The coevolution of recognition and social behavior.

PubMed

Smead, Rory; Forber, Patrick

2016-05-26

Recognition of behavioral types can facilitate the evolution of cooperation by enabling altruistic behavior to be directed at other cooperators and withheld from defectors. While much is known about the tendency for recognition to promote cooperation, relatively little is known about whether such a capacity can coevolve with the social behavior it supports. Here we use evolutionary game theory and multi-population dynamics to model the coevolution of social behavior and recognition. We show that conditional harming behavior enables the evolution and stability of social recognition, whereas conditional helping leads to a deterioration of recognition ability. Expanding the model to include a complex game where both helping and harming interactions are possible, we find that conditional harming behavior can stabilize recognition, and thereby lead to the evolution of conditional helping. Our model identifies a novel hypothesis for the evolution of cooperation: conditional harm may have coevolved with recognition first, thereby helping to establish the mechanisms necessary for the evolution of cooperation.

The coevolution of recognition and social behavior

PubMed Central

Smead, Rory; Forber, Patrick

2016-01-01

Recognition of behavioral types can facilitate the evolution of cooperation by enabling altruistic behavior to be directed at other cooperators and withheld from defectors. While much is known about the tendency for recognition to promote cooperation, relatively little is known about whether such a capacity can coevolve with the social behavior it supports. Here we use evolutionary game theory and multi-population dynamics to model the coevolution of social behavior and recognition. We show that conditional harming behavior enables the evolution and stability of social recognition, whereas conditional helping leads to a deterioration of recognition ability. Expanding the model to include a complex game where both helping and harming interactions are possible, we find that conditional harming behavior can stabilize recognition, and thereby lead to the evolution of conditional helping. Our model identifies a novel hypothesis for the evolution of cooperation: conditional harm may have coevolved with recognition first, thereby helping to establish the mechanisms necessary for the evolution of cooperation. PMID:27225673

Behavior of Collective Cooperation Yielded by Two Update Rules in Social Dilemmas: Combining Fermi and Moran Rules

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xia, Cheng-Yi; Wang, Lei; Wang, Juan; Wang, Jin-Song

2012-09-01

We combine the Fermi and Moran update rules in the spatial prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games to investigate the behavior of collective cooperation among agents on the regular lattice. Large-scale simulations indicate that, compared to the model with only one update rule, the cooperation behavior exhibits the richer phenomena, and the role of update dynamics should be paid more attention in the evolutionary game theory. Meanwhile, we also observe that the introduction of Moran rule, which needs to consider all neighbor's information, can markedly promote the aggregate cooperation level, that is, randomly selecting the neighbor proportional to its payoff to imitate will facilitate the cooperation among agents. Current results will contribute to further understand the cooperation dynamics and evolutionary behaviors within many biological, economic and social systems.

The infamous among us: Enhanced reputational memory for uncooperative ingroup members.

PubMed

Hechler, Stefanie; Neyer, Franz J; Kessler, Thomas

2016-12-01

People remember uncooperative individuals better than cooperative ones. We hypothesize that this is particularly true when uncooperative individuals belong to one's ingroup, as their behavior violates positive expectations. Two studies examined the effect of minimal group categorization on reputational memory of the social behavior of particular ingroup and outgroup members. We manipulated uncooperative behavior as the unfair sharing of resources with ingroup members (Study 1), or as descriptions of cheating (Study 2). Participants evaluated several uncooperative and cooperative (and neutral) ingroup and outgroup members. In a surprise memory test, they had to recognize target faces and recall their behavior. We disentangled face recognition, reputational memory, and guessing biases with multinomial models of source monitoring. The results show enhanced reputational memory for uncooperative ingroup members, but not uncooperative outgroup members. In contrast, guessing behavior indicated that participants assumed more ingroup cooperation than outgroup cooperation. Our findings integrate prior research on memory for uncooperative person behavior and person memory in group contexts. We suggest that the ability to remember the uncooperative amidst the supposedly cooperative ingroup could stabilize intragroup cooperation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Does Group Size Matter for Behavior in Online Trust Dilemmas?

PubMed

Artinger, Sabrina; Vulkan, Nir

2016-01-01

How does group size influence behavior in online trust dilemmas? We investigate cooperation in groups of 4 to 100 players. While overall levels of cooperation are stable across group sizes, we find significant gender differences: women increase cooperation with group size and cooperate significantly more than men in large groups. These results are robust when controlling for risk aversion, age, and other individual differences. They highlight the importance of studying behavior and gender differences in large groups.

A Pilot Study of Cooperative Programming Learning Behavior and Its Relationship with Students' Learning Performance

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hwang, Wu-Yuin; Shadiev, Rustam; Wang, Chin-Yu; Huang, Zhi-Hua

2012-01-01

In this study we proposed a web-based programming assisted system for cooperation (WPASC) and we also designed one learning activity for facilitating students' cooperative programming learning. The aim of this study was to investigate cooperative programming learning behavior of students and its relationship with learning performance. Students'…

Heuristics guide cooperative behaviors in public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Yongjie; Chen, Tong

2015-12-01

In public goods game (PGG), player's cooperative behavior is not pure economical rationality, but social preference and prosocial intuition play extremely important roles as well. Social preference and prosocial intuition can be guided by heuristics from one's neighbors in daily life. To better investigate the impacts of heuristics on the evolution of cooperation, four types of agents are introduced into our spatial PGG. Through numerical simulations, results show that the larger percentages of cooperators with independent thought, the easier emergence and maintenance of collective cooperative behaviors. Additionally, we find that differentia heuristic capability has great effect on the equilibrium of PGG. Cooperation can be obviously promoted, when heuristic capability of cooperators with independent thought is stronger than that of defectors with independent thought. Finally, we observe that cooperators with independent thought and defectors with independent thought are favorable for the formation of some high quality clusters, which can resist the invasion between each other. Our work may help us understand more clearly the mechanism of cooperation in real world.

[Behavior change from defection to cooperation in a social dilemma: a field study of attitude-behavior consistency in campus parking behavior by motorcyclists].

PubMed

Minoura, Y

1987-12-01

Behavior change by persuasive communications in a social dilemma, in which a university tried to persuade students to park their motorcycles in a designated lot in order to resolve noise problems, was studied by a questionnaire. Hayashi's quantification theory III was applied to variables such as subjective norms, beliefs in the effectiveness of one's cooperation, the perception of campus traffic conditions and attitudes toward one's parking behavior. Factor scores obtained were subjected to a cluster analysis, which, within 105 defectors, yielded three subgroups. Contrary to prediction, subgroups were not different in their cooperation ratio examined 10 months later, but tended to be different in their readiness for acceptance of persuasion and in their intention to cooperate in a social dilemma other than parking. Two mechanisms underlying cooperation were revealed: internalization of prosocial norm, and compliance in which cooperation was unaccompanied by correspondent changes in normative beliefs. The Fishbein model was applicable only to change through internalization. A linear assumption in the Fishbein model between evaluative attitude and behavior should be reexamined in its application to a social dilemma.

Sex differences in neural and behavioral signatures of cooperation revealed by fNIRS hyperscanning

PubMed Central

Baker, Joseph M.; Liu, Ning; Cui, Xu; Vrticka, Pascal; Saggar, Manish; Hosseini, S. M. Hadi; Reiss, Allan L.

2016-01-01

Researchers from multiple fields have sought to understand how sex moderates human social behavior. While over 50 years of research has revealed differences in cooperation behavior of males and females, the underlying neural correlates of these sex differences have not been explained. A missing and fundamental element of this puzzle is an understanding of how the sex composition of an interacting dyad influences the brain and behavior during cooperation. Using fNIRS-based hyperscanning in 111 same- and mixed-sex dyads, we identified significant behavioral and neural sex-related differences in association with a computer-based cooperation task. Dyads containing at least one male demonstrated significantly higher behavioral performance than female/female dyads. Individual males and females showed significant activation in the right frontopolar and right inferior prefrontal cortices, although this activation was greater in females compared to males. Female/female dyad’s exhibited significant inter-brain coherence within the right temporal cortex, while significant coherence in male/male dyads occurred in the right inferior prefrontal cortex. Significant coherence was not observed in mixed-sex dyads. Finally, for same-sex dyads only, task-related inter-brain coherence was positively correlated with cooperation task performance. Our results highlight multiple important and previously undetected influences of sex on concurrent neural and behavioral signatures of cooperation. PMID:27270754

The Pizzagame: A virtual public goods game to assess cooperative behavior in children and adolescents.

PubMed

Keil, Jan; Michel, Andrea; Sticca, Fabio; Leipold, Kristina; Klein, Annette M; Sierau, Susan; von Klitzing, Kai; White, Lars O

2017-08-01

Social dilemmas are characterized by conflicts between immediate self-interest and long-term collective goals. Although such conflicts lie at the heart of various challenging social interactions, we know little about how cooperation in these situations develops. To extend work on social dilemmas to child and adolescent samples, we developed an age-appropriate computer task (the Pizzagame) with the structural features of a public goods game (PGG). We administered the Pizzagame to a sample of 191 children 9 to 16 years of age. Subjects were led to believe they were playing the game over the Internet with three sets of two same-aged, same-sex co-players. In fact, the co-players were computer-generated and programmed to expose children to three consecutive conditions: (1) a cooperative strategy, (2) a selfish strategy, and (3) divergent cooperative-selfish strategies. Supporting the validity of the Pizzagame, our results revealed that children and adolescents displayed conditional cooperation, such that their contributions rose with the increasing cooperativeness of their co-players. Age and gender did not influence children and adolescents' cooperative behavior within each condition. However, older children adapted their behavior more flexibly between conditions to parallel the strategies of their co-players. These results support the utility of the Pizzagame as a feasible, reliable, and valid instrument for assessing and quantifying child and adolescent cooperative behavior. Moreover, these findings extend previous work showing that age influences cooperative behavior in the PGG.

Evolutionary Establishment of Moral and Double Moral Standards through Spatial Interactions

PubMed Central

Helbing, Dirk; Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž; Szabó, György

2010-01-01

Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals (“defectors”), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called “cooperators” or “second-order free-riders”), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior (“moralists”), and defectors, who punish other defectors despite being non-cooperative themselves (“immoralists”). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the “second-order free-rider problem”. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times (“who laughs last laughs best effect”). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an “unholy collaboration”. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of “moral behavior” by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies. PMID:20454464

Separating conditional and unconditional cooperation in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game

PubMed Central

Mieth, Laura; Buchner, Axel

2017-01-01

Most theories of social exchange distinguish between two different types of cooperation, depending on whether or not cooperation occurs conditional upon the partner’s previous behaviors. Here, we used a multinomial processing tree model to distinguish between positive and negative reciprocity and cooperation bias in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In Experiments 1 and 2, the facial expressions of the partners were varied to manipulate cooperation bias. In Experiment 3, an extinction instruction was used to manipulate reciprocity. The results confirm that people show a stronger cooperation bias when interacting with smiling compared to angry-looking partners, supporting the notion that a smiling facial expression in comparison to an angry facial expression helps to construe a situation as cooperative rather than competitive. Reciprocity was enhanced for appearance-incongruent behaviors, but only when participants were encouraged to form expectations about the partners’ future behaviors. Negative reciprocity was not stronger than positive reciprocity, regardless of whether expectations were manipulated or not. Experiment 3 suggests that people are able to ignore previous episodes of cheating as well as previous episodes of cooperation if these turn out to be irrelevant for predicting a partner’s future behavior. The results provide important insights into the mechanisms of social cooperation. PMID:29121671

The effect of wealth-based anti-expectation behaviors on public cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Le; Chen, Tong; You, Xinshang; Wang, Yongjie

2018-03-01

Wealth difference is a common sense in our society. It is unreasonable to assume people have the same capability to donate money to the common pool in public goods game (PGG). Individuals have behavioral expectation towards their neighbors. In this paper, we introduce wealth-based anti-expectation mechanism to explore cooperation. Through numerical simulation results, we are glad to find that the anti-expectation mechanism could stimulate cooperation when the positive effects are equal to or larger than the negative effects from anti-expectation behaviors. Based on this mechanism, we propose propagation mechanism which aims to propagate the positive effects from the poor to inspire more people to choose cooperative strategies. When individuals are tolerant towards defectors, The fraction of cooperators increases with the increment of propagation distance. Enlarging the distance is not wise when individuals are harsh towards defectors. Additionally, we find that the more tolerant towards defectors we are, the higher the cooperation rate is in general. Therefore in PGG, we could consider one's anti-expectation towards others' behaviors and improve cooperation by propagating the poor's anti-expectation effects.

The virtual cooperation platform in enterprise and supplier cooperation models.

PubMed

Chang, Che-Wei; Wu, Cheng-Ru; Liao, Chia-Chun

2010-08-01

Abstract This study examines the use of the virtual enterprise network supplier supply-chain model of business behavior in creating synergies of cooperation. To explore virtual network behavior, it evaluates 60 samples, taken from of a few supply chains, and 17 items meeting certain behavioral criteria. Such an analysis may help to reduce costs and processing time effectively, as well as promote effective communication. Furthermore, the study of behavior in this electronic setting is a reliable and useful assessment method.

Cooperative Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner's Dilemma Depends on Players' Contributions.

PubMed

Bland, Amy R; Roiser, Jonathan P; Mehta, Mitul A; Schei, Thea; Sahakian, Barbara J; Robbins, Trevor W; Elliott, Rebecca

2017-01-01

Economic games such as the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) are widely used paradigms for studying fairness and cooperation. Monetary versions of these games involve two players splitting an arbitrary sum of money. In real life, however, people's propensity to engage in cooperative behavior depends on their effort and contribution; factors that are well known to affect perceptions of fairness. We therefore sought to explore the impact of relative monetary contributions by players in the UG and PD. Adapted computerized UG and PD games, in which relative contributions from each player were manipulated, were administered to 200 participants aged 18-50 years old (50% female). We found that players' contribution had large effects on cooperative behavior. Specifically, cooperation was greater amongst participants when their opponent had contributed more to joint earnings. This was manifested as higher acceptance rates and higher offers in the UG; and fewer defects in the PD compared to when the participant contributed more. Interestingly, equal contributions elicited the greatest sensitivity to fairness in the UG, and least frequent defection in the PD. Acceptance rates correlated positively with anxiety and sex differences were found in defection behavior. This study highlights the feasibility of computerized games to assess cooperative behavior and the importance of considering cooperation within the context of effortful contribution.

Single-exponential activation behavior behind the super-Arrhenius relaxations in glass-forming liquids.

PubMed

Wang, Lianwen; Li, Jiangong; Fecht, Hans-Jörg

2010-11-17

The reported relaxation time for several typical glass-forming liquids was analyzed by using a kinetic model for liquids which invoked a new kind of atomic cooperativity--thermodynamic cooperativity. The broadly studied 'cooperative length' was recognized as the kinetic cooperativity. Both cooperativities were conveniently quantified from the measured relaxation data. A single-exponential activation behavior was uncovered behind the super-Arrhenius relaxations for the liquids investigated. Hence the mesostructure of these liquids and the atomic mechanism of the glass transition became clearer.

Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.

PubMed

Ito, Hiromu; Yoshimura, Jin

2015-08-04

Why cooperation is well developed in human society is an unsolved question in biological and human sciences. Vast studies in game theory have revealed that in non-cooperative games selfish behavior generally dominates over cooperation and cooperation can be evolved only under very limited conditions. These studies ask the origin of cooperation; whether cooperation can evolve in a group of selfish individuals. In this paper, instead of asking the origin of cooperation, we consider the enhancement of cooperation in a small already cooperative society. We ask whether cooperative behavior is further promoted in a small cooperative society in which social penalty is devised. We analyze hawk-dove game and prisoner's dilemma introducing social penalty. We then expand it for non-cooperative games in general. The results indicate that cooperation is universally favored if penalty is further imposed. We discuss the current result in terms of the moral, laws, rules and regulations in a society, e.g., criminology and traffic violation.

Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society

PubMed Central

Ito, Hiromu; Yoshimura, Jin

2015-01-01

Why cooperation is well developed in human society is an unsolved question in biological and human sciences. Vast studies in game theory have revealed that in non-cooperative games selfish behavior generally dominates over cooperation and cooperation can be evolved only under very limited conditions. These studies ask the origin of cooperation; whether cooperation can evolve in a group of selfish individuals. In this paper, instead of asking the origin of cooperation, we consider the enhancement of cooperation in a small already cooperative society. We ask whether cooperative behavior is further promoted in a small cooperative society in which social penalty is devised. We analyze hawk-dove game and prisoner’s dilemma introducing social penalty. We then expand it for non-cooperative games in general. The results indicate that cooperation is universally favored if penalty is further imposed. We discuss the current result in terms of the moral, laws, rules and regulations in a society, e.g., criminology and traffic violation. PMID:26238521

Mediating effect of cooperative norm in predicting organizational citizenship behaviors from procedural justice climate.

PubMed

Lin, Shang-Ping; Tang, Ta-Wei; Li, Chao-Hua; Wu, Chien-Ming; Lin, Hsiu-Hsia

2007-08-01

Although the relationships between procedural justice climate and organizational citizenship behaviors have been examined in recent years, little research has explored the mechanism by which procedural justice climate shapes individual employee prosocial behaviors in the workplace. The purpose of this study was to examine the mediating role of a group-level cooperative norm on the relationships between the group-level procedural justice climate and individual-level organizational citizenship behaviors. The survey involved 45 work groups in four different industry fields in Taiwan, including manufacturing, technology, banking, and insurance, and each of the groups was composed of one supervisor and three subordinates. Cross-level analyses using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) indicated that the cooperative norm fully mediated the relationship between procedural justice climate and individual helping behaviors. Procedural justice climate indirectly affects individual helping behaviors through their effects on the cooperative norm.

Spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game with multiple interactive dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Su, Qi; Li, Aming; Wang, Long

2017-02-01

Spatial reciprocity is generally regarded as a positive rule facilitating the evolution of cooperation. However, a few recent studies show that, in the snowdrift game, spatial structure still could be detrimental to cooperation. Here we propose a model of multiple interactive dynamics, where each individual can cooperate and defect simultaneously against different neighbors. We realize individuals' multiple interactions simply by endowing them with strategies relevant to probabilities, and every one decides to cooperate or defect with a probability. With multiple interactive dynamics, the cooperation level in square lattices is higher than that in the well-mixed case for a wide range of cost-to-benefit ratio r, implying that spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game. Moreover, in square lattices, the most favorable strategy follows a simple relation of r, which confers theoretically the average evolutionary frequency of cooperative behavior. We further extend our study to various homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, which demonstrates the robustness of our results. Here multiple interactive dynamics stabilizes the positive role of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation and individuals' distinct reactions to different neighbors can be a new line in understanding the emergence of cooperation.

Sibling cooperative and externalizing behaviors in families raising children with disabilities.

PubMed

Platt, Christine; Roper, Susanne Olsen; Mandleco, Barbara; Freeborn, Donna

2014-01-01

Raising a child with a disability (CWD) in the home is increasing across the globe. Because of caregiver burden and the complexity of care, there is growing concern for typically developing sibling (TDS) outcomes. The aim of the study was to examine whether caregiver burden, parenting style, and sibling relationships in families raising a CWD are associated with cooperative and externalizing behaviors in TDS. This correlational study included 189 families raising both a CWD and a TDS. Multilevel modeling was used to identify which variables were most predictive of TDS outcomes and if there were parent gender effects. Authoritative parenting was positively associated with cooperative behaviors. Authoritarian parenting was positively associated with externalizing behaviors. Multilevel modeling revealed caregiver burden was a significant predictor of sibling behaviors in the first model. When parenting style was added as a predictor, it was also significant. When sibling relationships were added as predictors, they were significant predictors for both cooperative and externalizing TDS behaviors; however, caregiver burden was no longer significant. Authoritarian parenting significantly predicted externalizing behaviors, and authoritative parenting was significantly related to cooperative behaviors. In families raising a CWD, positive sibling relationships may help negate the effects of caregiver burden and are more predictive of TDS outcomes than some parenting practices.

Factors Affecting Co-Operative vs. Competitive Behavior in Dyads.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

O'Day, Gerald; Phelan, Joseph G.

Theoretical interpretations of cooperation and competition are discussed in relation to motivational and situational determinants. It is suggested that the degree of competition exhibited in an interaction is an inverse function of the quantity of resources available, and that the effect of situational characteristics on cooperative behavior is…

Explaining Helping Behavior in a Cooperative Learning Classroom Setting Using Attribution Theory

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ahles, Paula M.; Contento, Jann M.

2006-01-01

This recently completed study examined whether attribution theory can explain helping behavior in an interdependent classroom environment that utilized a cooperative-learning model. The study focused on student participants enrolled in 6 community college communication classes taught by the same instructor. Three levels of cooperative-learning…

Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation.

PubMed

Lergetporer, Philipp; Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias

2014-05-13

The human ability to establish cooperation, even in large groups of genetically unrelated strangers, depends upon the enforcement of cooperation norms. Third-party punishment is one important factor to explain high levels of cooperation among humans, although it is still somewhat disputed whether other animal species also use this mechanism for promoting cooperation. We study the effectiveness of third-party punishment to increase children's cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game. Based on an experiment with 1,120 children, aged 7 to 11 y, we find that the threat of third-party punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, despite the fact that children are rarely willing to execute costly punishment. We can show that the higher cooperation levels with third-party punishment are driven by two components. First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about the punishment behavior of third parties. Second, cooperation is a conditionally cooperative reaction to correct beliefs that third party punishment will increase a partner's level of cooperation.

Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness.

PubMed

Eshel, I; Cavalli-Sforza, L L

1982-02-01

The method of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), in its current form, is confronted with a difficulty when it tries to explain how some social behaviors initiate their evolution. We show that this difficulty may be removed by changing the assumption made tacitly in game theory (and in ESS) of randomness of meetings or encounters. In reality, such randomness seems to be rare in nature. Family, population and social structure, customs, and habits impose various types of deviation from randomness. Introducing nonrandomness of meeting in a way formally similar to assortative mating, we show that the bar to initial increase of inherited cooperative or altruistic behaviors can be removed, provided there is sufficient assortment of meetings. Family structure may cause contacts predominantly between certain types of relatives, and one can reconstruct some results of classical kin selection in terms of evolutionary stable strategy with assortative meetings. Neighbor effects and group selection might be similarly treated. Assortment need not be a passive consequence of population and social structure, but it can also be actively pursued. Behaviors favoring the choice of cooperative companions will have the effect of favoring the evolution of cooperativeness. It can be shown that discrimination in the choice of companions, especially if combined with assortment, can favor the development of cooperativeness, making initial increase of cooperative behavior possible even at levels of assortment passively imposed which would not be adequate, per se, to guarantee the increase of cooperativeness. It is possible that, in some cases, cooperativeness and behavior favoring some type of assortment are coselected.

Small groups and long memories promote cooperation.

PubMed

Stewart, Alexander J; Plotkin, Joshua B

2016-06-01

Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists the question is often how group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, can emerge and persist in an evolving system. Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. We construct a coordinate system for memory-m strategies in iterated n-player games that permits us to characterize all cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that, especially when groups are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. We also explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory. We find that even when memory has a cost, longer-memory strategies often evolve, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation, even when the benefits for cooperation are low.

The evolution of cooperation by the Hankshaw effect.

PubMed

Hammarlund, Sarah P; Connelly, Brian D; Dickinson, Katherine J; Kerr, Benjamin

2016-06-01

The evolution of cooperation-costly behavior that benefits others-faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the benefits, but evade the cost of cooperation. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperation becomes linked to a beneficial mutation, allowing cooperation to rise in abundance. Here, we explore hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more mutational opportunities than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the "Hankshaw effect" after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent-based model, we reveal a broad set of conditions that allow the evolution of cooperation through this effect. Additionally, we show that spite, a costly behavior that harms others, can evolve by the Hankshaw effect. While in an unchanging environment these costly social behaviors have transient success, in a dynamic environment, cooperation and spite can persist indefinitely. © 2016 The Author(s). Evolution © 2016 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

Spontaneous cooperation for prosocials, but not for proselfs: Social value orientation moderates spontaneous cooperation behavior

PubMed Central

Mischkowski, Dorothee; Glöckner, Andreas

2016-01-01

Cooperation is essential for the success of societies and there is an ongoing debate whether individuals have therefore developed a general spontaneous tendency to cooperate or not. Findings that cooperative behavior is related to shorter decision times provide support for the spontaneous cooperation effect, although contrary results have also been reported. We show that cooperative behavior is better described as person × situation interaction, in that there is a spontaneous cooperation effect for prosocial but not for proself persons. In three studies, one involving population representative samples from the US and Germany, we found that cooperation in a public good game is dependent on an interaction between individuals’ social value orientation and decision time. Increasing deliberation about the dilemma situation does not affect persons that are selfish to begin with, but it is related to decreasing cooperation for prosocial persons that gain positive utility from outcomes of others and score high on the related general personality trait honesty/humility. Our results demonstrate that the spontaneous cooperation hypothesis has to be qualified in that it is limited to persons with a specific personality and social values. Furthermore, they allow reconciling conflicting previous findings by identifying an important moderator for the effect. PMID:26876773

Cooperative Behavior in the Ultimatum Game and Prisoner’s Dilemma Depends on Players’ Contributions

PubMed Central

Bland, Amy R.; Roiser, Jonathan P.; Mehta, Mitul A.; Schei, Thea; Sahakian, Barbara J.; Robbins, Trevor W.; Elliott, Rebecca

2017-01-01

Economic games such as the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) are widely used paradigms for studying fairness and cooperation. Monetary versions of these games involve two players splitting an arbitrary sum of money. In real life, however, people’s propensity to engage in cooperative behavior depends on their effort and contribution; factors that are well known to affect perceptions of fairness. We therefore sought to explore the impact of relative monetary contributions by players in the UG and PD. Adapted computerized UG and PD games, in which relative contributions from each player were manipulated, were administered to 200 participants aged 18–50 years old (50% female). We found that players’ contribution had large effects on cooperative behavior. Specifically, cooperation was greater amongst participants when their opponent had contributed more to joint earnings. This was manifested as higher acceptance rates and higher offers in the UG; and fewer defects in the PD compared to when the participant contributed more. Interestingly, equal contributions elicited the greatest sensitivity to fairness in the UG, and least frequent defection in the PD. Acceptance rates correlated positively with anxiety and sex differences were found in defection behavior. This study highlights the feasibility of computerized games to assess cooperative behavior and the importance of considering cooperation within the context of effortful contribution. PMID:28670295

The Effect of N-Length on the Development of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Behavior in a Two-Person Game. Part of the Final Report on Head Start Evaluation and Research: 1968-69 to the Office of Economic Opportunity.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Manning, Brad A.; Pierce-Jones, John

In this study of cooperative behavior and its antecedents, the main experimental tool was a two-person, two-choice game. The subjects, 80 Negro males ranging in age from 4 1/2 to 6 years, could choose either to cooperate by giving a piece of candy or not to cooperate by refusing to give a piece of candy to the other child during an acquisition…

The Relationship Between Empathic Dentist Behavior and Children's Cooperation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Stave, Jonathan A.

1983-01-01

A study confirmed the dual hypotheses that the more empathic behavior a dental student showed, the greater the cooperation of children patients, and the more often the patients' verbal behavior is dentist-directed rather than self-directed. It is suggested that training in more socially sensitive behavior would enhance patient care. (MSE)

Emotional Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in Spatial Social Dilemmas.

PubMed

Yu, Chao; Zhang, Minjie; Ren, Fenghui; Tan, Guozhen

2015-12-01

Social dilemmas have attracted extensive interest in the research of multiagent systems in order to study the emergence of cooperative behaviors among selfish agents. Understanding how agents can achieve cooperation in social dilemmas through learning from local experience is a critical problem that has motivated researchers for decades. This paper investigates the possibility of exploiting emotions in agent learning in order to facilitate the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. In particular, the spatial version of social dilemmas is considered to study the impact of local interactions on the emergence of cooperation in the whole system. A double-layered emotional multiagent reinforcement learning framework is proposed to endow agents with internal cognitive and emotional capabilities that can drive these agents to learn cooperative behaviors. Experimental results reveal that various network topologies and agent heterogeneities have significant impacts on agent learning behaviors in the proposed framework, and under certain circumstances, high levels of cooperation can be achieved among the agents.

A Cooperative Training Program for Students with Severe Behavior Problems: Description and Comparative Evaluation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Reganick, Karol A.

The Cooperative Training Program was implemented with 20 students having severe behavior problems, to augment a classroom employability curriculum. Educators and business managers at a local Perkins restaurant worked cooperatively to design a new curriculum and recruitment procedure to benefit both students and the business. A continuous and…

Learning to Cooperate: The Evolution of Social Rewards in Repeated Interactions.

PubMed

Dridi, Slimane; Akçay, Erol

2018-01-01

Understanding the behavioral and psychological mechanisms underlying social behaviors is one of the major goals of social evolutionary theory. In particular, a persistent question about animal cooperation is to what extent it is supported by other-regarding preferences-the motivation to increase the welfare of others. In many situations, animals adjust their behaviors through learning by responding to the rewards they experience as a consequence of their actions. Therefore, we may ask whether learning in social situations can be driven by evolved other-regarding rewards. Here we develop a mathematical model in order to ask whether the mere act of cooperating with a social partner will evolve to be inherently rewarding. Individuals interact repeatedly in pairs and adjust their behaviors through reinforcement learning. We assume that individuals associate with each game outcome an internal reward value. These perceived rewards are genetically evolving traits. We find that conditionally cooperative rewards that value mutual cooperation positively but the sucker's outcome negatively tend to be evolutionarily stable. Purely other-regarding rewards can evolve only under special parameter combinations. On the other hand, selfish rewards that always lead to pure defection are also evolutionarily successful. These findings are consistent with empirical observations showing that humans tend to display conditionally cooperative behavior and also exhibit a diversity of preferences. Our model also demonstrates the need to further integrate multiple levels of biological causation of behavior.

The maintenance of cooperation in multiplex networks with limited and partible resources of agents

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Zhaofeng; Shen, Bi; Jiang, Yichuan

2017-02-01

In this paper, we try to explain the maintenance of cooperation in multiplex networks with limited and partible resources of agents: defection brings larger short-term benefit and cooperative agents may become defective because of the unaffordable costs of cooperative behaviors that are performed in multiple layers simultaneously. Recent studies have identified the positive effects of multiple layers on evolutionary cooperation but generally overlook the maximum costs of agents in these synchronous games. By utilizing network effects and designing evolutionary mechanisms, cooperative behaviors become prevailing in public goods games, and agents can allocate personal resources across multiple layers. First, we generalize degree diversity into multiplex networks to improve the prospect for cooperation. Second, to prevent agents allocating all the resources into one layer, a greedy-first mechanism is proposed, in which agents prefer to add additional investments in the higher-payoff layer. It is found that greedy-first agents can perform cooperative behaviors in multiplex networks when one layer is scale-free network and degree differences between conjoint nodes increase. Our work may help to explain the emergence of cooperation in the absence of individual reputation and punishment mechanisms.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

PubMed

Kümmerli, Rolf; Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; Ross-Gillespie, Adin; West, Stuart A

2010-06-01

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

The Collective Benefits of Feeling Good and Letting Go: Positive Emotion and (dis)Inhibition Interact to Predict Cooperative Behavior

PubMed Central

Rand, David G.; Kraft-Todd, Gordon; Gruber, June

2015-01-01

Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process) and positive emotion (an intuitive process) in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218) or during (Study 2, N = 236) the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing) may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion. PMID:25625722

The collective benefits of feeling good and letting go: positive emotion and (dis)inhibition interact to predict cooperative behavior.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Kraft-Todd, Gordon; Gruber, June

2015-01-01

Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process) and positive emotion (an intuitive process) in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218) or during (Study 2, N = 236) the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing) may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion.

Reinforcement Learning Explains Conditional Cooperation and Its Moody Cousin.

PubMed

Ezaki, Takahiro; Horita, Yutaka; Takezawa, Masanori; Masuda, Naoki

2016-07-01

Direct reciprocity, or repeated interaction, is a main mechanism to sustain cooperation under social dilemmas involving two individuals. For larger groups and networks, which are probably more relevant to understanding and engineering our society, experiments employing repeated multiplayer social dilemma games have suggested that humans often show conditional cooperation behavior and its moody variant. Mechanisms underlying these behaviors largely remain unclear. Here we provide a proximate account for this behavior by showing that individuals adopting a type of reinforcement learning, called aspiration learning, phenomenologically behave as conditional cooperator. By definition, individuals are satisfied if and only if the obtained payoff is larger than a fixed aspiration level. They reinforce actions that have resulted in satisfactory outcomes and anti-reinforce those yielding unsatisfactory outcomes. The results obtained in the present study are general in that they explain extant experimental results obtained for both so-called moody and non-moody conditional cooperation, prisoner's dilemma and public goods games, and well-mixed groups and networks. Different from the previous theory, individuals are assumed to have no access to information about what other individuals are doing such that they cannot explicitly use conditional cooperation rules. In this sense, myopic aspiration learning in which the unconditional propensity of cooperation is modulated in every discrete time step explains conditional behavior of humans. Aspiration learners showing (moody) conditional cooperation obeyed a noisy GRIM-like strategy. This is different from the Pavlov, a reinforcement learning strategy promoting mutual cooperation in two-player situations.

Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior

PubMed Central

Efferson, Charles; Roca, Carlos P.; Vogt, Sonja; Helbing, Dirk

2016-01-01

For cooperation to evolve, some mechanism must limit the rate at which cooperators are exposed to defectors. Only then can the advantages of mutual cooperation outweigh the costs of being exploited. Although researchers widely agree on this, they disagree intensely about which evolutionary mechanisms can explain the extraordinary cooperation exhibited by humans. Much of the controversy follows from disagreements about the informational regularity that allows cooperators to avoid defectors. Reliable information can allow cooperative individuals to avoid exploitation, but which mechanisms can sustain such a situation is a matter of considerable dispute. We conducted a behavioral experiment to see if cooperators could avoid defectors when provided with limited amounts of explicit information. We gave each participant the simple option to move away from her current neighborhood at any time. Participants were not identifiable as individuals, and they could not track each other's tendency to behave more or less cooperatively. More broadly, a participant had no information about the behavior she was likely to encounter if she moved, and so information about the risk of exploitation was extremely limited. Nonetheless, our results show that simply providing the option to move allowed cooperation to persist for a long period of time. Our results further show that movement, even though it involved considerable uncertainty, allowed would-be cooperators to assort positively and eliminate on average any individual payoff disadvantage associated with cooperation. This suggests that choosing to move, even under limited information, can completely reorganize the mix of selective forces relevant for the evolution of cooperation. PMID:26766895

The Physical Layer Security Experiments of Cooperative Communication System with Different Relay Behaviors.

PubMed

Su, Yishan; Han, Guangyao; Fu, Xiaomei; Xu, Naishen; Jin, Zhigang

2017-04-06

Physical layer security is an attractive security mechanism, which exploits the randomness characteristics of wireless transmission channel to achieve security. However, it is hampered by the limitation of the channel condition that the main channel must be better than the eavesdropper channel. To alleviate the limitation, cooperative communication is introduced. Few studies have investigated the physical layer security of the relay transmission model. In this paper, we performed some experiments to evaluate the physical layer security of a cooperative communication system, with a relay operating in decode-and-forward (DF) cooperative mode, selfish and malicious behavior in real non-ideal transmission environment. Security performance is evaluated in terms of the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity. Experiments showed some different results compared to theoretical simulation: (1) to achieve the maximum secrecy capacity, the optimal relay power according to the experiments result is larger than that of ideal theoretical results under both cooperative and selfish behavior relay; (2) the relay in malicious behavior who forwards noise to deteriorate the main channel may deteriorate the eavesdropper channel more seriously than the main channel; (3) the optimal relay positions under cooperative and selfish behavior relay cases are both located near the destination because of non-ideal transmission.

Third-party punishment increases cooperation in children through (misaligned) expectations and conditional cooperation

PubMed Central

Lergetporer, Philipp; Angerer, Silvia; Glätzle-Rützler, Daniela; Sutter, Matthias

2014-01-01

The human ability to establish cooperation, even in large groups of genetically unrelated strangers, depends upon the enforcement of cooperation norms. Third-party punishment is one important factor to explain high levels of cooperation among humans, although it is still somewhat disputed whether other animal species also use this mechanism for promoting cooperation. We study the effectiveness of third-party punishment to increase children’s cooperative behavior in a large-scale cooperation game. Based on an experiment with 1,120 children, aged 7 to 11 y, we find that the threat of third-party punishment more than doubles cooperation rates, despite the fact that children are rarely willing to execute costly punishment. We can show that the higher cooperation levels with third-party punishment are driven by two components. First, cooperation is a rational (expected payoff-maximizing) response to incorrect beliefs about the punishment behavior of third parties. Second, cooperation is a conditionally cooperative reaction to correct beliefs that third party punishment will increase a partner’s level of cooperation. PMID:24778231

Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a small-world networked game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Long

2008-01-01

Based on learning theory, we adopt a stochastic learning updating rule to investigate the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on Newman-Watts small-world networks with different payoff aspiration levels. Interestingly, simulation results show that the mechanism of intermediate aspiration promoting cooperation resembles a resonancelike behavior, and there exists a ping-pong vibration of cooperation for large payoff aspiration. To explain the nontrivial dependence of the cooperation level on the aspiration level, we investigate the fractions of links, provide analytical results of the cooperation level, and find that the simulation results are in close agreement with analytical ones. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the aspiration level in society.

Behavioral economics: areas of cooperative research between economics and applied behavioral analysis1

PubMed Central

Kagel, John H.; Winkler, Robin C.

1972-01-01

The current research methods of behavioral economics are characterized by inadequate empirical foundations. Psychologists involved in the experimental analysis of behavior with their research strategies and their experimental technology, particularly that of the Token Economy, can assist in providing empirical foundations for behavioral economics. Cooperative research between economists and psychologists to this end should be immediately fruitful and mutually beneficial. PMID:16795356

The decline of cooperation, the rise of competition: developmental effects of long-term social change in Mexico.

PubMed

García, Camilo; Rivera, Natanael; Greenfield, Patricia M

2015-02-01

Using Greenfield's theory of sociocultural change and human development as a point of departure, we carried out two experimental studies exploring the implications of decades of globalised social change in Mexico for children's development of cooperation and competition. In rural San Vicente, Baja California, the baseline was 1970 and the historical comparison took place 40 years later. In Veracruz, the baseline was 1985 and the historical comparison took place 20 years later. In Veracruz, children were tested in both rural and urban settings. We hypothesized that cooperative behavior would decrease in all three settings as a result of the sociocultural transformations of the past decades in Mexico. The Madsen Marble Pull Game was used to assess cooperative and competitive behavior. As predicted by Greenfield's theory of social change and human development, the Marble Pull procedure revealed a striking decrease over time in levels of cooperative behavior, with a corresponding rise in competitive behavior, in all three settings. © 2015 International Union of Psychological Science.

Cooperation, Fast and Slow: Meta-Analytic Evidence for a Theory of Social Heuristics and Self-Interested Deliberation.

PubMed

Rand, David G

2016-09-01

Does cooperating require the inhibition of selfish urges? Or does "rational" self-interest constrain cooperative impulses? I investigated the role of intuition and deliberation in cooperation by meta-analyzing 67 studies in which cognitive-processing manipulations were applied to economic cooperation games (total N = 17,647; no indication of publication bias using Egger's test, Begg's test, or p-curve). My meta-analysis was guided by the social heuristics hypothesis, which proposes that intuition favors behavior that typically maximizes payoffs, whereas deliberation favors behavior that maximizes one's payoff in the current situation. Therefore, this theory predicts that deliberation will undermine pure cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where there are few future consequences for one's actions, such that cooperating is not in one's self-interest) but not strategic cooperation (i.e., cooperation in settings where cooperating can maximize one's payoff). As predicted, the meta-analysis revealed 17.3% more pure cooperation when intuition was promoted over deliberation, but no significant difference in strategic cooperation between more intuitive and more deliberative conditions. © The Author(s) 2016.

Monopolizing Sanctioning Power under Noise Eliminates Perverse Punishment But Does Not Increase Cooperation

PubMed Central

Fischer, Sven; Grechenig, Kristoffel; Meier, Nicolas

2016-01-01

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators (perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment behavior, and how contributions react. PMID:27746725

Vocal Emotion Expressions Effects on Cooperation Behavior

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Caballero Meneses, Jonathan Azael; Menez Díaz, Judith Marina

2017-01-01

Emotional expressions have been proposed to be important for regulating social interaction as they can serve as cues for behavioral intentions. The issue has been mainly addressed analyzing the effects of facial emotional expressions in cooperation behavior, but there are contradictory results regarding the impact of emotional expressions on that…

Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.

PubMed

Santos, F C; Pacheco, J M; Lenaerts, Tom

2006-02-28

Real populations have been shown to be heterogeneous, in which some individuals have many more contacts than others. This fact contrasts with the traditional homogeneous setting used in studies of evolutionary game dynamics. We incorporate heterogeneity in the population by studying games on graphs, in which the variability in connectivity ranges from single-scale graphs, for which heterogeneity is small and associated degree distributions exhibit a Gaussian tale, to scale-free graphs, for which heterogeneity is large with degree distributions exhibiting a power-law behavior. We study the evolution of cooperation, modeled in terms of the most popular dilemmas of cooperation. We show that, for all dilemmas, increasing heterogeneity favors the emergence of cooperation, such that long-term cooperative behavior easily resists short-term noncooperative behavior. Moreover, we show how cooperation depends on the intricate ties between individuals in scale-free populations.

Cooperative behavior and phase transitions in co-evolving stag hunt game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, W.; Li, Y. S.; Xu, C.; Hui, P. M.

2016-02-01

Cooperative behavior and different phases in a co-evolving network dynamics based on the stag hunt game is studied. The dynamical processes are parameterized by a payoff r that tends to promote non-cooperative behavior and a probability q for a rewiring attempt that could isolate the non-cooperators. The interplay between the parameters leads to different phases. Detailed simulations and a mean field theory are employed to reveal the properties of different phases. For small r, the cooperators are the majority and form a connected cluster while the non-cooperators increase with q but remain isolated over the whole range of q, and it is a static phase. For sufficiently large r, cooperators disappear in an intermediate range qL ≤ q ≤qU and a dynamical all-non-cooperators phase results. For q >qU, a static phase results again. A mean field theory based on how the link densities change in time by the co-evolving dynamics is constructed. The theory gives a phase diagram in the q- r parameter space that is qualitatively in agreement with simulation results. The sources of discrepancies between theory and simulations are discussed.

Effects of Cooperative Learning on Learning Achievement and Group Working Behavior of Junior Students in Modern French Literature Course

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Orprayoon, Soudaya

2014-01-01

This study reported on the results of a quasi-experimental research to explore the effectiveness of using a cooperative learning method on students' academic achievement, their group working behavior and their perception and opinions towards cooperative learning in a Modern French Literature course. The sample included twelve junior students…

Vasopressin increases human risky cooperative behavior

PubMed Central

Brunnlieb, Claudia; Nave, Gideon; Camerer, Colin F.; Schosser, Stephan; Vogt, Bodo; Münte, Thomas F.; Heldmann, Marcus

2016-01-01

The history of humankind is an epic of cooperation, which is ubiquitous across societies and increasing in scale. Much human cooperation occurs where it is risky to cooperate for mutual benefit because successful cooperation depends on a sufficient level of cooperation by others. Here we show that arginine vasopressin (AVP), a neuropeptide that mediates complex mammalian social behaviors such as pair bonding, social recognition and aggression causally increases humans’ willingness to engage in risky, mutually beneficial cooperation. In two double-blind experiments, male participants received either AVP or placebo intranasally and made decisions with financial consequences in the “Stag hunt” cooperation game. AVP increases humans’ willingness to cooperate. That increase is not due to an increase in the general willingness to bear risks or to altruistically help others. Using functional brain imaging, we show that, when subjects make the risky Stag choice, AVP down-regulates the BOLD signal in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), a risk-integration region, and increases the left dlPFC functional connectivity with the ventral pallidum, an AVP receptor-rich region previously associated with AVP-mediated social reward processing in mammals. These findings show a previously unidentified causal role for AVP in social approach behavior in humans, as established by animal research. PMID:26858433

Cooperation in N-person evolutionary snowdrift game in scale-free Barabási Albert networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lee, K. H.; Chan, Chun-Him; Hui, P. M.; Zheng, Da-Fang

2008-09-01

Cooperation in the N-person evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG) is studied in scale-free Barabási-Albert (BA) networks. Due to the inhomogeneity of the network, two versions of NESG are proposed and studied. In a model where the size of the competing group varies from agent to agent, the fraction of cooperators drops as a function of the payoff parameter. The networking effect is studied via the fraction of cooperative agents for nodes with a particular degree. For small payoff parameters, it is found that the small- k agents are dominantly cooperators, while large- k agents are of non-cooperators. Studying the spatial correlation reveals that cooperative agents will avoid to be nearest neighbors and the correlation disappears beyond the next-nearest neighbors. The behavior can be explained in terms of the networking effect and payoffs. In another model with a fixed size of competing groups, the fraction of cooperators could show a non-monotonic behavior in the regime of small payoff parameters. This non-trivial behavior is found to be a combined effect of the many agents with the smallest degree in the BA network and the increasing fraction of cooperators among these agents with the payoff for small payoffs.

Case study: videogame distraction reduces behavioral distress in a preschool-aged child undergoing repeated burn dressing changes: a single-subject design.

PubMed

Sil, Soumitri; Dahlquist, Lynnda M; Burns, Andrew J

2013-04-01

This single-subject design study evaluated the feasibility and efficacy of passive and interactive videogame distraction on behavioral distress for a preschool-aged child receiving repeated burn dressing changes. A 4-year-old girl underwent 3 baseline and 10 videogame distraction sessions (5 passive and 5 interactive) using a restricted alternating treatments design. Observed behavioral distress was coded, and parents and nurses rated the child's distress and cooperative behavior. Relative to baseline, behavioral distress decreased and cooperative behavior increased immediately after the onset of videogame distraction. Single Case Randomization Tests revealed significantly lower behavioral distress and greater cooperation during interactive videogame distraction relative to passive videogame distraction. Interactive videogame distraction appears to be a feasible and effective pain management strategy for a preschool-aged child undergoing repeated painful medical procedures.

Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games

PubMed Central

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N.; West, Stuart A.

2013-01-01

It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have “prosocial preferences” that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games, rather than with direct experimental tests. Here, we test how behavior in a public-goods game is influenced by knowledge of the consequences of actions for other players. We found that (i) individuals cooperate at similar levels, even when they are not informed that their behavior benefits others; (ii) an increased awareness of how cooperation benefits others leads to a reduction, rather than an increase, in the level of cooperation; and (iii) cooperation can be either lower or higher than expected, depending on experimental design. Overall, these results contradict the suggested role of the prosocial preferences hypothesis and show how the complexity of human behavior can lead to misleading conclusions from controlled laboratory experiments. PMID:23248298

Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

PubMed Central

Niella, Tamara; Stier-Moses, Nicolás; Sigman, Mariano

2016-01-01

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society. PMID:26797425

Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment.

PubMed

Niella, Tamara; Stier-Moses, Nicolás; Sigman, Mariano

2016-01-01

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.

Prosocial preferences do not explain human cooperation in public-goods games.

PubMed

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; West, Stuart A

2013-01-02

It has become an accepted paradigm that humans have "prosocial preferences" that lead to higher levels of cooperation than those that would maximize their personal financial gain. However, the existence of prosocial preferences has been inferred post hoc from the results of economic games, rather than with direct experimental tests. Here, we test how behavior in a public-goods game is influenced by knowledge of the consequences of actions for other players. We found that (i) individuals cooperate at similar levels, even when they are not informed that their behavior benefits others; (ii) an increased awareness of how cooperation benefits others leads to a reduction, rather than an increase, in the level of cooperation; and (iii) cooperation can be either lower or higher than expected, depending on experimental design. Overall, these results contradict the suggested role of the prosocial preferences hypothesis and show how the complexity of human behavior can lead to misleading conclusions from controlled laboratory experiments.

The Enforcement of Moral Boundaries Promotes Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior in Groups

PubMed Central

Simpson, Brent; Willer, Robb; Harrell, Ashley

2017-01-01

The threat of free-riding makes the marshalling of cooperation from group members a fundamental challenge of social life. Where classical social science theory saw the enforcement of moral boundaries as a critical way by which group members regulate one another’s self-interest and build cooperation, moral judgments have most often been studied as processes internal to individuals. Here we investigate how the interpersonal expression of positive and negative moral judgments encourages cooperation in groups and prosocial behavior between group members. In a laboratory experiment, groups whose members could make moral judgments achieved greater cooperation than groups with no capacity to sanction, levels comparable to those of groups featuring costly material sanctions. In addition, members of moral judgment groups subsequently showed more interpersonal trust, trustworthiness, and generosity than all other groups. These findings extend prior work on peer enforcement, highlighting how the enforcement of moral boundaries offers an efficient solution to cooperation problems and promotes prosocial behavior between group members. PMID:28211503

Individual Characteristics vs. Experience: An Experimental Study on Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

PubMed Central

Barreda-Tarrazona, Iván; Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, Ainhoa; Pavan, Marina; Sabater-Grande, Gerardo

2017-01-01

Cooperative behavior is often assumed to depend on individuals' characteristics, such as altruism and reasoning ability. Evidence is mixed about what the precise impact of these characteristics is, as the subjects of study are generally randomly paired, generating a heterogeneous mix of the two characteristics. In this study we ex-ante create four different groups of subjects by factoring their higher or lower than the median scores in both altruism and reasoning ability. Then we use these groups in order to analyze the joint effect of the two characteristics on the individual choice of cooperating and on successful paired cooperation. Subjects belonging to each group play first 10 one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) games with ten random partners and then three consecutive 10-round repeated PD games with three random partners. In all games, we elicit players' beliefs regarding cooperation using an incentive compatible method. Individuals with high altruism are more optimistic about the cooperative behavior of the other player in the one-shot game. They also show higher individual cooperation and paired cooperation rates in the first repetitions of this game. Contrary to the one-shot PD games where high reasoning ability reduces the probability of playing cooperatively, the sign of the relationship is inverted in the first repeated PD game, showing that high reasoning ability individuals better adjust their behavior to the characteristics of the game they are playing. In this sense, the joint effect of reasoning ability and altruism is not linear, with reasoning ability counteracting the cooperative effect of altruism in the one-shot game and reinforcing it in the first repeated game. However, experience playing the repeated PD games takes over the two individual characteristics in explaining individual and paired cooperation. Thus, in a (PD) setting, altruism and reasoning ability significantly affect behavior in single encounters, while in repeated interactions individual and paired cooperation reach similarly high levels independently of these individual characteristics. PMID:28473787

Two distinct neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity.

PubMed

Watanabe, Takamitsu; Takezawa, Masanori; Nakawake, Yo; Kunimatsu, Akira; Yamasue, Hidenori; Nakamura, Mitsuhiro; Miyashita, Yasushi; Masuda, Naoki

2014-03-18

Cooperation is a hallmark of human society. Humans often cooperate with strangers even if they will not meet each other again. This so-called indirect reciprocity enables large-scale cooperation among nonkin and can occur based on a reputation mechanism or as a succession of pay-it-forward behavior. Here, we provide the functional and anatomical neural evidence for two distinct mechanisms governing the two types of indirect reciprocity. Cooperation occurring as reputation-based reciprocity specifically recruited the precuneus, a region associated with self-centered cognition. During such cooperative behavior, the precuneus was functionally connected with the caudate, a region linking rewards to behavior. Furthermore, the precuneus of a cooperative subject had a strong resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) with the caudate and a large gray matter volume. In contrast, pay-it-forward reciprocity recruited the anterior insula (AI), a brain region associated with affective empathy. The AI was functionally connected with the caudate during cooperation occurring as pay-it-forward reciprocity, and its gray matter volume and rsFC with the caudate predicted the tendency of such cooperation. The revealed difference is consistent with the existing results of evolutionary game theory: although reputation-based indirect reciprocity robustly evolves as a self-interested behavior in theory, pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity does not on its own. The present study provides neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity and suggests that pay-it-forward reciprocity may not occur as myopic profit maximization but elicit emotional rewards.

Two distinct neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity

PubMed Central

Watanabe, Takamitsu; Takezawa, Masanori; Nakawake, Yo; Kunimatsu, Akira; Yamasue, Hidenori; Nakamura, Mitsuhiro; Miyashita, Yasushi; Masuda, Naoki

2014-01-01

Cooperation is a hallmark of human society. Humans often cooperate with strangers even if they will not meet each other again. This so-called indirect reciprocity enables large-scale cooperation among nonkin and can occur based on a reputation mechanism or as a succession of pay-it-forward behavior. Here, we provide the functional and anatomical neural evidence for two distinct mechanisms governing the two types of indirect reciprocity. Cooperation occurring as reputation-based reciprocity specifically recruited the precuneus, a region associated with self-centered cognition. During such cooperative behavior, the precuneus was functionally connected with the caudate, a region linking rewards to behavior. Furthermore, the precuneus of a cooperative subject had a strong resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) with the caudate and a large gray matter volume. In contrast, pay-it-forward reciprocity recruited the anterior insula (AI), a brain region associated with affective empathy. The AI was functionally connected with the caudate during cooperation occurring as pay-it-forward reciprocity, and its gray matter volume and rsFC with the caudate predicted the tendency of such cooperation. The revealed difference is consistent with the existing results of evolutionary game theory: although reputation-based indirect reciprocity robustly evolves as a self-interested behavior in theory, pay-it-forward indirect reciprocity does not on its own. The present study provides neural mechanisms underlying indirect reciprocity and suggests that pay-it-forward reciprocity may not occur as myopic profit maximization but elicit emotional rewards. PMID:24591599

Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies.

PubMed

House, Bailey R; Silk, Joan B; Henrich, Joseph; Barrett, H Clark; Scelza, Brooke A; Boyette, Adam H; Hewlett, Barry S; McElreath, Richard; Laurence, Stephen

2013-09-03

Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3-14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity.

Variation in Environmentalism among University Students: Majoring in Outdoor Recreation, Parks, and Tourism Predicts Environmental Concerns and Behaviors

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Arnocky, Steven; Stroink, Mirella L.

2011-01-01

In a survey of Canadian university students (N = 205), the relationship between majoring in an outdoor recreation university program and environmental concern, cooperation, and behavior were examined. Stepwise linear regression indicated that enrollment in outdoor recreation was predictive of environmental behavior and ecological cooperation; and…

The International Research Training Group on "Brain-Behavior Relationship of Normal and Disturbed Emotions in Schizophrenia and Autism" as an Example of German-American Cooperation in Doctoral Training

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Schneider, Frank; Gur, Ruben C.

2008-01-01

The International Research Training Group "Brain-Behavior Relationship of Normal and Disturbed Emotions in Schizophrenia and Autism" (IRTG 1328), funded by the German Research Council (DFG), is a German-American cooperation. Its major aims are interdisciplinary and international scientific cooperation and the support of young scientists…

Case Study: Videogame Distraction Reduces Behavioral Distress in a Preschool-Aged Child Undergoing Repeated Burn Dressing Changes: A Single-Subject Design

PubMed Central

Sil, Soumitri; Burns, Andrew J.

2013-01-01

Objective This single-subject design study evaluated the feasibility and efficacy of passive and interactive videogame distraction on behavioral distress for a preschool-aged child receiving repeated burn dressing changes. Method A 4-year-old girl underwent 3 baseline and 10 videogame distraction sessions (5 passive and 5 interactive) using a restricted alternating treatments design. Observed behavioral distress was coded, and parents and nurses rated the child’s distress and cooperative behavior. Results Relative to baseline, behavioral distress decreased and cooperative behavior increased immediately after the onset of videogame distraction. Single Case Randomization Tests revealed significantly lower behavioral distress and greater cooperation during interactive videogame distraction relative to passive videogame distraction. Conclusions Interactive videogame distraction appears to be a feasible and effective pain management strategy for a preschool-aged child undergoing repeated painful medical procedures. PMID:23248343

Cooperativeness and competitiveness as two distinct constructs: validating the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale in a social dilemma context.

PubMed

Lu, Su; Au, Wing-Tung; Jiang, Feng; Xie, Xiaofei; Yam, Paton

2013-01-01

The present research validated the construct and criterion validities of the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale (CCPS) in a social dilemma context. The results from three studies supported the notion that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two independent dimensions, challenging the traditional view that they are two ends of a single continuum. First, confirmatory factor analyses revealed that a two-factor structure fit the data significantly better than a one-factor structure. Moreover, cooperativeness and competitiveness were either not significantly correlated (Studies 1 and 3) or only moderately positively correlated (Study 2). Second, cooperativeness and competitiveness were differentially associated with Schwartz's Personal Values. These results further supported the idea that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two distinct constructs. Specifically, the individuals who were highly cooperative emphasized self-transcendent values (i.e., universalism and benevolence) more, whereas the individuals who were highly competitive emphasized self-enhancement values (i.e., power and achievement) more. Finally, the CCPS, which adheres to the trait perspective of personality, was found to be a useful supplement to more prevalent social motive measures (i.e., social value orientation) in predicting cooperative behaviors. Specifically, in Study 2, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in a public goods dilemma (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale contributed more to the public goods). In Study 3, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in commons dilemmas (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale requested fewer resources from the common resource pool). The practical implications of the CCPS in conflict resolution, as well as in recruitment and selection settings, are discussed.

Cooperation and charity in spatial public goods game under different strategy update rules

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yixiao; Jin, Xiaogang; Su, Xianchuang; Kong, Fansheng; Peng, Chengbin

2010-03-01

Human cooperation can be influenced by other human behaviors and recent years have witnessed the flourishing of studying the coevolution of cooperation and punishment, yet the common behavior of charity is seldom considered in game-theoretical models. In this article, we investigate the coevolution of altruistic cooperation and egalitarian charity in spatial public goods game, by considering charity as the behavior of reducing inter-individual payoff differences. Our model is that, in each generation of the evolution, individuals play games first and accumulate payoff benefits, and then each egalitarian makes a charity donation by payoff transfer in its neighborhood. To study the individual-level evolutionary dynamics, we adopt different strategy update rules and investigate their effects on charity and cooperation. These rules can be classified into two global rules: random selection rule in which individuals randomly update strategies, and threshold selection rule where only those with payoffs below a threshold update strategies. Simulation results show that random selection enhances the cooperation level, while threshold selection lowers the threshold of the multiplication factor to maintain cooperation. When charity is considered, it is incapable in promoting cooperation under random selection, whereas it promotes cooperation under threshold selection. Interestingly, the evolution of charity strongly depends on the dispersion of payoff acquisitions of the population, which agrees with previous results. Our work may shed light on understanding human egalitarianism.

Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks.

PubMed

Fowler, James H; Christakis, Nicholas A

2010-03-23

Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks, but subjects in such studies can choose to befriend people with similar behaviors, posing difficulty for causal inference. Here, we exploit a seminal set of laboratory experiments that originally showed that voluntary costly punishment can help sustain cooperation. In these experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to a sequence of different groups to play a series of single-shot public goods games with strangers; this feature allowed us to draw networks of interactions to explore how cooperative and uncooperative behaviors spread from person to person to person. We show that, in both an ordinary public goods game and in a public goods game with punishment, focal individuals are influenced by fellow group members' contribution behavior in future interactions with other individuals who were not a party to the initial interaction. Furthermore, this influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of separation (from person to person to person to person). The results suggest that each additional contribution a subject makes to the public good in the first period is tripled over the course of the experiment by other subjects who are directly or indirectly influenced to contribute more as a consequence. These results show experimentally that cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks.

Evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pereda, María

2016-09-01

In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.

Money and trust among strangers

PubMed Central

Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria

2013-01-01

What makes money essential for the functioning of modern society? Through an experiment, we present evidence for the existence of a relevant behavioral dimension in addition to the standard theoretical arguments. Subjects faced repeated opportunities to help an anonymous counterpart who changed over time. Cooperation required trusting that help given to a stranger today would be returned by a stranger in the future. Cooperation levels declined when going from small to large groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size. We then introduced intrinsically worthless tokens. Tokens endogenously became money: subjects took to reward help with a token and to demand a token in exchange for help. Subjects trusted that strangers would return help for a token. Cooperation levels remained stable as the groups grew larger. In all conditions, full cooperation was possible through a social norm of decentralized enforcement, without using tokens. This turned out to be especially demanding in large groups. Lack of trust among strangers thus made money behaviorally essential. To explain these results, we developed an evolutionary model. When behavior in society is heterogeneous, cooperation collapses without tokens. In contrast, the use of tokens makes cooperation evolutionarily stable. PMID:23980139

Collaborative hierarchy maintains cooperation in asymmetric games.

PubMed

Antonioni, Alberto; Pereda, María; Cronin, Katherine A; Tomassini, Marco; Sánchez, Angel

2018-03-29

The interplay of social structure and cooperative behavior is under much scrutiny lately as behavior in social contexts becomes increasingly relevant for everyday life. Earlier experimental work showed that the existence of a social hierarchy, earned through competition, was detrimental for the evolution of cooperative behaviors. Here, we study the case in which individuals are ranked in a hierarchical structure based on their performance in a collective effort by having them play a Public Goods Game. In the first treatment, participants are ranked according to group earnings while, in the second treatment, their rankings are based on individual earnings. Subsequently, participants play asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma games where higher-ranked players gain more than lower ones. Our experiments show that there are no detrimental effects of the hierarchy formed based on group performance, yet when ranking is assigned individually we observe a decrease in cooperation. Our results show that different levels of cooperation arise from the fact that subjects are interpreting rankings as a reputation which carries information about which subjects were cooperators in the previous phase. Our results demonstrate that noting the manner in which a hierarchy is established is essential for understanding its effects on cooperation.

Money and trust among strangers.

PubMed

Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria

2013-09-10

What makes money essential for the functioning of modern society? Through an experiment, we present evidence for the existence of a relevant behavioral dimension in addition to the standard theoretical arguments. Subjects faced repeated opportunities to help an anonymous counterpart who changed over time. Cooperation required trusting that help given to a stranger today would be returned by a stranger in the future. Cooperation levels declined when going from small to large groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size. We then introduced intrinsically worthless tokens. Tokens endogenously became money: subjects took to reward help with a token and to demand a token in exchange for help. Subjects trusted that strangers would return help for a token. Cooperation levels remained stable as the groups grew larger. In all conditions, full cooperation was possible through a social norm of decentralized enforcement, without using tokens. This turned out to be especially demanding in large groups. Lack of trust among strangers thus made money behaviorally essential. To explain these results, we developed an evolutionary model. When behavior in society is heterogeneous, cooperation collapses without tokens. In contrast, the use of tokens makes cooperation evolutionarily stable.

Evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks.

PubMed

Pereda, María

2016-09-01

In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.

Genetic Susceptibility for Individual Cooperation Preferences: The Role of Monoamine Oxidase A Gene (MAOA) in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

PubMed Central

Mertins, Vanessa; Schote, Andrea B.; Hoffeld, Wolfgang; Griessmair, Michele; Meyer, Jobst

2011-01-01

In the context of social dilemmas, previous research has shown that human cooperation is mainly based on the social norm of conditional cooperation. While in most cases individuals behave according to such a norm, deviant behavior is no exception. Recent research further suggests that heterogeneity in social behavior might be associated with varying genetic predispositions. In this study, we investigated the relationship between individuals' behavior in a public goods experiment and the promoter-region functional repeat polymorphism in the monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA). In a dynamic setting of increasing information about others' contributions, we analyzed differences in two main components of conditional cooperation, namely the players' own contribution and their beliefs regarding the contribution of other players. We showed that there is a significant association between individuals' behavior in a repeated public goods game and MAOA. Our results suggest that male carriers of the low activity alleles cooperate significantly less than those carrying the high activity alleles given a situation where subjects had to rely on their innate beliefs about others' contributions. With increasing information about the others' cooperativeness, the genetic effect diminishes. Furthermore, significant opposing effects for female subjects carrying two low activity alleles were observed. PMID:21698196

Can bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) cooperate when solving a novel task?

PubMed

Kuczaj, Stan A; Winship, Kelley A; Eskelinen, Holli C

2015-03-01

Cooperative behavior has been observed in cetacean species in a variety of situations, including foraging, mate acquisition, play, and epimeletic behavior. However, it has proven difficult to demonstrate cooperative behavior among dolphins in more controlled settings. Dolphins (Tursiops truncatus) in this study were exposed to a task that could most easily be solved if dolphins cooperated. Six dolphins were provided opportunities to solve the task and had to learn to do so without human intervention or training. Two adult males consistently and spontaneously jointly interacted in order to most efficiently open a container that contained fish by pulling on ropes at the ends of the container. Their interaction was viewed as cooperative because each dolphin pulled on their respective ropes in the opposite direction, which resulted in one end of the container opening. The dolphins did not show aggression toward one another while solving the task, and both dolphins consumed the food after the container was opened. They also engaged in synchronous non-aggressive behaviors with the container after the food had been consumed. It is possible that some of the remaining four dolphins would have cooperated, but the two successful dolphins were dominant males and their interest in the apparatus appeared to preclude other animals from participating.

A Hypothesis of the Co-evolution of Cooperation and Responses to Inequity

PubMed Central

Brosnan, Sarah F.

2011-01-01

Recent evidence demonstrates that humans are not the only species to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes which are to their disadvantage. Several species respond negatively if they subsequently receive a less good reward than a social partner for completing the same task. While these studies suggest that the negative response to inequity is not a uniquely human behavior, they do not provide a functional explanation for the emergence of these responses due to similar characteristics among these species. However, emerging data support the hypothesis that an aversion to inequity is a mechanism to promote successful long-term cooperative relationships amongst non-kin. In this paper, I discuss several converging lines of evidence which illustrate the need to further evaluate this relationship. First, cooperation can survive modest inequity; in explicitly cooperative interactions, individuals are willing to continue to cooperate despite inequitable outcomes as long as the partner's overall behavior is equitable. Second, the context of inequity affects reactions to it in ways which support the idea that joint efforts lead to an expectation of joint payoffs. Finally, comparative studies indicate a link between the degree and extent of cooperation between unrelated individuals in a species and that species’ response to inequitable outcomes. This latter line of evidence indicates that this behavior evolved in conjunction with cooperation and may represent an adaptation to increase the payoffs associated with cooperative interactions. Together these data inform a testable working hypothesis for understanding decision-making in the context of inequity and provide a new, comparative framework for evaluating decision-making behavior. PMID:21519380

The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation

PubMed Central

Gallo, Edoardo; Yan, Chang

2015-01-01

The emergence and sustenance of cooperative behavior is fundamental for a society to thrive. Recent experimental studies have shown that cooperation increases in dynamic networks in which subjects can choose their partners. However, these studies did not vary reputational knowledge, or what subjects know about other’s past actions, which has long been recognized as an important factor in supporting cooperation. They also did not give subjects access to global social knowledge, or information on who is connected to whom in the group. As a result, it remained unknown how reputational and social knowledge foster cooperative behavior in dynamic networks both independently and by complementing each other. In an experimental setting, we show that global reputational knowledge is crucial to sustaining a high level of cooperation and welfare. Cooperation is associated with the emergence of dense and clustered networks with highly cooperative hubs. Global social knowledge has no effect on the aggregate level of cooperation. A community analysis shows that the addition of global social knowledge to global reputational knowledge affects the distribution of cooperative activity: cooperators form a separate community that achieves a higher cooperation level than the community of defectors. Members of the community of cooperators achieve a higher payoff from interactions within the community than members of the less cooperative community. PMID:25775544

Multi-agent cooperation rescue algorithm based on influence degree and state prediction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zheng, Yanbin; Ma, Guangfu; Wang, Linlin; Xi, Pengxue

2018-04-01

Aiming at the multi-agent cooperative rescue in disaster, a multi-agent cooperative rescue algorithm based on impact degree and state prediction is proposed. Firstly, based on the influence of the information in the scene on the collaborative task, the influence degree function is used to filter the information. Secondly, using the selected information to predict the state of the system and Agent behavior. Finally, according to the result of the forecast, the cooperative behavior of Agent is guided and improved the efficiency of individual collaboration. The simulation results show that this algorithm can effectively solve the cooperative rescue problem of multi-agent and ensure the efficient completion of the task.

Partner choice cooperation in prisoner's dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Qi; Xu, Zhaojin; Zhang, Lianzhong

2017-12-01

In this paper, we investigated the cooperative behavior in prisoner's dilemma when the individual behaviors and interaction structures could coevolve. Here, we study the model that the individuals can imitate the strategy of their neighbors and rewire their social ties throughout evolution, based exclusively on a fitness comparison. We find that the cooperation can be achieved if the time scale of network adaptation is large enough, even when the social dilemma strength is very strong. Detailed investigation shows that the presence or absence of the network adaptation has a profound impact on the collective behavior in the system.

Cooperation stimulation strategies for peer-to-peer wireless live video-sharing social networks.

PubMed

Lin, W Sabrina; Zhao, H Vicky; Liu, K J Ray

2010-07-01

Human behavior analysis in video sharing social networks is an emerging research area, which analyzes the behavior of users who share multimedia content and investigates the impact of human dynamics on video sharing systems. Users watching live streaming in the same wireless network share the same limited bandwidth of backbone connection to the Internet, thus, they might want to cooperate with each other to obtain better video quality. These users form a wireless live-streaming social network. Every user wishes to watch video with high quality while paying as little as possible cost to help others. This paper focuses on providing incentives for user cooperation. We propose a game-theoretic framework to model user behavior and to analyze the optimal strategies for user cooperation simulation in wireless live streaming. We first analyze the Pareto optimality and the time-sensitive bargaining equilibrium of the two-person game. We then extend the solution to the multiuser scenario. We also consider potential selfish users' cheating behavior and malicious users' attacking behavior and analyze the performance of the proposed strategies with the existence of cheating users and malicious attackers. Both our analytical and simulation results show that the proposed strategies can effectively stimulate user cooperation, achieve cheat free and attack resistance, and help provide reliable services for wireless live streaming applications.

Evolutionary dynamics under interactive diversity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Su, Qi; Li, Aming; Wang, Long

2017-10-01

As evidenced by many cases in human societies, individuals often make different behavior decisions in different interactions, and adaptively adjust their behavior in changeable interactive scenarios. However, up to now, how such diverse interactive behavior affects cooperation dynamics has still remained unknown. Here we develop a general framework of interactive diversity, which models individuals’ separated behavior against distinct opponents and their adaptive adjustment in response to opponents’ strategies, to explore the evolution of cooperation. We find that interactive diversity enables individuals to reciprocate every single opponent, and thus sustains large-scale reciprocal interactions. Our work witnesses an impressive boost of cooperation for a notably extensive range of parameters and for all pairwise games. These results are robust against well-mixed and various networked populations, and against degree-normalized and cumulative payoff patterns. From the perspective of network dynamics, distinguished from individuals competing for nodes in most previous work, in this paper, the system evolves in the form of behavior disseminating along edges. We propose a theoretical method based on evolution of edges, which predicts well both the frequency of cooperation and the compact cooperation clusters. Our thorough investigation clarifies the positive role of interactive diversity in resolving social dilemmas and highlights the significance of understanding evolutionary dynamics from the viewpoint of edge dynamics.

The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ito, Hiromu; Katsumata, Yuki; Hasegawa, Eisuke; Yoshimura, Jin

2017-02-01

The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner’s dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.

Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups.

PubMed

Weingart, Laurie R; Brett, Jeanne M; Olekalns, Mara; Smith, Philip L

2007-12-01

Negotiators' social motives (cooperative vs. individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. In this study, the authors used multilevel modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5-issue mixed-motive decision-making task were videotaped, and the tapes were transcribed and coded. Group composition included 2 homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and 3 heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators and 1 individualist, 2 cooperators and 2 individualists, 1 cooperator and 3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social-motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than did individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition. (c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved.

Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grujić, Jelena; Eke, Burcu; Cabrales, Antonio; Cuesta, José A.; Sánchez, Angel

2012-09-01

Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here report on experiments on iterated, multi-player Prisoner's dilemma, on groups of 2 to 5 people. We confirm the dependence on the previous step and that memory effects for earlier periods are not significant. We show that the behavior of subjects in pairwise dilemmas is qualitatively different from the cases with more players; After an initial decay, cooperation increases significantly reaching values above 80%. The strategy of the players is rather universal as far as their willingness to reciprocate cooperation is concerned, whereas there is much diversity in their initial propensity to cooperate. Our results indicate that, for cooperation to emerge and thrive, three is a crowd.

Self-organized cooperative behavior and critical penalty in an evolving population

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Chen; Hui, P. M.; Yu, You-Yang; Gu, Guo-Qing

2009-10-01

The emergence of cooperation and the effectiveness of penalties among competing agents are studied via a model of evolutionary game incorporating adaptive behavior and penalties for illegal acts. For initially identical agents, a phase diagram is obtained via an analytic approach, with results in good agreement with numerical simulations. The results show that there exists a critical penalty for achieving a completely honest population and a sufficiently well-behaved initial population requires no penalty. Self-organized segregation to extreme actions emerges in the dynamics for a system with uniformly distributed initial tendencies for cooperation. After training, the penalty can be relaxed without ruining the adapted cooperative behavior. Results of our model in a population taking on the form of a 2D square lattice are also reported.

Can we get some cooperation around here? The mediating role of group norms on the relationship between team personality and individual helping behaviors.

PubMed

Gonzalez-Mulé, Erik; DeGeest, David S; McCormick, Brian W; Seong, Jee Young; Brown, Kenneth G

2014-09-01

Drawing on the group-norms theory of organizational citizenship behaviors and person-environment fit theory, we introduce and test a multilevel model of the effects of additive and dispersion composition models of team members' personality characteristics on group norms and individual helping behaviors. Our model was tested using regression and random coefficients modeling on 102 research and development teams. Results indicated that high mean levels of extraversion are positively related to individual helping behaviors through the mediating effect of cooperative group norms. Further, low variance on agreeableness (supplementary fit) and high variance on extraversion (complementary fit) promote the enactment of individual helping behaviors, but only the effects of extraversion were mediated by cooperative group norms. Implications of these findings for theories of helping behaviors in teams are discussed. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Siblings, Birth Order, and Cooperative-Competitive Social Behavior: A Comparison of Anglo-American and Mexican-American Children.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Knight, George P.; Kagan, Spencer

1982-01-01

Tested the hypothesis that differences in cooperative-competitive social behavior between Anglo-Americans and Mexican Americans is a result of larger family size among the latter group. Found that, even after controlling for number of siblings and birth order, statistically significant differences in such behavior remained between the two groups.…

Neuromolecular correlates of cooperation and conflict during territory defense in a cichlid fish.

PubMed

Weitekamp, Chelsea A; Hofmann, Hans A

2017-03-01

Cooperative behavior is widespread among animals, yet the neural mechanisms have not been studied in detail. We examined cooperative territory defense behavior and associated neural activity in candidate forebrain regions in the cichlid fish, Astatotilapia burtoni. We find that a territorial male neighbor will engage in territory defense dependent on the perceived threat of the intruder. The resident male, on the other hand, engages in defense based on the size and behavior of his partner, the neighbor. In the neighbor, we find that an index of engagement correlates with neural activity in the putative homolog of the mammalian basolateral amygdala and in the preoptic area, as well as in preoptic dopaminergic neurons. In the resident, neighbor behavior is correlated with neural activity in the homolog of the mammalian hippocampus. Overall, we find distinct neural activity patterns between the neighbor and the resident, suggesting that an individual perceives and processes an intruder challenge differently during cooperative territory defense depending on its own behavioral role. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Ontogeny of prosocial behavior across diverse societies

PubMed Central

House, Bailey R.; Silk, Joan B.; Henrich, Joseph; Barrett, H. Clark; Scelza, Brooke A.; Boyette, Adam H.; Hewlett, Barry S.; McElreath, Richard; Laurence, Stephen

2013-01-01

Humans are an exceptionally cooperative species, but there is substantial variation in the extent of cooperation across societies. Understanding the sources of this variability may provide insights about the forces that sustain cooperation. We examined the ontogeny of prosocial behavior by studying 326 children 3–14 y of age and 120 adults from six societies (age distributions varied across societies). These six societies span a wide range of extant human variation in culture, geography, and subsistence strategies, including foragers, herders, horticulturalists, and urban dwellers across the Americas, Oceania, and Africa. When delivering benefits to others was personally costly, rates of prosocial behavior dropped across all six societies as children approached middle childhood and then rates of prosociality diverged as children tracked toward the behavior of adults in their own societies. When prosocial acts did not require personal sacrifice, prosocial responses increased steadily as children matured with little variation in behavior across societies. Our results are consistent with theories emphasizing the importance of acquired cultural norms in shaping costly forms of cooperation and creating cross-cultural diversity. PMID:23959869

Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Traulsen, Arne; Claussen, Jens Christian

2004-10-01

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of the coplayer, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent of parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.

Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments

PubMed Central

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N.; El Mouden, Claire; West, Stuart A.

2016-01-01

Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold. PMID:26787890

The Perception of Cooperativeness Without Any Visual or Auditory Communication.

PubMed

Chang, Dong-Seon; Burger, Franziska; Bülthoff, Heinrich H; de la Rosa, Stephan

2015-12-01

Perceiving social information such as the cooperativeness of another person is an important part of human interaction. But can people perceive the cooperativeness of others even without any visual or auditory information? In a novel experimental setup, we connected two people with a rope and made them accomplish a point-collecting task together while they could not see or hear each other. We observed a consistently emerging turn-taking behavior in the interactions and installed a confederate in a subsequent experiment who either minimized or maximized this behavior. Participants experienced this only through the haptic force-feedback of the rope and made evaluations about the confederate after each interaction. We found that perception of cooperativeness was significantly affected only by the manipulation of this turn-taking behavior. Gender- and size-related judgments also significantly differed. Our results suggest that people can perceive social information such as the cooperativeness of other people even in situations where possibilities for communication are minimal.

The Perception of Cooperativeness Without Any Visual or Auditory Communication

PubMed Central

Chang, Dong-Seon; Burger, Franziska; de la Rosa, Stephan

2015-01-01

Perceiving social information such as the cooperativeness of another person is an important part of human interaction. But can people perceive the cooperativeness of others even without any visual or auditory information? In a novel experimental setup, we connected two people with a rope and made them accomplish a point-collecting task together while they could not see or hear each other. We observed a consistently emerging turn-taking behavior in the interactions and installed a confederate in a subsequent experiment who either minimized or maximized this behavior. Participants experienced this only through the haptic force-feedback of the rope and made evaluations about the confederate after each interaction. We found that perception of cooperativeness was significantly affected only by the manipulation of this turn-taking behavior. Gender- and size-related judgments also significantly differed. Our results suggest that people can perceive social information such as the cooperativeness of other people even in situations where possibilities for communication are minimal. PMID:27551362

Conditional cooperation and confusion in public-goods experiments.

PubMed

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; El Mouden, Claire; West, Stuart A

2016-02-02

Economic experiments are often used to study if humans altruistically value the welfare of others. A canonical result from public-good games is that humans vary in how they value the welfare of others, dividing into fair-minded conditional cooperators, who match the cooperation of others, and selfish noncooperators. However, an alternative explanation for the data are that individuals vary in their understanding of how to maximize income, with misunderstanding leading to the appearance of cooperation. We show that (i) individuals divide into the same behavioral types when playing with computers, whom they cannot be concerned with the welfare of; (ii) behavior across games with computers and humans is correlated and can be explained by variation in understanding of how to maximize income; (iii) misunderstanding correlates with higher levels of cooperation; and (iv) standard control questions do not guarantee understanding. These results cast doubt on certain experimental methods and demonstrate that a common assumption in behavioral economics experiments, that choices reveal motivations, will not necessarily hold.

The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda

PubMed Central

Grossman, Guy; Baldassarri, Delia

2013-01-01

Communities often rely on sanctioning to induce public goods contributions. Past studies focus on how external agencies or peer sanctioning induce cooperation. In this article, we focus instead on the role played by centralized authorities, internal to the community. Combining “lab-in-the-field” experiments with observational data on 1,541 Ugandan farmers from 50 communities, we demonstrate the positive effect of internal centralized sanctioning authorities on cooperative behavior. We also show that the size of this effect depends on the political process by which authority is granted: subjects electing leaders contribute more to public goods than subjects who were assigned leaders through a lottery. To test the ecological validity of our findings, we relate farmers’ behavior in the experiment to their level of cooperation in their community organization. We show that deference to authority in the controlled setting predicts cooperative behavior in the farmers’ natural environment, in which they face a similar social dilemma. PMID:23729913

Supervisory Behaviors of Cooperating Agricultural Education Teachers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thobega, Moreetsi; Miller, Greg

2007-01-01

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which cooperating agricultural education teachers used selected supervision models. The relationships between maturity characteristics of the cooperating teachers and their choices of a supervision model were also examined. Results showed that cooperating teachers commonly used clinical,…

Investigating Cooperative Behavior in Ecological Settings: An EEG Hyperscanning Study.

PubMed

Toppi, Jlenia; Borghini, Gianluca; Petti, Manuela; He, Eric J; De Giusti, Vittorio; He, Bin; Astolfi, Laura; Babiloni, Fabio

2016-01-01

The coordinated interactions between individuals are fundamental for the success of the activities in some professional categories. We reported on brain-to-brain cooperative interactions between civil pilots during a simulated flight. We demonstrated for the first time how the combination of neuroelectrical hyperscanning and intersubject connectivity could provide indicators sensitive to the humans' degree of synchronization under a highly demanding task performed in an ecological environment. Our results showed how intersubject connectivity was able to i) characterize the degree of cooperation between pilots in different phases of the flight, and ii) to highlight the role of specific brain macro areas in cooperative behavior. During the most cooperative flight phases pilots showed, in fact, dense patterns of interbrain connectivity, mainly linking frontal and parietal brain areas. On the contrary, the amount of interbrain connections went close to zero in the non-cooperative phase. The reliability of the interbrain connectivity patterns was verified by means of a baseline condition represented by formal couples, i.e. pilots paired offline for the connectivity analysis but not simultaneously recorded during the flight. Interbrain density was, in fact, significantly higher in real couples with respect to formal couples in the cooperative flight phases. All the achieved results demonstrated how the description of brain networks at the basis of cooperation could effectively benefit from a hyperscanning approach. Interbrain connectivity was, in fact, more informative in the investigation of cooperative behavior with respect to established EEG signal processing methodologies applied at a single subject level.

Investigating Cooperative Behavior in Ecological Settings: An EEG Hyperscanning Study

PubMed Central

Petti, Manuela; He, Eric J.; De Giusti, Vittorio; He, Bin; Astolfi, Laura; Babiloni, Fabio

2016-01-01

The coordinated interactions between individuals are fundamental for the success of the activities in some professional categories. We reported on brain-to-brain cooperative interactions between civil pilots during a simulated flight. We demonstrated for the first time how the combination of neuroelectrical hyperscanning and intersubject connectivity could provide indicators sensitive to the humans’ degree of synchronization under a highly demanding task performed in an ecological environment. Our results showed how intersubject connectivity was able to i) characterize the degree of cooperation between pilots in different phases of the flight, and ii) to highlight the role of specific brain macro areas in cooperative behavior. During the most cooperative flight phases pilots showed, in fact, dense patterns of interbrain connectivity, mainly linking frontal and parietal brain areas. On the contrary, the amount of interbrain connections went close to zero in the non-cooperative phase. The reliability of the interbrain connectivity patterns was verified by means of a baseline condition represented by formal couples, i.e. pilots paired offline for the connectivity analysis but not simultaneously recorded during the flight. Interbrain density was, in fact, significantly higher in real couples with respect to formal couples in the cooperative flight phases. All the achieved results demonstrated how the description of brain networks at the basis of cooperation could effectively benefit from a hyperscanning approach. Interbrain connectivity was, in fact, more informative in the investigation of cooperative behavior with respect to established EEG signal processing methodologies applied at a single subject level. PMID:27124558

Linking Individual and Collective Behavior in Adaptive Social Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pinheiro, Flávio L.; Santos, Francisco C.; Pacheco, Jorge M.

2016-03-01

Adaptive social structures are known to promote the evolution of cooperation. However, up to now the characterization of the collective, population-wide dynamics resulting from the self-organization of individual strategies on a coevolving, adaptive network has remained unfeasible. Here we establish a (reversible) link between individual (micro)behavior and collective (macro)behavior for coevolutionary processes. We demonstrate that an adaptive network transforms a two-person social dilemma locally faced by individuals into a collective dynamics that resembles that associated with an N -person coordination game, whose characterization depends sensitively on the relative time scales between the entangled behavioral and network evolutions. In particular, we show that the faster the relative rate of adaptation of the network, the smaller the critical fraction of cooperators required for cooperation to prevail, thus establishing a direct link between network adaptation and the evolution of cooperation. The framework developed here is general and may be readily applied to other dynamical processes occurring on adaptive networks, notably, the spreading of contagious diseases or the diffusion of innovations.

Evolution of cooperation driven by social-welfare-based migration

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yan; Ye, Hang; Zhang, Hong

2016-03-01

Individuals' migration behavior may play a significant role in the evolution of cooperation. In reality, individuals' migration behavior may depend on their perceptions of social welfare. To study the relationship between social-welfare-based migration and the evolution of cooperation, we consider an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which an individual's migration depends on social welfare but not on the individual's own payoff. By introducing three important social welfare functions (SWFs) that are commonly studied in social science, we find that social-welfare-based migration can promote cooperation under a wide range of parameter values. In addition, these three SWFs have different effects on cooperation, especially through the different spatial patterns formed by migration. Because the relative efficiency of the three SWFs will change if the parameter values are changed, we cannot determine which SWF is optimal for supporting cooperation. We also show that memory capacity, which is needed to evaluate individual welfare, may affect cooperation levels in opposite directions under different SWFs. Our work should be helpful for understanding the evolution of human cooperation and bridging the chasm between studies of social preferences and studies of social cooperation.

Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks

PubMed Central

Fowler, James H.; Christakis, Nicholas A.

2010-01-01

Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks, but subjects in such studies can choose to befriend people with similar behaviors, posing difficulty for causal inference. Here, we exploit a seminal set of laboratory experiments that originally showed that voluntary costly punishment can help sustain cooperation. In these experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to a sequence of different groups to play a series of single-shot public goods games with strangers; this feature allowed us to draw networks of interactions to explore how cooperative and uncooperative behaviors spread from person to person to person. We show that, in both an ordinary public goods game and in a public goods game with punishment, focal individuals are influenced by fellow group members’ contribution behavior in future interactions with other individuals who were not a party to the initial interaction. Furthermore, this influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of separation (from person to person to person to person). The results suggest that each additional contribution a subject makes to the public good in the first period is tripled over the course of the experiment by other subjects who are directly or indirectly influenced to contribute more as a consequence. These results show experimentally that cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks. PMID:20212120

Diverse ontogenies of reciprocal and prosocial behavior: cooperative development in Fiji and the United States.

PubMed

House, Bailey R

2017-11-01

Contingent reciprocity is an important foundation of human cooperation, but we know little about how reciprocal behavior develops across diverse societies, nor about how the development of reciprocal behavior is related to the development of prosocial behavior more broadly. Three- to 16-year-old children were presented with the opportunity to control the allocation of real food rewards in a binary-choice cooperative dilemma. Within dyads children alternated making choices across multiple trials, and reciprocal behavior emerged in three diverse populations (rural Fijian villages, and urban communities in both Fiji and the United States) by age 7-8. There was more societal variation in prosocial behavior than in reciprocal behavior, and there were more substantial differences between Fijians and Americans than between rural and urban populations. This suggests that the development of prosocial behavior is not driven entirely by the development of reciprocity, and differences in prosocial behavior across rural Fijians and urban Americans may not be due only to differences across rural and urban populations. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Evolution of group-wise cooperation: Is direct reciprocity insufficient?

PubMed

Kurokawa, Shun; Ihara, Yasuo

2017-02-21

Group-wise cooperation, or cooperation among three or more individuals, is an integral part of human societies. It is likely that group-wise cooperation also played a crucial role in the survival of early hominins, who were confronted with novel environmental challenges, long before the emergence of Homo sapiens. However, previous theoretical and empirical studies, focusing mainly on modern humans, have tended to suggest that evolution of cooperation in sizable groups cannot be explained by simple direct reciprocity and requires some additional mechanisms (reputation, punishment, etc.), which are cognitively too demanding for early hominins. As a partial resolution of the paradox, our recent analysis of a stochastic evolutionary model, which considers the effect of random drift, has revealed that evolution of group-wise cooperation is more likely to occur in larger groups when an individual's share of the benefit produced by one cooperator does not decrease with increasing group size (i.e., goods are non-rivalrous). In this paper, we further extend our previous analysis to explore possible consequences of introducing rare mistakes in behavior or imperfect information about behavior of others on the model outcome. Analyses of the extended models show that evolution of group-wise cooperation can be facilitated by large group size even when individuals intending to cooperate sometimes fail to do so or when all the information about the past behavior of group members is not available. We argue, therefore, that evolution of cooperation in sizable groups does not necessarily require other mechanisms than direct reciprocity if the goods to be produced via group-wise cooperation are non-rivalrous. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Zero-knowledge cooperation in dilemma games.

PubMed

Huck, Steffen; Normann, Hans Theo; Oechssler, Jorg

2003-01-07

We consider a very simple adaptive rule that induces cooperative behavior in a large class of dilemma games. The rule has a Pavlovian flavor and can be described as win-continue, lose-reverse. It assumes no knowledge about the underlying structure of the environment (the "rules of the game") and requires very little cognitive effort. Both features make it an appealing candidate for explaining the emergence of cooperative behavior in non-human species. Copyright 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd.

Social dilemma cooperation (unlike Dictator Game giving) is intuitive for men as well as women.

PubMed

Rand, David G

2017-11-01

Does intuition favor prosociality, or does prosocial behavior require deliberative self-control? The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) stipulates that intuition favors typically advantageous behavior - but which behavior is typically advantageous depends on both the individual and the context. For example, non-zero-sum cooperation (e.g. in social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma) typically pays off because of the opportunity for reciprocity. Conversely, reciprocity does not promote zero-sum cash transfers (e.g. in the Dictator Game, DG). Instead, DG giving can be long-run advantageous because of reputation concerns: social norms often require such behavior of women but not men. Thus, the SHH predicts that intuition will favor social dilemma cooperation regardless of gender, but only favor DG giving among women. Here I present meta-analytic evidence in support of this prediction. In 31 studies examining social dilemma cooperation (N=13,447), I find that promoting intuition increases cooperation to a similar extent for both men and women. This stands in contrast to the results from 22 DG studies (analyzed in Rand et al., 2016) where intuition promotes giving among women but not men. Furthermore, I show using meta-regression that the interaction between gender and intuition is significantly larger in the DG compared to the cooperation games. Thus, I find clear evidence that the role of intuition and deliberation varies across both setting and individual as predicted by the SHH.

On Cooperative Behavior in Distributed Teams: The Influence of Organizational Design, Media Richness, Social Interaction, and Interaction Adaptation

PubMed Central

Håkonsson, Dorthe D.; Obel, Børge; Eskildsen, Jacob K.; Burton, Richard M.

2016-01-01

Self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental dilemma in animal behavior as well as in human and organizational behavior. In organizations, how to get people to cooperate despite or in conjunction with their self-interest is fundamental to the achievement of a common goal. While both organizational designs and social interactions have been found to further cooperation in organizations, some of the literature has received contradictory support, just as very little research, if any, has examined their joint effects in distributed organizations, where communication is usually achieved via different communication media. This paper reviews the extant literature and offers a set of hypotheses to integrate current theories and explanations. Further, it discusses how future research should examine the joint effects of media, incentives, and social interactions. PMID:27242605

On Cooperative Behavior in Distributed Teams: The Influence of Organizational Design, Media Richness, Social Interaction, and Interaction Adaptation.

PubMed

Håkonsson, Dorthe D; Obel, Børge; Eskildsen, Jacob K; Burton, Richard M

2016-01-01

Self-interest vs. cooperation is a fundamental dilemma in animal behavior as well as in human and organizational behavior. In organizations, how to get people to cooperate despite or in conjunction with their self-interest is fundamental to the achievement of a common goal. While both organizational designs and social interactions have been found to further cooperation in organizations, some of the literature has received contradictory support, just as very little research, if any, has examined their joint effects in distributed organizations, where communication is usually achieved via different communication media. This paper reviews the extant literature and offers a set of hypotheses to integrate current theories and explanations. Further, it discusses how future research should examine the joint effects of media, incentives, and social interactions.

Social rank and social cooperation: Impact of social comparison processes on cooperative decision-making

PubMed Central

Sanfey, Alan G.

2017-01-01

Successful navigation of our complex social world requires the capability to recognize and judge the relative status of others. Hence, social comparison processes are of great importance in our interactions, informing us of our relative standing and in turn potentially motivating our behavior. However, so far few studies have examined in detail how social comparison can influence interpersonal decision-making. One aspect of social decision-making that is of particular importance is cooperative behavior, and identifying means of maintaining and promoting cooperation in the provision of public goods is of vital interest to society. Here, we manipulated social comparison by grading performance rankings on a reaction time task, and then measured cooperative decisions via a modified Public Goods Game (PGG). Findings revealed that individuals ranked highest tended to be more cooperative as compared to those who placed in the bottom rank. Interestingly, this effect was regardless of whether the comparison group members were the subsequent players in the PGG or not, and this effect was stronger in those with higher social orientation. In summary, the present research shows how different social comparison processes (assessed via social rankings) can operate in our daily interaction with others, demonstrating an important effect on cooperative behavior. PMID:28388684

Technology and Cooperation: The Behaviors of Networking.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Martin, Susan K.

1987-01-01

Discusses the pros and cons of library cooperation as exemplified by interlibrary loan and OCLC. Moving away from cooperation toward the more intensive use of local systems is suggested as one alternative for the future. (MES)

Cooperation in Human-Agent Systems to Support Resilience: A Microworld Experiment.

PubMed

Chiou, Erin K; Lee, John D

2016-09-01

This study uses a dyadic approach to understand human-agent cooperation and system resilience. Increasingly capable technology fundamentally changes human-machine relationships. Rather than reliance on or compliance with more or less reliable automation, we investigate interaction strategies with more or less cooperative agents. A joint-task microworld scenario was developed to explore the effects of agent cooperation on participant cooperation and system resilience. To assess the effects of agent cooperation on participant cooperation, 36 people coordinated with a more or less cooperative agent by requesting resources and responding to requests for resources in a dynamic task environment. Another 36 people were recruited to assess effects following a perturbation in their own hospital. Experiment 1 shows people reciprocated the cooperative behaviors of the agents; a low-cooperation agent led to less effective interactions and less resource sharing, whereas a high-cooperation agent led to more effective interactions and greater resource sharing. Experiment 2 shows that an initial fast-tempo perturbation undermined proactive cooperation-people tended to not request resources. However, the initial fast tempo had little effect on reactive cooperation-people tended to accept resource requests according to cooperation level. This study complements the supervisory control perspective of human-automation interaction by considering interdependence and cooperation rather than the more common focus on reliability and reliance. The cooperativeness of automated agents can influence the cooperativeness of human agents. Design and evaluation for resilience in teams involving increasingly autonomous agents should consider the cooperative behaviors of these agents. © 2016, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Unto Others: Illustrating the Human Capacity for Cooperation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Morris, J. Andrew; Urbanski, John; Hunt, Jason

2011-01-01

Research in both evolutionary economics and evolutionary psychology provides strong evidence that human behavior can be, and is, a complex mix of hedonism and altruism with a strong inclination toward cooperation under certain conditions. In this article, behavioral assumptions made in mainstream business theory are compared and contrasted with…

Social embeddedness and economic opportunism: a game situation.

PubMed

Sakalaki, Maria; Fousiani, Kyriaki

2012-06-01

According to Evolutionary Game Theory, multiple exchanges with partners are necessary to foster cooperation. Multiple exchanges with partners tend to enhance the good experience of the partners and the predictability of their behaviour and should therefore increase cooperativeness. This study explored whether social embeddedness, or the preference for close and stable social relationships, a variable which tends to increase multiple exchanges, is associated with more cooperative attitudes; and whether social embeddedness increases cooperative behavior towards unknown partners in a game situation. The first study, with 169 undergraduates, indicated that social embeddedness (preference for close and durable social relations) was negatively associated with opportunistic attitudes. The second study had a sample of 60 undergraduates playing a Trust Game with unknown partners and showed that self-reported social embeddedness was positively correlated with scores for cooperative economic behavior towards the partners. These results highlight the relationships of social embeddedness with cooperative attitudes and behaviour.

Gender, trust and cooperation in environmental social dilemmas.

PubMed

Irwin, Kyle; Edwards, Kimberly; Tamburello, Jeffrey A

2015-03-01

This research addresses gender differences in environmental protection efforts. Recent work indicates that, across a variety of domains, women are more generous, charitable, and prosocial than men. Despite above-average levels of these motivators for cooperation, considerable experimental research points to no difference in cooperation between genders. What can explain women's lower-than-expected cooperation levels? Prior research indicates that, compared to men, women are less trusting and respond to fear incentives in social dilemmas - they are concerned about being exploited. We test these arguments in the context of environmental behaviors and argue that lower trust and greater responses to fear incentives mean that women's cooperation is predicated on trust. For men, trust does not predict environmental cooperation. The current research represents the first empirical test of these arguments. Using data from the General Social Survey we focus on private sphere behaviors and political participation and predict an interaction between gender and trust on cooperation. Results support this prediction. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The influence of cooperation and defection on social decision making in depression: A study of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

PubMed

Sorgi, Kristen M; van 't Wout, Mascha

2016-12-30

This study evaluated the influence of self-reported levels of depression on interpersonal strategic decision making when interacting with partners who differed in their predetermined tendency to cooperate in three separate computerized iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games (iPDGs). Across 29 participants, cooperation was lowest when interacting with a predominantly defecting partner and highest when interacting with a predominantly cooperating partner. Greater depression severity was related to steadier and continued cooperation over trials with the cooperating partner, seeming to reflect a prosocial response tendency when interacting with this partner. With the unbiased partner, depression severity was associated with a more volatile response pattern in reaction to cooperation and defection by this partner. Severity of depression did not influence cooperation with a defecting partner or expectations about partner cooperation reported before the task began. Taken together, these data appear to show that in predominately positive interactions, as in the cooperating partner condition, depression is associated with less volatile, more consistent cooperation. When such clear feedback is absent, as in the unbiased partner condition, depression is associated with more volatile behavior. Nonetheless, participants were generally able to adapt their behavior accordingly in this dynamic interpersonal decision making context. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

How Do Children Behave Regarding Their Birth Order in Dental Setting?

PubMed

Ghaderi, Faezeh; Fijan, Soleiman; Hamedani, Shahram

2015-12-01

Prediction of child cooperation level in dental setting is an important issue for a dentist to select the proper behavior management method. Many psychological studies have emphasized the effect of birth order on patient behavior and personality; however, only a few researches evaluated the effect of birth order on child's behavior in dental setting. This study was designed to evaluate the influence of children ordinal position on their behavior in dental setting. A total of 158 children with at least one primary mandibular molar needing class I restoration were selected. Children were classified based on the ordinal position; first, middle, or last child as well as single child. A blinded examiner recorded the pain perception of children during injection based on Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) and Sound, Eye and Movement (SEM) scale. To assess the child's anxiety, the questionnaire known as "Dental Subscale of the Children's Fear Survey Schedule" (CFSS-DS) was employed. The results showed that single children were significantly less cooperative and more anxious than the other children (p<0.001). The middle children were significantly more cooperative in comparison with the other child's position (p< 0.001). Single child may behave less cooperatively in dental setting. The order of child birth must also be considered in prediction of child's behavior for behavioral management.

Cooperative and Competitive Behavior as a Function of Self-Esteem

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vance, John J.; Richmond, Bert O.

1975-01-01

Two hundred forty elementary school age children were paired on the basis of sex, race, and level of self-concept to participate in a cooperative-competitive game situation. Black children were found to be more cooperative than white children. The low self-concept subjects were more cooperative than high self-concept subjects. (Author)

The effect of oxytocin on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma depends on the social context and a person's social value orientation.

PubMed

Declerck, Carolyn H; Boone, Christophe; Kiyonari, Toko

2014-06-01

The interactionist approach to the study of exogenous oxytocin (OT) effects on prosocial behavior has emphasized the need to consider both contextual cues and individual differences. Therefore, an experiment was set up to examine the joint effect of intranasal OT, a salient social cue and the personality trait social value orientation on cooperative behavior in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. The outcome of these mixed-motive games is known to be highly dependent on values and on social information that might reveal the partner's intent. Consistent with an a priori hypothesis, OT and social information interact significantly to affect the behavior of individuals with a proself value orientation: after prior contact with the game partner, OT enhances cooperative behavior, whereas in anonymous conditions, it exacerbates their intrinsic self-interested behavior. These effects of OT do not hold for individuals with a prosocial value orientation, whose cooperation levels appear to be more influenced by prior contact with the game partner. Follow-up hypotheses for why prosocial and proself individuals respond differently to exogenous OT were developed. © The Author (2013). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

The effect of oxytocin on cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma depends on the social context and a person’s social value orientation

PubMed Central

Boone, Christophe; Kiyonari, Toko

2014-01-01

The interactionist approach to the study of exogenous oxytocin (OT) effects on prosocial behavior has emphasized the need to consider both contextual cues and individual differences. Therefore, an experiment was set up to examine the joint effect of intranasal OT, a salient social cue and the personality trait social value orientation on cooperative behavior in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games. The outcome of these mixed-motive games is known to be highly dependent on values and on social information that might reveal the partner’s intent. Consistent with an a priori hypothesis, OT and social information interact significantly to affect the behavior of individuals with a proself value orientation: after prior contact with the game partner, OT enhances cooperative behavior, whereas in anonymous conditions, it exacerbates their intrinsic self-interested behavior. These effects of OT do not hold for individuals with a prosocial value orientation, whose cooperation levels appear to be more influenced by prior contact with the game partner. Follow-up hypotheses for why prosocial and proself individuals respond differently to exogenous OT were developed. PMID:23588271

[Demonstrating that monitoring and punishing increase non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma game].

PubMed

Kitakaji, Yoko; Ohnuma, Susumu

2014-04-01

This research demonstrated the negative influence of monitoring and punishing during a social dilemma game, taking the illegal dumping of industrial waste as an example. The first study manipulated three conditions: a producing-industries monitoring condition (PIM), an administrative monitoring condition (ADM), and a control condition (no monitoring). The results showed that non-cooperative behavior was more frequent in the PIM condition than in the control condition. The second study had three conditions: a punishing condition (PC), a monitoring condition (MC), and a control condition (no monitoring, no punishing). The results indicated that non-cooperative behavior was observed the most in the PC, and the least in the control condition. Furthermore, information regarding other players' costs and benefits was shared the most in the control conditions in both studies. The results suggest that sanctions prevent people from sharing information, which decreases expectations of mutual cooperation.

Bacterial cheating limits antibiotic resistance

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xiao Chao, Hui; Yurtsev, Eugene; Datta, Manoshi; Artemova, Tanya; Gore, Jeff

2012-02-01

The widespread use of antibiotics has led to the evolution of resistance in bacteria. Bacteria can gain resistance to the antibiotic ampicillin by acquiring a plasmid carrying the gene beta-lactamase, which inactivates the antibiotic. This inactivation may represent a cooperative behavior, as the entire bacterial population benefits from removing the antibiotic. The cooperative nature of this growth suggests that a cheater strain---which does not contribute to breaking down the antibiotic---may be able to take advantage of cells cooperatively inactivating the antibiotic. Here we find experimentally that a ``sensitive'' bacterial strain lacking the plasmid conferring resistance can invade a population of resistant bacteria, even in antibiotic concentrations that should kill the sensitive strain. We observe stable coexistence between the two strains and find that a simple model successfully explains the behavior as a function of antibiotic concentration and cell density. We anticipate that our results will provide insight into the evolutionary origin of phenotypic diversity and cooperative behaviors.

Prosocial Behavior and Subjective Insecurity in Violent Contexts: Field Experiments.

PubMed

Vélez, María Alejandra; Trujillo, Carlos Andres; Moros, Lina; Forero, Clemente

2016-01-01

Subjective insecurity is a key determinant of different forms of prosocial behavior. In Study 1, we used field experiments with farmers in Colombian villages exposed to different levels of violence to investigate how individual perceptions of insecurity affect cooperation, trust, reciprocity and altruism. To do so, we developed a cognitive-affective measure of subjective insecurity. We found that subjective insecurity has a negative effect on cooperation but influences trust and altruism positively. In Study 2, carried out three years after Study 1, we repeated the initial design with additional measures of victimization. Our goal was to relate subjective insecurity with actual victimization. The findings of Study 2 support the initial results, and are robust and consistent for cooperative behavior and trust when including victimization as a mediator. Different indicators of victimization are positively correlated with subjective insecurity and an aggregate index of victimization has a negative effect on cooperation but exerts a positive influence on trust.

Social Value Induction and Cooperation in the Centipede Game

PubMed Central

2016-01-01

The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic interactions. Two experiments investigated psychological factors driving cooperation in 20 rounds of a Centipede game with significant monetary incentives and anonymous and random re-pairing of players after every round. The main purpose of the research was to determine whether the pattern of strategic choices observed when no specific social value orientation is experimentally induced—the standard condition in all previous investigations of behavior in the Centipede and most other experimental games—is essentially individualistic, the orthodox game-theoretic assumption being that players are individualistically motivated in the absence of any specific motivational induction. Participants in whom no specific state social value orientation was induced exhibited moderately non-cooperative play that differed significantly from the pattern found when an individualistic orientation was induced. In both experiments, the neutral treatment condition, in which no orientation was induced, elicited competitive behavior resembling behavior in the condition in which a competitive orientation was explicitly induced. Trait social value orientation, measured with a questionnaire, influenced cooperation differently depending on the experimentally induced state social value orientation. Cooperative trait social value orientation was a significant predictor of cooperation and, to a lesser degree, experimentally induced competitive orientation was a significant predictor of non-cooperation. The experimental results imply that the standard assumption of individualistic motivation in experimental games may not be valid, and that the results of such investigations need to take into account the possibility that players are competitively motivated. PMID:27010385

The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it.

PubMed

Powers, Simon T; Penn, Alexandra S; Watson, Richard A

2011-06-01

The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for kin or group selection. We argue that models that do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, because they cannot explain how the prerequisite population structures arise. Here, we consider the concurrent evolution of genetic traits that affect population structure, with those that affect social behavior. We show that not only does population structure drive social evolution, as in previous models, but that the opportunity for cooperation can in turn drive the creation of population structures that support it. This occurs through the generation of linkage disequilibrium between socio-behavioral and population-structuring traits, such that direct kin selection on social behavior creates indirect selection pressure on population structure. We illustrate our argument with a model of the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social behavior. © 2011 The Author(s). Evolution© 2011 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

Industry Cluster's Adaptive Co-competition Behavior Modeling Inspired by Swarm Intelligence

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xiang, Wei; Ye, Feifan

Adaptation helps the individual enterprise to adjust its behavior to uncertainties in environment and hence determines a healthy growth of both the individuals and the whole industry cluster as well. This paper is focused on the study on co-competition adaptation behavior of industry cluster, which is inspired by swarm intelligence mechanisms. By referencing to ant cooperative transportation and ant foraging behavior and their related swarm intelligence approaches, the cooperative adaptation and competitive adaptation behavior are studied and relevant models are proposed. Those adaptive co-competition behaviors model can be integrated to the multi-agent system of industry cluster to make the industry cluster model more realistic.

Special Education in General Education Classrooms: Cooperative Teaching Using Supportive Learning Activities.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Johnson, Robin R.; And Others

1995-01-01

Supportive learning activities were implemented in a multiple-baseline time series design across four fifth-grade classrooms to evaluate the effects of a cooperative teaching alternative (supportive learning) on teaching behavior, the behavior and grades of general and special education students, and the opinions of general education teachers.…

An Examination of the Feasibility of Integrating Motivational Interviewing Techniques into FCS Cooperative Extension Programming

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Radunovich, Heidi Liss; Ellis, Sarah; Spangler, Taylor

2017-01-01

Demonstrating program impact through behavior change is critical for the continued success of Family and Consumer Sciences (FCS) Cooperative Extension programming. However, the literature suggests that simply providing information to participants does not necessarily lead to behavior change. This study pilot tested the integration of Motivational…

Humans expect generosity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Rodríguez-Lara, Ismael; Sánchez, Angel

2017-02-01

Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological feature likely to be relevant is the formation of expectations, particularly about receiving cooperative or generous behavior from others. Without such expectations, social life will be seriously impeded and, in turn, expectations leading to satisfactory interactions can become norms and institutionalize cooperation. In this paper, we assess people’s expectations of generosity in a series of controlled experiments using the dictator game. Despite differences in respective roles, involvement in the game, degree of social distance or variation of stakes, the results are conclusive: subjects seldom predict that dictators will behave selfishly (by choosing the Nash equilibrium action, namely giving nothing). The majority of subjects expect that dictators will choose the equal split. This implies that generous behavior is not only observed in the lab, but also expected by subjects. In addition, expectations are accurate, matching closely the donations observed and showing that as a society we have a good grasp of how we interact. Finally, correlation between expectations and actual behavior suggests that expectations can be an important ingredient of generous or cooperative behavior.

Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation

PubMed Central

Nishi, Akihiro; Christakis, Nicholas A.; Evans, Anthony M.; O’Malley, A. James; Rand, David G.

2016-01-01

Are cooperative decisions typically made more quickly or slowly than non-cooperative decisions? While this question has attracted considerable attention in recent years, most research has focused on one-shot interactions. Yet it is repeated interactions that characterize most important real-world social interactions. In repeated interactions, the cooperativeness of one’s interaction partners (the “social environment”) should affect the speed of cooperation. Specifically, we propose that reciprocal decisions (choices that mirror behavior observed in the social environment), rather than cooperative decisions per se, occur more quickly. We test this hypothesis by examining four independent decision time datasets with a total of 2,088 subjects making 55,968 decisions. We show that reciprocal decisions are consistently faster than non-reciprocal decisions: cooperation is faster than defection in cooperative environments, while defection is faster than cooperation in non-cooperative environments. These differences are further enhanced by subjects’ previous behavior – reciprocal decisions are faster when they are consistent with the subject’s previous choices. Finally, mediation analyses of a fifth dataset suggest that the speed of reciprocal decisions is explained, in part, by feelings of conflict – reciprocal decisions are less conflicted than non-reciprocal decisions, and less decision conflict appears to lead to shorter decision times. PMID:27435940

Evolution of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas on Complex Networks

PubMed Central

Iyer, Swami; Killingback, Timothy

2016-01-01

Cooperation in social dilemmas is essential for the functioning of systems at multiple levels of complexity, from the simplest biological organisms to the most sophisticated human societies. Cooperation, although widespread, is fundamentally challenging to explain evolutionarily, since natural selection typically favors selfish behavior which is not socially optimal. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in three exemplars of key social dilemmas, representing the prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-dove and coordination classes of games, in structured populations defined by complex networks. Using individual-based simulations of the games on model and empirical networks, we give a detailed comparative study of the effects of the structural properties of a network, such as its average degree, variance in degree distribution, clustering coefficient, and assortativity coefficient, on the promotion of cooperative behavior in all three classes of games. PMID:26928428

Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations.

PubMed

Kitts, James A; Leal, Diego F; Felps, Will; Jones, Thomas M; Berman, Shawn L

2016-01-01

Extensive interdisciplinary literatures have built on the seminal spatial dilemmas model, which depicts the evolution of cooperation on regular lattices, with strategies propagating locally by relative fitness. In this model agents may cooperate with neighbors, paying an individual cost to enhance their collective welfare, or they may exploit cooperative neighbors and diminish collective welfare. Recent research has extended the model in numerous ways, incorporating behavioral noise, implementing other network topologies or adaptive networks, and employing alternative dynamics of replication. Although the underlying dilemma arises from two distinct dimensions-the gains for exploiting cooperative partners (Greed) and the cost of cooperating with exploitative partners (Fear)-most work following from the spatial dilemmas model has argued or assumed that the dilemma can be represented with a single parameter: This research has typically examined Greed or Fear in isolation, or a composite such as the K-index of Cooperation or the ratio of the benefit to cost of cooperation. We challenge this claim on theoretical grounds-showing that embedding interaction in networks generally leads Greed and Fear to have divergent, interactive, and highly nonlinear effects on cooperation at the macro level, even when individuals respond identically to Greed and Fear. Using computational experiments, we characterize both dynamic local behavior and long run outcomes across regions of this space. We also simulate interventions to investigate changes of Greed and Fear over time, showing how model behavior changes asymmetrically as boundaries in payoff space are crossed, leading some interventions to have irreversible effects on cooperation. We then replicate our experiments on inter-organizational network data derived from links through shared directors among 2,400 large US corporations, thus demonstrating our findings for Greed and Fear on a naturally-occurring network. In closing, we discuss implications of our main findings regarding Greed and Fear for the problem of cooperation on inter-organizational networks.

Greed and Fear in Network Reciprocity: Implications for Cooperation among Organizations

PubMed Central

Kitts, James A.; Leal, Diego F.; Felps, Will; Jones, Thomas M.; Berman, Shawn L.

2016-01-01

Extensive interdisciplinary literatures have built on the seminal spatial dilemmas model, which depicts the evolution of cooperation on regular lattices, with strategies propagating locally by relative fitness. In this model agents may cooperate with neighbors, paying an individual cost to enhance their collective welfare, or they may exploit cooperative neighbors and diminish collective welfare. Recent research has extended the model in numerous ways, incorporating behavioral noise, implementing other network topologies or adaptive networks, and employing alternative dynamics of replication. Although the underlying dilemma arises from two distinct dimensions—the gains for exploiting cooperative partners (Greed) and the cost of cooperating with exploitative partners (Fear)–most work following from the spatial dilemmas model has argued or assumed that the dilemma can be represented with a single parameter: This research has typically examined Greed or Fear in isolation, or a composite such as the K-index of Cooperation or the ratio of the benefit to cost of cooperation. We challenge this claim on theoretical grounds—showing that embedding interaction in networks generally leads Greed and Fear to have divergent, interactive, and highly nonlinear effects on cooperation at the macro level, even when individuals respond identically to Greed and Fear. Using computational experiments, we characterize both dynamic local behavior and long run outcomes across regions of this space. We also simulate interventions to investigate changes of Greed and Fear over time, showing how model behavior changes asymmetrically as boundaries in payoff space are crossed, leading some interventions to have irreversible effects on cooperation. We then replicate our experiments on inter-organizational network data derived from links through shared directors among 2,400 large US corporations, thus demonstrating our findings for Greed and Fear on a naturally-occurring network. In closing, we discuss implications of our main findings regarding Greed and Fear for the problem of cooperation on inter-organizational networks. PMID:26863540

How Do Children Behave Regarding Their Birth Order in Dental Setting?

PubMed Central

Ghaderi, Faezeh; Fijan, Soleiman; Hamedani, Shahram

2015-01-01

Statement of the Problem Prediction of child cooperation level in dental setting is an important issue for a dentist to select the proper behavior management method. Many psychological studies have emphasized the effect of birth order on patient behavior and personality; however, only a few researches evaluated the effect of birth order on child’s behavior in dental setting. Purpose This study was designed to evaluate the influence of children ordinal position on their behavior in dental setting. Materials and Method A total of 158 children with at least one primary mandibular molar needing class I restoration were selected. Children were classified based on the ordinal position; first, middle, or last child as well as single child. A blinded examiner recorded the pain perception of children during injection based on Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) and Sound, Eye and Movement (SEM) scale. To assess the child's anxiety, the questionnaire known as “Dental Subscale of the Children's Fear Survey Schedule” (CFSS-DS) was employed. Results The results showed that single children were significantly less cooperative and more anxious than the other children (p<0.001). The middle children were significantly more cooperative in comparison with the other child's position (p< 0.001). Conclusion Single child may behave less cooperatively in dental setting. The order of child birth must also be considered in prediction of child’s behavior for behavioral management. PMID:26636121

The Role of Inhibitory Control in Children's Cooperative Behaviors during a Structured Puzzle Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Giannotta, Fabrizia; Burk, William J.; Ciairano, Silvia

2011-01-01

This study examined the role of inhibitory control (measured by Stroop interference) in children's cooperative behaviors during a structured puzzle task. The sample consisted of 250 8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds (117 girls and 133 boys) attending classrooms in three primary schools in Northern Italy. Children individually completed an elaborated…

Competitive Aggression without Interaction: Effects of Competitive versus Cooperative Instructions on Aggressive Behavior in Video Games.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Anderson, Craig A.; Morrow, Melissa

1995-01-01

Extended and tested Deutsch's theory of competition effects. Predicted that people view competitive situations as inherently more aggressive than cooperative ones. Predicted that leading people to think of an aggressive situation in competitive terms would increase aggressive behavior. Increase of kill ratio occurred in absence of changes in…

Academic Expectations, Attributed Responsibility, and Teachers' Reinforcement Behavior: A Comment on Cooper and Baron, with Some Additional Data.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Meyer, Wulf-Uwe

1979-01-01

Cooper and Baron's conclusions (EJ 174 719) that teachers' performance expectations were more potent predictors of their reinforcement behavior in class than were their attributions of responsibility is criticized on the basis of methodological flaws in the study. Evidence associations between teachers' attributions of responsibility and their…

Randomly biased investments and the evolution of public goods on interdependent networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chen, Wei; Wu, Te; Li, Zhiwu; Wang, Long

2017-08-01

Deciding how to allocate resources between interdependent systems is significant to optimize efficiency. We study the effects of heterogeneous contribution, induced by such interdependency, on the evolution of cooperation, through implementing the public goods games on two-layer networks. The corresponding players on different layers try to share a fixed amount of resources as the initial investment properly. The symmetry breaking of investments between players located on different layers is able to either prevent investments from, or extract them out of the deadlock. Results show that a moderate investment heterogeneity is best favorable for the evolution of cooperation, and random allocation of investment bias suppresses the cooperators at a wide range of the investment bias and the enhancement effect. Further studies on time evolution with different initial strategy configurations show that the non-interdependent cooperators along the interface of interdependent cooperators also are an indispensable factor in facilitating cooperative behavior. Our main results are qualitatively unchanged even diversifying investment bias that is subject to uniform distribution. Our study may shed light on the understanding of the origin of cooperative behavior on interdependent networks.

Teaching Cooperative Skills through Games.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Glakas, Barbara A.

1991-01-01

Through cooperative games and play, children learn to share, empathize with others' feelings, and get along better. The article makes suggestions to physical educators on how to design games to teach students cooperative behaviors and how to incorporate them into class, noting four important game-design principles. (SM)

Swarm intelligence inspired shills and the evolution of cooperation.

PubMed

Duan, Haibin; Sun, Changhao

2014-06-09

Many hostile scenarios exist in real-life situations, where cooperation is disfavored and the collective behavior needs intervention for system efficiency improvement. Towards this end, the framework of soft control provides a powerful tool by introducing controllable agents called shills, who are allowed to follow well-designed updating rules for varying missions. Inspired by swarm intelligence emerging from flocks of birds, we explore here the dependence of the evolution of cooperation on soft control by an evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game staged on square lattices, where the shills adopt a particle swarm optimization (PSO) mechanism for strategy updating. We demonstrate that not only can cooperation be promoted by shills effectively seeking for potentially better strategies and spreading them to others, but also the frequency of cooperation could be arbitrarily controlled by choosing appropriate parameter settings. Moreover, we show that adding more shills does not contribute to further cooperation promotion, while assigning higher weights to the collective knowledge for strategy updating proves a efficient way to induce cooperative behavior. Our research provides insights into cooperation evolution in the presence of PSO-inspired shills and we hope it will be inspirational for future studies focusing on swarm intelligence based soft control.

A Cooperative Learning Classroom Intervention for Increasing Peer's Acceptance of Children With ADHD.

PubMed

Capodieci, Agnese; Rivetti, Thomas; Cornoldi, Cesare

2016-08-31

The hypothesis behind this study was that trained teachers using cooperative learning procedures with children in their classroom (aged from 6 to 10 years) can influence the social skills of children with ADHD symptoms and their acceptance by their peers. The study involved 30 children with ADHD symptoms attending 12 different classes, where cooperative learning was adopted in some, and standard practices in others. ADHD children's symptoms, social skills, and cooperative behavior were assessed by means of a teacher's questionnaire, and the social preferences of the children in their class were collected. Changes emerged in teachers' assessments of the children's cooperative behavior in the experimental classes. Improvements in the sociometric status of children with ADHD symptoms were only seen in the cooperative learning classes. These results show the importance of well-structured intervention in classes that include children with ADHD symptoms. Implications of these findings for future intervention are discussed. © The Author(s) 2016.

Tolerance-based punishment in continuous public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gao, Jia; Li, Zhi; Cong, Rui; Wang, Long

2012-08-01

Altruistic punishment for defectors is considered as a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. However, there is no clear border between the cooperative and defective behaviors in a continuous strategy game. We propose a model to study the effect of punishment on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods game, wherein individuals have the traits to punish the co-players based on social tolerance. We show that a reasonable punishment with a uniform tolerance can spur individuals to make more investments. Additionally, for a fixed punishment cost and a fixed fine, a moderate value of tolerance can result in the best promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of investment and tolerance. We find that the population splits into two branches: high-tolerance individuals who make high investments and low-tolerance individuals who make low investments. A dynamic equilibrium is achieved between these two types of individuals. Our work extends punishment to continuous cooperative behaviors and the results may enhance the understanding of altruistic punishment in the evolution of human cooperation.

The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives.

PubMed

Dong, Yali; Zhang, Boyu; Tao, Yi

2016-06-24

The empirical research on the public goods game (PGG) indicates that both institutional rewards and institutional punishment can curb free-riding and that the punishment effect is stronger than the reward effect. Self-regarding models that are based on Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies or evolutionary game dynamics correctly predict which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, but individuals do not play these rational strategies overall. The goal of our study is to investigate the dynamics of human decision making in the repeated PGG with institutional incentives. We consider that an individual's contribution is affected by four factors, which are self-interest, the behavior of others, the reaction to rewards, and the reaction to punishment. We find that people on average do not react to rewards and punishment, and that self-interest and the behavior of others sufficiently explain the dynamics of human behavior. Further analysis suggests that institutional incentives promote cooperation by affecting the self-regarding preference and that the other-regarding preference seems to be independent of incentive schemes. Because individuals do not change their behavioral patterns even if they were not rewarded or punished, the mere potential to punish defectors and reward cooperators can lead to considerable increases in the level of cooperation.

Special Agents Can Promote Cooperation in the Population

PubMed Central

Wang, Xin; Han, Jing; Han, Huawei

2011-01-01

Cooperation is ubiquitous in our real life but everyone would like to maximize her own profits. How does cooperation occur in the group of self-interested agents without centralized control? Furthermore, in a hostile scenario, for example, cooperation is unlikely to emerge. Is there any mechanism to promote cooperation if populations are given and play rules are not allowed to change? In this paper, numerical experiments show that complete population interaction is unfriendly to cooperation in the finite but end-unknown Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD). Then a mechanism called soft control is proposed to promote cooperation. According to the basic idea of soft control, a number of special agents are introduced to intervene in the evolution of cooperation. They comply with play rules in the original group so that they are always treated as normal agents. For our purpose, these special agents have their own strategies and share knowledge. The capability of the mechanism is studied under different settings. We find that soft control can promote cooperation and is robust to noise. Meanwhile simulation results demonstrate the applicability of the mechanism in other scenarios. Besides, the analytical proof also illustrates the effectiveness of soft control and validates simulation results. As a way of intervention in collective behaviors, soft control provides a possible direction for the study of reciprocal behaviors. PMID:22216202

An IUR evolutionary game model on the patent cooperate of Shandong China

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Mengmeng; Ma, Yinghong; Liu, Zhiyuan; You, Xuemei

2017-06-01

Organizations of industries and university & research institutes cooperate to meet their respective needs based on social contacts, trust and share complementary resources. From the perspective of complex network together with the patent data of Shandong province in China, a novel evolutionary game model on patent cooperation network is presented. Two sides in the game model are industries and universities & research institutes respectively. The cooperation is represented by a connection when a new patent is developed together by the two sides. The optimal strategy of the evolutionary game model is quantified by the average positive cooperation probability p ¯ and the average payoff U ¯ . The feasibility of this game model is simulated on the parameters such as the knowledge spillover, the punishment, the development cost and the distribution coefficient of the benefit. The numerical simulations show that the cooperative behaviors are affected by the variation of parameters. The knowledge spillover displays different behaviors when the punishment is larger than the development cost or less than it. Those results indicate that reasonable punishment would improve the positive cooperation. The appropriate punishment will be useful to enhance the big degree nodes positively cooperate with industries and universities & research institutes. And an equitable plan for the distribution of cooperative profits is half-and-half distribution strategy for the two sides in game.

Human behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma experiments suppresses network reciprocity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos; Cuesta, José A.; Sánchez, Angel; Moreno, Yamir

2012-03-01

During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex networks. In this context, the Prisoner's Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has been established that imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to very different outcomes depending on the details of the network. We here report that when one takes into account the real behavior of people observed in the experiments, both at the mean-field level and on utterly different networks, the observed level of cooperation is the same. We thus show that when human subjects interact in a heterogeneous mix including cooperators, defectors and moody conditional cooperators, the structure of the population does not promote or inhibit cooperation with respect to a well mixed population.

The effect of juvenile hormone on Polistes wasp fertility varies with cooperative behavior.

PubMed

Tibbetts, Elizabeth A; Sheehan, Michael J

2012-04-01

Social insects provide good models for studying how and why the mechanisms that underlie reproduction vary, as there is dramatic reproductive plasticity within and between species. Here, we test how the effect of juvenile hormone (JH) on fertility covaries with cooperative behavior in workers and nest-founding queens in the primitively eusocial wasp Polistes metricus. P. metricus foundresses and workers appear morphologically similar and both are capable of reproduction, though there is variation in the extent of social cooperation and the probability of reproduction across castes. Do the endocrine mechanisms that mediate reproduction co-vary with cooperative behavior? We found dramatic differences in the effect of JH on fertility across castes. In non-cooperative nest-founding queens, all individuals responded to JH by increasing their fertility. However, in cooperative workers, the effect of JH on fertility varies with body weight; large workers increase their fertility in response to JH while small workers do not. The variation in JH response may be an adaptation to facilitate resource allocation based on the probability of independent reproduction. This work contrasts with previous studies in closely related Polistes dominulus paper wasps, in which both foundresses and workers form cooperative associations and both castes show similar, condition-dependent JH response. The variation in JH responsiveness within and between species suggests that endocrine responsiveness and the factors influencing caste differentiation are surprisingly evolutionarily labile. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Effects of inhomogeneous activity of players and noise on cooperation in spatial public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Guan, Jian-Yue; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Wang, Ying-Hai

2007-11-01

We study the public goods game in the noisy case by considering the players with inhomogeneous activity of teaching on a square lattice. It is shown that the introduction of the inhomogeneous activity of teaching the players can remarkably promote cooperation. By investigating the effects of noise on cooperative behavior in detail, we find that the variation of cooperator density ρC with the noise parameter κ displays several different behaviors: ρC monotonically increases (decreases) with κ ; ρC first increases (decreases) with κ and then it decreases (increases) monotonically after reaching its maximum (minimum) value, which depends on the amount of the multiplication factor r , on whether the system is homogeneous or inhomogeneous, and on whether the adopted updating is synchronous or asynchronous. These results imply that the noise plays an important and nontrivial role in the evolution of cooperation.

Impact of Social Punishment on Cooperative Behavior in Complex Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Zhen; Xia, Cheng-Yi; Meloni, Sandro; Zhou, Chang-Song; Moreno, Yamir

2013-10-01

Social punishment is a mechanism by which cooperative individuals spend part of their resources to penalize defectors. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in 2-person evolutionary games on networks when a mechanism for social punishment is introduced. Specifically, we introduce a new kind of role, punisher, which is aimed at reducing the earnings of defectors by applying to them a social fee. Results from numerical simulations show that different equilibria allowing the three strategies to coexist are possible as well as that social punishment further enhance the robustness of cooperation. Our results are confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. In addition, we analyze the microscopic mechanisms that give rise to the observed macroscopic behaviors in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. Our conclusions might provide additional insights for understanding the roots of cooperation in social systems.

Teaching Cooperation to Enhance Creativity--Theoretical Rationale.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Herrick, James; Herrick, Penny

The paper discusses the major components of creativity, the relationship of competition and cooperation to creativity, and a model for teaching cooperation to enhance creativity. Creative behavior is directed toward the imaginative construction of what is desired and its eventual actualization in everyday life. Components of creativity include…

Bacterial cheating limits the evolution of antibiotic resistance

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chao, Hui Xiao; Datta, Manoshi; Yurtsev, Eugene; Gore, Jeff

2011-03-01

The widespread use of antibiotics has led to the evolution of resistance in bacteria. Bacteria can gain resistance to the antibiotic ampicillin by acquiring a plasmid carrying the gene beta-lactamase, which inactivates the antibiotic. This inactivation may represent a cooperative behavior, as the entire bacterial population benefits from removing the antibiotic. The cooperative nature of this growth suggests that a cheater strain--which does not contribute to breaking down the antibiotic--may be able to take advantage of cells cooperatively inactivating the antibiotic. Here we experimentally find that a ``sensitive'' bacterial strain lacking the plasmid conferring resistance can invade a population of resistant bacteria, even in antibiotic concentrations that should kill the sensitive strain. We observe stable coexistence between the two strains and find that a simple model successfully explains the behavior as a function of antibiotic concentration and cell density. We anticipate that our results will provide insight into the evolutionary origin of phenotypic diversity and cooperative behaviors found in nature.

Prosocial Behavior and Subjective Insecurity in Violent Contexts: Field Experiments

PubMed Central

Vélez, María Alejandra; Trujillo, Carlos Andres; Moros, Lina; Forero, Clemente

2016-01-01

Subjective insecurity is a key determinant of different forms of prosocial behavior. In Study 1, we used field experiments with farmers in Colombian villages exposed to different levels of violence to investigate how individual perceptions of insecurity affect cooperation, trust, reciprocity and altruism. To do so, we developed a cognitive-affective measure of subjective insecurity. We found that subjective insecurity has a negative effect on cooperation but influences trust and altruism positively. In Study 2, carried out three years after Study 1, we repeated the initial design with additional measures of victimization. Our goal was to relate subjective insecurity with actual victimization. The findings of Study 2 support the initial results, and are robust and consistent for cooperative behavior and trust when including victimization as a mediator. Different indicators of victimization are positively correlated with subjective insecurity and an aggregate index of victimization has a negative effect on cooperation but exerts a positive influence on trust. PMID:27472437

Developmental and Cross-Cultural Differences in the Cooperative and Competitive Behavior of Young Children.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Madsen, Millard C.

An experimental task with accompanying apparatus was developed for use in the study of developmental and cultural differences in the cooperative-competitive behavior of children in a small Mexican town and in California. Two groups of 20 Mexican children (aged 7-8 and 10-11), from an elementary school in a town in Baja, California, Mexico, were…

Increasing Parent and Caregiver Understanding of the Power of Positive Interactions in Promoting Prosocial Behaviour in Young Children.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thompson, Pamela

The goal of the project presented in the practicum was to help parents develop competencies in interacting with their children in ways which foster self esteem and cooperative behavior. The objectives of the practicum included, first, increasing parents' knowledge of: (1) the factors leading to high self esteem and cooperative behavior; (2) the…

Correcting Inappropriate Classroom Behavior through the Use of Cooperative Learning and Peer and Self-Evaluation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Krause, Fritz

The effectiveness of a behavior modification program combining cooperative learning with peer and self-evaluation was field tested with a group of 20 students in a 9th-grade class in beginning small engines. The students represented a mix of racial/cultural and economic backgrounds, were of average intelligence, and exhibited a variety of poor…

Heart rate, salivary α-amylase activity, and cooperative behavior in previously naïve children receiving dental local anesthesia.

PubMed

Arhakis, Aristidis; Menexes, George; Coolidge, Trilby; Kalfas, Sotirios

2012-01-01

Psychosomatic indicators, such as heart rate (HR), salivary alpha amylase (sAA) activity, and behavior, can be used to determine stress. This study's aim was to assess the pattern of changes of salivary alpha amylase, heart rate, and cooperative behavior in previously naïve children receiving dental treatment under local anesthesia. Included were 30 children with no prior dental experience who needed 4 or more sessions of dental treatment involving local anesthesia. In each session, sAA, HR, and behavior were assessed before and during the application of local anesthesia and at the end of the treatment. The highest sAA value was always observed at the end of each session; overall, the value was lower in the fourth session. HR always increased during the local anesthesia, and did not vary across sessions. No significant relationship was found between child cooperation and either sAA or HR. In this sample, child cooperation may not be an accurate indicator of stress. Based on salivary alpha amylase activity changes, dental treatment involving local anesthesia in naïve children appeared to be less stressful after 3 sessions.

Impact of Cooperative Business Management Curriculum on Secondary Student Attitudes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McKee, Gregory; Duffield, Stacy K.

2011-01-01

The authors examined the effect a curriculum about cooperative businesses had on high school student attitudes toward these businesses. Cognitive, affective, and behavioral dimensions were measured before and after participating in the curriculum. Older high school students increased their attitudes toward cooperatives more than did younger…

Exposure to Hedione Increases Reciprocity in Humans

PubMed Central

Berger, Sebastian; Hatt, Hanns; Ockenfels, Axel

2017-01-01

Cooperation among unrelated humans is frequently regarded as a defining feature in the evolutionary success of our species. Whereas, much research has addressed the strategic and cognitive mechanisms that underlie cooperation, investigations into chemosensory processes have received very limited research attention. To bridge that gap, we build on recent research that has identified the chemically synthesized odorant Hedione (HED) as a ligand for the putative human pheromone receptor (VN1R1) expressed in the olfactory mucosa, and hypothesize that exposure to HED may increase reciprocity. Applying behavioral economics paradigms, the present research shows that exposure to the ligand causes differentiated behavioral effects in reciprocal punishments (Study 1) as well as rewards (Study 2), two types of behaviors that are frequently regarded as essential for the development and maintenance of cooperation. PMID:28512400

Establishing Cooperative Peer Relations in the Classroom.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kohler, Frank W.; And Others

1985-01-01

A classwide peer tutoring procedure stresses team competition and within-team cooperation and promotes social behavior in elementary children. Examples of the structural tutoring approach are given. (CL)

Variable ecological conditions promote male helping by changing banded mongoose group composition.

PubMed

Marshall, Harry H; Sanderson, Jennifer L; Mwanghuya, Francis; Businge, Robert; Kyabulima, Solomon; Hares, Michelle C; Inzani, Emma; Kalema-Zikusoka, Gladys; Mwesige, Kenneth; Thompson, Faye J; Vitikainen, Emma I K; Cant, Michael A

2016-01-01

Ecological conditions are expected to have an important influence on individuals' investment in cooperative care. However, the nature of their effects is unclear: both favorable and unfavorable conditions have been found to promote helping behavior. Recent studies provide a possible explanation for these conflicting results by suggesting that increased ecological variability, rather than changes in mean conditions, promote cooperative care. However, no study has tested whether increased ecological variability promotes individual-level helping behavior or the mechanisms involved. We test this hypothesis in a long-term study population of the cooperatively breeding banded mongoose, Mungos mungo , using 14 years of behavioral and meteorological data to explore how the mean and variability of ecological conditions influence individual behavior, body condition, and survival. Female body condition was more sensitive to changes in rainfall leading to poorer female survival and pronounced male-biased group compositions after periods of high rainfall variability. After such periods, older males invested more in helping behavior, potentially because they had fewer mating opportunities. These results provide the first empirical evidence for increased individual helping effort in more variable ecological conditions and suggest this arises because of individual differences in the effect of ecological conditions on body condition and survival, and the knock-on effect on social group composition. Individual differences in sensitivity to environmental variability, and the impacts this has on the internal structure and composition of animal groups, can exert a strong influence on the evolution and maintenance of social behaviors, such as cooperative care.

Variable ecological conditions promote male helping by changing banded mongoose group composition

PubMed Central

Sanderson, Jennifer L.; Mwanghuya, Francis; Businge, Robert; Kyabulima, Solomon; Hares, Michelle C.; Inzani, Emma; Kalema-Zikusoka, Gladys; Mwesige, Kenneth; Thompson, Faye J.; Vitikainen, Emma I. K.; Cant, Michael A.

2016-01-01

Ecological conditions are expected to have an important influence on individuals’ investment in cooperative care. However, the nature of their effects is unclear: both favorable and unfavorable conditions have been found to promote helping behavior. Recent studies provide a possible explanation for these conflicting results by suggesting that increased ecological variability, rather than changes in mean conditions, promote cooperative care. However, no study has tested whether increased ecological variability promotes individual-level helping behavior or the mechanisms involved. We test this hypothesis in a long-term study population of the cooperatively breeding banded mongoose, Mungos mungo, using 14 years of behavioral and meteorological data to explore how the mean and variability of ecological conditions influence individual behavior, body condition, and survival. Female body condition was more sensitive to changes in rainfall leading to poorer female survival and pronounced male-biased group compositions after periods of high rainfall variability. After such periods, older males invested more in helping behavior, potentially because they had fewer mating opportunities. These results provide the first empirical evidence for increased individual helping effort in more variable ecological conditions and suggest this arises because of individual differences in the effect of ecological conditions on body condition and survival, and the knock-on effect on social group composition. Individual differences in sensitivity to environmental variability, and the impacts this has on the internal structure and composition of animal groups, can exert a strong influence on the evolution and maintenance of social behaviors, such as cooperative care. PMID:27418750

Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lu, Peng

2015-10-01

Cooperation is vital in human societies and therefore is widely investigated in the evolutionary game theory. Varieties of mechanisms have been proposed to overcome temptation and promote cooperation. Existing studies usually believe that agents are rational, but irrationalism such as emotions and feelings matters as well. Winner and loser are defined by their payoffs. In addition to admiring and imitating winners, the mechanism of sympathizing and imitating losers is introduced into the model as an alternative action rule, and each one plays the prisoners' dilemma game with eight neighbors under the influence of both irrationalism and rationalism. Rationalism refers to imitating winner to get highest payoff, and irrationalism means that people sympathize and adopt the actions of losers. As it is widely recognized that temptation reduces cooperation, this study focuses on the effect of sympathy on cooperation within a certain group or society. If it overcomes temptation that leads to defection, sympathy will be a powerful mechanism to promote cooperative behavior. Simulation results indicate that sympathy and temptation shares similar quadratic relationships with cooperation. Both sympathy and temptation undermine cooperation below their thresholds, and they both promote cooperation above their thresholds. Temptation not only reduces cooperation but also promote it as temptation goes beyond the threshold. Although sympathy is a good merit or human nature that is beneficial to society, a crisis or collapse of cooperation is inevitable when the sympathy propensity is relatively smaller. After cooperation reaches a minimal bottom, it then rises increasingly and dramatically, which brings a much brighter future of the society.

Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation.

PubMed

Van Cleve, Jeremy

2017-09-01

One of the triumphs of evolutionary biology is the discovery of robust mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperative behaviors even when cooperation reduces the fertility or survival of cooperators. These mechanisms include, kin selection, reciprocity, and direct benefits to cooperation that are often nonlinear. Though they have been extensively studied separately, investigating the joint action of these mechanisms has been more difficult. Moreover, how these mechanisms shape variation in cooperation is not well known. Such variation is crucial for understanding the evolution of behavioral syndromes and animal personality. Here, I use the tools of kin selection and evolutionary game theory to build a framework that integrates these mechanisms for pairwise social interactions. Using relatedness as a measure of the strength of kin selection, responsiveness as a measure of reciprocity, and synergy as a measure of payoff nonlinearity, I show how different combinations of these three parameters produce directional selection for or against cooperation or variation in levels of cooperation via stabilizing or diversifying selection. Moreover, each of these outcomes maps uniquely to one of four classic games from evolutionary game theory, which means that modulating relatedness, responsiveness, and synergy effectively transforms the payoff matrix from one the evolutionary game to another. Assuming that cooperation exacts a fertility cost on cooperators and provides a fertility benefit to social partners, a prisoner's dilemma game and directional selection against cooperation occur when relatedness and responsiveness are low and synergy is not too positive. Enough positive synergy in these conditions generates a stag-hunt game and diversifying selection. High levels of relatedness or responsiveness turn cooperation from a fitness cost into a fitness benefit, which produces a mutualism game and directional selection for cooperation when synergy is not too negative. Sufficiently negative synergy in this case creates a hawk-dove game and stabilizing selection for cooperation. I extend the results with relatedness and synergy to social groups and show that how group size changes the effect of relatedness and synergy on selection for cooperation depends on how the per capita benefit of cooperation changes with group size. Together, these results provide a general framework with which to generate comparative predictions that can be tested using quantitative genetic techniques and experimental techniques that manipulate investment in cooperation. These predictions will help us understand both interspecific variation in cooperation as well as within-population and within-group variation in cooperation related to behavioral syndromes. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology. All rights reserved. For permissions please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity.

PubMed

Kurokawa, Shun

2016-06-01

The existence of cooperation demands explanation since cooperation is costly to the actor. Reciprocity has long been regarded as a potential explanatory mechanism for the existence of cooperation. Reciprocity is a mechanism wherein a cooperator responds to an opponent's behavior by switching his/her own behavior. Hence, a possible problematic case relevant to the theory of reciprocity evolution arises when the mechanism is such that the information regarding an opponent's behavior is imperfect. Although it has been confirmed also by previous theoretical studies that imperfect information interferes with the evolution of reciprocity, this argument is based on the assumption that there are no mistakes in behavior. And, a previous study presumed that it might be expected that when such mistakes occur, reciprocity can more readily evolve in the case of imperfect information than in the case of perfect information. The reason why the previous study considers so is that in the former case, reciprocators can miss defections incurred by other reciprocators' mistakes due to imperfect information, allowing cooperation to persist when such reciprocators meet. However, contrary to this expectation, the previous study has shown that even when mistakes occur, imperfect information interferes with the evolution of reciprocity. Nevertheless, the previous study assumed that payoffs are linear (i.e., that the effect of behavior is additive and there are no synergetic effects). In this study, we revisited the same problem but removed the assumption that payoffs are linear. We used evolutionarily stable strategy analysis to compare the condition for reciprocity to evolve when mistakes occur and information is imperfect with the condition for reciprocity to evolve when mistakes occur and information is perfect. Our study revealed that when payoffs are not linear, imperfect information can facilitate the evolution of reciprocity when mistakes occur; while when payoffs are linear, imperfect information disturbs the evolution of reciprocity even when mistakes occur. Imperfect information can encourage the evolution of cooperation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Cooperation and cheating in microbes

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gore, Jeff

2011-03-01

Understanding the cooperative and competitive dynamics within and between species is a central challenge in evolutionary biology. Microbial model systems represent a unique opportunity to experimentally test fundamental theories regarding the evolution of cooperative behaviors. In this talk I will describe our experiments probing cooperation in microbes. In particular, I will compare the cooperative growth of yeast in sucrose and the cooperative inactivation of antibiotics by bacteria. In both cases we find that cheater strains---which don't contribute to the public welfare---are able to take advantage of the cooperator strains. However, this ability of cheaters to out-compete cooperators occurs only when cheaters are present at low frequency, thus leading to steady-state coexistence. These microbial experiments provide fresh insight into the evolutionary origin of cooperation.

The influence of migration speed on cooperation in spatial games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Wen-Jing; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Gu, Changgui; Yang, Huijie

2017-12-01

Migration is a common phenomenon in human society which provides a person an opportunity to search for a new life from one area to another. In the framework of game theory, people may migrate to escape from a current adverse environment (evading defection). Since people may migrate at different speeds, it is interesting to figure out the influence of migration speed on the evolution of cooperative behavior. In an attempt to discover the influence, we propose here a model based on an adaptive migration mechanism. In this model, an individual migrates or updates his/her strategy asynchronously, which is tuned by migration frequency. Firstly, it is found that an appropriate migration speed may evoke an effective mechanism, which enables cooperators dominate even in highly adverse conditions. Secondly, we check how migration speed alters the paradigm of cooperation quantitatively in the conditions of different migration frequency. When migration frequency is high, cooperation is promoted only at a small migration speed. However, when migration frequency is low, cooperation is always promoted at any migration speed. In addition, we also investigated the influence of temptation to defect on cooperation for the case of different migration speeds and migration frequencies. Our results may provide a fresh perspective on the understanding of how human behavior affects cooperation.

Neural correlates of social cooperation and non-cooperation as a function of psychopathy.

PubMed

Rilling, James K; Glenn, Andrea L; Jairam, Meeta R; Pagnoni, Giuseppe; Goldsmith, David R; Elfenbein, Hanie A; Lilienfeld, Scott O

2007-06-01

Psychopathy is a disorder involving a failure to experience many emotions that are necessary for appropriate social behavior. In this study, we probed the behavioral, emotional, and neural correlates of psychopathic traits within the context of a dyadic social interaction. Thirty subjects were imaged with functional magnetic resonance imaging while playing an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with human confederates who were outside the scanner. Subjects also completed two self-report psychopathy questionnaires. Subjects scoring higher on psychopathy, particularly males, defected more often and were less likely to continue cooperating after establishing mutual cooperation with a partner. Further, they experienced more outcomes in which their cooperation was not reciprocated (cooperate-defect outcome). After such outcomes, subjects scoring high in psychopathy showed less amygdala activation, suggesting weaker aversive conditioning to those outcomes. Compared with low-psychopathy subjects, subjects higher in psychopathy also showed weaker activation within orbitofrontal cortex when choosing to cooperate and showed weaker activation within dorsolateral prefrontal and rostral anterior cingulate cortex when choosing to defect. These findings suggest that whereas subjects scoring low on psychopathy have emotional biases toward cooperation that can only be overcome with effortful cognitive control, subjects scoring high on psychopathy have an opposing bias toward defection that likewise can only be overcome with cognitive effort.

Range expansion promotes cooperation in an experimental microbial metapopulation

PubMed Central

Datta, Manoshi Sen; Korolev, Kirill S.; Cvijovic, Ivana; Dudley, Carmel; Gore, Jeff

2013-01-01

Natural populations throughout the tree of life undergo range expansions in response to changes in the environment. Recent theoretical work suggests that range expansions can have a strong effect on evolution, even leading to the fixation of deleterious alleles that would normally be outcompeted in the absence of migration. However, little is known about how range expansions might influence alleles under frequency- or density-dependent selection. Moreover, there is very little experimental evidence to complement existing theory, since expanding populations are difficult to study in the natural environment. In this study, we have used a yeast experimental system to explore the effect of range expansions on the maintenance of cooperative behaviors, which commonly display frequency- and density-dependent selection and are widespread in nature. We found that range expansions favor the maintenance of cooperation in two ways: (i) through the enrichment of cooperators at the front of the expanding population and (ii) by allowing cooperators to “outrun” an invading wave of defectors. In this system, cooperation is enhanced through the coupling of population ecology and evolutionary dynamics in expanding populations, thus providing experimental evidence for a unique mechanism through which cooperative behaviors could be maintained in nature. PMID:23569263

Adolescents' responses to marital conflict: The role of cooperative marital conflict.

PubMed

Zhou, Nan; Buehler, Cheryl

2017-10-01

Not all youth exposed to hostile marital interactions develop negative responses to marital conflict. Cooperative marital conflict has long been considered as an important way of managing conflict and may serve as an important context in which hostility might convey during marital interactions. In light of little prior attention placed on the positive side of conflict processes, the main and moderating effects of cooperative marital conflict on youth responses to marital conflict were examined in a sample of 416 2-parent families using a multimethod, 2-year prospective design. Cooperative marital conflict was associated with decreases in youth emotional dysregulation, perceived threat, and behavioral dysregulation, and increases in constructive family representations and coping efficacy. As a specific dimension of cooperation, effective conflict resolution was associated uniquely with elevated youth coping efficacy, and decreased emotional and behavioral dysregulation; marital warmth was associated uniquely with increased constructive family representations. Significant interactions between marital hostility and marital cooperation also were found. These findings highlight the importance of examining cooperation above and beyond hostility in studies of marital conflict in order to better understand youth development during early adolescence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

Navigating the complex path between the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and cooperation: an endophenotype approach.

PubMed

Haas, Brian W; Anderson, Ian W; Smith, Jessica M

2013-11-28

Although cooperation represents a core facet of human social behavior there exists considerable variability across people in terms of the tendency to cooperate. One factor that may contribute to individual differences in cooperation is a key gene within the oxytocin (OT) system, the OT reception gene (OXTR). In this article, we aim to bridge the gap between the OXTR gene and cooperation by using an endophenotype approach. We present evidence that the association between the OXTR gene and cooperation may in part be due to how the OXTR gene affects brain systems involved in emotion recognition, empathy/theory of mind, social communication and social reward seeking. There is evidence that the OXTR gene is associated with the functional anatomy of the amygdala, visual cortex (VC), anterior cingulate and superior temporal gyrus (STG). However, it is currently unknown how the OXTR gene may be linked to the functional anatomy of other relevant brain regions that include the fusiform gyrus (FG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and nucleus accumbens (NAcc). We conclude by highlighting potential future research directions that may elucidate the path between OXTR and complex behaviors such as cooperation.

Navigating the complex path between the oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) and cooperation: an endophenotype approach

PubMed Central

Haas, Brian W.; Anderson, Ian W.; Smith, Jessica M.

2013-01-01

Although cooperation represents a core facet of human social behavior there exists considerable variability across people in terms of the tendency to cooperate. One factor that may contribute to individual differences in cooperation is a key gene within the oxytocin (OT) system, the OT reception gene (OXTR). In this article, we aim to bridge the gap between the OXTR gene and cooperation by using an endophenotype approach. We present evidence that the association between the OXTR gene and cooperation may in part be due to how the OXTR gene affects brain systems involved in emotion recognition, empathy/theory of mind, social communication and social reward seeking. There is evidence that the OXTR gene is associated with the functional anatomy of the amygdala, visual cortex (VC), anterior cingulate and superior temporal gyrus (STG). However, it is currently unknown how the OXTR gene may be linked to the functional anatomy of other relevant brain regions that include the fusiform gyrus (FG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and nucleus accumbens (NAcc). We conclude by highlighting potential future research directions that may elucidate the path between OXTR and complex behaviors such as cooperation. PMID:24348360

Evolution of cooperation in a heterogeneous population with influential individuals

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhuang, Qian; Wang, Dong; Fan, Ying; Di, Zengru

2012-02-01

Influential individuals are introduced and integrated with the public goods game (PGG) to investigate their influence on the emergence and evolution of cooperation. In the model, some influential individuals whose behaviors can be controlled by us are introduced into a homogeneous population on a square lattice. The influential individuals can play three kinds of roles: I. exemplar, II. supervisor with the power to punish defectors, and III. supervisor with the power to reward cooperative co-players. It is found that the existence of influential individuals who play Role I turns out to be detrimental to cooperation and that the larger the number of influential individuals is, the more difficult it is for cooperation to be maintained. For those playing supervisory roles, both punishment and reward are found to be effective ways for the influential individuals to promote and stabilize cooperative behavior. By comparing the critical costs and the mean payoffs for a low multiplication factor under the role of punishment and the role of reward, it is found that reward is a more effective intervention measure than punishment for influential individuals seeking to improve cooperation and that reward leads to a higher mean payoff.

When do people cooperate? The neuroeconomics of prosocial decision making.

PubMed

Declerck, Carolyn H; Boone, Christophe; Emonds, Griet

2013-02-01

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we propose that the motivation to cooperate (or not), generated by the reward system in the brain (extending from the striatum to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex), is modulated by two neural networks: a cognitive control system (centered on the lateral prefrontal cortex) that processes extrinsic cooperative incentives, and/or a social cognition system (including the temporo-parietal junction, the medial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala) that processes trust and/or threat signals. The independent modulatory influence of incentives and trust on the decision to cooperate is substantiated by a growing body of neuroimaging data and reconciles the apparent paradox between economic versus social rationality in the literature, suggesting that we are in fact wired for both. Furthermore, the theoretical framework can account for substantial behavioral heterogeneity in prosocial behavior. Based on the existing data, we postulate that self-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt an economically rational strategy) are more responsive to extrinsic cooperative incentives and therefore rely relatively more on cognitive control to make (un)cooperative decisions, whereas other-regarding individuals (who are more likely to adopt a socially rational strategy) are more sensitive to trust signals to avoid betrayal and recruit relatively more brain activity in the social cognition system. Several additional hypotheses with respect to the neural roots of social preferences are derived from the model and suggested for future research. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, UT Behavior, 1966-69.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents findings from an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Computer printout of the analysis is included. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their ability to analyze international relations, this monograph reports on the testing of relative status…

The Effects of Cooperative and Individual Goal Structures on Learning Disabled and Nondisabled Students.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cosden, Merith; And Others

1985-01-01

Elementary children (N=138) in LD-NLD or NLD-LD (learning disabled - nonlearning disabled) dyads were individually tested on reading comprehension after study periods which emphasized either cooperative or individual study behaviors and goal incentives. There were sex differences in the impact of cooperative goal structures on attitudes,…

Some Effects of Target Cooperation and Reciprocated Promises on Conflict Resolution.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bonoma, Thomas V.; And Others

Forty female subjects were given intermittent options to transmit noncontingent promises of intent to cooperate during the course of a mixed-motive laboratory game. In a 2 x 2 experimental design, a robot target either reciprocated subjects' promise statements or concealed her behavioral intentions, and was either always cooperative or always…

Coevolving agent strategies and network topology for the public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, C. Y.; Zhang, J. L.; Xie, G. M.; Wang, L.

2011-03-01

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Coevolutionary public goods games in structured populations are studied where players can change from an unproductive public goods game to a productive one, by evaluating the productivity of the public goods games. In our model, each individual participates in games organized by its neighborhood plus by itself. Coevolution here refers to an evolutionary process entailing both deletion of existing links and addition of new links between agents that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of time scale separation of strategy and structure on cooperation level. This study presents the following: Foremost, we observe that high cooperation levels in public goods interactions are attained by the entangled coevolution of strategy and structure. Presented results also confirm that the resulting networks show many features of real systems, such as cooperative behavior and hierarchical clustering. The heterogeneity of the interaction network is held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. We hope our work may offer an explanation for the origin of large-scale cooperative behavior among unrelated individuals.

Coevolution of strategy-selection time scale and cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rong, Zhihai; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Chen, Guanrong

2013-06-01

In this paper, we investigate a networked prisoner's dilemma game where individuals' strategy-selection time scale evolves based on their historical learning information. We show that the more times the current strategy of an individual is learnt by his neighbors, the longer time he will stick on the successful behavior by adaptively adjusting the lifetime of the adopted strategy. Through characterizing the extent of success of the individuals with normalized payoffs, we show that properly using the learned information can form a positive feedback mechanism between cooperative behavior and its lifetime, which can boost cooperation on square lattices and scale-free networks.

Cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game on interdependent networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Luo, Chao; Zhang, Xiaolin; Liu, Hong; Shao, Rui

2016-05-01

Memory or so-called experience normally plays the important role to guide the human behaviors in real world, that is essential for rational decisions made by individuals. Hence, when the evolutionary behaviors of players with bounded rationality are investigated, it is reasonable to make an assumption that players in system are with limited memory. Besides, in order to unravel the intricate variability of complex systems in real world and make a highly integrative understanding of their dynamics, in recent years, interdependent networks as a comprehensive network structure have obtained more attention in this community. In this article, the evolution of cooperation in memory-based prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on interdependent networks composed by two coupled square lattices is studied. Herein, all or part of players are endowed with finite memory ability, and we focus on the mutual influence of memory effect and interdependent network reciprocity on cooperation of spatial PDG. We show that the density of cooperation can be significantly promoted within an optimal region of memory length and interdependent strength. Furthermore, distinguished by whether having memory ability/external links or not, each kind of players on networks would have distinct evolutionary behaviors. Our work could be helpful to understand the emergence and maintenance of cooperation under the evolution of memory-based players on interdependent networks.

Socially cooperative choices: An approach to achieving resource sustainability in the coastal zone

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Crance, Colin; Draper, Dianne

1996-03-01

Achieving resource sustainability, particularly in the coastal zone, is complicated by a variety of interdependencies and trade-offs between economic, social, and ecological variables. Although trade-offs between each of these variables are important, this paper emphasizes the social components of resource management. In this regard a distinction is made between individual and cooperative choices. Individual choices frequently are made from a shortterm, self-interested perspective, whereas cooperative choices are made from a long-term, community and resource-sustainability perspective. Typically, when presented with a spectrum of resource management decisions, individuals have a tendency to act in a self-interested manner. Thus, cooperative benefits, such as reduced conflict and improved resource certainty, are not realized. An overview of selected aspects of social dilemma theory suggests that socially cooperative choice outcomes are attainable in coastal zone management by integrating structural and behavioral solutions in resource use decision making. Three barriers to successful integration of structural and behavioral solutions are identified as self-interest, mistrust, and variable perceptions of resource amenities. Examples from coastal zone management indicate that these barriers may be overcome using approaches such as scopereduction, co-management, community education, and local participation. The paper also provides comment on the potential benefits of integrating structural and behavioral solutions in international coastal zone management efforts.

Self-recognition, color signals, and cycles of greenbeard mutualism and altruism

PubMed Central

Sinervo, Barry; Chaine, Alexis; Clobert, Jean; Calsbeek, Ryan; Hazard, Lisa; Lancaster, Lesley; McAdam, Andrew G.; Alonzo, Suzanne; Corrigan, Gwynne; Hochberg, Michael E.

2006-01-01

Altruism presents a challenge to evolutionary theory because selection should favor selfish over caring strategies. Greenbeard altruism resolves this paradox by allowing cooperators to identify individuals carrying similar alleles producing a form of genic selection. In side-blotched lizards, genetically similar but unrelated blue male morphs settle on adjacent territories and cooperate. Here we show that payoffs of cooperation depend on asymmetric costs of orange neighbors. One blue male experiences low fitness and buffers his unrelated partner from aggressive orange males despite the potential benefits of defection. We show that recognition behavior is highly heritable in nature, and we map genetic factors underlying color and self-recognition behavior of genetic similarity in both sexes. Recognition and cooperation arise from genome-wide factors based on our mapping study of the location of genes responsible for self-recognition behavior, recognition of blue color, and the color locus. Our results provide an example of greenbeard interactions in a vertebrate that are typified by cycles of greenbeard mutualism interspersed with phases of transient true altruism. Such cycles provide a mechanism encouraging the origin and stability of true altruism. PMID:16651531

Heart rate variability is associated with social value orientation in males but not females.

PubMed

Lischke, Alexander; Mau-Moeller, Anett; Jacksteit, Robert; Pahnke, Rike; Hamm, Alfons O; Weippert, Matthias

2018-05-09

Phylogenetic and neurobiological theories suggest that inter-individual differences in high frequency heart rate variability (HF-HRV) are associated with inter-individual differences in social behavior and social cognition. To test these theories, we investigated whether individuals with high and low HF-HRV would show different preferences for cooperative behavior in social contexts. We recorded resting state HF-HRV in 84 healthy individuals before they completed the Social Value Orientation task, a well-established measure of cooperative preferences. HF-HRV was derived from short-term (300 s) and ultra-short-term (60 s, 120 s) recordings of participants' heart rate to determine the robustness of possible findings. Irrespective of recording length, we found a sex-dependent association between inter-individual differences in HF-HRV and inter-individual differences in social value orientation: The preference for cooperation was more pronounced among individuals with high as compared low HF-HRV, albeit only in male and not in female participants. These findings suggest that males with high HF-HRV are more inclined to engage in cooperative behavior than males with low HF-HRV.

Emotional decisions in structured populations for the evolution of public cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Yongjie; Chen, Tong; Chen, Qiao; Si, Guangrun

2017-02-01

The behaviors of humans are not always profit-driven in public goods games (PGG). In addition, social preference and decision-making might be influenced, even changed by heuristics and conformity in the real life. Motivated by the facts, we would like to investigate the role of emotional system in cooperative behaviors of structured population in PGG. Meantime, the effects of diffusion of influence are studied in structured population. Numerical simulation results are indicated that emotions play very significant role indeed in emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations in PGG. However, the influences of emotions on others are limited due to diminishing of influence diffusion and the existence of pure defectors. What is more, conformity, to some extent, could drive potentially more people to accept cooperative strategy with higher probability. Higher-level cooperation could be promoted as increasing values of synergy factors, but while the effects might diminish gradually as increasing number of positive heuristic players and conformist. Our work may be beneficial to address the social dilemmas in PGG.

The role of emotions in the maintenance of cooperative behaviors

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Chunyan; Zhang, Jianlei; Weissing, Franz J.

2014-04-01

Our attention is focused on how individual emotions influence collective behaviors, which captures an aspect of reality missing from past studies: free riders may suffer some stress, which could adapt jointly with the individual stress intensity and size of the gaming group. With an evolutionary game theoretical approach, we gain the fixation probability for one mutant cooperator to invade and dominate the whole defecting population. When the stress intensity exceeds a threshold, natural selection favors cooperators replacing defectors in a finite population. We further infer that lower stress intensity is sufficient for one mutant cooperator to become fixed with an advantageous probability in a larger population. Moreover, when the gaming group is smaller than the population size, the more the return from the public goods, the lower the threshold of stress intensity required to facilitate the full dominance of cooperators. We hope our studies may show that individual sentiments or psychological activities will open up novel explanations for the puzzle of collective actions.

Cooperation in multicultural negotiations: How the cultures of people with low and high power interact.

PubMed

Kopelman, Shirli; Hardin, Ashley E; Myers, Christopher G; Tost, Leigh Plunkett

2016-05-01

This study examined whether the cultures of low- and high-power negotiators interact to influence cooperative behavior of low-power negotiators. Managers from 4 different cultural groups (Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, and the United States) negotiated face-to-face in a simulated power-asymmetric commons dilemma. Results supported an interaction effect in which cooperation of people with lower power was influenced by both their culture and the culture of the person with higher power. In particular, in a multicultural setting, low-power managers from Hong Kong, a vertical-collectivist culture emphasizing power differences and group alignment, adjusted their cooperation depending on the culture of the high-power manager with whom they interacted. This study contributes to understanding how culture shapes behavior of people with relatively low power, illustrates how a logic of appropriateness informs cooperation, and highlights the importance of studying multicultural social interactions in the context of negotiations, work teams, and global leadership. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Emergent behaviors of the Schrödinger-Lohe model on cooperative-competitive networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Huh, Hyungjin; Ha, Seung-Yeal; Kim, Dohyun

2017-12-01

We present several sufficient frameworks leading to the emergent behaviors of the coupled Schrödinger-Lohe (S-L) model under the same one-body external potential on cooperative-competitive networks. The S-L model was first introduced as a possible phenomenological model exhibiting quantum synchronization and its emergent dynamics on all-to-all cooperative networks has been treated via two distinct approaches, Lyapunov functional approach and the finite-dimensional reduction based on pairwise correlations. In this paper, we further generalize the finite-dimensional dynamical systems approach for pairwise correlation functions on cooperative-competitive networks and provide several sufficient frameworks leading to the collective exponential synchronization. For small systems consisting of three and four quantum subsystem, we also show that the system for pairwise correlations can be reduced to the Lotka-Volterra model with cooperative and competitive interactions, in which lots of interesting dynamical patterns appear, e.g., existence of closed orbits and limit-cycles.

Cooperative Networks: Altruism, Group Solidarity, Reciprocity, and Sanctioning in Ugandan Producer Organizations.

PubMed

Baldassarri, Delia

2015-09-01

Repeated interaction and social networks are commonly considered viable solutions to collective action problems. This article identifies and systematically measures four general mechanisms--that is, generalized altruism, group solidarity, reciprocity, and the threat of sanctioning--and tests which of them brings about cooperation in the context of Ugandan producer organizations. Using an innovative methodological framework that combines "lab-in-the-field" experiments with survey interviews and complete social networks data, the article goes beyond the assessment of a relationship between social networks and collective outcomes to study the mechanisms that favor cooperative behavior. The article first establishes a positive relationship between position in the network structure and propensity to cooperate in the producer organization and then uses farmers' behavior in dictator and public goods games to test different mechanisms that may account for such a relationship. Results show that cooperation is induced by patterns of reciprocity that emerge through repeated interaction rather than other-regarding preferences like altruism or group solidarity.

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, TT Behavior, 1966-69.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents findings from an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their ability to analyze international relations, this monograph reports on the testing of relative status field theory on WEIS conflict data for 1966-1969…

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, TU Behavior, 1966-69.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents findings from an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their ability to analyze international relations, this monograph reports on the testing of relative status field theory on WEIS conflict data for 1966-1969…

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Relative Status-Field Theory, Results for Cooperation, UU Behavior, 1966-69.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents findings from an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their ability to analyze international relations, this monograph reports on the testing of relative status field theory on WEIS conflict data for 1966-1969…

Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: A case study of the Nile Basin

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Xun; Whittington, Dale

2006-02-01

Nation-states rarely go to war over water, but it is equally rare that water conflicts in an international river basin are resolved through cooperation among the riparian countries that use the shared resources. Gains from cooperation will mean little to individual riparians unless the required cooperative behaviors are incentive compatible. Cooperative game theory offers useful insights for assessing cooperative solutions for water conflicts in international river basins. Applying cooperative game theory concepts such as core, nucleolus, and Shapley value to Nile water conflicts, we examine the incentive structure of both cooperative and noncooperative strategies for different riparian countries and establish some baseline conditions for incentive-compatible cooperation in the Nile basin.

Perceptions of morality and competence in (non)interdependent games.

PubMed

Krueger, Joachim I; DiDonato, Theresa E

2010-05-01

Individuals' actions and their stated beliefs affect how others perceive them. In a prisoner's dilemma, a defector who expects others to cooperate is perceived as less moral than a defector who expects others to defect; a cooperator who expects others to defect is perceived as less competent than a cooperator who expects others to cooperate (Experiment 1). This pattern suggests that in a context of interdependence, a stated expectation that the behavior of others will resemble one's own may protect one's social reputation. When outcomes are not interdependent, expectations do not moderate the effects of behavior on reputation (Experiment 2). In such a context, inductive reasoning is sufficient to explain social projection. Both types of results are replicated in a modified N-person social dilemma (Experiment 3), further validating the inductive-reasoning hypothesis. Copyright 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Trust, conflict, and cooperation: a meta-analysis.

PubMed

Balliet, Daniel; Van Lange, Paul A M

2013-09-01

Many theories of trust emphasize that trust is most relevant to behavior in situations involving a conflict of interests. However, it is not clear how trust relates to behavior across situations that differ in the degree of conflicting interest: Does trust matter more when the conflict of interest is small or large? According to an interdependence perspective, trust becomes an especially important determinant of behavior in situations involving larger, compared to smaller, degrees of conflicting interests. To examine this perspective, we conducted a meta-analysis involving 212 effect sizes on the relation between trust (both state and dispositional trust in others) and cooperation in social dilemmas-situations that involve varying degrees of conflict between self-interest and collective interest. Results revealed that the positive relation between trust and cooperation is stronger when there is a larger, compared to smaller, degree of conflict. We also examined several other possible moderators of the relation between trust and cooperation. The relation between trust and cooperation was stronger during individual, compared to intergroup, interactions but did not vary as a function of the situation being either a one-shot or repeated interaction. We also find differences across countries in the extent that people condition their own cooperation based on their trust in others. We discuss how the results support an emerging consensus about trust being limited to situations of conflict and address some theoretical and societal implications for our understanding of how and why trust is so important to social interactions and relationships. (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.

Cooperation and Competition among Children in the Pacific Islands and New Zealand: The School as an Agent of Social Change.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thomas, David R.

1978-01-01

Studies with the Madsen Cooperation Board are described, showing differences in cooperation and competition between Polynesian and European children. Another study of Cook Islands, Samoan, and Fijian children is reported and the school's role in increasing competitive behavior discussed. Teaching changes are suggested to encourage more adaptive…

Cooperation as a Strategy for Rural Economic Development. Rural Research Report. Volume 19, Issue 2, Spring 2008

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kuhn, Bill

2008-01-01

Cooperative behaviors among private investors, local entities and a county can create significant efficiencies and resources to achieve a countywide vision. A county willing to take on this leadership role can provide technology and creates incentives for cooperation, supports opportunistic action, and regulates a balance between private sector…

Sex Differences in Cooperation: A Meta-Analytic Review of Social Dilemmas

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Balliet, Daniel; Li, Norman P.; Macfarlan, Shane J.; Van Vugt, Mark

2011-01-01

Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here, we derive predictions from both…

The Development of Cooperation: Explorations in Cognitive and Moral Competence and Social Authority.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kutnick, P.J.; Brees, Patricia

1982-01-01

Three groups of children pursued sensitivity exercises, cooperative activities, and free play, respectively, over six weeks. Children in the sensitivity group (which promoted trust/dependence) showed less competitive and more cooperative behaviors on a cognitive task and more child-sensitivity on a moral task than the other two groups. (Author/MJL)

Datasets on organizational citizenship behavior in the selected hospitals with different ownership.

PubMed

Jahani, Mohammad Ali; Mahmoudjanloo, Shahrbanoo; Rostami, Fatemeh Hoseini; Nikbakht, Hosein Ali; Mahmoudi, Ghahraman

2018-08-01

Studying the role of employees as the base of an organization on achieving organizational goals has increased in recent years [1]. To have better organizational citizens, organizations should encourage their staff [2]. As the most powerful form of organizational behavior, organizational citizenship is more influential than organizational cooperation [3]. Studies have shown that cooperative behavior, such as the citizenship behavior results in easier organizational communication, promoting organizational planning, improving inter-personal cooperation and developing better organizational climate, directly influence staff satisfaction, work life quality, service-provision, job commitment and financial output [4]. As the most fundamental organizational behavior, the organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) causes so-called organizational effectiveness. This study Focused on the comparing organizational citizenship behavior components including conscientiousness, courtesy, altruism, sportsmanship and civic virtue among hospitals based on ownership. Research population included all therapeutic and non-therapeutic employees working in the five selected hospital located in Golestan province, Iran in 2016. This study is approved by Ethical committee of Islamic Azad Sari Branch. Based on Cochran׳s sampling formula, 312 employees working in different hospital sections and units (nurses and administrative personnel) were proportionally selected as the research sample. They completed the Persian version of Podsakoff׳s standard scale measuring organizational citizenship behavior. The data were analyzed using SPSS 22 and applying inferential statistics approaches such as t-test, Tukey, and ANOVA in the confidence interval of 95%.

Selective Cooperation in the Supermarket : Field Experimental Evidence for Indirect Reciprocity.

PubMed

Lange, Florian; Eggert, Frank

2015-12-01

Numerous laboratory experiments suggest that mechanisms of indirect reciprocity might account for human cooperation. However, conclusive field data supporting the predictions of indirect reciprocity in everyday life situations is still scarce. Here, we attempt to compensate for this lack by examining the determinants of cooperative behavior in a German supermarket. Our methods were as follows: Confederates of the experimenter lined up at the checkout, apparently to buy a single item. As an act of cooperation, the waiting person in front (the potential helper) could allow the confederate to go ahead. By this means, the potential helper could take a cost (additional waiting time) by providing the confederate with a benefit (saved waiting time). We recorded the potential helpers' behavior and the number of items they purchased as a quantitative measure proportional to the confederate's benefit. Moreover, in a field experimental design, we varied the confederates' image by manipulating the item they purchased (beer vs. water). As predicted, the more waiting time they could save, the more likely the confederates were to receive cooperation. This relationship was moderated by the confederates' image. Cost-to-benefit ratios were required to be more favorable for beer-purchasing individuals to receive cooperation. Our results demonstrate that everyday human cooperation can be studied unobtrusively in the field and that cooperation among strangers is selective in a way that is consistent with current models of indirect reciprocity.

Cooperation and age structure in spatial games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Zhen; Wang, Zhen; Zhu, Xiaodan; Arenzon, Jeferson J.

2012-01-01

We study the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary spatial games when the payoff correlates with the increasing age of players (the level of correlation is set through a single parameter, α). The demographic heterogeneous age distribution, directly affecting the outcome of the game, is thus shown to be responsible for enhancing the cooperative behavior in the population. In particular, moderate values of α allow cooperators not only to survive but to outcompete defectors, even when the temptation to defect is large and the ageless, standard α=0 model does not sustain cooperation. The interplay between age structure and noise is also considered, and we obtain the conditions for optimal levels of cooperation.

The Hard Problem of Cooperation

PubMed Central

Eriksson, Kimmo; Strimling, Pontus

2012-01-01

Based on individual variation in cooperative inclinations, we define the “hard problem of cooperation” as that of achieving high levels of cooperation in a group of non-cooperative types. Can the hard problem be solved by institutions with monitoring and sanctions? In a laboratory experiment we find that the answer is affirmative if the institution is imposed on the group but negative if development of the institution is left to the group to vote on. In the experiment, participants were divided into groups of either cooperative types or non-cooperative types depending on their behavior in a public goods game. In these homogeneous groups they repeatedly played a public goods game regulated by an institution that incorporated several of the key properties identified by Ostrom: operational rules, monitoring, rewards, punishments, and (in one condition) change of rules. When change of rules was not possible and punishments were set to be high, groups of both types generally abided by operational rules demanding high contributions to the common good, and thereby achieved high levels of payoffs. Under less severe rules, both types of groups did worse but non-cooperative types did worst. Thus, non-cooperative groups profited the most from being governed by an institution demanding high contributions and employing high punishments. Nevertheless, in a condition where change of rules through voting was made possible, development of the institution in this direction was more often voted down in groups of non-cooperative types. We discuss the relevance of the hard problem and fit our results into a bigger picture of institutional and individual determinants of cooperative behavior. PMID:22792282

How Victim Sensitivity leads to Uncooperative Behavior via Expectancies of Injustice

PubMed Central

Maltese, Simona; Baumert, Anna; Schmitt, Manfred J.; MacLeod, Colin

2016-01-01

According to the Sensitivity-to-mean-intentions model, dispositional victim sensitivity involves a suspicious mindset that is activated by situational cues and guides subsequent information processing and behavior like a schema. Study 1 tested whether victim-sensitive persons are more prone to form expectancies of injustice in ambiguous situations and whether these expectancies mediate the relationship between victim sensitivity and cooperation behavior in a trust game. Results show an indirect effect of victim sensitivity on cooperation after unfair treatment (vs. control condition), mediated by expectancies of injustice. In Study 2 we directly manipulated the tendency to form expectancies of injustice in ambiguous situations to test for causality. Results confirmed that the readiness to expect unjust outcomes led to lower cooperation, compared to a control condition. These findings provide direct evidence that expectancy tendencies are implicated in elevated victim sensitivity and are of theoretical and practical relevance. PMID:26793163

Game theory: applications for surgeons and the operating room environment.

PubMed

McFadden, David W; Tsai, Mitchell; Kadry, Bassam; Souba, Wiley W

2012-11-01

Game theory is an economic system of strategic behavior, often referred to as the "theory of social situations." Very little has been written in the medical literature about game theory or its applications, yet the practice of surgery and the operating room environment clearly involves multiple social situations with both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors. A comprehensive review was performed of the medical literature on game theory and its medical applications. Definitive resources on the subject were also examined and applied to surgery and the operating room whenever possible. Applications of game theory and its proposed dilemmas abound in the practicing surgeon's world, especially in the operating room environment. The surgeon with a basic understanding of game theory principles is better prepared for understanding and navigating the complex Operating Room system and optimizing cooperative behaviors for the benefit all stakeholders. Copyright © 2012 Mosby, Inc. All rights reserved.

Siblings in dyads: relationships among perceptions and behavior.

PubMed

Graham-Bermann, S A

1991-06-01

The ways in which middle-childhood siblings perceive themselves as similar or different was assessed with a sample of 40 pairs of 9- to 11-year-old (younger) and 12- to 14-year-old (older) siblings. Each child was interviewed and completed a card sort procedure and a measure of self-competence. Sibling pairs participated in three behavioral tasks coded for cooperation and conflict. Self-ratings, self-perceptions, and sibling behavior were analyzed for their association with the perceived similarity construct. Siblings perceived themselves as being more like one another than did their mothers. Forty-one percent of the variance in their perceived similarity was accounted for by paired self-cooperation ratings, social competence, and behavioral task scores.

Evolutionary dynamics for persistent cooperation in structured populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yan; Liu, Xinsheng; Claussen, Jens Christian; Guo, Wanlin

2015-06-01

The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This feature still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a multiplying factor. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperative strategies, including a recent model in which only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players through introducing a new strategy named persistent cooperation. A persistent cooperator is a contributor who is willing to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining portion of the payoff contributed by themselves. In a previous study, this model was analyzed in the framework of well-mixed populations. This paper focuses on discussing the persistent cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The evolutionary dynamics of the structured populations consisting of three types of competing players (pure cooperators, defectors, and persistent cooperators) are revealed by theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. In particular, the approximate expressions of fixation probabilities for strategies are derived on one-dimensional lattices. The phase diagrams of stationary states, and the evolution of frequencies and spatial patterns for strategies are illustrated on both one-dimensional and square lattices by simulations. Our results are consistent with the general observation that, at least in most situations, a structured population facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Specifically, here we find that the existence of persistent cooperators greatly suppresses the spreading of defectors under more relaxed conditions in structured populations compared to that obtained in well-mixed populations.

Children's Sympathy, Guilt, and Moral Reasoning in Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing: A 6-Year Longitudinal Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Malti, Tina; Ongley, Sophia F.; Peplak, Joanna; Chaparro, Maria P.; Buchmann, Marlis; Zuffianò, Antonio; Cui, Lixian

2016-01-01

This study examined the role of sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning in helping, cooperation, and sharing in a 6-year, three-wave longitudinal study involving 175 children (M[subscript age] 6.10, 9.18, and 12.18 years). Primary caregivers reported on children's helping and cooperation; sharing was assessed behaviorally. Child sympathy was assessed…

Deciding to defect: the effects of video-game violence on cooperative behavior.

PubMed

Sheese, Brad E; Graziano, William G

2005-05-01

This experiment examined the effect of video-game violence on cooperative decision making. Participants (N= 48) were randomly assigned to play either a violent or a nonviolent version of the video game Doom in dyads. Following the video-game task, participants were separated and given an opportunity to choose to cooperate with their partner for mutual gain, withdraw from the interaction, or exploit their partner for their own benefit. Participants in the violent condition were significantly more likely to choose to exploit their partners than participants in the nonviolent condition. These findings suggest that playing violent video games may undermine prosocial motivation and promote exploitive behavior in social interactions.

Fairness overrides reputation: the importance of fairness considerations in altruistic cooperation

PubMed Central

Güney, Şule; Newell, Ben R.

2013-01-01

Behavioral findings in several strategic games indicate that people punish others if they think they are being treated unequally, even at the cost of minimizing their own material payoff. We investigated the primary driving force behind such non-self-regarding behavior, so-called, altruistic cooperation. In all of our studies, a mini ultimatum game was played either one-shot (in Experiment 1a and 1b) or repeatedly (Experiment 2), and rejections of inequitable distribution were taken as a measure of altruistic cooperation. In Experiment 1a, we replicated previous findings indicating that the key mechanism contributing to the emergence of altruistic cooperation is fairness considerations. In Experiment 1b, we delved into the relative importance of two aspects of fairness considerations (i.e., outcome fairness and intentions) and showed that both aspects were effective in determining the level of altruistic cooperation, with the contribution of intentions being more important. In Experiment 2, we investigated the effect of the opportunity for reputation building and future interaction on altruistic cooperation. We found that these factors became influential only when fairness considerations were weakened, particularly, as a result of the removal of the possible intentions behind an offer. PMID:23760110

Investigation of autistic traits through strategic decision-making in games with adaptive agents.

PubMed

Craig, Alexis B; Grossman, Emily; Krichmar, Jeffrey L

2017-07-17

Autism Spectrum Disorders are characterized by difficulties in communicating and cooperating with other people. Impairment in Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer what another person is thinking, may contribute to these social deficits. The present study assesses the relationship between autistic traits and decision-making in a socioeconomic game environment that measures ToM and cooperation. We quantified participant strategy during game play with computer agents that simulated aspects of ToM or fixed strategy agents with static behaviors or heuristics. Individuals with higher Autism Quotient (AQ) scores cooperated less than subjects with low AQ scores with the ToM agents. In contrast, subjects with higher AQ scores cooperated more with fixed strategy agents. Additionally, subjects with higher AQ scores spent more time than low AQ subjects signaling cooperative intent in games with fixed strategy agents while spending less time signaling cooperation with adaptive agents, indicating a preference toward systemizing behaviors in the face of uncertainty. We conclude that individuals with high levels of autistic traits are less likely to utilize ToM as a cognitive strategy, even when it is beneficial, to achieve a desired outcome.

Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning.

PubMed

Tampuu, Ardi; Matiisen, Tambet; Kodelja, Dorian; Kuzovkin, Ilya; Korjus, Kristjan; Aru, Juhan; Aru, Jaan; Vicente, Raul

2017-01-01

Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments.

Collective behaviours: from biochemical kinetics to electronic circuits.

PubMed

Agliari, Elena; Barra, Adriano; Burioni, Raffaella; Di Biasio, Aldo; Uguzzoni, Guido

2013-12-10

In this work we aim to highlight a close analogy between cooperative behaviors in chemical kinetics and cybernetics; this is realized by using a common language for their description, that is mean-field statistical mechanics. First, we perform a one-to-one mapping between paradigmatic behaviors in chemical kinetics (i.e., non-cooperative, cooperative, ultra-sensitive, anti-cooperative) and in mean-field statistical mechanics (i.e., paramagnetic, high and low temperature ferromagnetic, anti-ferromagnetic). Interestingly, the statistical mechanics approach allows a unified, broad theory for all scenarios and, in particular, Michaelis-Menten, Hill and Adair equations are consistently recovered. This framework is then tested against experimental biological data with an overall excellent agreement. One step forward, we consistently read the whole mapping from a cybernetic perspective, highlighting deep structural analogies between the above-mentioned kinetics and fundamental bricks in electronics (i.e. operational amplifiers, flashes, flip-flops), so to build a clear bridge linking biochemical kinetics and cybernetics.

Triangulating the neural, psychological, and economic bases of guilt aversion

PubMed Central

Chang, Luke J.; Smith, Alec; Dufwenberg, Martin; Sanfey, Alan G.

2011-01-01

Why do people often choose to cooperate when they can better serve their interests by acting selfishly? One potential mechanism is that the anticipation of guilt can motivate cooperative behavior. We utilize a formal model of this process in conjunction with fMRI to identify brain regions that mediate cooperative behavior while participants decided whether or not to honor a partner’s trust. We observed increased activation in the insula, supplementary motor area, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and temporal parietal junction when participants were behaving consistent with our model, and found increased activity in the ventromedial PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and nucleus accumbens when they chose to abuse trust and maximize their financial reward. This study demonstrates that a neural system previously implicated in expectation processing plays a critical role in assessing moral sentiments that in turn can sustain human cooperation in the face of temptation. PMID:21555080

Collective behaviours: from biochemical kinetics to electronic circuits

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Agliari, Elena; Barra, Adriano; Burioni, Raffaella; di Biasio, Aldo; Uguzzoni, Guido

2013-12-01

In this work we aim to highlight a close analogy between cooperative behaviors in chemical kinetics and cybernetics; this is realized by using a common language for their description, that is mean-field statistical mechanics. First, we perform a one-to-one mapping between paradigmatic behaviors in chemical kinetics (i.e., non-cooperative, cooperative, ultra-sensitive, anti-cooperative) and in mean-field statistical mechanics (i.e., paramagnetic, high and low temperature ferromagnetic, anti-ferromagnetic). Interestingly, the statistical mechanics approach allows a unified, broad theory for all scenarios and, in particular, Michaelis-Menten, Hill and Adair equations are consistently recovered. This framework is then tested against experimental biological data with an overall excellent agreement. One step forward, we consistently read the whole mapping from a cybernetic perspective, highlighting deep structural analogies between the above-mentioned kinetics and fundamental bricks in electronics (i.e. operational amplifiers, flashes, flip-flops), so to build a clear bridge linking biochemical kinetics and cybernetics.

No place to hide: when shame causes proselfs to cooperate.

PubMed

Declerck, Carolyn Henriette; Boone, Christophe; Kiyonari, Toko

2014-01-01

Shame is considered a social emotion with action tendencies that elicit socially beneficial behavior. Yet, unlike other social emotions, prior experimental studies do not indicate that incidental shame boosts prosocial behavior. Based on the affect as information theory, we hypothesize that incidental feelings of shame can increase cooperation, but only for self-interested individuals, and only in a context where shame is relevant with regards to its action tendency. To test this hypothesis, cooperation levels are compared between a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma (where "defect" may result from multiple motives) and a sequential prisoner's dilemma (where "second player defect" is the result of intentional greediness). As hypothesized, shame positively affected proselfs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Hence ashamed proselfs become inclined to cooperate when they believe they have no way to hide their greediness, and not necessarily because they want to make up for earlier wrong-doing.

Tactile communication, cooperation, and performance: an ethological study of the NBA.

PubMed

Kraus, Michael W; Huang, Cassey; Keltner, Dacher

2010-10-01

Tactile communication, or physical touch, promotes cooperation between people, communicates distinct emotions, soothes in times of stress, and is used to make inferences of warmth and trust. Based on this conceptual analysis, we predicted that in group competition, physical touch would predict increases in both individual and group performance. In an ethological study, we coded the touch behavior of players from the National Basketball Association (NBA) during the 2008-2009 regular season. Consistent with hypotheses, early season touch predicted greater performance for individuals as well as teams later in the season. Additional analyses confirmed that touch predicted improved performance even after accounting for player status, preseason expectations, and early season performance. Moreover, coded cooperative behaviors between teammates explained the association between touch and team performance. Discussion focused on the contributions touch makes to cooperative groups and the potential implications for other group settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).

Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning

PubMed Central

Kodelja, Dorian; Kuzovkin, Ilya; Korjus, Kristjan; Aru, Juhan; Aru, Jaan; Vicente, Raul

2017-01-01

Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments. PMID:28380078

Assortative and dissortative priorities for game interaction and strategy adaptation significantly bolster network reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tanimoto, Jun

2014-05-01

In 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium. Here we show that combining the process for selecting a gaming partner with the process for selecting an adaptation partner significantly enhances cooperation, even though such selection processes require additional costs to collect further information concerning which neighbor should be chosen. Based on elaborate investigations of the dynamics generated by our model, we find that high levels of cooperation result from two kinds of behavior: cooperators tend to interact with cooperators to prevent being exploited by defectors and defectors tend to choose cooperators to exploit despite the possibility that some defectors convert to cooperators.

The evolution of reputation-based partner-switching behaviors with a cost

PubMed Central

Li, Yixiao

2014-01-01

Humans constantly adjust their social relationships and choose new partners of good reputations, thereby promoting the evolution of cooperation. Individuals have to pay a cost to build a reputation, obtain others' information and then make partnership adjustments, yet the conditions under which such costly behaviors are able to evolve remain to be explored. In this model, I assume that individuals have to pay a cost to adjust their partnerships. Furthermore, whether an individual can adjust his partnership based on reputation is determined by his strategic preference, which is updated via coevolution. Using the metaphor of a public goods game where the collective benefit is shared among all members of a group, the coupling dynamics of cooperation and partnership adjustment were numerically simulated. Partner-switching behavior cannot evolve in a public goods game with a low amplification factor. However, such an effect can be exempted by raising the productivity of public goods or the frequency of partnership adjustment. Moreover, costly partner-switching behavior is remarkably promoted by the condition that the mechanism of reputation evaluation considers its prosociality. A mechanism of reputation evaluation that praises both cooperative and partner-switching behaviors allows them to coevolve. PMID:25091006

The evolution of reputation-based partner-switching behaviors with a cost

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yixiao

2014-08-01

Humans constantly adjust their social relationships and choose new partners of good reputations, thereby promoting the evolution of cooperation. Individuals have to pay a cost to build a reputation, obtain others' information and then make partnership adjustments, yet the conditions under which such costly behaviors are able to evolve remain to be explored. In this model, I assume that individuals have to pay a cost to adjust their partnerships. Furthermore, whether an individual can adjust his partnership based on reputation is determined by his strategic preference, which is updated via coevolution. Using the metaphor of a public goods game where the collective benefit is shared among all members of a group, the coupling dynamics of cooperation and partnership adjustment were numerically simulated. Partner-switching behavior cannot evolve in a public goods game with a low amplification factor. However, such an effect can be exempted by raising the productivity of public goods or the frequency of partnership adjustment. Moreover, costly partner-switching behavior is remarkably promoted by the condition that the mechanism of reputation evaluation considers its prosociality. A mechanism of reputation evaluation that praises both cooperative and partner-switching behaviors allows them to coevolve.

Predicting Human Cooperation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nay, John J.; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy; Xia, Cheng -Yi

The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational modelmore » of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. As a result, we demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.« less

Predicting Human Cooperation

DOE PAGES

Nay, John J.; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy; Xia, Cheng -Yi

2016-05-12

The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational modelmore » of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. As a result, we demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.« less

Predicting Human Cooperation

PubMed Central

Nay, John J.; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy

2016-01-01

The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational model of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. We demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation. PMID:27171417

Variants at serotonin transporter and 2A receptor genes predict cooperative behavior differentially according to presence of punishment.

PubMed

Schroeder, Kari B; McElreath, Richard; Nettle, Daniel

2013-03-05

Punishment of free-riding has been implicated in the evolution of cooperation in humans, and yet mechanisms for punishment avoidance remain largely uninvestigated. Individual variation in these mechanisms may stem from variation in the serotonergic system, which modulates processing of aversive stimuli. Functional serotonin gene variants have been associated with variation in the processing of aversive stimuli and widely studied as risk factors for psychiatric disorders. We show that variants at the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) and serotonin 2A receptor gene (HTR2A) predict contributions to the public good in economic games, dependent upon whether contribution behavior can be punished. Participants with a variant at the serotonin transporter gene contribute more, leading to group-level differences in cooperation, but this effect dissipates in the presence of punishment. When contribution behavior can be punished, those with a variant at the serotonin 2A receptor gene contribute more than those without it. This variant also predicts a more stressful experience of the games. The diversity of institutions (including norms) that govern cooperation and punishment may create selective pressures for punishment avoidance that change rapidly across time and space. Variant-specific epigenetic regulation of these genes, as well as population-level variation in the frequencies of these variants, may facilitate adaptation to local norms of cooperation and punishment.

Variants at serotonin transporter and 2A receptor genes predict cooperative behavior differentially according to presence of punishment

PubMed Central

Schroeder, Kari B.; McElreath, Richard; Nettle, Daniel

2013-01-01

Punishment of free-riding has been implicated in the evolution of cooperation in humans, and yet mechanisms for punishment avoidance remain largely uninvestigated. Individual variation in these mechanisms may stem from variation in the serotonergic system, which modulates processing of aversive stimuli. Functional serotonin gene variants have been associated with variation in the processing of aversive stimuli and widely studied as risk factors for psychiatric disorders. We show that variants at the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) and serotonin 2A receptor gene (HTR2A) predict contributions to the public good in economic games, dependent upon whether contribution behavior can be punished. Participants with a variant at the serotonin transporter gene contribute more, leading to group-level differences in cooperation, but this effect dissipates in the presence of punishment. When contribution behavior can be punished, those with a variant at the serotonin 2A receptor gene contribute more than those without it. This variant also predicts a more stressful experience of the games. The diversity of institutions (including norms) that govern cooperation and punishment may create selective pressures for punishment avoidance that change rapidly across time and space. Variant-specific epigenetic regulation of these genes, as well as population-level variation in the frequencies of these variants, may facilitate adaptation to local norms of cooperation and punishment. PMID:23431136

Variation in Behavioral Reactivity Is Associated with Cooperative Restraint Training Efficiency

PubMed Central

Bliss-Moreau, Eliza; Moadab, Gilda

2016-01-01

Training techniques that prepare laboratory animals to participate in testing via cooperation are useful tools that have the potential to benefit animal wellbeing. Understanding how animals systematically vary in their cooperative training trajectories will help trainers to design effective and efficient training programs. In the present report we document an updated method for training rhesus monkeys to cooperatively participate in restraint in a ‘primate chair.’ We trained 14 adult male macaques to raise their head above a yoke and accept yoke closure in an average of 6.36 training days in sessions that lasted an average of 10.52 min. Behavioral observations at 2 time points prior to training (approximately 3 y and 1.3 y prior) were used to quantify behavioral reactivity directed toward humans and toward other macaques. Individual differences in submissive–affiliative reactivity to humans but not reactivity toward other monkeys were related to learning outcomes. Macaques that were more reactive to humans were less willing to participate in training, were less attentive to the trainer, were more reactive during training sessions, and required longer training sessions, longer time to yoke, and more instances of negative reinforcement. These results suggest that rhesus macaques can be trained to cooperate with restraint rapidly and that individual difference data can be used to structure training programs to accommodate variation in animal temperament. PMID:26817979

Climate policies under wealth inequality.

PubMed

Vasconcelos, Vítor V; Santos, Francisco C; Pacheco, Jorge M; Levin, Simon A

2014-02-11

Taming the planet's climate requires cooperation. Previous failures to reach consensus in climate summits have been attributed, among other factors, to conflicting policies between rich and poor countries, which disagree on the implementation of mitigation measures. Here we implement wealth inequality in a threshold public goods dilemma of cooperation in which players also face the risk of potential future losses. We consider a population exhibiting an asymmetric distribution of rich and poor players that reflects the present-day status of nations and study the behavioral interplay between rich and poor in time, regarding their willingness to cooperate. Individuals are also allowed to exhibit a variable degree of homophily, which acts to limit those that constitute one's sphere of influence. Under the premises of our model, and in the absence of homophily, comparison between scenarios with wealth inequality and without wealth inequality shows that the former leads to more global cooperation than the latter. Furthermore, we find that the rich generally contribute more than the poor and will often compensate for the lower contribution of the latter. Contributions from the poor, which are crucial to overcome the climate change dilemma, are shown to be very sensitive to homophily, which, if prevalent, can lead to a collapse of their overall contribution. In such cases, however, we also find that obstinate cooperative behavior by a few poor may largely compensate for homophilic behavior.

Cooperation Is Not Enough—Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use

PubMed Central

Wijermans, Nanda; Schlüter, Maja; Lindahl, Therese

2016-01-01

Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived environmental uncertainty. Recent behavioral experimental research indicates variation in the degree to which a group of users can identify a sustainable exploitation level. In this paper, we identify social-ecological micro-foundations that facilitate cooperative sustainable common-pool resource use. We do so by using an agent-based model (ABM) that is informed by behavioral common-pool resource experiments. In these experiments, groups that cooperate do not necessarily manage the resource sustainably, but also over- or underexploit. By reproducing the patterns of the behavioral experiments in a qualitative way, the ABM represents a social-ecological explanation for the experimental observations. We find that the ecological knowledge of each group member cannot sufficiently explain the relationship between cooperation and sustainable resource use. Instead, the development of a sustainable exploitation level depends on the distribution of ecological knowledge among the group members, their influence on each other’s knowledge, and the environmental uncertainty the individuals perceive. The study provides insights about critical social-ecological micro-foundations underpinning collective action and sustainable resource management. These insights may inform policy-making, but also point to future research needs regarding the mechanisms of social learning, the development of shared management strategies and the interplay of social and ecological uncertainty. PMID:27556175

Cooperation Is Not Enough—Exploring Social-Ecological Micro-Foundations for Sustainable Common-Pool Resource Use [corrected].

PubMed

Schill, Caroline; Wijermans, Nanda; Schlüter, Maja; Lindahl, Therese

2016-01-01

Cooperation amongst resource users holds the key to overcoming the social dilemma that characterizes community-based common-pool resource management. But is cooperation alone enough to achieve sustainable resource use? The short answer is no. Developing management strategies in a complex social-ecological environment also requires ecological knowledge and approaches to deal with perceived environmental uncertainty. Recent behavioral experimental research indicates variation in the degree to which a group of users can identify a sustainable exploitation level. In this paper, we identify social-ecological micro-foundations that facilitate cooperative sustainable common-pool resource use. We do so by using an agent-based model (ABM) that is informed by behavioral common-pool resource experiments. In these experiments, groups that cooperate do not necessarily manage the resource sustainably, but also over- or underexploit. By reproducing the patterns of the behavioral experiments in a qualitative way, the ABM represents a social-ecological explanation for the experimental observations. We find that the ecological knowledge of each group member cannot sufficiently explain the relationship between cooperation and sustainable resource use. Instead, the development of a sustainable exploitation level depends on the distribution of ecological knowledge among the group members, their influence on each other's knowledge, and the environmental uncertainty the individuals perceive. The study provides insights about critical social-ecological micro-foundations underpinning collective action and sustainable resource management. These insights may inform policy-making, but also point to future research needs regarding the mechanisms of social learning, the development of shared management strategies and the interplay of social and ecological uncertainty.

Simultaneous Cooperation and Competition in the Evolution of Musical Behavior: Sex-Related Modulations of the Singer's Formant in Human Chorusing

PubMed Central

Keller, Peter E.; König, Rasmus; Novembre, Giacomo

2017-01-01

Human interaction through music is a vital part of social life across cultures. Influential accounts of the evolutionary origins of music favor cooperative functions related to social cohesion or competitive functions linked to sexual selection. However, work on non-human “chorusing” displays, as produced by congregations of male insects and frogs to attract female mates, suggests that cooperative and competitive functions may coexist. In such chorusing, rhythmic coordination between signalers, which maximizes the salience of the collective broadcast, can arise through competitive mechanisms by which individual males jam rival signals. Here, we show that mixtures of cooperative and competitive behavior also occur in human music. Acoustic analyses of the renowned St. Thomas Choir revealed that, in the presence of female listeners, boys with the deepest voices enhance vocal brilliance and carrying power by boosting high spectral energy. This vocal enhancement may reflect sexually mature males competing for female attention in a covert manner that does not undermine collaborative musical goals. The evolutionary benefits of music may thus lie in its aptness as a medium for balancing sexually motivated behavior and group cohesion. PMID:28959222

Oxytocin modulates third-party sanctioning of selfish and generous behavior within and between groups.

PubMed

Daughters, Katie; Manstead, Antony S R; Ten Velden, Femke S; De Dreu, Carsten K W

2017-03-01

Human groups function because members trust each other and reciprocate cooperative contributions, and reward others' cooperation and punish their non-cooperation. Here we examined the possibility that such third-party punishment and reward of others' trust and reciprocation is modulated by oxytocin, a neuropeptide generally involved in social bonding and in-group (but not out-group) serving behavior. Healthy males and females (N=100) self-administered a placebo or 24 IU of oxytocin in a randomized, double-blind, between-subjects design. Participants were asked to indicate (incentivized, costly) their level of reward or punishment for in-group (outgroup) investors donating generously or fairly to in-group (outgroup) trustees, who back-transferred generously, fairly or selfishly. Punishment (reward) was higher for selfish (generous) investments and back-transfers when (i) investors were in-group rather than outgroup, and (ii) trustees were in-group rather than outgroup, especially when (iii) participants received oxytocin rather than placebo. It follows, first, that oxytocin leads individuals to ignore out-groups as long as out-group behavior is not relevant to the in-group and, second, that oxytocin contributes to creating and enforcing in-group norms of cooperation and trust. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Oxytocin can hinder trust and cooperation in borderline personality disorder.

PubMed

Bartz, Jennifer; Simeon, Daphne; Hamilton, Holly; Kim, Suah; Crystal, Sarah; Braun, Ashley; Vicens, Victor; Hollander, Eric

2011-10-01

We investigated the effects of intranasal oxytocin (OXT) on trust and cooperation in borderline personality disorder (BPD), a disorder marked by interpersonal instability and difficulties with cooperation. Although studies in healthy adults show that intranasal OXT increases trust, individuals with BPD may show an altered response to exogenous OXT because the effects of OXT on trust and pro-social behavior may vary depending on the relationship representations and expectations people possess and/or altered OXT system functioning in BPD. BPD and control participants received intranasal OXT and played a social dilemma game with a partner. Results showed that OXT produced divergent effects in BPD participants, decreasing trust and the likelihood of cooperative responses. Additional analyses focusing on individual differences in attachment anxiety and avoidance across BPD and control participants indicate that these divergent effects were driven by the anxiously attached, rejection-sensitive participants. These data suggest that OXT does not uniformly facilitate trust and pro-social behavior in humans; indeed, OXT may impede trust and pro-social behavior depending on chronic interpersonal insecurities, and/or possible neurochemical differences in the OXT system. Although popularly dubbed the 'hormone of love', these data suggest a more circumspect answer to the question of who will benefit from OXT.

Parents' Verbal and Nonverbal Caring Behaviors and Child Distress During Cancer-Related Port Access Procedures: A Time-Window Sequential Analysis.

PubMed

Bai, Jinbing; Harper, Felicity W K; Penner, Louis A; Swanson, Kristen; Santacroce, Sheila J

2017-11-01

To study the relationship between parental verbal and nonverbal caring behaviors and child distress during cancer-related port access placement using correlational and time-window sequential analyses.
. Longitudinal, observational design.
. Children's Hospital of Michigan and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital.
. 43 child-parent dyads, each with two or three video recordings of the child undergoing cancer-related port placement.
. Two trained raters coded parent interaction behaviors and child distress using the Parent Caring Response Scoring System and Karmanos Child Coping and Distress Scale, respectively. Mixed modeling with generalized estimating equations examined the associations between parent interaction behaviors and parent distress, child distress, and child cooperation reported by multiple raters. Time-window sequential analyses were performed to investigate the temporal relationships in parent-child interactions within a five-second window.
. Parent caring behaviors, child distress, and child cooperation.
. Parent caring interaction behaviors were significantly correlated with parent distress, child distress, and child cooperation during repeated cancer port accessing. Sequential analyses showed that children were significantly less likely to display behavioral and verbal distress following parent caring behaviors than at any other time. If a child is already distressed, parent verbal and nonverbal caring behaviors can significantly reduce child behavioral and verbal distress.
. Parent caring behaviors, particularly the rarely studied nonverbal behaviors (e.g., eye contact, distance close to touch, supporting/allowing), can reduce the child's distress during cancer port accessing procedures.
. Studying parent-child interactions during painful cancer-related procedures can provide evidence to develop nursing interventions to support parents in caring for their child during painful procedures.

Toward a Mobile Agent Relay Network

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-03-01

in the study of particle movement. In computer science, flocking movement has been adapted for use in the collective, cooperative movement of...MARN). For our approach, we utilize a mod- ified flocking behavior to generate cooperative movement that utilizes the agent’s re- lay capability. We...Summary Our testing focuses on measuring effective cooperative movement and robustness against malicious agents. The movement testing demonstrated that a

Males collectively defend their one-male units against bachelor males in a multi-level primate society.

PubMed

Xiang, Zuo-Fu; Yang, Bang-He; Yu, Yang; Yao, Hui; Grueter, Cyril C; Garber, Paul A; Li, Ming

2014-07-01

Group-level male-male co-operation, which has been documented in several primate and non-primate societies, may be mutualistically advantageous to the participants when confronted with threats such as takeovers and cuckoldry by external males. Co-operation among members of distinct social units-while universal among humans-is extremely rare in non-human primates. We present the first observations of collective action or co-operation among males of different one-male units (OMU) in a multi-level society of Rhinopithecus roxellana. A total of 59 instances of male co-operation were recorded. Male co-operation included coordinated chasing, joint vigilance, and patrolling behavior directed at lone adult males trying to enter an OMU. Male co-operation was significantly more frequent during the mating season when the risk of incursions and extra-group paternity was higher. Paternity of infants born in the subsequent birth season and kin relationships among resident males were identified using microsatellite genotype. All infants were sired by OMU males, which we interpret as possible evidence for their success at thwarting mating attempts by satellite males. OMU males were principally unrelated suggesting that male co-operation is best understood in terms of the mutual direct benefits individuals obtain through collective action. Our findings lend support to the bachelor threat hypothesis in which the cooperative behavior of several individuals is more effective than the lone action of a single individual in providing mate defense. Our research has implications for understanding male bonding, higher-level collective action, and the evolution of social co-operation in human societies. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

On the estimation of cooperativity in ion channel kinetics: activation free energy and kinetic mechanism of Shaker K+ channel.

PubMed

Banerjee, Kinshuk; Das, Biswajit; Gangopadhyay, Gautam

2013-04-28

In this paper, we have explored generic criteria of cooperative behavior in ion channel kinetics treating it on the same footing with multistate receptor-ligand binding in a compact theoretical framework. We have shown that the characterization of cooperativity of ion channels in terms of the Hill coefficient violates the standard Hill criteria defined for allosteric cooperativity of ligand binding. To resolve the issue, an alternative measure of cooperativity is proposed here in terms of the cooperativity index that sets a unified criteria for both the systems. More importantly, for ion channel this index can be very useful to describe the cooperative kinetics as it can be readily determined from the experimentally measured ionic current combined with theoretical modelling. We have analyzed the correlation between the voltage value and slope of the voltage-activation curve at the half-activation point and consequently determined the standard free energy of activation of the ion channel using two well-established mechanisms of cooperativity, namely, Koshland-Nemethy-Filmer (KNF) and Monod-Wyman-Changeux (MWC) models. Comparison of the theoretical results for both the models with appropriate experimental data of mutational perturbation of Shaker K(+) channel supports the experimental fact that the KNF model is more suitable to describe the cooperative behavior of this class of ion channels, whereas the performance of the MWC model is unsatisfactory. We have also estimated the mechanistic performance through standard free energy of channel activation for both the models and proposed a possible functional disadvantage in the MWC scheme.

Early dyadic patterns of mother-infant interactions and outcomes of prematurity at 18 months.

PubMed

Forcada-Guex, Margarita; Pierrehumbert, Blaise; Borghini, Ayala; Moessinger, Adrien; Muller-Nix, Carole

2006-07-01

With the increased survival of very preterm infants, there is a growing concern for their developmental and socioemotional outcomes. The quality of the early mother-infant relationship has been noted as 1 of the factors that may exacerbate or soften the potentially adverse impact of preterm birth, particularly concerning the infant's later competencies and development. The first purpose of the study was to identify at 6 months of corrected age whether there were specific dyadic mother-infant patterns of interaction in preterm as compared with term mother-infant dyads. The second purpose was to examine the potential impact of these dyadic patterns on the infant's behavioral and developmental outcomes at 18 months of corrected age. During a 12-month period (January-December 1998), all preterm infants who were <34 weeks of gestational age and hospitalized at the NICU of the Lausanne University Hospital were considered for inclusion in this longitudinal prospective follow-up study. Control healthy term infants were recruited during the same period from the maternity ward of our hospital. Mother-infant dyads with preterm infants (n = 47) and term infants (n = 25) were assessed at 6 months of corrected age during a mother-infant play interaction and coded according to the Care Index. This instrument evaluates the mother's interactional behavior according to 3 scales (sensitivity, control, and unresponsiveness) and the child's interactional behavior according to 4 scales (cooperation, compliance, difficult, and passivity). At 18 months, behavioral outcomes of the children were assessed on the basis of a semistructured interview of the mother, the Symptom Check List. The Symptom Check List explores 4 groups of behavioral symptoms: sleeping problems, eating problems, psychosomatic symptoms, and behavioral and emotional disorders. At the same age, developmental outcomes were evaluated using the Griffiths Developmental Scales. Five areas were evaluated: locomotor, personal-social, hearing and speech, eye-hand coordination, and performance. Among the possible dyadic patterns of interaction, 2 patterns emerge recurrently in mother-infant preterm dyads: a "cooperative pattern" with a sensitive mother and a cooperative-responsive infant (28%) and a "controlling pattern" with a controlling mother and a compulsive-compliant infant (28%). The remaining 44% form a heterogeneous group that gathers all of the other preterm dyads and is composed of 1 sensitive mother-passive infant; 10 controlling mothers with a cooperative, difficult, or passive infant; and 10 unresponsive mothers with a cooperative, difficult, or passive infant. Among the term control subjects, 68% of the dyads are categorized as cooperative pattern dyads, 12% as controlling pattern dyads, and the 20% remaining as heterogeneous dyads. At 18 months, preterm infants of cooperative pattern dyads have similar outcomes as the term control infants. Preterm infants of controlling pattern dyads have significantly fewer positive outcomes as compared with preterm infants of cooperative pattern dyads, as well as compared with term control infants. They display significantly more behavioral symptoms than term infants, including more eating problems than term infants as well as infants from cooperative preterm dyads. Infants of the controlling preterm dyads do not differ significantly for the total development quotient but have worse personal-social development than term infants and worse hearing-speech development than infants from cooperative preterm dyads. The preterm infants of the heterogeneous group have outcomes that can be considered as intermediate with no significant differences compared with preterm infants from the cooperative pattern or the controlling pattern dyads. Among mother-preterm infant dyads, we identified 2 specific patterns of interaction that could play either a protective (cooperative pattern) or a risk-precipitating (controlling pattern) role on developmental and behavioral outcome, independent of perinatal risk factors and of the family's socioeconomic background. The controlling pattern is much more prevalent among preterm than term dyads and is related to a less favorable infant outcome. However, the cooperative pattern still represents almost 30% of the preterm dyads, with infants' outcome comparable to the ones of term infants. These results point out the impact of the quality of mother-infant relationship on the infant's outcome. The most important clinical implication should be to support a healthy parent-infant relationship already in the NICU but also in the first months of the infant's life. Early individualized family-based interventions during neonatal hospitalization and transition to home have been shown to reduce maternal stress and depression and increase maternal self-esteem and to improve positive early parent-preterm infant interactions.

Feedback between Population and Evolutionary Dynamics Determines the Fate of Social Microbial Populations

PubMed Central

Sanchez, Alvaro; Gore, Jeff

2013-01-01

The evolutionary spread of cheater strategies can destabilize populations engaging in social cooperative behaviors, thus demonstrating that evolutionary changes can have profound implications for population dynamics. At the same time, the relative fitness of cooperative traits often depends upon population density, thus leading to the potential for bi-directional coupling between population density and the evolution of a cooperative trait. Despite the potential importance of these eco-evolutionary feedback loops in social species, they have not yet been demonstrated experimentally and their ecological implications are poorly understood. Here, we demonstrate the presence of a strong feedback loop between population dynamics and the evolutionary dynamics of a social microbial gene, SUC2, in laboratory yeast populations whose cooperative growth is mediated by the SUC2 gene. We directly visualize eco-evolutionary trajectories of hundreds of populations over 50–100 generations, allowing us to characterize the phase space describing the interplay of evolution and ecology in this system. Small populations collapse despite continual evolution towards increased cooperative allele frequencies; large populations with a sufficient number of cooperators “spiral” to a stable state of coexistence between cooperator and cheater strategies. The presence of cheaters does not significantly affect the equilibrium population density, but it does reduce the resilience of the population as well as its ability to adapt to a rapidly deteriorating environment. Our results demonstrate the potential ecological importance of coupling between evolutionary dynamics and the population dynamics of cooperatively growing organisms, particularly in microbes. Our study suggests that this interaction may need to be considered in order to explain intraspecific variability in cooperative behaviors, and also that this feedback between evolution and ecology can critically affect the demographic fate of those species that rely on cooperation for their survival. PMID:23637571

Access Control for Cooperation Systems Based on Group Situation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kim, Minsoo; Joshi, James B. D.; Kim, Minkoo

Cooperation systems characterize many emerging environments such as ubiquitous and pervasive systems. Agent based cooperation systems have been proposed in the literature to address challenges of such emerging application environments. A key aspect of such agent based cooperation system is the group situation that changes dynamically and governs the requirements of the cooperation. While individual agent context is important, the overall cooperation behavior is more driven by the group context because of relationships and interactions between agents. Dynamic access control based on group situation is a crucial challenge in such cooperation systems. In this paper we propose a dynamic role based access control model for cooperation systems based on group situation. The model emphasizes capability based agent to role mapping and group situation based permission assignment to allow capturing dynamic access policies that evolve continuously.

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Nowak, Martin A

2012-05-07

Classical economic models make behavioral predictions based on the assumption that people are fully rational and care only about maximizing their own payoffs. Although this approach successfully explains human behavior in many situations, there is a wealth of experimental evidence demonstrating conditions where people deviate from the predictions of these models. One setting that has received particular attention is fixed length repeated games. Iterating a social dilemma can promote cooperation through direct reciprocity, even if it is common knowledge that all players are rational and self-interested. However, this is not the case if the length of the game is known to the players. In the final round, a rational player will defect, because there is no future to be concerned with. But if you know the other player will defect in the last round, then you should defect in the second to last round, and so on. This logic of backwards induction leads to immediate defection as the only rational (sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium) strategy. When people actually play such games, however, immediate defection is rare. Here we use evolutionary dynamics in finite populations to study the centipede game, which is designed to explore this issue of backwards induction. We make the following observation: since full cooperation can risk-dominate immediate defection in the centipede game, stochastic evolutionary dynamics can favor both delayed defection and even full cooperation. Furthermore, our evolutionary model can quantitatively reproduce human behavior from two experiments by fitting a single free parameter, which is the product of population size and selection intensity. Thus we provide evidence that people's cooperative behavior in fixed length games, which is often called 'irrational', may in fact be the favored outcome of natural selection. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Relaxation mechanisms in glassy dynamics: the Arrhenius and fragile regimes.

PubMed

Hentschel, H George E; Karmakar, Smarajit; Procaccia, Itamar; Zylberg, Jacques

2012-06-01

Generic glass formers exhibit at least two characteristic changes in their relaxation behavior, first to an Arrhenius-type relaxation at some characteristic temperature and then at a lower characteristic temperature to a super-Arrhenius (fragile) behavior. We address these transitions by studying the statistics of free energy barriers for different systems at different temperatures and space dimensions. We present a clear evidence for changes in the dynamical behavior at the transition to Arrhenius and then to a super-Arrhenius behavior. A simple model is presented, based on the idea of competition between single-particle and cooperative dynamics. We argue that Arrhenius behavior can take place as long as there is enough free volume for the completion of a simple T1 relaxation process. Once free volume is absent one needs a cooperative mechanism to "collect" enough free volume. We show that this model captures all the qualitative behavior observed in simulations throughout the considered temperature range.

Cooperation and depressive symptoms.

PubMed

Brendan Clark, C; Thorne, Christopher B; Hardy, Sonya; Cropsey, Karen L

2013-09-25

Deficits in pro-social cooperation are common in many individuals with mental illnesses such as depression. For decades, researchers have used economic game paradigms to compare cross-cultural cooperative behavior. However, research using economic games to assess cooperative behavior in clinical populations is in the early stages. We hypothesized that individuals with greater depressive symptoms would struggle to maintain reciprocity in iterative games, but not in single-iteration games measuring personal values. Participants (n=41) played four computer-based economic games (prisoner's dilemma, the public goods game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game) measuring different aspects of cooperation. Participants completed the Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS) and other measures of personality and demographics. Analyses assessed the relationships between game performance and psychological distress as measured by the DASS. Significant correlations were found between game performance and depressive symptoms, but not symptoms of anxiety or stress. Performance in the prisoner's dilemma and public goods game was significantly related to depression in a linear regression even when known associations with depressive affect such as age, gender, race, education, marital status, and neuroticism were controlled for. Depressive symptoms were associated with an inability to sustain reciprocal cooperation. Participants showed the predicted deficits in cooperation in these economic games. Economic games show the potential for assessing the social deficits associated with depressive symptoms. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions

PubMed Central

Helbing, Dirk; Yu, Wenjian

2009-01-01

According to Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan [1651; 2008 (Touchstone, New York), English Ed], “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” and it would need powerful social institutions to establish social order. In reality, however, social cooperation can also arise spontaneously, based on local interactions rather than centralized control. The self-organization of cooperative behavior is particularly puzzling for social dilemmas related to sharing natural resources or creating common goods. Such situations are often described by the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we report the sudden outbreak of predominant cooperation in a noisy world dominated by selfishness and defection, when individuals imitate superior strategies and show success-driven migration. In our model, individuals are unrelated, and do not inherit behavioral traits. They defect or cooperate selfishly when the opportunity arises, and they do not know how often they will interact or have interacted with someone else. Moreover, our individuals have no reputation mechanism to form friendship networks, nor do they have the option of voluntary interaction or costly punishment. Therefore, the outbreak of prevailing cooperation, when directed motion is integrated in a game-theoretical model, is remarkable, particularly when random strategy mutations and random relocations challenge the formation and survival of cooperative clusters. Our results suggest that mobility is significant for the evolution of social order, and essential for its stabilization and maintenance. PMID:19237576

The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions.

PubMed

Helbing, Dirk; Yu, Wenjian

2009-03-10

According to Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan [1651; 2008 (Touchstone, New York), English Ed], "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," and it would need powerful social institutions to establish social order. In reality, however, social cooperation can also arise spontaneously, based on local interactions rather than centralized control. The self-organization of cooperative behavior is particularly puzzling for social dilemmas related to sharing natural resources or creating common goods. Such situations are often described by the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we report the sudden outbreak of predominant cooperation in a noisy world dominated by selfishness and defection, when individuals imitate superior strategies and show success-driven migration. In our model, individuals are unrelated, and do not inherit behavioral traits. They defect or cooperate selfishly when the opportunity arises, and they do not know how often they will interact or have interacted with someone else. Moreover, our individuals have no reputation mechanism to form friendship networks, nor do they have the option of voluntary interaction or costly punishment. Therefore, the outbreak of prevailing cooperation, when directed motion is integrated in a game-theoretical model, is remarkable, particularly when random strategy mutations and random relocations challenge the formation and survival of cooperative clusters. Our results suggest that mobility is significant for the evolution of social order, and essential for its stabilization and maintenance.

Cooperation and deception in primates.

PubMed

Hall, Katie; Brosnan, Sarah F

2017-08-01

Though competition and cooperation are often considered opposing forces in an arms race driving natural selection, many animals, including humans, cooperate in order to mitigate competition with others. Understanding others' psychological states, such as seeing and knowing, others' goals and intentions, and coordinating actions are all important for complex cooperation-as well as for predicting behavior in order to take advantage of others through tactical deception, a form of competition. We outline evidence of primates' understanding of how others perceive the world, and then consider how the evidence from both deception and cooperation fits this framework to give us a more complete understanding of the evolution of complex social cognition in primates. In experimental food competitions, primates flexibly manipulate group-mates' behavior to tactically deceive them. Deception can infiltrate cooperative interactions, such as when one takes an unfair share of meat after a coordinated hunt. In order to counter competition of this sort, primates maintain cooperation through partner choice, partner control, and third party punishment. Yet humans appear to stand alone in their ability to understand others' beliefs, which allows us not only to deceive others with the explicit intent to create a false belief, but it also allows us to put ourselves in others' shoes to determine when cheaters need to be punished, even if we are not directly disadvantaged by the cheater. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Heterogeneous Multi-Robot Cooperation

DTIC Science & Technology

1994-02-01

1992a) Maja Mataric. Designing emergent behaviors: From local interac- tions to collective intelligence. In J. Meyer, H. Roitblat , and S. Wilson, editors...1992] Lynne E. Parker. Adaptive action selection for cooperative agent teams. In Jean-Arcady Meyer, Herbert Roitblat . and Stewart Wilson. editors

Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control Human Factors Study : Experiment 2 : Merging Behavior

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2016-12-01

This study is the second in a series of four experiments exploring human factors issues associated with the introduction of cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC). Specifically, this study explored drivers abilities to merge into a stream of c...

Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups.

PubMed

Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb; Schultz, Michael

2014-03-01

The widespread existence of cooperation is difficult to explain because individuals face strong incentives to exploit the cooperative tendencies of others. In the research reported here, we examined how the spread of reputational information through gossip promotes cooperation in mixed-motive settings. Results showed that individuals readily communicated reputational information about others, and recipients used this information to selectively interact with cooperative individuals and ostracize those who had behaved selfishly, which enabled group members to contribute to the public good with reduced threat of exploitation. Additionally, ostracized individuals responded to exclusion by subsequently cooperating at levels comparable to those who were not ostracized. These results suggest that the spread of reputational information through gossip can mitigate egoistic behavior by facilitating partner selection, thereby helping to solve the problem of cooperation even in noniterated interactions.

The evolution of human mobility based on the public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yan, Shiqing

2017-07-01

We explore the evolution of human mobility behavior based on public goods game. By using mean field method, the population distribution in different regions is theoretical calculated. Numerical simulation results show that the correlation between the region's degree and its final population is not significant under a larger human migration rate. Human mobility could effectively promote cooperative behavior and the population balance of different regions. Therefore, encouraging individuals to migrate may increase the total benefits of the whole society. Moreover, increasing the cooperation cost could reduce the number of cooperators, and that would happen to the correlation between the region's degree and its final population. The results indicate the total population could not dramatically rise with the region's degree under an unfair society.

A security mechanism based on evolutionary game in fog computing.

PubMed

Sun, Yan; Lin, Fuhong; Zhang, Nan

2018-02-01

Fog computing is a distributed computing paradigm at the edge of the network and requires cooperation of users and sharing of resources. When users in fog computing open their resources, their devices are easily intercepted and attacked because they are accessed through wireless network and present an extensive geographical distribution. In this study, a credible third party was introduced to supervise the behavior of users and protect the security of user cooperation. A fog computing security mechanism based on human nervous system is proposed, and the strategy for a stable system evolution is calculated. The MATLAB simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can reduce the number of attack behaviors effectively and stimulate users to cooperate in application tasks positively.

A Replication and Extension Study on N-Length, Inhibition and Cooperative Behavior with a Mexican-American Population. Part of the Final Report on Head Start Evaluation and Research: 1968-69 to the Office of Economic Opportunity.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Manning, Brad A.; And Others

A study of cooperative behavior (social learning) and N-lengths using Negro subjects was replicated and extended. Subjects were 100 Mexican-American children, 4 1/2 to 6 years old. N-length was defined as the number of nonreinforced trials spaced between reinforced trials and intertrial reinforcement (ITR), introduced between regularly scheduled…

Behavior-based multi-robot collaboration for autonomous construction tasks

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Stroupe, Ashley; Huntsberger, Terry; Okon, Avi; Aghazarian, Hrand; Robinson, Matthew

2005-01-01

The Robot Construction Crew (RCC) is a heterogeneous multi-robot system for autonomous construction of a structure through assembly of Long components. The two robot team demonstrates component placement into an existing structure in a realistic environment. The task requires component acquisition, cooperative transport, and cooperative precision manipulation. A behavior-based architecture provides adaptability. The RCC approach minimizes computation, power, communication, and sensing for applicability to space-related construction efforts, but the techniques are applicable to terrestrial construction tasks.

Behavior-Based Multi-Robot Collaboration for Autonomous Construction Tasks

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Stroupe, Ashley; Huntsberger, Terry; Okon, Avi; Aghazarian, Hrand; Robinson, Matthew

2005-01-01

We present a heterogeneous multi-robot system for autonomous construction of a structure through assembly of long components. Placement of a component within an existing structure in a realistic environment is demonstrated on a two-robot team. The task requires component acquisition, cooperative transport, and cooperative precision manipulation. Far adaptability, the system is designed as a behavior-based architecture. Far applicability to space-related construction efforts, computation, power, communication, and sensing are minimized, though the techniques developed are also applicable to terrestrial construction tasks.

Problems of integrated palliative care: a Dutch case study of routines and cooperation in the region of Arnhem.

PubMed

van Raak, Arno; Paulus, Aggie; Cuijpers, Rianne; Te Velde, Clary

2008-12-01

Cooperation in networks of providers of palliative care in Europe is problematic. Based on the concept of routines (patterns of behavior) and data about a Dutch network, we developed an explanation of this problem, in order to better understand the conditions for cooperation. Although more research is needed, the study suggests that disparate matches (divergence) between routines of the network members hampers cooperation. To promote cooperation, divergence, and legislation that stabilizes existing routines, must be identified. Divergence must be overcome and negotiations and transformational leadership, which require power sources, may be useful for this.

Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Yongkui; Zhang, Lin; Chen, Xiaojie; Ren, Lei; Wang, Long

2013-09-01

In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational individual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significantly promoted when individuals’ cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations.

42 CFR 52h.1 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... reference in this part to grants includes cooperative agreements) for biomedical and behavioral research; and (2) Biomedical and behavioral research and development contract project concepts and proposals for...

42 CFR 52h.1 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... reference in this part to grants includes cooperative agreements) for biomedical and behavioral research; and (2) Biomedical and behavioral research and development contract project concepts and proposals for...

42 CFR 52h.1 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... reference in this part to grants includes cooperative agreements) for biomedical and behavioral research; and (2) Biomedical and behavioral research and development contract project concepts and proposals for...

42 CFR 52h.1 - Applicability.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... reference in this part to grants includes cooperative agreements) for biomedical and behavioral research; and (2) Biomedical and behavioral research and development contract project concepts and proposals for...

Heuristics for Cooperative Problem Solving

DTIC Science & Technology

1989-02-01

briefly, cooperation is a very common problem-solving technique in natural systems and occurs in a wide variety of animals ranging from termites and...primitive way with pheromones but sometimes more directly. As with social spiders, they show relatively primitive coordination of behavior. In spite

78 FR 57401 - Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) Opportunity With the Department of...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-09-18

... DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY [Docket No. DHS-2013-0064] Cooperative Research and Development... Research of Purpose Bred Explosive Detection Canines AGENCY: Science and Technology Directorate... canines; understanding, collection and analysis of quantitative behavior trait measurement; application of...

Sample path analysis of contribution and reward in cooperative groups.

PubMed

Toyoizumi, Hiroshi

2009-02-07

Explaining cooperative behavior is one of the major challenges in both biology and human society. The individual reward in cooperative group depends on how we share the rewards in the group. Thus, the group size dynamics in a cooperative group and reward-allocation rule seem essential to evaluate the emergence of cooperative groups. We apply a sample path-based analysis called an extension of Little's formula to general cooperative group. We show that the expected reward is insensitive to the specific reward-allocation rule and probabilistic structure of group dynamics, and the simple productivity condition guarantees the expected reward to be larger than the average contribution. As an example, we take social queues to see the insensitivity result in detail.

Effects of Inertia on Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin; Liu, Run-Ran; Wang, Zhen

2012-09-01

Considering the inertia of individuals in real life, we propose a modified Fermi updating rule, where the inertia of players is introduced into evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) on square lattices. We mainly focus on how the inertia affects the cooperative behavior of the system. Interestingly, we find that the cooperation level has a nonmonotonic dependence on the inertia: with small inertia, cooperators will soon be invaded by defectors; with large inertia, players are unwilling to change their strategies and the cooperation level remains the same as the initial state; while a moderate inertia can induce the highest cooperation level. Moreover, effects of environmental noise and individual inertia are studied. Our work may be helpful in understanding the emergence and persistence of cooperation in nature and society.

Climate change and game theory.

PubMed

Wood, Peter John

2011-02-01

This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, as well as games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, are also examined. Cooperative and noncooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behavior of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely. © 2011 New York Academy of Sciences.

Caring Cooperators and Powerful Punishers: Differential Effects of Induced Care and Power Motivation on Different Types of Economic Decision Making.

PubMed

Chierchia, G; Lesemann, F H Parianen; Snower, D; Vogel, M; Singer, T

2017-09-11

Standard economic theory postulates that decisions are driven by stable context-insensitive preferences, while motivation psychology suggests they are driven by distinct context-sensitive motives with distinct evolutionary goals and characteristic psycho-physiological and behavioral patterns. To link these fields and test how distinct motives could differentially predict different types of economic decisions, we experimentally induced participants with either a Care or a Power motive, before having them take part in a suite of classic game theoretical paradigms involving monetary exchange. We show that the Care induction alone raised scores on a latent factor of cooperation-related behaviors, relative to a control condition, while, relative to Care, Power raised scores on a punishment-related factor. These findings argue against context-insensitive stable preferences and theories of strong reciprocity and in favor of a motive-based approach to economic decision making: Care and Power motivation have a dissociable fingerprint in shaping either cooperative or punishment behaviors.

76 FR 33365 - Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement: Document-Tools for Implementing Inmate Behavior...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-08

...: Document--Tools for Implementing Inmate Behavior Management; Setting Measurable Goals AGENCY: National... elements of inmate behavior management (IBM), as defined by NIC. This document will be written in the context of inmate behavior management, which is described under SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION below. This...

The extended reciprocity: Strong belief outperforms persistence.

PubMed

Kurokawa, Shun

2017-05-21

The existence of cooperation is a mysterious phenomenon and demands explanation, and direct reciprocity is one key potential explanation for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity allows cooperation to evolve for cooperators who switch their behavior on the basis of information about the opponent's behavior. Here, relevant to direct reciprocity is information deficiency. When the opponent's last move is unknown, how should players behave? One possibility is to choose cooperation with some default probability without using any further information. In fact, our previous paper (Kurokawa, 2016a) examined this strategy. However, there might be beneficial information other than the opponent's last move. A subsequent study of ours (Kurokawa, 2017) examined the strategy which uses the own last move when the opponent's last move is unknown, and revealed that referring to the own move and trying to imitate it when information is absent is beneficial. Is there any other beneficial information else? How about strong belief (i.e., have infinite memory and believe that the opponent's behavior is unchanged)? Here, we examine the evolution of strategies with strong belief. Analyzing the repeated prisoner's dilemma game and using evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis against an invasion by unconditional defectors, we find the strategy with strong belief is more likely to evolve than the strategy which does not use information other than the opponent player's last move and more likely to evolve than the strategy which uses not only the opponent player's last move but also the own last move. Strong belief produces the extended reciprocity and facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Additionally, we consider the two strategies game between strategies with strong belief and any strategy, and we consider the four strategies game in which unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors, pessimistic reciprocators with strong belief, and optimistic reciprocators with strong belief are present. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Different responses to reward comparisons by three primate species.

PubMed

Freeman, Hani D; Sullivan, Jennifer; Hopper, Lydia M; Talbot, Catherine F; Holmes, Andrea N; Schultz-Darken, Nancy; Williams, Lawrence E; Brosnan, Sarah F

2013-01-01

Recently, much attention has been paid to the role of cooperative breeding in the evolution of behavior. In many measures, cooperative breeders are more prosocial than non-cooperatively breeding species, including being more likely to actively share food. This is hypothesized to be due to selective pressures specific to the interdependency characteristic of cooperatively breeding species. Given the high costs of finding a new mate, it has been proposed that cooperative breeders, unlike primates that cooperate in other contexts, should not respond negatively to unequal outcomes between themselves and their partner. However, in this context such pressures may extend beyond cooperative breeders to other species with pair-bonding and bi-parental care. Here we test the response of two New World primate species with different parental strategies to unequal outcomes in both individual and social contrast conditions. One species tested was a cooperative breeder (Callithrix spp.) and the second practiced bi-parental care (Aotus spp.). Additionally, to verify our procedure, we tested a third confamilial species that shows no such interdependence but does respond to individual (but not social) contrast (Saimiri spp.). We tested all three genera using an established inequity paradigm in which individuals in a pair took turns to gain rewards that sometimes differed from those of their partners. None of the three species tested responded negatively to inequitable outcomes in this experimental context. Importantly, the Saimiri spp responded to individual contrast, as in earlier studies, validating our procedure. When these data are considered in relation to previous studies investigating responses to inequity in primates, they indicate that one aspect of cooperative breeding, pair-bonding or bi-parental care, may influence the evolution of these behaviors. These results emphasize the need to study a variety of species to gain insight in to how decision-making may vary across social structures.

Clark’s Nutcrackers (Nucifraga columbiana) Flexibly Adapt Caching Behavior to a Cooperative Context

PubMed Central

Clary, Dawson; Kelly, Debbie M.

2016-01-01

Corvids recognize when their caches are at risk of being stolen by others and have developed strategies to protect these caches from pilferage. For instance, Clark’s nutcrackers will suppress the number of caches they make if being observed by a potential thief. However, cache protection has most often been studied using competitive contexts, so it is unclear whether corvids can adjust their caching in beneficial ways to accommodate non-competitive situations. Therefore, we examined whether Clark’s nutcrackers, a non-social corvid, would flexibly adapt their caching behaviors to a cooperative context. To do so, birds were given a caching task during which caches made by one individual were reciprocally exchanged for the caches of a partner bird over repeated trials. In this scenario, if caching behaviors can be flexibly deployed, then the birds should recognize the cooperative nature of the task and maintain or increase caching levels over time. However, if cache protection strategies are applied independent of social context and simply in response to cache theft, then cache suppression should occur. In the current experiment, we found that the birds maintained caching throughout the experiment. We report that males increased caching in response to a manipulation in which caches were artificially added, suggesting the birds could adapt to the cooperative nature of the task. Additionally, we show that caching decisions were not solely due to motivational factors, instead showing an additional influence attributed to the behavior of the partner bird. PMID:27826273

Collective behaviours: from biochemical kinetics to electronic circuits

PubMed Central

Agliari, Elena; Barra, Adriano; Burioni, Raffaella; Di Biasio, Aldo; Uguzzoni, Guido

2013-01-01

In this work we aim to highlight a close analogy between cooperative behaviors in chemical kinetics and cybernetics; this is realized by using a common language for their description, that is mean-field statistical mechanics. First, we perform a one-to-one mapping between paradigmatic behaviors in chemical kinetics (i.e., non-cooperative, cooperative, ultra-sensitive, anti-cooperative) and in mean-field statistical mechanics (i.e., paramagnetic, high and low temperature ferromagnetic, anti-ferromagnetic). Interestingly, the statistical mechanics approach allows a unified, broad theory for all scenarios and, in particular, Michaelis-Menten, Hill and Adair equations are consistently recovered. This framework is then tested against experimental biological data with an overall excellent agreement. One step forward, we consistently read the whole mapping from a cybernetic perspective, highlighting deep structural analogies between the above-mentioned kinetics and fundamental bricks in electronics (i.e. operational amplifiers, flashes, flip-flops), so to build a clear bridge linking biochemical kinetics and cybernetics. PMID:24322327

Local Reasons to Give Globally: Identity Extension and Global Cooperation.

PubMed

Buchan, Nancy R; Jeong, Sophia Soyoung; Ward, A K

2017-11-14

Recent political events across the world suggest a retrenchment from globalization and a possible increase in parochialism. This inward-looking threat from parochialism occurs just as the global community faces growing challenges that require trans-national cooperation. In this research, we question if strong identification with an in-group necessarily leads to parochialism and ultimately is detrimental to global cooperation. Building on research on global social identification, we explore whether strong local identification can expand in inclusiveness to global identification, and among whom this is likely to happen. The results of our global public goods study - conducted in South Korea and the United States - show that high levels of social identification with a local group can extend to the global collective, particularly for individuals who are also high in concern-for-others. Furthermore, this identification translates into behavior that benefits the global, anonymous group at a cost to oneself. These results shed light on how to avoid the trap of parochialism and instead engender cooperative behavior with the broader global community.

Evolution of tag-mediated altruistic behavior in one-shot encounters on large-scale complex networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hadzibeganovic, Tarik; Lima, F. Welington S.; Stauffer, Dietrich

2012-11-01

An agent-based evolutionary model of tag-mediated altruism is studied on large-scale complex networks addressing multiplayer one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma-like games with four competing strategies. Contrary to standard theoretical predictions, but in line with recent empirical findings, we observed that altruistic acts in non-repeated interactions can emerge as a natural consequence of recognition of heritable phenotypic traits such as visual tags, which enable the discrimination between potentially beneficial and unproductive encounters. Moreover, we identified topological regimes in which cooperation always prevails at short times, but where unconditional cooperators are favored over conditional tag-based helpers, even though the latter initially have a slight reproductive advantage. After very long times, we found that all four strategies appeared about equally often, meaning that only one quarter of agents refused cooperation egoistically. However, our study suggests that intra-tag generosity can quickly evolve to dominate over other strategies in spatially structured environments that are otherwise detrimental to cooperative behavior.

Computational design of microscopic swimmers and capsules: From directed motion to collective behavior

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nikolov, Svetoslav V.; Shum, Henry; Balazs, Anna C.

Systems of motile microscopic particles can exhibit behaviors that resemble those of living microorganisms, including cooperative motion, self-organization, and adaptability to changing environments. Using mesoscale computational modeling, we design synthetic microswimmers and microcapsules that undergo controllable, self-propelled motion in solution. Stimuli-responsive hydrogels are used to actuate the microswimmers and to enable their navigation and chemotaxing behavior. The self-propelled motion of microcapsules on solid surfaces is achieved by the release of encapsulated solutes that alter the surface adhesiveness. These signaling solutes also enable interactions among multiple microcapsules that lead to complex, cooperative behavior. Our findings provide guidelines for creating microscopic devicesmore » and machines able to autonomously move and mimic the communication and chemotaxis of biological microorganisms.« less

Decreasing burned children's pain behavior: impacting the trauma of hydrotherapy.

PubMed Central

Kelley, M L; Jarvie, G J; Middlebrook, J L; McNeer, M F; Drabman, R S

1984-01-01

We evaluated the effects of cartoon viewing with the use of a star feedback chart on two burned children's pain behavior during their physical therapy sessions. In addition, the degree to which the observational data corresponded with physical therapists' and mothers' ratings of the children's pain, fear, and cooperativeness was examined. Using a reversal single-subject design, the results showed that the children's pain behavior substantially decreased during experimental treatment sessions compared to their baseline levels. The rating scale data indicated that the physical therapist's and mother's rating of pain, anxiety, and cooperativeness were all correlated significantly with the observational data (p less than .05). The contributions of respondent and operant conditioning to the occurrence and treatment of pain behavior in burned children are discussed. PMID:6735948

Competing while cooperating with the same others: The consequences of conflicting demands in co-opetition.

PubMed

Landkammer, Florian; Sassenberg, Kai

2016-12-01

Numerous studies comparing the effects of competition and cooperation demonstrated that competition is detrimental on the social level. However, instead of purely competing, many social contexts require competing while cooperating with the same social target. The current work examined the consequences of such "co-opetition" situations between individuals. Because having to compete and to cooperate with the same social target constitutes conflicting demands, co-opetition should lead to more flexibility, such as (a) less rigid transfer effects of competitive behavior and (b) less rigidity/more flexibility in general. Supporting these predictions, Studies 1a and 1b demonstrated that co-opetition did not elicit competitive behavior in a subsequent task (here: enhanced deceiving of uninvolved others). Study 2 showed that adding conflicting demands (independent of social interdependence) to competition likewise elicits less competitive transfer than competition without such conflicting demands. Beyond that, co-opetition reduced rigid response tendencies during a classification task in Studies 3a and 3b and enhanced flexibility during brainstorming in Study 4, compared with other forms of interdependence. Together, these results suggest that co-opetition leads to more flexible behavior when individuals have to reconcile conflicting demands. Implications for research on social priming, interdependence and competition in everyday life are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Cooperation predictors for dental patients with autism.

PubMed

Marshall, Jennifer; Sheller, Barbara; Williams, Bryan J; Mancl, Lloyd; Cowan, Charles

2007-01-01

This study evaluated potential predictors of cooperation during dental appointments for children with autism. Data were collected from 108 parent/child pairs and their dentists. Questions included: (1) medical/dental history; (2)functional language; (3) personal hygiene skills; (4) academic setting; and (5) achievements. Behavior was scored using the Frankl scale. Subjects were 80 males and 28 females 2.7 to 19 years old with a mean age of 9.8 years. Frankl scores were 65% uncooperative (definitely negative or negative) and 35% cooperative (positive or definitely positive). Multiple factors predicted uncooperative behavior: (1) appointment type (P=.03); (2) concurrent medical diagnoses (P=.04); (3) nonverbal/minimal or echololic language (P=.005); (4) inability to understand language appropriate for age (P=.02); (5) inability to follow multistep instructions (P=.04); (6) parents providing most/all tooth-brushing (P=.004); (7) partially or not toilet trained at 4+ years (P=.02); (8) inability to sit for a haircut (P=.01); (9) attending special education (P<.001); and (10) inability to read at 6+ years (P<.001). Five questions readily answered by a caregiver may indicate a child's cooperative potential. Preappointment inquiry about toilet training, toothbrushing, haircuts, academic achievement and language can give the dentist insight into the child's ability to respond positively to behavior guidance techniques based on communication.

Double-dealing behavior potentially promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Li, Yuting; Yang, Junzhong

2010-11-01

We investigate the effects of double-dealing behavior on cooperation in evolutionary games. Each individual in a population has two attributes: character and action. One's action may be consistent with one's character or not. We provide analytical results by a mean-field description of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs). Moreover, we give numerical results on different networks, ranging from square lattices to scale-free networks (SFNs). Two important conclusions have been drawn from the results on SFNs. Firstly, if only non-influential individuals (those with low degrees) have chances of becoming double-dealers, cooperation is certain to deteriorate. Secondly, when influential individuals (those with high degrees) adopt double-dealing behavior moderately, cooperation would be enhanced, which is in opposition to the traditional belief. These results help us to understand better the social phenomenon of the existence of double-dealers. In addition to the PDG, other types of games including the snowdrift game, the stag-hunt game and the harmony game have also been studied on our model. The results for these three games are also presented, which are consistent with the results for the PDG qualitatively. Furthermore, we consider our model under the co-evolution framework, in which the probability of an individual changing into a double-dealer and the individual strategy both could evolve during the evolutionary process.

Who Cries Wolf, and When? Manipulation of Perceived Threats to Preserve Rank in Cooperative Groups

PubMed Central

Barclay, Pat; Benard, Stephen

2013-01-01

People perform greater within-group cooperation when their groups face external threats, such as hostile outgroups or natural disasters. Researchers and social commentators suggest that high-ranking group members manipulate this “threat-dependent” cooperation by exaggerating threats in order to promote cooperation and suppress competition for their position. However, little systematic research tests this claim or possible situational moderators. In three studies, we use a cooperative group game to show that participants pay to increase others’ perceptions of group threats, and spend more on manipulation when holding privileged positions. This manipulation cost-effectively elicits cooperation and sustains privilege, and is fostered by competition over position, not only position per se. Less cooperative people do more manipulation than more cooperative people do. Furthermore, these effects generalize to broader definitions of privilege. Conceptually, these results offer new insights into an understudied dimension of group behavior. Methodologically, the research extends cooperative group games to allow for analyzing more complex group dynamics. PMID:24069239

Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Yu'E.; Chang, Shuhua; Zhang, Zhipeng; Deng, Zhenghong

2017-01-01

Social reward, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation by proposing a reward model in network population, where a third strategy, reward, as an independent yet particular type of cooperation is introduced in 2-person evolutionary games. Specifically, a new kind of role corresponding to reward strategy, reward agents, is defined, which is aimed at increasing the income of cooperators by applying to them a social reward. Results from numerical simulations show that consideration of social reward greatly promotes the evolution of cooperation, which is confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. Moreover, we explore the microscopic mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation in the three-strategy model. As expected, the reward agents play a vital role in the formation of cooperative clusters, thus resisting the aggression of defectors. Our research might provide valuable insights into further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world.

Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

PubMed Central

Wu, Yu’e; Chang, Shuhua; Zhang, Zhipeng; Deng, Zhenghong

2017-01-01

Social reward, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation by proposing a reward model in network population, where a third strategy, reward, as an independent yet particular type of cooperation is introduced in 2-person evolutionary games. Specifically, a new kind of role corresponding to reward strategy, reward agents, is defined, which is aimed at increasing the income of cooperators by applying to them a social reward. Results from numerical simulations show that consideration of social reward greatly promotes the evolution of cooperation, which is confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. Moreover, we explore the microscopic mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation in the three-strategy model. As expected, the reward agents play a vital role in the formation of cooperative clusters, thus resisting the aggression of defectors. Our research might provide valuable insights into further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world. PMID:28112276

Knowledge of Social Affiliations Biases Economic Decisions

PubMed Central

Martinez, Joel E.; Mack, Michael L.; Gelman, Bernard D.; Preston, Alison R.

2016-01-01

An individual’s reputation and group membership can produce automatic judgments and behaviors toward that individual. Whether an individual’s social reputation impacts interactions with affiliates has yet to be demonstrated. We tested the hypothesis that during initial encounters with others, existing knowledge of their social network guides behavior toward them. Participants learned reputations (cooperate, defect, or equal mix) for virtual players through an iterated economic game (EG). Then, participants learned one novel friend for each player. The critical question was how participants treated the friends in a single-shot EG after the friend-learning phase. Participants tended to cooperate with friends of cooperators and defect on friends of defectors, indicative of a decision making bias based on memory for social affiliations. Interestingly, participants’ explicit predictions of the friends’ future behavior showed no such bias. Moreover, the bias to defect on friends of defectors was enhanced when affiliations were learned in a social context; participants who learned to associate novel faces with player faces during reinforcement learning did not show reputation-based bias for associates of defectors during single-shot EG. These data indicate that when faced with risky social decisions, memories of social connections influence behavior implicitly. PMID:27441563

The virtues of gossip: reputational information sharing as prosocial behavior.

PubMed

Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb; Stellar, Jennifer; Keltner, Dacher

2012-05-01

Reputation systems promote cooperation and deter antisocial behavior in groups. Little is known, however, about how and why people share reputational information. Here, we seek to establish the existence and dynamics of prosocial gossip, the sharing of negative evaluative information about a target in a way that protects others from antisocial or exploitative behavior. We present a model of prosocial gossip and the results of 4 studies testing the model's claims. Results of Studies 1 through 3 demonstrate that (a) individuals who observe an antisocial act experience negative affect and are compelled to share information about the antisocial actor with a potentially vulnerable person, (b) sharing such information reduces negative affect created by observing the antisocial behavior, and (c) individuals possessing more prosocial orientations are the most motivated to engage in such gossip, even at a personal cost, and exhibit the greatest reduction in negative affect as a result. Study 4 demonstrates that prosocial gossip can effectively deter selfishness and promote cooperation. Taken together these results highlight the roles of prosocial motivations and negative affective reactions to injustice in maintaining reputational information sharing in groups. We conclude by discussing implications for reputational theories of the maintenance of cooperation in human groups.

Evolution of Signaling in a Multi-Robot System: Categorization and Communication

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ampatzis, Christos; Tuci, Elio; Trianni, Vito; Dorigo, Marco

We use Evolutionary Robotics to design robot controllers in which decision-making mechanisms to switch from solitary to social behavior are integrated with the mechanisms that underpin the sensory-motor repertoire of the robots. In particular, we study the evolution of behavioral and communicative skills in a categorization task. The individual decision-making structures are based on the integration over time of sensory information. The mechanisms for switching from solitary to social behavior and the ways in which the robots can affect each other's behavior are not predetermined by the experimenter, but are aspects of our model designed by artificial evolution. Our results show that evolved robots manage to cooperate and collectively discriminate between different environments by developing a simple communication protocol based on sound signaling. Communication emerges in the absence of explicit selective pressure coded in the fitness function. The evolution of communication is neither trivial nor obvious; for a meaningful signaling system to evolve, evolution must produce both appropriate signals and appropriate reactions to signals. The use of communication proves to be adaptive for the group, even if, in principle, non-cooperating robots can be equally successful with cooperating robots.

Contextual modulation of biases in face recognition.

PubMed

Felisberti, Fatima Maria; Pavey, Louisa

2010-09-23

The ability to recognize the faces of potential cooperators and cheaters is fundamental to social exchanges, given that cooperation for mutual benefit is expected. Studies addressing biases in face recognition have so far proved inconclusive, with reports of biases towards faces of cheaters, biases towards faces of cooperators, or no biases at all. This study attempts to uncover possible causes underlying such discrepancies. Four experiments were designed to investigate biases in face recognition during social exchanges when behavioral descriptors (prosocial, antisocial or neutral) embedded in different scenarios were tagged to faces during memorization. Face recognition, measured as accuracy and response latency, was tested with modified yes-no, forced-choice and recall tasks (N = 174). An enhanced recognition of faces tagged with prosocial descriptors was observed when the encoding scenario involved financial transactions and the rules of the social contract were not explicit (experiments 1 and 2). Such bias was eliminated or attenuated by making participants explicitly aware of "cooperative", "cheating" and "neutral/indifferent" behaviors via a pre-test questionnaire and then adding such tags to behavioral descriptors (experiment 3). Further, in a social judgment scenario with descriptors of salient moral behaviors, recognition of antisocial and prosocial faces was similar, but significantly better than neutral faces (experiment 4). The results highlight the relevance of descriptors and scenarios of social exchange in face recognition, when the frequency of prosocial and antisocial individuals in a group is similar. Recognition biases towards prosocial faces emerged when descriptors did not state the rules of a social contract or the moral status of a behavior, and they point to the existence of broad and flexible cognitive abilities finely tuned to minor changes in social context.

Utility Evaluation Based on One-To-N Mapping in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game for Interdependent Networks.

PubMed

Wang, Juan; Lu, Wenwen; Liu, Lina; Li, Li; Xia, Chengyi

2016-01-01

In the field of evolutionary game theory, network reciprocity has become an important means to promote the level of promotion within the population system. Recently, the interdependency provides a novel perspective to understand the widespread cooperation behavior in many real-world systems. In previous works, interdependency is often built from the direct or indirect connections between two networks through the one-to-one mapping mode. However, under many realistic scenarios, players may need much more information from many neighboring agents so as to make a more rational decision. Thus, beyond the one-to-one mapping mode, we investigate the cooperation behavior on two interdependent lattices, in which the utility evaluation of a focal player on one lattice may not only concern himself, but also integrate the payoff information of several corresponding players on the other lattice. Large quantities of simulations indicate that the cooperation can be substantially promoted when compared to the traditionally spatial lattices. The cluster formation and phase transition are also analyzed in order to explore the role of interdependent utility coupling in the collective cooperation. Current results are beneficial to deeply understand various mechanisms to foster the cooperation exhibited inside natural, social and engineering systems.

Cognitive Adaptations for n-person Exchange: The Evolutionary Roots of Organizational Behavior.

PubMed

Tooby, John; Cosmides, Leda; Price, Michael E

2006-03-01

Organizations are composed of stable, predominantly cooperative interactions or n -person exchanges. Humans have been engaging in n -person exchanges for a great enough period of evolutionary time that we appear to have evolved a distinct constellation of species-typical mechanisms specialized to solve the adaptive problems posed by this form of social interaction. These mechanisms appear to have been evolutionarily elaborated out of the cognitive infrastructure that initially evolved for dyadic exchange. Key adaptive problems that these mechanisms are designed to solve include coordination among individuals, and defense against exploitation by free riders. Multi-individual cooperation could not have been maintained over evolutionary time if free riders reliably benefited more than contributors to collective enterprises, and so outcompeted them. As a result, humans evolved mechanisms that implement an aversion to exploitation by free riding, and a strategy of conditional cooperation, supplemented by punitive sentiment towards free riders. Because of the design of these mechanisms, how free riding is treated is a central determinant of the survival and health of cooperative organizations. The mapping of the evolved psychology of n -party exchange cooperation may contribute to the construction of a principled theoretical foundation for the understanding of human behavior in organizations.

Cognitive Adaptations for n-person Exchange: The Evolutionary Roots of Organizational Behavior

PubMed Central

Tooby, John; Cosmides, Leda; Price, Michael E.

2013-01-01

Organizations are composed of stable, predominantly cooperative interactions or n-person exchanges. Humans have been engaging in n-person exchanges for a great enough period of evolutionary time that we appear to have evolved a distinct constellation of species-typical mechanisms specialized to solve the adaptive problems posed by this form of social interaction. These mechanisms appear to have been evolutionarily elaborated out of the cognitive infrastructure that initially evolved for dyadic exchange. Key adaptive problems that these mechanisms are designed to solve include coordination among individuals, and defense against exploitation by free riders. Multi-individual cooperation could not have been maintained over evolutionary time if free riders reliably benefited more than contributors to collective enterprises, and so outcompeted them. As a result, humans evolved mechanisms that implement an aversion to exploitation by free riding, and a strategy of conditional cooperation, supplemented by punitive sentiment towards free riders. Because of the design of these mechanisms, how free riding is treated is a central determinant of the survival and health of cooperative organizations. The mapping of the evolved psychology of n-party exchange cooperation may contribute to the construction of a principled theoretical foundation for the understanding of human behavior in organizations. PMID:23814325

Enhanced old-new recognition and source memory for faces of cooperators and defectors in a social-dilemma game.

PubMed

Bell, Raoul; Buchner, Axel; Musch, Jochen

2010-12-01

A popular assumption in evolutionary psychology is that the human mind comprises specialized cognitive modules for social exchange, including a module that serves to enhance memory for faces of cheaters. In the present study, participants played a trust game with computerized opponents, who either defected or cooperated. In a control condition, no interaction took place. In a surprise memory test, old-new recognition for faces and source memory for the associated cooperative or non-cooperative behavior were assessed. A multinomial model was used to measure old-new discrimination, source memory, and guessing biases separately. Inconsistent with the assumption of a memory mechanism that focuses exclusively on cheating, the present study showed enhanced old-new discrimination and source memory for both cooperators and defectors. Rarity of the behavior strategies within the experiment modulated source memory, but only when the differences in base rates were extreme. The findings can be attributed to a mechanism that focuses on exchange-relevant information and flexibly adapts to take into account the relative significance of this information in the encoding context, which may be more beneficial than focusing exclusively on cheaters. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Intergroup Cooperation in Common Pool Resource Dilemmas.

PubMed

Sadowski, Jathan; Spierre, Susan G; Selinger, Evan; Seager, Thomas P; Adams, Elizabeth A; Berardy, Andrew

2015-10-01

Fundamental problems of environmental sustainability, including climate change and fisheries management, require collective action on a scale that transcends the political and cultural boundaries of the nation-state. Rational, self-interested neoclassical economic theories of human behavior predict tragedy in the absence of third party enforcement of agreements and practical difficulties that prevent privatization. Evolutionary biology offers a theory of cooperation, but more often than not in a context of discrimination against other groups. That is, in-group boundaries are necessarily defined by those excluded as members of out-groups. However, in some settings human's exhibit behavior that is inconsistent with both rational economic and group driven cooperation of evolutionary biological theory. This paper reports the results of a non-cooperative game-theoretic exercise that models a tragedy of the commons problem in which groups of players may advance their own positions only at the expense of other groups. Students enrolled from multiple universities and assigned to different multi-university identity groups participated in experiments that repeatedly resulted in cooperative outcomes despite intergroup conflicts and expressions of group identity. We offer three possible explanations: (1) students were cooperative because they were in an academic setting; (2) students may have viewed their instructors as the out-group; or (3) the emergence of a small number of influential, ethical leaders is sufficient to ensure cooperation amongst the larger groups. From our data and analysis, we draw out lessons that may help to inform approaches for institutional design and policy negotiations, particularly in climate change management.

Similarity and difference: Student cooperation in Taiwanese and Australian science classrooms

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wallace, John; Chou, Ching-Yang

2001-11-01

In this study, we examine the way in which students cooperate in Taiwanese and Australian science classrooms. We adopt the position that student cooperation is best understood by examining the patterns of variation within and between countries rather than trying to describe similarities and differences in essential terms. A critical analysis of large-scale learning environment questionnaire data combined with in-depth interview and observational data leads to several findings about the nature of student cooperation in the two countries. We conclude that students from Taiwan and Australia have a range of understandings and interpretations about what it means to cooperate in science classrooms. There are complex connections between cooperative behavior, student academic ability, sex, and nationality, which are best understood in socio-cultural terms.

Cooperation between referees and authors increases peer review accuracy.

PubMed

Leek, Jeffrey T; Taub, Margaret A; Pineda, Fernando J

2011-01-01

Peer review is fundamentally a cooperative process between scientists in a community who agree to review each other's work in an unbiased fashion. Peer review is the foundation for decisions concerning publication in journals, awarding of grants, and academic promotion. Here we perform a laboratory study of open and closed peer review based on an online game. We show that when reviewer behavior was made public under open review, reviewers were rewarded for refereeing and formed significantly more cooperative interactions (13% increase in cooperation, P = 0.018). We also show that referees and authors who participated in cooperative interactions had an 11% higher reviewing accuracy rate (P = 0.016). Our results suggest that increasing cooperation in the peer review process can lead to a decreased risk of reviewing errors.

Cooperation of a Dissatisfied Adaptive Prisoner's Dilemma in Spatial Structures

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Wen; Li, Yao-Sheng; Du, Peng; Xu, Chen

2013-10-01

We study the cooperative behavior of a dissatisfied adaptive prisoner's dilemma via a pair updating rule. We compare two kinds of relationship among the competing agents, one is the well-mixed population and the other is the two-dimensional square lattice. It is found that the cooperation emerges in both the cases and the frequency of cooperation is enhanced in the square lattice. Though it is impossible for the cooperators to have a higher average payoff than that of the defectors in the well-mixed case, the cooperators in the spatial square lattice could have higher average payoffs in certain regions of the game parameters. We theoretically analyze the well-mixed case exactly and the square lattice by pair approximation. The theoretic results are in agreement with the simulation data.

Coparenting and children's temperament predict firstborns' cooperation in the care of an infant sibling.

PubMed

Song, Ju-Hyun; Volling, Brenda L

2015-02-01

This study examined how coparenting and firstborn children's temperament predicted children's cooperative behavior in response to maternal requests for assistance in the care of a 1-month-old infant sibling. Children's cooperative responding was observed during a diaper change session for 216 firstborns (ages 13 to 70 months; M = 32). Parents also completed questionnaires assessing coparenting and children's temperament. Results suggested that coparenting quality moderated the association between children's temperament (i.e., soothability) and children's cooperation as revealed in a Temperament × Cooperative Coparenting × Undermining Coparenting interaction. Specifically, low soothability predicted low levels of children's cooperation in families with high undermining and low cooperative coparenting, over and above the effects of child age, gender, and mothers' education. Findings further our understanding of how temperamental characteristics and coparenting quality conjointly predict individual differences in firstborn children's positive adjustment across the transition to siblinghood. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved.

Multinational investigation of cross-societal cooperation.

PubMed

Dorrough, Angela Rachael; Glöckner, Andreas

2016-09-27

In a globalized world, establishing successful cooperation between people from different nations is becoming increasingly important. We present results from a comprehensive investigation of cross-societal cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas involving population-representative samples from six countries and identify crucial facilitators of and obstacles to cooperation. In interactions involving mutual knowledge about only the other players' nationalities, we demonstrate that people hold strong and transnationally shared expectations (i.e., stereotypes) concerning the cooperation level of interaction partners from other countries. These expectations are the strongest determinants of participant cooperation. Paradoxically, however, they turn out to be incorrect stereotypes that even correlate negatively with reality. In addition to erroneous expectations, participants' cooperation behavior is driven by (shared) social preferences that vary according to the interaction partner's nationality. In the cross-societal context, these social preferences are influenced by differences in wealth and ingroup favoritism, as well as effects of specific country combinations but not by spatial distance between nations.

Spatial modes of cooperation based on bounded rationality

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pan, Qiuhui; Wang, Lingxiao; Shi, Rongrong; Wang, Huan; He, Mingfeng

2014-12-01

Social factors, such as public opinion, values, ethics, moral standards, could guide people’s behavior to some degree. In this paper, we introduce social orientation as a motivator factor into the Nowak model, and discuss the variation of cooperation proportion under the function of motivator factor and betrayal temptation. Results show that motivator factors can promote cooperation proportion, and there is a motivator factor threshold. And a jump point is present in the value, on each side of which cooperation proportion has a small change. Reduction of betrayal temptation can also promote cooperation proportion, and there is a betrayal temptation threshold. And the value is corresponding with a jump point. And cooperation proportion changes very little on each side of the value. In addition, when betrayal temptation and motivator factor both play a role in a system, there are always cooperators and defectors in coexistence.

Time Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas

PubMed Central

Cone, Jeremy; Rand, David G.

2014-01-01

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect. PMID:25551386

Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas.

PubMed

Cone, Jeremy; Rand, David G

2014-01-01

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

Cooperative SIS epidemics can lead to abrupt outbreaks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ghanbarnejad, Fakhteh; Chen, Li; Cai, Weiran; Grassberger, Peter

2015-03-01

In this paper, we study spreading of two cooperative SIS epidemics in mean field approximations and also within an agent based framework. Therefore we investigate dynamics on different topologies like Erdos-Renyi networks and regular lattices. We show that cooperativity of two diseases can lead to strongly first order outbreaks, while the dynamics still might present some scaling laws typical for second order phase transitions. We argue how topological network features might be related to this interesting hybrid behaviors.

Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals

PubMed Central

Roca, Carlos P.; Helbing, Dirk

2011-01-01

Human wellbeing in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate greediness favors social cohesionby a coevolution between cooperation and spatial organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although enhancing individuals’ returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior. PMID:21709245

When Cooperation Was Efficient or Inefficient. Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Evidence

PubMed Central

Balconi, Michela; Vanutelli, Maria E.

2017-01-01

Cooperation is a construct within social cognition that requires both self-perception and the comprehension of others' actions. In the case of synchronized activities the adoption of common strategies is crucial, but this process can be strongly influenced by those variables. In fact, self-perceived efficacy within the social exchange can affect the motivational components toward the creation of synergic actions. Thus, what happens when our performance is efficient or inefficient during cooperation? This question was answered in the present study where we compared behavioral performance and neural activation across different conditions where subjects received an external feedback assessing a good or a poor outcome during a cooperative game. The request was to synchronize responses in a way to achieve good cooperation scorings. Results showed that the behavioral performance was affected by feedback valence, since the negative feedback induced a significant worse performance in contrast to the positive one, which significantly increased performance. For what concerns neural activation, data from functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) showed a specific lateralization effect with the right DLPFC recruited in the case of negative feedback, and an opposite left-sided effect in the case of a positive feedback. Findings were interpreted by proposing that the inefficient condition could be similar to a competitive context since the perception of a failed joint action could have frustrated the cooperative attitude and the use of joint strategies. PMID:28536508

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

PubMed Central

Helbing, Dirk; Johansson, Anders

2010-01-01

Background Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. Methodology and Principal Findings To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Conclusions and Significance Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well. PMID:20967256

Emergence of social cohesion in a model society of greedy, mobile individuals.

PubMed

Roca, Carlos P; Helbing, Dirk

2011-07-12

Human wellbeing in modern societies relies on social cohesion, which can be characterized by high levels of cooperation and a large number of social ties. Both features, however, are frequently challenged by individual self-interest. In fact, the stability of social and economic systems can suddenly break down as the recent financial crisis and outbreaks of civil wars illustrate. To understand the conditions for the emergence and robustness of social cohesion, we simulate the creation of public goods among mobile agents, assuming that behavioral changes are determined by individual satisfaction. Specifically, we study a generalized win-stay-lose-shift learning model, which is only based on previous experience and rules out greenbeard effects that would allow individuals to guess future gains. The most noteworthy aspect of this model is that it promotes cooperation in social dilemma situations despite very low information requirements and without assuming imitation, a shadow of the future, reputation effects, signaling, or punishment. We find that moderate greediness favors social cohesion by a coevolution between cooperation and spatial organization, additionally showing that those cooperation-enforcing levels of greediness can be evolutionarily selected. However, a maladaptive trend of increasing greediness, although enhancing individuals' returns in the beginning, eventually causes cooperation and social relationships to fall apart. Our model is, therefore, expected to shed light on the long-standing problem of the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior.

Analytic game—theoretic approach to ground-water extraction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Loáiciga, Hugo A.

2004-09-01

The roles of cooperation and non-cooperation in the sustainable exploitation of a jointly used groundwater resource have been quantified mathematically using an analytical game-theoretic formulation. Cooperative equilibrium arises when ground-water users respect water-level constraints and consider mutual impacts, which allows them to derive economic benefits from ground-water indefinitely, that is, to achieve sustainability. This work shows that cooperative equilibrium can be obtained from the solution of a quadratic programming problem. For cooperative equilibrium to hold, however, enforcement must be effective. Otherwise, according to the commonized costs-privatized profits paradox, there is a natural tendency towards non-cooperation and non-sustainable aquifer mining, of which overdraft is a typical symptom. Non-cooperative behavior arises when at least one ground-water user neglects the externalities of his adopted ground-water pumping strategy. In this instance, water-level constraints may be violated in a relatively short time and the economic benefits from ground-water extraction fall below those obtained with cooperative aquifer use. One example illustrates the game theoretic approach of this work.

Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

PubMed Central

Li, Xuelong; Wang, Zhen; Li, Huijia; Shi, Lei; Podobnik, Boris; Havlin, Shlomo; Boccaletti, Stefano

2018-01-01

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks. PMID:29259113

Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation.

PubMed

Levine, Emma E; Barasch, Alixandra; Rand, David; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A

2018-05-01

We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate-those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason. Third, individuals' behavioral responses towards signals of emotion and reason depend on their own decision mode: those who rely on emotion tend to conditionally cooperate (that is, cooperate only when they believe that their partner has cooperated), whereas those who rely on reason tend to defect regardless of their partner's signal. These findings shed light on how different decision processes, and lay theories about decision processes, facilitate and impede cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Self-report measures, facial feedback, and personality differences (BEES) in cooperative vs. noncooperative situations: contribution of the mimic system to the sense of empathy.

PubMed

Balconi, Michela; Bortolotti, Adriana; Crivelli, Davide

2013-01-01

The present study integrated three different measures of emotional empathic behavior in a social context: verbal self-report measures (empathic response, emotional involvement, emotional significance, and valence), facial mimicry (activity of corrugator and zygomaticus muscles), and personal response to the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES). Participants were presented with different interpersonal scene types (cooperation, noncooperation, conflict, indifference). Firstly, self-rating on empathy, emotional involvement, and valence varied as a function of interpersonal context. Secondly, corrugator activity increased in response to conflictual and noncooperative situations; zygomatic activity increased in response to cooperative situations. Third, high- and low-BEES subjects showed different empathic behavior: High-empathic subjects were more responsive to empathy-related situations than low-empathic subjects. The convergence and divergence of these multidimensional measures was discussed.

Cooperative synchronized assemblies enhance orientation discrimination.

PubMed

Samonds, Jason M; Allison, John D; Brown, Heather A; Bonds, A B

2004-04-27

There is no clear link between the broad tuning of single neurons and the fine behavioral capabilities of orientation discrimination. We recorded from populations of cells in the cat visual cortex (area 17) to examine whether the joint activity of cells can support finer discrimination than found in individual responses. Analysis of joint firing yields a substantial advantage (i.e., cooperation) in fine-angle discrimination. This cooperation increases to more considerable levels as the population of an assembly is increased. The cooperation in a population of six cells provides encoding of orientation with an information advantage that is at least 2-fold in terms of requiring either fewer cells or less time than independent coding. This cooperation suggests that correlated or synchronized activity can increase information.

Socio-environmental cooperation and conflict? A discursive understanding and its application to the case of Israel and Palestine

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ide, T.; Fröhlich, C.

2015-10-01

The existing literature faces difficulties when accounting for the simultaneity of socio-environmental conflict and cooperation. We suggest that this puzzle can be solved by more recent constructivist works, which argue that conflictive or cooperative behavior is driven by discursively constructed interests, identities and situation assessments. Based on a literature review and field interviews, we analyze and compare the dominant water discourses in Israel and Palestine with the discourse dominant among the activists of a water cooperation project between communities from Israel and the West Bank. Our main result is that discourses are indeed crucial for understanding water-related conflict and cooperation. This finding highlights the relevance of constructivist approaches in the study of socio-environmental conflict and cooperation as well as of practices of bottom-up discursive conflict transformation.

Effect of sensory adaptation on anxiety of children with developmental disabilities: a new approach.

PubMed

Shapiro, Michele; Melmed, Raphael N; Sgan-Cohen, Harold D; Parush, Shula

2009-01-01

The aim of this study was to evaluate the effect of a sensory-adapted dental environment (SADE) on anxiety, relaxation, and cooperation of children with developmental disabilities (CDDs). Pharmacological treatment has been widely used to reduce anxiety, but nonpharmacological methods may be similarly effective. The standardized clinical situation chosen was a dental hygiene cleaning. A SADE was structured. Sixteen CDDs participated in an open cross-over intervention trial measuring behavioral and psychophysiological variables. There was a substantial increase in relaxation and cooperation in the SADE as opposed to the regular dental environment (RDE). This was reflected by: mean duration of anxious behaviors (SADE = 9.04 minutes vs. RDE = 23.44 minutes; P < .01); mean magnitude of anxious behaviors (SADE = 8.49 vs. RDE = 15.50; P < .01); cooperation levels (SADE = 331 vs. RDE = 1.94; P < .01); mean electrodermal activity (EDA; SADE = 1230 vs. RDE = 446; P < .001); and difference in degree of relaxation by EDA (SADE=2014 vs. RDE=763; P < .004). The findings indicate the potential importance of considering the sensory-adapted environment as a preferable dental environment for this population.

Social Skills Training and Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Casey, Kathryn J.

2012-01-01

There is a large body of literature suggesting that students with emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) lack appropriate social skills, including deficits in building and maintaining interpersonal relationships, prosocial behaviors (e.g., sharing, helping, cooperation), and self-management strategies. While the literature shows small to modest…

Doesn't He Have Beautiful Blue Eyes? Tips for a Successful Parent-Teacher Conference.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Strudler, Ruth

1993-01-01

Tips for successful parent-teacher conferences concerning children with special needs focus on preventing a conflict cycle and developing a cooperation cycle. Specific suggestions to reduce stress levels and involve parents positively are offered for preconference behaviors, conference behaviors, and postconference behaviors. (DB)

Dentist-Implemented Contingent Escape for Management of Disruptive Child Behavior.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Allen, Keith D.; And Others

1992-01-01

This paper describes a dentist-implemented intervention in which brief escape from dental treatment (contingent on brief periods of cooperative behavior) was provided to manage disruptive child behavior during restorative dental treatment with four children, aged three to seven years. The procedure required no more time than traditional management…

Siblings and the Development of Prosocial Behavior.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Dunn, Judy; Munn, Penny

1986-01-01

Examines the capability and motivation of 18- and 24-month-old infants to share, help, comfort, and cooperate with their older siblings; the frequency of such prosocial behavior by both siblings; and the children's response to sibling distress. The relationship between prosocial and conflict behavior was also studied. (HOD)

Reputation-Based Investment Helps to Optimize Group Behaviors in Spatial Lattice Networks.

PubMed

Ding, Hong; Cao, Lin; Ren, Yizhi; Choo, Kim-Kwang Raymond; Shi, Benyun

2016-01-01

Encouraging cooperation among selfish individuals is crucial in many real-world systems, where individuals' collective behaviors can be analyzed using evolutionary public goods game. Along this line, extensive studies have shown that reputation is an effective mechanism to investigate the evolution of cooperation. In most existing studies, participating individuals in a public goods game are assumed to contribute unconditionally into the public pool, or they can choose partners based on a common reputation standard (e.g., preferences or characters). However, to assign one reputation standard for all individuals is impractical in many real-world deployment. In this paper, we introduce a reputation tolerance mechanism that allows an individual to select its potential partners and decide whether or not to contribute an investment to the public pool based on its tolerance to other individuals' reputation. Specifically, an individual takes part in a public goods game only if the number of participants with higher reputation exceeds the value of its tolerance. Moreover, in this paper, an individual's reputation can increase or decrease in a bounded interval based on its historical behaviors. We explore the principle that how the reputation tolerance and conditional investment mechanisms can affect the evolution of cooperation in spatial lattice networks. Our simulation results demonstrate that a larger tolerance value can achieve an environment that promote the cooperation of participants.

What Are Punishment and Reputation for?

PubMed Central

Krasnow, Max M.; Cosmides, Leda; Pedersen, Eric J.; Tooby, John

2012-01-01

Why did punishment and the use of reputation evolve in humans? According to one family of theories, they evolved to support the maintenance of cooperative group norms; according to another, they evolved to enhance personal gains from cooperation. Current behavioral data are consistent with both hypotheses (and both selection pressures could have shaped human cooperative psychology). However, these hypotheses lead to sharply divergent behavioral predictions in circumstances that have not yet been tested. Here we report results testing these rival predictions. In every test where social exchange theory and group norm maintenance theory made different predictions, subject behavior violated the predictions of group norm maintenance theory and matched those of social exchange theory. Subjects do not direct punishment toward those with reputations for norm violation per se; instead, they use reputation self-beneficially, as a cue to lower the risk that they personally will experience losses from defection. More tellingly, subjects direct their cooperative efforts preferentially towards defectors they have punished and away from those they haven’t punished; they avoid expending punitive effort on reforming defectors who only pose a risk to others. These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the psychology of punishment evolved to uphold group norms. The circumstances in which punishment is deployed and withheld–its circuit logic–support the hypothesis that it is generated by psychological mechanisms that evolved to benefit the punisher, by allowing him to bargain for better treatment. PMID:23049833

What are punishment and reputation for?

PubMed

Krasnow, Max M; Cosmides, Leda; Pedersen, Eric J; Tooby, John

2012-01-01

Why did punishment and the use of reputation evolve in humans? According to one family of theories, they evolved to support the maintenance of cooperative group norms; according to another, they evolved to enhance personal gains from cooperation. Current behavioral data are consistent with both hypotheses (and both selection pressures could have shaped human cooperative psychology). However, these hypotheses lead to sharply divergent behavioral predictions in circumstances that have not yet been tested. Here we report results testing these rival predictions. In every test where social exchange theory and group norm maintenance theory made different predictions, subject behavior violated the predictions of group norm maintenance theory and matched those of social exchange theory. Subjects do not direct punishment toward those with reputations for norm violation per se; instead, they use reputation self-beneficially, as a cue to lower the risk that they personally will experience losses from defection. More tellingly, subjects direct their cooperative efforts preferentially towards defectors they have punished and away from those they haven't punished; they avoid expending punitive effort on reforming defectors who only pose a risk to others. These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the psychology of punishment evolved to uphold group norms. The circumstances in which punishment is deployed and withheld-its circuit logic-support the hypothesis that it is generated by psychological mechanisms that evolved to benefit the punisher, by allowing him to bargain for better treatment.

Cooperation in the Classroom: Students and Teachers Together. Analysis and Action Series. Second Edition.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cangelosi, James S.

The central question addressed by this book is, "How can middle and secondary school teachers overcome seemingly impossible circumstances in the classroom and elicit students' attention, effort, and cooperation?" The first five chapters focus on teachers' responsibility for student's classroom behavior, and ways for teachers to manage…

Working with Truants: Effective Use of College Cooperative Education Students in the High School.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Matson, Linda Casey; Matson, Ronald R.

1992-01-01

For their co-op job, six college students were placed in high schools as truancy prevention facilitators. Data collected on 600 high school truants showed that the facilitators were effective change agents in influencing attendance behavior, establishing informal positive relations with truants, and effecting cooperation among truants, their…

Aggression and Cooperation: Helping Young Children Develop Constructive Strategies. ERIC Digest.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jewett, Jan

Aggression and cooperation, which represent two critical features in the child's social domain, have one element in common: they both emerge from children's strong developmental push to initiate and maintain relationships with other children. Aggression is defined as any intentional behavior that results in physical or mental injury to any person…

Social Discounting and the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Locey, Matthew L.; Safin, Vasiliy; Rachlin, Howard

2013-01-01

Altruistic behavior has been defined in economic terms as “…costly acts that confer economic benefits on other individuals” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). In a prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation benefits the group but is costly to the individual (relative to defection), yet a significant number of players choose to cooperate. We propose that…

2008 Service Academy Gender Relations Survey

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-12-01

quid pro quo harassment . Three component measures of sexual harassment are derived from Q17. The...classic quid pro quo instances of specific treatment or favoritism conditioned on sexual cooperation. The measurement of these behaviors is derived from...relationship; • Sexual coercionclassic quid pro quo instances of specific treatment or favoritism conditioned on sexual cooperation. 73

Children's Cooperative and Competitive Interactions in Limited Resource Situations: A Literature Review

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Green, Vanessa A.; Rechis, Ruth

2006-01-01

The ability to balance cooperative and competitive behaviors has important implications for a child's overall development. While socially competent children appear to learn highly successful strategies for entering peer groups and negotiating access to limited resources, the development of this level of social competence can be challenging for…

The Definition, Measurement and Development of Social Motives Underlying Cooperative and Competitive Behavior.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McClintock, Charles G.; Messick, David M.

This research proposal supports a program in social psychology which uses a variety of game paradigms and related tasks to obtain estimates of the relative dominance of various social motives including those of maximizing own gain (individualism), joint gain (cooperation), and relative gain (competition). Numerous major studies completed or in…

You Cannot Do This Alone! Increasing Task Interdependence in Cooperative Educational Videogames to Encourage Collaboration

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Nebel, Steve; Schneider, Sascha; Beege, Maik; Kolda, Franziska; Mackiewicz, Valerie; Rey, Günter Daniel

2017-01-01

Complex, multimedia software such as educational videogames offer a wide range of elements to modify learner behavior. The adjustment of such software might support learning, especially in complex settings like collaborative or cooperative scenarios. Coming from a theoretical background of educational psychology, our experiment seeks to implement…

Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity.

PubMed

Sommerfeld, Ralf D; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Semmann, Dirk; Milinski, Manfred

2007-10-30

Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.

His, hers, or theirs? Coparenting after the birth of a second child.

PubMed

Kuo, Patty X; Volling, Brenda L; Gonzalez, Richard

2017-09-01

This study examined changes in coparenting after the birth of a second child. Mothers and fathers from 241 2-parent families reported on their spouses' coparenting cooperation and conflict with their firstborn children before (prenatal) and 4 months after the birth of a second child. Parents completed prenatal questionnaires on their gender-role attitudes, marital satisfaction, and firstborn children's temperamental characteristics. Parents also reported on their second-born infants' temperaments at 1 month of age. Coparenting conflict increased across the transition, and cooperation decreased. Couples in which fathers reported greater marital satisfaction were more cooperative 4 months after the second birth. Firstborns' difficult temperaments contributed to less cooperative coparenting by both parents. When mothers had more traditional gender-role beliefs, fathers engaged in more conflictual coparenting behavior, and when fathers had more traditional gender-role beliefs, mothers engaged in more conflictual coparenting behavior. Mothers, but not fathers, engaged in more coparenting conflict regarding the firstborn when both the firstborn and infant sibling had difficult temperaments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

Trust and cooperation: a new experimental approach.

PubMed

Acedo, Cristina; Gomila, Antoni

2013-09-01

Several theories within different disciplines emphasize the role of trust in fostering cooperation in human social life. Despite differences, the core of these notions of trust is affectively motivated loyalty, which makes the individuals feel mutually committed and willing to accept vulnerability because of positive expectations about each other's behavior. In evolutionary game theory and experimental economics, the notion of trust is much simpler: it is an expectation about another's behavior, a kind of wager, in which the sense of mutual commitment and vulnerability is completely absent. In order to extend the paradigm of trust games typical in those fields to explore the fuller sense of trust relationships, we have developed a new experimental design, in which an iterated prisoner dilemma is played by participants who do or do not hold a trusting personal relationship, while anonymity is preserved. We present here the results of our two pilot studies, which indicate the relevance of personal trust in fostering cooperation and suggest the influence of the structure of social networks on the degree of cooperation achieved. © 2013 New York Academy of Sciences.

Mesoscopic structure conditions the emergence of cooperation on social networks

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Lozano, S.; Arenas, A.; Sanchez, A.

We study the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on two social networks substrates obtained from actual relational data. We find very different cooperation levels on each of them that cannot be easily understood in terms of global statistical properties of both networks. We claim that the result can be understood at the mesoscopic scale, by studying the community structure of the networks. We explain the dependence of the cooperation level on the temptation parameter in terms of the internal structure of the communities and their interconnections. We then test our results on community-structured, specifically designed artificial networks, finding a good agreement withmore » the observations in both real substrates. Our results support the conclusion that studies of evolutionary games on model networks and their interpretation in terms of global properties may not be sufficient to study specific, real social systems. Further, the study allows us to define new quantitative parameters that summarize the mesoscopic structure of any network. In addition, the community perspective may be helpful to interpret the origin and behavior of existing networks as well as to design structures that show resilient cooperative behavior.« less

Similarity increases altruistic punishment in humans

PubMed Central

Mussweiler, Thomas; Ockenfels, Axel

2013-01-01

Humans are attracted to similar others. As a consequence, social networks are homogeneous in sociodemographic, intrapersonal, and other characteristics—a principle called homophily. Despite abundant evidence showing the importance of interpersonal similarity and homophily for human relationships, their behavioral correlates and cognitive foundations are poorly understood. Here, we show that perceived similarity substantially increases altruistic punishment, a key mechanism underlying human cooperation. We induced (dis)similarity perception by manipulating basic cognitive mechanisms in an economic cooperation game that included a punishment phase. We found that similarity-focused participants were more willing to punish others’ uncooperative behavior. This influence of similarity is not explained by group identity, which has the opposite effect on altruistic punishment. Our findings demonstrate that pure similarity promotes reciprocity in ways known to encourage cooperation. At the same time, the increased willingness to punish norm violations among similarity-focused participants provides a rationale for why similar people are more likely to build stable social relationships. Finally, our findings show that altruistic punishment is differentially involved in encouraging cooperation under pure similarity vs. in-group conditions. PMID:24218611

Non-cooperative Fisher-KPP systems: traveling waves and long-time behavior

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Girardin, Léo

2018-01-01

This paper is concerned with non-cooperative parabolic reaction-diffusion systems which share structural similarities with the scalar Fisher-KPP equation. These similarities make it possible to prove, among other results, an extinction and persistence dichotomy and, when persistence occurs, the existence of a positive steady state, the existence of traveling waves with a half-line of possible speeds and a positive minimal speed and the equality between this minimal speed and the spreading speed for the Cauchy problem. Non-cooperative KPP systems can model various phenomena where the following three mechanisms occur: local diffusion in space, linear cooperation and superlinear competition.

Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Amor, Daniel R.; Fort, Joaquim

2011-12-01

We deal with a system of prisoner's dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation.

Utility Evaluation Based on One-To-N Mapping in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game for Interdependent Networks

PubMed Central

Wang, Juan; Lu, Wenwen; Liu, Lina; Li, Li; Xia, Chengyi

2016-01-01

In the field of evolutionary game theory, network reciprocity has become an important means to promote the level of promotion within the population system. Recently, the interdependency provides a novel perspective to understand the widespread cooperation behavior in many real-world systems. In previous works, interdependency is often built from the direct or indirect connections between two networks through the one-to-one mapping mode. However, under many realistic scenarios, players may need much more information from many neighboring agents so as to make a more rational decision. Thus, beyond the one-to-one mapping mode, we investigate the cooperation behavior on two interdependent lattices, in which the utility evaluation of a focal player on one lattice may not only concern himself, but also integrate the payoff information of several corresponding players on the other lattice. Large quantities of simulations indicate that the cooperation can be substantially promoted when compared to the traditionally spatial lattices. The cluster formation and phase transition are also analyzed in order to explore the role of interdependent utility coupling in the collective cooperation. Current results are beneficial to deeply understand various mechanisms to foster the cooperation exhibited inside natural, social and engineering systems. PMID:27907024

Mechanisms and dynamics of cooperation and competition emergence in complex networked systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gianetto, David A.

Cooperative behavior is a pervasive phenomenon in human interactions and yet how it can evolve and become established, through the selfish process of natural selection, is an enduring puzzle. These behaviors emerge when agents interact in a structured manner; even so, the key structural factors that affect cooperation are not well understood. Moreover, the literature often considers cooperation a single attribute of primitive agents who do not react to environmental changes but real-world actors are more perceptive. The present work moves beyond these assumptions by evolving more realistic game participants, with memories of the past, on complex networks. Agents play repeated games with a three-part Markovian strategy that allows us to separate the cooperation phenomenon into trust, reciprocity, and forgiveness characteristics. Our results show that networks matter most when agents gain the most by acting in a selfish manner, irrespective of how much they may lose by cooperating; since the context provided by neighborhoods inhibits greedy impulses that agents otherwise succumb to in isolation. Network modularity is the most important driver of cooperation emergence in these high-stakes games. However, modularity fails to tell the complete story. Modular scale-free graphs impede cooperation when close coordination is required, partially due to the acyclic nature of scale-free network models. To achieve the highest cooperation in diverse social conditions, both high modularity, low connectivity within modules, and a rich network of long cycles become important. With these findings in hand, we study the influence of networks on coordination and competition within the federal health care insurance exchange. In this applied study, we show that systemic health care coordination is encouraged by the emergent insurance network. The network helps underpin the viability of the exchange and provides an environment of stronger competition once a critical-mass of insurers have entered the market.

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.

PubMed

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

2015-05-01

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation

PubMed Central

Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

2015-01-01

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players’ incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives. PMID:25974684

Social Motility in African Trypanosomes

PubMed Central

McLelland, Bryce T.; Hill, Kent L.

2010-01-01

African trypanosomes are devastating human and animal pathogens that cause significant human mortality and limit economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Studies of trypanosome biology generally consider these protozoan parasites as individual cells in suspension cultures or in animal models of infection. Here we report that the procyclic form of the African trypanosome Trypanosoma brucei engages in social behavior when cultivated on semisolid agarose surfaces. This behavior is characterized by trypanosomes assembling into multicellular communities that engage in polarized migrations across the agarose surface and cooperate to divert their movements in response to external signals. These cooperative movements are flagellum-mediated, since they do not occur in trypanin knockdown parasites that lack normal flagellum motility. We term this behavior social motility based on features shared with social motility and other types of surface-induced social behavior in bacteria. Social motility represents a novel and unexpected aspect of trypanosome biology and offers new paradigms for considering host-parasite interactions. PMID:20126443

Promotion of cooperation induced by two-sided players in prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Su, Zhen; Li, Lixiang; Xiao, Jinghua; Podobnik, B.; Stanley, H. Eugene

2018-01-01

We examine how real-world individuals and companies can either reach an agreement or fail to reach an agreement after several stages of negotiation. We use a modified prisoner's dilemma game with two-sided players who can either cooperate or not cooperate with their neighbors. We find that the presence of even a small number of these two-sided players substantially promotes the cooperation because, unlike the rock-paper-scissors scenario, when the cooperators change to the non-cooperators to gain a payoff, they can turn to the two-sided players and continue negotiating. We find that the network structure influences the spread of strategies. Lattice and regular-random (RR) networks benefit the spread of both non-cooperation and two-sided strategies, but scale-free (SF) networks stop both strategies. We also find that the Erdös-R e ´ nyi (ER) network promotes the two-sided strategy and blocks the spread of non-cooperation. As the ER network density decreases, and the network degree is lowered the lifetime of non-cooperators increases. Our results expand our understanding of the role played by the two-sided strategy in the growth of the cooperative behavior in networks.

Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Xiongrui; Rong, Zhihai; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Zhou, Tao; Tse, Chi Kong

2017-05-01

In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations (individuals are located on either a regular lattice or a scale-free network) in the context of repeated games by involving three types of strategies, namely, unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and extortion. The strategy updating of the players is ruled by the replicator-like dynamics. We find that extortion strategies can act as catalysts to promote the emergence of cooperation in structured populations via different mechanisms. Specifically, on regular lattice, extortioners behave as both a shield, which can enwrap cooperators inside and keep them away from defectors, and a spear, which can defeat those surrounding defectors with the help of the neighboring cooperators. Particularly, the enhancement of cooperation displays a resonance-like behavior, suggesting the existence of optimal extortion strength mostly favoring the evolution of cooperation, which is in good agreement with the predictions from the generalized mean-field approximation theory. On scale-free network, the hubs, who are likely occupied by extortioners or defectors at the very beginning, are then prone to be conquered by cooperators on small-degree nodes as time elapses, thus establishing a bottom-up mechanism for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.

When does "economic man" dominate social behavior?

PubMed

Camerer, Colin F; Fehr, Ernst

2006-01-06

The canonical model in economics considers people to be rational and self-regarding. However, much evidence challenges this view, raising the question of when "Economic Man" dominates the outcome of social interactions, and when bounded rationality or other-regarding preferences dominate. Here we show that strategic incentives are the key to answering this question. A minority of self-regarding individuals can trigger a "noncooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for the majority of other-regarding individuals to mimic the minority's behavior. Likewise, a minority of other-regarding individuals can generate a "cooperative" aggregate outcome if their behavior generates incentives for a majority of self-regarding people to behave cooperatively. Similarly, in strategic games, aggregate outcomes can be either far from or close to Nash equilibrium if players with high degrees of strategic thinking mimic or erase the effects of others who do very little strategic thinking. Recently developed theories of other-regarding preferences and bounded rationality explain these findings and provide better predictions of actual aggregate behavior than does traditional economic theory.

Canine-assisted therapy for children with ADHD: preliminary findings from the positive assertive cooperative kids study.

PubMed

Schuck, Sabrina E B; Emmerson, Natasha A; Fine, Aubrey H; Lakes, Kimberley D

2015-02-01

The objective of this study was to provide preliminary findings from an ongoing randomized clinical trial using a canine-assisted intervention (CAI) for 24 children with ADHD. Project Positive Assertive Cooperative Kids (P.A.C.K.) was designed to study a 12-week cognitive-behavioral intervention delivered with or without CAI. Children were randomly assigned to group therapy with or without CAI. Parents of children in both groups simultaneously participated in weekly parent group therapy sessions. Across both treatment groups, parents reported improvements in children's social skills, prosocial behaviors, and problematic behaviors. In both groups, the severity of ADHD symptoms declined during the course of treatment; however, children who received the CAI model exhibited greater reductions in the severity of ADHD symptoms than did children who received cognitive-behavioral therapy without CAI. Results suggest that CAI offers a novel therapeutic strategy that may enhance cognitive-behavioral interventions for children with ADHD. © 2013 SAGE Publications.

[Relationships between motivational regulation strategies, motivational factors, and learning behaviors outside the classroom].

PubMed

Umemoto, Takatoyo; Tanaka, Kenshiro

2017-04-01

This study examined the relationships among motivational regulation strategies, motivational factors, and learning behaviors outside the classroom. There are three subtypes of motivational regulation strategies: autonomous regulation strategies, cooperative strategies, and performance-focused strategies. Motivational factors included in the investigation were self-efficacy and task value, while behavioral and emotional engagement and study time were selected as learning behaviors outside the classroom. A self-report questionnaire was administered to 322 undergraduates from two universities. Multiple regression analysis revealed the use of autonomous regulation strategies, and that task value was positively correlated with engagement and study time. Moreover, self-efficacy positively predicted study time. In contrast, the use of performance strategies negatively predicted engagement. The use of cooperative strategies did not predict learning behaviors. These results indicate that motivation, as well as the regulation of motivation, were important for learning outside the classroom. The effects of regulation of motivation and motivation on learning outside the classroom are discussed in light of the current findings.

Cognitive Load Does Not Affect the Behavioral and Cognitive Foundations of Social Cooperation.

PubMed

Mieth, Laura; Bell, Raoul; Buchner, Axel

2016-01-01

The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners' cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants' positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect-that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners-depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load.

Cognitive Load Does Not Affect the Behavioral and Cognitive Foundations of Social Cooperation

PubMed Central

Mieth, Laura; Bell, Raoul; Buchner, Axel

2016-01-01

The present study serves to test whether the cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation are affected by cognitive load. Participants interacted with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners in a sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Facial trustworthiness was manipulated to stimulate expectations about the future behavior of the partners which were either violated or confirmed by the partners’ cheating or cooperation during the game. In a source memory test, participants were required to recognize the partners and to classify them as cheaters or cooperators. A multinomial model was used to disentangle item memory, source memory and guessing processes. We found an expectancy-congruent bias toward guessing that trustworthy-looking partners were more likely to be associated with cooperation than untrustworthy-looking partners. Source memory was enhanced for cheating that violated the participants’ positive expectations about trustworthy-looking partners. We were interested in whether or not this expectancy-violation effect—that helps to revise unjustified expectations about trustworthy-looking partners—depends on cognitive load induced via a secondary continuous reaction time task. Although this secondary task interfered with working memory processes in a validation study, both the expectancy-congruent guessing bias as well as the expectancy-violation effect were obtained with and without cognitive load. These findings support the hypothesis that the expectancy-violation effect is due to a simple mechanism that does not rely on demanding elaborative processes. We conclude that most cognitive mechanisms underlying social cooperation presumably operate automatically so that they remain unaffected by cognitive load. PMID:27630597

The risk of predation favors cooperation among breeding prey

PubMed Central

Krama, Tatjana; Berzins, Arnis; Rantala, Markus J

2010-01-01

Empirical studies have shown that animals often focus on short-term benefits under conditions of predation risk, which reduces the likelihood that they will cooperate with others. However, some theoretical studies predict that animals in adverse conditions should not avoid cooperation with their neighbors since it may decrease individual risks and increase long-term benefits of reciprocal help. We experimentally tested these two alternatives to find out whether increased predation risk enhances or diminishes the occurrence of cooperation in mobbing, a common anti-predator behavior, among breeding pied flycatchers, Ficedula hypoleuca. Our results show that birds attended mobs initiated by their neighbors more often, approached the stuffed predator significantly more closely, and mobbed it at a higher intensity in areas where the perceived risk of predation was experimentally increased. This study demonstrates a positive impact of predation risk on cooperation in breeding songbirds, which might help to explain the emergence and evolution of cooperation. PMID:20714404

Inequity aversion and the evolution of cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ahmed, Asrar; Karlapalem, Kamalakar

2014-02-01

Evolution of cooperation is a widely studied problem in biology, social science, economics, and artificial intelligence. Most of the existing approaches that explain cooperation rely on some notion of direct or indirect reciprocity. These reciprocity based models assume agents recognize their partner and know their previous interactions, which requires advanced cognitive abilities. In this paper we are interested in developing a model that produces cooperation without requiring any explicit memory of previous game plays. Our model is based on the notion of inequity aversion, a concept introduced within behavioral economics, whereby individuals care about payoff equality in outcomes. Here we explore the effect of using income inequality to guide partner selection and interaction. We study our model by considering both the well-mixed and the spatially structured population and present the conditions under which cooperation becomes dominant. Our results support the hypothesis that inequity aversion promotes cooperative relationship among nonkin.

Inequity aversion and the evolution of cooperation.

PubMed

Ahmed, Asrar; Karlapalem, Kamalakar

2014-02-01

Evolution of cooperation is a widely studied problem in biology, social science, economics, and artificial intelligence. Most of the existing approaches that explain cooperation rely on some notion of direct or indirect reciprocity. These reciprocity based models assume agents recognize their partner and know their previous interactions, which requires advanced cognitive abilities. In this paper we are interested in developing a model that produces cooperation without requiring any explicit memory of previous game plays. Our model is based on the notion of inequity aversion, a concept introduced within behavioral economics, whereby individuals care about payoff equality in outcomes. Here we explore the effect of using income inequality to guide partner selection and interaction. We study our model by considering both the well-mixed and the spatially structured population and present the conditions under which cooperation becomes dominant. Our results support the hypothesis that inequity aversion promotes cooperative relationship among nonkin.

Social diversity promotes cooperation in spatial multigames

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Qin, Jiahu; Chen, Yaming; Kang, Yu; Perc, Matjaž

2017-04-01

Social diversity is omnipresent in the modern world. Here we introduce this diversity into spatial multigames and study its impact on the evolution of cooperation. Multigames are characterized by two or more different social dilemmas being contested among players in the population. When a fraction of players plays the prisoner's dilemma game while the remainder plays the snowdrift game cooperation becomes a difficult proposition. We show that social diversity, determined by the payoff scaling factors from the uniform, exponential or power-law distribution, significantly promotes cooperation. In particular, the stronger the social diversity, the more widespread cooperative behavior becomes. Monte Carlo simulations on the square lattice reveal that a power-law distribution of social diversity is in fact optimal for socially favorable states, thus resonating with findings previously reported for single social dilemmas. We also show that the same promotion mechanism works in time-varying environments, thus further generalizing the important role of social diversity for cooperation in social dilemmas.

Children's Sympathy, Guilt, and Moral Reasoning in Helping, Cooperation, and Sharing: A 6-Year Longitudinal Study.

PubMed

Malti, Tina; Ongley, Sophia F; Peplak, Joanna; Chaparro, Maria P; Buchmann, Marlis; Zuffianò, Antonio; Cui, Lixian

2016-11-01

This study examined the role of sympathy, guilt, and moral reasoning in helping, cooperation, and sharing in a 6-year, three-wave longitudinal study involving 175 children (M age 6.10, 9.18, and 12.18 years). Primary caregivers reported on children's helping and cooperation; sharing was assessed behaviorally. Child sympathy was assessed by self- and teacher reports, and self-attributed feelings of guilt-sadness and moral reasoning were assessed by children's responses to transgression vignettes. Sympathy predicted helping, cooperation, and sharing. Guilt-sadness and moral reasoning interacted with sympathy in predicting helping and cooperation; both sympathy and guilt-sadness were associated with the development of sharing. The findings are discussed in relation to the emergence of differential motivational pathways to helping, cooperation, and sharing. © 2016 The Authors. Child Development © 2016 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

Cooperative Research Projects in the Microgravity Combustion Science Programs Sponsored by NASA and NEDO

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ross, Howard (Compiler)

2000-01-01

This document contains the results of a collection of selected cooperative research projects between principal investigators in the microgravity combustion science programs, sponsored by NASA and NEDO. Cooperation involved the use of drop towers in Japan and the United States, and the sharing of subsequent research data and findings. The topical areas include: (1) Interacting droplet arrays, (2) high pressure binary fuel sprays, (3) sooting droplet combustion, (4) flammability limits and dynamics of spherical, premixed gaseous flames and, (5) ignition and transition of flame spread across thin solid fuel samples. All of the investigators view this collaboration as a success. Novel flame behaviors were found and later published in archival journals. In some cases the experiments provided verification of the design and behavior in subsequent experiments performed on the Space Shuttle. In other cases, the experiments provided guidance to experiments that are expected to be performed on the International Space Station.

From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

PubMed

Menshikov, Ivan S; Shklover, Alexsandr V; Babkina, Tatiana S; Myagkov, Mikhail G

2017-01-01

In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants' behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.

Could shame and honor save cooperation?

PubMed Central

Jacquet, Jennifer; Hauert, Christoph; Traulsen, Arne; Milinski, Manfred

2012-01-01

Shame and honor are mechanisms that expose behavior that falls outside the social norm. With recent six-player public goods experiments, we demonstrated that the threat of shame or the promise of honor led to increased cooperation. Participants were told in advance that after ten rounds two participants would be asked to come forward and write their names on the board in front of the fellow group members. In the shame treatment, the least cooperative players were exposed and wrote their names under the sentence “I donated least” while the honored participants wrote their name under “I donated most.” In both the shame and honor treatments, participants contributed approximately 50% more to the public good, as compared with the control treatment in which all players retained their anonymity. Here, we also discuss how shame and honor differ from full transparency, and some of the challenges to understanding how anonymity and exposure modify behavior. PMID:22808336

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

PubMed Central

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espín, Antonio M.; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Herrmann, Benedikt

2014-01-01

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems. PMID:25113502

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game.

PubMed

Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Espín, Antonio M; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Herrmann, Benedikt

2014-08-12

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.

[Anxious School Absenteeism: Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of School Phobia at a Psychological Counseling Center].

PubMed

Diegel, Klaus

2015-01-01

Resulting from a shortage of possibilities in the ambulant treatment of school phobia behavior-therapeutic interventions were established at a psychological counseling center for families twenty years ago, which have been in existence to this day. The criteria of anxiety-based absenteeism as well as problems of terminology and classification will be presented with emphasis on school phobia as a combination of separation anxiety and social anxiety ("Schulphobie"). The multimodal treatment focuses on cognitive interventions, graduated exposition and close cooperation with teachers. The counselor is also in charge of the networking and cooperation of all people concerned. A short case study is used to illustrate the process. Measures such as training and information for teachers and school social workers and a manual for the comprehension and the treatment of school phobia, which was edited in cooperation with a psychological counseling center for schools complement the treatment.

From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

PubMed Central

Myagkov, Mikhail G.

2017-01-01

In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants’ behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction. PMID:29190280

Do gray wolves (Canis lupus) support pack mates during aggressive inter-pack interactions?

PubMed

Cassidy, Kira A; McIntyre, Richard T

2016-09-01

For group-living mammals, social coordination increases success in everything from hunting and foraging (Crofoot and Wrangham in Mind the Gap, Springer, Berlin, 2010; Bailey et al. in Behav Ecol Sociobiol 67:1-17, 2013) to agonism (Mosser and Packer in Anim Behav 78:359-370, 2009; Wilson et al. in Anim Behav 83:277-291, 2012; Cassidy et al. in Behav Ecol 26:1352-1360, 2015). Cooperation is found in many species and, due to its low costs, likely is a determining factor in the evolution of living in social groups (Smith in Anim Behav 92:291-304, 2014). Beyond cooperation, many mammals perform costly behaviors for the benefit of group mates (e.g., parental care, food sharing, grooming). Altruism is considered the most extreme case of cooperation where the altruist increases the fitness of the recipient while decreasing its own fitness (Bell in Selection: the mechanism of evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008). Gray wolf life history requires intra-pack familiarity, communication, and cooperation in order to succeed in hunting (MacNulty et al. in Behav Ecol doi: 10.1093/beheco/arr159 2011) and protecting group resources (Stahler et al. in J Anim Ecol 82: 222-234, 2013; Cassidy et al. in Behav Ecol 26:1352-1360, 2015). Here, we report 121 territorial aggressive inter-pack interactions in Yellowstone National Park between 1 April 1995 and 1 April 2011 (>5300 days of observation) and examine each interaction where one wolf interferes when its pack mate is being attacked by a rival group. This behavior was recorded six times (17.6 % of interactions involving an attack) and often occurred between dyads of closely related individuals. We discuss this behavior as it relates to the evolution of cooperation, sociality, and altruism.

The prosocial functions of early social emotions: the case of guilt.

PubMed

Vaish, Amrisha

2018-04-01

To safeguard human cooperation, it is vital that when cooperative relationships break down, they are repaired. This requirement is met by the social emotion of guilt, at two levels: the experience of guilt motivates transgressors to repair the damage they have caused, and transgressors' displays of guilt appease victims and bystanders and elicit cooperation toward the transgressor. I review recent evidence that guilt functions in both of these ways from early in development. The experience of guilt motivates reparative behavior in children 2-3 years of age, and transgressors' displays of guilt appease and elicit cooperation in children 4-5 years of age. Thus, over the first few years of ontogeny, guilt becomes an important mechanism for upholding cooperation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A cognitive and economic decision theory for examining cyber defense strategies.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bier, Asmeret Brooke

Cyber attacks pose a major threat to modern organizations. Little is known about the social aspects of decision making among organizations that face cyber threats, nor do we have empirically-grounded models of the dynamics of cooperative behavior among vulnerable organizations. The effectiveness of cyber defense can likely be enhanced if information and resources are shared among organizations that face similar threats. Three models were created to begin to understand the cognitive and social aspects of cyber cooperation. The first simulated a cooperative cyber security program between two organizations. The second focused on a cyber security training program in which participantsmore » interact (and potentially cooperate) to solve problems. The third built upon the first two models and simulates cooperation between organizations in an information-sharing program.« less

Predictor variables of happiness and its connection with risk and protective factors for health

PubMed Central

Garaigordobil, Maite

2015-01-01

Great thinkers, philosophers, scientists, and artists from History have often been concerned about one of the most important elements of life: happiness. The study had four goals: (1) To analyze possible differences in feelings of happiness as a function of sex and age; (2) To explore the relations of happiness with risk factors (psychopathological symptoms, behavior problems) and protective factors (self-concept-self-esteem, cooperative behavior, social skills) for health; (3) To identify predictor variables of happiness; and (4) To explore whether self-esteem mediates the relationship between happiness and psychopathological symptoms. The sample comprised 286 adolescents (14–16 years old). The study used a descriptive, correlational, and cross-sectional methodology. Seven assessment instruments were administered. The ANOVAs confirm that there are no sex differences, but happiness decreases as age increases. Pearson coefficients show that adolescents with more feelings of happiness had fewer psychopathological symptoms (somatization, obsession–compulsion, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, psychoticism…), fewer behavioral problems (school-academic, antisocial behavior, shyness-withdrawal, psychopathological, psychosomatic), high social adaptation, high self-concept/self-esteem, many cooperative behaviors, many appropriate social skills, and few negative social skills (inappropriate assertiveness, impulsiveness, jealousy-withdrawal). Multiple regression analysis identified five variables predicting happiness: high self-concept, few symptoms of depression, many cooperative behaviors, high self-esteem, and low psychoticism. Results showed a partial mediational effect of self-esteem in the relation between happiness and psychopathological symptoms. The discussion focuses on the importance of implementing programs to promote feelings of happiness, as well as protective factors for health (self-esteem, cooperation…). PMID:26321990

The evolution of anti-social punishment in optional public goods games

PubMed Central

Rand, David G.; Nowak, Martin A.

2011-01-01

Cooperation, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a fundamental building block of the natural world and of human society. It has been suggested that costly punishment can promote the evolution of cooperation, with the threat of punishment deterring free-riders. Recent experiments, however, have revealed the existence of ‘anti-social’ punishment, where non-cooperators punish cooperators. While various theoretical models find that punishment can promote the evolution of cooperation, these models a priori exclude the possibility of anti-social punishment. Here we extend the standard theory of optional public goods games to include the full set of punishment strategies. We find that punishment no longer increases cooperation, and that selection favors substantial levels of anti-social punishment for a wide range of parameters. Furthermore, we conduct behavioral experiments, which lead to results that are consistent with our model predictions. As opposed to an altruistic act that promotes cooperation, punishment is mostly a self-interested tool for protecting oneself against potential competitors. PMID:21847108

Cooperate without looking: why we care what people think and not just what they do.

PubMed

Hoffman, Moshe; Yoeli, Erez; Nowak, Martin A

2015-02-10

Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to "look" at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love.

Group Size Effect on Cooperation in One-Shot Social Dilemmas II: Curvilinear Effect.

PubMed

Capraro, Valerio; Barcelo, Hélène

2015-01-01

In a world in which many pressing global issues require large scale cooperation, understanding the group size effect on cooperative behavior is a topic of central importance. Yet, the nature of this effect remains largely unknown, with lab experiments insisting that it is either positive or negative or null, and field experiments suggesting that it is instead curvilinear. Here we shed light on this apparent contradiction by considering a novel class of public goods games inspired to the realistic scenario in which the natural output limits of the public good imply that the benefit of cooperation increases fast for early contributions and then decelerates. We report on a large lab experiment providing evidence that, in this case, group size has a curvilinear effect on cooperation, according to which intermediate-size groups cooperate more than smaller groups and more than larger groups. In doing so, our findings help fill the gap between lab experiments and field experiments and suggest concrete ways to promote large scale cooperation among people.

Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do

PubMed Central

Hoffman, Moshe; Yoeli, Erez; Nowak, Martin A.

2015-01-01

Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One player has the option to “look” at the costs of cooperation, and the other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is harmful for player 2, then cooperation without looking is a subgame perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love. PMID:25624473

The evolution of parental cooperation in birds.

PubMed

Remeš, Vladimír; Freckleton, Robert P; Tökölyi, Jácint; Liker, András; Székely, Tamás

2015-11-03

Parental care is one of the most variable social behaviors and it is an excellent model system to understand cooperation between unrelated individuals. Three major hypotheses have been proposed to explain the extent of parental cooperation: sexual selection, social environment, and environmental harshness. Using the most comprehensive dataset on parental care that includes 659 bird species from 113 families covering both uniparental and biparental taxa, we show that the degree of parental cooperation is associated with both sexual selection and social environment. Consistent with recent theoretical models parental cooperation decreases with the intensity of sexual selection and with skewed adult sex ratios. These effects are additive and robust to the influence of life-history variables. However, parental cooperation is unrelated to environmental factors (measured at the scale of whole species ranges) as indicated by a lack of consistent relationship with ambient temperature, rainfall or their fluctuations within and between years. These results highlight the significance of social effects for parental cooperation and suggest that several parental strategies may coexist in a given set of ambient environment.

Personality and prosocial behavior: linking basic traits and social value orientations.

PubMed

Hilbig, Benjamin E; Glöckner, Andreas; Zettler, Ingo

2014-09-01

Concerning the dispositional determinants of prosocial behavior and cooperation, work based on the classic 5 personality factors, and especially Agreeableness, has turned out somewhat inconsistent. A clearer picture has emerged from consideration of the HEXACO model of personality--though supported entirely by hypothetical behavior as criterion, so far. Thus, in 2 studies and a reanalysis, we investigated "actual behavior" in the form of individually and socially consequential distribution decisions. As expected, HEXACO Honesty-Humility consistently predicted prosocial behavior, including a theory-consistent pattern on the facet level. Importantly, this pattern might explain why five-factor Agreeableness has only sometimes been found to account for prosocial behavior. Indeed, further results indicate that five-factor Agreeableness comprises some aspects that are predictive of prosocial behavior--aspects well covered by HEXACO Honesty-Humility--but also others that play no role for this criterion. As such, the links between five-factor Agreeableness and prosocial behavior are well-covered by HEXACO Honesty-Humility, but not vice versa. Taken together, these findings hint that especially HEXACO Honesty-Humility (and certain aspects of five-factor Agreeableness) account for prosocial behavior--thus explaining previous inconsistencies and providing a more nuanced understanding of the links between basic personality and prosocial or cooperative behavior. 2014 APA, all rights reserved

Preschool Children's Sleep and Wake Behavior: Effects of Massage Therapy.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Field, Tiffany; And Others

1996-01-01

Preschool children received twice-weekly massages for five weeks. Compared to control children, the massaged children had better behavior ratings on mood state, vocalization, activity, and cooperation following massage on day one and throughout the study. Teachers rated their behavior more optimally, and their parents rated them as having less…

Social Identity, Social Ties and Social Capital: A Study in Gaming Context

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jiang, Hao

2012-01-01

This work will focus on how different social relationships, namely shared identity and personal tie, will impact cooperative behavior, a form of social capital. I designed and conducted an economic game study to show that shared identity and personal ties work differently on cooperation among people and resource flow in social groups. Many factors…

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Patterns of Cooperation: Distance Theory.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their ability to analyze international relations, this monograph presents data on the application of distance theory to patterns of cooperation among nations. Distance theory implies that international relations systems (nations, organizations, individuals, etc.) can be…

Psychological and physiological correlates of stress: Performance on a cooperative task

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Roessler, R.; Lester, J.; Knapp, T.

1976-01-01

The relationship of personality dimensions to performance was investigated. The personality measure used to select subjects, the Barratt impulsiveness scale, is hypothesized to be related to a style of behavior which should affect the trend of choices which various subjects will make. Personality dimensions were specifically examined during performance of a cooperative task, the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Influence of Technology on the Leadership of 21st-Century Career and Technical Education Administrators

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Suarez, Linda Maria

2012-01-01

The purpose of this qualitative study was to examine how the technology beliefs of New York State Career and Technical Education Board of Cooperative Education Services administrators influenced their leadership behaviors. The participants were from a purposive selection from five suburban and rural Boards of Cooperative Education Services in…

Such Stuff as Habits Are Made on: A Reply to Cooper and Shallice (2006)

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Botvinick, Matthew M.; Plaut, David C.

2006-01-01

The representations and mechanisms guiding everyday routine sequential action remain incompletely understood. In recent work, the authors proposed a computational model of routine sequential behavior that took the form of a recurrent neural network (M. Botvinick & D. C. Plaut, 2004). Subsequently, R. P. Cooper and T. Shallice (2006) put forth a…

Cooperation or Competition: Does Game Theory Have Relevance for Public Health?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Westhoff, Wayne W.; Cohen, Cynthia F.; Cooper, Elizabeth Elliott; Corvin, Jaime; McDermott, Robert J.

2012-01-01

In this paper, we use game theory to understand decisions to cooperate or to compete in the delivery of public health services. Health care is a quasi-public good that is often associated with altruistic behavior, yet it operates in an increasingly competitive environment. With mounting health care regulation and changes in privatization,…

Political Identity of First-Year College Students: An Analysis of Student Characteristics Using Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) Data

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mulberry, Stella L.

2010-01-01

This quantitative study utilized secondary self-reported data from the 2008 administration of the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) Freshman Survey from two Texas public universities to investigate the pre-college demographic, academic, attitude, behavioral, and familial factors that may relate to students' self-reported political…

Mechanisms of cooperation in cancer nanomedicine: towards systems nanotechnology.

PubMed

Hauert, Sabine; Bhatia, Sangeeta N

2014-09-01

Nanoparticles are designed to deliver therapeutics and diagnostics selectively to tumors. Their size, shape, charge, material, coating, and cargo determine their individual functionalities. A systems approach could help predict the behavior of trillions of nanoparticles interacting in complex tumor environments. Engineering these nanosystems may lead to biomimetic strategies where interactions between nanoparticles and their environment give rise to cooperative behaviors typically seen in natural self-organized systems. Examples include nanoparticles that communicate the location of a tumor to amplify tumor homing or self-assemble and disassemble to optimize nanoparticle transport. The challenge is to discover which nanoparticle designs lead to a desired system behavior. To this end, novel nanomaterials, deep understanding of biology, and computational tools are emerging as the next frontier. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Transient Cooperative Processes in Dewetting Polymer Melts.

PubMed

Chandran, Sivasurender; Reiter, Günter

2016-02-26

We compare the high velocity dewetting behavior, at elevated temperatures, of atactic polystyrene (aPS) and isotactic polystyrene (iPS) films, with the zero shear bulk viscosity (η_{bulk}) of aPS being approximately ten times larger than iPS. As expected, for aPS the apparent viscosity of the films (η_{f}) derived from high-shear dewetting is less than η_{bulk}, displaying a shear thinning behavior. Surprisingly, for iPS films, η_{f} is always larger than η_{bulk}, even at about 50 °C above the melting point, with η_{f}/η_{bulk} following an Arrhenius behavior. The corresponding activation energy of ∼160±10  kJ/mol for iPS films suggests a cooperative motion of segments which are aligned and agglomerated by fast dewetting.

Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pan, Qiuhui; Liu, Xuesong; Bao, Honglin; Su, Yu; He, Mingfeng

2018-02-01

In this paper, we study the effect of adaptive interaction on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The connections of players are co-evolutionary with cooperation; whether adjacent players can play the prisoner's dilemma game is associated with the strategies they took in the preceding round. If a player defected in the preceding round, his neighbors will refuse to play the prisoner's dilemma game with him in accordance with a certain probability distribution. We use the disconnecting strength to represent this probability. We discuss the evolution of cooperation with different values of temptation to defect, sucker's payoff and disconnecting strength. The simulation results show that cooperation can be significantly enhanced through increasing the value of the disconnecting strength. In addition, the increase in disconnecting strength can improve the cooperators' ability to resist the increase in temptation and the decrease in reward. We study the parameter ranges for three different evolutionary results: cooperators extinction, defectors extinction, cooperator and defector co-existence. Meanwhile, we recruited volunteers and designed a human behavioral experiment to verify the theoretical simulation results. The punishment of disconnection has a positive effect on cooperation. A higher disconnecting strength will enhance cooperation more significantly. Our research findings reveal some significant insights into efficient mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation.

Promotion of cooperation by adaptive interaction: The role of heterogeneity in neighborhoods

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Han, Xu; Zhao, Xiaowei; Xia, Haoxiang

2018-07-01

Evolution of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games has been studied extensively in the past decades. Recent studies have investigated the effect of adaptive interaction intensity on spatial prisoner's dilemma, showing that if individuals can adjust their interaction intensity with each opponent at the same extent, cooperation can be promoted in a proper scale. However, the previous studies about adaptive interaction willingness do not consider the heterogeneity of the opponents. In this paper, a simulative model is developed to examine whether and how the interactive diversity influences cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games, in which individuals consider the corresponding behavior of different opponents. The simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively promote cooperation, and the average payoff of the system can significantly be improved by high interaction intensity between cooperators. In addition, we also show four kinds of different individuals to analyze the evolution progresses. The simulations show that cooperators on the boundary decrease their interaction willingness, which makes the boundary defectors lose their opportunity to participate in the interaction and be invaded by cooperators.

Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments.

PubMed

Li, Xuelong; Jusup, Marko; Wang, Zhen; Li, Huijia; Shi, Lei; Podobnik, Boris; Stanley, H Eugene; Havlin, Shlomo; Boccaletti, Stefano

2018-01-02

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism-costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks. Copyright © 2017 the Author(s). Published by PNAS.

Social dilemmas in an online social network: The structure and evolution of cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fu, Feng; Chen, Xiaojie; Liu, Lianghuan; Wang, Long

2007-11-01

We investigate two paradigms for studying the evolution of cooperation—Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift game in an online friendship network, obtained from a social networking site. By structural analysis, it is revealed that the empirical social network has small-world and scale-free properties. Besides, it exhibits assortative mixing pattern. Then, we study the evolutionary version of the two types of games on it. It is found that cooperation is substantially promoted with small values of game matrix parameters in both games. Whereas the competent cooperators induced by the underlying network of contacts will be dramatically inhibited with increasing values of the game parameters. Further, we explore the role of assortativity in evolution of cooperation by random edge rewiring. We find that increasing amount of assortativity will to a certain extent diminish the cooperation level. We also show that connected large hubs are capable of maintaining cooperation. The evolution of cooperation on empirical networks is influenced by various network effects in a combined manner, compared with that on model networks. Our results can help understand the cooperative behaviors in human groups and society.

Behavioral evidence for inter-hemispheric cooperation during a lexical decision task: a divided visual field experiment.

PubMed

Perrone-Bertolotti, Marcela; Lemonnier, Sophie; Baciu, Monica

2013-01-01

HIGHLIGHTSThe redundant bilateral visual presentation of verbal stimuli decreases asymmetry and increases the cooperation between the two hemispheres.The increased cooperation between the hemispheres is related to semantic information during lexical processing.The inter-hemispheric interaction is represented by both inhibition and cooperation. This study explores inter-hemispheric interaction (IHI) during a lexical decision task by using a behavioral approach, the bilateral presentation of stimuli within a divided visual field experiment. Previous studies have shown that compared to unilateral presentation, the bilateral redundant (BR) presentation decreases the inter-hemispheric asymmetry and facilitates the cooperation between hemispheres. However, it is still poorly understood which type of information facilitates this cooperation. In the present study, verbal stimuli were presented unilaterally (left or right visual hemi-field successively) and bilaterally (left and right visual hemi-field simultaneously). Moreover, during the bilateral presentation of stimuli, we manipulated the relationship between target and distractors in order to specify the type of information which modulates the IHI. Thus, three types of information were manipulated: perceptual, semantic, and decisional, respectively named pre-lexical, lexical and post-lexical processing. Our results revealed left hemisphere (LH) lateralization during the lexical decision task. In terms of inter-hemisphere interaction, the perceptual and decision-making information increased the inter-hemispheric asymmetry, suggesting the inhibition of one hemisphere upon the other. In contrast, semantic information decreased the inter-hemispheric asymmetry, suggesting cooperation between the hemispheres. We discussed our results according to current models of IHI and concluded that cerebral hemispheres interact and communicate according to various excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms, all which depend on specific processes and various levels of word processing.

Behavioral evidence for inter-hemispheric cooperation during a lexical decision task: a divided visual field experiment

PubMed Central

Perrone-Bertolotti, Marcela; Lemonnier, Sophie; Baciu, Monica

2013-01-01

HIGHLIGHTS The redundant bilateral visual presentation of verbal stimuli decreases asymmetry and increases the cooperation between the two hemispheres.The increased cooperation between the hemispheres is related to semantic information during lexical processing.The inter-hemispheric interaction is represented by both inhibition and cooperation. This study explores inter-hemispheric interaction (IHI) during a lexical decision task by using a behavioral approach, the bilateral presentation of stimuli within a divided visual field experiment. Previous studies have shown that compared to unilateral presentation, the bilateral redundant (BR) presentation decreases the inter-hemispheric asymmetry and facilitates the cooperation between hemispheres. However, it is still poorly understood which type of information facilitates this cooperation. In the present study, verbal stimuli were presented unilaterally (left or right visual hemi-field successively) and bilaterally (left and right visual hemi-field simultaneously). Moreover, during the bilateral presentation of stimuli, we manipulated the relationship between target and distractors in order to specify the type of information which modulates the IHI. Thus, three types of information were manipulated: perceptual, semantic, and decisional, respectively named pre-lexical, lexical and post-lexical processing. Our results revealed left hemisphere (LH) lateralization during the lexical decision task. In terms of inter-hemisphere interaction, the perceptual and decision-making information increased the inter-hemispheric asymmetry, suggesting the inhibition of one hemisphere upon the other. In contrast, semantic information decreased the inter-hemispheric asymmetry, suggesting cooperation between the hemispheres. We discussed our results according to current models of IHI and concluded that cerebral hemispheres interact and communicate according to various excitatory and inhibitory mechanisms, all which depend on specific processes and various levels of word processing. PMID:23818879

[Prosocial personality. Why is cooperation and moral adjustment the rule?].

PubMed

Kroeber, H-L

2011-01-01

Human beings are adapted for acting and thinking cooperatively in cultural groups and the most impressive cognitive achievements of humans are the products not of individuals acting alone but of individuals interacting. As they grow, human children are equipped to participate in this cooperative group thinking through a special kind of cultural intelligence, comprising species-unique social-cognitive skills and motivations for collaboration, communication, social learning and other forms of shared intentionality. Some mechanism of social learning and norm orientation are reported, leading to some presumptions about the roots of antisocial behavior.

Effects of cooperative learning strategy on undergraduate kinesiology students' learning styles.

PubMed

Meeuwsen, Harry J; King, George A; Pederson, Rockie

2005-10-01

A growing body of research supports cooperative learning as an effective teaching strategy. A specific cooperative learning strategy, Team-based Learning, was applied to a convenience sample of four undergraduate sophomore-level motor behavior courses over four semesters from Fall 2002 to Spring 2004 to examine whether this strategy would affect students' learning styles. The data from the Grasha-Reichmann Student Learning Style Scales indicated that this teaching strategy was associated with a significant decrease in the negative Avoidant and Dependent learning styles and an improvement in the positive Participant learning style.

Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

PubMed

Yuan, Wu-Jie; Xia, Cheng-Yi

2014-01-01

Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter α. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of α (increment of heterogeneous investment) is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.

Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma

PubMed Central

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N.; West, Stuart A.

2012-01-01

Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when “playing” for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected. PMID:22485141

Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness.

PubMed

Jordan, Jillian J; Hoffman, Moshe; Nowak, Martin A; Rand, David G

2016-07-20

Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject's choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.

Correlates of cooperation in a one-shot high-stakes televised prisoners' dilemma.

PubMed

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; West, Stuart A

2012-01-01

Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when "playing" for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected.

Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness

PubMed Central

Jordan, Jillian J.; Hoffman, Moshe; Nowak, Martin A.; Rand, David G.

2016-01-01

Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject’s choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love. PMID:27439873

Heterogeneous Link Weight Promotes the Cooperation in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ma, Zhi-Qin; Xia, Cheng-Yi; Sun, Shi-Wen; Wang, Li; Wang, Huai-Bin; Wang, Juan

The spatial structure has often been identified as a prominent mechanism that substantially promotes the cooperation level in prisoner's dilemma game. In this paper we introduce a weighting mechanism into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game to explore the cooperative behaviors on the square lattice. Here, three types of weight distributions: exponential, power-law and uniform distributions are considered, and the weight is assigned to links between players. Through large-scale numerical simulations we find, compared with the traditional spatial game, that this mechanism can largely enhance the frequency of cooperators. For most ranges of b, we find that the power-law distribution enables the highest promotion of cooperation and the uniform one leads to the lowest enhancement, whereas the exponential one lies often between them. The great improvement of cooperation can be caused by the fact that the distributional link weight yields inhomogeneous interaction strength among individuals, which can facilitate the formation of cooperative clusters to resist the defector's invasion. In addition, the impact of amplitude of the undulation of weight distribution and noise strength on cooperation is also investigated for three kinds of weight distribution. Current researches can aid in the further understanding of evolutionary cooperation in biological and social science.

The Effect of Keystone Individuals on Collective Outcomes Can Be Mediated through Interactions or Behavioral Persistence

PubMed Central

Pinter-Wollman, Noa; Keiser, Carl N.; Wollman, Roy; Pruitt, Jonathan N.

2017-01-01

Collective behavior emerges from interactions among group members who often vary in their behavior. The presence of just one or a few keystone individuals, such as leaders or tutors, may have a large effect on collective outcomes. These individuals can catalyze behavioral changes in other group members, thus altering group composition and collective behavior. The influence of keystone individuals on group function may lead to trade-offs between ecological situations, because the behavioral composition they facilitate may be suitable in one situation but not another. We use computer simulations to examine various mechanisms that allow keystone individuals to exert their influence on group members. We further discuss a trade-off between two potentially conflicting collective outcomes, cooperative prey attack and disease dynamics. Our simulations match empirical data from a social spider system and produce testable predictions for the causes and consequences of the influence of keystone individuals on group composition and collective outcomes. We find that a group’s behavioral composition can be impacted by the keystone individual through changes to interaction patterns or behavioral persistence over time. Group behavioral composition and the mechanisms that drive the distribution of phenotypes influence collective outcomes and lead to trade-offs between disease dynamics and cooperative prey attack. PMID:27420788

Energy aspects of the synchronization of model neurons

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Torrealdea, F. J.; D'Anjou, A.; Graña, M.; Sarasola, C.

2006-07-01

We have deduced an energy function for a Hindmarsh-Rose model neuron and we have used it to evaluate the energy consumption of the neuron during its signaling activity. We investigate the balance of energy in the synchronization of two bidirectional linearly coupled neurons at different values of the coupling strength. We show that when two neurons are coupled there is a specific cost associated to the cooperative behavior. We find that the energy consumption of the neurons is incoherent until very near the threshold of identical synchronization, which suggests that cooperative behaviors without complete synchrony could be energetically more advantageous than those with complete synchrony.

Correlation of Positive and Negative Reciprocity Fails to Confer an Evolutionary Advantage: Phase Transitions to Elementary Strategies

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2013-10-01

Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavior is therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.

Statistical physics of human cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perc, Matjaž; Jordan, Jillian J.; Rand, David G.; Wang, Zhen; Boccaletti, Stefano; Szolnoki, Attila

2017-05-01

Extensive cooperation among unrelated individuals is unique to humans, who often sacrifice personal benefits for the common good and work together to achieve what they are unable to execute alone. The evolutionary success of our species is indeed due, to a large degree, to our unparalleled other-regarding abilities. Yet, a comprehensive understanding of human cooperation remains a formidable challenge. Recent research in the social sciences indicates that it is important to focus on the collective behavior that emerges as the result of the interactions among individuals, groups, and even societies. Non-equilibrium statistical physics, in particular Monte Carlo methods and the theory of collective behavior of interacting particles near phase transition points, has proven to be very valuable for understanding counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. By treating models of human cooperation as classical spin models, a physicist can draw on familiar settings from statistical physics. However, unlike pairwise interactions among particles that typically govern solid-state physics systems, interactions among humans often involve group interactions, and they also involve a larger number of possible states even for the most simplified description of reality. The complexity of solutions therefore often surpasses that observed in physical systems. Here we review experimental and theoretical research that advances our understanding of human cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, on the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed solutions, and on self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states.

A new consequence of Simpson's paradox: stable cooperation in one-shot prisoner's dilemma from populations of individualistic learners.

PubMed

Chater, Nick; Vlaev, Ivo; Grinberg, Maurice

2008-08-01

Theories of choice in economics typically assume that interacting agents act individualistically and maximize their own utility. Specifically, game theory proposes that rational players should defect in one-shot prisoners' dilemmas (PD). Defection also appears to be the inevitable outcome for agents who learn by reinforcement of past choices, because whatever the other player does, defection leads to greater reinforcement on each trial. In a computer simulation and 4 experiments, the authors show that, apparently paradoxically, when players' choices are correlated by an exogenous factor (here, the cooperativeness of the specific PD chosen), people obtain greater average reinforcement for cooperating, which can sustain cooperation. This effect arises from a well-known statistical paradox, Simpson's paradox. The authors speculate that this effect may be relevant to aspects of real-world human cooperative behavior.

The Impact of Test-Taking Behaviors on WISC-IV Spanish Domain Scores in Its Standardization Sample

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Oakland, Thomas; Callueng, Carmelo; Harris, Josette G.

2012-01-01

The use of individually administered measures of intelligence and other cognitive abilities requires clinicians to monitor a client's test behaviors, given the need for a client to be engaged fully, attentive, and cooperative during the testing process. The use of standardized and norm-referenced measures of test-taking behaviors facilitates this…

Confronting passive behavior through outdoor experience: a TA approach to experiential learning

Treesearch

Frederick W. Medrick

1977-01-01

The concepts and techniques of transactional analysis (TA) can usefully be applied to outdoor challenge programs aimed at facilitating personal growth, developing responsibility, and teaching cooperative behavior. Passive behavior results from discounting of the self and others; four levels of it have been identified, and TA offers various means of preventing or...

Different gain/loss sensitivity and social adaptation ability in gifted adolescents during a public goods game.

PubMed

Chung, Dongil; Yun, Kyongsik; Kim, Jin Ho; Jang, Bosun; Jeong, Jaeseung

2011-02-16

Gifted adolescents are considered to have high IQs with advanced mathematical and logical performances, but are often thought to suffer from social isolation or emotional mal-adaptation to the social group. The underlying mechanisms that cause stereotypic portrayals of gifted adolescents are not well known. We aimed to investigate behavioral performance of gifted adolescents during social decision-making tasks to assess their affective and social/non-social cognitive abilities. We examined cooperation behaviors of 22 gifted and 26 average adolescents during an iterative binary public goods (PG) game, a multi-player social interaction game, and analyzed strategic decision processes that include cooperation and free-riding. We found that the gifted adolescents were more cooperative than average adolescents. Particularly, comparing the strategies for the PG game between the two groups, gifted adolescents were less sensitive to loss, yet were more sensitive to gain. Additionally, the behavioral characteristics of average adolescents, such as low trust of the group and herding behavior, were not found in gifted adolescents. These results imply that gifted adolescents have a high cognitive ability but a low ability to process affective information or to adapt in social groups compared with average adolescents. We conclude that gain/loss sensitivity and the ability to adapt in social groups develop to different degrees in average and gifted adolescents.

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir

2009-12-01

Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Collective-goal ascription increases cooperation in humans.

PubMed

Mitkidis, Panagiotis; Sørensen, Jesper; Nielbo, Kristoffer L; Andersen, Marc; Lienard, Pierre

2013-01-01

Cooperation is necessary in many types of human joint activity and relations. Evidence suggests that cooperation has direct and indirect benefits for the cooperators. Given how beneficial cooperation is overall, it seems relevant to investigate the various ways of enhancing individuals' willingness to invest in cooperative endeavors. We studied whether ascription of a transparent collective goal in a joint action promotes cooperation in a group. A total of 48 participants were assigned in teams of 4 individuals to either a "transparent goal-ascription" or an "opaque goal-ascription" condition. After the manipulation, the participants played an anonymous public goods game with another member of their team. We measured the willingness of participants to cooperate and their expectations about the other player's contribution. Between subjects analyses showed that transparent goal ascription impacts participants' likelihood to cooperate with each other in the future, thereby greatly increasing the benefits from social interactions. Further analysis showed that this could be explained with a change in expectations about the partner's behavior and by an emotional alignment of the participants. The study found that a transparent goal ascription is associated with an increase of cooperation. We propose several high-level mechanisms that could explain the observed effect: general affect modulation, trust, expectation and perception of collective efficacy.

Collapse of cooperation in evolving games.

PubMed

Stewart, Alexander J; Plotkin, Joshua B

2014-12-09

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players' payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, when there is a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of cooperation, coevolution often leads to a dramatic loss of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential reward for mutual cooperation increases. Depending upon the form of tradeoffs, evolution may even move away from the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game altogether. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.

Evolutionary Fuzzy Control and Navigation for Two Wheeled Robots Cooperatively Carrying an Object in Unknown Environments.

PubMed

Juang, Chia-Feng; Lai, Min-Ge; Zeng, Wan-Ting

2015-09-01

This paper presents a method that allows two wheeled, mobile robots to navigate unknown environments while cooperatively carrying an object. In the navigation method, a leader robot and a follower robot cooperatively perform either obstacle boundary following (OBF) or target seeking (TS) to reach a destination. The two robots are controlled by fuzzy controllers (FC) whose rules are learned through an adaptive fusion of continuous ant colony optimization and particle swarm optimization (AF-CACPSO), which avoids the time-consuming task of manually designing the controllers. The AF-CACPSO-based evolutionary fuzzy control approach is first applied to the control of a single robot to perform OBF. The learning approach is then applied to achieve cooperative OBF with two robots, where an auxiliary FC designed with the AF-CACPSO is used to control the follower robot. For cooperative TS, a rule for coordination of the two robots is developed. To navigate cooperatively, a cooperative behavior supervisor is introduced to select between cooperative OBF and cooperative TS. The performance of the AF-CACPSO is verified through comparisons with various population-based optimization algorithms for the OBF learning problem. Simulations and experiments verify the effectiveness of the approach for cooperative navigation of two robots.

The Effects of 10 Communication Modes on the Behavior of Teams During Co-Operative Problem-Solving

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ochsman, Richard B.; Chapanis, Alphonse

1974-01-01

Sixty teams of two college students each solved credible "real world" problems co-operatively. Conversations were carried on in one of 10 modes of communication: (1) typewriting only, (2) handwriting only, (3) handwriting and typewriting, (4) typewriting and video, (5) handwriting and video, (6) voice only, (7) voice and typewriting, (8) voice and…

Southwestern Cooperative Educational Laboratory Interaction Observation Schedule (SCIOS): A System for Analyzing Teacher-Pupil Interaction in the Affective Domain.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bemis, Katherine A.; Liberty, Paul G.

The Southwestern Cooperative Interaction Observation Schedule (SCIOS) is a classroom observation instrument designed to record pupil-teacher interaction. The classification of pupil behavior is based on Krathwohl's (1964) theory of the three lowest levels of the affective domain. The levels are (1) receiving: the learner should be sensitized to…

2010 Service Academy Gender Relations Survey

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-12-15

sexual relationship. Sexual coercion includes classic quid pro quo instances of specific treatment or favoritism conditioned on sexual cooperation...and DoD as behaviors that might lead to a hostile or offensive work environment, or represent quid pro quo harassment . Three component measures of... quid pro quo instances of specific treatment or favoritism rnnHitinnpH nn CPYIIJII rnnnpratinn co ditioned o sexual cooper tio .

A Grounded Research Perspective for Motivating College Students' Self-Regulated Learning Behaviors: Preparing and Gaining the Cooperation, Commitment of Teachers.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Talbot, Gilles L.

This paper suggests that the processes one would have college teachers use to motivate students closely parallel those that should be used to gain the cooperation, commitment, and preparation of teachers for this task. It discusses the "learning orientation" versus "grading orientation" of students, along with "class-side manners" that college…

Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games

PubMed Central

Wang, Zhen; Wang, Lin; Yin, Zi-Yu; Xia, Cheng-Yi

2012-01-01

In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately realize others’ reputation situation. Here we introduce the mechanism of inferring reputation into the selection of potential strategy sources to explore the evolution of cooperation. Before the game each player is assigned with a randomly distributed parameter p denoting his ability to infer the reputation of others. The parameter p of each individual is kept constant during the game. The value of p indicates that the neighbor possessing highest reputation is chosen with the probability p and randomly choosing an opponent is left with the probability 1−p. We find that this novel mechanism can be seen as an universally applicable promoter of cooperation, which works on various interaction networks and in different types of evolutionary game. Of particular interest is the fact that, in the early stages of evolutionary process, cooperators with high reputation who are easily regarded as the potential strategy donors can quickly lead to the formation of extremely robust clusters of cooperators that are impervious to defector attacks. These clusters eventually help cooperators reach their undisputed dominance, which transcends what can be warranted by the spatial reciprocity alone. Moreover, we provide complete phase diagrams to depict the impact of uncertainty in strategy adoptions and conclude that the effective interaction topology structure may be altered under such a mechanism. When the estimation of reputation is extended, we also show that the moderate value of evaluation factor enables cooperation to thrive best. We thus present a viable method of understanding the ubiquitous cooperative behaviors in nature and hope that it will inspire further studies to resolve social dilemmas. PMID:22808120

Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity

PubMed Central

Sommerfeld, Ralf D.; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Semmann, Dirk; Milinski, Manfred

2007-01-01

Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip. PMID:17947384

Evolutionary dynamics of public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Jing; Wu, Bin; Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Long

2010-05-01

The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations. The theory of stochastic process is innovatively adopted to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the public goods games involving a diversity of contributions. In the limit of rare mutations, the general stationary distribution of this stochastic process can be analytically approximated by means of diffusion theory. Moreover, we demonstrate that increasing the diversity of contributions greatly reduces the probability of finding the population in a homogeneous state full of defectors. This increase also raises the expectation of the total contribution in the entire population and thus promotes social cooperation. Furthermore, by investigating the evolutionary dynamics of optional public goods games with diverse contributions, we find that nonparticipation can assist players who contribute more in resisting invasion and taking over individuals who contribute less. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to confirm our analytical results. Our results may provide insight into the effect of diverse contributions on cooperative behaviors in the real world.

Cooperation Survives and Cheating Pays in a Dynamic Network Structure with Unreliable Reputation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Antonioni, Alberto; Sánchez, Angel; Tomassini, Marco

2016-06-01

In a networked society like ours, reputation is an indispensable tool to guide decisions about social or economic interactions with individuals otherwise unknown. Usually, information about prospective counterparts is incomplete, often being limited to an average success rate. Uncertainty on reputation is further increased by fraud, which is increasingly becoming a cause of concern. To address these issues, we have designed an experiment based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a model for social interactions. Participants could spend money to have their observable cooperativeness increased. We find that the aggregate cooperation level is practically unchanged, i.e., global behavior does not seem to be affected by unreliable reputations. However, at the individual level we find two distinct types of behavior, one of reliable subjects and one of cheaters, where the latter artificially fake their reputation in almost every interaction. Cheaters end up being better off than honest individuals, who not only keep their true reputation but are also more cooperative. In practice, this results in honest subjects paying the costs of fraud as cheaters earn the same as in a truthful environment. These findings point to the importance of ensuring the truthfulness of reputation for a more equitable and fair society.

Phase transitions in models of human cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perc, Matjaž

2016-08-01

If only the fittest survive, why should one cooperate? Why should one sacrifice personal benefits for the common good? Recent research indicates that a comprehensive answer to such questions requires that we look beyond the individual and focus on the collective behavior that emerges as a result of the interactions among individuals, groups, and societies. Although undoubtedly driven also by culture and cognition, human cooperation is just as well an emergent, collective phenomenon in a complex system. Nonequilibrium statistical physics, in particular the collective behavior of interacting particles near phase transitions, has already been recognized as very valuable for understanding counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes. However, unlike pairwise interactions among particles that typically govern solid-state physics systems, interactions among humans often involve group interactions, and they also involve a larger number of possible states even for the most simplified description of reality. Here we briefly review research done in the realm of the public goods game, and we outline future research directions with an emphasis on merging the most recent advances in the social sciences with methods of nonequilibrium statistical physics. By having a firm theoretical grip on human cooperation, we can hope to engineer better social systems and develop more efficient policies for a sustainable and better future.

Coalition Factor in the Evolution of Non-Kin Altruism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dessalles, Jean-Louis

Animal behavior is often altruistic. In the frame of the theory of natural selection, altruism can only exist under specific conditions like kin selection or reciprocal cooperation. We show that reciprocal cooperation, which is generally invoked to explain non-kin altruism, requires very restrictive conditions to be stable. Some of these conditions are not met in many cases of altruism observed in nature. In search of another explanation of non-kin altruism, we consider Zahavis's theory of prestige. We extend it to propose a "political" model of altruism. We give evidence showing that non-kin altruism can evolve in the context of inter-subgroup competition. Under such circumstances, altruistic behavior can be used by individuals to advertise their quality as efficient coalition members. In this model, only abilities which positively correlate with the subgroup success can evolve into altruistic behaviors.

Examining the relationship between face processing and social interaction behavior in children with and without autism spectrum disorder

PubMed Central

2014-01-01

Background Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show impairment in reciprocal social communication, which includes deficits in social cognition and behavior. Since social cognition and social behavior are considered to be interdependent, it is valuable to examine social processes on multiple levels of analysis. Neuropsychological measures of face processing often reveal deficits in social cognition in ASD including the ability to identify and remember facial information. However, the extent to which neuropsychological measures are associated with or predictive of real-world social behavior is unclear. Methods The study investigated 66 children (ASD 34, typically developing (TD) 32) using neuropsychological measures of face processing (identity, affect, and memory). Children also participated in a peer interaction paradigm, which allowed observation and coding of natural social interaction behaviors during play with peers (e.g., Self-Play, Cooperative Play, Verbal Bout). ANCOVA, regression, and correlation models analyzed between-group differences, the ability of neuropsychological measures to predict social behavior, and the strength of the associations. Results Between-group differences were shown on Memory for Faces Delayed and the peer interaction variables Self-Play and Verbal Bout. Regression models indicated that Memory for Faces Delayed predicted the amount of Self-Play, Equipment use alone, and Cooperative Play with peers on the playground. Autism symptomology only predicted verbal exchange with peers. Conclusions Face memory strongly predicts relevant social engagement patterns in both children with and without ASD. Impairment in facial memory is associated with reduced ‘real-world’ social interaction and more self-play, whereas higher performance in face memory predicts more cooperative play. Results highlight the strong connection between face memory and reciprocal social interaction, suggesting that improvement in one may benefit the other. PMID:25180050

A hierarchical model of the evolution of cooperation in cultural systems.

PubMed

Savatsky, K; Reynolds, R G

1989-01-01

In this paper the following problem is addressed: "Under what conditions can a collection of individual organisms learn to cooperate when cooperation appears to outwardly degrade individual performance at the outset. In order to attempt a theoretical solution to this problem, data from a real world problem in anthropology is used. A distributed simulation model of this system was developed to assess its long term behavior using using an approach suggested by Zeigler (Zeigler, B.P., 1984, Multifaceted Modelling and Discrete Event Simulation (Academic Press, London)). The results of the simulation are used to show that although cooperation degrades the performance potential of each individual, it enhances the persistence of the individual's partial solution to the problem in certain situations."

Sparse cliques trump scale-free networks in coordination and competition

PubMed Central

Gianetto, David A.; Heydari, Babak

2016-01-01

Cooperative behavior, a natural, pervasive and yet puzzling phenomenon, can be significantly enhanced by networks. Many studies have shown how global network characteristics affect cooperation; however, it is difficult to understand how this occurs based on global factors alone, low-level network building blocks, or motifs are necessary. In this work, we systematically alter the structure of scale-free and clique networks and show, through a stochastic evolutionary game theory model, that cooperation on cliques increases linearly with community motif count. We further show that, for reactive stochastic strategies, network modularity improves cooperation in the anti-coordination Snowdrift game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma game but not in the Stag Hunt coordination game. We also confirm the negative effect of the scale-free graph on cooperation when effective payoffs are used. On the flip side, clique graphs are highly cooperative across social environments. Adding cycles to the acyclic scale-free graph increases cooperation when multiple games are considered; however, cycles have the opposite effect on how forgiving agents are when playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. PMID:26899456

Stability and robustness analysis of cooperation cycles driven by destructive agents in finite populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Requejo, Rubén J.; Camacho, Juan; Cuesta, José A.; Arenas, Alex

2012-08-01

The emergence and promotion of cooperation are two of the main issues in evolutionary game theory, as cooperation is amenable to exploitation by defectors, which take advantage of cooperative individuals at no cost, dooming them to extinction. It has been recently shown that the existence of purely destructive agents (termed jokers) acting on the common enterprises (public goods games) can induce stable limit cycles among cooperation, defection, and destruction when infinite populations are considered. These cycles allow for time lapses in which cooperators represent a relevant fraction of the population, providing a mechanism for the emergence of cooperative states in nature and human societies. Here we study analytically and through agent-based simulations the dynamics generated by jokers in finite populations for several selection rules. Cycles appear in all cases studied, thus showing that the joker dynamics generically yields a robust cyclic behavior not restricted to infinite populations. We also compute the average time in which the population consists mostly of just one strategy and compare the results with numerical simulations.

Diverse strategy-learning styles promote cooperation in evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Run-Ran; Jia, Chun-Xiao; Rong, Zhihai

2015-11-01

Observational learning and practice learning are two important learning styles and play important roles in our information acquisition. In this paper, we study a spacial evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game, where players can choose the observational learning rule or the practice learning rule when updating their strategies. In the proposed model, we use a parameter p controlling the preference of players choosing the observational learning rule, and found that there exists an optimal value of p leading to the highest cooperation level, which indicates that the cooperation can be promoted by these two learning rules collaboratively and one single learning rule is not favor the promotion of cooperation. By analysing the dynamical behavior of the system, we find that the observational learning rule can make the players residing on cooperative clusters more easily realize the bad sequence of mutual defection. However, a too high observational learning probability suppresses the players to form compact cooperative clusters. Our results highlight the importance of a strategy-updating rule, more importantly, the observational learning rule in the evolutionary cooperation.

Sparse cliques trump scale-free networks in coordination and competition

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gianetto, David A.; Heydari, Babak

2016-02-01

Cooperative behavior, a natural, pervasive and yet puzzling phenomenon, can be significantly enhanced by networks. Many studies have shown how global network characteristics affect cooperation; however, it is difficult to understand how this occurs based on global factors alone, low-level network building blocks, or motifs are necessary. In this work, we systematically alter the structure of scale-free and clique networks and show, through a stochastic evolutionary game theory model, that cooperation on cliques increases linearly with community motif count. We further show that, for reactive stochastic strategies, network modularity improves cooperation in the anti-coordination Snowdrift game and the Prisoner’s Dilemma game but not in the Stag Hunt coordination game. We also confirm the negative effect of the scale-free graph on cooperation when effective payoffs are used. On the flip side, clique graphs are highly cooperative across social environments. Adding cycles to the acyclic scale-free graph increases cooperation when multiple games are considered; however, cycles have the opposite effect on how forgiving agents are when playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.

Conditional dissociation as a punishment mechanism in the evolution of cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Qu, Xinglong; Zhou, Changli; Cao, Zhigang; Yang, Xiaoguang

2016-05-01

Recent studies show that conditional dissociation, a.k.a. post-interaction partner-refusal, can promote the emergence and stability of cooperation. However, in most of these studies, players' strategies are restricted to pure ones, which is obviously inconsistent with many biological and economic situations. Another concern with line of these studies is that conditional dissociation is often combined with other mechanisms. These mechanisms may favor cooperation per se, leaving it unclear whether conditional dissociation is indeed a key factor. In this paper, we study a clean model, pruning all the factors other than conditional dissociation that may favor cooperation. We find that conditional dissociation, which could be viewed as a variant of peer punishment, does promote cooperation, no matter whether mixed strategies are allowed or not. This confirms the previous findings in the literature. In addition, compared with the pure strategy scenario, cooperators are less competitive when mixed strategies are allowed. Our main finding is supported by both the numerical simulations and the theoretical analysis of Neutrally Stable Strategy. We also find that cooperative behavior is favored when waiting time and/or the population's lifespan are longer.

Relatedness predicts multiple measures of investment in cooperative nest construction in sociable weavers

PubMed Central

Leighton, Gavin M.; Echeverri, Sebastian; Heinrich, Dirk; Kolberg, Holger

2015-01-01

Although communal goods are often critical to society, they are simultaneously susceptible to exploitation and are evolutionarily stable only if mechanisms exist to curtail exploitation. Mechanisms such as punishment and kin selection have been offered as general explanations for how communal resources can be maintained. Evidence for these mechanisms comes largely from humans and social insects, leaving their generality in question. To assess how communal resources are maintained, we observed cooperative nest construction in sociable weavers (Philetairus socius). The communal nest of sociable weavers provides thermal benefits for all individuals but requires continual maintenance. We observed cooperative nest construction and also recorded basic morphological characteristics. We also collected blood samples, performed next-generation sequencing, and isolated 2358 variable single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) to estimate relatedness. We find that relatedness predicts investment in cooperative nest construction, while no other morphological characters significantly explain cooperative output. We argue that indirect benefits are a critical fitness component for maintaining the cooperative behavior that maintains the communal good. PMID:26726282

From outgroups to allied forces: Effect of intergroup cooperation in violent and nonviolent video games on boosting favorable outgroup attitudes.

PubMed

Adachi, Paul J C; Hodson, Gordon; Willoughby, Teena; Blank, Carolyn; Ha, Alexandra

2016-03-01

Here we addressed whether even violent video games can improve intergroup attitudes if played cooperatively with an outgroup, in keeping with the Contact Hypothesis. In addition, we examined potential mechanisms of this effect. In Experiment 1 (N = 77), Canadians played a violent video game (Call of Duty: Black Ops) against zombies, either cooperatively or independently (i.e., at the same time but solo) with a (supposed) University of Buffalo participant. As expected, cooperative (vs. solo) play significantly improved outgroup attitudes and pro-outgroup participant behavior, effects explained by heightened 1-group recategorization (i.e., feeling psychologically on the same team and connected with the outgroup member). In Experiment 2 (N = 239), effects of cooperation (vs. solo play) held whether playing a violent or nonviolent video game. Importantly, our findings offer an engaging and pragmatic solution to the pervasive issue of setting up and negotiating opportunities for successful intergroup cooperation. (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).

Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pichler, Elgar; Shapiro, Avi M.

2017-07-01

Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, reap public goods benefits, which are shares of the contributions amplified by a synergy factor. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a complex network in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs relative to past payoffs parameterized by greediness. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.

Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks.

PubMed

Pichler, Elgar; Shapiro, Avi M

2017-07-01

Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, reap public goods benefits, which are shares of the contributions amplified by a synergy factor. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a complex network in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs relative to past payoffs parameterized by greediness. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.

Cooperation, cheating, and collapse in microbial populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gore, Jeff

2012-02-01

Natural populations can suffer catastrophic collapse in response to small changes in environmental conditions, and recovery after such a collapse can be exceedingly difficult. We have used laboratory yeast populations to study proposed early warning signals of impending extinction. Yeast cooperatively breakdown the sugar sucrose, meaning that there is a minimum number of cells required to sustain the population. We have demonstrated experimentally that the fluctuations in the population size increase in magnitude and become slower as the population approaches collapse. The cooperative nature of yeast growth on sucrose suggests that the population may be susceptible to cheater cells, which do not contribute to the public good and instead merely take advantage of the cooperative cells. We have confirmed this possibility experimentally by using a cheater yeast strain that lacks the gene encoding the cooperative behavior [1]. However, recent results in the lab demonstrate that the presence of a bacterial competitor may drive cooperation within the yeast population.[4pt] [1] Gore et al, Nature 459, 253 -- 256 (2009)

Neuronal prediction of opponent's behavior during cooperative social interchange in primates.

PubMed

Haroush, Keren; Williams, Ziv M

2015-03-12

A cornerstone of successful social interchange is the ability to anticipate each other's intentions or actions. While generating these internal predictions is essential for constructive social behavior, their single neuronal basis and causal underpinnings are unknown. Here, we discover specific neurons in the primate dorsal anterior cingulate that selectively predict an opponent's yet unknown decision to invest in their common good or defect and distinct neurons that encode the monkey's own current decision based on prior outcomes. Mixed population predictions of the other was remarkably near optimal compared to behavioral decoders. Moreover, disrupting cingulate activity selectively biased mutually beneficial interactions between the monkeys but, surprisingly, had no influence on their decisions when no net-positive outcome was possible. These findings identify a group of other-predictive neurons in the primate anterior cingulate essential for enacting cooperative interactions and may pave a way toward the targeted treatment of social behavioral disorders. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Nomadic-colonial life strategies enable paradoxical survival and growth despite habitat destruction

PubMed Central

Tan, Zong Xuan; Cheong, Kang Hao

2017-01-01

Organisms often exhibit behavioral or phenotypic diversity to improve population fitness in the face of environmental variability. When each behavior or phenotype is individually maladaptive, alternating between these losing strategies can counter-intuitively result in population persistence–an outcome similar to the Parrondo’s paradox. Instead of the capital or history dependence that characterize traditional Parrondo games, most ecological models which exhibit such paradoxical behavior depend on the presence of exogenous environmental variation. Here we present a population model that exhibits Parrondo’s paradox through capital and history-dependent dynamics. Two sub-populations comprise our model: nomads, who live independently without competition or cooperation, and colonists, who engage in competition, cooperation, and long-term habitat destruction. Nomads and colonists may alternate behaviors in response to changes in the colonial habitat. Even when nomadism and colonialism individually lead to extinction, switching between these strategies at the appropriate moments can paradoxically enable both population persistence and long-term growth. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.21673.001 PMID:28084993

Cooperative microbial tolerance behaviors in host-microbiota mutualism

PubMed Central

Ayres, Janelle S.

2016-01-01

Animal defense strategies against microbes are most often thought of as a function of the immune system, the primary function of which is to sense and kill microbes through the execution of resistance mechanisms. However, this antagonistic view creates complications for our understanding of beneficial host-microbe interactions. Pathogenic microbes are described as employing a few common behaviors that promote their fitness at the expense of host health and fitness. Here, a complementary framework is proposed to suggest that in addition to pathogens, beneficial microbes have evolved behaviors to manipulate host processes in order to promote their own fitness and do so through the promotion of host health and fitness. In this Perspective, I explore the idea that patterns or behaviors traditionally ascribed to pathogenic microbes are also employed by beneficial microbes to promote host tolerance defense strategies. Such strategies would promote host health without having a negative impact on microbial fitness and would thereby yield cooperative evolutionary dynamics that are likely required to drive mutualistic co-evolution of hosts and microbes. PMID:27259146

Effects of behavioral patterns and network topology structures on Parrondo’s paradox

PubMed Central

Ye, Ye; Cheong, Kang Hao; Cen, Yu-wan; Xie, Neng-gang

2016-01-01

A multi-agent Parrondo’s model based on complex networks is used in the current study. For Parrondo’s game A, the individual interaction can be categorized into five types of behavioral patterns: the Matthew effect, harmony, cooperation, poor-competition-rich-cooperation and a random mode. The parameter space of Parrondo’s paradox pertaining to each behavioral pattern, and the gradual change of the parameter space from a two-dimensional lattice to a random network and from a random network to a scale-free network was analyzed. The simulation results suggest that the size of the region of the parameter space that elicits Parrondo’s paradox is positively correlated with the heterogeneity of the degree distribution of the network. For two distinct sets of probability parameters, the microcosmic reasons underlying the occurrence of the paradox under the scale-free network are elaborated. Common interaction mechanisms of the asymmetric structure of game B, behavioral patterns and network topology are also revealed. PMID:27845430

Effects of behavioral patterns and network topology structures on Parrondo’s paradox

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ye, Ye; Cheong, Kang Hao; Cen, Yu-Wan; Xie, Neng-Gang

2016-11-01

A multi-agent Parrondo’s model based on complex networks is used in the current study. For Parrondo’s game A, the individual interaction can be categorized into five types of behavioral patterns: the Matthew effect, harmony, cooperation, poor-competition-rich-cooperation and a random mode. The parameter space of Parrondo’s paradox pertaining to each behavioral pattern, and the gradual change of the parameter space from a two-dimensional lattice to a random network and from a random network to a scale-free network was analyzed. The simulation results suggest that the size of the region of the parameter space that elicits Parrondo’s paradox is positively correlated with the heterogeneity of the degree distribution of the network. For two distinct sets of probability parameters, the microcosmic reasons underlying the occurrence of the paradox under the scale-free network are elaborated. Common interaction mechanisms of the asymmetric structure of game B, behavioral patterns and network topology are also revealed.

Evolution of global cooperation driven by risks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Wang, Long

2012-05-01

Globalization facilitates our communication with each other, while it magnifies problems such as overharvesting of natural resources and human-induced climate change. Thus people all over the world are involved in a global social dilemma which calls for worldwide cooperation to reduce the risks of these extreme events and disasters. A collective target (threshold) is required to prevent such events. Everyone may lose their wealth once their total individual contributions fail to reach the threshold. To this end, we establish a model of threshold public goods games in a group-structured population and investigate its evolutionary process. We study multilevel public goods games with defectors, local cooperators, and global cooperators and are primarily concerned with how the global cooperative behavior evolves. We find that, compared with the standard public goods games, the strategy of global cooperation accounts for a bigger proportion in the stationary distribution of threshold public goods games. On the other hand, the fixation time of the global cooperation strategy is greatly shortened with increase of the probability of disaster striking. Therefore, global risks induced by the threshold can effectively promote global cooperation in environmental investment and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Critical mass of public goods and its coevolution with cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Shi, Dong-Mei; Wang, Bing-Hong

2017-07-01

In this study, the enhancing parameter represented the value of the public goods to the public in public goods game, and was rescaled to a Fermi-Dirac distribution function of critical mass. Public goods were divided into two categories, consumable and reusable public goods, and their coevolution with cooperative behavior was studied. We observed that for both types of public goods, cooperation was promoted as the enhancing parameter increased when the value of critical mass was not very large. An optimal value of critical mass which led to the best cooperation was identified. We also found that cooperations emerged earlier for reusable public goods, and defections became extinct earlier for the consumable public goods. Moreover, we observed that a moderate depreciation rate for public goods resulted in an optimal cooperation, and this range became wider as the enhancing parameter increased. The noise influence on cooperation was studied, and it was shown that cooperation density varied non-monotonically as noise amplitude increased for reusable public goods, whereas decreased monotonically for consumable public goods. Furthermore, existence of the optimal critical mass was also identified in other three regular networks. Finally, simulation results were utilized to analyze the provision of public goods in detail.

Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans

PubMed Central

Rand, David G.; Arbesman, Samuel; Christakis, Nicholas A.

2011-01-01

Human populations are both highly cooperative and highly organized. Human interactions are not random but rather are structured in social networks. Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one's social partners. This dynamic structure permits an important form of conditional action that has been explored theoretically but has received little empirical attention: People can respond to the cooperation and defection of those around them by making or breaking network links. Here, we present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modification it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups. Our experiments explore large-scale cooperation, where subjects’ cooperative actions are equally beneficial to all those with whom they interact. Consistent with previous research, we find that cooperation decays over time when social networks are shuffled randomly every round or are fixed across all rounds. We also find that, when networks are dynamic but are updated only infrequently, cooperation again fails. However, when subjects can update their network connections frequently, we see a qualitatively different outcome: Cooperation is maintained at a high level through network rewiring. Subjects preferentially break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators, creating an incentive to cooperate and leading to substantial changes in network structure. Our experiments confirm the predictions of a set of evolutionary game theoretic models and demonstrate the important role that dynamic social networks can play in supporting large-scale human cooperation. PMID:22084103

Cooperative spreading processes in multiplex networks.

PubMed

Wei, Xiang; Chen, Shihua; Wu, Xiaoqun; Ning, Di; Lu, Jun-An

2016-06-01

This study is concerned with the dynamic behaviors of epidemic spreading in multiplex networks. A model composed of two interacting complex networks is proposed to describe cooperative spreading processes, wherein the virus spreading in one layer can penetrate into the other to promote the spreading process. The global epidemic threshold of the model is smaller than the epidemic thresholds of the corresponding isolated networks. Thus, global epidemic onset arises in the interacting networks even though an epidemic onset does not arise in each isolated network. Simulations verify the analysis results and indicate that cooperative spreading processes in multiplex networks enhance the final infection fraction.

Evolutionary Games in Multi-Agent Systems of Weighted Social Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin; Zheng, Hao-Ran; Zhou, Hong; Hu, Mao-Bin

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

Preschool children's behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity.

PubMed

Kato-Shimizu, Mayuko; Onishi, Kenji; Kanazawa, Tadahiro; Hinobayashi, Toshihiko

2013-01-01

Social indirect reciprocity seems to be crucial in enabling large-scale cooperative networks among genetically unrelated individuals in humans. However, there are relatively few studies on social indirect reciprocity in children compared to adults. Investigating whether young children have a behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity will help us understand how and when the fundamental ability to form cooperative relationships among adults is acquired. Using naturalistic observation at a nursery school, this study examined whether 5- to 6-year-olds show a behavioral tendency to engage in social indirect reciprocity in response to their peers' prosocial behavior toward a third party. The results revealed that bystander children tended to display prosocial behavior toward their peers more frequently after observing these peers' prosocial behavior toward third-party peers, compared with control situations; this suggests that 5- to 6-year-olds may have an essential behavioral tendency to establish social indirect reciprocity when interacting with peers in their daily lives. In addition, bystanders tended to display affiliative behavior after observing focal children's prosocial behavior. In other words, observing peers' prosocial behavior toward third-party peers evoked bystanders' positive emotions toward the helpers. Considering both the present results and previous findings, we speculate that in preschoolers, such positive emotions might mediate the increase in the bystander's prosocial behavior toward the helper. In addition, an intuitional emotional process plays an important role in the preschooler's behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity in natural interactions with peers.

Preschool Children’s Behavioral Tendency toward Social Indirect Reciprocity

PubMed Central

Kanazawa, Tadahiro; Hinobayashi, Toshihiko

2013-01-01

Social indirect reciprocity seems to be crucial in enabling large-scale cooperative networks among genetically unrelated individuals in humans. However, there are relatively few studies on social indirect reciprocity in children compared to adults. Investigating whether young children have a behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity will help us understand how and when the fundamental ability to form cooperative relationships among adults is acquired. Using naturalistic observation at a nursery school, this study examined whether 5- to 6-year-olds show a behavioral tendency to engage in social indirect reciprocity in response to their peers’ prosocial behavior toward a third party. The results revealed that bystander children tended to display prosocial behavior toward their peers more frequently after observing these peers’ prosocial behavior toward third-party peers, compared with control situations; this suggests that 5- to 6-year-olds may have an essential behavioral tendency to establish social indirect reciprocity when interacting with peers in their daily lives. In addition, bystanders tended to display affiliative behavior after observing focal children’s prosocial behavior. In other words, observing peers’ prosocial behavior toward third-party peers evoked bystanders’ positive emotions toward the helpers. Considering both the present results and previous findings, we speculate that in preschoolers, such positive emotions might mediate the increase in the bystander’s prosocial behavior toward the helper. In addition, an intuitional emotional process plays an important role in the preschooler’s behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity in natural interactions with peers. PMID:23951040

Exploration of Peer Leader Verbal Behaviors as They Intervene with Small Groups in College General Chemistry

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kulatunga, Ushiri; Lewis, Jennifer E.

2013-01-01

Current literature has emphasized the lack of research into verbal behaviors of teachers as a barrier to understanding the effectiveness of instructional interventions. This study focuses on the verbal behaviors of peer leaders, who serve as de facto teachers in a college chemistry teaching reform based on cooperative learning. Video data obtained…

Assistance dogs provide a useful behavioral model to enrich communicative skills of assistance robots.

PubMed

Gácsi, Márta; Szakadát, Sára; Miklósi, Adám

2013-01-01

These studies are part of a project aiming to reveal relevant aspects of human-dog interactions, which could serve as a model to design successful human-robot interactions. Presently there are no successfully commercialized assistance robots, however, assistance dogs work efficiently as partners for persons with disabilities. In Study 1, we analyzed the cooperation of 32 assistance dog-owner dyads performing a carrying task. We revealed typical behavior sequences and also differences depending on the dyads' experiences and on whether the owner was a wheelchair user. In Study 2, we investigated dogs' responses to unforeseen difficulties during a retrieving task in two contexts. Dogs displayed specific communicative and displacement behaviors, and a strong commitment to execute the insoluble task. Questionnaire data from Study 3 confirmed that these behaviors could successfully attenuate owners' disappointment. Although owners anticipated the technical competence of future assistance robots to be moderate/high, they could not imagine robots as emotional companions, which negatively affected their acceptance ratings of future robotic assistants. We propose that assistance dogs' cooperative behaviors and problem solving strategies should inspire the development of the relevant functions and social behaviors of assistance robots with limited manual and verbal skills.

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, UU Actors.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their power in analyzing international relations, this monograph presents the computer printout of data on the application of second stage factor analysis of 'underdog'…

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, UT Actors.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents the computer printout of an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their power in analyzing international relations, this monograph presents data on the application of discriminant function analysis of combined…

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, TU Actors.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents the computer printout of an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their power in analyzing international relations, this monograph presents data on the application of discriminant function analysis to combined…

Effect of self-interaction on the evolution of cooperation in complex topologies

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Yu'e.; Zhang, Zhipeng; Chang, Shuhua

2017-09-01

Self-interaction, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this text, we consider a new self-interaction mechanism in the two typical pairwise models including the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift games, where the cooperative agents will gain extra bonus for their selfless behavior. We find that under the mechanism the collective cooperation is elevated to a very high level especially after adopting the finite population analogue of replicator dynamics for evolution. The robustness of the new mechanism is tested for different complex topologies for the prisoner's dilemma game. All the presented results demonstrate that the enhancement effects are independent of the structure of the applied spatial networks and the potential evolutionary games, and thus showing a high degree of universality. Our conclusions might shed light on the understanding of the evolution of cooperation in the real world.

Evolving Righteousness in a Corrupt World

PubMed Central

Duéñez-Guzmán, Edgar A.; Sadedin, Suzanne

2012-01-01

Punishment offers a powerful mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies, but the maintenance of costly punishment itself remains problematic. Game theory has shown that corruption, where punishers can defect without being punished themselves, may sustain cooperation. However, in many human societies and some insect ones, high levels of cooperation coexist with low levels of corruption, and such societies show greater wellbeing than societies with high corruption. Here we show that small payments from cooperators to punishers can destabilize corrupt societies and lead to the spread of punishment without corruption (righteousness). Righteousness can prevail even in the face of persistent power inequalities. The resultant righteous societies are highly stable and have higher wellbeing than corrupt ones. This result may help to explain the persistence of costly punishing behavior, and indicates that corruption is a sub-optimal tool for maintaining cooperation in human societies. PMID:22984510

Successful implementation of cooperative handling eliminates the need for restraint in a complex nonhuman primate disease model

PubMed Central

Graham, Melanie L; Rieke, Eric F; Mutch, Lucas A; Zolondek, Elizabeth K; Faig, Aaron W; DuFour, Theresa A; Munson, James W; Kittredge, Jessica A; Schuurman, Henk-Jan

2011-01-01

Introduction Streptozotocin-induced diabetic nonhuman primates are used to study efficacy and safety of innovative immunosuppression after islet transplantation. We implemented a training program for medical management of a chronic disease state. Methods Cooperation with hand feeding and drinking; shifting; and limb presentation were trained utilizing predominately positive but also negative reinforcement in 52 animals compared with 28 macaques subjected to conventional physical and/or chemical restraint. The success of and timing of behavior acquisition was evaluated in a representative subset of 14 animals. Results Over 90% of animals were successful in behavior acquisition. Programmatically this resulted in complete elimination of chair restraint and negligible requirement for sedation. About half of trained animals had no to moderate thymic involution, indicative of a substantial reduction in stress. Conclusion Cooperative handling enhances animal well-being. This contributes to validity of scientific results and eliminates model-induced confounding that can obstruct interpretation of safety and efficacy data. PMID:22150842

Characteristics of traffic flow at a non-signalized intersection in the framework of game theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fan, Hongqiang; Jia, Bin; Tian, Junfang; Yun, Lifen

2014-12-01

At a non-signalized intersection, some vehicles violate the traffic rules to pass the intersection as soon as possible. These behaviors may cause many traffic conflicts even traffic accidents. In this paper, a simulation model is proposed to research the effects of these behaviors at a non-signalized intersection. Vehicle’s movement is simulated by the cellular automaton (CA) model. The game theory is introduced for simulating the intersection dynamics. Two types of driver participate the game process: cooperator (C) and defector (D). The cooperator obey the traffic rules, but the defector does not. A transition process may occur when the cooperator is waiting before the intersection. The critical value of waiting time follows the Weibull distribution. One transition regime is found in the phase diagram. The simulation results illustrate the applicability of the proposed model and reveal a number of interesting insights into the intersection management, including that the existence of defectors is benefit for the capacity of intersection, but also reduce the safety of intersection.

Five-Year Olds, but Not Chimpanzees, Attempt to Manage Their Reputations

PubMed Central

Engelmann, Jan M.; Herrmann, Esther; Tomasello, Michael

2012-01-01

Virtually all theories of the evolution of cooperation require that cooperators find ways to interact with one another selectively, to the exclusion of cheaters. This means that individuals must make reputational judgments about others as cooperators, based on either direct or indirect evidence. Humans, and possibly other species, add another component to the process: they know that they are being judged by others, and so they adjust their behavior in order to affect those judgments – so-called impression management. Here, we show for the first time that already preschool children engage in such behavior. In an experimental study, 5-year-old human children share more and steal less when they are being watched by a peer than when they are alone. In contrast, chimpanzees behave the same whether they are being watched by a groupmate or not. This species difference suggests that humans' concern for their own self-reputation, and their tendency to manage the impression they are making on others, may be unique to humans among primates. PMID:23119015

Self-organization of punishment in structured populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perc, Matjaž; Szolnoki, Attila

2012-04-01

Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.

Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2012-09-01

Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.

Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation

PubMed Central

Gao, Lei; Wang, Zhen; Pansini, Riccardo; Li, Yao-Tang; Wang, Rui-Wu

2015-01-01

Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism. In the case of mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible. PMID:26634907

Collective punishment is more effective than collective reward for promoting cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gao, Lei; Wang, Zhen; Pansini, Riccardo; Li, Yao-Tang; Wang, Rui-Wu

2015-12-01

Collective punishment and reward are usually regarded as two potential mechanisms to explain the evolution of cooperation. Both scenarios, however, seem problematic to understand cooperative behavior, because they can raise the second-order free-rider problem and many organisms are not able to discriminate less cooperating individuals. Even though they have been proved to increase cooperation, there has been a debate about which one being more effective. To address this issue, we resort to the N-player evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG), where a collective punishment/reward mechanism is added by allowing some players to display punishment/reward towards all remaining players. By means of numerous simulations and analyses, we find that collective punishment is more effective in promoting cooperation for a relatively high initial frequency of cooperation or for a relatively small group. When the intensity of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, a stable state of full cooperation emerges for both small and large groups. In contrast, such state does not appear for large groups playing a NESG with reward mechanism. In the case of mutualistic interactions, finally, our results show the new payoff with collective punishment/reward can lead to the coexistence of cooperators and defectors when discrimination between these two is not possible.

Moderate sedation helps improve future behavior in pediatric dental patients - a prospective study.

PubMed

Antunes, Denise Espíndola; Viana, Karolline Alves; Costa, Paulo Sucasas; Costa, Luciane Rezende

2016-10-24

There is little evidence on the long-term effects of pharmacological management in children undergoing dental treatment. This study aimed to assess children's behavior in consecutive dental sessions following oral rehabilitation using different pharmacological regimens for behavioral control. Participants were preschoolers who were previously treated for caries under one of the following: no sedative, oral sedation with midazolam, oral sedation with midazolam/ketamine, or general anesthesia. The children's behavior in the follow-up sessions was assessed using the Ohio State University Behavioral Rating Scale (OSUBRS); higher scores represented less cooperative behavior (range 5-20). Follow-up assessments were conducted on 50 children under four years old for up to 29 months. Data were analyzed by the Friedman/Wilcoxon tests and Cox regression model. OSUBRS mean (standard deviation) scores for the whole sample decreased from 11.9 (5.4) before treatment to 6.8 (3.2) at the final recall session (p < 0.001). Moderate sedation with midazolam (OR 2.9, 95%CI 1.2-6.9) or midazolam/ketamine (OR 4.3, 95%CI 1.6-11.4) improved children's future behavior. The general anesthesia group (n = 4) had a small sample size and the results should be considered with caution. Although invasive dental treatment negatively affected the child's behavior in the dental chair, they became more cooperative over time. Moderately sedated children showed better prospective behavior than those in the non-sedation group.

Creative Behavior Modification Strategies That Work.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kalishman, Arline

This paper describes a discipline plan at Brentwood (Missouri) Junior High School based on firm and consistent enforcement of rules and regulations that have been developed cooperatively by principal, faculty, and students. The principal holds monthly faculty meetings where all students who are experiencing academic or behavioral difficulties are…

Plasticity of Altruistic Behavior in Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lozada, Mariana; D'Adamo, Paola; Carro, Natalia

2014-01-01

The present study investigates the plasticity of altruistic behavior in children, analyzing the effect of a short intervention on 6- to 7-year-olds. After a 10-session intervention performed in a school context, altruism significantly increased. The intervention, which included relaxation practices, cooperative activities and emotional security…

Collapse of cooperation in evolving games

PubMed Central

Stewart, Alexander J.; Plotkin, Joshua B.

2014-01-01

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players’ payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, when there is a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of cooperation, coevolution often leads to a dramatic loss of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential reward for mutual cooperation increases. Depending upon the form of tradeoffs, evolution may even move away from the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game altogether. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions. PMID:25422421

Selective Cooperation in Early Childhood – How to Choose Models and Partners

PubMed Central

Hermes, Jonas; Behne, Tanya; Studte, Kristin; Zeyen, Anna-Maria; Gräfenhain, Maria; Rakoczy, Hannes

2016-01-01

Cooperation is essential for human society, and children engage in cooperation from early on. It is unclear, however, how children select their partners for cooperation. We know that children choose selectively whom to learn from (e.g. preferring reliable over unreliable models) on a rational basis. The present study investigated whether children (and adults) also choose their cooperative partners selectively and what model characteristics they regard as important for cooperative partners and for informants about novel words. Three- and four-year-old children (N = 64) and adults (N = 14) saw contrasting pairs of models differing either in physical strength or in accuracy (in labeling known objects). Participants then performed different tasks (cooperative problem solving and word learning) requiring the choice of a partner or informant. Both children and adults chose their cooperative partners selectively. Moreover they showed the same pattern of selective model choice, regarding a wide range of model characteristics as important for cooperation (preferring both the strong and the accurate model for a strength-requiring cooperation tasks), but only prior knowledge as important for word learning (preferring the knowledgeable but not the strong model for word learning tasks). Young children’s selective model choice thus reveals an early rational competence: They infer characteristics from past behavior and flexibly consider what characteristics are relevant for certain tasks. PMID:27505043

Factors affecting athletes' motor behavior after the observation of scenes of cooperation and competition in competitive sport: the effect of sport attitude.

PubMed

Stefani, Elisa De; De Marco, Doriana; Gentilucci, Maurizio

2015-01-01

This study delineated how observing sports scenes of cooperation or competition modulated an action of interaction, in expert athletes, depending on their specific sport attitude. In a kinematic study, athletes were divided into two groups depending on their attitude toward teammates (cooperative or competitive). Participants observed sport scenes of cooperation and competition (basketball, soccer, water polo, volleyball, and rugby) and then they reached for, picked up, and placed an object on the hand of a conspecific (giving action). Mixed-design ANOVAs were carried out on the mean values of grasping-reaching parameters. Data showed that the type of scene observed as well as the athletes' attitude affected reach-to-grasp actions to give. In particular, the cooperative athletes were speeded when they observed scenes of cooperation compared to when they observed scenes of competition. Participants were speeded when executing a giving action after observing actions of cooperation. This occurred only when they had a cooperative attitude. A match between attitude and intended action seems to be a necessary prerequisite for observing an effect of the observed type of scene on the performed action. It is possible that the observation of scenes of competition activated motor strategies which interfered with the strategies adopted by the cooperative participants to execute a cooperative (giving) sequence.

Conditional imitation might promote cooperation under high temptations to defect

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Qian, Xiaolan; Zhang, Mei; Yang, Junzhong

2012-07-01

In this paper we introduce a conditional imitation rule into an evolutionary game, in which the imitation probabilities of individuals are determined by a function of payoff difference and two crucial parameters μ and σ. The parameter μ characterizes the most adequate goal for individuals and the parameter σ characterizes the tolerance of individuals. By using the pair approximation method and numerical simulations, we find an anomalous cooperation enhancement in which the cooperation level shows a nonmonotonic variation with the increase of temptation. The parameter μ affects the regime of the payoff parameter which supports the anomalous cooperation enhancement, whereas the parameter σ plays a decisive role on the appearance of the nonmonotonic variation of the cooperation level. Furthermore, to give explicit implications for the parameters μ and σ we present an alterative form of the conditional imitation rule based on the benefit and the cost incurred to individuals during strategy updates. In this way, we also provide a phenomenological interpretation for the nonmonotonic behavior of cooperation with the increase of temptation. The results give a clue that a higher cooperation level could be obtained under adverse environments for cooperation by applying the conditional imitation rule, which is possible to be manipulated in real life. More generally, the results in this work might point out an efficient way to maintain cooperation in the risky environments to cooperators.

Sex differences in cooperation: a meta-analytic review of social dilemmas.

PubMed

Balliet, Daniel; Li, Norman P; Macfarlan, Shane J; Van Vugt, Mark

2011-11-01

Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here, we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes-sampled across 50 years of research-on social dilemmas to examine several potential moderators. The overall average effect size is not statistically different from zero (d = -0.05), suggesting that men and women do not differ in their overall amounts of cooperation. However, the association between sex and cooperation is moderated by several key features of the social context: Male-male interactions are more cooperative than female-female interactions (d = 0.16), yet women cooperate more than men in mixed-sex interactions (d = -0.22). In repeated interactions, men are more cooperative than women. Women were more cooperative than men in larger groups and in more recent studies, but these differences disappeared after statistically controlling for several study characteristics. We discuss these results in the context of both sociocultural and evolutionary theories of sex differences, stress the need for an integrated biosocial approach, and outline directions for future research.

Serotonin blockade delays learning performance in a cooperative fish.

PubMed

Soares, Marta C; Paula, José R; Bshary, Redouan

2016-09-01

Animals use learning and memorizing to gather information that will help them to make ecologically relevant decisions. Neuro-modulatory adjustments enable them to make associations between stimuli and appropriate behavior. A key candidate for the modulation of cooperative behavior is serotonin. Previous research has shown that modulation of the serotonergic system spontaneously affects the behavior of the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus during interactions with so-called 'client' reef fish. Here, we asked whether shifts in serotonin function affect the cleaners' associative learning abilities when faced with the task to distinguish two artificial clients that differ in their value as a food source. We found that the administration of serotonin 1A receptor antagonist significantly slowed learning speed in comparison with saline treated fish. As reduced serotonergic signaling typically enhances fear, we discuss the possibility that serotonin may affect how cleaners appraise, acquire information and respond to client-derived stimuli via manipulation of the perception of danger.

The Alzheimer's Disease Cooperative Study Prevention Instrument Project: Longitudinal Outcome of Behavioral Measures as Predictors of Cognitive Decline

PubMed Central

Banks, Sarah Jane; Raman, Rema; He, Feng; Salmon, David P.; Ferris, Steven; Aisen, Paul; Cummings, Jeffrey

2014-01-01

Background/Methods The Alzheimer's Disease Cooperative Study Prevention Instrument Project is a longitudinal study that recruited 644 cognitively healthy older subjects (aged between 75 and 93 years, 58% women) at baseline and evaluated their cognitive change over 4 years. The study was structured like a clinical trial to anticipate a prevention trial and to determine the performance of novel trial instruments in a longitudinal non-interventional trial framework. Behavioral symptoms were assessed at baseline. Results The existence of participant-reported behavioral symptoms at baseline predicted conversion to Clinical Dementia Rating scale score ≥0.5 over the 4-year period. Conclusions The results imply that early anxiety and depression may be harbingers of future cognitive decline, and that patients exhibiting such symptoms, even in the absence of co-occurring cognitive symptoms, should be closely followed over time. PMID:25685141

Interaction Quality during Partner Reading

PubMed Central

Meisinger, Elizabeth B.; Schwanenflugel, Paula J.; Bradley, Barbara A.; Stahl, Steven A.

2009-01-01

The influence of social relationships, positive interdependence, and teacher structure on the quality of partner reading interactions was examined. Partner reading, a scripted cooperative learning strategy, is often used in classrooms to promote the development of fluent and automatic reading skills. Forty-three pairs of second grade children were observed during partner reading sessions taking place in 12 classrooms. The degree to which the partners displayed social cooperation (instrumental support, emotional support, and conflict management) and on/off task behavior was evaluated. Children who chose their own partners showed greater social cooperation than those children whose teacher selected their partner. However, when the positive interdependence requirements of the task were not met within the pair (neither child had the skills to provide reading support or no one needed support), lower levels of on-task behavior were observed. Providing basic partner reading script instruction at the beginning of the year was associated with better social cooperation during partner reading, but providing elaborated instruction or no instruction was associated with poorer social cooperation. It is recommended that teachers provide basic script instruction and allow children to choose their own partners. Additionally, pairings of low ability children with other low ability children and high ability children with other high ability children should be avoided. Teachers may want to suggest alternate partners for children who inadvertently choose such pairings or adjust the text difficulty to the pair. Overall, partner reading seems to be an enjoyable pedagogical strategy for teaching reading fluency. PMID:19830259

Fairness expectations and altruistic sharing in 15-month-old human infants.

PubMed

Schmidt, Marco F H; Sommerville, Jessica A

2011-01-01

Human cooperation is a key driving force behind the evolutionary success of our hominin lineage. At the proximate level, biologists and social scientists have identified other-regarding preferences--such as fairness based on egalitarian motives, and altruism--as likely candidates for fostering large-scale cooperation. A critical question concerns the ontogenetic origins of these constituents of cooperative behavior, as well as whether they emerge independently or in an interrelated fashion. The answer to this question will shed light on the interdisciplinary debate regarding the significance of such preferences for explaining how humans become such cooperative beings. We investigated 15-month-old infants' sensitivity to fairness, and their altruistic behavior, assessed via infants' reactions to a third-party resource distribution task, and via a sharing task. Our results challenge current models of the development of fairness and altruism in two ways. First, in contrast to past work suggesting that fairness and altruism may not emerge until early to mid-childhood, 15-month-old infants are sensitive to fairness and can engage in altruistic sharing. Second, infants' degree of sensitivity to fairness as a third-party observer was related to whether they shared toys altruistically or selfishly, indicating that moral evaluations and prosocial behavior are heavily interconnected from early in development. Our results present the first evidence that the roots of a basic sense of fairness and altruism can be found in infancy, and that these other-regarding preferences develop in a parallel and interwoven fashion. These findings support arguments for an evolutionary basis--most likely in dialectical manner including both biological and cultural mechanisms--of human egalitarianism given the rapidly developing nature of other-regarding preferences and their role in the evolution of human-specific forms of cooperation. Future work of this kind will help determine to what extent uniquely human sociality and morality depend on other-regarding preferences emerging early in life.

Why humans might help strangers

PubMed Central

Raihani, Nichola J.; Bshary, Redouan

2015-01-01

Humans regularly help strangers, even when interactions are apparently unobserved and unlikely to be repeated. Such situations have been simulated in the laboratory using anonymous one-shot games (e.g., prisoner’s dilemma) where the payoff matrices used make helping biologically altruistic. As in real-life, participants often cooperate in the lab in these one-shot games with non-relatives, despite that fact that helping is under negative selection under these circumstances. Two broad explanations for such behavior prevail. The “big mistake” or “mismatch” theorists argue that behavior is constrained by psychological mechanisms that evolved predominantly in the context of repeated interactions with known individuals. In contrast, the cultural group selection theorists posit that humans have been selected to cooperate in anonymous one-shot interactions due to strong between-group competition, which creates interdependence among in-group members. We present these two hypotheses before discussing alternative routes by which humans could increase their direct fitness by cooperating with strangers under natural conditions. In doing so, we explain why the standard lab games do not capture real-life in various important aspects. First, asymmetries in the cost of perceptual errors regarding the context of the interaction (one-shot vs. repeated; anonymous vs. public) might have selected for strategies that minimize the chance of making costly behavioral errors. Second, helping strangers might be a successful strategy for identifying other cooperative individuals in the population, where partner choice can turn strangers into interaction partners. Third, in contrast to the assumptions of the prisoner’s dilemma model, it is possible that benefits of cooperation follow a non-linear function of investment. Non-linear benefits result in negative frequency dependence even in one-shot games. Finally, in many real-world situations individuals are able to parcel investments such that a one-shot interaction is turned into a repeated game of many decisions. PMID:25750619

Robustness of linkage strategy that leads to large-scale cooperation.

PubMed

Inaba, Misato; Takahashi, Nobuyuki; Ohtsuki, Hisashi

2016-11-21

One of the most well-known models to characterize cooperation among unrelated individuals is Social dilemma (SD). However there is no consensus about how to solve the SD by itself. Since SDs are often embedded in other social interactions, including indirect reciprocity games (IR), human can coordinate their behaviors across multiple games. Such coordination is called 'linkage'. Recently linkage has been considered as a promising solution to resolve SDs, since excluding SD defectors (i.e. those who defected in SD) from indirectly reciprocal relationships functions as a costless sanction. A previous study performed mathematical modeling and revealed that a linkage strategy, which cooperates in SD and engages in the Standing strategy in IR based on the recipients' behaviors in both SD and IR, was an ESS against a non-linkage strategy which defects in SD and engages in the Standing strategy in IR based on recipients' behaviors only in IR (Panchanathan and Boyd, 2004). In order to investigate the robustness of the linkage strategy, we devised a non-linkage strategy, which cooperates in SD but does not link two games. First, we conducted a mathematical analysis and demonstrated that the linkage strategy was not an ESS against cooperating non-linkage strategy. Second, we conducted a series of agent-based computer simulations to examine how the strategies perform in situations in which various types of errors can occur. Our results showed that the linkage strategy was an ESS only when there are implementation errors in SD. However, the equilibrium of the linkage strategy was unstable when there are perception errors. Since we know that humans are not free from perception errors in their social life, future studies will need to show how perception errors can be overcome in order to provide support for the conclusion that linkage is a plausible solution to SDs. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Genetic and morphological divergence among Cooper's Hawk (Accipiter cooperii) populations breeding in north-central and western North America

USGS Publications Warehouse

Sonsthagen, Sarah A.; Rosenfield, Robert N.; Bielefeldt, John; Murphy, Robert K.; Stewart, Andrew C.; Stout, William C.; Driscoll, Timothy G.; Bozek, Michael A.; Sloss, Brian L.; Talbot, Sandra L.

2012-01-01

Cooper's Hawk (Accipiter cooperii) populations breeding in the northern portion of the species' range exhibit variation in morphological traits that conforms to predictions based on differences in prey size, tree stand density, and migratory behavior. We examined genetic structure and gene flow and compared divergence at morphological traits (PST) and genetic markers (FST) to elucidate mechanisms (selection or genetic drift) that promote morphological diversification among Cooper's Hawk populations. Cooper's Hawks appear to conform to the genetic pattern of an east-west divide. Populations in British Columbia are genetically differentiated from north-central populations (Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota; pairwise microsatellite FST= 0.031-0.050; mitochondrial DNA ΦST = 0.177-0.204), which suggests that Cooper's Hawks were restricted to at least two Pleistocene glacial refugia. The strength of the Rocky Mountains—Great Plains area as a barrier to dispersal is further supported by restricted gene-flow rates between British Columbia and other sampled breeding populations. Divergence in morphological traits (PST) was also observed across study areas, but with British Columbia and North Dakota differentiated from Wisconsin and Minnesota, a pattern not predicted on the basis of FST and ΦST interpopulation estimates. Comparison of PSTand FSTestimates suggests that heterogeneous selection may be acting on Cooper's Hawks in the northern portion of their distribution, which is consistent with hypotheses that variation in prey mass and migratory behavior among populations may be influencing overall body size and wing chord. We were unable to distinguish between the effects of genetic drift and selection on tail length in the study populations.

Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation.

PubMed

Okada, Daijiro; Bingham, Paul M

2008-07-21

Humans are unique among all species of terrestrial history in both ecological dominance and individual properties. Many, or perhaps all, of the unique elements of this nonpareil status can be plausibly interpreted as evolutionary and strategic elements and consequences of the unprecedented intensity and scale of our social cooperation. Convincing explanation of this unique human social adaptation remains a central, unmet challenge to the scientific enterprise. We develop a hypothesis for the ancestral origin of expanded cooperative social behavior. Specifically, we present a game theoretic analysis demonstrating that a specific pattern of expanded social cooperation between conspecific individuals with conflicts of interest (including non-kin) can be strategically viable, but only in animals that possess a highly unusual capacity for conspecific violence (credible threat) having very specific properties that dramatically reduce the costs of coercive violence. The resulting reduced costs allow preemptive or compensated coercion to be an instantaneously self-interested behavior under diverse circumstances rather than in rare, idiosyncratic circumstances as in actors (animals) who do not have access to inexpensive coercive threat. Humans are apparently unique among terrestrial organisms in having evolved conspecific coercive capabilities that fulfill these stringent requirements. Thus, our results support the proposal that access to a novel capacity for projection of coercive threat might represent the essential initiating event for the evolution of a human-like pattern of social cooperation and the subsequent evolution of the diverse features of human uniqueness. Empirical evidence indicates that these constraints were, in fact, met only in our evolutionary lineage. The logic for the emergence of uniquely human cooperation suggested by our analysis apparently accounts simply for the human fossil record.

Sibling cooperation in earwig families provides insights into the early evolution of social life.

PubMed

Falk, Joachim; Wong, Janine W Y; Kölliker, Mathias; Meunier, Joël

2014-04-01

The evolutionary transition from solitary to social life is driven by direct and indirect fitness benefits of social interactions. Understanding the conditions promoting the early evolution of social life therefore requires identification of these benefits in nonderived social systems, such as animal families where offspring are mobile and able to disperse and will survive independently. Family life is well known to provide benefits to offspring through parental care, but research on sibling interactions generally focused on fitness costs to offspring due to competitive behaviors. Here we show experimentally that sibling interactions also reflect cooperative behaviors in the form of food sharing in nonderived families of the European earwig, Forficula auricularia. Food ingested by individual offspring was transferred to their siblings through mouth-to-anus contacts and active allo-coprophagy. These transfers occurred in both the presence and the absence of the tending mothers, even though the direct contact with the mothers limited sibling food sharing. Neither food deprivation or relatedness influenced the total amount of transferred food, but relatedness affected frass release and the behavioral mechanisms mediating food sharing. Related offspring obtained food predominately through allo-coprophagy, whereas unrelated offspring obtained food through mouth-to-anus contacts. Overall, this study emphasizes that sibling cooperation may be a key process promoting the early evolution of social life.

Dynamics of Complex Systems Built as Coupled Physical, Communication and Decision Layers

PubMed Central

Kühnlenz, Florian; Nardelli, Pedro H. J.

2016-01-01

This paper proposes a simple model to capture the complexity of multilayer systems where their constituent layers affect, and are affected by, each other. The physical layer is a circuit composed by a power source and resistors in parallel. Every individual agent aims at maximizing its own delivered power by adding, removing or keeping the resistors it has; the delivered power is in turn a non-linear function that depends on the other agents’ behavior, its own internal state, its global state perception, the information received from its neighbors via the communication network and a randomized selfishness. We develop an agent-based simulation to analyze the effects of number of agents (system size), communication network topology, communication errors and the minimum power gain that triggers a behavioral change on the system dynamic. Our results show that a wave-like behavior at macro-level (caused by individual changes in the decision layer) can only emerge for a specific system size. The ratio between cooperators and defectors depends on the minimum gain assumed—lower minimal gains lead to less cooperation, and vice-versa. Different communication network topologies imply different levels of power utilization and fairness at the physical layer, and a certain level of error in the communication layer induces more cooperation. PMID:26730590

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas.

PubMed

Probst; Carnevale; Triandis

1999-03-01

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.

Children's Beliefs toward Cooperative Playing with Peers with Disabilities in Physical Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Obrusnikova, Iva; Block, Martin E.; Dillon, Suzanna

2010-01-01

Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991) was used to elicit salient behavioral, normative, and control beliefs of children without disabilities toward playing with a hypothetical peer with a disability in general physical education. Participants were 350 elementary and middle school students who completed two questionnaires. Questionnaires were…

Experiential Learning through Classroom Experiments

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bowes, David; Johnson, Jay

2008-01-01

This paper describes classroom experiments in cooperative behavior as examples of experiential learning in economics classes. Several games are briefly discussed and a new game in cartel behavior is presented. In this game, Students make production decisions as a cartel and earn revenues based on their own output decision and the output decision…

Altruism and Popularity

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Egilmez, Eda; Naylor-Tincknell, Janett

2017-01-01

Popularity, as a manifestation of social status, has been widely researched and determined by group members. Prosocial behaviors are actions with intention of benefiting others or society as whole with little or no personal gain and may include helping, cooperating, and other voluntary works. Altruism is a type of prosocial behavior that could…

Impact of Conflict Management Strategies on the Generation Mechanism of Miners' Unsafe Behavior Tendency

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Li, Ji-Zu; Zhang, Ya-Ping; Liu, Xiao-Guang; Liu, Yao-Long; Wang, Tian-Ri

2017-01-01

In this paper, we examine the relationship between the generation mechanism of miners' unsafe behavior tendency and conflict management strategies, including cooperative conflict management strategy, competitive conflict management strategy and avoidant conflict management strategy. Miners from 3 collieries in Shanxi province completed a…

Associations among Middle School Students' Bullying Roles and Social Skills

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jenkins, Lyndsay N.; Demaray, Michelle Kilpatrick; Fredrick, Stephanie Secord; Summers, Kelly Hodgson

2016-01-01

This study explored the relations among self-reported bully participant role behaviors (i.e., bullying, assisting, experiencing victimization, defending, and outsider behavior) and self-reported social skills (i.e., cooperation, assertion, empathy, and self-control) among boys and girls. The sample consisted of 636 middle school students (52%…

When Do People Cooperate? The Neuroeconomics of Prosocial Decision Making

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Declerck, Carolyn H.; Boone, Christophe; Emonds, Griet

2013-01-01

Understanding the roots of prosocial behavior is an interdisciplinary research endeavor that has generated an abundance of empirical data across many disciplines. This review integrates research findings from different fields into a novel theoretical framework that can account for when prosocial behavior is likely to occur. Specifically, we…

Effects of Advance Organizer Instruction on Preschool Children's Prosocial Behavior.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lawton, Joseph T.; Burk, Jill

This study investigated the effects of advanced organizer instruction on 3- to 5-year-old preschoolers' learning of general prosocial skill concepts, rules for using prosocial skills, and spontaneous prosocial behavior. The six prosocial skills considered included cooperation, sharing, taking turns, helping, demonstration of awareness of another's…

Development of an Observational Scale to Measure Social Competence in Young Children.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Porter, Robin

An observational instrument was developed to measure social competence in kindergarten classrooms. Social competence was specified in terms of four broad behavioral categories: obedience, cooperation, interaction, and autonomy. Each category was further particularized in terms of observable behaviors. Initial 5-minute observations using the…

Enhancing On-Task Behavior in Fourth-Grade Students Using a Modified Color Wheel System

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Blondin, Carolyn; Skinner, Christopher; Parkhurst, John; Wood, Allison; Snyder, Jamie

2012-01-01

The authors used a withdrawal design to evaluate the effects of a modified Color Wheel System (M-CWS) on the on-task behavior of 7 students enrolled in the 4th grade. Standard CWS procedures were modified to include a 4th set of rules designed to set behavioral expectation for cooperative learning activities. Mean data showed that immediately…

Increasing Active Student Responding in a University Applied Behavior Analysis Course: The Effect of Daily Assessment and Response Cards on End of Week Quiz Scores

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Malanga, Paul R.; Sweeney, William J.

2008-01-01

The study compared the effects of daily assessment and response cards on average weekly quiz scores in an introduction to applied behavior analysis course. An alternating treatments design (Kazdin 1982, "Single-case research designs." New York: Oxford University Press; Cooper et al. 2007, "Applied behavior analysis." Upper Saddle River:…

Teachers' Perception of Children's Behavioral Adjustment in Tanzanian Preprimary Schools and Their Relationship to Teachers' Cultural Beliefs Regarding Obedience, Cooperation, and Play

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Shavega, Theresia Julius; van Tuijl, Cathy; Brugman, Daniel

2015-01-01

This article addresses teachers' perception of behavioral adjustment in preprimary school children and how they relate to teachers' cultural beliefs and to the behavioral management strategies used by the teachers. The sample consisted of 120 preprimary teachers from 60 schools in 3 regions of the mainland of Tanzania. Teachers' perception of…

Relationships between cooperation and goal orientation among male professional and semi-professional team athletes.

PubMed

Lameiras, João; Almeida, Pedro L; Garcia-Mas, Alexandre

2014-12-01

In team sports, athletes' goals may focus on the task (enhancing performance, developing better skills, etc.) or on ego (being better than the others, achieving superiority, etc.). This study investigated the relationships between athletes' goal orientation and their tendency to cooperate with teammates and coaches. 158 professional men (M age = 24.1 yr., SD = 4.6) who played on various sport teams participated in this study. Goal orientation was measured with the Portuguese version of the Task and Ego Orientation in Sport Questionnaire, and cooperation was measured with the Questionário de Cooperação Desportiva. Cooperation was positively correlated with task orientation, and negatively correlated with ego orientation. Overall, the findings support that in sports, directing the players' focus on task may promote prosocial behavior.

Cooperation in lovers: An fNIRS-based hyperscanning study.

PubMed

Pan, Yafeng; Cheng, Xiaojun; Zhang, Zhenxin; Li, Xianchun; Hu, Yi

2017-02-01

This study investigated interactive exchange in lovers and the associated interpersonal brain synchronization (IBS) using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS)-based hyperscanning. Three types of female-male dyads, lovers, friends, and strangers, performed a cooperation task during which brain activity was recorded in right frontoparietal regions. We measured better cooperative behavior in lover dyads compared with friend and stranger dyads. Lover dyads demonstrated increased IBS in right superior frontal cortex, which also covaried with their task performance. Granger causality analyses in lover dyads revealed stronger directional synchronization from females to males than from males to females, suggesting different roles for females and males during cooperation. Our study refines the theoretical explanation of romantic interaction between lovers. Hum Brain Mapp 38:831-841, 2017. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Attributes and National Behavior, Part 2: Modern International Relations Monograph Series. Patterns of Cooperation: Relative Status-Field Theory, TT Actors.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vincent, Jack E.

This monograph presents findings from an analysis of data on international cooperation over a three-year period. Part of a large scale research project to test various theories with regard to their power in analyzing international relations, this monograph reports on the testing of relative status field theory on WEIS conflict data for 1966-1969…