48 CFR 716.303 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-sharing contracts. 716.303 Section 716.303 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost Reimbursement Contracts 716.303 Cost-sharing...
48 CFR 716.303 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cost-sharing contracts. 716.303 Section 716.303 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost Reimbursement Contracts 716.303 Cost-sharing...
48 CFR 3416.303 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-sharing contracts. 3416.303 Section 3416.303 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 3416.303...
Option pricing: a flexible tool to disseminate shared savings contracts.
Friedberg, Mark W; Buendia, Anthony M; Lauderdale, Katherine E; Hussey, Peter S
2013-08-01
Due to volatility in healthcare costs, shared savings contracts can create systematic financial losses for payers, especially when contracting with smaller providers. To improve the business case for shared savings, we calculated the prices of financial options that payers can "sell" to providers to offset these losses. Using 2009 to 2010 member-level total cost of care data from a large commercial health plan, we calculated option prices by applying a bootstrap simulation procedure. We repeated these simulations for providers of sizes ranging from 500 to 60,000 patients and for shared savings contracts with and without key design features (minimum savings thresholds,bonus caps, cost outlier truncation, and downside risk) and under assumptions of zero, 1%, and 2% real cost reductions due to the shared savings contracts. Assuming no real cost reduction and a 50% shared savings rate, per patient option prices ranged from $225 (3.1% of overall costs) for 500-patient providers to $23 (0.3%) for 60,000-patient providers. Introducing minimum savings thresholds, bonus caps, cost outlier truncation, and downside risk reduced these option prices. Option prices were highly sensitive to the magnitude of real cost reductions. If shared savings contracts cause 2% reductions in total costs, option prices fall to zero for all but the smallest providers. Calculating the prices of financial options that protect payers and providers from downside risk can inject flexibility into shared savings contracts, extend such contracts to smaller providers, and clarify the tradeoffs between different contract designs, potentially speeding the dissemination of shared savings.
48 CFR 1516.303-73 - Types of cost-sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
..., cost matching, or other in-kind contributions. (b) In-kind contributions represent non-cash... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Types of cost-sharing. 1516... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 1516.303-73 Types of...
Antonanzas, Fernando; Juarez-Castello, Carmelo; Rodriguez-Ibeas, Roberto
2011-07-01
In this paper, we characterise the risk-sharing contracts that health authorities can design when they face a regulatory decision on drug pricing and reimbursement in a context of uncertainty. We focus on two types of contracts. On the one hand, the health authority can reimburse the firm for each treated patient regardless of health outcomes (non risk-sharing). Alternatively, the health authority can pay for the drug only when the patient is cured (risk-sharing contract). The optimal contract depends on the trade-off between the monitoring costs, the marginal production cost and the utility derived from treatment. A non-risk-sharing agreement will be preferred by the health authority, if patients who should not be treated impose a relatively low cost to the health system. When this cost is high, the health authority would prefer a risk-sharing agreement for relatively low monitoring costs.
7 CFR 634.27 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.27 Cost-share... essential for meeting the water quality objectives in the project area. (c) Basis for cost-share payment. (1...) Average cost, or (ii) Actual cost not to exceed average cost. (2) If the average cost at the time of...
7 CFR 634.27 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.27 Cost-share... essential for meeting the water quality objectives in the project area. (c) Basis for cost-share payment. (1...) Average cost, or (ii) Actual cost not to exceed average cost. (2) If the average cost at the time of...
7 CFR 634.27 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.27 Cost-share... essential for meeting the water quality objectives in the project area. (c) Basis for cost-share payment. (1...) Average cost, or (ii) Actual cost not to exceed average cost. (2) If the average cost at the time of...
7 CFR 634.27 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.27 Cost-share... essential for meeting the water quality objectives in the project area. (c) Basis for cost-share payment. (1...) Average cost, or (ii) Actual cost not to exceed average cost. (2) If the average cost at the time of...
7 CFR 634.27 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.27 Cost-share... essential for meeting the water quality objectives in the project area. (c) Basis for cost-share payment. (1...) Average cost, or (ii) Actual cost not to exceed average cost. (2) If the average cost at the time of...
48 CFR 52.216-12 - Cost-Sharing Contract-No Fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
....216-12 Cost-Sharing Contract—No Fee. As prescribed in 16.307(f), insert the following clause in... nonprofit organization. Cost-Sharing Contract—No Fee (APR 1984) (a) The Government shall not pay to the... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-Sharing Contract-No...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.24 Cost sharing... participant's water rights, cannot be considered a part of the participant's share of the cost. (b) The... offsite water quality, and (2) The matching share requirements would place a burden on the landowner or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.24 Cost sharing... participant's water rights, cannot be considered a part of the participant's share of the cost. (b) The... offsite water quality, and (2) The matching share requirements would place a burden on the landowner or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.24 Cost sharing... participant's water rights, cannot be considered a part of the participant's share of the cost. (b) The... offsite water quality, and (2) The matching share requirements would place a burden on the landowner or...
48 CFR 1552.211-73 - Level of effort-cost-reimbursement term contract.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... contracts without fee, cost-sharing contracts, cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts, cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts (CPIF), and cost-plus-award-fee contracts (CPAF). Level of Effort—Cost-Reimbursement Term Contract... additional effort shall not result in any increase in the fixed fee, if any. If this is a cost-plus-incentive...
48 CFR 1516.303-75 - Amount of cost-sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
.... 1516.303-75 Section 1516.303-75 Federal Acquisition Regulations System ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 1516.303-75 Amount of... market share position; (3) The time and risk necessary to achieve success; (4) If the results of the...
48 CFR 2016.307-70 - Contract provisions and clauses.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
..., Level of Effort, in solicitations for negotiated procurements containing labor costs other than maintenance services to be awarded on a cost reimbursement, cost sharing, cost-plus-award fee, cost-plus-fixed... COMMISSION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost Reimbursement Contracts 2016.307-70...
7 CFR 632.31 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... out the contract, the land user is indebted to the United States for the cost of the misused material... contract. The cost-share payment is to be determined by one of the following methods: (1) Average cost. (2) Actual cost but not more than the average cost. (3) Specified maximum cost. If the average cost or the...
7 CFR 632.31 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... out the contract, the land user is indebted to the United States for the cost of the misused material... contract. The cost-share payment is to be determined by one of the following methods: (1) Average cost. (2) Actual cost but not more than the average cost. (3) Specified maximum cost. If the average cost or the...
7 CFR 632.31 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... out the contract, the land user is indebted to the United States for the cost of the misused material... contract. The cost-share payment is to be determined by one of the following methods: (1) Average cost. (2) Actual cost but not more than the average cost. (3) Specified maximum cost. If the average cost or the...
7 CFR 632.31 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... out the contract, the land user is indebted to the United States for the cost of the misused material... contract. The cost-share payment is to be determined by one of the following methods: (1) Average cost. (2) Actual cost but not more than the average cost. (3) Specified maximum cost. If the average cost or the...
7 CFR 632.31 - Cost-share payment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... out the contract, the land user is indebted to the United States for the cost of the misused material... contract. The cost-share payment is to be determined by one of the following methods: (1) Average cost. (2) Actual cost but not more than the average cost. (3) Specified maximum cost. If the average cost or the...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Pakpahan, Eka K. A.; Iskandar, Bermawi P.
2015-12-01
Mining industry is characterized by a high operational revenue, and hence high availability of heavy equipment used in mining industry is a critical factor to ensure the revenue target. To maintain high avaliability of the heavy equipment, the equipment's owner hires an agent to perform maintenance action. Contract is then used to control the relationship between the two parties involved. The traditional contracts such as fixed price, cost plus or penalty based contract studied is unable to push agent's performance to exceed target, and this in turn would lead to a sub-optimal result (revenue). This research deals with designing maintenance contract compensation schemes. The scheme should induce agent to select the highest possible maintenance effort level, thereby pushing agent's performance and achieve maximum utility for both parties involved. Principal agent theory is used as a modeling approach due to its ability to simultaneously modeled owner and agent decision making process. Compensation schemes considered in this research includes fixed price, cost sharing and revenue sharing. The optimal decision is obtained using a numerical method. The results show that if both parties are risk neutral, then there are infinite combination of fixed price, cost sharing and revenue sharing produced the same optimal solution. The combination of fixed price and cost sharing contract results in the optimal solution when the agent is risk averse, while the optimal combination of fixed price and revenue sharing contract is obtained when agent is risk averse. When both parties are risk averse, the optimal compensation scheme is a combination of fixed price, cost sharing and revenue sharing.
48 CFR 42.707 - Cost-sharing rates and limitations on indirect cost rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... final indirect cost rate ceiling in a contract. Examples of such circumstances are when the proposed... ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND AUDIT SERVICES Indirect Cost Rates 42... authorized, may call for the contractor to participate in the costs of the contract by accepting indirect...
48 CFR 1516.303-76 - Fee on cost-sharing contracts by subcontractors.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... alert to a potential vulnerability for the Government under cost-sharing contracts when evaluating... subcontractor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the prime. The vulnerability consists of the subsidiary earning a...
10 CFR 603.530 - Acceptable cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... Evaluation Cost Sharing § 603.530 Acceptable cost sharing. The contracting officer may accept any cash or in... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Acceptable cost sharing. 603.530 Section 603.530 Energy..., they represent meaningful cost sharing that demonstrates the recipient's commitment to the success of...
7 CFR 1468.21 - Contract requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... provisions of § 1468.24 of this part; (iv) Agree to forego participation in CRP, EQIP, and the cost-share... those practices transferred from terminated CRP and EQIP contracts and WRP cost-share agreements. For persons wishing to transfer from CRP, EQIP, or WRP to CFO, practices included in CRP or EQIP contracts or...
7 CFR 636.7 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.7 Cost-share payments. (a) NRCS may... costs to develop fish and wildlife habitat. The cost-share payment to a participant will be reduced...
7 CFR 636.7 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.7 Cost-share payments. (a) NRCS may... costs to develop fish and wildlife habitat. The cost-share payment to a participant will be reduced...
7 CFR 636.7 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.7 Cost-share payments. (a) NRCS may... costs to develop fish and wildlife habitat. The cost-share payment to a participant will be reduced...
7 CFR 636.7 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.7 Cost-share payments. (a) NRCS may... costs to develop fish and wildlife habitat. The cost-share payment to a participant will be reduced...
7 CFR 636.7 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVES PROGRAM § 636.7 Cost-share payments. (a) NRCS... establishing conservation practices to develop fish and wildlife habitat. The cost-share payment to a...
48 CFR 2015.209-70 - Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 2052.215-71, Project Officer Authority in applicable solicitations and contracts for cost-reimbursement, cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-award-fee, cost sharing, labor-hour or time-and-materials, including... for cost type contracts; (2) Section 2052.215-75 Alternate 1 may be used for all solicitations for...
48 CFR 1852.216-83 - Fixed price incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... Price Incentive (OCT 1996) The target cost of this contract is $___. The Target profit of this contract is $___. The target price (target cost plus target profit) of this contract is $___. [The ceiling price is $___.] The cost sharing for target cost underruns is: Government ___percent; Contractor...
48 CFR 1852.216-83 - Fixed price incentive.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... Price Incentive (OCT 1996) The target cost of this contract is $___. The Target profit of this contract is $___. The target price (target cost plus target profit) of this contract is $___. [The ceiling price is $___.] The cost sharing for target cost underruns is: Government ___percent; Contractor...
7 CFR 1467.20 - Market-based conservation initiatives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... CORPORATION, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM § 1467... contract, or restoration cost-share agreement. NRCS asserts no direct or indirect interest in these credits... under a WRP easement, 30-year contract, or restoration cost-share agreement, participants are highly...
7 CFR 1467.10 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM § 1467.10 Cost-share... easement, 30-year contract, or restoration cost-share agreement, NRCS will offer to pay at least 50 percent... entity may receive, directly or indirectly, for one or more restoration cost-share agreements, for any...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... economic benefits for the contractor and the Government beyond the Government's contract. (b) Cost-sharing... reasonable, allocable and allowable in accordance with the cost principles of the contract. Allowable costs...
48 CFR 1816.303-70 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... organizations is mandatory in any contract for basic or applied research resulting from an unsolicited proposal... the research, and the contractor has no means of recovering its shared costs on such projects. (2) The... contribution from non-Federal sources; (ii) The extent to which the particular area of research requires...
40 CFR 35.6235 - Cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program... indirect costs of all activities covered by the Core Program Cooperative Agreement. Indian Tribes are not required to share in the cost of Core Program activities. The State must provide its cost share with non...
48 CFR 48.104-4 - Sharing alternative-no-cost settlement method.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... contract, the contracting officer shall analyze the different approaches available to determine which one... the contracting officer's judgment, reliance on other VECP approaches likely would not be more cost-effective, and the no-cost settlement would provide adequate consideration to the Government. Under this...
48 CFR 48.104-4 - Sharing alternative-no-cost settlement method.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... contract, the contracting officer shall analyze the different approaches available to determine which one... the contracting officer's judgment, reliance on other VECP approaches likely would not be more cost-effective, and the no-cost settlement would provide adequate consideration to the Government. Under this...
7 CFR 1410.40 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... such contract. (g) CCC may make cost-share payments for thinning of existing tree stands to benefit... 7 Agriculture 10 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cost-share payments. 1410.40 Section 1410.40... OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM § 1410.40 Cost...
7 CFR 1467.10 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... restrictions on the costs of establishing or installing conservation practices or activities specified in the... easement, 30-year contract, or restoration cost-share agreement, NRCS will offer to pay at least 50 percent... entity may receive, directly or indirectly, for one or more restoration cost-share agreements, for any...
48 CFR 48.104-2 - Sharing acquisition savings.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.104-2 Sharing acquisition savings. (a... value engineering clause or alternate used, and the type of savings, as follows: Government/Contractor... percent for fixed-price contracts; or (2) 75 percent for cost-reimbursement contracts. Value engineering...
42 CFR 438.108 - Cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost sharing. 438.108 Section 438.108 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE Enrollee Rights and Protections § 438.108 Cost sharing. The contract must...
7 CFR 632.17 - Cost-share rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... level required to obtain participation if the main benefits of reclamation are offsite (in the public... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cost-share rates. 632.17 Section 632.17 Agriculture... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL ABANDONED MINE PROGRAM Qualifications § 632.17 Cost-share rates. (a...
Qin, Juanjuan; Zhao, Yuhui; Xia, Liangjie
2018-04-13
Motivated by the industrial practices, this work explores the carbon emission reductions for the manufacturer, while taking into account the capital constraint and the cap-and-trade regulation. To alleviate the capital constraint, two contracts are analyzed: greening financing and cost sharing. We use the Stackelberg game to model four cases as follows: (1) in Case A1, the manufacturer has no greening financing and no cost sharing; (2) in Case A2, the manufacturer has greening financing, but no cost sharing; (3) in Case B1, the manufacturer has no greening financing but has cost sharing; and, (4) in Case B2, the manufacturer has greening financing and cost sharing. Then, using the backward induction method, we derive and compare the equilibrium decisions and profits of the participants in the four cases. We find that the interest rate of green finance does not always negatively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. Meanwhile, the cost sharing from the retailer does not always positively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. When the cost sharing is low, both of the participants' profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are not less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). When the cost sharing is high, both of the participants' profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance).
32 CFR 3.6 - Limitations on cost-sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... THAN CONTRACTS, GRANTS, OR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS FOR PROTOTYPE PROJECTS § 3.6 Limitations on cost... prototype project and cost-sharing is the reason for using OT authority, then the non-Federal amounts... the OT agreement becomes effective. Costs that were incurred for a prototype project by the business...
Carbon Emission Reduction with Capital Constraint under Greening Financing and Cost Sharing Contract
Qin, Juanjuan; Zhao, Yuhui; Xia, Liangjie
2018-01-01
Motivated by the industrial practices, this work explores the carbon emission reductions for the manufacturer, while taking into account the capital constraint and the cap-and-trade regulation. To alleviate the capital constraint, two contracts are analyzed: greening financing and cost sharing. We use the Stackelberg game to model four cases as follows: (1) in Case A1, the manufacturer has no greening financing and no cost sharing; (2) in Case A2, the manufacturer has greening financing, but no cost sharing; (3) in Case B1, the manufacturer has no greening financing but has cost sharing; and, (4) in Case B2, the manufacturer has greening financing and cost sharing. Then, using the backward induction method, we derive and compare the equilibrium decisions and profits of the participants in the four cases. We find that the interest rate of green finance does not always negatively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. Meanwhile, the cost sharing from the retailer does not always positively affect the carbon emission reduction of the manufacturer. When the cost sharing is low, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are not less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). When the cost sharing is high, both of the participants’ profits in Case B1 (under no greening finance) are less than that in Case B2 (under greening finance). PMID:29652859
48 CFR 715.604 - Agency points of contact.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Unsolicited Proposals 715.604 Agency points... responsibility; (5) Organizational conflict of interest; (6) Cost sharing; and (7) Procedures for submission and...
Controlling supply expenses through capitated supply contracting.
Kowalski, J C
1997-07-01
Some providers dealing with the financial challenges of managed care are attempting to control supply expenses through capitated supply contracting and similar risk/reward sharing arrangements. Under such arrangements, a supplier sells products and services to a provider for a fixed, prospective price in exchange for the provider's exclusive business. If expenses exceed the prospectively established amount, the supplier and provider share the loss. Conversely, if expenses are less than the fixed amount, they share the savings. For a capitated supply arrangement to be successful, providers must be able to identify and track supply expense drivers, such as clinical pathways, technology utilization, and product selection and utilization. Sophisticated information systems are needed to capture data, such as total and per-transaction product usage/volume; unit price per item; average and cost per item; average and total cost per transaction; and total cost per outcome. Providers also will need to establish mutually cooperative relationships with the suppliers with whom they contract.
48 CFR 48.104-4 - Sharing alternative-no-cost settlement method.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
...-cost settlement method. 48.104-4 Section 48.104-4 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.104-4 Sharing alternative—no-cost settlement method. In selecting an appropriate mechanism for incorporating a VECP into a...
10 CFR 603.550 - Acceptability of intellectual property.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... contributions of cash or tangible assets. The purpose of cost share is to ensure that the recipient incurs real... AGREEMENTS Pre-Award Business Evaluation Cost Sharing § 603.550 Acceptability of intellectual property. (a) In most instances, the contracting officer should not count costs of patents and other intellectual...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... accounts differently for its own and the Federal Government shares of project costs? 37.570 Section 37.570... the Federal Government shares of project costs? (a) If a participant has Federal procurement contracts... Government's share of project costs under the TIA. This may arise, for example, if a for-profit firm or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... accounts differently for its own and the Federal Government shares of project costs? 37.570 Section 37.570... the Federal Government shares of project costs? (a) If a participant has Federal procurement contracts... Government's share of project costs under the TIA. This may arise, for example, if a for-profit firm or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... accounts differently for its own and the Federal Government shares of project costs? 37.570 Section 37.570... the Federal Government shares of project costs? (a) If a participant has Federal procurement contracts... Government's share of project costs under the TIA. This may arise, for example, if a for-profit firm or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... accounts differently for its own and the Federal Government shares of project costs? 37.570 Section 37.570... the Federal Government shares of project costs? (a) If a participant has Federal procurement contracts... Government's share of project costs under the TIA. This may arise, for example, if a for-profit firm or other...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... than a conservation practice that is included in the WRPO or restoration cost-share agreement, as..., or enhanced through an easement, contract, or restoration cost-share agreement. Agreement means the... Conservation Service or the person delegated authority to act for the Chief. Commenced conversion wetland means...
7 CFR 636.12 - Termination of cost-share agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Termination of cost-share agreements. 636.12 Section 636.12 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.12 - Termination of cost-share agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Termination of cost-share agreements. 636.12 Section 636.12 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.12 - Termination of cost-share agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Termination of cost-share agreements. 636.12 Section 636.12 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.12 - Termination of cost-share agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Termination of cost-share agreements. 636.12 Section 636.12 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.12 - Termination of cost-share agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Termination of cost-share agreements. 636.12 Section 636.12 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVES PROGRAM § 636...
40 CFR 35.6235 - Cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Cost sharing. 35.6235 Section 35.6235 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program...
40 CFR 35.6235 - Cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Cost sharing. 35.6235 Section 35.6235 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program...
40 CFR 35.6235 - Cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 40 Protection of Environment 1 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Cost sharing. 35.6235 Section 35.6235 Protection of Environment ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY GRANTS AND OTHER FEDERAL ASSISTANCE STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Cooperative Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions Core Program...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
48 CFR 48.105 - Relationship to other incentives.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.105 Relationship to other incentives...
25 CFR 39.1202 - Distribution of funds.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... determined by the percentage share which that school's fiscal year 1979 operation and maintenance cost represents in the total fiscal year 1979 operation and maintenance cost for all such schools. (b) To be... Contract School Operation and Maintenance Fund § 39.1202 Distribution of funds. (a) Each contract school...
Optimal health insurance: the case of observable, severe illness.
Chernew, M E; Encinosa, W E; Hirth, R A
2000-09-01
We explore optimal cost-sharing provisions for insurance contracts when individuals have observable, severe diseases with a discrete number of medically appropriate treatment options. Variation in preferences for alternative treatments is unobserved by the insurer and non-contractible. Interest in such situations is increasingly common, exemplified by disease carve-out programs and shared decision-making (SDM) tools. We demonstrate that optimal insurance charges a copay to patients choosing the high-cost treatment and provides consumers of the low-cost treatment a cash payment. A simulation of the effect of such a policy, based on prostate cancer, indicates a substantial reduction in moral hazard.
7 CFR 1467.14 - Transfer of land.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM § 1467.14 Transfer of land. (a... restoration cost-share agreement contract, including the landowner entering into a contract or purchase...
7 CFR 1467.14 - Transfer of land.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM § 1467.14 Transfer of land. (a... restoration cost-share agreement contract, including the landowner entering into a contract or purchase...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Brown, Casey; Carriquiry, Miguel
2007-11-01
This paper explores the performance of a system of economic instruments designed to facilitate the reduction of hydroclimatologic variability-induced impacts on stakeholders of shared water supply. The system is composed of bulk water option contracts between urban water suppliers and agricultural users and insurance indexed on reservoir inflows. The insurance is designed to cover the financial needs of the water supplier in situations where the option is likely to be exercised. Insurance provides the irregularly needed funds for exercising the water options. The combined option contract - reservoir index insurance system creates risk sharing between sectors that is currently lacking in many shared water situations. Contracts are designed for a shared agriculture - urban water system in Metro Manila, Philippines, using optimization and Monte Carlo analysis. Observed reservoir inflows are used to simulate contract performance. Results indicate the option - insurance design effectively smooths water supply costs of hydrologic variability for both agriculture and urban water.
7 CFR 636.11 - Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement. 636.11 Section 636.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.11 - Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement. 636.11 Section 636.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVES PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.11 - Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement. 636.11 Section 636.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.11 - Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement. 636.11 Section 636.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
7 CFR 636.11 - Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 7 Agriculture 6 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false Transfer of interest in a cost-share agreement. 636.11 Section 636.11 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued) NATURAL RESOURCES CONSERVATION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636...
10 CFR 603.530 - Acceptable cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
...-kind contributions that meet all of the following criteria. (a) In the contracting officer's judgment, they represent meaningful cost sharing that demonstrates the recipient's commitment to the success of..., as described in 48 CFR part 31.208-18, that meet all of the criteria in paragraphs (a) through (e) of...
10 CFR 603.535 - Value of proposed real property or equipment.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Value of proposed real property or equipment. 603.535... AGREEMENTS Pre-Award Business Evaluation Cost Sharing § 603.535 Value of proposed real property or equipment. The contracting officer rarely should accept values for cost sharing contributions of real property or...
48 CFR 2448.104-3 - Sharing collateral savings.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING 2448.104-3 Sharing collateral savings. (a) The authority of the HCA to determine that the cost of calculating and tracking collateral savings will exceed the...
48 CFR 2448.104-3 - Sharing collateral savings.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING 2448.104-3 Sharing collateral savings. (a) The authority of the HCA to determine that the cost of calculating and tracking collateral savings will exceed the...
48 CFR 2448.104-3 - Sharing collateral savings.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING 2448.104-3 Sharing collateral savings. (a) The authority of the HCA to determine that the cost of calculating and tracking collateral savings will exceed the...
78 FR 3477 - International Mail Contracts
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-01-16
... they share similar cost and market characteristics. Id. at 5. It notes that the pricing formula and...-filed Postal Service request concerning an additional Global Plus 2C contract. This document invites... announcing that it is entering into an additional Global Plus 2C contract (Agreement).\\1\\ The Postal Service...
23 CFR 635.127 - Agreement provisions regarding overruns in contract time.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-04-01
... ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE Contract Procedures § 635.127 Agreement... types. These rates shall, as a minimum, be established to cover the estimated average daily construction... proportional share, as used in this section, is the ratio of the final contract construction costs eligible for...
23 CFR 635.127 - Agreement provisions regarding overruns in contract time.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE Contract Procedures § 635.127 Agreement... types. These rates shall, as a minimum, be established to cover the estimated average daily construction... proportional share, as used in this section, is the ratio of the final contract construction costs eligible for...
23 CFR 635.127 - Agreement provisions regarding overruns in contract time.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE Contract Procedures § 635.127 Agreement... types. These rates shall, as a minimum, be established to cover the estimated average daily construction... proportional share, as used in this section, is the ratio of the final contract construction costs eligible for...
23 CFR 635.127 - Agreement provisions regarding overruns in contract time.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-04-01
... ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE Contract Procedures § 635.127 Agreement... types. These rates shall, as a minimum, be established to cover the estimated average daily construction... proportional share, as used in this section, is the ratio of the final contract construction costs eligible for...
23 CFR 635.127 - Agreement provisions regarding overruns in contract time.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-04-01
... ENGINEERING AND TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE Contract Procedures § 635.127 Agreement... types. These rates shall, as a minimum, be established to cover the estimated average daily construction... proportional share, as used in this section, is the ratio of the final contract construction costs eligible for...
48 CFR 1816.303-70 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... has no commercial, production, education, or service activities that would benefit from the results of... not-for-profit organizations. (1) Costs to perform research stemming from an unsolicited proposal by...
48 CFR 1816.303-70 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... has no commercial, production, education, or service activities that would benefit from the results of... not-for-profit organizations. (1) Costs to perform research stemming from an unsolicited proposal by...
48 CFR 1816.303-70 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... has no commercial, production, education, or service activities that would benefit from the results of... not-for-profit organizations. (1) Costs to perform research stemming from an unsolicited proposal by...
48 CFR 1816.303-70 - Cost-sharing contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... has no commercial, production, education, or service activities that would benefit from the results of... not-for-profit organizations. (1) Costs to perform research stemming from an unsolicited proposal by...
7 CFR 1468.24 - Contract modifications and transfers of land.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... conservation practices installed under CRP, EQIP, or WRP. (c) CCC may require a participant to refund all or a portion of any assistance earned under a CRP or EQIP contract, or WRP cost-share agreement that was...
7 CFR 1468.22 - Conservation practice operation and maintenance.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... operation and maintenance is occurring. (b) For those persons who are signatories to existing CRP or EQIP contracts, or WRP cost-share agreements, practices will be transferred from EQIP and CRP contracts or WRP... rights and obligations under CRP, EQIP, or WRP will be incorporated into the new CFO contract. Practices...
41 CFR 102-38.295 - May we retain sales proceeds?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
..., equal to your direct costs and reasonably related indirect costs (including your share of the Governmentwide costs to support the eFAS Internet portal and Governmentwide reporting requirements) incurred in... subcontract provisions authorize the proceeds of sale to be credited to the price or cost of the contract or...
41 CFR 102-38.295 - May we retain sales proceeds?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
..., equal to your direct costs and reasonably related indirect costs (including your share of the Governmentwide costs to support the eFAS Internet portal and Governmentwide reporting requirements) incurred in... subcontract provisions authorize the proceeds of sale to be credited to the price or cost of the contract or...
48 CFR 922.804-2 - Construction.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Construction. 922.804-2... APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION Equal Employment Opportunity 922.804-2 Construction. (a) Construction contracts, including cost-sharing contracts, are subject to OFCCP orders applicable in particular...
48 CFR 922.804-2 - Construction.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Construction. 922.804-2... APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION Equal Employment Opportunity 922.804-2 Construction. (a) Construction contracts, including cost-sharing contracts, are subject to OFCCP orders applicable in particular...
48 CFR 922.804-2 - Construction.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Construction. 922.804-2... APPLICATION OF LABOR LAWS TO GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION Equal Employment Opportunity 922.804-2 Construction. (a) Construction contracts, including cost-sharing contracts, are subject to OFCCP orders applicable in particular...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
..., into which a project is divided for budgeting and funding purposes. Continuation award means an award... project period or renewal thereof. Contract means a written procurement contract executed by a recipient... sharing or matching means that portion of project or programs costs not borne by the Federal Government...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... the grantee or subgrantee by other public agencies and institutions, and private organizations and... definitions for grant and subgrant in this section and except where qualified by Federal) a procurement contract under a grant or subgrant, and means a procurement subcontract under a contract. Cost sharing or...
48 CFR 42.707 - Cost-sharing rates and limitations on indirect cost rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... contractor— (i) Is a new or recently reorganized company, and there is no past or recent record of incurred... volume of sales without a commensurate decline in indirect expenses; or (iii) Seeks to enhance its... those that may reasonably be expected to occur during contract performance, thereby causing a cost...
Shared Savings Contracting for Reducing Energy Costs of Defense Facilities.
1983-01-01
also needs additional -4 operation and maintenance help, especially if new equipment is involved. New equipment with sophisticated control technology...process may take time to develop and may be " difficult to integrate with existing financial control practices. For example, the regulations and...will seek a change order on the contract. The potential for such changes, if not controlled , seriously undermines the value of these contracts. DoD
Olson Mechanical and Heavy Rigging, Inc
1989-08-01
neutral advisor with experience in public contract law and two construction experts. The Corps and Olson agreed to share the costs of the neutral... contract law . Unfortunately, he fell ill and was not able to participate. Turner then suggested Mr. Guy Randles of the law finn of Stoel, Rives, Boley...Grey, & Jones, who had extensive experience in government contract law . Turner called Randles, and found he was interested in serving as the neutral
2017-03-01
NAVY SHIPBUILDING Need to Document Rationale for the Use of Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts and Study Effectiveness of Added...Use of Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts and Study Effectiveness of Added Incentives What GAO Found Over 80 percent of the Navy’s shipbuilding...mackinm@gao.gov. Why GAO Did This Study DOD encourages the use of FPI contracts because they allow for equitable sharing of costs savings and risk
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVES PROGRAM § 636.16 Appeals. (a) Any participant..., and cost-share percentages; (2) The designation of approved fish and wildlife priority areas, habitats...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.16 Appeals. (a) Any participant may... cost-share percentages; (2) The designation of approved fish and wildlife priority areas, habitats, or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.16 Appeals. (a) Any participant may... cost-share percentages; (2) The designation of approved fish and wildlife priority areas, habitats, or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.16 Appeals. (a) Any participant may... cost-share percentages; (2) The designation of approved fish and wildlife priority areas, habitats, or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.16 Appeals. (a) Any participant may... cost-share percentages; (2) The designation of approved fish and wildlife priority areas, habitats, or...
7 CFR 636.19 - Access to operating unit.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.19 Access to... information necessary to evaluate the habitat development performance specified in the cost-share agreements...
7 CFR 636.19 - Access to operating unit.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.19 Access to... information necessary to evaluate the habitat development performance specified in the cost-share agreements...
7 CFR 636.19 - Access to operating unit.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.19 Access to... information necessary to evaluate the habitat development performance specified in the cost-share agreements...
7 CFR 636.19 - Access to operating unit.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
..., DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING WILDLIFE HABITAT INCENTIVE PROGRAM § 636.19 Access to... information necessary to evaluate the habitat development performance specified in the cost-share agreements...
75 FR 1403 - Notice of Proposed Information Collection for 1004-0102
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-01-11
... to pay private landowners for the use and/or maintenance of their roads. These fees represent the BLM's share of road construction and maintenance costs under reciprocal right-of-way agreements between... contract, and to amortize road construction and maintenance costs among several road users. Frequency of...
49 CFR 18.24 - Matching or cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... requirement of another Federal grant agreement, a Federal procurement contract, or any other award of Federal... allocability of regular personnel costs. (7) Special standards for third party in-kind contributions. (i) Third.... Except for private donations of right-of-way, contributions and donations shall not be considered State...
1993-06-18
A unique identifying number assigned by the contracting officer that is a binding agreement between the Government and a Vendor. quantity- of -beds The...repair it; maintenance contracts may be costly. Barriers to Implementation • Requires the large amount of funding to link a significant number of ...and follow-on requirements for maintenance, training, and installation. 22. Cross Sharing of Standard Contract Shells A3 2.88 Al112 Local activities
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... annuity. The value of the gift is the cost of the contract. Example (2). An annuitant purchased from a... Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES GIFT TAX; GIFTS MADE AFTER DECEMBER 31, 1954 Transfers § 25.2512-6 Valuation of certain life insurance and annuity...
Zulman, Donna M; Pal Chee, Christine; Wagner, Todd H; Yoon, Jean; Cohen, Danielle M; Holmes, Tyson H; Ritchie, Christine; Asch, Steven M
2015-01-01
Objectives To investigate the relationship between multimorbidity and healthcare utilisation patterns among the highest cost patients in a large, integrated healthcare system. Design In this retrospective cross-sectional study of all patients in the U.S. Veterans Affairs (VA) Health Care System, we aggregated costs of individuals’ outpatient and inpatient care, pharmacy services and VA-sponsored contract care received in 2010. We assessed chronic condition prevalence, multimorbidity as measured by comorbidity count, and multisystem multimorbidity (number of body systems affected by chronic conditions) among the 5% highest cost patients. Using multivariate regression, we examined the association between multimorbidity and healthcare utilisation and costs, adjusting for age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, homelessness and health insurance status. Setting USA VA Health Care System. Participants 5.2 million VA patients. Measures Annual total costs; absolute and share of costs generated through outpatient, inpatient, pharmacy and VA-sponsored contract care; number of visits to primary, specialty and mental healthcare; number of emergency department visits and hospitalisations. Results The 5% highest cost patients (n=261 699) accounted for 47% of total VA costs. Approximately two-thirds of these patients had chronic conditions affecting ≥3 body systems. Patients with cancer and schizophrenia were less likely to have documented comorbid conditions than other high-cost patients. Multimorbidity was generally associated with greater outpatient and inpatient utilisation. However, increased multisystem multimorbidity was associated with a higher outpatient share of total costs (1.6 percentage points per affected body system, p<0.01) but a lower inpatient share of total costs (−0.6 percentage points per affected body system, p<0.01). Conclusions Multisystem multimorbidity is common among high-cost VA patients. While some patients might benefit from disease-specific programmes, for most patients with multimorbidity there is a need for interventions that coordinate and maximise efficiency of outpatient services across multiple conditions. PMID:25882486
The integrated supplier: key to cost management and multi-franchise capitation contracting.
Schuweiler, R C
1996-05-01
Capitation...most healthcare providers do not work under it, comprehend it, or even want it, yet supply capitation contracting seminars are popping up everywhere creating the feeling that the bandwagon is leaving, and it might be time to get on board. Not true. Supply capitation is not for all organizations. Capitation contracting is not easy and there are not many successful models to help the uninitiated. If a panacea is sought for reducing supply costs, capitation is only one component of a systematic strategy to reduce materiel costs. This article suggests a direction using the Group Health Materiel Management (Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, WA) experience as a point of reference. It advocates a systematic approach that focuses on expense reduction in: cost of goods, holding cost of inventory, labor cost associated with all materiel processes, distribution cost (transportation and par stock pick, pack, and replenishment), product utilization, variation in product standards, and waste stream byproducts. At Group Health (GH) these issues are primarily addressed through the use of: information systems, supplier certification/selection processes, group purchasing compliance, supply channel management, supply capitation contracting programs, standardization, and utilization management. Because of managed care organizational structure, Group Health Cooperative supply capitation contracting, as performed at GH, is discussed not as a quick fix solution but in the spirit of sharing our experience with others who may be considering it as a cost savings tactic in the context of a broad-based materiel management strategy. This article highlights the experiences of GH beginning with materiel management's business process assumptions toward multiple-franchise supply capitation.
Study on the contract characteristics of Internet architecture
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fu, Chuan; Zhang, Guoqing; Yang, Jing; Liu, Xiaona
2011-11-01
The importance of Internet architecture goes beyond the technical aspects. The architecture of Internet has a profound influence on the Internet-based economy in term of how the profits are shared by different market participants (Internet Server Provider, Internet Content Provider), since it is the physical foundation upon which the profit-sharing contracts are derived. In order to facilitate the continuing growth of the Internet, it is necessary to systematically study factors that curtail the Internet-based economy including the existing Internet architecture. In this paper, we used transaction cost economics and contract economics as new tools to analyse the contracts derived from the current Internet architecture. This study sheds light on how the macro characteristics of Internet architecture effect the microeconomical decisions of market participants. Based on the existing Internet architecture, we discuss the possibility of promoting Internet-based economy by encouraging user to connect their private stub network to the Internet and giving the user more right of self-governing.
Fraze, Taressa K; Lewis, Valerie A; Tierney, Emily; Colla, Carrie H
2017-12-06
Accountable care organizations (ACOs), a primary care-centric delivery and payment model, aim to promote integrated population health, which may improve care for those with chronic conditions such as diabetes. Research has shown that, overall, the ACO model is effective at reducing costs, but there is substantial variation in how effective different types of ACOs are at impacting costs and improving care delivery. This study examines how ACO organizational characteristics - such as composition, staffing, care management, and experiences with health reform - were associated with quality of care delivered to patients with diabetes. Secondary data were analyzed retrospectively to examine Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) ACOs' performance on diabetes metrics in the first 2 years of ACO contracts. Ordinary least squares was used to analyze 162 MSSP ACOs with publicly available performance data and the National Survey of ACOs. ACOs improved performance significantly for patients with diabetes between contract years 1 and 2. In year 1, also having a private payer contract and an increased number of services within the ACO were positively associated with performance, while having a community health center or a hospital were negatively associated with performance. Better performance in year 1 was negatively associated with improved performance in year 2. This study found that ACOs substantively improved diabetes management within initial contract years. ACOs may need different types of support throughout their contracts to ensure continued improvements in performance.
7 CFR 634.4 - Responsibilities.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
...) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will— (1) Approve 208 water quality management plans, (2) Participate in... enter into contracts to install and maintain best management practices to control agricultural nonpoint... Secretary may designate, (3) Provide technical assistance and share the cost of carrying out best management...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... following address: Director, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Attention: Office of Policy.... (b) Each party must pay its respective share of all costs and fees associated with any contracted or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... following address: Director, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Attention: Office of Policy.... (b) Each party must pay its respective share of all costs and fees associated with any contracted or...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... following address: Director, Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, Attention: Office of Policy.... (b) Each party must pay its respective share of all costs and fees associated with any contracted or...
76 FR 43652 - Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-07-21
... data collection, and cost recovery fee collection. The Crab Rationalization Program Arbitration System... organization notification and report, 5 hours; contract arbitrator report, 4 hours; combined shared arbitration... communities through a limited access system that balances the interests of these groups who depend on these...
7 CFR 1467.15 - Violations and remedies.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM § 1467.15 Violations... contract, or any restoration cost-share agreement involving the participant, the participant shall be given... important wetland functions and values or other rights of the United States under the easement. The...
7 CFR 1467.15 - Violations and remedies.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... OF AGRICULTURE LOANS, PURCHASES, AND OTHER OPERATIONS WETLANDS RESERVE PROGRAM § 1467.15 Violations... contract, or any restoration cost-share agreement involving the participant, the participant shall be given... important wetland functions and values or other rights of the United States under the easement. The...
24 CFR 266.630 - Partial payment of claims.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY RISK-SHARING PROGRAM FOR INSURED AFFORDABLE MULTIFAMILY PROJECT LOANS Contract... other resources available to the project are sufficient to restore the financial viability of the project; (iii) The project is or can (at reasonable cost) be made structurally sound; (iv) The management...
Consumer-driven health care: tangible employer actions.
Beauregard, Thomas R
2004-01-01
In response to double-digit health care cost increases, leading employers are aiming aggressive strategies at changing participant and provider behaviors--strategies that go well beyond the narrow idea of a new cost-sharing design. This article describes the elements of a comprehensive consumer-driven health care strategy and provides examples of tangible consumer-driven health care initiatives in the areas of design, pricing, contracting, support and public policy.
Zulman, Donna M; Pal Chee, Christine; Wagner, Todd H; Yoon, Jean; Cohen, Danielle M; Holmes, Tyson H; Ritchie, Christine; Asch, Steven M
2015-04-16
To investigate the relationship between multimorbidity and healthcare utilisation patterns among the highest cost patients in a large, integrated healthcare system. In this retrospective cross-sectional study of all patients in the U.S. Veterans Affairs (VA) Health Care System, we aggregated costs of individuals' outpatient and inpatient care, pharmacy services and VA-sponsored contract care received in 2010. We assessed chronic condition prevalence, multimorbidity as measured by comorbidity count, and multisystem multimorbidity (number of body systems affected by chronic conditions) among the 5% highest cost patients. Using multivariate regression, we examined the association between multimorbidity and healthcare utilisation and costs, adjusting for age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, homelessness and health insurance status. USA VA Health Care System. 5.2 million VA patients. Annual total costs; absolute and share of costs generated through outpatient, inpatient, pharmacy and VA-sponsored contract care; number of visits to primary, specialty and mental healthcare; number of emergency department visits and hospitalisations. The 5% highest cost patients (n=261,699) accounted for 47% of total VA costs. Approximately two-thirds of these patients had chronic conditions affecting ≥3 body systems. Patients with cancer and schizophrenia were less likely to have documented comorbid conditions than other high-cost patients. Multimorbidity was generally associated with greater outpatient and inpatient utilisation. However, increased multisystem multimorbidity was associated with a higher outpatient share of total costs (1.6 percentage points per affected body system, p<0.01) but a lower inpatient share of total costs (-0.6 percentage points per affected body system, p<0.01). Multisystem multimorbidity is common among high-cost VA patients. While some patients might benefit from disease-specific programmes, for most patients with multimorbidity there is a need for interventions that coordinate and maximise efficiency of outpatient services across multiple conditions. Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.
The Economics of Provider Payment Reform: Are Accountable Care Organizations the Answer?
Feldman, Roger
2015-08-01
A remarkable consensus has developed that the fee-for-service (FFS) approach for paying medical providers must be replaced. This payment approach is said to increase the volume of services without improving care coordination. In response to these calls, Medicare and private payers are experimenting with payment systems that combine the basic element of FFS - a fee for each service - with arrangements that allow providers to share the savings if they hold total spending per patient below a targeted amount. Medicare's accountable care organizations (ACOs) embody the shared savings approach to payment reform. Private payers have introduced total cost of care contracting (TCOC) in several locations. This article questions the consensus that FFS must go. If the fees are too high, then someone needs to "bite the bullet" and reduce fees in key areas. Hoping to control overspending by investment in ACOs is wishful thinking. I describe the theory and practice of shared savings payment systems and summarize recent TCOC contracting initiatives in the private sector. Medicare's shared savings approach is likely to be less effective than private contracts. Cutting providers' fees would be more efficient. Finally, the new payment models in the Affordable Care Act will not ease the problem of high prices for private payers. Copyright © 2015 by Duke University Press.
7 CFR 625.10 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... recovery of listed species under the ESA, candidate, or other species covered by this regulation. These protections operate with lands enrolled in the HFRP and are valid for as long as the landowner is in compliance with the terms and conditions of such assurances, any associated permit, the easement, contract...
7 CFR 625.10 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... recovery of listed species under the ESA, candidate, or other species covered by this regulation. These protections operate with lands enrolled in the HFRP and are valid for as long as the landowner is in compliance with the terms and conditions of such assurances, any associated permit, the easement, contract...
7 CFR 625.10 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... recovery of listed species under the ESA, candidate, or other species covered by this regulation. These protections operate with lands enrolled in the HFRP and are valid for as long as the landowner is in compliance with the terms and conditions of such assurances, any associated permit, the easement, contract...
7 CFR 625.10 - Cost-share payments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... recovery of listed species under the ESA, candidate, or other species covered by this regulation. These protections operate with lands enrolled in the HFRP and are valid for as long as the landowner is in compliance with the terms and conditions of such assurances, any associated permit, the easement, contract...
Pharma rebates, pharmacy benefit managers and employer outcomes.
Ali, Ozden Gür; Mantrala, Murali
2010-12-01
Corporate employers contract with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) with the goals of lowering their employee prescription drug coverage costs while maintaining health care quality. However, little is known about how employer-PBM contract elements and brand drugmakers' rebates combine to influence a profit-maximizing PBM's actions, and the impact of those actions on the employer's outcomes. To shed more light on these issues, the authors build and analyze a mathematical simulation model of a competitive pharmaceutical market comprised of one generic and two branded drugs, and involving a PBM contracted by a corporate employer to help it lower prescription drug costs while achieving a minimum desired quality of health care for its employees. The brand drugmakers' rebate offers, the PBM's assignment of drugs to formulary tiers, and the resulting employer outcomes under varying contracts and pharma brand marketing mix environmental scenarios are analyzed to provide insights. The findings include that the pharma brands offer rebates for the PBM's ability to move prescription share away from the unpreferred brand, but reduce these offers when the PBM's contract requires it to proactively influence physicians to prescribe the generic drug alternative. Further, Pareto optimal contracts that provide the highest health benefit for a given employer cost budget for the employer are analyzed to provide managerial implications. They are found to involve strong PBM influence on physician prescribing to discourage unpreferred brands, as well as high patient copayment requirements for unpreferred brands to align the patient prescription fill probability with the formulary, while other copayment requirements provide an instrument to determine the level of desired health benefit-cost tradeoff.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wang, Sheng-Dong; Zhou, Yong-Wu; Wang, Jun-Ping
2010-10-01
This article discusses production and order as well as advertising coordination issues in a single-manufacturer single-buyer supply chain, where the manufacturer sells a newsvendor-type product through the buyer who faces a random demand depending on advertising expenditure and selling price. The buyer has two ordering opportunities: the one happens before the beginning of the season, and the other takes place at the end of the season. The ordered items are produced by the manufacturer in two production modes for different requirements. The first production mode is relatively cheap but requires a long lead-time, whereas the second is expensive but offers quick response. Under such a setting, the centralised and decentralised decision models are developed, respectively, and the closed form solution to each model is provided as well. Moreover, we point out that the traditional revenue-sharing contract fails to coordinate the supply chain. We thus propose an improved revenue-sharing contract that requests the manufacturer not only shares the buyer's revenue but also bears a portion of the buyer's operating costs. Such a contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate its profit between two parties.
2016-01-01
fund its share of program costs , and how the program will manage divergence from a common configuration baseline. In the formal agreement establishing...total spare parts than if all the participants operated on a purely national basis because of differentials in demand, particularly for high- cost parts...by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts , whose findings were published in 2011, the international spares pooling contracts did not work
24 CFR 982.616 - Shared housing: Lease and HAP contract.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... 24 Housing and Urban Development 4 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Shared housing: Lease and HAP... Types Shared Housing § 982.616 Shared housing: Lease and HAP contract. For assistance in a shared housing unit, there is a separate HAP contract and lease for each assisted family. ...
Xu, Xingzhong
2018-01-01
In a two-echelon new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, the coordination and sustainability problem is investigated. The risk-averse retailer, who makes sales effort and undertakes the incurred effort cost, decides the order quantity and sales effort level under the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion. We derive the optimal centralized decisions of a vertically integrated supply chain where the retailer is owned by the manufacturer. Taking such a centralized case as the benchmark, we prove that the subsidy-sharing-based wholesale price (SS-WP) contract fails to coordinate the NEV supply chain under the decentralized case where the retailer makes decisions independently. Then we design a subsidy-sharing-based sales rebate/penalty (SS-SRP) contract and derive the contract parameters to achieve coordination. We evaluate the coordination efficiency of this contract and find that a well-designed SS-SRP contract can promote the NEV sales and lead to a Pareto-improving win-win situation for both the NEV manufacturer and retailer compared to the non-coordination case. A series of numerical experiments are carried out to compare the effects of significant parameters under the SS-WP and SS-SRP contract and provide additional observations and implications, including an indication of the necessary conditions to sustainably maintain the NEV supply chain. PMID:29912926
Torts to contract? Moving from informed consent to shared decision-making.
Monico, Edward P; Calise, Arthur; Calabro, Joseph
2008-01-01
Many claims of medical malpractice arise from a breakdown in communication between physician and patient. As a result, medical decision-making may change from an informed consent model to a shared decision-making strategy. Shared decision-making, a contract derivative, will trigger contract obligations and change the face of medical malpractice from tort to contract.
Medical Devices Transition to Information Systems: Lessons Learned
Charters, Kathleen G.
2012-01-01
Medical devices designed to network can share data with a Clinical Information System (CIS), making that data available within clinician workflow. Some lessons learned by transitioning anesthesia reporting and monitoring devices (ARMDs) on a local area network (LAN) to integration of anesthesia documentation within a CIS include the following categories: access, contracting, deployment, implementation, planning, security, support, training and workflow integration. Areas identified for improvement include: Vendor requirements for access reconciled with the organizations’ security policies and procedures. Include clauses supporting transition from stand-alone devices to information integrated into clinical workflow in the medical device procurement contract. Resolve deployment and implementation barriers that make the process less efficient and more costly. Include effective field communication and creative alternatives in planning. Build training on the baseline knowledge of trainees. Include effective help desk processes and metrics. Have a process for determining where problems originate when systems share information. PMID:24199054
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... healthy newborn nursery; and (6) Custodial care beds. (c) Measurement for teaching activity. The factor...: (A) Is approved by one of the national organizations listed in § 415.152 of this chapter. (B) May... under a risk-sharing contract with an eligible organization under section 1876 of the Act or with a...
Clinical coordination in accountable care organizations: A qualitative study.
Lewis, Valerie A; Schoenherr, Karen; Fraze, Taressa; Cunningham, Aleen
2016-12-06
Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are becoming a common payment and delivery model. Despite widespread interest, little empirical research has examined what efforts or strategies ACOs are using to change care and reduce costs. Knowledge of ACOs' clinical efforts can provide important context for understanding ACO performance, particularly to distinguish arenas where ACOs have and have not attempted care transformation. The aim of the study was to understand ACOs' efforts to change clinical care during the first 18 months of ACO contracts. We conducted semistructured interviews between July and December 2013. Our sample includes ACOs that began performance contracts in 2012, including Medicare Shared Savings Program and Pioneer participants, stratified across key factors. In total, we conducted interviews with executives from 30 ACOs. Iterative qualitative analysis identified common patterns and themes. ACOs in the first year of performance contracts are commonly focusing on four areas: first, transforming primary care through increased access and team-based care; second, reducing avoidable emergency department use; third, strengthening practice-based care management; and fourth, developing new boundary spanner roles and activities. ACOs were doing little around transforming specialty care, acute and postacute care, or standardizing care across practices during the first 18 months of ACO performance contracts. Results suggest that cost reductions associated with ACOs in the first years of contracts may be related to primary care. Although in the long term many hope ACOs will achieve coordination across a wide array of care settings and providers, in the short term providers under ACO contracts are focused largely on primary care-related strategies. Our work provides a template of the common areas of clinical activity in the first years of ACO contracts, which may be informative to providers considering becoming an ACO. Further research will be needed to understand how these strategies are associated with performance.This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial License 4.0 (CCBY-NC), where it is permissible to download and share the work provided it is properly cited. The work cannot be changed in any way or used commercially without permission from the journal.
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-04-09
... Contracts Overlying 10 Shares of a Security (``Mini-Options Contracts'') and Implementing Rule Text... contracts'') and implement rule text necessary to distinguish mini-options contracts from option contracts overlying 100 shares of a security (``standard contracts''). The text of the proposed rule change is...
H., Hildebrandt; C., Hermann; R., Knittel; M., Richter-Reichhelm; A., Siegel; W., Witzenrath
2010-01-01
Introduction Integrated care solutions need supportive financial incentives. In this paper, we describe the financial architecture and operative details of the integrated pilot Gesundes Kinzigtal. Description of integrated care case Located in Southwest Germany, Gesundes Kinzigtal is one of the few population-based integrated care approaches in Germany, organising care across all health service sectors and indications. The system serving around half of the population of the region is run by a regional health management company (Gesundes Kinzigtal GmbH) in cooperation with the physicians' network in the region (MQNK), a German health care management company with a background in medical sociology and health economics (OptiMedis AG) and with two statutory health insurers (among them is the biggest health insurer in Southwest Germany: AOK Baden-Württemberg). Discussion and (preliminary) conclusion The shared savings contract between Gesundes Kinzigtal GmbH and the two health insurers, providing financial incentives for managers and health care providers to realize a substantial efficiency gain, could be an appropriate contractual base of Gesundes Kinzigtal's population health gain approach. This approach is based on the assumption that a more effective trans-sector organization of Germany's health care system and increased investments in well-designed preventive programmes will lead to a reduction in morbidity, and in particular to a reduced incidence and prevalence of chronic diseases. This, in turn, is to lead to a comparative reduction in health care cost. Although the comparative cost in the Kinzigtal region has been reduced from the onset of Gesundes Kinzigtal Integrated Care, only future research will have to demonstrate whether—and to what extent—cost reduction may be attributed to a real population health gain. PMID:20689772
48 CFR 48.104-1 - Determining sharing period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.104-1 Determining sharing period. (a.... (c) For engineering-development contracts and contracts containing low-rate-initial-production or...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Cunningham, P.
For energy users, the driving force that makes renegotiating an electric contract realistic is the deregulation of the electric utility industry. Monumental changes are occurring that has the whole industry in chaos at the moment. Utilities are scrambling to retain or gain market share. New alternatives for power supplies will become available. Regulatory agencies are becoming more flexible. Many users are finding the utilities very willing to change from a rigid approach to a customer oriented attitude in anticipation of further changes in the deregulation process. Now is the time to renegotiate your electric contracts. The paper discusses the statusmore » of electric deregulation; new technology; utility company reactions; regulatory agency attitudes; independent power producers; power marketers and brokers; wheeling or transporting power; commoditization of electricity; power costs; stranded investment; and utilities` willingness to negotiate new contracts.« less
State of the NASA Aeropropulsion Discipline Input from the Glenn Research Center
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Reddy, D. R.; Schmidt, George
2017-01-01
PROBLEM: Current power turbines are designed for single operating speed, and performance degrades rapidly as power turbine speed decreases. OBJECTIVES: Demonstrate 50 improvement in efficient operational capability using a Variable Speed Power Turbine concept. (Refer to figure lower left, where the goal is to raise efficiency from the current technology line to the green line which represents the AVSPOT VSPT goal.APPROACH: Conduct RD required to advance the technology readiness level of VSPT technology to TRL 4Partner with DoD and leverage DOD AVSPOT contract to share government cost (5050) of contracted efforts to GE and PW for VSPT TRL 45 demonstration.
Applying secret sharing for HIS backup exchange.
Kuroda, Tomohiro; Kimura, Eizen; Matsumura, Yasushi; Yamashita, Yoshinori; Hiramatsu, Haruhiko; Kume, Naoto; Sato, Atsushi
2013-01-01
To secure business continuity is indispensable for hospitals to fulfill its social responsibility under disasters. Although to back up the data of the hospital information system (HIS) at multiple remote sites is a key strategy of business continuity plan (BCP), the requirements to treat privacy sensitive data jack up the cost for the backup. The secret sharing is a method to split an original secret message up so that each individual piece is meaningless, but putting sufficient number of pieces together to reveal the original message. The secret sharing method eases us to exchange HIS backups between multiple hospitals. This paper evaluated the feasibility of the commercial secret sharing solution for HIS backup through several simulations. The result shows that the commercial solution is feasible to realize reasonable HIS backup exchange platform when template of contract between participating hospitals is ready.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Wu, Zhihui; Chen, Dongyan; Yu, Hui
2016-07-01
In this paper, the problem of the coordination policy is investigated for vendor-managed consignment inventory supply chain subject to consumer return. Here, the market demand is assumed to be affected by promotional effort and consumer return policy. The optimal consignment inventory and the optimal promotional effort level are proposed under the decentralized and centralized decisions. Based on the optimal decision conditions, the markdown allowance-promotional cost-sharing contract is investigated to coordinate the supply chain. Subsequently, the comparison between the two extreme policies shows that full-refund policy dominates the no-return policy when the returning cost and the positive effect of return policy are satisfied certain conditions. Finally, a numerical example is provided to illustrate the impacts of consumer return policy on the coordination contract and optimal profit as well as the effectiveness of the proposed supply chain decision.
Xu, Lang; Wang, Chuanxu; Li, Hui
2017-06-08
We focus on the impacts of technological spillovers and environmental awareness in a two-echelon supply chain with one-single supplier and one-single manufacturer to reduce carbon emission. In this supply chain, carbon abatement investment becomes one of key factors of cutting costs and improving profits, which is reducing production costs in the components and products-the investment from players in supply chain. On the basis of optimality theory, the centralized and decentralized models are respectively established to investigate the optimal decisions and profits. Further, setting the players' profits of the decentralized scenario as the disagreement points, we propose a bargaining-coordination contract through revenue-cost sharing to enhance the performance. Finally, by theoretical comparison and numerical analysis, the results show that: (i) The optimal profits of players and supply chain improve as technological spillovers and environmental awareness increase, and the profits of them in the bargaining-coordination contract are higher than that in the decentralized scenario; (ii) Technological spillovers between the players amplify the impact of "free-ride" behavior, in which the supplier always incentives the manufacturer to improve carbon emission intensity, but the cooperation will achieves and the profits will improve only when technological spillovers and environmental awareness are great; (iii) The contract can effectively achieve coordinated supply chain, and improve carbon abatement investment.
48 CFR 16.405-1 - Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-incentive-fee... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. (a) Description. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... sharing agreements, contracts for scarce medical specialist services and contracts for other medical... medical specialist services and contracts for other medical services. The Under Secretary for Health is... specialist services at Department of Veterans Affairs health care facilities (including, but not limited to...
European Science Notes Information Bulletin Reports on Current European/Middle Eastern Science
1990-02-01
Exploitation and Optimum Use of discussed the relationship of the Framework program to Biological Resources the 1992 single European market. This...operation: Shared-cost contracts]. hancement of food quality; (2) food hygiene, safety, and D. The Exploitation and optimum use or Biological toxicology...Table 9), and dis- bracing the biological sciences, agriculture, geologi- semination of research results (see Table 10). cal, and marine and deep sea
Defense Acquisition: Overview, Issues, and Options for Congress
2007-06-04
Unified Combatant Commands ( UCCs ); the Defense Agencies; and DOD field activities. The PPBES process consists of four stages; planning, programming...thorough market research is performed for a procurement action. But, opponents could argue that the cost and time necessary to perform the analysis may...they sought, on the other, that the industrialists in their own states and districts got their fair share , or more, of the military contracts there
Zaric, Gregory S; Xie, Bin
2009-01-01
Health insurers are increasingly making use of risk-sharing agreements with drug manufacturers to manage uncertainties regarding the costs and effectiveness of new drugs. Several risk-sharing models exist including those based on sales volume, achievement of clinical thresholds, and achievement of cost-effectiveness thresholds. The objective of this article is to compare two risk-sharing arrangements and to investigate conditions under which each is preferable from the perspective of the payer and the manufacturer. We develop two two-period models to compare two risk-sharing arrangements between a payer and a drug manufacturer in which there is uncertainty about the effectiveness of the new drug. In the first risk-sharing agreement, the drug is listed on a formulary in the first period but delisted in the second period if the net monetary benefit in the first period is negative. In the second risk-sharing agreement, the manufacturer pays a rebate in each period if the net monetary benefit in that period is negative. We show that the relative performance of the two arrangements depends on several factors and that neither arrangement is always preferred. Additionally, we are able to identify situations in which a payer and a manufacturer would prefer the same plan and other situations in which the two parties would disagree on which plan was most desirable. Because neither risk-sharing arrangement is always preferred, payers and manufacturers must carefully consider the characteristics of their individual situation when entering into such contracts.
48 CFR 16.304 - Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-incentive-fee...-incentive-fee contracts. A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides... allowable costs to total target costs. Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts are covered in subpart 16.4...
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bejmuk, Bohdan I.; Williams, Larry
1992-01-01
As a result of limited resources and tight fiscal constraints over the past several years, the defense and aerospace industries have experienced a downturn in business activity. The impact of fewer contracts being awarded has placed a greater emphasis for effectiveness and efficiency on industry contractors. It is clear that a reallocation of resources is required for America to continue to lead the world in space and technology. The key to technological and economic survival is the transforming of existing programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program, into more cost efficient programs so as to divert the savings to other NASA programs. The partnership between Rockwell International and NASA and their joint improvement efforts that resulted in significant streamlining and cost reduction measures to Rockwell International Space System Division's work on the Space Shuttle System Integration Contract is described. This work was a result of an established Cost Effectiveness Enhancement (CEE) Team formed initially in Fiscal Year 1991, and more recently expanded to a larger scale CEE Initiative in 1992. By working closely with the customer in agreeing to contract content, obtaining management endorsement and commitment, and involving the employees in total quality management (TQM) and continuous improvement 'teams,' the initial annual cost reduction target was exceeded significantly. The CEE Initiative helped reduce the cost of the Shuttle Systems Integration contract while establishing a stronger program based upon customer needs, teamwork, quality enhancements, and cost effectiveness. This was accomplished by systematically analyzing, challenging, and changing the established processes, practices, and systems. This examination, in nature, was work intensive due to the depth and breadth of the activity. The CEE Initiative has provided opportunities to make a difference in the way Rockwell and NASA work together - to update the methods and processes of the organizations. The future success of NASA space programs and Rockwell hinges upon the ability to adopt new, more efficient and effective work processes. Efficiency, proficiency, cost effectiveness, and teamwork are a necessity for economic survival. Continuous improvement initiatives like the CEE are, and will continue to be, vehicles by which the road can be traveled with a vision to the future.
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Bejmuk, Bohdan I.; Williams, Larry
As a result of limited resources and tight fiscal constraints over the past several years, the defense and aerospace industries have experienced a downturn in business activity. The impact of fewer contracts being awarded has placed a greater emphasis for effectiveness and efficiency on industry contractors. It is clear that a reallocation of resources is required for America to continue to lead the world in space and technology. The key to technological and economic survival is the transforming of existing programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program, into more cost efficient programs so as to divert the savings to other NASA programs. The partnership between Rockwell International and NASA and their joint improvement efforts that resulted in significant streamlining and cost reduction measures to Rockwell International Space System Division's work on the Space Shuttle System Integration Contract is described. This work was a result of an established Cost Effectiveness Enhancement (CEE) Team formed initially in Fiscal Year 1991, and more recently expanded to a larger scale CEE Initiative in 1992. By working closely with the customer in agreeing to contract content, obtaining management endorsement and commitment, and involving the employees in total quality management (TQM) and continuous improvement 'teams,' the initial annual cost reduction target was exceeded significantly. The CEE Initiative helped reduce the cost of the Shuttle Systems Integration contract while establishing a stronger program based upon customer needs, teamwork, quality enhancements, and cost effectiveness. This was accomplished by systematically analyzing, challenging, and changing the established processes, practices, and systems. This examination, in nature, was work intensive due to the depth and breadth of the activity. The CEE Initiative has provided opportunities to make a difference in the way Rockwell and NASA work together - to update the methods and processes of the organizations. The future success of NASA space programs and Rockwell hinges upon the ability to adopt new, more efficient and effective work processes. Efficiency, proficiency, cost effectiveness, and teamwork are a necessity for economic survival. Continuous improvement initiatives like the CEE are, and will continue to be, vehicles by which the road can be traveled with a vision to the future.
Specialty service contracting.
Malcolm, C L; Fukui, M
1993-01-01
Package pricing of specific services and procedures can be an effective cost-containment and marketing tool for payers and providers. Payers can secure fixed prices at discounted rates, and hospitals and physicians can retain and gain market share in an increasingly competitive health care market. Successful implementation of a package pricing strategy, however, requires a careful assessment of both market and operational factors. This chapter outlines how to identify opportunities for package pricing and how to establish rates and procedures.
Business Models for Cost Sharing & Capability Sustainment
2012-08-18
digital technology into existing mechanical products and their supporting processes can only work correctly if the firm carrying it out changes its entire...average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed...Capability Sustainment 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK
Guide to Policies and Contracts on Job Sharing in the Schools.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Moorman, Barbara; And Others
Job Sharing--two persons sharing one full-time position--is becoming increasingly popular in the nation's schools. This guide provides information on policies and contracts and collective bargaining implications, based on practices in California, where the job sharing is allowed in 27 percent of the school districts. Provisions of policies and…
Minority business bidding for local government contracts: the complexity of availability.
Bangs, Ralph L; Murrell, Audrey; Constance-Huggins, Monique
2007-01-01
While minority-business enterprises (MBEs) have gained some access to local government contracts during the last three decades, these firms continue to receive a small share of local government contract spending relative to the number of available firms. Researchers have suggested two general explanations for the low representation of MBEs in contract awards: (1) lack of qualifications and capacity among MBEs, and (2) public and private discrimination against MBEs in contracting processes. This study on prime contract opportunities in a Northern central city and county with a large minority population finds that low bid rates greatly contribute to the low MBE shares of prime contracts and that bidding is reduced by both local government processes and characteristics of the firms. Some implications of these findings are that local governments need to: (1) monitor MBE shares of prime contract bids by size of contract and use share of bids as one measure of program and organizational effectiveness; (2) identify MBEs that are qualified for prime contracts and encourage and help interested firms to submit competitive bids; and (3) ensure that local government policies and practices do not diminish access to information about prime contract opportunities for qualified and interested minority firms. Another implication is that bidders lists should not be a primary basis for determining MBE availability, since many qualified and interested MBEs do not bid because of perceived barriers in local government.
48 CFR 1316.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-award-fee... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 1316.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts. Insert clause 1352.216-72, Determination of Award Fee, in all cost-plus-award-fee contracts. ...
48 CFR 216.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-award-fee... Contracts 216.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts. (b) Application. The cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract... avoid— (1) Establishing cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts when the criteria for cost-plus-fixed-fee...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
NONE
1993-06-01
In September 1986 a contract was signed between Chloride Silent Power Limited (CSPL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) entitled ``Sodium Sulfur Electric Vehicle Battery Engineering Program``. The aim of the cost shared program was to advance the state of the art of sodium sulfur batteries for electric vehicle propulsion. Initially, the work statement was non-specific in regard to the vehicle to be used as the design and test platform. Under a separate contract with the DOE, Ford Motor Company was designing an advanced electric vehicle drive system. This program, called the ETX II, used a modified Aerostar van for itsmore » platform. In 1987, the ETX II vehicle was adopted for the purposes of this contract. This report details the development and testing of a series of battery designs and concepts which led to the testing, in the US, of three substantial battery deliverables.« less
48 CFR 216.306 - Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-fixed-fee... SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 216.306 Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. (c) Limitations. (i) Except as provided in...
48 CFR 16.304 - Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. 16.304 Section 16.304 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 16.304 Cost-plus...
48 CFR 36.215 - Special procedures for cost-reimbursement contracts for construction.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... cost-reimbursement contracts for construction. 36.215 Section 36.215 Federal Acquisition Regulations...-reimbursement contracts for construction. Contracting officers may use a cost-reimbursement contract to acquire... limitation on cost-reimbursement contracts). [48 FR 42356, Sept. 19, 1983. Redesignated at 62 FR 272, Jan. 2...
Will a catch share for whales improve social welfare?
Smith, Martin D; Asche, Frank; Bennear, Lori S; Havice, Elizabeth; Read, Andrew J; Squires, Dale
2014-01-01
We critique a proposal to use catch shares to manage transboundary wildlife resources with potentially high non-extractive values, and we focus on the case of whales. Because whales are impure public goods, a policy that fails to capture all nonmarket benefits (due to free riding) could lead to a suboptimal outcome. Even if free riding were overcome, whale shares would face four implementation challenges. First, a whale share could legitimize the international trade in whale meat and expand the whale meat market. Second, a legal whale trade creates monitoring and enforcement challenges similar to those of organizations that manage highly migratory species such as tuna. Third, a whale share could create a new political economy of management that changes incentives and increases costs for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve the current level of conservation. Fourth, a whale share program creates new logistical challenges for quota definition and allocation regardless of whether the market for whale products expands or contracts. Each of these issues, if left unaddressed, could result in lower overall welfare for society than under the status quo.
Evolutionary dynamics of collective index insurance.
Pacheco, Jorge M; Santos, Francisco C; Levin, Simon A
2016-03-01
Index-based insurances offer promising opportunities for climate-risk investments in developing countries. Indeed, contracts conditional on, e.g., weather or livestock indexes can be cheaper to set up than conventional indemnity-based insurances, while offering a safety net to vulnerable households, allowing them to eventually escape poverty traps. Moreover, transaction costs by insurance companies may be additionally reduced if contracts, instead of arranged with single households, are endorsed by collectives of households that bear the responsibility of managing the division of the insurance coverage by its members whenever the index is surpassed, allowing for additional flexibility in what concerns risk-sharing and also allowing insurance companies to avoid the costs associated with moral hazard. Here we resort to a population dynamics framework to investigate under which conditions household collectives may find collective index insurances attractive, when compared with individual index insurances. We assume risk sharing among the participants of each collective, and model collective action in terms of an N-person threshold game. Compared to less affordable individual index insurances, we show how collective index insurances lead to a coordination problem in which the adoption of index insurances may become the optimal decision, spreading index insurance coverage to the entire population. We further investigate the role of risk-averse and risk-prone behaviors, as well as the role of partial correlation between insurance coverage and actual loss of crops, and in which way these affect the original coordination thresholds.
48 CFR 1552.217-72 - Option to extend the term of the contract-cost-plus-award-fee contract.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... of the contract-cost-plus-award-fee contract. 1552.217-72 Section 1552.217-72 Federal Acquisition...-award-fee contract. As prescribed in 1517.208(c), insert this contract clause in cost-plus-award-fee... Term of the Contract—Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract (APR 1984) (a) The Government has the option to...
48 CFR 15.408 - Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.408... contemplated. (b) Price Reduction for Defective Certified Cost or Pricing Data. The contracting officer shall... Certified Cost or Pricing Data, in solicitations and contracts when it is contemplated that certified cost...
Determinants of success in Shared Savings Programs: An analysis of ACO and market characteristics.
Ouayogodé, Mariétou H; Colla, Carrie H; Lewis, Valerie A
2017-03-01
Medicare's Accountable Care Organization (ACO) programs introduced shared savings to traditional Medicare, which allow providers who reduce health care costs for their patients to retain a percentage of the savings they generate. To examine ACO and market factors associated with superior financial performance in Medicare ACO programs. We obtained financial performance data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); we derived market-level characteristics from Medicare claims; and we collected ACO characteristics from the National Survey of ACOs for 215 ACOs. We examined the association between ACO financial performance and ACO provider composition, leadership structure, beneficiary characteristics, risk bearing experience, quality and process improvement capabilities, physician performance management, market competition, CMS-assigned financial benchmark, and ACO contract start date. We examined two outcomes from Medicare ACOs' first performance year: savings per Medicare beneficiary and earning shared savings payments (a dichotomous variable). When modeling the ACO ability to save and earn shared savings payments, we estimated positive regression coefficients for a greater proportion of primary care providers in the ACO, more practicing physicians on the governing board, physician leadership, active engagement in reducing hospital re-admissions, a greater proportion of disabled Medicare beneficiaries assigned to the ACO, financial incentives offered to physicians, a larger financial benchmark, and greater ACO market penetration. No characteristic of organizational structure was significantly associated with both outcomes of savings per beneficiary and likelihood of achieving shared savings. ACO prior experience with risk-bearing contracts was positively correlated with savings and significantly increased the likelihood of receiving shared savings payments. In the first year, performance is quite heterogeneous, yet organizational structure does not consistently predict performance. Organizations with large financial benchmarks at baseline have greater opportunities to achieve savings. Findings on prior risk bearing suggest that ACOs learn over time under risk-bearing contracts. Given the lack of predictive power for organizational characteristics, CMS should continue to encourage diversity in organizational structures for ACO participants, and provide alternative funding and risk bearing mechanisms to continue to allow a diverse group of organizations to participate. III. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Determinants of Success in Shared Savings Programs: An Analysis of ACO and Market Characteristics
Colla, Carrie H.; Lewis, Valerie A.
2016-01-01
Background Medicare’s Accountable Care Organization (ACO) programs introduced shared savings to traditional Medicare, which allow providers who reduce health care costs for their patients to retain a percentage of the savings they generate. Objective To examine ACO and market factors associated with superior financial performance in Medicare ACO programs. Methods We obtained financial performance data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS); we derived market-level characteristics from Medicare claims; and we collected ACO characteristics from the National Survey of ACOs for 215 ACOs. We examined the association between ACO financial performance and ACO provider composition, leadership structure, beneficiary characteristics, risk bearing experience, quality and process improvement capabilities, physician performance management, market competition, CMS-assigned financial benchmark, and ACO contract start date. We examined two outcomes from Medicare ACOs’ first performance year: savings per Medicare beneficiary and earning shared savings payments (a dichotomous variable). Results When modeling the ACO ability to save and earn shared savings payments, we estimated positive regression coefficients for a greater proportion of primary care providers in the ACO, more practicing physicians on the governing board, physician leadership, active engagement in reducing hospital re-admissions, a greater proportion of disabled Medicare beneficiaries assigned to the ACO, financial incentives offered to physicians, a larger financial benchmark, and greater ACO market penetration. No characteristic of organizational structure was significantly associated with both outcomes of savings per beneficiary and likelihood of achieving shared savings. ACO prior experience with risk-bearing contracts was positively correlated with savings and significantly increased the likelihood of receiving shared savings payments. Conclusions In the first year performance is quite heterogeneous, yet organizational structure does not consistently predict performance. Organizations with large financial benchmarks at baseline have greater opportunities to achieve savings. Findings on prior risk bearing suggest that ACOs learn over time under risk-bearing contracts. Implications Given the lack of predictive power for organizational characteristics, CMS should continue to encourage diversity in organizational structures for ACO participants, and provide alternative funding and risk bearing mechanisms to continue to allow a diverse group of organizations to participate. Level of evidence III PMID:27687917
48 CFR 1516.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Cost-plus-award-fee... AGENCY CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 1516.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts. ...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-06-12
... trading option contracts overlying 1,000 SPDR[supreg] S&P 500[supreg] exchange-traded fund shares (``SPY''),\\3\\ or (``Jumbo SPY Options'').\\4\\ Whereas standard options contracts represent a deliverable of 100... the number of deliverable shares, Jumbo SPY Options have the same terms and contract characteristics...
48 CFR 29.402-2 - Foreign cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Foreign cost-reimbursement... GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS TAXES Contract Clauses 29.402-2 Foreign cost-reimbursement contracts. (a) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.229-8, Taxes—Foreign Cost-Reimbursement...
Davidson, Carolyn; Steinberg, Daniel; Margolis, Robert
2015-02-04
We report that over the past several years, third-party-ownership (TPO) structures for residential photovoltaic (PV) systems have become the predominant ownership model in the US residential market. Under a TPO contract, the PV system host typically makes payments to the third-party owner of the system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the total TPO contract payments made by the customer can differ significantly from payments in which the system host directly purchases the system. Furthermore, payments can vary depending on TPO contract structure. To date, a paucity of data on TPO contracts has precluded studies evaluating trends in TPO contract cost. Thismore » study relies on a sample of 1113 contracts for residential PV systems installed in 2010–2012 under the California Solar Initiative to evaluate how the timing of payments under a TPO contract impacts the ultimate cost of the system to the customer. Furthermore, we evaluate how the total cost of TPO systems to customers has changed through time, and the degree to which contract costs have tracked trends in the installed costs of a PV system. We find that the structure of the contract and the timing of the payments have financial implications for the customer: (1) power-purchase contracts, on average, cost more than leases, (2) no-money-down contracts are more costly than prepaid contracts, assuming a customer's discount rate is lower than 17% and (3) contracts that include escalator clauses cost more, for both power-purchase agreements and leases, at most plausible discount rates. Additionally, all contract costs exhibit a wide range, and do not parallel trends in installed costs over time.« less
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Davidson, Carolyn; Steinberg, Daniel; Margolis, Robert
2015-02-01
Over the past several years, third-party-ownership (TPO) structures for residential photovoltaic (PV) systems have become the predominant ownership model in the US residential market. Under a TPO contract, the PV system host typically makes payments to the third-party owner of the system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the total TPO contract payments made by the customer can differ significantly from payments in which the system host directly purchases the system. Furthermore, payments can vary depending on TPO contract structure. To date, a paucity of data on TPO contracts has precluded studies evaluating trends in TPO contract cost. This study relies on a sample of 1113 contracts for residential PV systems installed in 2010-2012 under the California Solar Initiative to evaluate how the timing of payments under a TPO contract impacts the ultimate cost of the system to the customer. Furthermore, we evaluate how the total cost of TPO systems to customers has changed through time, and the degree to which contract costs have tracked trends in the installed costs of a PV system. We find that the structure of the contract and the timing of the payments have financial implications for the customer: (1) power-purchase contracts, on average, cost more than leases, (2) no-money-down contracts are more costly than prepaid contracts, assuming a customer’s discount rate is lower than 17% and (3) contracts that include escalator clauses cost more, for both power-purchase agreements and leases, at most plausible discount rates. In addition, all contract costs exhibit a wide range, and do not parallel trends in installed costs over time.
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Davidson, Carolyn; Steinberg, Daniel; Margolis, Robert
We report that over the past several years, third-party-ownership (TPO) structures for residential photovoltaic (PV) systems have become the predominant ownership model in the US residential market. Under a TPO contract, the PV system host typically makes payments to the third-party owner of the system. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the total TPO contract payments made by the customer can differ significantly from payments in which the system host directly purchases the system. Furthermore, payments can vary depending on TPO contract structure. To date, a paucity of data on TPO contracts has precluded studies evaluating trends in TPO contract cost. Thismore » study relies on a sample of 1113 contracts for residential PV systems installed in 2010–2012 under the California Solar Initiative to evaluate how the timing of payments under a TPO contract impacts the ultimate cost of the system to the customer. Furthermore, we evaluate how the total cost of TPO systems to customers has changed through time, and the degree to which contract costs have tracked trends in the installed costs of a PV system. We find that the structure of the contract and the timing of the payments have financial implications for the customer: (1) power-purchase contracts, on average, cost more than leases, (2) no-money-down contracts are more costly than prepaid contracts, assuming a customer's discount rate is lower than 17% and (3) contracts that include escalator clauses cost more, for both power-purchase agreements and leases, at most plausible discount rates. Additionally, all contract costs exhibit a wide range, and do not parallel trends in installed costs over time.« less
48 CFR 236.271 - Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-fixed-fee... CONTRACTS Special Aspects of Contracting for Construction 236.271 Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts. Annual military construction appropriations acts restrict the use of cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts (see 216.306(c...
48 CFR 49.403 - Termination of cost-reimbursement contracts for default.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...-reimbursement contracts for default. 49.403 Section 49.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... of cost-reimbursement contracts for default. (a) The right to terminate a cost-reimbursement contract... case by the clause. (b) Settlement of a cost-reimbursement contract terminated for default is subject...
Non-price competition in NHS secondary care contracting: empirical results.
Gray, Keith; Bailey, Mark F
2008-01-01
The purpose of this paper is, for English acute NHS hospitals, to investigate how they operate their governance systems in the area of secondary care contracting and identify the key determinants of relationship building within the contacting/commissioning of secondary care focusing upon non-price competitive behaviour. A survey instrument was designed and mailed to a sample of all acute NHS hospitals in England of whom 35 per cent responded. This survey was then analysed using logit techniques. The analysis suggests that: those NHS Trusts offering volume discounts, non-price competitive incentives or having a strong belief in performance being by "payment by results" criteria are significantly more likely to offer augmented services to secondary care purchasers over and above contractual minima; those NHS Trusts strongly believing in the importance of non-price factors (such as contract augmentation or quality) in the contracting process are more likely to offer customisation of generic services; and those NHS Trusts using cost-sharing agreements to realign contracts when negotiating contracts or who strongly believe in the importance of service augmentation in strengthening relationships, or that increased hospital efficiency is the most important aspect of recent NHS reform are more likely to utilise default measures to help realign contracts. This paper fills a gap in the area of non-price competition in English NHS acute secondary care contracting.
48 CFR 1316.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 1316.405 Section 1316.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 1316.405 Cost-reimbursement...
48 CFR 916.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 916.405 Section 916.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 916.405 Cost-reimbursement...
Comparison of Navy and Private-Sector Construction Costs
1997-09-01
contracts are comparable to private - sector construction costs. This report compares those costs. The report includes a description of the methodology...costs of complying with federal contracting requirements as compared with the costs of similar projects completed under typical private - sector contracts...The study found that the costs of facilities constructed under Navy contracts compare favorably to private - sector construction costs for similar
48 CFR 731.370 - Predetermined fixed rates for indirect costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts... determining the indirect costs applicable under contracts with educational institutions. ...
48 CFR 731.370 - Predetermined fixed rates for indirect costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts... determining the indirect costs applicable under contracts with educational institutions. ...
48 CFR 416.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-award-fee... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 416.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts. The HCA may designate an acquisition official other than the contracting officer as the fee...
Alternative Measured-Service Rate Structures for Local Telephone Service,
1980-06-01
contracts or grants . Views expressed in a Papet are the author’s own, and are not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors. The Rand Corporation...by National Science Foundation, grant DAR 77-16286 to The Rand Corporation. Measuring costs depend strongly on the technology of the telephone network...a Budget Constraint. The Case of the Two-Part Tariff," Review of Economic Studies, July 1974, Vol. 41, pp. 337-345. -28- Oi, W. Y., "A Disneyland
Derkey, Pamela Dunlap; Paul, Ken; Johnston, Bea; Palmer, Pamela; Zamanek, Alexander; Fakourbayat, Mahasti; Hovland, R.D.
1985-01-01
This report summarizes information on the thickness grade, lateral continuity, phosphate resources, and ownership of phosphate bearing units in the Meade Park Phosphatic Shale Member of the Phosphoria Formation in the Snowdrift Mountain quadrangle. This report is one of a series of quadrangle reports prepared by the Idaho Bureau of Mines and Geology under U.S. Geological Survey cost-sharing contract #14-08-0001-17925 to calculate phosphate resources in southeastern Idaho (fig.1).
2010-10-27
means by which USAID and other federal agencies share the cost of common administrative support at State’s diplomatic and consular posts overseas...73 Feka Insaat Sanayi Ve Ticaret, Ltd. 4 74 UCC Budservice Construction and Engineering, Joint Venture 4 75 Kolin Construction Manufacturing...Personal services contracts(a) 36 12 AECOM International Development 36 13 International Relief and Development 34 14 Emerging Markets Group 32 15
48 CFR 36.518 - Work oversight in cost-reimbursement construction contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...-reimbursement construction contracts. 36.518 Section 36.518 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... Contract Clauses 36.518 Work oversight in cost-reimbursement construction contracts. The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.236-18, Work Oversight in Cost-Reimbursement Construction Contracts...
48 CFR 215.404-74 - Fee requirements for cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Fee requirements for cost... NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.404-74 Fee requirements for cost-plus-award-fee contracts. In developing a fee objective for cost-plus-award-fee contracts, the contracting officer shall— (a) Follow the...
48 CFR 16.305 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 16.305 Cost-plus-award... consisting of (a) a base amount (which may be zero) fixed at inception of the contract and (b) an award amount, based upon a judgmental evaluation by the Government, sufficient to provide motivation for...
48 CFR 1552.217-74 - Option for increased quantity-cost-plus-award-fee contract.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... quantity-cost-plus-award-fee contract. 1552.217-74 Section 1552.217-74 Federal Acquisition Regulations... Texts of Provisions and Clauses 1552.217-74 Option for increased quantity—cost-plus-award-fee contract. As prescribed in 1517.208(e), insert this contract clause in cost-plus-award-fee term contracts when...
48 CFR 16.306 - Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-fixed-fee...-fee contracts. (a) Description. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that.... The fixed fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in the work...
48 CFR 52.242-1 - Notice of Intent To Disallow Costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... in solicitations and contracts when a cost-reimbursement contract, a fixed-price incentive contract, or a contract providing for price redetermination is contemplated: Notice of Intent To Disallow Costs... rights to take exception to incurred costs. (End of clause) ...
Social Contracts for Writing: Negotiating Shared Understandings about Text in the Preschool Years
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Rowe, Deborah Wells
2008-01-01
This article describes some of the foundational social contracts about written texts that two-year-olds and their teachers were negotiating in a U.S. preschool writing center. Social contracts are shared cultural knowledge that individuals draw on to produce and use written texts in culturally appropriate ways. Participants in this study were 18…
48 CFR 16.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee... during performance and that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in the areas of cost... consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at inception of the contract, if applicable and at the discretion of...
48 CFR 46.303 - Cost-reimbursement supply contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement supply contracts. 46.303 Section 46.303 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE Contract Clauses 46.303 Cost-reimbursement supply contracts. The...
48 CFR 46.305 - Cost-reimbursement service contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement service contracts. 46.305 Section 46.305 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE Contract Clauses 46.305 Cost-reimbursement service contracts. The...
48 CFR 30.201-4 - Contract clauses.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... REQUIREMENTS COST ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION CAS Program Requirements 30.201-4 Contract clauses. (a) Cost Accounting Standards. (1) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at FAR 52.230-2, Cost... cost accounting practices (applicable to CAS-covered contracts only), and to follow disclosed and...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... submission of cost or pricing data or information other than cost or pricing data. 215.403-5 Section 215.403... DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403-5 Instructions for submission of cost or pricing data or information other than cost or pricing data. When the...
48 CFR 1515.404-475 - Cost realism.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1515.404-475 Cost realism. The EPA structured approach is not required when the contracting officer is evaluating cost realism in a competitive...
Risk transfer and accountability in managed care organizations' carve-out contracts.
Garnick, D W; Horgan, C M; Hodgkin, D; Merrick, E L; Goldin, D; Ritter, G; Skwara, K C
2001-11-01
This study examined characteristics of contracts between managed care organizations (MCOs) and managed behavioral health organizations (MBHOs) in terms of delegation of functions, financial arrangements between the MCO and the MBHO, and the use of performance standards. Nationally representative administrative and clinical information about the three largest types of commercial products offered by 434 MCOs in 60 market areas was gathered by telephone survey. These products comprised services provided by health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, and point-of-service plans. Chi square tests were performed between pairings of all three types of products to ascertain differences in the degree to which claims processing, maintenance of provider networks, utilization management, case management, and quality improvement were delegated to MBHOs through specialty contracts among the various types of products. Contractual specifications about capitation arrangements, risk sharing, the use of performance standards, and final utilization review decisions were also compared. For all types of products, almost all the major functions were contracted by the MCO to the MBHO. Although most contracts assigned some risk for the costs of services to the MBHO, the degree of this risk varied by product type. Except in the case of preferred-provider organizations, a large number of performance standards were identified in MCOs' contracts with MBHOs, although financial incentives were rarely tied to such standards. MCOs that contract with MBHOs place major responsibility, both financial and administrative, on the vendors.
48 CFR 31.205-15 - Fines, penalties, and mischarging costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial... violations of, or failure of the contractor to comply with, Federal, State, local, or foreign laws and... of the contract or written instructions from the contracting officer. (b) Costs incurred in...
48 CFR 28.307 - Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 28.307 Section 28.307 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION...-reimbursement contracts. Cost-reimbursement contracts (and subcontracts, if the terms of the prime contract are...
48 CFR 32.110 - Payment of subcontractors under cost-reimbursement prime contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... under cost-reimbursement prime contracts. 32.110 Section 32.110 Federal Acquisition Regulations System... Purchase Financing 32.110 Payment of subcontractors under cost-reimbursement prime contracts. If the contractor makes financing payments to a subcontractor under a cost-reimbursement prime contract, the...
The consequences of hospital autonomization in Colombia: a transaction cost economics analysis.
Castano, Ramon; Mills, Anne
2013-03-01
Granting autonomy to public hospitals in developing countries has been common over recent decades, and implies a shift from hierarchical to contract-based relationships with health authorities. Theory on transactions costs in contractual relationships suggests they stem from relationship-specific investments and contract incompleteness. Transaction cost economics argues that the parties involved in exchanges seek to reduce transaction costs. The objective of this research was to analyse the relationships observed between purchasers and the 22 public hospitals of the city of Bogota, Colombia, in order to understand the role of relationship-specific investments and contract incompleteness as sources of transaction costs, through a largely qualitative study. We found that contract-based relationships showed relevant transaction costs associated mainly with contract incompleteness, not with relationship-specific investments. Regarding relationships between insurers and local hospitals for primary care services, compulsory contracting regulations locked-in the parties to the contracts. For high-complexity services (e.g. inpatient care), no restrictions applied and relationships suggested transaction-cost minimizing behaviour. Contract incompleteness was found to be a source of transaction costs on its own. We conclude that transaction costs seemed to play a key role in contract-based relationships, and contract incompleteness by itself appeared to be a source of transaction costs. The same findings are likely in other contexts because of difficulties in defining, observing and verifying the contracted products and the underlying information asymmetries. The role of compulsory contracting might be context-specific, although it is likely to emerge in other settings due to the safety-net role of public hospitals.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 3028.311 Section 3028.311... contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 15.406-2 - Certificate of current cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... cost or pricing data. 15.406-2 Section 15.406-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.406-2 Certificate of current cost or pricing data. (a) When certified cost or pricing data are...
48 CFR 15.406-2 - Certificate of current cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... cost or pricing data. 15.406-2 Section 15.406-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.406-2 Certificate of current cost or pricing data. (a) When certified cost or pricing data are...
48 CFR 15.406-2 - Certificate of current cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... cost or pricing data. 15.406-2 Section 15.406-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.406-2 Certificate of current cost or pricing data. (a) When certified cost or pricing data are...
48 CFR 22.101-2 - Contract pricing and administration.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...-reimbursement contracts or for recognition of costs in pricing fixed-price contracts if they result in... organizations to settle disputes. (c) Strikes normally result in changing patterns of cost incurrence and... recognition of costs in pricing fixed-price contracts. Certain costs may increase because of strikes; e.g...
48 CFR 22.101-2 - Contract pricing and administration.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
...-reimbursement contracts or for recognition of costs in pricing fixed-price contracts if they result in... organizations to settle disputes. (c) Strikes normally result in changing patterns of cost incurrence and... recognition of costs in pricing fixed-price contracts. Certain costs may increase because of strikes; e.g...
48 CFR 216.405-1 - Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-incentive-fee... Contracts 216.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. See PGI 216.405-1 for guidance on the use of cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. [71 FR 39007, July 11, 2006] ...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit Organizations 731.770 OMB Circular A-122, cost principles... and Assistance, has been so designated. The Overhead and Special Cost and Contract Close-Out Branch...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit Organizations 731.770 OMB Circular A-122, cost principles... and Assistance, has been so designated. The Overhead and Special Cost and Contract Close-Out Branch...
48 CFR 1315.407 - Special cost or pricing areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Special cost or pricing... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1315.407 Special cost or pricing areas. ...
48 CFR 15.407 - Special cost or pricing areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Special cost or pricing... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.407 Special cost or pricing areas. ...
48 CFR 216.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 216.405 Section 216.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION... Contracts 216.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. ...
48 CFR 1815.407 - Special cost or pricing areas.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Special cost or pricing... ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.407 Special cost or pricing areas. ...
Cattle producers' economic incentives for preventing bovine brucellosis under uncertainty.
Roberts, Trenton W; Peck, Dannele E; Ritten, John P
2012-12-01
Cattle in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem occasionally contract bovine brucellosis from free-ranging elk and bison. Cattle producers use a variety of brucellosis prevention activities to reduce their herds' risk of contracting brucellosis, such as: (1) having state agency personnel haze elk off private land, (2) fencing haystacks, (3) administering adult booster vaccination, (4) spaying heifers, (5) altering the winter-feeding schedule of cattle, (6) hiring riders to prevent cattle-elk commingling, and (7) delaying grazing on high-risk allotments. Their brucellosis prevention decisions are complicated, however, by several sources of uncertainty, including the following: a cattle herd's baseline risk of contracting brucellosis, the inherent randomness of brucellosis outbreaks, the cost of implementing prevention activities, and the activities' effectiveness. This study eliminates one source of uncertainty by estimating the cost of implementing brucellosis prevention activities on a representative cow/calf-long yearling operation in the southern GYE. It then reports the minimum level of effectiveness each prevention activity must achieve to justify investment by a risk-neutral producer. Individual producers face different levels of baseline risk, however, and the US government's brucellosis-response policy is constantly evolving. We therefore estimate breakeven levels of effectiveness for a range of baseline risks and government policies. Producers, animal health experts, and policymakers can use this study's results to determine which brucellosis prevention activities are unlikely to generate sufficient expected benefits to cover their cost of implementation. Results also demonstrate the influence of government policy on producers' incentives to prevent brucellosis. Policies that increase the magnitude of economic loss a producer incurs when their herd contracts brucellosis subsequently decrease prevention activities' breakeven levels of effectiveness, and increase producers' incentives to implement those activities. Producers' incentives to implement prevention activities also increase as activities' costs decrease. Policymakers can easily adapt the results of this analysis to help target cost-share agreements to producers and prevention activities most likely to generate positive expected net benefits. Epidemiologists can also use our results to help prioritize future research on the technical effectiveness of various brucellosis prevention activities. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
48 CFR 916.306 - Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-fixed-fee... METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 916.306 Cost-plus-fixed-fee... application of the statutory price or fee limitations. [49 FR 11955, Mar. 28, 1984, as amended at 59 FR 9105...
48 CFR 52.216-11 - Cost Contract-No Fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost Contract-No Fee. 52....216-11 Cost Contract—No Fee. As prescribed in 16.307(e), insert the following clause in solicitations and contracts when a cost-reimbursement contract is contemplated that provides no fee and is not a...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-06-27
... Option Contracts Overlying 10 Shares of a Security (``Mini-Options Contracts'') and Implement Rule Text... Contracts and implement rule text necessary to distinguish Mini-Options Contracts from Standard Contracts...
48 CFR 31.205-21 - Labor relations costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 31.205-21 Labor relations costs. Costs incurred in maintaining satisfactory relations between the... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Labor relations costs. 31...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 1428.311 Section 1428.311... under cost-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 915.404-4-72 - Special considerations for cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... cost-plus-award-fee contracts. 915.404-4-72 Section 915.404-4-72 Federal Acquisition Regulations System....404-4-72 Special considerations for cost-plus-award-fee contracts. (a) When a contract is to be awarded on a cost-plus-award-fee basis several special considerations are appropriate. Fee objectives for...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 1828.311 Section 1828.311... insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 16.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 16.405 Section 16.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION...-reimbursement incentive contracts. See 16.301 for requirements applicable to all cost-reimbursement contracts...
48 CFR 1615.406-2 - Certificate of accurate cost or pricing data for community-rated carriers.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... cost or pricing data for community-rated carriers. 1615.406-2 Section 1615.406-2 Federal Acquisition... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1615.406-2 Certificate of accurate cost or pricing data for community-rated carriers. The contracting officer will require a carrier...
Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies: Do They Create Value in the US Healthcare System?
Lyles, Alan
2017-05-01
Pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs) perform functions in the US market-based healthcare system that may be performed by public agencies or quasi-public institutions in other nations. By aggregating lives covered under their many individual contracts with payers, PBMs have formidable negotiating power. They influence pharmaceutical insurance coverage, design the terms of coverage in a plan's drug benefit, and create competition among providers for inclusion in a plan's network. PBMs have, through intermediation, the potential to secure lower drug prices and to improve rational prescribing. Whether these potential outcomes are realized within the relevant budget is a function of the healthcare system and the interaction of benefit design and clinical processes-not just individually vetted components. Efficiencies and values achieved in price discounts and cost sharing can be nullified if there is irrational prescribing (over-utilization, under-utilization and mis-utilization), variable patient adherence to medication regimens, ineffective formulary processes, or fraud, waste and abuse. Rising prescription drug costs and the increasing prevalence of 'high deductible health plans', which require much greater patient out-of-pocket costs, is creating a crisis for PBM efforts towards an affordable pharmacy benefit. Since PBM rebate and incentive contracts are opaque to the public, whether they add value by restraining higher drug prices or benefit from them is debatable.
Scale and structure of capitated physician organizations in California.
Rosenthal, M B; Frank, R G; Buchanan, J L; Epstein, A M
2001-01-01
Physician organizations in California broke new ground in the 1980s by accepting capitated contracts and taking on utilization management functions. In this paper we present new data that document the scale, structure, and vertical affiliations of physician organizations that accept capitation in California. We provide information on capitated enrollment, the share of revenue derived by physician organizations from capitation contracts, and the scope of risk sharing with health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Capitation contracts and risk sharing dominate payment arrangements with HMOs. Physician organizations appear to have responded to capitation by affiliating with hospitals and management companies, adopting hybrid organizational structures, and consolidating into larger entities.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 228.311 Section 228.311 Federal... liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 1631.200 - Scope of subpart.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... actual costs incurred. ... HEALTH BENEFITS ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 1631.200 Scope of subpart. The cost principles under this...
Military Personnel Procurement Resources Report
1991-05-28
directed at enlistment in the Military Service. Include cost of advertising agency contract spent on marketing research (to include cost of advertising...programs. Include cost of advertising agency contract spent on marketing research (to include cost of advertising agency subcontractors). 7. Printed...Include cost of advertising agency contract spent on marketing research (to include cost of advertising agency sub- contractors). 7. Printed
48 CFR 31.105 - Construction and architect-engineer contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
..., include unallowable interest costs, or use improper cost of money rates or computations. Contracting... contracts, including cost-reimbursement subcontracts thereunder; (2) Negotiating indirect cost rates; (3... appropriate they serve to express the parties' understanding and avoid possible subsequent disputes or...
48 CFR 52.203-10 - Price or Fee Adjustment for Illegal or Improper Activity.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... contract and the total cost and fee under a cost-type contract by the amount of profit or fee determined as... Regulation. (b) The price or fee reduction referred to in paragraph (a) of this clause shall be— (1) For cost...-incentive contracts, the Government may— (i) Reduce the contract target price and contract target profit...
48 CFR 1315.407-4 - Should-cost review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Should-cost review. 1315.407-4 Section 1315.407-4 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1315.407-4 Should-cost review. The...
48 CFR 2815.407-4 - Should-cost review.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Should-cost review. 2815.407-4 Section 2815.407-4 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Contracting Methods and Contract Types CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 2815.407-4 Should-cost review. In...
Saul, Jessie E.; Lemaire, Robin H.; Valente, Thomas W.; Leischow, Scott J.
2015-01-01
Objectives. We examined the coevolution of information sharing and implementation of evidence-based practices among US and Canadian tobacco cessation quitlines within the North American Quitline Consortium (NAQC). Methods. Web-based surveys were used to collect data from key respondents representing each of 74 participating funders of NAQC quitlines during the summer and fall of 2009, 2010, and 2011. We used stochastic actor-based models to estimate changes in information sharing and practice implementation in the NAQC network. Results. Funders were more likely to share information within their own country and with funders that contracted with the same service provider. Funders contracting with larger service providers shared less information but implemented significantly more practices. Funders connected to larger numbers of tobacco control researchers more often received information from other funders. Intensity of ties to the NAQC network administrative organization did not influence funders’ decisions to share information or implement practices. Conclusions. Our findings show the importance of monitoring the NAQC network over time. We recommend increased cross-border information sharing and sharing of information between funders contracting with different and smaller service providers. PMID:26180993
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.25 Contracting... agrees to apply his or her water-quality plan. Any person who controls, or shares control, of the farm... basic contract document, special provisions as needed, the participant's water-quality plan, schedule of...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.25 Contracting... agrees to apply his or her water-quality plan. Any person who controls, or shares control, of the farm... basic contract document, special provisions as needed, the participant's water-quality plan, schedule of...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.25 Contracting... agrees to apply his or her water-quality plan. Any person who controls, or shares control, of the farm... basic contract document, special provisions as needed, the participant's water-quality plan, schedule of...
Guidelines for cost control and analysis of cost-type research and development contracts
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Sibbers, C. W.
1981-01-01
The cost information which should be obtained from a contractor(s) on a major, cost type research and development contract(s), and the analyses and effective use of these data are discussed. Specific type(s) of information which should be required, methods for analyzing such information, and methods for effectively using the results of such analyses to enhance NASA contract and project management are included. The material presented is based primarily on the principal methods which have been effectively used in the management of major cost type research and development contracts.
The design of optimal electric power demand management contracts
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Fahrioglu, Murat
1999-11-01
Our society derives a quantifiable benefit from electric power. In particular, forced outages or blackouts have enormous consequences on society, one of which is loss of economic surplus. Electric utilities try to provide reliable supply of electric power to their customers. Maximum customer benefit derives from minimum cost and sufficient supply availability. Customers willing to share in "availability risk" can derive further benefit by participating in controlled outage programs. Specifically, whenever utilities foresee dangerous loading patterns, there is a need for a rapid reduction in demand either system-wide or at specific locations. The utility needs to get relief in order to solve its problems quickly and efficiently. This relief can come from customers who agree to curtail their loads upon request in exchange for an incentive fee. This thesis shows how utilities can get efficient load relief while maximizing their economic benefit. This work also shows how estimated customer cost functions can be calibrated, using existing utility data, to help in designing efficient demand management contracts. In order to design such contracts, optimal mechanism design is adopted from "Game Theory" and applied to the interaction between a utility and its customers. The idea behind mechanism design is to design an incentive structure that encourages customers to sign up for the right contract and reveal their true value of power. If a utility has demand management contracts with customers at critical locations, most operational problems can be solved efficiently. This thesis illustrates how locational attributes of customers incorporated into demand management contract design can have a significant impact in solving system problems. This kind of demand management contracts can also be used by an Independent System Operator (ISO). During times of congestion a loss of economic surplus occurs. When the market is too slow or cannot help relieve congestion, demand management can help solve the problem. Another tool the ISO requires for security purposes is reserves. Even though demand management contracts may not be a good substitute for spinning reserves, they are adequate to augment or replace supplemental and backup reserves.
48 CFR 215.408 - Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY....215-11, Price Reduction for Defective Cost or Pricing Data—Modifications; (ii) FAR 52.215-12, Subcontractor Cost or Pricing Data; or (iii) FAR 52.215-13, Subcontractor Cost or Pricing Data—Modifications. (2...
48 CFR 215.403-3 - Requiring information other than cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... other than cost or pricing data. 215.403-3 Section 215.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403-3 Requiring information other than cost or pricing data...
48 CFR 215.403-3 - Requiring information other than cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... other than cost or pricing data. 215.403-3 Section 215.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403-3 Requiring information other than cost or pricing data...
48 CFR 215.403-3 - Requiring information other than cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... other than cost or pricing data. 215.403-3 Section 215.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403-3 Requiring information other than cost or pricing data...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... installation support services (cost-reimbursement contracts). 5152.245-9001 Section 5152.245-9001 Federal... CONTRACT CLAUSES 5152.245-9001 Government property for installation support services (cost-reimbursement contracts). As prescribed in 5145.302-3(S-91), insert the following clause: Government Property for...
48 CFR 52.236-18 - Work Oversight in Cost-Reimbursement Construction Contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...-Reimbursement Construction Contracts. 52.236-18 Section 52.236-18 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... Provisions and Clauses 52.236-18 Work Oversight in Cost-Reimbursement Construction Contracts. As prescribed in 36.518, insert the following clause in solicitations and contracts when cost-reimbursement...
48 CFR 48.104-1 - Determining sharing period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
..., based on planning and programming or production documentation at the time the VECP is accepted. The.... (c) For engineering-development contracts and contracts containing low-rate-initial-production or early production units, the end of the sharing period is based not on a calendar date, but on acceptance...
48 CFR 48.104-1 - Determining sharing period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
..., based on planning and programming or production documentation at the time the VECP is accepted. The.... (c) For engineering-development contracts and contracts containing low-rate-initial-production or early production units, the end of the sharing period is based not on a calendar date, but on acceptance...
48 CFR 48.104-1 - Determining sharing period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
..., based on planning and programming or production documentation at the time the VECP is accepted. The.... (c) For engineering-development contracts and contracts containing low-rate-initial-production or early production units, the end of the sharing period is based not on a calendar date, but on acceptance...
48 CFR 48.104-1 - Determining sharing period.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
..., based on planning and programming or production documentation at the time the VECP is accepted. The.... (c) For engineering-development contracts and contracts containing low-rate-initial-production or early production units, the end of the sharing period is based not on a calendar date, but on acceptance...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-5... AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-5 Instructions for submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. (a) Taking into...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-5... AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-5 Instructions for submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. (a) Taking into...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-5... AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-5 Instructions for submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. (a) Taking into...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-5... AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-5 Instructions for submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. (a) Taking into...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-5... AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-5 Instructions for submission of certified cost or pricing data and data other than certified cost or pricing data. (a) Taking into...
Towse, Adrian; Garrison, Louis P
2010-01-01
This article examines performance-based risk-sharing agreements for pharmaceuticals from a theoretical economic perspective. We position these agreements as a form of coverage with evidence development. New performance-based risk sharing could produce a more efficient market equilibrium, achieved by adjustment of the price post-launch to reflect outcomes combined with a new approach to the post-launch costs of evidence collection. For this to happen, the party best able to manage or to bear specific risks must do so. Willingness to bear risk will depend not only on ability to manage it, but on the degree of risk aversion. We identify three related frameworks that provide relevant insights: value of information, real option theory and money-back guarantees. We identify four categories of risk sharing: budget impact, price discounting, outcomes uncertainty and subgroup uncertainty. We conclude that a value of information/real option framework is likely to be the most helpful approach for understanding the costs and benefits of risk sharing. There are a number of factors that are likely to be crucial in determining if performance-based or risk-sharing agreements are efficient and likely to become more important in the future: (i) the cost and practicality of post-launch evidence collection relative to pre-launch; (ii) the feasibility of coverage with evidence development without a pre-agreed contract as to how the evidence will be used to adjust price, revenues or use, in which uncertainty around the pay-off to additional research will reduce the incentive for the manufacturer to collect the information; (iii) the difficulty of writing and policing risk-sharing agreements; (iv) the degree of risk aversion (and therefore opportunity to trade) on the part of payers and manufacturers; and (v) the extent of transferability of data from one country setting to another to support coverage with evidence development in a risk-sharing framework. There is no doubt that--in principle--risk sharing can provide manufacturers and payers additional real options that increase overall efficiency. Given the lack of empirical evidence on the success of schemes already agreed and on the issues we set out above, it is too early to tell if the recent surge of interest in these arrangements is likely to be a trend or only a fad.
2008-02-01
liabilities (e.g., accounts payable). This ratio can be compared to the firm’s weighted average cost of capital ( WACC ). WACC is the cost of debt plus the cost...RatioCost of Debt Marginal Tax Rate Risk-Free Rate Cost of Equity Risk Premium Industry Beta WACC Technical Risk CPFF/CPAF …. FFP/ MYP - Contract Choice...estimates the levered WACC as the discount rate, and finally calculates the NPV of the contract. Specific model input includes profit policy levers
48 CFR 2131.205-71 - Reinsurer administrative expense costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 2131.205-71... as set forth in the contract is an allowable cost when documented through an internal accounting... expense costs. 2131.205-71 Section 2131.205-71 Federal Acquisition Regulations System OFFICE OF PERSONNEL...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Allowable costs under cost reimbursement vocational rehabilitation and education contracts or agreements. 831.7001 Section 831.7001 Federal... reimbursement vocational rehabilitation and education contracts or agreements. ...
48 CFR 15.403-2 - Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... certified cost or pricing data are not required. 15.403-2 Section 15.403-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-2 Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required. (a...
48 CFR 15.403-2 - Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... certified cost or pricing data are not required. 15.403-2 Section 15.403-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-2 Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required. (a...
48 CFR 15.403-2 - Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... certified cost or pricing data are not required. 15.403-2 Section 15.403-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-2 Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required. (a...
48 CFR 15.403-2 - Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... certified cost or pricing data are not required. 15.403-2 Section 15.403-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403-2 Other circumstances where certified cost or pricing data are not required. (a...
48 CFR 52.229-8 - Taxes-Foreign Cost-Reimbursement Contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...-Reimbursement Contracts. 52.229-8 Section 52.229-8 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION... Clauses 52.229-8 Taxes—Foreign Cost-Reimbursement Contracts. As prescribed in 29.402-2(a), insert the following clause: Taxes—Foreign Cost-Reimbursement Contracts (MAR 1990) (a) Any tax or duty from which the...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 328.311 Section 328.311 Federal... Insurance 328.311 Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement...
48 CFR 52.216-10 - Incentive Fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... determined as provided in this contract. (b) Target cost and target fee. The target cost and target fee... (d) below. (1) Target cost, as used in this contract, means the estimated cost of this contract as initially negotiated, adjusted in accordance with paragraph (d) below. (2) Target fee, as used in this...
48 CFR 52.216-10 - Incentive Fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... determined as provided in this contract. (b) Target cost and target fee. The target cost and target fee... (d) below. (1) Target cost, as used in this contract, means the estimated cost of this contract as initially negotiated, adjusted in accordance with paragraph (d) below. (2) Target fee, as used in this...
26 CFR 1.460-5 - Cost allocation rules.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-04-01
... rules. (a) Overview. This section prescribes methods of allocating costs to long-term contracts... section provides rules concerning consistency in method of allocating costs to long-term contracts. (b... paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a taxpayer must allocate costs to each long-term contract subject to the...
26 CFR 1.460-5 - Cost allocation rules.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-04-01
... rules. (a) Overview. This section prescribes methods of allocating costs to long-term contracts... section provides rules concerning consistency in method of allocating costs to long-term contracts. (b... paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a taxpayer must allocate costs to each long-term contract subject to the...
26 CFR 1.460-5 - Cost allocation rules.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-04-01
... rules. (a) Overview. This section prescribes methods of allocating costs to long-term contracts... section provides rules concerning consistency in method of allocating costs to long-term contracts. (b... paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a taxpayer must allocate costs to each long-term contract subject to the...
26 CFR 1.460-5 - Cost allocation rules.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... rules. (a) Overview. This section prescribes methods of allocating costs to long-term contracts... section provides rules concerning consistency in method of allocating costs to long-term contracts. (b... paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a taxpayer must allocate costs to each long-term contract subject to the...
48 CFR 52.229-9 - Taxes-Cost-Reimbursement Contracts With Foreign Governments.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Taxes-Cost-Reimbursement... Provisions and Clauses 52.229-9 Taxes—Cost-Reimbursement Contracts With Foreign Governments. As prescribed in 29.402-2(b), insert the following clause: Taxes—Cost-Reimbursement Contracts With Foreign Governments...
Hospital-based group: ideal practice for the future?
Matloff, J M; Denton, T A
1995-11-01
The format for future cardiothoracic surgical practices includes the option of a hospital-based group where provider groups and the hospital share the responsibilities and obligations of clinical care and the cost of that care. Based on personal experience at the Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, three separate contract relationships during our tenure have reflected the evolution of cardiothoracic surgeons' relationship to our patients and the hospital in which we work. Although other organizational modes may prove equally successful, the hospital-based group practice is a viable structure that supports the preservation of quality in the work performed. This relationship helps to maintain a steady volume of patients enabling research endeavors, which are primarily funded through practice incomes, to continue and it also provides a platform for networking with defined patient referrals, shared services, and bench-marking with other centers.
48 CFR 931.205-47 - Costs related to legal and other proceedings.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... ENERGY GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial... those contractors and subcontractors with contracts exceeding $5,000,000. Employee whistleblower action... against a covered contractor or subcontractor, the contracting officer— (i) May authorize reimbursement of...
Hospitals, nursing homes turn to 3rd-party financing
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Slaff, J.
Experience is teaching the administrators of hospitals and nursing homes how to make better arrangements for third-party financing of energy-management systems. Accustomed to health-insurance reimbursement for health-care costs, hospitals have lacked incentives for conservation. Plans now used most by hospitals and health-care facilities involve third-party arrangements where: (1) an equipment vendor installs equipment and takes a share of the energy-cost savings; or (2) energy-services firms both install capital-intensive equipment and implement a variety of low-cost conservation measures, again for a percentage of the savings. Although most users think these arrangements are satisfactory, they advise a preliminary low-cost audit and participationmore » in a basic energy-management seminar before employing an energy-services firm. Accurate baseline energy-consumption data should be developed in order to evaluate results, and assurance is needed that staff members understand the accounting formulas. Also recommended are independent audits after installation and attention to the legal clauses in contracts. (DCK)« less
48 CFR 228.307 - Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 228.307 Section 228.307 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION....307 Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 1815.403 - Obtaining cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... data. 1815.403 Section 1815.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403 Obtaining cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 1815.403 - Obtaining cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... data. 1815.403 Section 1815.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403 Obtaining cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 1815.403 - Obtaining cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... data. 1815.403 Section 1815.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403 Obtaining cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 1815.403 - Obtaining cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... data. 1815.403 Section 1815.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403 Obtaining cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 1815.403 - Obtaining cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... data. 1815.403 Section 1815.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403 Obtaining cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 32.704 - Limitation of cost or funds.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT FINANCING Contract Funding 32.704 Limitation of cost or funds... contracting officer shall promptly give the contractor written notice of the decision not to provide funds. (b...
48 CFR 1615.407-1 - Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. 1615.407-1 Section 1615.407-1 Federal Acquisition... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1615.407-1 Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. The clause set forth in section 1652.215-70...
48 CFR 1615.407-1 - Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. 1615.407-1 Section 1615.407-1 Federal Acquisition... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1615.407-1 Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. The clause set forth in section 1652.215-70...
48 CFR 1615.407-1 - Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. 1615.407-1 Section 1615.407-1 Federal Acquisition... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1615.407-1 Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. The clause set forth in section 1652.215-70...
48 CFR 1615.407-1 - Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. 1615.407-1 Section 1615.407-1 Federal Acquisition... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1615.407-1 Rate reduction for defective pricing or defective cost or pricing data. The clause set forth in section 1652.215-70...
48 CFR 46.308 - Cost-reimbursement research and development contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... research and development contracts. 46.308 Section 46.308 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... research and development contracts. The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.246-8, Inspection of Research and Development—Cost-Reimbursement, in solicitations and contracts for research and...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.404-4... prenegotiation profit or fee objective on any negotiated contract action when cost or pricing data is obtained... analysis when assessing cost realism in competitive acquisitions. (2) When using a structured approach, the...
48 CFR 46.308 - Cost-reimbursement research and development contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... research and development contracts. 46.308 Section 46.308 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... research and development contracts. The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 52.246-8, Inspection of Research and Development—Cost-Reimbursement, in solicitations and contracts for research and...
48 CFR 3028.307 - Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 3028.307 Section 3028.307 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND... Insurance 3028.307 Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. ...
Brufsky, J W; Ross-Degnan, D; Calabrese, D; Gao, X; Soumerai, S B
1998-03-01
This study was undertaken to determine whether a program of education, therapeutic reevaluation of eligible patients, and performance feedback could shift prescribing to cimetidine from other histamine-2 receptor antagonists, which commonly are used in the management of ulcers and reflux, and reduce costs without increasing rates of ulcer-related hospital admissions. This study used an interrupted monthly time series with comparison series in a large mixed-model health maintenance organization. Physicians employed in health centers (staff model) and physicians in independent medical groups contracting to provide health maintenance organization services (group model) participated. The comparative percentage prescribed of specific histamine-2 receptor antagonists (market share), total histamine-2 receptor antagonist prescribing, cost per histamine-2 receptor antagonist prescription, and the rate of hospitalization for gastrointestinal illness were assessed. In the staff model, therapeutic reevaluation resulted in a sudden increase in market share of the preferred histamine-2 receptor antagonist cimetidine (+53.8%) and a sudden decrease in ranitidine (-44.7%) and famotidine (-4.8%); subsequently, cimetidine market share grew by 1.1% per month. In the group model, therapeutic reevaluation resulted in increased cimetidine market share (+9.7%) and decreased prescribing of other histamine-2 receptor antagonists (ranitidine -11.6%; famotidine -1.2%). Performance feedback did not result in further changes in prescribing in either setting. Use of omeprazole, an expensive alternative, essentially was unchanged by the interventions, as were overall histamine-2 receptor antagonist prescribing and hospital admissions for gastrointestinal illnesses. This intervention, which cost approximately $60,000 to implement, resulted in estimated annual savings in histamine-2 receptor antagonist expenditures of $1.06 million. Annual savings in histamine-2 receptor antagonist expenditures after this multifaceted intervention were more than implementation costs, with no discernible effects on numbers of hospitalizations. The magnitude of effect and cost savings were much greater in the staff model; organizational factors and economic incentives may have contributed to these differences. More research is needed to determine the generalizability of this approach to other technologies and managed care settings.
Titanium Aluminide Technologies Successfully Transferred From HSR Program to RLV VentureStar Program
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Bartolotta, Paul A.
2000-01-01
Through a cost-share contract, BFGoodrich Aerostructures group successfully fabricated three titanium aluminide (gamma TiAl) truss core structures using technologies pioneered in the High-Speed Research (HSR) program at the NASA Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field. The truss core subelement is approximately 60-cm (24-in.) long by 14-cm (5.5-in.) wide by 6-cm (2.5-in.) deep. To fabricate this subelement, BFGoodrich first obtained gamma TiAl sheets from Plansee (Austria) which produced the sheets using techniques developed collaboratively by Glenn, Pratt & Whitney, and Plansee. This new gamma TiAl production technology has significantly lowered the cost of gamma TiAl sheet (approx. 75-percent decrease) and has made the production of larger gamma TiAl sheets possible (approx. 60-percent increase).
48 CFR 15.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... or pricing data. 15.403 Section 15.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 15.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... or pricing data. 15.403 Section 15.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 15.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... or pricing data. 15.403 Section 15.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 215.403 - Obtaining cost or price data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... data. 215.403 Section 215.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403 Obtaining cost or price data. ...
48 CFR 215.403 - Obtaining cost or price data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... data. 215.403 Section 215.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403 Obtaining cost or price data. ...
48 CFR 15.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... or pricing data. 15.403 Section 15.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 15.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... or pricing data. 15.403 Section 15.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 15.407-1 - Defective certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... Defective certified cost or pricing data. (a) If, before agreement on price, the contracting officer learns... based on an agreement about the total cost of the contract and there was no agreement about the cost of..., based on prime contract progress billings or deliveries, which included payments for a completed and...
26 CFR 1.460-0 - Outline of regulations under section 460.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... total allocable contract costs. (iv) Pre-contracting-year costs. (v) Post-completion-year costs. (6) 10... improvements. (iv) Mixed use costs. (3) $10,000,000 gross receipts test. (i) In general. (ii) Single employer...) Computations. (3) Post-completion-year income. (4) Total contract price. (i) In general. (A) Definition. (B...
48 CFR 916.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
..., output, be it hardware, research and development, demonstration or services, together with business... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 916.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee... appropriate) and business management considerations tailored to the needs of the particular situation. In...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...) Termination settlements; and (v) Cost-plus-award-fee contracts; (b) Unless otherwise restricted by contracting... CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 415.404-4 Profit. (a)(1) USDA will use a... negotiation is based on cost analysis. (2) The following types of acquisitions are exempt from the...
Preferred supplier contracts in post-patent prescription drug markets.
Blankart, Carl Rudolf; Stargardt, Tom
2016-02-22
In recent years, the expiration of patents for large drug classes has increased the importance of post-patent drug markets. However, previous research has focused solely on patent drug markets. In this study, the authors evaluate the influence of preferred supplier contracts, the German approach to tendering, in post-patent drug markets using a hierarchical market share attraction model. The authors find that preferred supplier contracts are a powerful strategic instrument for generic manufacturers in a highly competitive environment. They quantify the effects of signing a preferred supplier contract and show that brand-name manufacturers are vulnerable to tendering. Therefore, brand-name manufacturers should readjust their strategies and consider including preferred supplier contracts in their marketing mix. In addition, the authors employ a simulation to demonstrate that a first-mover advantage might be gained from signing a preferred supplier contract. Furthermore, their results can be used as a blueprint for decision makers in the pharmaceutical industry to assess the market share effects of different contracting strategies regarding preferred supplier contracts.
Cost analysis helps evaluate contract profitability.
Sides, R W
2000-02-01
A cost-accounting analysis can help group practices assess their costs of doing business and determine the profitability of managed care contracts. Group practices also can use cost accounting to develop budgets and financial benchmarks. To begin a cost analysis, group practices need to determine their revenue and cost centers. Then they can allocate their costs to each center, using an appropriate allocation basis. The next step is to calculate costs per procedure. The results can be used to evaluate operational cost efficiency as well as help negotiate managed care contracts.
48 CFR 47.306-1 - Transportation cost determinations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Transportation cost... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-1 Transportation cost determinations. When requesting the transportation officer to assist in evaluating offers, the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-1 - Transportation cost determinations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Transportation cost... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-1 Transportation cost determinations. When requesting the transportation officer to assist in evaluating offers, the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-1 - Transportation cost determinations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Transportation cost... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-1 Transportation cost determinations. When requesting the transportation officer to assist in evaluating offers, the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-1 - Transportation cost determinations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Transportation cost... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-1 Transportation cost determinations. When requesting the transportation officer to assist in evaluating offers, the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-1 - Transportation cost determinations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Transportation cost... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-1 Transportation cost determinations. When requesting the transportation officer to assist in evaluating offers, the contracting...
48 CFR 731.205-46 - Travel costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... Section 731.205-46 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 731.205-46 Travel costs. It is USAID policy to require prior written approval of international travel by...
Contracting for health services in New Zealand: a transaction cost analysis.
Ashton, T
1998-02-01
The splitting of the functions of purchaser and provider in the New Zealand health system in 1993 necessitated the use of explicit contracts between the two parties. This paper examines contracting experiences during the first two years of operation. The study focuses on four services: rest homes, primary care clinics, surgical services, and acute mental health services. The insights of transaction cost economics form the theoretical framework. The objective of this study was to examine whether the transaction costs associated with contracting vary across the four different services, and whether different types of contracts and contractual relationships are emerging as transactors attempt to reduce these costs. Information was collected in a series of 53 interviews with purchasers and providers, together with any relevant documentation. The results suggest that the costs of contracting are indeed greater for some services than for others. Other variables such as the style of negotiations, the type and specificity of contracts and the degree of monitoring also differ across the four services. At this early stage of the reform process, there was little evidence that purchasers and providers were attempting to reduce transaction costs by negotiating more flexible, longer-term, relational contracts. The main benefit from contracting to date has been improved accountability of service providers.
48 CFR 15.407-1 - Defective certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... or pricing data. 15.407-1 Section 15.407-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.407-1 Defective certified cost or pricing data. (a) If, before agreement on price, the contracting officer learns...
48 CFR 49.303-4 - Adjustment of indirect costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Adjustment of indirect costs. 49.303-4 Section 49.303-4 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS Additional Principles for Cost-Reimbursement Contracts...
48 CFR 731.773 - Independent research and development costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Independent research and development costs. 731.773 Section 731.773 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit...
48 CFR 742.770 - Negotiated indirect cost rate agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... rate agreement. 742.770 Section 742.770 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION Indirect Cost Rates 742.770 Negotiated indirect cost... Agreement is automatically incorporated in each contract between the parties and shall specify: (a) The...
48 CFR 742.770 - Negotiated indirect cost rate agreement.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... rate agreement. 742.770 Section 742.770 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION Indirect Cost Rates 742.770 Negotiated indirect cost... Agreement is automatically incorporated in each contract between the parties and shall specify: (a) The...
48 CFR 731.773 - Independent research and development costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Independent research and development costs. 731.773 Section 731.773 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit...
2009-02-01
cost of capital ( WACC ). WACC is the cost of debt plus the cost of equity both weighted by the market values debt and equity, respectively. The cost...Beta WACC Technical Risk CPFF/CPAF …. FFP/ MYP - Contract Choice (FAR 16.1) Margin – (p = f(NBV, n, α, risk)) Payments (α) FCOM ( = f(NBV, Treasury...projections, layers on the profit and contract financing policy, estimates the levered WACC as the discount rate, and finally calculates the NPV of the
Comparing the costs of agency and contract fire crews.
G.H. Donovan
2007-01-01
This paper compares the cost of using Forest Service fire crews versus contract fire crews. Results suggest that if sufficient work is available to keep a Forest Service crew productively employed throughout a fire season, then the daily cost of a Forest Service type II crew is lower than the daily cost of a contract crew.
48 CFR 215.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... or pricing data. 215.403 Section 215.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 215.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... or pricing data. 215.403 Section 215.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
48 CFR 215.403 - Obtaining certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... or pricing data. 215.403 Section 215.403 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403 Obtaining certified cost or pricing data. ...
A transaction costs analysis of changing contractual relations in the English NHS.
Marini, Giorgia; Street, Andrew
2007-09-01
The English National Health Service has replaced locally negotiated block contracting arrangements with a system of national prices to pay for hospital activity. This paper applies a transaction costs approach to quantify and analyse the nature of how contracting costs have changed as a consequence. Data collection was based on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders from hospitals and Primary Care Trusts, which purchase hospital services. Replacing block contracting with activity based funding has led to lower costs of price negotiation, but these are outweighed by higher costs associated with volume control, of data collection, contract monitoring, and contract enforcement. There was consensus that the new contractual arrangements were preferable, but the benefits will have to be demonstrated formally in future.
14 CFR 1260.54 - Cost sharing.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... cash and non-cash contributions shall be governed by § 1260.123, Cost Sharing or Matching. The... 14 Aeronautics and Space 5 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Cost sharing. 1260.54 Section 1260.54... Special Conditions § 1260.54 Cost sharing. Cost Sharing October 2000 (a) NASA and the Recipient will share...
United States Navy Contracting Officer Warranting Process
2011-03-01
by 30% or more of the respondents: Contract Law , Cost Analysis, Market Research, Contract Source Selection, Simplified Acquisition Procedures, and...that the majority of AOs found the following course at least somewhat important: Contract Law , Cost Analysis, Market Research, Contract 52 Source...the budget and appropriation cycle 4. Ethics and conduct standards 5. Basic contract laws and regulations 6. Socio-economic requirements in
48 CFR 1542.705 - Final indirect cost rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
.... 1542.705 Section 1542.705 Federal Acquisition Regulations System ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION Indirect Cost Rates 1542.705 Final indirect cost rates. (a) The... contracts when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the cognizant federal agency and a FACO will be...
48 CFR 47.306-2 - Lowest overall transportation costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... transportation costs. 47.306-2 Section 47.306-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-2 Lowest overall transportation costs. (a) For the evaluation of offers, the transportation officer shall give to the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-2 - Lowest overall transportation costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... transportation costs. 47.306-2 Section 47.306-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-2 Lowest overall transportation costs. (a) For the evaluation of offers, the transportation officer shall give to the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-2 - Lowest overall transportation costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... transportation costs. 47.306-2 Section 47.306-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-2 Lowest overall transportation costs. (a) For the evaluation of offers, the transportation officer shall give to the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-2 - Lowest overall transportation costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... transportation costs. 47.306-2 Section 47.306-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-2 Lowest overall transportation costs. (a) For the evaluation of offers, the transportation officer shall give to the contracting...
48 CFR 47.306-2 - Lowest overall transportation costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... transportation costs. 47.306-2 Section 47.306-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION Transportation in Supply Contracts 47.306-2 Lowest overall transportation costs. (a) For the evaluation of offers, the transportation officer shall give to the contracting...
48 CFR 1816.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 1816.405 Section 1816.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS... 1816.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. [62 FR 3478, Jan. 23, 1997. Redesignated at 62 FR...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Requirements. 31.303... REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Educational Institutions 31.303 Requirements. (a) Contracts that refer to this subpart 31.3 for determining allowable costs under contracts...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Requirements. 31.303... REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Educational Institutions 31.303 Requirements. (a) Contracts that refer to this subpart 31.3 for determining allowable costs under contracts...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Requirements. 31.303... REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Educational Institutions 31.303 Requirements. (a) Contracts that refer to this subpart 31.3 for determining allowable costs under contracts...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Requirements. 31.303... REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Educational Institutions 31.303 Requirements. (a) Contracts that refer to this subpart 31.3 for determining allowable costs under contracts...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 528.311 Section 528.311 Federal...-reimbursement contracts. ...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Solicitation provision and contract clause on liability insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 28.311 Section 28.311 Federal...-reimbursement contracts. ...
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Connolly, Barbara Mary
This dissertation applies theoretical insights from transaction cost economics to explain and predict the organizational form of cooperative agreements between Eastern and Western Europe in areas of regional environmental and political concern. It examines five contracting problems related to nuclear power safety and acid rain, and describes the history of international negotiations to manage these problems. It argues that the level of interdependence in a given issue area, or costly effects experienced in one state due to activities and decisions of other states, along with the level of transactional vulnerability, or sunk costs invested in support of a particular contractual relationship among these states, are key determinants of the governance structures states choose to facilitate cooperation in that issue area. Empirically, the dissertation traces the evolution of three sets of institutional arrangements related to nuclear safety: governance for western nuclear safety assistance to Eastern Europe, negotiations of a global convention on safety standards for nuclear power plants, and contracts among utilities and multilateral banks to build new nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. Next it studies European acid rain, chronicling the history of international acid rain controls within the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and the European Union, and finally examining institutional arrangements for burden-sharing to promote European bargains on emissions reduction, including bilateral aid transfers and proposals for multilateral burden sharing. Political actors have a wide range of choice among institutional arrangements to facilitate international cooperation, from simple market-type exchanges, to arbitration-type regimes that provide information and enhance reputation effects, to self-enforcing agreements such as issue-linkage, to supranational governance. The governance structures states devise to manage their cooperative relations affects outcomes of cooperation, by influencing the bargains states make and how well those bargains stick. This research shows that patterns of interdependence and sunk costs in cooperative relationships with particular states strongly condition the choices states make between these institutional structures to facilitate mutually beneficial international cooperation while protecting against opportunism.
36 CFR 230.6 - Project costs and cost share requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2013-07-01 2013-07-01 false Project costs and cost share... Project costs and cost share requirements. (a) The CFP Federal contribution cannot exceed 50 percent of the total project costs. (b) Allowable project and cost share costs will include the purchase price...
36 CFR 230.6 - Project costs and cost share requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2014-07-01 2014-07-01 false Project costs and cost share... Project costs and cost share requirements. (a) The CFP Federal contribution cannot exceed 50 percent of the total project costs. (b) Allowable project and cost share costs will include the purchase price...
36 CFR 230.6 - Project costs and cost share requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-07-01
... 36 Parks, Forests, and Public Property 2 2012-07-01 2012-07-01 false Project costs and cost share... Project costs and cost share requirements. (a) The CFP Federal contribution cannot exceed 50 percent of the total project costs. (b) Allowable project and cost share costs will include the purchase price...
Private Health Plans’ Contracts with Managed Behavioral Healthcare Organizations
Garnick, Deborah W.; Horgan, Constance M.; Merrick, Elizabeth L.; Hodgkin, Dominic; Reif, Sharon; Quinn, Amity E.; Stewart, Maureen; Creedon, Timothy B.
2015-01-01
Contracts between health plans and managed behavioral health care organizations (MBHOs) influence access and quality of behavioral health care. This report presents information on performance requirements, information sharing, and financial risk from a nationally representative survey of private health plans. Most contracts include geographic access to providers (93.3%) and NCQA’s performance standards (84.2%). Health plans and MBHOs share data (99.0%), generally by the MBHO sending information to the health plan (96.3%). About a quarter of contracts impose financial penalties (23.0%), but few include incentives related to performance standards (<1.0%). Contract terms can shape the provision of behavioral health services in response to changes such as parity legislation or health reform. If current trends continue towards increases in value-based purchasing in the privately financed behavioral health sector, the focus on quality in contracts between health plans and MBHOs will be critical to understand. PMID:26276421
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... signs a contract is obligated to apply or arrange for the application of the land use and conservation..., joint participation is permitted only if it will result in better land use and treatment than individual...-sharing contracts. A land user who has an approved reclamation plan may enter into a contract with NRCS to...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... agrees to apply his or her water-quality plan. Any person who controls, or shares control, of the farm... AGRICULTURE LONG TERM CONTRACTING RURAL CLEAN WATER PROGRAM Participant RCWP Contracts § 634.25 Contracting... of the farm, ranch, or other land. The administering agency is to determine the acceptability of the...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-12-26
... Rule Change To Increase the Position and Exercise Limits for Options on the iShares MSCI Emerging... exercise limits for options on the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets Index Fund (``EEM'') to 500,000 contracts... 3120 to increase the position and exercise limits for EEM options to 500,000 contracts.\\3\\ There is...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-09-14
... Exchange is proposing to eliminate the PULSe non-standard services fee. All of these changes, which are.... Currently the fee is set at $0.05 per executed contract or share equivalent. The Exchange is proposing to reduce the fee to $0.02 per contract or share equivalent. The second purpose of this proposed rule change...
Coping with Prescription Drug Cost Sharing: Knowledge, Adherence, and Financial Burden
Reed, Mary; Brand, Richard; Newhouse, Joseph P; Selby, Joe V; Hsu, John
2008-01-01
Objective Assess patient knowledge of and response to drug cost sharing. Study Setting Adult members of a large prepaid, integrated delivery system. Study Design/Data Collection Telephone interviews with 932 participants (72 percent response rate) who reported knowledge of the structures and amounts of their prescription drug cost sharing. Participants reported cost-related changes in their drug adherence, any financial burden, and other cost-coping behaviors. Actual cost sharing amounts came from administrative databases. Principal Findings Overall, 27 percent of patients knew all of their drug cost sharing structures and amounts. After adjustment for individual characteristics, additional patient cost sharing structures (tiers and caps), and higher copayment amounts were associated with reporting decreased adherence, financial burden, or other cost-coping behaviors. Conclusions Patient knowledge of their drug benefits is limited, especially for more complex cost sharing structures. Patients also report a range of responses to greater cost sharing, including decreasing adherence. PMID:18370979
2017-03-01
COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH INITIAL CONTRACTING TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR UNRESTRICTED MARINE OFFICERS by Lee A. White...WITH INITIAL CONTRACTING TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR UNRESTRICTED MARINE OFFICERS 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Lee A. White 7. PERFORMING...unlimited. AN ANALYSIS OF COSTS AND BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH INITIAL CONTRACTING TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR UNRESTRICTED MARINE OFFICERS
Baldyga, William; Hilgendorf, Amy; Walker, Jennifer Gilchrist; Hewson, Danielle; Rhew, Lori; Uskali, Amber
2015-01-01
Community Transformation Grant awardees in North Carolina, Illinois, and Wisconsin promoted joint use agreements (formal agreements between 2 parties for the shared use of land or facilities) as a strategy to increase access to physical activity in their states. However, awardees experienced significant barriers to establishing joint use agreements, including 1) confusion about terminology and an aversion to complex legal contracts, 2) lack of applicability to single organizations with open use policies, and 3) questionable value in nonurban areas where open lands for physical activity are often available and where the need is instead for physical activity programs and infrastructure. Furthermore, promotion of formal agreements may unintentionally reduce access by raising concerns regarding legal risks and costs associated with existing shared use of land. Thus, joint use agreements have practical limitations that should be considered when selecting among strategies to promote physical activity participation. PMID:25880770
Stein, Anna; Baldyga, William; Hilgendorf, Amy; Walker, Jennifer Gilchrist; Hewson, Danielle; Rhew, Lori; Uskali, Amber
2015-04-16
Community Transformation Grant awardees in North Carolina, Illinois, and Wisconsin promoted joint use agreements (formal agreements between 2 parties for the shared use of land or facilities) as a strategy to increase access to physical activity in their states. However, awardees experienced significant barriers to establishing joint use agreements, including 1) confusion about terminology and an aversion to complex legal contracts, 2) lack of applicability to single organizations with open use policies, and 3) questionable value in nonurban areas where open lands for physical activity are often available and where the need is instead for physical activity programs and infrastructure. Furthermore, promotion of formal agreements may unintentionally reduce access by raising concerns regarding legal risks and costs associated with existing shared use of land. Thus, joint use agreements have practical limitations that should be considered when selecting among strategies to promote physical activity participation.
48 CFR 31.205-17 - Idle facilities and idle capacity costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial..., or sale, in accordance with sound business, economics, or security practices. Widespread idle...
48 CFR 332.704 - Limitation of cost or funds.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Limitation of cost or funds. 332.704 Section 332.704 Federal Acquisition Regulations System HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT FINANCING Contract Funding 332.704 Limitation of cost or funds. See subpart...
48 CFR 31.205-43 - Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs. 31.205-43 Section 31.205-43 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations...
48 CFR 31.205-43 - Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs. 31.205-43 Section 31.205-43 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations...
48 CFR 31.205-43 - Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs. 31.205-43 Section 31.205-43 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations...
48 CFR 31.205-43 - Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Trade, business, technical, and professional activity costs. 31.205-43 Section 31.205-43 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations...
48 CFR 47.104-3 - Cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement... CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TRANSPORTATION General 47.104-3 Cost-reimbursement contracts. (a) 49 U.S.C. 10721 and... accrues to the Government, i.e., the Government shall pay the charges or directly and completely reimburse...
The commercialisation of GP services: a survey of APMS contracts and new GP ownership
Heins, Elke; Pollock, Allyson M; Price, David
2009-01-01
Background Alternative provider of medical services (APMS) legislation enables private commercial firms to provide NHS primary care. There is no central monitoring of APMS adoption by primary care trusts (PCTs), the new providers, or market competition. Aim The aims were to: examine APMS contract data on bidders and providers, patient numbers, contract value, duration, and services; present a typology of primary care providers; establish the extent of competition; and identify which commercial providers have entered the English primary care market. Design of study Cross-sectional study. Setting All PCTs in England. Method A survey was carried out in March 2008 gathering information on the number of APMS contracts, their value and duration, patient numbers, the successful tender, and other bidders. Results A total of 141 out of 152 PCTs provided information on 71 APMS contracts that had been awarded and 66 contracts that were out to tender. Of those contracts awarded, 36 went to 14 different commercial companies, 28 to independent GP contractors, seven to social enterprises, and two to a PCT-managed service; one contract is shared by three different provider types. In more than half of the responses information on competition was not disclosed. In a fifth of those contracts awarded to the commercial sector, for which there is information on other bidders, there was no competition. Contracts varied widely, covering from one to several hundred thousand patients, with a value of £6000–12 million, and lasting from 1 year to being open-ended. Most contracts offered standard, essential, additional, and enhanced services; only a few were for specialist services. Conclusion The lack of data on cost, patient services, and staff makes it impossible to evaluate value for money or quality, and the absence of competition is a further concern. There needs to be a proper evaluation of the APMS policy from the perspective of value for money and quality of care, as well as patient access and coverage. PMID:19843414
2001 contract management survey.
2001-10-01
For the second year running, hospitals are spending more on clinical outsourcing than on business services. The Eleventh Annual Contract Services Survey shows that, in clinical areas, executives use outsourcing to acquire specialized expertise with cost savings secondary. Reducing costs and FTEs are the primary reasons for outsourcing business operations. Business service contracts are more likely to meet expectations for cost savings. Overall, satisfaction levels are up, but in some areas there's still a lot of room for improvement. This report examines current trends in outsourcing, strategies for the future, satisfaction levels, the decisionmaking process, contract features, and costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... computer hardware or software, or both, the cost of contracting for those services, or the cost of... operating budget. At the HA's option, the cost of the computer software may include service contracts to...
48 CFR 15.404-3 - Subcontract pricing considerations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.404-3 Subcontract..., including subcontractor's certified cost or pricing data. (b) The prime contractor or subcontractor shall... paragraph (c) of this subsection, submit subcontractor certified cost or pricing data to the Government as...
48 CFR 15.404-3 - Subcontract pricing considerations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.404-3 Subcontract..., including subcontractor's certified cost or pricing data. (b) The prime contractor or subcontractor shall... paragraph (c) of this subsection, submit subcontractor certified cost or pricing data to the Government as...
48 CFR 15.404-3 - Subcontract pricing considerations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.404-3 Subcontract..., including subcontractor's certified cost or pricing data. (b) The prime contractor or subcontractor shall... paragraph (c) of this subsection, submit subcontractor certified cost or pricing data to the Government as...
48 CFR 731.205-71 - Salary supplements for Host Government employees.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 731.205-71 Salary supplements for Host Government employees. (a... Contracting Officer shall provide written approval to the contractor in order for such costs to be eligible...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... deciding whether to use the fixed-fee or cost-reimbursable contracting method? 302-12.109 Section 302-12... Services Company § 302-12.109 What must we consider in deciding whether to use the fixed-fee or cost...-fee or cost-reimbursable contracting method: (a) Risk of alternative methods. Under a fixed fee...
Financial risk sharing with providers in health maintenance organizations, 1999.
Gold, Marsha R; Lake, Timothy; Hurley, Robert; Sinclair, Michael
2002-01-01
The transfer of financial risk from health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to providers is controversial. To provide timely national data on these practices, we conducted a telephone survey in 1999 of a multi-staged probability sample of HMOs in 20 of the nation's 60 largest markets, accounting for 86% of all HMO enrollees nationally. Among those sampled, 82% responded. We found that HMOs' provider networks with physicians, hospitals, skilled nursing homes, and home health agencies are complex and multi-tiered Seventy-six percent of HMOs in our study use contracts for their HMO products that involve global, professional services, or hospital risk capitation to intermediate entities. These arrangements account for between 24.5 million and 27.4 million of the 55.9 million commercial and Medicare HMO enrollees in the 60 largest markets. While capitation arrangements are particularly common in California, they are more common elsewhere than many assume. The complex layering of risk sharing and delegation of care management responsibility raise questions about accountability and administrative costs in managed care. Do complex structures provide a way to involve providers more directly in managed care, or do they diffuse authority and add to administrative costs?
75 FR 54590 - Notice of 2010 National Organic Certification Cost-Share Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2010-09-08
...] Notice of 2010 National Organic Certification Cost-Share Program AGENCY: Agricultural Marketing Service... Certification Cost-Share Funds. The AMS has allocated $22.0 million for this organic certification cost-share... National Organic Certification Cost- Share Program is authorized under 7 U.S.C. 6523, as amended by section...
78 FR 5781 - Cost-Sharing Rates for Pharmacy Benefits Program of the TRICARE Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-01-28
... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary Cost-Sharing Rates for Pharmacy Benefits Program of... to cost-sharing rates to the TRICARE Pharmacy Benefits Program. SUMMARY: This notice is to advise interested parties of cost-sharing rate change for the Pharmacy Benefits Program. DATES: The cost-sharing...
48 CFR 416.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 416.405 Section 416.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF...-reimbursement incentive contracts. ...
48 CFR 1816.405-2 - Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts. 1816.405-2 Section 1816.405-2 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND....405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts. [62 FR 3478, Jan. 23, 1997. Redesignated at 62 FR 36706...
48 CFR 31.205-40 - Special tooling and special test equipment costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Special tooling and special test equipment costs. 31.205-40 Section 31.205-40 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 31.205-40...
HMO Risk Contracts--A "No Cost" Way to Manage Retiree Health Care Costs?
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Hammer, Barbara F.
1995-01-01
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) "risk contracts," under which HMOs cover Medicare-eligible individuals, are explained; and the costs, benefits, and coverage are compared with those of other managed care options. Employers with retiree medical plans are encouraged to consider using HMO risk contracts for both short- and long-term…
48 CFR 53.301-1437 - Settlement Proposal for Cost-Reimbursement Type Contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 2 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Settlement Proposal for Cost-Reimbursement Type Contracts. 53.301-1437 Section 53.301-1437 Federal Acquisition Regulations...-1437 Settlement Proposal for Cost-Reimbursement Type Contracts. ER09DE97.012 [62 FR 64951, Dec. 9, 1997] ...
Stephanie A. Snyder; Keith D. Stockmann; Gaylord E. Morris
2012-01-01
The US Forest Service used contracted helicopter services as part of its wildfire suppression strategy. An optimization decision-modeling system was developed to assist in the contract selection process. Three contract award selection criteria were considered: cost per pound of delivered water, total contract cost, and quality ratings of the aircraft and vendors....
Tracking and data relay satellite system: NASA's new spacecraft data acquisition system
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Schneider, W. C.; Garman, A. A.
The growth in NASA's ground network complexity and cost triggered a search for an alternative. Through a lease service contract, Western Union will provide to NASA 10 years of space communications services with a Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS). A constellation of four operating satellites in geostationary orbit and a single ground terminal will provide complete tracking, telemetry and command service for all of NASA's Earth orbital satellites below an altitude of 12,000 km. The system is shared: two satellites will be dedicated to NASA service; a third will provide backup as a shared spare; the fourth satellite will be dedicated to Western Union's Advanced Westar commercial service. Western Union will operate the ground terminal and provide operational satellite control. NASA's Network Control Center will provide the focal point for scheduling user services and controlling the interface between TDRSS and the rest of the NASA communications network, project control centers and data processing facilities. TDRSS single access user spacecraft data systems should be designed for efficient time shared data relay support. Reimbursement policy and rate structure for non-NASA users are currently being developed.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... contract to the cost of an annual procurement approach, using a present value analysis. Do not award the multiyear contract unless the analysis shows that the multiyear contract will result in the lower cost (10 U...
42 CFR 438.812 - Costs under risk and nonrisk contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... SERVICES (CONTINUED) MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MANAGED CARE Conditions for Federal Financial Participation § 438.812 Costs under risk and nonrisk contracts. (a) Under a risk contract, the total amount the...
48 CFR 1028.307 - Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 1028.307 Section 1028.307 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF THE...-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 428.307 - Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Insurance under cost-reimbursement contracts. 428.307 Section 428.307 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF...-reimbursement contracts. ...
48 CFR 15.407-3 - Forward pricing rate agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.407-3 Forward pricing rate agreements. (a) When certified cost or pricing data are required, offerors are required to... apply and to identify the latest cost or pricing data already submitted in accordance with the FPRA. All...
48 CFR 1815.403-170 - Waivers of cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... data. 1815.403-170 Section 1815.403-170 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403-170 Waivers of cost or pricing data. (a) NASA has waived the requirement for the submission of...
48 CFR 1815.403-170 - Waivers of cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... data. 1815.403-170 Section 1815.403-170 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403-170 Waivers of cost or pricing data. (a) NASA has waived the requirement for the submission of...
48 CFR 1815.403-170 - Waivers of cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... data. 1815.403-170 Section 1815.403-170 Federal Acquisition Regulations System NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 1815.403-170 Waivers of cost or pricing data. (a) NASA has waived the requirement for the submission of...
48 CFR 15.407-3 - Forward pricing rate agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15.407-3 Forward pricing rate agreements. (a) When certified cost or pricing data are required, offerors are required to... apply and to identify the latest cost or pricing data already submitted in accordance with the FPRA. All...
48 CFR 49.603-4 - Cost-reimbursement contracts-complete termination, with settlement limited to fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement... Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS... conditions of the contract and parts 31 and 49 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. [Insert subparagraph (3...
48 CFR 49.603-4 - Cost-reimbursement contracts-complete termination, with settlement limited to fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement... Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS... conditions of the contract and parts 31 and 49 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. [Insert subparagraph (3...
48 CFR 49.603-4 - Cost-reimbursement contracts-complete termination, with settlement limited to fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement... Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS... conditions of the contract and parts 31 and 49 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. [Insert subparagraph (3...
48 CFR 32.102 - Description of contract financing methods.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... Description of contract financing methods. (a) Advance payments are advances of money by the Government to a... payments based on costs are made on the basis of costs incurred by the contractor as work progresses under..., contract financing. When appropriate, contract statements of work and pricing arrangements must permit...
42 CFR 447.53 - Cost sharing for drugs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 42 Public Health 4 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Cost sharing for drugs. 447.53 Section 447.53... and Cost Sharing § 447.53 Cost sharing for drugs. (a) The agency may establish differential cost sharing for preferred and non-preferred drugs. The provisions in § 447.56(a) shall apply except as the...
14 CFR 151.43 - United States share of project costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2012-01-01 2012-01-01 false United States share of project costs. 151... United States share of project costs. (a) The United States share of the allowable costs of a project is... part, the United States share of the costs of an approved project for airport development (regardless...
14 CFR 151.43 - United States share of project costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2013-01-01 2013-01-01 false United States share of project costs. 151... United States share of project costs. (a) The United States share of the allowable costs of a project is... part, the United States share of the costs of an approved project for airport development (regardless...
14 CFR 151.43 - United States share of project costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2011-01-01 2011-01-01 false United States share of project costs. 151... United States share of project costs. (a) The United States share of the allowable costs of a project is... part, the United States share of the costs of an approved project for airport development (regardless...
14 CFR 151.43 - United States share of project costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2014-01-01 2014-01-01 false United States share of project costs. 151... United States share of project costs. (a) The United States share of the allowable costs of a project is... part, the United States share of the costs of an approved project for airport development (regardless...
14 CFR 151.43 - United States share of project costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
... 14 Aeronautics and Space 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false United States share of project costs. 151... United States share of project costs. (a) The United States share of the allowable costs of a project is... part, the United States share of the costs of an approved project for airport development (regardless...
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-12-27
... accounting standards governing measurement, assignment, and allocation of costs to contracts with the United... contracting parties; Measurement of pension costs must be objectively verifiable; Accounting rules must keep... cost accounting that preclude their use for the appropriate measurement, assignment and allocation of...
The commercialization of migration.
Abrera-mangahas, M A
1989-01-01
International migration is not new to the Philippines. In the recent outflow of contract workers to the Middle East, there is a shift from individual and family initiated migrations to the more organized, highly commercial variety. While profit-taking intermediaries have played some role in the past, the increase in the number and influence of these intermediaries has altered the story of migration decision-making. In 1975, the signing of the bilateral labor agreement between the governments of Iran and the Philippines signalled the rising demand for Filipino contract workers. From 1970 to 1975, the number of Asian migrant workers in the Gulf countries rose from about 120,000 to 370,000. These figures rose dramatically to 3.3 million in 1985. The growing share of organized and commercialized migration has altered migration decision making. Primarily, intermediaries are able to broaden access to foreign job and high wage opportunities. Commercialization effectively raises the transaction costs for contract migration. Studies on recruitment costs and fees show that self-solicited foreign employment costs less than employment obtained through recruitment agents and intermediaries. The difference in the 2 prices is due, not only to overhead costs of intermediation, but more importantly to the rent exacted by agents from having job information and placement rights. In the Philippines in October 1987 the average placement fee was P8000, greatly exceeding the mandated maximum fee level of P5000. This average is understated because the computation includes the 17% who do not pay any fees. The widespread and popular view of recruitment intermediaries is negative, dominated by images of abuses and victims. Private intermediaries and the government bureaucracy need each other. Intermediaries need government; their consistent demand for incentives and protection is indicative. On the other hand, government expands its supervision of control of overseas employment via the intermediaries. For both the community at large and the government, more can be gained in endeavors assisting workers and their families to make choices based on the widest available information. The most valuable program is that of providing correct information on recruitment charges and costs, on work and living conditions at the job site, on family and social consequences.
Cost Sharing in Medicaid: Assumptions, Evidence, and Future Directions.
Powell, Victoria; Saloner, Brendan; Sabik, Lindsay M
2016-08-01
Several states have received waivers to expand Medicaid to poor adults under the Affordable Care Act using more cost sharing than the program traditionally allows. We synthesize literature on the effects of cost sharing, focusing on studies of low-income U.S. populations from 1995 to 2014. Literature suggests that cost sharing has a deterrent effect on initiation of treatments, and can reduce utilization of ongoing treatments. Furthermore, cost sharing may be difficult for low-income populations to understand, patients often lack sufficient information to choose medical treatment, and cost sharing may be difficult to balance within the budgets of poor adults. Gaps in the literature include evidence of long-term effects of cost sharing on health and financial well-being, evidence related to effectiveness of cost sharing combined with patient education, and evidence related to targeted programs that use financial incentives for wellness. Literature underscores the need for evaluation of the effects of cost sharing on health status and spending, particularly among the poorest adults. © The Author(s) 2015.
Cost-sharing in Medicaid: Assumptions, Evidence, and Future Directions
Powell, Victoria; Saloner, Brendan; Sabik, Lindsay M.
2015-01-01
Several states have received waivers to expand Medicaid to poor adults under the Affordable Care Act using more cost-sharing than the program traditionally allows. We synthesize literature of the effects of cost-sharing, focusing on studies of low-income US populations from 1995–2014. Literature suggests cost-sharing has a deterrent effect on initiation of treatments, and can reduce utilization of ongoing treatments. Further, cost-sharing may be difficult for low-income populations to understand; patients often lack sufficient information to choose medical treatment; and cost-sharing may be difficult to balance within the budgets of poor adults. Gaps in the literature include evidence of long-term effects of cost-sharing on health and financial wellbeing, evidence related to effectiveness of cost-sharing combined with patient education, and evidence related to targeted programs that use financial incentives for wellness. Literature underscores the need for evaluation of the effects of cost-sharing on health status and spending, particularly among the poorest adults. PMID:26602175
48 CFR 1852.216-84 - Estimated cost and incentive fee.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... the following clause: Estimated Cost and Incentive Fee (OCT 1996) The target cost of this contract is $___. The target fee of this contract is $___. The total target cost and target fee as contemplated by the...
Graham, Jonathan; Earnshaw, Stephanie; Burslem, Kate; Lim, Jonathan
2018-06-01
Afatinib is 1 of 3 tyrosine kinase inhibitors approved in the United States for the first-line treatment of patients with metastatic non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) whose tumors have epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) exon 19 deletions (del19) or exon 21 (L858R) substitution mutations. In clinical trials, afatinib has demonstrated improvement in progression-free survival versus standard chemotherapy and gefitinib. To analyze the impact of increases in afatinib treatment share on the cost and health outcomes in a commercial health plan in the United States. A decision model was developed to evaluate the budget impact of increases in afatinib share for the first-line treatment of patients with metastatic NSCLC with EGFR del19 or L858R substitution mutations over a 5-year time horizon. The model compared the total annual costs for a health plan with 1 million covered lives in a scenario in which afatinib share increased 5 percentage points annually to one in which all treatment shares remained constant over time. The number of patients eligible for treatment was estimated using published incidence data. Therapies included in the model were afatinib, erlotinib, gefitinib, and the chemotherapy doublet, pemetrexed in combination with cisplatin. The mean time spent by patients in progression-free and progressive disease states was based on survival data from clinical trials and a network meta-analysis. Therapy-related costs included monthly drug acquisition and administration costs and costs of managing adverse reactions. Disease management costs were also assessed in the model. Scenario analyses were performed to assess alternative scenarios of afatinib treatment share. Additionally, a one-way sensitivity analysis was performed to test the robustness of the model, given parameter uncertainty. Using the base-case parameter assumptions and a 5-percentage-point annual increase in afatinib treatment share, we estimated the total budget increases in years 1 through 5 to be $1,606, $65,542, $140,564, $209,272, and $303,368, respectively. These budget increases translated to per-member-per-month increases ranging from $0.00 to $0.03 in years 1 to 5. The increase in afatinib use resulted in the proportion of the treated population (134 patients treated over 5 years) remaining in progression-free disease increasing from 23.7% to 26.2% at the end of year 5, versus if afatinib treatment share had stayed constant. Increasing the treatment share of afatinib in a health plan for the first-line treatment of NSCLC with EGFR del19 or L858R mutations was estimated to increase the proportion of treated patients remaining in progression-free disease, while having small budget impact to the health plan. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals funded this study research and was involved in all stages of study conduct, including the analysis of data, and also undertook all costs associated with the development and publication of this manuscript. Graham and Earnshaw are employees of RTI Health Solutions, an independent contract research organization that has received research funding for this and other studies from Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals. Lim and Burslem are employees of Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, which developed and produces afatinib, along with other pharmaceutical products.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Commercial Organizations 31.202 Direct... amount as an indirect cost if the accounting treatment— (1) Is consistently applied to all final cost... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Direct costs. 31.202...
More of the same is not enough.
Willison, Donald J
2002-01-01
Growth in pharmaceutical expenditures in Canada is approximately double the rate of growth in other healthcare expenditures. Conventional approaches to controlling expenditures are not working. The policy options proposed by Laupacis, Anderson and O'Brien for managing pharmaceutical budgets--better evidence, better dissemination, additional regulation and increased dialogue--are necessary but not sufficient to bring about more cost-effective prescribing. This paper suggests three additional strategies that will complement existing policies: restructuring consumer co-payments such that consumer cost-sharing varies inversely with therapeutic necessity; introducing physician budgets for those pharmaceuticals for which there is reasonable suspicion of overuse; and price-volume contracting with pharmaceutical firms, consistent with evidence from pharmaco-economic evaluation. The first strategy will send better signals to the consumer as to the value of the pharmaceuticals they are consuming. The latter two strategies will provide incentives for physicians to prescribe and industry to market their pharmaceuticals in a fashion more consistent with cost-effective use of these drugs. Better evidence and better dissemination are simply not enough.
An analysis of cost overruns on defense acquisition contracts
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Christensen, David S.
1994-01-01
This article examines the history of cost overruns reported on 64 completed defense contracts. Its purpose is to formally test the observation of the Under Secretary. Results confirm the observation at the 95 percent level of confidence, and were generally insensitive to the contract type (price, cost), the contract phase (development, production), the type of weapon system (air, ground, sea), and the armed forces service (Air Force, Army, Navy) that managed the contract. After a review of terminology, concepts, and related research for those unfamiliar with the area, the methodology, results, and managerial implications are described.
32 CFR 37.535 - How do I value cost sharing related to real property or equipment?
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... 32 National Defense 1 2010-07-01 2010-07-01 false How do I value cost sharing related to real... Evaluation Cost Sharing § 37.535 How do I value cost sharing related to real property or equipment? You rarely should accept values for cost sharing contributions of real property or equipment that are in...
48 CFR 48.104 - Sharing arrangements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Sharing arrangements. 48.104 Section 48.104 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT VALUE ENGINEERING Policies and Procedures 48.104 Sharing arrangements. ...
DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)
Thomas, C.E.; Kuhn, I.F. Jr.
The fuel cell electric vehicle (FCEV) is undoubtedly the only option that can meet both the California zero emission vehicle (ZEV) standard and the President`s goal of tripling automobile efficiency without sacrificing performance in a standard 5-passenger vehicle. The three major automobile companies are designing and developing FCEVs powered directly by hydrogen under cost-shared contracts with the Department of Energy. Once developed, these vehicles will need a reliable and inexpensive source of hydrogen. Steam reforming of natural gas would produce the least expensive hydrogen, but funding may not be sufficient initially to build both large steam reforming plants and themore » transportation infrastructure necessary to deliver that hydrogen to geographically scattered FCEV fleets or individual drivers. This analysis evaluates the economic feasibility of using small scale water electrolysis to provide widely dispersed but cost-effective hydrogen for early FCEV demonstrations. We estimate the cost of manufacturing a complete electrolysis system in large quantities, including compression and storage, and show that electrolytic hydrogen could be cost competitive with fully taxed gasoline, using existing residential off-peak electricity rates.« less
Annual Growth of Contract Costs for Major Programs in Development and Early Production
2016-03-21
changes, we can identify some underlying drivers and rule out others. Development and Early Production Differences BBP-era drops are driven by dropping...Annual Growth of Contract Costs for Major Programs in Development and Early Production Dan Davis and Philip S...Growth of Contract Costs for Major Programs in Development and Early Production Dan Davis and Philip S. Antón March 21, 2016 SUMMARY Cost is
48 CFR 15.403-3 - Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-3 Section 15.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15...
48 CFR 15.403-3 - Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-3 Section 15.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15...
48 CFR 15.403-3 - Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2012-10-01 2012-10-01 false Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-3 Section 15.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15...
48 CFR 15.403-3 - Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-3 Section 15.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15...
48 CFR 15.403-3 - Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Requiring data other than certified cost or pricing data. 15.403-3 Section 15.403-3 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 15...
41 CFR 60-741.4 - Coverage and waivers.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-07-01
... facilitated, performance of the contract or a provision of the contract; or (B) The cost or a portion of the... allocable in whole or in part as a direct cost to any Government contract, and only a de minimis (less than... quantities. With respect to indefinite delivery-type contracts and subcontracts (including, but not limited...
23 CFR 140.907 - Overhead and indirect construction costs.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... accounting principles; (2) The costs included in the distribution are limited to costs actually incurred by...), part 31, Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, relating to contracts with commercial organizations... 23 Highways 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Overhead and indirect construction costs. 140.907...
48 CFR 731.109 - Advance agreements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
....109 Section 731.109 Federal Acquisition Regulations System AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Applicability 731.109 Advance... Special Cost and Contract Close-Out Branch, Office of Acquisition and Assistance. Such advance...
40 CFR 35.938-3 - Type of contract.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-07-01
... STATE AND LOCAL ASSISTANCE Grants for Construction of Treatment Works-Clean Water Act § 35.938-3 Type of... other acceptable type of contract. The cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contract shall not be used in any...
A supply chain contract with flexibility as a risk-sharing mechanism for demand forecasting
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Kim, Whan-Seon
2013-06-01
Demand forecasting is one of the main causes of the bullwhip effect in a supply chain. As a countermeasure for demand uncertainty as well as a risk-sharing mechanism for demand forecasting in a supply chain, this article studies a bilateral contract with order quantity flexibility. Under the contract, the buyer places orders in advance for the predetermined horizons and makes minimum purchase commitments. The supplier, in return, provides the buyer with the flexibility to adjust the order quantities later, according to the most updated demand information. To conduct comparative simulations, four-echelon supply chain models, that employ the contracts and different forecasting techniques under dynamic market demands, are developed. The simulation outcomes show that demand fluctuation can be effectively absorbed by the contract scheme, which enables better inventory management and customer service. Furthermore, it has been verified that the contract scheme under study plays a role as an effective coordination mechanism in a decentralised supply chain.
Gibbard, Katherine; Griep, Yannick; De Cooman, Rein; Hoffart, Genevieve; Onen, Denis; Zareipour, Hamidreza
2017-01-01
With the knowledge that team work is not always associated with high(er) performance, we draw from the Multi-Level Theory of Psychological Contracts, Person-Environment Fit Theory, and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory to study shared perceptions of psychological contract (PC) breach in relation to shared perceptions of complementary and supplementary fit to explain why some teams perform better than other teams. We collected three repeated survey measures in a sample of 128 respondents across 46 teams. After having made sure that we met all statistical criteria, we aggregated our focal variables to the team-level and analyzed our data by means of a longitudinal three-wave autoregressive moderated-mediation model in which each relationship was one-time lag apart. We found that shared perceptions of PC breach were directly negatively related to team output and negatively related to perceived team member effectiveness through a decrease in shared perceptions of supplementary fit. However, we also demonstrated a beneficial process in that shared perceptions of PC breach were positively related to shared perceptions of complementary fit, which in turn were positively related to team output. Moreover, best team output appeared in teams that could combine high shared perceptions of complementary fit with modest to high shared perceptions of supplementary fit. Overall, our findings seem to indicate that in terms of team output there may be a bright side to perceptions of PC breach and that perceived person-team fit may play an important role in this process.
Gibbard, Katherine; Griep, Yannick; De Cooman, Rein; Hoffart, Genevieve; Onen, Denis; Zareipour, Hamidreza
2017-01-01
With the knowledge that team work is not always associated with high(er) performance, we draw from the Multi-Level Theory of Psychological Contracts, Person-Environment Fit Theory, and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory to study shared perceptions of psychological contract (PC) breach in relation to shared perceptions of complementary and supplementary fit to explain why some teams perform better than other teams. We collected three repeated survey measures in a sample of 128 respondents across 46 teams. After having made sure that we met all statistical criteria, we aggregated our focal variables to the team-level and analyzed our data by means of a longitudinal three-wave autoregressive moderated-mediation model in which each relationship was one-time lag apart. We found that shared perceptions of PC breach were directly negatively related to team output and negatively related to perceived team member effectiveness through a decrease in shared perceptions of supplementary fit. However, we also demonstrated a beneficial process in that shared perceptions of PC breach were positively related to shared perceptions of complementary fit, which in turn were positively related to team output. Moreover, best team output appeared in teams that could combine high shared perceptions of complementary fit with modest to high shared perceptions of supplementary fit. Overall, our findings seem to indicate that in terms of team output there may be a bright side to perceptions of PC breach and that perceived person-team fit may play an important role in this process. PMID:29170648
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2012-11-19
... Accounting Standards: Revision of the Exemption From Cost Accounting Standards for Contracts and Subcontracts... Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) Board. ACTION: Proposed rule. SUMMARY... J. M. Wong, Director, Cost Accounting Standards Board (telephone: 202-395-6805; email: Raymond_wong...
Consumer Cost-Sharing in Marketplace vs. Employer Health Insurance Plans, 2015.
Gabel, Jon; Whitmore, Heidi; Green, Matthew; Stromberg, Sam; Oran, Rebecca
2015-12-01
Using data from 49 states and Washington, D.C., we analyzed changes in cost-sharing under health plans offered to individuals and families through state and federal exchanges from 2014 to 2015. We examined eight vehicles for cost-sharing, including deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket limits, and compared findings with cost-sharing under employer-based insurance. We found cost-sharing under marketplace plans remained essentially unchanged from 2014 to 2015. Stable premiums during that period do not reflect greater costs borne by enrollees. Further, 56 percent of enrollees in marketplace plans attained cost-sharing reductions in 2015. However, for people without cost-sharing reductions, average copayments, deductibles, and out-of-pocket limits under catastrophic, bronze, and silver plans are considerably higher than under employer-based plans on average, while cost-sharing under gold plans is similar employer-based plans on average. Marketplace plans are far more likely than employer-based plans to require enrollees to meet deductibles before they receive coverage for prescription drugs.
ERIC Educational Resources Information Center
Jackson, Lisa M.
1997-01-01
Describes one Massachusetts school district's solution to rising energy costs by using contract services to head off capital costs and guarantee savings. Highlights keys to successful management of this contracting system and the elements that make up a successful contract services candidate. (GR)
How might immunization rates change if cost sharing is eliminated?
Shen, Angela K; O'Grady, Michael J; McDevitt, Roland D; Pickreign, Jeremy D; Laudenberger, Laura K; Esber, Allahna; Shortridge, Emily F
2014-01-01
There is a debate regarding the effect of cost sharing on immunization, particularly as the Affordable Care Act will eliminate cost sharing for recommended vaccines. This study estimates changes in immunization rates and spending associated with extending first-dollar coverage to privately insured children for four childhood vaccines. We used the 2008 National Immunization Survey and peer-reviewed literature to generate estimates of immunization status for each vaccine by age group and insurance type. We used the Truven Health Analytics 2006 MarketScan Commercial Claims and Encounters Database of line-item medical claims to estimate changes in immunization rates that would result from eliminating cost sharing, and we used the Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust Employer Health Benefits Survey to determine the prevalence of coverage for patients with first-dollar coverage, patients who face office visit cost sharing, and patients who face cost sharing for all vaccine cost components. We assumed that once cost sharing is removed, coverage rates in plans that impose cost sharing will rise to the level of plans that do not. We estimate that immunization rates would increase modestly and result in additional direct spending of $26.0 million to insurers/employers. Further, these payers would have an additional $11.0 million in spending associated with eliminating cost sharing for children already receiving immunizations. The effects of eliminating cost sharing for vaccines vary by vaccine. Overall, immunization rates will rise modestly given high insurance coverage for vaccinations, and these increases would be more substantial for those currently facing cost sharing. However, in addition to the removal of cost sharing for immunizations, these findings suggest other strategies to consider to further increase immunization rates.
Radiology equipment maintenance and contract procurement in the UK.
Wright, Christopher J
2012-01-01
Radiology equipment maintenance has a similar financial value to new device acquisition over the lifetime of the device. Comprehensive style contracts are dominant largely due to their ease of use and the potential to control budgetary costs, but costs are high. Creative procurement solutions can offer better value. The corrective portion of comprehensive contracts is estimated to be between 50% (Mobile C-Arm) to 92% (CT), which equates to $29.4 million; 80% of the total contract costs within the research population of this study. Many organizations could free up cash by better managing their maintenance costs, potentially creating funding opportunities for new equipment.
The Post-Award Costs of Contracting Out: The U.S. Navy’s Implementation of OMB Circular A-76
1988-06-01
Commercial Activities (CA) Program Update, 6 April 1987. 4. Horngren , C.T. and Foster, G., Cost Accounting : A Managerial Emphasis, 6th Ed., Prentice-Hall... COSTS OF CONTRACTING OUT: THE U.S. NAVY’S IMPLEMENTATION OF OMB CIRCULAR A-76 12 PERSONAL AUTHOR( S ) Cole. Nancy S . and Cnlp Charla P 13a TYPE OF...of contracting out and identifies those costs that are either underestimated or not accounted for in the cost comparison process. Research was
Cost and Schedule Benchmarks for Defense Acquisition Contracts
1994-09-01
and schedule deviations early Knepp & S -curves for cost S -curves couldn’t Stroble/1993 control be used Terry & EAC Indices SCI-based EAC is...completed and on-going contracts from the early 1970’ s to date. Some of the fields in the database used in determining the status of cost overruns and...Measurement Data (Christensen, 1992:20). Christensen Article David S . Christensen published an analysis of cost overruns on DoD acquisition contracts
Setting government priorities in preventing HIV / AIDS.
Ainsworth, M
1998-03-01
Since no cure has yet been found for AIDS and an effective vaccine is far off, preventing HIV infection by changing individual behavior is the key to stopping the AIDS epidemic in developing countries. People who have many sex partners and do not use condoms, and people who inject drugs and share unsterilized injecting equipment have the greatest risk of contracting HIV and infecting others. How quickly and extensively an HIV/AIDS epidemic spreads in a given population depends largely upon the extent to which people with many sex partners mix with people with fewer partners. A World Bank research report has, however, found that people who engage in high-risk behavior act to reduce their risk of contracting and spreading HIV when they have the knowledge and means to do so and a supportive community. The report highlights the following strategies to reduce risky behavior: providing information, lowering the costs of safer behavior, and raising the costs of risky behavior. Governments' main responsibilities in preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS are reducing the negative externalities of high-risk behavior and producing public goods. Without government action, individuals and firms will not have the incentives to do what is necessary. The need to act now and mobilizing political support are discussed.
48 CFR 49.113 - Cost principles.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost principles. 49.113 Section 49.113 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS General Principles 49.113 Cost principles. The cost principles and procedures in the...
Adherence to Metformin, Statins, and ACE/ARBs Within the Diabetes Health Plan (DHP).
Duru, O Kenrik; Turk, Norman; Ettner, Susan L; Neugebauer, Romain; Moin, Tannaz; Li, Jinnan; Kimbro, Lindsay; Chan, Charles; Luchs, Robert H; Keckhafer, Abigail M; Kirvan, Anya; Ho, Sam; Mangione, Carol M
2015-11-01
Reducing patient cost-sharing and engaging patients in disease management activities have been shown to increase uptake of evidence-based care. To evaluate the effect of employer purchase of a disease-specific plan with reduced cost-sharing and disease management (the Diabetes Health Plan/DHP) on medication adherence among eligible employees and dependents. Employer-level "intent to treat" cohort study, including data from eligible employees and their dependents with diabetes, regardless of whether they were enrolled in the DHP. Employers that contracted with a large national health plan administrator in 2009, 2010, and/or 2011. Ten employers that purchased the DHP and 191 employers that did not (controls). Inverse probability weighting (IPW) estimation was used to adjust for inter-group differences. The DHP includes free or low-cost medications and physician visits. Enrollment strategies and specific benefit designs are determined by the employer and vary in practice. DHP participants are notified up front that they must engage in their own health care (e.g., receiving diabetes-related screening) in order to remain enrolled. Mean employee adherence to metformin, statins, and ACE/ARBs at the employer level at one year post-DHP implementation, as measured by the proportion of days covered (PDC). Baseline adherence to the three medications was similar across DHP and control employers, ranging from 64 to 69 %. In the first year after DHP implementation, predicted employer-level adherence for metformin (+4.9 percentage points, p = 0.017), statins (+4.8, p = 0.019), and ACE/ARBs (+4.4, p = 0.02) was higher with DHP purchase. Non-randomized, observational study. The Diabetes Health Plan, an innovative health plan that combines reduced cost-sharing and disease management with an up-front requirement of enrollee participation in his or her own health care, is associated with a modest improvement in medication adherence at 12 months.
Huber, Carola A; Rüesch, Peter; Mielck, Andreas; Böcken, Jan; Rosemann, Thomas; Meyer, Peter C
2012-08-01
Several studies have assessed the effect of cost sharing on health service utilization (HSU), mostly in the USA. Results are heterogeneous, showing different effects. Whereas previous studies compared insurants within one health care system but different modes of insurance, we aimed at comparing two different health care systems in Europe: Germany and Switzerland. Furthermore, we assessed the impact of cost sharing depending on socio-demographic factors as well as health status. Two representative samples of 5197 Swiss insurants with and 5197 German insurants without cost sharing were used to assess the independent association between cost sharing and the use of outpatient care. To minimize confounding, we performed cross-sectional analyses between propensity score matched Swiss and German insurants. We investigated subgroups according to health and socio-economic status to assess a potential social gradient in HSU. We found a significant association between health insurance scheme and the use of outpatient services. German insurants without cost sharing (visit rate: 4.8 per year) consulted a general practitioner or specialist more frequently than Swiss insurants with cost sharing (visit rate: 3.0 per year; P < 0.01). Subgroup analyses showed that vulnerable populations were differently affected by cost sharing. In the group of respondents with poor health and low socio-economic status, the cost-sharing effect was strongest. Cost-sharing models reduce HSU. The challenge is to create cost-sharing models which do not preclude vulnerable populations from seeking essential health care. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Overview of NASA Lewis Research Center free-piston Stirling engine activities
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Slaby, J. G.
1984-01-01
A generic free-piston Stirling technology project is being conducted to develop technologies generic to both space power and terrestrial heat pump applications in a cooperative, cost-shared effort. The generic technology effort includes extensive parametric testing of a 1 kW free-piston Stirling engine (RE-1000), development of a free-piston Stirling performance computer code, design and fabrication under contract of a hydraulic output modification for RE-1000 engine tests, and a 1000-hour endurance test, under contract, of a 3 kWe free-piston Stirling/alternator engine. A newly initiated space power technology feasibility demonstration effort addresses the capability of scaling a free-piston Stirling/alternator system to about 25 kWe; developing thermodynamic cycle efficiency or equal to 70 percent of Carnot at temperature ratios in the order of 1.5 to 2.0; achieving a power conversion unit specific weight of 6 kg/kWe; operating with noncontacting gas bearings; and dynamically balancing the system. Planned engine and component design and test efforts are described.
Disease management and medication compliance.
Cohen, Joshua; Christensen, Kathyrn; Feldman, Lanna
2012-02-01
Lack of medication compliance is harmful to health care systems from both a clinical and economic perspective. This study examines the methods that disease management organizations employ to identify nonadherent patients and to measure effectiveness of compliance programs for patients with diabetes, hyperlipidemia, and cystic fibrosis. In addition, this study investigates the degree to which disease managers assume risk in their contracts, and whether compliance strategies are being coordinated with payers' use of value-based insurance design, in which patient cost sharing is a function of the relative value of pharmaceuticals. This study's findings suggest that disease management may be falling short in terms of: (a) comprehensive commitment to expert-recommended at-home devices used to self-diagnose and measure health indicators; (b) early adoption of expert-recommended new technologies to measure and improve compliance; (c) intensity of use of standard tests in outpatient clinics; (d) coordination of compliance strategies with payers' use of value-based insurance design; and (e) the proportion of risk assumed in disease management contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... DEFENSE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION Cost and Software Data Reporting 234.7100 Policy. (a) The cost and software data reporting (CSDR) requirement is mandatory for major defense... data reporting and software resources data reporting. (b) Prior to contract award, contracting officers...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... DEFENSE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION Cost and Software Data Reporting 234.7100 Policy. (a) The cost and software data reporting (CSDR) requirement is mandatory for major defense... data reporting and software resources data reporting. (b) Prior to contract award, contracting officers...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... DEFENSE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION Cost and Software Data Reporting 234.7100 Policy. (a) The cost and software data reporting (CSDR) requirement is mandatory for major defense... data reporting and software resources data reporting. (b) Prior to contract award, contracting officers...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... DEFENSE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITION Cost and Software Data Reporting 234.7100 Policy. (a) The cost and software data reporting (CSDR) requirement is mandatory for major defense... data reporting and software resources data reporting. (b) Prior to contract award, contracting officers...
Competition in decentralized electricity markets: Three papers on electricity auctions
NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)
Harbord, David William Cameron
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers on the analysis of electricity auctions written over a period of twelve years. The first paper models price competition in a decentralized wholesale market for electricity as a first-price, sealed-bid, multi-unit auction. In both the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria of the model, above marginal cost pricing and inefficient despatch of generating units occur. An alternative regulatory pricing rule is considered and it is shown that offering to supply at marginal cost can be induced as a dominant strategy for all firms. The second paper analyses strategic interaction between long-term contracts and price competition in the British electricity wholesale market, and confirms that forward contracts will tend to put downward pressure on spot market prices. A 'strategic commitment' motive for selling forward contracts is also identified: a generator may commit itself to bidding lower prices into the spot market in order to ensure that it will be despatched with its full capacity. The third paper characterizes bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. The paper also clarifies some methodological issues in the analysis of electricity auctions. In particular we show that analogies with continuous share auctions are misplaced so long as firms are restricted to a finite number of bids.
48 CFR 9905.502-60 - Illustrations.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... for the same purpose: (1) An educational institution normally allocates special test equipment costs directly to contracts. The costs of general purpose test equipment are normally included in the indirect... of general purpose test equipment costs from the indirect cost pool to the contract, in addition to...
48 CFR 49.603-5 - Cost-reimbursement contracts-partial termination.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement....603-5 Cost-reimbursement contracts—partial termination. [Insert the following in Block 14 of SF 30, Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract, for settlement agreements for cost-reimbursement...
48 CFR 942.705 - Final indirect cost rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Final indirect cost rates. 942.705 Section 942.705 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND AUDIT SERVICES Indirect Cost Rates 942.705 Final indirect cost rates. ...
48 CFR 3442.705 - Final indirect cost rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Final indirect cost rates. 3442.705 Section 3442.705 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION Indirect Cost Rates 3442.705 Final indirect cost rates...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... cost or pricing data (10 U.S.C. 2306a and 41 U.S.C. 254b). 215.403-1 Section 215.403-1 Federal... METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing 215.403-1 Prohibition on obtaining cost or pricing data (10 U.S.C. 2306a and 41 U.S.C. 254b). (b) Exceptions to cost or pricing data...
Guinness, Lorna
2011-06-01
This paper aims to understand the transaction costs implications of two different governance modes for large scale contracting of HIV prevention services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2 states in India as part of the National AIDS Control Programme between 2001 and 2003. Interviews at purposively selected case study NGOs, contracting agencies and key informants as well as document review were used to compile qualitative data and make comparisons between the states on five themes theoretically proposed to shape transaction costs: institutional environment, informational problems, opportunism, scale of activity and asset specificity (the degree to which investments made specifically for the contract have value elsewhere). The State AIDS Control Society (SACS) in state Y used a management agency to manage the NGO contracts whereas the SACS in state X contracted directly with the NGOs. A high level of uncertainty, endemic corruption and weak information systems served to weaken the contractual relationships in both states. The management agency in state Y enabled the development of a strong NGO network, greater transparency and control over corrupt practises than the contract model in state X. State X's contractual process was further weakened by inadequate human resources. The application of the transaction cost framework to contracting out public services to NGOs identified the key costs associated with the governance of HIV prevention services through NGO contracts in India. A more successful form of relational contract evolved within the network of the contract management agency and the NGOs. This led to improved flows of information and perceived quality, and limited corrupt practises. It is unlikely that the SACS on its own, with broader responsibilities and limited autonomy can achieve the same ends. The management agency approach therefore appears to be both transaction cost reducing and better able to cope with the large scale of these contracting programmes. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Guinness, Lorna
2011-01-01
This paper aims to understand the transaction costs implications of two different governance modes for large scale contracting of HIV prevention services to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 2 states in India as part of the National AIDS Control Programme between 2001 and 2003. Interviews at purposively selected case study NGOs, contracting agencies and key informants as well as document review were used to compile qualitative data and make comparisons between the states on five themes theoretically proposed to shape transaction costs: institutional environment, informational problems, opportunism, scale of activity and asset specificity (the degree to which investments made specifically for the contract have value elsewhere). The State AIDS Control Society (SACS) in state Y used a management agency to manage the NGO contracts whereas the SACS in state X contracted directly with the NGOs. A high level of uncertainty, endemic corruption and weak information systems served to weaken the contractual relationships in both states. The management agency in state Y enabled the development of a strong NGO network, greater transparency and control over corrupt practises than the contract model in state X. State X’s contractual process was further weakened by inadequate human resources. The application of the transaction cost framework to contracting out public services to NGOs identified the key costs associated with the governance of HIV prevention services through NGO contracts in India. A more successful form of relational contract evolved within the network of the contract management agency and the NGOs. This led to improved flows of information and perceived quality, and limited corrupt practises. It is unlikely that the SACS on its own, with broader responsibilities and limited autonomy can achieve the same ends. The management agency approach therefore appears to be both transaction cost reducing and better able to cope with the large scale of these contracting programmes. PMID:21349622
A comparison of the costs of forest service and contract fire crews in the Pacific Northwest.
Geoffrey H. Donovan
2005-01-01
Rising wildfire suppression expenditures on public land in the United States have led to increased scrutiny of wildfire management practices. One area that has received particular attention is the Forest Service's increasing reliance on contract fire crews. Because a contract crew rate includes several costs that are not included in the wage costs of a Forest...
Partners HealthCare: an exercise in marital counseling.
Thier, Samuel O
2002-01-01
The high cost of health care in Boston led industry and government to expand managed care. The expensive academic health centers had the choice of closing, downsizing, merging, and/or integrating. The MGH and BWH chose to develop Partners HealthCare (PHCS) an integrated healthcare system that maintained the identities of the founding institutions. PHS founded in 1994 is physician-led and protects the missions of patient care, research and education. It includes the MGH and BWH, four community hospitals and one thousand primary care physicians. All administrative services have been consolidated as had several clinical departments, residencies and fellowships. Research coordination has resulted in shared space, grants, industrial partnerships, and a growth in support. Clinical service volumes have surpassed pre-merger levels. Contracts now cover the true costs of care and produce positive operating margins and bottom lines. The strategy of forming an integrated health system has achieved most but not all of its goals.
48 CFR 42.603 - Responsibilities.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
...) Fully utilize the responsible contract audit agency financial and advisory accounting services... cost rates for cost-reimbursement contracts, (2) establishment of advance agreements or recommendations on corporate/home office expense allocations, and (3) administration of Cost Accounting Standards...
76 FR 55000 - Notice of Agricultural Management Assistance Organic Certification Cost-Share Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-09-06
...] Notice of Agricultural Management Assistance Organic Certification Cost-Share Program AGENCY... Departments of Agriculture for the Agricultural Management Assistance Organic Certification Cost-Share Program... organic certification cost-share funds. The AMS has allocated $1.5 million for this organic certification...
78 FR 5164 - Notice of Agricultural Management Assistance Organic Certification Cost-Share Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2013-01-24
...] Notice of Agricultural Management Assistance Organic Certification Cost-Share Program AGENCY... Departments of Agriculture for the Agricultural Management Assistance Organic Certification Cost-Share Program... organic certification cost-share funds. The AMS has allocated $1.425 million for this organic...
48 CFR 436.605 - Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... for architect-engineer work. 436.605 Section 436.605 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECT-ENGINEER CONTRACTS Architect-Engineer Service 436.605 Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work. The contracting...
48 CFR 436.605 - Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... for architect-engineer work. 436.605 Section 436.605 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECT-ENGINEER CONTRACTS Architect-Engineer Service 436.605 Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work. The contracting...
48 CFR 436.605 - Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... for architect-engineer work. 436.605 Section 436.605 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECT-ENGINEER CONTRACTS Architect-Engineer Service 436.605 Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work. The contracting...
48 CFR 436.605 - Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... for architect-engineer work. 436.605 Section 436.605 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECT-ENGINEER CONTRACTS Architect-Engineer Service 436.605 Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work. The contracting...
48 CFR 436.605 - Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... for architect-engineer work. 436.605 Section 436.605 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF CONTRACTING CONSTRUCTION AND ARCHITECT-ENGINEER CONTRACTS Architect-Engineer Service 436.605 Government cost estimate for architect-engineer work. The contracting...
48 CFR 3432.704 - Limitation of cost or funds.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 7 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Limitation of cost or funds. 3432.704 Section 3432.704 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT FINANCING Contract Funding 3432.704...
48 CFR 1815.403-170 - Waivers of cost or pricing data.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... data when contracting for Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program Phase II contracts. However... SPACE ADMINISTRATION CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION Contract Pricing...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
.... Contracting office includes any contracting office that the acquisition is transferred to, such as another... projected learning or changes in quantity during the sharing period. It is calculated at the time the VECP...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... 25 Indians 2 2013-04-01 2013-04-01 false At the end of a self-determination construction contract... SERVICES CONTRACTS UNDER THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT Construction § 900.134 At the end of a self-determination construction contract, what happens to savings on a cost...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-04-01
... 25 Indians 2 2014-04-01 2014-04-01 false At the end of a self-determination construction contract... SERVICES CONTRACTS UNDER THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT Construction § 900.134 At the end of a self-determination construction contract, what happens to savings on a cost...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-04-01
... 25 Indians 2 2011-04-01 2011-04-01 false At the end of a self-determination construction contract... SERVICES CONTRACTS UNDER THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT Construction § 900.134 At the end of a self-determination construction contract, what happens to savings on a cost...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-04-01
... 25 Indians 2 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false At the end of a self-determination construction contract... SERVICES CONTRACTS UNDER THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT Construction § 900.134 At the end of a self-determination construction contract, what happens to savings on a cost...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-04-01
... 25 Indians 2 2012-04-01 2012-04-01 false At the end of a self-determination construction contract... SERVICES CONTRACTS UNDER THE INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND EDUCATION ASSISTANCE ACT Construction § 900.134 At the end of a self-determination construction contract, what happens to savings on a cost...
Hatcher, Peter; Shaikh, Shiraz; Fazli, Hassan; Zaidi, Shehla; Riaz, Atif
2014-11-13
There is dearth of evidence on provider cost of contracted out services particularly for Maternal and Newborn Health (MNH). The evidence base is weak for policy makers to estimate resources required for scaling up contracting. This paper ascertains provider unit costs and expenditure distribution at contracted out government primary health centers to inform the development of optimal resource envelopes for contracting out MNH services. This is a case study of provider costs of MNH services at two government Rural Health Centers (RHCs) contracted out to a non-governmental organization in Pakistan. It reports on four selected Basic Emergency Obstetrical and Newborn Care (BEmONC) services provided in one RHC and six Comprehensive Emergency Obstetrical and Newborn Care (CEmONC) services in the other. Data were collected using staff interviews and record review to compile resource inputs and service volumes, and analyzed using the CORE Plus tool. Unit costs are based on actual costs of MNH services and are calculated for actual volumes in 2011 and for volumes projected to meet need with optimal resource inputs. The unit costs per service for actual 2011 volumes at the BEmONC RHC were antenatal care (ANC) visit USD$ 18.78, normal delivery US$ 84.61, newborn care US$ 16.86 and a postnatal care (PNC) visit US$ 13.86; and at the CEmONC RHC were ANC visit US$ 45.50, Normal Delivery US$ 148.43, assisted delivery US$ 167.43, C-section US$ 183.34, Newborn Care US$ 41.07, and PNC visit US$ 27.34. The unit costs for the projected volumes needed were lower due to optimal utilization of resources. The percentage distribution of expenditures at both RHCs was largest for salaries of technical staff, followed by salaries of administrative staff, and then operating costs, medicines, medical and diagnostic supplies. The unit costs of MNH services at the two contracted out government rural facilities remain higher than is optimal, primarily due to underutilization. Provider cost analysis using standard treatment guideline (STG) based service costing frameworks should be applied across a number of health facilities to calculate the cost of services and guide development of evidence based resource envelopes and performance based contracting.
7 CFR 3015.195 - Subgrants and cost-type contracts.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-01-01
...-21 would apply to the costs incurred by the institution of higher education even though OMB Circular A-87 would apply to the costs incurred by the State. ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Subgrants and cost-type contracts. 3015.195 Section...
48 CFR 842.705 - Final indirect cost rates.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Final indirect cost rates. 842.705 Section 842.705 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS CONTRACT MANAGEMENT CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND AUDIT SERVICES Indirect Cost Rates 842.705 Final indirect cost rates...
76 FR 54999 - Notice of 2011 National Organic Certification Cost-Share Program
Federal Register 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014
2011-09-06
...] Notice of 2011 National Organic Certification Cost-Share Program AGENCY: Agricultural Marketing Service... for the National Organic Certification Cost- Share Program. SUMMARY: This Notice invites all States of...) for the allocation of National Organic Certification Cost-Share Funds. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2008...
42 CFR 457.560 - Cumulative cost-sharing maximum.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR
2010-10-01
... 42 Public Health 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cumulative cost-sharing maximum. 457.560 Section... State Plan Requirements: Enrollee Financial Responsibilities § 457.560 Cumulative cost-sharing maximum... writing and orally if appropriate of their individual cumulative cost-sharing maximum amount at the time...
Proposal Improvements That Work
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Dunn, F.
1998-01-01
Rocketdyne Propulsion and Power, an operating location of Boeing in Canoga Park, California is under contract with NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama for design, development, production, and mission support of Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs). The contract was restructured in 1996 to emphasize a mission contracting environment under which Rocketdyne supports the Space Transportation System launch manifest of seven flights a year without the need for a detailed list of contract deliverables such as nozzles, turbopumps, and combustion devices. This contract structure is in line with the overall Space Shuttle program goals established by the NASA to fly safely, meet the flight manifest, and reduce cost. Rocketdyne's Contracts, Pricing, and Estimating team has worked for the past several years with representatives from MSFC, the local Defense Contract Management Command, and the DCAA to improve the quality of cost proposals to MSFC for contract changes on the SSME. The contract changes on the program result primarily from engineering change proposals for product enhancements to improve safety, maintainability, or operability in the space environment. This continuous improvement team effort has been successful in improving proposal quality, reducing cycle time, and reducing cost. Some of the principal lessons learned are highlighted here to show how proposal improvements can be implemented to enhance customer satisfaction and ensure cost proposals can be evaluated easily by external customers.
24 CFR 232.605 - Contract requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... Fire Safety Equipment Form of Contract § 232.605 Contract requirements. (a) The contract between the... contract. Either form of contract shall include the cost of fire safety equipment, its installation, and...
24 CFR 232.605 - Contract requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-04-01
... Fire Safety Equipment Form of Contract § 232.605 Contract requirements. (a) The contract between the... contract. Either form of contract shall include the cost of fire safety equipment, its installation, and...
24 CFR 232.605 - Contract requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-04-01
... Fire Safety Equipment Form of Contract § 232.605 Contract requirements. (a) The contract between the... contract. Either form of contract shall include the cost of fire safety equipment, its installation, and...
48 CFR 1631.205-10 - Cost of money.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-10-01
... Section 1631.205-10 Federal Acquisition Regulations System OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES..., the supplemental information supporting submitted costs (such as the Supplemental Schedule of...
48 CFR 1631.205-10 - Cost of money.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... Section 1631.205-10 Federal Acquisition Regulations System OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS ACQUISITION REGULATION GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES..., the supplemental information supporting submitted costs (such as the Supplemental Schedule of...
The advantages of cost plus award fee contracts
NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
Keathley, William C.
1994-01-01
A Cost Plus Award Fee contract is the best procurement vehicle for the high-tech, one-of-a-kind, development projects that constitute most of NASA'S projects. The use of this type of contract requires more government and contractor effort than any other forms of contracts. An award fee contract is described as an arrangement whereby the government periodically awards a fee consistent with the cost, schedule and technical performance that is achieved by a contractor during a preset period with preset award fee pools. It's the only contracting method where both the government and contractor goals are closely linked. It also has a built-in mechanism to conveniently alter and emphasize program events in order to current external and internal situations. The award fee process also demands good communication between government and contractor participants.
Cost and quality trends in direct contracting arrangements.
Lyles, Alan; Weiner, Jonathan P; Shore, Andrew D; Christianson, Jon; Solberg, Leif I; Drury, Patricia
2002-01-01
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of a 1997 initiative of the Buyers Health Care Action Group (BHCAG) known as Choice Plus. This initiative entailed direct contracts with provider-controlled delivery systems; annual care system bidding; public reports of consumer satisfaction and quality; uniform benefits; and risk-adjusted payment. After case-mix adjustment, hospital costs decreased, ambulatory care costs rose modestly, and pharmacy costs increased substantially. Process-oriented quality indicators were stable or improved. The BHCAG employer-to-provider direct contracting and consumer choice model appeared to perform reasonably well in containing costs, without measurable adverse effects on quality.
Zallman, Leah; Nardin, Rachel; Sayah, Assaad; McCormick, Danny
2015-10-29
Under the Massachusetts health reform, low income residents (those with incomes below 150 % of the Federal Poverty Level [FPL]) were eligible for Medicaid and health insurance exchange-based plans with minimal cost-sharing and no premiums. Those with slightly higher incomes (150 %-300 % FPL) were eligible for exchange-based plans that required cost-sharing and premium payments. We conducted face to face surveys in four languages with a convenience sample of 976 patients seeking care at three hospital emergency departments five years after Massachusetts reform. We compared perceived affordability of insurance, financial burden, and satisfaction among low cost sharing plan recipients (recipients of Medicaid and insurance exchange-based plans with minimal cost-sharing and no premiums), high cost sharing plan recipients (recipients of exchange-based plans that required cost-sharing and premium payments) and the commercially insured. We found that despite having higher incomes, higher cost-sharing plan recipients were less satisfied with their insurance plans and perceived more difficulty affording their insurance than those with low cost-sharing plans. Higher cost-sharing plan recipients also reported more difficulty affording medical and non-medical health care as well as insurance premiums than those with commercial insurance. In contrast, patients with low cost-sharing public plans reported higher plan satisfaction and less financial concern than the commercially insured. Policy makers with responsibility for the benefit design of public insurance available under health care reforms in the U.S. should calibrate cost-sharing to income level so as to minimize difficulty affording care and financial burdens.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-04-01
... payments are to be made, the value may be approximated by adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at... Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES GIFT TAX... and annuity contracts. The value of a life insurance contract or of a contract for the payment of an...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR
2012-04-01
... payments are to be made, the value may be approximated by adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at... Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES GIFT TAX... and annuity contracts. The value of a life insurance contract or of a contract for the payment of an...
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-04-01
... payments are to be made, the value may be approximated by adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at... Revenue INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (CONTINUED) ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES GIFT TAX... and annuity contracts. The value of a life insurance contract or of a contract for the payment of an...
48 CFR 231.703 - Requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR
2013-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2013-10-01 2013-10-01 false Requirements. 231.703... OF DEFENSE GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit Organizations 231.703 Requirements. Under 10 U.S.C. 2249, the costs cited in 231.205-22(a) are...
48 CFR 231.703 - Requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR
2011-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2011-10-01 2011-10-01 false Requirements. 231.703... OF DEFENSE GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit Organizations 231.703 Requirements. Under 10 U.S.C. 2249, the costs cited in 231.205-22(a) are...
48 CFR 231.703 - Requirements.
Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR
2014-10-01
... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 3 2014-10-01 2014-10-01 false Requirements. 231.703... OF DEFENSE GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS CONTRACT COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES Contracts With Nonprofit Organizations 231.703 Requirements. Under 10 U.S.C. 2249, the costs cited in 231.205-22(a) are...