue properties of dynamic auctions for IDV bidders. We adopt a computational approach to design single-item revenue-optimal dynamic auctions with known arrivals and departures but (private) signals that arrive online. In leveraging a characterization of truthful auctions, we present a mixed-integer programming formulation of the design problem. Although a discretization is imposed on bidder signals the solution is a mechanism applicable to continuous signals. The formulation size grows exponentially in the dependence of bidders' values on other bidders' signals. We highlight general properties of revenue-optimal dynamic auctions in a simple parametrized example and study the sensitivity of prices and revenue to model parameters.

  3. Competitive bidding for health insurance contracts: lessons from the online HMO auctions.

    PubMed

    Gupta, Alok; Parente, Stephen T; Sanyal, Pallab

    2012-12-01

    Healthcare is an important social and economic component of modern society, and the effective use of information technology in this industry is critical to its success. As health insurance premiums continue to rise, competitive bidding may be useful in generating stronger price competition and lower premium costs for employers and possibly, government agencies. In this paper, we assess an endeavor by several Fortune 500 companies to reduce healthcare procurement costs for their employees by having HMOs compete in open electronic auctions. Although the auctions were successful in generating significant cost savings for the companies in the first year, i.e., 1999, they failed to replicate the success and were eventually discontinued after two more years. Over the past decade since the failed auction experiment, effective utilization of information technologies have led to significant advances in the design of complex electronic markets. Using this knowledge, and data from the auctions, we point out several shortcomings of the auction design that, we believe, led to the discontinuation of the market after three years. Based on our analysis, we propose several actionable recommendations that policy makers can use to design a sustainable electronic market for procuring health insurance.

  4. Competition in decentralized electricity markets: Three papers on electricity auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Harbord, David William Cameron

    This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis of electricity auctions written over a period of twelve years. The first paper models price competition in a decentralized wholesale market for electricity as a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction. In both the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria of the model, above marginal cost pricing and inefficient despatch of generating units occur. An alternative regulatory pricing rule is considered and it is shown that offering to supply at marginal cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms. The second paper analyses strategic interaction between long-term contracts and price competition in the British electricity wholesale market, and confirms that forward contracts will tend to put downward pressure on spot market prices. A 'strategic commitment' motive for selling forward contracts is also identified: a generator may commit itself to bidding lower prices into the spot market in order to ensure that it will be despatched with its full capacity. The third paper characterizes bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids.

  5. Learning Based Bidding Strategy for HVAC Systems in Double Auction Retail Energy Markets

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Sun, Yannan; Somani, Abhishek; Carroll, Thomas E.

    In this paper, a bidding strategy is proposed using reinforcement learning for HVAC systems in a double auction market. The bidding strategy does not require a specific model-based representation of behavior, i.e., a functional form to translate indoor house temperatures into bid prices. The results from reinforcement learning based approach are compared with the HVAC bidding approach used in the AEP gridSMART® smart grid demonstration project and it is shown that the model-free (learning based) approach tracks well the results from the model-based behavior. Successful use of model-free approaches to represent device-level economic behavior may help develop similar approaches tomore » represent behavior of more complex devices or groups of diverse devices, such as in a building. Distributed control requires an understanding of decision making processes of intelligent agents so that appropriate mechanisms may be developed to control and coordinate their responses, and model-free approaches to represent behavior will be extremely useful in that quest.« less

  6. Testing Neoclassical Competitive Theory in Multilateral Decentralized Markets

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    List, John A.

    2004-01-01

    Walrasian tatonnement has been a fundamental assumption in economics ever since Walras' general equilibrium theory was introduced in 1874. Nearly a century after its introduction, Vernon Smith relaxed the Walrasian tatonnement assumption by showing that neoclassical competitive market theory explains the equilibrating forces in "double-auction"…

  7. 31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the matter to...

  8. 31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the matter to...

  9. 31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the matter to...

  10. 31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... barring the person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the...

  11. 31 CFR 356.34 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the auction rules or fails to pay for...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE... person or entity from participating in future auctions under this part. We also may refer the matter to...

  12. A Classroom Experiment on Banking

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Kassis, Mary Mathewes; Hazlett, Denise; Ygosse Battisti, Jolanda E.

    2012-01-01

    This classroom experiment uses double oral auction credit markets to illustrate the role of banks as financial intermediaries. The experiment demonstrates how risk affects market interest rates in the presence of asymmetric information. It provides fodder for a discussion of the moral-hazard problem of deposit insurance and its impact on depositor…

  13. Laboratory Experiments for Undergraduate Instruction in Economics.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wells, Donald A.

    1991-01-01

    Describes the generation and use of experimental data in teaching economics. Includes a double oral auction experiment and a monopoly pricing experiment. Concludes that such experiments allow the instructor to see what the students have learned, how they reason, and what parts of the material have proved difficult. (DK)

  14. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

  15. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

  16. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

  17. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

  18. 40 CFR 73.70 - Auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ...—Allowance Schedule for Auctions Year of purchase Spot auction Advance auction Advance auction* 1993 50,000 a... for therein. (b) Timing of the auctions. The spot auction and the advance auction will be held on the... Administrator will conduct one spot auction and one advance auction in each calendar year. (c) Submittal for...

  19. Designing a Successful Bidding Strategy Using Fuzzy Sets and Agent Attitudes

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ma, Jun; Goyal, Madhu Lata

    To be successful in a multi-attribute auction, agents must be capable of adapting to continuously changing bidding price. This chapter presents a novel fuzzy attitude-based bidding strategy (FA-Bid), which employs dual assessment technique, i.e., assessment of multiple attributes of the goods as well as assessment of agents' attitude (eagerness) to procure an item in automated auction. The assessment of attributes adapts the fuzzy sets technique to handle uncertainty of the bidding process as well use heuristic rules to determine the attitude of bidding agents in simulated auctions to procure goods. The overall assessment is used to determine a price range based on current bid, which finally selects the best one as the new bid.

  20. Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems

    PubMed Central

    Duan, Zhuojun; Yan, Mingyuan; Cai, Zhipeng; Wang, Xiaoming; Han, Meng; Li, Yingshu

    2016-01-01

    With the emergence of new technologies, mobile devices are capable of undertaking computational and sensing tasks. A large number of users with these mobile devices promote the formation of the Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs). Within a MCS, each mobile device can contribute to the crowdsourcing platform and get rewards from it. In order to achieve better performance, it is important to design a mechanism that can attract enough participants with mobile devices and then allocate the tasks among participants efficiently. In this paper, we are interested in the investigation of tasks allocation and price determination in MCSs. Two truthful auction mechanisms are proposed for different working patterns. A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism is proposed to the continuous working pattern, and a suboptimal auction mechanism is introduced for the discontinuous working pattern. Further analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms have the properties of individual rationality and computational efficiencies. Experimental results suggest that both mechanisms guarantee all the mobile users bidding with their truthful values and the optimal maximal social cost can be achieved in the VCG-based auction mechanism. PMID:27058541

  1. 7 CFR 1955.131 - Auctioneers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... REGULATIONS (CONTINUED) PROPERTY MANAGEMENT Disposal of Inventory Property Use of Contractors to Dispose of..., location, advertising, broker cooperation, innovations, mechanics of sale, sample advertising, personal...

  2. Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer's Revenues in Expanding Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Rabin, Jonathan; Shehory, Onn

    The expanding auction is a multi-unit auction which provides the auctioneer with control over the outcome of the auction by means of dynamically adding items for sale. Previous research on the expanding auction has provided a numeric method to calculate a strategy that optimizes the auctioneer's revenue. In this paper, we analyze various theoretical properties of the expanding auction, and compare it to VCG, a multi-unit auction protocol known in the art. We examine the effects of errors in the auctioneer's estimation of the buyers' maximal bidding values and prove a theoretical bound on the ratio between the revenue yielded by the Informed Decision Strategy (IDS) and the post-optimal strategy. We also analyze the relationship between the auction step and the optimal revenue and introduce a method of computing this optimizing step. We further compare the revenues yielded by the use of IDS with an expanding auction to those of the VCG mechanism and determine the conditions under which the former outperforms the latter. Our work provides new insight into the properties of the expanding auction. It further provides theoretically founded means for optimizing the revenue of auctioneer.

  3. 76 FR 1158 - Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for July 19, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-07

    ... relating to Auction 92. A. Auction Structure i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction Design 7. The Bureau proposes to auction all licenses included in Auction 92 using the Commission's standard simultaneous... competitiveness and economic efficiency of a simultaneous multiple-round auction may be enhanced if such...

  4. Emergence of Cooperative Long-Term Market Loyalty in Double Auction Markets.

    PubMed

    Alorić, Aleksandra; Sollich, Peter; McBurney, Peter; Galla, Tobias

    2016-01-01

    Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs. We ask whether it is possible, instead, for loyalty to arise spontaneously, and in particular as a consequence of repeated interaction and co-adaptation among the agents in a market. We devise a stylized model of double auction markets and adaptive traders that incorporates these features. Traders choose where to trade (which market) and how to trade (to buy or to sell) based on their previous experience. We find that when the typical scale of market returns (or, at fixed scale of returns, the intensity of choice) become higher than some threshold, the preferred state of the system is segregated: both buyers and sellers are segmented into subgroups that are persistently loyal to one market over another. We characterize the segregated state analytically in the limit of large markets: it is stabilized by some agents acting cooperatively to enable trade, and provides higher rewards than its unsegregated counterpart both for individual traders and the population as a whole.

  5. Emergence of Cooperative Long-Term Market Loyalty in Double Auction Markets

    PubMed Central

    Alorić, Aleksandra; Sollich, Peter; McBurney, Peter; Galla, Tobias

    2016-01-01

    Loyal buyer-seller relationships can arise by design, e.g. when a seller tailors a product to a specific market niche to accomplish the best possible returns, and buyers respond to the dedicated efforts the seller makes to meet their needs. We ask whether it is possible, instead, for loyalty to arise spontaneously, and in particular as a consequence of repeated interaction and co-adaptation among the agents in a market. We devise a stylized model of double auction markets and adaptive traders that incorporates these features. Traders choose where to trade (which market) and how to trade (to buy or to sell) based on their previous experience. We find that when the typical scale of market returns (or, at fixed scale of returns, the intensity of choice) become higher than some threshold, the preferred state of the system is segregated: both buyers and sellers are segmented into subgroups that are persistently loyal to one market over another. We characterize the segregated state analytically in the limit of large markets: it is stabilized by some agents acting cooperatively to enable trade, and provides higher rewards than its unsegregated counterpart both for individual traders and the population as a whole. PMID:27120473

  6. Successes and Challenges in the Resale of Alternative Fuel Vehicles: July 2001 - March 2002

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    2002-05-01

    This report provides the outcome of Dorfman & O'Neal's effort to examine the resale market for automobiles as it relates to the resale of late-model, original equipment manufacture (OEM), alternative fuel vehicles. Auctions provide an exceptionally rapid, effective, and efficient market for the transfer of property between buyers and sellers at reasonable prices. The first automobile auction in the United States was successful because used cars were in reasonably constant supply, were uniformly packaged, and were easily graded for quality. Also, the auction had sufficient volume to significantly lower the handling and transaction costs for wholesalers and dealers. To thismore » day, the automobile auction industry conducts business primarily with registered wholesalers and dealers. Except for the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) auctions and some consignment auctions, nearly all automobile auctions are closed to the public. The auction system represents a near-perfect market, validated by the lack of statistical price differences in value of specific model cars between various regions of the country. However, specialty cars may be subject to arbitrage. The buyer purchases the vehicle believing that it can be sold immediately at a profit in another region. A variety of vehicle pricing services are available to serve the consumer and the wholesale automobile industry. Each has a different philosophy for collecting, analyzing, and reporting data. ''The Automobile Lease Guide'' (ALG) is clearly the authority on vehicle residual values. Auction companies continue to apply automated technologies to lower transaction costs. Automated technologies are the only way to track the increasing number of transactions in the growing industry. Nevertheless, people-to-people relationships remain critical to the success of all auction companies. Our assessment is that everyone in the secondary automobile market is aware of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs) and is interested to watch how the wholesale market for these vehicles may develop. However, none of the industry representatives we interviewed appears to be willing to take a leadership role in this market. Exact figures are not publicly available, but the GSA is probably the largest reseller of bifuel and dedicated compressed natural gas vehicles. These vehicles number in the hundreds; the total number of vehicles disposed by GSA each year is more than 20,000. GSA representatives have stated that bi-fuel vehicles are selling at approximately 80% of Black Book'' national average and dedicated vehicles are selling at 60% of ''Black Book national average compared to gasoline-only vehicles.« less

  7. The use of importance and performance analysis (IPA) to evaluate effectiveness of the forward auction market agro commodities: A case study

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wulansari, Dwi Ratna; Sutopo, Wahyudi; Hisjam, Muh.

    2018-02-01

    The empowering auction market for commodities in East Java Province is one of five auction market revitalization programs conducted by the Republic of Indonesia c.q. Ministry of Trading started in 2014. One of the districts in East Java Province, namely Magetan District utilizes the commodity auction market to improve the competitiveness of their agricultural industry by shortening the supply chain. The Magetan District needs to evaluate their support for farmers or farmer groups to participate in the forward auction market (FAM). Implementation of the FAM commodities is divided into three main processes, namely pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The auction market is organized to shorten the trading chain. Implementation of the FAM requires good planning, among Seller (namely Farmer or Farmer Group), organizer of Auction (namely Commodity Auction Company), Buyer, and Local Government (namely the farmer facilitator). This article is aimed to develop the instrument of a Performance Measurement Model Using Important and Performance Analysis (IPA) for Improving the FAM Effectiveness of Agro Commodity from Magetan District with Supply Chain Management approach. IPA is implemented at pre-auction, auction, and post-auction. The IPA model results in the diagram to decide the strategies in improving the FAM effectiveness, and then it can encourage farmers to improve welfare and realize the competitiveness of the auctioneer.

  8. Optimal Price Decision Problem for Simultaneous Multi-article Auction and Its Optimal Price Searching Method by Particle Swarm Optimization

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Masuda, Kazuaki; Aiyoshi, Eitaro

    We propose a method for solving optimal price decision problems for simultaneous multi-article auctions. An auction problem, originally formulated as a combinatorial problem, determines both every seller's whether or not to sell his/her article and every buyer's which article(s) to buy, so that the total utility of buyers and sellers will be maximized. Due to the duality theory, we transform it equivalently into a dual problem in which Lagrange multipliers are interpreted as articles' transaction price. As the dual problem is a continuous optimization problem with respect to the multipliers (i.e., the transaction prices), we propose a numerical method to solve it by applying heuristic global search methods. In this paper, Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) is used to solve the dual problem, and experimental results are presented to show the validity of the proposed method.

  9. A Hierarchical Auction-Based Mechanism for Real-Time Resource Allocation in Cloud Robotic Systems.

    PubMed

    Wang, Lujia; Liu, Ming; Meng, Max Q-H

    2017-02-01

    Cloud computing enables users to share computing resources on-demand. The cloud computing framework cannot be directly mapped to cloud robotic systems with ad hoc networks since cloud robotic systems have additional constraints such as limited bandwidth and dynamic structure. However, most multirobotic applications with cooperative control adopt this decentralized approach to avoid a single point of failure. Robots need to continuously update intensive data to execute tasks in a coordinated manner, which implies real-time requirements. Thus, a resource allocation strategy is required, especially in such resource-constrained environments. This paper proposes a hierarchical auction-based mechanism, namely link quality matrix (LQM) auction, which is suitable for ad hoc networks by introducing a link quality indicator. The proposed algorithm produces a fast and robust method that is accurate and scalable. It reduces both global communication and unnecessary repeated computation. The proposed method is designed for firm real-time resource retrieval for physical multirobot systems. A joint surveillance scenario empirically validates the proposed mechanism by assessing several practical metrics. The results show that the proposed LQM auction outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms for resource allocation.

  10. 31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...-93) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that...

  11. 31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that is available on...

  12. 31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that is available on...

  13. 31 CFR 356.23 - How are the auction results announced?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How are the auction results announced...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.23 How are the auction results announced? (a) After the conclusion of the auction, we will announce the auction results through a press release that is available on...

  14. 78 FR 72081 - Closed Auction of AM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for May 6, 2014; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-02

    ... Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for May 6, 2014; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures... announces the auction of certain AM broadcast construction permits. Auction 84 will be a ``closed'' auction..., New York. II. Construction Permits In Auction 84 2. The Bureaus will proceed to auction for 22 new...

  15. Three essays on auction markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Shunda, Nicholas James

    This dissertation contains a series of theoretical investigations of auction markets. The essays it contains cover wholesale electricity markets, a popular selling mechanism on eBay, and supplier entry into multi-unit procurement auctions. The study in Chapter 1 compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts as if the auction featured a discriminatory final payment method when, in fact, the markets are uniform price auctions. The proposed alternative explicitly accounts for the market-clearing price during the allocation phase. We find that the proposed alternative largely outperforms the current practice on the basis of procurement costs in the context of simple auction markets featuring both day-ahead and real-time auctions and that the procurement cost advantage of the alternative is complete when we simulate the effects of increased competition. We also find that a tradeoff between the objectives of procurement cost minimization and productive efficiency emerges in our simple auction markets and persists in the face of increased competition. The study in Chapter 2 considers a possible rationale for an auction with a buy price. In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. The "Buy-It-Now" option on eBay is a leading example of an auction with a buy price. The study develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price and buy price than when she can affect the bidders' reference price through the auction's reserve price only. Introducing a small reference-price effect can shrink the range of buy prices bidders are willing to exercise. The comparative statics properties of bidding behavior are in sharp contrast to equilibrium behavior in other models where the existence and size of the auction's buy price have no effect on bidding behavior. The study in Chapter 3 investigates endogenous entry in multi-unit auctions. We formulate and study models of multi-unit discriminatory and uniform price auctions and investigate the entry incentives and procurement costs they generate in equilibrium. We study two types of endogenous entry: in auctions with "interim entry costs," suppliers know their private cost information before deciding whether or not to undertake entry; in auctions with ex ante entry costs, suppliers do not know their private cost information before deciding whether or not to enter. The discriminatory and uniform price auctions are efficient and procurement cost equivalent in all the environments we study. With interim entry costs, the two auctions provide identical entry incentives. In contrast, with ex ante entry costs, suppliers enter the discriminatory auction at a higher rate than they enter the uniform price auction.

  16. Analysing Buyers' and Sellers' Strategic Interactions in Marketplaces: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Vytelingum, Perukrishnen; Cliff, Dave; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    We develop a new model to analyse the strategic behaviour of buyers and sellers in market mechanisms. In particular, we wish to understand how the different strategies they adopt affect their economic efficiency in the market and to understand the impact of these choices on the overall efficiency of the marketplace. To this end, we adopt a two-population evolutionary game theoretic approach, where we consider how the behaviours of both buyers and sellers evolve in marketplaces. In so doing, we address the shortcomings of the previous state-of-the-art analytical model that assumes that buyers and sellers have to adopt the same mixed strategy in the market. Finally, we apply our model in one of the most common market mechanisms, the Continuous Double Auction, and demonstrate how it allows us to provide new insights into the strategic interactions of such trading agents.

  17. Network formation in a multi-asset artificial stock market

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wu, Songtao; He, Jianmin; Li, Shouwei; Wang, Chao

    2018-04-01

    A multi-asset artificial stock market is developed. In the market, stocks are assigned to a number of sectors and traded by heterogeneous investors. The mechanism of continuous double auction is employed to clear order book and form daily closed prices. Simulation results of prices at the sector level show an intra-sector similarity and inter-sector distinctiveness, and returns of individual stocks have stylized facts that are ubiquitous in the real-world stock market. We find that the market risk factor has critical impact on both network topology transition and connection formation, and that sector risk factors account for the formation of intra-sector links and sector-based local interaction. In addition, the number of community in threshold-based networks is correlated negatively and positively with the value of correlation coefficients and the ratio of intra-sector links, which are respectively determined by intensity of sector risk factors and the number of sectors.

  18. 78 FR 45524 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-07-29

    ... issues relating to the conduct of Auction 96. A. Auction Design i. Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction--With or Without Package Bidding 14. The Bureau proposes to conduct Auction 96 using a simultaneous... incorporate provisions for a simple form of package bidding into the simultaneous multiple-round auction. In...

  19. China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

    PubMed

    Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

    2013-01-01

    This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003-2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a "two stage auction". The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are "cold", which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities.

  20. Progress Report. 1981-1982.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1982-04-01

    double auctions are efficient also has a basic * importance for the foundations of the economic theory of markets. Tradition- ally, much of economic...MOULIN During his tenure at the Center, Herve Moulin wrote about two-thirds of his new book, Game Theory for the Social Sciences , which has since...restric- tive conditions.) He also worked, jointly with Pradeep Dubey, of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale, on a paper, "Payoffs in

  1. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

  2. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

  3. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

  4. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture... THAN RULES OF PRACTICE) UNDER THE PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES ACT, 1930 Auction Sales § 46.25 Auction sales. Commission merchants, dealers and brokers who offer produce for sale through auction...

  5. 29 CFR 780.617 - Adjunct livestock auction operations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Adjunct livestock auction operations. 780.617 Section 780... Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption § 780.617 Adjunct livestock auction operations. The livestock auction operations...

  6. China’s Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption?

    PubMed Central

    Cai, Hongbin; Henderson, J. Vernon; Zhang, Qinghua

    2013-01-01

    This paper studies the urban land market in China in 2003—2007. In China, all urban land is owned by the state. Leasehold use rights for land for (re)development are sold by city governments and are a key source of city revenue. Leasehold sales are viewed as a major venue for corruption, prompting a number of reforms over the years. Reforms now require all leasehold rights be sold at public auction. There are two main types of auction: regular English auction and an unusual type which we call a “two stage auction”. The latter type of auction seems more subject to corruption, and to side deals between potential bidders and the auctioneer. Absent corruption, theory suggests that two stage auctions would most likely maximize sales revenue for properties which are likely to have relatively few bidders, or are “cold”, which would suggest negative selection on property unobservables into such auctions. However, if such auctions are more corruptible, that could involve positive selection as city officials divert hotter properties to a more corruptible auction form. The paper finds that, overall, sales prices are lower for two stage auctions, and there is strong evidence of positive selection. The price difference is explained primarily by the fact that two stage auctions typically have just one bidder, or no competition despite the vibrant land market in Chinese cities. PMID:25506125

  7. 9 CFR 11.20 - Responsibilities and liabilities of management.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... liabilities of management. (a) The management of any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction..., horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. Horses entered for sale or auction at a horse sale or... the sale or auction and prohibited from entering the sale or auction ring. Sore horses or horses...

  8. 9 CFR 11.20 - Responsibilities and liabilities of management.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... liabilities of management. (a) The management of any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction..., horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. Horses entered for sale or auction at a horse sale or... the sale or auction and prohibited from entering the sale or auction ring. Sore horses or horses...

  9. 75 FR 61752 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 29, 2011; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-06

    ... Construction Permits Scheduled for March 29, 2011; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction... auction of certain FM construction permits scheduled to commence on March 29, 2011 (Auction 91). This... Telecommunications and the Media Bureaus (the Bureaus) announce an auction of certain FM Broadcast construction...

  10. 76 FR 60830 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-09-30

    ... Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Comment Sought on Competitive Bidding Procedures for Auction... auction of certain FM broadcast construction permits scheduled to commence on March 27, 2012. This... construction permits and seek comment on the procedures to be used for this auction. This auction is scheduled...

  11. 32 CFR 644.541 - Award of contract.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... auctioneers, are in a position to give other advice and assistance, and may authorize auction sales on behalf... auctioneers. Consideration should be given to auction sales when there is likely to be considerable interest...

  12. 78 FR 65982 - Auction of H Block Licenses in the 1915-1920 MHz and 1995-2000 MHz Bands Rescheduled for January...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-04

    ...This document announces the procedures, reserve price, and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of H Block licenses (Auction 96) and provides the revised schedule for Auction 96. This document is intended to familiarize prospective applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the auction.

  13. 75 FR 8703 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for May 25, 2010; Notice and Filing...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-25

    ...: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: For legal questions: Scott...://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/87/ . Due to the large number of licenses in Auction 87, the complete list of... ``Attachment A'' files at http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/87/ . A paper copy of the complete list of licenses...

  14. Smarter than others? Conjectures in lowest unique bid auctions.

    PubMed

    Zhou, Cancan; Dong, Hongguang; Hu, Rui; Chen, Qinghua

    2015-01-01

    Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), has also attracted significant attention. Various models have been proposed, but they often fail to explain satisfactorily the real bid-distribution characteristics. This paper discusses LUBA bid-distribution characteristics, including the inverted-J shape and the exponential decrease in the upper region. The authors note that this type of distribution, which initially increases and later decreases, cannot be derived from the symmetric Nash equilibrium framework based on perfect information that has previously been used. A novel optimization model based on non-perfect information is presented. The kernel of this model is the premise that agents make decisions to achieve maximum profit based on imaginary information or assumptions regarding the behavior of others.

  15. 77 FR 57085 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction; Release of Files with Recalculated Road Miles for Auction 901...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-17

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-1446] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction... Mobility Fund Phase I support to be offered in Auction 901, which is to be held on September 27, 2012, and the change of the mock auction date from September 25, 2012 to September 21, 2012. DATES: The mock...

  16. The Use of Reverse Auction Within the U.S. Army

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2016-12-01

    by conducting a literature review on auction theory and the economic principles surrounding open markets and competition. Books, magazine articles...economic principles within auction theory examine buyer and seller motivation. B. AUCTION THEORY Auction theory explains how market participants...that leverage the power of fluid market conditions through a dynamic pricing environment. This project examines the use of RAs within the Army

  17. 78 FR 68839 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for February 25, 2014; Notice of Changes to...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-15

    ...) announce the rescheduling of Auction 902 and revise the dates and deadlines for the filing window for short...-auction deadlines for Auction 902. 2. The Auction 902 short-form application filing window opened at 12... short-form application (FCC Form 180) filing window will reopen on November 18, 2013, at 12:00 noon ET...

  18. Auction-based bandwidth allocation in the Internet

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wei, Jiaolong; Zhang, Chi

    2002-07-01

    It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this paper, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called uniform-price auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and it's incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.

  19. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES MISCELLANEOUS WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service § 27.1213 Designated entity provisions for BRS in...

  20. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES MISCELLANEOUS WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service § 27.1213 Designated entity provisions for BRS in...

  1. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES MISCELLANEOUS WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service § 27.1213 Designated entity provisions for BRS in...

  2. 47 CFR 27.1213 - Designated entity provisions for BRS in Commission auctions commencing prior to January 1, 2004.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES MISCELLANEOUS WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Broadband Radio Service and Educational Broadband Service § 27.1213 Designated entity provisions for BRS in...

  3. Former Auctioneer Finds Voice After Aphasia

    MedlinePlus

    ... And, people in trials also benefit from the social interaction. They become part of our group and we try to create an enjoyable, welcoming, and supportive environment." Now, five years ... social situations and continue normal activities. Limit your conversation ...

  4. Evaluating the impacts of farmers' behaviors on a hypothetical agricultural water market based on double auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Du, Erhu; Cai, Ximing; Brozović, Nicholas; Minsker, Barbara

    2017-05-01

    Agricultural water markets are considered effective instruments to mitigate the impacts of water scarcity and to increase crop production. However, previous studies have limited understanding of how farmers' behaviors affect the performance of water markets. This study develops an agent-based model to explicitly incorporate farmers' behaviors, namely irrigation behavior (represented by farmers' sensitivity to soil water deficit λ) and bidding behavior (represented by farmers' rent seeking μ and learning rate β), in a hypothetical water market based on a double auction. The model is applied to the Guadalupe River Basin in Texas to simulate a hypothetical agricultural water market under various hydrological conditions. It is found that the joint impacts of the behavioral parameters on the water market are strong and complex. In particular, among the three behavioral parameters, λ affects the water market potential and its impacts on the performance of the water market are significant under most scenarios. The impacts of μ or β on the performance of the water market depend on the other two parameters. The water market could significantly increase crop production only when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) λ is small and (2) μ is small and/or β is large. The first condition requires efficient irrigation scheduling, and the second requires well-developed water market institutions that provide incentives to bid true valuation of water permits.

  5. Essays on wholesale auctions in deregulated electricity markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Baltaduonis, Rimvydas

    2007-12-01

    The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including price spikes, inefficiency, security, and the overall relationship of market clearing prices to generation costs. Unsatisfactory outcomes in these markets are thought to have resulted in part from strategic generator behaviors encouraged by inappropriate market design features. In this dissertation, I examine the performance of three auction mechanisms for wholesale power markets - Offer Cost Minimization auction, Payment Cost Minimization auction and Simple-Offer auction - when electricity suppliers act strategically. A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the traditional Offer Cost Minimization auction with the intention to solve the problem of inflated wholesale electricity prices. Efficiency concerns for this proposal were voiced due to insights predicated on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using a game theoretic approach and an experimental method, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices that they are willing to sell at, but also the start-up fees, which are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that the complex structure of the offers leaves considerable room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti-competitive and inefficient market outcomes. In the last chapter of my dissertation, I use laboratory experiments to contrast the performance of two complex-offer auctions against the performance of a simple-offer auction, in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs - fixed and variable - through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that a simple-offer auction significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the complex-offer auctions and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

  6. Auctions for coastal energy resources

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Griffin, Robert M.

    It is becoming increasingly common to allocate public resources to the private sector for the purpose of developing these resources. One of the earliest uses of auctions in the U.S. for allocating rights to public resources was in the offshore oil and gas industry. The U.S. Federal government, through the Department of Interior (DOI), has used auctions to allocate development rights to offshore oil and gas resources to the private sector since the 1950's. Since then many things have changed. Oil and gas markets have gone through boom and bust cycles, giant technological advances in extraction and assessment have taken place, and alternative energy based in the coastal zone is now in demand in markets as well. There has been an enormous amount of research into the drivers of bidder behavior in auctions and optimal auction design in the last 60 years as well. Throughout all of this, the DOI has continued to use basically the same exact auction design to allocate oil and gas leases. The U.S. offshore oil and gas resources sold by the Department of Interior have accounted for more than $65 billion in revenue since the program started. These offshore resources are an important source of government revenue and national wealth. Additionally, the expansion of the energy sector offshore has enormous potential for electricity generation in the U.S., estimated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory as approaching 54 gigawatts by 2030 (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). Taken together, the DOI controls access to a large part of the future of energy in the U.S. The research herein assesses the auction formats used to allocate both fossil fuels and renewable resources on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The first manuscript looks at the current method used by the DOI to allocate oil and gas leases on the OCS, and is primarily interested in how bidders behave in this environment. Using latent class estimation techniques to separate distinct bidding behavior in a laboratory simulation of current U.S. policy, it compares lab results to field data and identifies efficiency and revenue losses stemming from the endogenous entry aspect of current policy. The second manuscript identifies an alternative auction method for allocating these development rights and develops a bidding model based on that of Milgrom (2000) for private value auctions. When tested against laboratory data, the model is favorably predictive of outcomes, but the path of bidding significantly deviates from predictions due to jump bidding and bidder impatience. The final manuscript provides a qualitative assessment of alternative auction arrangements for allocating access to wind energy on the OCS. In consideration of the relative state of the wind energy and oil and gas industries, the DOI may want to employ an allocation policy that better fits the current status of the wind energy industry. Considering the federal mandates regarding allocation that the DOI is required to follow, several allocation methods are identified for the short and medium term that meet federal mandates and promote the growth of the industry.

  7. Rationality, irrationality and escalating behavior in lowest unique bid auctions.

    PubMed

    Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A N

    2012-01-01

    Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions--lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of "bid space". The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets.

  8. Rationality, Irrationality and Escalating Behavior in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

    PubMed Central

    Radicchi, Filippo; Baronchelli, Andrea; Amaral, Luís A. N.

    2012-01-01

    Information technology has revolutionized the traditional structure of markets. The removal of geographical and time constraints has fostered the growth of online auction markets, which now include millions of economic agents worldwide and annual transaction volumes in the billions of dollars. Here, we analyze bid histories of a little studied type of online auctions – lowest unique bid auctions. Similarly to what has been reported for foraging animals searching for scarce food, we find that agents adopt Lévy flight search strategies in their exploration of “bid space”. The Lévy regime, which is characterized by a power-law decaying probability distribution of step lengths, holds over nearly three orders of magnitude. We develop a quantitative model for lowest unique bid online auctions that reveals that agents use nearly optimal bidding strategies. However, agents participating in these auctions do not optimize their financial gain. Indeed, as long as there are many auction participants, a rational profit optimizing agent would choose not to participate in these auction markets. PMID:22279553

  9. Robust Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yokoo, Makoto; Sakurai, Yuko; Matsubara, Shigeo

    This paper presents a new multi-unit auction protocol (IR protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for executing auctions, the possibility of a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been pointed out. A false-name bid is a bid submitted under a fictitious name. A protocol called LDS has been developed for combinatorial auctions of multiple different items and has proven to be robust against false-name bids. Although we can modify the LDS protocol to handle multi-unit auctions, in which multiple units of an identical item are auctioned, the protocol is complicated and requires the auctioneer to carefully pre-determine the combination of bundles to obtain a high social surplus or revenue. For the auctioneer, our newly developed IR protocol is easier to use than the LDS, since the combination of bundles is automatically determined in a flexible manner according to the declared evaluation values of agents. The evaluation results show that the IR protocol can obtain a better social surplus than that obtained by the LDS protocol.

  10. Exploring Online Auction Behaviors and Motivations

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Jeon, Sua; Crutsinger, Christy; Kim, Haejung

    2008-01-01

    The availability and convenience of the Internet, combined with the variety of products available at any given time, have contributed to the success of online auctions.This exploratory study examined online auction behaviors among college students in an attempt to identify underlying dimensions of auction motivations. Questionnaires completed by…

  11. Green auctions and reduction of information rents in payments for environmental services: an experimental investigation in Sunan County, northwestern China.

    PubMed

    Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

    2015-01-01

    Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the "Grain for Green" Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. "Perfect information" in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions.

  12. Green Auctions and Reduction of Information Rents in Payments for Environmental Services: An Experimental Investigation in Sunan County, Northwestern China

    PubMed Central

    Deng, Xiaohong; Xu, Zhongmin

    2015-01-01

    Reducing information rents is an important task for government agencies wishing to purchase maximal environmental services with limited budgets. This paper reports on several green auction options for reducing information rents and improving the performance of the “Grain for Green” Payments for environmental services (PES) program implemented in northwestern China. In r experimental auctions and investigations, door-to-door interviews were conducted and bidding envelopes and survey questionnaires were used to determine the offers and the foregone profits of the participants. Three scenarios are analyzed in this paper: a uniform price auction, a discriminatory price auction, and an opportunity-cost system. The results show that compared to the uniform price auction system, the other auction systems can increase the cost-effectiveness of conservation contracting. Competitive bidding can reveal true opportunity costs and can reduce information rents extracted from the government by farmers using private information. The demographics and average bids of these auction types were also analyzed. “Perfect information” in the opportunity-cost offer system has the best performance but is very hard to implement in reality. The results of this research show that the auction is a valuable tool for purchasing conservation contracts in northwestern China, but that in the future, the performance of these auctions should be studied with relaxed model assumptions. PMID:25793263

  13. Internet Auction Sellers: Does Size Really Matter?

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Halstead, Diane; Becherer, Richard C.

    2003-01-01

    Examines the Internet auction phenomenon as it relates to the marketing mix of online auction sellers. The data indicate that, while there is great diversity among businesses that utilize online auctions, distinct cost leadership and differentiation marketing strategies are both evident. These two approaches are further distinguished in terms of…

  14. 76 FR 81932 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits; Revised Construction Permit Number in Auction 93

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-29

    ... Construction Permits; Revised Construction Permit Number in Auction 93 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: This document announces a change to the construction permit number for one of the FM broadcast construction permits for Auction 93. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Linda...

  15. Competencies Needed by Livestock Sale Barn Employees.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Reidel, Wallace Franklin, Jr.

    To determine the competencies needed by managers, assistant managers, and auctioneers in the livestock auction sale business and to determine the implications for educational programs, a questionnaire of 20 competencies compiled from a survey of livestock auction businesses was sent to every livestock auction sale barn listed with the Iowa…

  16. Auctioneering Training Certificate Program 93-1001. Final Report.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Clark, Charles H.

    A project was conducted to prepare a catalog of duties and tasks, performance objectives and guides, and instructional materials that would enable schools to develop instructional programs designed to prepare persons to enter the career of auctioneering. An occupational survey of auctioneers was conducted; a writing team of auctioneers prepared…

  17. Auction-based Security Game for Multiuser Cooperative Networks

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, An; Cai, Yueming; Yang, Wendong; Cheng, Yunpeng

    2013-04-01

    In this paper, we develop an auction-based algorithm to allocate the relay power efficiently to improve the system secrecy rate in a cooperative network, where several source-destination pairs and one cooperative relay are involved. On the one hand, the cooperative relay assists these pairs to transmit under a peak power constraint. On the other hand, the relay is untrusty and is also a passive eavesdropper. The whole auction process is completely distributed and no instantaneous channel state information exchange is needed. We also prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) for the proposed power auction game. Moreover, the Pareto optimality is also validated. Simulation results show that our proposed auction-based algorithm can effectively improve the system secrecy rate. Besides, the proposed auction-based algorithm can converge to the unique NE point within a finite number of iterations. More interestingly, we also find that the proposed power auction mechanism is cheat-proof.

  18. 78 FR 24404 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Band Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Notice of Filing...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-04-25

    ...This document announces the procedures and minimum opening bids for the upcoming auction of licenses in the lower and upper paging bands (Auction 95). This document is intended to familiarize prospective applicants with the procedures and other requirements for participation in the auction.

  19. 75 FR 31820 - Notice of Applications for Deregistration Under Section 8(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-06-04

    .... Each applicant also distributed preferred shares of Dutch Auction Rate Transferable Securities (``DARTS'') of the acquiring fund to holders of applicants' Auction Rate Preferred Shares, DARTS, or Auction... distributed Dutch Auction Rate Transferable Securities (``DARTS'') of the acquiring fund to the holders of...

  20. 29 CFR 780.619 - Work “in connection with” livestock auction operations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Work âin connection withâ livestock auction operations. 780... FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption § 780.619 Work “in connection with” livestock auction...

  1. 75 FR 74719 - Auction of VHF Commercial Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-01

    ... Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011; Notice and Filing Requirements... upcoming auction of certain VHF commercial TV construction permits (Auction 90). This document is intended... December 15, 2010. Bidding for construction permits in Auction 90 is scheduled to begin on February 15...

  2. 75 FR 8070 - Closed Auction of Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for July 20, 2010; Auction 88...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-23

    ... Construction Permits Scheduled for July 20, 2010; Auction 88 Applicants Must Provide Supplemental Information..., AM, and FM Translator construction permits scheduled to commence on July 20, 2010 (Auction 88). This.... Any envelopes must be disposed of before entering the building. Commercial overnight mail (other than...

  3. 77 FR 38803 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated Data For Auction 901

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-29

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-990] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated Data For Auction 901 AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: In this... blocks. The map is a visual representation of data from the Attachment A files, which contain more...

  4. 78 FR 28265 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing and...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-05-14

    ... (2) a non-price specific commitment to auto-match all Auction responses received during the Auction... enhance competition in the Auctions and provide customers with additional opportunities for price... Auction processing, and specify (i) a single price at which it seeks to cross the Agency Order (with...

  5. Competition strength influences individual preferences in an auction game

    PubMed Central

    Toelch, Ulf; Jubera-Garcia, Esperanza; Kurth-Nelson, Zeb; Dolan, Raymond J.

    2014-01-01

    Competitive interactions between individuals are ubiquitous in human societies. Auctions represent an institutionalized context for these interactions, a context where individuals frequently make non-optimal decisions. In particular, competition in auctions can lead to overbidding, resulting in the so-called winner’s curse, often explained by invoking emotional arousal. In this study, we investigated an alternative possibility, namely that competitors’ bids are construed as a source of information about the good’s common value thereby influencing an individuals’ private value estimate. We tested this hypothesis by asking participants to bid in a repeated all-pay auction game for five different real items. Crucially, participants had to rank the auction items for their preference before and after the experiment. We observed a clear relation between auction dynamics and preference change. We found that low competition reduced preference while high competition increased preference. Our findings support a view that competitors’ bids in auction games are perceived as valid social signal for the common value of an item. We suggest that this influence of social information constitutes a major cause for the frequently observed deviations from optimality in auctions. PMID:25168161

  6. Health Auctions: a Valuation Experiment (HAVE) study protocol.

    PubMed

    Kularatna, Sanjeewa; Petrie, Dennis; Scuffham, Paul A; Byrnes, Joshua

    2016-04-07

    Quality-adjusted life years are derived using health state utility weights which adjust for the relative value of living in each health state compared with living in perfect health. Various techniques are used to estimate health state utility weights including time-trade-off and standard gamble. These methods have exhibited limitations in terms of complexity, validity and reliability. A new composite approach using experimental auctions to value health states is introduced in this protocol. A pilot study will test the feasibility and validity of using experimental auctions to value health states in monetary terms. A convenient sample (n=150) from a population of university staff and students will be invited to participate in 30 auction sets with a group of 5 people in each set. The 9 health states auctioned in each auction set will come from the commonly used EQ-5D-3L instrument. At most participants purchase 2 health states, and the participant who acquires the 2 'best' health states on average will keep the amount of money they do not spend in acquiring those health states. The value (highest bid and average bid) of each of the 24 health states will be compared across auctions to test for reliability across auction groups and across auctioneers. A test retest will be conducted for 10% of the sample to assess reliability of responses for health states auctions. Feasibility of conducting experimental auctions to value health states will also be examined. The validity of estimated health states values will be compared with published utility estimates from other methods. This pilot study will explore the feasibility, reliability and validity in using experimental auction for valuing health states. Ethical clearance was obtained from Griffith University ethics committee. The results will be disseminated in peer-reviewed journals and major international conferences. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/

  7. 78 FR 61350 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction (Auction 902); Short-Form Application Filing Window...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-10-03

    ... Fund Phase I Auction (Auction 902); Short-Form Application Filing Window Rescheduled To Open on... rescheduling of the filing window for short-form applications and release an updated list of eligible areas for... Application Filing Window Rescheduled To Open on September 30, 2013 1. The Bureaus announce that the filing...

  8. 75 FR 32773 - Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses Scheduled for December 7...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-06-09

    ... licenses included in Auction 89 using the Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round auction format... sequential bidding rounds. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be released.... For Auction 89, the Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous stopping rule approach. A simultaneous...

  9. Auctions vs negotiations: a study of price differentials.

    PubMed

    Kjerstad, Egil

    2005-12-01

    Recent contributions in auction and bargaining theory suggest that a procurer should place more faith in the power of competition among alternative suppliers than in his or her own negotiating skill. Based on data from 216 contracts between procurers and suppliers of medical and surgical articles, we test whether auctions and bargaining result in significantly different prices. The main results are that auctions give 'thicker' markets compared with negotiations, as expected, but that auctions do not result in significantly lower prices compared with negotiations. Copyright (c) 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  10. A Combinatorial Auction among Versatile Experts and Amateurs

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ito, Takayuki; Yokoo, Makoto; Matsubara, Shigeo

    Auctions have become an integral part of electronic commerce and a promising field for applying multi-agent technologies. Correctly judging the quality of auctioned goods is often difficult for amateurs, in particular, in Internet auctions. However, experts can correctly judge the quality of goods. In this situation, it is difficult to make experts tell the truth and attain an efficient allocation, since experts have a clear advantage over amateurs and they would not reveal their valuable information without some reward. In our previous work, we have succeeded in developing such auction protocols under the following two cases: (1) the case of a single-unit auction among experts and amateurs, and (2) the case of a combinatorial auction among single-skilled experts and amateurs. In this paper, we focus on versatile experts. Versatile experts have an interest in, and expert knowledge on the qualities of several goods. In the case of versatile experts, there would be several problems, e.g., free riding problems, if we simply extended the previous VCG-style auction protocol. Thus, in this paper, we employ PORF (price-oriented, rationing-free) protocol for designing our new protocol to realize a strategy-proof auction protocol for experts. In the protocol, the dominant strategy for experts is truth-telling. Also, for amateurs, truth-telling is the best response when two or more experts select the dominant strategy. Furthermore, the protocol is false-name-proof.

  11. Using Laboratory Experiments for Policymaking: An Example from the Georgia Irrigation Reduction Auction

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Cummings, Ronald G.; Holt, Charles A.; Laury, Susan K.

    2004-01-01

    In recent years, interest has been growing in policy applications of different auction systems. This paper reports a series of experiments that were used to design and implement an auction in a unique policymaking environment. In April 2000, the Georgia legislature passed a law that mandated that the state hold an auction in drought years to pay…

  12. 29 CFR 780.620 - Minimum wage for livestock auction work.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... minimum rate required by section 6(a)(1) of the Act for the time spent in livestock auction work. The exemption does not apply unless there is payment for all hours spent in livestock auction work at not less... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Minimum wage for livestock auction work. 780.620 Section...

  13. 29 CFR 516.13 - Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay....13 Livestock auction employees exempt from overtime pay requirements under section 13(b)(13) of the... employee is employed both in agriculture and in connection with livestock auction operations: (a) The total...

  14. Auction Mechanism to Allocate Air Traffic Control Slots

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Raffarin, Marianne

    2003-01-01

    This article deals with an auction mechanism for airspace slots, as a means of solving the European airspace congestion problem. A disequilibrium, between Air Traffic Control (ATC) services supply and ATC services demand are at the origin of almost one fourth of delays in the air transport industry in Europe. In order to tackle this congestion problem, we suggest modifying both pricing and allocation of ATC services, by setting up an auction mechanism. Objects of the auction will be the right for airlines to cross a part of the airspace, and then to benefit from ATC services over a period corresponding to the necessary time for the crossing. Allocation and payment rules have to be defined according to the objectives of this auction. The auctioneer is the public authority in charge of ATC services, whose aim is to obtain an efficient allocation. Therefore, the social value will be maximized. Another objective is to internalize congestion costs. To that end, we apply the principle of Clarke-Groves mechanism auction: each winner has to pay the externalities imposed on other bidders. The complex context of ATC leads to a specific design for this auction.

  15. Sequential Auctions in Uncertain Information Settings

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Fatima, Shaheen; Wooldridge, Michael; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncertainty of the bidders. Specifically, there are three key auction parameters that the bidders could be uncertain about: the valuations of the objects for sale, the number of objects for sale, and the number of participating bidders. We analyse the bidding behaviour for each of these three sources of uncertainty. For each setting, we first find the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that comprise a series. Then we analyze the effect of these uncertainties on the computational and economic properties of the equilibrium solution. The former analysis is essential if we want to use software agents to bid on our behalf. The latter is essential because both the auctioneer and the bidders want to know how these uncertainties affect their profits. Thus we compare the outcomes for these settings from the perspective of the bidders (i.e., in terms of their profits), from the perspective of the auctioneer (i.e., in terms of his revenue), and from a global perspective (i.e., in terms of auction efficiency).

  16. Market power in auction and efficiency in emission permits allocation.

    PubMed

    Jiang, Min Xing; Yang, Dong Xiao; Chen, Zi Yue; Nie, Pu Yan

    2016-12-01

    This paper analyzes how to achieve the cost-effectiveness by initial allocation of CO 2 emission permits when a single dominant firm in production market has market power in auction, and compare two prevalent allocation patterns, mixed allocation and single auction. We show how the firm with market power may manipulate the auction price, thereby this leads to fail to achieve cost-effective solution by auction unless the total permits for allocation equal to the effective emissions cap. Provided that the market power firm receives strictly positive free permits, the effective emissions cap of mixed allocation is larger than that of single auction. The production market share of dominant firm is increasing with the free permits it holds. Finally, we examine the compliance costs and welfare of mixed allocation and single auction, the result show that the former is preferred to the later when policy makers consider economic welfare without welfare cost due to CO 2 emissions. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  17. Cooperation based dynamic team formation in multi-agent auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pippin, Charles E.; Christensen, Henrik

    2012-06-01

    Auction based methods are often used to perform distributed task allocation on multi-agent teams. Many existing approaches to auctions assume fully cooperative team members. On in-situ and dynamically formed teams, reciprocal collaboration may not always be a valid assumption. This paper presents an approach for dynamically selecting auction partners based on observed team member performance and shared reputation. In addition, we present the use of a shared reputation authority mechanism. Finally, experiments are performed in simulation on multiple UAV platforms to highlight situations in which it is better to enforce cooperation in auctions using this approach.

  18. 75 FR 67060 - Universal Service Reform Mobility Fund

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-11-01

    ... CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum Access Division: Scott Mackoul at (202... the first cellular telephone licenses, the wireless industry has continually expanded and upgraded its networks to the point where third generation (called advanced or 3G) mobile wireless services are now...

  19. Poisson-process generalization for the trading waiting-time distribution in a double-auction mechanism

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cincotti, Silvano; Ponta, Linda; Raberto, Marco; Scalas, Enrico

    2005-05-01

    In this paper, empirical analyses and computational experiments are presented on high-frequency data for a double-auction (book) market. Main objective of the paper is to generalize the order waiting time process in order to properly model such empirical evidences. The empirical study is performed on the best bid and best ask data of 7 U.S. financial markets, for 30-stock time series. In particular, statistical properties of trading waiting times have been analyzed and quality of fits is evaluated by suitable statistical tests, i.e., comparing empirical distributions with theoretical models. Starting from the statistical studies on real data, attention has been focused on the reproducibility of such results in an artificial market. The computational experiments have been performed within the Genoa Artificial Stock Market. In the market model, heterogeneous agents trade one risky asset in exchange for cash. Agents have zero intelligence and issue random limit or market orders depending on their budget constraints. The price is cleared by means of a limit order book. The order generation is modelled with a renewal process. Based on empirical trading estimation, the distribution of waiting times between two consecutive orders is modelled by a mixture of exponential processes. Results show that the empirical waiting-time distribution can be considered as a generalization of a Poisson process. Moreover, the renewal process can approximate real data and implementation on the artificial stocks market can reproduce the trading activity in a realistic way.

  20. Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-03-24

    SPONSORED REPORT SERIES Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions 24 March 2015 Justin Blott, 2d Lt; Nicholas...TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2015 to 00-00-2015 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Auction and Game Theory Based Recommendations for DOD Acquisitions 5a...Postgraduate School Abstract This paper synthesizes auction and game theory literature into specific military acquisition improvement

  1. 40 CFR 74.41 - Identifying allowances.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... for auction. (1) An authorized account representative may offer for sale in the spot auction under... compliance use date earlier than the year in which the spot auction is to be held and if the Administrator...

  2. Combining auctions and performance-based payments in a forest enrichment field trial in Western Kenya.

    PubMed

    Khalumba, Mercelyne; Wünscher, Tobias; Wunder, Sven; Büdenbender, Mirjam; Holm-Müller, Karin

    2014-06-01

    Cost-effectiveness is an important aspect in the assessment of payments for environmental services (PES) initiatives. In participatory field trials with communities in Western Kenya, we combined procurement auctions for forest enrichment contracts with performance-based payments and compared the outcomes with a baseline scenario currently used by the Kenyan Forest Service. Procurement auctions were the most cost-effective. The competitive nature of the auction reduced contracting expenses (provision costs), and the result-oriented payments provided additional incentives to care for the planted seedlings, resulting in their improved survival rates (service quantity). These gains clearly exceeded increases in transaction costs associated with conducting an auction. The number of income-poor auction participants and winners was disproportionately high and local institutional buy-in was remarkably strong. Our participatory approach may, however, require adaptations when conducted at a larger scale. Although the number of contracts we monitored was limited and prohibited the use of statistical tests, our study is one of the first to reveal the benefits of using auctions for PES in developing countries. © 2014 Society for Conservation Biology.

  3. 47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan, anyone making a contribution to...

  4. 47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan, anyone making a contribution to...

  5. 47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... from paying statutory charges under subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan...

  6. 47 CFR 1.8003 - Providing the FRN in Commission filings.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... from paying statutory charges under subpart G of this part, anyone participating in a spectrum auction, making up-front payments or deposits in a spectrum auction, anyone making a payment on an auction loan...

  7. Pricing strategies, the strength of bidding intentions, and online auction performance: a cross-cultural study.

    PubMed

    Peng, Yu-Shu; Jan, Lih-Tsyr

    2009-10-01

    Over the past decade, electronic markets based on the Internet, particularly online auctions, have become popular venues for conducting business. Previous studies often focused on the construction of the best bidding model, while few studies have tried to integrate multiple pricing strategies to predict the probability of closing an auction and the price premium. This study constructs a mediated model to examine the relationship among pricing strategies, the strength of bidding intentions, and online auction performance. The sample consists of 1,055 auctions of iPod MP3 players from eBay Web sites in Hong Kong, Singapore, Belgium, and France. Empirical results show that the pricing strategies directly influence both the probability of closing an auction and the level of price premium. The pricing strategies also indirectly influence the price premium through the mediating effect of the strength of bidding intentions.

  8. Approximating the Qualitative Vickrey Auction by a Negotiation Protocol

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Hindriks, Koen V.; Tykhonov, Dmytro; de Weerdt, Mathijs

    A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose this constraint but still approximate the outcome of the auction. In this paper we show that a multi-round multi-party negotiation protocol may be used to this end if the negotiating agents are capable of learning opponent preferences. The latter condition can be met by current state of the art negotiation technology. We show that this protocol approximates the theoretical outcome predicted by a so-called Qualitative Vickrey auction mechanism (even) on a complex multi-issue domain.

  9. 47 CFR 24.716 - Installment payments for licenses for frequency Block F.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Block F. 24.716 Section 24.716 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON....716 Installment payments for licenses for frequency Block F. Installment Payments. Each eligible licensee of frequency Block F may pay the remaining 80 percent of the net auction price for the license in...

  10. 47 CFR 24.711 - Installment payments for licenses for frequency Block C.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Block C. 24.711 Section 24.711 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON....711 Installment payments for licenses for frequency Block C. Installment payments. Each eligible licensee of frequency Block C may pay the remaining 90 percent of the net auction price for the license in...

  11. 47 CFR 24.717 - Bidding credits for licenses for frequency Block F.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Block F. 24.717 Section 24.717 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Competitive Bidding Procedures for Broadband PCS § 24... closed bidding in auctions that begin after March 23, 1999, a winning bidder that qualifies as a small...

  12. 47 CFR 24.712 - Bidding credits for licenses won for frequency Block C.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... Block C. 24.712 Section 24.712 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (CONTINUED) COMMON CARRIER SERVICES PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES Competitive Bidding Procedures for Broadband PCS § 24... closed bidding in auctions that begin after March 23, 1999, a winning bidder that qualifies as a small...

  13. 47 CFR 1.2206 - Confidentiality of Commission-held data.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1... reassignments and reallocations under section 6403(b)(1)(B) of the Spectrum Act become effective or until two...)(1)(B) of the Spectrum Act become effective, the Commission will continue to take all reasonable...

  14. Design and Promotion Strategy of Marketing Platform of Aquatic Auction based on Internet

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Peng, Jianliang

    For the online trade and promotion of aquatic products and related materials through the network between supply and demand, the design content and effective promotional strategies of aquatic auctions online marketing platform is proposed in this paper. Design elements involve the location of customer service, the basic function of the platform including the purchase of general orders, online auctions, information dissemination, and recommendation of fine products, human services, and payment preferences. Based on network and mobile e-commerce transaction support, the auction platform makes the transaction of aquatic products well in advance. The results are important practical value for the design and application of online marketing platform of aquatic auction.

  15. Auction fever: exploring informational social influences on bidder choices.

    PubMed

    Chen, Yi-Fen

    2011-01-01

    Previous investigations of herd behavior have identified the importance of informational social influences in consumer decision making. This research presents three studies examining herd behavior in online auctions. The three studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including bid number, feedback ratings, and number of questions and answers. This research also investigated the effect of different levels of herd cues on bidder online choices under high and low brand awareness in online auctions. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, different levels of herd cues influence bidder online choices in both high and low brand awareness product situations.

  16. Auctions in Defense Acquisition: Theory and Experimental Evidence

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2002-01-01

    Department of Defense (DoD) has recently begun purchasing with online auctions — receiving offers from suppli- ers for things ranging from computers to...equipment for U.S. Navy vessels. The Navy was the first to try online auctions for procuring airplane and ship parts. The Army’s first venture into...system. The Air Force first tested the online auction waters in Au- gust 2000 to acquire computer equipment and saved about $88,000, or 27 percent of

  17. Sequential Auctions with Partially Substitutable Goods

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Vetsikas, Ioannis A.; Jennings, Nicholas R.

    In this paper, we examine a setting in which a number of partially substitutable goods are sold in sequential single unit auctions. Each bidder needs to buy exactly one of these goods. In previous work, this setting has been simplified by assuming that bidders do not know their valuations for all items a priori, but rather are informed of their true valuation for each item right before the corresponding auction takes place. This assumption simplifies the strategies of bidders, as the expected revenue from future auctions is the same for all bidders due to the complete lack of private information. In our analysis we don't make this assumption. This complicates the computation of the equilibrium strategies significantly. We examine this setting both for first and second-price auction variants, initially when the closing prices are not announced, for which we prove that sequential first and second-price auctions are revenue equivalent. Then we assume that the prices are announced; because of the asymmetry in the announced prices between the two auction variants, revenue equivalence does not hold in this case. We finish the paper, by giving some initial results about the case when free disposal is allowed, and therefore a bidder can purchase more than one item.

  18. 47 CFR 1.2208 - Public notice of auction completion and auction results.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... PROCEDURE Grants by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse... broadcast television spectrum incentive auction conducted under section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, public... indicate that the reassignments of television channels and reallocations of broadcast television spectrum...

  19. Using a Second-Price Auction to set Military Retention Bonus Levels: An Application to the Australian Army

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-03-01

    and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT...auction is used to set salaries levels in a generic labor market scenario. The experimental results support the literature: a second-price auction...analyses an experiment where a sealed-bid, second-price auction is used to set salaries levels in a generic labor market scenario. The experimental

  20. 19 CFR 127.34 - Auctioneer's commissions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Auctioneer's commissions. 127.34 Section 127.34 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY GENERAL ORDER, UNCLAIMED, AND ABANDONED MERCHANDISE Proceeds of Sale § 127.34 Auctioneer's...

  1. A Trustworthy Internet Auction Model with Verifiable Fairness.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Liao, Gen-Yih; Hwang, Jing-Jang

    2001-01-01

    Describes an Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed. (Author/AEF)

  2. 7 CFR 29.36 - Auction market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction market. 29.36 Section 29.36 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.36 Auction market. A place to which tobacco is delivered by the...

  3. 31 CFR 356.25 - How does the settlement process work?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How does the settlement process work? 356.25 Section 356.25 Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued...) Determination of Auction Awards; Settlement § 356.25 How does the settlement process work? Securities bought in...

  4. 77 FR 9655 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-02-17

    ... Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION... Bureaus provide an updated list of potentially eligible census blocks for Auction 901 scheduled to... summary of the Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Updated List of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks Public...

  5. 75 FR 44296 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-07-28

    ... currently collected and made transparent by the MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and... MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs... auction procedures and interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VRDOs...

  6. 75 FR 52793 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Order Granting Approval of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-08-27

    ... the MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand Obligations (``VRDOs... information currently collected and made transparent by the MSRB on municipal Auction Rate Securities (``ARS... that define auction procedures and interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities...

  7. 47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

  8. 47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

  9. 47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

  10. 47 CFR 90.903 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... Bureau will establish and may vary the sequence in which 800 MHz SMR licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be auctioned. (b) Grouping. (1) All EA licenses for Spectrum Blocks A through V will be... the auction, an alternative method of grouping these licenses for auction. (2) Spectrum blocks D...

  11. 75 FR 56533 - Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Postpones Auction of 218-219 MHz Service and Phase II 220 MHz...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-16

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 10-107; DA 10-1630] Wireless Telecommunications... Auction 89. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Auctions and Spectrum... by the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau pursuant to authority delegated by 47 CFR 0.131...

  12. Auction-theoretic analyses of the first offshore wind energy auction in Germany

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kreiss, J.; Ehrhart, K.-M.; Hanke, A.-K.

    2017-11-01

    The first offshore wind energy auction in Germany led to a striking result. The average award price was 0.44 ct/kWh and even more interesting, 3 out of 4 awarded projects had a strike price of 0.0 ct/kWh. That implies that those projects will only receive the actual wholesale market price for electricity as revenue. Although there has been a strong decline in costs of offshore wind projects, such a result is still surprising. We analyzed this result auction-theoretically and showed how the auction design and the market environment can explain part of the outcome. However, another aspect of the explanation is the high risk that the awarded bidders take regarding the future development of both the project costs and the wholesale market price.

  13. Identification of shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects.

    PubMed

    Hatipkarasulu, Yilmaz; Gill, James H

    2004-04-01

    The increasing number of companies providing internet services and auction tools helped popularize the online reverse auction trend for purchasing commodities and services in the last decade. As a result, a number of owners, both public and private, accepted the online reverse auctions as the bidding technique for their construction projects. Owners, while trying to minimize their costs for construction projects, are also required to address their ethical responsibilities to the shareholders. In the case of online reverse auctions for construction projects, the ethical issues involved in the bidding technique directly reflects on the owner's ethical and social responsibilities to their shareholders. The goal of this paper is to identify the shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects by analyzing the ethical issues for the parties involved in the process. The identification of the ethical issues and responsibilities requires clear definition and understanding of professional ethics and the roles of the involved parties. In this paper, first, the concept of professional ethics and social responsibility is described in a general form. To illustrate the ethical issues and responsibilities, a sample case of bidding for a construction project using online reverse auction techniques is presented in which the shareholders were actively involved in questioning the ethical issues. The issues involved in the bidding process and their reflection on the shareholder responsibilities are described and analyzed for each stage of the process. A brief discussion of the overall process is also included to address the general ethical issues involved in online reverse auctions.

  14. 30 CFR 285.220 - What auction format may MMS use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 285.220 What auction format may MMS use... renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through the lease...

  15. 30 CFR 285.220 - What auction format may MMS use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 285... competitive auctions to award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as...

  16. 30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through...

  17. 30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through...

  18. 30 CFR 585.220 - What auction format may BOEM use in a lease sale?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY AND ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING FACILITIES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF Issuance of OCS Renewable Energy Leases Competitive Lease Award Process § 585.220 What auction format may... award renewable energy leases and will use one of the following auction formats, as determined through...

  19. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and...

  20. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and...

  1. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 9 Animals and Animal Products 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers. 2.76 Section 2.76 Animals and Animal Products ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and...

  2. Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Bajari, Patrick; Hortacsu, Ali

    2005-01-01

    Recently, economists have developed methods for structural estimation of auction models. Many researchers object to these methods because they find the strict rationality assumptions to be implausible. Using bid data from first-price auction experiments, we estimate four alternative structural models: (1) risk-neutral Bayes-Nash, (2) risk-averse…

  3. 77 FR 57171 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-17

    ... Change Relating to Complex Order Auctions September 11, 2012. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the... of the Proposed Rule Change The Exchange proposed to amend its Rules regarding complex order auctions... Exchange may activate the electronic complex order request for responses (``RFR'') auction (``COA''), which...

  4. Sold! The Elementary Classroom Auction as Learning Tool of Communication and Economics

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Boyd, Josh; Boyd, Gina

    2014-01-01

    An auction, though an economic tool, is essentially a performance dependent on communication (Smith, 1989). The auctioneer dictates the pace, asks for bids, and acknowledges responses; the enterprise is controlled by a voice (Boyce, 2001). Bidders must listen and respond strategically to the communication of the people around them. An auction…

  5. 76 FR 82336 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-30

    ... (2) a non-price specific commitment to auto- match all Auction responses achieved during the Auction... price responses, leading to more robust competition in AIM. \\16\\ See supra note 3; see also Securities... enhance competition in the AIM Auctions and provide customers with additional opportunities for price...

  6. Electronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating an E-Sourcing Tool into a Sales and Purchasing Cross-Course Negotiation Project

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Williams, Jacqueline A.; Dobie, Kathryn

    2011-01-01

    Electronic reverse auctions are increasingly being used by firms to improve firm financial and operational performance. The described teaching innovation serves as a model for introducing electronic reverse auctions as a central element in a comprehensive negotiation exercise involving sales management and purchasing management students. Results…

  7. Competitive Bidding in a Certain Class of Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Johansson, Mathias

    2006-11-01

    We consider the problem of determining the amount to bid in a certain type of auctions in which customers submit one sealed bid. The bid reflects the price a customer is willing to pay for one unit of the offered goods. The auction is repeated and at each auction each customer requests a certain amount of goods, an amount that we call the capacity of the customer and that varies among customers and over time. At each auction, only the customer with the largest bid-capacity product obtains any goods. The price paid by the winner equals his/her bid-capacity product, and the amount of goods obtained in return equals the winner's capacity. The auction is repeated many times, with only limited information concerning winning bid-capacity products being announced to the customers. This situation is motivated in for example wireless communication networks in which a possible way of obtaining a desired service level is to use dynamic pricing and competitive bidding. In this application, the capacity is typically uncertain when the bid is made. We derive bidding rules and loss functions for a few typical service requirements.

  8. Emerging behavior in electronic bidding.

    PubMed

    Yang, I; Jeong, H; Kahng, B; Barabási, A-L

    2003-07-01

    We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of agents on two major online auction sites. The measurements indicate that the total number of bids placed in a single category and the number of distinct auctions frequented by a given agent follow power-law distributions, implying that a few agents are responsible for a significant fraction of the total bidding activity on the online market. We find that these agents exert an unproportional influence on the final price of the auctioned items. This domination of online auctions by an unusually active minority may be a generic feature of all online mercantile processes.

  9. Emerging behavior in electronic bidding

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yang, I.; Jeong, H.; Kahng, B.; Barabási, A.-L.

    2003-07-01

    We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of agents on two major online auction sites. The measurements indicate that the total number of bids placed in a single category and the number of distinct auctions frequented by a given agent follow power-law distributions, implying that a few agents are responsible for a significant fraction of the total bidding activity on the online market. We find that these agents exert an unproportional influence on the final price of the auctioned items. This domination of online auctions by an unusually active minority may be a generic feature of all online mercantile processes.

  10. Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

    PubMed Central

    Jaber-López, Tarek; García-Gallego, Aurora; Perakakis, Pandelis; Georgantzis, Nikolaos

    2014-01-01

    We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially toward the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest. PMID:25566002

  11. Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption.

    PubMed

    Jaber-López, Tarek; García-Gallego, Aurora; Perakakis, Pandelis; Georgantzis, Nikolaos

    2014-01-01

    We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially toward the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

  12. 77 FR 22575 - The Auction Block Company, an Alaska Corporation v. the City of Homer, a Municipal Corporation...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-04-16

    ... FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION [Docket No. 12-03] The Auction Block Company, an Alaska Corporation v. the City of Homer, a Municipal Corporation and Its Port of Homer; Notice of Filing of Complaint and...) by The Auction Block Company, an Alaska Corporation, hereinafter ``Complainant,'' against the City of...

  13. 76 FR 33015 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-06-07

    ..., specifically a Complex Order Live Auction (``COLA'').\\5\\ The Exchange is not amending the Rebate for Adding... (collectively ``Other Auctions''). \\5\\ COLA is the automated Complex Order Live Auction process. A COLA may take place upon identification of the existence of a COLA- eligible order either: (1) Following a COOP, or (2...

  14. 76 FR 64413 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-10-18

    ... Customers in Section 1c is $0.07 per executed contract for all non-PIP transactions. The Exchange proposes to amend Section 1c to expand this applicable fee to all non-Auction Transactions and define the term ``Auction Transactions'' to include all transactions executed through PIP, the Solicitation Auction...

  15. Land Sales - Division of Mining, Land, and Water

    Science.gov Websites

    to Alaska Land Sales Public Notices Residential Land Auction #484 Agricultural Land Auction #485 Over for sale Agricultural Land Auction (#485)Open until June 7th This program allows anyone (resident or non-resident) to bid on a parcel of agricultural land. Agricultural land has covenants and conditions

  16. 78 FR 11179 - Auction of Lower and Upper Paging Bands Licenses Scheduled for July 16, 2013; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-02-15

    ... investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the... cooperate, collaborate, or communicate, including discussing bids, bidding strategies, or post-auction... schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study...

  17. Hipster Racism and Sexism in Charity Date Auctions: Individualism, Privilege Blindness and Irony in the Academy

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Current, Cheris Brewer; Tillotson, Emily

    2018-01-01

    This paper follows one small, Christian university's five-year experience with student charity date auctions. The contemporary re-emergence of date auctions represents a backlash against gender and racial progress. Student leaders believe that in a post-racial and post-sexist society, race and gender are decontextualised neutral elements of…

  18. Decentralized Planning for Autonomous Agents Cooperating in Complex Missions

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-09-01

    Consensus - based decentralized auctions for robust task allocation ," IEEE Transactions on Robotics...Robotics, vol. 24, pp. 209-222, 2006. [44] H.-L. Choi, L. Brunet, and J. P. How, " Consensus - based decentralized auctions for robust task allocation ...2003. 123 [31] L. Brunet, " Consensus - Based Auctions for Decentralized Task Assignment," Master’s thesis, Dept.

  19. 77 FR 65751 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-30

    ... Relating to the Complex Order Auction Process October 24, 2012. I. Introduction On August 30, 2012, the... Complex Order RFR Auction,'' to: (i) Include the side of the market in the request for response (``RFR'') message sent to Trading Permit Holders at the start of a Complex Order Auction (``COA''); and (ii) require...

  20. Understanding Overbidding: Using the Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions

    PubMed Central

    Delgado, Mauricio R.; Schotter, Andrew; Ozbay, Erkut Y.; Phelps, Elizabeth A.

    2011-01-01

    We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed that the social competition inherent in an auction results in a more pronounced blood oxygen level–dependent (BOLD) response to loss in the striatum, with greater overbidding correlated with the magnitude of this response. Leveraging these neuroimaging results, we design a behavioral experiment that demonstrates that framing an experimental auction to emphasize loss increases overbidding. These results highlight a role for the contemplation of loss in understanding the tendency to bid “too high.” Current economic theories suggest overbidding may result from either “joy of winning” or risk aversion. By combining neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques, we find that another factor, namely loss contemplation in a social context, may mediate overbidding in auctions. PMID:18818362

  1. Understanding overbidding: using the neural circuitry of reward to design economic auctions.

    PubMed

    Delgado, Mauricio R; Schotter, Andrew; Ozbay, Erkut Y; Phelps, Elizabeth A

    2008-09-26

    We take advantage of our knowledge of the neural circuitry of reward to investigate a puzzling economic phenomenon: Why do people overbid in auctions? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we observed that the social competition inherent in an auction results in a more pronounced blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response to loss in the striatum, with greater overbidding correlated with the magnitude of this response. Leveraging these neuroimaging results, we design a behavioral experiment that demonstrates that framing an experimental auction to emphasize loss increases overbidding. These results highlight a role for the contemplation of loss in understanding the tendency to bid "too high." Current economic theories suggest overbidding may result from either "joy of winning" or risk aversion. By combining neuroeconomic and behavioral economic techniques, we find that another factor, namely loss contemplation in a social context, may mediate overbidding in auctions.

  2. Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ghosh, Gagan Pratap

    In my dissertation, I investigate the effects of budget-constraints in multi-unit auctions. This is done in three parts. First, I analyze a case where all bidders have a common budget constraint. Precisely, I analyze an auction where two units of an object are sold at two simultaneous, sealed bid, first-price auctions, to bidders who have demand for both units. Bidders differ with respect to their valuations for the units. All bidders have an identical budget constraint which binds their ability to spend in the auction. I show that if valuation distribution is atom-less, then their does not exist any symmetric equilibrium in this auction game. In the second and third parts of my thesis, I analyze the sale of licenses for the right to drill for oil and natural gas in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) of the United States. These sales are conducted using simultaneous sealed-bid first-price auctions for multiple licenses, each representing a specific area (called a tract). Using aspects of observed bidding-behavior, I first make a prima facie case that bidders are budget-constrained in these auctions. In order to formalize this argument, I develop a simple extension of the standard model (where bidders differ in their valuations for the objects) by incorporating (random) budgets for the bidders. The auction-game then has a two-dimensional set of types for each player. I study the theoretical properties of this auction, assuming for simplicity that two units are being sold. I show that this game has an equilibrium in pure strategies that is symmetric with respect to the players and with respect to the units. The strategies are essentially pure in the sense that each bidder-type has a unique split (up to a permutation) of his budget between the two auctions. I then characterize the equilibrium in terms of the bid-distribution and iso-bid curves in the value-budget space. I derive various qualitative features of this equilibrium, among which are: (1) under mild assumptions, there always exist bidder-types who submit unequal bids in equilibrium, (2) the equilibrium is monotonic in the sense that bidders with higher valuations prefer more unequal splits of their budgets than bidders with lower valuations and the same budget-level. With a formal theory in place, I carry out a quantitative exercise, using data from the 1970 OCS auction. I show that the model is able to match many aspects of the data. (1) In the data, the number of tracts bidders submit bids on is positively correlated with budgets (an R2 of 0.84), even though this relationship is non-monotonic; my model is able to capture this non-monotonicity, while producing an R2 of 0.89 (2) In the data, the average number of bids per tract is 8.21; for the model, this number is 10.09. (3) Auction revenue in the data was 1.927 billion; the model produced a mean revenue of 1.944 billion.

  3. 75 FR 56494 - High-Cost Universal Service Support and Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-16

    ... Wireless Services. In 2008, the Commission conducted the auction of Advanced Wireless Services (``AWS'') licenses. This auction, which as designated as Auction 78, offered 35 licenses in the AWS 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (``AWS-1''). The AWS-1 licenses were licenses for which there were no winning bids...

  4. A Classroom Auction with Externalities: Applied to Mergers and Acquisitions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Meister, J. Patrick; Anderson, Kyle J.

    2007-01-01

    The authors describe an in-class exercise in which students participate in an auction to buy US Airways. The exercise is based on events of late 1995, in which neither United nor American Airlines decided to bid for US Airways. Two teams of students participate in an English auction. Students learn that the equilibrium of the sequential game is…

  5. Auctioning Airport Slots?

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Gruyer, Nicolas; Lenoir, Nathalie

    2003-01-01

    The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring effluent slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the Euopean commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary" utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

  6. Bandwidth auction for SVC streaming in dynamic multi-overlay

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Xiong, Yanting; Zou, Junni; Xiong, Hongkai

    2010-07-01

    In this paper, we study the optimal bandwidth allocation for scalable video coding (SVC) streaming in multiple overlays. We model the whole bandwidth request and distribution process as a set of decentralized auction games between the competing peers. For the upstream peer, a bandwidth allocation mechanism is introduced to maximize the aggregate revenue. For the downstream peer, a dynamic bidding strategy is proposed. It achieves maximum utility and efficient resource usage by collaborating with a content-aware layer dropping/adding strategy. Also, the convergence of the proposed auction games is theoretically proved. Experimental results show that the auction strategies can adapt to dynamic join of competing peers and video layers.

  7. Model of Auctioneer Estimation of Swordtip Squid (Loligo edulis) Quality

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nakamura, Makoto; Matsumoto, Keisuke; Morimoto, Eiji; Ezoe, Satoru; Maeda, Toshimichi; Hirano, Takayuki

    The knowledge of experienced auctioneers regarding the circulation of marine products is an essential skill and is necessary for evaluating product quality and managing aspects such as freshness. In the present study, the ability of an auctioneer to quickly evaluate the freshness of swordtip squid (Loligo edulis) at fish markets was analyzed. Evaluation characteristics used by an auctioneer were analyzed and developed using a fuzzy logic model. Forty boxes containing 247 swordtip squid with mantles measuring 220 mm that had been evaluated and assigned to one of five quality categories by an auctioneer were used for the analysis and the modeling. The relationships between the evaluations of appearance, body color, and muscle freshness were statistically analyzed. It was found that a total of four indexes of the epidermis color strongly reflected evaluations of appearance: dispersion ratio of the head, chroma on the head-end mantle and the difference in the chroma and brightness of the mantle. The fuzzy logic model used these indexes for the antecedent-part of the linguistic rules. The results of both simulation and evaluations demonstrate that the model is robust, with the predicted results corresponding with more than 96% of the quality assignments of the auctioneers.

  8. 77 FR 69933 - Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-11-21

    ...In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, ``Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions'' (NPRM), released October 2, 2012, the Commission considers matters related to the implementation of Congress's mandate to conduct an incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum as set forth in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (Spectrum Act).

  9. Linking Internet strategy to high-quality, cost-effective managed care.

    PubMed

    Beauregard, T R

    2000-01-01

    This article describes an experimental pilot project incorporating e-commerce and the Internet into the traditional process of health benefit negotiations through the utilization of an HMO Internet auction. The timeline and process of the auction are described, with the final auction taking place during the last week of negotiations. The results reveal an efficient and effective system to augment the traditional benefit negotiation process.

  10. Multiparty Quantum English Auction Scheme Using Single Photons as Message Carrier

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Liu, Ge; Zhang, Jian-Zhong; Xie, Shu-Cui

    2018-03-01

    In this paper, a secure and economic multiparty english auction protocol using the single photons as message carrier of bids is proposed. In order to achieve unconditional security, fairness, undeniability and so on, we adopt the decoy photon checking technique and quantum encryption algorithm. Analysis result shows that our protocol satisfies all the characteristics of traditional english auction, meanwhile, it can resist malicious attacks.

  11. 78 FR 21355 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for October 24, 2013; Comment Sought on...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-04-10

    ... unit is the basic unit that will be used to determine the winners in Auction 902 and to measure... Bureaus will measure coverage based on population rather than road miles. Under the auction design options...: EV-DO, EV-DO Rev A, UMTS/HSPA, HSPA+, WiMAX, and LTE. If the Mosaik data did not show such coverage...

  12. Mental Training for the Distance Athlete: "The Running Values Auction"

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Osteen, Deborah E.; Phillips, Dennis

    2006-01-01

    Coaches and sports psychologists often say that it is the mind that controls the body, and that once a race begins, it is 90 percent mental and 10 percent physical training. Teaching young athletes to use mental strategies is a skill they will continue to use throughout their athletic career, and best of all, throughout their everyday lives, even…

  13. 31 CFR 375.31 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the redemption operation rules or fails...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE... future redemption operations under this part and future auctions under 31 CFR part 356. We also may refer...

  14. 31 CFR 375.31 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the redemption operation rules or fails...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE... future redemption operations under this part and future auctions under 31 CFR part 356. We also may refer...

  15. 31 CFR 375.31 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the redemption operation rules or fails...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE... future redemption operations under this part and future auctions under 31 CFR part 356. We also may refer...

  16. 31 CFR 375.31 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the redemption operation rules or fails...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE... future redemption operations under this part and future auctions under 31 CFR part 356. We also may refer...

  17. 31 CFR 375.31 - What could happen if someone does not fully comply with the redemption operation rules or fails...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false What could happen if someone does not... Money and Finance: Treasury Regulations Relating to Money and Finance (Continued) FISCAL SERVICE... future redemption operations under this part and future auctions under 31 CFR part 356. We also may refer...

  18. Emissions markets, power markets and market power: A study of the interactions between contemporary emissions markets and deregulated electricity markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dormady, Noah Christopher

    Chapter 1: A Monte Carlo Approach. The use of auctions to distribute tradeable property rights to firms in already heavily concentrated markets may further exacerbate the problems of market power that exist within those markets. This chapter provides a model of a two-stage emissions market modeled after a contemporary regional permit trading market in the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc. (RGGI). It then introduces Oligopsony 1.0, a C# software package constructed in the .NET environment that simulates uniform-price auctions using stochastic Monte Carlo simulation for modeling market power in tradeable property rights auctions. Monte Carlo methods add a probabilistic element to standard auction theoretic equilibria. The results of these simulations indicate that there can be significant non-linearities between profit and market power as exercised through strategic demand reduction. This analysis finds the optimum point of strategic demand reduction that enables the firm to exploit these non-linearities, and it determines the probability distributions of these optima using kernel density analysis. Chapter 2: An Experimental Approach. How will emerging auction-based emissions markets function within the context of today's deregulated auction-based electricity markets? This chapter provides an experimental analysis of a joint energy-emissions market. The impact of market power and collusion among dominant firms is evaluated to determine the extent to which an auction-based tradeable permit market influences performance in an adjacent electricity market. The experimental treatment design controls for a variety of real-world institutional features, including variable demand, permit banking, inter-temporal (multi-round) dynamics, a tightening cap, and resale. Results suggest that the exercise of market power significantly increases electricity auction clearing prices, without significantly increasing emissions auction clearing prices, and in some cases, even significantly suppresses them. The institution of auction-based carbon markets in the already-concentrated energy sector can further strengthen the market position of dominant firms who can leverage energy-emissions market linkages to their operational advantage. Chapter 3: Regulatory Mechanisms and Policy Approaches. Contemporary deregulated electricity markets are defined by a complex array of multi-settlement markets, with additional market-based mechanisms designed, to a large extent, to limit the exercise of market power by dominant firms. On top of the already complex nature of these markets, policymakers are also adding market-based mechanisms to curtail greenhouse gases. Key linkages exist between electricity and emissions markets that may be utilized by dominant firms. This chapter provides an analysis of three specific policy mechanisms that are utilized in contemporary markets to effectively reduce the incentive of dominant firms to exercise market power. These include convergence bidding, consignment auctions and multilevel holding accounts.

  19. Security analysis with improved design of post-confirmation mechanism for quantum sealed-bid auction with single photons

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhang, Ke-Jia; Kwek, Leong-Chuan; Ma, Chun-Guang; Zhang, Long; Sun, Hong-Wei

    2018-02-01

    Quantum sealed-bid auction (QSA) has been widely studied in quantum cryptography. For a successful auction, post-confirmation is regarded as an important mechanism to make every bidder verify the identity of the winner after the auctioneer has announced the result. However, since the auctioneer may be dishonest and collude with malicious bidders in practice, some potential loopholes could exist. In this paper, we point out two types of collusion attacks for a particular post-confirmation technique with EPR pairs. And it is not difficult to see that there exists no unconditionally secure post-confirmation mechanism in the existing QSA model, if the dishonest participants have the ability to control multiparticle entanglement. In the view of this, we note that some secure implementation could exist if the participants are supposed to be semi-quantum, i.e., they can only control single photons. Finally, two potential methods to design post-confirmation mechanism are presented in this restricted scenario.

  20. Human remains sold to the highest bidder! A snapshot of the buying and selling of human skeletal remains on eBay, an Internet auction site.

    PubMed

    Huxley, Angie K; Finnegan, Michael

    2004-01-01

    Internet auction sites have become increasingly popular, with diverse items up for sale to the public worldwide. The purposes of this paper are to inform the forensic community that human skeletal remains, old and new, are for sale on the eBay internet auction site, and to advise forensic scientists that eBay does not use a forensic anthropologist to assess photographs of these materials. Over the last few years, this website was "surfed," with numerous auctions during this period. After contacting eBay by email, representatives responded that they adhere to Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) and that their website indicates that auctions must state that sale of human remains is for instructional purposes only. Based on the photographs, the remains appear to be of prehistoric and modern origin. An unfortunate consequence of such sale may generate interest in stealing remains from graves, mortuaries, hospitals, or county morgues worldwide.

  1. Bidding Behavior in a Multi-attribute First-price Auction

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2010-01-01

    of applying key features of the multi-unit auction to proxy buyer /seller marginal valuations of the attributes of a job. Two experiments were...compensation package show promise in ascertaining buyer /seller marginal valuations of a job. This research effort was supported by a grant from the...auctions observed in the goods market, as measured by maximizing consumer and producer surplus, are likely to have promising applications to labor markets

  2. An equation of state for the financial markets: connecting order flow to price formation.

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Gerig, Austin; Mike, Szabolcs; Doyne Farmer, J.

    2006-03-01

    Many of the peculiarities of price formation in the financial marketplace can be understood as the result of a few regularities in the placement and removal of trading orders. Based on a large data set from the London Stock Exchange we show that the distribution of prices where people place orders to buy or sell follows a surprisingly simple functional form that depends on the current best prices. In addition, whether or not an order is to buy or sell is described by a long-memory process, and the cancellation of orders can be described by a few simple rules. When these results are combined, simply by following the rules of the continuous double auction, the resulting simulation model produces good predictions for the distribution of price changes and transaction costs without any adjustment of parameters. We use the model to empirically derive equations of state relating order flow and the statistical properties of prices. In contrast to previous conjectures, our results demonstrate that these distributions are not universal, but rather depend on parameters of individual markets. They also show that factors other than supply and demand play an important role in price formation.

  3. Impact of information cost and switching of trading strategies in an artificial stock market

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Liu, Yi-Fang; Zhang, Wei; Xu, Chao; Vitting Andersen, Jørgen; Xu, Hai-Chuan

    2014-08-01

    This paper studies the switching of trading strategies and its effect on the market volatility in a continuous double auction market. We describe the behavior when some uninformed agents, who we call switchers, decide whether or not to pay for information before they trade. By paying for the information they behave as informed traders. First we verify that our model is able to reproduce some of the stylized facts in real financial markets. Next we consider the relationship between switching and the market volatility under different structures of investors. We find that there exists a positive relationship between the market volatility and the percentage of switchers. We therefore conclude that the switchers are a destabilizing factor in the market. However, for a given fixed percentage of switchers, the proportion of switchers that decide to buy information at a given moment of time is negatively related to the current market volatility. In other words, if more agents pay for information to know the fundamental value at some time, the market volatility will be lower. This is because the market price is closer to the fundamental value due to information diffusion between switchers.

  4. An economic and feasible Quantum Sealed-bid Auction protocol

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zhang, Rui; Shi, Run-hua; Qin, Jia-qi; Peng, Zhen-wan

    2018-02-01

    We present an economic and feasible Quantum Sealed-bid Auction protocol using quantum secure direct communication based on single photons in both the polarization and the spatial-mode degrees of freedom, where each single photon can carry two bits of classical information. Compared with previous protocols, our protocol has higher efficiency. In addition, we propose a secure post-confirmation mechanism without quantum entanglement to guarantee the security and the fairness of the auction.

  5. Application for Single Price Auction Model (SPA) in AC Network

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wachi, Tsunehisa; Fukutome, Suguru; Chen, Luonan; Makino, Yoshinori; Koshimizu, Gentarou

    This paper aims to develop a single price auction model with AC transmission network, based on the principle of maximizing social surplus of electricity market. Specifically, we first formulate the auction market as a nonlinear optimization problem, which has almost the same form as the conventional optimal power flow problem, and then propose an algorithm to derive both market clearing price and trade volume of each player even for the case of market-splitting. As indicated in the paper, the proposed approach can be used not only for the price evaluation of auction or bidding market but also for analysis of bidding strategy, congestion effect and other constraints or factors. Several numerical examples are used to demonstrate effectiveness of our method.

  6. Increasing the Effectiveness of Navy Retention Compensation by Evaluating Different Auction Compensation Formats

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-06-01

    ABBREVIATIONS ACCP aviation career continuation pay BCA Budget Control Act CO commanding officer DOD Department of Defense MILPERS Military Personnel...healthcare costs, overhaul retirement benefits, set a limit on pay increases, and eliminate acquisition programs. Ensuring an optimum level of...Congressional Budget Office, 2014). This appropriation houses the basic pay , allowances and retention bonuses that are offered to service members

  7. Analyzing the prices of the most expensive sheet iron all over the world: Modeling, prediction and regime change

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Song, Fu-Tie; Zhou, Wei-Xing

    2010-09-01

    The private car license plates issued in Shanghai are bestowed the title of “the most expensive sheet iron all over the world”, more expensive than gold. A citizen has to bid in a monthly auction to obtain a license plate for his new private car. We perform statistical analysis to investigate the influence of the minimal price Pmin of the bidding winners, the quota N of private car license plates, the number N of bidders, as well as two external shocks including the legality debate of the auction in 2004 and the auction regime reform in January 2008 on the average price P of all bidding winners. It is found that the legality debate of the auction had marginal transient impact on the average price in a short time period. In contrast, the change of the auction rules has significant permanent influence on the average price, which reduces the price by about 3020 yuan Renminbi. It means that the average price exhibits nonlinear behaviors with a regime change. The evolution of the average price is independent of the number N of bidders in both regimes. In the early regime before January 2008, the average price P was influenced only by the minimal price Pmin in the preceding month with a positive correlation. In the current regime since January 2008, the average price is positively correlated with the minimal price and the quota in the preceding month and negatively correlated with the quota in the same month. We test the predictive power of the two models using 2-year and 3-year moving windows and find that the latter outperforms the former. It seems that the auction market becomes more efficient after the auction reform since the prediction error increases.

  8. Evaluation of Aviation Career Pay Incentives Among the Naval Aviation Enterprise Utilizing Auction Mechanisms

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2015-03-01

    the cm1·ent program has failed to meet targeted retention across conununities while ove1paying nearly $5,300,000 dming FY-2013, according to Eric...Kelso. This thesis examines the potential improvements of applying unif01m-price auction, Quality Adjusted Discount (QUAD), and Combinatorial Retention ...responses, we developed individual quality scores and reservation prices to apply three auction mechanisms to the retention goals and costs of the

  9. Modelling of auctioning mechanism for solar photovoltaic capacity

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Poullikkas, Andreas

    2016-10-01

    In this work, a modified optimisation model for the integration of renewable energy sources for power-generation (RES-E) technologies in power-generation systems on a unit commitment basis is developed. The purpose of the modified optimisation procedure is to account for RES-E capacity auctions for different solar photovoltaic (PV) capacity electricity prices. The optimisation model developed uses a genetic algorithm (GA) technique for the calculation of the required RES-E levy (or green tax) in the electricity bills. Also, the procedure enables the estimation of the level of the adequate (or eligible) feed-in-tariff to be offered to future RES-E systems, which do not participate in the capacity auctioning procedure. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the optimisation procedure developed the case of PV capacity auctioning for commercial systems is examined. The results indicated that the required green tax, in order to promote the use of RES-E technologies, which is charged to the electricity customers through their electricity bills, is reduced with the reduction in the final auctioning price. This has a significant effect related to the reduction of electricity bills.

  10. The influence of an online auction's product price and e-retailer reputation on consumers' perception, attitude, and behavioral intention.

    PubMed

    Wu, Wann-Yih; Huang, Po-Ching; Fu, Chen-Su

    2011-06-01

    Online auctions combine the conventional auction model with information technology. However, information asymmetry within such auctions causes risks and uncertainties that influence consumer purchase intentions. In this study, a 2 (product price: high vs. low) × 2 (e-retailer reputation: high vs. low) experimental design was used to understand whether the product price and e-retailer reputation will influence consumers' perceived risk, attitude toward the website and purchase intention. The results of this study indicate that perceived risk negatively influences consumer attitude toward the website and online purchase intention, while consumer attitude toward the website positively influences purchase intention. Moreover, involvement moderates the influence of product price and e-retailer reputation only on social risk but does not have a significant effect on consumer attitude toward the website. This study contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of online auction users' behavior. Finally, the managerial implications, limitations and future research directions are also provided. © 2011 The Authors. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology © 2011 The Scandinavian Psychological Associations.

  11. Ordering competition: the interactional accomplishment of the sale of art and antiques at auction.

    PubMed

    Heath, Christian; Luff, Paul

    2007-03-01

    Auctions provide an institutional solution to a social problem; they enable the legitimate pricing and exchange of goods where those goods are of uncertain value. In turn, auctions raise a number of social and organizational issues that are resolved within the interaction that arise in sales by auction. In this paper, we examine sales of fine art, antiques and objets d'art and explore the ways in which auctioneers mediate competition between buyers and establish a value for goods. In particular, we explore how bids are elicited, co-ordinated and revealed so as to rapidly escalate the price of goods in a transparent manner that enables the legitimate valuation and exchange of goods. In directing attention towards the significance of the social interaction, including talk, visual and material conduct, the paper contributes to the growing corpus of ethnographic studies of markets. It suggests that to understand the operation of markets and their outcomes, and to unpack issues of agency, trust and practice, we need to place the 'interaction order' at the heart of analytic agenda.

  12. Anonymous, Yet Trustworthy Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chanda, Prasit Bikash; Naessens, Vincent; de Decker, Bart

    An auction is an inevitable market mechanism to setup prices of goods or services in a competitive and dynamic environment. Anonymity of bidders is required to conceal their business strategies from competitors. However, it is also essential to provide the seller guarantees that a bidder is trustworthy and competent enough to perform certain tasks (e.g transports). This paper proposes an auction protocol where bidders will participate anonymously, yet prove to be trustworthy and competent and can be held accountable towards auctioneers and sellers. Moreover, the protocol introduces promises, bonuses and compensations to ensure the best price for the sellers, extra profit for bidders and opportunities for newcomers in the business. It also handles ties, and copes with last minute bidding. Finally, the auction’s fair proceedings and outcome can be verified by everyone.

  13. Bidding process in online auctions and winning strategy: Rate equation approach

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yang, I.; Kahng, B.

    2006-06-01

    Online auctions have expanded rapidly over the last decade and have become a fascinating new type of business or commercial transaction in this digital era. Here we introduce a master equation for the bidding process that takes place in online auctions. We find that the number of distinct bidders who bid k times up to the t th bidding progresses, called the k -frequent bidder, seems to scale as nk(t)˜tk-2.4 . The successfully transmitted bidding rate by the k -frequent bidder is likely to scale as qk(t)˜k-1.4 , independent of t for large t . This theoretical prediction is close to empirical data. These results imply that bidding at the last moment is a rational and effective strategy to win in an eBay auction.

  14. Statistical Mechanics of Combinatorial Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Galla, Tobias; Leone, Michele; Marsili, Matteo; Sellitto, Mauro; Weigt, Martin; Zecchina, Riccardo

    2006-09-01

    Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are found and interpreted in terms of the geometric structure of the space of solutions. We introduce an iterative algorithm to solve intermediate and large instances, and discuss competing states of optimal revenue and maximal number of satisfied bidders. The algorithm can be generalized to the hard phase and to more sophisticated auction protocols.

  15. 43 CFR 2546.4 - Public auctions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR LAND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000) COLOR-OF-TITLE AND OMITTED LANDS Snake River... public auction any lands for which preference-claimants do not qualify for patents under the regulations...

  16. Comparisons of auction mechanisms in a multiple unit setting: A consideration for restructuring electric power markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bernard, John Charles

    The objective of this study was to compare the performance of five single sided auctions that could be used in restructured electric power markets across different market sizes in a multiple unit setting. Auction selection would profoundly influence an industry over $200 billion in size in the United States, and the consequences of implementing an inappropriate mechanism would be great. Experimental methods were selected to analyze the auctions. Two rounds of experiments were conducted, the first testing the sealed offer last accepted offer (LAO) and first rejected offer (FRO), and the clock English (ENG) and sealed offer English (SOE) in markets of sizes two and six. The FRO, SOE, and ENG used the same pricing rule. Second round testing was on the LAO, FRO, and the nonuniform price multiple unit Vickrey (MUV) in markets of sizes two, four, and six. Experiments lasted 23 and 75 periods for rounds 1 and 2 respectively. Analysis of variance and contrast analysis were used to examine the data. The four performance measures used were price, efficiency, profits per unit, and supply revelation. Five basic principles were also assessed: no sales at losses, all low cost capacity should be offered and sold, no high cost capacity should sell, and the market should clear. It was expected group size and auction type would affect performance. For all performance measures, group size was a significant variable, with smaller groups showing poorer performance. Auction type was significant only for the efficiency performance measure, where clock auctions outperformed the others. Clock auctions also proved superior for the first four principles. The FRO performed poorly in almost all situations, and should not be a preferred mechanism in any market. The ENG was highly efficient, but expensive for the buyer. The SOE appeared superior to the FRO and ENG. The clock improves efficiency over the FRO while less information kept prices under the ENG. The MUV was superior in revealing costs, but performed less well in other categories. While concerns existed for all the mechanisms investigated, the commonly proposed LAO was the best option for restructured electric power markets.

  17. The Modified Values Auction: A Data Analytic Classroom Game

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Miller, Larry D.

    1978-01-01

    Describes a modified values auction simulation game, reports on three levels of analysis employing actual classroom data (group, subgroup, and individual), and offers suggestions for utilizing values data in social research. (CMV)

  18. A revealed preference approach to estimating supply curves for ecosystem services: use of auctions to set payments for soil erosion control in Indonesia.

    PubMed

    Jack, B Kelsey; Leimona, Beria; Ferraro, Paul J

    2009-04-01

    To supply ecosystem services, private landholders incur costs. Knowledge of these costs is critical for the design of conservation-payment programs. Estimating these costs accurately is difficult because the minimum acceptable payment to a potential supplier is private information. We describe how an auction of payment contracts can be designed to elicit this information during the design phase of a conservation-payment program. With an estimate of the ecosystem-service supply curve from a pilot auction, conservation planners can explore the financial, ecological, and socioeconomic consequences of alternative scaled-up programs. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in Indonesia, where soil erosion on coffee farms generates downstream ecological and economic costs. Bid data from a small-scale, uniform-price auction for soil-conservation contracts allowed estimates of the costs of a scaled-up program, the gain from integrating biophysical and economic data to target contracts, and the trade-offs between poverty alleviation and supply of ecosystem services. Our study illustrates an auction-based approach to revealing private information about the costs of supplying ecosystem services. Such information can improve the design of programs devised to protect and enhance ecosystem services.

  19. Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions.

    PubMed

    Gugler, Klaus; Weichselbaumer, Michael; Zulehner, Christine

    2015-01-01

    We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups.

  20. Mechanism Design for Multi-slot Ads Auction in Sponsored Search Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Deng, Xiaotie; Sun, Yang; Yin, Ming; Zhou, Yunhong

    In this paper, we study pricing models for multi-slot advertisements, where advertisers can bid to place links to their sales webpages at one or multiple slots on a webpage, called the multi-slot AD auction problem. We develop and analyze several important mechanisms, including the VCG mechanism for multi-slot ads auction, the optimal social welfare solution, as well as two weighted GSP-like protocols (mixed and hybrid). Furthermore, we consider that forward-looking Nash equilibrium and prove its existence in the weighted GSP-like pricing protocols.

  1. Analysis on trust influencing factors and trust model from multiple perspectives of online Auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Yu, Wang

    2017-10-01

    Current reputation models lack the research on online auction trading completely so they cannot entirely reflect the reputation status of users and may cause problems on operability. To evaluate the user trust in online auction correctly, a trust computing model based on multiple influencing factors is established. It aims at overcoming the efficiency of current trust computing methods and the limitations of traditional theoretical trust models. The improved model comprehensively considers the trust degree evaluation factors of three types of participants according to different participation modes of online auctioneers, to improve the accuracy, effectiveness and robustness of the trust degree. The experiments test the efficiency and the performance of our model under different scale of malicious user, under environment like eBay and Sporas model. The experimental results analysis show the model proposed in this paper makes up the deficiency of existing model and it also has better feasibility.

  2. Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction.

    PubMed

    Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, G H

    2015-01-01

    One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer's utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider.

  3. 7 CFR 46.25 - Auction sales.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Auction sales. 46.25 Section 46.25 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing Practices), DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING OF PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES REGULATIONS (OTHER...

  4. 7 CFR 29.73 - Designation of markets; termination of designation.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... markets; termination of designation. An auction market where tobacco bought or sold thereon at auction or... considered as a new market, as defined in § 29.1, and any future application for services shall be filed and...

  5. Consumer preferences for micronutrient strategies in China. A comparison between folic acid supplementation and folate biofortification.

    PubMed

    De Steur, Hans; Feng, Shuyi; Xiaoping, Shi; Gellynck, Xavier

    2014-06-01

    Despite public health efforts, folate deficiency is still largely prevalent in poor, rural populations and continues to cause a large burden of disease. The present paper determines and compares consumer preferences for two folate strategies: folic acid supplementation v. folate biofortification, i.e. the enhancement of the folate content in staple crops. Experimental auctions with non-repeated information rounds are applied to rice in order to obtain willingness-to-pay for folate products. Thereby, GM or non-GM folate-biofortified rice (FBR) is auctioned together with rice that is supplemented with free folic acid pills (FAR). Shanxi Province (China) as a high-risk region of folate deficiency. One hundred and twenty-six women of childbearing age, divided into a school (n 60) and market sample (n 66). Despite differences according to the targeted sample, a general preference for folate biofortification is observed, regardless of the applied breeding technology. Premiums vary between 33·9 % (GM FBR), 36·5 % (non-GM FBR) and 19·0 % (FAR). Zero bidding behaviour as well as the product choice question, respectively, support and validate these findings. The targeted sample, the timing of the auction, the intention to consume GM food and the responsibility for rice purchases are considered key determinants of product choice. A novel ex-post negative valuation procedure shows low consistency in zero bidding. While the low attractiveness of FAR provides an additional argument for the limited effectiveness of past folic acid supplementation programmes, the positive reactions towards GM FBR further support its potential as a possible complementary micronutrient intervention.

  6. 10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

  7. 10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

  8. 10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

  9. 10 CFR 452.5 - Bidding procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.5 Bidding... producer auction process open only to pre-auction eligible cellulosic biofuels producers. The following... cellulosic biofuels producers during the open window established in the solicitation. The open window shall...

  10. 9 CFR 2.76 - Records: Operators of auction sales and brokers.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL WELFARE REGULATIONS Records § 2.76 Records: Operators of auction sales and... breed or type of animal; (ii) The sex of the animal; and (iii) The date of birth or approximate age; and...

  11. The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jung, Hyunwoo; Chwa, Kyung-Yong

    We consider the balloon popping problem introduced by Immorlica et al. in 2007 [13]. This problem is directly related to the problem of profit maximization in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competitive ratio of Immorlica et al.’s algorithm was in the range [1.64, 4.33]. In this paper, we narrow the gap to [1.659, 2].

  12. The predictive power of zero intelligence in financial markets.

    PubMed

    Farmer, J Doyne; Patelli, Paolo; Zovko, Ilija I

    2005-02-08

    Standard models in economics stress the role of intelligent agents who maximize utility. However, there may be situations where constraints imposed by market institutions dominate strategic agent behavior. We use data from the London Stock Exchange to test a simple model in which minimally intelligent agents place orders to trade at random. The model treats the statistical mechanics of order placement, price formation, and the accumulation of revealed supply and demand within the context of the continuous double auction and yields simple laws relating order-arrival rates to statistical properties of the market. We test the validity of these laws in explaining cross-sectional variation for 11 stocks. The model explains 96% of the variance of the gap between the best buying and selling prices (the spread) and 76% of the variance of the price diffusion rate, with only one free parameter. We also study the market impact function, describing the response of quoted prices to the arrival of new orders. The nondimensional coordinates dictated by the model approximately collapse data from different stocks onto a single curve. This work is important from a practical point of view, because it demonstrates the existence of simple laws relating prices to order flows and, in a broader context, suggests there are circumstances where the strategic behavior of agents may be dominated by other considerations.

  13. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... and bond issues. We set the interest rate at a 1/8 of one percent increment. If a Treasury inflation-protected securities auction results in a negative or zero yield, the interest rate will be set at zero, and...

  14. 78 FR 45589 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Notice of Designation of a Longer Period for...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-07-29

    ... on Proposed Rule Change Relating To Which Complex Orders Can Initiate a Complex Order Live Auction... Exchange to determine by order sender which complex orders can initiate a Complex Order Live Auction...

  15. 49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

  16. 49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

  17. 49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

  18. 49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

  19. 49 CFR 580.9 - Odometer record retention for auction companies.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... the buyer; (c) The vehicle identification number; and (d) The odometer reading on the date which the auction company took possession of the motor vehicle. ... permits systematic retrieval, for five years following the date of sale of each motor vehicle, the...

  20. 76 FR 4827 - High-Cost Universal Service Support and Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-27

    ... Wireless Services (``AWS'') licenses. This auction, which was designated as Auction 78, offered 35 licenses in the AWS 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands (``AWS-1''). The AWS-1 licenses were licenses for...

  1. 47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment...) to same person or entity Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will...

  2. 47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment...) to same person or entity Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will...

  3. 47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment...) to same person or entity Payment to auction contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will...

  4. 47 CFR 1.2203 - Competitive bidding mechanisms.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1.2203... forward auction assigning new spectrum licenses will occur. (2) Reserve price. Reserve prices, either... winning bid. A winning bidder will relinquish spectrum usage rights pursuant to the terms of any winning...

  5. Using a Memory Test to Limit a User to One Account

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Conitzer, Vincent

    In many Web-based applications, there are incentives for a user to sign up for more than one account, under false names. By doing so, the user can send spam e-mail from an account (which will eventually cause the account to be shut down); distort online ratings by rating multiple times (in particular, she can inflate her own reputation ratings); indefinitely continue using a product with a free trial period; place shill bids on items that she is selling on an auction site; engage in false-name bidding in combinatorial auctions; etc. All of these behaviors are highly undesirable from the perspective of system performance. While CAPTCHAs can prevent a bot from automatically signing up for many accounts, they do not prevent a human from signing up for multiple accounts. It may appear that the only way to prevent the latter is to require the user to provide information that identifies her in the real world (such as a credit card or telephone number), but users are reluctant to give out such information.

  6. 47 CFR 1.2207 - Two competing participants required.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1... to relinquish spectrum usage rights in exchange for a share of the proceeds from the related forward auction assigning new spectrum licenses unless at least two competing licensees participate in the reverse...

  7. 47 CFR 1.2205 - Prohibition of certain communications.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1... provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, in the broadcast television spectrum incentive auction conducted under section 6403 of the Spectrum Act, beginning on the deadline for submitting applications to...

  8. Short-selling constraints as cause for price distortions: An experimental study

    PubMed Central

    Hauser, Florian; Huber, Jürgen

    2012-01-01

    In this paper we explore the influence of the possibility to short stocks and/or borrow money in laboratory markets. A key innovation of our study is that subjects can simultaneously trade two risky assets on two double-auction markets, allowing us to differentiate between assets with relatively high versus low capitalization. Divergence of opinions is created by providing each trader with noisy information on the intrinsic values of both assets. We find that when borrowing money or shorting stocks is restricted prices are systematically distorted. Specifically, stocks with high (low) capitalization are traded at lower (higher) prices than their fundamental value. Lifting the restrictions leads to more efficient prices and more liquidity, thereby also lowering volatility and bid-ask spreads. PMID:26523081

  9. A multi agent model for the limit order book dynamics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Bartolozzi, M.

    2010-11-01

    In the present work we introduce a novel multi-agent model with the aim to reproduce the dynamics of a double auction market at microscopic time scale through a faithful simulation of the matching mechanics in the limit order book. The agents follow a noise decision making process where their actions are related to a stochastic variable, the market sentiment, which we define as a mixture of public and private information. The model, despite making just few basic assumptions over the trading strategies of the agents, is able to reproduce several empirical features of the high-frequency dynamics of the market microstructure not only related to the price movements but also to the deposition of the orders in the book.

  10. Effect of Trader Composition on Stock Market

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Mo-Gei; Wang, Xing-Yuan; Liu, Zhen-Zhen

    2011-05-01

    In this study, we build a double auction market model, which contains two types of agent traders, i.e., the noise traders and fundamentalists, to investigate the effect of the trader composition on the stock market. It is found that, the non-trivial Hurst exponent and the fat-tailed distribution of transaction prices can be observed at any ratio of the noise traders. Analyses on the price variation properties, including the Hurst exponent and the price variation region, show that these properties are stable when the ratio is moderate. However, the non-price variation properties, including the trading volume and the profitability of the two kinds of agents, do not keep stable untrivially in any interval of the ratio of noise traders.

  11. Design and implementation of location-based wireless targeted advertising

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Li, Benjamin; Xu, Deyin

    2001-10-01

    As advertisements are time and location sensitive, a challenge for wireless marketing is to have advertisements delivered when and where they are most convenient. In this paper we introduce a two-stage auction model for location-based wireless targeted advertising. This system extends the notion of location-based service by using location information to target advertising, and does so specifically by enabling advertisers to specify their preferences and bid for advertisement delivery, where those preferences are then used in a subsequent automated auction of actual deliveries to wireless data users. The automated auction in the second stage is especially effective because it can use information about the individual user profile data, including customer relationship management system contents as well as location from the wireless system's location management service, including potentially location history such as current trajectory from recent history and longer-term historical trip records for that user. Through two-stage auction, real-time bidding by advertisers and matching ads contents to mobile users help advertising information reach maximal value.

  12. AUCTION MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTING TRADABLE NETWORK PERMIT MARKETS

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wada, Kentaro; Akamatsu, Takashi

    This paper proposes a new auction mechanism for implementing the tradable network permit markets. Assuming that each user makes a trip from an origin to a destination along a path in a specific time period, we design an auction mechanism that enables each user to purchase a bundle of permits corresponding to a set of links in the user's preferred path. The objective of the proposed mechanism is to achieve a socially optimal state with minimal revelation of users' private information. In order to achieve this, the mechanism employs an evolutionary approach that has an auction phase and a path capacity adjustment phase, which are repeated on a day-to-day basis. We prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (1) truthful bidding is the dominant strategy for each user and (2) the proposed mechanism converges to an approximate socially optimal state in the sense that the achieved value of the social surplus reaches its maximum value when the number of users is large.

  13. The impact of product information and trials on demand for smokeless tobacco and cigarettes: Evidence from experimental auctions

    PubMed Central

    Rousu, Matthew C.; O'Connor, Richard; Thrasher, James F; June, Kristie; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James

    2014-01-01

    Introduction Epidemiological and toxicological evidence suggests lower risk of smokeless tobacco (ST) products compared to cigarettes. Less is known, however, about consumer perceptions and use of novel forms of ST, including snus and dissolvable tobacco. Methods In this study, we conducted in-person experimental auctions in Buffalo, NY, Columbia, SC, and Selinsgrove, PA with 571 smokers to test the impact of information and product trials on smokers’ preferences. Auctions were conducted between November 2010-November 2011. Results We found no evidence of an impact of product trials on demand in our auctions. Anti-ST information increased demand for cigarettes when presented alone, but when presented with Pro-ST information it decreased demand for cigarettes. It did not decrease demand for ST products. Anti-smoking information increased demand for ST products, but did not affect cigarette demand. Conclusions These findings suggest that credible and effective communications about tobacco harm reduction should reinforce the negative effects of smoking. PMID:24321456

  14. The impact of product information and trials on demand for smokeless tobacco and cigarettes: evidence from experimental auctions.

    PubMed

    Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard J; Thrasher, James F; June, Kristie M; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James

    2014-03-01

    Epidemiological and toxicological evidence suggests lower risk of smokeless tobacco (ST) products compared to cigarettes. Less is known, however, about consumer perceptions and use of novel forms of ST, including snus and dissolvable tobacco. In this study, we conducted in-person experimental auctions in Buffalo, NY, Columbia, SC, and Selinsgrove, PA with 571 smokers to test the impact of information and product trials on smokers' preferences. Auctions were conducted between November 2010-November 2011. We found no evidence of an impact of product trials on demand in our auctions. Anti-ST information increased demand for cigarettes when presented alone, but when presented with pro-ST information it decreased demand for cigarettes. It did not decrease demand for ST products. Anti-smoking information increased demand for ST products, but did not affect cigarette demand. These findings suggest that credible and effective communications about tobacco harm reduction should reinforce the negative effects of smoking. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  15. Essays on empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions: Impacts of financial transmission rights on the restructured electricity industry

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zang, Hailing

    This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However, prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs. This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multi-unit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions. The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations. The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR auctions. I find that FTRs' strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is significant for large bidders---firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions. Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit very accurately while large generators' forecasts of future FTR credit tends to be biased upward. Finally, the bid shading patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and support the existence of common values.

  16. Auction development for the price-based electric power industry

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Dekrajangpetch, Somgiat

    The restructuring of the electric power industry is to move away from the cost-based monopolistic environment of the past to the priced-based competitive environment. As the electric power industry is restructuring in many places, there are still many problems that need to be solved. The work in this dissertation contributes to solve some of the electric power auction problems. The majority of this work is aimed to help develop good markets. A LaGrangian relaxation (LR) Centralized Daily Commitment Auction (CDCA) has been implemented. It has been shown that the solution might not be optimal nor fair to some generation companies (GENCOs) when identical or similar generating units participate in a LR CDCA based auction. Supporting information for bidding strategies on how to change unit data to enhance the chances of bid acceptance has been developed. The majority of this work is based on Single Period Commodity Auction (SPCA). Alternative structures for the SPCA are outlined. Whether the optimal solution is degenerated is investigated. Good pricing criteria are summarized and the pricing method following good pricing criteria is developed. Electricity is generally considered as a homogeneous product. When availability level is used as additional characteristic to distinct electricity, electricity can be considered a heterogeneous product. The procedure to trade electricity as a heterogeneous product is developed. The SPCA is formulated as a linear program. The basic IPLP algorithm has been extended so that sensitivity analysis can be performed as in the simplex method. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine market reach. Additionally, sensitivity analysis is used in combination with the investigation of historical auction results to provide raw data for power system expansion. Market power is a critical issue in electric power deregulation. Firms with market power have an advantage over other competitor firms in terms of market reach. Various approaches to determine market power and market reach are to be investigated. How firms can acquire additional customers or additional transactions, given the auction results, is to be investigated. Additionally, how firms can utilize their market power to enhance their chances of success is to be investigated.

  17. Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation.

    PubMed

    Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Milgrom, Paul; Segal, Ilya

    2017-07-11

    The recent "incentive auction" of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters' property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes.

  18. Statistical Properties of Online Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Namazi, Alireza; Schadschneider, Andreas

    We characterize the statistical properties of a large number of online auctions run on eBay. Both stationary and dynamic properties, like distributions of prices, number of bids etc., as well as relations between these quantities are studied. The analysis of the data reveals surprisingly simple distributions and relations, typically of power-law form. Based on these findings we introduce a simple method to identify suspicious auctions that could be influenced by a form of fraud known as shill bidding. Furthermore the influence of bidding strategies is discussed. The results indicate that the observed behavior is related to a mixture of agents using a variety of strategies.

  19. 47 CFR 1.2105 - Bidding application and certification procedures; prohibition of certain communications.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... include changes in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control... Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, by the most expeditious means... Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, by the most expeditious means...

  20. Biological auctions with multiple rewards

    PubMed Central

    Reiter, Johannes G.; Kanodia, Ayush; Gupta, Raghav; Nowak, Martin A.; Chatterjee, Krishnendu

    2015-01-01

    The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards. PMID:26180069

  1. Restoration of stormwater retention capacity at the allotment-scale through a novel economic instrument.

    PubMed

    Fletcher, Tim D; Walsh, Chistopher J; Bos, Darren; Nemes, Veronika; RossRakesh, Sharyn; Prosser, Toby; Hatt, Belinda; Birch, Rhiannon

    2011-01-01

    Urbanisation results in changes to runoff behaviour which, if not addressed, inevitably degrade receiving waters. To date, most stormwater management has focussed on the streetscape and public open space. Given that much of the catchment imperviousness is located on private land, we developed and tested a novel economic instrument (a uniform price auction) for encouraging allotment-scale stormwater retention. We evaluated bids using an integrated environmental benefit index (EBI), based on the ability of the proposed works to reduce runoff frequency, pollutant loads and to reduce potable water demand. The uniform price auction resulted in 1.4 ha of impervious areas being effectively 'disconnected' from the stormwater system. The EBI provided an objective and transparent method of comparing bids, which varied in the type of works proposed (e.g. rainwater tank, rain-garden), the cost and the resulting environmental benefit. Whilst the pilot auction was a success, the public subsidy of works undertaken was around 85%, meaning that property owners a relatively small private benefit in the works. Future auction rounds will be revised to (i) test an EBI which is more focussed on the protection of streams (assessing changes to runoff frequency, baseflow volumes and water quality) and (ii) provide an auction process which is simpler to understand, and provides greater practical support for landholders who wish to undertake works.

  2. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ..., our computer time stamp will establish the receipt time. You are bound by your bids after the closing... failures or disruptions of equipment or communications facilities used for participating in Treasury auctions. (4) Submitters are responsible for bids submitted using computer equipment on their premises...

  3. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ..., our computer time stamp will establish the receipt time. You are bound by your bids after the closing... failures or disruptions of equipment or communications facilities used for participating in Treasury auctions. (4) Submitters are responsible for bids submitted using computer equipment on their premises...

  4. 77 FR 73969 - Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-12

    ...] Expanding the Economic and Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions AGENCY: Federal... Media Bureau extends the deadline for filing comments and reply comments on the Notice of Proposed... delivery, by commercial overnight courier, or by first-class or overnight U.S. Postal Service mail...

  5. 76 FR 20783 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Order Granting Approval of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-04-13

    ... rates and descriptive information about Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand... interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VDROs, information about orders submitted for an ARS auction, and additional information about VRDOs.\\5\\ To provide subscribers with access...

  6. 75 FR 78768 - Proposed Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-12-16

    ... Securities, as discussed herein. 2. The Applicant describes Auction Rate Securities (or ARS) and the arrangement by which ARS are bought and sold as follows. Auction Rate Securities are preferred stock or bonds... to perpetuity. ARS interest rates or dividend yields are determined and periodically reset at...

  7. 76 FR 11547 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; Notice of Filing of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-03-02

    ... interest rates and descriptive information about Auction Rate Securities (``ARS'') and Variable Rate Demand... interest rate setting mechanisms for ARS and liquidity facilities for VRDOs, information about orders submitted for an ARS auction, and additional information about VRDOs.\\4\\ To provide subscribers with access...

  8. Making Marketing Principles Tangible: Online Auctions as Living Case Studies

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Wood, Charles M.; Suter, Tracy A.

    2004-01-01

    This article presents an effective course supplement for Principles of Marketing classes. An experiential project involving online auctions is offered to instructors seeking to create a more participatory student environment and an interactive teaching style. A number of learning points are illustrated that allow instructors to use an auction…

  9. 76 FR 78645 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Scheduled for March 27, 2012; Notice and Filing...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-12-19

    ... touch upon impermissible subject matters because they may convey pricing information and bidding... FCC auction does not constitute an endorsement by the FCC of any particular service, technology, or... habitats, historical or archaeological sites, Indian religious sites, floodplains, and surface features. In...

  10. 77 FR 38061 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Supplemental Short-Form Instructions and Other Information

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-06-26

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-947] Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Supplemental Short-Form Instructions and Other Information AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION... number, for example, DA 12-947. The Supplemental Filing Instructions Public Notice and related documents...

  11. Books at Auction: The Art of Deaccessioning.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Model, Peter

    1981-01-01

    Lack of space and budget cuts force many libraries to weed out books and to be selective in accepting collection bequests. The approach for deciding which books to weed out and whether to dispose of these books through dealers or auctions are decisions private clubs and many libraries must make. (RBF)

  12. The Potential Impact of an Auction Based Retention Bonus and Other Factors on Continuation Rates of General Dentists Completing Their Initial Obligation

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2007-03-01

    join the Navy Dental Corps. Those wanting to become Navy dentists may take advantage of one of the multiple commissioning programs available...Medicine Physician, and OPTEMPO are significant factors for a General Medical Officer ( GMO ) in his or her decision to stay or leave. Gender, marital...different than GMOs : deployments, surgical specialties, occupational specialties, assigned to Naval Medical Center San Diego.81 The common factors were

  13. Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Said, Maher

    We study a stochastic sequential allocation problem with a dynamic population of privately-informed buyers. We characterize the set of efficient allocation rules and show that a dynamic VCG mechanism is both efficient and periodic ex post incentive compatible; we also show that the revenue-maximizing direct mechanism is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. We then consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with and without a reserve price. We construct equilibrium bidding strategies in this indirect mechanism where bidders reveal their private information in every period, yielding the same outcomes as the direct mechanisms. Thus, the sequential ascending auction is a natural institution for achieving either efficient or optimal outcomes.

  14. A new quantum sealed-bid auction protocol with secret order in post-confirmation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Jing-Tao; Chen, Xiu-Bo; Xu, Gang; Meng, Xiang-Hua; Yang, Yi-Xian

    2015-10-01

    A new security protocol for quantum sealed-bid auction is proposed to resist the collusion attack from some malicious bidders. The most significant feature of this protocol is that bidders prepare their particles with secret order in post-confirmation for encoding bids. In addition, a new theorem and its proof are given based on the theory of combinatorial mathematics, which can be used as evaluation criteria for the collusion attack. It is shown that the new protocol is immune to the collusion attack and meets the demand for a secure auction. Compared with those previous protocols, the security, efficiency and availability of the proposed protocol are largely improved.

  15. Reciprocity in Online Markets: Empirical Studies of Auction and Barter Markets

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Ye, Shun

    2013-01-01

    My dissertation seeks to understand how reciprocity affects transaction outcomes and mechanism design in online markets. The first essay examines negative reciprocity illustrated as feedback-revoking behavior in the eBay auction market, focusing on its impact and implications for reputation system design. I utilize the biggest policy change of…

  16. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ..., but not above, par when evaluated at the yield of awards to successful competitive bidders. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

  17. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ..., but not above, par when evaluated at the yield of awards to successful competitive bidders. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

  18. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ..., but not above, par when evaluated at the yield of awards to successful competitive bidders. (2... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... the yield or discount rate for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield...

  19. 30 CFR 285.308 - How will MMS conduct an auction for ROW grants and RUE grants?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... and RUE grants? 285.308 Section 285.308 Mineral Resources BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY ALTERNATE USES OF EXISTING... Renewable Energy Activities Obtaining Row Grants and Rue Grants § 285.308 How will MMS conduct an auction...

  20. 75 FR 53366 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-08-31

    ... Rule Change Relating to Routing Fees, the Monthly Cap and Electronic Auctions August 25, 2010. Pursuant... Monthly Cap on equity option transaction fees; and (iii) clarify language relating to electronic auctions...-105. The Exchange also proposes to amend its Monthly Cap assessed on Registered Options Traders...

  1. 78 FR 67421 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BOX Options Exchange LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-12

    ... Broker Dealers and adjust the Tiered Auction Transaction Fees for Initiating Participants based upon... Exchange proposes to increase the existing liquidity fees and credits for certain PIP Transactions within... Transaction \\5\\ fees for Professional Customers and Broker Dealers to $0.37 from $0.35. For Non-Auction...

  2. 78 FR 66955 - Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-11-07

    ... Auction Rate Securities by UBS AG (ARS Rights) in connection with a Settlement Agreement, (b) the sale of an Auction Rate Security to UBS pursuant to such ARS Rights, where such sale (a Settlement Sale) is... the offer of ARS Rights (the ARS Rights Offer) are consistent with the requirements set forth in the...

  3. 76 FR 9366 - Proposed Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-02-17

    ... Security'' or ``ARS'' means a security: (1) That is either a debt instrument (generally with a long-term... purchase of an ARS by Wachovia from a Plan. DATES: Effective Date: If granted, this proposed exemption will... describes Auction Rate Securities and the arrangement by which ARS are bought and sold as follows. Auction...

  4. 77 FR 7152 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for September 27, 2012; Comment Sought on Competitive...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-02-10

    ... application deadlines and other dates related to Auction 901 after considering comments provided in response... must file an application for support. Only after review of the application to confirm compliance with... for support to Tribal lands. 7. The USF/ICC Transformation Order established application, performance...

  5. 78 FR 56874 - Comment Sought on Petition for Reconsideration of Auction 902 Procedures Public Notice

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-09-16

    ... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 13-53; DA 13-1876] Comment Sought on Petition for Reconsideration of Auction 902 Procedures Public Notice AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: This document announces that on September 6, 2013, Smith Bagley, Inc. (SBI) filed a petition...

  6. Improving the secrecy rate by turning foes to allies: An auction scheme

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ma, Ya-Yan; Wang, Bao-Yun

    2015-09-01

    Security against eavesdroppers is a critical issue in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In this paper, a scenario consisting of one primary pair and multiple secondary pairs is considered. The secondary transmitters (STs) work in half-duplex mode and they are potential eavesdroppers on the primary transmission unless they are allowed to simultaneously transmit with the primary transmitter (PT). A modified second-price sealed-bid auction scheme is employed to model the interaction between the PT and STs. With the proposed auction scheme, the hostile relationship between the PT and STs is transformed into a cooperative relationship. An iterative algorithm based on the max-min criteria is proposed to find the optimal bidding power of the STs for an access chance in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Numerical results show that the proposed auction scheme not only improves the PT’s security but also increases the access opportunities of the STs. Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 61271232 and 61372126) and the University Postgraduate Research and Innovation Project in Jiangsu Province, China (Grant No. CXZZ12-0472).

  7. Hospital treatment as a foal does not adversely affect future sales performance in Thoroughbred horses.

    PubMed

    Corley, K T T; Corley, M M B

    2012-02-01

    Many Thoroughbred foals are intended to be sold at public auction. The impact of disease conditions necessitating hospital treatment as a foal on future sales performance is unknown. To determine whether Thoroughbred horses that were treated in a hospital before age 125 days and presented to public auction sell for a different mean price than controls. Foals aged < 125 days, treated at a hospital in Ireland in 2007 or 2008 and presented for sale to a public auction recorded on a publicly accessible database were selected for inclusion in the study. The sales outcome of these subjects was compared to that of 6 controls for each subject, consisting of the 3 horses that were presented to the same sale immediately before and immediately after the subject. Results were controlled for the sale at which the animal presented and the sex of the subject and controls. Sixty-three subjects were presented to public auction: 19 at the foal sales, 39 at the yearling sales and 5 at the 2-year-old sales. Forty-five subjects were sold. There was no difference in the mean sales price (subjects Euros 38,207; controls Euros 35,026) or percentage of animals sold (subjects 71.4%; controls 66.4%) between subjects and controls. If Thoroughbred horses are presented for public auction following hospital treatment as a foal, there is no impact on sales outcome. This information may help commercial breeders of Thoroughbred foals make informed decisions about treatment of their foals.

  8. Market reaction to a bid-ask spread change: A power-law relaxation dynamics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Ponzi, Adam; Lillo, Fabrizio; Mantegna, Rosario N.

    2009-07-01

    We study the relaxation dynamics of the bid-ask spread and of the midprice after a sudden variation of the spread in a double auction financial market. We find that the spread decays as a power law to its normal value. We measure the price reversion dynamics and the permanent impact, i.e., the long-time effect on price, of a generic event altering the spread and we find an approximately linear relation between immediate and permanent impact. We hypothesize that the power-law decay of the spread is a consequence of the strategic limit order placement of liquidity providers. We support this hypothesis by investigating several quantities, such as order placement rates and distribution of prices and times of submitted orders, which affect the decay of the spread.

  9. Profiting from competition: Financial tools for electric generation companies

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Richter, Charles William, Jr.

    Regulations governing the operation of electric power systems in North America and many other areas of the world are undergoing major changes designed to promote competition. This process of change is often referred to as deregulation. Participants in deregulated electricity systems may find that their profits will greatly benefit from the implementation of successful bidding strategies. While the goal of the regulators may be to create rules which balance reliable power system operation with maximization of the total benefit to society, the goal of generation companies is to maximize their profit, i.e., return to their shareholders. The majority of the research described here is conducted from the point of view of generation companies (GENCOs) wishing to maximize their expected utility function, which is generally comprised of expected profit and risk. Strategies that help a GENCO to maximize its objective function must consider the impact of (and aid in making) operating decisions that may occur within a few seconds to multiple years. The work described here assumes an environment in which energy service companies (ESCOs) buy and GENCOs sell power via double auctions in regional commodity exchanges. Power is transported on wires owned by transmission companies (TRANSCOs) and distribution companies (DISTCOs). The proposed market framework allows participants to trade electrical energy contracts via the spot, futures, options, planning, and swap markets. An important method of studying these proposed markets and the behavior of participating agents is the field of experimental/computational economics. For much of the research reported here, the market simulator developed by Kumar and Sheble and similar simulators has been adapted to allow computerized agents to trade energy. Creating computerized agents that can react as rationally or irrationally as a human trader is a difficult problem for which we have turned to the field of artificial intelligence. Some of our work uses GP-Automata, a technique which combines genetic programming and finite state machines, to represent adaptive agents. We use a genetic algorithm to evolve these adaptive agents (each with its own bidding strategy) for use in a double auction. The agent's strategies may be judged by the amount of profit they produce and are tested by computerized agents repeatedly buying and selling electricity in an auction simulator. In addition to the obvious profit-maximization strategies, one can also design strategies which exhibit other types of trading behaviors. The resulting strategies can be used directly in on-line trading, or as realistic models of competitors in a trading simulator. In addition to developing double auction bidding strategies, we investigate and discuss methods of an energy trader's risk. This can be done using such financial vehicles as futures and options contracts or through the inclusion of risk while judging strategies used in the market simulations described above. We discuss the role of fuzzy logic in the competitive electric marketplace, including how it can be applied in developing bidding strategies. Since competition promises to drive the power system closer to its operating limits, improvements in measurement and system control will be important. We provide an example of using fuzzy logic to do automatic generation control and discuss extensions that would make it superior to traditional controllers. Since the GENCO's forte is primarily generating electricity, we examine unit commitment and discuss how to update it for the competitive environment. We discuss the role of unit commitment in developing bidding strategies, as well as, the role of bidding strategies in solving the unit commitment problem. Depending on the market structure adopted by a particular location, large amounts of bidding data may be available to regulators or market participants. Ideally, regulators could use this data to verify dig the market is efficient. Market participants with access to this data might gain an advantage over their competitors if they could somehow determine their competitor's bidding strategy. We outline methods of automatically inferring other participants' trading rules based on historical data. Much of the work described here should aid in the design of effective operating procedures, trading strategies and profitable portfolios for energy producers.

  10. 77 FR 60163 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing and Immediate...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-02

    ... Change Related to AIM and SAM September 26, 2012. Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange.... Under Rule 6.52, Solicitation Auction Mechanism (``SAM''), a Trading Permit Holder that represents... Agency Order for electronic execution into the SAM auction process, under which both the Agency Order and...

  11. Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM)

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2008-12-01

    NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS INTEGRATING MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES UTILIZING THE...Monetary and Non- monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 6. AUTHOR(S) Brooke Zimmerman 5...iii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited INTEGRATING MONETARY AND NON-MONETARY REENLISTMENT INCENTIVES UTILIZING THE

  12. 31 CFR 356.20 - How does the Treasury determine auction awards?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false How does the Treasury determine... margin for the securities we are auctioning. (2) Accepting bids at the high yield, discount rate, or... the remaining par amount needed to fill the offering amount by the par amount of the bids at the high...

  13. 34 CFR 682.302 - Payment of special allowance on FFEL loans.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... disbursement is made on or after January 1, 2000; or (B) The 91-day Treasury bills auctioned during the 3-month... the bond equivalent rate of the 91-day Treasury bills auctioned during that quarter, plus 3.1 percent... associated committees of such, the for-profit entity is authorized by law, agreement, or otherwise to approve...

  14. See Art History in a New Light: Have an Art Auction

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Benter, Doris J.

    2008-01-01

    At Portledge School in Locust Valley, New York, ninth graders in their upper school study art history for one semester. The visual arts department has created a vigorous new syllabus culminating in an hour-long mock art auction. The department selects several art movements (e.g., Post-Impressionism, Cubism, Abstract Expressionism, Social Realism,…

  15. 77 FR 75459 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change To...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-12-20

    ... both sides would participate in an Exchange Auction, this proposed change would aid in price discovery... auction price. This proposed change would aid in price discovery and help to reduce the likelihood of... Sell Shares and, therefore, a User would never have complete knowledge of liquidity available on both...

  16. Auctions to Reinforce Understanding

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Flores, Haynet Rivera

    2018-01-01

    An auction is a process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling each good or service to the highest bidder. Participants bid openly against one another; each bid must be higher than the previous bid. In the activity described rather than goods or services, English teachers sell sentences!…

  17. 77 FR 25522 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Fixed Income Clearing Corporation; Order Approving Proposed Rule...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-04-30

    ... trades with final money calculations on the night of Auction Date, after the Treasury auction results... end of day netting process. However, when Interactive Messaging was implemented in 2000, this... efficiency, competition, and capital formation. See 15 U.S.C. 78c(f). \\9\\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12). For the...

  18. 76 FR 25711 - Proposed Exemptions from Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-05-05

    ...)) of an Auction Rate Security (ARS, as defined in Section III(c)) to Northern Trust Corporation or an... of section 4975 of the Code. Section II. Conditions (a) The Plan acquired the ARS in connection with brokerage or advisory services provided by Northern to the Plan; (b) The last auction for the ARS was...

  19. 78 FR 43930 - Proposed Exemptions From Certain Prohibited Transaction Restrictions

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-07-22

    ...), of certain rights issued to owners of Auction Rate Securities by UBS AG (ARS Rights) in connection with a Settlement Agreement, (b) the sale of an Auction Rate Security to UBS pursuant to such ARS... in Section III (a) The terms and delivery of the offer of ARS Rights (the ARS Rights Offer) are...

  20. Understanding Persuasive Online Sales Messages from eBay Auctions

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    White, Barbara Jo; Clapper, Danial; Noel, Rita; Fortier, Jenny; Grabolosa, Pierre

    2007-01-01

    Online auctions are dominated by eBay, which started bringing together buyers and sellers in 1995. eBay product listings can easily be used in business communication courses to better understand online sales messages. One great advantage is that the vast majority of nearly 15 million listings a day are written and assembled by everyday consumers…

  1. 75 FR 57947 - Auction of VHF Commercial Television Station Construction Permits Scheduled for February 15, 2011...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-23

    ... technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the construction permits for... auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their... and other factors. The Bureaus seek comment on this proposal. Commenters may wish to address the role...

  2. 78 FR 46425 - Sale and Issue of Marketable Book-Entry Treasury Bills, Notes, and Bonds

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-07-31

    ... a simple-interest money market yield computed on an actual/360 basis, subject to an appropriate... 13-week Treasury bill auction High Rate (stop out rate) converted into a simple actual/360 interest...-week Treasury bill auction High Rate that has been translated into a simple-interest money market yield...

  3. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued? There are three book-entry securities systems... marketable Treasury securities. We maintain and transfer securities in these three book-entry systems at... inflation. Securities may be transferred from one system to the other, unless the securities are not...

  4. Teaching Auction Strategy Using Experiments Administered Via the Internet

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Asker, John; Grosskopf, Brit; McKinney, C. Nicholas; Niederle, Muriel; Roth, Alvin E.; Weizsacker, Georg

    2004-01-01

    The authors present an experimental design used to teach concepts in the economics of auctions and implications for e-Business procurement. The experiment is easily administered and can be adapted to many different treatments. The chief innovation is that it does not require the use of a lab or class time. Instead, the design can be implemented on…

  5. 77 FR 57173 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of a Proposed...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-09-17

    ... Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Complex... its Rules regarding complex order auctions. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the... basis, the Exchange may activate the electronic complex order request for responses (``RFR'') auction...

  6. 77 FR 65754 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving Proposed Rule...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-10-30

    ... Organizations; C2 Options Exchange, Incorporated; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Complex...,\\2\\ a proposed rule change to modify C2 Rule 6.13(c), ``Process for Complex Order RFR Auction,'' to... at the start of a Complex Order Auction (``COA''); and (ii) require responses to an RFR message...

  7. 77 FR 9279 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-02-16

    ...-032). Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend several portions of Rule 11.23 to allow MOO, LOO, and LLOO orders to participate in IPO Auctions. Under the proposal, MOO orders would behave like... modifications to the definitions of MOO, LOO, and LLOO orders and to make clear that these Opening Auction...

  8. The predictive power of zero intelligence in financial markets

    PubMed Central

    Farmer, J. Doyne; Patelli, Paolo; Zovko, Ilija I.

    2005-01-01

    Standard models in economics stress the role of intelligent agents who maximize utility. However, there may be situations where constraints imposed by market institutions dominate strategic agent behavior. We use data from the London Stock Exchange to test a simple model in which minimally intelligent agents place orders to trade at random. The model treats the statistical mechanics of order placement, price formation, and the accumulation of revealed supply and demand within the context of the continuous double auction and yields simple laws relating order-arrival rates to statistical properties of the market. We test the validity of these laws in explaining cross-sectional variation for 11 stocks. The model explains 96% of the variance of the gap between the best buying and selling prices (the spread) and 76% of the variance of the price diffusion rate, with only one free parameter. We also study the market impact function, describing the response of quoted prices to the arrival of new orders. The nondimensional coordinates dictated by the model approximately collapse data from different stocks onto a single curve. This work is important from a practical point of view, because it demonstrates the existence of simple laws relating prices to order flows and, in a broader context, suggests there are circumstances where the strategic behavior of agents may be dominated by other considerations. PMID:15687505

  9. Efficient Nash Equilibrium Resource Allocation Based on Game Theory Mechanism in Cloud Computing by Using Auction

    PubMed Central

    Nezarat, Amin; Dastghaibifard, GH

    2015-01-01

    One of the most complex issues in the cloud computing environment is the problem of resource allocation so that, on one hand, the cloud provider expects the most profitability and, on the other hand, users also expect to have the best resources at their disposal considering the budget constraints and time. In most previous work conducted, heuristic and evolutionary approaches have been used to solve this problem. Nevertheless, since the nature of this environment is based on economic methods, using such methods can decrease response time and reducing the complexity of the problem. In this paper, an auction-based method is proposed which determines the auction winner by applying game theory mechanism and holding a repetitive game with incomplete information in a non-cooperative environment. In this method, users calculate suitable price bid with their objective function during several round and repetitions and send it to the auctioneer; and the auctioneer chooses the winning player based the suggested utility function. In the proposed method, the end point of the game is the Nash equilibrium point where players are no longer inclined to alter their bid for that resource and the final bid also satisfies the auctioneer’s utility function. To prove the response space convexity, the Lagrange method is used and the proposed model is simulated in the cloudsim and the results are compared with previous work. At the end, it is concluded that this method converges to a response in a shorter time, provides the lowest service level agreement violations and the most utility to the provider. PMID:26431035

  10. Generating spatially optimized habitat in a trade-off between social optimality and budget efficiency.

    PubMed

    Drechsler, Martin

    2017-02-01

    Auctions have been proposed as alternatives to payments for environmental services when spatial interactions and costs are better known to landowners than to the conservation agency (asymmetric information). Recently, an auction scheme was proposed that delivers optimal conservation in the sense that social welfare is maximized. I examined the social welfare and the budget efficiency delivered by this scheme, where social welfare represents the difference between the monetized ecological benefit and the conservation cost incurred to the landowners and budget efficiency is defined as maximizing the ecological benefit for a given conservation budget. For the analysis, I considered a stylized landscape with land patches that can be used for agriculture or conservation. The ecological benefit was measured by an objective function that increases with increasing number and spatial aggregation of conserved land patches. I compared the social welfare and the budget efficiency of the auction scheme with an agglomeration payment, a policy scheme that considers spatial interactions and that was proposed recently. The auction delivered a higher level of social welfare than the agglomeration payment. However, the agglomeration payment was more efficient budgetarily than the auction, so the comparative performances of the 2 schemes depended on the chosen policy criterion-social welfare or budget efficiency. Both policy criteria are relevant for conservation. Which one should be chosen depends on the problem at hand, for example, whether social preferences should be taken into account in the decision of how much money to invest in conservation or whether the available conservation budget is strictly limited. © 2016 Society for Conservation Biology.

  11. [Current status of illegal trade in pharmaceutical products on Internet auction sites in Japan and responses of site administrators to such transactions].

    PubMed

    Ohtani, Hisakazu; Imaoka, Ayuko; Akiyoshi, Takeshi

    2015-01-01

    In Japan, it is illegal to sell pharmaceuticals on Internet auction sites, although a considerable number of pharmaceuticals are listed on such sites. We investigated the current situation regarding the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals on Japanese Internet auction sites and the responses of site administrators to such transactions. We searched for pharmaceuticals and "gray" items that were suspected of being pharmaceuticals on Yahoo-oku! (Yahoo! Auctions, Japan) over a 37-day period and then submitted violation reports indicating that selling pharmaceuticals is illegal or that the description of an item was insufficient. The reports were directed to the site administrators and forwarded to the sellers. One hundred and six pharmaceutical products and 34 gray items were identified during the study period. After the submission of the violation reports, only 28 of the pharmaceutical products and one of the gray items were deleted by the administrator, while 18 of the pharmaceutical products and 7 of the gray items were withdrawn by their sellers. However, 41 pharmaceuticals and 20 gray items were sold. Most of the gray items were listed using characteristic terms or abbreviations without photographic images. More than 70% of the identified pharmaceuticals had a contraindication(s) other than hypersensitivity. In conclusion, the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals on Internet auction sites remains a serious problem in Japan, and the responses of site administrators to such transactions are inadequate. The government and pharmaceutical industry may have to take measures such as providing public and administrative guidance to stop the illegal trade in pharmaceuticals on the Internet.

  12. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

  13. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance: Treasury 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

  14. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

  15. 31 CFR 356.5 - What types of securities does the Treasury auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... securities. (a) Treasury bills. (1) Are issued at a discount or at par, depending upon the auction results; (2) Are redeemed at their par amount at maturity; and (3) Have maturities of not more than one year... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false What types of securities does the...

  16. 34 CFR 685.202 - Charges for which Direct Loan Program borrowers are responsible.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... held prior to that June 1 plus 3.1 percentage points, but does not exceed 8.25 percent. (ii) Loans... plus 2.5 percentage points, but does not exceed 8.25 percent. (B) During all other periods. The...-day Treasury bills auctioned at the final auction held prior to that June 1 plus 3.1 percentage points...

  17. Teaching Undergraduate Money and Banking: T-Bill Auctions and Stock Market Models

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Saros, Daniel E.

    2009-01-01

    The author offers innovative approaches to 3 topics that are typically only briefly mentioned (if at all) in money and banking courses. The first topic is a Treasury bill auction experiment in which students have an opportunity to participate directly. The results from a class of 14 money and banking students are used to explain how an instructor…

  18. 77 FR 32092 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Scheduled for September 27, 2012; Notice and Filing Requirements...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-05-31

    ... Mobility Fund Phase I support they seek, including any agreements relating to post-auction market structure... FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION [AU Docket No. 12-25; DA 12-641 and DA 12-721] Mobility Fund... million in one-time Mobility Fund Phase I support scheduled to commence on September 27, 2012. The Bureaus...

  19. 76 FR 2920 - Notice of Correction to Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Online Auction of Public Lands in...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-18

    ... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLNVS00560 L58530000.EU0000 241A; N-81926 et al.; 11-08807; TAS: 14X5232] Notice of Correction to Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Online Auction of Public Lands in Clark County, NV AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior. ACTION: Notice of...

  20. 12 CFR 617.7620 - What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? 617.7620 Section 617.7620 Banks and... What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? System institutions electing to sell or lease acquired agricultural real estate or a...

  1. 12 CFR 617.7620 - What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? 617.7620 Section 617.7620 Banks and... What should the System institution do when it decides to sell acquired agricultural real estate at a public auction? System institutions electing to sell or lease acquired agricultural real estate or a...

  2. 76 FR 3892 - Auction of FM Broadcast Construction Permits Rescheduled for April 27, 2011; Notice and Filing...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-01-21

    .... The commenter also argues that, in the event that only one applicant places a bid on a permit, that...). The Commission makes no warranty whatsoever with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall..., 2011 Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens--January 31, 2011; 12 noon ET Short-Form...

  3. 25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted or...

  4. 25 CFR 215.4 - Leases to be sold at public auction.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... 25 Indians 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Leases to be sold at public auction. 215.4 Section 215.4 Indians BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ENERGY AND MINERALS LEAD AND ZINC MINING... provided in the regulations in this part, no lead and zinc mining lease under this part of restricted or...

  5. 75 FR 38545 - Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands in White Pine County, NV

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-07-02

    ... DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Bureau of Land Management [LLNVL01000 L14300000.EU0000 241A; N-86667; 10-08807; MO 4500012445; TAS: 14X5232] Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Auction of Public Lands..., cashier's check, certified check or U.S. postal money order, or any combination thereof, and made payable...

  6. 7 CFR 29.75a - Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... in designated markets. 29.75a Section 29.75a Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... § 29.75a Display of burley tobacco on auction warehouse floors in designated markets. (a)(1) Each lot... arrayed sequence of lots and rows of tobacco, shall have prior approval of the Set Work Leader or Circuit...

  7. 77 FR 15369 - Mobility Fund Phase I Auction GIS Data of Potentially Eligible Census Blocks

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2012-03-15

    ....fcc.gov/auctions/901/ , are the following: Downloadable shapefile Web mapping service MapBox map tiles... GIS software allows you to add this service as a layer to your session or project. 6. MapBox map tiles are cached map tiles of the data. With this open source software approach, these image tiles can be...

  8. Examining the relationship between psychosocial and behavioral proxies for future consumption behavior: self-reported impact and bidding behavior in an experimental auction study on cigarette labeling

    PubMed Central

    Rousu, Matthew C.; Thrasher, James F.

    2014-01-01

    Experimental and observational research often involves asking consumers to self-report the impact of some proposed option. Because self-reported responses involve no consequence to the respondent for falsely revealing how he or she feels about an issue, self-reports may be subject to social desirability and other influences that bias responses in important ways. In this article, we analyzed data from an experiment on the impact of cigarette packaging and pack warnings, comparing smokers’ self-reported impact (four-item scale) and the bids they placed in experimental auctions to estimate differences in demand. The results were consistent across methods; however, the estimated effect size associated with different warning labels was two times greater for the four-item self-reported response scale when compared to the change in demand as indicated by auction bids. Our study provides evidence that self-reported psychosocial responses provide a valid proxy for behavioral change as reflected by experimental auction bidding behavior. More research is needed to better understand the advantages and disadvantages of behavioral economic methods and traditional self-report approaches to evaluating health behavior change interventions. PMID:24399267

  9. Effect of herd cues and product involvement on bidder online choices.

    PubMed

    Chen, Yi-Fen; Wang, Ya-Ju

    2010-08-01

    Previous works have shown that consumers are influenced by others in decision making. Herd behavior is common in situations in which consumers infer product quality from other consumer choices and incorporate that information into their own decision making. This research presents two studies examining herd effect and the moderating role of product involvement on bidder choices in online auctions. The two studies addressed the influence on bidder online choices of herd cues frequently found in online auctions, including feedback ratings and number of questions and answers. The experimental results demonstrated that bidders use online herd cues when making decisions in online auctions. Additionally, the effects of herd cues on bidder online choices were stronger in high-involvement than low-involvement participants. Results and implications are discussed.

  10. Collective induction without cooperation? Learning and knowledge transfer in cooperative groups and competitive auctions.

    PubMed

    Maciejovsky, Boris; Budescu, David V

    2007-05-01

    There is strong evidence that groups perform better than individuals do on intellective tasks with demonstrably correct solutions. Typically, these studies assume that group members share common goals. The authors extend this line of research by replacing standard face-to-face group interactions with competitive auctions, allowing for conflicting individual incentives. In a series of studies involving the well-known Wason selection task, they demonstrate that competitive auctions induce learning effects equally impressive as those of standard group interactions, and they uncover specific and general knowledge transfers from these institutions to new reasoning problems. The authors identify payoff feedback and information pooling as the driving factors underlying these findings, and they explain these factors within the theoretical framework of collective induction. ((c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved).

  11. Variability of Valuation of Non-Monetary Incentives: Motivating and Implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-03-01

    homeport, geographic stability for two tours and compressed work week; homeport, lump sum SRB, and telecommuting ). The Monte Carlo simulation...Geographic stability 2 tours, and compressed work week). The Add 2 combination includes home port choice, lump sum SRB, and telecommuting ...VALUATION OF NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES: MOTIVATING AND IMPLEMENTING THE COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM by Jason Blake Ellis March 2009

  12. 75 FR 47637 - Prohibited Transaction Exemptions and Grant of Individual Exemptions Involving: 2010-23, D-11500...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-08-06

    ... the past sale of certain Auction Rate Securities (ARS) by the Four-Way Tool & Die, Inc. Profit Sharing... of section 4975 of the Code. (A) The subject ARS were acquired for the Plan by Citizens Bank Wealth...) The last auction for each of the ARS was unsuccessful; (C) The sale of the ARS was directly between...

  13. 75 FR 17966 - Application No. and Proposed Exemption involving D-11565, Citizens Bank Wealth Management, N.A.

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-04-08

    ..., 2008, to the past sale of certain Auction Rate Securities (ARS) by the Four-Way Tool & Die, Inc. Profit... corresponding provisions of section 4975 of the Code. (A) The subject ARS were acquired for the Plan by Citizens... independent broker; (B) The last auction for each of the ARS was unsuccessful; (C) The sale of the ARS was...

  14. 78 FR 50086 - Notice of Competitive Auction for Solar Energy Development on Public Lands in the State of Colorado

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-08-16

    ... Competitive Auction for Solar Energy Development on Public Lands in the State of Colorado AGENCY: Bureau of...) application and a plan of development for solar energy projects on approximately 3,705 acres of public land in... designated Solar Energy Zones (SEZ): Los Mogotes East SEZ and De Tilla Gulch SEZ. Applications for solar...

  15. Timber sale value as a function of sale characteristics and number of bidders

    Treesearch

    Paul E. Sendak; Paul E. Sendak

    1991-01-01

    Examines the effect of sale characteristics and number of bidders on sale value for timber sold by sealed-bid auction on the Green Mountain National Forest in Vermont. As anticipated from theory and previous empirical studies, increasing the number of bidders tended to increase the winning-bid value for the timber auctions studied. Efforts made to ensure that a timber...

  16. 31 CFR 356.4 - What are the book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 31 Money and Finance:Treasury 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false What are the book-entry systems in... BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT SALE AND ISSUE OF MARKETABLE BOOK-ENTRY TREASURY BILLS, NOTES, AND BONDS... book-entry systems in which auctioned Treasury securities may be issued or maintained? There are three...

  17. A detailed heterogeneous agent model for a single asset financial market with trading via an order book.

    PubMed

    Mota Navarro, Roberto; Larralde, Hernán

    2017-01-01

    We present an agent based model of a single asset financial market that is capable of replicating most of the non-trivial statistical properties observed in real financial markets, generically referred to as stylized facts. In our model agents employ strategies inspired on those used in real markets, and a realistic trade mechanism based on a double auction order book. We study the role of the distinct types of trader on the return statistics: specifically, correlation properties (or lack thereof), volatility clustering, heavy tails, and the degree to which the distribution can be described by a log-normal. Further, by introducing the practice of "profit taking", our model is also capable of replicating the stylized fact related to an asymmetry in the distribution of losses and gains.

  18. A detailed heterogeneous agent model for a single asset financial market with trading via an order book

    PubMed Central

    2017-01-01

    We present an agent based model of a single asset financial market that is capable of replicating most of the non-trivial statistical properties observed in real financial markets, generically referred to as stylized facts. In our model agents employ strategies inspired on those used in real markets, and a realistic trade mechanism based on a double auction order book. We study the role of the distinct types of trader on the return statistics: specifically, correlation properties (or lack thereof), volatility clustering, heavy tails, and the degree to which the distribution can be described by a log-normal. Further, by introducing the practice of “profit taking”, our model is also capable of replicating the stylized fact related to an asymmetry in the distribution of losses and gains. PMID:28245251

  19. Microscopic understanding of heavy-tailed return distributions in an agent-based model

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Schmitt, Thilo A.; Schäfer, Rudi; Münnix, Michael C.; Guhr, Thomas

    2012-11-01

    The distribution of returns in financial time series exhibits heavy tails. It has been found that gaps between the orders in the order book lead to large price shifts and thereby to these heavy tails. We set up an agent-based model to study this issue and, in particular, how the gaps in the order book emerge. The trading mechanism in our model is based on a double-auction order book. In situations where the order book is densely occupied with limit orders we do not observe fat-tailed distributions. As soon as less liquidity is available, a gap structure forms which leads to return distributions with heavy tails. We show that return distributions with heavy tails are an order-book effect if the available liquidity is constrained. This is largely independent of specific trading strategies.

  20. Auction-based distributed efficient economic operations of microgrid systems

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zou, Suli; Ma, Zhongjing; Liu, Xiangdong

    2014-12-01

    This paper studies the economic operations of the microgrid in a distributed way such that the operational schedule of each of the units, like generators, load units, storage units, etc., in a microgrid system, is implemented by autonomous agents. We apply and generalise the progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism which was proposed by Lazar and Semret to efficiently allocate the divisible network resources. Considering the economic operation for the microgrid systems, the generators play as sellers to supply energy and the load units play as the buyers to consume energy, while a storage unit, like battery, super capacitor, etc., may transit between buyer and seller, such that it is a buyer when it charges and becomes a seller when it discharges. Furthermore in a connected mode, each individual unit competes against not only the other individual units in the microgrid but also the exogenous main grid possessing fixed electricity price and infinite trade capacity; that is to say, the auctioneer assigns the electricity among all individual units and the main grid with respect to the submitted bid strategies of all individual units in the microgrid in an economic way. Due to these distinct characteristics, the underlying auction games are distinct from those studied in the literature. We show that under mild conditions, the efficient economic operation strategy is a Nash equilibrium (NE) for the PSP auction games, and propose a distributed algorithm under which the system can converge to an NE. We also show that the performance of worst NE can be bounded with respect to the system parameters, say the energy trading price with the main grid, and based upon that, the implemented NE is unique and efficient under some conditions.

  1. Balancing Army and endangered species concerns: Green vs. Green.

    PubMed

    McKee, M; Berrens, R P

    2001-01-01

    A number of endangered, threatened, or at-risk species have been identified on US Army training bases. Before further training is restricted or curtailed under provisions of the US Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Army can explore available proactive options for providing habitat protection and mitigation. This paper investigates the possibility of an Army habitat acquisition program to acquire (by lease or purchase) buffer zones of at-risk species' habitat around its bases and away from training. To identify the most cost-effective manner for acquiring habitat, auction market experiments are utilized for analyzing program design. Laboratory auction experiments provide a powerful and low-cost vehicle for investigating ex ante program design issues. We find the discriminative, as opposed to a uniform price, auction with a minimum quantity requirement to be the least-cost mechanism.

  2. Essays in financial transmission rights pricing

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Posner, Barry

    This work examines issues in the pricing of financial transmission rights in the PJM market region. The US federal government is advocating the creation of large-scale, not-for-profit regional transmission organizations to increase the efficiency of the transmission of electricity. As a non-profit entity, PJM needs to allocate excess revenues collected as congestion rents, and the participants in the transmission markets need to be able to hedge their exposure to congestion rents. For these purposes, PJM has developed an instrument known as the financial transmission right (FTR). This research, utilizing a new data set assembled by the author, looks at two aspects of the FTR market. The first chapter examines the problem of forecasting congestion in a transmission grid. In the PJM FTR system firms bid in a competitive auction for FTRs that cover a period of one month. The auctions take place in the middle of the previous month; therefore firms have to forecast congestion rents for the period two to six weeks after the auction. The common methods of forecasting congestion are either time-series models or full-information engineering studies. In this research, the author develops a forecasting system that is more economically grounded than a simple time-series model, but requires less information than an engineering model. This method is based upon the arbitrage-cost methodology, whereby congesting is calculated as the difference of two non-observable variables: the transmission price difference that would exist in the total absence of transmission capacity between two nodes, and the ability of the existing transmission to reduced that price difference. If the ability to reduce the price difference is greater than the price difference, then the cost of electricity at each node will be the same, and congestion rent will be zero. If transmission capacity limits are binding on the flow of power, then a price difference persists and congestion rents exist. Three transmission paths in the Delmarva Peninsula were examined. The maximum-likelihood two-way Tobit model developed in Chapter One consistently predicts the expected responses to the independent variables that have employed, but the model as defined here does a poor job of predicting prices. This is likely due to the inability to include system outages (i.e., short-term changes in the structure of the transmission grid) as variables in the estimation model. The second chapter addresses the behavior of firms in the monthly auctions for FTRs. FTRs are a claim to congestion rent revenues along a certain path within the PJM grid, and are awarded in a uniform-price divisible-goods auction. Firms typically submit a schedule of bids for different amounts of FTR at different prices, akin to a demand curve. A firm bidding too high a price may cause the clearing price of the FTR to be higher than the realized value of the FTR, creating a loss from ownership of the FTR. A firm bidding too low means that it wins no FTRs, depriving itself of the ability to profit from ownership or to hedge against congestion. Several questions concerning firm behavior are addressed in this study. It is found that firms adjust their bids in response to new information that is obtained from past auctions: they raise or lower bids in accordance with changes in recent FTR prices and payoffs. Firms consistently bid below the value of the FTR (i.e., shade their bids). This adds empirical evidence to the theoretically-posited notion that uniform-price auctions are not truth-telling, unlike the second-price auction for a non-divisible good. Firms employ greater bid-shading in response to increases in the volatility of both FTR clearing prices and realized FTR values. This validates the notion that firms are risk-averse. It is discovered that better-informed "insider" firms employ structurally different bidding strategies, but these differences do not lead to greater profits. However, profits do increase as firms gain more experience in these markets, lending credence to the notion that firms learn over time and that markets discipline poorly performing firms by either educating them or driving them out of the market. It is also found that firms that employ complicated bidding strategies enjoy greater profitability than firms which employ simple bidding strategies. A surprising corollary finding is that firm strategies do not converge to a common form, but that different firms continue to employ different strategies, and often move away from the seemingly dominant strategy. Firms can enter this market as either long-buyers or short-sellers, and it is discovered that long and short players display structurally divergent bidding strategies. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that long players can be either hedgers or speculators, but short players are overwhelmingly speculators.

  3. 75 FR 54928 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-09-09

    ... (``LOC'') orders executed in the NYSE Closing Auction. For stocks with a per share stock price of $1.00... stocks with a per share stock price less than $1.00 per share, the fee will change from (A) the lesser of... LOC orders executed in the NYSE Closing Auction. For stocks with a per share stock price of $1.00 or...

  4. 31 CFR 356.13 - When must I report my net long position and how do I calculate it?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... auctioned you must report a zero. (iii) the total of your bids and your net long position in the security... blank) or report your net long position. (2) Also, if you have more than one bid in an auction and you must report either your net long position or a zero, you must report that figure only once. Finally, if...

  5. A Virtual Field Trip to the Real World of Cap and Trade: Environmental Economics and the EPA SO[subscript 2] Allowance Auction

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Lewis, Lynne Y.

    2011-01-01

    In the spring of 2001, Bates College Environmental Economics classes bought their first sulfur dioxide emissions allowance at U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's annual auction, then conducted by the Chicago Board of Trade. In the spring of 2010, they bought their 22nd through 34th allowances. This article describes a three-part method for…

  6. DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Marathe, Aniruddha P.; Harris, Rachel A.; Lowenthal, David K.

    The use of clouds to execute high-performance computing (HPC) applications has greatly increased recently. Clouds provide several potential advantages over traditional supercomputers and in-house clusters. The most popular cloud is currently Amazon EC2, which provides fixed-cost and variable-cost, auction-based options. The auction market trades lower cost for potential interruptions that necessitate checkpointing; if the market price exceeds the bid price, a node is taken away from the user without warning. We explore techniques to maximize performance per dollar given a time constraint within which an application must complete. Specifically, we design and implement multiple techniques to reduce expected cost bymore » exploiting redundancy in the EC2 auction market. We then design an adaptive algorithm that selects a scheduling algorithm and determines the bid price. We show that our adaptive algorithm executes programs up to seven times cheaper than using the on-demand market and up to 44 percent cheaper than the best non-redundant, auction-market algorithm. We extend our adaptive algorithm to incorporate application scalability characteristics for further cost savings. In conclusion, we show that the adaptive algorithm informed with scalability characteristics of applications achieves up to 56 percent cost savings compared to the expected cost for the base adaptive algorithm run at a fixed, user-defined scale.« less

  7. An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT.

    PubMed

    Chen, Xin; Xing, Lei; Qiu, Tie; Li, Zhuo

    2017-02-16

    The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP) and femtocell holders (FHs) as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0-1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing.

  8. 31 CFR 356.12 - What are the different types of bids and do they have specific requirements or restrictions?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... the specific security being auctioned; (ii) For which the security being auctioned is one of several... increments. The third decimal must be either a zero or a five, for example, 5.320 or 5.325. We will treat any missing decimals as zero, for example, a bid of 5.32 will be treated as 5.320. The rate bid may be a...

  9. The Allocation of Runway Slots by Auction. Volume II. The Airline Management Game and Slot Auction Testing.

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1980-04-15

    schedule their air transportation networks, and learn the performance and financial results through simulation of the resulting traffic flows, costs...players in the role of airline management responsible for airline scheduling and market, fleet and financial planning. The Game Administrator created a...revenues and consequently the financial results for each airline. During this exercise the objective of each airline team was to schedule its flights so

  10. Responses to the advanced notice of proposed rulemaking EPA published on June 6, 1996 regarding changes to the EPA allowance auctions and elimination of the direct sale

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Critchfield, L.R.

    1997-12-31

    On June 6, 1996, EPA`s Acid Rain Program published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register seeking comment on: (1) whether to change the design of the annual sulfur dioxide (SO{sub 2}) allowance auctions; (2) whether to change the timing of the allowance auctions; (3) whether to change the requirement that the minimum price of offered allowances must be in whole dollars, and (4) whether EPA should propose the ability to submit allowance transfers electronically. EPA also published on that day a proposed and direct final rule on whether to eliminate the direct sale. This papermore » documents the issues addressed in the ANPRM, the comments EPA received, and EPA`s responses to those comments. EPA received comments from 14 separate commenters.« less

  11. Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Mous, Lonneke; Robu, Valentin; La Poutré, Han

    This paper studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face when participating in multiple, sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementary-valued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this model from a decision-theoretic perspective and we show, for a setting where the competition is formed by local bidders, that using options can increase the expected profit for both buyers and sellers. Furthermore, we derive the equations that provide minimum and maximum bounds between which a synergy buyer's bids should fall in order for both sides to have an incentive to use the options mechanism. Next, we perform an experimental analysis of a market in which multiple synergy bidders are active simultaneously.

  12. Encouraging information sharing to boost the name-your-own-price auction

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chen, Yahong; Li, Jinlin; Huang, He; Ran, Lun; Hu, Yusheng

    2017-08-01

    During a name-your-own-price (NYOP) auction, buyers can learn a lot of knowledge from their socially connected peers. Such social learning process makes them become more active to attend the auction and also helps them make decisions on what price to submit. Combining an information diffusion model and a belief decision model, we explore three effects of bidders' information sharing on the buyers' behaviors and the seller profit. The results indicate that information sharing significantly increases the NYOP popularity and the seller profit. When enlarging the quality or quantity of information sharing, or increasing the spreading efficiency of the network topology, the number of attenders and the seller profit are increased significantly. However, the spread of information may make bidders be more likely to bid higher and consequently lose surplus. In addition, the different but interdependent influence of the successful information and failure information are discussed in this work.

  13. Equilibrium Strategy and Population-Size Effects in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Pigolotti, Simone; Bernhardsson, Sebastian; Juul, Jeppe; Galster, Gorm; Vivo, Pierpaolo

    2012-02-01

    In lowest unique bid auctions, N players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the lowest bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium distribution of strategies. We then study the properties of the solution as a function of the mean number of players, and compare them with a large data set of internet auctions. The theory agrees with the data with striking accuracy for small population-size N, while for larger N a qualitatively different distribution is observed. We interpret this result as the emergence of two different regimes, one in which adaptation is feasible and one in which it is not. Our results question the actual possibility of a large population to adapt and find the optimal strategy when participating in a collective game.

  14. Exploiting Redundancy and Application Scalability for Cost-Effective, Time-Constrained Execution of HPC Applications on Amazon EC2

    DOE PAGES

    Marathe, Aniruddha P.; Harris, Rachel A.; Lowenthal, David K.; ...

    2015-12-17

    The use of clouds to execute high-performance computing (HPC) applications has greatly increased recently. Clouds provide several potential advantages over traditional supercomputers and in-house clusters. The most popular cloud is currently Amazon EC2, which provides fixed-cost and variable-cost, auction-based options. The auction market trades lower cost for potential interruptions that necessitate checkpointing; if the market price exceeds the bid price, a node is taken away from the user without warning. We explore techniques to maximize performance per dollar given a time constraint within which an application must complete. Specifically, we design and implement multiple techniques to reduce expected cost bymore » exploiting redundancy in the EC2 auction market. We then design an adaptive algorithm that selects a scheduling algorithm and determines the bid price. We show that our adaptive algorithm executes programs up to seven times cheaper than using the on-demand market and up to 44 percent cheaper than the best non-redundant, auction-market algorithm. We extend our adaptive algorithm to incorporate application scalability characteristics for further cost savings. In conclusion, we show that the adaptive algorithm informed with scalability characteristics of applications achieves up to 56 percent cost savings compared to the expected cost for the base adaptive algorithm run at a fixed, user-defined scale.« less

  15. An Auction-Based Spectrum Leasing Mechanism for Mobile Macro-Femtocell Networks of IoT

    PubMed Central

    Chen, Xin; Xing, Lei; Qiu, Tie; Li, Zhuo

    2017-01-01

    The Internet of Things (IoT) is a vision of the upcoming society. It can provide pervasive communication between two or more entities using 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) communication technology. In 4G-LTE networks, there are two important problems: helping manage the spectrum demands of IoT devices and achieving much more revenue with the limited resource. This paper proposes a pricing framework to investigate the spectrum leasing in mobile heterogeneous networks with single macrocell and multiple femtocells. We modeled the leasing procedure between the macrocell service provider (MSP) and femtocell holders (FHs) as an auction to motivate the MSP to lease its spectrum resource. All FHs act as the bidders, and the monopolist MSP acts as the auctioneer. In the auction, FHs submit their bids to rent the spectrum resource so that they can make a profit by selling it to their subscribers. The MSP determines the spectrum leasing amount and chooses the winning FHs by solving the dynamic programming-based 0–1 knapsack problem. In our proposed framework, we focus on the spectrum pricing strategy and revenue maximization of the MSP. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme provides effective motivation for the MSP to lease the spectrum to FHs, and both the MSP and FHs can benefit from spectrum leasing. PMID:28212317

  16. Asset price and trade volume relation in artificial market impacted by value investors

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tangmongkollert, K.; Suwanna, S.

    2016-05-01

    The relationship between return and trade volume has been of great interests in a financial market. The appearance of asymmetry in the price-volume relation in the bull and bear market is still unsettled. We present a model of the value investor traders (VIs) in the double auction system, in which agents make trading decision based on the pseudo fundamental price modelled by sawtooth oscillations. We investigate the system by two different time series for the asset fundamental price: one corresponds to the fundamental price in a growing phase; and the other corresponds to that in a declining phase. The simulation results show that the trade volume is proportional to the difference between the market price and the fundamental price, and that there is asymmetry between the buying and selling phases. Furthermore, the selling phase has more significant impact of price on the trade volume than the buying phase.

  17. AEP Ohio gridSMART Demonstration Project Real-Time Pricing Demonstration Analysis

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Widergren, Steven E.; Subbarao, Krishnappa; Fuller, Jason C.

    2014-02-01

    This report contributes initial findings from an analysis of significant aspects of the gridSMART® Real-Time Pricing (RTP) – Double Auction demonstration project. Over the course of four years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) worked with American Electric Power (AEP), Ohio and Battelle Memorial Institute to design, build, and operate an innovative system to engage residential consumers and their end-use resources in a participatory approach to electric system operations, an incentive-based approach that has the promise of providing greater efficiency under normal operating conditions and greater flexibility to react under situations of system stress. The material contained in this report supplementsmore » the findings documented by AEP Ohio in the main body of the gridSMART report. It delves into three main areas: impacts on system operations, impacts on households, and observations about the sensitivity of load to price changes.« less

  18. The value of information in a multi-agent market model. The luck of the uninformed

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Tóth, B.; Scalas, E.; Huber, J.; Kirchler, M.

    2007-01-01

    We present an experimental and simulated model of a multi-agent stock market driven by a double auction order matching mechanism. Studying the effect of cumulative information on the performance of traders, we find a non monotonic relationship of net returns of traders as a function of information levels, both in the experiments and in the simulations. Particularly, averagely informed traders perform worse than the non informed and only traders with high levels of information (insiders) are able to beat the market. The simulations and the experiments reproduce many stylized facts of tick-by-tick stock-exchange data, such as fast decay of autocorrelation of returns, volatility clustering and fat-tailed distribution of returns. These results have an important message for everyday life. They can give a possible explanation why, on average, professional fund managers perform worse than the market index.

  19. A Centralized Auction Mechanism for the Disability and Survivors Insurance in Chile

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Reyes H., Gonzalo

    As part of the pension reform recently approved in Chile, the government introduced a centralized auction mechanism to provide the Disability and Survivors (D&S) Insurance that covers recent contributors among the more than 8 million participants in the mandatory private pension system. This paper is intended as a case study presenting the main distortions found in the decentralized operation of the system that led to this reform and the challenges faced when designing a competitive auction mechanism to be implemented jointly by the Pension Fund Managers (AFP). In a typical bilateral contract the AFP retained much of the risk and the Insurance Company acted in practice as a reinsurer. The process to hire this contract was not competitive and colligated companies ended up providing the service. Several distortions affected competition in the market through incentives to cream-skim members by AFPs (since they bear most of the risk) or efforts to block disability claims. Since the price of this insurance is hidden in the fees charged by AFPs for the administration of individual accounts and pension funds there was lack of price transparency. Since new AFPs have no history of members’ disability and mortality profile the insurance contract acted as a barrier to entry in the market of AFP services, especially when D&S insurance costs reached 50% of total costs. Cross-subsidies between members of the same AFP, inefficient risk pooling (due to pooling occurring at the AFP rather than at the system level) and regulatory arbitrage, since AFPs provided insurance not being regulated as an insurance company, were also present. A centralized auction mechanism solves these market failures, but also gives raise to new challenges, such as how to design a competitive auction that attracts participation and deters collusion. Design features that were incorporated in the regulation to tackle these issues, such as dividing coverage into predefined percentage blocks, are presented here.

  20. Estimating the impact of various menu labeling formats on parents' demand for fast-food kids' meals for their children: An experimental auction.

    PubMed

    Hobin, Erin; Lillico, Heather; Zuo, Fei; Sacco, Jocelyn; Rosella, Laura; Hammond, David

    2016-10-01

    This study experimentally tested whether parents' demand for fast-food kids' meals for their children is influenced by various menu labeling formats disclosing calorie and sodium information. The study also examined the effect of various menu labeling formats on parents' ability to identify fast-food kids' meals with higher calorie and sodium content. Online surveys were conducted among parents of children aged 3-12. Parents were randomized to view 1 of 5 menu conditions: 1) No Nutrition Information; 2) Calories-Only; 3) Calories + Contextual Statement (CS); 4) Calories, Sodium, + CS; and, 5) Calorie and Sodium in Traffic Lights + CS. Using an established experimental auction study design, parents viewed replicated McDonald's menus according to their assigned condition and were asked to bid on 4 Happy Meals. A randomly selected price was chosen; bids equal to or above this price "won" the auction, and bids less than this price "lost" the auction. After the auction, participants were asked to identify the Happy Meal with the highest calories and sodium content. Adjusting for multiple comparisons and covariates, the Calories, Sodium, + CS menu had a mean attributed value across all 4 Happy Meals which was 8% lower (-$0.31) than the Calories + CS menu (p < 0.05). Significantly more parents in the 4 menu conditions providing calories were able to correctly identify the Happy Meal with the highest calories (p < 0.0001) and significantly more parents in the 2 conditions providing sodium information were able to correctly identify the Happy Meal with the highest sodium content (p < 0.0001). Menus disclosing both calories and sodium information may reduce demand for fast-food kids' meals and better support parents in making more informed and healthier food choices for their children. Copyright © 2016. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

  1. The Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh: Sale of its Library at Sotheby's *

    PubMed Central

    Crawford, Helen

    1970-01-01

    The library of the Royal Medical Society of Edinburgh, which has been in existence for nearly 250 years, was sold by Sotheby & Co. of London at three auction sales during 1969. The author describes her attendance at the three sales, with emphasis on the most valuable items sold and the considerable acquisitions made for the Middleton Medical Library of the University of Wisconsin. Concluding observations concern some of the practical problems of acquiring antiquarian books at auction. Images PMID:5496237

  2. Strategies of Adaptation: A Soviet Enterprise Under Perestroika and Privatization

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1991-06-01

    Rozhkov. "The Beginnings of Producer Goods Auctions in the USSR." A. Bardhan and Gregory Grossman. "A Producer Goods Auction in the USSR." 23. Kimberly...similar sort of investment hunger. Leggett (1983, p . 142) reports that, in 1980, the amount of unfinished construction was equivalent to about six percent...of the value of the total capital stock in the economy, and to almost eighty percent of total fixed capital investment. According to Aslund (1989, p

  3. Multiagent model and mean field theory of complex auction dynamics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chen, Qinghua; Huang, Zi-Gang; Wang, Yougui; Lai, Ying-Cheng

    2015-09-01

    Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in analyzing a variety of socio-economic phenomena using methods from statistical and nonlinear physics. We study a class of complex systems arising from economics, the lowest unique bid auction (LUBA) systems, which is a recently emerged class of online auction game systems. Through analyzing large, empirical data sets of LUBA, we identify a general feature of the bid price distribution: an inverted J-shaped function with exponential decay in the large bid price region. To account for the distribution, we propose a multi-agent model in which each agent bids stochastically in the field of winner’s attractiveness, and develop a theoretical framework to obtain analytic solutions of the model based on mean field analysis. The theory produces bid-price distributions that are in excellent agreement with those from the real data. Our model and theory capture the essential features of human behaviors in the competitive environment as exemplified by LUBA, and may provide significant quantitative insights into complex socio-economic phenomena.

  4. Integrating watershed hydrology and economics to establish a local market for water quality improvement: A field experiment.

    PubMed

    Uchida, Emi; Swallow, Stephen K; Gold, Arthur; Opaluch, James; Kafle, Achyut; Merrill, Nathaniel; Michaud, Clayton; Gill, Carrie Anne

    2018-04-01

    Innovative market mechanisms are being increasingly recognized as effective decision-making institutions to incorporate the value of ecosystem services into the economy. We present a field experiment that integrates an economic auction and a biophysical water flux model to develop a local market process consisting of both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, we operate an auction with small-scale livestock owners who bid for contracts to implement site-specific manure management practices that reduce phosphorus loadings to a major reservoir. On the demand side, we implement a real money, multi-unit public good auction for these contracts with residents who potentially benefit from reduced water quality risks. The experiments allow us to construct supply and demand curves to find an equilibrium price for water quality improvement. The field experiments provide a proof-of-concept for practical implementation of a local market for environmental improvements, even for the challenging context of nonpoint pollution.

  5. Effect of management, marketing, and certified health programs on the sale price of beef calves sold through a livestock video auction service from 1995 through 2009.

    PubMed

    Seeger, Jon T; King, Michael E; Grotelueschen, Dale M; Rogers, Glenn M; Stokka, Gerald S

    2011-08-15

    To evaluate and update the previously quantified effects of management, marketing, and certified health programs on the sale price of beef calves sold through a livestock video auction service. Longitudinal study. 41,657 lots representing 5,042,272 beef calves sold from 1995 through 2009. Data describing each lot of beef calves marketed from 1995 through 2009 by a livestock video auction service were obtained from sale catalogues. For each year of the study, multiple regression analysis was used to quantify the effect of management, marketing, and certified health programs on sale price. Sale date, base sale weight, quadratic effect of base weight, sex of calf, region of origin, breed description, inclusion in a certified health program, and number of calves in the lot significantly affected sale price for every year of the study. Variation in body weight, flesh score, and number of days between sale and delivery date had significant effects on price in most of the years; frame score and calves with horns affected price in 7 of 15 years; age and source verification influenced sale price in every year since source verification was introduced in 2005; and the auction service's progressive genetics program increased price during the 1 year that program was available. Some management, marketing, and certified health initiatives have consistently increased the sale price of beef calves, and producers can increase the price of their calves by implementing these practices.

  6. Clean air, clear market. Making emissions trading work: The role of a computer-assisted auction

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Bartels, C.W.; Marron, D.B.; Lipsky, M.I.

    1993-06-15

    Creating a new commodity presents the chance to develop new markets in which to trade it. In many cases, existing markets can be adapted easily; in other cases it proves worthwhile to develop new forms that reflect special characteristics of the commodity and those who trade it. In the case of the sulfur dioxide (SO[sub 2]) emission allowances created by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, a number of standard market forms already have been adopted. While these will prove useful for handling some transactions, a new Market Clearing Auction (MCA) offers buyers and sellers a centralized marketplace formore » trading SO[sub 2] emission allowances. The MCA, which was developed by the brokerage firm Cantor Fitzgerald, is a computer-assisted [open quotes]smart[close quotes] auction designed to replicate the outcome of an efficient market in emission allowances, and accepts bids and offers for any possible combination of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances. Orders can be submitted for streams of allowances covering more than one year. The auction then determines the combination of bids and offers that maximizes the gains from trades in the market, and establishes uniform market clearing prices for each allowance issue (1995, 1996, and so on). Once executed, trades are settled on a cash-forward basis; that is, allowances are delivered and payments are made at future dates.« less

  7. A Winner Determination Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions Based on Hybrid Artificial Fish Swarm Algorithm

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Zheng, Genrang; Lin, ZhengChun

    The problem of winner determination in combinatorial auctions is a hotspot electronic business, and a NP hard problem. A Hybrid Artificial Fish Swarm Algorithm(HAFSA), which is combined with First Suite Heuristic Algorithm (FSHA) and Artificial Fish Swarm Algorithm (AFSA), is proposed to solve the problem after probing it base on the theories of AFSA. Experiment results show that the HAFSA is a rapidly and efficient algorithm for The problem of winner determining. Compared with Ant colony Optimization Algorithm, it has a good performance with broad and prosperous application.

  8. Essays on restructured electricity markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Nicholson, Emma Leah

    This dissertation focuses on the performance of restructured electricity markets in the United States. In chapter 1, I study bidder-specific offer caps ("BSOCs") which are used to mitigate market power in three wholesale electricity markets. The price of electricity is determined through multi-unit uniform price auctions and BSOCs impose an upper limit, which is increasing in marginal cost, on each generator's bid. I apply BSOCs in both the uniform and discriminatory price auctions and characterize the equilibria in a two firm model with stochastic demand. BSOCs unambiguously increase expected production efficiency in the uniform price auction and they can increase the expected profit of the generator with the lower cap. Chapter 2, coauthored with Ramteen Sioshansi, Ph.D., compares two types of uniform price auction formats used in wholesale electricity markets, centrally committed markets and self committed markets. In centrally committed markets, generators submit two-part bids consisting of a fixed startup cost and a variable (per MWh) energy cost, and the auctioneer ensures that no generator operates at a loss. Generators in self committed markets must incorporate their startup costs into their one part energy bids. We derive Nash equilibria for both the centrally and self committed electricity markets in a model with two symmetric generators with nonconvex costs and deterministic demand. Using a numerical example, we demonstrate that if the caps on the bid elements are chosen appropriately, the two market designs are equivalent in terms of generator revenues and settlement costs. Regulators and prominent academic experts believe that electric restructuring polices have stifled investment in new generation capacity. In chapter 3 I seek to determine whether these fears are supported by empirical evidence. I examine both total investment in megawatts and the number of new investments across regions that adopted different electric restructuring policies to determine whether electric restructuring is associated with lower levels of investment in new generation capacity. The estimation results do not prove that total investment levels are lower in regions with restructured electric systems, but I cannot rule the possibility out.

  9. Control system of the inspection robots group applying auctions and multi-criteria analysis for task allocation

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Panfil, Wawrzyniec; Moczulski, Wojciech

    2017-10-01

    In the paper presented is a control system of a mobile robots group intended for carrying out inspection missions. The main research problem was to define such a control system in order to facilitate a cooperation of the robots resulting in realization of the committed inspection tasks. Many of the well-known control systems use auctions for tasks allocation, where a subject of an auction is a task to be allocated. It seems that in the case of missions characterized by much larger number of tasks than number of robots it will be better if robots (instead of tasks) are subjects of auctions. The second identified problem concerns the one-sided robot-to-task fitness evaluation. Simultaneous assessment of the robot-to-task fitness and task attractiveness for robot should affect positively for the overall effectiveness of the multi-robot system performance. The elaborated system allows to assign tasks to robots using various methods for evaluation of fitness between robots and tasks, and using some tasks allocation methods. There is proposed the method for multi-criteria analysis, which is composed of two assessments, i.e. robot's concurrency position for task among other robots and task's attractiveness for robot among other tasks. Furthermore, there are proposed methods for tasks allocation applying the mentioned multi-criteria analysis method. The verification of both the elaborated system and the proposed tasks' allocation methods was carried out with the help of simulated experiments. The object under test was a group of inspection mobile robots being a virtual counterpart of the real mobile-robot group.

  10. Quantum auctions: Facts and myths

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Piotrowski, Edward W.; Sładkowski, Jan

    2008-06-01

    Quantum game theory, whatever opinions may be held due to its abstract physical formalism, have already found various applications even outside the orthodox physics domain. In this paper we introduce the concept of a quantum auction, its advantages and drawbacks. Then we describe the models that have already been put forward. A general model involves Wigner formalism and infinite dimensional Hilbert spaces - we envisage that the implementation might not be an easy task. But a restricted model advocated by the Hewlett-Packard group (Hogg et al.) seems to be much easier to implement. We focus on problems related to combinatorial auctions and technical assumptions that are made. Powerful quantum algorithms for finding solutions would extend the range of possible applications. Quantum strategies, being qubits, can be teleported but are immune from cloning - therefore extreme privacy of the agent’s activity could in principle be guaranteed. Then we point out some key problems that have to be solved before commercial use would be possible. With present technology, optical networks, single photon sources and detectors seems to be sufficient for an experimental realization in the near future.

  11. Trends in Wage and Income Distribution Under Gorbachev, Analysis of New Soviet Data

    DTIC Science & Technology

    1991-02-01

    Producer Goods Auctions. September 1990. 73 pp. Y. Chemisheva and M. Rozhkov. "The Beginnings of Producer Goods Auctions in the USSR." A. Bardhan and...250-300 1.3 2.1 3.8 5.6 7.7 Over 300 0.4 1.1 2.0 3.4 6.2 9.6 SOURCE: Figures given in Trud v SSSR [1988, p . 146] have been adjusted by excluding part...this effect. The case of state subsidies is more complicated. BERGSON [1984, p . 1075] suggests that, on balance, subsidies tend to even out

  12. Commodity durability, trader specialization, and market performance

    PubMed Central

    Dickhaut, John; Lin, Shengle; Porter, David; Smith, Vernon

    2012-01-01

    The original double auction studies of supply and demand markets established their strong efficiency and equilibrium convergence behavior using economically unsophisticated and untrained subjects. The results were unexpected because all individual costs and values were private and dependent entirely on the market trading process to aggregate the dispersed information into socially desirable outcomes. The exchange environment, however, corresponded to that of perishable, and not re-traded goods in which participants were specialized as buyers or sellers. We report experiments in repeated single-period markets where tradability, and buyer-seller role specialization, is varied by imposing or relaxing a restriction on re-trade within each period. In re-trade markets scope is given to speculative motives unavailable where goods perish on purchase. We observe greatly increased trade volume and decreased efficiency but subject experience increases efficiency. Observed speculation slows convergence by impeding the process whereby individuals learn from the market whether their private circumstances lead them to specialize as buyers or sellers. PMID:22307595

  13. On fair, effective and efficient REDD mechanism design

    PubMed Central

    2009-01-01

    The issues surrounding 'Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation' (REDD) have become a major component of continuing negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This paper aims to address two key requirements of any potential REDD mechanism: first, the generation of measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) REDD credits; and secondly, the sustainable and efficient provision of emission reductions under a robust financing regime. To ensure the supply of MRV credits, we advocate the establishment of an 'International Emission Reference Scenario Coordination Centre' (IERSCC). The IERSCC would act as a global clearing house for harmonized data to be used in implementing reference level methodologies. It would be tasked with the collection, reporting and subsequent processing of earth observation, deforestation- and degradation driver information in a globally consistent manner. The IERSCC would also assist, coordinate and supervise the computation of national reference scenarios according to rules negotiated under the UNFCCC. To overcome the threats of "market flooding" on the one hand and insufficient economic incentives for REDD on the other hand, we suggest an 'International Investment Reserve' (IIR) as REDD financing framework. In order to distribute the resources of the IIR we propose adopting an auctioning mechanism. Auctioning not only reveals the true emission reduction costs, but might also allow for incentivizing the protection of biodiversity and socio-economic values. The introduced concepts will be vital to ensure robustness, environmental integrity and economic efficiency of the future REDD mechanism. PMID:19943927

  14. Autonomous Guidance Strategy for Spacecraft Formations and Reconfiguration Maneuvers

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wahl, Theodore P.

    A guidance strategy for autonomous spacecraft formation reconfiguration maneuvers is presented. The guidance strategy is presented as an algorithm that solves the linked assignment and delivery problems. The assignment problem is the task of assigning the member spacecraft of the formation to their new positions in the desired formation geometry. The guidance algorithm uses an auction process (also called an "auction algorithm''), presented in the dissertation, to solve the assignment problem. The auction uses the estimated maneuver and time of flight costs between the spacecraft and targets to create assignments which minimize a specific "expense'' function for the formation. The delivery problem is the task of delivering the spacecraft to their assigned positions, and it is addressed through one of two guidance schemes described in this work. The first is a delivery scheme based on artificial potential function (APF) guidance. APF guidance uses the relative distances between the spacecraft, targets, and any obstacles to design maneuvers based on gradients of potential fields. The second delivery scheme is based on model predictive control (MPC); this method uses a model of the system dynamics to plan a series of maneuvers designed to minimize a unique cost function. The guidance algorithm uses an analytic linearized approximation of the relative orbital dynamics, the Yamanaka-Ankersen state transition matrix, in the auction process and in both delivery methods. The proposed guidance strategy is successful, in simulations, in autonomously assigning the members of the formation to new positions and in delivering the spacecraft to these new positions safely using both delivery methods. This guidance algorithm can serve as the basis for future autonomous guidance strategies for spacecraft formation missions.

  15. Essays in applied microeconomics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Wang, Xiaoting

    In this dissertation I use Microeconomic theory to study firms' behavior. Chapter One introduces the motivations and main findings of this dissertation. Chapter Two studies the issue of information provision through advertisement when markets are segmented and consumers' price information is incomplete. Firms compete in prices and advertising strategies for consumers with transportation costs. High advertising costs contribute to market segmentation. Low advertising costs promote price competition among firms and improves consumer welfare. Chapter Three also investigates market power as a result of consumers' switching costs. A potential entrant can offer a new product bundled with an existing product to compensate consumers for their switching cost. If the primary market is competitive, bundling simply plays the role of price discrimination, and it does not dominate unbundled sales in the process of entry. If the entrant has market power in the primary market, then bundling also plays the role of leveraging market power and it dominates unbundled sales. The market for electric power generation has been opened to competition in recent years. Chapter Four looks at issues involved in the deregulated electricity market. By comparing the performance of the competitive market with the social optimum, we identify the conditions under which market equilibrium generates socially efficient levels of electric power. Chapter Two to Four investigate the strategic behavior among firms. Chapter Five studies the interaction between firms and unemployed workers in a frictional labor market. We set up an asymmetric job auction model, where two types of workers apply for two types of job openings by bidding in auctions and firms hire the applicant offering them the most profits. The job auction model internalizes the determination of the share of surplus from a match, therefore endogenously generates incentives for an efficient division of the matching surplus. Microeconomic foundation for competitive auctions is also discussed in this chapter.

  16. A Robust Open Ascending-price Multi-unit Auction Protocol against False-name Bids

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto; Terada, Kenji

    This paper develops a new ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol that has following characteristics: (i) it has an open format, (ii) sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy even if the marginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids. False-name bids are bids submitted under fictitious names such as multiple e-mail addresses, which can be done easily in the Internet. This is the first protocol that has these two characteristics. We show that our new protocol outperforms an existing protocol, which satisfies (ii), with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue.

  17. Auction dynamics: A volume constrained MBO scheme

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Jacobs, Matt; Merkurjev, Ekaterina; Esedoǧlu, Selim

    2018-02-01

    We show how auction algorithms, originally developed for the assignment problem, can be utilized in Merriman, Bence, and Osher's threshold dynamics scheme to simulate multi-phase motion by mean curvature in the presence of equality and inequality volume constraints on the individual phases. The resulting algorithms are highly efficient and robust, and can be used in simulations ranging from minimal partition problems in Euclidean space to semi-supervised machine learning via clustering on graphs. In the case of the latter application, numerous experimental results on benchmark machine learning datasets show that our approach exceeds the performance of current state-of-the-art methods, while requiring a fraction of the computation time.

  18. Spectrum sharing in cognitive radio networks--an auction-based approach.

    PubMed

    Wang, Xinbing; Li, Zheng; Xu, Pengchao; Xu, Youyun; Gao, Xinbo; Chen, Hsiao-Hwa

    2010-06-01

    Cognitive radio is emerging as a promising technique to improve the utilization of the radio frequency spectrum. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among primary (or "licensed") users (PUs) and secondary (or "unlicensed") users (SUs). We formulate the problem based on bandwidth auction, in which each SU makes a bid for the amount of spectrum and each PU may assign the spectrum among the SUs by itself according to the information from the SUs without degrading its own performance. We show that the auction is a noncooperative game and that Nash equilibrium (NE) can be its solution. We first consider a single-PU network to investigate the existence and uniqueness of the NE and further discuss the fairness among the SUs under given conditions. Then, we present a dynamic updating algorithm in which each SU achieves NE in a distributed manner. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this spectrum-sharing scheme is studied. The discussion is generalized to the case in which there are multiple PUs in the network, where the properties of the NE are shown under appropriate conditions. Simulations were used to evaluate the system performance and verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.

  19. Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation

    PubMed Central

    Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Segal, Ilya

    2017-01-01

    The recent “incentive auction” of the US Federal Communications Commission was the first auction to reallocate radio frequencies between two different kinds of uses: from broadcast television to wireless Internet access. The design challenge was not just to choose market rules to govern a fixed set of potential trades but also, to determine the broadcasters’ property rights, the goods to be exchanged, the quantities to be traded, the computational procedures, and even some of the performance objectives. An essential and unusual challenge was to make the auction simple enough for human participants while still ensuring that the computations would be tractable and capable of delivering nearly efficient outcomes. PMID:28652335

  20. Statistical mechanics of budget-constrained auctions

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Altarelli, F.; Braunstein, A.; Realpe-Gomez, J.; Zecchina, R.

    2009-07-01

    Finding the optimal assignment in budget-constrained auctions is a combinatorial optimization problem with many important applications, a notable example being in the sale of advertisement space by search engines (in this context the problem is often referred to as the off-line AdWords problem). On the basis of the cavity method of statistical mechanics, we introduce a message-passing algorithm that is capable of solving efficiently random instances of the problem extracted from a natural distribution, and we derive from its properties the phase diagram of the problem. As the control parameter (average value of the budgets) is varied, we find two phase transitions delimiting a region in which long-range correlations arise.

  1. Identification by Raman microscopy of anachronistic pigments on a purported Chagall nude: conservation consequences

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Chaplin, Tracey D.; Clark, Robin J. H.

    2016-03-01

    A painting purported to be by the artist Marc Chagall has been examined using Raman microscopy to check on its proposed execution date of 1910. The analysis shows that, due the presence of phthalocyanine pigments, the painting cannot have been created prior to c.1938. Transport of the painting to the Chagall Committee in France for inspection has led to their declaration that the painting is a forgery. Under French law the painting is required to be destroyed rather than retained for other forensic examination; the consequences for preservation of such items is of paramount importance, as is the need for auction houses to carry out analyses prior to auction.

  2. Using Experimental Auctions to Examine Demand for E-Cigarettes.

    PubMed

    O'Connor, Richard; Rousu, Matthew C; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Vogl, Lisa; Corrigan, Jay R

    2017-06-01

    E-cigarettes are the latest in a line of potentially reduced exposure products that have garnered interest among smokers. In this paper, we use experimental auctions to estimate smokers' demand for e-cigarettes and to assess the impact of advertisements on willingness to pay. These are actual auctions, with winners and losers, which means hypothetical biases often seen in surveys are minimized. We find smokers have positive demand for e-cigarettes, and that the print advertisements used in our study had greater effectiveness than video ads (b = 2.00, p < .05) in terms of increasing demand for disposable e-cigarettes. Demand was greater for reusable versus disposable e-cigarettes. In multivariate models, demand for e-cigarettes was higher among non-white participants and among smokers willing to pay more for cigarettes. Our findings suggest that cigarette smokers are interested in e-cigarettes as alternatives to traditional products, particularly for reusable forms, and that this demand can be influenced by messaging/advertising. Given these reduced harm products are appealing, if smokers are able to switch completely to e-cigarettes, there is a good chance for accrual of significant harm reduction. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  3. Challenges in managing freshwater fishery resource through Lebak Lebung Auction approach: a case study in Pangkalan Lampam District Ogan Komering Ilir Regency

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Muslimin, B.; Suadi

    2018-03-01

    Responsible management of fishery resources has been a tradition of Ogan Komering Ilir (OKI) of South Sumatera for generations. It was recorded that since 1630 the Dutch Government had made auction policy for managing water territory in OKI Regency as an effort to preserve nature and to avoid the conflict of inland water ownership. Currently, the community-based management model has been adopted by local governments into formal regulations, known as Regional Regulation on Auction of Flood Water Swamp and Rivers (Lelang Lebak Lebung dan Sungai or L3S). This paper describes the success factors and the threats for the failure of the L3S management model in OKI Regency, based on a case study in Pangkalan Lampam District. The study showed that the management mechanism through the L3S system had been well instituted and become a well-established management practice. The management model is in line with the principle of co-management and the approach has become critical success factor in L3S management. However, ecological, economic and social aspects influence the sustainability of such fishery management model. Besides, L3S management model faces limited data and information related to fish stocks, which result in difficulties in determining the total allowable catch.

  4. Using Economic Incentives to Manage Stormwater Runoff in ...

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    Communities nationwide are facing increased responsibility for controlling stormwater runoff, and, subsequently, rising costs of stormwater management. In this report we describe and test a methodology that can be used by communities to focus limited budgets on the most efficient and ecologically-effective installation of stormwater management practices. The overall project has two primary objectives: (1) to test the use of an auction to cost-effectively allocate stormwater management practices among landowners, and (2) to determine the effectiveness of the resulting implementation in terms of hydrological, water quality, and ecological measures. Here, we describe the theories, methods, and criteria used to distribute rain gardens and rain barrels to homeowners in a small, midwestern watershed. The first round of the reverse auction in 2007 resulted in 50 rain gardens and 100 rain barrels installed at 67 of the approximately 350 residential properties in the experimental watershed. In 2008, the auction was repeated and we accepted bids for an additional 35 rain gardens and 74 rain barrels. Stormwater management practices were distributed relatively evenly throughout the watershed and are expected to result in significant improvements in stream quality. We describe our monitoring approach, including 1) parcel-scale hydrology and water quality monitoring of selected rain gardens, and 2) stream monitoring following before-after-control-impact approach for as

  5. A Two-Phase Model for Trade Matching and Price Setting in Double Auction Water Markets

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Xu, Tingting; Zheng, Hang; Zhao, Jianshi; Liu, Yicheng; Tang, Pingzhong; Yang, Y. C. Ethan; Wang, Zhongjing

    2018-04-01

    Delivery in water markets is generally operated by agencies through channel systems, which imposes physical and institutional market constraints. Many water markets allow water users to post selling and buying requests on a board. However, water users may not be able to choose efficiently when the information (including the constraints) becomes complex. This study proposes an innovative two-phase model to address this problem based on practical experience in China. The first phase seeks and determines the optimal assignment that maximizes the incremental improvement of the system's social welfare according to the bids and asks in the water market. The second phase sets appropriate prices under constraints. Applying this model to China's Xiying Irrigation District shows that it can improve social welfare more than the current "pool exchange" method can. Within the second phase, we evaluate three objective functions (minimum variance, threshold-based balance, and two-sided balance), which represent different managerial goals. The threshold-based balance function should be preferred by most users, while the two-sided balance should be preferred by players who post extreme prices.

  6. Solve the organ shortage: let the bidding begin!

    PubMed

    Kevorkian, J

    2001-01-01

    Commercialization of transplantable human organs is the only sure way to end the crisis of their supply. This is best accomplished by implementing a free, non-profit, nationwide, ultimately global online auction market. It should be independent of the current United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS) system dealing solely with altruistic donation, and of governmental, sectarian, academic, and other bureaucratic control. The operation of such an auction is described with a hypothetical example. An included provision guarantees equity for poor, uninsured, and indigent recipients. Money accrued can be substantial, and would be disbursed by established formula, with major portions going to donors' families and to special funds to be used to bid for the poor and to defray costs incurred by them. As the organ shortage eases, bid prices should drop, resulting perhaps in eventual altruistic donation. Objections to commericalization based on ethics, bodily sanctity, inequity, pecuniary greed, and the slippery slope tocsin are nullified by cogent arguments and examples. The current situation has worsened despite so-called required request laws, proposed token payments to cover funeral expenses for donor families, and extensive media advertising to spur altruistic donation. Prohibitive national and state laws must be rescinded for the sake of more than 60,000 patients now on lengthening waiting lists. A profession committed to saving lives is duty-bound to endorse, help implement, and participate in an auction system dedicated to that end.

  7. 21 CFR 172.330 - Calcium pantothenate, calcium chloride double salt.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (CONTINUED) FOOD ADDITIVES PERMITTED FOR DIRECT ADDITION TO FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION Special Dietary and Nutritional Additives § 172.330 Calcium pantothenate, calcium chloride double salt. The food additive calcium chloride double salt of calcium pantothenate may...

  8. 21 CFR 172.330 - Calcium pantothenate, calcium chloride double salt.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (CONTINUED) FOOD ADDITIVES PERMITTED FOR DIRECT ADDITION TO FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION Special Dietary and Nutritional Additives § 172.330 Calcium pantothenate, calcium chloride double salt. The food additive calcium chloride double salt of calcium pantothenate may...

  9. 21 CFR 172.330 - Calcium pantothenate, calcium chloride double salt.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... SERVICES (CONTINUED) FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION (CONTINUED) FOOD ADDITIVES PERMITTED FOR DIRECT ADDITION TO FOOD FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION Special Dietary and Nutritional Additives § 172.330 Calcium pantothenate, calcium chloride double salt. The food additive calcium chloride double salt of calcium pantothenate may...

  10. KSC-2012-6142

    NASA Image and Video Library

    2012-11-03

    CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. – A guest checks out an item available for auction at the Astronaut Scholarship Foundation's dinner at the Radisson Resort at the Port in Cape Canaveral celebrating the 40th anniversary of Apollo 17. The auction of space-related memorabilia was held with proceeds supporting college scholarships for students who exhibit imagination and exceptional performance in science, technology, engineering and math. The gala commemorating the anniversary of Apollo 17 included mission commander Eugene Cernan and other astronauts who flew Apollo missions. Launched Dec. 7, 1972, Cernan and lunar module pilot Harrison Schmitt landed in the moon's Taurus-Littrow highlands while command module pilot Ronald Evans remained in lunar orbit operating a scientific instrument module. For more information, visit http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo-17/apollo-17.htm Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

  11. Designing PURPA (Public Utilities Regulatory Act) power purchase auctions: Theory and practice. [Cogenerated electricity purchasing model

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Rothkopf, M.H.; Kahn, E.P.; Teisberg, T.J.

    The Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURPA) requires there to be procedures for electric utilities to buy electric power from qualifying cogenerators and small power producers (QFs) at rates up to ''avoided cost.'' This has led to price-posting procedures at prices calculated as the utility's marginal cost. Unexpectedly large sales at these prices and slow adjustment to falling energy cost are partially responsible for payments to QFs in excess of the utility's true avoided cost. Using competitive bidding instead of posted prices has been proposed as a way to avoid this outcome. This report reviews bidding theory and explores four issuesmore » that arise in deisigning auction systems for the purchase of power from QFs under PURPA. 77 refs., 6 figs., 15 tabs.« less

  12. Designing PURPA (Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act) power purchase auctions: Theory and practice. [Buys from cogenerators and small power generators

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Not Available

    The Public Utilities Regulatory Act (PURPA) requires there to be procedures for electric utilities to buy electric power from qualifying cogenerators and small power producers (QFs) at rates up to ''avoided cost''. This has led to price-posting procedures at prices calculated as the utility's marginal cost. Unexpectedly large sales at these prices and slow adjustment to falling energy cost are partially responsible for payments to QFs in excess of the utility's true avoided cost. Using competitive bidding instead of posted prices has been proposed as a way to avoid this outcome. This report reviews bidding theory and explores four issuesmore » that arise in designing auction systems for the purchase of power from QFs under PURPA.« less

  13. Essays in Energy Economics

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Myers, Erica Catherine

    This dissertation combines research on three topics in applied energy economics. The first two papers investigate whether consumers are informed about and pay attention to energy costs in residential housing. The first paper explores this issue in the rental housing market, while the second paper focuses on housing purchases. The third paper, based on joint work with AJ Bostian and Harrison Fell, uses a laboratory experiment to test the effects of positive versus negative cost shocks on mulit-unit procurement auction performance. The first paper explores whether there are energy cost information asymmetries between landlords and tenants. If tenants are uninformed about energy costs, landlords cannot capitalize energy efficiency investments into higher rents, leading to under-investment. I exploit variation in energy costs in the form of relative heating fuel price changes in the northeastern United States where some apartment units heat with oil and some units heat with natural gas. I develop a search model to describe the matching of landlords and tenants, and derive predictions about the incidence of relative fuel price changes, tenant turnover, and efficiency investments under both symmetric and asymmetric information. My model predicts that, under symmetric full information, these outcomes will not differ depending on whether landlords or tenants pay for energy. In contrast, under asymmetric information, the demand of uninformed tenants for units that heat with oil rather than gas will not shift when oil prices rise relative to gas prices. In a search model, this leads to different market outcomes when landlords, rather than tenants, pay for energy. I find that the capitalization of energy prices into rents, turnover rates, and energy efficiency investments differ between the two payment regimes in ways that are consistent with asymmetric information. The second paper explores whether home buyers are myopic about future energy costs. I exploit variation in energy costs in the form of fuel price changes in Massachusetts where there is an even distribution of homes that heat with oil and homes that heat with natural gas. I find that relative fuel price shifts cause relative changes in housing transaction prices that are consistent with full capitalization of the present value of future energy cost differences under low discount rates. These findings are consistent with home buyers being attentive to energy costs at point of sale and are not consistent with myopia. The third paper uses a laboratory experiment to test the effects of positive versus negative costs shocks on multi-unit procurement auction performance. Output prices tend to respond more quickly to increases in input prices than to decreases in input prices. While standard economic theory would not predict this pattern, it is found in many market settings. We compare outcomes in uniform price and discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions for two different kinds of costs shocks. First we look at ''industry wide'' cost shocks where the cost of a common input changes uniformly for all bidders. We also look at idiosyncratic cost shocks, where bidders' individual costs are changing, but the expected Walrasian price remains fixed. We find evidence for a new explanation of asymmetric passthrough in multi-unit procurement auctions related to the bidding incentives in discriminatory auctions. Discriminatory auctions may be worse than uniform at ''tracking'' shifts in underlying costs, leading to price adjustment asymmetries and production inefficiencies.

  14. Worst-Case Cooperative Jamming for Secure Communications in CIoT Networks.

    PubMed

    Li, Zhen; Jing, Tao; Ma, Liran; Huo, Yan; Qian, Jin

    2016-03-07

    The Internet of Things (IoT) is a significant branch of the ongoing advances in the Internet and mobile communications. The use of a large number of IoT devices makes the spectrum scarcity problem even more serious. The usable spectrum resources are almost entirely occupied, and thus, the increasing radio access demands of IoT devices cannot be met. To tackle this problem, the Cognitive Internet of Things (CIoT) has been proposed. In a CIoT network, secondary users, i.e., sensors and actuators, can access the licensed spectrum bands provided by licensed primary users (such as telephones). Security is a major concern in CIoT networks. However, the traditional encryption method at upper layers (such as symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography) may be compromised in CIoT networks, since these types of networks are heterogeneous. In this paper, we address the security issue in spectrum-leasing-based CIoT networks using physical layer methods. Considering that the CIoT networks are cooperative networks, we propose to employ cooperative jamming to achieve secrecy transmission. In the cooperative jamming scheme, a certain secondary user is employed as the helper to harvest energy transmitted by the source and then uses the harvested energy to generate an artificial noise that jams the eavesdropper without interfering with the legitimate receivers. The goal is to minimize the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper subject to the quality of service (QoS) constraints of the primary traffic and the secondary traffic. We formulate the considered minimization problem into a two-stage robust optimization problem based on the worst-case Channel State Information of the Eavesdropper. By using semi-definite programming (SDP), the optimal solutions of the transmit covariance matrices can be obtained. Moreover, in order to build an incentive mechanism for the secondary users, we propose an auction framework based on the cooperative jamming scheme. The proposed auction framework jointly formulates the helper selection and the corresponding energy allocation problems under the constraint of the eavesdropper's SINR. By adopting the Vickrey auction, truthfulness and individual rationality can be guaranteed. Simulation results demonstrate the good performance of the cooperative jamming scheme and the auction framework.

  15. 31 CFR 356.11 - How are bids submitted in an auction?

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... failures or disruptions of equipment or communications facilities used for participating in Treasury.... (c) TreasuryDirect. You must submit your bids through your established book-entry, online Treasury...

  16. 76 FR 20450 - Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-04-12

    ... participate in U.S. Treasury Securities Auctions via TAPPS Link. Affected Public: Private Sector: Businesses... of the Public Debt, 200 Third Street, Parkersburg, West Virginia 26106; (304) 480-8112. OMB Reviewer...

  17. 75 FR 8190 - Art Advisory Panel of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-02-23

    ... function, Panel records and discussions must include tax return information. Therefore, the Panel meetings... balanced between museum directors and curators, art dealers and auction representatives to afford differing...

  18. 47 CFR 25.403 - Bidding application and certification procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-10-01

    ... CARRIER SERVICES SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS Competitive Bidding Procedures for DARS § 25.403 Bidding...'s name; (b) Mailing Address (no Post Office boxes); (c) City; (d) State; (e) ZIP Code; (f) Auction...

  19. 47 CFR 25.403 - Bidding application and certification procedures.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... CARRIER SERVICES SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS Competitive Bidding Procedures for DARS § 25.403 Bidding...'s name; (b) Mailing Address (no Post Office boxes); (c) City; (d) State; (e) ZIP Code; (f) Auction...

  20. KSC-2012-6141

    NASA Image and Video Library

    2012-11-03

    CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. – Kennedy Space Center Director Bob Cabana checks out an item available for auction at the Astronaut Scholarship Foundation's dinner at the Radisson Resort at the Port in Cape Canaveral celebrating the 40th anniversary of Apollo 17. The auction of space-related memorabilia was held with proceeds supporting college scholarships for students who exhibit imagination and exceptional performance in science, technology, engineering and math. The gala commemorating the anniversary of Apollo 17 included mission commander Eugene Cernan and other astronauts who flew Apollo missions. Launched Dec. 7, 1972, Cernan and lunar module pilot Harrison Schmitt landed in the moon's Taurus-Littrow highlands while command module pilot Ronald Evans remained in lunar orbit operating a scientific instrument module. For more information, visit http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo-17/apollo-17.htm Photo credit: NASA/Kim Shiflett

  1. Improving the design of competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage.

    PubMed

    Cawley, John H; Whitford, Andrew B

    2007-04-01

    In 2003, Congress passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, which required that in 2006 the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implement a system of competitive bids to set payments for the Medicare Advantage program. Managed care plans now bid for the right to enroll Medicare beneficiaries. Data from the first year of bidding suggest that imperfect competition is limiting the success of the bidding system. This article offers suggestions to improve this system based on findings from auction theory and previous government-run auctions. In particular, CMS can benefit by adjusting its system of competitive bids in four ways: credibly committing to regulations governing bidding; limiting the scope for collusion, entry deterrence, and predatory behavior among bidders; adjusting how benchmark reimbursement rates are set; and accounting for asymmetric information among bidders.

  2. The impact of free trial acceptance on demand for alternative nicotine products: evidence from experimental auctions.

    PubMed

    Rousu, Matthew C; O'Connor, Richard J; Bansal-Travers, Maansi; Pitcavage, James M; Thrasher, James F

    2015-06-11

    This study explored the relationship between product trials and consumer demand for alternative nicotine products (ANP). An experimental auction was conducted with 258 adult smokers, wherein participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. The participants received the opportunity to try, but did not have to accept, one of three relatively novel ST products (i.e., snus, dissolvable tobacco, or medicinal nicotine), or they were placed into a control group (i.e., no trial). All the participants then bid on all three of these products, as well as on cigarettes. We assessed interest in using ANP based on both trial of the product and bids placed for the products in the experimental auction. Fewer smokers were willing to try snus (44%) than dissolvable tobacco (64%) or medicine nicotine (68%). For snus, we find modest evidence suggesting that willingness to try is associated with greater demand for the product. For dissolvable tobacco or medicinal nicotine, we find no evidence that those who accept the product trial have higher demand for the product. Free trials of a novel ANP were not strongly associated with product demand, as assessed by willingness to pay. Given the debate over the potential for ANP to reduce the harm from smoking, these results are important in understanding the impact of free trial offers on adoption of ST product as a strategy to reduce harm from tobacco use.

  3. Who is entitled to double effect?

    PubMed

    Boyle, J

    1991-10-01

    The doctrine of double effect continues to be an important tool in bioethical casuistry. Its role within the Catholic moral tradition continues, and there is considerable interest in it by contemporary moral philosophers. But problems of justification and correct application remain. I argue that if the traditional Catholic conviction that there are exceptionless norms prohibiting inflicting some kinds of harms on people is correct, then double effect is justified and necessary. The objection that double effect is superfluous is a rejection of that normative conviction, not a refutation of double effect itself. This justification suggests the correct way of applying double effect to controversial cases. But versions of double effect which dispense with the absolutism of the Catholic tradition lack justification and fall to the objection that double effect is an unnecessary complication.

  4. 27 CFR 72.61 - Alternative methods of sale.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... to be placed in a newspaper of general circulation published in the judicial district wherein the... carrier may be advertised for sale, and sold, at public auction to the highest bidder on open, competitive...

  5. A Human-Centered Approach to Sense and Respond Logistics

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2009-04-10

    United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), a human-centered research initiative consisting of eight distinct research efforts designed to...27  2.5  Experimental Design ...120  6.3.6  Auction design parameters

  6. 26 CFR 31.3306(i)-1 - Who are employees.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... tools and the furnishing of a place to work, to the individual who performs the services. In general, if..., public stenographers, and auctioneers, engaged in the pursuit of an independent trade, business, or...

  7. Transactive System: Part II: Analysis of Two Pilot Transactive Systems using Foundational Theory and Metrics

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Lian, Jianming; Sun, Y.; Kalsi, Karanjit

    This document is the second of a two-part report. Part 1 reviewed several demonstrations of transactive control and compared them in terms of their payoff functions, control decisions, information privacy, and mathematical solution concepts. It was suggested in Part 1 that these four listed components should be adopted for meaningful comparison and design of future transactive systems. Part 2 proposes qualitative and quantitative metrics that will be needed to compare alternative transactive systems. It then uses the analysis and design principles from Part 1 while conducting more in-depth analysis of two transactive demonstrations: the American Electric Power (AEP) gridSMART Demonstration,more » which used a double –auction market mechanism, and a consensus method like that used in the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration. Ultimately, metrics must be devised and used to meaningfully compare alternative transactive systems. One significant contribution of this report is an observation that the decision function used for thermostat control in the AEP gridSMART Demonstration has superior performance if its decision function is recast to more accurately reflect the power that will be used under for thermostatic control under alternative market outcomes.« less

  8. 16 CFR 301.44 - Misrepresentation of prices.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... “bankrupt stock”, “samples”, “show room models”, “Hollywood Models”, “Paris Models”, “French Models”, “Parisian Creations”, “Furs Worn by Society Women”, “Clearance Stock”, “Auction Stock”, “Stock of a business...

  9. Electric Generation Ownership, Market Concentration and Auction Size

    EPA Pesticide Factsheets

    In this Technical Support Document (TSD), EPA explains in more detail the issues and analyses completed for the alternative remedy of State Budgets/Intrastate Trading described in the proposed Transport Rule preamble in section V.D.5.

  10. Research on Multirobot Pursuit Task Allocation Algorithm Based on Emotional Cooperation Factor

    PubMed Central

    Fang, Baofu; Chen, Lu; Wang, Hao; Dai, Shuanglu; Zhong, Qiubo

    2014-01-01

    Multirobot task allocation is a hot issue in the field of robot research. A new emotional model is used with the self-interested robot, which gives a new way to measure self-interested robots' individual cooperative willingness in the problem of multirobot task allocation. Emotional cooperation factor is introduced into self-interested robot; it is updated based on emotional attenuation and external stimuli. Then a multirobot pursuit task allocation algorithm is proposed, which is based on emotional cooperation factor. Combined with the two-step auction algorithm recruiting team leaders and team collaborators, set up pursuit teams, and finally use certain strategies to complete the pursuit task. In order to verify the effectiveness of this algorithm, some comparing experiments have been done with the instantaneous greedy optimal auction algorithm; the results of experiments show that the total pursuit time and total team revenue can be optimized by using this algorithm. PMID:25152925

  11. Research on multirobot pursuit task allocation algorithm based on emotional cooperation factor.

    PubMed

    Fang, Baofu; Chen, Lu; Wang, Hao; Dai, Shuanglu; Zhong, Qiubo

    2014-01-01

    Multirobot task allocation is a hot issue in the field of robot research. A new emotional model is used with the self-interested robot, which gives a new way to measure self-interested robots' individual cooperative willingness in the problem of multirobot task allocation. Emotional cooperation factor is introduced into self-interested robot; it is updated based on emotional attenuation and external stimuli. Then a multirobot pursuit task allocation algorithm is proposed, which is based on emotional cooperation factor. Combined with the two-step auction algorithm recruiting team leaders and team collaborators, set up pursuit teams, and finally use certain strategies to complete the pursuit task. In order to verify the effectiveness of this algorithm, some comparing experiments have been done with the instantaneous greedy optimal auction algorithm; the results of experiments show that the total pursuit time and total team revenue can be optimized by using this algorithm.

  12. Pyrrhic victories: the need for social status drives costly competitive behavior.

    PubMed

    van den Bos, Wouter; Golka, Philipp J M; Effelsberg, David; McClure, Samuel M

    2013-01-01

    Competitive behavior is commonly defined as the decision to maximize one's payoffs relative to others. We argue instead that competitive drive derives from a desire for social status. We make use of a multi-player auction task in which subjects knowingly incur financial losses for the sake of winning auctions. First, we show that overbidding is increased when the task includes members of a rival out-group, suggesting that social identity is an important mediator of competitiveness. In addition, we show that the extent that individuals are willing to incur losses is related to affective responses to social comparisons but not to monetary outcomes. Second, we show that basal levels of testosterone predict overbidding, and that this effect of testosterone is mediated by affective responses to social comparisons. Based on these findings, we argue that competitive behavior should be conceptualized in terms of social motivations as opposed to just relative monetary payoffs.

  13. Pyrrhic victories: the need for social status drives costly competitive behavior

    PubMed Central

    van den Bos, Wouter; Golka, Philipp J. M.; Effelsberg, David; McClure, Samuel M.

    2013-01-01

    Competitive behavior is commonly defined as the decision to maximize one's payoffs relative to others. We argue instead that competitive drive derives from a desire for social status. We make use of a multi-player auction task in which subjects knowingly incur financial losses for the sake of winning auctions. First, we show that overbidding is increased when the task includes members of a rival out-group, suggesting that social identity is an important mediator of competitiveness. In addition, we show that the extent that individuals are willing to incur losses is related to affective responses to social comparisons but not to monetary outcomes. Second, we show that basal levels of testosterone predict overbidding, and that this effect of testosterone is mediated by affective responses to social comparisons. Based on these findings, we argue that competitive behavior should be conceptualized in terms of social motivations as opposed to just relative monetary payoffs. PMID:24167468

  14. Effects of scarcity, aesthetics and ecology on wildlife auction prices of large African mammals.

    PubMed

    Dalerum, Fredrik; Miranda, María; Muñiz, Cristina; Rodríguez, Plácido

    2018-02-01

    For successful integration of biological conservation into economic markets, economic processes need to capture ecological values. South African wildlife ranching is a tourist-based activity that generates unique information on the economic value of wildlife species. We used public data from South African wildlife auctions to evaluate if annual prices 1991-2012 related to species characteristics associated with scarcity, aesthetics and ecology of South African carnivores and ungulates. While none of the species characteristics influenced carnivore prices, ungulate prices were related to characteristics associated with novelty and aesthetics, which relative importance had increased over time. We raise both ecological and economic concerns for this apparent focus. Our results also suggest a potential importance of non-species-related factors, such as market and buyer characteristics. We encourage further evaluation of the relative influences of species characteristics versus factors that are intrinsically linked to economic processes on price variations in South African wildlife.

  15. Effects of information on young consumers' willingness to pay for genetically modified food: experimental auction analysis.

    PubMed

    Kajale, Dilip B; Becker, T C

    2014-01-01

    This study examines the effects of information on consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for genetically modified food (GMF). We used Vickrey second price experimental auction method for elicitation of consumer WTP for GM potato chips and GM soya-chocolate bar. The sample used in this study was university students from Delhi, India. Four information formats (positive, negative, no information, and combined information about GM technology) were used for the examination. The results show that, when students received the combine information they were willing to pay around 17%-20% premium for GMF and when received the negative information they demanded around 22% discount for GMF. While the positive- and the no-information formats alone have no considerable effect on consumers' WTP for GMF. Overall, our findings suggest that while doing marketing of GMF in India, the best strategy is to provide combined information about GM technology.

  16. Applying a Reverse Auction to Reduce Stormwater Runoff

    EPA Science Inventory

    Incentivizing commercial properties to adopt stormwater runoff control is usually done through command-and-control tactics such as stormwater fees with rebates for implementation of certain best management practices (BMP). In recently-built housing developments around the count...

  17. 75 FR 31437 - Notice of Public Information Collection(s) Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-06-03

    ... auctions for spectrum, and maintain license information. In this mission, WTB has a ``help desk'' that... INFORMATION: OMB Control Number: 3060-1042. Title: Request for Technical Support - Help Request Form. Form No...

  18. 78 FR 14529 - Combined Notice of Filings #1

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-03-06

    .... Comments Due: 5 p.m. ET 3/20/13. Docket Numbers: ER13-992-000. Applicants: ISO New England Inc. Description: ISO New England Inc. submits 7th Forward Capacity Auction Results Filing. Filed Date: 2/26/13...

  19. Asymmetric Cooperative Communications Based Spectrum Leasing via Auctions in Cognitive Radio Networks

    DTIC Science & Technology

    2011-08-01

    level of responsibility for design activities and program management. He has authored or co-authored numerous papers on designs for space and radiation effects. Mr. Avery is a member of IEEE/ NPSS and AIAA.

  20. Encouraging stormwater management using a reverse auction: potential to restore stream ecosystems

    EPA Science Inventory

    Stormwater runoff is the primary mechanism by which urbanizing landscapes disrupt natural, stream ecosystems. Source control management has been demonstrated as an effective and cost-efficient method for reducing stormwater runoff; however, sufficiently widespread implementation...

  1. Using a Reverse Auction to Promote Household Level Stormwater Control

    EPA Science Inventory

    Phase Two of the US Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA) National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) stormwater regulations requires communities smaller than 100,000 residents to meet new criteria for stormwater runoff reduction. In many cases these smaller comm...

  2. 47 CFR 1.907 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION GENERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Wireless Radio Services... requests to assign rights granted by the authorization or to transfer control of entities holding authorizations. Auctionable license. A Wireless Radio Service license identified in § 1.2102 of this part for...

  3. 47 CFR 1.907 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... Wireless Radio Services Applications and Proceedings Scope and Authority § 1.907 Definitions. Antenna... term also encompasses requests to assign rights granted by the authorization or to transfer control of entities holding authorizations. Auctionable license. A Wireless Radio Service license identified in § 1...

  4. 47 CFR 1.907 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... Wireless Radio Services Applications and Proceedings Scope and Authority § 1.907 Definitions. Antenna... term also encompasses requests to assign rights granted by the authorization or to transfer control of entities holding authorizations. Auctionable license. A Wireless Radio Service license identified in § 1...

  5. 47 CFR 1.2209 - Disbursement of incentive payments.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-10-01

    ... 47 Telecommunication 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Disbursement of incentive payments. 1.2209 Section 1.2209 Telecommunication FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION GENERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Grants by Random Selection Competitive Bidding Proceedings Broadcast Television Spectrum Reverse Auction § 1...

  6. Economic Incentives for Stormwater Control (ISBN9781439845608)

    EPA Science Inventory

    Addressing a huge knowledge gap from a policy perspective, this book focuses on the economic tools available for stormwater runoff control. It provides case studies demonstrating the application of various incentives, such as tradable credits, fees with rebates, and auction mecha...

  7. The Sky's the Limit.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Robison, Shelba

    1981-01-01

    Suggests funding techniques community college foundations can use: jogathons, concerts, dinners, roasts, auctions, benefit preview parties, and sporting events. Identifies the benefits of capital campaigns and corporate giving. Feels foundations can provide extras for community college budgets, improve public relations, and offer cultural and…

  8. A resolution designating April 18, 2009, as "National Auctioneers Day".

    THOMAS, 111th Congress

    Sen. Brownback, Sam [R-KS

    2009-03-26

    Senate - 03/31/2009 Resolution agreed to in Senate without amendment and with a preamble by Unanimous Consent. (All Actions) Tracker: This bill has the status Agreed to in SenateHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

  9. 75 FR 61533 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; International Securities Exchange, LLC; Order Granting Approval of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-10-05

    ... intraday auction, then the next available price is used. If no price is available by the end of the Xetra... 611 permits members to exercise discretionary power with respect to trading options in a customer's...

  10. Next Generation of Renewable Electricity Policy: How Rapid Change is Breaking Down Conventional Policy Categories

    DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

    Couture, T. D.; Jacobs, D.; Rickerson, W.

    A number of policies have been used historically in order to stimulate the growth of the renewable electricity sector. This paper examines four of these policy instruments: competitive tendering, sometimes called renewable electricity auctions, feed-in tariffs, net metering and net billing, and tradable renewable energy certificates. In recent years, however, a number of changes to both market circumstances and to policy priorities have resulted in numerous policy innovations, including the emergence of policy hybrids. With no common language for these evolving policy mechanisms, policymakers have generally continued to use the same traditional policy labels, occasionally generating confusion as many ofmore » these new policies no longer look, or act, like their traditional predecessors. In reviewing these changes, this paper makes two separate but related claims: first, policy labels themselves are breaking down and evolving. As a result, policy comparisons that rely on the conventional labels may no longer be appropriate, or advisable. Second, as policymakers continue to adapt, we are in effect witnessing the emergence of the next generation of renewable electricity policies, a change that could have significant impacts on investment, as well as on market growth in both developed and developing countries.« less

  11. Generation of continuous-wave single-frequency 1.5 W 378 nm radiation by frequency doubling of a Ti:sapphire laser.

    PubMed

    Cha, Yong-Ho; Ko, Kwang-Hoon; Lim, Gwon; Han, Jae-Min; Park, Hyun-Min; Kim, Taek-Soo; Jeong, Do-Young

    2010-03-20

    We have generated continuous-wave single-frequency 1.5 W 378 nm radiation by frequency doubling a high-power Ti:sapphire laser in an external enhancement cavity. An LBO crystal that is Brewster-cut and antireflection coated on both ends is used for a long-term stable frequency doubling. By optimizing the input coupler's reflectivity, we could generate 1.5 W 378 nm radiation from a 5 W 756 nm Ti:sapphire laser. According to our knowledge, this is the highest CW frequency-doubled power of a Ti:sapphire laser.

  12. Survey of quality defects in market beef and dairy cows and bulls sold through livestock auction markets in the Western United States: I. Incidence rates.

    PubMed

    Ahola, J K; Foster, H A; Vanoverbeke, D L; Jensen, K S; Wilson, R L; Glaze, J B; Fife, T E; Gray, C W; Nash, S A; Panting, R R; Rimbey, N R

    2011-05-01

    A survey was conducted to quantify incidence of Beef Quality Assurance (BQA)-related defects in market beef and dairy cows and bulls selling at auction during 2 seasons in 2008. Twenty-three BQA-related traits were evaluated by 9 trained personnel during sales at 10 livestock auction markets in Idaho (n = 5; beef and dairy), California, (n = 4; dairy only), and Utah (n = 1; beef and dairy). Overall, 18,949 unique lots (8,213 beef cows, 1,036 beef bulls, 9,177 dairy cows, and 523 dairy bulls,) consisting of 23,479 animals (9,299 beef cows, 1,091 beef bulls, 12,429 dairy cows, and 660 dairy bulls) were evaluated during 125 sales (64 spring, 61 fall) for dairy and 79 sales (40 spring, 39 fall) for beef. The majority of market beef cows and bulls (60.9 and 71.3%, respectively) were predominantly black-hided, and the Holstein hide pattern was observed in 95.4 and 93.6% of market dairy cows and bulls, respectively. Market cattle weighed 548 ± 103.6 kg (beef cows), 751 ± 176.1 kg (beef bulls), 658 ± 129.7 kg (dairy cows), and 731 ± 150.8 kg (dairy bulls). Most beef cows (79.6%) weighed 455 to 726 kg, and most beef bulls (73.8%) weighed 545 to 954 kg, respectively. Among market beef cattle, 16.0% of cows and 14.5% of bulls weighed less than 455 and 545 kg, respectively, and 63.7% of dairy cows and 81.5% of dairy bulls weighed 545 to 817 kg or 545 to 954 kg, respectively. However, 19.5% of dairy cows and 13.1% of dairy bulls weighed less than 545 kg. Mean BCS for beef cattle (9-point scale) was 4.7 ± 1.2 (cows) and 5.3 ± 0.9 (bulls), and for dairy cattle (5-point scale) was 2.6 ± 0.8 (cows) and 2.9 ± 0.6 (bulls). Some 16.5% of beef cows and 4.1% of beef bulls had a BCS of 1 to 3, whereas 34.8% of dairy cows and 10.4% of dairy bulls had a BCS of 2 or less. Emaciation (beef BCS = 1, dairy BCS = 1.0) or near-emaciation (beef BCS = 2, dairy BCS = 1.5) was observed in 13.3% of dairy cows and 3.9% of beef cows. Among beef cattle, 15.1% of cows and 15.4% of bulls were considered lame. In contrast, 44.7% of dairy cows and 26.1% of dairy bulls were lame. Ocular neoplasia (cancer eye) was observed in only 0.6% of beef cows, 0.3% of beef bulls, 0.3% of dairy cows, and 0.0% of dairy bulls. However, among animals with ocular neoplasia, it was cancerous in 34.4% of beef bulls, 48.0% of dairy cows, and 73.3% of beef cows. In conclusion, numerous quality defects are present in market beef and dairy cattle selling at auction in the Western United States, which could influence their value at auction.

  13. Neural correlates of economic value and valuation context: an event-related potential study.

    PubMed

    Tyson-Carr, John; Kokmotou, Katerina; Soto, Vicente; Cook, Stephanie; Fallon, Nicholas; Giesbrecht, Timo; Stancak, Andrej

    2018-05-01

    The value of environmental cues and internal states is continuously evaluated by the human brain, and it is this subjective value that largely guides decision making. The present study aimed to investigate the initial value attribution process, specifically the spatiotemporal activation patterns associated with values and valuation context, using electroencephalographic event-related potentials (ERPs). Participants completed a stimulus rating task in which everyday household items marketed up to a price of £4 were evaluated with respect to their desirability or material properties. The subjective values of items were evaluated as willingness to pay (WTP) in a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction. On the basis of the individual's subjective WTP values, the stimuli were divided into high- and low-value items. Source dipole modeling was applied to estimate the cortical sources underlying ERP components modulated by subjective values (high vs. low WTP) and the evaluation condition (value-relevant vs. value-irrelevant judgments). Low-WTP items and value-relevant judgments both led to a more pronounced N2 visual evoked potential at right frontal scalp electrodes. Source activity in right anterior insula and left orbitofrontal cortex was larger for low vs. high WTP at ∼200 ms. At a similar latency, source activity in right anterior insula and right parahippocampal gyrus was larger for value-relevant vs. value-irrelevant judgments. A stronger response for low- than high-value items in anterior insula and orbitofrontal cortex appears to reflect aversion to low-valued item acquisition, which in an auction experiment would be perceived as a relative loss. This initial low-value bias occurs automatically irrespective of the valuation context. NEW & NOTEWORTHY We demonstrate the spatiotemporal characteristics of the brain valuation process using event-related potentials and willingness to pay as a measure of subjective value. The N2 component resolves values of objects with a bias toward low-value items. The value-related changes of the N2 component are part of an automatic valuation process.

  14. 47 CFR 73.3700 - Channel sharing.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-10-01

    ... conjunction with the reverse auction. (2) The party relinquishing spectrum pursuant to a channel sharing... channel sharing licensee shall retain spectrum usage rights adequate to ensure a sufficient amount of the... carriage rights. A broadcast television station that voluntarily relinquishes spectrum usage rights under...

  15. 47 CFR 73.3700 - Channel sharing.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-10-01

    ... conjunction with the reverse auction. (2) The party relinquishing spectrum pursuant to a channel sharing... channel sharing licensee shall retain spectrum usage rights adequate to ensure a sufficient amount of the... carriage rights. A broadcast television station that voluntarily relinquishes spectrum usage rights under...

  16. 78 FR 74208 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-12-10

    ... systemically enforced narrow-width bid-ask differential applicable to the auction process. Since the time of... narrow-width NBBO is received from OPRA. This is a systemic solution which renders the rules-based narrow...

  17. Teaching Qualitative Methods: A Face-to-Face Encounter.

    ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

    Keen, Mike F.

    1996-01-01

    Considers the complete ethnographic project as a strategy for teaching qualitative methods. Describes an undergraduate class where students chose an ethnographic setting, gathered and analyzed data, and wrote a final report. Settings included Laundromats, bingo halls, auctions, karaoke clubs, and bowling leagues. (MJP)

  18. 75 FR 28278 - Notice of amendment to Notice of Realty Action: Competitive Online Auction of Public Lands in...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2010-05-20

    .... ACTION: Notice of amendment. SUMMARY: This notice amends a Notice of Realty Action (NORA) published in... GSA Web site, https://www.auctionrp.com/ . The NORA published on September 11, 2009, is amended to...

  19. 7 CFR 29.37 - Designated market.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Designated market. 29.37 Section 29.37 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Standards, Inspections, Marketing... INSPECTION Regulations Definitions § 29.37 Designated market. An auction market designated by the Secretary...

  20. Power Management in Regenerative Life Support Systems

    NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

    Crawford, Sekou; Pawlowski, Christopher; Finn, Cory; Mead, Susan C. (Technical Monitor)

    1999-01-01

    Effective management of power can reduce the cost of launch and operation of regenerative life support systems. Variations in power may be quite severe and may manifest as surges or spikes, While the power plant may have some ability to deal with these variations, with batteries for example, over-capacity is expensive and does nothing to address the fundamental issue of excessive demand. Because the power unit must be sized to accommodate the largest demand, avoiding power spikes has the potential to reduce the required size of the power plant while at the same time increasing the dependability of the system. Scheduling of processors can help to reduce potential power spikes. However, not all power-consuming equipment is easily scheduled. Therefore, active power management is needed to further decrease the risk of surges or spikes. We investigate the use of a hierarchical scheme to actively manage power for a model of a regenerative life support system. Local level controllers individually determine subsystem power usage. A higher level controller monitors overall system power and detects surges or spikes. When a surge condition is detected, the higher level controller conducts an 'auction' and describes subsystem power usage to re-allocate power. The result is an overall reduction in total power during a power surge. The auction involves each subsystem making a 'bid' to buy or sell power based on local needs. However, this re-allocation cannot come at the expense of life support function. To this end, participation in the auction is restricted to those processes meeting certain tolerance constraints. These tolerances represent acceptable limits within which system processes can be operated. We present a simulation model and discuss some of our results.

  1. Prices need no preferences: social trends determine decisions in experimental markets for pain relief.

    PubMed

    Vlaev, Ivo; Seymour, Ben; Chater, Nick; Winston, Joel S; Yoshida, Wako; Wright, Nicholas; Symmonds, Mkael; Dolan, Ray

    2014-01-01

    A standard view in health economics is that, although there is no market that determines the "prices" for health states, people can nonetheless associate health states with monetary values (or other scales, such as quality adjusted life year [QALYs] and disability adjusted life year [DALYs]). Such valuations can be used to shape health policy, and a major research challenge is to elicit such values from people; creating experimental "markets" for health states is a theoretically attractive way to address this. We explore the possibility that this framework may be fundamentally flawed-because there may not be any stable values to be revealed. Instead, perhaps people construct ad hoc values, influenced by contextual factors, such as the observed decisions of others. The participants bid to buy relief from equally painful electrical shocks to the leg and arm in an experimental health market based on an interactive second-price auction. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions where the bids by "others" were manipulated to follow increasing or decreasing price trends for one, but not the other, pain. After the auction, a preference test asked the participants to choose which pain they prefer to experience for a longer duration. Players remained indifferent between the two pain-types throughout the auction. However, their bids were differentially attracted toward what others bid for each pain, with overbidding during decreasing prices and underbidding during increasing prices. Health preferences are dissociated from market prices, which are strongly referenced to others' choices. This suggests that the price of health care in a free-market has the capacity to become critically detached from people's underlying preferences. 2014 APA, all rights reserved

  2. BLM Live Internet Auctions Act

    THOMAS, 113th Congress

    Rep. Johnson, Bill [R-OH-6

    2013-02-06

    House - 09/10/2013 Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 148. (All Actions) Notes: For further action, see H.R.3979, which became Public Law 113-291 on 12/19/2014. Tracker: This bill has the status IntroducedHere are the steps for Status of Legislation:

  3. 29 CFR 780.605 - Employment in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Employment in agriculture. 780.605 Section 780.605 Labor... POLICY OR INTERPRETATION NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO REGULATIONS EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE... Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption...

  4. 29 CFR 780.605 - Employment in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Employment in agriculture. 780.605 Section 780.605 Labor... POLICY OR INTERPRETATION NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO REGULATIONS EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE... Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption...

  5. 29 CFR 780.605 - Employment in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Employment in agriculture. 780.605 Section 780.605 Labor... POLICY OR INTERPRETATION NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO REGULATIONS EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE... Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption...

  6. 29 CFR 780.605 - Employment in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Employment in agriculture. 780.605 Section 780.605 Labor... POLICY OR INTERPRETATION NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO REGULATIONS EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE... Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption...

  7. 29 CFR 780.605 - Employment in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Employment in agriculture. 780.605 Section 780.605 Labor... POLICY OR INTERPRETATION NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO REGULATIONS EXEMPTIONS APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE... Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements for Exemption...

  8. 10 CFR 452.3 - Solicitations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Solicitations. 452.3 Section 452.3 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.3 Solicitations. The reverse auction process commences with the issuance of a solicitation by DOE. DOE will publish a...

  9. 10 CFR 452.3 - Solicitations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Solicitations. 452.3 Section 452.3 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.3 Solicitations. The reverse auction process commences with the issuance of a solicitation by DOE. DOE will publish a...

  10. 10 CFR 452.3 - Solicitations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Solicitations. 452.3 Section 452.3 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.3 Solicitations. The reverse auction process commences with the issuance of a solicitation by DOE. DOE will publish a...

  11. 10 CFR 452.3 - Solicitations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Solicitations. 452.3 Section 452.3 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.3 Solicitations. The reverse auction process commences with the issuance of a solicitation by DOE. DOE will publish a...

  12. 12 CFR 362.2 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... adjustable rate preferred stock, money market (auction rate) preferred stock, or other newly developed...) and the National Market System, i.e., the top tier of the National Association of Securities Dealers... shall be understood to be present whenever the FDIC determines there is a high probability that the...

  13. The Shepherd Creek experience and some lessons learned

    EPA Science Inventory

    A decentralized, retrofit approach to storm water management was implemented in a small suburban drainage on the basis of a voluntary reverse auction. This campaign led to the installation of 83 rain gardens and 176 rain barrels on approximately 20 percent of 350 residential prop...

  14. 47 CFR 1.1182 - Schedule of fees for products and services provided by the Commission in connection with...

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-10-01

    ... telephone bill. Remote Bidding Software $175.00 per package Payment to auction contractor by credit card or... contractor by credit card or check. (Public Notice will specify exact payment procedures.) [60 FR 38280, July...

  15. 10 CFR 452.3 - Solicitations.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Solicitations. 452.3 Section 452.3 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION PRODUCTION INCENTIVES FOR CELLULOSIC BIOFUELS § 452.3 Solicitations. The reverse auction process commences with the issuance of a solicitation by DOE. DOE will publish a...

  16. 76 FR 67238 - Self-Regulatory Organizations; BATS Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change by BATS...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2011-10-31

    ...'' or ``MOO'' order, ``Limit-On-Open'' or ``LOO'' order, and a ``Late-Limit-On-Open'' or ``LLOO'' order... Rule 11.23(a)(8) defines ``Eligible Auction Orders'' as any MOO, LOO, LLOO, MOC, LOC, or LLOC order...

  17. 78 FR 56875 - Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I Auction Rescheduled for December 19, 2013; Notice and Filing...

    Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

    2013-09-16

    ... of comparing bids and measuring the performance of Tribal Mobility Fund Phase I support recipients..., EV-DO Rev A, UMTS/HSPA, HSPA+, WiMAX, and LTE. If the Mosaik data did not show such coverage, the...

  18. 7 CFR 29.1 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-01-01

    ... containing one or more warehouses where tobacco is delivered by producers thereof, or their agents, for sale... applicable sales data on each lot. (e) Designated market means an auction market designated by the Secretary... warehouse beyond those boundaries which received tobacco inspection and price support services during the...

  19. 7 CFR 29.1 - Definitions.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... containing one or more warehouses where tobacco is delivered by producers thereof, or their agents, for sale... applicable sales data on each lot. (e) Designated market means an auction market designated by the Secretary... warehouse beyond those boundaries which received tobacco inspection and price support services during the...

  20. Remembering Irving I. Gottesman: Twin Research Colleague and Friend Extraordinaire/Research Studies: Face-Lift Technique Comparison in Identical Twins; Raising Preterm Twins; Fetal Behavior in Dichorionic Twin Pregnancies; Co-Bedding and Stress Reduction in Twins/Public Interest: Identical Co-Twins' Same Day Delivery; Teaching Twins in Bosnia; Twin Auctioneers; Sister, the Play.

    PubMed

    Segal, Nancy L

    2016-12-01

    Dr Irving I. Gottesman, a colleague, friend, and long-time member of the International Society of Twin Studies passed away on June 29, 2016. His contributions to twin research and some personal reflections are presented to honor both the man and the memory. This tribute is followed by short reviews of twin research concerning differences between cosmetic surgical techniques, the rearing of preterm twins, behavioral observations of dichorionic fetal twins, and the outcomes of co-bedding twins with reference to stress reduction. Interesting and informative articles in the media describe identical co-twins who delivered infants on the same day, educational policies regarding twins in Bosnia and the United Kingdom, unusual practices of twin auctioneers, and a theatrical production, Sister, featuring identical twins in the leading roles.

  1. Willingness to pay for small solar powered bed net fans: results of a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction in Ghana.

    PubMed

    Yukich, Joshua O; Briët, Olivier J T; Ahorlu, Collins K; Nardini, Peter; Keating, Joseph

    2017-08-07

    Long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) are one of the main interventions recommended by the World Health Organization for malaria vector control. LLINs are ineffective if they are not being used. Subsequent to the completion of a cluster randomized cross over trial conducted in rural Greater Accra where participants were provided with the 'Bɔkɔɔ System'-a set of solar powered net fan and light consoles with a solar panel and battery-or alternative household water filters, all trial participants were invited to participate in a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction to determine the mean willingness to pay (WTP) for the fan and light consoles and to estimate the demand curve for the units. Results demonstraed a mean WTP of approximately 55 Cedis (~13 USD). Demand results suggested that at a price which would support full manufacturing cost recovery, a majority of households in the area would be willing to purchase at least one such unit.

  2. Price dynamics and market power in an agent-based power exchange

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Cincotti, Silvano; Guerci, Eric; Raberto, Marco

    2005-05-01

    This paper presents an agent-based model of a power exchange. Supply of electric power is provided by competing generating companies, whereas demand is assumed to be inelastic with respect to price and is constant over time. The transmission network topology is assumed to be a fully connected graph and no transmission constraints are taken into account. The price formation process follows a common scheme for real power exchanges: a clearing house mechanism with uniform price, i.e., with price set equal across all matched buyer-seller pairs. A single class of generating companies is considered, characterized by linear cost function for each technology. Generating companies compete for the sale of electricity through repeated rounds of the uniform auction and determine their supply functions according to production costs. However, an individual reinforcement learning algorithm characterizes generating companies behaviors in order to attain the expected maximum possible profit in each auction round. The paper investigates how the market competitive equilibrium is affected by market microstructure and production costs.

  3. Neural correlates of reinforcement learning and social preferences in competitive bidding.

    PubMed

    van den Bos, Wouter; Talwar, Arjun; McClure, Samuel M

    2013-01-30

    In competitive social environments, people often deviate from what rational choice theory prescribes, resulting in losses or suboptimal monetary gains. We investigate how competition affects learning and decision-making in a common value auction task. During the experiment, groups of five human participants were simultaneously scanned using MRI while playing the auction task. We first demonstrate that bidding is well characterized by reinforcement learning with biased reward representations dependent on social preferences. Indicative of reinforcement learning, we found that estimated trial-by-trial prediction errors correlated with activity in the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Additionally, we found that individual differences in social preferences were related to activity in the temporal-parietal junction and anterior insula. Connectivity analyses suggest that monetary and social value signals are integrated in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and striatum. Based on these results, we argue for a novel mechanistic account for the integration of reinforcement history and social preferences in competitive decision-making.

  4. A Study on Partnering Mechanism in B to B EC Server for Global Supply Chain Management

    NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

    Kaihara, Toshiya

    B to B Electronic Commerce (EC) technology is now in progress and regarded as an information infrastructure for global business. As the number and diversity of EC participants grows at the agile environment, the complexity of purchasing from a vast and dynamic array of goods and services needs to be hidden from the end user. Putting the complexity into the EC system instead means providing flexible auction server for enabling commerce within different business units. Market mechanism could solve the product distribution problem in the auction server by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. In this paper, we propose a partnering mechanism for B to B EC with market-oriented programming that mediates amongst unspecified various companies in the trade, and demonstrate the applicability of the economic analysis to this framework after constructing a primitive EC server. The proposed mechanism facilitates sophisticated B to B EC, which conducts a Pareto optimal solution for all the participating business units in the coming agile era.

  5. 36 CFR 223.231 - Bidding methods.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Bidding methods. 223.231... methods. The Contracting Officer or designated forest officer shall offer advertised sales of special forest products through sealed bid or sealed bid followed by oral auction. The method selected shall: (a...

  6. 29 CFR 780.611 - Workweek exclusively in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Workweek exclusively in agriculture. 780.611 Section 780... AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements...

  7. 29 CFR 780.611 - Workweek exclusively in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Workweek exclusively in agriculture. 780.611 Section 780... AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements...

  8. 29 CFR 780.611 - Workweek exclusively in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Workweek exclusively in agriculture. 780.611 Section 780... AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements...

  9. 29 CFR 780.611 - Workweek exclusively in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Workweek exclusively in agriculture. 780.611 Section 780... AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements...

  10. 29 CFR 780.611 - Workweek exclusively in agriculture.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... 29 Labor 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Workweek exclusively in agriculture. 780.611 Section 780... AGRICULTURE, PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES, AND RELATED SUBJECTS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT Employment in Agriculture and Livestock Auction Operations Under the Section 13(b)(13) Exemption Requirements...

  11. 41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-01-01

    ... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

  12. 41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-01-01

    ... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

  13. 41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-07-01

    ... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

  14. 41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-07-01

    ... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

  15. 41 CFR 109-45.304-51 - Documentation.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-01-01

    ... return for property sold. (g) When appropriate, full and adequate justification for not advertising the... of auction or spot bid sales, the following additional information should be included: (1) A summary listing of the advertising used (e.g., newspapers, radio, television, and public postings). (2) The names...

  16. 19 CFR 351.511 - Provision of goods or services.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

    2011-04-01

    ... available world market price, the Secretary will average such prices to the extent practicable, making due... normally seek to measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the government price to a market..., imported, or auctioned; and other factors affecting comparability. (ii) Actual market-determined price...

  17. 19 CFR 351.511 - Provision of goods or services.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

    2014-04-01

    ... available world market price, the Secretary will average such prices to the extent practicable, making due... normally seek to measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the government price to a market..., imported, or auctioned; and other factors affecting comparability. (ii) Actual market-determined price...

  18. 19 CFR 351.511 - Provision of goods or services.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

    2012-04-01

    ... available world market price, the Secretary will average such prices to the extent practicable, making due... normally seek to measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the government price to a market..., imported, or auctioned; and other factors affecting comparability. (ii) Actual market-determined price...

  19. 19 CFR 351.511 - Provision of goods or services.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

    2013-04-01

    ... available world market price, the Secretary will average such prices to the extent practicable, making due... normally seek to measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the government price to a market..., imported, or auctioned; and other factors affecting comparability. (ii) Actual market-determined price...

  20. 19 CFR 351.511 - Provision of goods or services.

    Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

    2010-04-01

    ... available world market price, the Secretary will average such prices to the extent practicable, making due... normally seek to measure the adequacy of remuneration by comparing the government price to a market..., imported, or auctioned; and other factors affecting comparability. (ii) Actual market-determined price...

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