7 CFR 1484.73 - Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make required contributions?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make... Cooperators penalized for failing to make required contributions? A Cooperator's contribution requirement is specified in the Cooperator program allocation letter. If a Cooperator fails to contribute the amount...

7 CFR 1484.73 - Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make required contributions?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make... § 1484.73 Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make required contributions? A Cooperator's contribution requirement is specified in the Cooperator program allocation letter. If a Cooperator fails to...

7 CFR 1484.73 - Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make required contributions?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make... § 1484.73 Are Cooperators penalized for failing to make required contributions? A Cooperator's contribution requirement is specified in the Cooperator program allocation letter. If a Cooperator fails to...

Cooperative Games: A Way to Modify Aggressive and Cooperative Behaviors in Young Children.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bay-Hinitz, April K.; And Others

1994-01-01

Aggressive and cooperative behaviors of 70 preschool children were measured during game conditions and subsequent free-play periods. Cooperative behavior increased and aggression decreased during cooperative games and free play; conversely, competitive games were followed by increases in aggressive behavior and decreases in cooperative behavior.…

Assessing cooperativity in supramolecular systems.

PubMed

von Krbek, Larissa K S; Schalley, Christoph A; Thordarson, Pall

2017-05-09

This tutorial review summarises different aspects of cooperativity in supramolecular complexes. We propose a systematic categorisation of cooperativity into cooperative aggregation, intermolecular (allosteric) cooperativity, intramolecular (chelate) cooperativity and interannular cooperativity and discuss approaches to quantify them thermodynamically using cooperativity factors. A brief summary of methods to determine the necessary thermodynamic data is given with emphasis on isothermal titration calorimetry (ITC), a method still underrepresented in supramolecular chemistry, which however offers some advantages over others. Finally, a discussion of very few selected examples, which highlight different aspects to illustrate why such an analysis is useful, rounds up this review.

Shape matters: Lifecycle of cooperative patches promotes cooperation in bulky populations

PubMed Central

Misevic, Dusan; Frénoy, Antoine; Lindner, Ariel B; Taddei, François

2015-01-01

Natural cooperative systems take many forms, ranging from one-dimensional cyanobacteria arrays to fractal-like biofilms. We use in silico experimental systems to study a previously overlooked factor in the evolution of cooperation, physical shape of the population. We compare the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in populations of digital organisms that inhabit bulky (100 × 100 cells) or slender (4 × 2500) toroidal grids. Although more isolated subpopulations of secretors in a slender population could be expected to favor cooperation, we find the opposite: secretion evolves to higher levels in bulky populations. We identify the mechanistic explanation for the shape effect by analyzing the lifecycle and dynamics of cooperator patches, from their emergence and growth, to invasion by noncooperators and extinction. Because they are constrained by the population shape, the cooperator patches expand less in slender than in bulky populations, leading to fewer cooperators, less public good secretion, and generally lower cooperation. The patch dynamics and mechanisms of shape effect are robust across several digital cooperation systems and independent of the underlying basis for cooperation (public good secretion or a cooperation game). Our results urge for a greater consideration of population shape in the study of the evolution of cooperation across experimental and modeling systems. PMID:25639379

The effects of reputational and social knowledge on cooperation

PubMed Central

Gallo, Edoardo; Yan, Chang

2015-01-01

The emergence and sustenance of cooperative behavior is fundamental for a society to thrive. Recent experimental studies have shown that cooperation increases in dynamic networks in which subjects can choose their partners. However, these studies did not vary reputational knowledge, or what subjects know about other’s past actions, which has long been recognized as an important factor in supporting cooperation. They also did not give subjects access to global social knowledge, or information on who is connected to whom in the group. As a result, it remained unknown how reputational and social knowledge foster cooperative behavior in dynamic networks both independently and by complementing each other. In an experimental setting, we show that global reputational knowledge is crucial to sustaining a high level of cooperation and welfare. Cooperation is associated with the emergence of dense and clustered networks with highly cooperative hubs. Global social knowledge has no effect on the aggregate level of cooperation. A community analysis shows that the addition of global social knowledge to global reputational knowledge affects the distribution of cooperative activity: cooperators form a separate community that achieves a higher cooperation level than the community of defectors. Members of the community of cooperators achieve a higher payoff from interactions within the community than members of the less cooperative community. PMID:25775544

The emergence of cooperation from a single cooperative mutant

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cremer, Jonas; Melbinger, Anna; Frey, Erwin

2012-02-01

Population structure is one central condition which promotes the stability of cooperation: If cooperators more likely interact with other cooperators (positive assortment), they keep most of their benefit for themselves and are less exploited by non-cooperators. However, positive assortment can only act successfully if cooperation is already well established in the population such that cooperative individuals can successfully assort. But how can cooperation emerge when starting with a single cooperative mutant? Here we study this issue for a generic situation of microbial systems where microbes regularly form new colonies and show strong population growth. We show how and when the dynamical interplay between colony formation, population growth and evolution within colonies can provoke the emergence of cooperation. In particular, the probability for a single cooperative mutant to succeed is robustly large when colony-formation is fast or comparable to the time-scale of growth within colonies; growth supports cooperation.[4pt] [1] A. Melbinger, J. Cremer, and E. Frey, Evolutionary game theory in growing populations, Phys. Rev. Lett. 105, 178101 (2010)[0pt] [2] J. Cremer, A. Melbinger, and E. Frey, Evolutionary and population dynamics: a coupled approach, arXiv:1108.2604

Static network structure can stabilize human cooperation.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Nowak, Martin A; Fowler, James H; Christakis, Nicholas A

2014-12-02

The evolution of cooperation in network-structured populations has been a major focus of theoretical work in recent years. When players are embedded in fixed networks, cooperators are more likely to interact with, and benefit from, other cooperators. In theory, this clustering can foster cooperation on fixed networks under certain circumstances. Laboratory experiments with humans, however, have thus far found no evidence that fixed network structure actually promotes cooperation. Here, we provide such evidence and help to explain why others failed to find it. First, we show that static networks can lead to a stable high level of cooperation, outperforming well-mixed populations. We then systematically vary the benefit that cooperating provides to one's neighbors relative to the cost required to cooperate (b/c), as well as the average number of neighbors in the network (k). When b/c > k, we observe high and stable levels of cooperation. Conversely, when b/c ≤ k or players are randomly shuffled, cooperation decays. Our results are consistent with a quantitative evolutionary game theoretic prediction for when cooperation should succeed on networks and, for the first time to our knowledge, provide an experimental demonstration of the power of static network structure for stabilizing human cooperation.

Static network structure can stabilize human cooperation

PubMed Central

Rand, David G.; Nowak, Martin A.; Fowler, James H.; Christakis, Nicholas A.

2014-01-01

The evolution of cooperation in network-structured populations has been a major focus of theoretical work in recent years. When players are embedded in fixed networks, cooperators are more likely to interact with, and benefit from, other cooperators. In theory, this clustering can foster cooperation on fixed networks under certain circumstances. Laboratory experiments with humans, however, have thus far found no evidence that fixed network structure actually promotes cooperation. Here, we provide such evidence and help to explain why others failed to find it. First, we show that static networks can lead to a stable high level of cooperation, outperforming well-mixed populations. We then systematically vary the benefit that cooperating provides to one’s neighbors relative to the cost required to cooperate (b/c), as well as the average number of neighbors in the network (k). When b/c > k, we observe high and stable levels of cooperation. Conversely, when b/c ≤ k or players are randomly shuffled, cooperation decays. Our results are consistent with a quantitative evolutionary game theoretic prediction for when cooperation should succeed on networks and, for the first time to our knowledge, provide an experimental demonstration of the power of static network structure for stabilizing human cooperation. PMID:25404308

Play for Play's Sake: Cooperative Games As a Strategy for Integration. Revised Edition.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McGill, Judith

This manual makes a case for cooperative (as opposed to competitive) play among disabled and nondisabled children. Part 1, which concerns the philosophy involved, discusses the rationale for cooperative games, the importance of play, cooperative games as an alternative, components of cooperative games, structure of cooperative games, and…

Cooperative Game Theoretic Models for Decision-Making in Contexts of Library Cooperation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hayes, Robert M.

2003-01-01

Presents a brief summary of Cooperative Economic Game Theory, followed by a summary of specific measures identified by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. Reviews contexts in which negotiation and cooperation among libraries is of special economic importance, and for two of these contexts-cooperative acquisitions and cooperative automation-illustrates…

The Cooperative Companion Digest (No. 1-4). Thinking about the Nature and Power of Cooperative Learning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Daniels, Ed; Gatto, Mike

These digests provide information for educators about the nature of cooperation and how cooperative principles can be used to restructure classrooms, administrative hierarchies, and work relationships of all types. Digest 1 describes the competitive, individual, and cooperative interaction patterns and examines the impact of cooperative learning…

Spatial self-organization favors heterotypic cooperation over cheating.

PubMed

Momeni, Babak; Waite, Adam James; Shou, Wenying

2013-11-12

Heterotypic cooperation-two populations exchanging distinct benefits that are costly to produce-is widespread. Cheaters, exploiting benefits while evading contribution, can undermine cooperation. Two mechanisms can stabilize heterotypic cooperation. In 'partner choice', cooperators recognize and choose cooperating over cheating partners; in 'partner fidelity feedback', fitness-feedback from repeated interactions ensures that aiding your partner helps yourself. How might a spatial environment, which facilitates repeated interactions, promote fitness-feedback? We examined this process through mathematical models and engineered Saccharomyces cerevisiae strains incapable of recognition. Here, cooperators and their heterotypic cooperative partners (partners) exchanged distinct essential metabolites. Cheaters exploited partner-produced metabolites without reciprocating, and were competitively superior to cooperators. Despite initially random spatial distributions, cooperators gained more partner neighbors than cheaters did. The less a cheater contributed, the more it was excluded and disfavored. This self-organization, driven by asymmetric fitness effects of cooperators and cheaters on partners during cell growth into open space, achieves assortment. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.00960.001.

Social setting, intuition and experience in laboratory experiments interact to shape cooperative decision-making

PubMed Central

Capraro, Valerio; Cococcioni, Giorgia

2015-01-01

Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation typically has a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a cooperative setting and with no previous experience in economic games on cooperation (history dependence). Here, we report on a laboratory experiment exploring how these findings transfer to a non-cooperative setting. We find two major results: (i) promoting intuition versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behaviour among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting; (ii) experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily via the channel of intuition. Our findings shed further light on the cognitive basis of human cooperative decision-making and provide further support for the recently proposed social heuristics hypothesis. PMID:26156762

Coevolution of cooperation and network structure under natural selection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, D.-P.; Lin, H.; Shuai, J. W.

2011-02-01

A coevolution model by coupling mortality and fertility selection is introduced to investigate the evolution of cooperation and network structure in the prisoner's dilemma game. The cooperation level goes through a continuous phase transition vs. defection temptation b for low mortality selection intensity β and through a discontinuous one for infinite β. The cooperation level is enhanced most at β≈1 for any b. The local and global properties of the network structure, such as cluster and cooperating k-core, are investigated for the understanding of cooperation evolution. Cooperation is promoted by forming a tight cooperating k-core at moderate β, but too large β will destroy the cooperating k-core rapidly resulting in a rapid drop of the cooperation level. Importantly, the infinite β changes the normalized sucker's payoff S from 0 to 1-b and its dynamics of the cooperation level undergoes a very slow power-law decay, which leads the evolution into the regime of neutral evolution.

7 CFR 4285.1 - Objective.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) RURAL BUSINESS-COOPERATIVE SERVICE AND RURAL UTILITIES SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS Federal-State Research on Cooperatives... for providing Federal-State Research on Cooperatives cooperative agreement funds to finance programs...

Cooperative Activities for the Home: Parents Working with Teachers to Support Cooperative Learning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Holm, Audray; And Others

A collection of activities is presented for use at home to foster cooperative attitudes and build social skills. The activities are aimed at strengthening the cooperative bond in a family and giving family members practice in the skills needed to cooperate effectively. This handbook explains the cooperative learning concept, outlines the rules for…

Cooperation and cheating in microbes

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gore, Jeff

2011-03-01

Understanding the cooperative and competitive dynamics within and between species is a central challenge in evolutionary biology. Microbial model systems represent a unique opportunity to experimentally test fundamental theories regarding the evolution of cooperative behaviors. In this talk I will describe our experiments probing cooperation in microbes. In particular, I will compare the cooperative growth of yeast in sucrose and the cooperative inactivation of antibiotics by bacteria. In both cases we find that cheater strains---which don't contribute to the public welfare---are able to take advantage of the cooperator strains. However, this ability of cheaters to out-compete cooperators occurs only when cheaters are present at low frequency, thus leading to steady-state coexistence. These microbial experiments provide fresh insight into the evolutionary origin of cooperation.

Mobility, fitness collection, and the breakdown of cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gelimson, Anatolij; Cremer, Jonas; Frey, Erwin

2013-04-01

The spatial arrangement of individuals is thought to overcome the dilemma of cooperation: When cooperators engage in clusters, they might share the benefit of cooperation while being more protected against noncooperating individuals, who benefit from cooperation but save the cost of cooperation. This is paradigmatically shown by the spatial prisoner's dilemma model. Here, we study this model in one and two spatial dimensions, but explicitly take into account that in biological setups, fitness collection and selection are separated processes occurring mostly on vastly different time scales. This separation is particularly important to understand the impact of mobility on the evolution of cooperation. We find that even small diffusive mobility strongly restricts cooperation since it enables noncooperative individuals to invade cooperative clusters. Thus, in most biological scenarios, where the mobility of competing individuals is an irrefutable fact, the spatial prisoner's dilemma alone cannot explain stable cooperation, but additional mechanisms are necessary for spatial structure to promote the evolution of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is analyzed in detail. We confirm the existence of a phase transition, here controlled by mobility and costs, which distinguishes between purely cooperative and noncooperative absorbing states. While in one dimension the model is in the class of the voter model, it belongs to the directed percolation universality class in two dimensions.

To Cooperate or Not to Cooperate: Why Behavioural Mechanisms Matter

PubMed Central

2016-01-01

Mutualistic cooperation often requires multiple individuals to behave in a coordinated fashion. Hence, while the evolutionary stability of mutualistic cooperation poses no particular theoretical difficulty, its evolutionary emergence faces a chicken and egg problem: an individual cannot benefit from cooperating unless other individuals already do so. Here, we use evolutionary robotic simulations to study the consequences of this problem for the evolution of cooperation. In contrast with standard game-theoretic results, we find that the transition from solitary to cooperative strategies is very unlikely, whether interacting individuals are genetically related (cooperation evolves in 20% of all simulations) or unrelated (only 3% of all simulations). We also observe that successful cooperation between individuals requires the evolution of a specific and rather complex behaviour. This behavioural complexity creates a large fitness valley between solitary and cooperative strategies, making the evolutionary transition difficult. These results reveal the need for research on biological mechanisms which may facilitate this transition. PMID:27148874

7 CFR 1150.119 - Cooperative association.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Cooperative association. 1150.119 Section 1150.119 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (Marketing... Order Definitions § 1150.119 Cooperative association. Cooperative association means any cooperative...

75 FR 36349 - Announcement of Rural Cooperative Development Grant Application Deadlines

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-25

... DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Rural Business-Cooperative Service Announcement of Rural Cooperative Development Grant Application Deadlines AGENCY: Rural Business-Cooperative Service, USDA. ACTION: Notice of...: Overview Federal Agency: Rural Business-Cooperative Service (RBS). Funding Opportunity Title: Rural...

Environmental influences on cooperation in social dilemmas on networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xie, Yunya; Chang, Shuhua; Yan, Ming; Zhang, Zhipeng; Wang, Xinyu

2018-02-01

Environmental influence on cooperation is a classical topic that is widely applicable to social interactions. Here, we introduce a realistic model which depends on both the payoff and the strategy of the environment. As the strategy of the environment rather than the neighbor is imitated with a probability, the model takes more attention on the comprehensive influence of the nearby neighbors. The simulation results show that the cooperation level can be widely enhanced for the prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game with this environment factor. In this environmental model, the mechanism of the survival of cooperators is deeply studied, and the corresponding results can be derived. Although the survival of cooperators also depends on the formation of the cooperator clusters, the enhancement of the cooperation level can be interpreted as the accumulation effect of the transformation of defection into cooperation. Interestingly, there exists a threshold of the initial fraction of the cooperators, and the cooperation increases significantly when this threshold is reached Moreover, the square cooperative cluster is stable, and robust against different levels of the noise parameter and temptation in the strategy adoption process. This work may shed light on the mechanism of cooperation in the real world.

Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards.

PubMed

Gneezy, Ayelet; Fessler, Daniel M T

2012-01-22

Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is plausible that propensities to punish and reward will be elevated during intergroup conflict. Using experiments conducted before, during and after the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, we show that, during wartime, people are more willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative group members. Rather than simply increasing within-group solidarity, violent intergroup conflict thus elicits behaviours that, writ large, enhance cooperation within the group, thereby making victory more likely.

Kin Selection in the RNA World.

PubMed

Levin, Samuel R; West, Stuart A

2017-12-05

Various steps in the RNA world required cooperation. Why did life's first inhabitants, from polymerases to synthetases, cooperate? We develop kin selection models of the RNA world to answer these questions. We develop a very simple model of RNA cooperation and then elaborate it to model three relevant issues in RNA biology: (1) whether cooperative RNAs receive the benefits of cooperation; (2) the scale of competition in RNA populations; and (3) explicit replicator diffusion and survival. We show: (1) that RNAs are likely to express partial cooperation; (2) that RNAs will need mechanisms for overcoming local competition; and (3) in a specific example of RNA cooperation, persistence after replication and offspring diffusion allow for cooperation to overcome competition. More generally, we show how kin selection can unify previously disparate answers to the question of RNA world cooperation.

The Effect of Geographical Proximity on Scientific Cooperation among Chinese Cities from 1990 to 2010

PubMed Central

Ma, Haitao; Fang, Chuanglin; Pang, Bo; Li, Guangdong

2014-01-01

Background The relations between geographical proximity and spatial distance constitute a popular topic of concern. Thus, how geographical proximity affects scientific cooperation, and whether geographically proximate scientific cooperation activities in fact exhibit geographic scale features should be investigated. Methodology Selected statistics from the ISI database on cooperatively authored papers, the authors of which resided in 60 typical cites in China, and which were published in the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010, were used to establish matrices of geographic distance and cooperation levels between cities. By constructing a distance-cooperation model, the degree of scientific cooperation based on spatial distance was calculated. The relationship between geographical proximity and scientific cooperation, as well as changes in that relationship, was explored using the fitting function. Result (1) Instead of declining, the role of geographical proximity in inter-city scientific cooperation has increased gradually but significantly with the popularization of telecommunication technologies; (2) the relationship between geographical proximity and scientific cooperation has not followed a perfect declining curve, and at certain spatial scales, the distance-decay regularity does not work; (3) the Chinese scientific cooperation network gathers around different regional center cities, showing a trend towards a regional network; within this cooperation network the amount of inter-city cooperation occurring at close range increased greatly. Conclusion The relationship between inter-city geographical distance and scientific cooperation has been enhanced and strengthened over time. PMID:25365449

Social setting, intuition and experience in laboratory experiments interact to shape cooperative decision-making.

PubMed

Capraro, Valerio; Cococcioni, Giorgia

2015-07-22

Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation typically has a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a cooperative setting and with no previous experience in economic games on cooperation (history dependence). Here, we report on a laboratory experiment exploring how these findings transfer to a non-cooperative setting. We find two major results: (i) promoting intuition versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behaviour among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting; (ii) experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily via the channel of intuition. Our findings shed further light on the cognitive basis of human cooperative decision-making and provide further support for the recently proposed social heuristics hypothesis. © 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

Spontaneous giving and calculated greed.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Greene, Joshua D; Nowak, Martin A

2012-09-20

Cooperation is central to human social behaviour. However, choosing to cooperate requires individuals to incur a personal cost to benefit others. Here we explore the cognitive basis of cooperative decision-making in humans using a dual-process framework. We ask whether people are predisposed towards selfishness, behaving cooperatively only through active self-control; or whether they are intuitively cooperative, with reflection and prospective reasoning favouring 'rational' self-interest. To investigate this issue, we perform ten studies using economic games. We find that across a range of experimental designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. Furthermore, forcing subjects to decide quickly increases contributions, whereas instructing them to reflect and forcing them to decide slowly decreases contributions. Finally, an induction that primes subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions compared with an induction that promotes greater reflection. To explain these results, we propose that cooperation is intuitive because cooperative heuristics are developed in daily life where cooperation is typically advantageous. We then validate predictions generated by this proposed mechanism. Our results provide convergent evidence that intuition supports cooperation in social dilemmas, and that reflection can undermine these cooperative impulses.

How is human cooperation different?

PubMed Central

Melis, Alicia P.; Semmann, Dirk

2010-01-01

Although cooperation is a widespread phenomenon in nature, human cooperation exceeds that of all other species with regard to the scale and range of cooperative activities. Here we review and discuss differences between humans and non-humans in the strategies employed to maintain cooperation and control free-riders. We distinguish forms of cooperative behaviour based on their influence on the immediate payoffs of actor and recipient. If the actor has immediate costs and only the recipient obtains immediate benefits, we term this investment. If the behaviour has immediate positive effects for both actor and recipient, we call this a self-serving mutually beneficial behaviour or mutual cooperation. We argue that humans, in contrast to all other species, employ a wider range of enforcement mechanisms, which allow higher levels of cooperation to evolve and stabilize among unrelated individuals and in large groups. We also discuss proximate mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour and focus on our experimental work with humans and our closest primate relatives. Differences in the proximate mechanisms also seem to contribute to explaining humans' greater ability to cooperate and enforce cooperation. PMID:20679110

7 CFR 989.12a - Cooperative bargaining association.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 8 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative bargaining association. 989.12a Section... PRODUCED FROM GRAPES GROWN IN CALIFORNIA Order Regulating Handling Definitions § 989.12a Cooperative bargaining association. Cooperative bargaining association means a nonprofit cooperative association of...

40 CFR 35.6205 - Removal Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Removal Cooperative Agreements. 35.6205... ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Removal Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6205 Removal Cooperative Agreements. (a) The...

43 CFR 43.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 43 Public Lands: Interior 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative agreement. 43.620 Section 43... DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 43.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative... activity contemplated by the award. The term does not include cooperative research and development...

28 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46... Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is...

28 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46... Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is...

28 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46... Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is...

10 CFR 745.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative research. 745.114 Section 745.114 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 745.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research... of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and...

10 CFR 745.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative research. 745.114 Section 745.114 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 745.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research... of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and...

10 CFR 745.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Cooperative research. 745.114 Section 745.114 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 745.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research... of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and...

10 CFR 745.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Cooperative research. 745.114 Section 745.114 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 745.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research... of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and...

28 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46... Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is...

10 CFR 745.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative research. 745.114 Section 745.114 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 745.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research... of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and...

28 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46... Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is...

41 CFR 105-74.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative agreement....620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

41 CFR 105-74.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 41 Public Contracts and Property Management 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Cooperative agreement....620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.

PubMed

Nowak, Martin A

2006-12-08

Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.

Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nowak, Martin A.

2006-12-01

Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived that specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation.

Contagion of Cooperation in Static and Fluid Social Networks.

PubMed

Jordan, Jillian J; Rand, David G; Arbesman, Samuel; Fowler, James H; Christakis, Nicholas A

2013-01-01

Cooperation is essential for successful human societies. Thus, understanding how cooperative and selfish behaviors spread from person to person is a topic of theoretical and practical importance. Previous laboratory experiments provide clear evidence of social contagion in the domain of cooperation, both in fixed networks and in randomly shuffled networks, but leave open the possibility of asymmetries in the spread of cooperative and selfish behaviors. Additionally, many real human interaction structures are dynamic: we often have control over whom we interact with. Dynamic networks may differ importantly in the goals and strategic considerations they promote, and thus the question of how cooperative and selfish behaviors spread in dynamic networks remains open. Here, we address these questions with data from a social dilemma laboratory experiment. We measure the contagion of both cooperative and selfish behavior over time across three different network structures that vary in the extent to which they afford individuals control over their network ties. We find that in relatively fixed networks, both cooperative and selfish behaviors are contagious. In contrast, in more dynamic networks, selfish behavior is contagious, but cooperative behavior is not: subjects are fairly likely to switch to cooperation regardless of the behavior of their neighbors. We hypothesize that this insensitivity to the behavior of neighbors in dynamic networks is the result of subjects' desire to attract new cooperative partners: even if many of one's current neighbors are defectors, it may still make sense to switch to cooperation. We further hypothesize that selfishness remains contagious in dynamic networks because of the well-documented willingness of cooperators to retaliate against selfishness, even when doing so is costly. These results shed light on the contagion of cooperative behavior in fixed and fluid networks, and have implications for influence-based interventions aiming at increasing cooperative behavior.

Kin Selection in the RNA World

PubMed Central

West, Stuart A.

2017-01-01

Various steps in the RNA world required cooperation. Why did life’s first inhabitants, from polymerases to synthetases, cooperate? We develop kin selection models of the RNA world to answer these questions. We develop a very simple model of RNA cooperation and then elaborate it to model three relevant issues in RNA biology: (1) whether cooperative RNAs receive the benefits of cooperation; (2) the scale of competition in RNA populations; and (3) explicit replicator diffusion and survival. We show: (1) that RNAs are likely to express partial cooperation; (2) that RNAs will need mechanisms for overcoming local competition; and (3) in a specific example of RNA cooperation, persistence after replication and offspring diffusion allow for cooperation to overcome competition. More generally, we show how kin selection can unify previously disparate answers to the question of RNA world cooperation. PMID:29206171

Cooperation of German Airports in Europe: Comparison of Different Types by Means of an Interdependence-Profile-Model

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Meincke, Peter A.

2003-01-01

The limited growth possibilities in the home markets - not the least of which, based on capacity and expansion problems - force the large airport operators to enter into, via partnerships, cooperations and alliances. The German airports already cooperate among one another in different forms. The purpose of the paper is to examine the structures and possibilities of cooperation among airports in Europe (e.g. Airport Systems, Airport Networks). The experience of German airports with different cooperations and alliances will be also considered. Finally the forms of cooperations among airports are analysed by means of interdependence-profile-models with different features (mutual dependence, coordination volume, complexity, cooperation profit, value, degree of formalization and temporal frame), in order to find out how high the cooperative attachment of cooperation is to be evaluated.

Conflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards

PubMed Central

Gneezy, Ayelet; Fessler, Daniel M. T.

2012-01-01

Unlike most species, humans cooperate extensively with group members who are not closely related to them, a pattern sustained in part by punishing non-cooperators and rewarding cooperators. Because internally cooperative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, it is thought that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the evolution of human cooperation. Consequently, it is plausible that propensities to punish and reward will be elevated during intergroup conflict. Using experiments conducted before, during and after the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war, we show that, during wartime, people are more willing to pay costs to punish non-cooperative group members and reward cooperative group members. Rather than simply increasing within-group solidarity, violent intergroup conflict thus elicits behaviours that, writ large, enhance cooperation within the group, thereby making victory more likely. PMID:21653590

36 CFR 1212.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1212... § 1212.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

32 CFR 219.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cooperative research. 219.114 Section 219.114...) MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 219.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are... cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of...

14 CFR 1230.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1230.114 Section 1230... § 1230.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

15 CFR 27.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative research. 27.114 Section... § 27.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

14 CFR 1230.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2011-01-01 2010-01-01 true Cooperative research. 1230.114 Section 1230... § 1230.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

15 CFR 27.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative research. 27.114 Section... § 27.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

16 CFR 1028.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1028.114 Section 1028... § 1028.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

38 CFR 16.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative research. 16... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 16.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

14 CFR 1230.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1230.114 Section 1230... § 1230.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

16 CFR 1028.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1028.114 Section 1028... § 1028.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

16 CFR 1028.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1028.114 Section 1028... § 1028.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

14 CFR 1230.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1230.114 Section 1230... § 1230.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

32 CFR 219.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cooperative research. 219.114 Section 219.114...) MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 219.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are... cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of...

15 CFR 27.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Cooperative research. 27.114 Section... § 27.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

38 CFR 16.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cooperative research. 16... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 16.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

32 CFR 219.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative research. 219.114 Section 219.114...) MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 219.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are... cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of...

15 CFR 27.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative research. 27.114 Section... § 27.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

38 CFR 16.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cooperative research. 16... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 16.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

38 CFR 16.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative research. 16... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 16.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

38 CFR 16.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative research. 16... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 16.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

15 CFR 27.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Cooperative research. 27.114 Section... § 27.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

16 CFR 1028.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1028.114 Section 1028... § 1028.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

32 CFR 219.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative research. 219.114 Section 219.114...) MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 219.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are... cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of...

32 CFR 219.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 32 National Defense 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative research. 219.114 Section 219.114...) MISCELLANEOUS PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 219.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are... cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of...

21 CFR 1405.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1405.620 Section 1405.620... WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1405.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means... contemplated by the award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined...

36 CFR 1212.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1212... § 1212.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

28 CFR 83.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 28 Judicial Administration 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 83.620 Section 83...-FREE WORKPLACE (GRANTS) Definitions § 83.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an... by the award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in...

7 CFR 1415.17 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative agreements. 1415.17 Section 1415.17... Cooperative agreements. (a) NRCS may enter into cooperative agreements which establish terms and conditions... cooperative agreement with those eligible entities selected for funding. Once a proposal is selected by the...

21 CFR 1405.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1405.620 Section 1405.620... WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1405.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means... contemplated by the award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined...

7 CFR 1415.17 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative agreements. 1415.17 Section 1415.17... Cooperative agreements. (a) NRCS may enter into cooperative agreements which establish terms and conditions... cooperative agreement with those eligible entities selected for funding. Once a proposal is selected by the...

7 CFR 3021.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 15 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative agreement. 3021.620 Section 3021.620...) Definitions § 3021.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance... not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

22 CFR 312.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2011-04-01 2009-04-01 true Cooperative agreement. 312.620 Section 312.620...) Definitions § 312.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

21 CFR 1405.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1405.620 Section 1405.620... WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1405.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means... contemplated by the award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined...

22 CFR 312.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2012-04-01 2009-04-01 true Cooperative agreement. 312.620 Section 312.620...) Definitions § 312.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

36 CFR 1212.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1212... § 1212.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

7 CFR 1484.12 - What is the Cooperator program?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... Market Development Cooperator (Cooperator) Program, FAS enters into project agreements with eligible... products. FAS does not provide brand promotion assistance to Cooperators under this program. (b) FAS enters... Cooperator program generally operates on a reimbursement basis. (d) FAS policy is to ensure that benefits...

7 CFR 1484.12 - What is the Cooperator program?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... Market Development Cooperator (Cooperator) Program, FAS enters into project agreements with eligible... products. FAS does not provide brand promotion assistance to Cooperators under this program. (b) FAS enters... Cooperator program generally operates on a reimbursement basis. (d) FAS policy is to ensure that benefits...

Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Peysakhovich, Alexander; Kraft-Todd, Gordon T; Newman, George E; Wurzbacher, Owen; Nowak, Martin A; Greene, Joshua D

2014-04-22

Cooperation is central to human societies. Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive underpinnings of cooperative decision making. Does cooperation require deliberate self-restraint? Or is spontaneous prosociality reined in by calculating self-interest? Here we present a theory of why (and for whom) intuition favors cooperation: cooperation is typically advantageous in everyday life, leading to the formation of generalized cooperative intuitions. Deliberation, by contrast, adjusts behaviour towards the optimum for a given situation. Thus, in one-shot anonymous interactions where selfishness is optimal, intuitive responses tend to be more cooperative than deliberative responses. We test this 'social heuristics hypothesis' by aggregating across every cooperation experiment using time pressure that we conducted over a 2-year period (15 studies and 6,910 decisions), as well as performing a novel time pressure experiment. Doing so demonstrates a positive average effect of time pressure on cooperation. We also find substantial variation in this effect, and show that this variation is partly explained by previous experience with one-shot lab experiments.

Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Yongkui; Zhang, Lin; Chen, Xiaojie; Ren, Lei; Wang, Long

2013-09-01

In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational individual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significantly promoted when individuals’ cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations.

Spatial self-organization favors heterotypic cooperation over cheating

PubMed Central

Momeni, Babak; Waite, Adam James; Shou, Wenying

2013-01-01

Heterotypic cooperation—two populations exchanging distinct benefits that are costly to produce—is widespread. Cheaters, exploiting benefits while evading contribution, can undermine cooperation. Two mechanisms can stabilize heterotypic cooperation. In ‘partner choice’, cooperators recognize and choose cooperating over cheating partners; in ‘partner fidelity feedback’, fitness-feedback from repeated interactions ensures that aiding your partner helps yourself. How might a spatial environment, which facilitates repeated interactions, promote fitness-feedback? We examined this process through mathematical models and engineered Saccharomyces cerevisiae strains incapable of recognition. Here, cooperators and their heterotypic cooperative partners (partners) exchanged distinct essential metabolites. Cheaters exploited partner-produced metabolites without reciprocating, and were competitively superior to cooperators. Despite initially random spatial distributions, cooperators gained more partner neighbors than cheaters did. The less a cheater contributed, the more it was excluded and disfavored. This self-organization, driven by asymmetric fitness effects of cooperators and cheaters on partners during cell growth into open space, achieves assortment. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.00960.001 PMID:24220506

The shadow of the future promotes cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma for children

PubMed Central

Blake, Peter R.; Rand, David G.; Tingley, Dustin; Warneken, Felix

2015-01-01

Cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals can be supported by direct reciprocity. Theoretical models and experiments with adults show that the possibility of future interactions with the same partner can promote cooperation via conditionally cooperative strategies such as tit-for-tat (TFT). Here, we introduce a novel implementation of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) designed for children to examine whether repeated interactions can successfully promote cooperation in 10 and 11 year olds. We find that children cooperate substantially more in repeated PDs than in one-shot PDs. We also find that girls cooperate more than boys, and that children with more conduct problems cooperate less. Finally, we find that children use conditional cooperation strategies but that these strategies vary by gender and conduct problem rating. Specifically, girls and children with few conduct problems appear to follow an altruistic version of win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS), attempting to re-establish cooperation after they had defected. Boys and children with more conduct problems appear to follow a Grim strategy, defecting for the duration after the partner defects. Thus we provide evidence that children utilize the power of direct reciprocity to promote cooperation in strategic interactions and that, by late elementary school, distinct strategies of conditional cooperation have emerged. PMID:26417661

Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games.

PubMed

Suzuki, Shinsuke; Akiyama, Eizo

2008-06-21

Evolution of cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals has been of considerable concern in various fields such as biology, economics, and psychology. The evolution of cooperation is often explained by reciprocity. Under reciprocity, cooperation can prevail in a society because a donor of cooperation receives reciprocation from the recipient of the cooperation, called direct reciprocity, or from someone else in the community, called indirect reciprocity. Nowak and Sigmund [1993. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90, 5091-5094] have demonstrated that directly reciprocal cooperation in two-person prisoner's dilemma games with mutation of strategies can be maintained dynamically as periodic or chaotic oscillation. Furthermore, Eriksson and Lindgren [2005. Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 232, 399-409] have reported that directly reciprocal cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemma games (n>2) can be maintained as periodic oscillation. Is dynamic cooperation observed only in direct reciprocity? Results of this study show that indirectly reciprocal cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemma games can be maintained dynamically as periodic or chaotic oscillation. This is, to our knowledge, the first demonstration of chaos in indirect reciprocity. Furthermore, the results show that oscillatory dynamics are observed in common in the evolution of reciprocal cooperation whether for direct or indirect.

What promotes and inhibits cooperation in mental health care across disciplines, services and service sectors? A qualitative study.

PubMed

Bramesfeld, A; Ungewitter, C; Böttger, D; El, Jurdi J; Losert, C; Kilian, R

2012-03-01

To explore the practice of cooperation in mental health care across services and identify conditions that promote and inhibit cooperation. Focus groups with relevant service providers were conducted in four exemplary regions in Germany (rural/ urban and East/West). The discussions were content analysed. Seven central categories were deduced: (1) involved service providers, (2) comprehension, (3) reasons, (4) instruments for cooperation, (5) promoting and inhibiting conditions, (6) interdisciplinarity, and (7) regional and personal networks. Cooperation is practiced in networks, rather than defined relations. Who is involved in cooperation depends on patients/clients needs and may vary from case to case. Service providers do not have theoretical concepts of cooperation. Cooperation relies not only on personal contacts and knowledge between services but also on time, financial reimbursement and the social capital of the environment. In particular, cooperation with physicians was considered to be difficult by non-medical professionals. Physician's role models do not seem to include cooperation with other disciplines as a core task. To improve cooperation, regional and sustainable mental health networks have to be systematically implemented by providing leadership, time and reimbursement for network meetings. Interdisciplinary cooperation practice should be part of the curricula of medical students and residents in psychiatry.

From Additivity to Cooperativity in Chemistry: Can Cooperativity Be Measured?

PubMed

Tebben, Ludger; Mück-Lichtenfeld, Christian; Fernández, Gustavo; Grimme, Stefan; Studer, Armido

2017-05-02

Cooperative effects can be observed in various research areas in chemistry; cooperative catalysis is well-established, the assembly of compounds on surfaces can be steered by cooperative effects, and supramolecular polymerization can proceed in a cooperative manner. In biological systems, cooperativity is observed in protein-protein, protein-lipid and protein-molecule interactions. Synergistic effects are relevant in frustrated Lewis pairs, organic multispin systems, multimetallic clusters and also in nanoparticles. However, a general approach to determine cooperativity in the different chemical systems is currently not known. In the present concept paper it is suggested that, at least for simpler systems that can be described at the molecular level, cooperativity can be defined based on energy considerations. For systems in which no chemical transformation occurs, determination of interaction energies of the whole system with respect to the interaction energies between all individual component pairs (subsystems) will allow determination of cooperativity. For systems comprising of chemical transformations, cooperativity can be evaluated by determining the activation energy of the synergistic system and by comparing this with activation energies of the corresponding subsystems that lack an activating moiety. For more complex systems, cooperativity is generally determined at a qualitative level. © 2017 Wiley-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

50 CFR 15.24 - Permits for cooperative breeding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... PLANTS WILD BIRD CONSERVATION ACT Permits and Approval of Cooperative Breeding Programs § 15.24 Permits for cooperative breeding. (a) Application requirements for permits for cooperative breeding. Each... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Permits for cooperative breeding. 15.24...

50 CFR 15.24 - Permits for cooperative breeding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... PLANTS WILD BIRD CONSERVATION ACT Permits and Approval of Cooperative Breeding Programs § 15.24 Permits for cooperative breeding. (a) Application requirements for permits for cooperative breeding. Each... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Permits for cooperative breeding. 15.24...

49 CFR 32.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative agreement. 32.620 Section 32.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 32.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

7 CFR 1491.20 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative agreements. 1491.20 Section 1491.20... Cooperative Agreements and Conservation Easement Deeds § 1491.20 Cooperative agreements. (a) NRCS, on behalf of CCC, shall enter into a cooperative agreement with those entities selected for funding. Once a...

29 CFR 94.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 true Cooperative agreement. 94.620 Section 94.620 Labor Office of...) Definitions § 94.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

7 CFR 1425.19 - Member cooperatives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Member cooperatives. 1425.19 Section 1425.19... OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS § 1425.19 Member cooperatives. A CMA may obtain loans or LDP's on behalf of a member cooperative when the member...

45 CFR 690.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Cooperative research. 690.114 Section 690.114... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 690.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

45 CFR 690.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Cooperative research. 690.114 Section 690.114... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 690.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

45 CFR 690.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative research. 690.114 Section 690.114... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 690.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

45 CFR 690.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cooperative research. 690.114 Section 690.114... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 690.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

45 CFR 690.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Cooperative research. 690.114 Section 690.114... OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 690.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research...

26 CFR 601.802 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 20 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Cooperative agreements. 601.802 Section 601.802... STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL RULES Tax Counseling for the Elderly § 601.802 Cooperative agreements. (a) General... cooperative agreements with the Internal Revenue Service. Use of cooperative agreements is in accordance with...

29 CFR 94.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 29 Labor 1 2014-07-01 2013-07-01 true Cooperative agreement. 94.620 Section 94.620 Labor Office of...) Definitions § 94.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that... cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

7 CFR 1491.20 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative agreements. 1491.20 Section 1491.20... Cooperative Agreements and Conservation Easement Deeds § 1491.20 Cooperative agreements. (a) NRCS, on behalf of CCC, shall enter into a cooperative agreement with those entities selected for funding. Once a...

36 CFR 212.3 - Cooperative work.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative work. 212.3... MANAGEMENT Administration of the Forest Transportation System § 212.3 Cooperative work. (a) Cooperative... for expenditure from the appropriation “Cooperative Work, Forest Service.” If a State, county or other...

50 CFR 15.24 - Permits for cooperative breeding.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... PLANTS WILD BIRD CONSERVATION ACT Permits and Approval of Cooperative Breeding Programs § 15.24 Permits for cooperative breeding. (a) Application requirements for permits for cooperative breeding. Each... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Permits for cooperative breeding. 15.24...

76 FR 43347 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-07-20

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Diesel Aftertreatment Accelerated Aging Cycles--Heavy... Institute-- Cooperative Research Group on Diesel Aftertreatment Accelerated Aging Cycles--Heavy-Duty...

International University Co-operation: Summary Record of a Working Party on International University Co-operation. Papers-9.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

International Association of Universities, Paris (France).

This report delineates areas, patterns, effects, and purposes of international university cooperation. Areas of international university cooperation encompass teaching and study, research, university administration and organization. Patterns of cooperation include the basic principles of governing agreements, methods for full university…

A Framework for a Computer System to Support Distributed Cooperative Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Chiu, Chiung-Hui

2004-01-01

To develop a computer system to support cooperative learning among distributed students; developers should consider the foundations of cooperative learning. This article examines the basic elements that make cooperation work and proposes a framework for such computer supported cooperative learning (CSCL) systems. This framework is constituted of…

78 FR 9775 - Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, Receipt of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-02-11

...: Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Cooper),\\1\\ has determined that certain Cooper brand tires manufactured... brand standard load tires manufactured in Mexico by Cooper's affiliate, Corporaci[oacute]n de Occidente... Docket Management System (FDMS) Web site at http://www.regulations.gov/ . Follow the online instructions...

10 CFR 603.1240 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative agreement. 603.1240 Section 603.1240 Energy... Used in this Part § 603.1240 Cooperative agreement. A legal instrument which, consistent with 31 U.S.C... carrying out the activity contemplated by the cooperative agreement. The term does not include “cooperative...

16 CFR § 1028.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... 16 Commercial Practices 2 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Cooperative research. § 1028.114 Section Â... § 1028.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each...

22 CFR 133.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 133.620 Section 133.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 133.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

34 CFR 84.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 84.620 Section 84.620 Education... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 84.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a...

50 CFR 81.3 - Cooperative Agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative Agreement. 81.3 Section 81.3... SPECIES OF FISH, WILDLIFE, AND PLANTS-COOPERATION WITH THE STATES § 81.3 Cooperative Agreement. Upon... Secretary shall enter into an Agreement with the State. A Cooperative Agreement is necessary before a...

36 CFR § 1212.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 3 2013-07-01 2012-07-01 true Cooperative agreement. § 1212...) Definitions § 1212.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance... not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

50 CFR 81.3 - Cooperative Agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 9 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Cooperative Agreement. 81.3 Section 81.3... SPECIES OF FISH, WILDLIFE, AND PLANTS-COOPERATION WITH THE STATES § 81.3 Cooperative Agreement. Upon... Secretary shall enter into an Agreement with the State. A Cooperative Agreement is necessary before a...

22 CFR 133.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 133.620 Section 133.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 133.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

34 CFR 84.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 84.620 Section 84.620 Education... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 84.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a...

22 CFR 1008.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2012-04-01 2009-04-01 true Cooperative agreement. 1008.620 Section 1008.620... ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1008.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

22 CFR 1509.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2012-04-01 2009-04-01 true Cooperative agreement. 1509.620 Section 1509.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1509.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C...

22 CFR 133.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 133.620 Section 133.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 133.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

45 CFR 1155.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1155.620 Section 1155.620... ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1155.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

22 CFR 1509.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2011-04-01 2009-04-01 true Cooperative agreement. 1509.620 Section 1509.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1509.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C...

34 CFR 84.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 84.620 Section 84.620 Education... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 84.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a...

45 CFR 1155.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1155.620 Section 1155.620... ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1155.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

45 CFR 1155.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1155.620 Section 1155.620... ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1155.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

22 CFR 210.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 210.620 Section 210.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 210.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

45 CFR 1173.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1173.620 Section 1173.620... (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1173.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of... award. The term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C...

22 CFR 1008.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 2 2011-04-01 2009-04-01 true Cooperative agreement. 1008.620 Section 1008.620... ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1008.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial... term does not include cooperative research and development agreements as defined in 15 U.S.C. 3710a. ...

A Course of Study in Cooperation and Cooperatives.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bjoraker, Walter T., Ed.

Designed for teachers with limited experience in cooperatives, this course of study was prepared by seminar students for use in high school or adult education programs, and emphasizes the principles of cooperation, the operation and management of cooperatives, and the communication required for their effective functioning. Units requiring a total…

26 CFR 1.521-1 - Farmers' cooperative marketing and purchasing associations; requirements for exemption under...

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 7 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 true Farmers' cooperative marketing and purchasing...) Farmers' Cooperatives § 1.521-1 Farmers' cooperative marketing and purchasing associations; requirements for exemption under section 521. (a)(1) Cooperative associations engaged in the marketing of farm...

Sharing the Riches--Cooperation and the Library of Congress.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Welsh, William J.

These remarks are based on the Association's cooperative library study finding that two-thirds of the southeastern libraries are already participating in cooperative programs. Libraries must now exploit these avenues of cooperation, especially with the Library of Congress. Cooperative projects in automation such as CONSER, COMARC, and RLG are…

75 FR 14191 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-24

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group On: Diesel After Treatment Accelerated Aging Cycles--Heavy... Institute--Cooperative Research Group on Diesel After Treatment Accelerated Aging Cycles--Heavy-Duty...

40 CFR 35.6055 - State-lead pre-remedial Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false State-lead pre-remedial Cooperative... for Superfund Response Actions Pre-Remedial Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6055 State-lead pre-remedial Cooperative Agreements. (a) To receive a State-lead pre-remedial Cooperative Agreement, the...

Cooperation in the Game and Sport Structure of Children: One Dimension of Psychosocial Development.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Foster, Wayne K.

1984-01-01

Examines benefits to individuals and society of cooperative--as opposed to competitive--interpersonal relationships. Discusses children's sports, games, and play as means to promote cooperation and reviews research showing positive effects of children's cooperative play. Provides standards for a cooperative philosophy that would promote positive…

Cooperative Learning and Second-Language Teaching: Frequently-Asked Questions.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jacobs, George M.; Gilbert, Charles C.; Lopriore, Lucilla; Goldstein, Sue; Thiyagarajali, Rosy

1998-01-01

Summarizes a discussion about cooperative learning in second-language teaching by 45 teachers, highlighting six issues: how to cover the syllabus, how long cooperative groups should stay together, how cooperative learning is affected by competition in society, using cooperative learning with low language proficiency students, using cooperative…

Fuzzy restrictions and an application to cooperative games with restricted cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gallardo, J. M.; Jiménez, N.; Jiménez-Losada, A.

2017-10-01

The concept of restriction, which is an extension of that of interior operator, was introduced to model limited cooperation in cooperative game theory. In this paper, a fuzzy version of restrictions is presented. We show that these new operators, called fuzzy restrictions, can be characterized by the transitivity of the fuzzy dependence relations that they induce. As an application, we introduce cooperative games with fuzzy restriction, which are used to model cooperative situations in which each player in a coalition has a level of cooperation within the coalition. A value for these games is defined and characterized.

[Child protection--cooperation and conflict management].

PubMed

Averbeck, Birgit; Hermans, Björn Enno

2010-01-01

When people have to deal with conflicts or opposing views they often refer to the term cooperation. But after lengthy discussions the question may be raised if it is more useful not to cooperate. The authors of this article analyse why cooperation is often called for but frequently fails. In this article key prerequisites for successful cooperation are described before the authors present their practical method of 'sYpport'. 'SYpport' mostly refers to trans-institutional cooperation and focuses on the required attitude of those involved. The authors' simple but crucial conclusion is that cooperation requires faith in others.

Five rules for the evolution of cooperation

PubMed Central

Nowak, Martin A.

2011-01-01

Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. The emergence of genomes, cells, multi-cellular organisms, social insects and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another. But natural selection implies competition and therefore opposes cooperation unless a specific mechanism is at work. Here I discuss five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and group selection. For each mechanism, a simple rule is derived which specifies whether natural selection can lead to cooperation. PMID:17158317

Effect of playing violent video games cooperatively or competitively on subsequent cooperative behavior.

PubMed

Ewoldsen, David R; Eno, Cassie A; Okdie, Bradley M; Velez, John A; Guadagno, Rosanna E; DeCoster, Jamie

2012-05-01

Research on video games has yielded consistent findings that violent video games increase aggression and decrease prosocial behavior. However, these studies typically examined single-player games. Of interest is the effect of cooperative play in a violent video game on subsequent cooperative or competitive behavior. Participants played Halo II (a first-person shooter game) cooperatively or competitively and then completed a modified prisoner's dilemma task to assess competitive and cooperative behavior. Compared with the competitive play conditions, players in the cooperative condition engaged in more tit-for-tat behaviors-a pattern of behavior that typically precedes cooperative behavior. The social context of game play influenced subsequent behavior more than the content of the game that was played.

Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: A case study of the Nile Basin

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Xun; Whittington, Dale

2006-02-01

Nation-states rarely go to war over water, but it is equally rare that water conflicts in an international river basin are resolved through cooperation among the riparian countries that use the shared resources. Gains from cooperation will mean little to individual riparians unless the required cooperative behaviors are incentive compatible. Cooperative game theory offers useful insights for assessing cooperative solutions for water conflicts in international river basins. Applying cooperative game theory concepts such as core, nucleolus, and Shapley value to Nile water conflicts, we examine the incentive structure of both cooperative and noncooperative strategies for different riparian countries and establish some baseline conditions for incentive-compatible cooperation in the Nile basin.

Growth dynamics and the evolution of cooperation in microbial populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cremer, Jonas; Melbinger, Anna; Frey, Erwin

2012-02-01

Microbes providing public goods are widespread in nature despite running the risk of being exploited by free-riders. However, the precise ecological factors supporting cooperation are still puzzling. Following recent experiments, we consider the role of population growth and the repetitive fragmentation of populations into new colonies mimicking simple microbial life-cycles. Individual-based modeling reveals that demographic fluctuations, which lead to a large variance in the composition of colonies, promote cooperation. Biased by population dynamics these fluctuations result in two qualitatively distinct regimes of robust cooperation under repetitive fragmentation into groups. First, if the level of cooperation exceeds a threshold, cooperators will take over the whole population. Second, cooperators can also emerge from a single mutant leading to a robust coexistence between cooperators and free-riders. We find frequency and size of population bottlenecks, and growth dynamics to be the major ecological factors determining the regimes and thereby the evolutionary pathway towards cooperation.

When Reputation Enforces Evolutionary Cooperation in Unreliable MANETs.

PubMed

Tang, Changbing; Li, Ang; Li, Xiang

2015-10-01

In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions. We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategies and derive the threshold of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.

The narrow gap between norms and cooperative behaviour in a reindeer herding community

PubMed Central

2018-01-01

Cooperation evolves on social networks and is shaped, in part, by norms: beliefs and expectations about the behaviour of others or of oneself. Networks of cooperative social partners and associated norms are vital for pastoralists, such as Saami reindeer herders in northern Norway. However, little is known quantitatively about how norms structure pastoralists' social networks or shape cooperation. Saami herders reported their social networks and participated in field experiments, allowing us to gauge the overlap between reported and emergent cooperation. We show that individuals' perceptions of reciprocal cooperation within their social networks exceeded actual reciprocity, although both occurred frequently and were concentrated within herding groups. Herders with more extensive cooperation networks received more rewards in an economic game. Although herders overestimated reciprocal helping, cooperation in this community was still extensive, suggesting that perceived norms potentially allow network structures promoting cooperation to emerge and be maintained. PMID:29515842

Heterogeneous game resource distributions promote cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cui, Guang-Hai; Wang, Zhen; Yang, Yan-Cun; Tian, Sheng-Wen; Yue, Jun

2018-01-01

In social networks, individual abilities to establish interactions are always heterogeneous and independent of the number of topological neighbors. We here study the influence of heterogeneous distributions of abilities on the evolution of individual cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. First, we introduced a prisoner's dilemma game, taking into account individual heterogeneous abilities to establish games, which are determined by the owned game resources. Second, we studied three types of game resource distributions that follow the power-law property. Simulation results show that the heterogeneous distribution of individual game resources can promote cooperation effectively, and the heterogeneous level of resource distributions has a positive influence on the maintenance of cooperation. Extensive analysis shows that cooperators with large resource capacities can foster cooperator clusters around themselves. Furthermore, when the temptation to defect is high, cooperator clusters in which the central pure cooperators have larger game resource capacities are more stable than other cooperator clusters.

From cooperation to conflict? Swedish rehabilitation professionals' experiences of interorganizational cooperation.

PubMed

Ståhl, Christian; Svensson, Tommy; Ekberg, Kerstin

2011-09-01

This article analyses Swedish rehabilitation professionals' experiences of interorganizational cooperation in return-to-work and labour market reintegration. Two groups (n = 15) from different organizations met on a regular basis to discuss their practice from a cooperation perspective. The participants had experience of cooperation in the organizational setting of Coordination Associations. The groups worked with a tutor according to a problem-based methodology, to discuss how their practice is influenced by new structures for cooperation. The material was analysed inductively using qualitative content analysis. Interorganizational cooperation in rehabilitation is generally perceived as promoting coherence and communication. Nevertheless, there are several contradictory factors in the implementation of such work forms, primarily inflexible sickness insurance regulations and inability of managers to implement cooperation in regular practice. While interorganizational cooperation promotes professional discretion and tailored solutions, the insurance system contradicts such ambitions through increased governance. Ultimately, the contradictory tendencies of cooperative initiatives and the stricter governance of sickness insurance regulations are political matters. If political attempts to promote interorganizational cooperation are to succeed, the increasing sectorization that results from strict governance of sickness insurance regulations needs to be targeted on a system level.

Resource and competitive dynamics shape the benefits of public goods cooperation in a plant pathogen

PubMed Central

Platt, Thomas G.; Fuqua, Clay; Bever, James D.

2012-01-01

Cooperative benefits depend on a variety of ecological factors. Many cooperative bacteria increase the population size of their groups by making a public good available. Increased local population size can alleviate the constraints of kin competition on the evolution of cooperation by enhancing the between-group fitness of cooperators. The cooperative pathogenesis of Agrobacterium tumefaciens causes infected plants to exude opines—resources that provide a nearly exclusive source of nutrient for the pathogen. We experimentally demonstrate that opines provide cooperative A. tumefaciens cells a within-group fitness advantage over saprophytic agrobacteria. Our results are congruent with a resource-consumer competition model, which predicts that cooperative, virulent agrobacteria are at a competitive disadvantage when opines are unavailable, but have an advantage when opines are available at sufficient levels. This model also predicts that freeloading agrobacteria that catabolize opines but cannot infect plants competitively displace the cooperative pathogen from all environments. However, we show that these cooperative public goods also promote increased local population size. A model built from the Price Equation shows that this effect on group size can contribute to the persistence of cooperative pathogenesis despite inherent kin competition for the benefits of pathogenesis. PMID:22671559

Power Asymmetries and Punishment in a Prisoner's Dilemma with Variable Cooperative Investment.

PubMed

Bone, Jonathan E; Wallace, Brian; Bshary, Redouan; Raihani, Nichola J

2016-01-01

In many two-player games, players that invest in punishment finish with lower payoffs than those who abstain from punishing. These results question the effectiveness of punishment at promoting cooperation, especially when retaliation is possible. It has been suggested that these findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal in terms of power. However, a previous empirical study which incorporated power asymmetries into an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game failed to show that power asymmetries stabilize cooperation when punishment is possible. Instead, players cooperated in response to their partner cooperating, and punishment did not yield any additional increase in tendency to cooperate. Nevertheless, this previous study only allowed an all-or-nothing-rather than a variable-cooperation investment. It is possible that power asymmetries increase the effectiveness of punishment from strong players only when players are able to vary their investment in cooperation. We tested this hypothesis using a modified IPD game which allowed players to vary their investment in cooperation in response to being punished. As in the previous study, punishment from strong players did not increase cooperation under any circumstances. Thus, in two-player games with symmetric strategy sets, punishment does not appear to increase cooperation.

Sustained cooperation by running away from bad behavior

PubMed Central

Efferson, Charles; Roca, Carlos P.; Vogt, Sonja; Helbing, Dirk

2016-01-01

For cooperation to evolve, some mechanism must limit the rate at which cooperators are exposed to defectors. Only then can the advantages of mutual cooperation outweigh the costs of being exploited. Although researchers widely agree on this, they disagree intensely about which evolutionary mechanisms can explain the extraordinary cooperation exhibited by humans. Much of the controversy follows from disagreements about the informational regularity that allows cooperators to avoid defectors. Reliable information can allow cooperative individuals to avoid exploitation, but which mechanisms can sustain such a situation is a matter of considerable dispute. We conducted a behavioral experiment to see if cooperators could avoid defectors when provided with limited amounts of explicit information. We gave each participant the simple option to move away from her current neighborhood at any time. Participants were not identifiable as individuals, and they could not track each other's tendency to behave more or less cooperatively. More broadly, a participant had no information about the behavior she was likely to encounter if she moved, and so information about the risk of exploitation was extremely limited. Nonetheless, our results show that simply providing the option to move allowed cooperation to persist for a long period of time. Our results further show that movement, even though it involved considerable uncertainty, allowed would-be cooperators to assort positively and eliminate on average any individual payoff disadvantage associated with cooperation. This suggests that choosing to move, even under limited information, can completely reorganize the mix of selective forces relevant for the evolution of cooperation. PMID:26766895

The oxidative costs of parental care in cooperative and pair-breeding African starlings.

PubMed

Guindre-Parker, Sarah; Rubenstein, Dustin R

2018-06-01

The cost of parental care has long been thought to favor the evolution of cooperative breeding, because breeders can provide reduced parental care when aided by alloparents. Oxidative stress-the imbalance between reactive oxygen species and neutralizing antioxidants-has been proposed to mediate the cost of parental care, though results from empirical studies remain equivocal. We measured changes in oxidative status during reproduction in cooperatively breeding superb starlings (Lamprotornis superbus) to gain insight into the relationships among breeding status, parental care, and oxidative stress. We also compared the oxidative cost of reproduction in the cooperatively breeding superb starling to that in a sympatric non-cooperatively breeding species, the greater blue-eared glossy starling (L. chalybaeus), to determine whether cooperatively breeding individuals face reduced oxidative costs of parental care relative to non-cooperatively breeding individuals. Breeders and alloparents of the cooperative species did not differ in oxidative status throughout a breeding attempt. However, individuals of the non-cooperative species incurred an increase in reactive oxygen metabolites proportionally to an individual's workload during offspring care. These findings suggest that non-cooperative starlings experience an oxidative cost of parental care, whereas cooperatively breeding starlings do not. It is possible that high nest predation risk and multi-brooding in the cooperatively breeding species may have favored reduced physiological costs of parental care more strongly compared to pair-breeding starlings. Reduced physiological costs of caring for young may thus represent a direct benefit that promotes cooperative breeding.

General practitioners' satisfaction with and attitudes to out-of-hours services.

PubMed

van Uden, Caro J T; Nieman, Fred H M; Voss, Gemma B W E; Wesseling, Geertjan; Winkens, Ron A G; Crebolder, Harry F J M

2005-03-31

In recent years, Dutch general practitioner (GP) out-of-hours service has been reorganised into large-scale GP cooperatives. Until now little is known about GPs' experiences with working at these cooperatives for out-of-hours care. The purpose of this study is to gain insight into GPs' satisfaction with working at GP cooperatives for out-of-hours care in separated and integrated cooperatives. A GP cooperative separate from the hospital Accident and Emergency (A&E) department, and a GP cooperative integrated within the A&E department of another hospital. Both cooperatives are situated in adjacent geographic regions in the South of The Netherlands. One hundred GPs were interviewed by telephone; fifty GPs working at the separated GP cooperative and fifty GPs from the integrated GP cooperative. Opinions on different aspects of GP cooperatives for out-of-hours care were measured, and regression analysis was performed to investigate if these could be related to GP satisfaction with out-of-hours care organisation. GPs from the separated model were more satisfied with the organisation of out-of-hours care than GPs from the integrated model (70 vs. 60 on a scale score from 0 to 100; P = 0.020). Satisfaction about out-of-hours care organisation was related to opinions on workload, guarantee of gatekeeper function, and attitude towards out-of-hours care as being an essential part of general practice. Cooperation with medical specialists was much more appreciated at the integrated model (77 vs. 48; P < 0.001) versus the separated model. GPs in this study appear to be generally satisfied with the organisation of GP cooperatives for out-of-hours care. Furthermore, GPs working at the separated cooperative seem to be more satisfied compared to GPs working at the integrated cooperative.

On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for bi-cooperative games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Meirong, Wu; Shaochen, Cao; Huazhen, Zhu

2016-06-01

There are three decisions available for each participant in bi-cooperative games which can depict real life accurately in this paper. This paper researches the Shapley value of bi-cooperative games and completes the unique characterization. The axiom similar to classical cooperative games which could be used to characterize the Shapley value of bi-cooperative games as well. Meanwhile, it introduces a structural axiom and a zero excluded axiom instead of effective axiom in classical cooperative games.

Implementing interorganizational cooperation in labour market reintegration: a case study.

PubMed

Ståhl, Christian

2012-06-01

To bring people with complex medical, social and vocational needs back to the labour market, interorganizational cooperation is often needed. Yet, studies of processes and strategies for achieving sustainable interorganizational cooperation are sparse. The aim of this study was to analyse the implementation processes of Swedish legislation on financial coordination, with specific focus on different strategies for and perspectives on implementing interorganizational cooperation. A multiple-case study was used, where two local associations for financial coordination were studied in order to elucidate and compare the development of cooperative work in two settings. The material, collected during a 3-year period, consisted of documents, individual interviews with managers, and focus groups with officials. Two different implementation strategies were identified. In case 1, a linear strategy was used to implement cooperative projects, which led to difficulties in maintaining cooperative work forms due to a fragmented and time-limited implementation process. In case 2, an interactive strategy was used, where managers and politicians were continuously involved in developing a central cooperation team that became a central part of a developing structure for interorganizational cooperation. An interactive cooperation strategy with long-term joint financing was here shown to be successful in overcoming organizational barriers to cooperation. It is suggested that a strategy based on adaptation to local conditions, flexibility and constant evaluation is preferred for developing sustainable interorganizational cooperation when implementing policies or legislation affecting interorganizational relationships.

76 FR 66324 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-26

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Nasgro Development and Support Notice is hereby given that, on October 3, 2011, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production...

75 FR 62569 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-12

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on High Efficiency Dilute Gasoline Engine II Notice is...--Cooperative Research Group on High-Efficiency Dilute Gasoline Engine II, (``HEDGE II'') has filed written...

75 FR 4423 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-01-27

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on High Efficiency Dilute Gasoline Engine II Notice is...--Cooperative Research Group on High-Efficiency Dilute Gasoline Engine II, (``HEDGE II'') has filed written...

75 FR 14192 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-24

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on High-Efficiency Dilute Gasoline Engine II Notice is...--Cooperative Research Group on High-Efficiency Dilute Gasoline Engine II (``HEDGE II'') has filed written...

Farmers' Cooperatives in Nigeria: A Vehicle for Mutual Help and Education.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ukaga, Okechukwu M.

Data for a study of learning within farmers' cooperatives were collected by interviewing members of 25 such cooperatives in Imo State of Nigeria. Information was also gathered from a literature review and interviews with Nigerian government officials who worked closely with cooperatives. Three types of cooperative associations were identified:…

An Empirical Study on the Application of Cooperative Learning to English Listening Classes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Han, Min

2015-01-01

Cooperative learning is a strategic instructional system applied by many educators the world over. Researchers of cooperative learning have carried out the study in this field and proved that cooperative learning can create a more interesting and relaxed learning atmosphere. It is generally acknowledged that cooperative learning can reduce…

76 FR 70759 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-11-15

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Energy Storage System Evaluation and Safety Notice is hereby given that, on October 6, 2011, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and...

The evolution of altruistic social preferences in human groups

PubMed Central

Silk, Joan B.; House, Bailey R.

2016-01-01

In this paper, we consider three hypotheses to account for the evolution of the extraordinary capacity for large-scale cooperation and altruistic social preferences within human societies. One hypothesis is that human cooperation is built on the same evolutionary foundations as cooperation in other animal societies, and that fundamental elements of the social preferences that shape our species' cooperative behaviour are also shared with other closely related primates. Another hypothesis is that selective pressures favouring cooperative breeding have shaped the capacity for cooperation and the development of social preferences, and produced a common set of behavioural dispositions and social preferences in cooperatively breeding primates and humans. The third hypothesis is that humans have evolved derived capacities for collaboration, group-level cooperation and altruistic social preferences that are linked to our capacity for culture. We draw on naturalistic data to assess differences in the form, scope and scale of cooperation between humans and other primates, experimental data to evaluate the nature of social preferences across primate species, and comparative analyses to evaluate the evolutionary origins of cooperative breeding and related forms of behaviour. PMID:26729936

Time Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas

PubMed Central

Cone, Jeremy; Rand, David G.

2014-01-01

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect. PMID:25551386

Time pressure increases cooperation in competitively framed social dilemmas.

PubMed

Cone, Jeremy; Rand, David G

2014-01-01

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

Persistence paves the way for cooperation in evolutionary games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Huang, Chang-Wei; Dai, Qiong-Lin

2017-04-01

Cooperation is an effective way to maximize collective benefits, especially in modern human society. The issues on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation have attracted much attention in recent years. Here, we introduce the persistence parameter τ to characterize the time duration of choices held by individuals and consider the effects of τ on cooperation. We find that persistence could promote cooperation in a population no matter what the network structure is. Furthermore, the results on heterogeneous networks show that individuals with larger τ are more inclined to cooperate than those with smaller τ. Moreover, we investigate the effects of correlations between degree and persistence in scale-free networks and find that assortative matching could remarkably enhance cooperation whereas disassortative matching has adverse impacts on the evolution of cooperation.

Heterogeneous investments promote cooperation in evolutionary public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Qun; Wang, Hanchen; Zhang, Zhuxi; Li, Yumeng; Liu, Yu; Perc, Matjaž

2018-07-01

The public goods game is widely accepted as a suitable theoretical paradigm for explaining collective cooperation. In this paper, we investigate the impact of heterogeneous investments on cooperation in groups, where the investment of one player to a particular group depends on the fraction of cooperators in that group. Our research reveals that the level of cooperation is significantly promoted as the level of heterogeneity in the investments increases. By studying the payoffs of players at the boundaries of cooperative clusters, we show that the positive effect on the evolution of cooperation can be attributed to the formation of clusters that are more robust against invading defectors. The presented results sharpen our understanding of cooperation in groups that are due to heterogeneity and related asymmetric influences on game dynamics.

Reciprocity Outperforms Conformity to Promote Cooperation.

PubMed

Romano, Angelo; Balliet, Daniel

2017-10-01

Evolutionary psychologists have proposed two processes that could give rise to the pervasiveness of human cooperation observed among individuals who are not genetically related: reciprocity and conformity. We tested whether reciprocity outperformed conformity in promoting cooperation, especially when these psychological processes would promote a different cooperative or noncooperative response. To do so, across three studies, we observed participants' cooperation with a partner after learning (a) that their partner had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials and (b) that their group members had behaved cooperatively (or not) on several previous trials with that same partner. Although we found that people both reciprocate and conform, reciprocity has a stronger influence on cooperation. Moreover, we found that conformity can be partly explained by a concern about one's reputation-a finding that supports a reciprocity framework.

Cooperation enhanced by habitat destruction in Prisoner's Dilemma Games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Xiqing; Wang, Wanxiong; Zhang, Feng; Qiao, Hongqiang

2017-11-01

The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a fundamental problem within groups of selfish individuals, whereby we introduce a model of replicator equations based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In the present work, the effect of habitat destruction on the evolution of cooperation will be taken into account. Our results show that cooperators can receive the biggest boost for a moderate value of habitat destruction, and more serious habitat destruction will lead to lower levels of cooperation until zero. Moreover, we also reach the conclusion that the cooperation level decreases monotonously with the increasing of the ratio of cooperative cost to benefit but increases monotonously with the increasing of the encounter probability. Our findings can help to further understand the evolution of cooperation under the harsh external environment.

How the workload impacts on cognitive cooperation: A pilot study.

PubMed

Sciaraffa, Nicolina; Borghini, Gianluca; Arico, Pietro; Di Flumeri, Gianluca; Toppi, Jlenia; Colosimo, Alfredo; Bezerianos, Anastatios; Thakor, Nitish V; Babiloni, Fabio

2017-07-01

Cooperation degradation can be seen as one of the main causes of human errors. Poor cooperation could arise from aberrant mental processes, such as mental overload, that negatively affect the user's performance. Using different levels of difficulty in a cooperative task, we combined behavioural, subjective and neurophysiological data with the aim to i) quantify the mental workload under which the crew was operating, ii) evaluate the degree of their cooperation, and iii) assess the impact of the workload demands on the cooperation levels. The combination of such data showed that high workload demand impacted significantly on the performance, workload perception, and degree of cooperation.

40 CFR 35.6260 - Combining Cooperative Agreement sites and activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Combining Cooperative Agreements § 35.6260 Combining Cooperative...

40 CFR 35.6260 - Combining Cooperative Agreement sites and activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Combining Cooperative Agreements § 35.6260 Combining Cooperative...

40 CFR 35.6260 - Combining Cooperative Agreement sites and activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Combining Cooperative Agreements § 35.6260 Combining Cooperative...

40 CFR 35.6260 - Combining Cooperative Agreement sites and activities.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Combining Cooperative Agreements § 35.6260 Combining Cooperative...

Consensual punishment does not promote cooperation in the six-person prisoner's dilemma game with noisy public monitoring

PubMed Central

van Miltenburg, Nynke; Buskens, Vincent

2017-01-01

We study the effects of different punishment institutions on cooperation in a six-person prisoner’s dilemma game in which actors observe others’ cooperation with some noise (i.e. imperfect public monitoring). Previous research has shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation, if a certain proportion of group members punish defectors at a cost to themselves. However, in the presence of noise, co-operators will sometimes be mistaken for defectors and punished, and defectors will sometimes be mistaken for co-operators and escape punishment. Both types of mistakes are detrimental for cooperation because cooperation is discouraged and defection is encouraged. By means of a laboratory experiment, we study whether this adverse effect of noise can be mitigated by consensual punishment. The more other group members have to agree on punishing a defector, the less likely will a co-operator be punished by mistake. We compare a punishment institution in which each subject decides individually whether to punish another, with institutions in which punishments are only implemented if subjects reach sufficient consensus that a particular group member should be punished. In conditions without noise, we find that cooperation and subjects’ payoffs are higher if more consensus is required before a punishment is implemented. In conditions with noise, cooperation is lower if more consensus is required. Moreover, with noise, subjects’ payoffs are lower under all punishment institutions than in the control condition without punishment opportunities. Our results narrow down the conditions under which punishment institutions can promote cooperation if such cooperation is noisy. PMID:29176900

Consensual punishment does not promote cooperation in the six-person prisoner's dilemma game with noisy public monitoring.

PubMed

van Miltenburg, Nynke; Przepiorka, Wojtek; Buskens, Vincent

2017-01-01

We study the effects of different punishment institutions on cooperation in a six-person prisoner's dilemma game in which actors observe others' cooperation with some noise (i.e. imperfect public monitoring). Previous research has shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation, if a certain proportion of group members punish defectors at a cost to themselves. However, in the presence of noise, co-operators will sometimes be mistaken for defectors and punished, and defectors will sometimes be mistaken for co-operators and escape punishment. Both types of mistakes are detrimental for cooperation because cooperation is discouraged and defection is encouraged. By means of a laboratory experiment, we study whether this adverse effect of noise can be mitigated by consensual punishment. The more other group members have to agree on punishing a defector, the less likely will a co-operator be punished by mistake. We compare a punishment institution in which each subject decides individually whether to punish another, with institutions in which punishments are only implemented if subjects reach sufficient consensus that a particular group member should be punished. In conditions without noise, we find that cooperation and subjects' payoffs are higher if more consensus is required before a punishment is implemented. In conditions with noise, cooperation is lower if more consensus is required. Moreover, with noise, subjects' payoffs are lower under all punishment institutions than in the control condition without punishment opportunities. Our results narrow down the conditions under which punishment institutions can promote cooperation if such cooperation is noisy.

The evolution of cooperation by the Hankshaw effect.

PubMed

Hammarlund, Sarah P; Connelly, Brian D; Dickinson, Katherine J; Kerr, Benjamin

2016-06-01

The evolution of cooperation-costly behavior that benefits others-faces one clear obstacle. Namely, cooperators are always at a competitive disadvantage relative to defectors, individuals that reap the benefits, but evade the cost of cooperation. One solution to this problem involves genetic hitchhiking, where the allele encoding cooperation becomes linked to a beneficial mutation, allowing cooperation to rise in abundance. Here, we explore hitchhiking in the context of adaptation to a stressful environment by cooperators and defectors with spatially limited dispersal. Under such conditions, clustered cooperators reach higher local densities, thereby experiencing more mutational opportunities than defectors. Thus, the allele encoding cooperation has a greater probability of hitchhiking with alleles conferring stress adaptation. We label this probabilistic enhancement the "Hankshaw effect" after the character Sissy Hankshaw, whose anomalously large thumbs made her a singularly effective hitchhiker. Using an agent-based model, we reveal a broad set of conditions that allow the evolution of cooperation through this effect. Additionally, we show that spite, a costly behavior that harms others, can evolve by the Hankshaw effect. While in an unchanging environment these costly social behaviors have transient success, in a dynamic environment, cooperation and spite can persist indefinitely. © 2016 The Author(s). Evolution © 2016 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

Adaptive play stabilizes cooperation in continuous public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Te; Wang, Long

2018-04-01

We construct a model to study the effects of repeated interaction on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods games. Instead of preassigning the duration of repeatedness, the likelihood of group entering next round interaction is positively dependent on the group's current cooperativeness. Meanwhile, when the disturbance happens, the interaction terminates. Under rare mutations, we show that such adaptive play can lead to the dominance of full cooperative state for weak disturbance. For fairly strong disturbance, all-or-none cooperative states share higher fractions of time in the long run, results similar to the ones reported in the study (Pinheiro et al., 2014) while differing from the ones reported in another relevant study (Van Segbroeck et al., 2012), although only strategy space and way determining next round vary. Our results remain valid when groups enter next round with a given probability independent of groups' cooperativeness. In the synergic public goods games, the positive effects of repeated interactions on promoting cooperation is further strengthened. In the discounted public goods game, only very weak disturbance can lead to the dominance of full cooperative state while fairly strong disturbance can favor both full cooperative state and a partially cooperative state. Our study thus enriches the literature on the evolution of cooperation in repeated public goods games.

A simple rule for the evolution of contingent cooperation in large groups

PubMed Central

Schonmann, Roberto H.; Boyd, Robert

2016-01-01

Humans cooperate in large groups of unrelated individuals, and many authors have argued that such cooperation is sustained by contingent reward and punishment. However, such sanctioning systems can also stabilize a wide range of behaviours, including mutually deleterious behaviours. Moreover, it is very likely that large-scale cooperation is derived in the human lineage. Thus, understanding the evolution of mutually beneficial cooperative behaviour requires knowledge of when strategies that support such behaviour can increase when rare. Here, we derive a simple formula that gives the relatedness necessary for contingent cooperation in n-person iterated games to increase when rare. This rule applies to a wide range of pay-off functions and assumes that the strategies supporting cooperation are based on the presence of a threshold fraction of cooperators. This rule suggests that modest levels of relatedness are sufficient for invasion by strategies that make cooperation contingent on previous cooperation by a small fraction of group members. In contrast, only high levels of relatedness allow the invasion by strategies that require near universal cooperation. In order to derive this formula, we introduce a novel methodology for studying evolution in group structured populations including local and global group-size regulation and fluctuations in group size. PMID:26729938

Functionality of cooperation between health, welfare and education sectors serving children and families

PubMed Central

Kanste, Outi; Halme, Nina; Perälä, Marja-Leena

2013-01-01

Introduction Children and their families use a lot of different services, which poses challenges in terms of cooperation between service providers. The purpose of the study was to evaluate and compare the functioning of this cooperation between services for children and families in Finland's mainland municipalities from the viewpoints of employees and managers. Method The study was carried out using a cross-sectional survey design. Data were gathered using two postal surveys from employees and managers working in health care, social welfare and educational settings. The data consisted of responses from 457 employees and 327 managers. Results Employees working in primary health care and education services assessed cooperation as working better than did those working in social welfare, special health care or mental health and substance abuse services. Well-functioning cooperation at the operational and strategic level was related to good awareness of services and to agreed and well-functioning cooperation practices with few barriers to cooperation. Employees were more critical than managers concerning the occurrence of barriers and about the agreed cooperation practices. Conclusions Successful cooperation in providing services for children and families requires an awareness of services, management structures that support cooperation, agreed practices and efforts to overcome barriers to cooperation. PMID:24363637

Power Asymmetries and Punishment in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with Variable Cooperative Investment

PubMed Central

Bone, Jonathan E.; Wallace, Brian; Bshary, Redouan; Raihani, Nichola J.

2016-01-01

In many two-player games, players that invest in punishment finish with lower payoffs than those who abstain from punishing. These results question the effectiveness of punishment at promoting cooperation, especially when retaliation is possible. It has been suggested that these findings may stem from the unrealistic assumption that all players are equal in terms of power. However, a previous empirical study which incorporated power asymmetries into an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game failed to show that power asymmetries stabilize cooperation when punishment is possible. Instead, players cooperated in response to their partner cooperating, and punishment did not yield any additional increase in tendency to cooperate. Nevertheless, this previous study only allowed an all-or-nothing–rather than a variable–cooperation investment. It is possible that power asymmetries increase the effectiveness of punishment from strong players only when players are able to vary their investment in cooperation. We tested this hypothesis using a modified IPD game which allowed players to vary their investment in cooperation in response to being punished. As in the previous study, punishment from strong players did not increase cooperation under any circumstances. Thus, in two-player games with symmetric strategy sets, punishment does not appear to increase cooperation. PMID:27191958

Entanglement guarantees emergence of cooperation in quantum prisoner's dilemma games on networks.

PubMed

Li, Angsheng; Yong, Xi

2014-09-05

It was known that cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games fails to emerge in homogenous networks such as random graphs. Here we proposed a quantum prisoner's dilemma game. The game consists of two players, in which each player has three choices of strategy: cooperator (C), defector (D) and super cooperator (denoted by Q). We found that quantum entanglement guarantees emergence of a new cooperation, the super cooperation of the quantum prisoner's dilemma games, and that entanglement is the mechanism of guaranteed emergence of cooperation of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games on networks. We showed that for a game with temptation b, there exists a threshold arccos √b/b for a measurement of entanglement, beyond which, (super) cooperation of evolutionary quantum prisoner's dilemma games is guaranteed to quickly emerge, giving rise to stochastic convergence of the cooperations, that if the entanglement degree γ is less than the threshold arccos √b/b, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games is positively correlated to the entanglement degree γ, and that if γ is less than arccos √b/b and b is beyond some boundary, then the equilibrium frequency of cooperations of the games on random graphs decreases as the average degree of the graphs increases.

Spontaneous cooperation for prosocials, but not for proselfs: Social value orientation moderates spontaneous cooperation behavior

PubMed Central

Mischkowski, Dorothee; Glöckner, Andreas

2016-01-01

Cooperation is essential for the success of societies and there is an ongoing debate whether individuals have therefore developed a general spontaneous tendency to cooperate or not. Findings that cooperative behavior is related to shorter decision times provide support for the spontaneous cooperation effect, although contrary results have also been reported. We show that cooperative behavior is better described as person × situation interaction, in that there is a spontaneous cooperation effect for prosocial but not for proself persons. In three studies, one involving population representative samples from the US and Germany, we found that cooperation in a public good game is dependent on an interaction between individuals’ social value orientation and decision time. Increasing deliberation about the dilemma situation does not affect persons that are selfish to begin with, but it is related to decreasing cooperation for prosocial persons that gain positive utility from outcomes of others and score high on the related general personality trait honesty/humility. Our results demonstrate that the spontaneous cooperation hypothesis has to be qualified in that it is limited to persons with a specific personality and social values. Furthermore, they allow reconciling conflicting previous findings by identifying an important moderator for the effect. PMID:26876773

Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pan, Qiuhui; Liu, Xuesong; Bao, Honglin; Su, Yu; He, Mingfeng

2018-02-01

In this paper, we study the effect of adaptive interaction on the evolution of cooperation in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The connections of players are co-evolutionary with cooperation; whether adjacent players can play the prisoner's dilemma game is associated with the strategies they took in the preceding round. If a player defected in the preceding round, his neighbors will refuse to play the prisoner's dilemma game with him in accordance with a certain probability distribution. We use the disconnecting strength to represent this probability. We discuss the evolution of cooperation with different values of temptation to defect, sucker's payoff and disconnecting strength. The simulation results show that cooperation can be significantly enhanced through increasing the value of the disconnecting strength. In addition, the increase in disconnecting strength can improve the cooperators' ability to resist the increase in temptation and the decrease in reward. We study the parameter ranges for three different evolutionary results: cooperators extinction, defectors extinction, cooperator and defector co-existence. Meanwhile, we recruited volunteers and designed a human behavioral experiment to verify the theoretical simulation results. The punishment of disconnection has a positive effect on cooperation. A higher disconnecting strength will enhance cooperation more significantly. Our research findings reveal some significant insights into efficient mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation.

The influence of cooperation and defection on social decision making in depression: A study of the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

PubMed

Sorgi, Kristen M; van 't Wout, Mascha

2016-12-30

This study evaluated the influence of self-reported levels of depression on interpersonal strategic decision making when interacting with partners who differed in their predetermined tendency to cooperate in three separate computerized iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Games (iPDGs). Across 29 participants, cooperation was lowest when interacting with a predominantly defecting partner and highest when interacting with a predominantly cooperating partner. Greater depression severity was related to steadier and continued cooperation over trials with the cooperating partner, seeming to reflect a prosocial response tendency when interacting with this partner. With the unbiased partner, depression severity was associated with a more volatile response pattern in reaction to cooperation and defection by this partner. Severity of depression did not influence cooperation with a defecting partner or expectations about partner cooperation reported before the task began. Taken together, these data appear to show that in predominately positive interactions, as in the cooperating partner condition, depression is associated with less volatile, more consistent cooperation. When such clear feedback is absent, as in the unbiased partner condition, depression is associated with more volatile behavior. Nonetheless, participants were generally able to adapt their behavior accordingly in this dynamic interpersonal decision making context. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

'Part of the solution': Developing sustainable energy through co-operatives and learning

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Duguid, Fiona C. B.

After five years of development, WindShare Co-operative in Toronto, Ontario became the first urban wind turbine in North America and the first co-operatively owned and operated wind turbine in Canada. The development of WindShare Co-operative has spurred the growth of a green energy co-operative sector in Ontario. This study, which included 27 interviews and a focus group with members of WindShare Co-operative, focuses on the roles of community-based green energy co-operatives in advancing sustainable energy development and energy literacy. Sustainable energy development is firmly rooted in the triple bottom line of environmental, social and economic success, and green energy co-operatives can be a way to help achieve those successes. Green energy co-operatives are structures for providing renewable energy generation or energy conservation practices, both of which have important environmental impacts regarding climate change and pollution levels. Co-operative structures are supported by processes that include local ownership, democracy, participation, community organizing, learning and social change. These processes have a significant social impact by creating a venue for people to be directly involved in the energy industry, by involving learning through participation in a community-based organization, and by advancing energy literacy within the membership and the general public. In regards to the economic impacts, green energy co-operatives foster a local economy and local investment opportunities, which have repercussions regarding building expertise within Ontario's green energy and co-operative development future, and more generally, captures members' interest because they have a direct stake in the co-operative. This thesis shows that green energy co-operatives, like WindShare, play an important role in advancing sustainable energy development, energy literacy and the triple bottom line. Members of WindShare expressed resounding feelings of pride, efficacy and understanding of WindShare's role in sustainable energy. WindShare Co-operative provided the structure whereby members felt a part of the solution in terms of sustainable energy development. Policies and practices at all levels of government should encourage the advancement of green energy co-operatives to support Canada's efforts at public involvement in combating climate change and pollution.

Reasons to Co-Operate: Co-Operative Solutions for Schools

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Roach, Patrick

2013-01-01

The NASUWT's landmark agreement with the Schools Co-operative Society has provided a new spur to co-operation, collaboration and collegiality in schools. Against a background of rapid and radical changes to the education landscape, co-operative schools are viewed by many as a means to maintaining public service ethos and values in education. The…

The Teacher's Sourcebook for Cooperative Learning: Practical Techniques, Basic Principles, and Frequently Asked Questions.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jacobs, George M.; Power, Michael A.; Inn, Loh Wan

This book demonstrates how classroom teachers can use cooperative learning techniques for lesson planning and classroom management. It emphasizes that cooperation among students is powerful, and it notes that just because students are in a group does not mean that they are cooperating. Part 1, "Getting Started with Cooperative Learning," includes…

Exploring Hope, Self-Efficacy, Procrastination, and Study Skills between Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Education Students

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Drysdale, Maureen T. B.; McBeath, Margaret

2014-01-01

The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between participation in cooperative education, and several psychological constructs believed to be related to success in both academic and professional settings. Participants, undergraduate cooperative (n = 1224) and non-cooperative education (n = 746) students in all years of study and from…

26 CFR 1.1382-3 - Taxable income of cooperatives; special deductions for exempt farmers' cooperatives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... deductions for exempt farmers' cooperatives. 1.1382-3 Section 1.1382-3 Internal Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE... Patrons § 1.1382-3 Taxable income of cooperatives; special deductions for exempt farmers' cooperatives. (a) In general. (1) Section 1382(c) provides that in determining the taxable income of a farmers', fruit...

The emergence of cooperation from a single mutant during microbial life cycles.

PubMed

Melbinger, Anna; Cremer, Jonas; Frey, Erwin

2015-07-06

Cooperative behaviour is widespread in nature, even though cooperating individuals always run the risk of being exploited by free-riders. Population structure effectively promotes cooperation given that a threshold in the level of cooperation was already reached. However, the question how cooperation can emerge from a single mutant, which cannot rely on a benefit provided by other cooperators, is still puzzling. Here, we investigate this question for a well-defined but generic situation based on typical life cycles of microbial populations where individuals regularly form new colonies followed by growth phases. We analyse two evolutionary mechanisms favouring cooperative behaviour and study their strength depending on the inoculation size and the length of a life cycle. In particular, we find that population bottlenecks followed by exponential growth phases strongly increase the survival and fixation probabilities of a single cooperator in a free-riding population. © 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

Principles of cooperation across systems: from human sharing to multicellularity and cancer.

PubMed

Aktipis, Athena

2016-01-01

From cells to societies, several general principles arise again and again that facilitate cooperation and suppress conflict. In this study, I describe three general principles of cooperation and how they operate across systems including human sharing, cooperation in animal and insect societies and the massively large-scale cooperation that occurs in our multicellular bodies. The first principle is that of Walk Away: that cooperation is enhanced when individuals can leave uncooperative partners. The second principle is that resource sharing is often based on the need of the recipient (i.e., need-based transfers) rather than on strict account-keeping. And the last principle is that effective scaling up of cooperation requires increasingly sophisticated and costly cheater suppression mechanisms. By comparing how these principles operate across systems, we can better understand the constraints on cooperation. This can facilitate the discovery of novel ways to enhance cooperation and suppress cheating in its many forms, from social exploitation to cancer.

Genetic information transfer promotes cooperation in bacteria

PubMed Central

Dimitriu, Tatiana; Lotton, Chantal; Bénard-Capelle, Julien; Misevic, Dusan; Brown, Sam P.; Lindner, Ariel B.; Taddei, François

2014-01-01

Many bacterial species are social, producing costly secreted “public good” molecules that enhance the growth of neighboring cells. The genes coding for these cooperative traits are often propagated via mobile genetic elements and can be virulence factors from a biomedical perspective. Here, we present an experimental framework that links genetic information exchange and the selection of cooperative traits. Using simulations and experiments based on a synthetic bacterial system to control public good secretion and plasmid conjugation, we demonstrate that horizontal gene transfer can favor cooperation. In a well-mixed environment, horizontal transfer brings a direct infectious advantage to any gene, regardless of its cooperation properties. However, in a structured population transfer selects specifically for cooperation by increasing the assortment among cooperative alleles. Conjugation allows cooperative alleles to overcome rarity thresholds and invade bacterial populations structured purely by stochastic dilution effects. Our results provide an explanation for the prevalence of cooperative genes on mobile elements, and suggest a previously unidentified benefit of horizontal gene transfer for bacteria. PMID:25024219

Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring.

PubMed

Okada, Isamu; Sasaki, Tatsuya; Nakai, Yutaka

2017-08-29

Indirect reciprocity is an important mechanism for resolving social dilemmas. Previous studies explore several types of assessment rules that are evolutionarily stable for keeping cooperation regimes. However, little is known about the effects of private information on social systems. Most indirect reciprocity studies assume public monitoring in which individuals share a single assessment for each individual. Here, we consider a private monitoring system that loosens such an unnatural assumption. We explore the stable norms in the private system using an individual-based simulation. We have three main findings. First, narrow and unstable cooperation: cooperation in private monitoring becomes unstable and the restricted norms cannot maintain cooperative regimes while they can in public monitoring. Second, stable coexistence of discriminators and unconditional cooperators: under private monitoring, unconditional cooperation can play a role in keeping a high level of cooperation in tolerant norm situations. Finally, Pareto improvement: private monitoring can achieve a higher cooperation rate than does public monitoring.

Who Cries Wolf, and When? Manipulation of Perceived Threats to Preserve Rank in Cooperative Groups

PubMed Central

Barclay, Pat; Benard, Stephen

2013-01-01

People perform greater within-group cooperation when their groups face external threats, such as hostile outgroups or natural disasters. Researchers and social commentators suggest that high-ranking group members manipulate this “threat-dependent” cooperation by exaggerating threats in order to promote cooperation and suppress competition for their position. However, little systematic research tests this claim or possible situational moderators. In three studies, we use a cooperative group game to show that participants pay to increase others’ perceptions of group threats, and spend more on manipulation when holding privileged positions. This manipulation cost-effectively elicits cooperation and sustains privilege, and is fostered by competition over position, not only position per se. Less cooperative people do more manipulation than more cooperative people do. Furthermore, these effects generalize to broader definitions of privilege. Conceptually, these results offer new insights into an understudied dimension of group behavior. Methodologically, the research extends cooperative group games to allow for analyzing more complex group dynamics. PMID:24069239

Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Yu'E.; Chang, Shuhua; Zhang, Zhipeng; Deng, Zhenghong

2017-01-01

Social reward, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation by proposing a reward model in network population, where a third strategy, reward, as an independent yet particular type of cooperation is introduced in 2-person evolutionary games. Specifically, a new kind of role corresponding to reward strategy, reward agents, is defined, which is aimed at increasing the income of cooperators by applying to them a social reward. Results from numerical simulations show that consideration of social reward greatly promotes the evolution of cooperation, which is confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. Moreover, we explore the microscopic mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation in the three-strategy model. As expected, the reward agents play a vital role in the formation of cooperative clusters, thus resisting the aggression of defectors. Our research might provide valuable insights into further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world.

Heuristics guide cooperative behaviors in public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Yongjie; Chen, Tong

2015-12-01

In public goods game (PGG), player's cooperative behavior is not pure economical rationality, but social preference and prosocial intuition play extremely important roles as well. Social preference and prosocial intuition can be guided by heuristics from one's neighbors in daily life. To better investigate the impacts of heuristics on the evolution of cooperation, four types of agents are introduced into our spatial PGG. Through numerical simulations, results show that the larger percentages of cooperators with independent thought, the easier emergence and maintenance of collective cooperative behaviors. Additionally, we find that differentia heuristic capability has great effect on the equilibrium of PGG. Cooperation can be obviously promoted, when heuristic capability of cooperators with independent thought is stronger than that of defectors with independent thought. Finally, we observe that cooperators with independent thought and defectors with independent thought are favorable for the formation of some high quality clusters, which can resist the invasion between each other. Our work may help us understand more clearly the mechanism of cooperation in real world.

Impact of Social Reward on the Evolution of the Cooperation Behavior in Complex Networks

PubMed Central

Wu, Yu’e; Chang, Shuhua; Zhang, Zhipeng; Deng, Zhenghong

2017-01-01

Social reward, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation by proposing a reward model in network population, where a third strategy, reward, as an independent yet particular type of cooperation is introduced in 2-person evolutionary games. Specifically, a new kind of role corresponding to reward strategy, reward agents, is defined, which is aimed at increasing the income of cooperators by applying to them a social reward. Results from numerical simulations show that consideration of social reward greatly promotes the evolution of cooperation, which is confirmed for different network topologies and two evolutionary games. Moreover, we explore the microscopic mechanisms for the promotion of cooperation in the three-strategy model. As expected, the reward agents play a vital role in the formation of cooperative clusters, thus resisting the aggression of defectors. Our research might provide valuable insights into further exploring the nature of cooperation in the real world. PMID:28112276

China's Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme: a type of health insurance or a type of health cooperative?

PubMed

Wang, Fang; Liang, Yuan

2017-03-01

The Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS) was popular in rural China in the 1960s and 1970s, having garnered praise from the World Bank and World Health Organization as an unprecedented example of a successful health care model in a low-income developing country. However, the CMS almost collapsed in the 1980s. Based on its historical origins and main activities, we think the CMS functioned as a health cooperative rather than a health insurance scheme. Perhaps, however, the importance to the CMS of cooperation between institutions has been overestimated. Overlooked, yet equally important, has been the cooperation between health workers and farmers to target health-related risk factors associated with agricultural work and ways of life. The 'cooperative' character of the CMS includes two aspects: cooperative institutions and cooperative behaviour. Although the CMS collapsed in China, similar schemes are flourishing elsewhere in the world. In the future, in-depth analysis of these schemes is required.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Perelson, Alan S; Gerrish, Philip J

The constructive creativity of natural selection originates from its paradoxical ability to foster cooperation through competition. Cooperating communities ranging from complex societies to somatic tissue are constantly under attack, however, by non-cooperating mutants or transformants, called 'cheaters'. Structure in these communities promotes the formation of cooperating clusters whose competitive superiority can alone be sufficient to thwart outgrowths of cheaters and thereby maintain cooperation. But we find that when cheaters appear too frequently -- exceeding a threshold mutation or transformation rate -- their scattered outgrowths infiltrate and break up cooperating clusters, resulting in a cascading loss of community integrity, a switchmore » to net positive selection for cheaters, and ultimately in the loss of cooperation. We find that this threshold mutation rate is directly proportional to the fitness support received from each cooperating neighbor minus the individual fitness benefit of cheating. When mutation rate also evolves, this threshold is crossed spontaneously after thousands of generations, at which point cheaters rapidly invade. In a structured community, cooperation can persist only if the mutation rate remains below a critical value.« less

7 CFR 4285.2 - Cooperative agreement purposes.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... agency to: (a) Conduct marketing research related to agricultural cooperatives. (b) Assist other organizations in conducting marketing research related to agricultural cooperatives. ... RURAL UTILITIES SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS Federal-State Research on...

Access Control for Cooperation Systems Based on Group Situation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kim, Minsoo; Joshi, James B. D.; Kim, Minkoo

Cooperation systems characterize many emerging environments such as ubiquitous and pervasive systems. Agent based cooperation systems have been proposed in the literature to address challenges of such emerging application environments. A key aspect of such agent based cooperation system is the group situation that changes dynamically and governs the requirements of the cooperation. While individual agent context is important, the overall cooperation behavior is more driven by the group context because of relationships and interactions between agents. Dynamic access control based on group situation is a crucial challenge in such cooperation systems. In this paper we propose a dynamic role based access control model for cooperation systems based on group situation. The model emphasizes capability based agent to role mapping and group situation based permission assignment to allow capturing dynamic access policies that evolve continuously.

Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans

PubMed Central

Rand, David G.; Arbesman, Samuel; Christakis, Nicholas A.

2011-01-01

Human populations are both highly cooperative and highly organized. Human interactions are not random but rather are structured in social networks. Importantly, ties in these networks often are dynamic, changing in response to the behavior of one's social partners. This dynamic structure permits an important form of conditional action that has been explored theoretically but has received little empirical attention: People can respond to the cooperation and defection of those around them by making or breaking network links. Here, we present experimental evidence of the power of using strategic link formation and dissolution, and the network modification it entails, to stabilize cooperation in sizable groups. Our experiments explore large-scale cooperation, where subjects’ cooperative actions are equally beneficial to all those with whom they interact. Consistent with previous research, we find that cooperation decays over time when social networks are shuffled randomly every round or are fixed across all rounds. We also find that, when networks are dynamic but are updated only infrequently, cooperation again fails. However, when subjects can update their network connections frequently, we see a qualitatively different outcome: Cooperation is maintained at a high level through network rewiring. Subjects preferentially break links with defectors and form new links with cooperators, creating an incentive to cooperate and leading to substantial changes in network structure. Our experiments confirm the predictions of a set of evolutionary game theoretic models and demonstrate the important role that dynamic social networks can play in supporting large-scale human cooperation. PMID:22084103

Density of founder cells affects spatial pattern formation and cooperation in Bacillus subtilis biofilms

PubMed Central

van Gestel, Jordi; Weissing, Franz J; Kuipers, Oscar P; Kovács, Ákos T

2014-01-01

In nature, most bacteria live in surface-attached sedentary communities known as biofilms. Biofilms are often studied with respect to bacterial interactions. Many cells inhabiting biofilms are assumed to express ‘cooperative traits', like the secretion of extracellular polysaccharides (EPS). These traits can enhance biofilm-related properties, such as stress resilience or colony expansion, while being costly to the cells that express them. In well-mixed populations cooperation is difficult to achieve, because non-cooperative individuals can reap the benefits of cooperation without having to pay the costs. The physical process of biofilm growth can, however, result in the spatial segregation of cooperative from non-cooperative individuals. This segregation can prevent non-cooperative cells from exploiting cooperative neighbors. Here we examine the interaction between spatial pattern formation and cooperation in Bacillus subtilis biofilms. We show, experimentally and by mathematical modeling, that the density of cells at the onset of biofilm growth affects pattern formation during biofilm growth. At low initial cell densities, co-cultured strains strongly segregate in space, whereas spatial segregation does not occur at high initial cell densities. As a consequence, EPS-producing cells have a competitive advantage over non-cooperative mutants when biofilms are initiated at a low density of founder cells, whereas EPS-deficient cells have an advantage at high cell densities. These results underline the importance of spatial pattern formation for competition among bacterial strains and the evolution of microbial cooperation. PMID:24694715

Density of founder cells affects spatial pattern formation and cooperation in Bacillus subtilis biofilms.

PubMed

van Gestel, Jordi; Weissing, Franz J; Kuipers, Oscar P; Kovács, Akos T

2014-10-01

In nature, most bacteria live in surface-attached sedentary communities known as biofilms. Biofilms are often studied with respect to bacterial interactions. Many cells inhabiting biofilms are assumed to express 'cooperative traits', like the secretion of extracellular polysaccharides (EPS). These traits can enhance biofilm-related properties, such as stress resilience or colony expansion, while being costly to the cells that express them. In well-mixed populations cooperation is difficult to achieve, because non-cooperative individuals can reap the benefits of cooperation without having to pay the costs. The physical process of biofilm growth can, however, result in the spatial segregation of cooperative from non-cooperative individuals. This segregation can prevent non-cooperative cells from exploiting cooperative neighbors. Here we examine the interaction between spatial pattern formation and cooperation in Bacillus subtilis biofilms. We show, experimentally and by mathematical modeling, that the density of cells at the onset of biofilm growth affects pattern formation during biofilm growth. At low initial cell densities, co-cultured strains strongly segregate in space, whereas spatial segregation does not occur at high initial cell densities. As a consequence, EPS-producing cells have a competitive advantage over non-cooperative mutants when biofilms are initiated at a low density of founder cells, whereas EPS-deficient cells have an advantage at high cell densities. These results underline the importance of spatial pattern formation for competition among bacterial strains and the evolution of microbial cooperation.

Relatedness decreases and reciprocity increases cooperation in Norway rats.

PubMed

Schweinfurth, Manon K; Taborsky, Michael

2018-03-14

Kin selection and reciprocity are two mechanisms underlying the evolution of cooperation, but the relative importance of kinship and reciprocity for decisions to cooperate are yet unclear for most cases of cooperation. Here, we experimentally tested the relative importance of relatedness and received cooperation for decisions to help a conspecific in wild-type Norway rats ( Rattus norvegicus ). Test rats provided more food to non-kin than to siblings, and they generally donated more food to previously helpful social partners than to those that had refused help. The rats thus applied reciprocal cooperation rules irrespective of relatedness, highlighting the importance of reciprocal help for cooperative interactions among both related and unrelated conspecifics. © 2018 The Author(s).

Co-Operation: The Antidote to Isolated Misery

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jones, Sarah

2013-01-01

This is a case study demonstrating the impact the co-operative movement has had on one co-operative school in south-west England. Lipson Co-operative Academy in Plymouth was one of the first schools to convert to become a co-operative school in 2009. The article has been co-written by members of the Academy and focuses on three transformational…

Preparing Pupils to Cooperate during Cooperative Controversy in Grade 6: A Way to Increase Positive Interactions and Learning?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Golub, Mijal; Buchs, Céline

2014-01-01

Research has underlined the necessity to prepare pupils to cooperate in order to boost cooperative learning benefits. However, this kind of training may appear very demanding. The present study aims to demonstrate that a short preparation related to social support and targeted cooperative rules relevant for the task increases constructive…

Comparisons of Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Students: An Analysis of Student Accounting System Data. Interim Report, June, 1981.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Frazier, Don

The major purpose of this study was to identify unique effects of cooperative vocational education. This interim report is of results of the analyses of existing data bases. Comparisons of cooperative and non-cooperative vocational programs are made on the following variables: enrollments by age, sex and race, school status, work status,…

Detecting reciprocity at a global scale

PubMed Central

Frank, Morgan R.; Obradovich, Nick; Sun, Lijun; Woon, Wei Lee; LeVeck, Brad L.; Rahwan, Iyad

2018-01-01

Reciprocity stabilizes cooperation from the level of microbes all the way up to humans interacting in small groups, but does reciprocity also underlie stable cooperation between larger human agglomerations, such as nation states? Famously, evolutionary models show that reciprocity could emerge as a widespread strategy for achieving international cooperation. However, existing studies have only detected reciprocity-driven cooperation in a small number of country pairs. We apply a new method for detecting mutual influence in dynamical systems to a new large-scale data set that records state interactions with high temporal resolution. Doing so, we detect reciprocity between many country pairs in the international system and find that these reciprocating country pairs exhibit qualitatively different cooperative dynamics when compared to nonreciprocating pairs. Consistent with evolutionary theories of cooperation, reciprocating country pairs exhibit higher levels of stable cooperation and are more likely to punish instances of noncooperation. However, countries in reciprocity-based relationships are also quicker to forgive single acts of noncooperation by eventually returning to previous levels of mutual cooperation. By contrast, nonreciprocating pairs are more likely to exploit each other’s cooperation via higher rates of defection. Together, these findings provide the strongest evidence to date that reciprocity is a widespread mechanism for achieving international cooperation. PMID:29326983

Detecting reciprocity at a global scale.

PubMed

Frank, Morgan R; Obradovich, Nick; Sun, Lijun; Woon, Wei Lee; LeVeck, Brad L; Rahwan, Iyad

2018-01-01

Reciprocity stabilizes cooperation from the level of microbes all the way up to humans interacting in small groups, but does reciprocity also underlie stable cooperation between larger human agglomerations, such as nation states? Famously, evolutionary models show that reciprocity could emerge as a widespread strategy for achieving international cooperation. However, existing studies have only detected reciprocity-driven cooperation in a small number of country pairs. We apply a new method for detecting mutual influence in dynamical systems to a new large-scale data set that records state interactions with high temporal resolution. Doing so, we detect reciprocity between many country pairs in the international system and find that these reciprocating country pairs exhibit qualitatively different cooperative dynamics when compared to nonreciprocating pairs. Consistent with evolutionary theories of cooperation, reciprocating country pairs exhibit higher levels of stable cooperation and are more likely to punish instances of noncooperation. However, countries in reciprocity-based relationships are also quicker to forgive single acts of noncooperation by eventually returning to previous levels of mutual cooperation. By contrast, nonreciprocating pairs are more likely to exploit each other's cooperation via higher rates of defection. Together, these findings provide the strongest evidence to date that reciprocity is a widespread mechanism for achieving international cooperation.

Is intuition really cooperative? Improved tests support the social heuristics hypothesis.

PubMed

Isler, Ozan; Maule, John; Starmer, Chris

2018-01-01

Understanding human cooperation is a major scientific challenge. While cooperation is typically explained with reference to individual preferences, a recent cognitive process view hypothesized that cooperation is regulated by socially acquired heuristics. Evidence for the social heuristics hypothesis rests on experiments showing that time-pressure promotes cooperation, a result that can be interpreted as demonstrating that intuition promotes cooperation. This interpretation, however, is highly contested because of two potential confounds. First, in pivotal studies compliance with time-limits is low and, crucially, evidence shows intuitive cooperation only when noncompliant participants are excluded. The inconsistency of test results has led to the currently unresolved controversy regarding whether or not noncompliant subjects should be included in the analysis. Second, many studies show high levels of social dilemma misunderstanding, leading to speculation that asymmetries in understanding might explain patterns that are otherwise interpreted as intuitive cooperation. We present evidence from an experiment that employs an improved time-pressure protocol with new features designed to induce high levels of compliance and clear tests of understanding. Our study resolves the noncompliance issue, shows that misunderstanding does not confound tests of intuitive cooperation, and provides the first independent experimental evidence for intuitive cooperation in a social dilemma using time-pressure.

Promotion of cooperation induced by two-sided players in prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Su, Zhen; Li, Lixiang; Xiao, Jinghua; Podobnik, B.; Stanley, H. Eugene

2018-01-01

We examine how real-world individuals and companies can either reach an agreement or fail to reach an agreement after several stages of negotiation. We use a modified prisoner's dilemma game with two-sided players who can either cooperate or not cooperate with their neighbors. We find that the presence of even a small number of these two-sided players substantially promotes the cooperation because, unlike the rock-paper-scissors scenario, when the cooperators change to the non-cooperators to gain a payoff, they can turn to the two-sided players and continue negotiating. We find that the network structure influences the spread of strategies. Lattice and regular-random (RR) networks benefit the spread of both non-cooperation and two-sided strategies, but scale-free (SF) networks stop both strategies. We also find that the Erdös-R e ´ nyi (ER) network promotes the two-sided strategy and blocks the spread of non-cooperation. As the ER network density decreases, and the network degree is lowered the lifetime of non-cooperators increases. Our results expand our understanding of the role played by the two-sided strategy in the growth of the cooperative behavior in networks.

Selective investment promotes cooperation in public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Jing; Wu, Te; Zeng, Gang; Wang, Long

2012-08-01

Most previous investigations on spatial Public Goods Game assume that individuals treat neighbors equivalently, which is in sharp contrast with realistic situations, where bias is ubiquitous. We construct a model to study how a selective investment mechanism affects the evolution of cooperation. Cooperators selectively contribute to just a fraction among their neighbors. According to the interaction result, the investment network can be adapted. On selecting investees, three patterns are considered. In the random pattern, cooperators choose their investees among the neighbors equiprobably. In the social-preference pattern, cooperators tend to invest to individuals possessing large social ties. In the wealth-preference pattern, cooperators are more likely to invest to neighbors with higher payoffs. Our result shows robustness of selective investment mechanism that boosts emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Cooperation is more or less hampered under the latter two patterns, and we prove the anti-social-preference or anti-wealth-preference pattern of selecting investees can accelerate cooperation to some extent. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis of our mechanism on double-star networks coincides with simulation results. We hope our finding could shed light on better understanding of the emergence of cooperation among adaptive populations.

Variable investment, the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma, and the origin of cooperation.

PubMed

Killingback, T; Doebeli, M; Knowlton, N

1999-09-07

Cooperation is fundamental to many biological systems. A common metaphor for studying the evolution of cooperation is the Prisoner's Dilemma, a game with two strategies: cooperate or defect. However, cooperation is rare all or nothing, and its evolution probably involves the gradual extension of initially modest degrees of assistance. The inability of the Prisoner's Dilemma to capture this basic aspect limits its use for understanding the evolutionary origins of cooperation. Here we consider a framework for cooperation based on the concept of investment: an act which is costly, but which benefits other individuals, where the cost and benefit depend on the level of investment made. In the resulting Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma the essential problem of cooperation remains: in the absence of any additional structure non-zero levels of investment cannot evolve. However, if investments are considered in a spatially structured context, selfish individuals who make arbitrarily low investments can be invaded by higher-investing mutants. This results in the mean level of investment evolving to significant levels, where it is maintained indefinitely. This approach provides a natural solution to the fundamental problem of how cooperation gradually increases from a non-cooperative state.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation.

PubMed

Cronin, Katherine A; Acheson, Daniel J; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2015-12-22

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it was earned or arbitrary. These findings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate findings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controlled way to investigate the social influences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of human behavior with other primate species.

Hierarchy is Detrimental for Human Cooperation

PubMed Central

Cronin, Katherine A.; Acheson, Daniel J.; Hernández, Penélope; Sánchez, Angel

2015-01-01

Studies of animal behavior consistently demonstrate that the social environment impacts cooperation, yet the effect of social dynamics has been largely excluded from studies of human cooperation. Here, we introduce a novel approach inspired by nonhuman primate research to address how social hierarchies impact human cooperation. Participants competed to earn hierarchy positions and then could cooperate with another individual in the hierarchy by investing in a common effort. Cooperation was achieved if the combined investments exceeded a threshold, and the higher ranked individual distributed the spoils unless control was contested by the partner. Compared to a condition lacking hierarchy, cooperation declined in the presence of a hierarchy due to a decrease in investment by lower ranked individuals. Furthermore, hierarchy was detrimental to cooperation regardless of whether it was earned or arbitrary. These findings mirror results from nonhuman primates and demonstrate that hierarchies are detrimental to cooperation. However, these results deviate from nonhuman primate findings by demonstrating that human behavior is responsive to changing hierarchical structures and suggests partnership dynamics that may improve cooperation. This work introduces a controlled way to investigate the social influences on human behavior, and demonstrates the evolutionary continuity of human behavior with other primate species. PMID:26692287

Cooperation and assortativity with dynamic partner updating

PubMed Central

Wang, Jing; Suri, Siddharth; Watts, Duncan J.

2012-01-01

The natural tendency for humans to make and break relationships is thought to facilitate the emergence of cooperation. In particular, allowing conditional cooperators to choose with whom they interact is believed to reinforce the rewards accruing to mutual cooperation while simultaneously excluding defectors. Here we report on a series of human subjects experiments in which groups of 24 participants played an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game where, critically, they were also allowed to propose and delete links to players of their own choosing at some variable rate. Over a wide variety of parameter settings and initial conditions, we found that dynamic partner updating significantly increased the level of cooperation, the average payoffs to players, and the assortativity between cooperators. Even relatively slow update rates were sufficient to produce large effects, while subsequent increases to the update rate had progressively smaller, but still positive, effects. For standard prisoner’s dilemma payoffs, we also found that assortativity resulted predominantly from cooperators avoiding defectors, not by severing ties with defecting partners, and that cooperation correspondingly suffered. Finally, by modifying the payoffs to satisfy two novel conditions, we found that cooperators did punish defectors by severing ties, leading to higher levels of cooperation that persisted for longer. PMID:22904193

Spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game with multiple interactive dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Su, Qi; Li, Aming; Wang, Long

2017-02-01

Spatial reciprocity is generally regarded as a positive rule facilitating the evolution of cooperation. However, a few recent studies show that, in the snowdrift game, spatial structure still could be detrimental to cooperation. Here we propose a model of multiple interactive dynamics, where each individual can cooperate and defect simultaneously against different neighbors. We realize individuals' multiple interactions simply by endowing them with strategies relevant to probabilities, and every one decides to cooperate or defect with a probability. With multiple interactive dynamics, the cooperation level in square lattices is higher than that in the well-mixed case for a wide range of cost-to-benefit ratio r, implying that spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game. Moreover, in square lattices, the most favorable strategy follows a simple relation of r, which confers theoretically the average evolutionary frequency of cooperative behavior. We further extend our study to various homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, which demonstrates the robustness of our results. Here multiple interactive dynamics stabilizes the positive role of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation and individuals' distinct reactions to different neighbors can be a new line in understanding the emergence of cooperation.

Game Theory-Based Cooperation for Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks: Taxonomy, Review, Research Challenges and Directions

PubMed Central

Muhammed, Dalhatu; Anisi, Mohammad Hossein; Vargas-Rosales, Cesar; Khan, Anwar

2018-01-01

Exploring and monitoring the underwater world using underwater sensors is drawing a lot of attention these days. In this field cooperation between acoustic sensor nodes has been a critical problem due to the challenging features such as acoustic channel failure (sound signal), long propagation delay of acoustic signal, limited bandwidth and loss of connectivity. There are several proposed methods to improve cooperation between the nodes by incorporating information/game theory in the node’s cooperation. However, there is a need to classify the existing works and demonstrate their performance in addressing the cooperation issue. In this paper, we have conducted a review to investigate various factors affecting cooperation in underwater acoustic sensor networks. We study various cooperation techniques used for underwater acoustic sensor networks from different perspectives, with a concentration on communication reliability, energy consumption, and security and present a taxonomy for underwater cooperation. Moreover, we further review how the game theory can be applied to make the nodes cooperate with each other. We further analyze different cooperative game methods, where their performance on different metrics is compared. Finally, open issues and future research direction in underwater acoustic sensor networks are highlighted. PMID:29389874

Temporal Structure in Cooperative Interactions: What Does the Timing of Exploitation Tell Us about Its Cost?

PubMed Central

Barker, Jessica L.; Bronstein, Judith L.

2016-01-01

Exploitation in cooperative interactions both within and between species is widespread. Although it is assumed to be costly to be exploited, mechanisms to control exploitation are surprisingly rare, making the persistence of cooperation a fundamental paradox in evolutionary biology and ecology. Focusing on between-species cooperation (mutualism), we hypothesize that the temporal sequence in which exploitation occurs relative to cooperation affects its net costs and argue that this can help explain when and where control mechanisms are observed in nature. Our principal prediction is that when exploitation occurs late relative to cooperation, there should be little selection to limit its effects (analogous to “tolerated theft” in human cooperative groups). Although we focus on cases in which mutualists and exploiters are different individuals (of the same or different species), our inferences can readily be extended to cases in which individuals exhibit mixed cooperative-exploitative strategies. We demonstrate that temporal structure should be considered alongside spatial structure as an important process affecting the evolution of cooperation. We also provide testable predictions to guide future empirical research on interspecific as well as intraspecific cooperation. PMID:26841169

Game Theory-Based Cooperation for Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks: Taxonomy, Review, Research Challenges and Directions.

PubMed

Muhammed, Dalhatu; Anisi, Mohammad Hossein; Zareei, Mahdi; Vargas-Rosales, Cesar; Khan, Anwar

2018-02-01

Exploring and monitoring the underwater world using underwater sensors is drawing a lot of attention these days. In this field cooperation between acoustic sensor nodes has been a critical problem due to the challenging features such as acoustic channel failure (sound signal), long propagation delay of acoustic signal, limited bandwidth and loss of connectivity. There are several proposed methods to improve cooperation between the nodes by incorporating information/game theory in the node's cooperation. However, there is a need to classify the existing works and demonstrate their performance in addressing the cooperation issue. In this paper, we have conducted a review to investigate various factors affecting cooperation in underwater acoustic sensor networks. We study various cooperation techniques used for underwater acoustic sensor networks from different perspectives, with a concentration on communication reliability, energy consumption, and security and present a taxonomy for underwater cooperation. Moreover, we further review how the game theory can be applied to make the nodes cooperate with each other. We further analyze different cooperative game methods, where their performance on different metrics is compared. Finally, open issues and future research direction in underwater acoustic sensor networks are highlighted.

Multi-Source Cooperative Data Collection with a Mobile Sink for the Wireless Sensor Network.

PubMed

Han, Changcai; Yang, Jinsheng

2017-10-30

The multi-source cooperation integrating distributed low-density parity-check codes is investigated to jointly collect data from multiple sensor nodes to the mobile sink in the wireless sensor network. The one-round and two-round cooperative data collection schemes are proposed according to the moving trajectories of the sink node. Specifically, two sparse cooperation models are firstly formed based on geographical locations of sensor source nodes, the impairment of inter-node wireless channels and moving trajectories of the mobile sink. Then, distributed low-density parity-check codes are devised to match the directed graphs and cooperation matrices related with the cooperation models. In the proposed schemes, each source node has quite low complexity attributed to the sparse cooperation and the distributed processing. Simulation results reveal that the proposed cooperative data collection schemes obtain significant bit error rate performance and the two-round cooperation exhibits better performance compared with the one-round scheme. The performance can be further improved when more source nodes participate in the sparse cooperation. For the two-round data collection schemes, the performance is evaluated for the wireless sensor networks with different moving trajectories and the variant data sizes.

Multi-Source Cooperative Data Collection with a Mobile Sink for the Wireless Sensor Network

PubMed Central

Han, Changcai; Yang, Jinsheng

2017-01-01

The multi-source cooperation integrating distributed low-density parity-check codes is investigated to jointly collect data from multiple sensor nodes to the mobile sink in the wireless sensor network. The one-round and two-round cooperative data collection schemes are proposed according to the moving trajectories of the sink node. Specifically, two sparse cooperation models are firstly formed based on geographical locations of sensor source nodes, the impairment of inter-node wireless channels and moving trajectories of the mobile sink. Then, distributed low-density parity-check codes are devised to match the directed graphs and cooperation matrices related with the cooperation models. In the proposed schemes, each source node has quite low complexity attributed to the sparse cooperation and the distributed processing. Simulation results reveal that the proposed cooperative data collection schemes obtain significant bit error rate performance and the two-round cooperation exhibits better performance compared with the one-round scheme. The performance can be further improved when more source nodes participate in the sparse cooperation. For the two-round data collection schemes, the performance is evaluated for the wireless sensor networks with different moving trajectories and the variant data sizes. PMID:29084155

Extortion provides alternative routes to the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Xiongrui; Rong, Zhihai; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Zhou, Tao; Tse, Chi Kong

2017-05-01

In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations (individuals are located on either a regular lattice or a scale-free network) in the context of repeated games by involving three types of strategies, namely, unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and extortion. The strategy updating of the players is ruled by the replicator-like dynamics. We find that extortion strategies can act as catalysts to promote the emergence of cooperation in structured populations via different mechanisms. Specifically, on regular lattice, extortioners behave as both a shield, which can enwrap cooperators inside and keep them away from defectors, and a spear, which can defeat those surrounding defectors with the help of the neighboring cooperators. Particularly, the enhancement of cooperation displays a resonance-like behavior, suggesting the existence of optimal extortion strength mostly favoring the evolution of cooperation, which is in good agreement with the predictions from the generalized mean-field approximation theory. On scale-free network, the hubs, who are likely occupied by extortioners or defectors at the very beginning, are then prone to be conquered by cooperators on small-degree nodes as time elapses, thus establishing a bottom-up mechanism for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.

Cooperativeness and competitiveness as two distinct constructs: validating the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale in a social dilemma context.

PubMed

Lu, Su; Au, Wing-Tung; Jiang, Feng; Xie, Xiaofei; Yam, Paton

2013-01-01

The present research validated the construct and criterion validities of the Cooperative and Competitive Personality Scale (CCPS) in a social dilemma context. The results from three studies supported the notion that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two independent dimensions, challenging the traditional view that they are two ends of a single continuum. First, confirmatory factor analyses revealed that a two-factor structure fit the data significantly better than a one-factor structure. Moreover, cooperativeness and competitiveness were either not significantly correlated (Studies 1 and 3) or only moderately positively correlated (Study 2). Second, cooperativeness and competitiveness were differentially associated with Schwartz's Personal Values. These results further supported the idea that cooperativeness and competitiveness are two distinct constructs. Specifically, the individuals who were highly cooperative emphasized self-transcendent values (i.e., universalism and benevolence) more, whereas the individuals who were highly competitive emphasized self-enhancement values (i.e., power and achievement) more. Finally, the CCPS, which adheres to the trait perspective of personality, was found to be a useful supplement to more prevalent social motive measures (i.e., social value orientation) in predicting cooperative behaviors. Specifically, in Study 2, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in a public goods dilemma (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale contributed more to the public goods). In Study 3, when social value orientation was controlled for, the CCPS significantly predicted cooperative behaviors in commons dilemmas (individuals who score higher on cooperativeness scale requested fewer resources from the common resource pool). The practical implications of the CCPS in conflict resolution, as well as in recruitment and selection settings, are discussed.

We can work it out: an enactive look at cooperation

PubMed Central

Fantasia, Valentina; De Jaegher, Hanne; Fasulo, Alessandra

2014-01-01

The past years have seen an increasing debate on cooperation and its unique human character. Philosophers and psychologists have proposed that cooperative activities are characterized by shared goals to which participants are committed through the ability to understand each other’s intentions. Despite its popularity, some serious issues arise with this approach to cooperation. First, one may challenge the assumption that high-level mental processes are necessary for engaging in acting cooperatively. If they are, then how do agents that do not possess such ability (preverbal children, or children with autism who are often claimed to be mind-blind) engage in cooperative exchanges, as the evidence suggests? Secondly, to define cooperation as the result of two de-contextualized minds reading each other’s intentions may fail to fully acknowledge the complexity of situated, interactional dynamics and the interplay of variables such as the participants’ relational and personal history and experience. In this paper we challenge such accounts of cooperation, calling for an embodied approach that sees cooperation not only as an individual attitude toward the other, but also as a property of interaction processes. Taking an enactive perspective, we argue that cooperation is an intrinsic part of any interaction, and that there can be cooperative interaction before complex communicative abilities are achieved. The issue then is not whether one is able or not to read the other’s intentions, but what it takes to participate in joint action. From this basic account, it should be possible to build up more complex forms of cooperation as needed. Addressing the study of cooperation in these terms may enhance our understanding of human social development, and foster our knowledge of different ways of engaging with others, as in the case of autism. PMID:25152745

Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation.

PubMed

Van Cleve, Jeremy

2017-09-01

One of the triumphs of evolutionary biology is the discovery of robust mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperative behaviors even when cooperation reduces the fertility or survival of cooperators. These mechanisms include, kin selection, reciprocity, and direct benefits to cooperation that are often nonlinear. Though they have been extensively studied separately, investigating the joint action of these mechanisms has been more difficult. Moreover, how these mechanisms shape variation in cooperation is not well known. Such variation is crucial for understanding the evolution of behavioral syndromes and animal personality. Here, I use the tools of kin selection and evolutionary game theory to build a framework that integrates these mechanisms for pairwise social interactions. Using relatedness as a measure of the strength of kin selection, responsiveness as a measure of reciprocity, and synergy as a measure of payoff nonlinearity, I show how different combinations of these three parameters produce directional selection for or against cooperation or variation in levels of cooperation via stabilizing or diversifying selection. Moreover, each of these outcomes maps uniquely to one of four classic games from evolutionary game theory, which means that modulating relatedness, responsiveness, and synergy effectively transforms the payoff matrix from one the evolutionary game to another. Assuming that cooperation exacts a fertility cost on cooperators and provides a fertility benefit to social partners, a prisoner's dilemma game and directional selection against cooperation occur when relatedness and responsiveness are low and synergy is not too positive. Enough positive synergy in these conditions generates a stag-hunt game and diversifying selection. High levels of relatedness or responsiveness turn cooperation from a fitness cost into a fitness benefit, which produces a mutualism game and directional selection for cooperation when synergy is not too negative. Sufficiently negative synergy in this case creates a hawk-dove game and stabilizing selection for cooperation. I extend the results with relatedness and synergy to social groups and show that how group size changes the effect of relatedness and synergy on selection for cooperation depends on how the per capita benefit of cooperation changes with group size. Together, these results provide a general framework with which to generate comparative predictions that can be tested using quantitative genetic techniques and experimental techniques that manipulate investment in cooperation. These predictions will help us understand both interspecific variation in cooperation as well as within-population and within-group variation in cooperation related to behavioral syndromes. © The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Integrative and Comparative Biology. All rights reserved. For permissions please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Contribution diversity and incremental learning promote cooperation in public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Penghui; Liu, Jing

2017-11-01

Understanding the evolution of cooperation in nature has long been a challenge and how to promote cooperation in public goods games (PGG) has attracted lots of attention recently. Social diversity has been found helpful to explain the emergence of cooperation in the absence of reputation and punishment. However, further refinement on how individuals reallocate their contribution to each PGG remains an open question. Moreover, individuals in existing works mostly teach or learn from neighbors according to their payoff in the last generation only. However, individuals in reality are preferred to learn from others with a long-term good performance. Therefore, in this paper, a new contribution diversity (CD) is designed and incremental learning (IL) is introduced. We investigate how these two may influence the evolution of cooperation in PGG. Based on the simulation results, we found that both the CD and IL can promote the cooperation in PGGs. Moreover, when cooperators are shaken in their strategy, CD may fail in reallocating contribution of individuals properly. However, IL is found effective to stabilize faith of cooperators and cooperators under IL reflect a long-term advantage over defectors in terms of benefits. Therefore, we further find IL and CD can mutually benefit each other in promoting cooperation, as CD can reasonably adjust the investment of cooperators while IL can provide more information to CD.

Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Madani, Kaveh; Dinar, Ariel

2012-09-01

Beneficiaries of common pool resources (CPRs) may select available noncooperative and regulatory exogenous institutions for managing the resource, as well as cooperative management institutions. All these institutions may increase the long-term gains, prolong the life of the resource, and help to escape the tragedy of the commons trap. Cooperative game theory approaches can serve as the backbone of cooperative CPR management institutions. This paper formulates and applies several commonly used cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, namely, the core, Nash-Harsanyi, Shapley, and nucleolus. Through a numerical groundwater example, we show how CPR users can share the gains obtained from cooperation in a fair and efficient manner based on these cooperative solution concepts (management institutions). Although, based on their fairness rationales, various cooperative management institutions may suggest different allocations that are potentially acceptable to the users, these allocation solutions may not be stable as some users may find them unfair. This paper discusses how different methods, such as application of the plurality rule and power index, stability index, and propensity to disrupt concepts, can help identify the most stable and likely solutions for enforcing cooperation among the CPR beneficiaries. Furthermore, how the noncooperative managerial characteristics of the CPR users can affect the stability and acceptability of the different cooperative CPR management institutions is discussed, providing valuable policy insights for cooperative CPR management at community levels.

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/8: Cooperative Border Security for Jordan: Assessment and Options

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Qojas, M.

1999-03-01

This document is an analysis of options for unilateral and cooperative action to improve the security of Jordan's borders. Sections describe the current political, economic, and social interactions along Jordan's borders. Next, the document discusses border security strategy for cooperation among neighboring countries and the adoption of confidence-building measures. A practical cooperative monitoring system would consist of hardware for early warning, command and control, communications, and transportation. Technical solutions can expand opportunities for the detection and identification of intruders. Sensors (such as seismic, break-wire, pressure-sensing, etc.) can warn border security forces of intrusion and contribute to the identification of themore » intrusion and help formulate the response. This document describes conceptual options for cooperation, offering three scenarios that relate to three hypothetical levels (low, medium, and high) of cooperation. Potential cooperative efforts under a low cooperation scenario could include information exchanges on military equipment and schedules to prevent misunderstandings and the establishment of protocols for handling emergency situations or unusual circumstances. Measures under a medium cooperation scenario could include establishing joint monitoring groups for better communications, with hot lines and scheduled meetings. The high cooperation scenario describes coordinated responses, joint border patrols, and sharing border intrusion information. Finally, the document lists recommendations for organizational, technical, and operational initiatives that could be applicable to the current situation.« less

Modulation of the Extent of Cooperative Structural Change During Protein Folding by Chemical Denaturant.

PubMed

Jethva, Prashant N; Udgaonkar, Jayant B

2017-09-07

Protein folding and unfolding reactions invariably appear to be highly cooperative reactions, but the structural and sequence determinants of cooperativity are poorly understood. Importantly, it is not known whether cooperative structural change occurs throughout the protein, or whether some parts change cooperatively and other parts change noncooperatively. In the current study, hydrogen exchange mass spectrometry has been used to show that the mechanism of unfolding of the PI3K SH3 domain is similar in the absence and presence of 5 M urea. The data are well described by a four state N ↔ I N ↔ I 2 ↔ U model, in which structural changes occur noncooperatively during the N ↔ I N and I N ↔ I 2 transitions, and occur cooperatively during the I 2 ↔ U transition. The nSrc-loop and RT-loop, as well as β strands 4 and 5 undergo noncooperative unfolding, while β strands 1, 2, and 3 unfold cooperatively in the absence of urea. However, in the presence of 5 M urea, the unfolding of β strand 4 switches to become cooperative, leading to an increase in the extent of cooperative structural change. The current study highlights the relationship between protein stability and cooperativity, by showing how the extent of cooperativity can be varied, using chemical denaturant to alter protein stability.

75 FR 14631 - Solicitations for Cooperative Agreements

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-26

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE National Institute of Corrections Solicitations for Cooperative Agreements.... Solicitation for a Cooperative Agreement--Training for Executive Excellence: The Role of the Correctional CEO... Cooperative Agreement--Training for Executive Excellence: Leadership Style and Instrumentation Curriculum...

Enabling Housing Cooperatives: policy lessons from Sweden, India and the United States.

PubMed

Ganapati, Sukumar

2010-01-01

Housing cooperatives became active in urban areas in Sweden, India and the United States during the interwar period. Yet, after the second world war, while housing cooperatives grew phenomenally nationwide in Sweden and India, they did not do so in the United States. This article makes a comparative institutional analysis of the evolution of housing cooperatives in these three countries. The analysis reveals that housing cooperatives' relationship with the state and the consequent support structures explain the divergent evolution. Although the relationships between cooperatives and the state evolved over time, they can be characterized as embedded autonomy, overembeddedness and disembeddedness in Sweden, India and the United States respectively. Whereas the consequent support structures for housing cooperatives became well developed in Sweden and India, such structures have been weak in the United States. The article highlights the need for embedded autonomy and the need for supportive structures to enable the growth of housing cooperatives.

Climate change and game theory.

PubMed

Wood, Peter John

2011-02-01

This paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from noncooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. We examine the solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, as well as games where players make decisions about treaty participation. The implications of linking cooperation on climate change with cooperation on other issues, such as trade, are also examined. Cooperative and noncooperative approaches to coalition formation are investigated in order to examine the behavior of coalitions cooperating on climate change. One way to achieve cooperation is to design a game, known as a mechanism, whose equilibrium corresponds to an optimal outcome. This paper examines some mechanisms that are based on conditional commitments, and their policy implications. These mechanisms could make cooperation on climate change mitigation more likely. © 2011 New York Academy of Sciences.

Cooperativity in Monomeric Enzymes with Single Ligand-Binding Sites

PubMed Central

Porter, Carol M.

2011-01-01

Cooperativity is widespread in biology. It empowers a variety of regulatory mechanisms and impacts both the kinetic and thermodynamic properties of macromolecular systems. Traditionally, cooperativity is viewed as requiring the participation of multiple, spatially distinct binding sites that communicate via ligand-induced structural rearrangements; however, cooperativity requires neither multiple ligand binding events nor multimeric assemblies. An underappreciated manifestation of cooperativity has been observed in the non-Michaelis-Menten kinetic response of certain monomeric enzymes that possess only a single ligand-binding site. In this review, we present an overview of kinetic cooperativity in monomeric enzymes. We discuss the primary mechanisms postulated to give rise to monomeric cooperativity and highlight modern experimental methods that could offer new insights into the nature of this phenomenon. We conclude with an updated list of single subunit enzymes that are suspected of displaying cooperativity, and a discussion of the biological significance of this unique kinetic response. PMID:22137502

Emergence of cooperation with self-organized criticality

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Park, Sangmin; Jeong, Hyeong-Chai

2012-02-01

Cooperation and self-organized criticality are two main keywords in current studies of evolution. We propose a generalized Bak-Sneppen model and provide a natural mechanism which accounts for both phenomena simultaneously. We use the prisoner's dilemma games to mimic the interactions among the members in the population. Each member is identified by its cooperation probability, and its fitness is given by the payoffs from neighbors. The least fit member with the minimum payoff is replaced by a new member with a random cooperation probability. When the neighbors of the least fit one are also replaced with a non-zero probability, a strong cooperation emerges. The Bak-Sneppen process builds a self-organized structure so that the cooperation can emerge even in the parameter region where a uniform or random population decreases the number of cooperators. The emergence of cooperation is due to the same dynamical correlation that leads to self-organized criticality in replacement activities.

Study on the Flexibility in Cross-Border Water Resources Cooperation Governance

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Zongrui; Wang, Teng; Zhou, Li

2018-02-01

Flexible strategy is very important to cross-border cooperation in international rivers water resources, which may be employed to reconcile contradictions and ease conflicts. Flexible characters of cross-border cooperation in international rivers water resources could be analyzed and revealed, using flexible strategic management framework, by taking international cooperation protocols related to water from Transboundary Freshwater Disputes Database (TFDD) as samples from the number of cooperation issues, the amount of management layers and regulator agencies in cooperation organization and the categories of income (cost) distribution (allocation) mode. The research demonstrates that there are some flexible features of cross-border cooperation in international rivers water resources: Riparian countries would select relative diversification strategies related to water, tend to construct a flexible cooperation organization featured with moderate hierarchies from vertical perspective and simplified administrations from horizontal perspective, and adopt selective inducement modes to respect ‘joint and several liability’.

77 FR 47882 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-08-10

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Clean Diesel VI Notice is hereby given that, on July 16, 2012, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''),...

75 FR 66792 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-10-29

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Clean Diesel V Notice is hereby given that, on October 7, 2010, pursuant to Section 6(a) of the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, 15 U.S.C. 4301 et seq. (``the Act''),...

Raising America's Awareness of Cooperative Education: A Historical Overview of the National Commission for Cooperative Education Public Service Advertising Campaign.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mosser, John W.; Muller, Brita

This article provides an overview of a major national advertising campaign in support of cooperative education designed to expand postsecondary cooperative education in the United States. Conducted by the Advertising Council at the request of the National Commission for Cooperative Education and endorsed by 700 colleges and universities, the U.S.…

Imitating winner or sympathizing loser? Quadratic effects on cooperative behavior in prisoners' dilemma games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lu, Peng

2015-10-01

Cooperation is vital in human societies and therefore is widely investigated in the evolutionary game theory. Varieties of mechanisms have been proposed to overcome temptation and promote cooperation. Existing studies usually believe that agents are rational, but irrationalism such as emotions and feelings matters as well. Winner and loser are defined by their payoffs. In addition to admiring and imitating winners, the mechanism of sympathizing and imitating losers is introduced into the model as an alternative action rule, and each one plays the prisoners' dilemma game with eight neighbors under the influence of both irrationalism and rationalism. Rationalism refers to imitating winner to get highest payoff, and irrationalism means that people sympathize and adopt the actions of losers. As it is widely recognized that temptation reduces cooperation, this study focuses on the effect of sympathy on cooperation within a certain group or society. If it overcomes temptation that leads to defection, sympathy will be a powerful mechanism to promote cooperative behavior. Simulation results indicate that sympathy and temptation shares similar quadratic relationships with cooperation. Both sympathy and temptation undermine cooperation below their thresholds, and they both promote cooperation above their thresholds. Temptation not only reduces cooperation but also promote it as temptation goes beyond the threshold. Although sympathy is a good merit or human nature that is beneficial to society, a crisis or collapse of cooperation is inevitable when the sympathy propensity is relatively smaller. After cooperation reaches a minimal bottom, it then rises increasingly and dramatically, which brings a much brighter future of the society.

A matter of trust? A study of coordination of Swedish stakeholders in return-to-work.

PubMed

Ståhl, Christian; Svensson, Tommy; Petersson, Gunilla; Ekberg, Kerstin

2010-09-01

Stakeholder cooperation in return-to-work has been increasingly emphasized over the last years. However, there is a lack of empirical studies on the subject. This study explores different public stakeholders' experiences of participating in Coordination Associations (CAs), a Swedish form of structured cooperation in return-to-work. The aim of the study is to determine the impact of stakeholder interests on the prerequisites for cooperation. Thirty-five representatives from two CAs in eastern Sweden were interviewed regarding the aim, structure and strategies for their common work. Stakeholders' actions are to a high degree determined by their institutional preferences and self-interest. In the CAs, the motives for cooperation differ, and although these differences supposedly could be overcome, they are in fact not. One of the stakeholders, the Public Employment Service, limit its interest to coordinating resources, while the other three wishes to engage in elaborated cooperative work forms, implying the crossing of organizational borders. This discrepancy can largely be attributed to the difficulties for representatives from state authorities in changing their priorities in order to make cooperation work. Stakeholders' interests have a high impact on the prerequisites for cooperation in return-to-work. By referring to organizational goals, stakeholders engage in non-cooperative behaviour, which threatens to spoil cooperative initiatives and to develop distrust in cooperative work forms. The results of this study expose the complexity of and threats to cooperation, and its conclusions may be used by return-to-work stakeholders in different jurisdictions to improve the possibilities for the development of cooperative structures.

The effects of extra-somatic weapons on the evolution of human cooperation towards non-kin.

PubMed

Phillips, Tim; Li, Jiawei; Kendall, Graham

2014-01-01

Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin is a major evolutionary puzzle, as is 'strong reciprocity' where no present or future rewards accrue to the co-operator/altruist. Here, we test the hypothesis that the development of extra-somatic weapons could have influenced the evolution of human cooperative behaviour, thus providing a new explanation for these two puzzles. Widespread weapons use could have made disputes within hominin groups far more lethal and also equalized power between individuals. In such a cultural niche non-cooperators might well have become involved in such lethal disputes at a higher frequency than cooperators, thereby increasing the relative fitness of genes associated with cooperative behaviour. We employ two versions of the evolutionary Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) model--one where weapons use is simulated and one where it is not. We then measured the performance of 25 IPD strategies to evaluate the effects of weapons use on them. We found that cooperative strategies performed significantly better, and non-cooperative strategies significantly worse, under simulated weapons use. Importantly, the performance of an 'Always Cooperate' IPD strategy, equivalent to that of 'strong reciprocity', improved significantly more than that of all other cooperative strategies. We conclude that the development of extra-somatic weapons throws new light on the evolution of human altruistic and cooperative behaviour, and particularly 'strong reciprocity'. The notion that distinctively human altruism and cooperation could have been an adaptive trait in a past environment that is no longer evident in the modern world provides a novel addition to theory that seeks to account for this major evolutionary puzzle.

Opting out against defection leads to stable coexistence with cooperation.

PubMed

Zhang, Bo-Yu; Fan, Song-Jia; Li, Cong; Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Bao, Jian-Zhang; Cressman, Ross; Tao, Yi

2016-10-24

Cooperation coexisting with defection is a common phenomenon in nature and human society. Previous studies for promoting cooperation based on kin selection, direct and indirect reciprocity, graph selection and group selection have provided conditions that cooperators outcompete defectors. However, a simple mechanism of the long-term stable coexistence of cooperation and defection is still lacking. To reveal the effect of direct reciprocity on the coexistence of cooperation and defection, we conducted a simple experiment based on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, where the basic idea behind our experiment is that all players in a PD game should prefer a cooperator as an opponent. Our experimental and theoretical results show clearly that the strategies allowing opting out against defection are able to maintain this stable coexistence.

Resource heterogeneity can facilitate cooperation.

PubMed

Kun, Ádám; Dieckmann, Ulf

2013-01-01

Although social structure is known to promote cooperation, by locally exposing selfish agents to their own deeds, studies to date assumed that all agents have access to the same level of resources. This is clearly unrealistic. Here we find that cooperation can be maintained when some agents have access to more resources than others. Cooperation can then emerge even in populations in which the temptation to defect is so strong that players would act fully selfishly if their resources were distributed uniformly. Resource heterogeneity can thus be crucial for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We also show that resource heterogeneity can hinder cooperation once the temptation to defect is significantly lowered. In all cases, the level of cooperation can be maximized by managing resource heterogeneity.

Can cooperative behaviors promote evacuation efficiency?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cheng, Yuan; Zheng, Xiaoping

2018-02-01

This study aims to get insight into the question whether cooperative behaviors can promote the evacuation efficiency during an evacuation process. In this work, cooperative behaviors and evacuation efficiency have been examined in detail by using a cellular automata model with behavioral extension. The simulation results show that moderate cooperative behaviors can result in the highest evacuation efficiency. It is found that in a mixture of cooperative and competitive individuals, more cooperative people will lead to relatively high evacuation efficiency, and the larger subgroup will play a leading role. This work can also provide some new insights for the study of cooperative behaviors and evacuation efficiency which can be a scientific decision-making basis for emergency response involving large-scale crowd evacuation in emergencies.

Promotion of cooperation induced by appropriate payoff aspirations in a small-world networked game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Long

2008-01-01

Based on learning theory, we adopt a stochastic learning updating rule to investigate the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on Newman-Watts small-world networks with different payoff aspiration levels. Interestingly, simulation results show that the mechanism of intermediate aspiration promoting cooperation resembles a resonancelike behavior, and there exists a ping-pong vibration of cooperation for large payoff aspiration. To explain the nontrivial dependence of the cooperation level on the aspiration level, we investigate the fractions of links, provide analytical results of the cooperation level, and find that the simulation results are in close agreement with analytical ones. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior induced by the aspiration level in society.

Cooperative Factors, Cooperative Innovation Effect and Innovation Performance for Chinese Firms: an Empirical Study

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xie, Xuemei

Based on a survey to 1206 Chinese firms, this paper empirically explores the factors impacting cooperative innovation effect of firms, and seeks to explore the relationship between cooperative innovation effect (CIE) and innovation performance using the technique of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The study finds there are significant positive relationships between basic sustaining factors, factors of government and policy, factors of cooperation mechanism and social network, and cooperative innovation effect. However, the result reveals that factors of government and policy demonstrate little impact on the CIE of firms compared with other factors. It is hoped that the findings can pave the way for future studies in improving cooperative innovation capacity for firms in emerging countries.

The cultural transmission of cooperative norms

PubMed Central

Zhou, Xinyue; Liu, Yan; Ho, Benjamin

2015-01-01

Cooperative behavior depends on cultural environment, so what happens when people move from to a new culture governed by a new norm? The dynamics of culture-induced cooperation has not been well understood. We expose lab participants to a sequence of different subject pools while playing a constrained Trust Game. We find prior exposure to different subject pools does in fact influence cooperative behavior; first impressions matter—the primacy effect plays a stronger role than the recency effect; and selfish first impressions matter more than cooperative first impressions—observing selfish behavior by others had a longer-lasting and greater influence on behaviors than observing cooperative behavior by others. Moreover, three consecutive exposures to cooperative environments were needed to neutralize one exposure to a selfish environment. PMID:26578993

Assortative and dissortative priorities for game interaction and strategy adaptation significantly bolster network reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tanimoto, Jun

2014-05-01

In 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium. Here we show that combining the process for selecting a gaming partner with the process for selecting an adaptation partner significantly enhances cooperation, even though such selection processes require additional costs to collect further information concerning which neighbor should be chosen. Based on elaborate investigations of the dynamics generated by our model, we find that high levels of cooperation result from two kinds of behavior: cooperators tend to interact with cooperators to prevent being exploited by defectors and defectors tend to choose cooperators to exploit despite the possibility that some defectors convert to cooperators.

Cooperation in scale-free networks with limited associative capacities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Poncela, Julia; Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús; Moreno, Yamir

2011-05-01

In this work we study the effect of limiting the number of interactions (the associative capacity) that a node can establish per round of a prisoner’s dilemma game. We focus on the way this limitation influences the level of cooperation sustained by scale-free networks. We show that when the game includes cooperation costs, limiting the associative capacity of nodes to a fixed quantity renders in some cases larger values of cooperation than in the unrestricted scenario. This allows one to define an optimum capacity for which cooperation is maximally enhanced. Finally, for the case without cooperation costs, we find that even a tight limitation of the associative capacity of nodes yields the same levels of cooperation as in the original network.

13 CFR 147.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 13 Business Credit and Assistance 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative agreement. 147.620 Section 147.620 Business Credit and Assistance SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION GOVERNMENTWIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (NONPROCUREMENT) Definitions § 147.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative...

Defense Security Cooperation Agency Vision 2020. Update 1

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-10-01

the feasibility and pros/ cons of developing a DoD- wide security cooperation workforce development and management program including training...Synchronizing Security Cooperation Activities ..................................................................................... 7 Meeting...Security Cooperation ............................. 15 6. Remaining a Provider of Choice for Our International Customers

Cooperative Learning--Part 3. Electronic Cooperative Quizzes.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Jensen, Murray; Moore, Randy; Hatch, Jay

2002-01-01

Introduces the Electronic Cooperative Quiz (ECQ) program which aims to investigate the implementation of cooperative quizzes to the World Wide Web. Describes the creation and design of the program and evaluates the two different methods used with students. (YDS)

Group size effect on cooperation in one-shot social dilemmas

PubMed Central

Barcelo, Hélène; Capraro, Valerio

2015-01-01

Social dilemmas are central to human society. Depletion of natural resources, climate protection, security of energy supply, and workplace collaborations are all examples of social dilemmas. Since cooperative behaviour in a social dilemma is individually costly, Nash equilibrium predicts that humans should not cooperate. Yet experimental studies show that people do cooperate even in anonymous one-shot interactions. In spite of the large number of participants in many modern social dilemmas, little is known about the effect of group size on cooperation. Does larger group size favour or prevent cooperation? We address this problem both experimentally and theoretically. Experimentally, we find that there is no general answer: it depends on the strategic situation. Specifically, we find that larger groups are more cooperative in the Public Goods game, but less cooperative in the N-person Prisoner's dilemma. Theoretically, we show that this behaviour is not consistent with either the Fehr & Schmidt model or (a one-parameter version of) the Charness & Rabin model, but it is consistent with the cooperative equilibrium model introduced by the second author. PMID:25605124

Differences in cooperative behavior among Damaraland mole rats are consequences of an age-related polyethism

PubMed Central

Zöttl, Markus; Vullioud, Philippe; Mendonça, Rute; Torrents Ticó, Miquel; Gaynor, David; Mitchell, Adam; Clutton-Brock, Tim

2016-01-01

In many cooperative breeders, the contributions of helpers to cooperative activities change with age, resulting in age-related polyethisms. In contrast, some studies of social mole rats (including naked mole rats, Heterocephalus glaber, and Damaraland mole rats, Fukomys damarensis) suggest that individual differences in cooperative behavior are the result of divergent developmental pathways, leading to discrete and permanent functional categories of helpers that resemble the caste systems found in eusocial insects. Here we show that, in Damaraland mole rats, individual contributions to cooperative behavior increase with age and are higher in fast-growing individuals. Individual contributions to different cooperative tasks are intercorrelated and repeatability of cooperative behavior is similar to that found in other cooperatively breeding vertebrates. Our data provide no evidence that nonreproductive individuals show divergent developmental pathways or specialize in particular tasks. Instead of representing a caste system, variation in the behavior of nonreproductive individuals in Damaraland mole rats closely resembles that found in other cooperatively breeding mammals and appears to be a consequence of age-related polyethism. PMID:27588902

Evolution of cooperation driven by social-welfare-based migration

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yan; Ye, Hang; Zhang, Hong

2016-03-01

Individuals' migration behavior may play a significant role in the evolution of cooperation. In reality, individuals' migration behavior may depend on their perceptions of social welfare. To study the relationship between social-welfare-based migration and the evolution of cooperation, we consider an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which an individual's migration depends on social welfare but not on the individual's own payoff. By introducing three important social welfare functions (SWFs) that are commonly studied in social science, we find that social-welfare-based migration can promote cooperation under a wide range of parameter values. In addition, these three SWFs have different effects on cooperation, especially through the different spatial patterns formed by migration. Because the relative efficiency of the three SWFs will change if the parameter values are changed, we cannot determine which SWF is optimal for supporting cooperation. We also show that memory capacity, which is needed to evaluate individual welfare, may affect cooperation levels in opposite directions under different SWFs. Our work should be helpful for understanding the evolution of human cooperation and bridging the chasm between studies of social preferences and studies of social cooperation.

Harnessing the power of reputation: strengths and limits for promoting cooperative behaviors.

PubMed

Barclay, Pat

2012-12-20

Evolutionary approaches have done much to identify the pressures that select for cooperative sentiment. This helps us understand when and why cooperation will arise, and applied research shows how these pressures can be harnessed to promote various types of cooperation. In particular, recent evidence shows how opportunities to acquire a good reputation can promote cooperation in laboratory and applied settings. Cooperation can be promoted by tapping into forces like indirect reciprocity, costly signaling, and competitive altruism. When individuals help others, they receive reputational benefits (or avoid reputational costs), and this gives people an incentive to help. Such findings can be applied to promote many kinds of helping and cooperation, including charitable donations, tax compliance, sustainable and pro-environmental behaviors, risky heroism, and more. Despite the potential advantages of using reputation to promote positive behaviors, there are several risks and limits. Under some circumstances, opportunities for reputation will be ineffective or promote harmful behaviors. By better understanding the dynamics of reputation and the circumstances under which cooperation can evolve, we can better design social systems to increase the rate of cooperation and reduce conflict.

Cognitive strategies take advantage of the cooperative potential of heterogeneous networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vukov, Jeromos; Santos, Francisco C.; Pacheco, Jorge M.

2012-06-01

Understanding the emergence and maintenance of cooperation is one of the most challenging topics of our time. Evolutionary game theory offers a very flexible framework within which to address this challenge. Here we use the prisoner's dilemma game to investigate the performance of individuals who are capable of adopting reactive strategies in communities structurally organized by means of Barabási-Albert scale-free networks. We find that basic cognitive abilities, such as the capability to distinguish their partners and act according to their previous actions, enable cooperation to thrive. This result is particularly significant whenever fear is the leading social tension, as this fosters retaliation, thus enforcing and sustaining cooperation. Being able to simultaneously reward fellow cooperators and punish defectors proves instrumental in achieving cooperation and the welfare of the community. As a result, central individuals can successfully lead the community and turn defective players into cooperative ones. Finally, even when participation costs—known to be detrimental to cooperation in scale-free networks—are explicitly included, we find that basic cognitive abilities have enough potential to help cooperation to prevail.

Cooperative Education Coordinator's Handbook.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Worley, Tom

Designed to serve as a guide for teacher-coordinators, counselors, administrators, and the employing community, this handbook is a performance-oriented desk reference that provides a base for cooperative education program operations. Chapter 1 overviews cooperative education, contrasts cooperative training and work experience programs, and…

78 FR 47050 - Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, Grant of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-08-02

...: Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Cooper) \\1\\ has determined that certain Cooper brand replacement tires... approximately 1,080 size P225/ 70R14 El Dorado Legend GT brand standard load replacement tires manufactured in...

7 CFR 1220.107 - Cooperator organization.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperator organization. 1220.107 Section 1220.107... CONSUMER INFORMATION Soybean Promotion and Research Order Definitions § 1220.107 Cooperator organization. The term Cooperator Organization means the American Soybean Association, or any successor organization...

76 FR 34692 - Inside Passage Electric Cooperative

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-06-14

... Electric Cooperative Notice of Preliminary Permit Application Accepted for Filing and Soliciting Comments..., the Inside Passage Electric Cooperative filed an application for a preliminary permit, pursuant to..., Operations Manager, Inside Passage Electric Cooperative, P.O. Box 210149, 12480 Mendenhall Loop Road, Auke...

7 CFR 1425.3 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATIONS § 1425.3 Definitions.... Approved cooperative marketing association (CMA) is a cooperative approved by CCC to participate in loan... approved by CCC to obtain marketing assistance loans or Loan deficiency payments. Cooperative is a business...

Gender and Cooperation in Children: Experiments in Colombia and Sweden

PubMed Central

Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo; Dreber, Anna; von Essen, Emma; Ranehill, Eva

2014-01-01

In this article we compare cooperation among Colombian and Swedish children aged 9–12. We illustrate the dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma in a new task that is easily understood by children and performed during a physical education class. We find no robust evidence of a difference in cooperation between Colombia and Sweden overall. However, Colombian girls cooperate less than Swedish girls. We also find indications that girls in Colombia are less cooperative than boys. Finally, there is also a tendency for children to be more cooperative with boys than with girls on average. PMID:24614513

Synthesizing perspectives on the evolution of cooperation within and between species.

PubMed

Barker, Jessica L; Bronstein, Judith L; Friesen, Maren L; Jones, Emily I; Reeve, H Kern; Zink, Andrew G; Frederickson, Megan E

2017-04-01

Cooperation is widespread both within and between species, but are intraspecific and interspecific cooperation fundamentally similar or qualitatively different phenomena? This review evaluates this question, necessary for a general understanding of the evolution of cooperation. First, we outline three advantages of cooperation relative to noncooperation (acquisition of otherwise inaccessible goods and services, more efficient acquisition of resources, and buffering against variability), and predict when individuals should cooperate with a conspecific versus a heterospecific partner to obtain these advantages. Second, we highlight five axes along which heterospecific and conspecific partners may differ: relatedness and fitness feedbacks, competition and resource use, resource-generation abilities, relative evolutionary rates, and asymmetric strategy sets and outside options. Along all of these axes, certain asymmetries between partners are more common in, but not exclusive to, cooperation between species, especially complementary resource use and production. We conclude that cooperation within and between species share many fundamental qualities, and that differences between the two systems are explained by the various asymmetries between partners. Consideration of the parallels between intra- and interspecific cooperation facilitates application of well-studied topics in one system to the other, such as direct benefits within species and kin-selected cooperation between species, generating promising directions for future research. © 2017 The Author(s). Evolution © 2017 The Society for the Study of Evolution.

When cooperation begets cooperation: the role of key individuals in galvanizing support.

PubMed

McAuliffe, Katherine; Wrangham, Richard; Glowacki, Luke; Russell, Andrew F

2015-12-05

Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in--and provide testable hypotheses of--two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation? © 2015 The Author(s).

Social Environment Shapes the Speed of Cooperation

PubMed Central

Nishi, Akihiro; Christakis, Nicholas A.; Evans, Anthony M.; O’Malley, A. James; Rand, David G.

2016-01-01

Are cooperative decisions typically made more quickly or slowly than non-cooperative decisions? While this question has attracted considerable attention in recent years, most research has focused on one-shot interactions. Yet it is repeated interactions that characterize most important real-world social interactions. In repeated interactions, the cooperativeness of one’s interaction partners (the “social environment”) should affect the speed of cooperation. Specifically, we propose that reciprocal decisions (choices that mirror behavior observed in the social environment), rather than cooperative decisions per se, occur more quickly. We test this hypothesis by examining four independent decision time datasets with a total of 2,088 subjects making 55,968 decisions. We show that reciprocal decisions are consistently faster than non-reciprocal decisions: cooperation is faster than defection in cooperative environments, while defection is faster than cooperation in non-cooperative environments. These differences are further enhanced by subjects’ previous behavior – reciprocal decisions are faster when they are consistent with the subject’s previous choices. Finally, mediation analyses of a fifth dataset suggest that the speed of reciprocal decisions is explained, in part, by feelings of conflict – reciprocal decisions are less conflicted than non-reciprocal decisions, and less decision conflict appears to lead to shorter decision times. PMID:27435940

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir

2009-12-01

Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Is intuition really cooperative? Improved tests support the social heuristics hypothesis

PubMed Central

Maule, John; Starmer, Chris

2018-01-01

Understanding human cooperation is a major scientific challenge. While cooperation is typically explained with reference to individual preferences, a recent cognitive process view hypothesized that cooperation is regulated by socially acquired heuristics. Evidence for the social heuristics hypothesis rests on experiments showing that time-pressure promotes cooperation, a result that can be interpreted as demonstrating that intuition promotes cooperation. This interpretation, however, is highly contested because of two potential confounds. First, in pivotal studies compliance with time-limits is low and, crucially, evidence shows intuitive cooperation only when noncompliant participants are excluded. The inconsistency of test results has led to the currently unresolved controversy regarding whether or not noncompliant subjects should be included in the analysis. Second, many studies show high levels of social dilemma misunderstanding, leading to speculation that asymmetries in understanding might explain patterns that are otherwise interpreted as intuitive cooperation. We present evidence from an experiment that employs an improved time-pressure protocol with new features designed to induce high levels of compliance and clear tests of understanding. Our study resolves the noncompliance issue, shows that misunderstanding does not confound tests of intuitive cooperation, and provides the first independent experimental evidence for intuitive cooperation in a social dilemma using time-pressure. PMID:29304055

The Collective Benefits of Feeling Good and Letting Go: Positive Emotion and (dis)Inhibition Interact to Predict Cooperative Behavior

PubMed Central

Rand, David G.; Kraft-Todd, Gordon; Gruber, June

2015-01-01

Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process) and positive emotion (an intuitive process) in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218) or during (Study 2, N = 236) the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing) may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion. PMID:25625722

Collective-goal ascription increases cooperation in humans.

PubMed

Mitkidis, Panagiotis; Sørensen, Jesper; Nielbo, Kristoffer L; Andersen, Marc; Lienard, Pierre

2013-01-01

Cooperation is necessary in many types of human joint activity and relations. Evidence suggests that cooperation has direct and indirect benefits for the cooperators. Given how beneficial cooperation is overall, it seems relevant to investigate the various ways of enhancing individuals' willingness to invest in cooperative endeavors. We studied whether ascription of a transparent collective goal in a joint action promotes cooperation in a group. A total of 48 participants were assigned in teams of 4 individuals to either a "transparent goal-ascription" or an "opaque goal-ascription" condition. After the manipulation, the participants played an anonymous public goods game with another member of their team. We measured the willingness of participants to cooperate and their expectations about the other player's contribution. Between subjects analyses showed that transparent goal ascription impacts participants' likelihood to cooperate with each other in the future, thereby greatly increasing the benefits from social interactions. Further analysis showed that this could be explained with a change in expectations about the partner's behavior and by an emotional alignment of the participants. The study found that a transparent goal ascription is associated with an increase of cooperation. We propose several high-level mechanisms that could explain the observed effect: general affect modulation, trust, expectation and perception of collective efficacy.

The collective benefits of feeling good and letting go: positive emotion and (dis)inhibition interact to predict cooperative behavior.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Kraft-Todd, Gordon; Gruber, June

2015-01-01

Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process) and positive emotion (an intuitive process) in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218) or during (Study 2, N = 236) the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing) may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion.

Collapse of cooperation in evolving games.

PubMed

Stewart, Alexander J; Plotkin, Joshua B

2014-12-09

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players' payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, when there is a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of cooperation, coevolution often leads to a dramatic loss of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential reward for mutual cooperation increases. Depending upon the form of tradeoffs, evolution may even move away from the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game altogether. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner's Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions.

Experiential learning implementation based on joint responsibility in women's cooperative development (Case study on Farmer Women Cooperative, Sumedang, West Java)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Suseno, Gijanto Purbo; Nataliningsih

2017-09-01

Cooperative extension is one form of non-formal education. The follow up of cooperative extension is a coaching that aims to cooperative boards and members apply the knowledge and skills acquired during extension. Learning from the experience (experience learning) of others combined with the concept of joint responsibility is expected to develop the participation of cooperative members as indicated by the repayment of loans on time. The research was conducted at Sumedang Farmer Women Cooperative of West Java with the stages of cooperative extension and coaching for 6 months so it can be evaluated its impact. The results showed that from 30 extension participants who stated willingness to be a member of joint responsibility group as many as 15 people (50%), which then divided into 3 groups of mutual responsibility with member of each group is 5 people. The result of impact evaluation showed the development of group dynamics of the joint liability shown by 9 people (60%) developing business, 3 people (20%) business stagnant and 3 (20%) less profitable business. Implementation of experiental learning based on the concept of mutual responsibility encourages the improvement of entrepreneurship and cooperative skills and the ability of members to pay loan installments on cooperatives in a timely manner.

Evolutionary Fuzzy Control and Navigation for Two Wheeled Robots Cooperatively Carrying an Object in Unknown Environments.

PubMed

Juang, Chia-Feng; Lai, Min-Ge; Zeng, Wan-Ting

2015-09-01

This paper presents a method that allows two wheeled, mobile robots to navigate unknown environments while cooperatively carrying an object. In the navigation method, a leader robot and a follower robot cooperatively perform either obstacle boundary following (OBF) or target seeking (TS) to reach a destination. The two robots are controlled by fuzzy controllers (FC) whose rules are learned through an adaptive fusion of continuous ant colony optimization and particle swarm optimization (AF-CACPSO), which avoids the time-consuming task of manually designing the controllers. The AF-CACPSO-based evolutionary fuzzy control approach is first applied to the control of a single robot to perform OBF. The learning approach is then applied to achieve cooperative OBF with two robots, where an auxiliary FC designed with the AF-CACPSO is used to control the follower robot. For cooperative TS, a rule for coordination of the two robots is developed. To navigate cooperatively, a cooperative behavior supervisor is introduced to select between cooperative OBF and cooperative TS. The performance of the AF-CACPSO is verified through comparisons with various population-based optimization algorithms for the OBF learning problem. Simulations and experiments verify the effectiveness of the approach for cooperative navigation of two robots.

The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation

PubMed Central

Egas, Martijn; Riedl, Arno

2008-01-01

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent findings suggest that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism maintaining cooperation among humans. We experimentally explore the boundaries of altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by varying both the cost and the impact of punishment, using an exceptionally extensive subject pool. Our results show that cooperation is only maintained if conditions for altruistic punishment are relatively favourable: low cost for the punisher and high impact on the punished. Our results indicate that punishment is strongly governed by its cost-to-impact ratio and that its effect on cooperation can be pinned down to one single variable: the threshold level of free-riding that goes unpunished. Additionally, actual pay-offs are the lowest when altruistic punishment maintains cooperation, because the pay-off destroyed through punishment exceeds the gains from increased cooperation. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost–impact analysis and suggest that altruistic punishment alone can hardly maintain cooperation under multi-level natural selection. Uncovering the workings of altruistic punishment as has been done here is important because it helps predicting under which conditions altruistic punishment is expected to maintain cooperation. PMID:18198144

When cooperation begets cooperation: the role of key individuals in galvanizing support

PubMed Central

McAuliffe, Katherine; Wrangham, Richard; Glowacki, Luke; Russell, Andrew F.

2015-01-01

Life abounds with examples of conspecifics actively cooperating to a common end, despite conflicts of interest being expected concerning how much each individual should contribute. Mathematical models typically find that such conflict can be resolved by partial-response strategies, leading investors to contribute relatively equitably. Using a case study approach, we show that such model expectations can be contradicted in at least four disparate contexts: (i) bi-parental care; (ii) cooperative breeding; (iii) cooperative hunting; and (iv) human cooperation. We highlight that: (a) marked variation in contributions is commonplace; and (b) individuals can often respond positively rather than negatively to the contributions of others. Existing models have surprisingly limited power in explaining these phenomena. Here, we propose that, although among-individual variation in cooperative contributions will be influenced by differential costs and benefits, there is likely to be a strong genetic or epigenetic component. We then suggest that selection can maintain high investors (key individuals) when their contributions promote support by increasing the benefits and/or reducing the costs for others. Our intentions are to raise awareness in—and provide testable hypotheses of—two of the most poorly understood, yet integral, questions regarding cooperative ventures: why do individuals vary in their contributions and when does cooperation beget cooperation? PMID:26503685

Towards Reliable and Energy-Efficient Incremental Cooperative Communication for Wireless Body Area Networks.

PubMed

Yousaf, Sidrah; Javaid, Nadeem; Qasim, Umar; Alrajeh, Nabil; Khan, Zahoor Ali; Ahmed, Mansoor

2016-02-24

In this study, we analyse incremental cooperative communication for wireless body area networks (WBANs) with different numbers of relays. Energy efficiency (EE) and the packet error rate (PER) are investigated for different schemes. We propose a new cooperative communication scheme with three-stage relaying and compare it to existing schemes. Our proposed scheme provides reliable communication with less PER at the cost of surplus energy consumption. Analytical expressions for the EE of the proposed three-stage cooperative communication scheme are also derived, taking into account the effect of PER. Later on, the proposed three-stage incremental cooperation is implemented in a network layer protocol; enhanced incremental cooperative critical data transmission in emergencies for static WBANs (EInCo-CEStat). Extensive simulations are conducted to validate the proposed scheme. Results of incremental relay-based cooperative communication protocols are compared to two existing cooperative routing protocols: cooperative critical data transmission in emergencies for static WBANs (Co-CEStat) and InCo-CEStat. It is observed from the simulation results that incremental relay-based cooperation is more energy efficient than the existing conventional cooperation protocol, Co-CEStat. The results also reveal that EInCo-CEStat proves to be more reliable with less PER and higher throughput than both of the counterpart protocols. However, InCo-CEStat has less throughput with a greater stability period and network lifetime. Due to the availability of more redundant links, EInCo-CEStat achieves a reduced packet drop rate at the cost of increased energy consumption.

The increased risk of joint venture promotes social cooperation.

PubMed

Wu, Te; Fu, Feng; Zhang, Yanling; Wang, Long

2013-01-01

The joint venture of many members is common both in animal world and human society. In these public enterprizes, highly cooperative groups are more likely to while low cooperative groups are still possible but not probable to succeed. Existent literature mostly focuses on the traditional public goods game, in which cooperators create public wealth unconditionally and benefit all group members unbiasedly. We here institute a model addressing this public goods dilemma with incorporating the public resource foraging failure risk. Risk-averse individuals tend to lead a autarkic life, while risk-preferential ones tend to participate in the risky public goods game. For participants, group's success relies on its cooperativeness, with increasing contribution leading to increasing success likelihood. We introduce a function with one tunable parameter to describe the risk removal pattern and study in detail three representative classes. Analytical results show that the widely replicated population dynamics of cyclical dominance of loner, cooperator and defector disappear, while most of the time loners act as savors while eventually they also disappear. Depending on the way that group's success relies on its cooperativeness, either cooperators pervade the entire population or they coexist with defectors. Even in the later case, cooperators still hold salient superiority in number as some defectors also survive by parasitizing. The harder the joint venture succeeds, the higher level of cooperation once cooperators can win the evolutionary race. Our work may enrich the literature concerning the risky public goods games.

The Increased Risk of Joint Venture Promotes Social Cooperation

PubMed Central

Wu, Te; Fu, Feng; Zhang, Yanling; Wang, Long

2013-01-01

The joint venture of many members is common both in animal world and human society. In these public enterprizes, highly cooperative groups are more likely to while low cooperative groups are still possible but not probable to succeed. Existent literature mostly focuses on the traditional public goods game, in which cooperators create public wealth unconditionally and benefit all group members unbiasedly. We here institute a model addressing this public goods dilemma with incorporating the public resource foraging failure risk. Risk-averse individuals tend to lead a autarkic life, while risk-preferential ones tend to participate in the risky public goods game. For participants, group's success relies on its cooperativeness, with increasing contribution leading to increasing success likelihood. We introduce a function with one tunable parameter to describe the risk removal pattern and study in detail three representative classes. Analytical results show that the widely replicated population dynamics of cyclical dominance of loner, cooperator and defector disappear, while most of the time loners act as savors while eventually they also disappear. Depending on the way that group's success relies on its cooperativeness, either cooperators pervade the entire population or they coexist with defectors. Even in the later case, cooperators still hold salient superiority in number as some defectors also survive by parasitizing. The harder the joint venture succeeds, the higher level of cooperation once cooperators can win the evolutionary race. Our work may enrich the literature concerning the risky public goods games. PMID:23750204

Asymmetric interaction and indeterminate fitness correlation between cooperative partners in the fig–fig wasp mutualism

PubMed Central

Wang, Rui-Wu; Sun, Bao-Fa; Zheng, Qi; Shi, Lei; Zhu, Lixing

2011-01-01

Empirical observations have shown that cooperative partners can compete for common resources, but what factors determine whether partners cooperate or compete remain unclear. Using the reciprocal fig–fig wasp mutualism, we show that nonlinear amplification of interference competition between fig wasps—which limits the fig wasps' ability to use a common resource (i.e. female flowers)—keeps the common resource unsaturated, making cooperation locally stable. When interference competition was manually prevented, the fitness correlation between figs and fig wasps went from positive to negative. This indicates that genetic relatedness or reciprocal exchange between cooperative players, which could create spatial heterogeneity or self-restraint, was not sufficient to maintain stable cooperation. Moreover, our analysis of field-collected data shows that the fitness correlation between cooperative partners varies stochastically, and that the mainly positive fitness correlation observed during the warm season shifts to a negative correlation during the cold season owing to an increase in the initial oviposition efficiency of each fig wasp. This implies that the discriminative sanction of less-cooperative wasps (i.e. by decreasing the egg deposition efficiency per fig wasp) but reward to cooperative wasps by fig, a control of the initial value, will facilitate a stable mutualism. Our finding that asymmetric interaction leading to an indeterminate fitness interaction between symbiont (i.e. cooperative actors) and host (i.e. recipient) has the potential to explain why conflict has been empirically observed in both well-documented intraspecific and interspecific cooperation systems. PMID:21490005

Towards Reliable and Energy-Efficient Incremental Cooperative Communication for Wireless Body Area Networks

PubMed Central

Yousaf, Sidrah; Javaid, Nadeem; Qasim, Umar; Alrajeh, Nabil; Khan, Zahoor Ali; Ahmed, Mansoor

2016-01-01

In this study, we analyse incremental cooperative communication for wireless body area networks (WBANs) with different numbers of relays. Energy efficiency (EE) and the packet error rate (PER) are investigated for different schemes. We propose a new cooperative communication scheme with three-stage relaying and compare it to existing schemes. Our proposed scheme provides reliable communication with less PER at the cost of surplus energy consumption. Analytical expressions for the EE of the proposed three-stage cooperative communication scheme are also derived, taking into account the effect of PER. Later on, the proposed three-stage incremental cooperation is implemented in a network layer protocol; enhanced incremental cooperative critical data transmission in emergencies for static WBANs (EInCo-CEStat). Extensive simulations are conducted to validate the proposed scheme. Results of incremental relay-based cooperative communication protocols are compared to two existing cooperative routing protocols: cooperative critical data transmission in emergencies for static WBANs (Co-CEStat) and InCo-CEStat. It is observed from the simulation results that incremental relay-based cooperation is more energy efficient than the existing conventional cooperation protocol, Co-CEStat. The results also reveal that EInCo-CEStat proves to be more reliable with less PER and higher throughput than both of the counterpart protocols. However, InCo-CEStat has less throughput with a greater stability period and network lifetime. Due to the availability of more redundant links, EInCo-CEStat achieves a reduced packet drop rate at the cost of increased energy consumption. PMID:26927104

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas.

PubMed

Probst; Carnevale; Triandis

1999-03-01

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.

7 CFR 611.2 - Cooperative relationships.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONSERVATION OPERATIONS SOIL SURVEYS General § 611.2 Cooperative relationships. (a) Soil surveys on nonfederal lands are carried out cooperatively with State agricultural experiment... setting forth guidelines for actions to be taken by each cooperating party in the performance of soil...

7 CFR 611.2 - Cooperative relationships.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONSERVATION OPERATIONS SOIL SURVEYS General § 611.2 Cooperative relationships. (a) Soil surveys on nonfederal lands are carried out cooperatively with State agricultural experiment... setting forth guidelines for actions to be taken by each cooperating party in the performance of soil...

7 CFR 611.2 - Cooperative relationships.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONSERVATION OPERATIONS SOIL SURVEYS General § 611.2 Cooperative relationships. (a) Soil surveys on nonfederal lands are carried out cooperatively with State agricultural experiment... setting forth guidelines for actions to be taken by each cooperating party in the performance of soil...

7 CFR 611.2 - Cooperative relationships.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONSERVATION OPERATIONS SOIL SURVEYS General § 611.2 Cooperative relationships. (a) Soil surveys on nonfederal lands are carried out cooperatively with State agricultural experiment... setting forth guidelines for actions to be taken by each cooperating party in the performance of soil...

7 CFR 611.2 - Cooperative relationships.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE CONSERVATION OPERATIONS SOIL SURVEYS General § 611.2 Cooperative relationships. (a) Soil surveys on nonfederal lands are carried out cooperatively with State agricultural experiment... setting forth guidelines for actions to be taken by each cooperating party in the performance of soil...

10 CFR 607.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative agreement. 607.620 Section 607.620 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (CONTINUED) ASSISTANCE REGULATIONS GOVERNMENTWIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 607.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of...

The Wallsend Owenites

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Todd, Nigel

2013-01-01

The nineteenth-century British Co-operative Movement included a commitment to education. Although only a minority of consumer co-operative societies offered educational facilities for their members, there was a willingness to experiment among those Co-operators whose grasp of Co-operation extended ideologically beyond remaining content with…

29 CFR 1607.8 - Cooperative studies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative studies. 1607.8 Section 1607.8 Labor... EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES (1978) General Principles § 1607.8 Cooperative studies. A. Encouragement of cooperative studies. The agencies issuing these guidelines encourage employers, labor organizations, and...

29 CFR 1607.8 - Cooperative studies.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative studies. 1607.8 Section 1607.8 Labor... EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES (1978) General Principles § 1607.8 Cooperative studies. A. Encouragement of cooperative studies. The agencies issuing these guidelines encourage employers, labor organizations, and...

78 FR 35239 - Inviting Applications for Small Socially-Disadvantaged Producer Grants

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2013-06-12

...--Cooperative Service Inviting Applications for Small Socially-Disadvantaged Producer Grants AGENCY: Rural Business--Cooperative Service, USDA. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The Rural Business--Cooperative Service... Business--Cooperative Service, at (202) 720-7558 for guidance on where to submit your application...

Enlightening Advantages of Cooperative Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Faryadi, Qais

2007-01-01

This appraisal discusses the notion that cooperative learning enhances learners' emotional and social performance. It also observes the perception that cooperative learning dramatically improves students' academic accomplishment. This review also examines the definition of cooperative learning and attempts to define it through the lens of renowned…

21 CFR 1405.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1405.620 Section 1405.620 Food and Drugs OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY GOVERNMENTWIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1405.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means...

48 CFR 702.170-4 - Cooperating country.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperating country. 702.170-4 Section 702.170-4 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL DEFINITIONS OF WORDS AND TERMS Definitions 702.170-4 Cooperating country. Cooperating country...

Cooperative Learning: Developments in Research

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gillies, Robyn M.

2014-01-01

Cooperative learning is widely recognized as a pedagogical practice that promotes socialization and learning among students from kindergarten through to college level and across different subject areas. Cooperative learning involves students working together to achieve common goals or complete group tasks. Interest in cooperative learning has…

Cooperative learning: An inside story

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Andre, Kathleen M.

1999-09-01

Cooperative learning is one innovative technique used in an engineering physics course at Ohio State. Student opinions on the cooperative element were solicited near the end of the course. These comments provide useful insight into why students believe cooperative learning is helpful in learning physics.

An Odyssey into Cooperative Learning.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lemke, Thomas L.; Basile, Carole

1997-01-01

An experiment using cooperative learning in a introductory pharmacy course in medicinal chemistry revealed general acceptance of the cooperative learning approach by students, and some perceived advantages for both students and teachers. Although quantitative evidence supporting superiority of the cooperative learning approach was not found,…

Gossip and ostracism promote cooperation in groups.

PubMed

Feinberg, Matthew; Willer, Robb; Schultz, Michael

2014-03-01

The widespread existence of cooperation is difficult to explain because individuals face strong incentives to exploit the cooperative tendencies of others. In the research reported here, we examined how the spread of reputational information through gossip promotes cooperation in mixed-motive settings. Results showed that individuals readily communicated reputational information about others, and recipients used this information to selectively interact with cooperative individuals and ostracize those who had behaved selfishly, which enabled group members to contribute to the public good with reduced threat of exploitation. Additionally, ostracized individuals responded to exclusion by subsequently cooperating at levels comparable to those who were not ostracized. These results suggest that the spread of reputational information through gossip can mitigate egoistic behavior by facilitating partner selection, thereby helping to solve the problem of cooperation even in noniterated interactions.

Second-Order Free-Riding on Antisocial Punishment Restores the Effectiveness of Prosocial Punishment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szolnoki, Attila; Perc, Matjaž

2017-10-01

Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order free-riding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that noncooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here, we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does is viable, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order free-riding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.

Self-Regulation, Cooperative Learning, and Academic Self-Efficacy: Interactions to Prevent School Failure

PubMed Central

Fernandez-Rio, Javier; Cecchini, Jose A.; Méndez-Gimenez, Antonio; Mendez-Alonso, David; Prieto, Jose A.

2017-01-01

Learning to learn and learning to cooperate are two important goals for individuals. Moreover, self regulation has been identified as fundamental to prevent school failure. The goal of the present study was to assess the interactions between self-regulated learning, cooperative learning and academic self-efficacy in secondary education students experiencing cooperative learning as the main pedagogical approach for at least one school year. 2.513 secondary education students (1.308 males, 1.205 females), 12–17 years old (M = 13.85, SD = 1.29), enrolled in 17 different schools belonging to the National Network of Schools on Cooperative Learning in Spain agreed to participate. They all had experienced this pedagogical approach a minimum of one school year. Participants were asked to complete the cooperative learning questionnaire, the strategies to control the study questionnaire and the global academic self-efficacy questionnaire. Participants were grouped based on their perceptions on cooperative learning and self-regulated learning in their classes. A combination of hierarchical and κ-means cluster analyses was used. Results revealed a four-cluster solution: cluster one included students with low levels of cooperative learning, self-regulated learning and academic self-efficacy, cluster two included students with high levels of cooperative learning, self-regulated learning and academic self-efficacy, cluster three included students with high levels of cooperative learning, low levels of self-regulated learning and intermediate-low levels of academic self-efficacy, and, finally, cluster four included students with high levels of self-regulated learning, low levels of cooperative learning, and intermediate-high levels of academic self-efficacy. Self-regulated learning was found more influential than cooperative learning on students’ academic self-efficacy. In cooperative learning contexts students interact through different types of regulations: self, co, and shared. Educators should be aware of these interactions, symmetrical or asymmetrical, because they determine the quality and quantity of the students’ participation and achievements, and they are key elements to prevent school failure. PMID:28154544

Self-Regulation, Cooperative Learning, and Academic Self-Efficacy: Interactions to Prevent School Failure.

PubMed

Fernandez-Rio, Javier; Cecchini, Jose A; Méndez-Gimenez, Antonio; Mendez-Alonso, David; Prieto, Jose A

2017-01-01

Learning to learn and learning to cooperate are two important goals for individuals. Moreover, self regulation has been identified as fundamental to prevent school failure. The goal of the present study was to assess the interactions between self-regulated learning, cooperative learning and academic self-efficacy in secondary education students experiencing cooperative learning as the main pedagogical approach for at least one school year. 2.513 secondary education students (1.308 males, 1.205 females), 12-17 years old ( M = 13.85, SD = 1.29), enrolled in 17 different schools belonging to the National Network of Schools on Cooperative Learning in Spain agreed to participate. They all had experienced this pedagogical approach a minimum of one school year. Participants were asked to complete the cooperative learning questionnaire, the strategies to control the study questionnaire and the global academic self-efficacy questionnaire. Participants were grouped based on their perceptions on cooperative learning and self-regulated learning in their classes. A combination of hierarchical and κ -means cluster analyses was used. Results revealed a four-cluster solution: cluster one included students with low levels of cooperative learning, self-regulated learning and academic self-efficacy, cluster two included students with high levels of cooperative learning, self-regulated learning and academic self-efficacy, cluster three included students with high levels of cooperative learning, low levels of self-regulated learning and intermediate-low levels of academic self-efficacy, and, finally, cluster four included students with high levels of self-regulated learning, low levels of cooperative learning, and intermediate-high levels of academic self-efficacy. Self-regulated learning was found more influential than cooperative learning on students' academic self-efficacy. In cooperative learning contexts students interact through different types of regulations: self, co, and shared. Educators should be aware of these interactions, symmetrical or asymmetrical, because they determine the quality and quantity of the students' participation and achievements, and they are key elements to prevent school failure.

Partner Choice in Raven (Corvus corax) Cooperation.

PubMed

Asakawa-Haas, Kenji; Schiestl, Martina; Bugnyar, Thomas; Massen, Jorg J M

2016-01-01

Although social animals frequently make decisions about when or with whom to cooperate, little is known about the underlying mechanisms of partner choice. Most previous studies compared different dyads' performances, though did not allow an actual choice among partners. We tested eleven ravens, Corvus corax, in triads, giving them first the choice to cooperate with either a highly familiar or a rather unfamiliar partner and, second, with either a friend or a non-friend using a cooperative string-pulling task. In either test, the ravens had a second choice and could cooperate with the other partner, given that this one had not pulled the string in the meantime. We show that during the experiments, these partner ravens indeed learn to wait and inhibit pulling, respectively. Moreover, the results of these two experiments show that ravens' preferences for a specific cooperation partner are not based on familiarity. In contrast, the ravens did show a preference based on relationship quality, as they did choose to cooperate significantly more with friends than with non-friends and they were also more proficient when cooperating with a friend. In order to further identify the proximate mechanism of this preference, we designed an open-choice experiment for the whole group where all birds were free to cooperate on two separate apparatuses. This set-up allowed us to distinguish between preferences for close proximity and preferences to cooperate. The results revealed that friends preferred staying close to each other, but did not necessarily cooperate with one another, suggesting that tolerance of proximity and not relationship quality as a whole may be the driving force behind partner choice in raven cooperation. Consequently, we stress the importance of experiments that allow such titrations and, suggest that these results have important implications for the interpretations of cooperation studies that did not include open partner choice.

Standardized Curriculum for Marketing and Cooperative Vocational Education.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mississippi State Dept. of Education, Jackson. Office of Vocational, Technical and Adult Education.

Standardized course titles and core contents for seven marketing and cooperative vocational education courses in Mississippi are provided: (1) marketing education, part one; (2) marketing education, part two; (3) fashion merchandising; (4) marketing cooperative education, part one; (5) marketing cooperative education, part two; (6) diversified…

Report: National Conference on Cooperative Education.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bureau of Occupational and Adult Education (DHEW/OE), Washington, DC. Div. of Vocational and Technical Education.

The conference report on cooperative vocational education contains four main sections. The first, background papers, contains three papers: Education in a Changing Society, Carl H. Madden; A Prospectus for Cooperative Vocational Education, William F. Pierce; and Critical Issues in Cooperative Vocational Education, Robert M. Worthington. The second…

75 FR 31431 - East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Cooperative); Notice Soliciting Comments and Final...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-06-03

... Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Cooperative); Notice Soliciting Comments and Final Recommendations, Terms and... recommendations, terms and conditions, and prescriptions is 60 days from the issuance of this notice; reply... ``COMMENTS,'' ``REPLY COMMENTS,'' ``RECOMMENDATIONS,'' ``TERMS AND CONDITIONS,'' or ``PRESCRIPTIONS;'' (2...

30 CFR 881.5 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreements. 881.5 Section 881.5... ABANDONED MINE LAND RECLAMATION SUBSIDENCE AND STRIP MINE REHABILITATION, APPALACHIA § 881.5 Cooperative agreements. (a) Each project shall be covered by a cooperative agreement between the Government, as...

24 CFR 21.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 24 Housing and Urban Development 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Cooperative agreement. 21.620... Development GOVERNMENTWIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (GRANTS) Definitions § 21.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that, consistent with 31 U.S.C. 6305...

Effects of Cooperative E-Learning on Learning Outcomes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yeh, Shang-Pao; Fu, Hsin-Wei

2014-01-01

This study aims to discuss the effects of E-Learning and cooperative learning on learning outcomes. E-Learning covers the dimensions of Interpersonal communication, abundant resources, Dynamic instruction, and Learning community; and, cooperative learning contains three dimensions of Cooperative motive, Social interaction, and Cognition…

22 CFR 225.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Cooperative research. 225.114 Section 225.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

22 CFR 225.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false Cooperative research. 225.114 Section 225.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

22 CFR 225.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false Cooperative research. 225.114 Section 225.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

49 CFR 11.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Cooperative research. 11.114 Section 11.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

49 CFR 11.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Cooperative research. 11.114 Section 11.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

49 CFR 11.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cooperative research. 11.114 Section 11.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

22 CFR 225.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Cooperative research. 225.114 Section 225.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

49 CFR 11.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative research. 11.114 Section 11.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

22 CFR 225.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 22 Foreign Relations 1 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Cooperative research. 225.114 Section 225.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

49 CFR 11.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 49 Transportation 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Cooperative research. 11.114 Section 11.114... research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the conduct of cooperative research projects, each institution is responsible for...

7 CFR 1.76 - Department cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Department cooperation. 1.76 Section 1.76 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS Cooperative Production of Television Films § 1.76 Department cooperation. When the producer agrees to meet the above stipulations to the...

7 CFR 1.76 - Department cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Department cooperation. 1.76 Section 1.76 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS Cooperative Production of Television Films § 1.76 Department cooperation. When the producer agrees to meet the above stipulations to the...

7 CFR 1.76 - Department cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Department cooperation. 1.76 Section 1.76 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS Cooperative Production of Television Films § 1.76 Department cooperation. When the producer agrees to meet the above stipulations to the...

7 CFR 1.76 - Department cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Department cooperation. 1.76 Section 1.76 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS Cooperative Production of Television Films § 1.76 Department cooperation. When the producer agrees to meet the above stipulations to the...

Fifty Views of Cooperative Education.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hunt, Donald C.

A series of opinions on many facets of the administration of cooperative education programming is presented. Part One reviews the philosophy of cooperative education including Lawrence Canjar's "convert" speech, a comparison of experiential and cooperative education, and discussions of parallel programs. In Part Two employers discuss cooperative…

75 FR 9246 - Cooperative Share Loan Insurance

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-01

... DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT [Docket No. FR-5376-N-14] Cooperative Share Loan... comments on the subject proposal. New guidance for cooperative housing loan insurance will be published to update existing policies, and better enable mortgagees to submit cooperative share loans for FHA...

Regional cooperation and transportation planning in Alaska : a regional models of cooperation peer exchange summary report.

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2017-01-31

This report summarizes the proceedings of a Regional Models of Cooperation Virtual Peer Exchange Workshop held on March 9 10, 2016 for the State of Alaska. Participants discussed the benefits and challenges of cooperation across jurisdictions and...

38 CFR 21.6362 - Satisfactory conduct and cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Satisfactory conduct and cooperation. 21.6362 Section 21.6362 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS... Pension Recipients Satisfactory Conduct and Cooperation § 21.6362 Satisfactory conduct and cooperation...

38 CFR 21.8360 - Satisfactory conduct and cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Satisfactory conduct and... Children of Vietnam Veterans-Spina Bifida and Covered Birth Defects Satisfactory Conduct and Cooperation § 21.8360 Satisfactory conduct and cooperation. The provisions for satisfactory conduct and cooperation...

14 CFR 1274.213 - Distribution of cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Distribution of cooperative agreements... COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS WITH COMMERCIAL FIRMS Pre-Award Requirements § 1274.213 Distribution of cooperative... functions are delegated to DOD or another agency), NASA Center for Aerospace Information (CASI), Attn...

Cooperative Learning in Elementary Schools

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Slavin, Robert E.

2015-01-01

Cooperative learning refers to instructional methods in which students work in small groups to help each other learn. Although cooperative learning methods are used for different age groups, they are particularly popular in elementary (primary) schools. This article discusses methods and theoretical perspectives on cooperative learning for the…

Cooperative Learning: Professional's Guide.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Grisham, Dana L.; Molinelli, Paul M.

Noting that since the 1970s cooperative learning has been widely investigated regarding its implementation and efficacy, this booklet is designed to introduce the teaching strategy of cooperative learning to classroom teachers. The booklet first provides an overview and supplies a context for cooperative learning and then defines cooperative…

Implementing Cooperative Learning in Australian Primary Schools: Generalist Teachers' Perspectives

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hennessey, Angela; Dionigi, Rylee A.

2013-01-01

To implement cooperative learning successfully in practice, teachers require knowledge of cooperative learning, its features and terms, and how it functions in classrooms. This qualitative study examined 12 Australian generalist primary teachers', understandings of cooperative learning and perceived factors affecting its implementation. Using…

Impacts of extension access and cooperative membership on technology adoption and household welfare.

PubMed

Wossen, Tesfamicheal; Abdoulaye, Tahirou; Alene, Arega; Haile, Mekbib G; Feleke, Shiferaw; Olanrewaju, Adetunji; Manyong, Victor

2017-08-01

This paper examines the impacts of access to extension services and cooperative membership on technology adoption, asset ownership and poverty using household-level data from rural Nigeria. Using different matching techniques and endogenous switching regression approach, we find that both extension access and cooperative membership have a positive and statistically significant effect on technology adoption and household welfare. Moreover, we find that both extension access and cooperative membership have heterogeneous impacts. In particular, we find evidence of a positive selection as the average treatment effects of extension access and cooperative membership are higher for farmers with the highest propensity to access extension and cooperative services. The impact of extension services on poverty reduction and of cooperatives on technology adoption is significantly stronger for smallholders with access to formal credit than for those without access. This implies that expanding rural financial markets can maximize the potential positive impacts of extension and cooperative services on farmers' productivity and welfare.

Onymity promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments

PubMed Central

Wang, Zhen; Jusup, Marko; Wang, Rui-Wu; Shi, Lei; Iwasa, Yoh; Moreno, Yamir; Kurths, Jürgen

2017-01-01

One of the most elusive scientific challenges for over 150 years has been to explain why cooperation survives despite being a seemingly inferior strategy from an evolutionary point of view. Over the years, various theoretical scenarios aimed at solving the evolutionary puzzle of cooperation have been proposed, eventually identifying several cooperation-promoting mechanisms: kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group selection. We report the results of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments with anonymous and onymous pairwise interactions among individuals. We find that onymity significantly increases the frequency of cooperation and the median payoff per round relative to anonymity. Furthermore, we also show that the correlation between players’ ranks and the usage of strategies (cooperation, defection, or punishment) underwent a fundamental shift, whereby more prosocial actions are rewarded with a better ranking under onymity. Our findings prove that reducing anonymity is a valid promoter of cooperation, leading to higher payoffs for cooperators and thus suppressing an incentive—anonymity—that would ultimately favor defection. PMID:28435860

Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Traulsen, Arne; Claussen, Jens Christian

2004-10-01

We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of the coplayer, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent of parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.

Analytic game—theoretic approach to ground-water extraction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Loáiciga, Hugo A.

2004-09-01

The roles of cooperation and non-cooperation in the sustainable exploitation of a jointly used groundwater resource have been quantified mathematically using an analytical game-theoretic formulation. Cooperative equilibrium arises when ground-water users respect water-level constraints and consider mutual impacts, which allows them to derive economic benefits from ground-water indefinitely, that is, to achieve sustainability. This work shows that cooperative equilibrium can be obtained from the solution of a quadratic programming problem. For cooperative equilibrium to hold, however, enforcement must be effective. Otherwise, according to the commonized costs-privatized profits paradox, there is a natural tendency towards non-cooperation and non-sustainable aquifer mining, of which overdraft is a typical symptom. Non-cooperative behavior arises when at least one ground-water user neglects the externalities of his adopted ground-water pumping strategy. In this instance, water-level constraints may be violated in a relatively short time and the economic benefits from ground-water extraction fall below those obtained with cooperative aquifer use. One example illustrates the game theoretic approach of this work.

Punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity in social dilemma experiments

PubMed Central

Li, Xuelong; Wang, Zhen; Li, Huijia; Shi, Lei; Podobnik, Boris; Havlin, Shlomo; Boccaletti, Stefano

2018-01-01

Network reciprocity has been widely advertised in theoretical studies as one of the basic cooperation-promoting mechanisms, but experimental evidence favoring this type of reciprocity was published only recently. When organized in an unchanging network of social contacts, human subjects cooperate provided the following strict condition is satisfied: The benefit of cooperation must outweigh the total cost of cooperating with all neighbors. In an attempt to relax this condition, we perform social dilemma experiments wherein network reciprocity is aided with another theoretically hypothesized cooperation-promoting mechanism—costly punishment. The results reveal how networks promote and stabilize cooperation. This stabilizing effect is stronger in a smaller-size neighborhood, as expected from theory and experiments. Contrary to expectations, punishment diminishes the benefits of network reciprocity by lowering assortment, payoff per round, and award for cooperative behavior. This diminishing effect is stronger in a larger-size neighborhood. An immediate implication is that the psychological effects of enduring punishment override the rational response anticipated in quantitative models of cooperation in networks. PMID:29259113

Different axes of environmental variation explain the presence vs. extent of cooperative nest founding associations in Polistes paper wasps.

PubMed

Sheehan, Michael J; Botero, Carlos A; Hendry, Tory A; Sedio, Brian E; Jandt, Jennifer M; Weiner, Susan; Toth, Amy L; Tibbetts, Elizabeth A

2015-10-01

Ecological constraints on independent breeding are recognised as major drivers of cooperative breeding across diverse lineages. How the prevalence and degree of cooperative breeding relates to ecological variation remains unresolved. Using a large data set of cooperative nesting in Polistes wasps we demonstrate that different aspects of cooperative breeding are likely to be driven by different aspects of climate. Whether or not a species forms cooperative groups is associated with greater short-term temperature fluctuations. In contrast, the number of cooperative foundresses increases in more benign environments with warmer, wetter conditions. The same data set reveals that intraspecific responses to climate variation do not mirror genus-wide trends and instead are highly heterogeneous among species. Collectively these data suggest that the ecological drivers that lead to the origin or loss of cooperation are different from those that influence the extent of its expression within populations. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons Ltd/CNRS.

A Verification Method of Inter-Task Cooperation in Embedded Real-time Systems and its Evaluation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yoshida, Toshio

In software development process of embedded real-time systems, the design of the task cooperation process is very important. The cooperating process of such tasks is specified by task cooperation patterns. Adoption of unsuitable task cooperation patterns has fatal influence on system performance, quality, and extendibility. In order to prevent repetitive work caused by the shortage of task cooperation performance, it is necessary to verify task cooperation patterns in an early software development stage. However, it is very difficult to verify task cooperation patterns in an early software developing stage where task program codes are not completed yet. Therefore, we propose a verification method using task skeleton program codes and a real-time kernel that has a function of recording all events during software execution such as system calls issued by task program codes, external interrupts, and timer interrupt. In order to evaluate the proposed verification method, we applied it to the software development process of a mechatronics control system.

Signaling emotion and reason in cooperation.

PubMed

Levine, Emma E; Barasch, Alixandra; Rand, David; Berman, Jonathan Z; Small, Deborah A

2018-05-01

We explore the signal value of emotion and reason in human cooperation. Across four experiments utilizing dyadic prisoner dilemma games, we establish three central results. First, individuals infer prosocial feelings and motivations from signals of emotion. As a result, individuals believe that a reliance on emotion signals that one will cooperate more so than a reliance on reason. Second, these beliefs are generally accurate-those who act based on emotion are more likely to cooperate than those who act based on reason. Third, individuals' behavioral responses towards signals of emotion and reason depend on their own decision mode: those who rely on emotion tend to conditionally cooperate (that is, cooperate only when they believe that their partner has cooperated), whereas those who rely on reason tend to defect regardless of their partner's signal. These findings shed light on how different decision processes, and lay theories about decision processes, facilitate and impede cooperation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Simultaneously selecting appropriate partners for gaming and strategy adaptation to enhance network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tanimoto, Jun

2014-01-01

Network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium in 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma games. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can be enhanced by using a skewed, rather than a random, selection of partners for either strategy adaptation or the gaming process. Here we show that combining both processes for selecting a gaming partner and an adaptation partner further enhances cooperation, provided that an appropriate selection rule and parameters are adopted. We also show that this combined model significantly enhances cooperation by reducing the degree of activity in the underlying network; we measure the degree of activity with a quantity called effective degree. More precisely, during the initial evolutionary stage in which the global cooperation fraction declines because initially allocated cooperators becoming defectors, the model shows that weak cooperative clusters perish and only a few strong cooperative clusters survive. This finding is the most important key to attaining significant network reciprocity.

Human Cooperation and Its Underlying Mechanisms.

PubMed

Strang, Sabrina; Park, Soyoung Q

Cooperation is a uniquely human behavior and can be observed across cultures. In order to maintain cooperative behavior in society, people are willing to punish deviant behavior on their own expenses and even without any personal benefits. Cooperation has been object of research in several disciplines. Psychologists, economists, sociologists, biologists, and anthropologists have suggested several motives possibly underlying cooperative behavior. In recent years, there has been substantial progress in understanding neural mechanisms enforcing cooperation. Psychological as well as economic theories were tested for their plausibility using neuroscientific methods. For example, paradigms from behavioral economics were adapted to be tested in the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. Also, related brain functions were modulated by using transmagnetic brain stimulation (TMS). While cooperative behavior has often been associated with positive emotions, noncooperative behavior was found to be linked to negative emotions. On a neural level, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), the striatum, and other reward-related brain areas have been shown to be activated by cooperation, whereas noncooperation has mainly been associated with activity in the insula.

Cheater genotypes in the parthenogenetic ant Pristomyrmex punctatus

PubMed Central

Dobata, Shigeto; Sasaki, Tomonori; Mori, Hideaki; Hasegawa, Eisuke; Shimada, Masakazu; Tsuji, Kazuki

2008-01-01

Cooperation is subject to cheating strategies that exploit the benefits of cooperation without paying the fair costs, and it has been a major goal of evolutionary biology to explain the origin and maintenance of cooperation against such cheaters. Here, we report that cheater genotypes indeed coexist in field colonies of a social insect, the parthenogenetic ant Pristomyrmex punctatus. The life history of this species is exceptional, in that there is no reproductive division of labour: all females fulfil both reproduction and cooperative tasks. Previous studies reported sporadic occurrence of larger individuals when compared with their nest-mates. These larger ants lay more eggs and hardly take part in cooperative tasks, resulting in lower fitness of the whole colony. Population genetic analysis showed that at least some of these large-bodied individuals form a genetically distinct lineage, isolated from cooperators by parthenogenesis. A phylogenetic study confirmed that this cheater lineage originated intraspecifically. Coexistence of cheaters and cooperators in this species provides a good model system to investigate the evolution of cooperation in nature. PMID:18854297

Climate-mediated cooperation promotes niche expansion in burying beetles.

PubMed

Sun, Syuan-Jyun; Rubenstein, Dustin R; Chen, Bo-Fei; Chan, Shih-Fan; Liu, Jian-Nan; Liu, Mark; Hwang, Wenbe; Yang, Ping-Shih; Shen, Sheng-Feng

2014-05-13

The ability to form cooperative societies may explain why humans and social insects have come to dominate the earth. Here we examine the ecological consequences of cooperation by quantifying the fitness of cooperative (large groups) and non-cooperative (small groups) phenotypes in burying beetles (Nicrophorus nepalensis) along an elevational and temperature gradient. We experimentally created large and small groups along the gradient and manipulated interspecific competition with flies by heating carcasses. We show that cooperative groups performed as thermal generalists with similarly high breeding success at all temperatures and elevations, whereas non-cooperative groups performed as thermal specialists with higher breeding success only at intermediate temperatures and elevations. Studying the ecological consequences of cooperation may not only help us to understand why so many species of social insects have conquered the earth, but also to determine how climate change will affect the success of these and other social species, including our own.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.02440.001. Copyright © 2014, Sun et al.

Climate-mediated cooperation promotes niche expansion in burying beetles

PubMed Central

Sun, Syuan-Jyun; Rubenstein, Dustin R; Chen, Bo-Fei; Chan, Shih-Fan; Liu, Jian-Nan; Liu, Mark; Hwang, Wenbe; Yang, Ping-Shih; Shen, Sheng-Feng

2014-01-01

The ability to form cooperative societies may explain why humans and social insects have come to dominate the earth. Here we examine the ecological consequences of cooperation by quantifying the fitness of cooperative (large groups) and non-cooperative (small groups) phenotypes in burying beetles (Nicrophorus nepalensis) along an elevational and temperature gradient. We experimentally created large and small groups along the gradient and manipulated interspecific competition with flies by heating carcasses. We show that cooperative groups performed as thermal generalists with similarly high breeding success at all temperatures and elevations, whereas non-cooperative groups performed as thermal specialists with higher breeding success only at intermediate temperatures and elevations. Studying the ecological consequences of cooperation may not only help us to understand why so many species of social insects have conquered the earth, but also to determine how climate change will affect the success of these and other social species, including our own. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.02440.001 PMID:24842999

Evolution of Cooperation in Public Goods Games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xia, Cheng-Yi; Zhang, Juan-Juan; Wang, Yi-Ling; Wang, Jin-Song

2011-10-01

We investigate the evolution of cooperation with evolutionary public goods games based on finite populations, where four pure strategies: cooperators, defectors, punishers and loners who are unwilling to participate are considered. By adopting approximate best response dynamics, we show that the magnitude of rationality not only quantitatively explains the experiment results in [Nature (London) 425 (2003) 390], but also it will heavily influence the evolution of cooperation. Compared with previous results of infinite populations, which result in two equilibriums, we show that there merely exists a special equilibrium and the relevant high value of bounded rationality will sustain cooperation. In addition, we characterize that loner's payoff plays an active role in the maintenance of cooperation, which will only be warranted for the low and moderate values of loner's payoff. It thus indicates the effects of rationality and loner's payoff will influence the cooperation. Finally, we highlight the important result that the introduction of voluntary participation and punishment will facilitate cooperation greatly.

Simulation of Yeast Cooperation in 2D.

PubMed

Wang, M; Huang, Y; Wu, Z

2016-03-01

Evolution of cooperation has been an active research area in evolutionary biology in decades. An important type of cooperation is developed from group selection, when individuals form spatial groups to prevent them from foreign invasions. In this paper, we study the evolution of cooperation in a mixed population of cooperating and cheating yeast strains in 2D with the interactions among the yeast cells restricted to their small neighborhoods. We conduct a computer simulation based on a game theoretic model and show that cooperation is increased when the interactions are spatially restricted, whether the game is of a prisoner's dilemma, snow drifting, or mutual benefit type. We study the evolution of homogeneous groups of cooperators or cheaters and describe the conditions for them to sustain or expand in an opponent population. We show that under certain spatial restrictions, cooperator groups are able to sustain and expand as group sizes become large, while cheater groups fail to expand and keep them from collapse.

Acknowledging selection at sub-organismal levels resolves controversy on pro-cooperation mechanisms

PubMed Central

Shou, Wenying

2015-01-01

Cooperators who pay a cost to produce publically-available benefits can be exploited by cheaters who do not contribute fairly. How might cooperation persist against cheaters? Two classes of mechanisms are known to promote cooperation: 'partner choice', where a cooperator preferentially interacts with cooperative over cheating partners; and 'partner fidelity feedback', where repeated interactions between individuals ensure that cheaters suffer as their cooperative partners languish (see, for example, Momeni et al., 2013). However when both mechanisms can act, differentiating them has generated controversy. Here, I resolve this controversy by noting that selection can operate on organismal and sub-organismal 'entities' such that partner fidelity feedback at sub-organismal level can appear as partner choice at organismal level. I also show that cooperation between multicellular eukaryotes and mitochondria is promoted by partner fidelity feedback and partner choice between sub-organismal entities, in addition to being promoted by partner fidelity feedback between hosts and symbionts, as was previously known. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.10106.001 PMID:26714105

Sustainable cooperation based on reputation and habituation in the public goods game.

PubMed

Liu, Yan; Chen, Tong

2017-10-01

Reputation can promote cooperation in public goods game and player's cooperative behavior is not pure economical rationality, but habituation would influence their behaviors as well. One's habituation can be formed by repeated behaviors in daily life and be affected by habitual preference. We aim to investigate the sustainable cooperation based on reputation and habit formation. To better investigate the impacts of reputation and habitual preference on the evolution and sustainability of cooperation. We introduce three types of agents into our spatial public goods game. Through numerical simulations, we find that the larger habitual preference make cooperation easier to emerge and maintain. Additionally, we find that a moderate number of agents who want to obtain more reputation (ICs) are best for the sustainability of cooperation. Finally, we observe that the variation of donations of ICs can influence greatly on the equilibrium of public goods game. When ICs reduce their donations, a proper contribution will be better to maintain the cooperative behaviors. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Asynchronous updates can promote the evolution of cooperation on multiplex networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Allen, James M.; Hoyle, Rebecca B.

2017-04-01

We study the importance to the frequency of cooperation of the choice of updating strategies in a game played asynchronously or synchronously across layers in a multiplex network. Updating asynchronously in the public goods game leads to higher frequencies of cooperation compared to synchronous updates. How large this effect is depends on the sensitivity of the game dynamics to changes in the number of cooperators surrounding a player, with the largest effect observed when players payoffs are small. The discovery of this effect enhances understanding of cooperation on multiplex networks, and demonstrates a new way to maintain cooperation in these systems.

Marketing Fresh Produce to Local Schools: The North Florida Cooperative Experience [and] Cultivating Schools as Customers in a Local Market: The New North Florida Cooperative Experience [and] Acquiring Capital and Establishing a Credit History: The North Florida Cooperative Experience [and] Success of the New North Florida Cooperative: A Progress Report on Producer Direct Sales to School Districts. Small Farmer Success Story. Bulletins 1-4.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC.

These four bulletins describe how a group of limited-resource small farmers in northern Florida's Jackson County, the USDA, the West Florida Resource Conservation and Development Council, Florida A&M University, and the Federation of Southern Cooperatives organized the New North Florida Cooperative to increase farm income by introducing…

Cooperation and age structure in spatial games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Zhen; Wang, Zhen; Zhu, Xiaodan; Arenzon, Jeferson J.

2012-01-01

We study the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary spatial games when the payoff correlates with the increasing age of players (the level of correlation is set through a single parameter, α). The demographic heterogeneous age distribution, directly affecting the outcome of the game, is thus shown to be responsible for enhancing the cooperative behavior in the population. In particular, moderate values of α allow cooperators not only to survive but to outcompete defectors, even when the temptation to defect is large and the ageless, standard α=0 model does not sustain cooperation. The interplay between age structure and noise is also considered, and we obtain the conditions for optimal levels of cooperation.

A Power-Optimized Cooperative MAC Protocol for Lifetime Extension in Wireless Sensor Networks.

PubMed

Liu, Kai; Wu, Shan; Huang, Bo; Liu, Feng; Xu, Zhen

2016-10-01

In wireless sensor networks, in order to satisfy the requirement of long working time of energy-limited nodes, we need to design an energy-efficient and lifetime-extended medium access control (MAC) protocol. In this paper, a node cooperation mechanism that one or multiple nodes with higher channel gain and sufficient residual energy help a sender relay its data packets to its recipient is employed to achieve this objective. We first propose a transmission power optimization algorithm to prolong network lifetime by optimizing the transmission powers of the sender and its cooperative nodes to maximize their minimum residual energy after their data packet transmissions. Based on it, we propose a corresponding power-optimized cooperative MAC protocol. A cooperative node contention mechanism is designed to ensure that the sender can effectively select a group of cooperative nodes with the lowest energy consumption and the best channel quality for cooperative transmissions, thus further improving the energy efficiency. Simulation results show that compared to typical MAC protocol with direct transmissions and energy-efficient cooperative MAC protocol, the proposed cooperative MAC protocol can efficiently improve the energy efficiency and extend the network lifetime.

A Power-Optimized Cooperative MAC Protocol for Lifetime Extension in Wireless Sensor Networks

PubMed Central

Liu, Kai; Wu, Shan; Huang, Bo; Liu, Feng; Xu, Zhen

2016-01-01

In wireless sensor networks, in order to satisfy the requirement of long working time of energy-limited nodes, we need to design an energy-efficient and lifetime-extended medium access control (MAC) protocol. In this paper, a node cooperation mechanism that one or multiple nodes with higher channel gain and sufficient residual energy help a sender relay its data packets to its recipient is employed to achieve this objective. We first propose a transmission power optimization algorithm to prolong network lifetime by optimizing the transmission powers of the sender and its cooperative nodes to maximize their minimum residual energy after their data packet transmissions. Based on it, we propose a corresponding power-optimized cooperative MAC protocol. A cooperative node contention mechanism is designed to ensure that the sender can effectively select a group of cooperative nodes with the lowest energy consumption and the best channel quality for cooperative transmissions, thus further improving the energy efficiency. Simulation results show that compared to typical MAC protocol with direct transmissions and energy-efficient cooperative MAC protocol, the proposed cooperative MAC protocol can efficiently improve the energy efficiency and extend the network lifetime. PMID:27706079

Role of investment heterogeneity in the cooperation on spatial public goods game.

PubMed

Yuan, Wu-Jie; Xia, Cheng-Yi

2014-01-01

Public cooperation plays a significant role in the survival and maintenance of biological species, to elucidate its origin thus becomes an interesting question from various disciplines. Through long-term development, the public goods game has proven to be a useful tool, where cooperator making contribution can beat again the free-rides. Differentiating from the traditional homogeneous investment, individual trend of making contribution is more likely affected by the investment level of his neighborhood. Based on this fact, we here investigate the impact of heterogeneous investment on public cooperation, where the investment sum is mapped to the proportion of cooperators determined by parameter α. Interestingly, we find, irrespective of interaction networks, that the increment of α (increment of heterogeneous investment) is beneficial for promoting cooperation and even guarantees the complete cooperation dominance under weak replication factor. While this promotion effect can be attributed to the formation of more robust cooperator clusters and shortening END period. Moreover, we find that this simple mechanism can change the potential interaction network, which results in the change of phase diagrams. We hope that our work may shed light on the understanding of the cooperative behavior in other social dilemmas.

Correlates of Cooperation in a One-Shot High-Stakes Televised Prisoners' Dilemma

PubMed Central

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N.; West, Stuart A.

2012-01-01

Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when “playing” for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected. PMID:22485141

Heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments

PubMed Central

Capraro, Valerio; Jordan, Jillian J.; Rand, David G.

2014-01-01

Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behaviour. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behaviour by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma (i.e. one-shot two-player Public Goods Game). We examine the distribution of cooperation amounts, and how that distribution varies based on the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation (b/c). Interestingly, we find a trimodal distribution at all b/c values investigated. Increasing b/c decreases the fraction of participants engaging in zero cooperation and increases the fraction engaging in maximal cooperation, suggesting a role for efficiency concerns. However, a substantial fraction of participants consistently engage in 50% cooperation regardless of b/c. The presence of these persistent 50% cooperators is surprising, and not easily explained by standard models of social preferences. We present evidence that this behaviour is a result of social preferences guided by simple decision heuristics, rather than the rational examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models. We also find a strong correlation between play in the Prisoner's Dilemma and in a subsequent Dictator Game, confirming previous findings suggesting a common prosocial motivation underlying altruism and cooperation. PMID:25348470

The maintenance of cooperation in multiplex networks with limited and partible resources of agents

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Zhaofeng; Shen, Bi; Jiang, Yichuan

2017-02-01

In this paper, we try to explain the maintenance of cooperation in multiplex networks with limited and partible resources of agents: defection brings larger short-term benefit and cooperative agents may become defective because of the unaffordable costs of cooperative behaviors that are performed in multiple layers simultaneously. Recent studies have identified the positive effects of multiple layers on evolutionary cooperation but generally overlook the maximum costs of agents in these synchronous games. By utilizing network effects and designing evolutionary mechanisms, cooperative behaviors become prevailing in public goods games, and agents can allocate personal resources across multiple layers. First, we generalize degree diversity into multiplex networks to improve the prospect for cooperation. Second, to prevent agents allocating all the resources into one layer, a greedy-first mechanism is proposed, in which agents prefer to add additional investments in the higher-payoff layer. It is found that greedy-first agents can perform cooperative behaviors in multiplex networks when one layer is scale-free network and degree differences between conjoint nodes increase. Our work may help to explain the emergence of cooperation in the absence of individual reputation and punishment mechanisms.

Games people play-toward an enactive view of cooperation in social neuroscience.

PubMed

Engemann, Denis A; Bzdok, Danilo; Eickhoff, Simon B; Vogeley, Kai; Schilbach, Leonhard

2012-01-01

The field of social neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural correlates of human cooperation by making use of brain imaging methods. Within this field, neuroeconomic research has drawn on paradigms from experimental economics, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and the Trust Game. These paradigms capture the topic of conflict in cooperation, while focusing strongly on outcome-related decision processes. Cooperation, however, does not equate with that perspective, but relies on additional psychological processes and events, including shared intentions and mutually coordinated joint action. These additional facets of cooperation have been successfully addressed by research in developmental psychology, cognitive science, and social philosophy. Corresponding neuroimaging data, however, is still sparse. Therefore, in this paper, we present a juxtaposition of these mutually related but mostly independent trends in cooperation research. We propose that the neuroscientific study of cooperation could benefit from paradigms and concepts employed in developmental psychology and social philosophy. Bringing both to a neuroimaging environment might allow studying the neural correlates of cooperation by using formal models of decision-making as well as capturing the neural responses that underlie joint action scenarios, thus, promising to advance our understanding of the nature of human cooperation.

Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

PubMed

Kümmerli, Rolf; Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; Ross-Gillespie, Adin; West, Stuart A

2010-06-01

The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.

Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness.

PubMed

Jordan, Jillian J; Hoffman, Moshe; Nowak, Martin A; Rand, David G

2016-07-20

Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject's choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.

Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperation

PubMed Central

Jensen, Keith

2010-01-01

Causing harm to others would hardly seem to be relevant to cooperation, other than as a barrier to it. However, because selfish individuals will exploit cooperators, functional punishment is an effective mechanism for enforcing cooperation by deterring free-riding. Although functional punishment can shape the social behaviour of others by targeting non-cooperative behaviour, it can also intimidate others into doing almost anything. Second-party functional punishment is a self-serving behaviour at the disposal of dominant individuals who can coerce others into behaving cooperatively, but it need not do so. Third-party and altruistic functional punishment are less likely to be selfishly motivated and would seem more likely to maintain norms of cooperation in large groups. These forms of functional punishment may be an essential part of non-kin cooperation on a scale exhibited only by humans. While punitive sentiments might be the psychological force behind punitive behaviours, spiteful motives might also play an important role. Furthermore, functionally spiteful acts might not be maladaptive; reckoning gains relative to others rather than in absolute terms can lead to hyper-competitiveness, which might also be an important part of human cooperation, rather than just an ugly by-product. PMID:20679108

Games people play—toward an enactive view of cooperation in social neuroscience

PubMed Central

Engemann, Denis A.; Bzdok, Danilo; Eickhoff, Simon B.; Vogeley, Kai; Schilbach, Leonhard

2012-01-01

The field of social neuroscience has made considerable progress in unraveling the neural correlates of human cooperation by making use of brain imaging methods. Within this field, neuroeconomic research has drawn on paradigms from experimental economics, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) and the Trust Game. These paradigms capture the topic of conflict in cooperation, while focusing strongly on outcome-related decision processes. Cooperation, however, does not equate with that perspective, but relies on additional psychological processes and events, including shared intentions and mutually coordinated joint action. These additional facets of cooperation have been successfully addressed by research in developmental psychology, cognitive science, and social philosophy. Corresponding neuroimaging data, however, is still sparse. Therefore, in this paper, we present a juxtaposition of these mutually related but mostly independent trends in cooperation research. We propose that the neuroscientific study of cooperation could benefit from paradigms and concepts employed in developmental psychology and social philosophy. Bringing both to a neuroimaging environment might allow studying the neural correlates of cooperation by using formal models of decision-making as well as capturing the neural responses that underlie joint action scenarios, thus, promising to advance our understanding of the nature of human cooperation. PMID:22675293

Contingent movement and cooperation evolve under generalized reciprocity

PubMed Central

Hamilton, Ian M; Taborsky, Michael

2005-01-01

How cooperation and altruism among non-relatives can persist in the face of cheating remains a key puzzle in evolutionary biology. Although mechanisms such as direct and indirect reciprocity and limited movement have been put forward to explain such cooperation, they cannot explain cooperation among unfamiliar, highly mobile individuals. Here we show that cooperation may be evolutionarily stable if decisions taken to cooperate and to change group membership are both dependent on anonymous social experience (generalized reciprocity). We find that a win–stay, lose–shift rule (where shifting is either moving away from the group or changing tactics within the group after receiving defection) evolves in evolutionary simulations when group leaving is moderately costly (i.e. the current payoff to being alone is low, but still higher than that in a mutually defecting group, and new groups are rarely encountered). This leads to the establishment of widespread cooperation in the population. If the costs of group leaving are reduced, a similar group-leaving rule evolves in association with cooperation in pairs and exploitation of larger anonymous groups. We emphasize that mechanisms of assortment within populations are often behavioural decisions and should not be considered independently of the evolution of cooperation. PMID:16191638

Correlates of cooperation in a one-shot high-stakes televised prisoners' dilemma.

PubMed

Burton-Chellew, Maxwell N; West, Stuart A

2012-01-01

Explaining cooperation between non-relatives is a puzzle for both evolutionary biology and the social sciences. In humans, cooperation is often studied in a laboratory setting using economic games such as the prisoners' dilemma. However, such experiments are sometimes criticized for being played for low stakes and by misrepresentative student samples. Golden balls is a televised game show that uses the prisoners' dilemma, with a diverse range of participants, often playing for very large stakes. We use this non-experimental dataset to investigate the factors that influence cooperation when "playing" for considerably larger stakes than found in economic experiments. The game show has earlier stages that allow for an analysis of lying and voting decisions. We found that contestants were sensitive to the stakes involved, cooperating less when the stakes were larger in both absolute and relative terms. We also found that older contestants were more likely to cooperate, that liars received less cooperative behavior, but only if they told a certain type of lie, and that physical contact was associated with reduced cooperation, whereas laughter and promises were reliable signals or cues of cooperation, but were not necessarily detected.

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation

PubMed Central

Li, Hui; Wang, Chuanxu; Shang, Meng; Ou, Wei

2017-01-01

In this paper, we examine the influences of vertical and horizontal cooperation models on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a manufacturer and two retailers, and study optimal operation in the competitive pricing, competitive the low-carbon promotion, the carbon emission reduction, the used-products collection and the profits. We consider the completely decentralized model, M-R vertical cooperation model, R-R horizontal cooperation model, M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model and completely centralized model, and also identify the optimal decision results and profits. It can be observed from a systematic comparison and numerical analysis that the completely centralized model is best in all optimal decision results among all models. In semi-cooperation, the M-R vertical cooperation model is positive, the R-R horizontal cooperation model is passive, and the positivity of the M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model decreases with competitive intensity increasing in the used-products returning, carbon emissions reduction level, low-carbon promotion effort and the profits of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain. PMID:29104268

Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness

PubMed Central

Jordan, Jillian J.; Hoffman, Moshe; Nowak, Martin A.; Rand, David G.

2016-01-01

Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject’s choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love. PMID:27439873

Pricing, Carbon Emission Reduction, Low-Carbon Promotion and Returning Decision in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Vertical and Horizontal Cooperation.

PubMed

Li, Hui; Wang, Chuanxu; Shang, Meng; Ou, Wei

2017-11-01

In this paper, we examine the influences of vertical and horizontal cooperation models on the optimal decisions and performance of a low-carbon closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a manufacturer and two retailers, and study optimal operation in the competitive pricing, competitive the low-carbon promotion, the carbon emission reduction, the used-products collection and the profits. We consider the completely decentralized model, M-R vertical cooperation model, R-R horizontal cooperation model, M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model and completely centralized model, and also identify the optimal decision results and profits. It can be observed from a systematic comparison and numerical analysis that the completely centralized model is best in all optimal decision results among all models. In semi-cooperation, the M-R vertical cooperation model is positive, the R-R horizontal cooperation model is passive, and the positivity of the M-R-R vertical and horizontal cooperation model decreases with competitive intensity increasing in the used-products returning, carbon emissions reduction level, low-carbon promotion effort and the profits of the manufacturer and the entire supply chain.

Heuristics guide the implementation of social preferences in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma experiments.

PubMed

Capraro, Valerio; Jordan, Jillian J; Rand, David G

2014-10-28

Cooperation in one-shot anonymous interactions is a widely documented aspect of human behaviour. Here we shed light on the motivations behind this behaviour by experimentally exploring cooperation in a one-shot continuous-strategy Prisoner's Dilemma (i.e. one-shot two-player Public Goods Game). We examine the distribution of cooperation amounts, and how that distribution varies based on the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation (b/c). Interestingly, we find a trimodal distribution at all b/c values investigated. Increasing b/c decreases the fraction of participants engaging in zero cooperation and increases the fraction engaging in maximal cooperation, suggesting a role for efficiency concerns. However, a substantial fraction of participants consistently engage in 50% cooperation regardless of b/c. The presence of these persistent 50% cooperators is surprising, and not easily explained by standard models of social preferences. We present evidence that this behaviour is a result of social preferences guided by simple decision heuristics, rather than the rational examination of payoffs assumed by most social preference models. We also find a strong correlation between play in the Prisoner's Dilemma and in a subsequent Dictator Game, confirming previous findings suggesting a common prosocial motivation underlying altruism and cooperation.

Social contact patterns can buffer costs of forgetting in the evolution of cooperation.

PubMed

Stevens, Jeffrey R; Woike, Jan K; Schooler, Lael J; Lindner, Stefan; Pachur, Thorsten

2018-06-13

Analyses of the evolution of cooperation often rely on two simplifying assumptions: (i) individuals interact equally frequently with all social network members and (ii) they accurately remember each partner's past cooperation or defection. Here, we examine how more realistic, skewed patterns of contact-in which individuals interact primarily with only a subset of their network's members-influence cooperation. In addition, we test whether skewed contact patterns can counteract the decrease in cooperation caused by memory errors (i.e. forgetting). Finally, we compare two types of memory error that vary in whether forgotten interactions are replaced with random actions or with actions from previous encounters. We use evolutionary simulations of repeated prisoner's dilemma games that vary agents' contact patterns, forgetting rates and types of memory error. We find that highly skewed contact patterns foster cooperation and also buffer the detrimental effects of forgetting. The type of memory error used also influences cooperation rates. Our findings reveal previously neglected but important roles of contact pattern, type of memory error and the interaction of contact pattern and memory on cooperation. Although cognitive limitations may constrain the evolution of cooperation, social contact patterns can counteract some of these constraints. © 2018 The Author(s).

Presence of a loner strain maintains cooperation and diversity in well-mixed bacterial communities.

PubMed

Inglis, R F; Biernaskie, J M; Gardner, A; Kümmerli, R

2016-01-13

Cooperation and diversity abound in nature despite cooperators risking exploitation from defectors and superior competitors displacing weaker ones. Understanding the persistence of cooperation and diversity is therefore a major problem for evolutionary ecology, especially in the context of well-mixed populations, where the potential for exploitation and displacement is greatest. Here, we demonstrate that a 'loner effect', described by economic game theorists, can maintain cooperation and diversity in real-world biological settings. We use mathematical models of public-good-producing bacteria to show that the presence of a loner strain, which produces an independent but relatively inefficient good, can lead to rock-paper-scissor dynamics, whereby cooperators outcompete loners, defectors outcompete cooperators and loners outcompete defectors. These model predictions are supported by our observations of evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed experimental communities of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We find that the coexistence of cooperators and defectors that produce and exploit, respectively, the iron-scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, is stabilized by the presence of loners with an independent iron-uptake mechanism. Our results establish the loner effect as a simple and general driver of cooperation and diversity in environments that would otherwise favour defection and the erosion of diversity. © 2016 The Authors.

Heterogeneous Link Weight Promotes the Cooperation in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ma, Zhi-Qin; Xia, Cheng-Yi; Sun, Shi-Wen; Wang, Li; Wang, Huai-Bin; Wang, Juan

The spatial structure has often been identified as a prominent mechanism that substantially promotes the cooperation level in prisoner's dilemma game. In this paper we introduce a weighting mechanism into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game to explore the cooperative behaviors on the square lattice. Here, three types of weight distributions: exponential, power-law and uniform distributions are considered, and the weight is assigned to links between players. Through large-scale numerical simulations we find, compared with the traditional spatial game, that this mechanism can largely enhance the frequency of cooperators. For most ranges of b, we find that the power-law distribution enables the highest promotion of cooperation and the uniform one leads to the lowest enhancement, whereas the exponential one lies often between them. The great improvement of cooperation can be caused by the fact that the distributional link weight yields inhomogeneous interaction strength among individuals, which can facilitate the formation of cooperative clusters to resist the defector's invasion. In addition, the impact of amplitude of the undulation of weight distribution and noise strength on cooperation is also investigated for three kinds of weight distribution. Current researches can aid in the further understanding of evolutionary cooperation in biological and social science.

Men increase contributions to a public good when under sexual competition

PubMed Central

Tognetti, Arnaud; Dubois, Dimitri; Faurie, Charlotte; Willinger, Marc

2016-01-01

Why humans cooperate in large groups and with non-kin remains a puzzle for researchers across the natural and social sciences. Investigating whether cooperation is sexually selected could contribute to an understanding of the evolution of human cooperation. Competition for access to mates could indeed select for cooperation. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we analyse whether and how the sex composition of a social environment, testosterone level, and relationship status affect contributions to a public good. The results show that variation in sex composition alters the amount of money that single men (but not men in a couple or women) contribute to a public good. Notably, in line with the competitive helping hypothesis, awareness of the presence of a woman leads to larger contributions by single men, most likely by triggering their competitiveness to be the most cooperative man in the group. However, we find no link between basal testosterone level and cooperativeness. We argue that men, notably single men, adopt cooperative behaviours as a signalling strategy in the context of mate choice and hence that cooperation is partly sexually selected. Our findings highlight the need to consider sexual selection as an additional mechanism for cooperation. PMID:27412070

42 CFR 411.23 - Beneficiary's cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 42 Public Health 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Beneficiary's cooperation. 411.23 Section 411.23... Medicare Payment: General Provisions § 411.23 Beneficiary's cooperation. (a) If CMS takes action to recover conditional payments, the beneficiary must cooperate in the action. (b) If CMS's recovery action is...

75 FR 10492 - Tribal Self-Governance Program; Negotiation Cooperative Agreement

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-03-08

...-2010-IHS-TSGN-0001] Tribal Self-Governance Program; Negotiation Cooperative Agreement Announcement Type... Description The purpose of the Negotiation Cooperative Agreement is to provide resources to Tribes interested... Negotiation Cooperative Agreement provides a Tribe with funds to help cover the expenses involved in preparing...

Regional cooperation and performance-based planning and programming in Indiana : a regional models of cooperation peer exchange summary report

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2016-05-01

This report highlights key themes identified at the Regional Cooperation and Performance-Based Planning and Programming in Indiana Peer Exchange held on May 25, 2016 in Indianapolis, Indiana. The Regional Models of Cooperation Initiative, which...

45 CFR 303.107 - Requirements for cooperative arrangements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Requirements for cooperative arrangements. 303.107... HUMAN SERVICES STANDARDS FOR PROGRAM OPERATIONS § 303.107 Requirements for cooperative arrangements. The State must ensure that all cooperative arrangements: (a) Contain a clear description of the specific...

38 CFR 36.4346 - Cooperative loans.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative loans. 36... Cooperative loans. (a) To be eligible for guaranty or insurance, any loan of the following types shall require... of residential units in any housing development, cooperative or otherwise, the title to which...

50 CFR 29.2 - Cooperative land management.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative land management. 29.2 Section... (CONTINUED) THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM LAND USE MANAGEMENT General Rules § 29.2 Cooperative land management. Cooperative agreements with persons for crop cultivation, haying, grazing, or the harvest of...

Keeping a Dream Alive: Cooper Union Library.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Iwan, Irene

1984-01-01

Profiles the Cooper Union Library, a private academic library specializing in architecture, art, and engineering that celebrated its 125th anniversary in fall 1984. Highlights include a biographical sketch of the college's founder, Peter Cooper; construction of the building; curriculum changes; library services and materials; and cooperative and…

75 FR 4422 - Notice Pursuant to The National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2010-01-27

... DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Antitrust Division Notice Pursuant to The National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Clean Diesel V Notice is hereby given that, on December 10, 2009, pursuant to Section [[Page 4423

Alternative Forms of International Cooperation: Comparing Their Efficiency

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tinbergen, Jan

1978-01-01

The author, an economist, discusses nine forms of international cooperation according to their strengths, and invites representatives of other disciplines to comment on international cooperation. Discusses relevant concepts and the estimation of optimal procedures for cooperation. Available from: Unipub, Box 433, Murray Hill Station, New York, New…

33 CFR 238.9 - Local cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 3 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Local cooperation. 238.9 Section 238.9 Navigation and Navigable Waters CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF... Local cooperation. (a) Cost sharing and other provisions of local cooperation shall be in conformity...

33 CFR 238.9 - Local cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 33 Navigation and Navigable Waters 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Local cooperation. 238.9 Section 238.9 Navigation and Navigable Waters CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF... Local cooperation. (a) Cost sharing and other provisions of local cooperation shall be in conformity...

Research Update. Rethinking Youth Sports.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ramsey, Georgianna; Rank, Bryan

1997-01-01

Youth sports need to defocus competitiveness and aggression and encourage cooperative games that involve cooperative efforts toward a goal and emphasize the process, not the outcome. This paper examines the New Games Movement, describes the benefits of cooperative games, presents examples of cooperative games, and notes the place for cooperative…

Supervisory Behaviors of Cooperating Agricultural Education Teachers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thobega, Moreetsi; Miller, Greg

2007-01-01

The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which cooperating agricultural education teachers used selected supervision models. The relationships between maturity characteristics of the cooperating teachers and their choices of a supervision model were also examined. Results showed that cooperating teachers commonly used clinical,…

12 CFR 615.5230 - Implementation of cooperative principles.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Implementation of cooperative principles. 615... Implementation of cooperative principles. (a) Voting shareholders of Farm Credit banks and associations shall be accorded full voting rights in accordance with cooperative principles. (1) Each voting shareholder of an...

First Graders' Interpersonal Understanding during Cooperative and Competitive Games

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zan, Betty; Hildebrandt, Carolyn

2003-01-01

Differences in children's social interactions during cooperative and competitive games were investigated. Thirty-seven children from two first grade classes with cooperative classroom climates were videotaped while playing a cooperative and a competitive board game. Children's social interactions were coded using Selman's Levels of Enacted…

Democratizing Rural Economy: Institutional Friction, Sustainable Struggle and the Cooperative Movement

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mooney, Patrick H.

2004-01-01

Sustainable development demands institutions manage the conflicts and struggles that inevitably arise over material and ideal interests. While current cooperative theory privileges the economic element, a political economy of cooperation emphasizes cooperatives' tentative bridging of economic and political spheres with a democratic ethos. The…

14 CFR 1267.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1267.620 Section... REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1267.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that, consistent with 31 U.S.C. 6305, is used to...

32 CFR 26.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 32 National Defense 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 26.620 Section 26.620 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DoD GRANT AND AGREEMENT... Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that, consistent with 31 U...

14 CFR 1267.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1267.620 Section... REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1267.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that, consistent with 31 U.S.C. 6305, is used to...

32 CFR 26.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 32 National Defense 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 26.620 Section 26.620 National Defense Department of Defense OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DoD GRANT AND AGREEMENT... Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that, consistent with 31 U...

7 CFR 1491.20 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 10 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative agreements. 1491.20 Section 1491.20... OF AGRICULTURE EXPORT PROGRAMS FARM AND RANCH LANDS PROTECTION PROGRAM Cooperative Agreements and Conservation Easement Deeds § 1491.20 Cooperative agreements. (a) NRCS, on behalf of the CCC, will enter into a...

40 CFR 35.6215 - Eligibility for Core Program Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Eligibility for Core Program... Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program Cooperative Agreements § 35.6215 Eligibility for Core Program Cooperative Agreements. (a) States and Indian Tribes may apply for Core Program Cooperative...

40 CFR 35.6225 - Activities eligible for funding under Core Program Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... Core Program Cooperative Agreements. 35.6225 Section 35.6225 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL... Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program Cooperative Agreements § 35.6225 Activities eligible for funding under Core Program Cooperative Agreements. (a) To be eligible for funding...

77 FR 26583 - Notice Pursuant to the National Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993-Cooperative...

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2012-05-04

... Production Act of 1993--Cooperative Research Group on Evaluation of Distributed Leak Detection Systems... Institute-- Cooperative Research Group on Evaluation of Distributed Leak Detection Systems--Performance... detection systems for offshore pipelines. Laboratory testing of distributed temperature and distributed...

Regional cooperation and environmental justice in transportation planning in Ohio : a regional models of cooperation peer exchange summary report

DOT National Transportation Integrated Search

2016-06-07

This report highlights key themes identified at the Regional Cooperation and Environmental Justice in Transportation Planning in Ohio Peer Exchange held on December 15, 2015 in Columbus, Ohio. The Regional Models of Cooperation Initiative, whic...

38 CFR 21.4257 - Cooperative courses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cooperative courses. 21...) VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND EDUCATION Administration of Educational Assistance Programs Courses § 21.4257 Cooperative courses. A cooperative course may be approved when the course meets the requirement of § 21.4233(a). ...

38 CFR 21.126 - Farm cooperative course.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Farm cooperative course.... Chapter 31 Educational and Vocational Training Services § 21.126 Farm cooperative course. (a) Definition. An approvable farm cooperative course is a full-time course designated to restore employability by...

38 CFR 21.4257 - Cooperative courses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative courses. 21...) VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND EDUCATION Administration of Educational Assistance Programs Courses § 21.4257 Cooperative courses. A cooperative course may be approved when the course meets the requirement of § 21.4233(a). ...

38 CFR 21.126 - Farm cooperative course.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Farm cooperative course.... Chapter 31 Educational and Vocational Training Services § 21.126 Farm cooperative course. (a) Definition. An approvable farm cooperative course is a full-time course designated to restore employability by...

38 CFR 21.126 - Farm cooperative course.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Farm cooperative course.... Chapter 31 Educational and Vocational Training Services § 21.126 Farm cooperative course. (a) Definition. An approvable farm cooperative course is a full-time course designated to restore employability by...

38 CFR 21.126 - Farm cooperative course.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Farm cooperative course.... Chapter 31 Educational and Vocational Training Services § 21.126 Farm cooperative course. (a) Definition. An approvable farm cooperative course is a full-time course designated to restore employability by...

38 CFR 21.4257 - Cooperative courses.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cooperative courses. 21...) VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND EDUCATION Administration of Educational Assistance Programs Courses § 21.4257 Cooperative courses. A cooperative course may be approved when the course meets the requirement of § 21.4233(a). ...

Implications of Cooperative Learning and Educational Reform for Students with Mild Disabilities

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fore, Cecil, III; Riser, Susan; Boon, Richard

2006-01-01

Cooperative learning is an instructional model that draws extensively on contributions of multiple theorists, including Piaget, Vygotsky, Carroll and other researchers. Many different cooperative learning arrangements have been developed and researched. The most extensively researched and evaluated cooperative learning arrangements is by Robert…

7 CFR 1484.12 - What is the Cooperator program?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... Development Cooperator (Cooperator) Program, FAS enters into project agreements with eligible nonprofit U.S... intended to create, expand, or maintain foreign markets for U.S. agricultural commodities and products. FAS does not provide brand promotion assistance to Cooperators under this program. (b) FAS enters into...

7 CFR 1484.12 - What is the Cooperator program?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... Development Cooperator (Cooperator) Program, FAS enters into project agreements with eligible nonprofit U.S... intended to create, expand, or maintain foreign markets for U.S. agricultural commodities and products. FAS does not provide brand promotion assistance to Cooperators under this program. (b) FAS enters into...

7 CFR 1484.12 - What is the Cooperator program?

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

... Development Cooperator (Cooperator) Program, FAS enters into project agreements with eligible nonprofit U.S... intended to create, expand, or maintain foreign markets for U.S. agricultural commodities and products. FAS does not provide brand promotion assistance to Cooperators under this program. (b) FAS enters into...

Co-Operative Learning and Development Networks.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hodgson, V.; McConnell, D.

1995-01-01

Discusses the theory, nature, and benefits of cooperative learning. Considers the Cooperative Learning and Development Network (CLDN) trial in the JITOL (Just in Time Open Learning) project and examines the relationship between theories about cooperative learning and the reality of a group of professionals participating in a virtual cooperative…

38 CFR 21.362 - Satisfactory conduct and cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 38 Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief 2 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Satisfactory conduct and.... Chapter 31 Conduct and Cooperation § 21.362 Satisfactory conduct and cooperation. (a) General. The... satisfactory conduct and cooperation in developing and implementing a program of rehabilitation services under...

Exploring Cooperative Education Partnerships: A Case Study in Sport Tertiary Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fleming, Jenny; Hickey, Chris

2013-01-01

Cooperative education can be expressed in terms of a partnership between students, university and industry. A stakeholder-integrated approach to cooperative education involves formalized sustainable relationships between stakeholders. This study investigated the motives and determinants for the formation of cooperative education partnerships.…

40 CFR 35.6215 - Eligibility for Core Program Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Eligibility for Core Program... Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program Cooperative Agreements § 35.6215 Eligibility for Core Program Cooperative Agreements. (a) States and Indian Tribes may apply for Core Program Cooperative...

40 CFR 35.6225 - Activities eligible for funding under Core Program Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... Core Program Cooperative Agreements. 35.6225 Section 35.6225 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL... Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program Cooperative Agreements § 35.6225 Activities eligible for funding under Core Program Cooperative Agreements. (a) To be eligible for funding...

International Cooperation in Science. Science Policy Study--Hearings Volume 7. Hearings before the Task Force on Science Policy of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session (June 18, 19, 20, 27, 1985). No. 50.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Congress of the U.S., Washington, DC. House Committee on Science and Technology.

These hearings on international cooperation in science focused on three issues: (1) international cooperation in big science; (2) the impact of international cooperation on research priorities; and (3) coordination in management of international cooperative research. Witnesses presenting testimony and/or prepared statements were: Victor Weisskopf;…

Collapse of cooperation in evolving games

PubMed Central

Stewart, Alexander J.; Plotkin, Joshua B.

2014-01-01

Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as a robust outcome in evolving populations. Here we extend evolutionary game theory by allowing players’ payoffs as well as their strategies to evolve in response to selection on heritable mutations. In nature, many organisms engage in mutually beneficial interactions and individuals may seek to change the ratio of risk to reward for cooperation by altering the resources they commit to cooperative interactions. To study this, we construct a general framework for the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in arbitrary iterated games. We show that, when there is a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of cooperation, coevolution often leads to a dramatic loss of cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The collapse of cooperation is so extreme that the average payoff in a population can decline even as the potential reward for mutual cooperation increases. Depending upon the form of tradeoffs, evolution may even move away from the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game altogether. Our work offers a new perspective on the Prisoner’s Dilemma and its predictions for cooperation in natural populations; and it provides a general framework to understand the coevolution of strategies and payoffs in iterated interactions. PMID:25422421

Selective Cooperation in Early Childhood – How to Choose Models and Partners

PubMed Central

Hermes, Jonas; Behne, Tanya; Studte, Kristin; Zeyen, Anna-Maria; Gräfenhain, Maria; Rakoczy, Hannes

2016-01-01

Cooperation is essential for human society, and children engage in cooperation from early on. It is unclear, however, how children select their partners for cooperation. We know that children choose selectively whom to learn from (e.g. preferring reliable over unreliable models) on a rational basis. The present study investigated whether children (and adults) also choose their cooperative partners selectively and what model characteristics they regard as important for cooperative partners and for informants about novel words. Three- and four-year-old children (N = 64) and adults (N = 14) saw contrasting pairs of models differing either in physical strength or in accuracy (in labeling known objects). Participants then performed different tasks (cooperative problem solving and word learning) requiring the choice of a partner or informant. Both children and adults chose their cooperative partners selectively. Moreover they showed the same pattern of selective model choice, regarding a wide range of model characteristics as important for cooperation (preferring both the strong and the accurate model for a strength-requiring cooperation tasks), but only prior knowledge as important for word learning (preferring the knowledgeable but not the strong model for word learning tasks). Young children’s selective model choice thus reveals an early rational competence: They infer characteristics from past behavior and flexibly consider what characteristics are relevant for certain tasks. PMID:27505043

Cheating and punishment in cooperative animal societies

PubMed Central

Riehl, Christina; Frederickson, Megan E.

2016-01-01

Cheaters—genotypes that gain a selective advantage by taking the benefits of the social contributions of others while avoiding the costs of cooperating—are thought to pose a major threat to the evolutionary stability of cooperative societies. In order for cheaters to undermine cooperation, cheating must be an adaptive strategy: cheaters must have higher fitness than cooperators, and their behaviour must reduce the fitness of their cooperative partners. It is frequently suggested that cheating is not adaptive because cooperators have evolved mechanisms to punish these behaviours, thereby reducing the fitness of selfish individuals. However, a simpler hypothesis is that such societies arise precisely because cooperative strategies have been favoured over selfish ones—hence, behaviours that have been interpreted as ‘cheating’ may not actually result in increased fitness, even when they go unpunished. Here, we review the empirical evidence for cheating behaviours in animal societies, including cooperatively breeding vertebrates and social insects, and we ask whether such behaviours are primarily limited by punishment. Our review suggests that both cheating and punishment are probably rarer than often supposed. Uncooperative individuals typically have lower, not higher, fitness than cooperators; and when evidence suggests that cheating may be adaptive, it is often limited by frequency-dependent selection rather than by punishment. When apparently punitive behaviours do occur, it remains an open question whether they evolved in order to limit cheating, or whether they arose before the evolution of cooperation. PMID:26729930

Factors affecting athletes' motor behavior after the observation of scenes of cooperation and competition in competitive sport: the effect of sport attitude.

PubMed

Stefani, Elisa De; De Marco, Doriana; Gentilucci, Maurizio

2015-01-01

This study delineated how observing sports scenes of cooperation or competition modulated an action of interaction, in expert athletes, depending on their specific sport attitude. In a kinematic study, athletes were divided into two groups depending on their attitude toward teammates (cooperative or competitive). Participants observed sport scenes of cooperation and competition (basketball, soccer, water polo, volleyball, and rugby) and then they reached for, picked up, and placed an object on the hand of a conspecific (giving action). Mixed-design ANOVAs were carried out on the mean values of grasping-reaching parameters. Data showed that the type of scene observed as well as the athletes' attitude affected reach-to-grasp actions to give. In particular, the cooperative athletes were speeded when they observed scenes of cooperation compared to when they observed scenes of competition. Participants were speeded when executing a giving action after observing actions of cooperation. This occurred only when they had a cooperative attitude. A match between attitude and intended action seems to be a necessary prerequisite for observing an effect of the observed type of scene on the performed action. It is possible that the observation of scenes of competition activated motor strategies which interfered with the strategies adopted by the cooperative participants to execute a cooperative (giving) sequence.

Parochial trust and cooperation across 17 societies

PubMed Central

Romano, Angelo; Balliet, Daniel; Liu, James H.

2017-01-01

International challenges such as climate change, poverty, and intergroup conflict require countries to cooperate to solve these complex problems. However, the political tide in many countries has shifted inward, with skepticism and reluctance to cooperate with other countries. Thus, cross-societal investigations are needed to test theory about trust and cooperation within and between groups. We conducted an experimental study in 17 countries designed to test several theories that explain why, who, and where people trust and cooperate more with ingroup members, compared with outgroup members. The experiment involved several interactions in the trust game, either as a trustor or trustee. We manipulated partner group membership in the trust game (ingroup, outgroup, or unknown) and if their reputation was at stake during the interaction. In addition to the standard finding that participants trust and cooperate more with ingroup than outgroup members, we obtained findings that reputational concerns play a decisive role for promoting trust and cooperation universally across societies. Furthermore, men discriminated more in favor of their ingroup than women. Individual differences in cooperative preferences, as measured by social value orientation, predicted cooperation with both ingroup and outgroup members. Finally, we did not find support for three theories about the cross-societal conditions that influence the degree of ingroup favoritism observed across societies (e.g., material security, religiosity, and pathogen stress). We discuss the implications for promoting cooperation within and between countries. PMID:29133403

Conditional imitation might promote cooperation under high temptations to defect

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dai, Qionglin; Li, Haihong; Cheng, Hongyan; Qian, Xiaolan; Zhang, Mei; Yang, Junzhong

2012-07-01

In this paper we introduce a conditional imitation rule into an evolutionary game, in which the imitation probabilities of individuals are determined by a function of payoff difference and two crucial parameters μ and σ. The parameter μ characterizes the most adequate goal for individuals and the parameter σ characterizes the tolerance of individuals. By using the pair approximation method and numerical simulations, we find an anomalous cooperation enhancement in which the cooperation level shows a nonmonotonic variation with the increase of temptation. The parameter μ affects the regime of the payoff parameter which supports the anomalous cooperation enhancement, whereas the parameter σ plays a decisive role on the appearance of the nonmonotonic variation of the cooperation level. Furthermore, to give explicit implications for the parameters μ and σ we present an alterative form of the conditional imitation rule based on the benefit and the cost incurred to individuals during strategy updates. In this way, we also provide a phenomenological interpretation for the nonmonotonic behavior of cooperation with the increase of temptation. The results give a clue that a higher cooperation level could be obtained under adverse environments for cooperation by applying the conditional imitation rule, which is possible to be manipulated in real life. More generally, the results in this work might point out an efficient way to maintain cooperation in the risky environments to cooperators.

Backstepping-based cooperative and adaptive tracking control design for a group of underactuated AUVs in horizontal plan

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ghommam, Jawhar; Saad, Maarouf

2014-05-01

In this paper, we investigate new implementable cooperative adaptive backstepping controllers for a group of underactuated autonomous vehicles that are communicating with their local neighbours to track a time-varying virtual leader of which the relative position may only be available to a portion of the team members. At the kinematic cooperative control level of the autonomous underwater vehicle, the virtual cooperative controller is basically designed on a proportional and derivative consensus algorithm presented in Ren (2010), which involves velocity information from local neighbours. In this paper, we propose a new design algorithm based on singular perturbation theory that precludes the use of the neighbours' velocity information in the cooperative design. At the dynamic cooperative control level, calculation of the partial derivatives of some stabilising functions which in turn will contain velocity information from the local neighbours is required. To facilitate the implementation of the cooperative controllers, we propose a command filter approach technique to avoid analytic differentiation of the virtual cooperative control laws. We show how Lyapunov-based techniques and graph theory can be combined together to yield a robust cooperative controller where the uncertain dynamics of the cooperating vehicles and the constraints on the communication topology which contains a directed spanning tree are explicitly taken into account. Simulation results with a dynamic model of underactuated autonomous underwater vehicles moving on the horizontal plane are presented and discussed.

Cooperative effects for CYP2E1 differ between styrene and its metabolites

PubMed Central

Hartman, Jessica H.; Boysen, Gunnar; Miller, Grover P.

2014-01-01

Cooperative interactions are frequently observed in the metabolism of drugs and pollutants by cytochrome P450s; nevertheless, the molecular determinants for cooperativity remain elusive. Previously, we demonstrated that steady-state styrene metabolism by CYP2E1 exhibits positive cooperativity.We hypothesized that styrene metabolites have lower affinity than styrene toward CYP2E1 and limited ability to induce cooperative effects during metabolism. To test the hypothesis, we determined the potency and mechanism of inhibition for styrene and its metabolites toward oxidation of 4-nitrophenol using CYP2E1 Supersomes® and human liver microsomes.Styrene inhibited the reaction through a mixed cooperative mechanism with high affinity for the catalytic site (67 μM) and lower affinity for the cooperative site (1100 μM), while increasing substrate turnover at high concentrations. Styrene oxide and 4-vinylphenol possessed similar affinity for CYP2E1. Styrene oxide behaved cooperatively like styrene, but 4-vinylphenol decreased turnover at high concentrations. Styrene glycol was a very poor competitive inhibitor. Among all compounds, there was a positive correlation with binding and hydrophobicity.Taken together, these findings for CYP2E1 further validate contributions of cooperative mechanisms to metabolic processes, demonstrate the role of molecular structure on those mechanisms and underscore the potential for heterotropic cooperative effects between different compounds. PMID:23327532

Sex differences in cooperation: a meta-analytic review of social dilemmas.

PubMed

Balliet, Daniel; Li, Norman P; Macfarlan, Shane J; Van Vugt, Mark

2011-11-01

Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here, we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes-sampled across 50 years of research-on social dilemmas to examine several potential moderators. The overall average effect size is not statistically different from zero (d = -0.05), suggesting that men and women do not differ in their overall amounts of cooperation. However, the association between sex and cooperation is moderated by several key features of the social context: Male-male interactions are more cooperative than female-female interactions (d = 0.16), yet women cooperate more than men in mixed-sex interactions (d = -0.22). In repeated interactions, men are more cooperative than women. Women were more cooperative than men in larger groups and in more recent studies, but these differences disappeared after statistically controlling for several study characteristics. We discuss these results in the context of both sociocultural and evolutionary theories of sex differences, stress the need for an integrated biosocial approach, and outline directions for future research.

Social image concerns promote cooperation more than altruistic punishment

PubMed Central

Grimalda, Gianluca; Pondorfer, Andreas; Tracer, David P.

2016-01-01

Human cooperation is enigmatic, as organisms are expected, by evolutionary and economic theory, to act principally in their own interests. However, cooperation requires individuals to sacrifice resources for each other's benefit. We conducted a series of novel experiments in a foraging society where social institutions make the study of social image and punishment particularly salient. Participants played simple cooperation games where they could punish non-cooperators, promote a positive social image or do so in combination with one another. We show that although all these mechanisms raise cooperation above baseline levels, only when social image alone is at stake do average economic gains rise significantly above baseline. Punishment, either alone or combined with social image building, yields lower gains. Individuals' desire to establish a positive social image thus emerges as a more decisive factor than punishment in promoting human cooperation. PMID:27504898

Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.

PubMed

Yang, Han-Xin; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Rong, Zhihai; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2015-02-01

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

Research on the Mode of University-Enterprise Cooperation to Promote Engineering Students' Employment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hui, Yan; Lihua, Sun

2018-06-01

The employment of university students has become a hot issue of concern to the whole society. Promoting the employment of university students is a top priority for higher education institutions. University-enterprise cooperation is an important trend in the development of modern higher education. It is also an important channel for promoting the employment of university students, especially for engineering students. Through an in-depth analysis of the status quo of employment of university graduates, this paper proposes four modes of university-enterprise cooperation to promote university graduates' employment: The post-employment cooperation model, the professional internship cooperation model, the second classroom expansion cooperation model and the enterprise-oriented recruitment model, and further proposed the countermeasures to strengthen the cooperation between university and enterprise in order to promote the employment of university students.

Culture and cooperation in a spatial public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stivala, Alex; Kashima, Yoshihisa; Kirley, Michael

2016-09-01

We study the coevolution of culture and cooperation by combining the Axelrod model of cultural dissemination with a spatial public goods game, incorporating both noise and social influence. Both participation and cooperation in public goods games are conditional on cultural similarity. We find that a larger "scope of cultural possibilities" in the model leads to the survival of cooperation, when noise is not present, and a higher probability of a multicultural state evolving, for low noise rates. High noise rates, however, lead to both rapid extinction of cooperation and collapse into cultural "anomie," in which stable cultural regions fail to form. These results suggest that cultural diversity can actually be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation, but that cultural information needs to be transmitted accurately in order to maintain both coherent cultural groups and cooperation.

Peer pressure: Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Han-Xin; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Rong, Zhihai; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2015-02-01

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

Identification of the potentiating mutations and synergistic epistasis that enabled the evolution of inter-species cooperation

DOE PAGES

Douglas, Sarah M.; Chubiz, Lon M.; Harcombe, William R.; ...

2017-05-11

Microbes often engage in cooperation through releasing biosynthetic compounds required by other species to grow. Given that production of costly biosynthetic metabolites is generally subjected to multiple layers of negative feedback, single mutations may frequently be insufficient to generate cooperative phenotypes. Synergistic epistatic interactions between multiple coordinated changes may thus often underlie the evolution of cooperation through overproduction of metabolites. To test the importance of synergistic mutations in cooperation we used an engineered bacterial consortium of an Escherichia coli methionine auxotroph and Salmonella enterica. S. enterica relies on carbon by-products from E. coli if lactose is the only carbon source.more » Directly selecting wild-type S. enterica in an environment that favored cooperation through secretion of methionine only once led to a methionine producer, and this producer both took a long time to emerge and was not very effective at cooperating. On the other hand, when an initial selection for resistance of S. enterica to a toxic methionine analog, ethionine, was used, subsequent selection for cooperation with E. coli was rapid, and the resulting double mutants were much more effective at cooperation. We found that potentiating mutations in metJ increase expression of metA, which encodes the first step of methionine biosynthesis. This increase in expression is required for the previously identified actualizing mutations in metA to generate cooperation. This work highlights that where biosynthesis of metabolites involves multiple layers of regulation, significant secretion of those metabolites may require multiple mutations, thereby constraining the evolution of cooperation.« less

Brazil-Africa technical cooperation in health: what's its relevance to the post-Busan debate on 'aid effectiveness'?

PubMed

Russo, Giuliano; Cabral, Lídia; Ferrinho, Paulo

2013-01-22

Brazil is rapidly becoming an influential player in development cooperation, also thanks to its high-visibility health projects in Africa and Latin America. The 4th High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in late 2011 marked a change in the way development cooperation is conceptualised. The present paper explores the issue of emerging donors' contribution to the post-Busan debate on aid effectiveness by looking at Brazil's health cooperation projects in Portuguese-speaking Africa. We first consider Brazil's health technical cooperation within the country's wider cooperation programme, aiming to identify its key characteristics, claimed principles and values, and analysing how these translate into concrete projects in Portuguese-speaking African countries. Then we discuss the extent to which the Busan conference has changed the way development cooperation is conceptualised, and how Brazil's technical cooperation health projects fit within the new framework. We conclude that, by adopting new concepts on health cooperation and challenging established paradigms--in particular on health systems and HIV/AIDS fight--the Brazilian health experience has already contributed to shape the emerging consensus on development effectiveness. However, its impact on the field is still largely unscrutinised, and its projects seem to only selectively comply with some of the shared principles agreed upon in Busan. Although Brazilian cooperation is still a model in the making, not immune from contradictions and shortcomings, it should be seen as enriching the debate on development principles, thus offering alternative solutions to advance the discourse on cooperation effectiveness in health.

Brazil-Africa technical cooperation in health: what’s its relevance to the post-Busan debate on ‘aid effectiveness’?

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

Background Brazil is rapidly becoming an influential player in development cooperation, also thanks to its high-visibility health projects in Africa and Latin America. The 4th High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in late 2011 marked a change in the way development cooperation is conceptualised. The present paper explores the issue of emerging donors’ contribution to the post-Busan debate on aid effectiveness by looking at Brazil’s health cooperation projects in Portuguese-speaking Africa. Debate We first consider Brazil’s health technical cooperation within the country’s wider cooperation programme, aiming to identify its key characteristics, claimed principles and values, and analysing how these translate into concrete projects in Portuguese-speaking African countries. Then we discuss the extent to which the Busan conference has changed the way development cooperation is conceptualised, and how Brazil’s technical cooperation health projects fit within the new framework. Summary We conclude that, by adopting new concepts on health cooperation and challenging established paradigms - in particular on health systems and HIV/AIDS fight - the Brazilian health experience has already contributed to shape the emerging consensus on development effectiveness. However, its impact on the field is still largely unscrutinised, and its projects seem to only selectively comply with some of the shared principles agreed upon in Busan. Although Brazilian cooperation is still a model in the making, not immune from contradictions and shortcomings, it should be seen as enriching the debate on development principles, thus offering alternative solutions to advance the discourse on cooperation effectiveness in health. PMID:23339681

Risk and Cooperation: Managing Hazardous Fuel in Mixed Ownership Landscapes

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fischer, A. Paige; Charnley, Susan

2012-06-01

Managing natural processes at the landscape scale to promote forest health is important, especially in the case of wildfire, where the ability of a landowner to protect his or her individual parcel is constrained by conditions on neighboring ownerships. However, management at a landscape scale is also challenging because it requires cooperation on plans and actions that cross ownership boundaries. Cooperation depends on people's beliefs and norms about reciprocity and perceptions of the risks and benefits of interacting with others. Using logistic regression tests on mail survey data and qualitative analysis of interviews with landowners, we examined the relationship between perceived wildfire risk and cooperation in the management of hazardous fuel by nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners in fire-prone landscapes of eastern Oregon. We found that NIPF owners who perceived a risk of wildfire to their properties, and perceived that conditions on nearby public forestlands contributed to this risk, were more likely to have cooperated with public agencies in the past to reduce fire risk than owners who did not perceive a risk of wildfire to their properties. Wildfire risk perception was not associated with past cooperation among NIPF owners. The greater social barriers to private-private cooperation than to private-public cooperation, and perceptions of more hazardous conditions on public compared with private forestlands may explain this difference. Owners expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with others in future cross-boundary efforts to reduce fire risk, however. We explore barriers to cooperative forest management across ownerships, and identify models of cooperation that hold potential for future collective action to reduce wildfire risk.

Risk and cooperation: managing hazardous fuel in mixed ownership landscapes.

PubMed

Fischer, A Paige; Charnley, Susan

2012-06-01

Managing natural processes at the landscape scale to promote forest health is important, especially in the case of wildfire, where the ability of a landowner to protect his or her individual parcel is constrained by conditions on neighboring ownerships. However, management at a landscape scale is also challenging because it requires cooperation on plans and actions that cross ownership boundaries. Cooperation depends on people's beliefs and norms about reciprocity and perceptions of the risks and benefits of interacting with others. Using logistic regression tests on mail survey data and qualitative analysis of interviews with landowners, we examined the relationship between perceived wildfire risk and cooperation in the management of hazardous fuel by nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) owners in fire-prone landscapes of eastern Oregon. We found that NIPF owners who perceived a risk of wildfire to their properties, and perceived that conditions on nearby public forestlands contributed to this risk, were more likely to have cooperated with public agencies in the past to reduce fire risk than owners who did not perceive a risk of wildfire to their properties. Wildfire risk perception was not associated with past cooperation among NIPF owners. The greater social barriers to private-private cooperation than to private-public cooperation, and perceptions of more hazardous conditions on public compared with private forestlands may explain this difference. Owners expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with others in future cross-boundary efforts to reduce fire risk, however. We explore barriers to cooperative forest management across ownerships, and identify models of cooperation that hold potential for future collective action to reduce wildfire risk.

Identification of the potentiating mutations and synergistic epistasis that enabled the evolution of inter-species cooperation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Douglas, Sarah M.; Chubiz, Lon M.; Harcombe, William R.

Microbes often engage in cooperation through releasing biosynthetic compounds required by other species to grow. Given that production of costly biosynthetic metabolites is generally subjected to multiple layers of negative feedback, single mutations may frequently be insufficient to generate cooperative phenotypes. Synergistic epistatic interactions between multiple coordinated changes may thus often underlie the evolution of cooperation through overproduction of metabolites. To test the importance of synergistic mutations in cooperation we used an engineered bacterial consortium of an Escherichia coli methionine auxotroph and Salmonella enterica. S. enterica relies on carbon by-products from E. coli if lactose is the only carbon source.more » Directly selecting wild-type S. enterica in an environment that favored cooperation through secretion of methionine only once led to a methionine producer, and this producer both took a long time to emerge and was not very effective at cooperating. On the other hand, when an initial selection for resistance of S. enterica to a toxic methionine analog, ethionine, was used, subsequent selection for cooperation with E. coli was rapid, and the resulting double mutants were much more effective at cooperation. We found that potentiating mutations in metJ increase expression of metA, which encodes the first step of methionine biosynthesis. This increase in expression is required for the previously identified actualizing mutations in metA to generate cooperation. This work highlights that where biosynthesis of metabolites involves multiple layers of regulation, significant secretion of those metabolites may require multiple mutations, thereby constraining the evolution of cooperation.« less

Let’s Dance Together: Synchrony, Shared Intentionality and Cooperation

PubMed Central

Reddish, Paul; Fischer, Ronald; Bulbulia, Joseph

2013-01-01

Previous research has shown that the matching of rhythmic behaviour between individuals (synchrony) increases cooperation. Such synchrony is most noticeable in music, dance and collective rituals. As well as the matching of behaviour, such collective performances typically involve shared intentionality: performers actively collaborate to produce joint actions. Over three experiments we examined the importance of shared intentionality in promoting cooperation from group synchrony. Experiment 1 compared a condition in which group synchrony was produced through shared intentionality to conditions in which synchrony or asynchrony were created as a by-product of hearing the same or different rhythmic beats. We found that synchrony combined with shared intentionality produced the greatest level of cooperation. To examinef the importance of synchrony when shared intentionality is present, Experiment 2 compared a condition in which participants deliberately worked together to produce synchrony with a condition in which participants deliberately worked together to produce asynchrony. We found that synchrony combined with shared intentionality produced the greatest level of cooperation. Experiment 3 manipulated both the presence of synchrony and shared intentionality and found significantly greater cooperation with synchrony and shared intentionality combined. Path analysis supported a reinforcement of cooperation model according to which perceiving synchrony when there is a shared goal to produce synchrony provides immediate feedback for successful cooperation so reinforcing the group’s cooperative tendencies. The reinforcement of cooperation model helps to explain the evolutionary conservation of traditional music and dance performances, and furthermore suggests that the collectivist values of such cultures may be an essential part of the mechanisms by which synchrony galvanises cooperative behaviours. PMID:23951106

12 CFR 614.4355 - Banks for cooperatives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Banks for cooperatives. 614.4355 Section 614.4355 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM LOAN POLICIES AND OPERATIONS Lending and Leasing Limits § 614.4355 Banks for cooperatives. No bank for cooperatives may make a loan if...

26 CFR 301.7701-14 - Cooperative bank.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-04-01

... 26 Internal Revenue 18 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false Cooperative bank. 301.7701-14 Section 301.7701... ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION Definitions § 301.7701-14 Cooperative bank. For taxable years beginning after October 16, 1962, the term “cooperative bank” means an institution without capital stock...

12 CFR 614.4355 - Banks for cooperatives.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 12 Banks and Banking 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Banks for cooperatives. 614.4355 Section 614.4355 Banks and Banking FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION FARM CREDIT SYSTEM LOAN POLICIES AND OPERATIONS Lending and Leasing Limits § 614.4355 Banks for cooperatives. No bank for cooperatives may make a loan if...

1 CFR 8.7 - Agency cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 1 General Provisions 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Agency cooperation. 8.7 Section 8.7 General Provisions ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER SPECIAL EDITIONS OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS § 8.7 Agency cooperation. Each agency shall cooperate in keeping publication of the...

1 CFR 8.7 - Agency cooperation.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 1 General Provisions 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Agency cooperation. 8.7 Section 8.7 General Provisions ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER SPECIAL EDITIONS OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS § 8.7 Agency cooperation. Each agency shall cooperate in keeping publication of the...

Using Cooperative Learning To Improve Reading and Writing in Science.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Nesbit, Catherine R.; Rogers, Cynthia A.

1997-01-01

Presents several cooperative learning lessons that integrate science, reading and writing. Notes that sample lessons involve six methods of cooperative learning drawn from four prominent developers and researchers, David Johnson, Roger Johnson, Robert Slavin, and Spencer Kagan. Describes the cooperative learning method to illustrate how to use it…

50 CFR 15.26 - Approval of cooperative breeding programs.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... WILDLIFE AND PLANTS WILD BIRD CONSERVATION ACT Permits and Approval of Cooperative Breeding Programs § 15.26 Approval of cooperative breeding programs. Upon receipt of a complete application, the Director... 50 Wildlife and Fisheries 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Approval of cooperative breeding programs...

29 CFR 1472.620 - Cooperative agreement.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 29 Labor 4 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreement. 1472.620 Section 1472.620 Labor... REQUIREMENTS FOR DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) Definitions § 1472.620 Cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreement means an award of financial assistance that, consistent with 31 U.S.C. 6305, is used to...

30 CFR 880.12 - Cooperative agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 30 Mineral Resources 3 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative agreements. 880.12 Section 880.12... ABANDONED MINE LAND RECLAMATION MINE FIRE CONTROL § 880.12 Cooperative agreements. (a) OSM shall, upon... cooperative agreement with the State or Indian tribe to control or extinguish fires in coal formations. (b...

Cooperative Learning in the Thinking Classroom: Research and Theoretical Perspectives.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lee, Christine; And Others

As a classroom organization and instructional method, cooperative learning merits serious consideration for use in thinking classrooms. Cooperative learning is more than just groupwork. In traditional group learning, students work in groups with no attention paid to group functioning, whereas in cooperative learning, group work is carefully…

Labor-Management Cooperation: The American Experience.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Siegel, Irving H.; Weinberg, Edgar

This book examines the wide range of opportunities, the attendant problems, and the potential benefits of labor-management cooperation. Cooperative arrangements are considered at different economic levels, and 65 cases are discussed. The first of 10 chapters sets up a conceptual framework for the review of American experience in cooperation.…

40 CFR 35.6110 - Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative... for Superfund Response Actions Remedial Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6110 Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements. (a) Application requirements. The Indian Tribe must comply with all of the...

40 CFR 35.6110 - Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative... for Superfund Response Actions Remedial Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6110 Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements. (a) Application requirements. The Indian Tribe must comply with all of the...

40 CFR 35.6110 - Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative... for Superfund Response Actions Remedial Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6110 Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements. (a) Application requirements. The Indian Tribe must comply with all of the...

40 CFR 35.6110 - Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative... for Superfund Response Actions Remedial Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6110 Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements. (a) Application requirements. The Indian Tribe must comply with all of the...

40 CFR 35.6110 - Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative... for Superfund Response Actions Remedial Response Cooperative Agreements § 35.6110 Indian Tribe-lead remedial Cooperative Agreements. (a) Application requirements. The Indian Tribe must comply with all of the...

76 FR 61950 - Security Zones, 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Oahu, HI

Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014

2011-10-06

...-AA87 Security Zones, 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, Oahu, HI AGENCY: Coast Guard... of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Oahu, Hawaii. The establishment of... necessary security measures required for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference held on Oahu. We...

Cooperation versus Competition: Is There Really Such an Issue?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Daniels, Ann Michelle

2007-01-01

This author argues that youth sports can move beyond the dichotomy of cooperation versus competition by redefining competition. This can be accomplished by considering the development of cooperative skills and achievement motivation. The article addresses how cooperative skills can be taught within a competitive sport. First, it is important to…

Interpretive Study of Research and Development Relative to Educational Cooperatives. Final Report.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hughes, Larry W.; And Others

This document analyzes some of the aspects of the trend toward educational regionalism and cooperation. Educational cooperatives are designed to provide the flexibility and service associated with large districts while allowing for local control and school district autonomy. Types of educational cooperatives discussed include intermediate…

Learning to Learn Cooperatively

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Byrd, Anne Hammond

2009-01-01

Cooperative learning, put quite simply, is a type of instruction whereby students work together in small groups to achieve a common goal. Cooperative learning has become increasingly popular as a feature of Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) with benefits that include increased student interest due to the quick pace of cooperative tasks,…

24 CFR 213.275 - Nature of the Cooperative Management Housing Insurance Fund.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-04-01

... 24 Housing and Urban Development 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false Nature of the Cooperative Management Housing Insurance Fund. 213.275 Section 213.275 Housing and Urban Development Regulations Relating... Nature of the Cooperative Management Housing Insurance Fund. The Cooperative Management Housing Insurance...

7 CFR 1c.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1c.114 Section 1c.114 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 1c.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one...

7 CFR 1c.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1c.114 Section 1c.114 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 1c.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one...

34 CFR 97.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2011-07-01 2011-07-01 false Cooperative research. 97.114 Section 97.114 Education... Protection of Human Subjects (Basic ED Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects) § 97.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than...

40 CFR 26.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative research. 26.114 Section 26... Basic EPA Policy for Protection of Subjects in Human Research Conducted or Supported by EPA § 26.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve...

45 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46.114 Public... HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects § 46.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the...

45 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46.114 Public... HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects § 46.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the...

7 CFR 1c.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1c.114 Section 1c.114 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 1c.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one...

45 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46.114 Public... HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects § 46.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the...

7 CFR 1c.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 7 Agriculture 1 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Cooperative research. 1c.114 Section 1c.114 Agriculture Office of the Secretary of Agriculture PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS § 1c.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one...

40 CFR 26.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cooperative research. 26.114 Section 26... Basic EPA Policy for Protection of Subjects in Human Research Conducted or Supported by EPA § 26.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve...

34 CFR 97.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cooperative research. 97.114 Section 97.114 Education... Protection of Human Subjects (Basic ED Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects) § 97.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than...

34 CFR 97.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-07-01

... 34 Education 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false Cooperative research. 97.114 Section 97.114 Education... Protection of Human Subjects (Basic ED Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects) § 97.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than...

45 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46.114 Public... HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects § 46.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the...

40 CFR 26.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-07-01

... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cooperative research. 26.114 Section 26... Basic EPA Policy for Protection of Subjects in Human Research Conducted or Supported by EPA § 26.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve...

45 CFR 46.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-10-01

... 45 Public Welfare 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Cooperative research. 46.114 Section 46.114 Public... HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects § 46.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those projects covered by this policy which involve more than one institution. In the...

14 CFR § 1230.114 - Cooperative research.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Cooperative research. § 1230.114 Section Â... SUBJECTS (Eff. until 2-14-14) § 1230.114 Cooperative research. Cooperative research projects are those... research projects, each institution is responsible for safeguarding the rights and welfare of human...