Los Alamos Explosives Performance Key to Stockpile Stewardship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dattelbaum, Dana

2014-11-03

As the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent ages, one essential factor in making sure that the weapons will continue to perform as designed is understanding the fundamental properties of the high explosives that are part of a nuclear weapons system. As nuclear weapons go through life extension programs, some changes may be advantageous, particularly through the addition of what are known as "insensitive" high explosives that are much less likely to accidentally detonate than the already very safe "conventional" high explosives that are used in most weapons. At Los Alamos National Laboratory explosives research includes a wide variety of both large- andmore » small-scale experiments that include small contained detonations, gas and powder gun firings, larger outdoor detonations, large-scale hydrodynamic tests, and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, underground sub-critical experiments.« less

78 FR 12292 - Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-22

... the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international arms control treaty. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and Commerce Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations specify the rights, responsibilities and obligations for submission of declarations, reports and inspections. Affected Public: Business...

15 CFR 710.2 - Scope of the CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.2 Scope of the CWCR. The Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (parts 710 through 729 of this subchapter), or CWCR, implement...

22 CFR 103.4 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES AND ON... of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (CWCIA), and sets forth relevant...

15 CFR 710.2 - Scope of the CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.2 Scope of the CWCR. The Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (parts 710 through 729 of this subchapter), or CWCR, implement...

15 CFR 710.2 - Scope of the CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.2 Scope of the CWCR. The Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (parts 710 through 729 of this subchapter), or CWCR, implement...

22 CFR 103.4 - General.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES AND ON... of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 (CWCIA), and sets forth relevant...

15 CFR 710.2 - Scope of the CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.2 Scope of the CWCR. The Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (parts 710 through 729 of this subchapter), or CWCR, implement...

22 CFR 103.2 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES... Office of Export Administration and the Office of Export Enforcement. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or...

22 CFR 103.2 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES... Office of Export Administration and the Office of Export Enforcement. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or...

15 CFR 710.2 - Scope of the CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.2 Scope of the CWCR. The Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (parts 710 through 729 of this subchapter), or CWCR, implement...

15 CFR 710.3 - Purposes of the Convention and CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.3 Purposes of..., produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly...

22 CFR 103.1 - Purpose.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES AND ON... intended to implement sections 304(f)(1) and 501 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of...

15 CFR 710.3 - Purposes of the Convention and CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.3 Purposes of..., produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly...

22 CFR 103.1 - Purpose.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES AND ON... intended to implement sections 304(f)(1) and 501 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of...

15 CFR 710.3 - Purposes of the Convention and CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.3 Purposes of..., produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly...

15 CFR 719.1 - Scope and definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT... proceedings. Section 719.3 of the CWCR sets forth violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention for which the... of the export requirements imposed pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention and set forth in the...

15 CFR 719.1 - Scope and definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT... proceedings. Section 719.3 of the CWCR sets forth violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention for which the... of the export requirements imposed pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention and set forth in the...

15 CFR 719.1 - Scope and definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT... proceedings. Section 719.3 of the CWCR sets forth violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention for which the... of the export requirements imposed pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention and set forth in the...

15 CFR 719.1 - Scope and definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT... proceedings. Section 719.3 of the CWCR sets forth violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention for which the... of the export requirements imposed pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention and set forth in the...

15 CFR 719.1 - Scope and definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT... proceedings. Section 719.3 of the CWCR sets forth violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention for which the... of the export requirements imposed pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention and set forth in the...

15 CFR 710.3 - Purposes of the Convention and CWCR.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.3 Purposes of..., produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly...

Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jenkins, Bonnie

1997-01-01

Reveals the growing threat posed to all countries by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Discusses the international effort combating this proliferation including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention, and Chemical Weapons Convention. Also considers regional arms…

Enhancing Energy in Future Conventional Munition

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Peiris, Suhithi

2017-06-01

Future conventional weapons are envisioned to contain more energy per volume than current weapons. Current weapons comprise of inert steel outer case, with inner volume for energetic materials, fuzing, sensor package, propulsion system, etc. Recent research on reactive materials (RM) & new energetics, and exploiting additive manufacturing can optimize the use of both mass and volume to achieve much higher energy in future weapons. For instance, replacing inert steel with RM of similar strength, additively manufacturing fuzing packages within the weapon form factor, and combing the whole with new energetics, will enable the same lethality effects from smaller weapons as obtained from today's larger weapons. This paper will elaborate on reactive materials and properties necessary for optimal utilization in various weapon features, and touch on other aspects of enhancing energy in future conventional munition.

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons...

75 FR 69630 - Impact of Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial Activities Involving...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-11-15

... Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention on Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals, Including Production of Schedule 1 Chemicals as Intermediates, Through Calendar Year 2010 AGENCY: Bureau of... (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention...

15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) § 710.6 Relationship between the... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Relationship between the Chemical...

22 CFR 103.3 - Requirement to provide a sample.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998... accordance with the applicable provisions contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the CWCIA. (d... for personal safety; (6) The taking of a sample does not pose a threat to the national security...

22 CFR 103.3 - Requirement to provide a sample.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998... accordance with the applicable provisions contained in the Chemical Weapons Convention and the CWCIA. (d... for personal safety; (6) The taking of a sample does not pose a threat to the national security...

Blinding laser weapons.

PubMed

Peters, A

1996-01-01

At its October 1995 Review Conference, the Convention on Conventional Weapons added a protocol banning the use and transfer of blinding laser weapons. The background to, and significance and limitations of this ban are discussed.

Bugs and gas: Agreements banning chemical and biological weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mikulak, Robert P.

2017-11-01

The use of chemical or biological weapons, whether by a State or terrorists, continues to be a serious security concern. Both types of weapons are prohibited by multilateral treaties that have very broad membership, but both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are facing major challenges. In particular, the continued use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war by government forces risks eroding the norm against the use of such weapons. This paper briefly explore the recent history of efforts to constrain chemical and biological weapons and outlines challenges for the future.

15 CFR 710.4 - Overview of scheduled chemicals and examples of affected industries.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... Schedule 2 chemicals may be useful in the production of chemical weapons, they also have legitimate uses in... may be useful in the production of chemical weapons, they also have legitimate uses in areas such as...

Biomechanical and performance implications of weapon design: comparison of bullpup and conventional configurations.

PubMed

Stone, Richard T; Moeller, Brandon F; Mayer, Robert R; Rosenquist, Bryce; Van Ryswyk, Darin; Eichorn, Drew

2014-06-01

Shooter accuracy and stability were monitored while firing two bullpup and two conventional configuration rifles of the same caliber in order to determine if one style of weapon results in superior performance. Considerable debate exists among police and military professionals regarding the differences between conventional configuration weapons, where the magazine and action are located ahead of the trigger, and bullpup configuration, where they are located behind the trigger (closer to the user). To date, no published research has attempted to evaluate this question from a physical ergonomics standpoint, and the knowledge that one style might improve stability or result in superior performance is of interest to countless military, law enforcement, and industry experts. A live-fire evaluation of both weapon styles was performed using a total of 48 participants. Shooting accuracy and fluctuations in biomechanical stability (center of pressure) were monitored while subjects used the weapons to perform standard drills. The bullpup weapon designs were found to provide a significant advantage in accuracy and shooter stability, while subjects showed considerable preference toward the conventional weapons. Although many mechanical and maintenance issues must be considered before committing to a bullpup or conventional weapon system, it is clear in terms of basic human stability that the bullpup is the more advantageous configuration. Results can be used by competitive shooter, military, law enforcement, and industry experts while outfitting personnel with a weapon system that leads to superior performance.

Re-evaluating Russia's biological weapons policy, as reflected in the Criminal Code and Official Admissions: insubordination leading to a president's subordination.

PubMed

Knoph, Jan T; Westerdahl, Kristina S

2006-01-01

Half-heartedly acknowledged by the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union ran the world's largest offensive program for biological weapons, breaching the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Russia criminalized biological weapons in 1993 only to decriminalize them in 1996, but in 2003 president Putin partly recriminalized them. None of these changes were declared within the Convention. Several well-known official statements, when reviewed in their context, turned out to admit to neither an offensive program nor a breach of the Convention. Thus, the Russian biological weapons policy is more ambiguous than usually depicted, and various policy shapers can be discerned.

77 FR 46683 - Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-08-06

...: Bureau of Industry and Security. Title: Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the Export... Respondents: 10. Average Hours per Response: 30 minutes. Needs and Uses: The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a multilateral arms control treaty that seeks to achieve an international ban on chemical weapons...

International Environmental Law and Naval War Newport paper no. 15

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-12-01

Conference, which adopted the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environ- mental...187 • Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological ( Biological ) and Toxin Weapons , and on their...1 Journal of Armed Conflict Law, 125 (1996). —————. “The Regulation of Biological and Chemical Weapons .” In Fox, H. and Meyer, M., Effective

Conventional nuclear strategy and the American doctrine of counterforce

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

David, C.P.

Debate over nuclear weapons still lingers and one cause of this trend, as suggested by this thesis, is the rise of conventional nuclear strategy or, in other words, the attempt by the US government to apply through the counterforce doctrine a conventional weapons strategy in an age of nuclear weapons. That debate is analyzed, as well as the thinking underlining conventional nuclear strategy, and explains why conventionalization has become popular in US nuclear weapons policies. A feature of the American nuclear debate has been the unresolved tension between two approaches to nuclear strategy, namely: the apocalyptic approach and the conventionalmore » approach. The confrontation between these camps has resulted over the years in a gradual but steady erosion of the strategic consensus to the point where, under the Reagan administration, the conventional camp appears to have emerged as a clear winner from the nuclear debate. The attractiveness of conventional nuclear strategy can be attributed to the influence and working of an American style of nuclear strategy, i.e., a specific approach to the phenomena of nuclear weapons. The author concludes that the conventional and official strategic view that nuclear problems can be solved by technological progress may, in fact, contribute to worsen rather than improve the thermonuclear condition of the world.« less

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. July 2006 - December 2006

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-12-01

and Biological Safety Eleventh Chemical Weapons Convention Better International Controls Needed to Prevent Bioterrorism Human Biomonitoring for...Environmental Cooperation to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons ...scanning reports.] [September 2006. Military Implications, Sources] Chemical and Biological Safey Eleventh Chemical Weapons Convention The 11th

International Environmental Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conventions During International Armed Conflict

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-12-01

Biological Weapons Convention and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environ- mental Modification Techniques...of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological ( Biological ) and Toxin Weapons , and on their Destruction, Lon- don/Washington...125 (1996). —————. “The Regulation of Biological and Chemical Weapons .” In Fox, H. and Meyer, M., Effective Compliance. Armed Conflict and the New Law

A feasibility study of the destruction of chemical weapons by photocatalytic oxidation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hitchman, M.L.; Spackman, A.R.; Yusta, F.J.

1997-01-01

The destruction of existing arsenals or deposits of chemical weapons is an important obstacle on the way to the successful implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention which was opened for signature in 1993. Many approaches have been proposed and none can be seen as panacea. Each has its merits and shortcomings. In this paper we review the different technologies and propose a new one, photocatalytic oxidation, which has the potential to fill an important gap; a cheap, small, mobile facility for chemical warfare agents which are difficult to transport or are deposited in a remote area. We report some relevantmore » experimental results with this technology for the destruction of chemical weapons. After many years of negotiation, a convention banning the production, possession and use of chemical weapons was opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. The convention, once it is ratified, will provide a framework and a program for the destruction of chemical weapons by the nations party to it. The framework will cover such topics as definitions of terminology, general rules of verification and verification measures, level of destruction of chemical weapons, activities not prohibited under the convention, and investigations in cases of alleged use of chemical weapons. The program will require that countries with chemical weapons shall start their destruction not later than one year after they have ratified the convention, and that they shall complete it within a ten year period. For this period involved countries are required to declare their plans for destruction. These plans have to include a time schedule for the destruction process, an inventory of equipment and buildings to be destroyed, proposed measures for verification, safety measures to be observed during destruction, specification of the types of chemical weapons and the type and quantity of chemical fill to be destroyed, and specification of the destruction method. 38 refs.« less

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 710 - Definitions of Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) Pt. 710, Supp. 2...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 710 - Definitions of Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) Pt. 710, Supp. 2...

Flying-qualities criteria for wings-level-turn maneuvering during an air-to-ground weapon delivery task

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sammonds, R. I.; Bunnell, J. W.

1981-01-01

A moving base simulator experiment demonstrated that a wings-level-turn control mode improved flying qualities for air to ground weapon delivery compared with those of a conventionally controlled aircraft. Evaluations of criteria for dynamic response for this system have shown that pilot ratings correlate well on the basis of equivalent time constant of the initial response. Ranges of this time constant, as well as digital system transport delays and lateral acceleration control authorities that encompassed level 1 through 3 handling qualities, were determined.

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. November 2006 Report

DTIC Science & Technology

2006-11-01

should follow this development for potential improved environmental biological weapons surveillance systems. Source: Researchers use laser...Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons came into force on 12 November 2006, almost three...potentials for nanotech weapons , create unique problems of proliferation, health effects, environmental impacts, and post-conflict cleanups that are

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan Albania...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan Albania...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 745 - States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their... REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 745—States... Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction List of States Parties as of May 21, 2009 Afghanistan Albania...

Enhancing Air Interdiction of WMD

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-04-01

The Convention on International Civil Aviation, 9th ed., 9 and 10 and Jennifer K. Elsa , Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal...Issues for Ships and Aircraft, CRS Report RL32097, (Washington D.C: CRS, 1 October 2003), 24. 15 Elsa , Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation...Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft, 20. 16 The Convention on International Civil Aviation, 9th ed., 4. 17 Elsa , Weapons of Mass Destruction

Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-02-03

Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues Amy F. Woolf Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy...February 3, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41464 Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles...Congressional Research Service Summary Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere

76 FR 36986 - Export Controls for High Performance Computers: Wassenaar Arrangement Agreement Implementation...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-24

... regimes and is working on becoming a member of the regimes. Albania and Croatia are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. In...

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) : are we safer?

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brune, Nancy E.

2010-07-01

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is designed to make world safer by reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. U.S. also seeks to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforce regional security architectures with missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities. But recent studies suggest that nuclear proliferation is a direct response to the perceived threat of U.S. conventional capabilities not U.S. nuclear stockpile. If this is true, then the intent of the NPR to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons and strengthen conventional military capabilities may actually make the world lessmore » safe. First stated objective of NPR is to reduce the role and numbers of U.S. nuclear weapons, reduce the salience of nuclear weapons and move step by step toward eliminating them. Second stated objective is a reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to maintaining a strong deterrent which forms the basis of U.S. assurances to allies and partners. The pathway - made explicit throughout the NPR - for reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures is to give conventional forces and capabilities and missile defenses (e.g. non-nuclear elements) a greater share of the deterrence burden.« less

Flying-qualities criteria for wings-level-turn maneuvering during an air-to-ground weapon delivery task

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sammonds, R. I.; Bunnell, J. W., Jr.

1980-01-01

A moving-base simulator experiment conducted at Ames Research Center demonstrated that a wings-level-turn control mode improved flying qualities for air-to-ground weapons delivery compared with those of a conventional aircraft. Evaluations of criteria for dynamic response for this system have shown that pilot ratings correlate well on the basis of equivalent time constant of the initial response. Ranges of this time constant, as well as digital-system transport delays and lateral-acceleration control authorities that encompassed Level I through Level III handling qualities, were determined.

Worldwide Emerging Environmental Issues Affecting the U.S. Military. Summarizing Environmental Security Monthly Scanning, July 2006-June 2007

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-01

if used on the battlefield. Clarification of what chemicals will be allowed under the treaty’s exception is needed. “The biological weapons threat... biological , and chemical weapons countermeasures include: • adoption of amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material...to Increase Enforcement of Environmental Regulations and Public Participation Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention Kyoto

Synthesis of reference compounds related to Chemical Weapons Convention for verification and drug development purposes – a Brazilian endeavour

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cavalcante, S. F. A.; de Paula, R. L.; Kitagawa, D. A. S.; Barcellos, M. C.; Simas, A. B. C.; Granjeiro, J. M.

2018-03-01

This paper deals with challenges that Brazilian Army Organic Synthesis Laboratory has been going through to access reference compounds related to the Chemical Weapons Convention in order to support verification analysis and for research of novel antidotes. Some synthetic procedures to produce the chemicals, as well as Quality Assurance issues and a brief introduction of international agreements banning chemical weapons are also presented.

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 710 - Definitions of Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... reaction Produced by synthesis* Formation through chemical synthesis.Processing to extract and isolate... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS (CWCR) Pt. 710, Supp. 2...

22 CFR 103.6 - Penalties.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Penalties. 103.6 Section 103.6 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES...

22 CFR 103.7 - Initiation of administrative enforcement proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Initiation of administrative enforcement proceedings. 103.7 Section 103.7 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION...

22 CFR 103.7 - Initiation of administrative enforcement proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Initiation of administrative enforcement proceedings. 103.7 Section 103.7 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION...

22 CFR 103.10 - Appeals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Appeals. 103.10 Section 103.10 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES...

22 CFR 103.6 - Penalties.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Penalties. 103.6 Section 103.6 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON THE TAKING OF SAMPLES...

22 CFR 103.8 - Final agency decision after administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Final agency decision after administrative proceedings. 103.8 Section 103.8 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION...

22 CFR 103.11 - Payment of final assessment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Payment of final assessment. 103.11 Section 103.11 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT OF 1998 ON...

22 CFR 103.8 - Final agency decision after administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Final agency decision after administrative proceedings. 103.8 Section 103.8 Foreign Relations DEPARTMENT OF STATE ECONOMIC AND OTHER FUNCTIONS REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION...

77 FR 22559 - Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-04-16

... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security Proposed Information Collection; Comment Request; Chemical Weapons Convention Provisions of the Export Administration Regulations AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce, as part of its...

Biotechnology

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-01-01

The former Soviet Union dedicated many resources to its offensive biological weapons program, employing over 25,000 scientists, engineers, and...compassionate partner in international affairs. The proliferation of biological weapons is a real and growing concern. The Biological Weapons ...Convention Treaty (BWC) of 1972 prohibits the development, possession and use of biological weapons , but the treaty lacks a means of verifying compliance

A rubber-covered ceramic weapon reduces the incidence of dental trauma in recruits during combat basic training.

PubMed

Becker, Talia; Ashkenazi, Malka

2011-10-01

The effect of a rubber-covered ceramic weapon was assessed on the incidence of dental trauma during basic training, since soldiers are more at risk of impact from a personal weapon. Dental files of soldiers (n = 4,542), who completed 8 months of training during 2008, were analyzed for incidence and type of dental trauma from a personal weapon. A rubber-covered ceramic weapon (n = 2,972) or a conventional one (n = 1,570, control) was used. Dental trauma was 0.4% per 8 months (0.6% per year) from the ceramic weapon and 1.5% per 8 months (2.3% per year) from the conventional one (p<0.001). The most prevalent type of injury was a simple/noncomplicated crown fracture (82% in study group, 75% in control group). The ceramic weapon significantly reduced dental trauma by diminishing the impact while in direct contact with the teeth or by absorbing and/or distributing the impact force. In conclusion, when possible a rubber-covered ceramic weapon should be preferred for basic combat training.

76 FR 76935 - Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-09

... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security [Docket No. 111130706-1686-01] Impact of Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Commercial Activities Involving ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals Through Calendar Year 2011; Impact of Adding Salts of CWC ``Schedule 1'' Chemicals to ``Schedule 1...

15 CFR 710.4 - Overview of scheduled chemicals and examples of affected industries.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION AND OVERVIEW OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Overview of scheduled chemicals and...

22 CFR 103.8 - Final agency decision after administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... administrative proceedings. (a) Review of initial decision—(1) Petition for review. Any party may, within 7 days... Secretary for review of the initial decision. A petition for review shall be addressed to and served on the...

22 CFR 103.8 - Final agency decision after administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... administrative proceedings. (a) Review of initial decision—(1) Petition for review. Any party may, within 7 days... Secretary for review of the initial decision. A petition for review shall be addressed to and served on the...

22 CFR 103.8 - Final agency decision after administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... REGULATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION... administrative proceedings. (a) Review of initial decision—(1) Petition for review. Any party may, within 7 days... Secretary for review of the initial decision. A petition for review shall be addressed to and served on the...

15 CFR 717.1 - Clarification procedures; challenge inspection requests pursuant to Article IX of the Convention.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC CLARIFICATION PROCEDURES (CONSULTATIONS AND CHALLENGE... through consultation between themselves or through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). A State Party may also request the OPCW to conduct an on-site challenge inspection of any...

Strategic defense initiative: critical issues

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nuckolls, J.H.

The objectives of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as outlined by President Reagan are discussed. The principal objective for SDI is as a defense against ballistic missiles. Soviet objections and a summary of US-USSR dialogue on the subject are reviewed. Most US studies have been critical of SDI. Four critical issues are addressed in depth: are defense weapons technologically feasible which have high economic leverage relative to offensive ballistic missiles; would the defense feasibility and leverage be degraded or enhanced in the technological race between weapons innovation and countermeasures; could stability be achieved during and after the transition to themore » defense dominated world envisioned by SDI proponents; would the deployment of high leverage defensive weapons increase or decrease the security of NATO Europe, and the probability of major conventional or nuclear wars. The issue of SDI may lead to a paradox that contains the seeds of catastrophe. The author concludes by warning that nuclear disarmament may eliminate the highly successful deterrent mechanism for avoiding another major world war. In a world made safe for major conventional wars by the apparent ''elimination'' of nuclear weapons, the leaders in a conventional World War III - involving unimaginable suffering, hatred, terror, and death - would be strongly motivated to introduce nuclear weapons in the crucial decisive battles. Even if diplomacy could ''eliminate'' nuclear weapons, man's knowledge of nuclear weapons can never be eliminated. The paradox is the attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons may maximize the probability of their use. (DMC)« less

Wargaming and interactive color graphics

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bly, S.; Buzzell, C.; Smith, G.

1980-08-04

JANUS is a two-sided interactive color graphic simulation in which human commanders can direct their forces, each trying to accomplish their mission. This competitive synthetic battlefield is used to explore the range of human ingenuity under conditions of incomplete information about enemy strength and deployment. Each player can react to new situations by planning new unit movements, using conventional and nuclear weapons, or modifying unit objectives. Conventional direct fire among tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, helicopters, and other units is automated subject to constraints of target acquisition, reload rate, range, suppression, etc. Artillery and missile indirect fire systems deliver conventional munitions,more » smoke, and nuclear weapons. Players use reconnaissance units, helicopters, or fixed wing aircraft to search for enemy unit locations. Counter-battery radars acquire enemy artillery. The JANUS simulation at LLL has demonstrated the value of the computer as a sophisticated blackboard. A small dedicated minicomputer is adequate for detailed calculations, and may be preferable to sharing a more powerful machine. Real-time color interactive graphics are essential to allow realistic command decision inputs. Competitive human-versus-human synthetic experiences are intense and well-remembered. 2 figures.« less

2001 Industry Studies: Biotechnology

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-01-01

the industry. The former Soviet Union dedicated many resources to its offensive biological weapons program, employing over 25,000 scientists...international affairs. The proliferation of biological weapons is a real and growing concern. The Biological Weapons Convention Treaty (BWC) of 1972...prohibits the development, possession and use of biological weapons , but the treaty lacks a means of verifying compliance. There is international

Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations.

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-01-01

chemical, biological and nuclear weapons continues. Despite the reduction of world tensions, almost every industrial nation will be armed with a range...of conventional, chemical, and biological weapons. Most of these weapons will have been supplied to them by the EC, the United States, and China before...weapons and delivery systems as well as chemical and biological weapons to build or increase their arsenals. The combined effect of new found economic

Taking a stand against nuclear proliferation: the pediatrician's role.

PubMed

Newman, Thomas B

2008-05-01

Nuclear weapons pose a grave threat to the health of children. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which for almost 40 years has limited the spread of nuclear weapons, is in danger of unraveling. At the 2000 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, 180 countries, including the United States, agreed on 13 practical steps to implement Article VI of the treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. However, the United States has acted in contravention of several of those disarmament steps, with announced plans to develop new nuclear weapons and to maintain a large nuclear arsenal for decades to come. Pediatricians, working individually and through organizations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, can educate the public and elected officials regarding the devastating and irremediable effects of nuclear weapons on children and the need for policies that comply with and strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than undermining it. For the children of the world, our goal must be a nuclear weapons convention (similar to the chemical and biological weapons conventions) that would prohibit these weapons globally.

Industry Studies 2004: Biotechnology

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-01-01

for biological agent research, development, and production are available on the open market. Since biological weapons are relatively cheap, easy to...growing concern is that non-state actors will acquire and use a biological weapon , the “poor man’s nuclear weapon .” Such action is extremely difficult...to detect and counter. International Protocols and the Need to Control Agents and Technologies - The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-10-25

States has signed such agreements with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands , Mongolia...Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group...biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes.” The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not

High Tech Decision Making in the Airpower Age

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-05-01

Note (About Question 1): Current World "All possible question(issues) for further breakup" Break up of the former Soviet Union Megatrends ...nukes, chemical & biological weapons) - also delivery vehicles (for sale on the open market) - advanced conventional weaponry - active/passive...costly to enemy in terms of rebuilding infrastructure, equipment -need to develop countermeasure -may violate the Biological Weapons convention

Chemical weapons: documented use and compounds on the horizon.

PubMed

Bismuth, Chantal; Borron, Stephen W; Baud, Frederic J; Barriot, Patrick

2004-04-01

Man's inhumanity to man is expressed through a plethora of tools of modern warfare and terror. The use of chemical and biological weapons with the goals of assault, demoralisation and lethality has been documented in recent history, both on the battlefield and in urban terror against civilians. A general review of a few of the currently employed chemical weapons and biological toxins, along with a look at potential chemical weapons and tools of counter-terrorism, follows. While these weapons are fearsome elements, the dangers should be viewed in the context of the widespread availability and efficacy of conventional weapons.

Chemical and biological weapons in the 'new wars'.

PubMed

Ilchmann, Kai; Revill, James

2014-09-01

The strategic use of disease and poison in warfare has been subject to a longstanding and cross-cultural taboo that condemns the hostile exploitation of poisons and disease as the act of a pariah. In short, biological and chemical weapons are simply not fair game. The normative opprobrium is, however, not fixed, but context dependent and, as a social phenomenon, remains subject to erosion by social (or more specifically, antisocial) actors. The cross cultural understanding that fighting with poisons and disease is reprehensible, that they are taboo, is codified through a web of interconnected measures, principal amongst these are the 1925 Geneva Protocol; the Biological Weapons Convention; and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Whilst these treaties have weathered the storm of international events reasonably well, their continued health is premised on their being 'tended to' in the face of contextual changes, particularly facing changes in science and technology, as well as the changed nature and character of conflict. This article looks at the potential for normative erosion of the norm against chemical and biological weapons in the face of these contextual changes and the creeping legitimization of chemical and biological weapons.

[Chemical weapons and chemical terrorism].

PubMed

Nakamura, Katsumi

2005-10-01

Chemical Weapons are kind of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They were used large quantities in WWI. Historically, large quantities usage like WWI was not recorded, but small usage has appeared now and then. Chemical weapons are so called "Nuclear weapon for poor countrys" because it's very easy to produce/possession being possible. They are categorized (1) Nerve Agents, (2) Blister Agents, (3) Cyanide (blood) Agents, (4) Pulmonary Agents, (5) Incapacitating Agents (6) Tear Agents from the viewpoint of human body interaction. In 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention has taken effect. It prohibits chemical weapons development/production, and Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification regime contributes to the chemical weapons disposal. But possibility of possession/use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist group represented in one by Matsumoto and Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack, So new chemical terrorism countermeasures are necessary.

Chemical and biological warfare. Should defenses be researched and deployed?

PubMed

Orient, J M

1989-08-04

The threat of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction has intensified because of improved delivery systems and advances in chemistry, genetics, and other sciences. Possible US responses to this threat include deterrence, defenses, and/or disarmament, including a reaffirmation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which is now in jeopardy. This article discusses the history of chemical and biological warfare, existing and potential weapons, the proliferation of weapons and delivery systems, ways to prevent the use of these weapons, and ways to protect populations from their effects.

Futures Meeting November 2009

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-09-01

18 Table 3 - Conventional Weapons vs. The Star Trek Phaser...significantly to the overall weight of the basic weapon. Mr. Appel suggested the Star Trek Phaser as an ideal weapon model. The Phaser was a pistol- sized...wearing body armor and adjust actions accordingly. Mr. Appel continued the discussion on the Star Trek Phaser the next morning (November 18, 2009

Neurotoxic Weapons and Syndromes.

PubMed

Carota, Antonio; Calabrese, Pasquale; Bogousslavsky, Julien

2016-01-01

The modern era of chemical and biological warfare began in World War I with the large-scale production and use of blistering and choking agents (chlorine, phosgene and mustard gases) in the battlefield. International treaties (the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention) banned biological and chemical weapons. However, several countries are probably still engaged in their development. Hence, there is risk of these weapons being used in the future. This chapter will focus on neurotoxic weapons (e.g. nerve agents, chemical and biological neurotoxins, psychostimulants), which act specifically or preeminently on the central nervous system and/or the neuromuscular junction. Deeply affecting the function of the nervous system, these agents either have incapacitating effects or cause clusters of casualties who manifest primary symptoms of encephalopathy, seizures, muscle paralysis and respiratory failure. The neurologist should be prepared both to notice patterns of symptoms and signs that are sufficiently consistent to raise the alarm of neurotoxic attacks and to define specific therapeutic interventions. Additionally, extensive knowledge on neurotoxic syndromes should stimulate scientific research to produce more effective antidotes and antibodies (which are still lacking for most neurotoxic weapons) for rapid administration in aerosolized forms in the case of terrorist or warfare scenarios. © 2016 S. Karger AG, Basel.

Intense X-ray machine for penetrating radiography

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lucht, Roy A.; Eckhouse, Shimon

Penetrating radiography has been used for many years in the nuclear weapons research programs. Infrequently penetrating radiography has been used in conventional weapons research programs. For example the Los Alamos PHERMEX machine was used to view uranium rods penetrating steel for the GAU-8 program, and the Ector machine was used to see low density regions in forming metal jets. The armor/anti-armor program at Los Alamos has created a need for an intense flash X-ray machine that can be dedicated to conventional weapons research. The Balanced Technology Initiative, through DARPA, has funded the design and construction of such a machine at Los Alamos. It will be an 8- to 10-MeV diode machine capable of delivering a dose of 500 R at 1 m with a spot size of less than 5 mm. The machine used an 87.5-stage low inductance Marx generator that charges up a 7.4-(Omega), 32-ns water line. The water line is discharged through a self-breakdown oil switch into a 12.4-(Omega) water line that rings up the voltage into the high impendance X-ray diode. A long (233-cm) vacuum drift tube is used to separate the large diameter oil-insulated diode region from the X-ray source area that may be exposed to high overpressures by the explosive experiments. The electron beam is selffocused at the target area using a low pressure background gas.

Mortality associated with use of weapons in armed conflicts, wartime atrocities, and civilian mass shootings: literature review

PubMed Central

Coupland, Robin M; Meddings, David R

1999-01-01

Objective To determine the implications of variation in mortality associated with use of weapons in different contexts. Design Literature review. Settings Armed conflicts and civilian mass shootings, 1929-96. Main outcome measure Mortality from wounds. Results During the fighting of war the number of people wounded is at least twice the number killed and may be 13 times as high; this ratio of the number wounded to the number killed results from the impact of a weapon system on human beings in the particular context of war. When firearms are used against people who are immobilised, in a confined space, or unable to defend themselves the wounded to killed ratio has been lower than 1 or even 0. Conclusions Mortality from firearms depends not only on the technology of the weapon or its ammunition but also on the context in which it is used. The increased mortality resulting from the use of firearms in situations other than war requires a complex interaction of factors explicable in terms of wound ballistics and the psychology of the user. Understanding these factors has implications for recognition of war crimes. In addition, the lethality of conventional weapons may be increased if combatants are disabled by the new non-lethal weapons beforehand; this possibility requires careful legal examination within the framework of the Geneva Conventions. Key messagesMortality from firearms varies according to the context in which they are usedIn war the number of people wounded is at least twice the number killedThe number killed may be greater than the number wounded when firearms are used against people who are immobilised, in a confined space, or unable to defend themselvesRecognising how the wounded to killed ratio varies has implications for recognising war crimesCombining use of weapons that are designed to incapacitate with use of conventional weapons requires examination under the law of war PMID:10445920

Combating terrorism : opportunities to improve domestic preparedness program focus and efficiency

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

1998-01-01

Concerned that terrorists might move beyond using conventional weapons to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices - Congress authorized the federal government to improve capabilities to respond to su...

Origins of the Tactical Nuclear Weapons Modernization Program: 1969-1979

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yaffe, Michael David

On December 12, 1979, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to deploy new long-range theater nuclear forces, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This marked the first major change in NATO's nuclear stockpile since the adoption of the flexible response strategy in 1967. The decision was controversial inasmuch as the Allies disagreed on the fundamental role of nuclear weapons in this strategy and, thereby, the types and number of weapons required for an effective deterrent posture. Europeans generally preferred long-range weapons capable of striking the Soviet Union and small conventional forces while Americans preferred shorter-range nuclear weapons and a stalwart conventional defense. Thus, the December decision is often described as purely politically motivated, in which the Americans reluctantly acquiesced to a European initiative for long-range weapons, prominently expressed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977. Recently declassified US government documents reveal, however, that long-range missiles were part of a long-term comprehensive nuclear modernization program conceived in the Pentagon under Defense Secretary James Schlesinger during the period of 1973 through 1975, and presented to skeptical European elites who favored arms control negotiations over costly new deployments. This program was motivated as much by changes in the American national security culture as by an increase in the Soviet military threat to Europe. It was grounded on a clear military rationale: "that a feasible and affordable conventional defense is only possible if NATO has modern nuclear forces" that can effectively hold at risk Warsaw Pact ground and air forces throughout the depth of their employment from the inner-German border to the western military districts of the Soviet Union. When the new US administration in 1977 disagreed with the modernization plan and its rationale, opting instead for more conventional forces, the Allies in a reversal of roles lobbied the US President to deploy the long-range weapons being developed by the Defense Department. In the course of deliberations, political preferences suppressed military considerations of deterrence and only a small portion of the original modernization program was implemented.

Educating the Army of 2010: A Strategic Plan

DTIC Science & Technology

1992-02-20

States have been identified by futurist John Naisbitt, in his books Megatrends : Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives and Megatrends 2000. Several...information and equipment. - The proliferation of weapons will continue, including chemical, biological , and nuclear weapons. Despite the reduction of...conventional systems as well as biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology will be more common, both as a source of

Vertical nuclear proliferation.

PubMed

Sidel, Victor W

2007-01-01

All the nuclear-weapon states are working to develop new nuclear-weapon systems and upgrade their existing ones. Although the US Congress has recently blocked further development of small nuclear weapons and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, the United States is planning a range of new warheads under the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, and renewing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. The United Kingdom is spending 1 billion pounds sterling on updating the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, and about 20 billion pounds sterling on replacing its Vanguard submarines and maintaining its Trident warhead stockpile. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans to install missile defence systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Russia threatens to upgrade its nuclear countermeasures. The nuclear-weapon states should comply with their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as summarised in the 13-point plan agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and they should negotiate a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Biosecurity: Addressing the Threats of Bioterrorism and Infectious Diseases

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-22

threats. Discussion: Biological threats can be divided into the intentional use of biological weapons as a form of terrorist attack and the natural...level, the Biological Weapon Convention (BWC) and World Health Organization (WHO) continue to act as key platforms to synchronize efforts to counter...outbreak. 5 2.1 BIOTERRORISM According to the United Nations, " Biological weapons are devices which disseminate disease-causing organisms or poisons

New approach for detecting and classifying concealed weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Roybal, Lyle G.; Rice, Philip M.; Manhardt, Joseph M.

1997-02-01

The possession of a weapon in the courtroom of our American justice system is a Federal offense. A weapon in the courtroom is a particularly serious problem for judges, plaintiffs, defendants, and bystanders because of the emotional nature and environment of the courtroom. Potential violators include organized criminals and gangsters, individuals with personal vendettas, and otherwise sane and reasonable people who, because of the emotion of the moment, lose sight of right and wrong in our justice system. Most Federal courthouses incorporate some sort of metal detection apparatus used to screen and prevent individuals from carrying personal weapons into courtrooms. These devices are considered conventional in the sense that they employ an active electromagnetic induction technique that is sensitive to the presence of metal. This technique provides no information concerning the massiveness and location of the offending metal object and is prone to false alarms. This work introduces an alternative method for weapons discrimination that is based on passive magnetics technology in concert with simple comparative algorithms such that massiveness and location of suspected weapons may be determined. Since this system provides information not available from conventional metal detectors, false alarms will be greatly reduced, allowing remote monitoring of all entrances into a courtroom from a single vantage point, thereby saving considerable resources used on personnel costs.

SECURITY GATE FOR WEAPONS STORAGE AREA. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

SECURITY GATE FOR WEAPONS STORAGE AREA. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, STORAGE BUILDING (BUILDING 3584), CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS SHOP (BUILDING 3580), AND SECURITY POLICE ENTRY CONTROL BUILDING (BUILDING 3582). VIEW TO SOUTHWEST - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, U.S. Route 9, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

F-15E Beddown at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-03-01

fuel tanks for extended range, an expanded weapons capacity, and LANTIRN for enhanced night operations. Procurement of 392 F-15Es is required to address...target recognizer. These capabilities permit the pilot of a single or dual seat aircraft to deliver guided and 1.1-i unguided weapons under day/night...functional subsystems. The targeting pod permits day or night precision delivery of conventional, laser guided bomb, and electro-optical weapons . The

The use of depleted uranium ammunition under contemporary international law: is there a need for a treaty-based ban on DU weapons?

PubMed

Borrmann, Robin

2010-01-01

This article examines whether the use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions can be considered illegal under current public international law. The analysis covers the law of arms control and focuses in particular on international humanitarian law. The article argues that DU ammunition cannot be addressed adequately under existing treaty based weapon bans, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, due to the fact that DU does not meet the criteria required to trigger the applicability of those treaties. Furthermore, it is argued that continuing uncertainties regarding the effects of DU munitions impedes a reliable review of the legality of their use under various principles of international law, including the prohibition on employing indiscriminate weapons; the prohibition on weapons that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment; and the prohibition on causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. All of these principles require complete knowledge of the effects of the weapon in question. Nevertheless, the author argues that the same uncertainty places restrictions on the use of DU under the precautionary principle. The paper concludes with an examination of whether or not there is a need for--and if so whether there is a possibility of achieving--a Convention that comprehensively outlaws the use, transfer and stockpiling of DU weapons, as proposed by some non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A.; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

2016-09-01

A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process.

GC-MS Study of Mono- and Bishaloethylphosphonates Related to Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Discovery of a New Intramolecular Halogen Transfer.

PubMed

Picazas-Márquez, Nerea; Sierra, María; Nova, Clara; Moreno, Juan Manuel; Aboitiz, Nuria; de Rivas, Gema; Sierra, Miguel A; Martínez-Álvarez, Roberto; Gómez-Caballero, Esther

2016-09-01

A new class of compounds, mono- and bis-haloethylphosphonates (HAPs and bisHAPs, respectively), listed in Schedule 2.B.04 of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has been synthesized and studied by GC-MS with two aims. First, to improve the identification of this type of chemicals by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, (OPCW). Second, to study the synergistic effect of halogen and silicon atoms in molecules undergoing mass spectrometry. Fragmentation patterns of trimethylsilyl derivatives of HAPs were found to depend on the nature of the halogen atom; this was in agreement with DFT-calculations. The data suggest that a novel intramolecular halogen transfer takes place during the fragmentation process. Graphical Abstract ᅟ.

Sandia Dynamic Materials Program Strategic Plan.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Flicker, Dawn Gustine; Benage, John F.; Desjarlais, Michael P.

2017-05-01

Materials in nuclear and conventional weapons can reach multi-megabar pressures and 1000s of degree temperatures on timescales ranging from microseconds to nanoseconds. Understanding the response of complex materials under these conditions is important for designing and assessing changes to nuclear weapons. In the next few decades, a major concern will be evaluating the behavior of aging materials and remanufactured components. The science to enable the program to underwrite decisions quickly and confidently on use, remanufacturing, and replacement of these materials will be critical to NNSA’s new Stockpile Responsiveness Program. Material response is also important for assessing the risks posed bymore » adversaries or proliferants. Dynamic materials research, which refers to the use of high-speed experiments to produce extreme conditions in matter, is an important part of NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program.« less

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.10 - Anti-terrorism: Sudan.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... controlled under ECCN 1C992. (x) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xi) Ammonium nitrate, including certain fertilizers...: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons to any...

15 CFR 742.9 - Anti-terrorism: Syria.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... will generally be denied: (i) Items that are controlled for chemical and biological weapons... fertilizers containing ammonium nitrate, controlled under ECCN 1C997. (xi) Technology for the production of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals controlled under ECCN 1E355. (xii) Concealed...

Global strike hypersonic weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lewis, Mark J.

2017-11-01

Beginning in the 1940's, the United States has pursued the development of hypersonic technologies, enabling atmospheric flight in excess of five times the speed of sound. Hypersonic flight has application to a range of military and civilian applications, including commercial transport, space access, and various weapons and sensing platforms. A number of flight tests of hypersonic vehicles have been conducted by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia, and China, that could lead the way to future hypersonic global strike weapon systems. These weapons would be especially effective at penetrating conventional defenses, and could pose a significant risk to national security.

76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-05-27

... control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear... the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The... contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a...

75 FR 40862 - Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; Imposition of Sanctions Against Foreign...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-07-14

... (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear Suppliers Group... of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The latter category... or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a material...

Medicalized weapons & modern war.

PubMed

Gross, Michael L

2010-01-01

"Medicalized" weapons--those that rely on advances in neuroscience, physiology, and pharmacology--offer the prospect of reducing casualties and protecting civilians. They could be especially useful in modern asymmetric wars in which conventional states are pitted against guerrilla or insurgent forces. But may physicians and other medical workers participate in their development?

15 CFR 718.3 - Disclosure of confidential business information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS... Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). (i) As provided by Section 404(b)(1) of the Act... notifications. Information contained in advance notifications of exports and imports of Schedule 1 chemicals is...

Implications of Present Knowledge and Past Experience for a Possible Future Chemical/Conventional Conflict

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-01-01

talk, but I haven’t really sorted them out yet. I’ve been busy scratching up the data. Nonetheless, one of the things that impressed me most in my...to interven- tion and power projection in various Third World countries. Chemical weapons have central roles in all these comtemporary Soviet...percutaneous hazard as well. Since the United States has been. essentially. " out of the business " of chemical/biological offensive weaponry production since

A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 1 of 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Drollinger, Harold; Jones, Robert C.; Thomas F. Bullard

2009-02-01

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 5 of 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

2009-02-01

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 6 of 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

2009-02-01

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 3 of 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

2009-02-01

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 2 of 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

2009-02-01

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

A Historical Evaluation of the U12t Tunnel, Nevada Test Site, Nye County, Nevada, Volume 4 of 6

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harold Drollinger; Robert C. Jones; and Thomas F. Bullard

2009-02-01

This report presents a historical evaluation of the U12t Tunnel on the Nevada Test Site in southern Nevada. The work was conducted by the Desert Research Institute at the request of the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office and the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The U12t Tunnel is one of a series of tunnels used for underground nuclear weapons effects tests on the east side of Rainier and Aqueduct Mesas. Six nuclear weapons effects tests, Mint Leaf, Diamond Sculls, Husky Pup, Midas Myth/Milagro, Mighty Oak, and Mission Ghost, and onemore » high explosive test, SPLAT, were conducted within the U12t Tunnel from 1970 to 1987. All six of the nuclear weapons effects tests and the high explosive test were sponsored by DTRA. Two conventional weapons experiments, Dipole Knight and Divine Eagle, were conducted in the tunnel portal area in 1997 and 1998. These experiments were sponsored by the Defense Special Weapons Agency. The U12t Tunnel complex is composed of the Portal and Mesa Areas and includes an underground tunnel with a main access drift and nine primary drifts, a substantial tailings pile fronting the tunnel portal, a series of discharge ponds downslope of the tailings pile, and two instrumentation trailer parks and 16 drill holes on top of Aqueduct Mesa. A total of 89 cultural features were recorded: 54 at the portal and 35 on the mesa. In the Portal Area, cultural features are mostly concrete pads and building foundations; other features include the portal, rail lines, the camel back, ventilation and cooling system components, communication equipment, and electrical equipment. On the mesa are drill holes, a few concrete pads, a loading ramp, and electrical equipment.« less

Cluster munitions: a threat to health and human rights.

PubMed

Parikh, Sujal M

2010-01-01

Over the course of 2009, dozens of nations signed a new convention on cluster munitions, and several nations ratified the convention. To determine how public health professionals can participate in preventing death and injury from cluster munitions, we review the history of these weapons, their effects on individuals and communities, the history of efforts to limit their use, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and ways that health professionals can support efforts to ban their use. Cluster munitions are a threat to civilians in conflict and post-conflict settings. They render homes, farms and businesses dangerous and inaccessible, and delay resettlement after the end of a conflict. Health professionals have led efforts to limit the use and proliferation of other weapons, and global collaboration to support the Convention on Cluster Munitions would be a step towards protecting the public's health.

Chemical warfare agents

PubMed Central

Ganesan, K.; Raza, S. K.; Vijayaraghavan, R.

2010-01-01

Among the Weapons of Mass Destruction, chemical warfare (CW) is probably one of the most brutal created by mankind in comparison with biological and nuclear warfare. Chemical weapons are inexpensive and are relatively easy to produce, even by small terrorist groups, to create mass casualties with small quantities. The characteristics of various CW agents, general information relevant to current physical as well as medical protection methods, detection equipment available and decontamination techniques are discussed in this review article. A brief note on Chemical Weapons Convention is also provided. PMID:21829312

76 FR 81004 - Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-12-27

... control lists (Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Nuclear... the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The... contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems, (b) other items with the potential of making such a...

15 CFR 720.1 - Denial of export privileges for convictions under 18 U.S.C. 229.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... threatening to use, a chemical weapon; or (b) Assisting or inducing, in any way, any person to violate... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES § 720.1 Denial of export privileges for...

15 CFR 720.1 - Denial of export privileges for convictions under 18 U.S.C. 229.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... threatening to use, a chemical weapon; or (b) Assisting or inducing, in any way, any person to violate... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES § 720.1 Denial of export privileges for...

Advances in neuroscience and the biological and toxin weapons convention.

PubMed

Dando, Malcolm

2011-01-01

This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse.

Advances in Neuroscience and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

PubMed Central

Dando, Malcolm

2011-01-01

This paper investigates the potential threat to the prohibition of the hostile misuse of the life sciences embodied in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention from the rapid advances in the field of neuroscience. The paper describes how the implications of advances in science and technology are considered at the Five Year Review Conferences of the Convention and how State Parties have developed their appreciations since the First Review Conference in 1980. The ongoing advances in neurosciences are then assessed and their implications for the Convention examined. It is concluded that State Parties should consider a much more regular and systematic review system for such relevant advances in science and technology when they meet at the Seventh Review Conference in late 2011, and that neuroscientists should be much more informed and engaged in these processes of protecting their work from malign misuse. PMID:21350673

Biological Terrorism: US Policies to Reduce Global Biothreats

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-01

program for pro- jects that advance BEP objectives. Global Cooperation to develop bio- safety and pathogen security stan- dards that are consistent with...security. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD ) has recently developed voluntary biosecurity guidelines for implementation...Abbreviations AG Australia Group BEP Biosecurity Engagement Program BSL Biosafety level BWC Biological Weapons Convention BWC-ISU Biological Weapons

15 CFR 745.1 - Advance notification and annual report of all exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to other States...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS... Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) not less than 30 days in advance of every export of a Schedule 1... of all exports of Schedule 1 chemicals to other States Parties. 745.1 Section 745.1 Commerce and...

Arms Control without Arms Control: The Failure of the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol and a New Paradigm for Fighting the Threat of Biological Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-03-01

www.fas.org/nuke/intro/bw/intro.htm. 15 Steve Sternberg, “Building the Ultimate BioWeapon,” USA Today, November 14, 2001, 9D. 16 Maura Lerner...Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), the successor to UNSCOM, see Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, “Why Iraq Will Defeat Arms Inspectors,” New York Times...5; Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, supra. 130 Milhollin & Motz, supra, note 128. 131 Zelicoff, supra note 120. 132 Peter Sleven, “US Drops Bid to

Biological weapons and bioterrorism in the first years of the twenty-first century.

PubMed

Leitenberg, Milton

2002-09-01

This paper evaluates four recent developments in biological-weapons politics and bioterrorism. First is American opposition to finalization of a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention; second, a successful attempt at mass-casualty terrorism; third, an ongoing investigation into the bioterrorist capabilities of the al Qaeda network; and, fourth, a series of fatal anthrax attacks in the United States. The first of these evaluations is informed by interviews conducted between 2000 and 2002 with policy principals in the United States and elsewhere.

A different kind of weapon focus: simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness.

PubMed

Taylor, J Eric T; Witt, Jessica K; Pratt, Jay

2017-01-01

Attentional allocation is flexibly altered by action-related priorities. Given that tools - and specifically weapons - can affect attentional allocation, we asked whether training with a weapon or holding a weapon during search would affect change detection. In three experiments, participants searched for changes to agents, shootable objects, or environments in the popular flicker paradigm. Participants trained with a simulated weapon or watched a video from the same training perspective and then searched for changes while holding a weapon or a control object. Results show an effect of training, highlighting the importance of sensorimotor experience for the action-relevant allocation of attention, and a possible interaction between training and the object held during search. Simulated training with ballistic weapons reduces change blindness. This result has implications for the interaction between tool use and attentional allocation.

15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... ricin in the form of Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), which is also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII), and Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), which is also known as ricin E. CW...

15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... ricin in the form of Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), which is also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII), and Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), which is also known as ricin E. CW...

15 CFR 742.18 - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC or Convention).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... ricin in the form of Ricinus Communis AgglutininII (RCAII), which is also known as ricin D or Ricinus Communis LectinIII (RCLIII), and Ricinus Communis LectinIV (RCLIV), which is also known as ricin E. CW...

Is this the time for a high-energy laser weapon program?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kiel, David H.

2013-02-01

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has made large investments weaponizing laser technology for air defense. Despite billions of dollars spent, there has not been a successful transition of a high-energy laser (HEL) weapon from the lab to the field. Is the dream of a low-cost-per-shot, deep-magazine, speed-of-light HEL weapon an impossible dream or a set of technologies that are ready to emerge on the modern battlefield? Because of the rapid revolution taking place in modern warfare that is making conventional defensive weapons very expensive relative to the offensive weapons systems, the pull for less expensive air defense may necessitate a HEL weapon system. Also, due to the recent technological developments in solid-state lasers (SSL), especially fiber lasers, used throughout manufacturing for cutting and welding, a HEL weapon finally may be able to meet all the requirements of ease of use, sustainability, and reliability. Due to changes in warfare and SSL technology advances, the era of HEL weapons isn't over; it may be just starting if DoD takes an evolutionary approach to fielding a HEL weapon. The U.S. Navy, with its large ships and their available electric power, should lead the way.

Effect of type and transfer of conventional weapons on civilian injuries: retrospective analysis of prospective data from Red Cross hospitals

PubMed Central

Coupland, Robin M; Samnegaard, Hans O

1999-01-01

Objective To examine the link between different weapons used in modern wars and their potential to injury civilians. Design Retrospective analysis of prospectively collected data about hospital admissions. Setting Hospitals of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Subjects 18 877 people wounded by bullets, fragmentation munitions, or mines. Of these, 2012 had been admitted to the hospital in Kabul within six hours of injury. Main outcome measures Age and sex of wounded people according to cause of injury and whether they were civilians (women and girls, boys under 16 years old, or men of 50 or more). Results 18.7% of those injured by bullets, 34.1% of those injured by fragments, and 30.8% of those injured by mines were civilians. Of those admitted to the Red Cross hospital in Kabul within six hours of injury, 39.1% of those injured by bullets, 60.6% of those injured by fragments, and 55.0% of those injured by mines were civilians. Conclusions The proportion of civilians injured differs between weapon systems. The higher proportion injured by fragments and mines is explicable in terms of the military efficiency of weapons, the distance between user and victim, and the effect that the kind of weapon has on the psychology of the user. Key messagesDuring war, mines and fragmenting munitions (mortars, bombs, and shells) are more likely than bullets to injure civiliansCivilians in a city under siege are particularly at risk of being injured by weapons whose users are not able to see the victimThe inherent nature of weapons may be a factor in determining whether civilians are killed or injuredThere is a need for greater respect for the Fourth Geneva Convention and for greater controls on weapons being transferred to untrained and undisciplined forces PMID:10445921

Criteria for Side-Force Control in Air-to-Ground Target Acquisition and Tracking

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sammonds, Robert I.; McNeill, Walter E.; Bunnell, John W.

1982-01-01

A moving-base simulator experiment conducted at Ames Research Center demonstrated that a wings-level-turn control mode improved flying qualities for air-to-ground weapons delivery compared with those of a conventional aircraft. Evaluations of criteria for dynamic response for this system have shown that pilot ratings correlate well with equivalent time constant of the initial response and with system bandwidth. Ranges of this time constant, as well as digital-system transport delays and lateral-acceleration control authorities that encompassed level 1 through level 3 handling qualities, were determined.

The weapon focus effect is weaker with Black versus White male perpetrators.

PubMed

Pickel, Kerri L; Sneyd, Danielle E

2018-01-01

We compared the influence of a weapon's presence on eyewitnesses' memory for a White versus a Black male perpetrator. Prior data indicate that unusual objects in visual scenes attract attention and that a weapon's effect depends on how unusual it seems within the context in which it appears. Therefore, given the stereotype linking Black men and weapons, we predicted a weaker weapon focus effect with the Black perpetrator. The results of Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis using White and Black witnesses. Moreover, in Experiment 2 the weapon focus effect became nonsignificant when the Black perpetrator wore a style of clothing that is strongly associated with Black men. We propose that observing an armed Black perpetrator automatically activates a stereotype linking Black men with weapons and crime, which in turn reduces the perceived unusualness of the weapon and thus its ability to attract attention.

JPRS Report, East Europe

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-12-14

situation in the world healthier, particularly for the program to liquidate nuclear arms and other types of weapons of mass destruction. During the...make preparations for extensive discussions with the aim of radically reducing tactical nuclear weapons, armed forces, and conventional weap- ons...liquidat- ing two classes of nuclear arms as a historic step which will create preconditions for limiting the feverish arms race and for better

Probabilistic Model and Analysis of Conventional Preinstalled Mine Field Defense.

DTIC Science & Technology

1980-09-01

process to model the one or two positions of mines in the mine field. The duel between the anti-tank weapon and offensive tanks crossing the field is...mine field. The duel between the anti-tank weapon and offensive tanks crossing the field is modeled with a con- tinuous time Markov chain. Some...11 B. DUEL ------------------------------------------- 15 IV. DUEL

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harvey, J.R.; Rubin, U.

Missiles themselves are not weapons of mass destruction; they do not give states the ability to wreak unimaginable destruction, or to radically shift the balance of power, as nuclear weapons do. Hence, the primary focus of nonproliferation efforts should remain on weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, rather than on one of the many possible means of delivering them. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, advanced strike aircraft can also be effective in delivering nuclear weapons, and are generally more effective than ballistic missiles for delivering conventional or chemical ordnance. Ultimately, if the industrialized nations seriously desire tomore » control the spread of delivery means for weapons of mass destruction, they need to consider bringing controls over ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft more into balance. At the same time, while efforts to control ballistic missile proliferation - centered on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - have had some successes and could be strengthened, US policy will be most effective if it recognizes two key realities: the spread of ballistic missiles cannot be as comprehensively controlled as the spread of nuclear weapons, nor need it be as comprehensively controlled.« less

Overall View of Chemical and Biochemical Weapons

PubMed Central

Pitschmann, Vladimír

2014-01-01

This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist. PMID:24902078

Overall view of chemical and biochemical weapons.

PubMed

Pitschmann, Vladimír

2014-06-04

This article describes a brief history of chemical warfare, which culminated in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention. It describes the current level of chemical weapons and the risk of using them. Furthermore, some traditional technology for the development of chemical weapons, such as increasing toxicity, methods of overcoming chemical protection, research on natural toxins or the introduction of binary technology, has been described. In accordance with many parameters, chemical weapons based on traditional technologies have achieved the limit of their development. There is, however, a big potential of their further development based on the most recent knowledge of modern scientific and technical disciplines, particularly at the boundary of chemistry and biology. The risk is even higher due to the fact that already, today, there is a general acceptance of the development of non-lethal chemical weapons at a technologically higher level. In the future, the chemical arsenal will be based on the accumulation of important information from the fields of chemical, biological and toxin weapons. Data banks obtained in this way will be hardly accessible and the risk of their materialization will persist.

Responding to chemical weapons violations in Syria: legal, health, and humanitarian recommendations.

PubMed

Brooks, Julia; Erickson, Timothy B; Kayden, Stephanie; Ruiz, Raul; Wilkinson, Stephen; Burkle, Frederick M

2018-01-01

The repeated use of prohibited chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict poses serious health, humanitarian, and security threats to civilians, healthcare personnel, and first responders. Moreover, the use of chemical weapons constitutes a clear and egregious violation of international law-likely amounting to a war crime-for which continued impunity is setting a dangerous precedent in relation to current and future conflicts. This debate article calls upon concerned states, organizations, and individuals to respond urgently and unequivocally to this serious breach of international legal and humanitarian norms. Based on health, humanitarian, and legal findings, this article calls for concrete action to: 1) reduce the risk of chemical weapons being used in current and future conflicts; 2) review and support the preparedness equipment and antidote supplies of first responders, humanitarian organizations, and military forces operating in Syria; 3) support international mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing the prohibition on chemical weapons, including through criminal accountability; 4) support civilian victims of chemical weapons attacks, including refugees; and 5) re-commit to the complete elimination of chemical weapons in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), a comprehensive treaty that bans chemical weapons and requires their complete destruction. All involved states and organizations should take urgent steps to ensure the protection of the most vulnerable victims of conflict, including victims of chemical weapons attacks in Syria, and to reinforce international law in the face of such serious violations.

Ballistic Missile Defense Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

DTIC Science & Technology

1994-10-01

included: the need for BMD; budget allocations; procedural problems related to NEPA; nuclear weapon dangers; arms reductions; and potential contravention...2-26 2.6.2 TECHNOLOGY ALTERNATIVES ........................... 2-26 2.6.2.1 Directed Energy Weapons ..................... 2-26 2.6.2.2 Nuclear ...national defense strategy of mutually assured destruction to keep conflicts from escalating beyond conventional warfare to nuclear war. In 1955, the

Kinematics of Laying an Automated Weapon System

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-07-19

mathematical transformation is required to move the firing solution from its reference frame to a reference frame that is meaningful to the weapon system. This...Procedures 2 Conventions and Variable Definitions 2 Rotation Matrices 5 Transformation of a Vector 5 Conversion Between Cartestian and Spherical...Coordinate Systems 6 Transformation of Earth Referenced Lay to Platform Reference Frame 6 Results and Discussions 7 Conclusions 8 Bibliography 9

ASSESSING THE UNCERTAINTY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-04-22

empirical attempts. From both qualitative and quantitative perspectives, this paper finds cause to question the certainty that nuclear deterrence will...suggests nuclear weapons do indeed possess a higher deterrence effect than conventional forces alone. Data from the “ Correlates of War” data set was...certainly do not provide an absolute deterrent against aggression. 16 While nuclear weapons appear to be correlated with a reduction in the occurrences

Weapon Involvement in the Victimization of Children.

PubMed

Mitchell, Kimberly J; Hamby, Sherry L; Turner, Heather A; Shattuck, Anne; Jones, Lisa M

2015-07-01

To report the prevalence of weapons involved in the victimization of youth with particular emphasis on weapons with a "high lethality risk" and how such exposure fits into the broader victimization and life experiences of children and adolescents. Data were collected as part of the Second National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence, a nationally representative telephone survey of youth ages 2 to 17 years and caregivers (N = 4114) conducted in 2011. Estimates from the Second National Survey of Children's Exposure to Violence indicate that almost 14 million youth, ages 2–17, in the United States have been exposed to violence involving a weapon in their lifetimes as witnesses or victims,or .1 in 5 children in this age group [corrected]. More than 2 million youth in the United States (1 in 33) have been directly assaulted in incidents where the high lethality risk weapons of guns and knives were used. Differences were noted between victimizations involving higher and lower lethality risk weapons as well as between any weapon involvement versus none. Poly-victims, youth with 7 or more victimization types, were particularly likely to experience victimization with any weapon, as well as victimization with a highly lethal weapon compared with nonpoly-victims. Findings add to the field's broadening conceptualization of youth victimization highlighting the potentially highly consequential risk factor of weapon exposure as a component of victimization experiences on the mental health of youth. Further work on improving gun safety practices and taking steps to reduce children's exposure to weapon-involved violence is warranted to reduce this problem. Copyright © 2015 by the American Academy of Pediatrics.

Implementing the chemical weapons convention: The nuts and bolts of compliance

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tanzman, E.A.

This paper is a presentation prepared for the American Bar Association in which the author discusses the issue of rights to privacy in the United States in the face of implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention inspections. The author points out that there are no clear precedents in law which deal with all the issues which will result from international inspections for verification which are required by the treaty. In particular as inspections tread on the issue of personal rights or private property there is a fairly ill defined legal area which needs to be developed to allow such inspections inmore » the face of constitutional guarantees.« less

15 CFR 716.5 - Notification, duration and frequency of inspections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS... and purpose of the Convention posed by the quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of... Convention posed by the quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of the facility and the nature...

Consolidation of Fe-N Magnets Using Equal Channel Angular Extrusion

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-03-23

Consolidation of Fe-N Magnets Using Equal Channel Angular Extrusion SG Sankar Advanced Materials Corporation (AMC), Pittsburgh, PA LJ Kecskes Weapons and...at the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL), Weapons and Materials Research Directorate, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Unlike conventional...Widenmeyer M, Hansen TC, Niewa R. Formation and decomposition of metastable α’’-Fe16N2 from in-situ powder neutron diffraction and thermal analysis. Zeit

Assessing the Risk of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-12-01

stories/review.htm>. 5 avoided partly as a result of this. Hundreds of nuclear weapons tests were conducted, proving the technical capability of...sites in Cuba. The results of such an attack could have been disastrous, putting conventional systems in direct contact with nuclear systems, and... nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Finally, India and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines are compared. These comparisons yield important results

Director`s series on proliferation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bailey, K.C.; Price, M.E.

1994-10-17

This series is an occasional publication of essays on the topics of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation. Essays contained in this document include: Key issues on NPT renewal and extension, Africa and nuclear nonproliferation, Kenya`s views on the NPT, Prospects for establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, effects of a special nuclear weapon materials cut-off convention, and The UK view of NPT renewal.

Social Data Analysis by Non-Linear Imbedding

DTIC Science & Technology

2013-09-20

Fig. 1 shows this dimenion-reduced galaxy. This example is chosen to illustrate how our “ history independent” techniques can infer major historical...DISTRIBUTION A: Distribution approved for public release. 1989 1990 1991 Middle East 2 7 6 Weapon Nonproliferation 2 6 5 Anti- Apartheid & Human Rights...the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) #3570 (Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of Apartheid

[Scientific progress and new biological weapons].

PubMed

Berche, Patrick

2006-02-01

The biological weapons are different from conventional weapons, because living germs hold an extraordinary and predictable potential for multiplication, propagation and genetic variation during their dissemination in a susceptible population. Only natural pathogens (1rst generation weapons) have been used in the past (smallpox virus, plague, anthrax, toxins...). However, new threats are emerging, due to the rapid progress of scientific knowledge and its exponential worldwide diffusion. It is possible to synthesize microorganisms from in silico sequences widely diffused on Internet (poliovirus, influenza...), thus resulting in the accessibility of very dangerous virus confined today in high-security laboratories (virus Ebola...). It is possible also to "improve" pathogens by genetic manipulations, becoming more resistant or virulent (2nd generation weapons). Finally, one can now create de novo new pathogens by molecular breeding (DNA shuffling), potentially highly dangerous for naive populations (3rd generation weapons). Making biological weapons does not require too much technological resources and appears accessible to terrorists, due to low cost and easy use. Although the destructive consequences are difficult to predict, the psychological and social damages should be considerable, because of the highly emotional burden in the population associated to the transgression by man of a taboo of life.

Worldwide governmental efforts to locate and destroy chemical weapons and weapons materials: minimizing risk in transport and destruction.

PubMed

Trapp, Ralf

2006-09-01

The article gives an overview on worldwide efforts to eliminate chemical weapons and facilities for their production in the context of the implementation of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It highlights the objectives of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international agency set up in The Hague to implement the CWC, and provides an overview of the present status of implementation of the CWC requirements with respect to chemical weapons (CW) destruction under strict international verification. It addresses new requirements that result from an increased threat that terrorists might attempt to acquire or manufacture CW or related materials. The article provides an overview of risks associated with CW and their elimination, from storage or recovery to destruction. It differentiates between CW in stockpile and old/abandoned CW, and gives an overview on the factors and key processes that risk assessment, management, and communication need to address. This discussion is set in the overall context of the CWC that requires the completion of the destruction of all declared CW stockpiles by 2012 at the latest.

United States initiative for chemical weapons arms control. Master`s thesis, 2 August 1995-7 June 1996

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Scott, R.D.

1996-06-07

This research investigates the US policy initiative renouncing the employment of chemical weapons (CW). The focus of the research is to determine if such an initiative will achieve the national objective for implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). If the initiative does not meet the national objective are there feasible options for the United States Government (USG). In 1993, the USG established a policy banning the use of chemical weapons. This act may have won the battle for the moral high ground, but it will not deter nor eliminate the use of chemical weapons worldwide. The relative ease bymore » which a nation can take various combinations of chemical compounds and produce a lethal chemical agent makes deterrence and/or complete elimination virtually impossible. The US should continue to employ the elements of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic policy regarding nonproliferation inclusive of a proven deterrent-CW. No use of CW or any weapon of mass destruction is best, but until the CWC is ratified a deterrent should be maintained by the US.« less

[In-hospital management of victims of chemical weapons of mass destruction].

PubMed

Barelli, Alessandro; Gargano, Flavio; Proietti, Rodolfo

2005-01-01

Emergency situations caused by chemical weapons of mass destruction add a new dimension of risk to those handling and treating casualties. The fundamental difference between a hazardous materials incident and conventional emergencies is the potential for risk from contamination to health care professionals, patients, equipment and facilities of the Emergency Department. Accurate and specific guidance is needed to describe the procedures to be followed by emergency medical personnel to safely care for a patient, as well as to protect equipment and people. This review is designed to familiarize readers with the concepts, terminology and key operational considerations that affect the in-hospital management of incidents by chemical weapons.

Extended Deterrence, Nuclear Proliferation, and START III

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Speed, R.D.

2000-06-20

Early in the Cold War, the United States adopted a policy of ''extended nuclear deterrence'' to protect its allies by threatening a nuclear strike against any state that attacks these allies. This threat can (in principle) be used to try to deter an enemy attack using conventional weapons or one using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The credibility of a nuclear threat has long been subject to debate and is dependent on many complex geopolitical factors, not the least of which is the military capabilities of the opposing sides. The ending of the Cold War has led to a significantmore » decrease in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by the United States and Russia. START II, which was recently ratified by the Russian Duma, will (if implemented) reduce the number deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side to 3500, compared to a level of over 11,000 at the end of the Cold War in 1991. The tentative limit established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for START III would reduce the strategic force level to 2000-2500. However, the Russians (along with a number of arms control advocates) now argue that the level should be reduced even further--to 1500 warheads or less. The conventional view is that ''deep cuts'' in nuclear weapons are necessary to discourage nuclear proliferation. Thus, as part of the bargain to get the non-nuclear states to agree to the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States pledged to work towards greater reductions in strategic forces. Without movement in the direction of deep cuts, it is thought by many analysts that some countries may decide to build their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, this was part of the rationale India used to justify its own nuclear weapons program. However, there is also some concern that deep cuts (to 1500 or lower) in the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal could have the opposite effect. The fear is that such cuts might undermine extended deterrence and cause a crisis in confidence among U.S. allies to such an extent that they could seek nuclear weapons of their own to protect themselves.« less

15 CFR 717.1 - Clarification procedures; challenge inspection requests pursuant to Article IX of the Convention.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Clarification procedures; challenge... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC CLARIFICATION PROCEDURES (CONSULTATIONS AND CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS) § 717.1 Clarification procedures; challenge inspection requests pursuant to Article IX of the...

15 CFR 716.7 - Samples.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL AND ROUTINE... will be restricted to verifying the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals, unless otherwise agreed...

15 CFR 716.7 - Samples.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL AND ROUTINE... will be restricted to verifying the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals, unless otherwise agreed...

On-line high-performance liquid chromatography-ultraviolet-nuclear magnetic resonance method of the markers of nerve agents for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

PubMed

Mazumder, Avik; Gupta, Hemendra K; Garg, Prabhat; Jain, Rajeev; Dubey, Devendra K

2009-07-03

This paper details an on-flow liquid chromatography-ultraviolet-nuclear magnetic resonance (LC-UV-NMR) method for the retrospective detection and identification of alkyl alkylphosphonic acids (AAPAs) and alkylphosphonic acids (APAs), the markers of the toxic nerve agents for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Initially, the LC-UV-NMR parameters were optimized for benzyl derivatives of the APAs and AAPAs. The optimized parameters include stationary phase C(18), mobile phase methanol:water 78:22 (v/v), UV detection at 268nm and (1)H NMR acquisition conditions. The protocol described herein allowed the detection of analytes through acquisition of high quality NMR spectra from the aqueous solution of the APAs and AAPAs with high concentrations of interfering background chemicals which have been removed by preceding sample preparation. The reported standard deviation for the quantification is related to the UV detector which showed relative standard deviations (RSDs) for quantification within +/-1.1%, while lower limit of detection upto 16mug (in mug absolute) for the NMR detector. Finally the developed LC-UV-NMR method was applied to identify the APAs and AAPAs in real water samples, consequent to solid phase extraction and derivatization. The method is fast (total experiment time approximately 2h), sensitive, rugged and efficient.

Conventional armed forces in Europe: Technology scenario development

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Houser, G.M.

1990-07-01

In January 1986, the Soviet Union's Mikhail Gorbachev proposed elimination of all nuclear weapons by the year 2000. In April of that year, Mr. Gorbachev proposed substantial reductions of conventional weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, including reductions in operational-tactical nuclear weapons. In May 1986, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) responded with the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control,'' which indicated readiness to open East/West discussions on establishing a mandate for negotiating conventional arms control throughout Europe. The Group of 23,'' which met in Vienna beginning in February 1987, concluded the meeting in Januarymore » 1989 with a mandate for the Conventional Armed Forced in Europe (CFE) negotiations. On 6 March 1989, CFE talks began, and these talks have continued through six rounds (as of April 1990). Although US President George Bush, on 30 May 1989, called for agreement within six months to a year, and the Malta meeting of December 1989 called for completion of a CFE agreement by the end of 1990, much remains to be negotiated. This report provides three types of information. First, treaty provisions brought to the table by both sides are compared. Second, on the basis of these provisions, problem areas for each of the provision elements are postulated and possible scenarios for resolving these problem areas are developed. Third, the scenarios are used as requirements for tasks assigned program elements for possible US implementation of a CFE treaty. As progress is achieved during the negotiations, this report could be updated, as necessary, in each of the areas to provide a continuing systematic basis for program implementation and technology development. 8 refs.« less

The continuing risk of nuclear war.

PubMed

McCoy, Ronald

2007-01-01

Climate change and nuclear war are currently the most dangerous challenges to human civilisation and survival. The effects of climate change are now sufficient to persuade many governments to take effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Today there are about 27,000 nuclear warheads, many at least ten times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs, and a meaningful medical response to a nuclear attack is impossible. Nevertheless, the threat of nuclear war does not raise public concern, and indeed the nuclear-weapon states are upgrading their capability. The only effective preventive measure is the abolition of nuclear weapons. Steps towards this include: a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, for the nuclear weapon states to observe their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force. The ultimate need is for a Nuclear Weapons Convention; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have launched an International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapons (ICAN) to promote a NWC.

Structural analysis of low-speed composite propfan blades for the LRCSW wind tunnel model

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ernst, Michael A.

1992-01-01

The Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, CA, is currently in the process of evaluating propulsion systems for the Long Range Conventional Standoff Weapons (LRCSW). At present, the Advanced Counter-Rotating Propfan system is being considered. The methodologies are documented which were used to structurally analyze the 0.55 scale CM1 composite propfan blades for the LRCSW with COBSTRAN and MSC/NASTRAN. Significant results are also reported.

Fragmentation pathways of O-alkyl methylphosphonothionocyanidates in the gas phase: toward unambiguous structural characterization of chemicals in the Chemical Weapons Convention framework.

PubMed

Saeidian, Hamid; Babri, Mehran; Ashrafi, Davood; Sarabadani, Mansour; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi

2013-08-01

The electron-impact (EI) mass spectra of a series of O-alkyl methylphosphonothionocyanidates were studied for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) purposes. General EI fragmentation pathways were constructed and discussed, and collision-induced dissociation studies of the major EI ions were performed to confirm proposed fragment structures by analyzing fragment ions of deuterated analogs and by use of density functional theory (DFT) calculations. Thiono-thiolo rearrangement, McLafferty-type rearrangement, and a previously unknown intramolecular electrophilic aromatic substitution reaction were observed and confirmed. The study also focused on differentiation of isomeric compounds. Retention indices for all compounds, and an electrophilicity index for several compounds, are reported and interpreted.

Defense without aggression

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harvey, H.

1988-09-01

In introducing this group of articles on nonoffensive defense the author notes that the prospect of nuclear disarmament in Europe is boosting ideas, which have been around for a decade, from theory to politics. This special section of articles looks at an emerging theory that may reduce reliance on nuclear weapons by bringing stability to the conventional standoff in central Europe. The idea is to rearrange conventional forces so that they can defend but not attack. Under such monikers as nonoffensive defense (the main term used in these articles), nonprovocative defense, defensive defense, reasonable sufficiency, and mutual defensive superiority, thesemore » proposals suggest that nations can restructure weapons, personnel, and strategy to assure their own military security without posing a threat to other nations. 5 refs.« less

Anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress in Iranian survivors of chemical warfare.

PubMed

Hashemian, Farnoosh; Khoshnood, Kaveh; Desai, Mayur M; Falahati, Farahnaz; Kasl, Stanislav; Southwick, Steven

2006-08-02

In the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, extensive use of chemical weapons resulted in high rates of morbidity and mortality. While much is known about the physical consequences of chemical warfare, there is a paucity of information about the long-term effects of chemical attacks on mental health. To assess the long-term psychological impact of chemical warfare on a civilian population. Cross-sectional randomized survey conducted in July 2004 of 153 civilians in 3 towns exposed to warfare in northwestern Iran: Oshnaviyeh (low-intensity conventional warfare), Rabat (high-intensity conventional warfare), and Sardasht (both high-intensity conventional warfare and chemical weapons). Full or partial posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis, anxiety symptoms, and depressive symptoms were assessed using Farsi versions of the Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale, Hamilton Scale for Anxiety, and Beck Depression Inventory, respectively. Overall participation rate was 93%. Respondents had a mean age of 45 years and were all of Kurdish ethnicity. Among individuals exposed to both high-intensity warfare and chemical weapons, prevalence rates for lifetime PTSD, current PTSD, major anxiety symptoms, and severe depressive symptoms were 59%, 33%, 65%, and 41%, respectively. Among the low-intensity warfare group, the corresponding rates were 8%, 2%, 18%, and 6%, respectively, while intermediate rates were found among those exposed to high-intensity warfare but not to chemical weapons (31%, 8%, 26%, and 12%, respectively). Compared with individuals exposed to low-intensity warfare, those exposed to both high-intensity warfare and chemical weapons were at higher risk for lifetime PTSD (odds ratio [OR], 18.6; 95% confidence interval [CI], 5.8-59.4), current PTSD (OR, 27.4; 95% CI, 3.4-218.2), increased anxiety symptoms (OR, 14.6; 95% CI, 6.0-35.6), and increased depressive symptoms (OR, 7.2; 95% CI, 3.3-15.9). Exposure to high-intensity warfare but not to chemical weapons was also significantly associated with lifetime PTSD (OR, 5.4; 95% CI, 1.7-17.6), compared with those in the low-intensity warfare group. Further, compared with individuals exposed to high-intensity warfare alone, those exposed to both high-intensity warfare and chemical weapons were at higher risk for lifetime PTSD (OR, 3.4; 95% CI, 1.5-7.4), current PTSD (OR, 6.2; 95% CI, 2.0-20.1), increased anxiety symptoms (OR, 5.6; 95% CI, 2.5-12.6), and increased depressive symptoms (OR, 3.7; 95% CI, 1.8-7.2). Exposure to chemical warfare is an extreme traumatic event that has long-lasting adverse consequences on mental health.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-03-01

deployed. It also would be based on a conical design, with winglets , rather than on the winged design of the HTV-2. Upon nearing a target, the weapon...nuclear and conventional strike forces as a separate mission and separate concept from PGS, Congress, initially at least, blended both into the

Weapon Carrying Among Victims of Bullying.

PubMed

Pham, Tammy B; Schapiro, Lana E; John, Majnu; Adesman, Andrew

2017-12-01

To examine, in a large, nationally representative sample of high school students, the association between bullying victimization and carrying weapons to school and to determine to what extent past experience of 1, 2, or 3 additional indicators of peer aggression increases the likelihood of weapon carrying by victims of bullying (VoBs). National data from the 2015 Youth Risk Behavior Survey were analyzed for grades 9 to 12 ( N = 15 624). VoB groups were determined by self-report of being bullied at school and additional adverse experiences: fighting at school, being threatened or injured at school, and skipping school out of fear for one's safety. Weapon carrying was measured by a dichotomized (ie, ≥1 vs 0) report of carrying a gun, knife, or club on school property. VoB groups were compared with nonvictims with respect to weapon carrying by logistic regression adjusting for sex, grade, and race/ethnicity. When surveyed, 20.2% of students reported being a VoB in the past year, and 4.1% reported carrying a weapon to school in the past month. VoBs experiencing 1, 2, or 3 additional risk factors were successively more likely to carry weapons to school. The subset of VoBs who experienced all 3 additional adverse experiences were more likely to carry weapons to school compared with nonvictims (46.4% vs 2.5%, P < .001). Pediatricians should recognize that VoBs, especially those who have experienced 1 or more indicators of peer aggression in conjunction, are at substantially increased risk of weapon carrying. Copyright © 2017 by the American Academy of Pediatrics.

Disaster preparedness, pediatric considerations in primary blast injury, chemical, and biological terrorism

PubMed Central

Hamele, Mitchell; Poss, William Bradley; Sweney, Jill

2014-01-01

Both domestic and foreign terror incidents are an unfortunate outgrowth of our modern times from the Oklahoma City bombings, Sarin gas attacks in Japan, the Madrid train bombing, anthrax spores in the mail, to the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001. The modalities used to perpetrate these terrorist acts range from conventional weapons to high explosives, chemical weapons, and biological weapons all of which have been used in the recent past. While these weapons platforms can cause significant injury requiring critical care the mechanism of injury, pathophysiology and treatment of these injuries are unfamiliar to many critical care providers. Additionally the pediatric population is particularly vulnerable to these types of attacks. In the event of a mass casualty incident both adult and pediatric critical care practitioners will likely be called upon to care for children and adults alike. We will review the presentation, pathophysiology, and treatment of victims of blast injury, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. The focus will be on those injuries not commonly encountered in critical care practice, primary blast injuries, category A pathogens likely to be used in terrorist incidents, and chemical weapons including nerve agents, vesicants, pulmonary agents, cyanide, and riot control agents with special attention paid to pediatric specific considerations. PMID:24834398

Iran's growing nuclear weapons program: A catalyst for regional instability in the Middle East. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Deyermond, J.J.

1993-03-10

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States as well as other nations around the world now find themselves in a state of political, economic, and military transition. While the US and other nations such as the Islamic Republic of Iran are undergoing significant increases in military spending. This increase has been primarily in the area of conventional forces, however there is growing evidence that Iran is also attempting to develop a nuclear weapons capability as well. This study examines Iran's nuclear weapons program in detail, and Tehran's increasing ability to emerge as a regional power in themore » Middle East.« less

Some less conventional options for plutonium disposal

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stoll, Dr. Wolfgang, Prof.

2000-07-01

Disposition of weapons Pu (W-Pu) aims at the replacement of military access restrictions by inherent longlasting technical barriers to make the return into the weapons state difficult and not rewarding anymore. At the time of the NAS-study in 1994, two ways were perceived to be mature and selected: Fissioning of W-Pu as LWR-MOX and the disposal in a vitrified radionuclide-spiked form.1 Both options since have been questioned for equality, met different acceptance at both superpowers and showed slow progress. A criterion to measure disarmament would be the amount of W-Pu in the different proliferation resistant forms, multiplied by the effort needed for each form to return to weapons quality.

Good Bugs, Bad Bugs: A Modern Approach for Detecting Offensive Biological Weapons Research

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-09-01

Michael Moodie is a consultant to CTNSP who has worked for more than 15 years on chemical and biological weapons issues in government and the ... the superstructure of the Convention and yet turn a blind eye to problems with the foundation itself. He then went on to state publicly that the ...Tunisia; a trilateral forum with Brazil, India, and South Africa fosters dialogue on critical biotechnology issues;6 the Economic Cooperation

Evolution of Security Identity of Domestic Antimilitarism and Roles of Political Parties: Case Studies of Japan and Germany

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-12-01

concerned. However, the political crisis engenered by the collapse of the Yugoslav Republic shaped conditions calling for revision of the German security...to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. Second, Germany admitted the U.S. military presence and bore some of the direct costs of same...voice for removing nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons of mass destruction in line with the peace movement. Similarly, it demanded greatly

Stealing the Sword: Limiting Terrorist Use of Advanced Conventional Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-01-01

ammunition, are combined (see Figure 2.9 for a handgun concept that features four barrels , two with lethal and two with nonlethal ammunition). Other...Weapons Figure 2.9 A Four- Barreled Concept Handgun Mortar Systems Mortars have long been regarded as cheap, lightweight, short-range artillery. Mortars are...Terrorists? 37 manner).63 An example of an advance in lightweight materials for mor- tars is the development of the carbon fiber composite barrel in the

Prompt Global Strike: China and the Spear

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-04-01

longer range systems that are embedded in a larger system of advanced C4ISR is also evidenced by studies that detail China’s long-range hypersonic...to view U.S. PGS as a threat to Beijing’s conventional and nuclear weapons systems , as well as its command and control centers. With the breadth of...U.S. platforms defined as PGS-related systems in China, its analysts have not ruled out their delivery of nuclear weapons. Despite its criticism of

The role of the Biological Weapons Convention in disease surveillance and response.

PubMed

Enemark, Christian

2010-11-01

This article assesses the role and significance of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with respect to infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks. Increasingly, the BWC is being used as a platform for addressing infectious disease threats arising naturally as well as traditional concerns about malicious dissemination of pathogenic microorganisms. The latter have long had a place on the security agenda, but natural disease outbreaks too are now being partially 'securitized' through the use of the BWC as a forum for exchanging information and ideas on disease surveillance and response. The article focuses on two prominent issues discussed at recent meetings of BWC member states: enhancing capacity for disease surveillance and response; and responding to allegations of biological weapons use and investigating outbreaks deemed suspicious. It concludes, firstly, that the BWC supports the efforts of international health organizations to enhance disease surveillance and response capacity worldwide. And secondly, that the BWC, rather than the World Health Organization (WHO), is the appropriate institution to deal with biological weapons allegations and investigations of suspicious outbreaks. The overall message is that securitization in the health sphere cuts both ways. Adding a security dimension (BW) alongside the task of detecting and responding to naturally occurring disease outbreaks is beneficial, but requiring a non-security organization (the WHO) to assume a security role would be counterproductive.

Nuclear obligations: Nuremberg law, nuclear weapons, and protest

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burroughs, J.R.

1991-01-01

Nuclear weapons use and deployment and nonviolent anti-nuclear protests are evaluated. Use of nuclear weapons would constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity as defined in both the Nuremberg Charter and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and applied by the International Military Tribunal and other Nuremberg courts. Strategic and atomic bombing during World War 2 did not set a precedent for use of nuclear weapons. The consequentialist argument for World War 2 bombing fails and the bombing has also been repudiated by codification of the law of war in Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The legality ofmore » deploying nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical policy is questionable when measured against the Nuremberg proscription of planning and preparation of aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and the United Nations Charter's proscription of aggressive threat of force. While states' practice of deploying the weapons and the arms-control treaties that regulate but do not prohibit mere possession provide some support for legality, those treaties recognize the imperative of preventing nuclear war, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commits nuclear-armed states to good-faith negotiation of nuclear disarmament.« less

15 CFR 715.3 - Declarations returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.3 Declarations returned...

15 CFR 715.3 - Declarations returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.3 Declarations returned...

15 CFR 715.3 - Declarations returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.3 Declarations returned...

15 CFR 715.3 - Declarations returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.3 Declarations returned...

15 CFR 716.9 - Report of inspection-related costs.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS... records, and costs associated with shutting down chemical production or processing during inspections, if...

15 CFR 717.4 - Report of inspection-related costs.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...), costs of producing records, and costs associated with shutting down chemical production or processing...

15 CFR 716.9 - Report of inspection-related costs.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS... records, and costs associated with shutting down chemical production or processing during inspections, if...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ball, D Y

The abysmal state of Russia's conventional forces has caused Russia to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security. This reliance was formalized in Russia's military doctrine which states that nuclear weapons can be used ''in situations critical to the national security of the RF and its allies.'' In fact, most Russian security analysts believe that this dependence on nuclear weapons will remain for the foreseeable future because the economy will have to improve significantly before a conventional force build up can be contemplated. Yet, despite Russia's need to rely on nuclear weapons, even this may be problematic because itsmore » economic plight may create difficulties in maintaining its current level of nuclear forces. Thus, Russia has a keen interest in negotiating a treaty to reduce Strategic Nuclear Forces below START II levels and would prefer to go even beyond the 2,000-2,500 numbers agreed to by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in 1997. Sergei Rogov, an influential defense analyst, believes that Russia's strategic nuclear forces will fall below 1,000 warheads by 2010 irrespective of arms control agreements. Accordingly, Russia is keen to ensure rough parity with the US. To retain a credible deterrent posture at these lower levels, Russia believes that it is important to restrain US sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM)--forces that have heretofore not been captured as strategic weapons in the START treaties. Russian officials reason that once strategic nuclear forces go to very low levels, SLCM capabilities become strategically significant. In fact, according to two well-known Russian security analysts, Anatoli Diakov and Pavel Podvig, Russia's current START III negotiating position calls for the complete elimination of all SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional. Prior to assessing Russia's position regarding cruise missiles and START III, I will examine Russia's overall view of its security position vis-a-vis the US in order to provide background for Russia's negotiating stance. I will also suggest how the US and Russia might approach START III in a manner that is equitable and focuses on creating a more stable environment.« less

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

22 CFR 103.12 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... person may notify: United States National Authority, Office of Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, Bureau of Arms Control, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC 20520, Telephone: (703) 235-1204...

15 CFR 716.10 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL... copy of the final inspection report to the inspected facility for their review upon receipt from the...

Spall Damage of Concrete Structures

DTIC Science & Technology

1988-06-01

structures prediction Structural response Cased charges Scabbing Tests Concrete walls--testing . emi -hardened Upgrading Conventional weapons Spall Weapon...recording devices in a trailer approximately 750 feet from the test pit. Up to 30 channels were recorded on a Sangamo Model III, 32-channel FM magnetic tape...6.7"’DEEP 23.6" N 21’.6" 0.114? 4000 0 73670636 RATx.000620 RAT%.000520 SHEILD WALL DESTROYED MAIM WALL 0.2611 4000 0.S9001025 RAT-.000S29 RATa.000S20

Another weapon too far: the anti-personnel laser.

PubMed

Gillow, J T

1995-06-01

The last decade has seen the development of military lasers designed to blind. Medical professionals dedicated to the prevention and treatment of visual disability, and particularly ophthalmologists under the terms of their newly acquired Royal Charter, have a responsibility to: document this new technology; explain its medical effects; and influence the threshold at which these weapons might be used. Proposals to prohibit anti-eye laser warfare at The United Nations Convention Conference in September 1995 present a unique opportunity to stigmatize blinding as a method of warfare.

Basic Studies on Electro-Energetic Physics (EEP) Weapons Technologies

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-01-15

Po\\\\ered Microwa\\e. High Energ) Laser. Charged Particle Beams. and II) pcrsonic Rail guns . Using these representations. wargame simulations of’ arious...Projectile length = 30 in (76 cm) • Barrel length = 10 m • Muzzle velocity = 2,100 m/s To understand how such an advanced weapon compares with conventional...weaponry, it is illustrating to compare these figures with the M-1 Abrams M256 120mm gun firing a M829A1 kinetic energy round Page 5 • Muzzle

15 CFR 717.5 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC... forward a copy of the final inspection report to the inspected facility for their review upon receipt from...

15 CFR 717.5 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC... forward a copy of the final inspection report to the inspected facility for their review upon receipt from...

15 CFR 717.5 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC... forward a copy of the final inspection report to the inspected facility for their review upon receipt from...

INTERIOR OF TYPICAL MUNITIONS INSPECTION ROOM. VIEW TO SOUTH WEST. ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

INTERIOR OF TYPICAL MUNITIONS INSPECTION ROOM. VIEW TO SOUTH- WEST. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Conventional Munitions Shop, Off Perimeter Road in Weapons Storage Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

15 CFR 712.8 - Declarations and reports returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.8 Declarations and reports returned...

15 CFR 714.5 - Declarations and reports returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.5 Declarations and reports returned...

15 CFR 713.6 - Declarations and reports returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.6 Declarations and reports returned...

15 CFR 712.8 - Declarations and reports returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.8 Declarations and reports returned...

15 CFR 713.6 - Declarations and reports returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.6 Declarations and reports returned...

15 CFR 714.5 - Declarations and reports returned without action by BIS.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.5 Declarations and reports returned...

SOUTH (SIDE) AND WEST (FRONT) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

SOUTH (SIDE) AND WEST (FRONT) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO NORTH. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Conventional Munitions Shop, Off Perimeter Road in Weapons Storage Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

WEST (FRONT) AND SOUTH (SIDE) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

WEST (FRONT) AND SOUTH (SIDE) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO NORTHEAST. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Conventional Munitions Shop, Off Perimeter Road in Weapons Storage Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

EAST (REAR) AND NORTH (SIDE) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

EAST (REAR) AND NORTH (SIDE) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO SOUTH. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Conventional Munitions Shop, Off Perimeter Road in Weapons Storage Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

WEST (FRONT) AND NORTH (SIDE) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

WEST (FRONT) AND NORTH (SIDE) ELEVATIONS OF BUILDING. VIEW TO WEST. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Conventional Munitions Shop, Off Perimeter Road in Weapons Storage Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

75 FR 1020 - Amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Based Upon the Accession of Albania and...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-01-08

...--Commerce Country Chart [Reason for control] Countries Chemical & biological Nuclear National Security Missile Regional Stability Firearms Crime control Anti-terrorism weapons nonproliferation Tech convention...

15 CFR 720.3 - Final decision on administrative action denying export privileges.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES § 720.3 Final decision on administrative action...

15 CFR 720.3 - Final decision on administrative action denying export privileges.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES § 720.3 Final decision on administrative action...

DETAIL OF SLIDING DOORS ON EAST (REAR) ELEVATION OF BUILDING. ...

Library of Congress Historic Buildings Survey, Historic Engineering Record, Historic Landscapes Survey

DETAIL OF SLIDING DOORS ON EAST (REAR) ELEVATION OF BUILDING. VIEW TO SOUTHWEST. - Plattsburgh Air Force Base, Conventional Munitions Shop, Off Perimeter Road in Weapons Storage Area, Plattsburgh, Clinton County, NY

Gas chromatography-mass spectrometric studies of O-alkyl O-2-(N,N-dialkylamino) ethyl alkylphosphonites(phosphonates) for chemical weapons convention verification.

PubMed

Saeidian, Hamid; Babri, Mehran; Ramezani, Atefeh; Ashrafi, Davood; Sarabadani, Mansour; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi

2013-01-01

The electron ionization (EI) mass spectra of a series of O-alkyl O-2-(N,N-dialkylaminolethyl alkylphosphonites(phosphonates), which are precursors of nerve agents, were studied for Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification. General El fragmentation pathways were constructed and discussed. Proposed fragment structures were confirmed through analyzing fragment ions of deuterated analogs and density functional theory (DFT) calculations. The observed fragment ions are due to different fragmentation pathways such as hydrogen and McLafferty+1 rearrangements, alkene, amine and alkoxy elimination by alpha- or beta-cleavage process. Fragment ions distinctly allow unequivocal identification of the interested compounds including those of isomeric compounds. The presence and abundance of fragment ions were found to depend on the size and structure of the alkyl group attached to nitrogen, phosphorus and oxygen atoms.

Nano-Structured Solids and Heterogeneous Catalysts: Powerful Tools for the Reduction of CBRN Threats

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Guidotti, M.; Rossodivita, A.; Ranghieri, M. C.

In the field of non-conventional CBRN weapons, the recent rapid development of nanotechnology and catalysis over nanosized solids provides innovative tools for the detection, protection and decontamination against these threats. By improving the efficiency of the countermeasures and by minimizing the negative effects of a deliberate use of CBRN agents, the practical application of the new technologies will readily represent a step forward in lowering the vulnerability of the civilian populations and in preventing the use of mass destruction weapons by terrorist groups or by `rogue states' supporting terrorists' activity. In such scenario, some relevant examples of nanosystems applied to the defense from non-conventional warfare agents will be here presented and commented. The key role of nanotechnology and heterogeneous catalysis for a multidisciplinary approach in counteracting CBRN threats will be highlighted too.

76 FR 41371 - Impact of Reducing the Mixture Concentration Threshold for Commercial Schedule 3 Chemical...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-13

...The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact of amending the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) to reduce the concentration level at which the CWCR exempt certain mixtures containing Schedule 3 chemicals from the declaration requirements that apply to Schedule 3 chemical production and the reporting requirements that apply to exports and imports of Schedule 3 chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). BIS is considering amending the CWCR declaration requirements that apply to the production of Schedule 3 chemicals to conform with the low concentration exemption adopted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2003, which applies when the concentration of any single Schedule 3 chemical in a mixture is ``30% or less,'' by weight or volume (whichever yields the lesser percent). Currently, the CWCR do not require the quantity of a Schedule 3 chemical contained in a mixture to be counted for declaration or reporting purposes if the concentration of the Schedule 3 chemical in the mixture is ``less than 80%'' by volume or weight (whichever yields the lesser percent). The current low concentration level was implemented in accordance with requirements set forth in the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA). Accordingly, publication and implementation of regulatory changes affecting this low concentration exemption level would be contingent upon amendment of the CWCIA by the Congress. In addition, consistent with U.S. national discretion, BIS is considering amending the CWCR reporting requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 3 chemicals by reducing the low concentration exemption that applies to certain mixtures containing Schedule 3 chemicals from the current low concentration level of ``less than 80%'' of a Schedule 3 chemical by volume or weight (whichever yields the lesser percent) to a concentration of ``30% or less.''

15 CFR 715.4 - Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Change in Inspection...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.4 Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations...

15 CFR 715.4 - Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Change in Inspection...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.4 Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations...

15 CFR 715.4 - Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Change in Inspection...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.4 Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations...

15 CFR 715.4 - Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Change in Inspection...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.4 Deadlines for submitting UDOC declarations...

77 FR 42482 - Materials Technical Advisory Committee; Notice of Partially Closed Meeting

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-07-19

... Bureau of Industry and Security senior management. 3. Discussion on the role of the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention. 4. Report on Composite Working Group and other working...

The Hidden Complexity of Biological "Dirty Bombs": Implications for Special Operations Medical Personnel.

PubMed

Washington, Michael A; Blythe, Jauchia

The recent capture of a terrorist in Belgium carrying explosives, fecal matter, and animal tissue may indicate a shift from conventional weapons to crude bacteriological preparations as instruments of terror. It is important to note that although such weapons lack technological sophistication, bacteria are inherently complex, unpredictable, and undetectable in the field. Therefore, it is important that Special Operations medical personnel understand the complications that such seemingly simple devices can add to the treatment of casualties in the field and subsequent evaluation in the clinic. 2016.

Another weapon too far: the anti-personnel laser.

PubMed Central

Gillow, J T

1995-01-01

The last decade has seen the development of military lasers designed to blind. Medical professionals dedicated to the prevention and treatment of visual disability, and particularly ophthalmologists under the terms of their newly acquired Royal Charter, have a responsibility to: document this new technology; explain its medical effects; and influence the threshold at which these weapons might be used. Proposals to prohibit anti-eye laser warfare at The United Nations Convention Conference in September 1995 present a unique opportunity to stigmatize blinding as a method of warfare. PMID:7629769

Weapons proliferation and organized crime: The Russian military and security force dimension

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Turbiville, G.H.

One dimension of international security of the post-Cold War era that has not received enough attention is how organized crime facilitates weapons proliferation worldwide. The former Soviet Union (FSU) has emerged as the world`s greatest counterproliferation challenge. It contains the best developed links among organized crime, military and security organizations, and weapons proliferation. Furthermore, Russian military and security forces are the principle source of arms becoming available to organized crime groups, participants in regional conflict, and corrupt state officials engaged in the black, gray, and legal arms markets in their various dimensions. The flourishing illegal trade in conventional weapons ismore » the clearest and most tangible manifestation of the close links between Russian power ministries and criminal organizations. The magnitude of the WMD proliferation problem from the FSU is less clear and less tangible. There have been many open reports of small-scale fissile material smuggling out of the FSU. The situation with regard to the proliferation of chemical weapon usually receives less attention but may be more serious. With an acknowledged stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, the potential for proliferation is enormous.« less

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Frye, A.

After decades of diplomatic wrangling, breakthroughs have come on many fronts, both bilateral and multilateral. Not only have Soviets and now Russians joined Americans in agreements to make massive reductions in strategic arms, but the overwhelming majority of nations have signed on to indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Leaders in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have greatly contributed to the nonproliferation regime by returning thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for safekeeping and elimination, a process to be completed this fall with the departure of the last few warheads from Belarus. The Conventional Forces in Europe Treatymore » has ratified and reinforced the transformation of the military balance on the continent, although the altered political landscape after the collapse of the Soviet empire will require nettlesome changes in its provisions. The long-sought Chemical Weapons Convention should enter into force shortly, and, despite India`s recalcitrance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban enjoys nearly universal support.« less

Flexible response and the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Force) Treaty: what next. Study project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Williams, H.A.

1988-03-14

The prospect of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty led the former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, GEN Bernard Rogers, to claim that NATO would lose weapons vital to the Alliance's defense when Pershing II (PII) and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) were withdrawn from Europe. Nuclear weapons and the NATO strategy of flexible response are inseparably dependent upon each other. GEN Rogers' comments focus directly on the capability which PII and GLCM provided NATO to strike Soviet territory in event of conflict and if such an escalatory step was deemed necessary. Various sources were researched to determine if the INF Treatymore » will cripple the flexible response strategy; while it should not, certain changes in NATO's approach to defense are suggested. Specifically, conventional and nuclear improvements, the latter within the terms of the INF Treaty, are suggested, as are conventional force reduction negotiations and the Europeanization of NATO.« less

A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L

1999-04-20

Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must buildmore » on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.« less

CALCM: The untold story of the weapon used to start the Gulf war

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nielson, John T.

1994-07-01

The Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile (CALCM) was developed from the strategic ALCM, AGM-86, by integrating GPS navigation into the missile in place of terrain correlation (TERCOM). In addition, the nuclear warhead was replaced by conventional explosives. The CALCM was developed, tested, and fielded in a single year (mid-1986 - mid-1987) by the Boeing Company where the author was then employed. Although the GPS technology used, a Rockwell single channel aided receiver, has been eclipsed by newer receivers with additional capabilities and newer technology, many innovative things were done in completing the CALCM integration: the external loading of almanac data along with other mission data, three satellite navigation capability, and the use of a single channel receiver in a dynamic flight environment. This effort demonstrated that GPS outputs can be integrated quickly into an existing weapon system using the traditional loosely coupled 'cascaded filter' approach. Although this approach is not as ideal as a tightly coupled integration using raw GPS data, the use of cascaded filters resulted in a weapon that was able to be rapidly fielded. The Air Force had sufficient confidence in the missile, that after four years of operational testing, 35 of these missiles were targeted at key sites at the start of the Gulf War in 1991. This effort, which was declassified in 1992, resulted in the first weapon in the DoD inventory to be operational using GPS navigation. The effort deserves consideration as a model as to how GPS integration can be performed.

TSARINA: A computer model for assessing conventional and chemical attacks on air bases

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Emerson, D.E.; Wegner, L.H.

This Note describes the latest version of the TSARINA (TSAR INputs using AIDA) airbase damage assessment computer program that has been developed to estimate the on-base concentration of toxic agents that would be deposited by a chemical attack and to assess losses to various on-base resources from conventional attacks, as well as the physical damage to runways, taxiways, buildings, and other facilities. Although the model may be used as a general-purpose, complex-target damage assessment model, its primary role in intended to be in support of the TSAR (Theater Simulation of Airbase Resources) aircraft sortie generation simulation program. When used withmore » TSAR, multiple trials of a multibase airbase-attack campaign can be assessed with TSARINA, and the impact of those attacks on sortie generation can be derived using the TSAR simulation model. TSARINA, as currently configured, permits damage assessments of attacks on an airbase (or other) complex that is compassed of up to 1000 individual targets (buildings, taxiways, etc,), and 2500 packets of resources. TSARINA determines the actual impact points (pattern centroids for CBUs and container burst point for chemical weapons) by Monte Carlo procedures-i.e., by random selections from the appropriate error distributions. Uncertainties in wind velocity and heading are also considered for chemical weapons. Point-impact weapons that impact within a specified distance of each target type are classed as hits, and estimates of the damage to the structures and to the various classes of support resources are assessed using cookie-cutter weapon-effects approximations.« less

The Use of MCNP in Flash Radiographic Applications at AWE

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Quillin, S.; Crotch, I.; McAlpin, S.; O'Malley, J.

AWE performs experiments to investigate the hydrodynamic behavior of explosive metal systems in order to underwrite the UK nuclear deterrent. The experiments involve the manufacture of a device to mock up some aspect of the weapon. Inert simulant materials replace fissile weapon components. The device is then detonated under remote control within specially designed explosive containment buildings called firing chambers. During the experiment a very brief, intense, collimated flash of high energy x-rays are used to take a snapshot of the implosion (see Fig. 1). Prom the resulting image measurements of the dynamic configuration and density distribution of the components in the device are inferred. These are then used to compare with calculations of the hydrodynamic operation of the weapon and understand how the device would perform under various conditions. This type of experiment is known as a core punch experiment.

Wounds and weapons.

PubMed

Vogel, H; Dootz, B

2007-08-01

X-ray findings are described, which are typical for injuries due to conventional weapons. It is intended to demonstrate that radiographs can show findings characteristic for weapons. The radiograms have been collected in Vietnam, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Chad, Iran, Afghanistan, USA, Great Britain, France, Israel, Palestine, and Germany. Radiograms of injuries due to hand grenades show their content (globes) and cover fragments. The globes are localized regionally in the victim's body. Survivors of cluster bombs show singular or few globes; having been hit by many globes would have been lethal. Shotguns produce characteristic distributions of the pallets and depth of penetration different from those of hand grenades and cluster bombs; cover fragments are lacking. Gunshot wounds (GSW) can be differentiated in those to low velocity bullets, high velocity projectiles, and projectiles, which disintegrate on impact. The radiogram furnishes the information about a dangerous shock and helps to recognize the weapon. Radiograms of victims of explosion show fragments and injuries due to the blast, information valid for therapy planning and prognosis. The radiogram shows details which can be used in therapy, forensic medicine and in war propaganda - examples could be findings typical for cluster bombs and for dumdum bullets; it shows the cruelty of the employment of weapons against humans and the conflict between the goal of medical care and those of military actions. Radiographs may show, which weapon has been employed; they can be read as war reports.

Males that drop a sexually selected weapon grow larger testes.

PubMed

Joseph, Paul N; Emberts, Zachary; Sasson, Daniel A; Miller, Christine W

2018-01-01

Costly sexually selected weapons are predicted to trade off with postcopulatory traits, such as testes. Although weapons can be important for achieving access to females, individuals of some species can permanently drop (i.e. autotomize) their weapons, without regeneration, to escape danger. We capitalized on this natural behavior to experimentally address whether the loss of a sexually selected weapon leads to increased testes investment in the leaf-footed cactus bug, Narnia femorata Stål (Hemiptera: Coreidae). In a second experiment, we measured offspring production for males that lost a weapon during development. As predicted, males that dropped a hind limb during development grew significantly larger testes than the control treatments. Hind-limb autotomy did not result in the enlargement of other nearby traits. Our results are the first to experimentally demonstrate that males compensate for natural weapon loss by investing more in testes. In a second experiment we found that females paired with males that lost a hind limb had 40% lower egg hatching success than females paired with intact males, perhaps because of lower mating receptivity to males with a lost limb. Importantly, in those cases where viable offspring were produced, males missing a hind limb produced 42% more offspring than males with intact limbs. These results suggest that the loss of a hind-limb weapon can, in some cases, lead to greater fertilization success. © 2017 The Author(s). Evolution © 2017 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

Concealed weapons detection using electromagnetic resonances

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hunt, Allen R.; Hogg, R. Douglas; Foreman, William

1998-12-01

Concealed weapons pose a significant threat to both law enforcement and security agency personnel. The uncontrolled environments associated with peacekeeping and the move toward relaxation of concealed weapons laws here in the U.S. provide a strong motivation for developing weapons detection technologies which are noninvasive and can function noncooperatively. Existing weapons detection systems are primarily oriented to detecting metal and require the cooperation of the person being searched. The new generation of detectors under development that focuses primarily on imaging methods, faces problems associated with privacy issues. There remains a need for a weapons detector which is portable, detects weapons remotely, avoids the issues associated with privacy rights, can tell the difference between car keys and a knife, and is affordable enough that one can be issued to every peacekeeper and law enforcement officer. AKELA is developing a concealed weapons detector that uses wideband radar techniques to excite natural electromagnetic resonances that characterize the size, shape, and material composition of an object. Neural network processing is used to classify the difference between weapons and nuisance objects. We have constructed both time and frequency domain test systems and used them to gather experimental data on a variety of armed and unarmed individuals. These experiments have been performed in an environment similar to the operational environment. Preliminary results from these experiments show that it is possible to detect a weapon being carried by an individual from a distance of 10 to 15 feet, and to detect a weapon being concealed behind the back. The power required is about 100 milliwatts. A breadboard system is being fabricated and will be used by AKELA and our law enforcement partner to gather data in operationally realistic situations. While a laptop computer will control the breadboard system, the wideband radar electronics will fit in a box the size of a CD ROM drive of a computer.

15 CFR 718.1 - Definition.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS... confidential business information as information included in categories specifically identified in sections 103... marketing data (other than shipment data); (c) Pricing data; (d) Personnel data; (e) Research data; (f...

The nuclear issue: where do we go from here?.

PubMed

Rotblat, Joseph

2003-01-01

The drive for the elimination of nuclear weapons is going badly and there is currently little support from the general public. The United States Nuclear Posture Review incorporates nuclear capability into conventional war planning. The Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed to maintain nuclear weapon capability. The US is planning an essentially new earth-penetrating nuclear weapon and is prepared to test this in the national interest if thought necessary. These policies could stimulate nuclear proliferation by others, do nothing to deter terrorism, promote persisting polarization of the world, are a clear breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and rest world security on a continued balance of terror. A renewed mass campaign to counteract all this, on legal and moral grounds in particular, is urgently needed. IPPNW and kindred organizations must restore sanity in our policies and humanity to our actions.

Advanced Technology and Mitigation (ATDM) SPARC Re-Entry Code Fiscal Year 2017 Progress and Accomplishments for ECP.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Crozier, Paul; Howard, Micah; Rider, William J.

The SPARC (Sandia Parallel Aerodynamics and Reentry Code) will provide nuclear weapon qualification evidence for the random vibration and thermal environments created by re-entry of a warhead into the earth’s atmosphere. SPARC incorporates the innovative approaches of ATDM projects on several fronts including: effective harnessing of heterogeneous compute nodes using Kokkos, exascale-ready parallel scalability through asynchronous multi-tasking, uncertainty quantification through Sacado integration, implementation of state-of-the-art reentry physics and multiscale models, use of advanced verification and validation methods, and enabling of improved workflows for users. SPARC is being developed primarily for the Department of Energy nuclear weapon program, with additional developmentmore » and use of the code is being supported by the Department of Defense for conventional weapons programs.« less

Threat is in the sex of the beholder: men find weapons faster than do women.

PubMed

Sulikowski, Danielle; Burke, Darren

2014-10-29

In visual displays, people locate potentially threatening stimuli, such as snakes, spiders, and weapons, more quickly than similar benign stimuli, such as beetles and gadgets. Such biases are likely adaptive, facilitating fast responses to potential threats. Currently, and historically, men have engaged in more weapons-related activities (fighting and hunting) than women. If biases of visual attention for weapons result from selection pressures related to these activities, then we would predict such biases to be stronger in men than in women. The current study reports the results of two visual search experiments, in which men showed a stronger bias of attention toward guns and knives than did women, whether the weapons were depicted wielded or not. When the weapons were depicted wielded, both sexes searched for them with more caution than when they were not. Neither of these effects extended reliably to syringes, a non-weapon-yet potentially threatening-object. The findings are discussed with respect to the "weapons effect" and social coercion theory.

Statement by Dr. Kathleen C. Bailey before the Senate Armed Services Committee

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bailey, K.C.

1994-08-16

This paper presents the personal views of the author on the subject of the proposed Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). She addresses here concerns about the national security issues which could result from ratification of this convention. She argues the convention alone is not likely to curtail production or availability of such items on the world market because of the relatively low cost. The treaty could thus put the country in a position less likely to protect itself, or adequately deal with such a threat.

Operations CROSSTIE and BOWLINE Events DOOR MIST, DORSAL FIN, MILK SHAKE, DIANA MOON, HUDSON SEAL, and MING VASE, 31 August 1967 - 20 November 1968

DTIC Science & Technology

1985-12-15

sponsored underground test events were conducted from 31 August 1967 to 20 November 1968 to study weapons effects . Two were shaft-type and four were...conducted, 161 were for weapons related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety ex- periments. An additional 22 nuclear experiments were conducted from...1962 until the last atmospheric test on 4 November 1962, 40 weapons related and weapons effects tests were conducted as part of the Pacific and Nevada

Automation of wear analysis for large caliber weapons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Salafia, Dominick; DeLeon, Norberto L.; Outlaw, James F.

1999-12-01

As part of the Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) the Metrology and Simulation Division (MT-MS) at the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground (USAYPG) has the mission to measure and record the wear effects of conventional and experimental munitions on large caliber weapons. The primary objective is to ensure that the weapon to be fired will safely meet the mission requirements for the quantity and energy of the munitions under live fire testing. Currently, there are two criteria used to "deadline" a weapon. One is the actual physical wear tolerance. The other relates to the energy (zone) expended by the round and the subsequent fatigue induced in the microstructure of the gun tube. The latter is referred to as the Equivalent Full Charge (EFC) for the particular round. In order to maximize safety and reduce the time required to manually search records for the appropriate level of useful life, the Measurements and Simulation Branch of MT-MS at USAYPG has made use of the installation network such that critical information may be accessed from the local area network or the Internet. An electronic database has been constructed and the query routines have been written so that systems test personnel, test directors (TD), and other government organizations may conduct a search for a particular weapon. The user may enter specifications such as percent physical life, percent EFC life, caliber, model, modifications, and serial number or any combination thereof. This paper is intended to inform the engineering and scientific community, engaged in weapons performance evaluation using simulations and field testing, of the existence of wear analysis automation for large caliber weapons.

Simulating Afterburn with LLNL Hydrocodes

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Daily, L D

2004-06-11

Presented here is a working methodology for adapting a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) developed hydrocode, ALE3D, to simulate weapon damage effects when afterburn is a consideration in the blast propagation. Experiments have shown that afterburn is of great consequence in enclosed environments (i.e. bomb in tunnel scenario, penetrating conventional munition in a bunker, or satchel charge placed in a deep underground facility). This empirical energy deposition methodology simulates the anticipated addition of kinetic energy that has been demonstrated by experiment (Kuhl, et. al. 1998), without explicitly solving the chemistry, or resolving the mesh to capture small-scale vorticity. This effortmore » is intended to complement the existing capability of either coupling ALE3D blast simulations with DYNA3D or performing fully coupled ALE3D simulations to predict building or component failure, for applications in National Security offensive strike planning as well as Homeland Defense infrastructure protection.« less

Trace level detection of compounds related to the chemical weapons convention by 1H-detected 13C NMR spectroscopy executed with a sensitivity-enhanced, cryogenic probehead.

PubMed

Cullinan, David B; Hondrogiannis, George; Henderson, Terry J

2008-04-15

Two-dimensional 1H-13C HSQC (heteronuclear single quantum correlation) and fast-HMQC (heteronuclear multiple quantum correlation) pulse sequences were implemented using a sensitivity-enhanced, cryogenic probehead for detecting compounds relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention present in complex mixtures. The resulting methods demonstrated exceptional sensitivity for detecting the analytes at trace level concentrations. 1H-13C correlations of target analytes at < or = 25 microg/mL were easily detected in a sample where the 1H solvent signal was approximately 58,000-fold more intense than the analyte 1H signals. The problem of overlapping signals typically observed in conventional 1H spectroscopy was essentially eliminated, while 1H and 13C chemical shift information could be derived quickly and simultaneously from the resulting spectra. The fast-HMQC pulse sequences generated magnitude mode spectra suitable for detailed analysis in approximately 4.5 h and can be used in experiments to efficiently screen a large number of samples. The HSQC pulse sequences, on the other hand, required roughly twice the data acquisition time to produce suitable spectra. These spectra, however, were phase-sensitive, contained considerably more resolution in both dimensions, and proved to be superior for detecting analyte 1H-13C correlations. Furthermore, a HSQC spectrum collected with a multiplicity-edited pulse sequence provided additional structural information valuable for identifying target analytes. The HSQC pulse sequences are ideal for collecting high-quality data sets with overnight acquisitions and logically follow the use of fast-HMQC pulse sequences to rapidly screen samples for potential target analytes. Use of the pulse sequences considerably improves the performance of NMR spectroscopy as a complimentary technique for the screening, identification, and validation of chemical warfare agents and other small-molecule analytes present in complex mixtures and environmental samples.

15 CFR 718.2 - Identification of confidential business information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... business information. 718.2 Section 718.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION 718.2 Identification of confidential business...

Can Nuclear Terrorists be Deterred?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ferguson, Charles

2005-04-01

Conventional thinking since September 11, 2001, posits that nuclear-armed terrorists cannot be deterred. However, not all terrorist groups are alike. For instance, those that are strongly affiliated with a national territory or a constituency that can be held hostage are more likely to be self-deterred against using or even acquiring nuclear weapons. In contrast, international terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, or apocalyptic groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo, may welcome retaliatory nuclear strikes because they embrace martyrdom. Such groups may be immune to traditional deterrence, which threatens direct punishment against the group in question or against territory or people the terrorists' value. Although deterring these groups may appear hopeless, nuclear forensic techniques could provide the means to establish deterrence through other means. In particular, as long as the source of the nuclear weapon or fissile material could be identified, the United States could threaten a retaliatory response against a nation that did not provide adequate security for its nuclear weapons or weapons-usable fissile material. This type of deterrent threat could be used to compel the nation with lax security to improve its security to meet rigorous standards.

US defense policy, US Air Force doctrine and strategic nuclear weapon systems, 1958-1964: the case of the Minuteman ICBM

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Reed, G.A.

This study examines the efforts of the US Air Force during 1958-1964 to develop doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems. These years were characterized by rapid, extensive change in the technology of nuclear weapons delivery systems, centering in ICBMs replacing bombers as the chief vehicles. Simultaneously, national military strategy changed with the transfer of power from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administrations, shifting from reliance on overwhelming nuclear retaliation to emphasis on balanced conventional and nuclear forces. Against this background, the study poses the question: did the Air Force, when confronted with major changes in technology and national policy, developmore » doctrine for strategic nuclear weapon systems that was politically acceptable, technically feasible, and strategically sound. Using the development of the Minuteman ICBM as a case study, the study examines the evolution of Air Force doctrine and concludes that the Air Force did not, because of conceptual problems and bureaucratic exigencies, develop a doctrine adequate to the requirements of deterrence in the dawning era of solid-fuel ICBMs.« less

Landmine Warfare in Support of Multi-domain Battle: Balancing Discrimination and Military Effectiveness

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-05-25

Combat Team CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons CTC Combat Training Center EMS Electro- Magnetic Spectrum FASCAM Family of...of a person or vehicle .”13 In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the economy of force, counter- mobility, and protection functions of landmines were...threat posed by the Soviet Union and the need for discrimination in the employment of persistent landmines by organizing them into well-marked fields

Guidebook for preparation of aircraft-system survivability requirements for procurement documents. Final report, October 1975-October 1976

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Morrow, J.J.; Burris, R.A.; Watson, D.J.

1977-05-01

This report is intended to provide guidelines for the preparation of procurements specifications for aircraft survivability enhancement equipment, for the survivability/vulnerability (S/V) tasks associated with the procurement of a total aircraft system or its relate subsystems, and also for the modification of current fleet aircraft to their related subsystems. It is intended that these S/V procurement guidelines be applied to the procurement of all military aircraft, aircraft subsystems, and aircraft componenets which can either lose their functional capability of have their performance degraded as a result of interactions with the damage mechanisms of threat weapons. The guidelines should be appliedmore » to preliminary design programs, to production programs, and to programs that will retrofit or modify existing systems. These guidelines include general requirements statements for the establishment of an S/V program, requirements statements for reducing the susceptibility of the system to the threat weapons, and requirements for the reduction of vulnerability to nonnuclear, nuclear, and laser weapon effects. Requirements for S/V assessments and the verification of vulnerability levels and survival enhancement features are also included. Although nuclear and laser weapon effects are included, the major emphasis is on the reduction of susceptibility and vulnerability to conventional weapons and the establishment of the S/V program.« less

Light Weapons and Intrastate Conflict, Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action. A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,

DTIC Science & Technology

1998-07-01

x. BACKGROUND , RECENT EXPERIENCE, AND THE BEGINNINGS 13 OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION Background , 13 Codifying and Illustrating the Experience to Date...are proposed for preventive action at the national, regional, and international level. BACKGROUND , RECENT EXPERIENCE, AND THE BEGINNINGS OF...the nature of such conflict, and most important, the types and modes of acquisition of the weapons now used in this type of conflict. BACKGROUND

15 CFR 713.5 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.5 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain... 2 chemicals produced, processed, or consumed; (2) Quantities of Schedule 2 chemicals produced...

76 FR 47527 - Retrospective Regulatory Review Under E.O. 13563

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-08-05

... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security 15 CFR Chapter VII [Docket No. 110711380... Security, Commerce. ACTION: Notice of inquiry. SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS... of portions of the Export Administration Regulations, Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations...

15 CFR 710.1 - Definitions of terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...) Administration and other offices; (2) Repair and maintenance shops; (3) Medical center; (4) Utilities; (5... section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, as amended (section 1903(b) of Title 46 App. of the...

15 CFR 710.1 - Definitions of terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

...) Administration and other offices; (2) Repair and maintenance shops; (3) Medical center; (4) Utilities; (5... section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, as amended (section 1903(b) of Title 46 App. of the...

15 CFR 710.1 - Definitions of terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...) Administration and other offices; (2) Repair and maintenance shops; (3) Medical center; (4) Utilities; (5... section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, as amended (section 1903(b) of Title 46 App. of the...

15 CFR 710.1 - Definitions of terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...) Administration and other offices; (2) Repair and maintenance shops; (3) Medical center; (4) Utilities; (5... section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, as amended (section 1903(b) of Title 46 App. of the...

15 CFR 715.2 - Amended declaration.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.2 Amended declaration. In order for BIS to... plant site that produced any amount of UDOCs (including all PSF chemicals); (3) Aggregate amount of...

15 CFR 715.2 - Amended declaration.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.2 Amended declaration. In order for BIS to... plant site that produced any amount of UDOCs (including all PSF chemicals); (3) Aggregate amount of...

15 CFR 715.2 - Amended declaration.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.2 Amended declaration. In order for BIS to... plant site that produced any amount of UDOCs (including all PSF chemicals); (3) Aggregate amount of...

15 CFR 715.2 - Amended declaration.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) § 715.2 Amended declaration. In order for BIS to... plant site that produced any amount of UDOCs (including all PSF chemicals); (3) Aggregate amount of...

15 CFR 719.15 - Procedural stipulations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Procedural stipulations. 719.15 Section 719.15 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.13 - Prehearing conference.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Prehearing conference. 719.13 Section 719.13 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.13 - Prehearing conference.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Prehearing conference. 719.13 Section 719.13 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.15 - Procedural stipulations.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Procedural stipulations. 719.15 Section 719.15 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 717.2 - Challenge inspections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Challenge inspections. 717.2 Section 717.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC...

15 CFR 713.5 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.5 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain... 2 chemicals produced, processed, or consumed; (2) Quantities of Schedule 2 chemicals produced...

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Scribner, R.A.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) present some particularly striking problems for both national security and arms control. These small, dual-purpose, difficult to detect weapons present some formidable challenges for verification in any scheme that attempts to limit rather than eliminate them. Conventionally armed SLCMs offer to the navies of both superpowers important offensive and defensive capabilities. Nuclear armed, long-range, land-attack SLCMs, on the other hand, seem to pose destabilizing threats and otherwise have questionable value, despite strong US support for extensive deployment of them. If these weapons are not constrained, their deployment could circumvent gains which might be made in agreementsmore » directly reducing of strategic nuclear weapons. This paper reviews the technology and planned deployments of SLCMs, the verification schemes which have been discussed and are being investigated to try to deal with the problem, and examines the proposed need for and possible uses of SLCMs. It presents an overview of the problem technically, militarily, and politically.« less

76 FR 41365 - Impact of Reducing the Mixture Concentration Threshold for Commercial Schedule 2A Chemical...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-13

...The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact of amending the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) to reduce the concentration level below which the CWCR exempt certain mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical from the declaration requirements that apply to Schedule 2A chemical production, processing, and consumption under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). To make these declaration requirements consistent with the international agreement adopted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), BIS is considering amending the CWCR to replace the current low concentration exemption (a concentration of ``less than 30%'' by volume or weight) with a two-tiered low concentration exemption that is based, in part, on whether the total amount of a Schedule 2A chemical produced, processed, or consumed at one or more plants on a plant site during a calendar year is less than the applicable verification threshold in the CWCR. Under this two- tiered approach, the declaration and reporting requirements in the CWCR would not apply to a chemical mixture containing a Schedule 2A chemical if: The concentration of the Schedule 2A chemical in the mixture is ``1% or less,'' or the concentration of the Schedule 2A chemical in the mixture is ``more than 1%, but less than or equal to 10%,'' and the annual amount of the Schedule 2A chemical produced, processed, or consumed is less than the relevant verification threshold. Legislative amendment of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act (CWCIA) is required in order to implement this proposed amendment to the CWCR. In addition, at U.S. national discretion, BIS is considering amending the CWCR to require declarations/reports for exports and imports of any mixtures that contain ``more than 10%'' of a Schedule 2A chemical by volume or weight (whichever method yields the lesser percentage), if the total quantity of the Schedule 2A chemical exported or imported during a calendar year exceeds the applicable CWCR declaration threshold.

Weaponisation of Space - Some Legal Considerations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jolly, C.

2002-01-01

This paper will examine a current national initiative from the United States of America to achieve greater national security through the `weaponisation' of extra-atmospheric space. We will propose a synthesis of the current international legal framework pertaining to military activities in space. Based on the analysis of the legal regime and on some current national and regional political initiatives, we will make some practical recommendations to prevent an arms race in space. Civil remote sensing, telecommunications, and launchers launch vehicle technologies have all benefited from a military heritage. They are dual use technologies, in other words, technologies that have both military and civilian applications. In fact, space has always been militarised, ever since the first satellites were put in orbit for reconnaissance missions. But recently, some national policies and technological advances are making the militarisation of space less `discrete'. Military assets from different countries are already stationed in orbit (e.g. reconnaissance and navigation satellites), but they might soon be joined by new `space weapons' with lethal strike capabilities. Currently, in the United States, military and civilian space activities are being closely intertwined. A typical example is the call of the NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe, a former Secretary of the Navy, for closer cooperation on research and development between NASA and the Department of Defense. Concerning plans to station weapons in space, the American Air Force Space Command issued, in February 2000, its `Strategic Master Plan for FY02 and Beyond'. It states that the United States "...future Air Force Space Command capabilities will enable a fully integrated Aerospace Force to rapidly engage military forces worldwide. [...] Full spectrum dominance in the space medium will be achieved through total space situational awareness, protection of friendly space assets, prevention of unauthorized use of those assets, negation of adversarial use of space and a fully-capable National Missile Defense (NMD). [American] ICBMs will continue to provide a credible strategic deterrence, while advanced, conventional weapons operating in or through space will provide our National Command Authorities (NCA) with formidable and flexible options for prompt, global, conventional strike." As we will see in this paper, the current international legal framework restricting the stationing and use of weapons in space is composed mainly of three treaties. They are: the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), called commonly the `ABM treaty', the `Outer Space Treaty' (1967) and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963). We will also see that - contrary to public opinion - those current legal instruments, even coupled with other international legal texts, do not prohibit the `weaponisation' of space. For instance, The Article Four of the Outer Space Treaty is often cited as the main legal argument against militarisation of space. This article does indeed prohibit the installation or stationing of "any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction", "in orbit around the Earth", "on celestial bodies", "in outer space" and "in any other manner". But, aside from the weapons identified (nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction), nothing prohibits a government signatory to the Outer Space Treaty, to actually station other types of weapons in space, such as laser-based systems. In this paper, the current situation of potential `weaponisation' of space, the international impacts of such a policy and the gaps of the international legal framework concerning the militarisation of space, will prompt some comments and practical recommendations.

''Whither Deterrence?'' A Brief Synopsis May, 2002

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Poppe, C; Vergino, E; Barker, R

To most audiences, deterrence has been interconnected with nuclear weapons whose purpose had been to deter a Soviet attack. But, the Soviet Union has been gone for almost a decade. President George W. Bush has stated that Russia is not an enemy of the US and the numbers of nuclear weapons can be dramatically reduced. It is important to note that deterrence has always transcended nuclear weapons. The US' first line of deterrence has been its formidable conventional warfare capability, designed to prevent conflict and win wars if necessary. The role of nuclear weapons has been to deter the,use ofmore » nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against U.S. interests during the conduct of conventional warfare and to ensure our ability to inflict massive destruction on any who would use nuclear weapons, or other weapons of mass destruction, against us. With regard to the Soviet Union, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons was a critical component of our deterrent to prevent massive Soviet conventional attack against our allies in Europe. However, the events of September 11, 2001 make clear that we have not convinced all who seek to harm us that we will be able to respond in a manner to make them wish they had not even tried. The September 11 attacks, as well as other past conflicts, do not mean that deterrence has failed-it remains effective against the threats for which it was designed. We have known there are other threats for which we did not have a credible deterrent. The challenge is to sustain deterrence against the classic threats as they evolve in technical sophistication while remaining alert to the need to evaluate continuously our ability to deter previously unforeseen challenges. How then should we be looking at deterrence as we consider fifteen or so years in the future, say to about 2015? What will be the role of nuclear weapons and other instruments of mass destruction in the future? What should the US be doing to prepare for the future? In this study, we present four futures as a tool for planners who must think ahead fifteen years or more, rather than a prediction of the future. None of the four futures will emerge in just the way we have described. Fifteen years from now, some mix of these futures is more likely, or perhaps we will see a trend towards one of the futures, but with the possibility that any of the other three could appear, perhaps quite swiftly. Any future will undoubtedly contain its own kind of unpleasant surprises and, in contrast to the Cold War; the possession of enormous nuclear-response and conventional-response capability may not be sufficient to deter these from happening. However, there are other tools that the US must include as part of its strategy and security policy in addition to deterrence, specifically dissuasion, defense, destruction, and assurance. Rather than rely on the Cold-War concept of deterrence, future security policy should be built upon the appropriate mix of these elements as a way to steer us toward a more favorable future, while ensuring that we are prepared for the kinds of surprises associated with far less favorable futures. In this study, we have defined three unfavorable futures to be avoided, and one future that represents, we believe, a more desirable global situation than the first three, but still not entirely benign. Our security policy should be defined to avoid or prevent the first three, which we have entitled ''Nuclear Giants, Global Terror'', and ''Regional Nuclear Tension and Use'', and steer us toward a more favorable future, ''Dynamic Cooperation''. We have examined the implications for both policy and military capability that are posed by these different futures. The result often raises more questions than we are able to answer without additional study-however, our primary purpose was to clarify the issues, to identify. what we believe we know, what we don't know, and where more study and effort are needed. Nevertheless, in preparing for unfavorable futures, we must also identify and plan the future we want. This study emphasizes that a desirable future in 2015 would be characterized by peaceful resolution of conflict, growing worldwide economic prosperity, an effective non-proliferation regime, the ability of the United States to control its own destiny without conflict, and expansion of political and economic freedom. Security policies, even in the face of unpleasant futures, should be crafted so as enhance, rather than diminish, these desired goals.« less

Superconducting RF Linacs Driving Subcritical Reactors for Profitable Disposition of Surplus Weapons-grade Plutonium

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cummings, Mary Anne; Johnson, Rolland

Acceptable capital and operating costs of high-power proton accelerators suitable for profitable commercial electric-power and process-heat applications have been demonstrated. However, studies have pointed out that even a few hundred trips of an accelerator lasting a few seconds would lead to unacceptable thermal stresses as each trip causes fission to be turned off in solid fuel structures found in conventional reactors. The newest designs based on the GEM*STAR concept take such trips in stride by using molten-salt fuel, where fuel pin fatigue is not an issue. Other aspects of the GEM*STAR concept which address all historical reactor failures include an internal spallation neutron target and high temperature molten salt fuel with continuous purging of volatile radioactive fission products such that the reactor contains less than a critical mass and almost a million times fewer volatile radioactive fission products than conventional reactors. GEM*STAR is a reactor that without redesign will burn spent nuclear fuel, natural uranium, thorium, or surplus weapons material. It will operate without the need for a critical core, fuel enrichment, or reprocessing making it an excellent candidate for export. As a first application, the design for a pilot plant is described for the profitable disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium by using process heat to produce green diesel fuel for the Department of Defense (DOD) from natural gas and renewable carbon.

For support of USAMRMC Biological Weapons Convention, treaty and statement implementation activities. Final report, 1 March 1996-28 February 1997

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fox, J.

Program of work to provide support to the Biological Arms Control Treaty Office (BACTO) of the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command (USAMRMC), in the development of Army and U.S. Government negotiation, implementation and compliance policies and preparations regarding potential verification and confidence measures for the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and related biological weapons agreements. Support services provided included the preparation of Army installations and commands for implementation of visits pursuant to the U.S./UK/Russian Trilateral Statement on BW. Support included site assistance visit, development of required facility documentation and briefings, identification of additional facilities potentially subject to access,more » and support to DOD development of guidelines, procedures, documentation, and other materials for the conduct of visits. Specific tasks under this contract included: identification and delineation of `Military Biological Facilities` and related activities at Army installations; development of visit implementation documentation for the Army; assessment of potentially at-risk equities and sensitivities at relevant facilities; facility staff training and preparation; and review and modification of facility inputs to annual BWC Confidence Building Measure Declarations. Also supported the provision of timely and critical technical support to the Joint Staff and OSD in the development of DoD negotiation biological arms control positions.« less

15 CFR 714.4 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.4 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain... following information that you have previously declared or reported: (1) Types of Schedule 3 chemicals...

15 CFR 712.7 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.7 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain... chemicals produced (e.g., additional Schedule 1 chemicals); (2) Quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced...

15 CFR Supplement No. 3 to Part 715 - Deadlines for Submission of Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC..., No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC...

15 CFR Supplement No. 3 to Part 715 - Deadlines for Submission of Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC... Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC) Facilities, and...

15 CFR Supplement No. 3 to Part 715 - Deadlines for Submission of Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC..., No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC...

15 CFR Supplement No. 3 to Part 715 - Deadlines for Submission of Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC... Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC) Facilities, and...

15 CFR Supplement No. 3 to Part 715 - Deadlines for Submission of Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Declarations, No Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC... Changes Authorization Forms, Amendments for Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical (UDOC) Facilities, and...

78 FR 40444 - Amendment of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-07-05

..., geopolitical and national security affairs, WMD, nuclear physics, chemistry, and biology. The Committee members... the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ASD(NCB..., and its allies and partners posed by nuclear, biological, chemical, conventional, and special weapons...

15 CFR 718.3 - Disclosure of confidential business information.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Disclosure of confidential business... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION § 718.3 Disclosure of confidential business information. (a) General...

15 CFR 716.6 - Facility agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL AND... inspection because of the type or amount of chemicals it produces, processes or consumes. (1) Schedule 1... 1 chemicals. (2) Schedule 2 plant sites. The USNA will ensure that such facility agreements are...

15 CFR 719.19 - Settlement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Settlement. 719.19 Section 719.19 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.19...

15 CFR 719.7 - Representation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Representation. 719.7 Section 719.7 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.7...

15 CFR 719.11 - Subpoenas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Subpoenas. 719.11 Section 719.11 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.11...

15 CFR 714.4 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.4 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain... following information that you have previously declared or reported: (1) Types of Schedule 3 chemicals...

15 CFR 717.5 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Post-inspection activities. 717.5 Section 717.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CWC...

15 CFR 719.11 - Subpoenas.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Subpoenas. 719.11 Section 719.11 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.11...

15 CFR 719.19 - Settlement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Settlement. 719.19 Section 719.19 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.19...

15 CFR 719.22 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Reporting a violation. 719.22 Section 719.22 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 716.10 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Post-inspection activities. 716.10 Section 716.10 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL...

15 CFR 719.14 - Hearings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Hearings. 719.14 Section 719.14 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.14...

15 CFR 719.22 - Reporting a violation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Reporting a violation. 719.22 Section 719.22 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.16 - Extension of time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Extension of time. 719.16 Section 719.16 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT...

15 CFR 719.20 - Record for decision.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Record for decision. 719.20 Section 719.20 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.7 - Representation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Representation. 719.7 Section 719.7 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.7...

15 CFR 712.7 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.7 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain... chemicals produced (e.g., additional Schedule 1 chemicals); (2) Quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced...

15 CFR 719.18 - Decisions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Decisions. 719.18 Section 719.18 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.18...

15 CFR 721.1 - Inspection of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Inspection of records. 721.1 Section 721.1 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INSPECTION...

15 CFR 719.17 - Post-hearing submissions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Post-hearing submissions. 719.17 Section 719.17 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.16 - Extension of time.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Extension of time. 719.16 Section 719.16 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT...

15 CFR 719.17 - Post-hearing submissions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Post-hearing submissions. 719.17 Section 719.17 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 721.1 - Inspection of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Inspection of records. 721.1 Section 721.1 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INSPECTION...

15 CFR 719.18 - Decisions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Decisions. 719.18 Section 719.18 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.18...

15 CFR 719.20 - Record for decision.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Record for decision. 719.20 Section 719.20 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.10 - Discovery.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Discovery. 719.10 Section 719.10 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.10...

15 CFR 716.10 - Post-inspection activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Post-inspection activities. 716.10 Section 716.10 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL...

Smallpox and biological warfare: the case for abandoning vaccination of military personnel.

PubMed Central

Capps, L; Vermund, S H; Johnsen, C

1986-01-01

Smallpox was officially declared eradicated from the world in 1980. Earlier, in 1972, over 50 nations signed the Biological Weapons Convention renouncing this entire category of weapons. Despite this international agreement, both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to vaccinate their military troops against smallpox, thus implying that each fears the other might still use it in biological warfare. Vaccination is not a harmless procedure, and vaccinia infections continue to be reported in troops and their contacts. Negotiating an end to the vaccination of troops would be a final step in ending the fear of smallpox. PMID:2944401

The Creation of a Contagious H5N1 Influenza Virus: Implications for the Education of Life Scientists

PubMed Central

Novossiolova, Tatyana; Minehata, Masamichi; Dando, Malcolm

2012-01-01

The paper contends that the ongoing controversy surrounding the creation of a contagious H5N1 influenza virus has already exposed the severe limitations of the possibility of preventing the hostile misuse of the life sciences by dint of oversight of proposals and publications. It further argues that in order to prevent the potential wholesale militarisation of the life sciences, it is essential that life scientists become aware of their responsibilities within the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and actively contribute their expertise to strengthening the biological weapons non-proliferation regime . PMID:22984642

Little Boy replication: justification and construction

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Malenfant, R.E.

A reconstruction of the Little Boy weapon allowed experiments to evaluate yield, leakage measurements for comparison with calculations, and phenomenological measurements to evaluate various in-situ dosimeters. The reconstructed weapon was operated at sustained delayed critical at the Los Alamos Critical Assembly Facility. The present experiments provide a wealth of information to benchmark calculations and demonstrate that the 1965 measurements on the Ichiban assembly (a spherical mockup of Little Boy) were in error.

Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Adams, Marvin

2011-04-01

As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

15 CFR 712.2 - Restrictions on activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.2 Section 712.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.2 Restrictions on activities involving...

15 CFR 713.4 - Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production, processing, or consumption...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.4 Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production... additionally planned production, processing, or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals. 713.4 Section 713.4...

15 CFR 712.2 - Restrictions on activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.2 Section 712.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.2 Restrictions on activities involving...

15 CFR 712.2 - Restrictions on activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.2 Section 712.2 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.2 Restrictions on activities involving...

U.S. Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-12-01

safeguard trade secrets. Leading corpora- tions such as DuPont, Dow, and Monsanto also supported CWC ratification to improve the public image of the...represented large chemical companies such as Dow, DuPont, and Monsanto , was highly effective at contacting senators, putting out useful information, and

15 CFR 714.4 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... chemicals exported; and (4) Source(s) of Schedule 3 chemicals imported. (c) Changes to company and plant...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.4 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain...

15 CFR 714.4 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... chemicals exported; and (4) Source(s) of Schedule 3 chemicals imported. (c) Changes to company and plant...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.4 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain...

15 CFR 714.4 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... chemicals exported; and (4) Source(s) of Schedule 3 chemicals imported. (c) Changes to company and plant...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.4 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain...

78 FR 75910 - Impact of the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-12-13

... (CWC) on Legitimate Commercial Chemical, Biotechnology, and Pharmaceutical Activities Involving... legitimate commercial activities and interests of chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical firms are being... Biotechnology,'' calls for the President to certify to Congress on an annual basis that ``the legitimate...

15 CFR 711.3 - Compliance review.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Compliance review. 711.3 Section 711.3... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION... DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS § 711.3 Compliance review. Periodically, BIS will request information from persons and...

15 CFR 711.3 - Compliance review.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Compliance review. 711.3 Section 711.3... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION... DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS § 711.3 Compliance review. Periodically, BIS will request information from persons and...

15 CFR 711.3 - Compliance review.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Compliance review. 711.3 Section 711.3... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION... DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS § 711.3 Compliance review. Periodically, BIS will request information from persons and...

15 CFR 711.3 - Compliance review.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Compliance review. 711.3 Section 711.3... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION... DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS § 711.3 Compliance review. Periodically, BIS will request information from persons and...

15 CFR 713.4 - Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production, processing, or consumption...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.4 Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production... additionally planned production, processing, or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals. 713.4 Section 713.4...

15 CFR 720.4 - Effect of denial.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Effect of denial. 720.4 Section 720.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS DENIAL OF EXPORT...

15 CFR 719.3 - Violations of the IEEPA subject to judicial enforcement proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.3 Violations of the IEEPA subject to judicial enforcement proceedings. (a) Violations—(1) Import restrictions involving Schedule 1 chemicals. Except as otherwise...

15 CFR 719.5 - Initiation of administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Initiation of administrative proceedings. 719.5 Section 719.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.9 - Summary decision.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Summary decision. 719.9 Section 719.9 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.9...

15 CFR 719.21 - Payment of final assessment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Payment of final assessment. 719.21 Section 719.21 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.9 - Summary decision.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Summary decision. 719.9 Section 719.9 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.9...

15 CFR 720.4 - Effect of denial.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Effect of denial. 720.4 Section 720.4 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS DENIAL OF EXPORT...

15 CFR 719.5 - Initiation of administrative proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Initiation of administrative proceedings. 719.5 Section 719.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.3 - Violations of the IEEPA subject to judicial enforcement proceedings.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.3 Violations of the IEEPA subject to judicial enforcement proceedings. (a) Violations—(1) Import restrictions involving Schedule 1 chemicals. Except as otherwise...

15 CFR 719.21 - Payment of final assessment.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Payment of final assessment. 719.21 Section 719.21 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

Exploring School Victimization and Weapon Carrying Among Military-Connected Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth in California Schools.

PubMed

Pedro, Kris Tunac De; Esqueda, Monica Christina

2017-07-01

Military-connected youth often experience daily stressors that affect their academic success and social and emotional development. Stressors such as multiple deployments and frequent school transitions may weaken the social ties that military-connected youth have with school communities, placing them at risk of social alienation and victimization. Within this youth population, military-connected lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) youth may be especially at risk of school victimization. However, to the authors' knowledge, no empirical studies have been conducted on the school experiences of military-connected LGBT youth. Drawing from the California Healthy Kids Survey (CHKS; n = 634,978), this study explored school victimization and weapon carrying among military-connected LGBT youth and their peers. Multivariate logistic regression analyses revealed that military connection, LGB identity, and transgender identity were associated with an increased odds of nonphysical victimization, physical violence, and weapon carrying. Military transgender youth were at an increased risk of weapon carrying (adjusted odds ratio [AOR] = 1.63; 95% confidence interval [CI] = [1.23, 2.16]). Future research is needed to explore risk and protective factors influencing school victimization and weapon carrying among military-connected LGBT youth.

Distinguishing among weapons offenders, drug offenders, and weapons and drug offenders based on childhood predictors and adolescent correlates.

PubMed

Stephens, Skye; Day, David M

2013-07-01

Weapons and drug offences incur a large cost to society and tend to be strongly associated. Improved understanding of their antecedents could inform targeted early intervention and prevention programmes. This study aimed to examine differences in criminal careers, childhood predictors and adolescent correlates among weapons-only offenders, drugs-only offenders and a versatile group of weapons + drugs offenders. We conducted a longitudinal records study of 455 young Canadians charged with drug and/or weapons offences who started their offending in late childhood/early adolescence. Consistent with expectation, differences emerged in their criminal careers as the versatile group had a longer criminal career and desisted from offending at a later age than weapons-only offenders. Against prediction, weapons-only offenders experienced the greatest number of childhood predictors and adolescent correlates. The three offending groups could be differentiated on offending trajectories and developmental factors.In making links between past events and later behaviour, life-course criminology may inform development of effective early intervention and prevention strategies.As weapons-only offenders experience the greatest level of adversity in childhood and adolescence, they may benefit most (of these three groups) from early intervention and prevention programmes.A reduction in weapon carrying and use might be achieved by early identification of children risk factors (e.g. family adversity) and appropriate intervention. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Is crisis stability still achievable?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pollack, Joshua

During the Cold War, the idea of crisis stability concerned whether the United States and the Soviet Union would be faced with powerful incentives to strike each other first with their nuclear weapons during periods of tension. This idea influenced the design of nuclear forces and guided aspects of nuclear arms control. The United States and Russia continue to operate large, alert nuclear forces, but at least three new factors have emerged that add significantly greater complexity to this picture. The first new factor consists of the development and deployment of new strategic military technologies that are entangled with nuclear weapons. These include strategic ballistic missile defenses, counter-space weapons, and strategic conventional weapons. The second new factor consists of new dyads of interacting strategic forces beyond US-Russia. These include US-China, US-North Korea, India-Pakistan, and India-China. The third new factor consists of the emergence of three-actor crisis stability dynamics, where the third actor is not necessarily nuclear-armed. This paper illustrates the concept with the US-North Korea-South Korea triangle. It briefly discusses the implications of these developments and reflects on the broad policy options that may be available.

Preparedness and response to bioterrorism.

PubMed

Spencer, R C; Lightfoot, N F

2001-08-01

As we enter the 21st century the threats of biological warfare and bioterrorism (so called asymmetric threats) appear to be more real than ever before. Historical evidence suggests that biological weapons have been used, with varying degrees of success, for many centuries. Despite the international agreements to ban such weapons, namely the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1975 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there is no effective international mechanism for challenging either the development of biological weapons or their use. Advances in technology and the rise of fundamentalist terror groups combine to present a significant threat to western democracies. A timely and definitive response to this threat will require co-operation between governments on a scale never seen before. There is a need for proper planning, good communication between various health, home office, defence and intelligence agencies and sufficient financial support for a realistic state of preparedness. The Department of Health has produced guidelines for responding to real or suspected incidents and the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) has produced detailed protocols to inform the actions required by microbiologists and consultants in communicable disease control. These protocols will be published on the Department of Health and PHLS web sites. Copyright 2001 The British Infection Society.

[Penetration depth of missiles fired from a pneumatic weapon with kinetic energy below 17 J, in 20% gelatine blocks as correlated with injuries found during autopsy of a 9-year-old boy].

PubMed

Smedra-Kaźmirska, Anna; Barzdo, Maciej; Kedzierski, Maciej; Szram, Stefan; Berent, Jarosław

2011-01-01

In Poland, according to the Act About Weapons and Ammunition, an air weapon which has kinetic energy of the fired projectiles below 17 J does not require registration and can be bought even on the Internet. Sport and recreation shooting with this weapon basically have to be performed in shooting ranges, but can be also carried on outside of shooting ranges, providing "particular caution" is exercised. In this study, we presented a case of fatal shooting of a 9-year-old boy; the weapon was a Chinese pneumatic device weapon with kinetic energy of the fired projectiles below 17 J. The aim of this study was to compare autopsy findings with penetration depth of missiles fired from this pneumatic weapon in 20% gelatine blocks. During the experiment, we used a Chinese pneumatic weapon with kinetic energy below 17 J, five kinds of lead projectiles with different shape and mass and 20% gelatine blocks at the temperature of 10 degrees C, which were the model of human soft tissues.

Little Boy replication: justification and construction

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Malenfant, R.E.

A reconstruction of the Little Boy weapon allowed experiments to evaluate yield, leakage measurements for comparison with calculations, and phenomenological measurements to evaluate various in-situ dosimeters. The reconstructed weapon was operated at sustained delayed critical at the Los Alamos Critical Assembly Facility. The present experiments provide a wealth of information to benchmark calculations and demonstrate that the 1965 measurements on the Ichiban assembly (a spherical mockup of Little Boy) were in error. 5 references, 2 figures.

15 CFR 719.6 - Request for hearing and answer.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS... respondent's defense(s). The answer must specifically admit or deny each separate allegation in the NOVA; if... must also set forth any additional or new matter the respondent contends supports a defense or claim of...

15 CFR 719.6 - Request for hearing and answer.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS... respondent's defense(s). The answer must specifically admit or deny each separate allegation in the NOVA; if... must also set forth any additional or new matter the respondent contends supports a defense or claim of...

77 FR 12622 - Records Schedules; Availability and Request for Comments

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-03-01

... chemical weapons convention program records and protocol program records. 3. Department of Defense, Defense... disposition process is available on request. Schedules Pending 1. Department of the Army, Agency-wide (N1-AU... programs, housing, recreation, and travel. 2. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, (N1...

15 CFR 713.7 - Deadlines for submission of Schedule 2 declarations, reports, and amendments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.7 Deadlines for submission... (production, processing, or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals during the previous calendar year); (b) Annual...

15 CFR 714.6 - Deadlines for submission of Schedule 3 declarations, reports, and amendments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.6 Deadlines for submission... past activities (production of Schedule 3 chemicals during the previous calendar year); (b) Annual...

15 CFR 712.4 - New Schedule 1 production facility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.4 New Schedule 1 production facility. (a) Establishment of a...) of the CWCR, and you intend to begin production of Schedule 1 chemicals at your facility in...

15 CFR 712.9 - Deadlines for submission of Schedule 1 declarations, reports, advance notifications, and amendments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.9... notifications, and amendments include: (a) Annual declaration on past activities (Schedule 1 chemical production...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 710 - Definitions of Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Supplement No. 2 to Part 710—Definitions of Production Schedule 1 chemicals Schedule 2 and Schedule 3... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Definitions of Production No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 711.6 - Where to obtain forms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL... and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW... Internet at www.cwc.gov. (b) If the amount of information you are required to submit is greater than the...

15 CFR 711.6 - Where to obtain forms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL... and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW... Internet at www.cwc.gov. (b) If the amount of information you are required to submit is greater than the...

15 CFR 711.6 - Where to obtain forms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL... and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW... Internet at www.cwc.gov. (b) If the amount of information you are required to submit is greater than the...

15 CFR 711.6 - Where to obtain forms.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL... and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW... Internet at www.cwc.gov. (b) If the amount of information you are required to submit is greater than the...

Economic Bases for Lessening U.S.-Soviet Tensions.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brown, Lester R.

1982-01-01

Discusses how the increasing Soviet dependence on American grain can be used to reduce international tensions. Soviet agricultural policies could affect worker morale and the entire Soviet political system. President Reagan is well-positioned to engage the Soviets in serious discussions of reductions in both nuclear and conventional weapons. (AM)

15 CFR 716.2 - Purposes and types of inspections of declared facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... purpose of the Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the plant site and the..., if applicable. (d) Unscheduled discrete organic chemical plant sites—(1) Purposes of inspections. The... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS...

15 CFR 713.5 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Schedule 2 chemical at particular plant site; (7) Exports or imports (e.g., changes in the types of...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.5 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain...

15 CFR 716.2 - Purposes and types of inspections of declared facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... purpose of the Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the plant site and the..., if applicable. (d) Unscheduled discrete organic chemical plant sites—(1) Purposes of inspections. The... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS...

15 CFR 713.5 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Schedule 2 chemical at particular plant site; (7) Exports or imports (e.g., changes in the types of...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.5 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain...

15 CFR 713.5 - Amended declaration or report.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Schedule 2 chemical at particular plant site; (7) Exports or imports (e.g., changes in the types of...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.5 Amended declaration or report. In order for BIS to maintain...

15 CFR 716.2 - Purposes and types of inspections of declared facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... purpose of the Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the plant site and the..., if applicable. (d) Unscheduled discrete organic chemical plant sites—(1) Purposes of inspections. The... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS...

15 CFR 716.1 - General information on the conduct of initial and routine inspections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL AND ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES § 716.1 General... the conduct of initial and routine inspections of declared facilities subject to inspection under CWC... provisions concerning challenge inspections. (a) Overview. Each State Party to the CWC, including the United...

15 CFR Supplement Nos. 2-3 to Part... - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false [Reserved] Nos. Supplement Nos. 2-3 to Part 716 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL...

15 CFR 721.3 - Destruction or disposal of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Destruction or disposal of records. 721.3 Section 721.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 712.4 - New Schedule 1 production facility.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.4 New Schedule 1 production facility. (a) Establishment of a...) of the CWCR, and you intend to begin production of Schedule 1 chemicals at your facility in...

15 CFR 716.3 - Consent to inspections; warrants for inspections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Consent to inspections; warrants for inspections. 716.3 Section 716.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 713.7 - Deadlines for submission of Schedule 2 declarations, reports, and amendments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.7 Deadlines for submission... (production, processing, or consumption of Schedule 2 chemicals during the previous calendar year); (b) Annual...

15 CFR 721.3 - Destruction or disposal of records.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Destruction or disposal of records. 721.3 Section 721.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 714.6 - Deadlines for submission of Schedule 3 declarations, reports, and amendments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.6 Deadlines for submission... past activities (production of Schedule 3 chemicals during the previous calendar year); (b) Annual...

15 CFR 714.3 - Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production of Schedule 3 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.3 Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production of Schedule 3 chemicals. (a) Declaration... additionally planned production of Schedule 3 chemicals. 714.3 Section 714.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade...

15 CFR Supplement Nos. 2-3 to Part... - [Reserved

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false [Reserved] Nos. Supplement Nos. 2-3 to Part 716 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL...

15 CFR 716.3 - Consent to inspections; warrants for inspections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Consent to inspections; warrants for inspections. 716.3 Section 716.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 719.6 - Request for hearing and answer.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Request for hearing and answer. 719.6 Section 719.6 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 711.5 - Numerical precision of submitted data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Numerical precision of submitted data. 711.5 Section 711.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 711.5 - Numerical precision of submitted data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Numerical precision of submitted data. 711.5 Section 711.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 711.5 - Numerical precision of submitted data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Numerical precision of submitted data. 711.5 Section 711.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 711.5 - Numerical precision of submitted data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Numerical precision of submitted data. 711.5 Section 711.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 711.5 - Numerical precision of submitted data.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Numerical precision of submitted data. 711.5 Section 711.5 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 710.1 - Definitions of terms used in the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR).

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... chemical means its conversion into another chemical via a chemical reaction. Unreacted material must be... formed through chemical reaction that is subsequently reacted to form another chemical. ITAR. Means the... formation of a chemical through chemical reaction, including biochemical or biologically mediated reaction...

Common tester platform concept.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Hurst, Michael James

This report summarizes the results of a case study on the doctrine of a common tester platform, a concept of a standardized platform that can be applicable across the broad spectrum of testing requirements throughout the various stages of a weapons program, as well as across the various weapons programs. The common tester concept strives to define an affordable, next-generation design that will meet testing requirements with the flexibility to grow and expand; supporting the initial development stages of a weapons program through to the final production and surveillance stages. This report discusses a concept investing key leveraging technologies andmore » operational concepts combined with prototype tester-development experiences and practical lessons learned gleaned from past weapons programs.« less

Blood lactate concentration after exposure to conducted energy weapons (including TASER® devices): is it clinically relevant?

PubMed

Jauchem, James R

2013-09-01

In previous studies, blood lactate concentration (BLac) consistently increased in anesthetized animals and in human subjects after exposures to TASER(®) conducted energy weapons (CEWs). Some have suggested the increased BLac would have detrimental consequences. In the current review, the following are evaluated: (a) the nature of muscle contractions due to CEWs, (b) general aspects of increased BLac, (c) previous studies of conventional neuromuscular electrical stimulation and CEW exposures, and (d) BLac in disease states. On the basis of these analyses, one can conclude that BLac, per se (independent of acidemia), would not be clinically relevant immediately after short-duration CEW applications, due to the short time course of any increase.

State-of-the-art in biosafety and biosecurity in European countries.

PubMed

Bielecka, Anna; Mohammadi, Ali Akbar

2014-06-01

The terms biosafety and biosecurity are widely used in different concepts and refer not only to protection of human beings and their surrounding environment against hazardous biological agent, but also to global disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. As a result, the biosafety and biosecurity issues should be considered interdisciplinary based on multilateral agreements against proliferation of biological weapons, public health and environmental protection. This publication presents information on both, international and national biosafety and biosecurity legislation. Status of national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, penalization issues and measures to account for and secure production, use, storage of particularly dangerous pathogens or activities involving humans, plants and animals where infection may pose a risk have been analyzed. Safety and security measures in laboratories have been studied. Moreover, dual-use technology and measures of secure transport of biohazard materials have been also taken into account. In addition, genetic engineering regulations, biosecurity activities in laboratories and code of conducts have been investigated, as well.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Smithson, A.E.

On July 15, the United States, supported by Britain, Australia, and Japan, proposed a new challenge inspection plan for the chemical weapons convention (CWC), which will prohibit the production, possession, use, and transfer of chemical weapons. The Bush administration claims this proposal has the same anytime, anywhere, with no right of refusal' challenge-inspection features George Bush first recommended in 1984 - as well as the latest in managed access,' aerial inspection, and use of sensing devices. But the proposal would let a challenged country stall for days without allowing inspectors to glimpse a suspected chemical-weapons site, and inspectors might nevermore » be able to step inside the gates of facilities where cheating is suspected. Countries considering joining the CWC must realize that the new US approach involves plenty of talk but little action. In fact, the US challenge-inspection plan falls so far short of the means needed to detect and deter prohibited activities that even Saddam Hussein and Muammar Khadafi may queue up to sign on the dotted line.« less

Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

None

2014-10-28

A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

Defense Experimentation and Stockpile Stewardship

ScienceCinema

None

2018-01-16

A primary mission of the site is to help ensure that the nation's nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. The stockpile stewardship program, working with the national weapons laboratories conducts a wide range of experiments using advanced diagnostic technologies, many of which were developed right here at the NNSS.

Microsynthesis and electron ionization mass spectral studies of O(S)-alkyl N,N-dimethyl alkylphosphono(thiolo)thionoamidates for Chemical Weapons Convention verification.

PubMed

Saeidian, Hamdollah; Babri, Mehran; Abdoli, Morteza; Sarabadani, Mansour; Ashrafi, Davood; Naseri, Mohammad Taghi

2012-12-15

The availability of mass spectra and interpretation skills are essential for unambiguous identification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-related chemicals. The O(S)-alkyl N,N-dimethyl alkylphosphono(thiolo)thionoamidates are included in the list of scheduled CWC-related compounds, but there are very few spectra from these compounds in the literature. This paper examines these spectra and their mass spectral fragmentation routes. The title chemicals were prepared through microsynthetic protocols and were analyzed using electron ionization mass spectrometry with gas chromatography as a MS-inlet system. Structures of fragments were confirmed using analysis of fragment ions of deuterated analogs, tandem mass spectrometry and density functional theory (DFT) calculations. Mass spectrometric studies revealed some interesting fragmentation pathways during the ionization process, such as alkene and amine elimination and McLafferty-type rearrangements. The most important fragmentation route of the chemicals is the thiono-thiolo rearrangement. DFT calculations are used to support MS results and to reveal relative preference formation of fragment ions. The retention indices (RIs) of all the studied compounds are also reported. Mass spectra of the synthesized compounds were investigated with the aim to enrich the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Central Analytical Database (OCAD) which may be used for detection and identification of CWC-related chemicals during on-site inspection and/or off-site analysis such as OPCW proficiency tests. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Application of cation-exchange solid-phase extraction for the analysis of amino alcohols from water and human plasma for verification of Chemical Weapons Convention.

PubMed

Kanaujia, Pankaj K; Tak, Vijay; Pardasani, Deepak; Gupta, A K; Dubey, D K

2008-03-28

The analysis of nitrogen containing amino alcohols, which are the precursors and degradation products of nitrogen mustards and nerve agent VX, constitutes an important aspect for verifying the compliance to the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention). This work devotes on the development of solid-phase extraction method using silica- and polymer-based SCX (strong cation-exchange) and MCX (mixed-mode strong cation-exchange) cartridges for N,N-dialkylaminoethane-2-ols and alkyl N,N-diethanolamines, from water. The extracted analytes were analyzed by GC-MS (gas chromatography-mass spectrometry) in the full scan and selected ion monitoring modes. The extraction efficiencies of SCX and MCX cartridges were compared, and results revealed that SCX performed better. Extraction parameters, such as loading capacity, extraction solvent, its volume, and washing solvent were optimized. Best recoveries were obtained using 2 mL methanol containing 10% NH(4)OH and limits of detection could be achieved up to 5 x 10(-3) microg mL(-1) in the selected ion monitoring mode and 0.01 microg mL(-1) in full scan mode. The method was successfully employed for the detection and identification of amino alcohol present in water sample sent by Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the official proficiency tests. The method was also applied to extract the analytes from human plasma. The SCX cartridge showed good recoveries of amino alcohols from human plasma after protein precipitation.

Environmental Support for Project WEAP (Weapons Environmental Acoustic Program), East of Montauk Point, New York, 7-28 May 1982.

DTIC Science & Technology

1983-10-01

scatterer of acoustic energy. During May, the * The objective of Project WEAP (Weapons sound speed gradient would be slightly Environmental Acoustics...remotely collected box site the experiment in a homogeneous cores for small macrofaunal animals. area or at least in an area where heter- Megafauna must...variety of sediment types. bation by both megafauna and macrofauna. DThis data may be required to understand During or after the acoustic experiment, the

Operations Praetorian, Phalanx, Fusileer, and Grenadier, Events HURON LANDING/DIAMOND ACE, MINI JADE, TOMME/MIDNIGHT ZEPHYR, MIDAS MYTH/MILAGRO and MISTY RAIN

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-07-01

General requirements and standards governing safety were based on the FCTC "Safety and Health Compliance Guide for Underground and Nuclear Effects Tests...Defense (DOD)-sponsored underground nuclear tests were conducted from 23 September 1982 through 6 April 1985 to study weapons effects . All six were...weapons- related or effects purposes, and 33 were safety experiments. An additional 24 nuclear experiments were conducted from December 1954 to February

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals no. Supplement no... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement no. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 713 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 2 Declarations, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 2... following any calendar year in which the production, processing, or consumption of a Schedule 2 chemical...

15 CFR 712.1 - Round to zero rule that applies to activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.1 Section 712.1 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.1 Round to zero...

15 CFR 712.3 - Initial declaration requirements for declared facilities which are engaged in the production of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.3 Initial declaration requirements for... declared facilities which are engaged in the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for purposes not prohibited...

15 CFR 714.3 - Advance declaration requirements for additionally planned production of Schedule 3 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... additionally planned production of Schedule 3 chemicals. 714.3 Section 714.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.3 Advance...

15 CFR 712.5 - Annual declaration requirements for facilities engaged in the production of Schedule 1 chemicals...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.5 Annual declaration requirements for facilities engaged in... facilities engaged in the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the CWC. 712.5...

15 CFR 716.1 - General information on the conduct of initial and routine inspections.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS INITIAL AND ROUTINE INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED FACILITIES § 716.1 General... is subject to inspection if it produced in excess of 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1 chemicals in the previous calendar year or anticipates producing in excess of 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 - Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Organic Chemical No. Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 715—Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical Unscheduled...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 - Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Organic Chemical No. Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 715—Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical Unscheduled...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 - Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production No. Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 715—Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 - Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Organic Chemical No. Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 715—Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical Unscheduled...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 - Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production No. Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 715—Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 - Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production No. Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 715—Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 - Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Organic Chemical No. Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 715—Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical Unscheduled...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 - Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production No. Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 Commerce and Foreign Trade... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 715—Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 712 - Schedule 1 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedule 1 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 712—Schedule 1 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 713 - Schedule 2 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedule 2 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 713—Schedule 2 Chemicals...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 714 - Schedule 3 Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedule 3 Chemicals No. Supplement No... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 714—Schedule 3 Chemicals...

15 CFR 719.8 - Filing and service of papers other than the NOVA.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Filing and service of papers other... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ENFORCEMENT § 719.8 Filing and service of papers other than the NOVA. (a) Filing. All...

15 CFR 745.2 - End-Use Certificate reporting requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... by mail or courier delivery to the following address: Information Technology Team, Treaty Compliance Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 4515, 14th Street and... Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 715 - Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete... WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 715—Definition of an Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemical Unscheduled...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 715 - Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (UDOCs) and UDOC Production

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Examples of Unscheduled Discrete... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING UNSCHEDULED DISCRETE ORGANIC CHEMICALS (UDOCs) Pt. 715, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 715—Examples of Unscheduled Discrete Organic...

Rapid Estimation of Building Damage by Conventional Weapons

DTIC Science & Technology

2014-09-01

impulse applied to reflect surface 17 iso = impulse of incident wave t0 = wave duration Lw = wavelength of incident wave ta = arrival time...floor area = 3 x 100 x 90 = 27000 ft2 Tributary area support per column = 27000 /30 = 900 ft2 Therefore, the tributary area supported by a column is

15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. 710.6 Section 710.6... Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. Certain... International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120 through 130). See in particular §§ 742.2 and...

15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. 710.6 Section 710.6... Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. Certain... International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120 through 130). See in particular §§ 742.2 and...

15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. 710.6 Section 710.6... Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. Certain... International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120 through 130). See in particular §§ 742.2 and...

15 CFR 710.6 - Relationship between the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations and the Export Administration...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. 710.6 Section 710.6... Traffic in Arms Regulations, and the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Regulations. Certain... International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120 through 130). See in particular §§ 742.2 and...

15 CFR 713.2 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 713.2 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 713.2 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 713.2 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction, including any associated... plant sites that produce, process or consume Schedule 2 chemicals in excess of specified thresholds. 713... (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

The nuclear dilemma and the just war tradition

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

O'Brien, W.V.; Langan, J.

This book presents papers on the ethical aspects of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include the concept of a ''just'' war, national defense, political aspects, religion and politics, the failure of deterrence, conventional warfare, nuclear deterrence and democratic politics, the future of the nuclear debate, non-proliferation policy, arms control, national security, and government policies.

15 CFR 712.3 - Initial declaration requirements for declared facilities which are engaged in the production of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.3 Initial declaration requirements for... declared facilities which are engaged in the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for purposes not prohibited...

15 CFR 712.9 - Deadlines for submission of Schedule 1 declarations, reports, advance notifications, and amendments.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.9... notifications, and amendments include: (a) Annual declaration on past activities (Schedule 1 chemical production during the previous calendar year); (b) Annual report on exports and imports of Schedule 1 chemicals from...

15 CFR 716.8 - On-site monitoring of Schedule 1 facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false On-site monitoring of Schedule 1 facilities. 716.8 Section 716.8 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

15 CFR 712.1 - Round to zero rule that applies to activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.1 Round to zero rule that applies to activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals. Facilities that produce, export or... activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals. 712.1 Section 712.1 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 718 - Confidential Business Information Declared or Reported *

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION Pt. 718, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part... Chemicals Forms: Certification Form NONE. Form UDOC NONE. FORMS A and B and attachments (all Schedules and...

15 CFR 716.8 - On-site monitoring of Schedule 1 facilities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false On-site monitoring of Schedule 1 facilities. 716.8 Section 716.8 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS...

New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brown, J. editor

In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is inmore » the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.« less

PRESENTED 03/01/2006: 2006 REMOTE SENSING AND GIS IN THE REMEDIATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTAMINATION IN AN URBAN LANDSCAPE

EPA Science Inventory

During World War 1, The American University in Washington, DC was used by the U.S. Army as an experiment station for the development and testing of a variety of battlefield munitions including chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas, Phosgene, Ricin and Lewisite

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pilat, Joseph F

2009-01-01

With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and othermore » weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are important in themselves, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars - nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative, and little prospect for a better deal.« less

Nuclear weapons and NATO-Russia relations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Cornwell, G.C.

1998-12-01

Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO- Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountabilitymore » and transparency, to make these adaptations in the short-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship defense, coupled with a tendency towards has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia`s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.« less

Transitioning Active Flow Control to Applications

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Joslin, Ronald D.; Horta, Lucas G.; Chen, Fang-Jenq

1999-01-01

Active Flow Control Programs at NASA, the U.S. Air Force, and DARPA have been initiated with the goals of obtaining revolutionary advances in aerodynamic performance and maneuvering compared to conventional approaches. These programs envision the use of actuators, sensors, and controllers on applications such as aircraft wings/tails, engine nacelles, internal ducts, nozzles, projectiles, weapons bays, and hydrodynamic vehicles. Anticipated benefits of flow control include reduced weight, part count, and operating cost and reduced fuel burn (and emissions), noise and enhanced safety if the sensors serve a dual role of flow control and health monitoring. To get from the bench-top or laboratory test to adaptive distributed control systems on realistic applications, reliable validated design tools are needed in addition to sub- and large-scale wind-tunnel and flight experiments. This paper will focus on the development of tools for active flow control applications.

REMOTE SENSING AND GIS IN THE REMEDIATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTAMINATION IN AN URBAN LANDSCAPE

EPA Science Inventory

During World War I, The American University in Washington D.C. was used by the U.S. Army as an experiment station for the development and testing of a variety of battlefield munitions including chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas, Phosgene, Ricin and Lewisite. After the end of t...

Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues

DTIC Science & Technology

2011-04-21

winglets , rather than on the winged design of the HTV-2. Upon nearing a target, the weapon would be able to maneuver to avoid flying over third party...concept from PGS, Congress, initially at least, blended both into the request for a new report. The Air Force submitted its report on the CAV concept of

15 CFR 711.8 - How to request authorization from BIS to make electronic submissions of declarations or reports.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...-DESI use. (iv) To prevent misuse of the Web-DESI account: (A) If Web-DESI user account information (i.e... the loss, theft or compromise of the user account information, immediately, by calling BIS at (202..., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS GENERAL INFORMATION REGARDING DECLARATION...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 714 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 3 Declarations, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 2... Schedule 3 chemical exceeded the declaration threshold in § 714.1(a)(1)(i) of the CWCR. Annual Report on...

15 CFR 713.3 - Annual declaration and reporting requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 2 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 2 chemicals. 713.3 Section 713.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.3 Annual...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 745 - Schedules of Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Schedules of Chemicals No. Supplement... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 745—Schedules of Chemicals C.A.S. Registry No. Schedule 1 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 745 - Schedules of Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Schedules of Chemicals No. Supplement... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 745—Schedules of Chemicals C.A.S. Registry No. Schedule 1 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me...

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 745 - Schedules of Chemicals

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Schedules of Chemicals No. Supplement... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REQUIREMENTS Pt. 745, Supp. 1 Supplement No. 1 to Part 745—Schedules of Chemicals C.A.S. Registry No. Schedule 1 A. Toxic chemicals: (1) O-Alkyl (≤C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me...

Ronald Reagan's Re-formulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of the "Zero Option,""Evil Empire," and "Star Wars" Addresses.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Goodnight, G. Thomas

1986-01-01

Analyzes speeches in which Reagan challenges the following convention: science will continue to create technologically advanced weapons against which no effective defense will be developed, making deterrence through an assured retaliatory capability the only possible defense. Textual analysis reveals how public discourse can achieve unities of…

CWC Industry Outreach III: Chemical Weapons Convention Ratification, Implementation, Compliance and Verification (CWC Video). Volume 2. Annexes.

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-08-01

7515 (818) 791-8805 (FAX) (415) 742-7540 (FAX) CHEVRON CORPORATION HUISH DETERGENTS, INC. CHARLOTTE R. FARBER DON GOLLADAY 225 BUSH STREET P.O. BOX 25057...USA) TEXAS INSTRUMENTS KENT BOSSART ZAK KARAMALLY 1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., NW #500 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS WASHINGTON, DC 20006 ZAK KARAMALLY 202-861-0668 P

15 CFR 714.1 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...

15 CFR 714.1 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...

15 CFR 714.1 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...

15 CFR 714.1 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...

15 CFR 714.1 - Annual declaration requirements for plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... in the production of a chemical in any units within the same plant through chemical reaction... plant sites that produce a Schedule 3 chemical in excess of 30 metric tons. 714.1 Section 714.1 Commerce... AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 713 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 2 Declarations, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS Pt. 713, Supp. 2... following any calendar year in which the production, processing, or consumption of a Schedule 2 chemical... exports or imports of a Schedule 2 chemical by a plant site, trading company, or other person subject to...

15 CFR 713.3 - Annual declaration and reporting requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 2 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS § 713.3 Annual declaration and reporting requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 2 chemicals. (a) Declarations and... requirements for exports and imports of Schedule 2 chemicals. 713.3 Section 713.3 Commerce and Foreign Trade...

Deterrence of ballistic missile systems and their effects on today's air operations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Durak, Hasan

2015-05-01

Lately, the effect-based approach has gained importance in executing air operations. Thus, it makes more successful in obtaining the desired results by breaking the enemy's determination in a short time. Air force is the first option to be chosen in order to defuse the strategic targets. However, the problems such as the defense of targets and country, radars, range…etc. becoming serious problems. At this level ballistic missiles emerge as a strategic weapon. Ultimate emerging technologies guided by the INS and GPS can also be embedded with multiple warheads and reinforced with conventional explosive, ballistic missiles are weapons that can destroy targets with precision. They have the advantage of high speed, being easily launched from every platform and not being easily detected by air defense systems contrary to other air platforms. While these are the advantages, there are also disadvantages of the ballistic missiles. The high cost, unavailability of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and its limited effect while using conventional explosives against destroying the fortified targets are the disadvantages. The features mentioned above should be considered as limitation to the impact of the ballistic missiles. The aim is to impose the requests on enemies without starting a war with all components and to ensure better implementation of the operation functions during the air operations. In this study, effects of ballistic missiles in the future on air battle theatre will be discussed in the beginning, during the process and at the end phase of air operations within the scope of an effect-based approach.

Shanidar 3 Neandertal rib puncture wound and paleolithic weaponry.

PubMed

Churchill, Steven E; Franciscus, Robert G; McKean-Peraza, Hilary A; Daniel, Julie A; Warren, Brittany R

2009-08-01

Since its discovery and initial description in the 1960s, the penetrating lesion to the left ninth rib of the Shanidar 3 Neandertal has been a focus for discussion about interpersonal violence and weapon technology in the Middle Paleolithic. Recent experimental studies using lithic points on animal targets suggest that aspects of weapon system dynamics can be inferred from the form of the bony lesions they produce. Thus, to better understand the circumstances surrounding the traumatic injury suffered by Shanidar 3, we conducted controlled stabbing experiments with replicas of Mousterian and Levallois points directed against the thoraces of pig carcasses. Stabs were conducted under both high and low kinetic energy conditions, in an effort to replicate the usual impact forces associated with thrusting spear vs. long-range projectile weapon systems, respectively. Analysis of the lesions produced in the pig ribs, along with examination of goat ribs subjected primarily to high kinetic energy stabs from an independent experiment, revealed consistent differences in damage patterns between the two conditions. In the case of Shanidar 3, the lack of major involvement of more than one rib, the lack of fracturing of the affected and adjacent ribs, and the lack of bony defects associated with the lesion (such as wastage, hinging, and radiating fracture lines) suggests that the weapon that wounded him was carrying relatively low kinetic energy. While accidental injury or attack with a thrusting spear or knife cannot absolutely be ruled out, the position, angulation, and morphology of the lesion is most consistent with injury by a low-mass, low-kinetic energy projectile weapon. Given the potential temporal overlap of Shanidar 3 with early modern humans in western Asia, and the possibility that the latter were armed with projectile weapon systems, this case carries more than simple paleoforensic interest.

Nonlethal weapons as force options for the Army

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Alexander, J.B.

This paper suggests that future challenges to US national security will be very different from those previously experienced. In a number of foreseeable circumstances, conventional military force will be inappropriate. The National Command Authority, and other appropriate levels of command, need expanded options available to meet threats for which the application of massive lethal force is counterproductive or inadvisable. It is proposed that nonlethal concepts be developed that provide additional options for military leaders and politicians. Included in this initiative should be exploration of policy, strategy, doctrine, and training issues as well as the development of selected technologies and weapons.more » In addition, civilian law enforcement agencies have similar requirements for less-than-lethal systems. This may be an excellent example for a joint technology development venture.« less

Supporting Data for Fiscal Year 1994. Budget Estimate Submission

DTIC Science & Technology

1993-04-01

0603401F 405 36 Space Systems Environmental Interactions Technology 0603410F 416 38 Conventional Weapons Technology 0603601F 423 39 Advanced Radiation...Transfer Pilot Program (SBIR/STTR) 0603302F Space and Missile Rocket Propulsion 31 392 060341OF Space Systems Environmental Interactions Technology 36...Deliver Interactive Decode (Rapid Message Processing) capability in Communications Element. - (U) Conduct maintainability demonstration. - (U) Begin Initial

JPRS Report, Arms Control.

DTIC Science & Technology

1989-08-16

Belgian Peace Delegation Visits, Holds Talks [AGERPRES 7 Aug] 7 LATIN AMERICA ARGENTINA Charges Filed in Missile Parts Sales to Argentina [ A ...table global convention on chemical weapons, a Chinese diplomat said here today. Speaking at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament, Fan...Guoxiang, the Chinese ambassador for disarmament affairs, said the Chinese Government stands for a com- plete prohibition and destruction of chemical

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 712 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 1 Declarations, Advance Notifications, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 2 Supplement No. 2 to Part 712—Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 1 Declarations... following any calendar year in which more than 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1 chemicals were produced...

15 CFR 713.1 - Prohibition on exports and imports of Schedule 2 chemicals to and from States not Party to the CWC.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Schedule 2 chemicals to and from States not Party to the CWC. 713.1 Section 713.1 Commerce and Foreign Trade Regulations Relating to Commerce and Foreign Trade (Continued) BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS...

15 CFR 714.2 - Annual reporting requirements for exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of Schedule 3...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.2 Annual reporting requirements for exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of... exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of Schedule 3 chemicals. 714.2 Section 714.2 Commerce and...

15 CFR 712.6 - Advance notification and annual report of all exports and imports of Schedule 1 chemicals to, or...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.6 Advance notification and annual report of all exports and imports of... of all exports and imports of Schedule 1 chemicals to, or from, other States Parties. 712.6 Section...

With Speech as My Weapon: Emma Goldman and the First Amendment. A Unit of Study for Grades 8-12.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Falk, Candace; Cole, Stephen; Thomas, Sally

This supplementary teaching unit provides students with the opportunity to explore freedom of expression by focusing on Emma Goldman (1869-1940), a major figure in the history of American radicalism and feminism. In a period when the expression of controversial ideas was dangerous, Goldman insisted on her right to challenge conventions. She…

15 CFR 712.1 - Round to zero rule that applies to activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Round to zero rule that applies to... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.1 Round to zero.... 1 to this part) as unavoidable by-products or impurities may round to zero and are not subject to...

15 CFR 712.1 - Round to zero rule that applies to activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Round to zero rule that applies to... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.1 Round to zero.... 1 to this part) as unavoidable by-products or impurities may round to zero and are not subject to...

15 CFR 712.1 - Round to zero rule that applies to activities involving Schedule 1 chemicals.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Round to zero rule that applies to... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.1 Round to zero.... 1 to this part) as unavoidable by-products or impurities may round to zero and are not subject to...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 714 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 3 Declarations, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... year in which exports or imports of a Schedule 3 chemical by a plant site, trading company, or other... chemical and the export or import of the same or a different Schedule 3 chemical by a declared plant site... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 2...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 714 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 3 Declarations, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... year in which exports or imports of a Schedule 3 chemical by a plant site, trading company, or other... chemical and the export or import of the same or a different Schedule 3 chemical by a declared plant site... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 2...

15 CFR 712.6 - Advance notification and annual report of all exports and imports of Schedule 1 chemicals to, or...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS § 712.6 Advance notification and annual report of all exports and imports of... of all exports and imports of Schedule 1 chemicals to, or from, other States Parties. 712.6 Section...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 714 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 3 Declarations, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS Pt. 714, Supp. 2... Schedule 3 chemical exceeded the declaration threshold in § 714.1(a)(1)(i) of the CWCR. Annual Report on... year in which exports or imports of a Schedule 3 chemical by a plant site, trading company, or other...

15 CFR Supplement No. 2 to Part 712 - Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 1 Declarations, Advance Notifications, Reports, and Amendments

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 1 CHEMICALS Pt. 712, Supp. 2 Supplement no. 2 to Part 712—Deadlines for Submission of Schedule 1 Declarations... following any calendar year in which more than 100 grams aggregate of Schedule 1 chemicals were produced...

15 CFR 714.2 - Annual reporting requirements for exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of Schedule 3...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REGULATIONS ACTIVITIES INVOLVING SCHEDULE 3 CHEMICALS § 714.2 Annual reporting requirements for exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of... exports and imports in excess of 30 metric tons of Schedule 3 chemicals. 714.2 Section 714.2 Commerce and...

A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century

DTIC Science & Technology

2004-10-12

defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.17 A survey of these mission sets aligns easily with functions of...and descriptions present a survey of conventional small arms often used by terrorists. Intelligence summaries provide the basis for this sampling...of hand or shoulder fired weapons. E: Improvised Explosive Devices. Illustrations, photographs, and descriptions present a survey of explosive

Extraction and derivatization of chemical weapons convention relevant aminoalcohols on magnetic cation-exchange resins.

PubMed

Singh, Varoon; Garg, Prabhat; Chinthakindi, Sridhar; Tak, Vijay; Dubey, Devendra Kumar

2014-02-14

Analysis and identification of nitrogen containing aminoalcohols is an integral part of the verification analysis of chemical weapons convention (CWC). This study was aimed to develop extraction and derivatization of aminoalcohols of CWC relevance by using magnetic dispersive solid-phase extraction (MDSPE) in combination with on-resin derivatization (ORD). For this purpose, sulfonated magnetic cation-exchange resins (SMRs) were prepared using magnetite nanoparticles as core, styrene and divinylbenzene as polymer coat and sulfonic acid as acidic cation exchanger. SMRs were successfully employed as extractant for targeted basic analytes. Adsorbed analytes were derivatized with hexamethyldisilazane (HMDS) on the surface of extractant. Derivatized (silylated) compounds were analyzed by GC-MS in SIM and full scan mode. The linearity of the method ranged from 5 to 200ngmL(-1). The LOD and LOQ ranged from 2 to 6ngmL(-1) and 5 to 19ngmL(-1) respectively. The relative standard deviation for intra-day repeatability and inter-day intermediate precision ranged from 5.1% to 6.6% and 0.2% to 7.6% respectively. Recoveries of analytes from spiked water samples from different sources varied from 28.4% to 89.3%. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Strategic forum. Number 70. Regional deterrence strategies for new proliferation threats

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kahan, J.H.

1996-04-01

The deterrence of armed aggression against the United States, its vital national interests, or its allies has moved beyond the requirements of conventional force deterrence. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons requires a new strategy to ensure effective deterrence against their use by regional states that could not win in a conventional conflict with the United States. Because proliferation has expanded to a number of regional actors, a single strategy is unlikely to be sufficient in deterring states with varied motivations, and social, economic, religious, cultural, and political backgrounds. The Unified Commands-principally the Pacific, Central and Europeanmore » Commands- provide a ready-made framework in which general U.S. deterrence strategies can be tailored to each proliferant state While the Unified Commands would shape the individual deterrence strategies, the national command authority (NCA) would retain control of key decisions. Guidelines for NBC regional deterrence should include developing credible counterproliferation postures, profiling potential adversaries, tailoring our military capabilities to specific threats, integrating NBC preparedness into exercises and warplans, and actively pursuing coalitions designed to deter regional proliferators from threatening to use or using NBC weapons.« less

Annual Report 2004

DTIC Science & Technology

2005-01-01

information for planning and management. MG-109-AF, Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons, Bernard Fox, Michael Boito...Experience fom Prince Sultan Air Base and Eskan Village in Saudi Arabia, Laura Werber Castaneda, Lawrence M. Hanser, and Constance H. Davis 28 RAND...India, C. Christine Fair ANNUAL REPORT 2004 47 Publications MG-109-AF, Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons, Bernard Fox

Preface: Chemical Forensics

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Fraga, Carlos G.

This virtual special issue is devoted to chemical forensics, a developing scientific discipline that aims to provide information to support the attribution of a chemical (or mixture) of interest to its source. This process is carried out through the analysis of the chemical itself or associated material constituents to address investigative, legal or intelligence questions. “Source” refers to how, where and when a chemical was handled or produced. Source information is critical in investigations of incidents of chemicals used for illicit or nefarious purposes, especially when toxic chemicals are used as weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international disarmamentmore » treaty that entered into force in 1997, prohibits the use of chemicals as weapons. This treaty has 192 States Parties (the countries who have joined the treaty) encompassing more than 98% of the global population and landmass, yet chemical attacks have continued to increase since this treaty was opened for signature to the governments of the world in 1993. The first notorious use of a chemical weapon since 1993 was by the Aum Shinrikyo cult whose sarin attack on the Tokyo subway system in March 1995 killed 13 and drove another 6,000 to seek medical treatment. More recently, over 160 alleged chemical attacks have been reported in Syria and Iraq with both governments and terrorist groups being accused, and casualties numbering in the thousands. Additionally, recent high profile nerve agent poisoning of dissidents from North Korea and Russia illustrate a willingness to use chemical threat agents (CTAs) with impunity. Given the threat posed by those that choose to use CTAs as weapons, there is a dire need for advancements in chemical forensics that can be used in investigations and inquiries to help find and hold to account, the perpetrators of chemical attacks.« less