Geophysics, Remote Sensing, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Integrated Field Exercise 2014

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sussman, A. J.; Macleod, G.; Labak, P.; Malich, G.; Rowlands, A. P.; Craven, J.; Sweeney, J. J.; Chiappini, M.; Tuckwell, G.; Sankey, P.

2015-12-01

The Integrated Field Exercise of 2014 (IFE14) was an event held in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (with concurrent activities in Austria) that tested the operational and technical capabilities of an on-site inspection (OSI) within the CTBT verification regime. During an OSI, up to 40 international inspectors will search an area for evidence of a nuclear explosion. Over 250 experts from ~50 countries were involved in IFE14 (the largest simulation of a real OSI to date) and worked from a number of different directions, such as the Exercise Management and Control Teams (which executed the scenario in which the exercise was played) and those participants performing as members of the Inspection Team (IT). One of the main objectives of IFE14 was to test and integrate Treaty allowed inspection techniques, including a number of geophysical and remote sensing methods. In order to develop a scenario in which the simulated exercise could be carried out, suites of physical features in the IFE14 inspection area were designed and engineered by the Scenario Task Force (STF) that the IT could detect by applying the geophysical and remote sensing inspection technologies, in addition to other techniques allowed by the CTBT. For example, in preparation for IFE14, the STF modeled a seismic triggering event that was provided to the IT to prompt them to detect and localize aftershocks in the vicinity of a possible explosion. Similarly, the STF planted shallow targets such as borehole casings and pipes for detection using other geophysical methods. In addition, airborne technologies, which included multi-spectral imaging, were deployed such that the IT could identify freshly exposed surfaces, imported materials, and other areas that had been subject to modification. This presentation will introduce the CTBT and OSI, explain the IFE14 in terms of the goals specific to geophysical and remote sensing methods, and show how both the preparation for and execution of IFE14 meet those goals.

Technology Advancement and the CTBT: Taking One Step Back from the Nuclear Brink

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Perry, W. J.

2016-12-01

Technology plays a pivotal role in international nuclear security and technological advancement continues to support a path toward stability. One near-term and readily-obtainable step back from the nuclear brink is the Comprehensive Nuclear-test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The technology to independently verify adherence to the CTBT has matured in the 20 years since the Treaty was opened for signature. Technology has also improved the safety and reliability of the US nuclear stockpile in the absence of testing. Due to these advances over the past two decades neither verification nor stockpiles effectiveness should be an impediment to the Treaty's entry into force. Other technical and geo-political evolution in this same period has changed the perceived benefit of nuclear weapons as instruments of security. Recognizing the change technology has brought to deliberation of nuclear security, nations are encouraged to take this one step away from instability.This presentation will reflect on the history and assumptions that have been used to justify the build-up and configuration of nuclear stockpiles, the changes in technology and conditions that alter the basis of these original assumptions, and the re-analysis of security using current and future assumptions that point to the need for revised nuclear policies. The author has a unique and well informed perspective as both the most senior US Defense Official and a technologist.

Atmospheric transport modelling in support of CTBT verification—overview and basic concepts

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wotawa, Gerhard; De Geer, Lars-Erik; Denier, Philippe; Kalinowski, Martin; Toivonen, Harri; D'Amours, Real; Desiato, Franco; Issartel, Jean-Pierre; Langer, Matthias; Seibert, Petra; Frank, Andreas; Sloan, Craig; Yamazawa, Hiromi

Under the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a global monitoring system comprising different verification technologies is currently being set up. The network will include 80 radionuclide (RN) stations distributed all over the globe that measure treaty-relevant radioactive species. While the seismic subsystem cannot distinguish between chemical and nuclear explosions, RN monitoring would provide the "smoking gun" of a possible treaty violation. Atmospheric transport modelling (ATM) will be an integral part of CTBT verification, since it provides a geo-temporal location capability for the RN technology. In this paper, the basic concept for the future ATM software system to be installed at the International Data Centre is laid out. The system is based on the operational computation of multi-dimensional source-receptor sensitivity fields for all RN samples by means of adjoint tracer transport modelling. While the source-receptor matrix methodology has already been applied in the past, the system that we suggest will be unique and unprecedented, since it is global, real-time and aims at uncovering source scenarios that are compatible with measurements. Furthermore, it has to deal with source dilution ratios that are by orders of magnitude larger than in typical transport model applications. This new verification software will need continuous scientific attention, and may well provide a prototype system for future applications in areas of environmental monitoring, emergency response and verification of other international agreements and treaties.

Summary report of the workshop on the U.S. use of surface waves for monitoring the CTBT

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ritzwoller, M; Walter, W R

1998-09-01

The workshop addressed the following general research goals of relevance to monitoring and verifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): A) To apprise participants of current and planned research in order to facilitate information exchange, collaboration, and peer review. B) To compare and discuss techniques for data selection, measurement, error assessment, modeling methodologies, etc. To compare results in regions where they overlap and understand the causes of obsenied differences. C) To hear about the U.S. research customer's (AFTAC and DOE Knowledge Base) current and anticipated interests in surface wave research. D) To discuss information flow and integration. How can researchmore » results be prepared for efficient use and integration into operational systems E) To identify and discuss fruitful future directions for research.« less

Fifty Years of Seismic Monitoring in Davao,Philippines

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

McNamara, D. J.

2016-12-01

The Manila Observatory was a 150 years old as of 2015. Fiftry years ago it began a seismic monitoring station in the Island of Mindanao, outside the city of Davao, 7 deg. N and 121 deg. E. approxiamtely. This station was chosen not only for its position on the Ring of Fire but also for the fact the the dip angle of the earth's manetic field is zeo at that location. When the CTBT was established and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) a signatory, the Davao station by agreement with RP, began to send its seismic data to the CTBT database in Vienna. This has continued to the present day with support from CTBTO for updates in equipment and maintainence. We discuss if such a private+government model is the way forward for more comprehensive monitoring in the future.

Merging Infrasound and Electromagnetic Signals as a Means for Nuclear Explosion Detection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ashkenazy, Joseph; Lipshtat, Azi; Kesar, Amit S.; Pistinner, Shlomo; Ben Horin, Yochai

2016-04-01

The infrasound monitoring network of the CTBT consists of 60 stations. These stations are capable of detecting atmospheric events, and may provide approximate location within time scale of a few hours. However, the nature of these events cannot be deduced from the infrasound signal. More than two decades ago it was proposed to use the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) as a means of discriminating nuclear explosion from other atmospheric events. An EMP is a unique signature of nuclear explosion and is not detected from chemical ones. Nevertheless, it was decided to exclude the EMP technology from the official CTBT verification regime, mainly because of the risk of high false alarm rate, due to lightning electromagnetic pulses [1]. Here we present a method of integrating the information retrieved from the infrasound system with the EMP signal which enables us to discriminate between lightning discharges and nuclear explosions. Furthermore, we show how spectral and other characteristics of the electromagnetic signal emitted from a nuclear explosion are distinguished from those of lightning discharge. We estimate the false alarm probability of detecting a lightning discharge from a given area of the infrasound event, and identifying it as a signature of a nuclear explosion. We show that this probability is very low and conclude that the combination of infrasound monitoring and EMP spectral analysis may produce a reliable method for identifying nuclear explosions. [1] R. Johnson, Unfinished Business: The Negotiation of the CTBT and the End of Nuclear Testing, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2009.

Sources of Error and the Statistical Formulation of M S: m b Seismic Event Screening Analysis

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Anderson, D. N.; Patton, H. J.; Taylor, S. R.; Bonner, J. L.; Selby, N. D.

2014-03-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a global ban on nuclear explosions, is currently in a ratification phase. Under the CTBT, an International Monitoring System (IMS) of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasonic and radionuclide sensors is operational, and the data from the IMS is analysed by the International Data Centre (IDC). The IDC provides CTBT signatories basic seismic event parameters and a screening analysis indicating whether an event exhibits explosion characteristics (for example, shallow depth). An important component of the screening analysis is a statistical test of the null hypothesis H 0: explosion characteristics using empirical measurements of seismic energy (magnitudes). The established magnitude used for event size is the body-wave magnitude (denoted m b) computed from the initial segment of a seismic waveform. IDC screening analysis is applied to events with m b greater than 3.5. The Rayleigh wave magnitude (denoted M S) is a measure of later arriving surface wave energy. Magnitudes are measurements of seismic energy that include adjustments (physical correction model) for path and distance effects between event and station. Relative to m b, earthquakes generally have a larger M S magnitude than explosions. This article proposes a hypothesis test (screening analysis) using M S and m b that expressly accounts for physical correction model inadequacy in the standard error of the test statistic. With this hypothesis test formulation, the 2009 Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea announced nuclear weapon test fails to reject the null hypothesis H 0: explosion characteristics.

Mapping and Imaging Methodologies within the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's On-Site Inspection Framework

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hawkins, W.; Sussman, A. J.; Kelley, R. E.; Wohletz, K. H.; Schultz-Fellenz, E. S.

2013-12-01

On-site inspection (OSI) is the final verification measure of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). OSIs rely heavily on geologic and geophysical investigations. The objective is to apply methods that are effective, efficient and minimally intrusive. We present a general overview of the OSI as provisioned in the CTBT, specifying the allowed techniques and the timeline for their application. A CTBT OSI relies on many geological, geophysical and radiological methods. The search area for an OSI is mostly defined by uncertainty in the location of a suspect event detected by the International Monitoring System (IMS) and reported through the International Data Center and can be as large as 1000 km2. Thus OSI methods are fundamentally divided into general survey methods that narrow the search area and more focused, detailed survey methods to look for evidence of a potential underground explosion and try to find its location within an area of several km2. The purpose and goal of a CTBT OSI, as specified in the Article IV of the Treaty, is 'to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty' and to 'gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator.' Through the use of visual, geophysical, and radiological techniques, OSIs can detect and characterize anomalies and artifacts related to the event that triggered the inspection. In the context of an OSI, an 'observable' is a physical property that is important to recognize and document because of its relevance to the purpose of the inspection. Potential observables include: (1) visual observables such as ground/environmental disturbances and manmade features, (2) geophysical techniques that provide measurements of altered and damaged ground and buried artifacts, and (3) radiological measurements on samples. Information provided in this presentation comes from observations associated with historical testing activities that were not intended to go undetected. Every CTBT OSI will be different, and the observables present and detectable within an Inspection Area (IA) will depend on many factors, such as location, geology, emplacement configuration, climate, and the time elapsed after the event before the deployment of the Inspection Team (IT). A successful OSI is contingent on familiarity with potential observables, the suitability of the equipment to detect and characterize relevant observables, and the team's ability to document and integrate all the information into comprehensive, logical, and factual reports. In preparation for an OSI, a variety of types, scales, and generations of open-source digital imagery can be compared using geographic information systems (GIS) to focus on areas of interest. Simple image comparison from various open sources within GIS afford the opportunity to view anthropogenic and natural changes to locations of interest over time, thus remotely elucidating information about a site's use and level of activity.

The Ascension Island hydroacoustic experiment: purpose, data set features and plans for future analysis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harben, P E; Rock, D; Rodgers, A J

1999-07-23

Calibration of hydroacoustic and T-phase stations for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring will be an important element in establishing new operational stations and upgrading existing stations. Calibration of hydroacoustic stations is herein defined as precision location of the hydrophones and determination of the amplitude response from a known source energy. T-phase station calibration is herein defined as a determination of station site attenuation as a function of frequency, bearing, and distance for known impulsive energy sources in the ocean. To understand how to best conduct calibration experiments for both hydroacoustic and T-phase stations, an experiment was conducted in May, 1999more » at Ascension Island in the South Atlantic Ocean. The experiment made use of a British oceanographic research vessel and collected data that will be used for CTBT issues and for fundamental understanding of the Ascension Island volcanic edifice.« less

National data centre preparedness exercise 2015 (NPE2015): MY-NDC progress result and experience

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rashid, Faisal Izwan Abdul; Zolkaffly, Muhammed Zulfakar

2017-01-01

Malaysia has established the National Data Centre (MY-NDC) in December 2005. MY-NDC is tasked to perform the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) data management as well as providing relevant information for Treaty related events to the Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia) as the CTBT National Authority. In the late 2015, MY-NDC has participated in the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise 2015 (NPE 2015) which aims to access the level of readiness at MY-NDC. This paper aims at presenting the progress result of NPE 2015 as well as highlighting MY-NDC experience in NPE 2015 compared to previous participation in NPE 2013. MY-NDC has utilised available resources for NPE 2015. In NPE 2015, MY-NDC has performed five type of analyses compared with only two analyses in NPE 2013. Participation in the NPE 2015 has enabled MY-NDC to assess its capability and identify rooms for improvement.

Three years of operational experience from Schauinsland CTBT monitoring station.

PubMed

Zähringer, M; Bieringer, J; Schlosser, C

2008-04-01

Data from three years of operation of a low-level aerosol sampler and analyzer (RASA) at Schauinsland monitoring station are reported. The system is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The fully automatic system is capable to measure aerosol borne gamma emitters with high sensitivity and routinely quantifies 7Be and 212Pb. The system had a high level of data availability of 90% within the reporting period. A daily screening process rendered 66 tentative identifications of verification relevant radionuclides since the system entered IMS operation in February 2004. Two of these were real events and associated to a plausible source. The remaining 64 cases can consistently be explained by detector background and statistical phenomena. Inter-comparison with data from a weekly sampler operated at the same station shows instabilities of the calibration during the test phase and a good agreement since certification of the system.

Listening to sounds from an exploding meteor and oceanic waves

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Evers, L. G.; Haak, H. W.

Low frequency sound (infrasound) measurements have been selected within the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a technique to detect and identify possible nuclear explosions. The Seismology Division of the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) operates since 1999 an experimental infrasound array of 16 micro-barometers. Here we show the rare detection and identification of an exploding meteor above Northern Germany on November 8th, 1999 with data from the Deelen Infrasound Array (DIA). At the same time, sound was radiated from the Atlantic Ocean, South of Iceland, due to the atmospheric coupling of standing ocean waves, called microbaroms. Occurring with only 0.04 Hz difference in dominant frequency, DIA proved to be able to discriminate between the physically different sources of infrasound through its unique lay-out and instruments. The explosive power of the meteor being 1.5 kT TNT is in the range of nuclear explosions and therefore relevant to the CTBT.

The LANL/LLNL/AFTAC Black Thunder Coal Mine regional mine monitoring experiment

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Pearson, D.C.; Stump, B.W.; Baker, D.F.

Cast blasting operations associated with near surface coal recovery provide relatively large explosive sources that generate regional seismograms of interest in monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). This paper describes preliminary results of a series of experiments currently being conducted at the Black Thunder Coal Mine in northeast Wyoming as part of the DOE CTBT Research and Development Program. These experiments are intended to provide an integrated set of near-source and regional seismic data for the purposes of quantifying the coupling and source characterization of the explosions. The focus of this paper is on the types of data beingmore » recovered with some preliminary implications. The Black Thunder experiments are designed to assess three major questions: (1) how many mining explosions produce seismograms at regional distances that will have to be detected, located and ultimately identified by the National Data Center and what are the waveform characteristics of these particular mining explosions; (2) can discrimination techniques based on empirical studies be placed on a firm physical basis so that they can be applied to other regions where there is little monitoring experience; (3) can large scale chemical explosions (possibly mining explosions) be used to calibrate source and propagation path effects to regional stations, can source depth of burial and decoupling effects be studied in such a controlled environment? With these key questions in mind and given the cooperation of the Black Thunder Mine, a suite of experiments have been and are currently being conducted. This paper will describe the experiments and their relevance to CTBT issues.« less

Innovative concept for a major breakthrough in atmospheric radioactive xenon detection for nuclear explosion monitoring.

PubMed

Le Petit, G; Cagniant, A; Morelle, M; Gross, P; Achim, P; Douysset, G; Taffary, T; Moulin, C

The verification regime of the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) is based on a network of three different waveform technologies together with global monitoring of aerosols and noble gas in order to detect, locate and identify a nuclear weapon explosion down to 1 kt TNT equivalent. In case of a low intensity underground or underwater nuclear explosion, it appears that only radioactive gases, especially the noble gas which are difficult to contain, will allow identification of weak yield nuclear tests. Four radioactive xenon isotopes, 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe and 135 Xe, are sufficiently produced in fission reactions and exhibit suitable half-lives and radiation emissions to be detected in atmosphere at low level far away from the release site. Four different monitoring CTBT systems, ARIX, ARSA, SAUNA, and SPALAX™ have been developed in order to sample and to measure them with high sensitivity. The latest developed by the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) is likely to be drastically improved in detection sensitivity (especially for the metastable isotopes) through a higher sampling rate, when equipped with a new conversion electron (CE)/X-ray coincidence spectrometer. This new spectrometer is based on two combined detectors, both exhibiting very low radioactive background: a well-type NaI(Tl) detector for photon detection surrounding a gas cell equipped with two large passivated implanted planar silicon chips for electron detection. It is characterized by a low electron energy threshold and a much better energy resolution for the CE than those usually measured with the existing CTBT equipments. Furthermore, the compact geometry of the spectrometer provides high efficiency for X-ray and for CE associated to the decay modes of the four relevant radioxenons. The paper focus on the design of this new spectrometer and presents spectroscopic performances of a prototype based on recent results achieved from both radioactive xenon standards and air sample measurements. Major improvements in detection sensitivity have been reached and quantified, especially for metastable radioactive isotopes 131m Xe and 133m Xe with a gain in minimum detectable activity (about 2 × 10 -3  Bq) relative to current CTBT SPALAX™ system (air sampling frequency normalized to 8 h) of about 70 and 30 respectively.

Enhanced global Radionuclide Source Attribution for the Nuclear-Test-Ban Verification by means of the Adjoint Ensemble Dispersion Modeling Technique applied at the IDC/CTBTO.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Becker, A.; Wotawa, G.; de Geer, L.

2006-05-01

The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission maintains and permanently updates a source-receptor matrix (SRM) describing the global monitoring capability of a highly sensitive 80 stations radionuclide (RN) network in order to verify states signatories' compliance of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). This is done by means of receptor-oriented Lagrangian particle dispersion modeling (LPDM) to help determine the region from which suspicious radionuclides may originate. In doing so the LPDM FLEXPART5.1 is integrated backward in time based on global analysis wind fields yielding global source-receptor sensitivity (SRS) fields stored in three-hour frequency and at 1º horizontal resolution. A database of these SRS fields substantially helps in improving the interpretation of the RN samples measurements and categorizations because it enables the testing of source-hypothesis's later on in a pure post-processing (SRM inversion) step being feasible on hardware with specifications comparable to currently sold PC's or Notebooks and at any place (decentralized), provided access to the SRS fields is warranted. Within the CTBT environment it is important to quickly achieve decision-makers confidence in the SRM based backtracking products issued by the PTS in the case of the occurrence of treaty relevant radionuclides. Therefore the PTS has set up a highly automated response system together with the Regional Specialized Meteorological Centers of the World Meteorological Organization in the field of dispersion modeling who committed themselves to provide the PTS with the same standard SRS fields as calculated by their systems for CTBT relevant cases. This system was twice utilized in 2005 in order to perform adjoint ensemble dispersion modeling (EDM) and demonstrated the potential of EDM based backtracking to improve the accuracy of the source location related to singular nuclear events thus serving the backward analogue to the findings of the ensemble dispersion modeling (EDM) technique No. 5 efforts performed by Galmarini et al, 2004 (Atmos. Env. 38, 4607-4617). As the scope of the adjoint EDM methodology is not limited to CTBT verification but can be applied to any kind of nuclear event monitoring and location it bears the potential to improve the design of manifold emergency response systems towards preparedness concepts as needed for mitigation of disasters (like Chernobyl) and pre-emptive estimation of pollution hazards.

Precipitation Nowcast using Deep Recurrent Neural Network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Akbari Asanjan, A.; Yang, T.; Gao, X.; Hsu, K. L.; Sorooshian, S.

2016-12-01

An accurate precipitation nowcast (0-6 hours) with a fine temporal and spatial resolution has always been an important prerequisite for flood warning, streamflow prediction and risk management. Most of the popular approaches used for forecasting precipitation can be categorized into two groups. One type of precipitation forecast relies on numerical modeling of the physical dynamics of atmosphere and another is based on empirical and statistical regression models derived by local hydrologists or meteorologists. Given the recent advances in artificial intelligence, in this study a powerful Deep Recurrent Neural Network, termed as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) model, is creatively used to extract the patterns and forecast the spatial and temporal variability of Cloud Top Brightness Temperature (CTBT) observed from GOES satellite. Then, a 0-6 hours precipitation nowcast is produced using a Precipitation Estimation from Remote Sensing Information using Artificial Neural Network (PERSIANN) algorithm, in which the CTBT nowcast is used as the PERSIANN algorithm's raw inputs. Two case studies over the continental U.S. have been conducted that demonstrate the improvement of proposed approach as compared to a classical Feed Forward Neural Network and a couple simple regression models. The advantages and disadvantages of the proposed method are summarized with regard to its capability of pattern recognition through time, handling of vanishing gradient during model learning, and working with sparse data. The studies show that the LSTM model performs better than other methods, and it is able to learn the temporal evolution of the precipitation events through over 1000 time lags. The uniqueness of PERSIANN's algorithm enables an alternative precipitation nowcast approach as demonstrated in this study, in which the CTBT prediction is produced and used as the inputs for generating precipitation nowcast.

The National Data Center Preparedness Exercise 2009 - First Results

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gestermann, Nicolai; Bönnemann, Christian; Ceranna, Lars; Wotawa, Gerhard

2010-05-01

The NDC preparedness initiative was initiated by 8 signature states. It has now a history of more than 2 years with two successful exercises and subsequent fruitful discussions during the NDC Evaluation Workshops of the CTBTO. The first exercise was carried out in 2007 (NPE07). The objectives of and the idea behind this exercise have been described in the working paper CTBT/WGB-28/DE-IT/1 of the CTBTO. The exercise simulates a fictitious violation of the CTBT and all NDCs are invited to clarify the nature of the selected event. This exercise should help to evaluate the effectiveness of analysis procedures applied at NDCs, as well as the quality, completeness, and usefulness of IDC products. Moreover, the NPE is a measure for the readiness of the NDCs to fulfil their duties in regard of the CTBT verification: the treaty compliance based judgments about the nature of events as natural or artificial and chemical or nuclear, respectively. The NPE09 has started on 1 October 2009, 00:00 UTC. In addition to the previous exercises, three technologies (seismology, infrasound, and radionuclide) have been taken into account leading to tentative mock events generated by strong explosions in open pit mines. Consequently, the first event, which fulfils all previously defined criteria, was close to the Kara-Zhyra mine in Eastern Kazakhstan and occurred on 28 November 2009 at 07:20:31 UTC. It generated seismic signals as well as infrasound signals at the closest IMS stations. The forward atmospheric transport modelling indicated that a sufficient number of radionuclide stations were also affected to enable the application of a negative testing scenario. First results of the seismo-acoustic analysis of the NPE09 event were presented along with details on the event selection process.

Alternatives for Laboratory Measurement of Aerosol Samples from the International Monitoring System of the CTBT

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Miley, H.; Forrester, J. B.; Greenwood, L. R.; Keillor, M. E.; Eslinger, P. W.; Regmi, R.; Biegalski, S.; Erikson, L. E.

2013-12-01

The aerosol samples taken from the CTBT International Monitoring Systems stations are measured in the field with a minimum detectable concentration (MDC) of ~30 microBq/m3 of Ba-140. This is sufficient to detect far less than 1 kt of aerosol fission products in the atmosphere when the station is in the plume from such an event. Recent thinking about minimizing the potential source region (PSR) from a detection has led to a desire for a multi-station or multi-time period detection. These would be connected through the concept of ';event formation', analogous to event formation in seismic event study. However, to form such events, samples from the nearest neighbors of the detection would require re-analysis with a more sensitive laboratory to gain a substantially lower MDC, and potentially find radionuclide concentrations undetected by the station. The authors will present recent laboratory work with air filters showing various cost effective means for enhancing laboratory sensitivity.

CTBT infrasound network performance to detect the 2013 Russian fireball event

DOE PAGES

Pilger, Christoph; Ceranna, Lars; Ross, J. Ole; ...

2015-03-18

The explosive fragmentation of the 2013 Chelyabinsk meteorite generated a large airburst with an equivalent yield of 500 kT TNT. It is the most energetic event recorded by the infrasound component of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty-International Monitoring System (CTBT-IMS), globally detected by 20 out of 42 operational stations. This study performs a station-by-station estimation of the IMS detection capability to explain infrasound detections and nondetections from short to long distances, using the Chelyabinsk meteorite as global reference event. Investigated parameters influencing the detection capability are the directivity of the line source signal, the ducting of acoustic energy, and the individualmore » noise conditions at each station. Findings include a clear detection preference for stations perpendicular to the meteorite trajectory, even over large distances. Only a weak influence of stratospheric ducting is observed for this low-frequency case. As a result, a strong dependence on the diurnal variability of background noise levels at each station is observed, favoring nocturnal detections.« less

UK National Data Centre archive of seismic recordings of (presumed) underground nuclear tests 1964-1996

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Young, John; Peacock, Sheila

2016-04-01

The year 1996 has particular significance for forensic seismologists. This was the year when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was signed in September at the United Nations, setting an international norm against nuclear testing. Blacknest, as a long time seismic centre for research into detecting and identifying underground explosions using seismology, provided significant technical advice during the CTBT negotiations. Since 1962 seismic recordings of both presumed nuclear explosions and earthquakes from the four seismometer arrays Eskdalemuir, Scotland (EKA), Yellowknife, Canada (YKA), Gauribidanur, India (GBA), and Warramunga, Australia (WRA) have been copied, digitised, and saved. There was a possibility this archive would be lost. It was decided to process the records and catalogue them for distribution to other groups and institutions. This work continues at Blacknest but the archive is no longer under threat. In addition much of the archive of analogue tape recordings has been re-digitised with modern equipment, allowing sampling rates of 100 rather than 20 Hz.

Scenario design and basic analysis of the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise 2013

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ross, Ole; Ceranna, Lars; Hartmann, Gernot; Gestermann, Nicolai; Bönneman, Christian

2014-05-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all kinds of nuclear explosions. For the detection of treaty violations the International Monitoring System (IMS) operates stations observing seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound signals as well as radioisotopes in the atmosphere. While the IMS data is collected, processed and technically analyzed in the International Data Center (IDC) of the CTBT-Organization, National Data Centers (NDC) provide interpretation and advice to their government concerning suspicious detections occurring in IMS data. NDC Preparedness Exercises (NPE) are regularly performed dealing with fictitious treaty violations to practice the combined analysis of CTBT verification technologies and for the mutual exchange of information between NDC and also with the IDC. The NPE2010 and NPE2012 trigger scenarios were based on selected seismic events from the Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) serving as starting point for fictitious Radionuclide dispersion. The main task was the identification of the original REB event and the discrimination between earthquakes and explosions as source. The scenario design of NPE2013 differs from those of previous NPEs. The waveform event selection is not constrained to events in the REB. The exercise trigger is a combination of a tempo-spatial indication pointing to a certain waveform event and simulated radionuclide concentrations generated by forward Atmospheric Transport Modelling based on a fictitious release. For the waveform event the date (4 Sept. 2013) is given and the region is communicated in a map showing the fictitious state of "Frisia" at the Coast of the North Sea in Central Europe. The synthetic radionuclide detections start in Vienna (8 Sept, I-131) and Schauinsland (11 Sept, Xe-133) with rather low activity concentrations and are most prominent in Stockholm and Spitsbergen mid of September 2013. Smaller concentrations in Asia follow later on. The potential connection between the waveform and radionuclide evidence remains unclear. The verification task is to identify the waveform event and to investigate potential sources of the radionuclide findings. Finally the potential conjunction between the sources and the CTBT-relevance of the whole picture has to be evaluated. The overall question is whether requesting an On-Site-Inspection in "Frisia" would be justified. The poster presents the NPE2013 scenario and gives a basic analysis of the initial situation concerning both waveform detections and atmospheric dispersion conditions in Central Europe in early September 2013. The full NPE2013 scenario will be presented at the NDC Workshop mid of May 2014.

OSI Passive Seismic Experiment at the Former Nevada Test Site

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Sweeney, J J; Harben, P

On-site inspection (OSI) is one of the four verification provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Under the provisions of the CTBT, once the Treaty has entered into force, any signatory party can request an on-site inspection, which can then be carried out after approval (by majority voting) of the Executive Council. Once an OSI is approved, a team of 40 inspectors will be assembled to carry out an inspection to ''clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of Article I''. One challenging aspect of carrying outmore » an on-site inspection (OSI) in the case of a purported underground nuclear explosion is to detect and locate the underground effects of an explosion, which may include an explosion cavity, a zone of damaged rock, and/or a rubble zone associated with an underground collapsed cavity. The CTBT (Protocol, Section II part D, paragraph 69) prescribes several types of geophysical investigations that can be carried out for this purpose. One of the methods allowed by the CTBT for geophysical investigation is referred to in the Treaty Protocol as ''resonance seismometry''. This method, which was proposed and strongly promoted by Russia during the Treaty negotiations, is not described in the Treaty. Some clarification about the nature of the resonance method can be gained from OSI workshop presentations by Russian experts in the late 1990s. Our understanding is that resonance seismometry is a passive method that relies on seismic reverberations set up in an underground cavity by the passage of waves from regional and teleseismic sources. Only a few examples of the use of this method for detection of underground cavities have been presented, and those were done in cases where the existence and precise location of an underground cavity was known. As is the case with many of the geophysical methods allowed during an OSI under the Treaty, how resonance seismology really works and its effectiveness for OSI purposes has yet to be determined. For this experiment, we took a broad approach to the definition of ''resonance seismometry''; stretching it to include any means that employs passive seismic methods to infer the character of underground materials. In recent years there have been a number of advances in the use of correlation and noise analysis methods in seismology to obtain information about the subsurface. Our objective in this experiment was to use noise analysis and correlation analysis to evaluate these techniques for detecting and characterizing the underground damage zone from a nuclear explosion. The site that was chosen for the experiment was the Mackerel test in Area 4 of the former Nevada Test Site (now named the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS). Mackerel was an underground nuclear test of less than 20 kT conducted in February of 1964 (DOENV-209-REV 15). The reason we chose this site is because there was a known apical cavity occurring at about 50 m depth above a rubble zone, and that the site had been investigated by the US Geological Survey with active seismic methods in 1965 (Watkins et al., 1967). Note that the time delay between detonation of the explosion (1964) and the time of the present survey (2010) is nearly 46 years - this would not be typical of an expected OSI under the CTBT.« less

WOSMIP II- Workshop on Signatures of Medical and Industrial Isotope Production

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Matthews, Murray; Achim, Pascal; Auer, M.

2011-11-01

Medical and industrial fadioisotopes are fundamental tools used in science, medicine and industry with an ever expanding usage in medical practice where their availability is vital. Very sensitive environmental radionuclide monitoring networks have been developed for nuclear-security-related monitoring [particularly Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) compliance verification] and are now operational.

Incorporating atmospheric uncertainties into estimates of the detection capability of the IMS infrasound network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Le Pichon, Alexis; Ceranna, Lars; Taillepied, Doriane

2015-04-01

To monitor compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a dedicated network is being deployed. Multi-year observations recorded by the International Monitoring System (IMS) infrasound network confirm that its detection capability is highly variable in space and time. Today, numerical modeling techniques provide a basis to better understand the role of different factors describing the source and the atmosphere that influence propagation predictions. Previous studies estimated the radiated source energy from remote observations using frequency dependent attenuation relation and state-of-the-art specifications of the stratospheric wind. In order to account for a realistic description of the dynamic structure of the atmosphere, model predictions are further enhanced by wind and temperature error distributions as measured in the framework of the ARISE project (http://arise-project.eu/). In the context of the future verification of the CTBT, these predictions quantify uncertainties in the spatial and temporal variability of the IMS infrasound network performance in higher resolution, and will be helpful for the design and prioritizing maintenance of any arbitrary infrasound monitoring network.

Incorporating atmospheric uncertainties into estimates of the detection capability of the IMS infrasound network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Le Pichon, Alexis; Blanc, Elisabeth; Rüfenacht, Rolf; Kämpfer, Niklaus; Keckhut, Philippe; Hauchecorne, Alain; Ceranna, Lars; Pilger, Christoph; Ross, Ole

2014-05-01

To monitor compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a dedicated network is being deployed. Multi-year observations recorded by the International Monitoring System (IMS) infrasound network confirm that its detection capability is highly variable in space and time. Today, numerical modeling techniques provide a basis to better understand the role of different factors describing the source and the atmosphere that influence propagation predictions. Previous studies estimated the radiated source energy from remote observations using frequency dependent attenuation relation and state-of-the-art specifications of the stratospheric wind. In order to account for a realistic description of the dynamic structure of the atmosphere, model predictions are further enhanced by wind and temperature error distributions as measured in the framework of the ARISE project (http://arise-project.eu/). In the context of the future verification of the CTBT, these predictions quantify uncertainties in the spatial and temporal variability of the IMS infrasound network performance in higher resolution, and will be helpful for the design and prioritizing maintenance of any arbitrary infrasound monitoring network.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Murphy, J.R.; Marshall, M.E.; Barker, B.W.

In situations where cavity decoupling of underground nuclear explosions is a plausible evasion scenario, comprehensive seismic monitoring of any eventual CTBT will require the routine identification of many small seismic events with magnitudes in the range 2.0 < m sub b < 3.5. However, since such events are not expected to be detected teleseismically, their magnitudes will have to be estimated from regional recordings using seismic phases and frequency bands which are different from those employed in the teleseismic m sub b scale which is generally used to specify monitoring capability. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the m submore » b equivalences of any selected regional magnitude measures in order to estimate the expected detection statistics and thresholds of proposed CTBT seismic monitoring networks. In the investigations summarized in this report, this has been accomplished through analyses of synthetic data obtained by theoretically scaling observed regional seismic data recorded in Scandinavia and Central Asia from various tamped nuclear tests to obtain estimates of the corresponding seismic signals to be expected from small cavity decoupled nuclear tests at those same source locations.« less

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Graham, Thomas Jr.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclearmore » stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.« less

Use of Geophysical and Remote Sensing Techniques During the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization's Integrated Field Exercise 2014

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Labak, Peter; Sussman, Aviva; Rowlands, Aled; Chiappini, Massimo; Malich, Gregor; MacLeod, Gordon; Sankey, Peter; Sweeney, Jerry; Tuckwell, George

2016-04-01

The Integrated Field Exercise of 2014 (IFE14) was a field event held in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (with concurrent activities in Austria) that tested the operational and technical capabilities of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) on-site inspection (OSI). During an OSI, up to 40 inspectors search a 1000km2 inspection area for evidence of a nuclear explosion. Over 250 experts from ~50 countries were involved in IFE14 (the largest simulation of an OSI to date) and worked from a number of different directions, such as the Exercise Management and Control Teams to execute the scenario in which the exercise was played, to those participants performing as members of the Inspection Team (IT). One of the main objectives of IFE14 was to test Treaty allowed inspection techniques, including a number of geophysical and remote sensing methods. In order to develop a scenario in which the simulated exercise could be carried out, a number of physical features in the IFE14 inspection area were designed and engineered by the Scenario Task Force Group (STF) that the IT could detect by applying the geophysical and remote sensing inspection technologies, as well as other techniques allowed by the CTBT. For example, in preparation for IFE14, the STF modeled a seismic triggering event that was provided to the IT to prompt them to detect and localize aftershocks in the vicinity of a possible explosion. Similarly, the STF planted shallow targets such as borehole casings and pipes for detection by other geophysical methods. In addition, airborne technologies, which included multi-spectral imaging, were deployed such that the IT could identify freshly exposed surfaces, imported materials and other areas that had been subject to modification. This presentation will introduce the CTBT and OSI, explain the IFE14 in terms of goals specific to geophysical and remote sensing methods, and show how both the preparation for and execution of IFE14 meet those goals.

Improvements in Calibration and Analysis of the CTBT-relevant Radioxenon Isotopes with High Resolution SiPIN-based Electron Detectors

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Khrustalev, K.

2016-12-01

Current process for the calibration of the beta-gamma detectors used for radioxenon isotope measurements for CTBT purposes is laborious and time consuming. It uses a combination of point sources and gaseous sources resulting in differences between energy and resolution calibrations. The emergence of high resolution SiPIN based electron detectors allows improvements in the calibration and analysis process to be made. Thanks to high electron resolution of SiPIN detectors ( 8-9 keV@129 keV) compared to plastic scintillators ( 35 keV@129keV) there are a lot more CE peaks (from radioxenon and radon progenies) can be resolved and used for energy and resolution calibration in the energy range of the CTBT-relevant radioxenon isotopes. The long term stability of the SiPIN energy calibration allows one to significantly reduce the time of the QC measurements needed for checking the stability of the E/R calibration. The currently used second order polynomials for the E/R calibration fitting are unphysical and shall be replaced by a linear energy calibration for NaI and SiPIN, owing to high linearity and dynamic range of the modern digital DAQ systems, and resolution calibration functions shall be modified to reflect the underlying physical processes. Alternatively, one can completely abandon the use of fitting functions and use only point-values of E/R (similar to the efficiency calibration currently used) at the energies relevant for the isotopes of interest (ROI - Regions Of Interest ). Current analysis considers the detector as a set of single channel analysers, with an established set of coefficients relating the positions of ROIs with the positions of the QC peaks. The analysis of the spectra can be made more robust using peak and background fitting in the ROIs with a single free parameter (peak area) of the potential peaks from the known isotopes and a fixed E/R calibration values set.

Broadband seismology and the detection and verification of underground nuclear explosions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tinker, Mark Andrew

1997-10-01

On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans the testing of all nuclear weapons thereby limiting their future development. Seismology is the primary tool used for the detection and identification of underground explosions and thus, will play a key role in monitoring a CTBT. The detection and identification of low yield explosions requires seismic stations at regional distances (<1500 km). However, because the regional wavefield propagates within the extremely heterogeneous crustal waveguide, the seismic waveforms are also very complicated. Therefore, it is necessary to have a solid understanding of how the phases used in regional discriminants develop within different tectonic regimes. Thus, the development of the seismic phases Pn and Lg, which compose the seismic discriminant Pn/Lg, within the western U.S. from the Non-Proliferation Experiment are evaluated. The most fundamental discriminant is event location as 90% of all seismic sources occur too deep within the earth to be unnatural. France resumed its nuclear testing program after a four year moratorium and conducted six tests during a five month period starting in September of 1995. Using teleseismic data, a joint hypocenter determination algorithm was used to determine the hypocenters of these six explosions. One of the most important problems in monitoring a CTBT is the detection and location of small seismic events. Although seismic arrays have become the central tool for event detection, in the context of a global monitoring treaty, there will be some dependence on sparse regional networks of three-component broadband seismic stations to detect low yield explosions. However, the full power of the data has not been utilized, namely using phases other than P and S. Therefore, the information in the surface wavetrain is used to improve the locations of small seismic events recorded on a sparse network in Bolivia. Finally, as a discrimination example in a complex region, P to S ratios are used to determine source parameters of the Msb{w} 8.3 deep Bolivia earthquake.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Graham, Thomas, Jr.

2014-05-01

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a "threat to peace and security", in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

NPE 2010 results - Independent performance assessment by simulated CTBT violation scenarios

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ross, O.; Bönnemann, C.; Ceranna, L.; Gestermann, N.; Hartmann, G.; Plenefisch, T.

2012-04-01

For verification of compliance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) the global International Monitoring System (IMS) is currently being built up. The IMS is designed to detect nuclear explosions through their seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide signature. The IMS data are collected, processed to analysis products, and distributed to the state signatories by the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. The state signatories themselves may operate National Data Centers (NDC) giving technical advice concerning CTBT verification to the government. NDC Preparedness Exercises (NPE) are regularly performed to practice the verification procedures for the detection of nuclear explosions in the framework of CTBT monitoring. The initial focus of the NPE 2010 was on the component of radionuclide detections and the application of Atmospheric Transport Modeling (ATM) for defining the source region of a radionuclide event. The exercise was triggered by fictitious radioactive noble gas detections which were calculated beforehand secretly by forward ATM for a hypothetical xenon release scenario starting at location and time of a real seismic event. The task for the exercise participants was to find potential source events by atmospheric backtracking and to analyze in the following promising candidate events concerning their waveform signals. The study shows one possible way of solution for NPE 2010 as it was performed at German NDC by a team without precedent knowledge of the selected event and release scenario. The ATM Source Receptor Sensitivity (SRS) fields as provided by the IDC were evaluated in a logical approach in order to define probable source regions for several days before the first reported fictitious radioactive xenon finding. Additional information on likely event times was derived from xenon isotopic ratios where applicable. Of the considered seismic events in the potential source region all except one could be identified as earthquakes by seismological analysis. The remaining event at Black Thunder Mine, Wyoming, on 23 Oct at 21:15 UTC showed clear explosion characteristics. It caused also Infrasound detections at one station in Canada. An infrasonic one station localization algorithm led to event localization results comparable in precision to the teleseismic localization. However, the analysis of regional seismological stations gave the most accurate result giving an error ellipse of about 60 square kilometer. Finally a forward ATM simulation was performed with the candidate event as source in order to reproduce the original detection scenario. The ATM results showed a simulated station fingerprint in the IMS very similar to the fictitious detections given in the NPE 2010 scenario which is an additional confirmation that the event was correctly identified. The shown event analysis of the NPE 2010 serves as successful example for Data Fusion between the technology of radionuclide detection supported by ATM and seismological methodology as well as infrasound signal processing.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-08-03

Academy of Sciences Study and Its Critics ....................................................... 39 Chronology... criticisms of that report. On February 13, the Administration rolled out its FY2013 budget request, which included funds for the CTBT Organization...So he has not ruled out testing in the future, but there are no plans to do so.”4 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies

Machine Learning and Data Mining for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Monitoring

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Russell, S; Vaidya, S

2009-07-30

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is gaining renewed attention in light of growing worldwide interest in mitigating risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and testing. Since the International Monitoring System (IMS) installed the first suite of sensors in the late 1990's, the IMS network has steadily progressed, providing valuable support for event diagnostics. This progress was highlighted at the recent International Scientific Studies (ISS) Conference in Vienna in June 2009, where scientists and domain experts met with policy makers to assess the current status of the CTBT Verification System. A strategic theme within the ISS Conference centered on exploring opportunitiesmore » for further enhancing the detection and localization accuracy of low magnitude events by drawing upon modern tools and techniques for machine learning and large-scale data analysis. Several promising approaches for data exploitation were presented at the Conference. These are summarized in a companion report. In this paper, we introduce essential concepts in machine learning and assess techniques which could provide both incremental and comprehensive value for event discrimination by increasing the accuracy of the final data product, refining On-Site-Inspection (OSI) conclusions, and potentially reducing the cost of future network operations.« less

13C-tryptophan breath test detects increased catabolic turnover of tryptophan along the kynurenine pathway in patients with major depressive disorder

PubMed Central

Teraishi, Toshiya; Hori, Hiroaki; Sasayama, Daimei; Matsuo, Junko; Ogawa, Shintaro; Ota, Miho; Hattori, Kotaro; Kajiwara, Masahiro; Higuchi, Teruhiko; Kunugi, Hiroshi

2015-01-01

Altered tryptophan–kynurenine (KYN) metabolism has been implicated in major depressive disorder (MDD). The l-[1-13C]tryptophan breath test (13C-TBT) is a noninvasive, stable-isotope tracer method in which exhaled 13CO2 is attributable to tryptophan catabolism via the KYN pathway. We included 18 patients with MDD (DSM-IV) and 24 age- and sex-matched controls. 13C-tryptophan (150 mg) was orally administered and the 13CO2/12CO2 ratio in the breath was monitored for 180 min. The cumulative recovery rate during the 180-min test (CRR0–180; %), area under the Δ13CO2-time curve (AUC; %*min), and the maximal Δ13CO2 (Cmax; %) were significantly higher in patients with MDD than in the controls (p = 0.004, p = 0.008, and p = 0.002, respectively). Plasma tryptophan concentrations correlated negatively with Cmax in both the patients and controls (p = 0.020 and p = 0.034, respectively). Our results suggest that the 13C-TBT could be a novel biomarker for detecting a subgroup of MDD with increased tryptophan–KYN metabolism. PMID:26524975

On the usability of frequency distributions and source attribution of Cs-137 detections encountered in the IMS radio-nuclide network for radionuclide event screening and climate change monitoring

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Becker, A.; Wotawa, G.; Zähringer, M.

2009-04-01

Under the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), airborne radioactivity is measured by means of high purity Germanium gamma ray detectors deployed in a global monitoring network. Almost 60 of the scheduled 80 stations have been put in provisional operations by the end of 2008. Each station daily sends the 24 hour samples' spectroscopic data to the Vienna based Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) for review for treaty-relevant nuclides. Cs-137 is one of these relevant isotopes. Its typical minimum detectable concentration is in the order of a few Bq/m3. However, this isotope is also known to occur in atmospheric trace concentrations, due to known non CTBT relevant processes and sources related to, for example, the re-suspension of cesium from historic nuclear tests and/or the Chernobyl reactor disaster, temporarily enhanced by bio-mass burning (Wotawa et al. 2006). Properly attributed cesium detections can be used as a proxy to detect Aeolian dust events (Igarashi et al, 2001) that potentially carry cesium from all aforementioned sources but are also known to play an important role for the radiative forcing in the atmosphere (shadow effect), at the surface (albedo) and the carbon dioxide cycle when interacting with oceanic phytoplankton (Mikami and Shi, 2005). In this context this paper provides a systematic attribution of recent Cs-137 detections in the PTS monitoring network in order to Characterize those stations which are regularly affected by Cs-137 Provide input for procedures that distinguish CTBT relevant detection from other sources (event screening) Explore on the capability of certain stations to use their Cs-137 detections as a proxy to detect aeolian dust events and to flag the belonging filters to be relevant for further investigations in this field (-> EGU-2009 Session CL16/AS4.6/GM10.1: Aeolian dust: initiator, player, and recorder of environmental change). References Igarashi, Y., M. Aoyama, K. Hirose,M. Takashi and S. Yabuki, 2001: Is It Possible to Use 90Sr and 137Cs As Tracers for the Aeolian Dust Transport? Water, Air, & Soil Pollution 130, 349-354. Mikami, M. and G. Shi, 2005: Preliminary summary of aeolian dust experiment on climate impact -Japan-Sino joint project ADEC. Geophysical Research Abstracts, 7, 05985 Wotawa, G., L.-E. De Geer, A. Becker, R.D'Amours, M. Jean, R. Servranck and K. Ungar, 2006: Inter- and intra-continental transport of radioactive cesium released by boreal forest fires, Geophys. Res. Lett. 33, L12806, doi: 10.1029/2006GL026206 Disclaimer The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission.

On the impact of RN network coverage on event selection and data fusion during the 2009 National Data Centres Preparedness Exercise

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Becker, Andreas; Krysta, Monika; Auer, Matthias; Brachet, Nicolas; Ceranna, Lars; Gestermann, Nicolai; Nikkinen, Mika; Zähringer, Matthias

2010-05-01

The so-called National Data Centres (NDCs) to the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization are in charge to provide for the final judgement on the CTBT relevance of explosion events encountered in the PTS International Monitoring System (IMS). The latter is a 321 stations network set-up by the PTS (to date completion level: 80%) in order to globally monitor for occurrence of CTBT relevant seismo-acoustic and radionuclide signals. In doing so, NDCs learn about any seismo-acoustic or radionuclide event by active retrieval or subscription to corresponding event lists and products provided by the International Data Centre (IDC) to the PTS. To prepare for their instrumental role in case of a CTBT relevant event, the NDCs jointly conduct annually so-called NDC Preparedness Exercises. In 2009, NDC Germany was in charge to lead the exercise and to choose a seismo-acoustic event out of the list of events provided by the PTS (Gestermann et al., EGU2010-13067). The novelty in this procedure was that also the infrasound readings and the monitoring coverage of existing (certified) radionuclide stations into the area of consideration were taken into account during the event selection process (Coyne et al., EGU2010-12660). Hence, the event finally chosen and examined took place near Kara-Zhyra mine in Eastern Kazakhstan on 28 November 2009 around 07:20:31 UTC (Event-ID 5727516). NDC Austria performed forward atmospheric transport modelling in order to predict RN measurements that should have occurred in the radionuclide IMS. In doing so the fictitious case that there would have been a release of radionuclides taking place at the same location (Wotawa and Schraik, 2010; EGU2010-4907) in a strength being typical for a non-contained nuclear explosion is examined. The stations indicated should then be analysed for their actual radionuclide readings in order to confirm the non nuclear character of the event (negative testing scenario). Obviously only stations already set up and ‘certified' of being capable of full operations, could be recruited for this. In doing so an issue was encountered with regard to the availability of RN data at certified RN stations. Despite the support to the event selection, PTS also supplied so-called data fusion bulletins that apply a method to collocate the RN and seismo-acoustic source location results (Krysta and Becker, EGU2010-10218). In this paper we demonstrate the impact of gaps in network coverage that appear due to the aforementioned reduced RN data availability for source location capacities. Network coverage assessments for the set of certified stations and the reduced set of stations actually sending data shall therefore be discussed. Furthermore, the capabilities and constraints of the data fusion method to make up for the RN source location accuracy losses related to reduced RN data availability at certified stations shall be presented.

Construction of 3-D Earth Models for Station Specific Path Corrections by Dynamic Ray Tracing

DTIC Science & Technology

2001-10-01

the numerical eikonal solution method of Vidale (1988) being used by the MIT led consortium. The model construction described in this report relies...assembled. REFERENCES Barazangi, M., Fielding, E., Isacks, B. & Seber, D., (1996), Geophysical And Geological Databases And Ctbt...preprint download6). Fielding, E., Isacks, B.L., and Baragangi. M. (1992), A Network Accessible Geological and Geophysical Database for

An Improved Method for Seismic Event Depth and Moment Tensor Determination: CTBT Related Application

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stachnik, J.; Rozhkov, M.; Baker, B.

2016-12-01

According to the Protocol to CTBT, International Data Center is required to conduct expert technical analysis and special studies to improve event parameters and assist State Parties in identifying the source of specific event. Determination of seismic event source mechanism and its depth is a part of these tasks. It is typically done through a strategic linearized inversion of the waveforms for a complete or subset of source parameters, or similarly defined grid search through precomputed Greens Functions created for particular source models. We show preliminary results using the latter approach from an improved software design and applied on a moderately powered computer. In this development we tried to be compliant with different modes of CTBT monitoring regime and cover wide range of source-receiver distances (regional to teleseismic), resolve shallow source depths, provide full moment tensor solution based on body and surface waves recordings, be fast to satisfy both on-demand studies and automatic processing and properly incorporate observed waveforms and any uncertainties a priori as well as accurately estimate posteriori uncertainties. Implemented HDF5 based Green's Functions pre-packaging allows much greater flexibility in utilizing different software packages and methods for computation. Further additions will have the rapid use of Instaseis/AXISEM full waveform synthetics added to a pre-computed GF archive. Along with traditional post processing analysis of waveform misfits through several objective functions and variance reduction, we follow a probabilistic approach to assess the robustness of moment tensor solution. In a course of this project full moment tensor and depth estimates are determined for DPRK 2009, 2013 and 2016 events and shallow earthquakes using a new implementation of waveform fitting of teleseismic P waves. A full grid search over the entire moment tensor space is used to appropriately sample all possible solutions. A recent method by Tape & Tape (2012) to discretize the complete moment tensor space from a geometric perspective is used. Moment tensors for DPRK events show isotropic percentages greater than 50%. Depth estimates for the DPRK events range from 1.0-1.4 km. Probabilistic uncertainty estimates on the moment tensor parameters provide robustness to solution.

Monitoring Research in the Context of CTBT Negotiations and Networks,

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-08-14

1995) estimates, using infrasound and satellite data, that these sources generate explosion-like signals worldwide at a rate of approximately 1/yr at...coupling and the waveform appearance of atmospheric explosions. In infrasound there is the development of new array designs and of new automatic detection ...sensors. The principal daily use of the hydroacoustic network is for purposes of simple discrimination of those oceanic earthquakes detected by the seismic

Xenon monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bowyer, Theodore W.

How do you monitor (verify) a CTBT? It is a difficult challenge to monitor the entire world for nuclear tests, regardless of size. Nuclear tests 'normally' occur underground, above ground or underwater. Setting aside very small tests (let's limit our thinking to 1 kiloton or more), nuclear tests shake the ground, emit large amounts of radioactivity, and make loud noises if in the atmosphere (or hydroacoustic waves if underwater)

Comprehensive test ban negotiations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Grab, G. Allen; Heckrotte, Warren

1983-10-01

Although it has been a stated policy goal of American and Soviet leaders since 1958 (with the exception of Ronald Reagan), the world today is still without a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Throughout their history, test an negotiatins have been plagued by a number of persistent problems. Chief among these is East-West differences on the verification question, with the United States concerned about the problem of possible Soviet cheating and the USSR concerned about the protection of its national sovereignty. In addition, internal bureaucratic politics have played a major role in preventing the successful conclusion of an agreement. Despite these problems, the superpowers have concluded several significant partial meausres: a brief (1958-1961) total moratorium on nuclear weapons tests; the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, banning tests in the air, water and outer space; the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 (150 KT limit on underground explosions); and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976 (150 KT limit on individal PNEs). Today, the main U.S. objections to a CTBT center is the nuclear weapons laboratories, the Department of Energy, and the Pentagon, who all stress the issues of stockpile reliability and verification. Those who remain committed to a CTBT emphasize and the potential political leverage it offers in checking both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

Post-installation activities in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS) infrasound network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vivas Veloso, J. A.; Christie, D. R.; Hoffmann, T. L.; Campus, P.; Bell, M.; Langlois, A.; Martysevich, P.; Demirovik, E.; Carvalho, J.; Kramer, A.; Wu, Sean F.

2002-11-01

The provisional operation and maintenance of IMS infrasound stations after installation and subsequent certification has the objective to prepare the infrasound network for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The goal is to maintain and fine tune the technical capabilities of the network, to repair faulty equipment, and to ensure that stations continue to meet the minimum specifications through evaluation of data quality and station recalibration. Due to the globally dispersed nature of the network, this program constitutes a significant undertaking that requires careful consideration of possible logistic approaches and their financial implications. Currently, 11 of the 60 IMS infrasound stations are transmitting data in the post-installation Testing & Evaluation mode. Another 5 stations are under provisional operation and are maintained in post-certification mode. It is expected that 20% of the infrasound network will be certified by the end of 2002. This presentation will focus on the different phases of post-installation activities of the IMS infrasound program and the logistical challenges to be tackled to ensure a cost-efficient management of the network. Specific topics will include Testing & Evaluation and Certification of Infrasound Stations, as well as Configuration Management and Network Sustainment.

Towards a new daily in-situ precipitation data set supporting parameterization of wet-deposition of CTBT relevant radionuclides

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Becker, A.; Ceranna, L.; Ross, O.; Schneider, U.; Meyer-Christoffer, A.; Ziese, M.; Lehner, K.; Rudolf, B.

2012-04-01

As contribution to the World Climate Research Program (WCRP) and in support of the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD) operates the Global Precipitation Climatology Centre (GPCC). The GPCC re-analysis and near-real time monitoring products are recognized world-wide as the most reliable global data set on rain-gauge based (in-situ) precipitation measurements. The GPCC Monitoring Product (Schneider et al, 2011; Becker et al. 2012, Ziese et al, EGU2012-5442) is available two months after the fact based on the data gathered while listening to the GTS to fetch the SYNOP and CLIMAT messages. This product serves also the reference data to calibrate satellite based precipitation measurements yielding the Global Precipitation Climatology Project (GPCP) data set (Huffmann et al., 2009). The quickest GPCC product is the First Guess version of the GPCC Monitoring Product being available already 3-5 days after the month regarded. Both, the GPCC and the GPCP products bear the capability to serve as data base for the computational light-weight post processing of the wet deposition impact on the radionuclide (RN) monitoring capability of the CTBT network (Wotawa et al., 2009) on the regional and global scale, respectively. This is of major importance any time, a reliable quantitative assessment of the source-receptor sensitivity is needed, e.g. for the analysis of isotopic ratios. Actually the wet deposition recognition is a prerequisite if ratios of particulate and noble gas measurements come into play. This is so far a quite unexplored field of investigation, but would alleviate the clearance of several apparently CTBT relevant detections, encountered in the past, as bogus and provide an assessment for the so far overestimation of the RN detection capability of the CTBT network. Besides the climatological kind of wet deposition assessment for threshold monitoring purposes, there are also singular release events like the Fukushima accident that need to be classified as bogus by a properly working RN verification regime. For these kinds of events a higher temporal resolution of the precipitation data sets is needed. In course of the research project 'Global DAily Precipitation Analysis for the validation of medium-range CLImate Predictions (DAPACLIP) within the Framework Research Programme MiKlip (Mittelfristige Klimaprognose), funded by the German ministry for research (BMBF), a new quality controlled and globally gridded daily precipitation data set is built up, where GPCC will serve the land-surface compartment. The data set is primarily constructed to study decadal behaviour of the essential climate variable precipitation, but as a collateral benefit it will also serve RN verification regime needs. The Fukushima accident has also provided impetus to construct even hourly in-situ precipitation data sets as will be presented in the same session by Yatagai (2012). A comprehensive overview on available precipitation data sets based on in-situ (rain gauge), satellite measurements or the combination of both systems is available from the International Precipitation Working Group (IPWG) web pages (http://www.isac.cnr.it/~ipwg/data/datasets.html).

Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-10-29

which has been done. Critics raised concerns about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. At present, Congress addresses...Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Most Recent Developments On October 24, Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 in...future, but there are no plans to do so.’”5 Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement

DOE Program on Seismic Characterization for Regions of Interest to CTBT Monitoring,

DTIC Science & Technology

1995-08-14

processing of the monitoring network data). While developing and testing the corrections and other parameters needed by the automated processing systems...the secondary network. Parameters tabulated in the knowledge base must be appropriate for routine automated processing of network data, and must also...operation of the PNDC, as well as to results of investigations of "special events" (i.e., those events that fail to locate or discriminate during automated

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Updated ’Safeguards’ and Net Assessments

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-06-03

measures that this nation can take unilaterally within the treaty to protect its nuclear security. To compensate for “disadvantages and risk” they...and strategic forces, and could be augmented with implementation measures . While Safeguards may be part of a future CTBT debate, both supporters and...A second path involves efforts to alter the net assessment through measures intended to mitigate perceived risks of the treaty. This path has been

China’s Foreign Policy Toward North Korea: The Nuclear Issue

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-12-01

Comprehensive National Power CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CVID Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement EAS East Asia Summit ETIM...realized that it had to take some measures to stop North Korea’s nuclear testing .5 Hong-seo Park analyzes China’s policy change from a perspective of...community have failed to find a consensus, and North Korea conducted a nuclear test in 2006. China had shown different responses between the first and

North Korea’s 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, Implications

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-04-02

inspections as prima facie evidence of a violation. One generally-accepted means of evading detection of nuclear tests, especially low-yield tests...In an attempt to extend these bans to cover all nuclear tests, negotiations on the CTBT were completed in 1996. The treaty’s basic obligation is to...Verification refers to determining whether a nation is in compliance with its treaty obligations , which in this case means determining whether a suspicious

Blind Source Separation of Seismic Events with Independent Component Analysis: CTBT related exercise

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rozhkov, Mikhail; Kitov, Ivan

2015-04-01

Blind Source Separation (BSS) methods used in signal recovery applications are attractive for they use minimal a priori information about the signals they are dealing with. Homomorphic deconvolution and cepstrum estimation are probably the only methods used in certain extent in CTBT applications that can be attributed to the given branch of technology. However Expert Technical Analysis (ETA) conducted in CTBTO to improve the estimated values for the standard signal and event parameters according to the Protocol to the CTBT may face problems which cannot be resolved with certified CTBTO applications and may demand specific techniques not presently used. The problem to be considered within the ETA framework is the unambiguous separation of signals with close arrival times. Here, we examine two scenarios of interest: (1) separation of two almost co-located explosions conducted within fractions of seconds, and (2) extraction of explosion signals merged with wavetrains from strong earthquake. The importance of resolving the problem related to case 1 is connected with the correct explosion yield estimation. Case 2 is a well-known scenario of conducting clandestine nuclear tests. While the first case can be approached somehow with the means of cepstral methods, the second case can hardly be resolved with the conventional methods implemented at the International Data Centre, especially if the signals have close slowness and azimuth. Independent Component Analysis (in its FastICA implementation) implying non-Gaussianity of the underlying processes signal's mixture is a blind source separation method that we apply to resolve the mentioned above problems. We have tested this technique with synthetic waveforms, seismic data from DPRK explosions and mining blasts conducted within East-European platform as well as with signals from strong teleseismic events (Sumatra, April 2012 Mw=8.6, and Tohoku, March 2011 Mw=9.0 earthquakes). The data was recorded by seismic arrays of the International Monitoring System of CTBTO and by small-aperture seismic array Mikhnevo (MHVAR) operated by the Institute of Geosphere Dynamics, Russian Academy of Sciences. Our approach demonstrated a good ability of separation of seismic sources with very close origin times and locations (hundreds of meters), and/or having close arrival times (fractions of seconds), and recovering their waveforms from the mixture. Perspectives and limitations of the method are discussed.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Background and Current Developments

DTIC Science & Technology

2008-04-30

resumed testing, and has no plans to test. It has reduced the time needed to conduct a nuclear test. Critics raised concerns about the implications of...lieu of the current treaty.1 On October 24, Senator Jon Kyl delivered a speech critical of the CTBT and of Section 3122 in H.R. 1585, the FY2008...2007. Critics expressed concern about the implications of these policies for testing and new weapons. A statement by Physicians for Social

The Crustal Structure And CTBT Monitoring Of India: New Insights From Deep Seismic Profiling

DTIC Science & Technology

2000-09-01

transitional type crust as a major source of Deccan trap flows. The Narmada-Son lineament is the most conspicuous linear geological feature in the... Deccan proto-continents) buckling of the upper and middle crustal layers of the proto-continents took place, resulting in the western block’s lower...crustal column subducting below the Deccan proto-continents. Thus, the collision process was of such severe magnitude that the impact was seen in both

SPALAX new generation: New process design for a more efficient xenon production system for the CTBT noble gas network.

PubMed

Topin, Sylvain; Greau, Claire; Deliere, Ludovic; Hovesepian, Alexandre; Taffary, Thomas; Le Petit, Gilbert; Douysset, Guilhem; Moulin, Christophe

2015-11-01

The SPALAX (Système de Prélèvement Automatique en Ligne avec l'Analyse du Xénon) is one of the systems used in the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to detect radioactive xenon releases following a nuclear explosion. Approximately 10 years after the industrialization of the first system, the CEA has developed the SPALAX New Generation, SPALAX-NG, with the aim of increasing the global sensitivity and reducing the overall size of the system. A major breakthrough has been obtained by improving the sampling stage and the purification/concentration stage. The sampling stage evolution consists of increasing the sampling capacity and improving the gas treatment efficiency across new permeation membranes, leading to an increase in the xenon production capacity by a factor of 2-3. The purification/concentration stage evolution consists of using a new adsorbent Ag@ZSM-5 (or Ag-PZ2-25) with a much larger xenon retention capacity than activated charcoal, enabling a significant reduction in the overall size of this stage. The energy consumption of the system is similar to that of the current SPALAX system. The SPALAX-NG process is able to produce samples of almost 7 cm(3) of xenon every 12 h, making it the most productive xenon process among the IMS systems. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Worldwide measurements of radioxenon background near isotope production facilities, a nuclear power plant and at remote sites: the ‘‘EU/JA-II’’ Project

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Saey, P. R.J.; Ringbom, Anders; Bowyer, Ted W.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) specifies that radioxenon measurements should be performed at 40 or more stations worldwide within the International Monitoring System (IMS). Measuring radioxenon is one of the principle techniques to detect underground nuclear explosions. Specifically, presence and ratios of different radioxenon isotopes allows determining whether a detection event under consideration originated from a nuclear explosion or a civilian source. However, radioxenon monitoring on a global scale is a novel technology and the global civil background must be characterized sufficiently. This paper lays out a study, based on several unique measurement campaigns, of the worldwide concentrations and sourcesmore » of verification relevant xenon isotopes. It complements the experience already gathered with radioxenon measurements within the CTBT IMS programme and focuses on locations in Belgium, Germany, Kuwait, Thailand and South Africa where very little information was available on ambient xenon levels or interesting sites offered opportunities to learn more about emissions from known sources. The findings corroborate the hypothesis that a few major radioxenon sources contribute in great part to the global radioxenon background. Additionally, the existence of independent sources of 131mXe (the daughter of 131I) has been demonstrated, which has some potential to bias the isotopic signature of signals from nuclear explosions.« less

Short-range quantitative precipitation forecasting using Deep Learning approaches

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Akbari Asanjan, A.; Yang, T.; Gao, X.; Hsu, K. L.; Sorooshian, S.

2017-12-01

Predicting short-range quantitative precipitation is very important for flood forecasting, early flood warning and other hydrometeorological purposes. This study aims to improve the precipitation forecasting skills using a recently developed and advanced machine learning technique named Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM). The proposed LSTM learns the changing patterns of clouds from Cloud-Top Brightness Temperature (CTBT) images, retrieved from the infrared channel of Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES), using a sophisticated and effective learning method. After learning the dynamics of clouds, the LSTM model predicts the upcoming rainy CTBT events. The proposed model is then merged with a precipitation estimation algorithm termed Precipitation Estimation from Remotely Sensed Information using Artificial Neural Networks (PERSIANN) to provide precipitation forecasts. The results of merged LSTM with PERSIANN are compared to the results of an Elman-type Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) merged with PERSIANN and Final Analysis of Global Forecast System model over the states of Oklahoma, Florida and Oregon. The performance of each model is investigated during 3 storm events each located over one of the study regions. The results indicate the outperformance of merged LSTM forecasts comparing to the numerical and statistical baselines in terms of Probability of Detection (POD), False Alarm Ratio (FAR), Critical Success Index (CSI), RMSE and correlation coefficient especially in convective systems. The proposed method shows superior capabilities in short-term forecasting over compared methods.

DTRA's Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Research and Development Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nichols, J.; Dainty, A.; Phillips, J.

2001-05-01

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has a Program in Basic Research and Development for Nuclear Explosion Technology within the Nuclear Treaties Branch of the Arms Control Technology Division. While the funding justification is Arms Control Treaties (i.e., Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, CTBT), the results are made available for any user. Funding for the Program has averaged around \\10m per year recently. By Congressional mandate, the program has disbursed money through competitive, peer-reviewed, Program Research and Development Announcements (PRDAs); there is usually (but not always) a PRDA each year. Typical awards have been for about three years at ~\\100,000 per year, currently there are over 60 contracts in place. In addition to the "typical" awards, there was an initiative 2000 to fund seismic location calibration of the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the CTBT; there are three three-year contracts of ~\\$1,000,000 per year to perform such calibration for Eurasia, and North Africa and the Middle East. Scientifically, four technological areas have been funded, corresponding to the four technologies in the IMS: seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide, with the lion's share of the funding going to the seismic area. The scientific focus of the Program for all four technologies is detection of signals, locating their origin, and trying to determine of they are unambiguously natural in origin ("event screening"). Location has been a particular and continuing focus within the Program.

Spalax™ new generation: A sensitive and selective noble gas system for nuclear explosion monitoring.

PubMed

Le Petit, G; Cagniant, A; Gross, P; Douysset, G; Topin, S; Fontaine, J P; Taffary, T; Moulin, C

2015-09-01

In the context of the verification regime of the Comprehensive nuclear Test ban Treaty (CTBT), CEA is developing a new generation (NG) of SPALAX™ system for atmospheric radioxenon monitoring. These systems are able to extract more than 6cm(3) of pure xenon from air samples each 12h and to measure the four relevant xenon radioactive isotopes using a high resolution detection system operating in electron-photon coincidence mode. This paper presents the performances of the SPALAX™ NG prototype in operation at Bruyères-le-Châtel CEA centre, integrating the most recent CEA developments. It especially focuses on an innovative detection system made up of a gas cell equipped with two face-to-face silicon detectors associated to one or two germanium detectors. Minimum Detectable activity Concentrations (MDCs) of environmental samples were calculated to be approximately 0.1 mBq/m(3) for the isotopes (131m)Xe, (133m)Xe, (133)Xe and 0.4 mBq/m(3) for (135)Xe (single germanium configuration). The detection system might be used to simultaneously measure particulate and noble gas samples from the CTBT International Monitoring System (IMS). That possibility could lead to new capacities for particulate measurements by allowing electron-photon coincidence detection of certain fission products. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Completing and sustaining IMS network for the CTBT Verification Regime

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Meral Ozel, N.

2015-12-01

The CTBT International Monitoring System is to be comprised of 337 facilities located all over the world for the purpose of detecting and locating nuclear test explosions. Major challenges remain, namely the completion of the network where most of the remaining stations have either environmental, logistical and/or political issues to surmont (89% of the stations have already been built) and the sustainment of a reliable and state-of the-art network covering 4 technologies - seismic, infrasound , hydroacoustic and radionuclide. To have a credible and trustworthy verification system ready for entry into force of the Treaty, the CTBTO is protecting and enhancing its investment of its global network of stations and is providing effective data to the International Data Centre (IDC) and Member States. Regarding the protection of the CTBTO's investment and enhanced sustainment of IMS station operations, the IMS Division is enhancing the capabilities of the monitoring system by applying advances in instrumentation and introducing new software applications that are fit for purpose. Some examples are the development of noble gas laboratory systems to process and analyse subsoil samples, development of a mobile noble gas system for onsite inspection purposes, optimization of Beta Gamma detectors for Xenon detection, assessing and improving the efficiency of wind noise reduction systems for infrasound stations, development and testing of infrasound stations with a self-calibrating capability, and research into the use of modular designs for the hydroacoustic network.

Proceedings of the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nichols, James W., LTC

2000-09-15

These proceedings contain papers prepared for the 22nd Annual DoD/DOE Seismic Research Symposium: Planning for Verification of and Compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), held 13-15 September 2000 in New Orleans, Louisiana. These papers represent the combined research related to ground-based nuclear explosion monitoring funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Department of Defense (DoD), US Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA), and other invited sponsors. The scientific objectives of the research are to improve the United States capability to detect, locate,more » and identify nuclear explosions. The purpose of the meeting is to provide the sponsoring agencies, as well as potential users, an opportunity to review research accomplished during the preceding year and to discuss areas of investigation for the coming year. For the researchers, it provides a forum for the exchange of scientific information toward achieving program goals, and an opportunity to discuss results and future plans. Paper topics include: seismic regionalization and calibration; detection and location of sources; wave propagation from source to receiver; the nature of seismic sources, including mining practices; hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide methods; on-site inspection; and data processing.« less

Prevalence and Clinical Relevance of Exon 2 Deletion of COMMD1 in Bedlington Terriers in Korea.

PubMed

Kim, Y G; Kim, S Y; Kim, J H; Lee, K K; Yun, Y M

2016-11-01

Deletion of exon 2 of copper metabolism domain containing 1 (COMMD1) results in copper toxicosis in Bedlington terriers (CT-BT). This study was conducted to identify the prevalence and clinical relevance of the COMMD1 mutation in Bedlington terriers in Korea. A total of 105 purebred Bedlington terriers (50 males, 55 females) from the kennels and pet dog clubs in Korea were examined during the period 2008-2013. A multiplex PCR was carried out to detect exon 2 deletion of COMMD1. Clinical analysis was performed on each genetic group, and clinical status of the dogs was followed up to estimate survival probability. Of the 105 samples, 52 (49%) were wild-type homozygote, 47 (45%) were heterozygote, and 6 (6%) were mutant-type homozygote. Plasma alanine aminotransferase (ALT) activity was increased in the mutant-type homozygous group >2 years of age (P < .0001). The survival probability of 6 mutant-type homozygotes surviving 2.5 years was 0.67, and 4 years was 0.5. Results show the prevalence and clinical relevance of exon 2 deletion of COMMD1 and could help establish a structured selective breeding program to prevent CT-BT in Korea. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Journal of Veterinary Internal Medicine published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of the American College of Veterinary Internal Medicine.

Black Thunder Coal Mine and Los Alamos National Laboratory experimental study of seismic energy generated by large scale mine blasting

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Martin, R.L.; Gross, D.; Pearson, D.C.

In an attempt to better understand the impact that large mining shots will have on verifying compliance with the international, worldwide, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, no nuclear explosion tests), a series of seismic and videographic experiments has been conducted during the past two years at the Black Thunder Coal Mine. Personnel from the mine and Los Alamos National Laboratory have cooperated closely to design and perform experiments to produce results with mutual benefit to both organizations. This paper summarizes the activities, highlighting the unique results of each. Topics which were covered in these experiments include: (1) synthesis of seismic,more » videographic, acoustic, and computer modeling data to improve understanding of shot performance and phenomenology; (2) development of computer generated visualizations of observed blasting techniques; (3) documentation of azimuthal variations in radiation of seismic energy from overburden casting shots; (4) identification of, as yet unexplained, out of sequence, simultaneous detonation in some shots using seismic and videographic techniques; (5) comparison of local (0.1 to 15 kilometer range) and regional (100 to 2,000 kilometer range) seismic measurements leading to determine of the relationship between local and regional seismic amplitude to explosive yield for overburden cast, coal bulking and single fired explosions; and (6) determination of the types of mining shots triggering the prototype International Monitoring System for the CTBT.« less

Obtaining Unique, Comprehensive Deep Seismic Sounding Data Sets for CTBT Monitoring and Broad Seismological Studies

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-07-02

TYPE Final Report 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 26-Sep-01 to 26-Jun-07 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE OBTAINING UNIQUE, COMPREHENSIVE DEEP SEISMIC ... seismic records from 12 major Deep Seismic Sounding (DSS) projects acquired in 1970-1980’s in the former Soviet Union. The data include 3-component...records from 22 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) and over 500 chemical explosions recorded by a grid of linear, reversed seismic profiles covering a

Contribution of the infrasound technology to characterize large scale atmospheric disturbances and impact on infrasound monitoring

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Blanc, Elisabeth; Le Pichon, Alexis; Ceranna, Lars; Pilger, Christoph; Charlton Perez, Andrew; Smets, Pieter

2016-04-01

The International Monitoring System (IMS) developed for the verification of the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) provides a unique global description of atmospheric disturbances generating infrasound such as extreme events (e.g. meteors, volcanoes, earthquakes, and severe weather) or human activity (e.g. explosions and supersonic airplanes). The analysis of the detected signals, recorded at global scales and over near 15 years at some stations, demonstrates that large-scale atmospheric disturbances strongly affect infrasound propagation. Their time scales vary from several tens of minutes to hours and days. Their effects are in average well resolved by the current model predictions; however, accurate spatial and temporal description is lacking in both weather and climate models. This study reviews recent results using the infrasound technology to characterize these large scale disturbances, including (i) wind fluctuations induced by gravity waves generating infrasound partial reflections and modifications of the infrasound waveguide, (ii) convection from thunderstorms and mountain waves generating gravity waves, (iii) stratospheric warming events which yield wind inversions in the stratosphere, (iv)planetary waves which control the global atmospheric circulation. Improved knowledge of these disturbances and assimilation in future models is an important objective of the ARISE (Atmospheric dynamics Research InfraStructure in Europe) project. This is essential in the context of the future verification of the CTBT as enhanced atmospheric models are necessary to assess the IMS network performance in higher resolution, reduce source location errors, and improve characterization methods.

Travel-time source-specific station correction improves location accuracy

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Giuntini, Alessandra; Materni, Valerio; Chiappini, Stefano; Carluccio, Roberto; Console, Rodolfo; Chiappini, Massimo

2013-04-01

Accurate earthquake locations are crucial for investigating seismogenic processes, as well as for applications like verifying compliance to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Earthquake location accuracy is related to the degree of knowledge about the 3-D structure of seismic wave velocity in the Earth. It is well known that modeling errors of calculated travel times may have the effect of shifting the computed epicenters far from the real locations by a distance even larger than the size of the statistical error ellipses, regardless of the accuracy in picking seismic phase arrivals. The consequences of large mislocations of seismic events in the context of the CTBT verification is particularly critical in order to trigger a possible On Site Inspection (OSI). In fact, the Treaty establishes that an OSI area cannot be larger than 1000 km2, and its larger linear dimension cannot be larger than 50 km. Moreover, depth accuracy is crucial for the application of the depth event screening criterion. In the present study, we develop a method of source-specific travel times corrections based on a set of well located events recorded by dense national seismic networks in seismically active regions. The applications concern seismic sequences recorded in Japan, Iran and Italy. We show that mislocations of the order of 10-20 km affecting the epicenters, as well as larger mislocations in hypocentral depths, calculated from a global seismic network and using the standard IASPEI91 travel times can be effectively removed by applying source-specific station corrections.

Seismological Investigations of the National Data Centre Preparedness Exercise 2015 (NPE2015)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gestermann, Nicolai; Hartmann, Gernot; Ross, Jens-Ole

2017-04-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all kinds of nuclear explosions. For the detection of treaty violations the International Monitoring System (IMS) operates stations observing seismic, hydroacoustic, and infrasound signals as well as radioisotopes in the atmosphere. While the IMS data is collected, processed and technically analyzed in the International Data Center (IDC) of the CTBT-Organization, National Data Centers (NDC) provide interpretation and advice to their government concerning suspicious detections occurring in IMS data. The National Data Centre Preparedness Exercises (NPE) are regularly performed dealing with fictitious treaty violations to practice the combined analysis of CTBT verification technologies and national technical means. These exercises should help to evaluate the effectiveness of analysis procedures applied at NDCs and the quality, completeness and usefulness of IDC products. The NPE2015 is a combined radionuclide-waveform scenario. Fictitious particulate radionuclide and radioxenon measurements at stations of the IMS (International Monitoring System) of the CTBTO were reported to the international community. The type of isotopes and concentrations could arise from an underground nuclear explosion (UNE). The task of the exercise is to identify the scenario behind the provided data. The source region and time domain of a possible treaty violation activity was determined from ATM in backtracking mode with input data from the fictitious data. A time slot in October and a region around the mining area of Lubin could be identified as the possible source area of the fictitious measurements. The seismicity of the determined source region was investigated in detail to identify events which cannot be classified as natural or induced within the relevant time interval. The comparison of spectral characteristics and a cluster analysis was applied to search for a non-characteristic event within a number of known induced events in the area. The results reveal that none of the candidate events had an explosion like characteristic. All candidate events are part of event cluster with a minimum of seven events with comparable signature. The possibility of a treaty violation would be very low in a real scenario. If the nature of a suspicious event cannot be clarified with data of the IMS or national technical means, an on-site inspection (OSI) can be requested by the member states. Taking into account the results of the seismological investigations it could be decided that an OSI is not necessary for the possible source region to exclude the possibility of a fictitious clandestine underground nuclear explosion.

On the exploitation of seismic resonances for cavity detection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schneider, Felix M.; Esterhazy, Sofi; Perugia, Ilaria; Bokelmann, Götz

2017-04-01

We study the interaction of a seismic wave-field with a spherical acoustic gas- or fluid-filled cavity. The intention of this study is to clarify whether seismic resonances can be expected, a characteristic feature, which may help detecting cavities in the subsurface. This is important for many applications, as in particular the detection of underground nuclear explosions which are to be prohibited by the Comprehensive-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT). On-Site Inspections (OSI) should assure possible violation of the CTBT to be convicted after detection of a suspicious event from a nuclear explosion by the international monitoring system (IMS). One primary structural target for the field team during an OSI is the detection of cavities created by underground nuclear explosions. The application of seismic resonances of the cavity for its detection has been proposed in the CTBT by mentioning "resonance seismometry" as possible technique during OSIs. In order to calculate the full seismic wave-field from an incident plane wave that interacts with the cavity, we considered an analytic formulation of the problem. The wave-field interaction consists of elastic scattering and the wave-field interaction between the acoustic and elastic media. Acoustic resonant modes, caused by internal reflections in the acoustic cavity, show up as spectral peaks in the frequency domain. The resonant peaks are in close correlation to the eigenfrequencies of the undamped system described by the particular acoustic medium bounded in a sphere with stiff walls. The filling of the cavity could thus be determined by the observation of spectral peaks from acoustic resonances. By energy transmission from the internal oscillations back into the elastic domain and intrisic attenuation, the oscillations experience damping, resulting in a frequency shift and a limitation of the resonance amplitudes. In case of a gas-filled cavity the impedance contrast is high resulting in very narrow, high-amplitude resonances. In synthetic seismograms calculated in the surrounding elastic domain, the acoustic resonances of gas-filled cavities show up as persisting oscillations. However, due to the weak acoustic-elastic coupling in this case the amplitudes of the oscillations are very low. Due to a lower impedance contrast, a fluid-filled cavity has a stronger acoustic-elastic coupling, which results in wide spectral peaks of lower amplitudes. In the synthetic seismograms derived in the surrounding medium of fluid-filled cavities, acoustic resonances show up as strong but fast decaying reverberations. Based on the analytical modeling methods for exploitation of these resonance features are developed and discussed.

Analysis, comparison, and modeling of radar interferometry, date of surface deformation signals associated with underground explosions, mine collapses and earthquakes. Phase I: underground explosions, Nevada Test Site

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Foxall, W; Vincent, P; Walter, W

1999-07-23

We have previously presented simple elastic deformation modeling results for three classes of seismic events of concern in monitoring the CTBT--underground explosions, mine collapses and earthquakes. Those results explored the theoretical detectability of each event type using synthetic aperture radar interferometry (InSAR) based on commercially available satellite data. In those studies we identified and compared the characteristics of synthetic interferograms that distinguish each event type, as well the ability of the interferograms to constrain source parameters. These idealized modeling results, together with preliminary analysis of InSAR data for the 1995 mb 5.2 Solvay mine collapse in southwestern Wyoming, suggested thatmore » InSAR data used in conjunction with regional seismic monitoring holds great potential for CTBT discrimination and seismic source analysis, as well as providing accurate ground truth parameters for regional calibration events. In this paper we further examine the detectability and ''discriminating'' power of InSAR by presenting results from InSAR data processing, analysis and modeling of the surface deformation signals associated with underground explosions. Specifically, we present results of a detailed study of coseismic and postseismic surface deformation signals associated with underground nuclear and chemical explosion tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Several interferograms were formed from raw ERS-1/2 radar data covering different time spans and epochs beginning just prior to the last U.S. nuclear tests in 1992 and ending in 1996. These interferograms have yielded information about the nature and duration of the source processes that produced the surface deformations associated with these events. A critical result of this study is that significant post-event surface deformation associated with underground nuclear explosions detonated at depths in excess of 600 meters can be detected using differential radar interferometry. An immediate implication of this finding is that underground nuclear explosions may not need to be captured coseismically by radar images acquired before and after an event in order to be detectable. This has obvious advantages in CTBT monitoring since suspect seismic events--which usually can be located within a 100 km by 100 km area of an ERS-1/2 satellite frame by established seismic methods-can be imaged after the event has been identified and located by existing regional seismic networks. Key Words: InSAR, SLC images, interferogram, synthetic interferogram, ERS-1/2 frame, phase unwrapping, DEM, coseismic, postseismic, source parameters.« less

The European Infrasound Bulletin

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pilger, Christoph; Ceranna, Lars; Ross, J. Ole; Vergoz, Julien; Le Pichon, Alexis; Brachet, Nicolas; Blanc, Elisabeth; Kero, Johan; Liszka, Ludwik; Gibbons, Steven; Kvaerna, Tormod; Näsholm, Sven Peter; Marchetti, Emanuele; Ripepe, Maurizio; Smets, Pieter; Evers, Laslo; Ghica, Daniela; Ionescu, Constantin; Sindelarova, Tereza; Ben Horin, Yochai; Mialle, Pierrick

2018-05-01

The European Infrasound Bulletin highlights infrasound activity produced mostly by anthropogenic sources, recorded all over Europe and collected in the course of the ARISE and ARISE2 projects (Atmospheric dynamics Research InfraStructure in Europe). Data includes high-frequency (> 0.7 Hz) infrasound detections at 24 European infrasound arrays from nine different national institutions complemented with infrasound stations of the International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Data were acquired during 16 years of operation (from 2000 to 2015) and processed to identify and locate ˜ 48,000 infrasound events within Europe. The source locations of these events were derived by combining at least two corresponding station detections per event. Comparisons with ground-truth sources, e.g., Scandinavian mining activity, are provided as well as comparisons with the CTBT Late Event Bulletin (LEB). Relocation is performed using ray-tracing methods to estimate celerity and back-azimuth corrections for source location based on meteorological wind and temperature values for each event derived from European Centre for Medium-range Weather Forecast (ECMWF) data. This study focuses on the analysis of repeating, man-made infrasound events (e.g., mining blasts and supersonic flights) and on the seasonal, weekly and diurnal variation of the infrasonic activity of sources in Europe. Drawing comparisons to previous studies shows that improvements in terms of detection, association and location are made within this study due to increasing the station density and thus the number of events and determined source regions. This improves the capability of the infrasound station network in Europe to more comprehensively estimate the activity of anthropogenic infrasound sources in Europe.

Multi-Detection Events, Probability Density Functions, and Reduced Location Area

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Eslinger, Paul W.; Schrom, Brian T.

2016-03-01

Abstract Several efforts have been made in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) community to assess the benefits of combining detections of radionuclides to improve the location estimates available from atmospheric transport modeling (ATM) backtrack calculations. We present a Bayesian estimation approach rather than a simple dilution field of regard approach to allow xenon detections and non-detections to be combined mathematically. This system represents one possible probabilistic approach to radionuclide event formation. Application of this method to a recent interesting radionuclide event shows a substantial reduction in the location uncertainty of that event.

Silicon PIN diode based electron-gamma coincidence detector system for Noble Gases monitoring.

PubMed

Khrustalev, K; Popov, V Yu; Popov, Yu S

2017-08-01

We present a new second generation SiPIN based electron-photon coincidence detector system developed by Lares Ltd. for use in the Noble Gas measurement systems of the International Monitoring System and the On-site Inspection verification regimes of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The SiPIN provide superior energy resolution for electrons. Our work describes the improvements made in the second generation detector cells and the potential use of such detector systems for other applications such as In-Situ Kr-85 measurements for non-proliferation purposes. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Use of IMS data and its potential for research through global noble gases concentration maps

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Terzi, Lucrezia; Kalinowski, Martin; Gueibe, Christophe; Camps, Johan; Gheddou, Abdelhakim; Kusmierczyk-Michulec, Jolanta; Schoeppner, Michael

2017-04-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) established for verification purposes a global monitoring system for atmospheric radioisotopes and noble gas radioactivity. Daily activity concentrations have been collected worldwide for over 15 years providing unique data sets with long term time series that can be used for atmospheric circulation dynamics analysis. In this study, we want to emphasize the value of worldwide noble gas data by reconstructing global xenon concentration maps and comparing these observations with ATM simulations. By creating a residual plot, we can improve our understanding of our source estimation level for each region.

Ongoing research experiments at the former Soviet nuclear test site in eastern Kazakhstan

USGS Publications Warehouse

Leith, William S.; Kluchko, Luke J.; Konovalov, Vladimir; Vouille, Gerard

2002-01-01

Degelen mountain, located in EasternKazakhstan near the city of Semipalatinsk, was once the Soviets most active underground nuclear test site. Two hundred fifteen nuclear tests were conducted in 181 tunnels driven horizontally into its many ridges--almost twice the number of tests as at any other Soviet underground nuclear test site. It was also the site of the first Soviet underground nuclear test--a 1-kiloton device detonated on October 11, 1961. Until recently, the details of testing at Degelen were kept secret and have been the subject of considerable speculation. However, in 1991, the Semipalatinsk test site became part of the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan; and in 1995, the Kazakhstani government concluded an agreement with the U.S. Department of Defense to eliminate the nuclear testing infrastructure in Kazakhstan. This agreement, which calls for the "demilitarization of the infrastructure directly associated with the nuclear weapons test tunnels," has been implemented as the "Degelen Mountain Tunnel Closure Program." The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in partnership with the Department of Energy, has permitted the use of the tunnel closure project at the former nuclear test site as a foundation on which to support cost-effective, research-and-development-funded experiments. These experiments are principally designed to improve U.S. capabilities to monitor and verify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but have provided a new source of information on the effects of nuclear and chemical explosions on hard, fractured rock environments. These new data extends and confirms the results of recent Russian publications on the rock environment at the site and the mechanical effects of large-scale chemical and nuclear testing. In 1998, a large-scale tunnel closure experiment, Omega-1, was conducted in Tunnel 214 at Degelen mountain. In this experiment, a 100-ton chemical explosive blast was used to test technologies for monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and to calibrate a portion of the CTBT's International Monitoring System. This experiment has also provided important benchmark data on the mechanical behavior of hard, dense, fractured rock, and has demonstrated the feasibility of fielding large-scale calibration explosions, which are specified as a "confidence-building measure" in the CTBT Protocol. Two other large-scale explosion experiments, Omega-2 and Omega-3, are planned for the summer of 1999 and 2000. Like the Tunnel 214 test, the 1999 experiment will include close-in monitoring of near-source effects, as well as contributing to the calibration of key seismic stations for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Omega-3 test will examine the effect of multiple blasts on the fractured rock environment.

Nuclear Explosion Monitoring History and Research and Development

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hawkins, W. L.; Zucca, J. J.

2008-12-01

Within a year after the nuclear detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Baruch Plan was presented to the newly formed United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (June 14, 1946) to establish nuclear disarmament and international control over all nuclear activities. These controls would allow only the peaceful use of atomic energy. The plan was rejected through a Security Council veto primarily because of the resistance to unlimited inspections. Since that time there have been many multilateral, and bilateral agreements, and unilateral declarations to limit or eliminate nuclear detonations. Almost all of theses agreements (i.e. treaties) call for some type of monitoring. We will review a timeline showing the history of nuclear testing and the more important treaties. We will also describe testing operations, containment, phenomenology, and observations. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which has been signed by 179 countries (ratified by 144) established the International Monitoring System global verification regime which employs seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide monitoring techniques. The CTBT also includes on-site inspection to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the Treaty. The US Department of Energy (DOE) through its National Nuclear Security Agency's Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring R&D Program supports research by US National Laboratories, and universities and industry internationally to detect, locate, and identify nuclear detonations. This research program builds on the broad base of monitoring expertise developed over several decades. Annually the DOE and the US Department of Defense jointly solicit monitoring research proposals. Areas of research include: seismic regional characterization and wave propagation, seismic event detection and location, seismic identification and source characterization, hydroacoustic monitoring, radionuclide monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and data processing and analysis. Reports from the selected research projects are published in the proceedings of the annual Monitoring Research Review conference.

Characterization of Xe-133 global atmospheric background: Implications for the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Achim, Pascal; Generoso, Sylvia; Morin, Mireille; Gross, Philippe; Le Petit, Gilbert; Moulin, Christophe

2016-05-01

Monitoring atmospheric concentrations of radioxenons is relevant to provide evidence of atmospheric or underground nuclear weapon tests. However, when the design of the International Monitoring Network (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was set up, the impact of industrial releases was not perceived. It is now well known that industrial radioxenon signature can interfere with that of nuclear tests. Therefore, there is a crucial need to characterize atmospheric distributions of radioxenons from industrial sources—the so-called atmospheric background—in the frame of the CTBT. Two years of Xe-133 atmospheric background have been simulated using 2013 and 2014 meteorological data together with the most comprehensive emission inventory of radiopharmaceutical facilities and nuclear power plants to date. Annual average simulated activity concentrations vary from 0.01 mBq/m3 up to above 5 mBq/m3 nearby major sources. Average measured and simulated concentrations agree on most of the IMS stations, which indicates that the main sources during the time frame are properly captured. Xe-133 atmospheric background simulated at IMS stations turn out to be a complex combination of sources. Stations most impacted are in Europe and North America and can potentially detect Xe-133 every day. Predicted occurrences of detections of atmospheric Xe-133 show seasonal variations, more accentuated in the Northern Hemisphere, where the maximum occurs in winter. To our knowledge, this study presents the first global maps of Xe-133 atmospheric background from industrial sources based on two years of simulation and is a first attempt to analyze its composition in terms of origin at IMS stations.

Detection capability of the IMS seismic network based on ambient seismic noise measurements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gaebler, Peter J.; Ceranna, Lars

2016-04-01

All nuclear explosions - on the Earth's surface, underground, underwater or in the atmosphere - are banned by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As part of this treaty, a verification regime was put into place to detect, locate and characterize nuclear explosion testings at any time, by anyone and everywhere on the Earth. The International Monitoring System (IMS) plays a key role in the verification regime of the CTBT. Out of the different monitoring techniques used in the IMS, the seismic waveform approach is the most effective technology for monitoring nuclear underground testing and to identify and characterize potential nuclear events. This study introduces a method of seismic threshold monitoring to assess an upper magnitude limit of a potential seismic event in a certain given geographical region. The method is based on ambient seismic background noise measurements at the individual IMS seismic stations as well as on global distance correction terms for body wave magnitudes, which are calculated using the seismic reflectivity method. From our investigations we conclude that a global detection threshold of around mb 4.0 can be achieved using only stations from the primary seismic network, a clear latitudinal dependence for the detection threshold can be observed between northern and southern hemisphere. Including the seismic stations being part of the auxiliary seismic IMS network results in a slight improvement of global detection capability. However, including wave arrivals from distances greater than 120 degrees, mainly PKP-wave arrivals, leads to a significant improvement in average global detection capability. In special this leads to an improvement of the detection threshold on the southern hemisphere. We further investigate the dependence of the detection capability on spatial (latitude and longitude) and temporal (time) parameters, as well as on parameters such as source type and percentage of operational IMS stations.

Atmospheric Transport Modelling confining potential source location of East-Asian radionuclide detections in May 2010

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ross, J. Ole; Ceranna, Lars

2016-04-01

The radionuclide component of the International Monitoring System (IMS) to verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is in place to detect tiny traces of fission products from nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. The challenge for the interpretation of IMS radionuclide data is to discriminate radionuclide sources of CTBT relevance against emissions from nuclear facilities. Remarkable activity concentrations of Ba/La-140 occurred at the IMS radionuclide stations RN 37 (Okinawa) and RN 58 (Ussurysk) mid of May 2010. In those days also an elevated Xe-133 level was measured at RN 38 (Takasaki). Additional regional measurements of radioxenon were reported in the press and further analyzed in various publications. The radionuclide analysis gives evidence for the presence of a nuclear fission source between 10 and 12 May 2010. Backward Atmospheric Transport Modelling (ATM) with HYSPLIT driven by 0.2° ECMWF meteorological data for the IMS samples indicates that, assuming a single source, a wide range of source regions is possible including the Korean Peninsula, the Sea of Japan (East Sea), and parts of China and Russia. Further confinement of the possible source location can be provided by atmospheric backtracking for the assumed sampling periods of the reported regional xenon measurements. New studies indicate a very weak seismic event at the DPRK test site on early 12 May 2010. Forward ATM for a pulse release caused by this event shows fairly good agreement with the observed radionuclide signature. Nevertheless, the underlying nuclear fission scenario remains quite unclear and speculative even if assuming a connection between the waveform and the radionuclide event.

Special event discrimination analysis: The TEXAR blind test and identification of the August 16, 1997 Kara Sea event. Final report, 13 September 1995--31 January 1998

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Baumgardt, D.

1998-03-31

The International Monitoring System (IMS) for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) faces the serious challenge of being able to accurately and reliably identify seismic events in any region of the world. Extensive research has been performed in recent years on developing discrimination techniques which appear to classify seismic events into broad categories of source types, such as nuclear explosion, earthquake, and mine blast. This report examines in detail the problem of effectiveness of regional discrimination procedures in the application of waveform discriminants to Special Event identification and the issue of discriminant transportability.

Global Monitoring of the CTBT: Progress, Capabilities and Plans (Invited)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zerbo, L.

2013-12-01

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), established in 1996, is tasked with building up the verification regime of the CTBT. The regime includes a global system for monitoring the earth, the oceans and the atmosphere for nuclear tests, and an on-site inspection (OSI) capability. More than 80% of the 337 facilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS) have been installed and are sending data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, Austria for processing. These IMS data along with IDC processed and reviewed products are available to all States that have signed the Treaty. Concurrent with the build-up of the global monitoring networks, near-field geophysical methods are being developed and tested for OSIs. The monitoring system is currently operating in a provisional mode, as the Treaty has not yet entered into force. Progress in installing and operating the IMS and the IDC and in building up an OSI capability will be described. The capabilities of the monitoring networks have progressively improved as stations are added to the IMS and IDC processing techniques refined. Detection thresholds for seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide events have been measured and in general are equal to or lower than the predictions used during the Treaty negotiations. The measurements have led to improved models and tools that allow more accurate predictions of future capabilities and network performance under any configuration. Unplanned tests of the monitoring network occurred when the DPRK announced nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. All three tests were well above the detection threshold and easily detected and located by the seismic monitoring network. In addition, noble gas consistent with the nuclear tests in 2006 and 2013 (according to atmospheric transport models) was detected by stations in the network. On-site inspections of these tests were not conducted as the Treaty has not entered into force. In order to achieve a credible and trustworthy Verification System, increased focus is being put on the development of OSI operational capabilities while operating and sustaining the existing monitoring system, increasing the data availability and quality, and completing the remaining facilities of the IMS. Furthermore, as mandated by the Treaty, the CTBTO also seeks to continuously improve its technologies and methods through interaction with the scientific community. Workshops and scientific conferences such as the CTBT Science and Technology Conference series provide venues for exchanging ideas, and mechanisms have been developed for sharing IMS data with researchers who are developing and testing new and innovative methods pertinent to the verification regime. While progress is steady on building up the verification regime, there is also progress in gaining entry into force of the Treaty, which requires the signatures and ratifications of the DPRK, India and Pakistan; it also requires the ratifications of China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States. Thirty-six other States, whose signatures and ratifications are needed for entry into force have already done so.

Extreme Scale Computing to Secure the Nation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brown, D L; McGraw, J R; Johnson, J R

2009-11-10

Since the dawn of modern electronic computing in the mid 1940's, U.S. national security programs have been dominant users of every new generation of high-performance computer. Indeed, the first general-purpose electronic computer, ENIAC (the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer), was used to calculate the expected explosive yield of early thermonuclear weapons designs. Even the U. S. numerical weather prediction program, another early application for high-performance computing, was initially funded jointly by sponsors that included the U.S. Air Force and Navy, agencies interested in accurate weather predictions to support U.S. military operations. For the decades of the cold war, national securitymore » requirements continued to drive the development of high performance computing (HPC), including advancement of the computing hardware and development of sophisticated simulation codes to support weapons and military aircraft design, numerical weather prediction as well as data-intensive applications such as cryptography and cybersecurity U.S. national security concerns continue to drive the development of high-performance computers and software in the U.S. and in fact, events following the end of the cold war have driven an increase in the growth rate of computer performance at the high-end of the market. This mainly derives from our nation's observance of a moratorium on underground nuclear testing beginning in 1992, followed by our voluntary adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) beginning in 1995. The CTBT prohibits further underground nuclear tests, which in the past had been a key component of the nation's science-based program for assuring the reliability, performance and safety of U.S. nuclear weapons. In response to this change, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) initiated the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program in response to the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, which requires, 'in the absence of nuclear testing, a progam to: (1) Support a focused, multifaceted program to increase the understanding of the enduring stockpile; (2) Predict, detect, and evaluate potential problems of the aging of the stockpile; (3) Refurbish and re-manufacture weapons and components, as required; and (4) Maintain the science and engineering institutions needed to support the nation's nuclear deterrent, now and in the future'. This program continues to fulfill its national security mission by adding significant new capabilities for producing scientific results through large-scale computational simulation coupled with careful experimentation, including sub-critical nuclear experiments permitted under the CTBT. To develop the computational science and the computational horsepower needed to support its mission, SBSS initiated the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, later renamed the Advanced Simulation & Computing (ASC) program (sidebar: 'History of ASC Computing Program Computing Capability'). The modern 3D computational simulation capability of the ASC program supports the assessment and certification of the current nuclear stockpile through calibration with past underground test (UGT) data. While an impressive accomplishment, continued evolution of national security mission requirements will demand computing resources at a significantly greater scale than we have today. In particular, continued observance and potential Senate confirmation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) together with the U.S administration's promise for a significant reduction in the size of the stockpile and the inexorable aging and consequent refurbishment of the stockpile all demand increasing refinement of our computational simulation capabilities. Assessment of the present and future stockpile with increased confidence of the safety and reliability without reliance upon calibration with past or future test data is a long-term goal of the ASC program. This will be accomplished through significant increases in the scientific bases that underlie the computational tools. Computer codes must be developed that replace phenomenology with increased levels of scientific understanding together with an accompanying quantification of uncertainty. These advanced codes will place significantly higher demands on the computing infrastructure than do the current 3D ASC codes. This article discusses not only the need for a future computing capability at the exascale for the SBSS program, but also considers high performance computing requirements for broader national security questions. For example, the increasing concern over potential nuclear terrorist threats demands a capability to assess threats and potential disablement technologies as well as a rapid forensic capability for determining a nuclear weapons design from post-detonation evidence (nuclear counterterrorism).« less

Make the World Safer from Nuclear Weapons

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bowyer, Ted

Senior Nuclear Scientist Ted Bowyer knows firsthand the challenges associated with protecting our nation. Ted and his colleagues help detect the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They developed award-winning technologies that give international treaty verification authorities “eyes and ears” around the globe. The instruments, located in 80 countries, help ensure compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, or CTBT. They are completely automated radionuclide monitoring systems that would detect airborne radioactive particles if a nuclear detonation occurred in the air, underground or at sea. Some samples collected through these technologies are sent to PNNL’s Shallow Underground Laboratory—the only certified U.S. radionuclidemore » laboratory for the CTBT’s International Monitoring System Organization.« less

Magnitude Based Discrimination of Manmade Seismic Events From Naturally Occurring Earthquakes in Utah, USA

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Koper, K. D.; Pechmann, J. C.; Burlacu, R.; Pankow, K. L.; Stein, J. R.; Hale, J. M.; Roberson, P.; McCarter, M. K.

2016-12-01

We investigate the feasibility of using the difference between local (ML) and coda duration (MC) magnitude as a means of discriminating manmade seismic events from naturally occurring tectonic earthquakes in and around Utah. Using a dataset of nearly 7,000 well-located earthquakes in the Utah region, we find that ML-MC is on average 0.44 magnitude units smaller for mining induced seismicity (MIS) than for tectonic seismicity (TS). MIS occurs within near-surface low-velocity layers that act as a waveguide and preferentially increase coda duration relative to peak amplitude, while the vast majority of TS occurs beneath the near-surface waveguide. A second dataset of more than 3,700 probable explosions in the Utah region also has significantly lower ML-MC values than TS, likely for the same reason as the MIS. These observations suggest that ML-MC, or related measures of peak amplitude versus signal duration, may be useful for discriminating small explosions from earthquakes at local-to-regional distances. ML and MC can be determined for small events with relatively few observations, hence an ML-MC discriminant can be effective in cases where moment tensor inversion is not possible because of low data quality or poorly known Green's functions. Furthermore, an ML-MC discriminant does not rely on the existence of the fast attenuating Rg phase at regional distances. ML-MC may provide a local-to-regional distance extension of the mb-MS discriminant that has traditionally been effective at identifying large nuclear explosions with teleseismic data. This topic is of growing interest in forensic seismology, in part because the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a zero tolerance treaty that prohibits all nuclear explosions, no matter how small. If the CTBT were to come into force, source discrimination at local distances would be required to verify compliance.

Implications from Meteoric and Volcanic Infrasound Measured in the Netherlands

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Evers, L.

2003-12-01

Infrasound observations started in the Netherlands in 1986. Since then, several array configurations and instruments have been developed, tested and made operational. Currently, three infrasound arrays are continuously measuring infrasound with in-house developed microbarometers. The array apertures vary from 30 to 1500 meters and the number of instruments from 6 to 16 microbarometers. The inter-array distance ranges from 50 up to 150 km. This dense network of infrasound arrays is used to distinguish between earthquakes and sources in the atmosphere. Sonic booms, for example, can be experienced in the same manner as small (gas induced) earthquakes. Furthermore, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related research is done. Meteors are one of the few natural impulsive sources generating energy in kT TNT equivalent range. Therefore, the study of meteors is essential to the CTBT where infrasound is applied as monitoring technique. Studies of meteors in the Netherlands have shown the capability of infrasound to trace a meteor through the stratosphere. The propagation of infrasound is in first order dependent on the wind and temperature structure of the atmosphere. The meteor's path could be reconstructed by using ECMWF atmospheric models for wind and temperature. The results were compared to visual observations, confirming the location, direction and reported origin time. The accuracy of the localization mainly depends on the applied atmospheric model and array resolution. Successfully applying infrasound depends on the array configuration that should be based on the -frequency depend- spatial coherence of the signals of interest. The array aperture and inter-element distance will play a decisive role in detecting low signal-to-noise ratios. This is shown by results from studies on volcanic infrasound from Mt. Etna (Italy) detected in the Netherlands. Sub-array processing on the 16 element array revealed an increased detectability of infrasound for small aperture, 800 m, arrays, compared to large aperture, 1500 m, arrays.

The Global Detection Capability of the IMS Seismic Network in 2013 Inferred from Ambient Seismic Noise Measurements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gaebler, P. J.; Ceranna, L.

2016-12-01

All nuclear explosions - on the Earth's surface, underground, underwater or in the atmosphere - are banned by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As part of this treaty, a verification regime was put into place to detect, locate and characterize nuclear explosion testings at any time, by anyone and everywhere on the Earth. The International Monitoring System (IMS) plays a key role in the verification regime of the CTBT. Out of the different monitoring techniques used in the IMS, the seismic waveform approach is the most effective technology for monitoring nuclear underground testing and to identify and characterize potential nuclear events. This study introduces a method of seismic threshold monitoring to assess an upper magnitude limit of a potential seismic event in a certain given geographical region. The method is based on ambient seismic background noise measurements at the individual IMS seismic stations as well as on global distance correction terms for body wave magnitudes, which are calculated using the seismic reflectivity method. From our investigations we conclude that a global detection threshold of around mb 4.0 can be achieved using only stations from the primary seismic network, a clear latitudinal dependence for the detection thresholdcan be observed between northern and southern hemisphere. Including the seismic stations being part of the auxiliary seismic IMS network results in a slight improvement of global detection capability. However, including wave arrivals from distances greater than 120 degrees, mainly PKP-wave arrivals, leads to a significant improvement in average global detection capability. In special this leads to an improvement of the detection threshold on the southern hemisphere. We further investigate the dependence of the detection capability on spatial (latitude and longitude) and temporal (time) parameters, as well as on parameters such as source type and percentage of operational IMS stations.

Verification System: First System-Wide Performance Test

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chernobay, I.; Zerbo, L.

2006-05-01

System-wide performance tests are essential for the development, testing and evaluation of individual components of the verification system. In addition to evaluating global readiness it helps establishing the practical and financial requirements for eventual operations. The first system-wide performance test (SPT1) was conducted in three phases: - A preparatory phase in May-June 2004 - A performance testing phase in April-June 2005 - An evaluation phase in the last half of 2005. The preparatory phase was developmental in nature. The main objectives for the performance testing phase included establishment of performance baseline under current provisional mode of operation (CTBT/PC- 19/1/Annex II, CTBT/WGB-21/1), examination of established requirements and procedures for operation and maintenance. To establish a system-wide performance baseline the system configuration was fixed for April-May 2005. The third month (June 2005) was used for implementation of 21 test case scenarios to examine either particular operational procedures or the response of the system components to the failures simulated under controlled conditions. A total of 163 stations and 5 certified radionuclide laboratories of International Monitoring System (IMS) participated in the performance testing phase - about 50% of the eventual IMS network. 156 IMS facilities and 40 National Data Centres (NDCs) were connected to the International Data Centre (IDC) via Global Communication Infrastructure (GCI) communication links. In addition, 12 legacy stations in the auxiliary seismic network sent data to the IDC over the Internet. During the performance testing phase, the IDC produced all required products, analysed more than 6100 seismic events and 1700 radionuclide spectra. Performance of all system elements was documented and analysed. IDC products were compared with results of data processing at the NDCs. On the basis of statistics and information collected during the SPT1 a system-wide performance baseline under current guidelines for provisional Operation and Maintenance was established. The test provided feedback for further development of the draft IMS and IDC Operational Manuals and identified priority areas for further system development.

The workshop on signatures of medical and industrial isotope production - WOSMIP; Strassoldo, Italy, 1-3 July 2009.

PubMed

Matthews, K M; Bowyer, T W; Saey, P R J; Payne, R F

2012-08-01

Radiopharmaceuticals make contributions of inestimable value to medical practice. With growing demand new technologies are being developed and applied worldwide. Most diagnostic procedures rely on (99m)Tc and the use of uranium targets in reactors is currently the favored method of production, with 95% of the necessary (99)Mo parent currently being produced by four major global suppliers. Coincidentally there are growing concerns for nuclear security and proliferation. New disarmament treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are coming into effect and treaty compliance-verification monitoring is gaining momentum. Radioxenon emissions (isotopes Xe-131, 133, 133m and 135) from radiopharmaceutical production facilities are of concern in this context because radioxenon is a highly sensitive tracer for detecting nuclear explosions. There exists, therefore, a potential for confusing source attribution, with emissions from radiopharmaceutical-production facilities regularly being detected in treaty compliance-verification networks. The CTBT radioxenon network currently under installation is highly sensitive with detection limits approaching 0.1 mBq/m³ and, depending on transport conditions and background, able to detect industrial release signatures from sites thousands of kilometers away. The method currently employed to distinguish between industrial and military radioxenon sources involves plots of isotope ratios (133m)Xe/(131m)Xe versus (135)Xe/(133)Xe, but source attribution can be ambiguous. Through the WOSMIP Workshop the environmental monitoring community is gaining a better understanding of the complexities of the processes at production facilities, and the production community is recognizing the impact their operations have on monitoring systems and their goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Further collaboration and discussion are needed, together with advances in Xe trapping technology and monitoring systems. Such initiatives will help in addressing the dichotomy which exists between expanding production and improving monitoring sensitivity, with the ultimate aim of enabling unambiguous distinction between different nuclide signatures. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Measurement of 37Ar to support technology for On-site Inspection under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Aalseth, Craig E.; Day, Anthony R.; Haas, Derek A.

On-Site Inspection (OSI) is a key component of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclide isotopes created by an underground nuclear explosion are a valuable signature of a Treaty violation. Argon-37 is produced from neutron interaction with calcium in soil, 40Ca(n,α)37Ar. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of 37Ar provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for completion of an inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This paper presents a low-background internal-source gas proportional counter with an 37Ar measurement sensitivity level equivalent to 45.1 mBq/SCM in whole air.

Characterization of infrasound from lightning

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Assink, J. D.; Evers, L. G.; Holleman, I.; Paulssen, H.

2008-08-01

During thunderstorm activity in the Netherlands, electromagnetic and infrasonic signals are emitted due to the process of lightning and thunder. It is shown that correlating infrasound detections with results from a electromagnetic lightning detection network is successful up to distances of 50 km from the infrasound array. Infrasound recordings clearly show blastwave characteristics which can be related to cloud-ground discharges, with a dominant frequency between 1-5 Hz. Amplitude measurements of CG discharges can partly be explained by the beam pattern of a line source with a dominant frequency of 3.9 Hz, up to a distance of 20 km. The ability to measure lightning activity with infrasound arrays has both positive and negative implications for CTBT verification purposes. As a scientific application, lightning studies can benefit from the worldwide infrasound verification system.

Challenges in Regional CTBT Monitoring: The Experience So Far From Vienna

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bratt, S. R.

2001-05-01

The verification system being established to monitor the CTBT will include an International Monitoring System (IMS) network of 321 seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations, transmitting digital data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, Austria over a Global Communications Infrastructure (GCI). The IDC started in February 2000 to disseminate a wide range of products based on automatic processing and interactive analysis of data from about 90 stations from the four IMS technologies. The number of events in the seismo-acoustic Reviewed Event Bulletins (REB) was 18,218 for the year 2000, with the daily number ranging from 30 to 360. Over 300 users from almost 50 Member States are now receiving an average of 18,000 data and product deliveries per month from the IDC. As the IMS network expands (40 - 60 new stations are scheduled start transmitting data this year) and as GCI communications links bring increasing volumes of new data into Vienna (70 new GCI sites are currently in preparation), the monitoring capability of the IMS and IDC has the potential to improve significantly. To realize this potential, the IDC must continue to improve its capacity to exploit regional seismic data from events defined by few stations with large azimuthal gaps. During 2000, 25% of the events in the REB were defined by five or fewer stations. 48% were defined by at least one regional phase, and 24% were defined by at least three. 34% had gaps in azimuthal coverage of more than 180 degrees. The fraction of regional, sparsely detected events will only increase as new, sensitive stations come on-line, and the detection threshold drops. This will be offset, to some extent, because stations within the denser network that detect near-threshold events will be at closer distances, on average. Thus to address the challenges of regional monitoring, the IDC must integrate "tuned" station and network processing parameters for new stations; enhanced and/or new methods for estimating location, depth and uncertainty bounds; and validated, regionally-calibrated travel times, event characterization parameters and screening criteria. A new IDC program to fund research to calibrate regional seismic travel paths seeks to address, in cooperation with other national efforts, one item on this list. More effective use of the full waveform data and cross-technology synergies must be explored. All of this work must be integrated into modular software systems that can be maintained and improved over time. To motivate these regional monitoring challenges and possible improvements, the experience from the IDC will be presented via a series of illustrative, sample events. Challenges in the technical and policy arenas must be addressed as well. IMS data must first be available at the IDC before they can be analyzed. The encouraging experience to date is that the availability of data arriving via the GCI is significantly higher (~95%) than the availability (~70%) from the same stations prior to GCI installation, when they were transmitting data via other routes. Within the IDC, trade-offs must be considered between the desired levels of product quality and timeliness, and the investment in personnel and system development to support the levels sought. Another high-priority objective is to develop a policy for providing data and products to scientific and disaster alert organizations. It is clear that broader exploitation of these rich and unique assets could be of great, mutual benefit, and is, perhaps, a necessity for the CTBT verification system to achieve its potential.

Monitoring the Earth's Atmosphere with the Global IMS Infrasound Network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brachet, Nicolas; Brown, David; Mialle, Pierrick; Le Bras, Ronan; Coyne, John; Given, Jeffrey

2010-05-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is tasked with monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans nuclear weapon explosions underground, in the oceans, and in the atmosphere. The verification regime includes a globally distributed network of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide stations which collect and transmit data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna, Austria shortly after the data are recorded at each station. The infrasound network defined in the Protocol of the CTBT comprises 60 infrasound array stations. Each array is built according to the same technical specifications, it is typically composed of 4 to 9 sensors, with 1 to 3 km aperture geometry. At the end of 2000 only one infrasound station was transmitting data to the IDC. Since then, 41 additional stations have been installed and 70% of the infrasound network is currently certified and contributing data to the IDC. This constitutes the first global infrasound network ever built with such a large and uniform distribution of stations. Infrasound data at the IDC are processed at the station level using the Progressive Multi-Channel Correlation (PMCC) method for the detection and measurement of infrasound signals. The algorithm calculates the signal correlation between sensors at an infrasound array. If the signal is sufficiently correlated and consistent over an extended period of time and frequency range a detection is created. Groups of detections are then categorized according to their propagation and waveform features, and a phase name is assigned for infrasound, seismic or noise detections. The categorization complements the PMCC algorithm to avoid overwhelming the IDC automatic association algorithm with false alarm infrasound events. Currently, 80 to 90% of the detections are identified as noise by the system. Although the noise detections are not used to build events in the context of CTBT monitoring, they represent valuable data for other civil applications like monitoring of natural hazards (volcanic activity, storm tracking) and climate change. Non-noise detections are used in network processing at the IDC along with seismic and hydroacoustic technologies. The arrival phases detected on the three waveform technologies may be combined and used for locating events in an automatically generated bulletin of events. This automatic event bulletin is routinely reviewed by analysts during the interactive review process. However, the fusion of infrasound data with the other waveform technologies has only recently (in early 2010) become part of the IDC operational system, after a software development and testing period that began in 2004. The build-up of the IMS infrasound network, the recent developments of the IDC infrasound software, and the progress accomplished during the last decade in the domain of real-time atmospheric modelling have allowed better understanding of infrasound signals and identification of a growing data set of ground-truth sources. These infragenic sources originate from natural or man-made sources. Some of the detected signals are emitted by local or regional phenomena recorded by a single IMS infrasound station: man-made cultural activity, wind farms, aircraft, artillery exercises, ocean surf, thunderstorms, rumbling volcanoes, iceberg calving, aurora, avalanches. Other signals may be recorded by several IMS infrasound stations at larger distances: ocean swell, sonic booms, and mountain associated waves. Only a small fraction of events meet the event definition criteria considering the Treaty verification mission of the Organization. Candidate event types for the IDC Reviewed Event Bulletin include atmospheric or surface explosions, meteor explosions, rocket launches, signals from large earthquakes and explosive volcanic eruptions.

An Evaluation of North Korea’s Nuclear Test by Belbasi Nuclear Tests Monitoring Center-KOERI

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Necmioglu, O.; Meral Ozel, N.; Semin, K.

2009-12-01

Bogazici University and Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake Research Institute (KOERI) is acting as the Turkish National Data Center (NDC) and responsible for the operation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) Primary Seismic Station (PS-43) under Belbasi Nuclear Tests Monitoring Center for the verification of compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) since February 2000. The NDC is responsible for operating two arrays which are part of the IMS, as well as for transmitting data from these stations to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna. The Belbasi array was established in 1951, as a four-element (Benioff 1051) seismic array as part of the United States Atomic Energy Detection System (USAEDS). Turkish General Staff (TGS) and U.S. Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC) under the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) jointly operated this short period array. The station was upgraded and several seismometers were added to array during 1951 and 1994 and the station code was changed from BSRS (Belbasi Seismic Research Station) to BRTR-PS43 later on. PS-43 is composed of two sub-arrays (Ankara and Keskin): the medium-period array with a ~40 km radius located in Ankara and the short-period array with a ~3 km radius located in Keskin. Each array has a broadband element located at the middle of the circular geometry. Short period instruments are installed at depth 30 meters from the surface while medium and broadband instruments are installed at depth 60 meters from surface. On 25 May 2009, The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) claimed that it had conducted a nuclear test. Corresponding seismic event was recorded by IMS and IDC released first automatic estimation of time (00:54:43 GMT), location (41.2896°N and 129.0480°E) and the magnitude (4.52 mb) of the event in less than two hours time (USGS: 00:54:43 GMT; 41.306°N, 129.029°E; 4.7 mb) During our preliminary analysis of the 25th May 2009 DPRK event, we saw a very clear P arrival at 01:05:47 (GMT) at BRTR SP array. The result of the f-k analysis performed in Geotool software, installed at NDC facilities in 2008 and is in full use currently, was also indicating that the arrival belongs to the DPRK event. When comparing our f-k results (calculated at 1-2 Hz) with IDC-REB, however, we have noticed that our calculation and therefore corresponding residuals (calculated with reference to REB residuals) are much better in comparison to REB. The reasons of this ambiguity have been explored and for the first time a comprehensive seismological analysis of a Nuclear Test has been conducted in Turkey. CTBT has an important role for the implementation of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and it is a key element for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In this study, we would like to reflect the technical and scientific aspects of the 25 May 2009 DPRK event analysis, together with our involvement in CTBT(O) affairs, which we believe it brings new dimensions to Turkey especially in the area of Geophysics.

Seismic resonances of acoustic cavities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schneider, F. M.; Esterhazy, S.; Perugia, I.; Bokelmann, G.

2016-12-01

The goal of an On-Site Inspection (OSI) is to clarify at a possible testsite whether a member state of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)has violated its rules by conducting a underground nuclear test. Compared toatmospheric and underwater tests underground nuclear explosions are the mostdifficult to detect.One primary structural target for the field team during an OSI is the detectionof an underground cavity, created by underground nuclear explosions. Theapplication of seismic-resonances of the cavity for its detection has beenproposed in the CTBT by mentioning "resonance seismometry" as possibletechnique during OSIs. We modeled the interaction of a seismic wave-field withan underground cavity by a sphere filled with an acoustic medium surrounded byan elastic full space. For this setting the solution of the seismic wave-fieldcan be computed analytically. Using this approach the appearance of acousticresonances can be predicted in the theoretical calculations. Resonance peaksappear in the spectrum derived for the elastic domain surrounding the acousticcavity, which scale in width with the density of the acoustic medium. For lowdensities in the acoustic medium as for an gas-filled cavity, the spectralpeaks become very narrow and therefore hard to resolve. The resonancefrequencies, however can be correlated to the discrete set of eigenmodes of theacoustic cavity and can thus be predicted if the dimension of the cavity isknown. Origin of the resonance peaks are internal reverberations of wavescoupling in the acoustic domain and causing an echoing signal that couples outto the elastic domain again. In the gas-filled case the amplitudes in timedomain are very low.Beside theoretical considerations we seek to find real data examples fromsimilar settings. As example we analyze a 3D active seismic data set fromFelsőpetény, Hungary that has been conducted between 2012 and 2014 on behalf ofthe CTBTO. In the subsurface of this area a former clay mine is situated, whichis connected to a karst cave of 30 m diameter in 70 m depth. Our aim is toinvestigate whether resonances predicted from theoretical models can be alsoobserved in data from such real experiments. Observation of spectral resonantpeaks could serve as the foundation of a cavity detection method that could beutilized for nuclear verification.

Seismic wave interaction with underground cavities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schneider, Felix M.; Esterhazy, Sofi; Perugia, Ilaria; Bokelmann, Götz

2016-04-01

Realization of the future Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will require ensuring its compliance, making the CTBT a prime example of forensic seismology. Following indications of a nuclear explosion obtained on the basis of the (IMS) monitoring network further evidence needs to be sought at the location of the suspicious event. For such an On-Site Inspection (OSI) at a possible nuclear test site the treaty lists several techniques that can be carried out by the inspection team, including aftershock monitoring and the conduction of active seismic surveys. While those techniques are already well established, a third group of methods labeled as "resonance seismometry" is less well defined and needs further elaboration. A prime structural target that is expected to be present as a remnant of an underground nuclear explosion is a cavity at the location and depth the bomb was fired. Originally "resonance seismometry" referred to resonant seismic emission of the cavity within the medium that could be stimulated by an incident seismic wave of the right frequency and observed as peaks in the spectrum of seismic stations in the vicinity of the cavity. However, it is not yet clear which are the conditions for which resonant emissions of the cavity could be observed. In order to define distance-, frequency- and amplitude ranges at which resonant emissions could be observed we study the interaction of seismic waves with underground cavities. As a generic model for possible resonances we use a spherical acoustic cavity in an elastic full-space. To solve the forward problem for the full elastic wave field around acoustic spherical inclusions, we implemented an analytical solution (Korneev, 1993). This yields the possibility of generating scattering cross-sections, amplitude spectrums and synthetic seismograms for plane incident waves. Here, we focus on the questions whether or not we can expect resonant responses in the wave field scattered from the cavity. We show results for varying input parameters such as dimensions, densities, and seismic velocities in and around the cavity, in order to discuss the applicability of such observations during an OSI.

Monitoring and Reporting Tools of the International Data Centre and International Monitoring System

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lastowka, L.; Anichenko, A.; Galindo, M.; Villagran Herrera, M.; Mori, S.; Malakhova, M.; Daly, T.; Otsuka, R.; Stangel, H.

2007-05-01

The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which prohibits all nuclear explosions was opened for signature in 1996. Since then, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization has been working towards the establishment of a global verification regime to monitor compliance with the ban on nuclear testing. The International Monitoring System (IMS) comprises facilities for seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide monitoring, and the means of communication. This system is supported by the International Data Centre (IDC), which provides objective products and services necessary for effective global monitoring. Upon completion of the IMS, 321 stations will be contributing to both near real-time and reviewed data products. Currently there are 194 facilities in IDC operations. This number is expected to increase by about 40% over the next few years, necessitating methods and tools to effectively handle the expansion. The requirements of high data availability as well as operational transparency are fundamental principals of IMS network operations, therefore, a suite of tools for monitoring and reporting have been developed. These include applications for monitoring Global Communication Infrastructure (GCI) links, detecting outages in continuous and segmented data, monitoring the status of data processing and forwarding to member states, and for systematic electronic communication and problem ticketing. The operation of the IMS network requires the help of local specialists whose cooperation is in some cases ensured by contracts or other agreements. The PTS (Provisional Technical Secretariat) strives to make the monitoring of the IMS as standardized and efficient as possible, and has therefore created the Operations Centre in which the use of most the tools are centralized. Recently the tasks of operations across all technologies, including the GCI, have been centralized within a single section of the organization. To harmonize the operations, an ongoing State of Health monitoring project will provide an integrated view of network, station and GCI performance and will provide system metrics. Comprehensive procedures will be developed to utilize this tool. However, as the IMS network expands, easier access to more information will cause additional challenges, mainly with human resources, to analyze and manage these metrics.

Comparison of Radionuclide Ratios in Atmospheric Nuclear Explosions and Nuclear Releases from Chernobyl and Fukushima seen in Gamma Ray Spectormetry

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Friese, Judah I.; Kephart, Rosara F.; Lucas, Dawn D.

2013-05-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has remote radionuclide monitoring followed by an On Site Inspection (OSI) to clarify the nature of a suspect event. An important aspect of radionuclide measurements on site is the discrimination of other potential sources of similar radionuclides such as reactor accidents or medical isotope production. The Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear reactor disasters offer two different reactor source term environmental inputs that can be compared against historical measurements of nuclear explosions. The comparison of whole-sample gamma spectrometry measurements from these three events and the analysis of similarities and differences are presented. This analysis ismore » a step toward confirming what is needed for measurements during an OSI under the auspices of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.« less

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wogman, Ned A.; Milbrath, Brian D.; Payne, Rosara F.

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of themore » sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.« less

Definition of Exclusion Zones Using Seismic Data

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bartal, Y.; Villagran, M.; Ben Horin, Y.; Leonard, G.; Joswig, M.

- In verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), there is a motivation to be effective, efficient and economical and to prevent abuse of the right to conduct an On-site Inspection (OSI) in the territory of a challenged State Party. In particular, it is in the interest of a State Party to avoid irrelevant search in specific areas. In this study we propose several techniques to determine `exclusion zones', which are defined as areas where an event could not have possibly occurred. All techniques are based on simple ideas of arrival time differences between seismic stations and thus are less prone to modeling errors compared to standard event location methods. The techniques proposed are: angular sector exclusion based on a tripartite micro array, half-space exclusion based on a station pair, and closed area exclusion based on circumferential networks.

Trends in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Research & Development - A Physics Perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Maceira, Monica; Blom, Philip Stephen; MacCarthy, Jonathan K.

This document entitled “Trends in Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Research and Development – A Physics Perspective” reviews the accessible literature, as it relates to nuclear explosion monitoring and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1996), for four research areas: source physics (understanding signal generation), signal propagation (accounting for changes through physical media), sensors (recording the signals), and signal analysis (processing the signal). Over 40 trends are addressed, such as moving from 1D to 3D earth models, from pick-based seismic event processing to full waveform processing, and from separate treatment of mechanical waves in different media to combined analyses. Highlighted in the documentmore » for each trend are the value and benefit to the monitoring mission, key papers that advanced the science, and promising research and development for the future.« less

An IMS Station life cycle from a sustainment point of view

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brely, Natalie; Gautier, Jean-Pierre; Foster, Daniel

2014-05-01

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is to consist of 321 monitoring facilities, composed of four different technologies with a variety of designs and equipment types, deployed in a range of environments around the globe. The International Monitoring System is conceived to operate in perpetuity through maintenance, replacement and recapitalization of IMS facilities' infrastructure and equipment when the end of service life is reached [CTBT/PTS/INF.1163]. Life Cycle techniques and modellization are being used by the PTS to plan and forecast life cycle sustainment requirements of IMS facilities. Through historical data analysis, Engineering inputs and Feedback from experienced Station Operators, the PTS currently works towards increasing the level of confidence on these forecasts and sustainment requirements planning. Continued validation, feedback and improvement of source data from scientific community and experienced users is sought and essential in order to ensure limited effect on data availability and optimal costs (human and financial).

New evaluated radioxenon decay data and its implications in nuclear explosion monitoring.

PubMed

Galan, Monica; Kalinowski, Martin; Gheddou, Abdelhakim; Yamba, Kassoum

2018-03-07

This work presents the last updated evaluations of the nuclear and decay data of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): Xe-131 m, Xe-133, Xe-133 m and Xe-135. This includes the most recent measured values on the half-lives, gamma emission probabilities (Pγ) and internal conversion coefficients (ICC). The evaluation procedure has been made within the Decay Data Evaluation Project (DDEP) framework and using the latest available versions of nuclear and atomic data evaluation software tools and compilations. The consistency of the evaluations was confirmed by the very close result between the total available energy calculated with the present evaluated data and the tabulated Q-value. The article also analyzes the implications on the variation of the activity ratio calculations from radioxenon monitoring facilities depending on the nuclear database of reference. Copyright © 2018. Published by Elsevier Ltd.

Atmospheric Transport Modelling assessing radionuclide detection chances after the nuclear test announced by the DPRK in January 2016

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ross, J. Ole; Ceranna, Lars

2016-04-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all kinds of nuclear explosions. The International Monitoring System (IMS) is in place and at about 90% complete to verify compliance with the CTBT. The stations of the waveform technologies are capable to detect seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasonic signals for detection, localization, and characterization of explosions. The seismic signals of the DPRK event on 6 January 2016 were detected by many seismic stations around the globe and allow for localization of the event and identification as explosion (see poster by G. Hartmann et al.). However, the direct evidence for a nuclear explosion is only possible through the detection of nuclear fission products which may be released. For that 80 Radionuclide (RN) Stations are part of the designed IMS, about 60 are already operational. All RN stations are highly sensitive for tiny traces of particulate radionuclides in large volume air samplers. There are 40 of the RN stations designated to be equipped with noble gas systems detecting traces of radioactive xenon isotopes which are more likely to escape from an underground test cavity than particulates. Already 30 of the noble gas systems are operational. Atmospheric Transport Modelling supports the interpretation of radionuclide detections (and as appropriate non-detections) by connecting the activity concentration measurements with potential source locations and release times. In our study forecasts with the Lagrangian Particle Dispersion Model HYSPLIT (NOAA) and GFS (NCEP) meteorological data are considered to assess the plume propagation patterns for hypothetical releases at the known DPRK nuclear test site. The results show a considerable sensitivity of the IMS station RN 38 Takasaki (Japan) to a potential radionuclide release at the test site in the days and weeks following the explosion in January 2016. In addition, backtracking simulations with ECMWF analysis data in 0.2° horizontal resolution are performed for selected samples to get a complementary estimation of the sensitivities and the connected thresholds for detectable releases.The meteorological situation is compared to the aftermath of the nuclear explosion on 12 February 2013 after which a specific occurrence of an unusual 131mXe signature at RN 38 eight weeks after the test could be very likely attributed to a late release from the DPRK event.

Hydroacoustic propagation grids for the CTBT knowledge databaes BBN technical memorandum W1303

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

J. Angell

1998-05-01

The Hydroacoustic Coverage Assessment Model (HydroCAM) has been used to develop components of the hydroacoustic knowledge database required by operational monitoring systems, particularly the US National Data Center (NDC). The database, which consists of travel time, amplitude correction and travel time standard deviation grids, is planned to support source location, discrimination and estimation functions of the monitoring network. The grids will also be used under the current BBN subcontract to support an analysis of the performance of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and national sensor systems. This report describes the format and contents of the hydroacoustic knowledgebase grids, and themore » procedures and model parameters used to generate these grids. Comparisons between the knowledge grids, measured data and other modeled results are presented to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the current approach. A recommended approach for augmenting the knowledge database with a database of expected spectral/waveform characteristics is provided in the final section of the report.« less

Entering the New Millennium: Dilemmas in Arms Control

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

BROWN,JAMES

The end of the Cold War finds the international community no longer divided into two opposing blocks. The concerns that the community now faces are becoming more fluid, less focused, and, in many ways, much less predictable. Issues of religion, ethnicity, and nationalism; the possible proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; and the diffusion of technology and information processing throughout the world community have greatly changed the international security landscape in the last decade. Although our challenges appear formidable, the United Nations, State Parties, nongovernmental organizations, and the arms control community are moving to address and lessen these concerns throughmore » both formal and informal efforts. Many of the multilateral agreements (e.g., NPT, BWC, CWC, CTBT, MTCR), as well as the bilateral efforts that are taking place between Washington and Moscow employ confidence-building and transparency measures. These measures along with on-site inspection and other verification procedures lessen suspicion and distrust and reduce uncertainty, thus enhancing stability, confidence, and cooperation.« less

Isotopic signature of atmospheric xenon released from light water reactors.

PubMed

Kalinowski, Martin B; Pistner, Christoph

2006-01-01

A global monitoring system for atmospheric xenon radioactivity is being established as part of the International Monitoring System to verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The isotopic activity ratios of (135)Xe, (133m)Xe, (133)Xe and (131m)Xe are of interest for distinguishing nuclear explosion sources from civilian releases. Simulations of light water reactor (LWR) fuel burn-up through three operational reactor power cycles are conducted to explore the possible xenon isotopic signature of nuclear reactor releases under different operational conditions. It is studied how ratio changes are related to various parameters including the neutron flux, uranium enrichment and fuel burn-up. Further, the impact of diffusion and mixing on the isotopic activity ratio variability are explored. The simulations are validated with reported reactor emissions. In addition, activity ratios are calculated for xenon isotopes released from nuclear explosions and these are compared to the reactor ratios in order to determine whether the discrimination of explosion releases from reactor effluents is possible based on isotopic activity ratios.

A fast and robust method for moment tensor and depth determination of shallow seismic events in CTBT related studies.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Baker, Ben; Stachnik, Joshua; Rozhkov, Mikhail

2017-04-01

International Data Center is required to conduct expert technical analysis and special studies to improve event parameters and assist State Parties in identifying the source of specific event according to the protocol to the Protocol to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Determination of seismic event source mechanism and its depth is closely related to these tasks. It is typically done through a strategic linearized inversion of the waveforms for a complete or subset of source parameters, or similarly defined grid search through precomputed Greens Functions created for particular source models. In this presentation we demonstrate preliminary results obtained with the latter approach from an improved software design. In this development we tried to be compliant with different modes of CTBT monitoring regime and cover wide range of source-receiver distances (regional to teleseismic), resolve shallow source depths, provide full moment tensor solution based on body and surface waves recordings, be fast to satisfy both on-demand studies and automatic processing and properly incorporate observed waveforms and any uncertainties a priori as well as accurately estimate posteriori uncertainties. Posterior distributions of moment tensor parameters show narrow peaks where a significant number of reliable surface wave observations are available. For earthquake examples, fault orientation (strike, dip, and rake) posterior distributions also provide results consistent with published catalogues. Inclusion of observations on horizontal components will provide further constraints. In addition, the calculation of teleseismic P wave Green's Functions are improved through prior analysis to determine an appropriate attenuation parameter for each source-receiver path. Implemented HDF5 based Green's Functions pre-packaging allows much greater flexibility in utilizing different software packages and methods for computation. Further additions will have the rapid use of Instaseis/AXISEM full waveform synthetics added to a pre-computed GF archive. Along with traditional post processing analysis of waveform misfits through several objective functions and variance reduction, we follow a probabilistic approach to assess the robustness of moment tensor solution. In a course of this project full moment tensor and depth estimates are determined for DPRK events and shallow earthquakes using a new implementation of teleseismic P waves waveform fitting. A full grid search over the entire moment tensor space is used to appropriately sample all possible solutions. A recent method by Tape & Tape (2012) to discretize the complete moment tensor space from a geometric perspective is used. Probabilistic uncertainty estimates on the moment tensor parameters provide robustness to solution.

The Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) for OSI - Experiences from IFE14

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gestermann, Nicolai; Sick, Benjamin; Häge, Martin; Blake, Thomas; Labak, Peter; Joswig, Manfred

2016-04-01

An on-site inspection (OSI) is the third of four elements of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The sole purpose of an OSI is to confirm whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the treaty and to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator. It thus constitutes the final verification measure under the CTBT if all other available measures are not able to confirm the nature of a suspicious event. The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) carried out the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) in the Dead Sea Area of Jordan from 3 November to 9. December 2014. It was a fictitious OSI whose aim was to test the inspection capabilities in an integrated manner. The technologies allowed during an OSI are listed in the Treaty. The aim of the Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) is to detect and localize aftershocks of low magnitudes of the triggering event or collapses of underground cavities. The locations of these events are expected in the vicinity of a possible previous explosion and help to narrow down the search area within an inspection area (IA) of an OSI. The success of SAMS depends on the main elements, hardware, software, deployment strategy, the search logic and not least the effective use of personnel. All elements of SAMS were tested and improved during the Built-Up Exercises (BUE) which took place in Austria and Hungary. IFE14 provided more realistic climatic and hazardous terrain conditions with limited resources. Significant variations in topography of the IA of IFE14 in the mountainous Dead Sea Area of Jordan led to considerable challenges which were not expected from experiences encountered during BUE. The SAMS uses mini arrays with an aperture of about 100 meters and with a total of 4 elements. The station network deployed during IFE14 and results of the data analysis will be presented. Possible aftershocks of the triggering event are expected in a very low magnitude range. Therefore the detection threshold of the network is one of the key parameters of SAMS and crucial for the success of the monitoring. One of the objectives was to record magnitude values down to -2.0 ML. The threshold values have been compared with historical seismicity in the region and those monitored during IFE14. Results of the threshold detection estimation and experiences of the exercise will be presented.

NG09 And CTBT On-Site Inspection Noble Gas Sampling and Analysis Requirements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carrigan, Charles R.; Tanaka, Junichi

2010-05-01

A provision of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) allows on-site inspections (OSIs) of suspect nuclear sites to determine if the occurrence of a detected event is nuclear in origin. For an underground nuclear explosion (UNE), the potential success of an OSI depends significantly on the containment scenario of the alleged event as well as the application of air and soil-gas radionuclide sampling techniques in a manner that takes into account both the suspect site geology and the gas transport physics. UNE scenarios may be broadly divided into categories involving the level of containment. The simplest to detect is a UNE that vents a significant portion of its radionuclide inventory and is readily detectable at distance by the International Monitoring System (IMS). The most well contained subsurface events will only be detectable during an OSI. In such cases, 37 Ar and radioactive xenon cavity gases may reach the surface through either "micro-seepage" or the barometric pumping process and only the careful siting of sampling locations, timing of sampling and application of the most site-appropriate atmospheric and soil-gas capturing methods will result in a confirmatory signal. The OSI noble gas field tests NG09 was recently held in Stupava, Slovakia to consider, in addition to other field sampling and analysis techniques, drilling and subsurface noble gas extraction methods that might be applied during an OSI. One of the experiments focused on challenges to soil-gas sampling near the soil-atmosphere interface. During withdrawal of soil gas from shallow, subsurface sample points, atmospheric dilution of the sample and the potential for introduction of unwanted atmospheric gases were considered. Tests were designed to evaluate surface infiltration and the ability of inflatable well-packers to seal out atmospheric gases during sample acquisition. We discuss these tests along with some model-based predictions regarding infiltration under different near-surface hydrologic conditions. We also consider how naturally occurring as well as introduced (e.g., SF6) soil-gas tracers might be used to guard against the possibility of atmospheric contamination of soil gases while sampling during an actual OSI. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the United States Government, the United States Department of Energy, or Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This work has been performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. LLNL-ABS-418791

Stockpile stewardship past, present, and future

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Adams, Marvin L., E-mail: mladams@tamu.edu

2014-05-09

The U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. 2) Doingmore » this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding; b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems; c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data; d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. continues its nuclear-explosion moratorium.« less

Characterization of a Commercial Silicon Beta Cell

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Foxe, Michael P.; Hayes, James C.; Mayer, Michael F.

Silicon detectors are of interest for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) due to their enhanced energy resolution compared to plastic scintillators beta cells. Previous work developing a figure-of-merit (FOM) for comparison of beta cells suggests that the minimum detectable activity (MDA) could be reduced by a factor of two to three with the use of silicon detectors. Silicon beta cells have been developed by CEA (France) and Lares Ltd. (Russia), with the PIPSBox developed by CEA being commercially available from Canberra for approximately $35k, but there is still uncertainty about the reproducibility of the capabilities in themore » field. PNNL is developing a high-resolution beta-gamma detector system in the shallow underground laboratory, which will utilize and characterize the operation of the PIPSBox detector. Throughout this report, we examine the capabilities of the PIPSBox as developed by CEA. The lessons learned through the testing and use of the PIPSBox will allow PNNL to strategically develop a silicon detector optimized to better suit the communities needs in the future.« less

Development of a new aerosol monitoring system and its application in Fukushima nuclear accident related aerosol radioactivity measurement at the CTBT radionuclide station in Sidney of Canada.

PubMed

Zhang, Weihua; Bean, Marc; Benotto, Mike; Cheung, Jeff; Ungar, Kurt; Ahier, Brian

2011-12-01

A high volume aerosol sampler ("Grey Owl") has been designed and developed at the Radiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada. Its design guidance is based on the need for a low operational cost and reliable sampler to provide daily aerosol monitoring samples that can be used as reference samples for radiological studies. It has been developed to provide a constant air flow rate at low pressure drops (∼3 kPa for a day sampling) with variations of less than ±1% of the full scale flow rate. Its energy consumption is only about 1.5 kW for a filter sampling over 22,000 standard cubic meter of air. It has been demonstrated in this Fukushima nuclear accident related aerosol radioactivity monitoring study at Sidney station, B.C. that the sampler is robust and reliable. The results provided by the new monitoring system have been used to support decision-making in Canada during an emergency response. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Radioxenon detections in the CTBT international monitoring system likely related to the announced nuclear test in North Korea on February 12, 2013.

PubMed

Ringbom, A; Axelsson, A; Aldener, M; Auer, M; Bowyer, T W; Fritioff, T; Hoffman, I; Khrustalev, K; Nikkinen, M; Popov, V; Popov, Y; Ungar, K; Wotawa, G

2014-02-01

Observations made in April 2013 of the radioxenon isotopes (133)Xe and (131m)Xe at measurement stations in Japan and Russia, belonging to the International Monitoring System for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, are unique with respect to the measurement history of these stations. Comparison of measured data with calculated isotopic ratios as well as analysis using atmospheric transport modeling indicate that it is likely that the xenon measured was created in the underground nuclear test conducted by North Korea on February 12, 2013, and released 7-8 weeks later. More than one release is required to explain all observations. The (131m)Xe source terms for each release were calculated to 0.7 TBq, corresponding to about 1-10% of the total xenon inventory for a 10 kt explosion, depending on fractionation and release scenario. The observed ratios could not be used to obtain any information regarding the fissile material that was used in the test. Copyright © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

New Horizons and New Strategies in Arms Control

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Brown, J. editor

In the last ten years, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, remarkable progress in arms control and disarmament has occurred. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Chemical Weapons Treaty (CWC) are indicative of the great strides made in the non- proliferation arena. Simultaneously, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Conventional Forces Treaty in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START), all associated with US-Soviet Union (now Russia) relations have assisted in redefining European relations and the security landscape. Finally, it now appears that progress is inmore » the offing in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In sum, all of these achievements have set the stage for the next round of arms control activities, which may lead to a much broader, and perhaps more diffused multilateral agenda. In this new and somewhat unpredictable international setting, arms control and disarmament issues will require solutions that are both more creative and innovative than heretofore.« less

Acoustic-Seismic Coupling of Broadband Signals - Analysis of Potential Disturbances during CTBT On-Site Inspection Measurements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liebsch, Mattes; Altmann, Jürgen

2015-04-01

For the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) the precise localisation of possible underground nuclear explosion sites is important. During an on-site inspection (OSI) sensitive seismic measurements of aftershocks can be performed, which, however, can be disturbed by other signals. To improve the quality and effectiveness of these measurements it is essential to understand those disturbances so that they can be reduced or prevented. In our work we focus on disturbing signals caused by airborne sources: When the sound of aircraft (as often used by the inspectors themselves) hits the ground, it propagates through pores in the soil. Its energy is transferred to the ground and soil vibrations are created which can mask weak aftershock signals. The understanding of the coupling of acoustic waves to the ground is still incomplete. However, it is necessary to improve the performance of an OSI, e.g. to address potential consequences for the sensor placement, the helicopter trajectories etc. We present our recent advances in this field. We performed several measurements to record sound pressure and soil velocity produced by various sources, e.g. broadband excitation by jet aircraft passing overhead and signals artificially produced by a speaker. For our experimental set-up microphones were placed close to the ground and geophones were buried in different depths in the soil. Several sensors were shielded from the directly incident acoustic signals by a box coated with acoustic damping material. While sound pressure under the box was strongly reduced, the soil velocity measured under the box was just slightly smaller than outside of it. Thus these soil vibrations were mostly created outside the box and travelled through the soil to the sensors. This information is used to estimate characteristic propagation lengths of the acoustically induced signals in the soil. In the seismic data we observed interference patterns which are likely caused by the superposition of acoustically induced seismic waves with reflections at a layer boundary. Their frequencies of increased/decreased amplitudes depend on the angle of incidence of the acoustic signal. So these patterns can be used to estimate the path(s) of propagation of acoustically induced soil vibrations. The frequency-dependent phase offset between different sensors is used to estimate the propagation velocity of soil. The research aims to deliver a better understanding of the interaction of acoustic waves and the ground when hitting the surface, the transfer of energy from sound waves into the soil and the possible excitation of seismic surface waves. The goal is to develop recommendations for sensitive seismic measurements during CTBTO on-site inspections to reduce disturbing vibrations caused by airborne sources.

Monitoring of reported sudden emission rate changes of major radioxenon emitters in the northern and southern hemispheres in 2008 to assess their contribution to the respective radioxenon backgrounds

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Saey, P. R. J.; Auer, M.; Becker, A.; Colmanet, S.; Hoffmann, E.; Nikkinen, M.; Schlosser, C.; Sonck, M.

2009-04-01

Atmospheric radioxenon monitoring is a key component of the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Radiopharmaceutical production facilities (RPF) have recently been identified of emitting the major part of the environmental radioxenon measured at globally distributed monitoring sites deployed to strengthen the radionuclide part of the CTBT verification regime. Efforts to raise a global radioxenon emission inventory revealed that the global total emission from RPF's is 2-3 orders of magnitude higher than the respective emissions related to maintenance of all nuclear power plants (NPP). Given that situation we have seen in 2008 two peculiar hemisphere-specific situations: 1) In the northern hemisphere, a joint shutdown of the global largest four radiopharmaceutical facilities revealed the contribution of the normally 'masked' NPP related emissions. Due to an incident, the Molybdenum production at the "Institut des Radioéléments" (IRE) in Fleurus, Belgium, was shut down between Monday 25 August and 2 December 2008. IRE is the third largest global producer of medical isotopes. In the same period, but for different reasons, the other three worldwide largest producers (CRL in Canada, HFR in The Netherlands and NTP in South Africa) also had scheduled and unscheduled shutdowns. The activity concentrations of 133Xe measured at the Schauinsland Mountain station near Freiburg in Germany (situated 380 km SW of Fleurus) which have a mean of 4.8 mBq/m3 for the period February 2004 - August 2008, went down to 0.87 mBq/m3 for the period September - November 2008. 2) In the southern hemisphere, after a long break, the only radiopharmaceutical facility in Australia started up test production in late November 2008. In the period before the start-up, the background of radioxenon in Australia (Melbourne and Darwin) was below measurable quantities. During six test runs of the renewed RPF at ANSTO in Lucas Heights, up to 6 mBq/m3 of 133Xe were measured in the station at Melbourne, 700 km SW from the facility. This paper confirms the hypothesis that radiopharmaceutical production facilities are the major emitters of radioxenon first of all. Moreover it demonstrates how the temporal shut down of these facilities indicates the scale of their contribution to the European radioxenon background, which decreased 6 fold. Finally we have studied the contribution of the start-up of a renewed RFP to the buildup of a radioxenon background across Australia and the southern hemisphere. Disclaimer The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission or any of the participating institutions.

Fusion of waveform events and radionuclide detections with the help of atmospheric transport modelling

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Krysta, Monika; Kushida, Noriyuki; Kotselko, Yuriy; Carter, Jerry

2016-04-01

Possibilities of associating information from four pillars constituting CTBT monitoring and verification regime, namely seismic, infrasound, hydracoustic and radionuclide networks, have been explored by the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) for a long time. Based on a concept of overlying waveform events with the geographical regions constituting possible sources of the detected radionuclides, interactive and non-interactive tools were built in the past. Based on the same concept, a design of a prototype of a Fused Event Bulletin was proposed recently. One of the key design elements of the proposed approach is the ability to access fusion results from either the radionuclide or from the waveform technologies products, which are available on different time scales and through various different automatic and interactive products. To accommodate various time scales a dynamic product evolving while the results of the different technologies are being processed and compiled is envisioned. The product would be available through the Secure Web Portal (SWP). In this presentation we describe implementation of the data fusion functionality in the test framework of the SWP. In addition, we address possible refinements to the already implemented concepts.

Status report on the establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) International Monitoring System (IMS) infrasound network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vivas Veloso, J. A.; Christie, D. R.; Campus, P.; Bell, M.; Hoffmann, T. L.; Langlois, A.; Martysevich, P.; Demirovik, E.; Carvalho, J.; Kramer, A.

2002-11-01

The infrasound component of the International Monitoring System (IMS) for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification aims for global detection and localization of low-frequency sound waves originating from atmospheric nuclear explosions. The infrasound network will consist of 60 array stations, distributed as evenly as possible over the globe to assure at least two-station detection capability for 1-kton explosions at any point on earth. This network will be larger and more sensitive than any other previously operated infrasound network. As of today, 85% of the site surveys for IMS infrasound stations have been completed, 25% of the stations have been installed, and 8% of the installations have been certified and are transmitting high-quality continuous data to the International Data Center in Vienna. By the end of 2002, 20% of the infrasound network is expected to be certified and operating in post-certification mode. This presentation will discuss the current status and progress made in the site survey, installation, and certification programs for IMS infrasound stations. A review will be presented of the challenges and difficulties encountered in these programs, together with practical solutions to these problems.

High-pressure swing system for measurements of radioactive fission gases in air samples

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schell, W. R.; Vives-Battle, J.; Yoon, S. R.; Tobin, M. J.

1999-01-01

Radionuclides emitted from nuclear reactors, fuel reprocessing facilities and nuclear weapons tests are distributed widely in the atmosphere but have very low concentrations. As part of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), identification and verification of the emission of radionuclides from such sources are fundamental in maintaining nuclear security. To detect underground and underwater nuclear weapons tests, only the gaseous components need to be analyzed. Equipment has now been developed that can be used to collect large volumes of air, separate and concentrate the radioactive gas constituents, such as xenon and krypton, and measure them quantitatively. By measuring xenon isotopes with different half-lives, the time since the fission event can be determined. Developments in high-pressure (3500 kPa) swing chromatography using molecular sieve adsorbents have provided the means to collect and purify trace quantities of the gases from large volumes of air automatically. New scintillation detectors, together with timing and pulse shaping electronics, have provided the low-background levels essential in identifying the gamma ray, X-ray, and electron energy spectra of specific radionuclides. System miniaturization and portability with remote control could be designed for a field-deployable production model.

Infrasonic waves from volcanic eruptions on the Kamchatka peninsula

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gordeev, E. I.; Firstov, P. P.; Kulichkov, S. N.; Makhmudov, E. R.

2013-07-01

The IS44 station operates at the observation point of Nachiki on the Kamchatka peninsula, which is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS), and it helps verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Kamchatka Branch, Geophysical Service, Russian Academy of Sciences (KB GS RAS), has a station operating in the village of Paratunka. Both of these stations allow one to monitor strong explosive eruptions of andesitic volcanoes.1 Both kinematic and dynamic parameters of acoustic signals accompanying the eruptions of the Bezymyannyi volcano (at a distance of 361 km from Nachiki) in 2009-2010 and the Kizimen volcano (at a distance of 275 km) on December 31, 2011, are considered. A low-frequency rarefaction phase 60 s in length has been revealed in the initial portion of the record of acoustic signals accompanying such strong eruptions. It is shown that the rarefaction phase occurs due to the rapid condensation of superheated juvenile vapor2 that enters the atmosphere during such explosions.3 The amount of volcanic ash emitted into the atmosphere has been estimated within (3.2-7.3) 106 m3 on the basis of acoustic signals recorded during the eruptions under consideration.

Radionuclide observables for the Platte underground nuclear explosive test on 14 April 1962

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Burnett, Jonathan L.; Milbrath, Brian D.

2016-11-01

Past nuclear weapons tests provide invaluable information for understanding the radionuclide observables and data quality objectives expected during an On-site Inspection (OSI) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These radioactive signatures are complex and subject to spatial and temporal variability. The Platte Underground Nuclear Test on 14 April 1962 provides extensive environmental monitoring data that can be modelled and used to assess an OSI. The 1.6 kT test is especially useful as it released the highest amounts of recorded activity during Operation Nougat at the Nevada Test Site – now known as the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). It hasmore » been estimated that 0.36% of the activity was released, and dispersed in a northerly direction. The deposition ranged from 1 x 10-11 to 1 x 10-9 of the atmospheric release (per m2), and has been used to evaluate a hypothetical OSI at 1 week to 2 years post-detonation. Radioactive decay reduces the activity of the 17 OSI relevant radionuclides by 99.7%, such that detection throughout the inspection is only achievable close to the explosion where deposition was highest.« less

LLNL's Regional Model Calibration and Body-Wave Discrimination Research in the Former Soviet Union using Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs)

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Bhattacharyya, J.; Rodgers, A.; Swenson, J.

2000-07-14

Long-range seismic profiles from Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) provide a unique data set to investigate several important issues in regional Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring. The recording station spacing ({approx}15 km) allows for extremely dense sampling of the propagation from the source to {approx} 3300 km. This allows us to analyze the waveforms at local, near- and far-regional and teleseismic distances. These data are used to: (1) study the evolution of regional phases and phase amplitude ratios along the profile; (2) infer one-dimensional velocity structure along the profile; and (3) evaluate the spatial correlationmore » of regional and teleseismic travel times and regional phase amplitude ratios. We analyzed waveform data from four PNE's (m{sub b} = 5.1-5.6) recorded along profile KRATON, which is an east-west trending profile located in northern Sibertil. Short-period regional discriminants, such as P/S amplitude ratios, will be essential for seismic monitoring of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at small magnitudes (m{sub b} < 4.0). However, P/S amplitude ratios in the short-period band, 0.5-5.0 Hz, show some scatter. This scatter is primarily due to propagation and site effects, which arise from variability in the elastic and anelastic structure of the crustal waveguide. Preliminary results show that Pg and Lg propagate efficiently in north Siberia at regional distances. The amplitude ratios show some variability between adjacent stations that are modeled by simple distance trends. The effect of topography, sediment and crustal thickness, and upper mantle discontinuities on these ratios, after removal of the distance trends, will be investigated. The travel times of the body wave phases recorded on KEATON have been used to compute the one-dimensional structure of the crust and upper mantle in this region. The path-averaged one-dimensional velocity model was computed by minimizing the first arriving P-phase travel-time residuals for all distances ({Delta} = 300-2300 km). A grid search approach was used in the minimization. The most significant features of this model are the negative lid-gradient and a low-velocity zone in the upper mantle between the depths of 100-200 km; precise location of the LVZ is poorly constrained by the travel time data. We will extend our investigation to additional PNE lines to further investigate the amplitude and travel-time variations in eastern and central Eurasia. Finally, the dense station spacing of the PNE profiles allows us to model the spatial correlation of travel times and amplitude ratios through variogram modeling. The statistical analysis suggests that the correlation lengths of the travel-time and amplitude measurements are 12{sup o} and 10{sup o}, respectively.« less

Design and optimization of a noise reduction system for infrasonic measurements using elements with low acoustic impedance.

PubMed

Alcoverro, Benoit; Le Pichon, Alexis

2005-04-01

The implementation of the infrasound network of the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) increases the effort in the design of suitable noise reducer systems. In this paper we present a new design consisting of low impedance elements. The dimensioning and the optimization of this discrete mechanical system are based on numerical simulations, including a complete electroacoustical modeling and a realistic wind-noise model. The frequency response and the noise reduction obtained for a given wind speed are compared to statistical noise measurements in the [0.02-4] Hz frequency band. The effects of the constructive parameters-the length of the pipes, inner diameters, summing volume, and number of air inlets-are investigated through a parametric study. The studied system consists of 32 air inlets distributed along an overall diameter of 16 m. Its frequency response is flat up to 4 Hz. For a 2 m/s wind speed, the maximal noise reduction obtained is 15 dB between 0.5 and 4 Hz. At lower frequencies, the noise reduction is improved by the use of a system of larger diameter. The main drawback is the high-frequency limitation introduced by acoustical resonances inside the pipes.

The influence of periodic wind turbine noise on infrasound array measurements

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pilger, Christoph; Ceranna, Lars

2017-02-01

Aerodynamic noise emissions from the continuously growing number of wind turbines in Germany are creating increasing problems for infrasound recording systems. These systems are equipped with highly sensitive micro pressure sensors accurately measuring acoustic signals in a frequency range inaudible to the human ear. Ten years of data (2006-2015) from the infrasound array IGADE in Northern Germany are analysed to quantify the influence of wind turbine noise on infrasound recordings. Furthermore, a theoretical model is derived and validated by a field experiment with mobile micro-barometer stations. Fieldwork was carried out 2004 to measure the infrasonic pressure level of a single horizontal-axis wind turbine and to extrapolate the sound effect for a larger number of nearby wind turbines. The model estimates the generated sound pressure level of wind turbines and thus enables for specifying the minimum allowable distance between wind turbines and infrasound stations for undisturbed recording. This aspect is particularly important to guarantee the monitoring performance of the German infrasound stations I26DE in the Bavarian Forest and I27DE in Antarctica. These stations are part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and thus have to meet stringent specifications with respect to infrasonic background noise.

Detection, Location, and Characterization of Hydroacoustic Signals Using Seafloor Cable Networks Offshore Japan

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Suyehiro, K.; Sugioka, H.; Watanabe, T.

2008-12-01

The hydroacoustic monitoring by the International Monitoring System for CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty) verification system utilizes hydrophone stations (6) and seismic stations (5 and called T- phase stations) for worldwide detection. Some conspicuous signals of natural origin include those from earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, or whale calls. Among artificial sources are non-nuclear explosions and airgun shots. It is important for the IMS system to detect and locate hydroacoustic events with sufficient accuracy and correctly characterize the signals and identify the source. As there are a number of seafloor cable networks operated offshore Japanese islands basically facing the Pacific Ocean for monitoring regional seismicity, the data from these stations (pressure and seismic sensors) may be utilized to increase the capability of IMS. We use these data to compare some selected event parameters with those by IMS. In particular, there have been several unconventional acoustic signals in the western Pacific,which were also captured by IMS hydrophones across the Pacific in the time period of 2007-present. These anomalous examples and also dynamite shots used for seismic crustal structure studies and other natural sources will be presented in order to help improve the IMS verification capabilities for detection, location and characterization of anomalous signals.

Data mining on long-term barometric data within the ARISE2 project

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hupe, Patrick; Ceranna, Lars; Pilger, Christoph

2016-04-01

The Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) led to the implementation of an international infrasound array network. The International Monitoring System (IMS) network includes 48 certified stations, each providing data for up to 15 years. As part of work package 3 of the ARISE2 project (Atmospheric dynamics Research InfraStructure in Europe, phase 2) the data sets will be statistically evaluated with regard on atmospheric dynamics. The current study focusses on fluctuations of absolute air pressure. Time series have been analysed for 17 monitoring stations which are located all over the world between Greenland and Antarctica along the latitudes to represent different climate zones and characteristic atmospheric conditions. Hence this enables quantitative comparisons between those regions. Analyses are shown including wavelet power spectra, multi-annual time series of average variances with regard to long-wave scales, and spectral densities to derive characteristics and special events. Evaluations reveal periodicities in average variances on 2 to 20 day scale with a maximum in the winter months and a minimum in summer of the respective hemisphere. This basically applies to time series of IMS stations beyond the tropics where the dominance of cyclones and anticyclones changes with seasons. Furthermore, spectral density analyses illustrate striking signals for several dynamic activities within one day, e.g., the semidiurnal tide.

Natural ³⁷Ar concentrations in soil air: implications for monitoring underground nuclear explosions.

PubMed

Riedmann, Robin A; Purtschert, Roland

2011-10-15

For on-site inspections (OSI) under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) measurement of the noble gas ³⁷Ar is considered an important technique. ³⁷Ar is produced underground by neutron activation of Calcium by the reaction ⁴⁰Ca(n,α)³⁷Ar. The naturally occurring equilibrium ³⁷Ar concentration balance in soil air is a function of an exponentially decreasing production rate from cosmic ray neutrons with increasing soil depth, diffusive transport in the soil air, and radioactive decay (T(1/2): 35 days). In this paper for the first time, measurements of natural ³⁷Ar activities in soil air are presented. The highest activities of ~100 mBq m⁻³ air are 2 orders of magnitude larger than in the atmosphere and are found in 1.5-2.5 m depth. At depths > 8 m ³⁷Ar activities are < 20 mBq m⁻³ air. After identifying the main ³⁷Ar production and gas transport factors the expected global activity range distribution of ³⁷Ar in shallow subsoil (0.7 m below the surface) was estimated. In high altitude soils, with large amounts of Calcium and with low gas permeability, ³⁷Ar activities may reach values up to 1 Bq m⁻³.

Detection and interpretation of seismoacoustic events at German infrasound stations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pilger, Christoph; Koch, Karl; Ceranna, Lars

2016-04-01

Three infrasound arrays with collocated or nearby installed seismometers are operated by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) as the German National Data Center (NDC) for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Infrasound generated by seismoacoustic events is routinely detected at these infrasound arrays, but air-to-ground coupled acoustic waves occasionally show up in seismometer recordings as well. Different natural and artificial sources like meteoroids as well as industrial and mining activity generate infrasonic signatures that are simultaneously detected at microbarometers and seismometers. Furthermore, many near-surface sources like earthquakes and explosions generate both seismic and infrasonic waves that can be detected successively with both technologies. The combined interpretation of seismic and acoustic signatures provides additional information about the origin time and location of remote infrasound events or about the characterization of seismic events distinguishing man-made and natural origins. Furthermore, seismoacoustic studies help to improve the modelling of infrasound propagation and ducting in the atmosphere and allow quantifying the portion of energy coupled into ground and into air by seismoacoustic sources. An overview of different seismoacoustic sources and their detection by German infrasound stations as well as some conclusions on the benefit of a combined seismoacoustic analysis are presented within this study.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Mellors, R J

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) includes provisions for an on-site inspection (OSI), which allows the use of specific techniques to detect underground anomalies including cavities and rubble zones. One permitted technique is active seismic surveys such as seismic refraction or reflection. The purpose of this report is to conduct some simple modeling to evaluate the potential use of seismic reflection in detecting cavities and to test the use of open-source software in modeling possible scenarios. It should be noted that OSI inspections are conducted under specific constraints regarding duration and logistics. These constraints are likely to significantly impactmore » active seismic surveying, as a seismic survey typically requires considerable equipment, effort, and expertise. For the purposes of this study, which is a first-order feasibility study, these issues will not be considered. This report provides a brief description of the seismic reflection method along with some commonly used software packages. This is followed by an outline of a simple processing stream based on a synthetic model, along with results from a set of models representing underground cavities. A set of scripts used to generate the models are presented in an appendix. We do not consider detection of underground facilities in this work and the geologic setting used in these tests is an extremely simple one.« less

Preliminary report on the Black Thunder, Wyoming CTBT R and D experiment quicklook report: LLNL input from regional stations

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Harben, P.E.; Glenn, L.A.

This report presents a preliminary summary of the data recorded at three regional seismic stations from surface blasting at the Black Thunder Coal Mine in northeast Wyoming. The regional stations are part of a larger effort that includes many more seismic stations in the immediate vicinity of the mine. The overall purpose of this effort is to characterize the source function and propagation characteristics of large typical surface mine blasts. A detailed study of source and propagation features of conventional surface blasts is a prerequisite to attempts at discriminating this type of blasting activity from other sources of seismic events.more » The Black Thunder Seismic experiment is a joint verification effort to determine seismic source and path effects that result from very large, but routine ripple-fired surface mining blasts. Studies of the data collected will be for the purpose of understanding how the near-field and regional seismic waveforms from these surface mining blasts are similar to, and different from, point shot explosions and explosions at greater depth. The Black Hills Station is a Designated Seismic Station that was constructed for temporary occupancy by the Former Soviet Union seismic verification scientists in accordance with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty protocol.« less

Value of Spaceborne Remotely Sensed Data Products in the Context of the Launch Phase of an On-Site Inspection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Labak, P.; Rowlands, A.; Malich, G.; Charlton, A.; Schultz-Fellenz, E. S.; Craven, J.

2016-12-01

The availability of data and the ability to effectively interpret those data in the context of an alleged Treaty violation are critical to operations during the launch phase of an inspection. The launch phase encompasses the time when the initial inspection plan is being developed and finalised; this document will set the scene for the inspection and will propose mission activities for the critical first three days of an inspection. While authenticated data products from the CTBT International Data Centre form the basis of the initial inspection plan, other data types, provided as national technical means, can also be used to inform the development of the initial inspection plan. In this context, remotely sensed data and derived products acquired from sensors on satellites feature prominently. Given the environmental setting, optical and/or radar sensors have the potential to provide valuable information to guide mission activities. Such data could provide more than mere backdrops to mapping products. While recognising time constraints and the difficulties associated with integrating data from disparate optical and radar sensors, this abstract uses case studies to illustrate the types of derived data products from sapecborne sensors that have the potential to inform inspectors during the preparation of the initial inspection plan.

Improvements of low-level radioxenon detection sensitivity by a state-of-the art coincidence setup.

PubMed

Cagniant, A; Le Petit, G; Gross, P; Douysset, G; Richard-Bressand, H; Fontaine, J-P

2014-05-01

The ability to quantify isotopic ratios of 135, 133 m, 133 and 131 m radioxenon is essential for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In order to improve detection limits, CEA has developed a new on-site setup using photon/electron coincidence (Le Petit et al., 2013. J. Radioanal. Nucl. Chem., DOI : 10.1007/s 10697-013-2525-8.). Alternatively, the electron detection cell equipped with large silicon chips (PIPS) can be used with HPGe detector for laboratory analysis purpose. This setup allows the measurement of β/γ coincidences for the detection of (133)Xe and (135)Xe; and K-shell Conversion Electrons (K-CE)/X-ray coincidences for the detection of (131m)Xe, (133m)Xe and (133)Xe as well. Good energy resolution of 11 keV at 130 keV and low energy threshold of 29 keV for the electron detection were obtained. This provides direct discrimination between K-CE from (133)Xe, (133m)Xe and (131m)Xe. Estimation of Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) for (131m)Xe is in the order of 1mBq over a 4 day measurement. An analysis of an environmental radioxenon sample using this method is shown. © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.

A method for limiting data acquisition in a high-resolution gamma-ray spectrometer during On-Site Inspection activities under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Aviv, O.; Lipshtat, A.

2018-05-01

On-Site Inspection (OSI) activities under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) allow limitations to measurement equipment. Thus, certain detectors require modifications to be operated in a restricted mode. The accuracy and reliability of results obtained by a restricted device may be impaired. We present here a method for limiting data acquisition during OSI. Limitations are applied to a high-resolution high-purity germanium detector system, where the vast majority of the acquired data that is not relevant to the inspection is filtered out. The limited spectrum is displayed to the user and allows analysis using standard gamma spectrometry procedures. The proposed method can be incorporated into commercial gamma-ray spectrometers, including both stationary and mobile-based systems. By applying this procedure to more than 1000 spectra, representing various scenarios, we show that partial data are sufficient for reaching reliable conclusions. A comprehensive survey of potential false-positive identifications of various radionuclides is presented as well. It is evident from the results that the analysis of a limited spectrum is practically identical to that of a standard spectrum in terms of detection and quantification of OSI-relevant radionuclides. A future limited system can be developed making use of the principles outlined by the suggested method.

Using the IMS infrasound network for the identification of mountain-associated waves and gravity waves hotspots

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hupe, Patrick; Ceranna, Lars; Pilger, Christoph; Le Pichon, Alexis

2017-04-01

The infrasound network of the International Monitoring System (IMS) has been established for monitoring the atmosphere to detect violations of the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The IMS comprises 49 certified infrasound stations which are globally distributed. Each station provides data for up to 16 years. Due to the uniform distribution of the stations, the IMS infrasound network can be used to derive global information on atmospheric dynamics' features. This study focuses on mountain-associated waves (MAWs), i.e. acoustic waves in the frequency range between approximately 0.01 Hz and 0.05 Hz. MAWs can be detected in infrasound data by applying the Progressive Multi-Channel Correlation (PMCC) algorithm. As a result of triangulation, global hotspots of MAWs can be identified. Previous studies on gravity waves indicate that global hotspots of gravity waves are similar to those found for MAWs by using the PMCC algorithm. The objective of our study is an enhanced understanding of the excitation sources and of possible interactions between MAWs and gravity waves. Therefore, spatial and temporal correlation analyses will be performed. As a preceding step, we will present (seasonal) hotspots of MAWs as well as hotspots of gravity waves derived by the IMS infrasound network.

Influence of atmospheric transport patterns on xenon detections at the CTBTO radionuclide network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Krysta, Monika; Kusmierczyk-Michulec, Jolanta

2016-04-01

In order to fulfil its task of monitoring for signals emanating from nuclear explosions, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) operates global International Monitoring System (IMS) comprising seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide measurement networks. At present, 24 among 80 radionuclide stations foreseen by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) are equipped with certified noble gas measurement systems. Over a past couple of years these systems collected a rich set of measurements of radioactive isotopes of xenon. Atmospheric transport modelling simulations are crucial to an assessment of the origin of xenon detected at the IMS stations. Numerous studies undertaken in the past enabled linking these detections to non Treaty-relevant activities and identifying main contributors. Presence and quantity of xenon isotopes at the stations is hence a result of an interplay of emission patterns and atmospheric circulation. In this presentation we analyse the presence or absence of radioactive xenon at selected stations from an angle of such an interplay. We attempt to classify the stations according to similarity of detection patterns, examine seasonality in those patterns and link them to large scale or local meteorological phenomena. The studies are undertaken using crude hypotheses on emission patterns from known sources and atmospheric transport modelling simulations prepared with the FLEXPART model.

An Overview of the Source Physics Experiments (SPE) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Snelson, C. M.; Barker, D. L.; White, R. L.; Emmitt, R. F.; Townsend, M. J.; Graves, T. E.; Becker, S. A.; Teel, M. G.; Lee, P.; Antoun, T. H.; Rodgers, A.; Walter, W. R.; Mellors, R. J.; Brunish, W. M.; Bradley, C. R.; Patton, H. J.; Hawkins, W. L.; Corbell, B. H.; Abbott, R. E.; SPE Working Group

2011-12-01

Modeling of explosion phenomenology has been primarily empirically based when looking at the seismic, infrasound, and acoustic signals. In order to detect low-yield nuclear explosions under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), we must be able to understand and model the explosive source in settings beyond where we have empirical data. The Source Physics Experiments (SPE) at the Nevada National Security Site are the first step in this endeavor to link the empirically based with the physics-based modeling to develop this predictive capability. The current series of tests is being conducted in a granite body called the Climax Stock. This location was chosen for several reasons, including the site's expected "simple geology"-the granite is a fairly homogeneous body. In addition, data are available from underground nuclear tests that were conducted in the same rock body, and the nature of the geology has been well-documented. Among the project goals for the SPE is to provide fully coupled seismic energy to the seismic and acoustic seismic arrays so that the transition between the near and far-field data can be modeled and our scientists can begin to understand how non-linear effects and anisotropy control seismic energy transmission and partitioning. The first shot for the SPE was conducted in May 2011 as a calibration shot (SPE1) with 220 lb (100 kg) of chemical explosives set at a depth of 180 ft (55 m). An array of sensors and diagnostics recorded the shot data, including accelerometers, geophones, rotational sensors, short-period and broadband seismic sensors, Continuous Reflectometry for Radius vs. Time Experiment (CORRTEX), Time of Arrival (TOA), Velocity of Detonation (VOD) as well as infrasound sensors. The three-component accelerometer packages were set at depths of 180 ft (55 m), 150 ft (46 m), and 50 ft (15 m) in two rings around ground zero (GZ); the inner ring was at 10 m and the outer ring was 20 m from GZ. Six sets of surface accelerometers (100 and 500 g) were placed along in an azimuth of SW from GZ every 10 m. Seven infrasound sensors were placed in an array around the GZ, extending from tens of meters to kilometers. Over 100 seismic stations were positioned, most of which were in five radial lines from GZ out to 2 km. Over 400 data channels were recorded for SPE1, and data recovery was about 95% with high signal to noise ratio. Future tests will be conducted in the same shot hole as SPE1. The SPE2 experiment will consist of 2200 lb (1000 kg) of chemical explosives shot at 150 ft (46 m) depth utilizing the above-described instrumentation. Subsequent SPE shots will be the same size, within the same shot hole, and within the damage zone. The ultimate goal of the SPE Project is to develop predictive capability for using seismic energy as a tool for CTBT issues. This work was done by National Security Technologies, LLC, under Contract No. DE AC52 06NA25946 with the U.S. Department of Energy.

Uncertainty quantification for discrimination of nuclear events as violations of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

PubMed

Sloan, Jamison; Sun, Yunwei; Carrigan, Charles

2016-05-01

Enforcement of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will involve monitoring for radiologic indicators of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). A UNE produces a variety of radioisotopes which then decay through connected radionuclide chains. A particular species of interest is xenon, namely the four isotopes (131m)Xe, (133m)Xe, (133)Xe, and (135)Xe. Due to their half lives, some of these isotopes can exist in the subsurface for more than 100 days. This convenient timescale, combined with modern detection capabilities, makes the xenon family a desirable candidate for UNE detection. Ratios of these isotopes as a function of time have been studied in the past for distinguishing nuclear explosions from civilian nuclear applications. However, the initial yields from UNEs have been treated as fixed values. In reality, these independent yields are uncertain to a large degree. This study quantifies the uncertainty in xenon ratios as a result of these uncertain initial conditions to better bound the values that xenon ratios can assume. We have successfully used a combination of analytical and sampling based statistical methods to reliably bound xenon isotopic ratios. We have also conducted a sensitivity analysis and found that xenon isotopic ratios are primarily sensitive to only a few of many uncertain initial conditions. Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Radionuclide observables for the Platte underground nuclear explosive test on 14 April 1962.

PubMed

Burnett, Jonathan L; Milbrath, Brian D

2016-11-01

Past nuclear weapon explosive tests provide invaluable information for understanding the radionuclide observables expected during an On-site Inspection (OSI) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These radioactive signatures are complex and subject to spatial and temporal variability. The Platte underground nuclear explosive test on 14 April 1962 provides extensive environmental monitoring data that can be modelled and used to calculate the maximum time available for detection of the OSI-relevant radionuclides. The 1.6 kT test is especially useful as it released the highest amounts of recorded activity during Operation Nougat at the Nevada Test Site - now known as the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). It has been estimated that 0.36% of the activity was released, and dispersed in a northerly direction. The deposition ranged from 1 × 10 -11 to 1 × 10 -9 of the atmospheric release (per m 2 ), and has been used in this paper to evaluate an OSI and the OSI-relevant radionuclides at 1 week to 2 years post-detonation. Radioactive decay reduces the activity of the OSI-relevant radionuclides by 99.7% within 2 years of detonation, such that detection throughout the hypothesized inspection is only achievable close to the explosion where deposition was highest. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Detection of Noble Gas Radionuclides from an Underground Nuclear Explosion During a CTBT On-Site Inspection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carrigan, Charles R.; Sun, Yunwei

2014-03-01

The development of a technically sound approach to detecting the subsurface release of noble gas radionuclides is a critical component of the on-site inspection (OSI) protocol under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In this context, we are investigating a variety of technical challenges that have a significant bearing on policy development and technical guidance regarding the detection of noble gases and the creation of a technically justifiable OSI concept of operation. The work focuses on optimizing the ability to capture radioactive noble gases subject to the constraints of possible OSI scenarios. This focus results from recognizing the difficulty of detecting gas releases in geologic environments—a lesson we learned previously from the non-proliferation experiment (NPE). Most of our evaluations of a sampling or transport issue necessarily involve computer simulations. This is partly due to the lack of OSI-relevant field data, such as that provided by the NPE, and partly a result of the ability of computer-based models to test a range of geologic and atmospheric scenarios far beyond what could ever be studied by field experiments, making this approach very highly cost effective. We review some highlights of the transport and sampling issues we have investigated and complete the discussion of these issues with a description of a preliminary design for subsurface sampling that addresses some of the sampling challenges discussed here.

Calibration of an Ultra-Low-Background Proportional Counter for Measuring 37Ar

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Seifert, Allen; Aalseth, Craig E.; Bonicalzi, Ricco

Abstract. An ultra-low-background proportional counter (ULBPC) design has been developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) using clean materials, primarily electrochemically-purified copper. This detector, along with an ultra-low-background counting system (ULBCS), was developed to complement a new shallow underground laboratory (30 meters water-equivalent) constructed at PNNL. The ULBCS design includes passive neutron and gamma shielding, along with an active cosmic-veto system. This system provides a capability for making ultra-sensitive measurements to support applications like age-dating soil hydrocarbons with 14C/3H, age-dating of groundwater with 39Ar, and soil-gas assay for 37Ar to support On-Site Inspection (OSI). On-Site Inspection is a key componentmore » of the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Measurements of radionuclides created by an underground nuclear explosion are valuable signatures of a Treaty violation. For OSI, the 35-day half-life of 37Ar, produced from neutron interactions with calcium in soil, provides both high specific activity and sufficient time for inspection before decay limits sensitivity. This work describes the calibration techniques and analysis methods developed to enable quantitative measurements of 37Ar samples over a broad range of pressures. These efforts, along with parallel work in progress on gas chemistry separation, are expected to provide a significant new capability for 37Ar soil gas background studies.« less

Low Noise Results From IMS Site Surveys: A Preliminary New High-Frequency Low Noise Model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ebeling, C.; Astiz, L.; Starovoit, Y.; Tavener, N.; Perez, G.; Given, H. K.; Barrientos, S.; Yamamoto, M.; Hfaiedh, M.; Stewart, R.; Estabrook, C.

2002-12-01

Since the establishment of the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, a vigorous seismic site survey program has been carried out to identify locations as necessary for International Monitoring System (IMS) primary and auxiliary seismic stations listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol to the CTBT. The IMS Seismic Section maintains for this purpose a small pool of seismic equipment comprised of Guralp CMG-3T and CMG-3ESP and Streckeisen STS-2 broadband seismometers, and Reftek and Guralp acquisition systems. Seismic site surveys are carried out by conducting continuous measurements of ground motion at temporary installations for approximately five to seven days. Seismometer installation methods, which depend on instrument type and on local conditions, range from placement within small cement-floored subsurface vaults to near-surface burial. Data are sampled at 40 Hz. Seismic noise levels are evaluated through the analysis of power spectral density distributions. Eleven 10.5-minute-long representative de-trended and mean-removed segments each of daytime and night-time data are chosen randomly, but reviewed to avoid event contamination. Fast Fourier Transforms are calculated for the five windows in each of these segments generated using a 50% overlap for Hanning-tapered sections ~200 s long. Instrument responses are removed. To date, 20 site surveys for primary and auxiliary stations have been carried out by the IMS. The sites surveyed represent a variety of physical and geological environments on most continents. The lowest high frequency (>1.4 Hz) noise levels at five sites with igneous or metamorphic geologies were as much as 6 dB below the USGS New Low Noise Model (NLNM) developed by Peterson (1993). These sites were in Oman (local geology consisting of Ordovician metasediments), Egypt (Precambrian granite), Niger (early Proterozoic tonalite and granodiorite), Saudi Arabia (Precambian metasediments), and Zimbabwe (Archaean granite). Based on a composite of the results from these five surveys, we propose a preliminary IMS Low-Noise Model (pIMS-LNM) consisting of a revision downward of Peterson's NLNM in the passband from 0.1 to about 0.7 s and an extension of Peterson's NLNM above 0.1 to 0.07 s. As these low noise results are derived from data recorded at temporary installations, improved resolution of this model will be possible when data from final installations become available. Preliminary International Monitoring System Low Noise Model (pIMS-LNM) for periods from 0.07 to 0.70 s. Decibels are relative to ground acceleration ((m/s2)2/Hz). Values presented in (Period, dB) format. Figure in bold is from Peterson's NLNM. [(0.07,-167.0),(0.08,-168.0),(0.09,-169.0),(0.10,-169.5), (0.11,-170.5),(0.13,-171.0),(0.14,-171.5),(0.17,-172.0), (0.20,-1 72.5),(0.25,-173.0),(0.30,-173.5),(0.40,-173.0), (0.50,-172.0),(0.60,-171.0),(0.70,-170.0),(0.80,-169.2)] Reference Peterson, J., 1993. Observations and Modeling of Seismic Background Noise, U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 93-322, 47 p.

Mapping crustal heterogeneity using Lg propagation efficiency throughout the Middle East, Mediterranean, Southern Europe and Northern Africa

USGS Publications Warehouse

McNamara, D.E.; Walter, W.R.

2001-01-01

In this paper we describe a technique for mapping the lateral variation of Lg characteristics such as Lg blockage, efficient Lg propagation, and regions of very high attenuation in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and the Mediterranean regions. Lg is used in a variety of seismological applications from magnitude estimation to identification of nuclear explosions for monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). These applications can give significantly biased results if the Lg phase is reduced or blocked by discontinuous structure or thin crust. Mapping these structures using quantitative techniques for determining Lg amplitude attenuation can break down when the phase is below background noise. In such cases Lg blockage and inefficient propagation zones are often mapped out by hand. With our approach, we attempt to visually simplify this information by imaging crustal structure anomalies that significantly diminish the amplitude of Lg. The visualization of such anomalies is achieved by defining a grid of cells that covers the entire region of interest. We trace Lg rays for each event/ station pair, which is simply the great circle path, and attribute to each cell a value equal to the maximum value of the Lg/P-coda amplitude ratio for all paths traversing that particular cell. The resulting map, from this empirical approach, is easily interpreted in terms of crustal structure and can successfully image small blockage features often missed by analysis of raypaths alone. This map can then be used to screen out events with blocked Lg prior to performing Q tomography, and to avoid using Lg-based methods of event identification for the CTBT in regions where they cannot work. For this study we applied our technique to one of the most tectonically complex regions on the earth. Nearly 9000 earthquake/station raypaths, traversing the vast region comprised of the Middle East, Mediterranean, Southern Europe and Northern Africa, have been analyzed. We measured the amplitude of Lg relative to the P-coda and mapped the lateral variation of Lg propagation efficiency. With the relatively dense coverage provided by the numerous crossing paths we are able to map out the pattern of crustal heterogeneity that gives rise to the observed character of Lg propagation. We observe that the propagation characteristics of Lg within the region of interest are very complicated but are readily correlated with the different tectonic environments within the region. For example, clear strong Lg arrivals are observed for paths crossing the stable continental interiors of Northern Africa and the Arabian Shield. In contrast, weakened to absent Lg is observed for paths crossing much of the Middle East, and Lg is absent for paths traversing the Mediterranean. Regions that block Lg transmission within the Middle East are very localized and include the Caspian Sea, the Iranian Plateau and the Red Sea. Resolution is variable throughout the region and strongly depends on the distribution of seismicity and recording stations. Lg propagation is best resolved within the Middle East where regions of crustal heterogeneity on the order of 100 km are imaged (e.g., South Caspian Sea and Red Sea). Crustal heterogeneity is resolvable but is poorest in seismically quiescent Northern Africa.

Infrasound data inversion for atmospheric sounding

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lalande, J.-M.; Sèbe, O.; Landès, M.; Blanc-Benon, Ph.; Matoza, R. S.; Le Pichon, A.; Blanc, E.

2012-07-01

The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) continuously records acoustic waves in the 0.01-10 Hz frequency band, known as infrasound. These waves propagate through the layered structure of the atmosphere. Coherent infrasonic waves are produced by a variety of anthropogenic and natural sources and their propagation is controlled by spatiotemporal variations of temperature and wind velocity. Natural stratification of atmospheric properties (e.g. temperature, density and winds) forms waveguides, allowing long-range propagation of infrasound waves. However, atmospheric specifications used in infrasound propagation modelling suffer from lack and sparsity of available data above an altitude of 50 km. As infrasound can propagate in the upper atmosphere up to 120 km, we assume that infrasonic data could be used for sounding the atmosphere, analogous to the use of seismic data to infer solid Earth structure and the use of hydroacoustic data to infer oceanic structure. We therefore develop an inversion scheme for vertical atmospheric wind profiles in the framework of an iterative linear inversion. The forward problem is treated in the high-frequency approximation using a Hamiltonian formulation and complete first-order ray perturbation theory is developed to construct the Fréchet derivatives matrix. We introduce a specific parametrization for the unknown model parameters based on Principal Component Analysis. Finally, our algorithm is tested on synthetic data cases spanning different seasonal periods and network configurations. The results show that our approach is suitable for infrasound atmospheric sounding on a regional scale.

Radionuclide data analysis in connection of DPRK event in May 2009

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nikkinen, Mika; Becker, Andreas; Zähringer, Matthias; Polphong, Pornsri; Pires, Carla; Assef, Thierry; Han, Dongmei

2010-05-01

The seismic event detected in DPRK on 25.5.2009 was triggering a series of actions within CTBTO/PTS to ensure its preparedness to detect any radionuclide emissions possibly linked with the event. Despite meticulous work to detect and verify, traces linked to the DPRK event were not found. After three weeks of high alert the PTS resumed back to normal operational routine. This case illuminates the importance of objectivity and procedural approach in the data evaluation. All the data coming from particulate and noble gas stations were evaluated daily, some of the samples even outside of office hours and during the weekends. Standard procedures were used to determine the network detection thresholds of the key (CTBT relevant) radionuclides achieved across the DPRK event area and for the assessment of radionuclides typically occurring at IMS stations (background history). Noble gas system has sometimes detections that are typical for the sites due to legitimate non-nuclear test related activities. Therefore, set of hypothesis were used to see if the detection is consistent with event time and location through atmospheric transport modelling. Also the consistency of event timing and isotopic ratios was used in the evaluation work. As a result it was concluded that if even 1/1000 of noble gasses from a nuclear detonation would had leaked, the IMS system would not had problems to detect it. This case also showed the importance of on-site inspections to verify the nuclear traces of possible tests.

Probing the Atmosphere in Antarctica using continuous microbarom recordings

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ceranna, L.; Le Pichon, A.; Blanc, E.

2009-12-01

Germany is operating one of the four Antarctic infrasound stations to fulfill the compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). I27DE is a nine element array which is in continuous operation since its deployment in January 2003. Using the PMCC detection algorithm coherent signals are observed in the frequency range from 0.0002 to 4.0 Hz covering a large variety of infrasound sources such as low frequent mountain-associated wave or high frequency ice-quakes. The most prominent signals are related to microbaroms (mb) generated by the strong peri-Antarctic ocean swells. These continuous signals with a dominant period of 5 s show a clear trend in the direction of their detection being well correlated to the prevailing stratospheric winds. For mb-signals a strong increase in trace velocity along with a decrease in the number of detections were observed during the Austral summer 2006 indicating strong variations in the stratospheric duct. However, wind speed profiles at the stations give no evidence for such an anomaly. Nevertheless, strong events of sudden stratospheric warming (SSW) at latitude ranges of the peri-Antarctic belt occurring during Austral winter 2006 together with cooling in the upper stratosphere caused by eruption of the Manam volcano in Indonesia provide a potential explanation for the abnormal ducting conditions. This will be demonstrated computing 2-D numerical simulations for sound propagation from the ocean swell to I27DE using appropriate horizontal wind speed and temperature profiles.

Auroral Infrasound Observed at I53US at Fairbanks, Alaska

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wilson, C. R.; Olson, J. V.

2003-12-01

In this presentation we will describe two different types of auroral infrasound recently observed at Fairbanks, Alaska in the pass band from 0.015 to 0.10 Hz. Infrasound signals associated with auroral activity (AIW) have been observed in Fairbanks over the past 30 years with infrasonic microphone arrays. The installation of the new CTBT/IMS infrasonic array, I53US, at Fairbanks has resulted in a greatly increased quality of the infrasonic data with which to study natural sources of infrasound. In the historical data at Fairbanks all the auroral infrasonic waves (AIW) detected were found to be the result of bow waves that are generated by supersonic motion of auroral arcs that contain strong electrojet currents. This infrasound is highly anisotropic, moving in the same direction as that of the auroral arc. AIW bow waves observed in 2003 at I53US will be described. Recently at I53US we have observed many events of very high trace velocity that are comprised of continuous, highly coherent wave trains. These waves occur in the morning hours at times of strong auroral activity. This new type of very high trace velocity AIW appears to be associated with pulsating auroral displays. Pulsating auroras occur predominantly after magnetic midnight (10:00 UT at Fairbanks). They are a usual part of the recovery phase of auroral substorms and are produced by energetic electrons precipitating into the atmosphere. Given proper dark, cloudless sky conditions during the AIW events, bright pulsating auroral forms were sometimes visible overhead.

Infrasound workshop for CTBT monitoring: Proceedings

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Christie, D.; Whitaker, R.

1998-11-01

It is expected that the establishment of new infrasound stations in the global IMS network by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO in Vienna will commence in the middle of 1998. Thus, decisions on the final operational design for IMS infrasound stations will have to be made within the next 12 months. Though many of the basic design problems have been resolved, it is clear that further work needs to be carried out during the coming year to ensure that IMS infrasound stations will operate with maximum capability in accord with the specifications determined during the May 1997 PrepCommore » Meeting. Some of the papers presented at the Workshop suggest that it may be difficult to design a four-element infrasound array station that will reliably detect and locate infrasound signals at all frequencies in the specified range from 0.02 to 4.0 Hz in all noise environments. Hence, if the basic design of an infrasound array is restricted to four array elements, the final optimized design may be suited only to the detection and location of signals in a more limited pass-band. Several participants have also noted that the reliable discrimination of infrasound signals could be quite difficult if the detection system leads to signal distortion. Thus, it has been emphasized that the detection system should not, if possible, compromise signal fidelity. This report contains the workshop agenda, a list of participants, and abstracts and viewgraphs from each presentation.« less

Influence of deep sedimentary basins, crustal thining, attenuation, and topography on regional phases: selected examples from theEastern Mediteranean and the Caspian Sea Regions

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Goldstein, P.; Schultz, C.; Larsen, S.

1997-07-15

Monitoring of a CTBT will require transportable seismic identification techniques, especially in regions where there is limited data. Unfortunately, most existing techniques are empirical and can not be used reliably in new regions. Our goal is to help develop transportable regional identification techniques by improving our ability to predict the behavior of regional phases and discriminants in diverse geologic regions and in regions with little or no data. Our approach is to use numerical modeling to understand the physical basis for regional wave propagation phenomena and to use this understanding to help explain observed behavior of regional phases and discriminants.more » In this paper, we focus on results from simulations of data in selected regions and investigate the sensitivity of these regional simulations to various features of the crustal structure. Our initial models use teleseismically estimated source locations, mechanisms, and durations and seismological structures that have been determined by others. We model the Mb 5.9, October 1992, Cairo Egypt earthquake at a station at Ankara Turkey (ANTO) using a two-dimensional crustal model consisting of a water layer over a deep sedimentary basin with a thinning crust beneath the basin. Despite the complex tectonics of the Eastern Mediterranean region, we find surprisingly good agreement between the observed data and synthetics based on this relatively smooth two-dimensional model.« less

Static Corrections to Improve Seismic Monitoring of the North Korean Nuclear Test Site with Regional Arrays

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wilkins, N.; Wookey, J. M.; Selby, N. D.

2017-12-01

Seismology is an important part of the International Monitoring System (IMS) installed to detect, identify, and locate nuclear detonations in breach of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prior to and after its entry into force. Seismic arrays in particular provide not only a means of detecting and locating underground nuclear explosions, but in discriminating them from naturally occurring earthquakes of similar magnitude. One potential discriminant is the amplitude ratio of high frequency (> 2 Hz) P waves to S waves (P/S) measured at regional distances (3 - 17 °). Accurate measurement of such discriminants, and the ability to detect low-magnitude seismicity from a suspicious event relies on high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) data. A correction to the slowness vector of the incident seismic wavefield, and static corrections applied to the waveforms recorded at each receiver within the array can be shown to improve the SNR. We apply codes we have developed to calculate slowness-azimuth station corrections (SASCs) and static corrections to the arrival time and amplitude of the seismic waveform to seismic arrays regional to the DPRK nuclear test site at Punggye-ri, North Korea. We use the F-statistic to demonstrate the SNR improvement to data from the nuclear tests and other seismic events in the vicinity of the test site. We also make new measurements of P/S with the corrected waveforms and compare these with existing measurements.

Phase II: Field Detector Development For Undeclared/Declared Nuclear Testing For Treaty Verfiation Monitoring

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kriz, M.; Hunter, D.; Riley, T.

2015-10-02

Radioactive xenon isotopes are a critical part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the detection or confirmation of nuclear weapons tests as well as on-site treaty verification monitoring. On-site monitoring is not currently conducted because there are no commercially available small/robust field detector devices to measure the radioactive xenon isotopes. Xenon is an ideal signature to detect clandestine nuclear events since they are difficult to contain and can diffuse and migrate through soils due to their inert nature. There are four key radioxenon isotopes used in monitoring: 135Xe (9 hour half-life), 133mXe (2 day half-life), 133Xe (5more » day half-life) and 131mXe (12 day half-life) that decay through beta emission and gamma emission. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is a leader in the field of gas collections and has developed highly selective molecular sieves that allow for the collection of xenon gas directly from air. Phase I assessed the development of a small, robust beta-gamma coincidence counting system, that combines collection and in situ detection methodologies. Phase II of the project began development of the custom electronics enabling 2D beta-gamma coincidence analysis in a field portable system. This will be a significant advancement for field detection/quantification of short-lived xenon isotopes that would not survive transport time for laboratory analysis.« less

A General Investigation of Optimized Atmospheric Sample Duration

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Eslinger, Paul W.; Miley, Harry S.

2012-11-28

ABSTRACT The International Monitoring System (IMS) consists of up to 80 aerosol and xenon monitoring systems spaced around the world that have collection systems sensitive enough to detect nuclear releases from underground nuclear tests at great distances (CTBT 1996; CTBTO 2011). Although a few of the IMS radionuclide stations are closer together than 1,000 km (such as the stations in Kuwait and Iran), many of them are 2,000 km or more apart. In the absence of a scientific basis for optimizing the duration of atmospheric sampling, historically scientists used a integration times from 24 hours to 14 days for radionuclidesmore » (Thomas et al. 1977). This was entirely adequate in the past because the sources of signals were far away and large, meaning that they were smeared over many days by the time they had travelled 10,000 km. The Fukushima event pointed out the unacceptable delay time (72 hours) between the start of sample acquisition and final data being shipped. A scientific basis for selecting a sample duration time is needed. This report considers plume migration of a nondecaying tracer using archived atmospheric data for 2011 in the HYSPLIT (Draxler and Hess 1998; HYSPLIT 2011) transport model. We present two related results: the temporal duration of the majority of the plume as a function of distance and the behavior of the maximum plume concentration as a function of sample collection duration and distance. The modeled plume behavior can then be combined with external information about sampler design to optimize sample durations in a sampling network.« less

Subsurface Xenon Migration by Atmospheric Pumping Using an Implicit Non-Iterative Algorithm for a Locally 1D Dual-Porosity Model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Annewandter, R.; Kalinowksi, M. B.

2009-04-01

An underground nuclear explosion injects radionuclids in the surrounding host rock creating an initial radionuclid distribution. In the case of fractured permeable media, cyclical changes in atmospheric pressure can draw gaseous species upwards to the surface, establishing a ratcheting pump effect. The resulting advective transport is orders of magnitude more significant than transport by molecular diffusion. In the 1990s the US Department of Energy funded the socalled Non-Proliferation Experiment conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate this barometric pumping effect for verifying compliance with respect to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. A chemical explosive of approximately 1 kt TNT-equivalent has been detonated in a cavity located 390 m deep in the Rainier Mesa (Nevada Test Site) in which two tracer gases were emplaced. Within this experiment SF6 was first detected in soil gas samples taken near fault zones after 50 days and 3He after 325 days. For this paper a locally one-dimensional dual-porosity model for flow along the fracture and within the permeable matrix was used after Nilson and Lie (1990). Seepage of gases and diffusion of tracers between fracture and matrix are accounted. The advective flow along the fracture and within the matrix block is based on the FRAM filtering remedy and methodology of Chapman. The resulting system of equations is solved by an implicit non-iterative algorithm. Results on time of arrival and subsurface concentration levels for the CTBT-relevant xenons will be presented.

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Doyle, James E; Meek, Elizabeth

2009-01-01

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the keymore » points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion verification. The remainder of this paper focuses on transparency and verification for nuclear arms and fissile material reductions.« less

Lessons learned from the first US/Russian Federation joint tabletop exercise to prepare for conducting on-site inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Filarowski, C; Kreek, S; Smith, A

1999-03-24

A U.S./Russian Federation Joint Tabletop Exercise took place in Snezhinsk, Russia, from 19 to 24 October 1998 whose objectives were to examine the functioning of an Inspection Team (IT) in a given scenario, to evaluate the strategies and techniques employed by the IT, to identify ambiguous interpretations of treaty provisions that needed clarification, and to confirm the overall utility of tabletop exercises to assist in developing an effective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime. To achieve these objectives, the United States and Russian Federation (RF) agreed that two exercises would be conducted. The first would be developed by themore » RF, who would act as controller and as the inspected State Party (ISP), while the United States would play the role of the IT. The roles would be reversed in the second exercise; the United States would develop the scenario and play the ISP, while the RF would play the IT. A joint control team, comprised of members of both the U.S. and RF control teams, agreed on a number of ground rules for the two exercises and established a joint Evaluation Team to evaluate both of the exercises against the stated objectives. To meet time limitations, the scope of this joint exercise needed to be limited. The joint control team decided that each of the two exercises would not go beyond the first 25 days of an on-site inspection (OSI) and that the focus would be on examining the decision-making of the IT as it utilized the various technologies to clarify whether a nuclear test explosion had taken place. Hence, issues such as logistics, restricted access, and activities prior to Point of Entry (POE) would be played only to the extent needed to provide for a realistic context for the exercises' focus on inspection procedures, sensor deployments, and data interpretation. Each of the exercises began at the POE and proceeded with several iterations of negotiations between the IT and ISP, instrument deployments, and data evaluation by the IT. By the end of each of the exercises, each IT had located the site of the underground nuclear explosion (UNE). While this validated the methods employed by each of the ITS, the Evaluation Team noted that each IT employed different search strategies and that each strategy had both advantages and disadvantages. The exercises also highlighted ambiguities in interpretation of certain treaty provisions related to overflights and seismic monitoring. Likewise, a substantial number of lessons were learned relating to radionuclide monitoring and the impact of logistical constraints on successful OSI execution. These lessons are discussed more fully in the body of this report. Notwithstanding the overall positive assessment by the U.S. and RF participants, as well as by the Evaluation Team, that the exercise had met its objectives, there were a variety of areas identified that could be improved in subsequent OSI exercises. Some of these included reexamination of the methods used to convey visual observation data in an exercise; the amount of time compression employed; and the need for better verification of agreements pertaining to the structure, format, and other rules of the exercise. This report summarizes the lessons learned pertaining to both the technical and operational aspects of an OSI as well as to those pertaining to the planning and execution of an OSI exercise. It concludes with comments from the Evaluation Team and proposed next steps for future U.S./RF interactions on CTBT OSIs.« less

Dynamics of the middle atmosphere as observed by the ARISE project

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Blanc, E.

2015-12-01

It has been strongly demonstrated that variations in the circulation of the middle atmosphere influence weather and climate all the way to the Earth's surface. A key part of this coupling occurs through the propagation and breaking of planetary and gravity waves. However, limited observations prevent to faithfully reproduce the dynamics of the middle atmosphere in numerical weather prediction and climate models. The main challenge of the ARISE (Atmospheric dynamics InfraStructure in Europe) project is to combine existing national and international observation networks including: the International infrasound monitoring system developed for the CTBT (Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) verification, the NDACC (Network for the Detection of Atmospheric Composition Changes) lidar network, European observation infrastructures at mid latitudes (OHP observatory), tropics (Maïdo observatory), high latitudes (ALOMAR and EISCAT), infrasound stations which form a dense European network and satellites. The ARISE network is unique by its coverage (polar to equatorial regions in the European longitude sector), its altitude range (from troposphere to mesosphere and ionosphere) and the involved scales both in time (from seconds to tens of years) and space (from tens of meters to thousands of kilometers). Advanced data products are produced with the scope to assimilate data in the Weather Prediction models to improve future forecasts over weeks and seasonal time scales. ARISE observations are especially relevant for the monitoring of extreme events such as thunderstorms, volcanoes, meteors and at larger scales, deep convection and stratospheric warming events for physical processes description and study of long term evolution with climate change. Among the applications, ARISE fosters integration of innovative methods for remote detection of non-instrumented volcanoes including distant eruption characterization to provide notifications with reliable confidence indices to the civil aviation.

Participation of the NDC Austria at the NDC Preparedness Exercise 2012

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mitterbauer, Ulrike; Wotawa, Gerhard; Schraick, Irene

2013-04-01

NDC Preparedness Exercises (NPEs) are conducted annually by the National Data Centers (NDCs) of CTBT States Signatories to train the detection of a (hypothetical) nuclear test. During the NDC Preparedness Exercise 2012, a fictitious radionuclide scenario originating from a real seismic event (mining explosion) was calculated by the German NDC and distributed among all NDCs. For the scenario computation, it was assumed that the selected seismic event was the epicentre of an underground nuclear fission explosion. The scenario included detections of the Iodine isotopes I-131 and I-133 (both particulates), and the Radioxenon Isotopes Xe-133, Xe-133M, Xe-131M and Xe-135 (noble gas). By means of atmospheric transport modelling (ATM), concentrations of all these six isotopes which would result from the hypothetical explosion were calculated and interpolated to the IMS station locations. The participating NDCs received information about the concentration of the isotopes at the station locations without knowing the underlying seismic event. The aim of the exercise was to identify this event based on the detection scenario. The Austrian NDC performed the following analyses: • Atmospheric backtracking and data fusion to identify seismic candidate events, • Seismic analysis of candidate events within the possible source region, • Atmospheric transport modelling (forward mode) from identified candidate events, comparison between "measured" and simulated concentrations based on certain release assumptions. The main goal of the analysis was to identify the event selected by NDC Germany to calculate the radionuclide scenario, and to exclude other events. In the presentation, the analysis methodology as well as the final results and conclusions will be shown and discussed in detail.

Evaluation of mean transit time of aerosols from the area of origin to the Arctic with 210Pb/210Po daily monitoring data.

PubMed

Zhang, Weihua; Sadi, Baki; Rinaldo, Christopher; Chen, Jing; Spencer, Norman; Ungar, Kurt

2018-08-01

In this study, the activity concentrations of 210 Pb and 210 Po on the 22 daily air filter samples, collected at CTBT Yellowknife station from September 2015 to April 2016, were analysed. To estimate the time scale of atmospheric long-range transport aerosol bearing 210 Pb in the Arctic during winter, the mean transit time of aerosol bearing 210 Pb from its origin was determined based on the activity ratios of 210 Po/ 210 Pb and the parent-progeny decay/ingrowth equation. The activity ratios of 210 Po/ 210 Pb varied between 0.06 and 0.21 with a median value of 0.11. The aerosol mean transit time based the activity ratio of 210 Po/ 210 Pb suggests longer mean transit time of 210 Pb aerosols in winter (12 d) than in autumn (3.7 d) and spring (2.9 d). Four years 210 Pb and 212 Pb monitoring results and meteorological conditions at the Yellowknife station indicate that the 212 Pb activity is mostly of local origin, and that 210 Pb aerosol in wintertime are mainly from outside of the Arctic regions in common with other pollutants and sources contributing to the Arctic. The activity concentration ratios of 210 Pb and 212 Pb have a relatively constant value in summer with a significant peak observed in winter, centered in the month of February. Comparison of the 210 Pb/ 212 Pb activity ratios and the estimated mean 210 Pb transit time, the mean aerosol transit times were real reflection of the atmosphere transport characteristics, which can be used as a radio-chronometer for the transport of air masses to the Arctic region. Crown Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Using continuous microbarom recordings for probing peri-Antarctica's atmosphere

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ceranna, Lars; Le Pichon, Alexis; Blanc, Elisabeth

2010-05-01

Germany is operating one of the four Antarctic infrasound stations to fulfil the compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). IS27 is a nine element array which is in continuous operation since its deployment in January 2003. Using the PMCC detection algorithm coherent signals are observed in the frequency range from 0.0002 to 4.0 Hz covering a large variety of infrasound sources such as low frequent mountain-associated wave or high frequency ice-quakes. The most prominent signals are related to microbaroms (mb) generated by the strong peri-Antarctic ocean swells. These continuous signals with a dominant period of 5 s show a clear trend in the direction of their detection being well correlated to the prevailing stratospheric winds. For mb-signals a strong increase in trace velocity along with a decrease in the number of detections were observed during the Austral summer 2006 indicating strong variations in the troposphere and the stratospheric wave duct. However, ECMWF wind speed profiles at the station give no evidence for such an anomaly. Nevertheless, a smaller El-Nino event during Austral winter 2006 together with cooling in the upper stratosphere caused by eruption of the Manam volcano in Indonesia provide a potential explanation for the abnormal ducting conditions. This will be demonstrated with a statistical approach for the dominating ray-parameter launched from the estimated source regions towards IS27 (based on NOAA wave watch III). An increase in gravity wave activity is considered for Austral summer 2006 since a comparison of ECMWF profiles and measured radiosonde data has revealed a cleaning of the numerical profiles with respect to turbulences in the troposphere and lower stratosphere.

Crustal Seismic Attenuation in Germany Measured with Acoustic Radiative Transfer Theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gaebler, Peter J.; Eulenfeld, Tom; Wegler, Ulrich

2017-04-01

This work is carried out in the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). As part of this treaty a verification regime was introduced to detect, locate and characterize nuclear explosion testings. The study of seismology can provide essential information in the form of broadband waveform recordings for the identification and verification of these critical events. A profound knowledge of the Earth's subsurface between source and receiver is required for a detailed description of the seismic wave field. In addition to underground parameters such as seismic velocity or anisotropy, information about seismic attenuation values of the medium are required. Goal of this study is the creation of a comprehensive model of crustal seismic attenuation in Germany and adjacent areas. Over 20 years of earthquake data from the German Central Seismological Observatory data archive is used to estimate the spatial dependent distribution of seismic intrinsic and scattering attenuation of S-waves for frequencies between 0.5 and 20 Hz. The attenuation models are estimated by fitting synthetic seismogram envelopes calculated with acoustic radiative transfer theory to observed seismogram envelopes. This theory describes the propagation of seismic S-energy under the assumption of multiple isotropic scattering, the crustal structure of the scattering medium is hereby represented by a half-space model. We present preliminary results of the spatial distribution of intrinsic attenuation represented by the absorption path length, as well as of scattering attenuation in terms of the mean free path and compare the outcomes to results from previous studies. Furthermore catalog magnitudes are compared to moment magnitudes estimated during the inversion process. Additionally site amplification factors of the stations are presented.

Near- and far-field infrasound monitoring in the Mediterranean area

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Campus, Paola; Marchetti, Emanuele; Le Pichon, Alexis; Wallenstein, Nicolau; Ripepe, Maurizio; Kallel, Mohamed; Mialle, Pierrick

2013-04-01

The Mediterranean area is characterized by a number of very interesting sources of infrasound signals and offers a promising playground for the development of a deeper understanding of such sources and of the associated propagation models. The progress in the construction and certification of infrasound arrays belonging to the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the vicinity of this area has been complemented, in the last decade, by the construction of infrasound arrays established by several European research groups. The University of Florence (UniFi) plays a crucial role for the detection of infrasound signals in the Mediterranean area, having deployed since several years two infrasound arrays on Stromboli and Etna volcanoes, and, more recently, three infrasound arrays in the Alpine area of NW Italy and one infrasound array on the Apennines (Mount Amiata), designed and established in the framework of the ARISE Project. The IMS infrasound arrays IS42 (Graciosa, Azores, Portugal) and IS48 (Kesra, Tunisia) recorded, since the time of their certification, a number of far-field events which can be correlated with some near-field records of the infrasound arrays belonging to UniFi. An analysis of the results and potentialities of infrasound source's detections in near and far-field realized by IS42, IS48 and UniFi arrays in the Mediterranean area, with special focus on volcanic events is presented. The combined results deriving from the analysis of data recorded by the Unifi arrays and by the IS42 and IS48 arrays, in collaboration with the Department of Analyse et Surveillance (CEA/DASE), will generate a synergy which will certainly contribute to the progress of the ARISE Project.

Inference and analysis of xenon outflow curves under multi-pulse injection in two-dimensional chromatography.

PubMed

Shu-Jiang, Liu; Zhan-Ying, Chen; Yin-Zhong, Chang; Shi-Lian, Wang; Qi, Li; Yuan-Qing, Fan

2013-10-11

Multidimensional gas chromatography is widely applied to atmospheric xenon monitoring for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). To improve the capability for xenon sampling from the atmosphere, sampling techniques have been investigated in detail. The sampling techniques are designed by xenon outflow curves which are influenced by many factors, and the injecting condition is one of the key factors that could influence the xenon outflow curves. In this paper, the xenon outflow curves of single-pulse injection in two-dimensional gas chromatography has been tested and fitted as a function of exponential modified Gaussian distribution. An inference formula of the xenon outflow curve for six-pulse injection is derived, and the inference formula is also tested to compare with its fitting formula of the xenon outflow curve. As a result, the curves of both the one-pulse and six-pulse injections obey the exponential modified Gaussian distribution when the temperature of the activated carbon column's temperature is 26°C and the flow rate of the carrier gas is 35.6mLmin(-1). The retention time of the xenon peak for one-pulse injection is 215min, and the peak width is 138min. For the six-pulse injection, however, the retention time is delayed to 255min, and the peak width broadens to 222min. According to the inferred formula of the xenon outflow curve for the six-pulse injection, the inferred retention time is 243min, the relative deviation of the retention time is 4.7%, and the inferred peak width is 225min, with a relative deviation of 1.3%. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The ISC Contribution to Monitoring Research

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Storchak, D. A.; Bondar, I.; Harris, J.; Gaspà Rebull, O.

2010-12-01

The International Seismological Centre (ISC) is a non-governmental organization charged with production of the ISC Bulletin - the definitive global summary of seismicity based on reports from over 4.5 thousand seismic stations worldwide. The ISC data have been extensively used in preparation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). They are now used by the CTBTO Preparatory Technical Secretariat (PTS) and the State Parties as an important benchmark for assessing and monitoring detection capabilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The ISC also provides a valuable collection of reviewed waveform readings at academic and operational sites co-located with the IMS stations. To improve the timeliness of its Bulletin, the ISC is making a special effort in collecting preliminary bulletins from a growing number of networks worldwide that become available soon after seismic events occur. Preliminary bulletins are later substituted with the final analysis data once these become available to the ISC from each network. The ISC also collects and maintains data sets that are useful for monitoring research. These are the IASPEI Reference Event List of globally distributed GT0-5 events, the groomed ISC bulletin (EHB), the IDC REB, USArray phase picking data. In cooperation with the World Data Center for Seismology, Denver (USGS), the ISC also maintains the International Seismographic Station Registry that holds parameters of seismic stations used in the international data exchange. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office along with partners from several Nordic countries are currently funding a project to make the ISC database securely linked with the computer facilities at PTS and National Data Centres. The ISC Bulletin data are made available via a dedicated software link designed to offer the ISC data in a way convenient to monitoring community.

The Nature of Scatter at the DARHT Facility and Suggestions for Improved Modeling of DARHT Facility

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Morneau, Rachel Anne; Klasky, Marc Louis

The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Program [1] is designed to sustain and evaluate the nuclear weapons stockpile while foregoing underground nuclear tests. The maintenance of a smaller, aging U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing requires complex computer calculations [14]. These calculations in turn need to be verified and benchmarked [14]. A wide range of research facilities have been used to test and evaluate nuclear weapons while respecting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) [2]. Some of these facilities include the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Z machine at Sandia National Laboratories, and the Dual Axismore » Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This research will focus largely on DARHT (although some information from Cygnus and the Los Alamos Microtron may be used in this research) by modeling it and comparing to experimental data. DARHT is an electron accelerator that employs high-energy flash x-ray sources for imaging hydro-tests. This research proposes to address some of the issues crucial to understanding DARHT Axis II and the analysis of the radiographic images produced. Primarily, the nature of scatter at DARHT will be modeled and verified with experimental data. It will then be shown that certain design decisions can be made to optimize the scatter field for hydrotest experiments. Spectral effects will be briefly explored to determine if there is any considerable effect on the density reconstruction caused by changes in the energy spectrum caused by target changes. Finally, a generalized scatter model will be made using results from MCNP that can be convolved with the direct transmission of an object to simulate the scatter of that object at the detector plane. The region in which with this scatter model is appropriate will be explored.« less

Technical Challenges for a Comprehensive Test Ban: A historical perspective to frame the future (Invited)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wallace, T. C.

2013-12-01

In the summer of 1958 scientists from the Soviet block and the US allies met in Geneva to discuss what it would take to monitor a forerunner to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the 'Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests'. Although armed with a limited resume of observations, the conference recommended a multi-phenomenology approach (air sampling, acoustics, seismic and electromagnetic) deployed it a network of 170 sites scattered across the Northern Hemisphere, and hypothesized a detection threshold of 1kt for atmospheric tests and 5kt for underground explosions. The conference recommendations spurred vigorous debate, with strong disagreement with the stated detection hypothesis. Nevertheless, the technical challenges posed lead to a very focused effort to improve facilities, methodologies and, most importantly, research and development on event detection, location and identification. In the ensuing 50 years the various challenges arose and were eventually 'solved'; these included quantifying yield determination to enter a Limited Threshold Test Ban, monitoring broad areas of emerging nuclear nations, and after the mid-1990s lowering the global detection threshold to sub-kiloton levels for underground tests. Today there is both an international monitoring regime (ie, the International Monitoring System, or IMS) and a group of countries that have their own national technical means (NTM). The challenges for the international regime are evolving; the IMS has established itself as a very credible monitoring system, but the demand of a CTBT to detect and identify a 'nuclear test' of diminished size (zero yield) poses new technical hurdles. These include signal processing and understanding limits of resolution, location accuracy, integration of heterogeneous data, and accurately characterizing anomalous events. It is possible to extrapolate past technical advances to predict what should be available by 2020; detection of coupled explosions to 100s of tons for all continental areas, as well as a probabilistic assessment of event identification.

From Regional Hazard Assessment to Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Support - InSAR Ground Motion Services

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lege, T.; Kalia, A.; Gruenberg, I.; Frei, M.

2016-12-01

There are numerous scientific applications of InSAR methods in tectonics, earthquake analysis and other geologic and geophysical fields. Ground motion on local and regional scale measured and monitored via the application of the InSAR techniques provide scientists and engineers with plenty of new insights and further understanding of subsurface processes. However, the operational use of InSAR is not yet very widespread. To foster the operational utilization of the Copernicus Sentinel Satellites in the day-to-day business of federal, state and municipal work and planning BGR (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) initiated workshops with potential user groups. Through extensive reconcilement of interests and demands with scientific, technical, economic and governmental stakeholders (e.g. Ministries, Mining Authorities, Geological Surveys, Geodetic Surveys and Environmental Agencies on federal and state level, SMEs, German Aerospace Center) BGR developed the concept of the InSAR based German National Ground Motion Service. One important backbone for the nationwide ground motion service is the so-called Persistent Scatterer Interferometry Wide Area Product (WAP) approach developed with grants of European research funds. The presentation shows the implementation of the ground motion service and examples for product developments for operational supervision of mining, water resources management and spatial planning. Furthermore the contributions of Copernicus Sentinel 1 radar data in the context of CTBT are discussed. The DInSAR processing of Sentinel 1 IW (Interferometric Wide Swath) SAR acquisitions from January 1st and 13th Jan. 2016 allow for the first time a near real time ground motion measurement of the North Korean nuclear test site. The measured ground displacements show a strong spatio-temporal correlation to the calculated epicenter measured by teleseismic stations. We are convinced this way another space technique will soon contribute even further to secure better societal information needs.

Being prepared to verify the CTBT-Atmospheric Transport modeling and radionuclide analysis at the Austrian National Data Centre during the NDC Preparedness Exercise 2009

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wotawa, Gerhard; Schraick, Irene

2010-05-01

An explosion in the Kara-Zhyra mine in Eastern Kazakhstan on 28 November 2009 around 07:20 UTC was recorded by both the CTBTO seismic and infrasound networks. This event triggered a world-wide preparedness exercise among the CTBTO National Data Centres. Within an hour after the event was selected by the German NDC, a computer program developed by NDC Austria based on weather forecasts from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) and from the U.S. National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) was started to analyse what Radionuclide Stations of the CTBTO International Monitoring System (IMS) would be potentially affected by the release from a nuclear explosion at this place in the course of the following 3-10 days. These calculations were daily updated to consider the observed state of the atmosphere instead of the predicted one. Based on these calculations, automated and reviewed radionuclide reports from the potentially affected stations as produced by the CTBTO International Data Centre (IDC) were looked at. An additional analysis of interesting spectra was provided by the Seibersdorf Laboratories. Based on all the results coming in, no evidence whatsoever was found that the explosion in Kazakhstan was nuclear. This is in accordance with ground truth information saying that the event was caused by the detonation of more than 53 Tons of explosives as part of mining operations. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this exercise. First, the international, bilateral as well as national mechanisms and procedures in place for such an event worked smoothly. Second, the products and services from the CTBTO IDC proved to be very useful to assist the member states in their verification efforts. Last but not least, issues with the availability of data from IMS radionuclide stations do remain.

Issues Involving The OSI Concept of Operation For Noble Gas Radionuclide Detection

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Carrigan, C R; Sun, Y

2011-01-21

The development of a technically sound protocol for detecting the subsurface release of noble gas radionuclides is critical to the successful operation of an on site inspection (OSI) under the CTBT and has broad ramifications for all aspects of the OSI regime including the setting of specifications for both sampling and analysis equipment used during an OSI. With NA-24 support, we are investigating a variety of issues and concerns that have significant bearing on policy development and technical guidance regarding the detection of noble gases and the creation of a technically justifiable OSI concept of operation. The work at LLNLmore » focuses on optimizing the ability to capture radioactive noble gases subject to the constraints of possible OSI scenarios. This focus results from recognizing the difficulty of detecting gas releases in geologic environments - a lesson we learned previously from the LLNL Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Evaluation of a number of important noble gas detection issues, potentially affecting OSI policy, has awaited the US re-engagement with the OSI technical community. Thus, there have been numerous issues to address during the past 18 months. Most of our evaluations of a sampling or transport issue necessarily involve computer simulations. This is partly due to the lack of OSI-relevant field data, such as that provided by the NPE, and partly a result of the ability of LLNL computer-based models to test a range of geologic and atmospheric scenarios far beyond what could ever be studied in the field making this approach very highly cost effective. We review some highlights of the transport and sampling issues we have investigated during the past year. We complete the discussion of these issues with a description of a preliminary design for subsurface sampling that is intended to be a practical solution to most if not all the challenges addressed here.« less

Detection, location, and characterization of hydroacoustic signals using seafloor cable networks offshore Japan (Invited)

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sugioka, H.; Suyehiro, K.; Shinohara, M.

2009-12-01

The hydroacoustic monitoring by the International Monitoring System (IMS) for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Treaty (CTBT) verification system utilize hydrophone stations and seismic stations called T-phase stations for worldwide detection. Some signals of natural origin include those from earthquakes, submarine volcanic eruptions, or whale calls. Among artificial sources there are non-nuclear explosions and air-gun shots. It is important for IMS system to detect and locate hydroacoustic events with sufficient accuracy and correctly characterize the signals and identify the source. As there are a number of seafloor cable networks operated offshore Japanese islands basically facing the Pacific Ocean for monitoring regional seismicity, the data from these stations (pressures, hydrophones and seismic sensors) may be utilized to verify and increase the capability of the IMS. We use these data to compare some selected event parameters with those by Pacific in the time period of 2004-present. These anomalous examples and also dynamite shots used for seismic crustal structure studies and other natural sources will be presented in order to help improve the IMS verification capabilities for detection, location and characterization of anomalous signals. The seafloor cable networks composed of three hydrophones and six seismometers and a temporal dense seismic array detected and located hydroacoustic events offshore Japanese island on 12th of March in 2008, which had been reported by the IMS. We detected not only the reverberated hydroacoustic waves between the sea surface and the sea bottom but also the seismic waves going through the crust associated with the events. The determined source of the seismic waves is almost coincident with the one of hydroacoustic waves, suggesting that the seismic waves are converted very close to the origin of the hydroacoustic source. We also detected very similar signals on 16th of March in 2009 to the ones associated with the event of 12th of March in 2008.

Grid-search Moment Tensor Estimation: Implementation and CTBT-related Application

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stachnik, J. C.; Baker, B. I.; Rozhkov, M.; Friberg, P. A.; Leifer, J. M.

2017-12-01

This abstract presents a review work related to moment tensor estimation for Expert Technical Analysis at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. In this context of event characterization, estimation of key source parameters provide important insights into the nature of failure in the earth. For example, if the recovered source parameters are indicative of a shallow source with large isotropic component then one conclusion is that it is a human-triggered explosive event. However, an important follow-up question in this application is - does an alternative hypothesis like a deeper source with a large double couple component explain the data approximately as well as the best solution? Here we address the issue of both finding a most likely source and assessing its uncertainty. Using the uniform moment tensor discretization of Tape and Tape (2015) we exhaustively interrogate and tabulate the source eigenvalue distribution (i.e., the source characterization), tensor orientation, magnitude, and source depth. The benefit of the grid-search is that we can quantitatively assess the extent to which model parameters are resolved. This provides a valuable opportunity during the assessment phase to focus interpretation on source parameters that are well-resolved. Another benefit of the grid-search is that it proves to be a flexible framework where different pieces of information can be easily incorporated. To this end, this work is particularly interested in fitting teleseismic body waves and regional surface waves as well as incorporating teleseismic first motions when available. Being that the moment tensor search methodology is well-established we primarily focus on the implementation and application. We present a highly scalable strategy for systematically inspecting the entire model parameter space. We then focus on application to regional and teleseismic data recorded during a handful of natural and anthropogenic events, report on the grid-search optimum, and discuss the resolution of interesting and/or important recovered source properties.

Detection of nuclear testing from surface concentration measurements: Analysis of radioxenon from the February 2013 underground test in North Korea

DOE PAGES

Kurzeja, R. J.; Buckley, R. L.; Werth, D. W.; ...

2017-12-28

A method is outlined and tested to detect low level nuclear or chemical sources from time series of concentration measurements. The method uses a mesoscale atmospheric model to simulate the concentration signature from a known or suspected source at a receptor which is then regressed successively against segments of the measurement series to create time series of metrics that measure the goodness of fit between the signatures and the measurement segments. The method was applied to radioxenon data from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) collection site in Ussuriysk, Russia (RN58) after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)more » underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013 near Punggye. The metrics were found to be a good screening tool to locate data segments with a strong likelihood of origin from Punggye, especially when multiplied together to a determine the joint probability. Metrics from RN58 were also used to find the probability that activity measured in February and April of 2013 originated from the Feb 12 test. A detailed analysis of an RN58 data segment from April 3/4, 2013 was also carried out for a grid of source locations around Punggye and identified Punggye as the most likely point of origin. Thus, the results support the strong possibility that radioxenon was emitted from the test site at various times in April and was detected intermittently at RN58, depending on the wind direction. The method does not locate unsuspected sources, but instead, evaluates the probability of a source at a specified location. However, it can be extended to include a set of suspected sources. Extension of the method to higher resolution data sets, arbitrary sampling, and time-varying sources is discussed along with a path to evaluate uncertainty in the calculated probabilities.« less

Frequency and Size of Strombolian Eruptions from the Phonolitic Lava Lake at Erebus Volcano, Antarctica: Insights from Infrasound and Seismic Observations on Bubble Formation and Ascent

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rotman, H. M. M.; Kyle, P. R.; Fee, D.; Curtis, A.

2015-12-01

Erebus, an active intraplate volcano on Ross Island, commonly produces bubble burst Strombolian explosions from a long-lived, convecting phonolitic lava lake. Persistent lava lakes are rare, and provide direct insights into their underlying magmatic system. Erebus phonolite is H2O-poor and contains ~30% anorthoclase megacrysts. At shallow depths lab measurements suggest the magma has viscosities of ~107 Pa s. This has implications for magma and bubble ascent rates through the conduit and into the lava lake. The bulk composition and matrix glass of Erebus ejecta has remained uniform for many thousands of years, but eruptive activity varies on decadal and shorter time scales. Over the last 15 years, increased activity took place in 2005-2007, and more recently in the 2013 austral summer. In the 2014 austral summer, new infrasound sensors were installed ~700 m from the summit crater hosting the lava lake. These sensors, supplemented by the Erebus network seismic stations, recorded >1000 eruptions between 1 January and 7 April 2015, with an average infrasound daily uptime of 9.6 hours. Over the same time period, the CTBT infrasound station IS55, ~25 km from Erebus, detected ~115 of the >1000 locally observed eruptions with amplitude decreases of >100x. An additional ~200 eruptions were recorded during local infrasound downtime. This represents an unusually high level of activity from the Erebus lava lake, and while instrument noise influences the minimum observable amplitude each day, the eruption infrasound amplitudes may vary by ~3 orders of magnitude over the scale of minutes to hours. We use this heightened period of variable activity and associated seismic and acoustic waveforms to examine mechanisms for bubble formation and ascent, such as rise speed dependence and collapsing foam; repose times for the larger eruptions; and possible eruption connections to lava lake cyclicity.

The Use of Explosion Aftershock Probabilities for Planning and Deployment of Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System for an On-site Inspection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Labak, P.; Ford, S. R.; Sweeney, J. J.; Smith, A. T.; Spivak, A.

2011-12-01

One of four elements of CTBT verification regime is On-site inspection (OSI). Since the sole purpose of an OSI shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out, inspection activities can be conducted and techniques used in order to collect facts to support findings provided in inspection reports. Passive seismological monitoring, realized by the seismic aftershock monitoring (SAMS) is one of the treaty allowed techniques during an OSI. Effective planning and deployment of SAMS during the early stages of an OSI is required due to the nature of possible events recorded and due to the treaty related constrains on size of inspection area, size of inspection team and length of an inspection. A method, which may help in planning the SAMS deployment is presented. An estimate of aftershock activity due to a theoretical underground nuclear explosion is produced using a simple aftershock rate model (Ford and Walter, 2010). The model is developed with data from the Nevada Test Site and Semipalatinsk Test Site, which we take to represent soft- and hard-rock testing environments, respectively. Estimates of expected magnitude and number of aftershocks are calculated using the models for different testing and inspection scenarios. These estimates can help to plan the SAMS deployment for an OSI by giving a probabilistic assessment of potential aftershocks in the Inspection Area (IA). The aftershock assessment combined with an estimate of the background seismicity in the IA and an empirically-derived map of threshold magnitude for the SAMS network could aid the OSI team in reporting. We tested the hard-rock model to a scenario similar to the 2008 Integrated Field Exercise 2008 deployment in Kazakhstan and produce an estimate of possible recorded aftershock activity.

Modeling Collapse Chimney and Spall Zone Settlement as a Source of Post-Shot Subsidence Detected by Synthetic Aperture Radar Interferometry

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Foxwall, W.

2000-07-24

Ground surface subsidence resulting from the March 1992 JUNCTION underground nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) imaged by satellite synthetic aperture radar interferometry (InSAR) wholly occurred during a period of several months after the shot (Vincent et al., 1999) and after the main cavity collapse event. A significant portion of the subsidence associated with the small (less than 20 kt) GALENA and DIVIDER tests probably also occurred after the shots, although the deformation detected in these cases contains additional contributions from coseismic processes, since the radar scenes used to construct the deformation interferogram bracketed these two later events,more » The dimensions of the seas of subsidence resulting from all three events are too large to be solely accounted for by processes confined to the damage zone in the vicinity of the shot point or the collapse chimney. Rather, the subsidence closely corresponds to the span dimensions predicted by Patton's (1990) empirical relationship between spall radius and yield. This suggests that gravitational settlement of damaged rock within the spall zone is an important source of post-shot subsidence, in addition to settlement of the rubble within the collapse chimney. These observations illustrate the potential power of InSAR as a tool for Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring and on-site inspection in that the relatively broad ({approx} 100 m to 1 km) subsidence signatures resulting from small shots detonated at normal depths of burial (or even significantly overburied) are readily detectable within large geographical areas (100 km x 100 km) under favorable observing conditions. Furthermore, the present results demonstrate the flexibility of the technique in that the two routinely gathered satellite radar images used to construct the interferogram need not necessarily capture the event itself, but can cover a time period up to several months following the shot.« less

Detection of nuclear testing from surface concentration measurements: Analysis of radioxenon from the February 2013 underground test in North Korea

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kurzeja, R. J.; Buckley, R. L.; Werth, D. W.; Chiswell, S. R.

2018-03-01

A method is outlined and tested to detect low level nuclear or chemical sources from time series of concentration measurements. The method uses a mesoscale atmospheric model to simulate the concentration signature from a known or suspected source at a receptor which is then regressed successively against segments of the measurement series to create time series of metrics that measure the goodness of fit between the signatures and the measurement segments. The method was applied to radioxenon data from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) collection site in Ussuriysk, Russia (RN58) after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013 near Punggye. The metrics were found to be a good screening tool to locate data segments with a strong likelihood of origin from Punggye, especially when multiplied together to a determine the joint probability. Metrics from RN58 were also used to find the probability that activity measured in February and April of 2013 originated from the Feb 12 test. A detailed analysis of an RN58 data segment from April 3/4, 2013 was also carried out for a grid of source locations around Punggye and identified Punggye as the most likely point of origin. Thus, the results support the strong possibility that radioxenon was emitted from the test site at various times in April and was detected intermittently at RN58, depending on the wind direction. The method does not locate unsuspected sources, but instead, evaluates the probability of a source at a specified location. However, it can be extended to include a set of suspected sources. Extension of the method to higher resolution data sets, arbitrary sampling, and time-varying sources is discussed along with a path to evaluate uncertainty in the calculated probabilities.

Working Towards Deep-Ocean Temperature Monitoring by Studying the Acoustic Ambient Noise Field in the South Pacific Ocean

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sambell, K.; Evers, L. G.; Snellen, M.

2017-12-01

Deriving the deep-ocean temperature is a challenge. In-situ observations and satellite observations are hardly applicable. However, knowledge about changes in the deep ocean temperature is important in relation to climate change. Oceans are filled with low-frequency sound waves created by sources such as underwater volcanoes, earthquakes and seismic surveys. The propagation of these sound waves is temperature dependent and therefore carries valuable information that can be used for temperature monitoring. This phenomenon is investigated by applying interferometry to hydroacoustic data measured in the South Pacific Ocean. The data is measured at hydrophone station H03 which is part of the International Monitoring System (IMS). This network consists of several stations around the world and is in place for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The station consists of two arrays located north and south of Robinson Crusoe Island separated by 50 km. Both arrays consist of three hydrophones with an intersensor distance of 2 km located at a depth of 1200 m. This depth is in range of the SOFAR channel. Hydroacoustic data measured at the south station is cross-correlated for the time period 2014-2017. The results are improved by applying one-bit normalization as a preprocessing step. Furthermore, beamforming is applied to the hydroacoustic data in order to characterize ambient noise sources around the array. This shows the presence of a continuous source at a backazimuth between 180 and 200 degrees throughout the whole time period, which is in agreement with the results obtained by cross-correlation. Studies on source strength show a seasonal dependence. This is an indication that the sound is related to acoustic activity in Antarctica. Results on this are supported by acoustic propagation modeling. The normal mode technique is used to study the sound propagation from possible source locations towards station H03.

Detection of nuclear testing from surface concentration measurements: Analysis of radioxenon from the February 2013 underground test in North Korea

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Kurzeja, R. J.; Buckley, R. L.; Werth, D. W.

A method is outlined and tested to detect low level nuclear or chemical sources from time series of concentration measurements. The method uses a mesoscale atmospheric model to simulate the concentration signature from a known or suspected source at a receptor which is then regressed successively against segments of the measurement series to create time series of metrics that measure the goodness of fit between the signatures and the measurement segments. The method was applied to radioxenon data from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) collection site in Ussuriysk, Russia (RN58) after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)more » underground nuclear test on February 12, 2013 near Punggye. The metrics were found to be a good screening tool to locate data segments with a strong likelihood of origin from Punggye, especially when multiplied together to a determine the joint probability. Metrics from RN58 were also used to find the probability that activity measured in February and April of 2013 originated from the Feb 12 test. A detailed analysis of an RN58 data segment from April 3/4, 2013 was also carried out for a grid of source locations around Punggye and identified Punggye as the most likely point of origin. Thus, the results support the strong possibility that radioxenon was emitted from the test site at various times in April and was detected intermittently at RN58, depending on the wind direction. The method does not locate unsuspected sources, but instead, evaluates the probability of a source at a specified location. However, it can be extended to include a set of suspected sources. Extension of the method to higher resolution data sets, arbitrary sampling, and time-varying sources is discussed along with a path to evaluate uncertainty in the calculated probabilities.« less

Bayesian Monitoring Systems for the CTBT: Historical Development and New Results

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Russell, S.; Arora, N. S.; Moore, D.

2016-12-01

A project at Berkeley, begun in 2009 in collaboration with CTBTO andmore recently with LLNL, has reformulated the global seismicmonitoring problem in a Bayesian framework. A first-generation system,NETVISA, has been built comprising a spatial event prior andgenerative models of event transmission and detection, as well as aMonte Carlo inference algorithm. The probabilistic model allows forseamless integration of various disparate sources of information,including negative information (the absence of detections). Workingfrom arrivals extracted by traditional station processing fromInternational Monitoring System (IMS) data, NETVISA achieves areduction of around 60% in the number of missed events compared withthe currently deployed network processing system. It also finds manyevents that are missed by the human analysts who postprocess the IMSoutput. Recent improvements include the integration of models forinfrasound and hydroacoustic detections and a global depth model fornatural seismicity trained from ISC data. NETVISA is now fullycompatible with the CTBTO operating environment. A second-generation model called SIGVISA extends NETVISA's generativemodel all the way from events to raw signal data, avoiding theerror-prone bottom-up detection phase of station processing. SIGVISA'smodel automatically captures the phenomena underlying existingdetection and location techniques such as multilateration, waveformcorrelation matching, and double-differencing, and integrates theminto a global inference process that also (like NETVISA) handles denovo events. Initial results for the Western US in early 2008 (whenthe transportable US Array was operating) shows that SIGVISA finds,from IMS data only, more than twice the number of events recorded inthe CTBTO Late Event Bulletin (LEB). For mb 1.0-2.5, the ratio is more than10; put another way, for this data set, SIGVISA lowers the detectionthreshold by roughly one magnitude compared to LEB. The broader message of this work is that probabilistic inference basedon a vertically integrated generative model that directly expressesgeophysical knowledge can be a much more effective approach forinterpreting scientific data than the traditional bottom-up processingpipeline.

Underground structure characterization using motor vehicles as passive seismic sources

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kuzma, H. A.; Liu, Y.; Zhao, Y.; Rector, J.; Vaidya, S.

2009-12-01

The ability to detect and characterize underground voids will be critical to the success of On-Site Inspections (OSI) as mandated by the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). OSIs may be conducted in order to successfully locate the Ground Zero of underground tests as well as infrastructure related to testing. Recently, our team has shown the potential of a new technique to detect underground objects using the amplitude of seismic surface waves generated by motor vehicles. In an experiment conducted in June, 2009 we were able to detect an abandoned railroad tunnel by recognizing a clear pattern in the surface waves scattered by the tunnel, using a signal generated by driving a car on a dirt road across the tunnel. Synthetic experiments conducted using physically realistic wave-equation models further suggest that the technique can be readily applied to detecting underground features: it may be possible to image structures of importance to OSI simply by laying out an array of geophones (or using an array already in place for passive listening for event aftershocks) and driving vehicles around the site. We present evidence from a set of field experiments and from synthetic modeling and inversion studies to illustrate adaptations of the technique for OSI. Signature of an abandoned underground railroad tunnel at Donner Summit, CA. To produce this image, a line of geophones was placed along a dirt road perpendicular to the tunnel (black box) and a single car was driven along the road. A normalized mean power-spectrum is displayed on a log scale as a function of meters from the center of the tunnel. The top of the tunnel was 18m below ground surface. The tunnel anomaly is made up of a shadow (light) directly above the tunnel and amplitude build-up (dark) on either side of the tunnel. The size of the anomaly (6 orders of magnitude) suggests that the method can be extended to find deep structures at greater distances from the source and receivers.

Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Solodov, Alexander

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA's mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting.

Automatic recovery of aftershock sequences at the International Data Centre: from concept to pipeline

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kitov, I.; Bobrov, D.; Rozhkov, M.

2016-12-01

Aftershocks of larger earthquakes represent an important source of information on the distribution and evolution of stresses and deformations in pre-seismic, co-seismic and post-seismic phases. For the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organization (CTBTO) largest aftershocks sequences are also a challenge for automatic and interactive processing. The highest rate of events recorded by two and more seismic stations of the International Monitoring System from a relatively small aftershock area may reach hundreds per hour (e.g. Sumatra 2004 and Tohoku 2011). Moreover, there are thousands of reflected/refracted phases per hour with azimuth and slowness within the uncertainty limits of the first P-waves. Misassociation of these later phases, both regular and site specific, as the first P-wave results in creation of numerous wrong event hypotheses in automatic IDC pipeline. In turn, interactive review of such wrong hypotheses is direct waste of analysts' resources. Waveform cross correlation (WCC) is a powerful tool to separate coda phases from actual P-wave arrivals and to fully utilize the repeat character of waveforms generated by events close in space. Array seismic stations of the IMS enhance the performance of the WCC in two important aspects - they reduce detection threshold and effectively suppress arrivals from all sources except master events. An IDC specific aftershock tool has been developed and merged with standard IDC pipeline. The tool includes several procedures: creation of master events consisting of waveform templates at ten and more IMS stations; cross correlation (CC) of real-time waveforms with these templates, association of arrivals detected at CC-traces in event hypotheses; building events matching IDC quality criteria; and resolution of conflicts between events hypotheses created by neighboring master-events. The final cross correlation standard event lists (XSEL) is a start point of interactive analysis. Since global monitoring of underground nuclear tests is based on historical and synthetic data, each aftershock sequence can be tested for the CTBT violation with big earthquakes as an evasion scenario.

Infrasound analysis of I18DK, northwest Greenland

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Evers, L. G.; Weemstra, C.

2010-12-01

Within the scope of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), four methods are used to verify the treaty. One of these methods is based on the detection of infrasound waves generated by a nuclear explosion. Seismological, hydroacoustical and radionuclide measurements are also applied. The International Monitoring System (IMS) will consist of 60 infrasound stations of which 35 stations are currently operational. Data obtained from an infrasound station situated on the northwestern shoreline of Greenland is analyzed. This station is operated by Denmark and labeled as I18DK. I18DK is situated in an area which receives an ever increasing attention from a geophysical perspective. I18DK has continuously been operational from April 2003 and onwards. The IMS station is an infrasound array with an aperture of about 1200 meters, where air-pressure fluctuations are recorded by eight microbarometers at a sample-rate of 20 Hz. The infrasonic recordings are filtered between 0.1 & 1.0 and 1.0 & 6.0 Hz. The slowness grid is searched for two different configurations in the higher frequency band. Once using all 8 stations and once only taking into account the 5 center stations. Several different source types are known to generate infrasound, for example, calving of icebergs and glaciers, explosions, earthquakes, oceanic wave-wave interaction, volcanic eruptions and aurora. The challenge is to distinguish between these different source types and use the outcome of the array analysis to better understand these phenomena. The rate of occurrence of icequakes, the calving of glaciers and the variation in extent of the sea ice in this area is of interest in relation to global warming. The processing results of the 1 to 6 Hz band seem to show dominating back-azimuths related to these sources. The glaciers south of I18DK produce significant infrasound during summer time. As well, a direct link can be found between the number of warm days in a year and the number of infrasound detections from a north-northeast direction. These signals seem to be generated by run- off of water from the local ice cap north of I18DK.

Support Vector Machine Model for Automatic Detection and Classification of Seismic Events

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Barros, Vesna; Barros, Lucas

2016-04-01

The automated processing of multiple seismic signals to detect, localize and classify seismic events is a central tool in both natural hazards monitoring and nuclear treaty verification. However, false detections and missed detections caused by station noise and incorrect classification of arrivals are still an issue and the events are often unclassified or poorly classified. Thus, machine learning techniques can be used in automatic processing for classifying the huge database of seismic recordings and provide more confidence in the final output. Applied in the context of the International Monitoring System (IMS) - a global sensor network developed for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) - we propose a fully automatic method for seismic event detection and classification based on a supervised pattern recognition technique called the Support Vector Machine (SVM). According to Kortström et al., 2015, the advantages of using SVM are handleability of large number of features and effectiveness in high dimensional spaces. Our objective is to detect seismic events from one IMS seismic station located in an area of high seismicity and mining activity and classify them as earthquakes or quarry blasts. It is expected to create a flexible and easily adjustable SVM method that can be applied in different regions and datasets. Taken a step further, accurate results for seismic stations could lead to a modification of the model and its parameters to make it applicable to other waveform technologies used to monitor nuclear explosions such as infrasound and hydroacoustic waveforms. As an authorized user, we have direct access to all IMS data and bulletins through a secure signatory account. A set of significant seismic waveforms containing different types of events (e.g. earthquake, quarry blasts) and noise is being analysed to train the model and learn the typical pattern of the signal from these events. Moreover, comparing the performance of the support-vector network to various classical learning algorithms used before in seismic detection and classification is an essential final step to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the model.

Numerical survey of pressure wave propagation around and inside an underground cavity with high order FEM

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Esterhazy, Sofi; Schneider, Felix; Schöberl, Joachim; Perugia, Ilaria; Bokelmann, Götz

2016-04-01

The research on purely numerical methods for modeling seismic waves has been more and more intensified over last decades. This development is mainly driven by the fact that on the one hand for subsurface models of interest in exploration and global seismology exact analytic solutions do not exist, but, on the other hand, retrieving full seismic waveforms is important to get insides into spectral characteristics and for the interpretation of seismic phases and amplitudes. Furthermore, the computational potential has dramatically increased in the recent past such that it became worthwhile to perform computations for large-scale problems as those arising in the field of computational seismology. Algorithms based on the Finite Element Method (FEM) are becoming increasingly popular for the propagation of acoustic and elastic waves in geophysical models as they provide more geometrical flexibility in terms of complexity as well as heterogeneity of the materials. In particular, we want to demonstrate the benefit of high-order FEMs as they also provide a better control on the accuracy. Our computations are done with the parallel Finite Element Library NGSOLVE ontop of the automatic 2D/3D mesh generator NETGEN (http://sourceforge.net/projects/ngsolve/). Further we are interested in the generation of synthetic seismograms including direct, refracted and converted waves in correlation to the presence of an underground cavity and the detailed simulation of the comprehensive wave field inside and around such a cavity that would have been created by a nuclear explosion. The motivation of this application comes from the need to find evidence of a nuclear test as they are forbidden by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). With this approach it is possible for us to investigate the wave field over a large bandwidth of wave numbers. This again will help to provide a better understanding on the characteristic signatures of an underground cavity, improve the protocols for OSI field deployment and create solid observational strategies for detecting the presence of an underground (nuclear) cavity.

Big Data Solution for CTBT Monitoring Using Global Cross Correlation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gaillard, P.; Bobrov, D.; Dupont, A.; Grenouille, A.; Kitov, I. O.; Rozhkov, M.

2014-12-01

Due to the mismatch between data volume and the performance of the Information Technology infrastructure used in seismic data centers, it becomes more and more difficult to process all the data with traditional applications in a reasonable elapsed time. To fulfill their missions, the International Data Centre of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO/IDC) and the Département Analyse Surveillance Environnement of Commissariat à l'Energie atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA/DASE) collect, process and produce complex data sets whose volume is growing exponentially. In the medium term, computer architectures, data management systems and application algorithms will require fundamental changes to meet the needs. This problem is well known and identified as a "Big Data" challenge. To tackle this major task, the CEA/DASE takes part during two years to the "DataScale" project. Started in September 2013, DataScale gathers a large set of partners (research laboratories, SMEs and big companies). The common objective is to design efficient solutions using the synergy between Big Data solutions and the High Performance Computing (HPC). The project will evaluate the relevance of these technological solutions by implementing a demonstrator for seismic event detections thanks to massive waveform correlations. The IDC has developed an expertise on such techniques leading to an algorithm called "Master Event" and provides a high-quality dataset for an extensive cross correlation study. The objective of the project is to enhance the Master Event algorithm and to reanalyze 10 years of waveform data from the International Monitoring System (IMS) network thanks to a dedicated HPC infrastructure operated by the "Centre de Calcul Recherche et Technologie" at the CEA of Bruyères-le-Châtel. The dataset used for the demonstrator includes more than 300,000 seismic events, tens of millions of raw detections and more than 30 terabytes of continuous seismic data from the primary IMS stations. In this talk, we will present the Master Event algorithm and the associated workflow, we will give an overview of the designed technical solutions (from the building blocks to the global infrastructure), and we will show the preliminary results at a regional scale.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Ford, Sean R.; Walter, William R.

Seismic waveform correlation offers the prospect of greatly reducing event detection thresholds when compared with more conventional processing methods. Correlation is applicable for seismic events that in some sense repeat, that is they have very similar waveforms. A number of recent studies have shown that correlated seismic signals may form a significant fraction of seismicity at regional distances. For the particular case of multiple nuclear explosions at the same test site, regional distance correlation also allows very precise relative location measurements and could offer the potential to lower thresholds when multiple events exist. Using the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Internationalmore » Monitoring System (IMS) seismic array at Matsushiro, Japan (MJAR), Gibbons and Ringdal (2012) were able to create a multichannel correlation detector with a very low false alarm rate and a threshold below magnitude 3.0. They did this using the 2006 or 2009 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear explosion as a template to search through a data stream from the same station to find a match via waveform correlation. In this paper, we extend the work of Gibbons and Ringdal (2012) and measure the correlation detection threshold at several other IMS arrays. We use this to address three main points. First, we show the IMS array station at Mina, Nevada (NVAR), which is closest to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), is able to detect a chemical explosion that is well under 1 ton with the right template. Second, we examine the two IMS arrays closest to the North Korean (DPRK) test site (at Ussuriysk, Russian Federation [USRK] and Wonju, Republic of Korea [KSRS]) to show that similarly low thresholds are possible when the right templates exist. We also extend the work of Schaff et al. (2012) and measure the correlation detection threshold at the nearest Global Seismic Network (GSN) three-component station (MDJ) at Mudanjiang, Heilongjiang Province, China, from the New China Digital Seismograph Network (IC). To conclude, we use these results to explore the recent claim by Zhang and Wen (2015) that the DPRK conducted “…a low-yield nuclear test…” on 12 May 2010.« less

Big Data solution for CTBT monitoring: CEA-IDC joint global cross correlation project

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bobrov, Dmitry; Bell, Randy; Brachet, Nicolas; Gaillard, Pierre; Kitov, Ivan; Rozhkov, Mikhail

2014-05-01

Waveform cross-correlation when applied to historical datasets of seismic records provides dramatic improvements in detection, location, and magnitude estimation of natural and manmade seismic events. With correlation techniques, the amplitude threshold of signal detection can be reduced globally by a factor of 2 to 3 relative to currently standard beamforming and STA/LTA detector. The gain in sensitivity corresponds to a body wave magnitude reduction by 0.3 to 0.4 units and doubles the number of events meeting high quality requirements (e.g. detected by three and more seismic stations of the International Monitoring System (IMS). This gain is crucial for seismic monitoring under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The International Data Centre (IDC) dataset includes more than 450,000 seismic events, tens of millions of raw detections and continuous seismic data from the primary IMS stations since 2000. This high-quality dataset is a natural candidate for an extensive cross correlation study and the basis of further enhancements in monitoring capabilities. Without this historical dataset recorded by the permanent IMS Seismic Network any improvements would not be feasible. However, due to the mismatch between the volume of data and the performance of the standard Information Technology infrastructure, it becomes impossible to process all the data within tolerable elapsed time. To tackle this problem known as "BigData", the CEA/DASE is part of the French project "DataScale". One objective is to reanalyze 10 years of waveform data from the IMS network with the cross-correlation technique thanks to a dedicated High Performance Computer (HPC) infrastructure operated by the Centre de Calcul Recherche et Technologie (CCRT) at the CEA of Bruyères-le-Châtel. Within 2 years we are planning to enhance detection and phase association algorithms (also using machine learning and automatic classification) and process about 30 terabytes of data provided by the IDC to update the world seismicity map. From the new events and those in the IDC Reviewed Event Bulletin, we will automatically create various sets of master event templates that will be used for the event location globally by the CTBTO and CEA.

Insights from the Source Physics Experiments on P/S Amplitude Ratio Methods of Identifying Explosions in a Background of Earthquakes

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Walter, W. R.; Ford, S. R.; Xu, H.; Pasyanos, M. E.; Pyle, M. L.; Matzel, E.; Mellors, R. J.; Hauk, T. F.

2012-12-01

It is well established empirically that regional distance (200-1600 km) amplitude ratios of seismic P-to-S waves at sufficiently high frequencies (~>2 Hz) can identify explosions among a background of natural earthquakes. However the physical basis for the generation of explosion S-waves, and therefore the predictability of this P/S technique as a function of event properties such as size, depth, geology and path, remains incompletely understood. A goal of the Source Physics Experiments (SPE) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS)) is to improve our physical understanding of the mechanisms of explosion S-wave generation and advance our ability to numerically model and predict them. Current models of explosion P/S values suggest they are frequency dependent with poor performance below the source corner frequencies and good performance above. This leads to expectations that small magnitude explosions might require much higher frequencies (>10 Hz) to identify them. Interestingly the 1-ton chemical source physics explosions SPE2 and SPE3 appear to discriminate well from background earthquakes in the frequency band 6-8 Hz, where P and S signals are visible at the NVAR array located near Mina, NV about 200 km away. NVAR is a primary seismic station in the International Monitoring System (IMS), part of the Comprehensive nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The NVAR broadband element NV31 is co-located with the LLNL station MNV that recorded many NTS nuclear tests, allowing the comparison. We find the small SPE explosions in granite have similar Pn/Lg values at 6-8 Hz as the past nuclear tests mainly in softer rocks. We are currently examining a number of other stations in addition to NVAR, including the dedicated SPE stations that recorded the SPE explosions at much closer distances with very high sample rates, in order to better understand the observed frequency dependence as compared with the model predictions. We plan to use these observations to improve our explosion models and our ability to understand and predict where P/S methods of identifying explosions work and any circumstances where they may not. This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.

Seismological analysis of the fourth North Korean nuclear test

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hartmann, Gernot; Gestermann, Nicolai; Ceranna, Lars

2016-04-01

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has conducted its fourth underground nuclear explosions on 06.01.2016 at 01:30 (UTC). The explosion was clearly detected and located by the seismic network of the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Additional seismic stations of international earthquake monitoring networks at regional distances, which are not part of the IMS, are used to precisely estimate the epicenter of the event in the North Hamgyong province (41.38°N / 129.05°E). It is located in the area of the North Korean Punggye-ri nuclear test site, where the verified nuclear tests from 2006, 2009, and 2013 were conducted as well. The analysis of the recorded seismic signals provides the evidence, that the event was originated by an explosive source. The amplitudes as well as the spectral characteristics of the signals were examined. Furthermore, the similarity of the signals with those from the three former nuclear tests suggests very similar source type. The seismograms at the 8,200 km distant IMS station GERES in Germany, for example, show the same P phase signal for all four explosions, differing in the amplitude only. The comparison of the measured amplitudes results in the increasing magnitude with the chronology of the explosions from 2006 (mb 4.2), 2009 (mb 4.8) until 2013 (mb 5.1), whereas the explosion in 2016 had approximately the same magnitude as that one three years before. Derived from the magnitude, a yield of 14 kt TNT equivalents was estimated for both explosions in 2013 and 2016; in 2006 and 2009 yields were 0.7 kt and 5.4 kt, respectively. However, a large inherent uncertainty for these values has to be taken into account. The estimation of the absolute yield of the explosions depends very much on the local geological situation and the degree of decoupling of the explosive from the surrounding rock. Due to the missing corresponding information, reliable magnitude-yield estimation for the North Korean test site is proved to be difficult. The direct evidence for the nuclear character of the explosion can only be found, if radioactive fission products of the explosion get released into the atmosphere and detected. The corresponding analysis by Atmospheric Transport Modelling is presented on the poster by O. Ross and L. Ceranna assessing the detection chances of IMS radionuclide stations.

International Monitoring System Correlation Detection at the North Korean Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri with Insights from the Source Physics Experiment

DOE PAGES

Ford, Sean R.; Walter, William R.

2015-05-06

Seismic waveform correlation offers the prospect of greatly reducing event detection thresholds when compared with more conventional processing methods. Correlation is applicable for seismic events that in some sense repeat, that is they have very similar waveforms. A number of recent studies have shown that correlated seismic signals may form a significant fraction of seismicity at regional distances. For the particular case of multiple nuclear explosions at the same test site, regional distance correlation also allows very precise relative location measurements and could offer the potential to lower thresholds when multiple events exist. Using the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Internationalmore » Monitoring System (IMS) seismic array at Matsushiro, Japan (MJAR), Gibbons and Ringdal (2012) were able to create a multichannel correlation detector with a very low false alarm rate and a threshold below magnitude 3.0. They did this using the 2006 or 2009 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear explosion as a template to search through a data stream from the same station to find a match via waveform correlation. In this paper, we extend the work of Gibbons and Ringdal (2012) and measure the correlation detection threshold at several other IMS arrays. We use this to address three main points. First, we show the IMS array station at Mina, Nevada (NVAR), which is closest to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), is able to detect a chemical explosion that is well under 1 ton with the right template. Second, we examine the two IMS arrays closest to the North Korean (DPRK) test site (at Ussuriysk, Russian Federation [USRK] and Wonju, Republic of Korea [KSRS]) to show that similarly low thresholds are possible when the right templates exist. We also extend the work of Schaff et al. (2012) and measure the correlation detection threshold at the nearest Global Seismic Network (GSN) three-component station (MDJ) at Mudanjiang, Heilongjiang Province, China, from the New China Digital Seismograph Network (IC). To conclude, we use these results to explore the recent claim by Zhang and Wen (2015) that the DPRK conducted “…a low-yield nuclear test…” on 12 May 2010.« less

On-Site inspections as a tool for nuclear explosion monitoring in the framework of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Arndt, R.; Gaya-Pique, L.; Labak, P.; Tanaka, J.

2009-04-01

On-site inspections (OSIs) constitute the final verification measure under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). OSIs are launched to establish whether or not a nuclear explosion has been carried out, thus they are conducted to verify States' compliance with the Treaty. During such an inspection, facts are gathered within a limited investigation area of 1000 Km2 to identify possible violators of the Treaty. Time scale (referring both to the preparation of the inspection as well as to the conduct of an OSI itself) is one of the challenges that an inspection team has to face when conducting an OSI. Other challenges are the size of the team - which is limited to 40 inspectors - and political limitations imposed by the Treaty in the use of allowed techniques. The Integrated Field Exercise 2008 (IFE08) recently conducted in Kazakhstan was the first large-scale, as well as the most comprehensive, on site inspection exercise ever conducted by the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The exercise took place in a deserted area south east of Kurchatov, within the former Soviet Union's Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. In this paper we will provide an overview of the technical activities conducted by the inspection team during IFE08 in order to collect evidence for a hypothetical nuclear explosion test. The techniques applied can be distributed in four different blocks: visual observation (to look for man-made changes in the geomorphology as well as anthropogenic features related to an underground nuclear explosion, UNE); passive seismic monitoring (to identify possible aftershocks created by the UNE); radionuclide measurements (to collect evidence for radionuclide isotopes related to a nuclear explosion); and finally geophysical surveys (to identify geophysical signatures related to an UNE in terms of changes in the geological strata, to the hydrogeological regime, and in terms of the shallow remains of the infrastructure deployed during the preparation and monitoring of the test). The data collected during IFE08, together with data from previous exercises, set the fundaments of a database of invaluable value to be used by CTBTO in the future for a better understanding of the phenomenology related to a nuclear explosion.

Improvement of IDC/CTBTO Event Locations in Latin America and the Caribbean Using a Regional Seismic Travel Time Model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Given, J. W.; Guendel, F.

2013-05-01

The International Data Centre is a vital element of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification mechanism. The fundamental mission of the International Data Centre (IDC) is to collect, process, and analyze monitoring data and to present results as event bulletins to Member States. For the IDC and in particular for waveform technologies, a key measure of the quality of its products is the accuracy by which every detected event is located. Accurate event location is crucial for purposes of an On Site Inspection (OSI), which would confirm the conduct of a nuclear test. Thus it is important for the IDC monitoring and data analysis to adopt new processing algorithms that improve the accuracy of event location. Among them the development of new algorithms to compute regional seismic travel times through 3-dimensional models have greatly increased IDC's location precision, the reduction of computational time, allowing forward and inverse modeling of large data sets. One of these algorithms has been the Regional Seismic Travel Time model (RSTT) of Myers et al., (2011). The RSTT model is nominally a global model; however, it currently covers only North America and Eurasia in sufficient detail. It is the intention CTBTO's Provisional Technical Secretariat and the IDC to extend the RSTT model to other regions of the earth, e.g. Latin America-Caribbean, Africa and Asia. This is particularly important for the IDC location procedure, as there are regions of the earth for which crustal models are not well constrained. For this purpose IDC has launched a RSTT initiative. In May 2012, a technical meeting was held in Vienna under the auspices of the CTBTO. The purpose of this meeting was to invite National Data Centre experts as well as network operators from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Australia, Latin and North America to discuss the context under which a project to extend the RSTT model would be implemented. A total of 41 participants from 32 Member States were present. The Latin America and Caribbean region with a rapidly expanding group of advanced seismic networks was selected as a pilot project for the implementation of a regional RSTT initiative. This poster will assess the actions taken by the IDC in order to advance the RSTT project in the Latin America and Caribbean Region.

Three-dimensional parabolic equation models of the acoustic coverage of the CTBT hydrophone station at Crozet

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zampolli, Mario; Haralabus, Georgios; Prior, Mark K.; Heaney, Kevin D.; Campbell, Richard

2014-05-01

Hydrophone stations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Organisation (CTBTO) International Monitoring System (IMS), with the exception of one in Australia, comprise two triplets of submerged moored hydrophones, one North and one South of the island from which the respective system is deployed. Triplet distances vary approximately between 50 - 100 km from the island, with each triplet connected to the receiving shore equipment by fibre-optic submarine data cables. Once deployed, the systems relay underwater acoustic waveforms in the band 1 - 100 Hz in real time to Vienna via a shore based satellite link. The design life of hydroacoustic stations is at least 20 years, without need for any maintenance of the underwater system. The re-establishment of hydrophone monitoring station HA04 at Crozet (French Southern and Antarctic Territories) in the South-Western Indian Ocean is currently being investigated. In order to determine appropriate locations and depths for the installation of the hydrophones a number of constraints need to be taken into account and balanced against each other. The most important of these are (i) hydrophone depth in a region where the sound-speed profile is mostly upward refracting and the Sound Fixing and Ranging (SOFAR) channel is not well defined, (ii) a safe distance from the surface currents which occupy the first few hundred meters of the water column, (iii) seabed slopes that enable the safe deployment of the hydrophone mooring bases, (iv) avoidance of regions of high internal tide activity, (v) choice of locations to optimize basin and cross-basin scale acoustic coverage of each triplet and (vi) redundancy considerations so that one triplet can partially cover for the other one in case of necessity. A state-of-the-art three-dimensional (3-D) parabolic equation acoustic propagation model was used to model the propagation for a number of potential triplet locations. Criteria for short-listing candidate triplet locations were based on acoustic coverage towards the North and South, as well as overall acoustic coverage, taking into account different scales of source strength. An increase in the predicted area coverage compared to predictions based on 2-D modelling was observed and attributed to diffraction around sharp localized features such as islands or sea-mounts.

T-phase and tsunami signals recorded by IMS hydrophone triplets during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Matsumoto, H.; Haralabus, G.; Zampolli, M.; Ozel, N. M.; Yamada, T.; Mark, P. K.

2016-12-01

A hydrophone station of the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is used to estimate the back-azimuth of T-phase signals generated by the 2011 Tohoku earthquake. Among the 6 IMS hydrophone stations required by the Treaty, 5 stations consist of two triplets, with the exception of HA1 (Australia), which has only one. The hydrophones of each triplet are suspended in the SOFAR channel and arranged to form an equilateral triangle with each side being approximately two kilometers long. The waveforms from the Tohoku earthquake were received at HA11, located on Wake Island, which is located approximately 3100 km south-east of the earthquake epicenter. The frequency range used in the array analysis was chosen to be less than 0.375 Hz, which assumed the target phase velocity to be 1.5 km/s for T-phases. The T-phase signals that originated from the seismic source however show peaks in the frequency band above one Hz. As a result of the inter-element distances of 2 km, spatial aliasing is observed in the frequency-wavenumber analysis (F-K analysis) if the entire 100 Hz bandwidth of the hydrophones is used. This spatial aliasing is significant because the distance between hydrophones in the triplet is large in comparison to the ratio between the phase velocity of T-phase signals and the frequency. To circumvent this spatial aliasing problem, a three-step processing technique used in seismic array analysis is applied: (1) high-pass filtering above 1 Hz to retrieve the T-phase, followed by (2) extraction of the envelope of this signal to highlight the T-phase contribution, and finally (3) low-pass filtering of the envelope below 0.375 Hz. The F-K analysis provides accurate back-azimuth and slowness estimations without spatial aliasing. Deconvolved waveforms are also processed to retrieve tsunami components by using a three-pole model of the frequency-amplitude-phase (FAP) response below 0.1 Hz and the measured sensor response for higher frequencies. It is also shown that short-period pressure fluctuations recorded by the IMS hydrophones correspond to theoretical dispersion curves of tsunamis. Thus, short-period dispersive tsunami signals can be identified by the IMS hydrophone triplets.

Results of Infrasound Interferometry in Netherlands

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fricke, J. T.; Ruigrok, E. N.; Evers, L. G.; Simons, D. G.; Wapenaar, K.

2012-04-01

The travel time of infrasound through the atmosphere depends on the temperature and the wind. These atmospheric conditions could be estimated by measuring the travel times between different receivers (microbarometers). For such an estimation an inverse model of the propagation of infrasound through the atmosphere is essential. In the first step it is useful to build a forward model. The inputs of our raytracing model are the atmospheric conditions and the positions of source and receiver. The model consists of three elements the source, the channel and the receiver. The source is a blast wave or microbaroms. The channel is the atmosphere and it takes into account the travel time along the eigen ray, the attenuation of the different atmospheric layers, the spreading of the rays and the influence of caustics. Each receiver is reached by different rays (eigen rays). To determine the eigen rays is part of the receiver element. As output the model generates synthetic barograms. The synthetic barograms can be used to explain measured barograms. Furthermore the synthetic barograms can also be used to evaluate the determination of the travel time. The accurate travel time is for the inverse model as input essential. Since small changes of the travel time lead to big changes of the output (temperature and wind). The travel time between two receivers is determined by crosscorrelating the barograms of these two receivers. This technique was already successfully applied in the troposphere (Haney, 2009). We show that the same can be achieved with more complicated stratospheric phases. Now we compare the crosscorrelation of synthetic barograms with the crosscorrelation of measured barograms. These barograms are measured with the 'Large Aperture Infrasound Array' (LAIA). LAIA is being installed by the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute (KNMI) in the framework of the radio-astronomical 'Low Frequency Array' (LOFAR) initiative. LAIA will consist of thirty microbarometers with an aperture of around 100 km. The in-house developed microbarometers are able to measure infrasound up to a period of 1000 seconds, which is in the acoustic-gravity wave regime. The results will also be directly applicable to the verification of the 'Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty' (CTBT), where uncertainties in the atmospheric propagation of infrasound play a dominant role. This research is made possible by the support of the 'Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research' (NWO). Haney, M., 2009. Infrasonic ambient noise interferometry from correlations of microbaroms, Geophysical Research Letters, 36, L19808, doi:10.1029/2009GL040179

Seismicity of the North Atlantic as measured by the International Data Centre using waveform cross correlation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Given, J. W.; Bobrov, D.; Kitov, I. O.; Spiliopoulos, S.

2012-12-01

The Technical Secretariat (TS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) will carry out the verification of the CTBT which obligates each State Party not to carry out any nuclear explosions, independently of their size and purpose. The International Data Centre (IDC) receives, collects, processes, analyses, reports on and archives data from the International Monitoring System(IMS). The IDC is responsible for automatic and interactive processing of the IMS data and for standard IDC products. The IDC is also required by the Treaty to progressively enhance its technical capabilities. In this study, we use waveform cross correlation as a technique to improve the detection capability and reliability of the seismic part of the IMS. In order to quantitatively estimate the gain obtained by cross correlation on the current sensitivity of automatic and interactive processing we compared seismic bulletins built for the North Atlantic (NA), which is an isolated region with earthquakes concentrating around the Mid-Atlantic Ridge. This avoids the influence of adjacent seismic regions on the final bulletins: the Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB) issued by the International Data Centre and the cross correlation Standard Event List (XSEL). We have cross correlated waveforms from ~1500 events reported in the REB since 2009. The resulting cross correlation matrix revealed the best candidates for master events. High-quality signals (SNR>5.0) recorded at eighteen array stations from approximately 50 master events evenly distributed over the seismically active zone in the NA were selected as templates. These templates are used for a continuous calculation of cross correlation coefficients since 2011. All detections obtained by cross-correlation are then used to build events according to the current IDC definition, i.e. at least three primary stations with accurate arrival times, azimuth and slowness estimates. The qualified event hypotheses populated the XSEL. In order to confirm the XSEL events not found in the REB, a portion of the newly built events was reviewed interactively by experienced analysts. The influence of all defining parameters (cross correlation coefficient threshold and SNR, F-statistics and fk-analysis, azimuth and slowness estimates, relative magnitude, etc.) on the final XSEL has been studied using the relevant frequency distributions for all detections vs only for those which were associated with the XSEL events. These distributions are also station and master dependent. This allows estimating the thresholds for all defining parameters, which may be adjusted to balance the rate of missed events and false alarms.

Identification of mine collapses, explosions and earthquakes using INSAR: a preliminary investigation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Foxall, B; Sweeney, J J; Walter, W R

1998-07-07

Interferograms constmcted from satellite-borne synthetic aperture radar images have the capability of mapping sub-cm ground surface deformation over areas on the order of 100 x 100 km with a spatial resolution on the order of 10 meters. We investigate the utility of synthetic aperture radar interferomehy (InSAR) used in conjunction with regional seismic methods in detecting and discriminating different types of seismic events in the context of special event analysis for the CTBT. For this initial study, we carried out elastic dislocation modeling of underground explosions, mine collapses and small (M<5.5) shallow earthquakes to produce synthetic interferograms and then analyzedmore » satellite radar data for a large mine collapse. The synthetic modeling shows that, for a given magnitude each type of event produces a distinctive pattern of ground deformation that can be recognized in, and recovered from, the corresponding interferogram. These diagnostic characteristics include not only differences in the polarities of surface displacements but also differences in displacement amplitudes from the different sources. The technique is especially sensitive to source depth, a parameter that is crucial in discriminating earthquakes from the other event types but is often very poorly constrained by regional seismic data alone. The ERS radar data analyzed is from a M L 5.2 seismic event that occurred in southwestern Wyoming on February 3,1995. Although seismic data from the event have some characteristics of an underground explosion, based on seismological and geodetic data it has been identified as being caused by a large underground collapse in the Solvay Mine. Several pairs of before-collapse and after-collapse radar images were phase processed to obtain interferograms. The minimum time separation for a before-collapse and after-collapse pair was 548 days. Even with this long time separation, phase coherence between the image pairs was acceptable and a deformation map was successfully obtained. Two images, separated by 1 day and occurring after the mine collapse, were used to form a digital elevation map (DEM) that was used to correct for topography. The interferograms identify the large deformation at the Solvay Mine as well as some areas of lesser deformation near other mines in the area. The large amount of deformation at the Solvay Mine was identified, but (as predicted by our dislocation modeling) could not be quantified absolutely because of the incoherent interference pattern it produced« less

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Modernization - the Stockpile Life Extension Program

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cook, Donald

2016-03-01

Underground nuclear testing of U.S. nuclear weapons was halted by President George H.W. Bush in 1992 when he announced a moratorium. In 1993, the moratorium was extended by President Bill Clinton and, in 1995, a program of Stockpile Stewardship was put in its place. In 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Twenty years have passed since then. Over the same time, the average age of a nuclear weapon in the stockpile has increased from 6 years (1992) to nearly 29 years (2015). At its inception, achievement of the objectives of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) appeared possible but very difficult. The cost to design and construct several large facilities for precision experimentation in hydrodynamics and high energy density physics was large. The practical steps needed to move from computational platforms of less than 100 Mflops/sec to 10 Teraflops/sec and beyond were unknown. Today, most of the required facilities for SSP are in place and computational speed has been increased by more than six orders of magnitude. These, and the physicists and engineers in the complex of labs and plants within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) who put them in place, have been the basis for underpinning an annual decision, made by the weapons lab directors for each of the past 20 years, that resort to underground nuclear testing is not needed for maintaining confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S stockpile. A key part of that decision has been annual assessment of the physical changes in stockpiled weapons. These weapons, quite simply, are systems that invariably and unstoppably age in the internal weapon environment of radioactive materials and complex interfaces of highly dissimilar organic and inorganic materials. Without an ongoing program to rebuild some components and replace other components to increase safety or security, i.e., life extending these weapons, either underground testing would again be required to assess many changes at once, or confidence in these weapons would be reduced. The strategy and details of the U.S. Stockpile Life Extension Program will be described in this talk. In brief, the strategy is to reduce the number of weapons in the stockpile while increasing confidence in the weapons that remain and, where possible, increase their safety, increase their security, and reduce their nuclear material quantities and yields. A number of ``myths'' pertaining to nuclear weapons, the SSP, and the Stockpile Life Extension Program will be explored.

Regional Seismic Methods of Identifying Explosions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Walter, W. R.; Ford, S. R.; Pasyanos, M.; Pyle, M. L.; Hauk, T. F.

2013-12-01

A lesson from the 2006, 2009 and 2013 DPRK declared nuclear explosion Ms:mb observations is that our historic collection of data may not be representative of future nuclear test signatures (e.g. Selby et al., 2012). To have confidence in identifying future explosions amongst the background of other seismic signals, we need to put our empirical methods on a firmer physical footing. Here we review the two of the main identification methods: 1) P/S ratios and 2) Moment Tensor techniques, which can be applied at the regional distance (200-1600 km) to very small events, improving nuclear explosion monitoring and confidence in verifying compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Amplitude ratios of seismic P-to-S waves at sufficiently high frequencies (~>2 Hz) can identify explosions among a background of natural earthquakes (e.g. Walter et al., 1995). However the physical basis for the generation of explosion S-waves, and therefore the predictability of this P/S technique as a function of event properties such as size, depth, geology and path, remains incompletely understood. Calculated intermediate period (10-100s) waveforms from regional 1-D models can match data and provide moment tensor results that separate explosions from earthquakes and cavity collapses (e.g. Ford et al. 2009). However it has long been observed that some nuclear tests produce large Love waves and reversed Rayleigh waves that complicate moment tensor modeling. Again the physical basis for the generation of these effects from explosions remains incompletely understood. We are re-examining regional seismic data from a variety of nuclear test sites including the DPRK and the former Nevada Test Site (now the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)). Newer relative amplitude techniques can be employed to better quantify differences between explosions and used to understand those differences in term of depth, media and other properties. We are also making use of the Source Physics Experiments (SPE) at NNSS. The SPE chemical explosions are explicitly designed to improve our understanding of emplacement and source material effects on the generation of shear and surface waves (e.g. Snelson et al., 2013). Our goal is to improve our explosion models and our ability to understand and predict where P/S and moment tensor methods of identifying explosions work, and any circumstances where they may not. This work performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344.

The Applicability of Incoherent Array Processing to IMS Seismic Array Stations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gibbons, S. J.

2012-04-01

The seismic arrays of the International Monitoring System for the CTBT differ greatly in size and geometry, with apertures ranging from below 1 km to over 60 km. Large and medium aperture arrays with large inter-site spacings complicate the detection and estimation of high frequency phases since signals are often incoherent between sensors. Many such phases, typically from events at regional distances, remain undetected since pipeline algorithms often consider only frequencies low enough to allow coherent array processing. High frequency phases that are detected are frequently attributed qualitatively incorrect backazimuth and slowness estimates and are consequently not associated with the correct event hypotheses. This can lead to missed events both due to a lack of contributing phase detections and by corruption of event hypotheses by spurious detections. Continuous spectral estimation can be used for phase detection and parameter estimation on the largest aperture arrays, with phase arrivals identified as local maxima on beams of transformed spectrograms. The estimation procedure in effect measures group velocity rather than phase velocity and the ability to estimate backazimuth and slowness requires that the spatial extent of the array is large enough to resolve time-delays between envelopes with a period of approximately 4 or 5 seconds. The NOA, AKASG, YKA, WRA, and KURK arrays have apertures in excess of 20 km and spectrogram beamforming on these stations provides high quality slowness estimates for regional phases without additional post-processing. Seven arrays with aperture between 10 and 20 km (MJAR, ESDC, ILAR, KSRS, CMAR, ASAR, and EKA) can provide robust parameter estimates subject to a smoothing of the resulting slowness grids, most effectively achieved by convolving the measured slowness grids with the array response function for a 4 or 5 second period signal. The MJAR array in Japan recorded high SNR Pn signals for both the 2006 and 2009 North Korea nuclear tests but, due to signal incoherence, failed to contribute to the automatic event detections. It is demonstrated that the smoothed incoherent slowness estimates for the MJAR Pn phases for both tests indicate unambiguously the correct type of phase and a backazimuth estimate within 5 degrees of the great-circle backazimuth. The detection part of the algorithm is applicable to all IMS arrays, and spectrogram-based processing may offer a reduction in the false alarm rate for high frequency signals. Significantly, the local maxima of the scalar functions derived from the transformed spectrogram beams provide good estimates of the signal onset time. High frequency energy is of greater significance for lower event magnitudes and in, for example, the cavity decoupling detection evasion scenario. There is a need to characterize propagation paths with low attenuation of high frequency energy and situations in which parameter estimation on array stations fails.

Using the DOE Knowledge Base for Special Event Analysis

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Armstrong, H.M.; Harris, J.M.; Young, C.J.

1998-10-20

The DOE Knowledge Base is a library of detailed information whose purpose is to support the United States National Data Center (USNDC) in its mission to monitor compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). One of the important tasks which the USNDC must accomplish is to periodically perform detailed analysis of events of high interest, so-called "Special Events", to provide the national authority with information needed to make policy decisions. In this paper we investigate some possible uses of the Knowledge Base for Special Event Analysis (SEA), and make recommendations for improving Knowledge Base support for SEA. To analyzemore » an event in detail, there are two basic types of data which must be used sensor-derived data (wave- forms, arrivals, events, etc.) and regiohalized contextual data (known sources, geological characteristics, etc.). Cur- rently there is no single package which can provide full access to both types of data, so for our study we use a separate package for each MatSeis, the Sandia Labs-developed MATLAB-based seismic analysis package, for wave- form data analysis, and ArcView, an ESRI product, for contextual data analysis. Both packages are well-suited to pro- totyping because they provide a rich set of currently available functionality and yet are also flexible and easily extensible, . Using these tools and Phase I Knowledge Base data sets, we show how the Knowledge Base can improve both the speed and the quality of SEA. Empirically-derived interpolated correction information can be accessed to improve both location estimates and associated error estimates. This information can in turn be used to identi~ any known nearby sources (e.g. mines, volcanos), which may then trigger specialized processing of the sensor data. Based on the location estimate, preferred magnitude formulas and discriminants can be retrieved, and any known blockages can be identified to prevent miscalculations. Relevant historic events can be identilled either by spatial proximity searches or through waveform correlation processing. The locations and waveforms of these events can then be made available for side-by-side comparison and processing. If synthetic modeling is thought to be warranted, a wide variety of rele- vant contextu~l information (e.g. crustal thickness and layering, seismic velocities, attenuation factors) can be retrieved and sent to the appropriate applications. Once formedj the synthetics can then be brought in for side-by-side comparison and fhrther processing. Based on our study, we make two general recommendations. First, proper inter-process communication between sensor data analysis software and contextual data analysis sofisvare should be developed. Second, some of the Knowl- edge Base data sets should be prioritized or winnowed to streamline comparison with observed quantities.« less

The Global Seismographic Network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Berger, J.; Anderson, K. R.; Butler, R.; Davis, P. B.; Derr, J.; Gee, L. S.; Song, X.

2009-12-01

Twenty-five years ago the IRIS Consortium was formed to advance the seismological interests of the US academic community. One of its core programs was the Global Seismographic Network (GSN).The GSN built upon the successes of its predecessors, the World-Wide Standardized Seismograph Network and the Global Digital Seismograph Network operated by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), and Project IDA operated by the University of California San Diego (UCSD), but with a far-reaching vision of more than 100 global stations with broadband seismometers, real-time data telemetry, and free and open data access. Based upon a partnership with USGS Albuquerque Seismological Laboratory and the UCSD IDA group, and with funding from the National Science Foundation, IRIS established its first stations in 1986. Today the GSN comprises 153 stations operated in cooperation with over 100 host organizations in 69 countries. With the goal of recording the entire seismic spectrum, the GSN stations include very-broadband seismometers installed in vaults and in 100m boreholes, strong-motion sensors to insure on-scale recordings of nearby or very large earthquakes, and high-frequency sensors to extend the frequency band for nuclear treaty monitoring interests. Using the GSN logistics, communications, and infrastructure for broader science interests, many GSN stations have been expanded as geophysical observatories to include microbarographs, GPS receivers, along with numerous co-located gravimeters, geomagnetic sensors, and meteorological sensors. In the early days of the GSN data were recorded at the stations on magnetic tape and then sent to the IRIS Data Center via mail. Gradually near real-time data collection progressed to telephone dial-up access, via private VSAT satellite access, and finally through the public Internet. Now over 95% of the GSN stations have real-time data flow openly accessible from IRIS, and from USGS and IDA data collection centers. In the years prior to the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the GSN received significant additional funding to support expansion of the GSN in the former Soviet Union, and to collaborate in the upgrade of the Chinese Digital Seismic Network to GSN standards. Over 50 GSN sites are designated as part of the CTBT International Monitoring System. The Mw 9.2 Sumatra-Andaman earthquake of 2004 and subsequent tsunami was the first operational test of the GSN design goals for a truly great earthquake. The GSN captured this event with full fidelity with over 88% of the network operational and with 88 of these stations provided data in real-time for tsunami warning. IRIS,IDA, and the USGS remain committed to maintaining a state-of-the-art facility, which will continue to serve as a foremost resource for seismological research and for training and educating the next generation of earth scientists while providing data for earthquake response, tsunami warning, and international nuclear treaty monitoring. To meet this commitment, the GSN is progressing rapidly in upgrading all of its stations with a new generation of data acquisition systems and the latest generation of standardized sensors.

Investigations of Periodic Disturbances on Seismic Aftershock Recordings

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liebsch, Mattes; Gorschlüter, Felix; Knoop, Jan-Frederik; Altmann, Jürgen

2013-04-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) runs the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect possible violations of the treaty. The seismic sensors of the IMS are set up to detect every underground explosion with a yield of 1 kT TNT equivalent or even better everywhere on the world. Under consideration of all IMS data the hypocentre of a large underground explosion is located within an area of about 1000 sq km. To verify if it was a violation of the Test-Ban Treaty the CTBTO (after CTBT entry into force) is allowed to carry out an on-site inspection (OSI) in the area of suspicion. During an OSI the hypocentre is to be located much more precisely; for this a local seismic aftershock monitoring system (SAMS) can be installed to detect small seismic events caused as a consequence of the explosion, such as relaxation of the rock around the cavity. However the magnitude of these aftershock signals is extremely weak. Other difficulties arise from other seismic signals in the inspection area, for example caused by vehicles of the inspectors, from coupling of airborne signals to the ground, or even by intended attempts to disturb the OSI. While the aftershock signals have a pulsed shape, man-made seismic signals (primarily created by engines) usually show periodic characteristics and thus are representable as a sum of sine functions and their harmonics. A mathematical expression for the Hann-windowed discrete Fourier transform of the underlying sine is used to characterise every such disturbance by the amplitude, frequency and phase. The contributions of these sines are computed and subtracted from the complex spectrum sequentially. Synthetic sines superposed to real signals, orders of magnitude stronger than the latter, can be removed successfully. Removal of periodic content from the signals of a helicopter overflight reduces the amplitude by a factor 3.3 when the frequencies are approximately constant. To reduce or prevent disturbing seismic signals created by coupling of acoustic waves to the ground in the first place a better understanding of the acoustic-seismic coupling is required. Several acoustic and seismic measurements of periodic signals (e.g. helicopters) and pulse-shaped signals (fire crackers, hammer blows) were analysed. The data were evaluated with respect to the distance between event and sensor, the elevation angle of the signal and the burying depth of the seismic sensors. From the correlation of acoustic and seismic spectral peaks the ratio of their spectral amplitudes can be calculated which gives the frequency dependent coupling coefficient. In the ongoing analysis the influence of constructive interference of surface waves, created by acoustic-seismic coupling at different positions in the vicinity of the sensor, is of special interest. Several recommendations for an OSI were developed with respect to sensor placement and flight trajectory of helicopters.

Vertically Integrated Seismological Analysis I : Modeling

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Russell, S.; Arora, N. S.; Jordan, M. I.; Sudderth, E.

2009-12-01

As part of its CTBT verification efforts, the International Data Centre (IDC) analyzes seismic and other signals collected from hundreds of stations around the world. Current processing at the IDC proceeds in a series of pipelined stages. From station processing to network processing, each decision is made on the basis of local information. This has the advantage of efficiency, and simplifies the structure of software implementations. However, this approach may reduce accuracy in the detection and phase classification of arrivals, association of detections to hypothesized events, and localization of small-magnitude events.In our work, we approach such detection and association problems as ones of probabilistic inference. In simple terms, let X be a random variable ranging over all possible collections of events, with each event defined by time, location, magnitude, and type (natural or man-made). Let Y range over all possible waveform signal recordings at all detection stations. Then Pθ(X) describes a parameterized generative prior over events, and P[|#30#|]φ(Y | X) describes how the signal is propagated and measured (including travel time, selective absorption and scattering, noise, artifacts, sensor bias, sensor failures, etc.). Given observed recordings Y = y, we are interested in the posterior P(X | Y = y), and perhaps in the value of X that maximizes it—i.e., the most likely explanation for all the sensor readings. As detailed below, an additional focus of our work is to robustly learn appropriate model parameters θ and φ from historical data. The primary advantage we expect is that decisions about arrivals, phase classifications, and associations are made with the benefit of all available evidence, not just the local signal or predefined recipes. Important phenomena—such as the successful detection of sub-threshold signals, correction of phase classifications using arrival information at other stations, and removal of false events based on the absence of signals—should all fall out of our probabilistic framework without the need for special processing rules. In our baseline model, natural events occur according to a spatially inhomogeneous Poisson process. Complex events (swarms and aftershocks) may then be captured via temporally inhomogeneous extensions. Man-made events have a uniform probability of occurring anywhere on the earth, with a tendency to occur closer to the surface. Phases are modelled via their amplitude, frequency distribution, and origin. In the simplest case, transmission times are characterized via the one-dimensional IASPEI-91 model, accounting for model errors with Gaussian uncertainty. Such homogeneous, approximate physical models can be further refined via historical data and previously developed corrections. Signal measurements are captured by station-specific models, based on sensor types and geometries, local frequency absorption characteristics, and time-varying noise models. At the conference, we expect to be able to quantitatively demonstrate the advantages of our approach, at least for simulated data. When reporting their findings, such systems can easily flag low-confidence events, unexplained arrivals, and ambiguous classifications to focus the efforts of expert analysts.

Inverse modeling of April 2013 radioxenon detections

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Hofman, Radek; Seibert, Petra; Philipp, Anne

2014-05-01

Significant concentrations of radioactive xenon isotopes (radioxenon) were detected by the International Monitoring System (IMS) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in April 2013 in Japan. Particularly, three detections of Xe-133 made between 2013-04-07 18:00 UTC and 2013-04-09 06:00 UTC at the station JPX38 are quite notable with respect to the measurement history of the station. Our goal is to analyze the data and perform inverse modeling under different assumptions. This work is useful with respect to nuclear test monitoring as well as for the analysis of and response to nuclear emergencies. Two main scenarios will be pursued: (i) Source location is assumed to be known (DPRK test site). (ii) Source location is considered unknown. We attempt to estimate the source strength and the source strength along with its plausible location compatible with the data in scenario (i) and (ii), respectively. We are considering also the possibility of a vertically distributed source. Calculations of source-receptor sensitivity (SRS) fields and the subsequent inversion are aimed at going beyond routine calculations performed by the CTBTO. For SRS calculations, we employ the Lagrangian particle dispersion model FLEXPART with high resolution ECMWF meteorological data (grid cell sizes of 0.5, 0.25 and ca. 0.125 deg). This is important in situations where receptors or sources are located in complex terrain which is the case of the likely source of detections-the DPRK test site. SRS will be calculated with convection enabled in FLEXPART which will also increase model accuracy. In the variational inversion procedure attention will be paid not only to all significant detections and their uncertainties but also to non-detections which can have a large impact on inversion quality. We try to develop and implement an objective algorithm for inclusion of relevant data where samples from temporal and spatial vicinity of significant detections are added in an iterative manner and the inversion is recalculated in each iteration. This procedure should gradually narrow down the set of hypotheses on the source term, where the source term is here understood as an emission in both spatial and temporal domains. Especially in scenario (ii) we expect a strong impact of non-detections for the reduction of possible solutions. For these and also other purposes like statistical quantification of typical background values, measurements from all IMS noble gas stations north of 30 deg S for a period from January to June 2013 were extracted from vDEC platform. We would like to acknowledge the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO for kindly providing limited access to the IMS data. This work contains only opinions of the authors, which can not in any case establish legal engagement of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO. This work is partially financed through the project "PREPARE: Innovative integrated tools and platforms for radiological emergency preparedness and post-accident response in Europe" (FP7, Grant 323287).

Mechanism of Lightning Associated Infrasonic Pulses from Thunderclouds

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pasko, V. P.

2008-12-01

The infrasonic waves correspond to the region of frequencies of acoustic sound waves 0.02-10 Hz, higher than the acoustic cut-off frequency but lower than the audible frequencies [e.g., Blanc, Ann. Geophys., 3, 673, 1985]. There is a strong experimental evidence that thunderstorms represent significant sources of infrasonic wave activity spanning a broad altitude range from the troposphere and up to the thermosphere [e.g., Blanc, 1985; Few, in Handbook of Atmospheric Electrodynamics, Vol. 2, edited by H. Volland, pp. 1-31, CRC Press, 1995; Drob et al., JGR, 108, 4680, 2003]. This evidence includes electrostatic production of 0.1- 1 Hz infrasonic waves from thunderclouds [Few, 1995] and recent discovery of infrasound from lightning induced transient luminous events in the mesosphere called sprites [Liszka, J. Low Freq. Noise Vibr. Active Control, 23, 85, 2004; Farges et al., GRL, 32, L13824, 2005; Liszka and Hobara, JASTP, 68, 1179, 2006]. The understanding and classification of different infrasonic waves and their sources is of great current interest from a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification perspective [e.g., Assink et al., GRL, 35, L15802, 2008]. It has been pointed many decades ago by C. T. R. Wilson [Phil. Trans. R. Soc. London A, 221, 73, 1920] that sudden reduction of the electric field inside a thundercloud immediately following a lightning discharge should produce an infrasound signature. Wilson [1920] noted that the pressure within a charged cloud must be less than the pressure outside, similarly to that within a charged soap bubble. In contrast to the sudden expansion of the air along the track of a lightning flash, the sudden contraction of a large volume of air must furnish a measurable rarefaction pulse [Wilson, 1920]. Many experimental and theoretical contributions followed these predictions by C. T. R. Wilson (see [Few, JGR, 90, 6175, 1985] and extensive list of references therein). Modeling investigation of related scenarios leading to emission of infrasound pulses documented in the existing literature, with particular emphasis on the initial compression phase of the observed infrasonic waveforms, represents a goal of the present work. The model employed in the present study utilizes linearized equations of acoustics with classical viscosity and atmospheric gravitational stratification effects. It is demonstrated that a growth of charge density in thundercloud prior to lightning discharge on time scales on the order of 2 to 6 seconds, comparable to typical documented time scales of generation of charge in thunderclouds, is fully sufficient for explanation of the initial compression waves in observed infrasonic pulses generated in accordance with the electrostatic mechanism proposed in [Wilson, 1920; Dessler, JGR, 78, 1889, 1973]. The arguments advanced in the present study agree with the ideas by Bohannon et al. [GRL, 4, 49, 1977] indicating a rapid intensification of the field prior to the lightning discharge. However, we provide a quantitative demonstration that the intensification does not need to be as fast as 0.5 seconds proposed in [Bohannon et al., 1977].

Forensic seismology revisited

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Douglas, A.

2007-01-01

The first technical discussions, held in 1958, on methods of verifying compliance with a treaty banning nuclear explosions, concluded that a monitoring system could be set up to detect and identify such explosions anywhere except underground: the difficulty with underground explosions was that there would be some earthquakes that could not be distinguished from an explosion. The development of adequate ways of discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions proved to be difficult so that only in 1996 was a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) finally negotiated. Some of the important improvements in the detection and identification of underground tests—that is in forensic seismology—have been made by the UK through a research group at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The paper describes some of the advances made in identification since 1958, particularly by the AWE Group, and the main features of the International Monitoring System (IMS), being set up to verify the Test Ban. Once the Treaty enters into force, then should a suspicious disturbance be detected the State under suspicion of testing will have to demonstrate that the disturbance was not a test. If this cannot be done satisfactorily the Treaty has provisions for on-site inspections (OSIs): for a suspicious seismic disturbance for example, an international team of inspectors will search the area around the estimated epicentre of the disturbance for evidence that a nuclear test really took place. Early observations made at epicentral distances out to 2,000 km from the Nevada Test Site showed that there is little to distinguish explosion seismograms from those of nearby earthquakes: for both source types the short-period (SP: ˜1 Hz) seismograms are complex showing multiple arrivals. At long range, say 3,000 10,000 km, loosely called teleseismic distances, the AWE Group noted that SP P waves—the most widely and well-recorded waves from underground explosions—were in contrast simple, comprising one or two cycles of large amplitude followed by a low-amplitude coda. Earthquake signals on the other hand were often complex with numerous arrivals of similar amplitude spread over 35 s or more. It therefore appeared that earthquakes could be recognised on complexity. Later however, complex explosion signals were observed which reduced the apparent effectiveness of complexity as a criterion for identifying earthquakes. Nevertheless, the AWE Group concluded that for many paths to teleseismic distances, Earth is transparent for P signals and this provides a window through which source differences will be most clearly seen. Much of the research by the Group has focused on understanding the influence of source type on P seismograms recorded at teleseismic distances. Consequently the paper concentrates on teleseismic methods of distinguishing between explosions and earthquakes. One of the most robust criteria for discriminating between earthquakes and explosions is the m b : M s criterion which compares the amplitudes of the SP P waves as measured by the body-wave magnitude m b, and the long-period (LP: ˜0.05 Hz) Rayleigh-wave amplitude as measured by the surface-wave magnitude M s; the P and Rayleigh waves being the main wave types used in forensic seismology. For a given M s, the m b for explosions is larger than for most earthquakes. The criterion is difficult to apply however, at low magnitude (say m b < 4.5) and there are exceptions—earthquakes that look like explosions. A difficulty with identification criteria developed in the early days of forensic seismology was that they were in the main empirical—it was not known why they appeared to work and if there were test sites or earthquakes where they would fail. Consequently the AWE Group in cooperation with the University of Cambridge used seismogram modelling to try and understand what controls complexity of SP P seismograms, and to put the m b : M s criterion on a theoretical basis. The results of this work show that the m b : M s criterion is robust because several factors contribute to the separation of earthquakes and explosions. The principal reason for the separation however, is that for many orientations of the earthquake source there is at least one P nodal plane in the teleseismic window and this biases m b low. Only for earthquakes with near 45° dip-slip mechanisms where the antinode of P is in the source window is the m b: M s criterion predicted to fail. The results from modelling are consistent with observation—in particular there are earthquakes, “anomalous events”, which look explosion-like on the m b: M s criterion, that turn out to have mechanisms close to 45° dip-slip. Fortunately the P seismograms from such earthquakes usually show pP and sP, the reflections from the free surface of P and S waves radiated upwards. From the pP P and sP P times the focal depth can be estimated. So far the estimated depth of the anomalous events have turned out to be ˜20 km, too deep to be explosions. Studies show that the observation that P seismograms are more complex than predicted by simple models can be explained on the weak-signal hypothesis: the standard phases, direct P and the surface reflections, are weak because of amongst other things, the effects of the radiation pattern or obstacles on the source-to-receiver path; other non-standard arrivals then appear relatively large on the seismograms. What has come out of the modelling of P seismograms is a criterion for recognising suspicious disturbances based on simplicity rather than complexity. Simple P seismograms for earthquakes at depths of more than a few kilometres are likely to be radiated only to stations that lie in a confined range of azimuths and distances. If then, simple seismograms are recorded over a wide range of distances and particularly azimuths, it is unlikely the source is an earthquake at depth. It is possible to test this using the relative amplitudes of direct P and later arrivals that might be surface reflections. The procedure is to use only the simple P seismograms on the assumption that whereas the propagation through Earth may make a signal more complex it is unlikely to make it simpler. From the amplitude of the coda of these seismograms, bounds can be placed on the size of possible pP and sP. The relative-amplitude method is then used to search for orientations of the earthquake source that are compatible with the observations. If no such orientations are found the source must be shallow so that any surface reflections merge with direct P, and hence could be an explosion. The IMS when completed will be a global network of 321 monitoring stations, including 170 seismological stations principally to detect the seismic waves from earthquakes and underground explosions. The IMS will also have stations with hydrophones, microbarographs and radionuclide detectors to detect explosions in the oceans and the atmosphere and any isotopes in the air characteristic of a nuclear test. The Global Communications Infrastructure provides communications between the IMS stations and the International Data Centre (IDC), Vienna, where the recordings from the monitoring stations is collected, collated, and analysed. The IDC issues bulletins listing geophysical disturbances, to States Signatories to the CTBT. The assessment of the disturbances to decide whether any are possible explosions, is a task for State Signatories. For each Signatory to do a detailed analysis of all disturbances would be expensive and time consuming. Fortunately many disturbances can be readily identified as earthquakes and removed from consideration—a process referred to as “event screening”. For example, many earthquakes with epicentres over the oceans can be distinguished from underwater explosions, because an explosion signal is of much higher frequency than that of earthquakes that occur below the ocean bed. Further, many earthquakes could clearly be identified at the IDC on the m b : M s criterion, but there is a difficulty—how to set the decision line. The possibility has to be very small that an explosion will be classed by mistake, as an earthquake. The decision line has therefore to be set conservatively, consequently with routine application of current screening criteria, only about 50% of earthquakes can be positively identified as such. Various methods have been proposed whereby a “determined violator” could avoid the provisions of a CTBT and carry out a test that would be either undetected or detected but not identified as an explosion. The increase in complexity and cost of such a test should discourage any State from attempting it. In addition, there is always the possibility of some stations detecting the test, the test being identified as suspicious, and so subject to an OSI. With time as the IMS becomes more efficient and effective it will act increasingly to deter anyone contemplating a clandestine test, from going ahead. What has emerged is several robust criteria. The criteria include: location, which when combined with hydro-acoustic data can identify earthquakes under the sea; m b : M s; and depth of focus. More detailed study is required of any remaining seismic disturbance that is regarded as suspicious: for example, is close to a site where nuclear tests have been carried out in the past. Any disturbance that is shown to be explosion-like, may be the subject of an OSI. One surprise is how little plate tectonics has contributed to resolving problems in forensic seismology. Much of the evidence for plate tectonics comes from seismological studies so it would be expected that the implications for Earth structure arising from forensic seismology would be consistent with plate-tectonic models. So far the AWE Group have found little synergy between plate tectonics and forensic seismology. It is to be hoped that the large volume of seismological data of high quality now being collected by the IMS and the increasing number of digital stations, will result in a revised Earth model that is consistent with the findings of forensic seismology, so that a future review of progress will show that the forensic seismologist can draw on this model in attempting to interpret apparently anomalous seismograms.

The ROSELEND-Gas Project: Research On Solicitation Effects in a Large-scale Experiment under Natural Dynamics with Gas

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pili, E.; Richon, P.; Moreira, M.; Agrinier, P.; Sabroux, J.; Adler, P. M.; Queisser, M.

2008-12-01

A 128-m long dead-end tunnel has been used since the 90's as an Underground Research Laboratory at 55 m below ground surface in the unsaturated zone of a fractured granitic body in Roselend (French Alps). As part of a multidisciplinary research project (Provost et al., 2004-EOS) aiming at understanding the impact of mechanical, meteorological, hydrogeological, and geochemical stimuli on transport in unsaturated fractured media, experiments have been run from and to the tunnel, based on long-term, high-resolution monitoring of a variety of physical and chemical parameters. In particular, transient phenomena have been studied within this highly dynamic system. The tunnel is located close to and above the artificial Roselend Lake where large variations in water level induce reproducible deformation and hydrogeological disturbances. This mountainous area is also characterized by contrasted water infiltration regimes. Solute transport presents a large variability in space and time due to variations in water content, flow pathways, and chemical reactions. Tracing experiments with natural and artificial tracers have been performed between ground surface and dripping water collecting points in the tunnel. Dripwater fluxes and water chemistry have been monitored for several years along sections of the tunnel showing different geological structures and flow rates in order to get water representative of different contributions of matrix porosity and fractures. Up to now, major findings include: - mechanisms of earthquake precursors (Trique et al., 1999-Nature; Pili et al., 2004-EPSL), - ventilation and the spatial and time variations of radon-222 concentrations in the tunnel (Richon et al., 2005-J.Env.Rad., Perrier et al., 2005-STOTEN), - stereological analysis of fractures and permeability determination (Patriarche et al., 2007-WRR), - reactive transport and residence time determination (Pili et al., 2008-Developments in Earth & Environmental Sciences). The new research project in the Roselend URL focuses on gases. It aims at understanding the origin and dynamics of natural gas sources, as well as the transfer mechanisms of gases from the tunnel toward the atmosphere through the unsaturated fractured rocks. This research program is of interest for the understanding natural emissions of greenhouse gases, the design of surface monitoring technologies for baseline determination and leakage detection in the framework of CO2 sequestration, as well as for improving tools for detection of concealed nuclear tests in the framework of the CTBT. At the Roselend site, CO2 is naturally produced in soils by plant and microbiological activity and in rocks by carbonate dissolution promoted by protons gained from pyrite oxidation upon water infiltration. Radon is emitted from rocks and transported through fractures. Naturally occurring CO2 and radon will be used as tracers in addition with an artificial mixture of noble gases. Tracers will be injected from an isolated section of the tunnel. High-frequency sampling will be followed by classical laboratory gas analyses (elemental and isotopic), and will be completed with high-resolution field monitoring, including the determination of the carbon isotope ratio in CO2 by diode-laser spectrometry.

Looking for underlying features in automatic and reviewed seismic bulletins through a neural network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Carluccio, R.; Console, R.; Chiappini, M.; Chiappini, S.

2009-12-01

SEL1 bulletins are, among all IDC products, a fundamental tool for NDCs in their task of national assessment of compliance with the CTBT. This is because SEL1s are expected to be disseminated within 2 hours from the occurrence of any detected waveform event, and the National Authorities are supposed to take a political decision in nearly real time, especially in the case when the event could triggers the request for an on site inspection. In this context not only the rapidity, but also the reliability of the SEL1 is a fundamental requirement. Our last years experience gained in the comparison between SEL1 and Italian Seismic Bulletin events has shown that SEL1s usually contain a big fraction of bogus events (sometimes close to 50%). This is due to many factors, all related to the availability of processing data and to the fast automatic algorithms involved. On the other hand, REBs are much more reliable as proved by our experience. Therefore, in spite of their relevant time delay by which they are distributed, which prevents their real-time use, REBs can be still useful in a retrospective way as reference information for comparison with SEL1s. This study tries to set up a sort of logical filter on the SEL1s that, while maintaining the rapidity requirements, improves their reliability. Our idea is based on the assumption that the SEL1s are produced by systematic algorithm of phase association and therefore some patterns among the input and output data could exist and be recognized. Our approach was initially based on a set of rules suggested by human experts on their personal experience, and its application on large datasets on a global scale. Other approaches not involving human interaction (data mining techniques) do exist. This study refers specifically to a semi-automatic approach: fitting of multi-parametric relationships hidden in the data set, through the application of neural networks by an algorithm of supervised learning. Full SEL1 and REB bulletins from Jan 2005 to Oct 2008 have been inserted in a database, together with IMS stations availability information. Part of these data have been used to create two sets of independent data (learning and verifying) used to train a "feed-forward" supervised neural network. A network supervised training algorithm using "confirmation flag" values has been used. In order to optimize network training input a significant, not redundant subset of input parameters has been looked for with the help of a genetic algorithm search tool. A suitable 12 input subset has been found and a network architecture of 12-20-1 has thus been chosen and trained on a 15094 records data set. Different runs of training sequences have been conducted, all showing CCR (Correct Classification Rate) values of the order of 75% - 80%. The trained network behavior is shown in term of ROC curve and input-out success-error matrices. The results of the analysis on our testing and validating data groups appear promising.

Technology Foresight and nuclear test verification: a structured and participatory approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Noack, Patrick; Gaya-Piqué, Luis; Haralabus, Georgios; Auer, Matthias; Jain, Amit; Grenard, Patrick

2013-04-01

As part of its mandate, the CTBTO's nuclear explosion monitoring programme aims to maintain its sustainability, effectiveness and its long-term relevance to the verification regime. As such, the PTS is conducting a Technology Foresight programme of activities to identify technologies, processes, concepts and ideas that may serve said purpose and become applicable within the next 20 years. Through the Technology Foresight activities (online conferences, interviews, surveys, workshops and other) we have involved the wider science community in the fields of seismology, infrasound, hydroacoustics, radionuclide technology, remote sensing and geophysical techniques. We have assembled a catalogue of over 200 items, which incorporate technologies, processes, concepts and ideas which will have direct future relevance to the IMS (International Monitoring System), IDC (International Data Centre) and OSI (On-Site Inspection) activities within the PTS. In order to render this catalogue as applicable and useful as possible for strategy and planning, we have devised a "taxonomy" based on seven categories, against which each technology is assessed through a peer-review mechanism. These categories are: 1. Focus area of the technology in question: identify whether the technology relates to (one or more of the following) improving our understanding of source and source physics; propagation modelling; data acquisition; data transport; data processing; broad modelling concepts; quality assurance and data storage. 2. Current Development Stage of the technology in question. Based on a scale from one to six, this measure is specific to PTS needs and broadly reflects Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). 3. Impact of the technology on each of the following capabilities: detection, location, characterization, sustainment and confidence building. 4. Development cost: the anticipated monetary cost of validating a prototype (i.e. Development Stage 3) of the technology in question. 5. Time to maturity: the number of years until the technology in question reaches Development Stage 3 (i.e. prototype validated). 6. Integration effort: the anticipated level of effort required by the PTS to fully integrate the technology, process, concept or idea into is verification environment. 7. Time to impact: the number of years until the technology is fully developed and integrated into the PTS verification environment and delivers on its full potential. The resulting database is coupled to Pivot, a novel information management software tool which offers powerful visualisation of the taxonomy's parameters for each technology. Pivot offers many advantages over conventional spreadhseet-interfaced database tools: based on shared categories in the taxonomy, users can quickly and intuitively discover linkages, communalities and various interpretations about prospective CTBT pertinent technologies. It is easily possible to visualise a resulting sub-set of technologies that conform to the specific user-selected attributes from the full range of taxonomy categories. In this presentation we will illustrate the range of future technologies, processes, concepts and ideas; we will demonstrate how the Pivot tool can be fruitfully applied to assist in strategic planning and development, and to identify gaps apparent on the technology development horizon. Finally, we will show how the Pivot tool together with the taxonomy offer real and emerging insights to make sense of large amounts of disparate technologies.

Vertically Integrated Seismological Analysis II : Inference

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Arora, N. S.; Russell, S.; Sudderth, E.

2009-12-01

Methods for automatically associating detected waveform features with hypothesized seismic events, and localizing those events, are a critical component of efforts to verify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As outlined in our companion abstract, we have developed a hierarchical model which views detection, association, and localization as an integrated probabilistic inference problem. In this abstract, we provide more details on the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods used to solve this inference task. MCMC generates samples from a posterior distribution π(x) over possible worlds x by defining a Markov chain whose states are the worlds x, and whose stationary distribution is π(x). In the Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) method, transitions in the Markov chain are constructed in two steps. First, given the current state x, a candidate next state x‧ is generated from a proposal distribution q(x‧ | x), which may be (more or less) arbitrary. Second, the transition to x‧ is not automatic, but occurs with an acceptance probability—α(x‧ | x) = min(1, π(x‧)q(x | x‧)/π(x)q(x‧ | x)). The seismic event model outlined in our companion abstract is quite similar to those used in multitarget tracking, for which MCMC has proved very effective. In this model, each world x is defined by a collection of events, a list of properties characterizing those events (times, locations, magnitudes, and types), and the association of each event to a set of observed detections. The target distribution π(x) = P(x | y), the posterior distribution over worlds x given the observed waveform data y at all stations. Proposal distributions then implement several types of moves between worlds. For example, birth moves create new events; death moves delete existing events; split moves partition the detections for an event into two new events; merge moves combine event pairs; swap moves modify the properties and assocations for pairs of events. Importantly, the rules for accepting such complex moves need not be hand-designed. Instead, they are automatically determined by the underlying probabilistic model, which is in turn calibrated via historical data and scientific knowledge. Consider a small seismic event which generates weak signals at several different stations, which might independently be mistaken for noise. A birth move may nevertheless hypothesize an event jointly explaining these detections. If the corresponding waveform data then aligns with the seismological knowledge encoded in the probabilistic model, the event may be detected even though no single station observes it unambiguously. Alternatively, if a large outlier reading is produced at a single station, moves which instantiate a corresponding (false) event would be rejected because of the absence of plausible detections at other sensors. More broadly, one of the main advantages of our MCMC approach is its consistent handling of the relative uncertainties in different information sources. By avoiding low-level thresholds, we expect to improve accuracy and robustness. At the conference, we will present results quantitatively validating our approach, using ground-truth associations and locations provided either by simulation or human analysts.

IDCDACS: IDC's Distributed Application Control System

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ertl, Martin; Boresch, Alexander; Kianička, Ján; Sudakov, Alexander; Tomuta, Elena

2015-04-01

The Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO is an international organization based in Vienna, Austria. Its mission is to establish a global verification regime to monitor compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions. For this purpose time series data from a global network of seismic, hydro-acoustic and infrasound (SHI) sensors are transmitted to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna in near-real-time, where it is processed to locate events that may be nuclear explosions. We newly designed the distributed application control system that glues together the various components of the automatic waveform data processing system at the IDC (IDCDACS). Our highly-scalable solution preserves the existing architecture of the IDC processing system that proved successful over many years of operational use, but replaces proprietary components with open-source solutions and custom developed software. Existing code was refactored and extended to obtain a reusable software framework that is flexibly adaptable to different types of processing workflows. Automatic data processing is organized in series of self-contained processing steps, each series being referred to as a processing pipeline. Pipelines process data by time intervals, i.e. the time-series data received from monitoring stations is organized in segments based on the time when the data was recorded. So-called data monitor applications queue the data for processing in each pipeline based on specific conditions, e.g. data availability, elapsed time or completion states of preceding processing pipelines. IDCDACS consists of a configurable number of distributed monitoring and controlling processes, a message broker and a relational database. All processes communicate through message queues hosted on the message broker. Persistent state information is stored in the database. A configurable processing controller instantiates and monitors all data processing applications. Due to decoupling by message queues the system is highly versatile and failure tolerant. The implementation utilizes the RabbitMQ open-source messaging platform that is based upon the Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP), an on-the-wire protocol (like HTML) and open industry standard. IDCDACS uses high availability capabilities provided by RabbitMQ and is equipped with failure recovery features to survive network and server outages. It is implemented in C and Python and is operated in a Linux environment at the IDC. Although IDCDACS was specifically designed for the existing IDC processing system its architecture is generic and reusable for different automatic processing workflows, e.g. similar to those described in (Olivieri et al. 2012, Kværna et al. 2012). Major advantages are its independence of the specific data processing applications used and the possibility to reconfigure IDCDACS for different types of processing, data and trigger logic. A possible future development would be to use the IDCDACS framework for different scientific domains, e.g. for processing of Earth observation satellite data extending the one-dimensional time-series intervals to spatio-temporal data cubes. REFERENCES Olivieri M., J. Clinton (2012) An almost fair comparison between Earthworm and SeisComp3, Seismological Research Letters, 83(4), 720-727. Kværna, T., S. J. Gibbons, D. B. Harris, D. A. Dodge (2012) Adapting pipeline architectures to track developing aftershock sequences and recurrent explosions, Proceedings of the 2012 Monitoring Research Review: Ground-Based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Technologies, 776-785.

The unique contribution of the IDC Reviewed Event Bulletin to global seismicity catalogues

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Koch, Karl; Kebede, Fekadu

2010-05-01

For monitoring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) the International Monitoring System (IMS) network is currently being established that will eventually consists of 241 seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound stations. The final result of processing and analysis of seismological and other waveform technology data from these stations is the Reviewed Event Bulletin (REB), which has been issued by the International Data Center (IDC) under provisional operation since February 2000 on a daily basis, except for a total of 28 days. The nearly 300,000 events produced since then correspond to more than 25,000 events per year. As an accompanying effort to the bulletin production at the IDC, quality assurance work has been carried out for the REB for the years from 2000 to 2008 through comparisons to similar bulletins of global seismicity, issued by the ISC and the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) of the United States Geological Survey. The comparisons with the NEIC bulletin concentrate on a timely identification of larger events that were either missed during interactive analysis at the IDC or which have been significantly mislocated. For the scope of this study the comparisons with the ISC bulletin are the focus, as this bulletin provides the most complete reference to global seismicity, even though it becomes available only after about two years of event occurrence. In our quality assessments we aimed at evaluating the consistency of event locations for common events, i.e. found in both the REB and the ISC bulletin having been relocated by ISC; the degree and the geospatial location of the events only produced in the REB and verified not being bogus, and those ISC relocated events not contained in the REB and which were missed during IDC analysis. Even though the seismic component of the IMS network with its maximum 170 seismometer stations is a sparse teleseismic network, locations differences of less than 1° (0.5° ) are observed, on average, for about 94% (85%) of the common events, as obtained from the ISC bulletin comparisons for the years 2000 to 2006. On the other hand, only 0.25% of such events were located more than 5° apart by the IDC and the ISC. The number of events of significant magnitude missed by the IDC is small and related predominantly to lack of sufficient number of observed arrivals to define an event. The unique contribution of the REB to global seismicity catalogues is expressed by the significant number of REB events that are solely reported in the ISC bulletin. Over the most recent years 2004-2006 the REB and ISC bulletin include about 20,000 common events which were reprocessed by the ISC. This compares to a steadily rising number of solely contributed REB events from more than 5,000 events in 2004 to nearly 7,500 events in 2006, i.e. a quarter to a third events more. These unique IDC events are mainly in remote and oceanic areas. A more important aspect, however, is the number of unique IDC events at depth. Below a depth of about 300 km there are nearly any ISC events not detected by the IMS network, while the number of events at larger depths and only detected by the IMS is significant. As conclusion it is found that the IDC REB is a valuable source for studies of deep seismicity occurring within the global subduction zones.

Testing of the KRI-developed Silicon PIN Radioxenon Detector

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Foxe, Michael P.; McIntyre, Justin I.

Radioxenon detectors are used for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in a network of detectors throughout the world called the International Monitoring System (IMS). The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) has tasked Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) with testing a V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute (KRI) and Lares Ltd-developed Silicon PIN detector for radioxenon detection. PNNL measured radioxenon with the silicon PIN detector and determined its potential compared to current plastic scintillator beta cells. While the PNNL tested Si detector experienced noise issues, a second detector was tested in Russia at Lares Ltd, whichmore » did not exhibit the noise issues. Without the noise issues, the Si detector produces much better energy resolution and isomer peak separation than a conventional plastic scintillator cell used in the SAUNA systems in the IMS. Under the assumption of 1 cm 3 of Xe in laboratory-like conditions, 24-hr count time (12-hr count time for the SAUNA), with the respective shielding the minimum detectable concentrations for the Si detector tested by Lares Ltd (and a conventional SAUNA system) were calculated to be: 131mXe – 0.12 mBq/m 3 (0.12 mBq/m 3); 133Xe – 0.18 mBq/m 3 (0.21 mBq/m 3); 133mXe – 0.07 mBq/m 3 (0.15 mBq/m 3); 135Xe – 0.45 mBq/m 3 (0.67 mBq/m 3). Detection limits, which are one of the important factors in choosing the best detection technique for radioxenon in field conditions, are significantly better than for SAUNA-like detection systems for 131mXe and 133mXe, but similar for 133Xe and 135Xe. Another important factor is the amount of “memory effect” or carry over signal from one radioxenon measurement to the subsequent sample. The memory effect is reduced by a factor of 10 in the Si PIN detector compared to the current plastic scintillator cells. There is potential for further reduction with the removal of plastics within the cell, which will need to be explored in future work. A third important parameter in choosing the best detection technique for radioxenon is the resolution of the electron detection. While the resolution is important in determining the minimum detectable concentration, it plays a larger role in source identification when there is a visible signal. The Silicon PIN diodes generated improved resolution over a similar plastic scintillator cell. With the improved resolution, it becomes easier to distinguish the radioxenon isomers ( 133mXe and 131mXe) from the 133Xe beta continuum background. With the beta background from 133Xe ever present with the detection of the isomers, the improved resolution proves vital in calculating the ratios of the three isotopes. With an accurate measurement of the isotopic ratios, the anthropogenic sources of radioxenon (medical isotope production and nuclear reactors) can be more accurately distinguished. Based on the results shown within this report, a Si PIN beta cell shows the potential to aid in the operation and discriminating power of the IMS for the CTBTO. However, there are a number of issues that need attention before a detector of this design would be reliable enough for field operations in the IMS. Issues that need develop include, but are not limited to: studying the robustness of the design in field conditions, eliminating or minimizing the noise and variability of individual Si detector elements, understanding the long-term gain stability of the Si detectors, and reducing the non-Si materials within the cell (i.e. the plastic housing).« less

Study of medical isotope production facility stack emissions and noble gas isotopic signature using automatic gamma-spectra analysis platform

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Weihua; Hoffmann, Emmy; Ungar, Kurt; Dolinar, George; Miley, Harry; Mekarski, Pawel; Schrom, Brian; Hoffman, Ian; Lawrie, Ryan; Loosz, Tom

2013-04-01

The nuclear industry emissions of the four CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) relevant radioxenon isotopes are unavoidably detected by the IMS along with possible treaty violations. Another civil source of radioxenon emissions which contributes to the global background is radiopharmaceutical production companies. To better understand the source terms of these background emissions, a joint project between HC, ANSTO, PNNL and CRL was formed to install real-time detection systems to support 135Xe, 133Xe, 131mXe and 133mXe measurements at the ANSTO and CRL 99Mo production facility stacks as well as the CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) primary coolant monitoring system at CRL. At each site, high resolution gamma spectra were collected every 15 minutes using a HPGe detector to continuously monitor a bypass feed from the stack or CANDU primary coolant system as it passed through a sampling cell. HC also conducted atmospheric monitoring for radioxenon at approximately 200 km distant from CRL. A program was written to transfer each spectrum into a text file format suitable for the automatic gamma-spectra analysis platform and then email the file to a server. Once the email was received by the server, it was automatically analysed with the gamma-spectrum software UniSampo/Shaman to perform radionuclide identification and activity calculation for a large number of gamma-spectra in a short period of time (less than 10 seconds per spectrum). The results of nuclide activity together with other spectrum parameters were saved into the Linssi database. This database contains a large amount of radionuclide information which is a valuable resource for the analysis of radionuclide distribution within the noble gas fission product emissions. The results could be useful to identify the specific mechanisms of the activity release. The isotopic signatures of the various radioxenon species can be determined as a function of release time. Comparison of 133mXe and 133Xe activity ratios showed distinct differences between the closed CANDU primary coolant system and radiopharmaceutical production releases. According to the concept proposed by Kalinowski and Pistner (2006), the relationship between different isotopic activity ratios based on three or four radioxenon isotopes was plotted in a log-log diagram for source characterisation (civil vs. nuclear test). The multiple isotopic activity ratios were distributed in three distinct areas: HC atmospheric monitoring ratios extended to far left; the CANDU primary coolant system ratios lay in the middle; and 99Mo stack monitoring ratios for ANSTO and CRL were located on the right. The closed CANDU primary coolant has the lowest logarithmic mean ratio that represents the nuclear power reactor operation. The HC atmospheric monitoring exhibited a broad range of ratios spreading over several orders of magnitude. In contrast, the ANSTO and CRL stack emissions showed the smallest range of ratios but the results indicate at least two processes involved in the 99Mo productions. Overall, most measurements were found to be shifted towards the reactor domain. The hypothesis is that this is due to an accumulation of the isotope 131mXe in the stack or atmospheric background as it has the longest half-life and extra 131mXe emissions from the decay of 131I. The contribution of older 131mXe to a fresh release shifts the ratio of 133mXe/131mXe to the left. It was also very interesting to note that there were some situations where isotopic ratios from 99Mo production emissions fell within the nuclear test domain. This is due to operational variability, such as shorter target irradiation times. Martin B. Kalinowski and Christoph Pistner, (2006), Isotopic signature of atmospheric xenon released from light water reactors, Journal of Environmental Radioactivity, 88, 215-235.

Signal Processing for Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Tests Recorded at IMS Stations Located in Israel

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gitterman, Y.; Pinsky, V.; Hofstetter, R.

- In compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) the International Monitoring System (IMS) was designed for detection and location of the clandestine Nuclear Tests (NT). Two auxiliary IMS seismic stations MRNI and EIL, deployed recently, were subjected to detectability, travel-time calibration and discrimination analysis. The study is based on the three recent 1998 underground nuclear explosions: one of India and two of Pakistan, which provided a ground-truth test of the existing IMS. These events, attaining magnitudes of 5.2, 4.8 and 4.6 correspondingly, were registered by many IMS and other seismic stations.The MRNI and EIL broadband (BB) stations are located in Israel at teleseismic distances (from the explosions) of 3600, 2800 and 2700km, respectively, where the signals from the tests are already weak. The Indian and the second Pakistan NT were not detected by the short-period Israel Seismic Network (ISN), using standard STA/LTA triggering. Therefore, for the chosen IMS stations we compare the STA/LTA response to the results of the more sensitive Murdock-Hutt (MH) and the Adaptive Statistically Optimal Detector (OD) that showed triggering for these three events. The second Pakistan NT signal arrived at the ISN and the IMS stations in the coda of a strong Afghanistan earthquake and was further disturbed by a preceding signal from a local earthquake. However, the NT signal was successfully extracted at EIL and MRNI stations using MH and OD procedures. For comparison we provide the signal analysis of the cooperating BB station JER, with considerably worse noise conditions than EIL and MRNI, and show that OD can detect events when the other algorithms fail. Using the most quiet EIL station, the most sensitive OD and different bandpass filters we tried in addition to detect the small Kazakh chemical 100-ton calibration explosion of 1998, with magnitude 3.7 at a distance approaching 4000km. The detector response curve showed uprising in the expected signal time interval, but yet was low for a reliable decision.After an NT is detected it should be recognized. Spectra were calculated in a 15-sec window including P and P-coda waves. The spectra for the first Pakistan NT showed a pronounced spectral null at 1.7Hz for all three components of the EIL station. The effect was confirmed by observation of the same spectral null at the vertical component of the ISN stations. For this ground-truth explosion with a reported shallow source depth, the phenomenon can be explained in terms of the interference of P and pP phases. However, the spectral null feature, considered separately, cannot serve as a reliable identification characteristic of nuclear explosions, because not all the tests provide the nulls, whereas some earthquakes show this feature. Therefore, the multi-channel spectral discrimination analysis, based on a spectral ratio of low-to-high frequency energy (in the 0.6-1Hz and 1-3Hz bands), and a semblance of spectral curves (in the 0.6-2Hz band), was conducted. Both statistics were calculated for the vertical component of the ISN stations as well for the three components of the EIL station. The statistics provided a reliable discrimination between the recent NT and several nearby earthquakes, and showed compliance with the former analysis of Soviet and Chinese NT, where nuclear tests demonstrated lower values of energy ratio and spectral semblance than earthquakes. Accurate location of NT requires calibration of travel time for IMS stations. Using known source locations, IASPEI91 travel-time tables and NEIC origin times we calculated expected arrival time for the P waves to the EIL and MRNI stations and showed that the measured arrival time has a delay of about 4 sec. Similar results were obtained for the nearby Pakistan earthquakes. The analysis was complimented by the P travel-time measurements for the set of Semipalatinsk NT, which showed delays of about 3.7sec to the short-period MBH station which is a surrogate station for EIL. Similar delays at different stations evidence a path- rather than site-effect. The results can be used for calibration of the IMS stations EIL and MRNI regarding Asian seismic events.

Intellectual Freedom and the National Laboratories : 2000 Sigma Xi Forum New Ethical Challenges in Science and Technology, November 9-10, 2000, Albuquerque, New Mexico"

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Browne, John C.

2001-01-01

As we move toward the 21st century, I believe the importance of the ethical system on which the scientific establishment, including the national laboratories, can build its contributions to society is becoming increasingly more important. Issues include the impact of the research we do, the trust we have between ourselves and the general public and the federal government, and the complexity of the problems that we work on. One of the most important roles that I see for research management in large institutions, like the national laboratories, is to create the appropriate environment for ethical behavior for all of itsmore » employees. Ethics and modern science demands that we create and live a set of shared values. As Bob Dynes pointed out this morning, we're not just talking about rules. We really must have values upon which we build and create the kind of behaviors we want to see. The major issue that I see in developing these shared values is that management and employees must jointly develop, socialize and live those shared values. In this session today, as I said, we want to explore the issues of intellectual freedom and ethical environment in government and the contracts under which the national laboratories operate. One of the laboratories is run by a nonprofit, the University of California, and the other is a paid-for-profit corporation. I don't know if there are any differences, depending on who the overseeing contractor is. I don't think there are, but it would be interesting to explore any differences we might see between the two. We have chosen the title 'Intellectual Freedom.' It's not academic freedom. Although, clearly, there are a lot of shared attributes between academic freedom and intellectual freedom. In our case, intellectual freedom allows our researchers to challenge technical decisions that are made by the laboratory, by the government or by their peers in their area of expertise, not in policy making, but in the scientific realm. It really does not permit them the freedom to roam at will outside of their areas of technical expertise into the realm of policy without clearly stating that their remarks are those of a private citizen and must be handled, therefore, outside of the laboratory business. This is a major issue within our laboratories, and I think one that we try to nurture very carefully, because without it, we think that there would be a closing up of laboratories because of the type of classified work that we do. The issues that I hope we might explore in this session include, (1) how do you give technical advice to a policymaker? Where do you draw the line with respect to your judgment, your advice versus your opinion, which can change how government attacks very significant societal problems: (2) The issue of security and classification. How does that affect the intellectual freedom of our staff? (3) Dealing with the public on matters of risk. I am going to add to that, also, dealing with our employees on matters of risk, because one of the things that we're finding as we get better with our detection technology and our screening technologies, we now find out about how employees might be susceptible to illnesses, such as berylliosis, problems with beryllium sensitivity. What ethical issues arise when you now have the ability to learn more about impacts on, not only the public, but your employees as well? We share similar types of problems that Bob Dynes mentioned: conflict of interest, intellectual property questions. And we also have the conflict of interest as an institution. And I'll just mention one--perhaps it could come up in the discussion-is in the past year we had an issue with respect to how the Congress and the Administration handled the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. What kind of eihical issues arise in testing on our technical judgment regarding the CTBT versus institutional conflict of interest? Questions were raised. Were the laboratory directors simply protecting budgets or were they speaking out on technical matters in which they believe very strongly? So, I think we have many of these issues that come into play in our jobs every day. The security issues raised in the past year regarding Los Alamos were complicated, in my opinion, because of stories in the media that were not necessarily complete or accurate. They were also Complicated by the actions of the federal government in not allowing certain information to be made public because of ongoing litigation. So, it raised a lot of questions, and I think, in the next 5 to 10 years, the events of the past year or two will actually raise a lot of ethical questions about how people handle classified information, not just at the national laboratories, but in general. Not only the legal issues, but the ethical issues, the values associated with handling classified information.« less