An evolutionary game model for behavioral gambit of loyalists: Global awareness and risk-aversion

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Alfinito, E.; Barra, A.; Beccaria, M.; Fachechi, A.; Macorini, G.

2018-02-01

We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by indifference with respect to the game at all: their dynamics is designed to account for risk-aversion as an innovative behavioral gambit. From this point of view, the choice of this solitary strategy is enhanced when innovation starts, while is depressed when it becomes the majority option. This implies that the payoff matrix of the game becomes dependent on the global awareness of the agents measured by the relevance of the population of the indifferent players. The resulting dynamics is nontrivial with different kinds of phase transition depending on a few model parameters. The phase diagram is studied on regular as well as complex networks.

Analysis of the dynamics of multi-team Bertrand game with heterogeneous players

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ding, Zhanwen; Hang, Qinglan; Yang, Honglin

2011-06-01

In this article, we study the dynamics of a two-team Bertrand game with players having heterogeneous expectations. We study the equilibrium solutions and the conditions of their locally asymptotic stability. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate the complex behaviours of the proposed model of the Bertrand game. We demonstrate that some parameters of the model have great influence on the stability of Nash equilibrium and on the speed of convergence to Nash equilibrium. The chaotic behaviour of the model has been controlled by using feedback control method.

Development and application of coupled system dynamics and game theory: A dynamic water conflict resolution method.

PubMed

Zomorodian, Mehdi; Lai, Sai Hin; Homayounfar, Mehran; Ibrahim, Shaliza; Pender, Gareth

2017-01-01

Conflicts over water resources can be highly dynamic and complex due to the various factors which can affect such systems, including economic, engineering, social, hydrologic, environmental and even political, as well as the inherent uncertainty involved in many of these factors. Furthermore, the conflicting behavior, preferences and goals of stakeholders can often make such conflicts even more challenging. While many game models, both cooperative and non-cooperative, have been suggested to deal with problems over utilizing and sharing water resources, most of these are based on a static viewpoint of demand points during optimization procedures. Moreover, such models are usually developed for a single reservoir system, and so are not really suitable for application to an integrated decision support system involving more than one reservoir. This paper outlines a coupled simulation-optimization modeling method based on a combination of system dynamics (SD) and game theory (GT). The method harnesses SD to capture the dynamic behavior of the water system, utilizing feedback loops between the system components in the course of the simulation. In addition, it uses GT concepts, including pure-strategy and mixed-strategy games as well as the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) method, to find the optimum allocation decisions over available water in the system. To test the capability of the proposed method to resolve multi-reservoir and multi-objective conflicts, two different deterministic simulation-optimization models with increasing levels of complexity were developed for the Langat River basin in Malaysia. The later is a strategic water catchment that has a range of different stakeholders and managerial bodies, which are however willing to cooperate in order to avoid unmet demand. In our first model, all water users play a dynamic pure-strategy game. The second model then adds in dynamic behaviors to reservoirs to factor in inflow uncertainty and adjust the strategies for the reservoirs using the mixed-strategy game and Markov chain methods. The two models were then evaluated against three performance indices: Reliability, Resilience and Vulnerability (R-R-V). The results showed that, while both models were well capable of dealing with conflict resolution over water resources in the Langat River basin, the second model achieved a substantially improved performance through its ability to deal with dynamicity, complexity and uncertainty in the river system.

Development and application of coupled system dynamics and game theory: A dynamic water conflict resolution method

PubMed Central

Lai, Sai Hin; Homayounfar, Mehran; Ibrahim, Shaliza; Pender, Gareth

2017-01-01

Conflicts over water resources can be highly dynamic and complex due to the various factors which can affect such systems, including economic, engineering, social, hydrologic, environmental and even political, as well as the inherent uncertainty involved in many of these factors. Furthermore, the conflicting behavior, preferences and goals of stakeholders can often make such conflicts even more challenging. While many game models, both cooperative and non-cooperative, have been suggested to deal with problems over utilizing and sharing water resources, most of these are based on a static viewpoint of demand points during optimization procedures. Moreover, such models are usually developed for a single reservoir system, and so are not really suitable for application to an integrated decision support system involving more than one reservoir. This paper outlines a coupled simulation-optimization modeling method based on a combination of system dynamics (SD) and game theory (GT). The method harnesses SD to capture the dynamic behavior of the water system, utilizing feedback loops between the system components in the course of the simulation. In addition, it uses GT concepts, including pure-strategy and mixed-strategy games as well as the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) method, to find the optimum allocation decisions over available water in the system. To test the capability of the proposed method to resolve multi-reservoir and multi-objective conflicts, two different deterministic simulation-optimization models with increasing levels of complexity were developed for the Langat River basin in Malaysia. The later is a strategic water catchment that has a range of different stakeholders and managerial bodies, which are however willing to cooperate in order to avoid unmet demand. In our first model, all water users play a dynamic pure-strategy game. The second model then adds in dynamic behaviors to reservoirs to factor in inflow uncertainty and adjust the strategies for the reservoirs using the mixed-strategy game and Markov chain methods. The two models were then evaluated against three performance indices: Reliability, Resilience and Vulnerability (R-R-V). The results showed that, while both models were well capable of dealing with conflict resolution over water resources in the Langat River basin, the second model achieved a substantially improved performance through its ability to deal with dynamicity, complexity and uncertainty in the river system. PMID:29216200

Cyber Selection Test Research Effort for U.S. Army New Accessions

DTIC Science & Technology

2017-10-12

assessment game 3. Develop an operational version of the STA game which incorporates assessments from phase 1 and (through game -play) examines...3 more STA abilities •5 STA behaviors 4. Validate the system thinking assessment game in an operational setting C O M PL ET ED PL AN N ED Research...Information Identifies Elements of Systems Models Relationships Understands System Dynamics Evaluates & Revises Model Applies Understanding to Problem STA Game

Dynamic multipopulation and density dependent evolutionary games related to replicator dynamics. A metasimplex concept.

PubMed

Argasinski, Krzysztof

2006-07-01

This paper contains the basic extensions of classical evolutionary games (multipopulation and density dependent models). It is shown that classical bimatrix approach is inconsistent with other approaches because it does not depend on proportion between populations. The main conclusion is that interspecific proportion parameter is important and must be considered in multipopulation models. The paper provides a synthesis of both extensions (a metasimplex concept) which solves the problem intrinsic in the bimatrix model. It allows us to model interactions among any number of subpopulations including density dependence effects. We prove that all modern approaches to evolutionary games are closely related. All evolutionary models (except classical bimatrix approaches) can be reduced to a single population general model by a simple change of variables. Differences between classic bimatrix evolutionary games and a new model which is dependent on interspecific proportion are shown by examples.

Research on Bifurcation and Chaos in a Dynamic Mixed Game System with Oligopolies Under Carbon Emission Constraint

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ma, Junhai; Yang, Wenhui; Lou, Wandong

This paper establishes an oligopolistic game model under the carbon emission reduction constraint and investigates its complex characteristics like bifurcation and chaos. Two oligopolistic manufacturers comprise three mixed game models, aiming to explore the variation in the status of operating system as per the upgrading of benchmark reward-penalty mechanism. Firstly, we set up these basic models that are respectively distinguished with carbon emission quantity and study these models using different game methods. Then, we concentrate on one typical game model to further study the dynamic complexity of variations in the system status, through 2D bifurcation diagrams and 4D parameter adjustment features based on the bounded rationality scheme for price, and the adaptive scheme for carbon emission. The results show that the carbon emission constraint has significant influence on the status variation of two-oligopolistic game operating systems no matter whether it is stable or chaotic. Besides, the new carbon emission regulation meets government supervision target and achieves the goal of being environment friendly by motivating the system to operate with lower carbon emission.

Bipartite graphs as models of population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games.

PubMed

Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

2012-01-01

By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, "games on graphs" study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner's dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner's dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures.

Evolutionary Games with Randomly Changing Payoff Matrices

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yakushkina, Tatiana; Saakian, David B.; Bratus, Alexander; Hu, Chin-Kun

2015-06-01

Evolutionary games are used in various fields stretching from economics to biology. In most of these games a constant payoff matrix is assumed, although some works also consider dynamic payoff matrices. In this article we assume a possibility of switching the system between two regimes with different sets of payoff matrices. Potentially such a model can qualitatively describe the development of bacterial or cancer cells with a mutator gene present. A finite population evolutionary game is studied. The model describes the simplest version of annealed disorder in the payoff matrix and is exactly solvable at the large population limit. We analyze the dynamics of the model, and derive the equations for both the maximum and the variance of the distribution using the Hamilton-Jacobi equation formalism.

Co-Evolution of Opinion and Strategy in Persuasion Dynamics:. AN Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ding, Fei; Liu, Yun; Li, Yong

In this paper, a new model of opinion formation within the framework of evolutionary game theory is presented. The model simulates strategic situations when people are in opinion discussion. Heterogeneous agents adjust their behaviors to the environment during discussions, and their interacting strategies evolve together with opinions. In the proposed game, we take into account payoff discount to join a discussion, and the situation that people might drop out of an unpromising game. Analytical and emulational results show that evolution of opinion and strategy always tend to converge, with utility threshold, memory length, and decision uncertainty parameters influencing the convergence time. The model displays different dynamical regimes when we set differently the rule when people are at a loss in strategy.

Traffic Games: Modeling Freeway Traffic with Game Theory

PubMed Central

Cortés-Berrueco, Luis E.; Gershenson, Carlos; Stephens, Christopher R.

2016-01-01

We apply game theory to a vehicular traffic model to study the effect of driver strategies on traffic flow. The resulting model inherits the realistic dynamics achieved by a two-lane traffic model and aims to incorporate phenomena caused by driver-driver interactions. To achieve this goal, a game-theoretic description of driver interaction was developed. This game-theoretic formalization allows one to model different lane-changing behaviors and to keep track of mobility performance. We simulate the evolution of cooperation, traffic flow, and mobility performance for different modeled behaviors. The analysis of these results indicates a mobility optimization process achieved by drivers’ interactions. PMID:27855176

Traffic Games: Modeling Freeway Traffic with Game Theory.

PubMed

Cortés-Berrueco, Luis E; Gershenson, Carlos; Stephens, Christopher R

2016-01-01

We apply game theory to a vehicular traffic model to study the effect of driver strategies on traffic flow. The resulting model inherits the realistic dynamics achieved by a two-lane traffic model and aims to incorporate phenomena caused by driver-driver interactions. To achieve this goal, a game-theoretic description of driver interaction was developed. This game-theoretic formalization allows one to model different lane-changing behaviors and to keep track of mobility performance. We simulate the evolution of cooperation, traffic flow, and mobility performance for different modeled behaviors. The analysis of these results indicates a mobility optimization process achieved by drivers' interactions.

Games of multicellularity.

PubMed

Kaveh, Kamran; Veller, Carl; Nowak, Martin A

2016-08-21

Evolutionary game dynamics are often studied in the context of different population structures. Here we propose a new population structure that is inspired by simple multicellular life forms. In our model, cells reproduce but can stay together after reproduction. They reach complexes of a certain size, n, before producing single cells again. The cells within a complex derive payoff from an evolutionary game by interacting with each other. The reproductive rate of cells is proportional to their payoff. We consider all two-strategy games. We study deterministic evolutionary dynamics with mutations, and derive exact conditions for selection to favor one strategy over another. Our main result has the same symmetry as the well-known sigma condition, which has been proven for stochastic game dynamics and weak selection. For a maximum complex size of n=2 our result holds for any intensity of selection. For n≥3 it holds for weak selection. As specific examples we study the prisoner's dilemma and hawk-dove games. Our model advances theoretical work on multicellularity by allowing for frequency-dependent interactions within groups. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cognitive Modeling of Video Game Player User Experience

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Bohil, Corey J.; Biocca, Frank A.

2010-01-01

This paper argues for the use of cognitive modeling to gain a detailed and dynamic look into user experience during game play. Applying cognitive models to game play data can help researchers understand a player's attentional focus, memory status, learning state, and decision strategies (among other things) as these cognitive processes occurred throughout game play. This is a stark contrast to the common approach of trying to assess the long-term impact of games on cognitive functioning after game play has ended. We describe what cognitive models are, what they can be used for and how game researchers could benefit by adopting these methods. We also provide details of a single model - based on decision field theory - that has been successfUlly applied to data sets from memory, perception, and decision making experiments, and has recently found application in real world scenarios. We examine possibilities for applying this model to game-play data.

Dynamic Game Behavior of Retailers Considering the Quality of Substitute Products Based on Delay Decision

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bao, Binshuo; Ma, Junhai

2017-12-01

Motivated by the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road project, i.e. the Belt and Road (B&R), more goods will flow around the world. With this trading platform, people can buy products at relatively cheap prices, and it is easier for people to buy various goods. The quality and quantity of products thus attract more and more attention in the supply chains. This paper discusses the quantity decision by considering the product quality in parallel supply chains where two manufacturers produce substitute products and then sell them to their downstream retailers separately. In terms of the changing quantity, as well as the different quality, this paper establishes a dynamic game model to explore the dynamic behavior when the optimal profits of two retailers have been calculated. The dynamic behaviors of the system, such as stable region, bifurcation and chaos, strange attractors and the largest Lyapunov exponents (LLE) are analyzed. The effect of the quantity adjustment parameter on the stability of the supply chain system is investigated through numerical simulations. Furthermore, a dynamic game model is established based on the quality delay decision, to investigate the influence of the quality delay parameter on the dynamic game model and the profits. Finally, the optimal decisions are obtained and analyzed.

Bipartite Graphs as Models of Population Structures in Evolutionary Multiplayer Games

PubMed Central

Peña, Jorge; Rochat, Yannick

2012-01-01

By combining evolutionary game theory and graph theory, “games on graphs” study the evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent selection in population structures modeled as geographical or social networks. Networks are usually represented by means of unipartite graphs, and social interactions by two-person games such as the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Unipartite graphs have also been used for modeling interactions going beyond pairwise interactions. In this paper, we argue that bipartite graphs are a better alternative to unipartite graphs for describing population structures in evolutionary multiplayer games. To illustrate this point, we make use of bipartite graphs to investigate, by means of computer simulations, the evolution of cooperation under the conventional and the distributed N-person prisoner’s dilemma. We show that several implicit assumptions arising from the standard approach based on unipartite graphs (such as the definition of replacement neighborhoods, the intertwining of individual and group diversity, and the large overlap of interaction neighborhoods) can have a large impact on the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Our work provides a clear example of the importance of construction procedures in games on graphs, of the suitability of bigraphs and hypergraphs for computational modeling, and of the importance of concepts from social network analysis such as centrality, centralization and bipartite clustering for the understanding of dynamical processes occurring on networked population structures. PMID:22970237

Study on system dynamics of evolutionary mix-game models

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gou, Chengling; Guo, Xiaoqian; Chen, Fang

2008-11-01

Mix-game model is ameliorated from an agent-based MG model, which is used to simulate the real financial market. Different from MG, there are two groups of agents in Mix-game: Group 1 plays a majority game and Group 2 plays a minority game. These two groups of agents have different bounded abilities to deal with historical information and to count their own performance. In this paper, we modify Mix-game model by assigning the evolution abilities to agents: if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will copy the best strategies the other agent has; and agents will repeat such evolution at certain time intervals. Through simulations this paper finds: (1) the average winning rates of agents in Group 1 and the mean volatilities increase with the increases of the thresholds of Group 1; (2) the average winning rates of both groups decrease but the mean volatilities of system increase with the increase of the thresholds of Group 2; (3) the thresholds of Group 2 have greater impact on system dynamics than the thresholds of Group 1; (4) the characteristics of system dynamics under different time intervals of strategy change are similar to each other qualitatively, but they are different quantitatively; (5) As the time interval of strategy change increases from 1 to 20, the system behaves more and more stable and the performances of agents in both groups become better also.

Archetypal dynamics, emergent situations, and the reality game.

PubMed

Sulis, William

2010-07-01

The classical approach to the modeling of reality is founded upon its objectification. Although successful dealing with inanimate matter, objectification has proven to be much less successful elsewhere, sometimes to the point of paradox. This paper discusses an approach to the modeling of reality based upon the concept of process as formulated within the framework of archetypal dynamics. Reality is conceptualized as an intermingling of information-transducing systems, together with the semantic frames that effectively describe and ascribe meaning to each system, along with particular formal representations of same which constitute the archetypes. Archetypal dynamics is the study of the relationships between systems, frames and their representations and the flow of information among these different entities. In this paper a specific formal representation of archetypal dynamics using tapestries is given, and a dynamics is founded upon this representation in the form of a combinatorial game called a reality game. Some simple examples are presented.

Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size.

PubMed

McAvoy, Alex; Fraiman, Nicolas; Hauert, Christoph; Wakeley, John; Nowak, Martin A

2018-05-01

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a natural feature of such a model that cooperators enable survival, while defectors drive extinction. Although defectors are favored for any mixed population, random drift could lead to their elimination and the resulting pure-cooperator population could survive. On the other hand, if the defectors remain, then the population will quickly go extinct because the frequency of cooperators steadily declines and defectors alone cannot survive. In a mutation-selection model, we find that (i) a steady supply of cooperators can enable long-term population survival, provided selection is sufficiently strong, and (ii) selection can increase the abundance of cooperators but reduce their relative frequency. Thus, evolutionary game dynamics in populations with variable size generate a multifaceted notion of what constitutes a trait's long-term success. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Bacteria and game theory: the rise and fall of cooperation in spatially heterogeneous environments.

PubMed

Lambert, Guillaume; Vyawahare, Saurabh; Austin, Robert H

2014-08-06

One of the predictions of game theory is that cooperative behaviours are vulnerable to exploitation by selfish individuals, but this result seemingly contradicts the survival of cooperation observed in nature. In this review, we will introduce game theoretical concepts that lead to this conclusion and show how the spatial competition dynamics between microorganisms can be used to model the survival and maintenance of cooperation. In particular, we focus on how Escherichia coli bacteria with a growth advantage in stationary phase (GASP) phenotype maintain a proliferative phenotype when faced with overcrowding to gain a fitness advantage over wild-type populations. We review recent experimental approaches studying the growth dynamics of competing GASP and wild-type strains of E. coli inside interconnected microfabricated habitats and use a game theoretical approach to analyse the observed inter-species interactions. We describe how the use of evolutionary game theory and the ideal free distribution accurately models the spatial distribution of cooperative and selfish individuals in spatially heterogeneous environments. Using bacteria as a model system of cooperative and selfish behaviours may lead to a better understanding of the competition dynamics of other organisms-including tumour-host interactions during cancer development and metastasis.

Cognitive Aspects of Power in a Two-Level Game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Juvina, Ion; Lebiere, Christian; Martin, Jolie; Gonzalez, Cleotilde

The Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma with Intragroup Power Dynamics (IPD^2) is a new game paradigm for studying human behavior in conflict situations. IPD^2 adds the concept of intragroup power to an intergroup version of the standard Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We conducted an exploratory laboratory study in which individual human participants played the game against computer strategies of various complexities. We also developed a cognitive model of human decision making in this game. The model was run in place of the human participant under the same conditions as in the laboratory study. Results from the human study and the model simulations are presented and discussed, emphasizing the value of including intragroup power in game theoretic models of conflict.

Evolutionary dynamics of a smoothed war of attrition game.

PubMed

Iyer, Swami; Killingback, Timothy

2016-05-07

In evolutionary game theory the War of Attrition game is intended to model animal contests which are decided by non-aggressive behavior, such as the length of time that a participant will persist in the contest. The classical War of Attrition game assumes that no errors are made in the implementation of an animal׳s strategy. However, it is inevitable in reality that such errors must sometimes occur. Here we introduce an extension of the classical War of Attrition game which includes the effect of errors in the implementation of an individual׳s strategy. This extension of the classical game has the important feature that the payoff is continuous, and as a consequence admits evolutionary behavior that is fundamentally different from that possible in the original game. We study the evolutionary dynamics of this new game in well-mixed populations both analytically using adaptive dynamics and through individual-based simulations, and show that there are a variety of possible outcomes, including simple monomorphic or dimorphic configurations which are evolutionarily stable and cannot occur in the classical War of Attrition game. In addition, we study the evolutionary dynamics of this extended game in a variety of spatially and socially structured populations, as represented by different complex network topologies, and show that similar outcomes can also occur in these situations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

A study of the dynamics of multi-player games on small networks using territorial interactions.

PubMed

Broom, Mark; Lafaye, Charlotte; Pattni, Karan; Rychtář, Jan

2015-12-01

Recently, the study of structured populations using models of evolutionary processes on graphs has begun to incorporate a more general type of interaction between individuals, allowing multi-player games to be played among the population. In this paper, we develop a birth-death dynamics for use in such models and consider the evolution of populations for special cases of very small graphs where we can easily identify all of the population states and carry out exact analyses. To do so, we study two multi-player games, a Hawk-Dove game and a public goods game. Our focus is on finding the fixation probability of an individual from one type, cooperator or defector in the case of the public goods game, within a population of the other type. We compare this value for both games on several graphs under different parameter values and assumptions, and identify some interesting general features of our model. In particular there is a very close relationship between the fixation probability and the mean temperature, with high temperatures helping fitter individuals and punishing unfit ones and so enhancing selection, whereas low temperatures give a levelling effect which suppresses selection.

The Poisson model limits in NBA basketball: Complexity in team sports

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Martín-González, Juan Manuel; de Saá Guerra, Yves; García-Manso, Juan Manuel; Arriaza, Enrique; Valverde-Estévez, Teresa

2016-12-01

Team sports are frequently studied by researchers. There is presumption that scoring in basketball is a random process and that can be described using the Poisson Model. Basketball is a collaboration-opposition sport, where the non-linear local interactions among players are reflected in the evolution of the score that ultimately determines the winner. In the NBA, the outcomes of close games are often decided in the last minute, where fouls play a main role. We examined 6130 NBA games in order to analyze the time intervals between baskets and scoring dynamics. Most numbers of baskets (n) over a time interval (ΔT) follow a Poisson distribution, but some (e.g., ΔT = 10 s, n > 3) behave as a Power Law. The Poisson distribution includes most baskets in any game, in most game situations, but in close games in the last minute, the numbers of events are distributed following a Power Law. The number of events can be adjusted by a mixture of two distributions. In close games, both teams try to maintain their advantage solely in order to reach the last minute: a completely different game. For this reason, we propose to use the Poisson model as a reference. The complex dynamics will emerge from the limits of this model.

Evolutionary games in the multiverse.

PubMed

Gokhale, Chaitanya S; Traulsen, Arne

2010-03-23

Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts.

Dynamics of the minority game for patients

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kim, Kyungsik; Yoon, Seong-Min; Kul Yum, Myung

2004-12-01

We analyze the minority game for patients, and the results known from the minority game are applied to the patient problem consulted at the department of pediatric cardiology. We find numerically the standard deviation and the global efficiency, which is discussed similar to the El Farol bar problem. After the score equation and the scaled utility are introduced, the dynamical behavior of our model is discussed for particular strategies. Our results presented will be compared with recent numerical calculations.

Effects of adaptive dynamical linking in networked games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Zhihu; Li, Zhi; Wu, Te; Wang, Long

2013-10-01

The role of dynamical topologies in the evolution of cooperation has received considerable attention, as some studies have demonstrated that dynamical networks are much better than static networks in terms of boosting cooperation. Here we study a dynamical model of evolution of cooperation on stochastic dynamical networks in which there are no permanent partners to each agent. Whenever a new link is created, its duration is randomly assigned without any bias or preference. We allow the agent to adaptively adjust the duration of each link during the evolution in accordance with the feedback from game interactions. By Monte Carlo simulations, we find that cooperation can be remarkably promoted by this adaptive dynamical linking mechanism both for the game of pairwise interactions, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG), and for the game of group interactions, illustrated by the public goods game (PGG). And the faster the adjusting rate, the more successful the evolution of cooperation. We also show that in this context weak selection favors cooperation much more than strong selection does. What is particularly meaningful is that the prosperity of cooperation in this study indicates that the rationality and selfishness of a single agent in adjusting social ties can lead to the progress of altruism of the whole population.

Quantum-like dynamics of decision-making in prisoner's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Asano, Masanari; Basieva, Irina; Khrennikov, Andrei; Ohya, Masanori; Tanaka, Yoshiharu

2012-03-01

In cognitive psychology, some experiments of games were reported [1, 2, 3, 4], and these demonstrated that real players did not use the "rational strategy" provided by classical game theory. To discuss probabilities of such "irrational choice", recently, we proposed a decision-making model which is based on the formalism of quantum mechanics [5, 6, 7, 8]. In this paper, we briefly explain the above model and calculate the probability of irrational choice in several prisoner's dilemma (PD) games.

Designing an optimal software intensive system acquisition: A game theoretic approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Buettner, Douglas John

The development of schedule-constrained software-intensive space systems is challenging. Case study data from national security space programs developed at the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (USAF SMC) provide evidence of the strong desire by contractors to skip or severely reduce software development design and early defect detection methods in these schedule-constrained environments. The research findings suggest recommendations to fully address these issues at numerous levels. However, the observations lead us to investigate modeling and theoretical methods to fundamentally understand what motivated this behavior in the first place. As a result, Madachy's inspection-based system dynamics model is modified to include unit testing and an integration test feedback loop. This Modified Madachy Model (MMM) is used as a tool to investigate the consequences of this behavior on the observed defect dynamics for two remarkably different case study software projects. Latin Hypercube sampling of the MMM with sample distributions for quality, schedule and cost-driven strategies demonstrate that the higher cost and effort quality-driven strategies provide consistently better schedule performance than the schedule-driven up-front effort-reduction strategies. Game theory reasoning for schedule-driven engineers cutting corners on inspections and unit testing is based on the case study evidence and Austin's agency model to describe the observed phenomena. Game theory concepts are then used to argue that the source of the problem and hence the solution to developers cutting corners on quality for schedule-driven system acquisitions ultimately lies with the government. The game theory arguments also lead to the suggestion that the use of a multi-player dynamic Nash bargaining game provides a solution for our observed lack of quality game between the government (the acquirer) and "large-corporation" software developers. A note is provided that argues this multi-player dynamic Nash bargaining game also provides the solution to Freeman Dyson's problem, for a way to place a label of good or bad on systems.

Forgetfulness can help you win games.

PubMed

Burridge, James; Gao, Yu; Mao, Yong

2015-09-01

We present a simple game model where agents with different memory lengths compete for finite resources. We show by simulation and analytically that an instability exists at a critical memory length, and as a result, different memory lengths can compete and coexist in a dynamical equilibrium. Our analytical formulation makes a connection to statistical urn models, and we show that temperature is mirrored by the agent's memory. Our simple model of memory may be incorporated into other game models with implications that we briefly discuss.

Teaching physics with Angry Birds: exploring the kinematics and dynamics of the game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rodrigues, M.; Simeão Carvalho, P.

2013-07-01

In this paper, we present classroom strategies for teaching kinematics at middle and high school levels, using Rovio’s famous game Angry Birds and the video analyser software Tracker. We show how to take advantage of this entertaining video game, by recording appropriate motions of birds that students can explore by manipulating data, characterizing the red bird’s motion and fitting results to physical models. A dynamic approach is also addressed to link gravitational force to projectile trajectories.

Modeling Misbehavior in Cooperative Diversity: A Dynamic Game Approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir

2009-12-01

Cooperative diversity protocols are designed with the assumption that terminals always help each other in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where terminals may misbehave for selfish or malicious intentions. The presence of misbehaving terminals creates a social-dilemma where terminals exhibit uncertainty about the cooperative behavior of other terminals in the network. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a suboptimal Nash equilibrium where wireless terminals opt out of cooperation. Hence, without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigate effects of misbehavior, it is difficult to maintain a socially optimal cooperation. In this paper, we first examine effects of misbehavior assuming static game model and show that cooperation under existing cooperative protocols is characterized by a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Using evolutionary game dynamics we show that a small number of mutants can successfully invade a population of cooperators, which indicates that misbehavior is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Our main goal is to design a mechanism that would enable wireless terminals to select reliable partners in the presence of uncertainty. To this end, we formulate cooperative diversity as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show that the proposed dynamic game formulation satisfied the conditions for the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Market mechanism based on the endogenous changing of game types such as Minority-Majority games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ahn, Sanghyun; Lim, Gyuchang; Kim, Sooyong; Kim, Kyungsik

2010-03-01

In many social and biological systems agents simultaneously and adaptively compete for limited resources, thereby altering their environment. We propose a evolution function extending Minority-Majority Games that captures the competition between agents to make money. The dynamics changes the ratio of two types of boundedly rational traders, fundamentalists and chartists with the payoff function endogenously. In the previous game theories, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting opportunistically between the minority and the majority. And using a mixture of local bifurcation theory and numerical methods, there are possible bifurcation routes to complicated asset price dynamics, chaotic attractors. Hereby we improve the thinking logic of the atoms for attaching the dynamics to the market. This working shows that removing unrealistic features of the game theories leads to models which reproduce a behavior close to what is observed in real markets.

Dynamic probability of reinforcement for cooperation: Random game termination in the centipede game.

PubMed

Krockow, Eva M; Colman, Andrew M; Pulford, Briony D

2018-03-01

Experimental games have previously been used to study principles of human interaction. Many such games are characterized by iterated or repeated designs that model dynamic relationships, including reciprocal cooperation. To enable the study of infinite game repetitions and to avoid endgame effects of lower cooperation toward the final game round, investigators have introduced random termination rules. This study extends previous research that has focused narrowly on repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games by conducting a controlled experiment of two-player, random termination Centipede games involving probabilistic reinforcement and characterized by the longest decision sequences reported in the empirical literature to date (24 decision nodes). Specifically, we assessed mean exit points and cooperation rates, and compared the effects of four different termination rules: no random game termination, random game termination with constant termination probability, random game termination with increasing termination probability, and random game termination with decreasing termination probability. We found that although mean exit points were lower for games with shorter expected game lengths, the subjects' cooperativeness was significantly reduced only in the most extreme condition with decreasing computer termination probability and an expected game length of two decision nodes. © 2018 Society for the Experimental Analysis of Behavior.

Examining Game Design Features for Identity Exploration and Change

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Foster, Aroutis; Shah, Mamta

2016-01-01

This study used the Dynamic Systems Model of Role Identity (DSMRI) to examine the extent to which a game, Land Science, afforded identity change opportunities as exploration of science identities, science content knowledge, science confidence, action possibilities, and interest/valuing in an intentional manner. Analysis of the game and existing…

Seeing Change in Time: Video Games to Teach about Temporal Change in Scientific Phenomena

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Corredor, Javier; Gaydos, Matthew; Squire, Kurt

2014-06-01

This article explores how learning biological concepts can be facilitated by playing a video game that depicts interactions and processes at the subcellular level. Particularly, this article reviews the effects of a real-time strategy game that requires players to control the behavior of a virus and interact with cell structures in a way that resembles the actual behavior of biological agents. The evaluation of the video game presented here aims at showing that video games have representational advantages that facilitate the construction of dynamic mental models. Ultimately, the article shows that when video game's characteristics come in contact with expert knowledge during game design, the game becomes an excellent medium for supporting the learning of disciplinary content related to dynamic processes. In particular, results show that students who participated in a game-based intervention aimed at teaching biology described a higher number of temporal-dependent interactions as measured by the coding of verbal protocols and drawings than students who used texts and diagrams to learn the same topic.

Evolutionary game theory for physical and biological scientists. I. Training and validating population dynamics equations.

PubMed

Liao, David; Tlsty, Thea D

2014-08-06

Failure to understand evolutionary dynamics has been hypothesized as limiting our ability to control biological systems. An increasing awareness of similarities between macroscopic ecosystems and cellular tissues has inspired optimism that game theory will provide insights into the progression and control of cancer. To realize this potential, the ability to compare game theoretic models and experimental measurements of population dynamics should be broadly disseminated. In this tutorial, we present an analysis method that can be used to train parameters in game theoretic dynamics equations, used to validate the resulting equations, and used to make predictions to challenge these equations and to design treatment strategies. The data analysis techniques in this tutorial are adapted from the analysis of reaction kinetics using the method of initial rates taught in undergraduate general chemistry courses. Reliance on computer programming is avoided to encourage the adoption of these methods as routine bench activities.

Evolutionary games in the multiverse

PubMed Central

Gokhale, Chaitanya S.; Traulsen, Arne

2010-01-01

Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some of these games may, in fact, take place between a number of individuals and not just between two. Here we address one-shot games with multiple players. As long as we have only two strategies, many results from two-player games can be generalized to multiple players. For games with multiple players and more than two strategies, we show that statements derived for pairwise interactions no longer hold. For two-player games with any number of strategies there can be at most one isolated internal equilibrium. For any number of players with any number of strategies , there can be at most isolated internal equilibria. Multiplayer games show a great dynamical complexity that cannot be captured based on pairwise interactions. Our results hold for any game and can easily be applied to specific cases, such as public goods games or multiplayer stag hunts. PMID:20212124

Continuous model for the rock-scissors-paper game between bacteriocin producing bacteria.

PubMed

Neumann, Gunter; Schuster, Stefan

2007-06-01

In this work, important aspects of bacteriocin producing bacteria and their interplay are elucidated. Various attempts to model the resistant, producer and sensitive Escherichia coli strains in the so-called rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game had been made in the literature. The question arose whether there is a continuous model with a cyclic structure and admitting an oscillatory dynamics as observed in various experiments. The May-Leonard system admits a Hopf bifurcation, which is, however, degenerate and hence inadequate. The traditional differential equation model of the RSP-game cannot be applied either to the bacteriocin system because it involves positive interaction terms. In this paper, a plausible competitive Lotka-Volterra system model of the RSP game is presented and the dynamics generated by that model is analyzed. For the first time, a continuous, spatially homogeneous model that describes the competitive interaction between bacteriocin-producing, resistant and sensitive bacteria is established. The interaction terms have negative coefficients. In some experiments, for example, in mice cultures, migration seemed to be essential for the reinfection in the RSP cycle. Often statistical and spatial effects such as migration and mutation are regarded to be essential for periodicity. Our model gives rise to oscillatory dynamics in the RSP game without such effects. Here, a normal form description of the limit cycle and conditions for its stability are derived. The toxicity of the bacteriocin is used as a bifurcation parameter. Exact parameter ranges are obtained for which a stable (robust) limit cycle and a stable heteroclinic cycle exist in the three-species game. These parameters are in good accordance with the observed relations for the E. coli strains. The roles of growth rate and growth yield of the three strains are discussed. Numerical calculations show that the sensitive, which might be regarded as the weakest, can have the longest sojourn times.

Imitation dynamics of vaccine decision-making behaviours based on the game theory.

PubMed

Yang, Junyuan; Martcheva, Maia; Chen, Yuming

2016-01-01

Based on game theory, we propose an age-structured model to investigate the imitation dynamics of vaccine uptake. We first obtain the existence and local stability of equilibria. We show that Hopf bifurcation can occur. We also establish the global stability of the boundary equilibria and persistence of the disease. The theoretical results are supported by numerical simulations.

Large fluctuations in anti-coordination games on scale-free graphs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sabsovich, Daniel; Mobilia, Mauro; Assaf, Michael

2017-05-01

We study the influence of the complex topology of scale-free graphs on the dynamics of anti-coordination games (e.g. snowdrift games). These reference models are characterized by the coexistence (evolutionary stable mixed strategy) of two competing species, say ‘cooperators’ and ‘defectors’, and, in finite systems, by metastability and large-fluctuation-driven fixation. In this work, we use extensive computer simulations and an effective diffusion approximation (in the weak selection limit) to determine under which circumstances, depending on the individual-based update rules, the topology drastically affects the long-time behavior of anti-coordination games. In particular, we compute the variance of the number of cooperators in the metastable state and the mean fixation time when the dynamics is implemented according to the voter model (death-first/birth-second process) and the link dynamics (birth/death or death/birth at random). For the voter update rule, we show that the scale-free topology effectively renormalizes the population size and as a result the statistics of observables depend on the network’s degree distribution. In contrast, such a renormalization does not occur with the link dynamics update rule and we recover the same behavior as on complete graphs.

The replicator equation and other game dynamics

PubMed Central

Cressman, Ross; Tao, Yi

2014-01-01

The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then extended to other game dynamics for symmetric games (e.g., the best response dynamics and adaptive dynamics) and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. It is also extended to multiplayer, population, and asymmetric games. PMID:25024202

Agent-Based Models in Social Physics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Quang, Le Anh; Jung, Nam; Cho, Eun Sung; Choi, Jae Han; Lee, Jae Woo

2018-06-01

We review the agent-based models (ABM) on social physics including econophysics. The ABM consists of agent, system space, and external environment. The agent is autonomous and decides his/her behavior by interacting with the neighbors or the external environment with the rules of behavior. Agents are irrational because they have only limited information when they make decisions. They adapt using learning from past memories. Agents have various attributes and are heterogeneous. ABM is a non-equilibrium complex system that exhibits various emergence phenomena. The social complexity ABM describes human behavioral characteristics. In ABMs of econophysics, we introduce the Sugarscape model and the artificial market models. We review minority games and majority games in ABMs of game theory. Social flow ABM introduces crowding, evacuation, traffic congestion, and pedestrian dynamics. We also review ABM for opinion dynamics and voter model. We discuss features and advantages and disadvantages of Netlogo, Repast, Swarm, and Mason, which are representative platforms for implementing ABM.

The Effects of a Simulation Game on Mental Models about Organizational Systems

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Reese, Rebecca M.

2017-01-01

This mixed methods study was designed to uncover evidence of change to mental models about organizational systems resulting from participation in a simulation game that is based on a system dynamics model. Thirty participants in a 2 day experiential workshop completed a pretest and posttest to assess learning about particular systems concepts.…

The development of video game enjoyment in a role playing game.

PubMed

Wirth, Werner; Ryffel, Fabian; von Pape, Thilo; Karnowski, Veronika

2013-04-01

This study examines the development of video game enjoyment over time. The results of a longitudinal study (N=62) show that enjoyment increases over several sessions. Moreover, results of a multilevel regression model indicate a causal link between the dependent variable video game enjoyment and the predictor variables exploratory behavior, spatial presence, competence, suspense and solution, and simulated experiences of life. These findings are important for video game research because they reveal the antecedents of video game enjoyment in a real-world longitudinal setting. Results are discussed in terms of the dynamics of video game enjoyment under real-world conditions.

Games of life and death: antibiotic resistance and production through the lens of evolutionary game theory.

PubMed

Conlin, Peter L; Chandler, Josephine R; Kerr, Benjamin

2014-10-01

In this review, we demonstrate how game theory can be a useful first step in modeling and understanding interactions among bacteria that produce and resist antibiotics. We introduce the basic features of evolutionary game theory and explore model microbial systems that correspond to some classical games. Each game discussed defines a different category of social interaction with different resulting population dynamics (exclusion, coexistence, bistability, cycling). We then explore how the framework can be extended to incorporate some of the complexity of natural microbial communities. Overall, the game theoretical perspective helps to guide our expectations about the evolution of some forms of antibiotic resistance and production because it makes clear the precise nature of social interaction in this context. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Foraging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic games.

PubMed

Özgüler, Arif Bülent; Yildiz, Aykut

2014-06-01

The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium under two different foraging location specifications, and both equilibria display many features of a foraging swarm behavior observed in biological swarms. Explicit expressions are derived for pairwise distances between individuals of the swarm, swarm size, and swarm center location during foraging.

Competition-Driven Network Dynamics: Emergence of a Scale-Free Leadership Structure and Collective Efficiency

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Anghel, M.; Toroczkai, Zoltán; Bassler, Kevin E.; Korniss, G.

2004-02-01

Using the minority game as a model for competition dynamics, we investigate the effects of interagent communications across a network on the global evolution of the game. Agent communication across this network leads to the formation of an influence network, which is dynamically coupled to the evolution of the game, and it is responsible for the information flow driving the agents' actions. We show that the influence network spontaneously develops hubs with a broad distribution of in-degrees, defining a scale-free robust leadership structure. Furthermore, in realistic parameter ranges, facilitated by information exchange on the network, agents can generate a high degree of cooperation making the collective almost maximally efficient.

Review of game theory applications for situation awareness

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Blasch, Erik; Shen, Dan; Pham, Khanh D.; Chen, Genshe

2015-05-01

Game theoretical methods have been used for spectral awareness, space situational awareness (SSA), cyber situational awareness (CSA), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance situation awareness (ISA). Each of these cases, awareness is supported by sensor estimation for assessment and the situation is determined from the actions of multiple players. Game theory assumes rational actors in a defined scenario; however, variations in social, cultural and behavioral factors include the dynamic nature of the context. In a dynamic data-driven application system (DDDAS), modeling must include both the measurements but also how models are used by different actors with different priorities. In this paper, we highlight the applications of game theory by reviewing the literature to determine the current state of the art and future needs. Future developments would include building towards knowledge awareness with information technology (e.g., data aggregation, access, indexing); multiscale analysis (e.g., space, time, and frequency), and software methods (e.g., architectures, cloud computing, protocols).

Game-theoretic equilibrium analysis applications to deregulated electricity markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Joung, Manho

This dissertation examines game-theoretic equilibrium analysis applications to deregulated electricity markets. In particular, three specific applications are discussed: analyzing the competitive effects of ownership of financial transmission rights, developing a dynamic game model considering the ramp rate constraints of generators, and analyzing strategic behavior in electricity capacity markets. In the financial transmission right application, an investigation is made of how generators' ownership of financial transmission rights may influence the effects of the transmission lines on competition. In the second application, the ramp rate constraints of generators are explicitly modeled using a dynamic game framework, and the equilibrium is characterized as the Markov perfect equilibrium. Finally, the strategic behavior of market participants in electricity capacity markets is analyzed and it is shown that the market participants may exaggerate their available capacity in a Nash equilibrium. It is also shown that the more conservative the independent system operator's capacity procurement, the higher the risk of exaggerated capacity offers.

Evaluation of the Efficacy of Simulation Games in Traffic Safety Education of Kindergarten Children.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Renaud, Lise; Suissa, Samy

1989-01-01

Uses a post-test-only control group study to evaluate the effect of three different types of simulation games used to teach traffic safety to kindergarten students. Results suggest that games including role-playing/group dynamics and modeling/training can change attitudes and modify behavior with this age group. (FMW)

Dynamic game balancing implementation using adaptive algorithm in mobile-based Safari Indonesia game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yuniarti, Anny; Nata Wardanie, Novita; Kuswardayan, Imam

2018-03-01

In developing a game there is one method that should be applied to maintain the interest of players, namely dynamic game balancing. Dynamic game balancing is a process to match a player’s playing style with the behaviour, attributes, and game environment. This study applies dynamic game balancing using adaptive algorithm in scrolling shooter game type called Safari Indonesia which developed using Unity. The game of this type is portrayed by a fighter aircraft character trying to defend itself from insistent enemy attacks. This classic game is chosen to implement adaptive algorithms because it has quite complex attributes to be developed using dynamic game balancing. Tests conducted by distributing questionnaires to a number of players indicate that this method managed to reduce frustration and increase the pleasure factor in playing.

On the preservation of cooperation in two-strategy games with nonlocal interactions.

PubMed

Aydogmus, Ozgur; Zhou, Wen; Kang, Yun

2017-03-01

Nonlocal interactions such as spatial interaction are ubiquitous in nature and may alter the equilibrium in evolutionary dynamics. Models including nonlocal spatial interactions can provide a further understanding on the preservation and emergence of cooperation in evolutionary dynamics. In this paper, we consider a variety of two-strategy evolutionary spatial games with nonlocal interactions based on an integro-differential replicator equation. By defining the invasion speed and minimal traveling wave speed for the derived model, we study the effects of the payoffs, the selection pressure and the spatial parameter on the preservation of cooperation. One of our most interesting findings is that, for the Prisoners Dilemma games in which the defection is the only evolutionary stable strategy for unstructured populations, analyses on its asymptotic speed of propagation suggest that, in contrast with spatially homogeneous games, the cooperators can invade the habitat under proper conditions. Other two-strategy evolutionary spatial games are also explored. Both our theoretical and numerical studies show that the nonlocal spatial interaction favors diversity in strategies in a population and is able to preserve cooperation in a competing environment. A real data application in a virus mutation study echoes our theoretical observations. In addition, we compare the results of our model to the partial differential equation approach to demonstrate the importance of including non-local interaction component in evolutionary game models. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Cognitive Model of Trust Dynamics Predicts Human Behavior within and between Two Games of Strategic Interaction with Computerized Confederate Agents

PubMed Central

Collins, Michael G.; Juvina, Ion; Gluck, Kevin A.

2016-01-01

When playing games of strategic interaction, such as iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and iterated Chicken Game, people exhibit specific within-game learning (e.g., learning a game's optimal outcome) as well as transfer of learning between games (e.g., a game's optimal outcome occurring at a higher proportion when played after another game). The reciprocal trust players develop during the first game is thought to mediate transfer of learning effects. Recently, a computational cognitive model using a novel trust mechanism has been shown to account for human behavior in both games, including the transfer between games. We present the results of a study in which we evaluate the model's a priori predictions of human learning and transfer in 16 different conditions. The model's predictive validity is compared against five model variants that lacked a trust mechanism. The results suggest that a trust mechanism is necessary to explain human behavior across multiple conditions, even when a human plays against a non-human agent. The addition of a trust mechanism to the other learning mechanisms within the cognitive architecture, such as sequence learning, instance-based learning, and utility learning, leads to better prediction of the empirical data. It is argued that computational cognitive modeling is a useful tool for studying trust development, calibration, and repair. PMID:26903892

A game dynamic model for delayer strategies in vaccinating behaviour for pediatric infectious diseases.

PubMed

Bhattacharyya, Samit; Bauch, C T

2010-12-07

Several studies have found that some parents delay the age at which their children receive pediatric vaccines due to perception of higher vaccine risk at the recommended age of vaccination. This has been particularly apparently during the Measles-Mumps-Rubella scare in the United Kingdom. Under a voluntary vaccination policy, vaccine coverage in certain age groups is a potentially complex interplay between vaccinating behaviour, disease dynamics, and age-specific risk factors. Here, we construct an age-structured game dynamic model, where individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to imitation dynamics depending on age-dependent disease prevalence and perceived risk of vaccination. Individuals may be timely vaccinators, delayers, or non-vaccinators. The model exhibits multiple equilibria and a broad range of possible dynamics. For certain parameter regimes, the proportion of timely vaccinators and delayers oscillate in an anti-phase fashion in response to oscillations in infection prevalence. Under an exogenous change to the perceived risk of vaccination as might occur during a vaccine scare, the model can also capture an increase in delayer strategists similar in magnitude to that observed during the Measles-Mumps-Rubella vaccine scare in the United Kingdom. Our model also shows that number of delayers steadily increases with increasing severity of the scare, whereas it saturates to specific value with increases in duration of the scare. Finally, by comparing the model dynamics with and without the option of a delayer strategy, we show that adding a third delayer strategy can have a stabilizing effect on model dynamics. In an era where individual choice--rather than accessibility--is becoming an increasingly important determinant of vaccine uptake, more infectious disease models may need to use game theory or related techniques to determine vaccine uptake. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Modelling the host-pathogen interactions of macrophages and Candida albicans using Game Theory and dynamic optimization.

PubMed

Dühring, Sybille; Ewald, Jan; Germerodt, Sebastian; Kaleta, Christoph; Dandekar, Thomas; Schuster, Stefan

2017-07-01

The release of fungal cells following macrophage phagocytosis, called non-lytic expulsion, is reported for several fungal pathogens. On one hand, non-lytic expulsion may benefit the fungus in escaping the microbicidal environment of the phagosome. On the other hand, the macrophage could profit in terms of avoiding its own lysis and being able to undergo proliferation. To analyse the causes of non-lytic expulsion and the relevance of macrophage proliferation in the macrophage- Candida albicans interaction, we employ Evolutionary Game Theory and dynamic optimization in a sequential manner. We establish a game-theoretical model describing the different strategies of the two players after phagocytosis. Depending on the parameter values, we find four different Nash equilibria and determine the influence of the systems state of the host upon the game. As our Nash equilibria are a direct consequence of the model parameterization, we can depict several biological scenarios. A parameter region, where the host response is robust against the fungal infection, is determined. We further apply dynamic optimization to analyse whether macrophage mitosis is relevant in the host-pathogen interaction of macrophages and C. albicans For this, we study the population dynamics of the macrophage- C. albicans interactions and the corresponding optimal controls for the macrophages, indicating the best macrophage strategy of switching from proliferation to attacking fungal cells. © 2017 The Author(s).

Dynamics in atomic signaling games.

PubMed

Fox, Michael J; Touri, Behrouz; Shamma, Jeff S

2015-07-07

We study an atomic signaling game under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. There are a finite number of players who repeatedly update from a finite number of available languages/signaling strategies. Players imitate the most fit agents with high probability or mutate with low probability. We analyze the long-run distribution of states and show that, for sufficiently small mutation probability, its support is limited to efficient communication systems. We find that this behavior is insensitive to the particular choice of evolutionary dynamic, a property that is due to the game having a potential structure with a potential function corresponding to average fitness. Consequently, the model supports conclusions similar to those found in the literature on language competition. That is, we show that efficient languages eventually predominate the society while reproducing the empirical phenomenon of linguistic drift. The emergence of efficiency in the atomic case can be contrasted with results for non-atomic signaling games that establish the non-negligible possibility of convergence, under replicator dynamics, to states of unbounded efficiency loss. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Propagation, cascades, and agreement dynamics in complex communication and social networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lu, Qiming

Many modern and important technological, social, information and infrastructure systems can be viewed as complex systems with a large number of interacting components. Models of complex networks and dynamical interactions, as well as their applications are of fundamental interests in many aspects. Here, several stylized models of multiplex propagation and opinion dynamics are investigated on complex and empirical social networks. We first investigate cascade dynamics in threshold-controlled (multiplex) propagation on random geometric networks. We find that such local dynamics can serve as an efficient, robust, and reliable prototypical activation protocol in sensor networks in responding to various alarm scenarios. We also consider the same dynamics on a modified network by adding a few long-range communication links, resulting in a small-world network. We find that such construction can further enhance and optimize the speed of the network's response, while keeping energy consumption at a manageable level. We also investigate a prototypical agent-based model, the Naming Game, on two-dimensional random geometric networks. The Naming Game [A. Baronchelli et al., J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. (2006) P06014.] is a minimal model, employing local communications that captures the emergence of shared communication schemes (languages) in a population of autonomous semiotic agents. Implementing the Naming Games with local broadcasts on random geometric graphs, serves as a model for agreement dynamics in large-scale, autonomously operating wireless sensor networks. Further, it captures essential features of the scaling properties of the agreement process for spatially-embedded autonomous agents. Among the relevant observables capturing the temporal properties of the agreement process, we investigate the cluster-size distribution and the distribution of the agreement times, both exhibiting dynamic scaling. We also present results for the case when a small density of long-range communication links are added on top of the random geometric graph, resulting in a "small-world"-like network and yielding a significantly reduced time to reach global agreement. We construct a finite-size scaling analysis for the agreement times in this case. When applying the model of Naming Game on empirical social networks, this stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of autonomous agents, corresponding to the development of shared classification schemes in a network of artificial agents or opinion spreading and social dynamics in social networks. Our study focuses on the impact that communities in the underlying social graphs have on the outcome of the agreement process. We find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely. Further, we investigate agent-based network strategies to facilitate convergence to global consensus.

A bargaining game analysis of international climate negotiations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Smead, Rory; Sandler, Ronald L.; Forber, Patrick; Basl, John

2014-06-01

Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to possible positive outcomes--that is, agreements with the requisite emissions reduction commitments. Other work on large-scale social dilemmas suggests that it should be possible to resolve the climate problem. It therefore seems that equilibrium selection may be a barrier to successful negotiations. Here we use an N-player bargaining game in an agent-based model with learning dynamics to examine the past failures of and future prospects for a robust international climate agreement. The model suggests reasons why the desirable solutions identified in previous game-theoretic models have not yet been accomplished in practice and what mechanisms might be used to achieve these solutions.

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game.

PubMed

Rand, David G; Nowak, Martin A

2012-05-07

Classical economic models make behavioral predictions based on the assumption that people are fully rational and care only about maximizing their own payoffs. Although this approach successfully explains human behavior in many situations, there is a wealth of experimental evidence demonstrating conditions where people deviate from the predictions of these models. One setting that has received particular attention is fixed length repeated games. Iterating a social dilemma can promote cooperation through direct reciprocity, even if it is common knowledge that all players are rational and self-interested. However, this is not the case if the length of the game is known to the players. In the final round, a rational player will defect, because there is no future to be concerned with. But if you know the other player will defect in the last round, then you should defect in the second to last round, and so on. This logic of backwards induction leads to immediate defection as the only rational (sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium) strategy. When people actually play such games, however, immediate defection is rare. Here we use evolutionary dynamics in finite populations to study the centipede game, which is designed to explore this issue of backwards induction. We make the following observation: since full cooperation can risk-dominate immediate defection in the centipede game, stochastic evolutionary dynamics can favor both delayed defection and even full cooperation. Furthermore, our evolutionary model can quantitatively reproduce human behavior from two experiments by fitting a single free parameter, which is the product of population size and selection intensity. Thus we provide evidence that people's cooperative behavior in fixed length games, which is often called 'irrational', may in fact be the favored outcome of natural selection. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Physics of cancer propagation: A game theory perspective

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cleveland, Chris; Liao, David; Austin, Robert

2012-03-01

This is a theoretical paper which examines at a game theoretical perspective the dynamics of cooperators and cheater cells under metabolic stress conditions and high spatial heterogeneity. Although the ultimate aim of this work is to understand the dynamics of cancer tumor evolution under stress, we use a simple bacterial model to gain fundamental insights into the progression of resistance to drugs under high competition and stress conditions.

From Tabletop RPG to Interactive Storytelling: Definition of a Story Manager for Videogames

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Delmas, Guylain; Champagnat, Ronan; Augeraud, Michel

Adding narrative in computer game is complicated because it may restrict player interactivity. Our aim is to design a controller that dynamically built a plot, through the game execution, centred on player's actions. Tabletop Role-playing games manage to deal with this goal. This paper presents a study of role-playing games, their organization, and the models commonly used for narrative generation. It then deduces a proposition of components and data structures for interactive storytelling in videogames. A prototype of a social game has been developed as example.

Coupled replicator equations for the dynamics of learning in multiagent systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sato, Yuzuru; Crutchfield, James P.

2003-01-01

Starting with a group of reinforcement-learning agents we derive coupled replicator equations that describe the dynamics of collective learning in multiagent systems. We show that, although agents model their environment in a self-interested way without sharing knowledge, a game dynamics emerges naturally through environment-mediated interactions. An application to rock-scissors-paper game interactions shows that the collective learning dynamics exhibits a diversity of competitive and cooperative behaviors. These include quasiperiodicity, stable limit cycles, intermittency, and deterministic chaos—behaviors that should be expected in heterogeneous multiagent systems described by the general replicator equations we derive.

Random and non-random mating populations: Evolutionary dynamics in meiotic drive.

PubMed

Sarkar, Bijan

2016-01-01

Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The model draws attention to the role of viability selections of different types to examine the stable nature of polymorphic equilibrium. A bridge between population genetics and evolutionary game theory has been built up by applying the concept of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. In addition to pointing out the influences of male and female segregation ratios on selection, configuration structure reveals some noted results, e.g., Hardy-Weinberg frequencies hold in replicator dynamics, occurrence of faster evolution at the maximized variance fitness, existence of mixed Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in asymmetric games, the tending evolution to follow not only a 1:1 sex ratio but also a 1:1 different alleles ratio at particular gene locus. Through construction of replicator dynamics in the group selection framework, our selection model introduces a redefining bases of game theory to incorporate non-random mating where a mating parameter associated with population structure is dependent on the social structure. Also, the model exposes the fact that the number of polymorphic equilibria will depend on the algebraic expression of population structure. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Adaptive Topographies and Equilibrium Selection in an Evolutionary Game

PubMed Central

Osinga, Hinke M.; Marshall, James A. R.

2015-01-01

It has long been known in the field of population genetics that adaptive topographies, in which population equilibria maximise mean population fitness for a trait regardless of its genetic bases, do not exist. Whether one chooses to model selection acting on a single locus or multiple loci does matter. In evolutionary game theory, analysis of a simple and general game involving distinct roles for the two players has shown that whether strategies are modelled using a single ‘locus’ or one ‘locus’ for each role, the stable population equilibria are unchanged and correspond to the fitness-maximising evolutionary stable strategies of the game. This is curious given the aforementioned population genetical results on the importance of the genetic bases of traits. Here we present a dynamical systems analysis of the game with roles detailing how, while the stable equilibria in this game are unchanged by the number of ‘loci’ modelled, equilibrium selection may differ under the two modelling approaches. PMID:25706762

Information Security Analysis Using Game Theory and Simulation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Schlicher, Bob G; Abercrombie, Robert K

Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic simulations of Agent Based Models (ABMs). Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. Our approach addresses imperfect information and scalability that allows us to also address previous limitations of current stochastic game models. Such models only consider perfect information assuming that the defender is always able to detect attacks; assuming that the state transition probabilities are fixed before the game assuming that the players actions aremore » always synchronous; and that most models are not scalable with the size and complexity of systems under consideration. Our use of ABMs yields results of selected experiments that demonstrate our proposed approach and provides a quantitative measure for realistic information systems and their related security scenarios.« less

ID201202961, DOE S-124,539, Information Security Analysis Using Game Theory and Simulation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Abercrombie, Robert K; Schlicher, Bob G

Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic simulations of Agent Based Models (ABMs). Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. Our approach addresses imperfect information and scalability that allows us to also address previous limitations of current stochastic game models. Such models only consider perfect information assuming that the defender is always able to detect attacks; assuming that the state transition probabilities are fixed before the game assuming that the players actions aremore » always synchronous; and that most models are not scalable with the size and complexity of systems under consideration. Our use of ABMs yields results of selected experiments that demonstrate our proposed approach and provides a quantitative measure for realistic information systems and their related security scenarios.« less

The coevolution of partner switching and strategy updating in non-excludable public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yixiao; Shen, Bin

2013-10-01

Spatial public goods game is a popular metaphor to model the dilemma of collective cooperation on graphs, yet the non-excludable property of public goods has seldom been considered in previous models. Based upon a coevolutionary model where agents play public goods games and adjust their partnerships, the present model incorporates the non-excludable property of public goods: agents are able to adjust their participation in the games hosted by others, whereas they cannot exclude others from their own games. In the coevolution, a directed and dynamical network which represents partnerships among autonomous agents is evolved. We find that non-excludable property counteracts the positive effect of partner switching, i.e., the equilibrium level of cooperation is lower than that in the situation of excludable public goods game. Therefore, we study the effect of individual punishment that cooperative agents pay a personal cost to decrease benefits of those defective neighbors who participate in their hosted games. It is found that the cooperation level in the whole population is heightened in the presence of such a costly behavior.

Imitation versus payoff: Duality of the decision-making process demonstrates criticality and consensus formation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Turalska, M.; West, B. J.

2014-11-01

We consider a dual model of decision making, in which an individual forms its opinion based on contrasting mechanisms of imitation and rational calculation. The decision-making model (DMM) implements imitating behavior by means of a network of coupled two-state master equations that undergoes a phase transition at a critical value of a control parameter. The evolutionary spatial game, being a generalization of the prisoner's dilemma game, is used to determine in objective fashion the cooperative or anticooperative strategy adopted by individuals. Interactions between two sources of dynamics increases the domain of initial states attracted to phase transition dynamics beyond that of the DMM network in isolation. Additionally, on average the influence of the DMM on the game increases the final observed fraction of cooperators in the system.

Exact probability distribution functions for Parrondo's games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zadourian, Rubina; Saakian, David B.; Klümper, Andreas

2016-12-01

We study the discrete time dynamics of Brownian ratchet models and Parrondo's games. Using the Fourier transform, we calculate the exact probability distribution functions for both the capital dependent and history dependent Parrondo's games. In certain cases we find strong oscillations near the maximum of the probability distribution with two limiting distributions for odd and even number of rounds of the game. Indications of such oscillations first appeared in the analysis of real financial data, but now we have found this phenomenon in model systems and a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. The method of our work can be applied to Brownian ratchets, molecular motors, and portfolio optimization.

The rock-paper-scissors game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhou, Hai-Jun

2016-04-01

Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a game of cyclic dominance, is not merely a popular children's game but also a basic model system for studying decision-making in non-cooperative strategic interactions. Aimed at students of physics with no background in game theory, this paper introduces the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable strategy, and reviews some recent theoretical and empirical efforts on the non-equilibrium properties of the iterated RPS, including collective cycling, conditional response patterns and microscopic mechanisms that facilitate cooperation. We also introduce several dynamical processes to illustrate the applications of RPS as a simplified model of species competition in ecological systems and price cycling in economic markets.

Exact probability distribution functions for Parrondo's games.

PubMed

Zadourian, Rubina; Saakian, David B; Klümper, Andreas

2016-12-01

We study the discrete time dynamics of Brownian ratchet models and Parrondo's games. Using the Fourier transform, we calculate the exact probability distribution functions for both the capital dependent and history dependent Parrondo's games. In certain cases we find strong oscillations near the maximum of the probability distribution with two limiting distributions for odd and even number of rounds of the game. Indications of such oscillations first appeared in the analysis of real financial data, but now we have found this phenomenon in model systems and a theoretical understanding of the phenomenon. The method of our work can be applied to Brownian ratchets, molecular motors, and portfolio optimization.

Dynamics of three-agent games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mungan, Muhittin; Rador, Tonguç

2008-02-01

We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers p, t and q denoting the probabilities that the team with the highest, middle or lowest accumulated score wins. The three-agent game can be regarded as a social model where a player can be favored or disfavored for advancement, based on his/her accumulated score. We study the full family of solutions in the regime, where the number of agents and competitions is large, which can be regarded as a hydrodynamic limit. Depending on the parameter values (p, q, t), we find six qualitatively different asymptotic score distributions and we provide a qualitative explanation of these results. We also compare our analytical results against numerical simulations of the microscopic model and find these to be in excellent agreement. It is possible to decide the outcome of a three-agent game through a mini-tournament of two-agent competitions among the participating players and it turns out that the resulting possible score distributions are a subset of those obtained for the general three-agent games. We discuss how one can add a steady and democratic decline rate to the model and present a simple geometric construction that allows one to obtain the score evolution equations for n-agent games.

Naming games in two-dimensional and small-world-connected random geometric networks.

PubMed

Lu, Qiming; Korniss, G; Szymanski, B K

2008-01-01

We investigate a prototypical agent-based model, the naming game, on two-dimensional random geometric networks. The naming game [Baronchelli, J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. (2006) P06014] is a minimal model, employing local communications that captures the emergence of shared communication schemes (languages) in a population of autonomous semiotic agents. Implementing the naming games with local broadcasts on random geometric graphs, serves as a model for agreement dynamics in large-scale, autonomously operating wireless sensor networks. Further, it captures essential features of the scaling properties of the agreement process for spatially embedded autonomous agents. Among the relevant observables capturing the temporal properties of the agreement process, we investigate the cluster-size distribution and the distribution of the agreement times, both exhibiting dynamic scaling. We also present results for the case when a small density of long-range communication links are added on top of the random geometric graph, resulting in a "small-world"-like network and yielding a significantly reduced time to reach global agreement. We construct a finite-size scaling analysis for the agreement times in this case.

Hierarchical Task Network Prototyping In Unity3d

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-06-01

visually debug. Here we present a solution for prototyping HTNs by extending an existing commercial implementation of Behavior Trees within the Unity3D game ...HTN, dynamic behaviors, behavior prototyping, agent-based simulation, entity-level combat model, game engine, discrete event simulation, virtual...commercial implementation of Behavior Trees within the Unity3D game engine prior to building the HTN in COMBATXXI. Existing HTNs were emulated within

Let Them Play: The Impact of Mechanics and Dynamics of a Serious Game on Student Perceptions of Learning Engagement

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wang, Yichuan; Rajan, Pramod; Sankar, Chetan S.; Raju, P. K.

2017-01-01

Serious games are becoming important educational tools and are increasingly being integrated into courses in many different academic areas and widely portrayed as a means of helping individuals concentrate on the subject matter and enjoy learning. This paper discusses the development and testing of a serious game by using a research model where…

Language competition in a population of migrating agents.

PubMed

Lipowska, Dorota; Lipowski, Adam

2017-05-01

Influencing various aspects of human activity, migration is associated also with language formation. To examine the mutual interaction of these processes, we study a Naming Game with migrating agents. The dynamics of the model leads to formation of low-mobility clusters, which turns out to break the symmetry of the model: although the Naming Game remains symmetric, low-mobility languages are favored. High-mobility languages are gradually eliminated from the system, and the dynamics of language formation considerably slows down. Our model is too simple to explain in detail language competition of migrating human communities, but it certainly shows that languages of settlers are favored over nomadic ones.

Language competition in a population of migrating agents

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lipowska, Dorota; Lipowski, Adam

2017-05-01

Influencing various aspects of human activity, migration is associated also with language formation. To examine the mutual interaction of these processes, we study a Naming Game with migrating agents. The dynamics of the model leads to formation of low-mobility clusters, which turns out to break the symmetry of the model: although the Naming Game remains symmetric, low-mobility languages are favored. High-mobility languages are gradually eliminated from the system, and the dynamics of language formation considerably slows down. Our model is too simple to explain in detail language competition of migrating human communities, but it certainly shows that languages of settlers are favored over nomadic ones.

Learning and dynamics in social systems. Comment on "Collective learning modeling based on the kinetic theory of active particles" by D. Burini et al.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dolfin, Marina

2016-03-01

The interesting novelty of the paper by Burini et al. [1] is that the authors present a survey and a new approach of collective learning based on suitable development of methods of the kinetic theory [2] and theoretical tools of evolutionary game theory [3]. Methods of statistical dynamics and kinetic theory lead naturally to stochastic and collective dynamics. Indeed, the authors propose the use of games where the state of the interacting entities is delivered by probability distributions.

Infusion of a Gaming Paradigm into Computer-Aided Engineering Design Tools

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-05-03

Virtual Test Bed (VTB), and the gaming tool, Unity3D . This hybrid gaming environment coupled a three-dimensional (3D) multibody vehicle system model...from Google Earth to the 3D visual front-end fabricated around Unity3D . The hybrid environment was sufficiently developed to support analyses of the...ndFr Cti3r4 G’OjrdFr ctior-2 The VTB simulation of the vehicle dynamics ran concurrently with and interacted with the gaming engine, Unity3D which

Modelling Market Dynamics with a "Market Game"

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Katahira, Kei; Chen, Yu

In the financial market, traders, especially speculators, typically behave as to yield capital gains by the difference between selling and buying prices. Making use of the structure of Minority Game, we build a novel market toy model which takes account of such the speculative mind involving a round-trip trade to analyze the market dynamics as a system. Even though the micro-level behavioral rules of players in this new model is quite simple, its macroscopic aggregational output has the reproducibility of the well-known stylized facts such as volatility clustering and heavy tails. The proposed model may become a new alternative bottom-up approach in order to study the emerging mechanism of those stylized qualitative properties of asset returns.

Stochastic stability in three-player games.

PubMed

Kamiński, Dominik; Miekisz, Jacek; Zaborowski, Marcin

2005-11-01

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently were evolutionarily stable strategies defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed [Broom, M., Cannings, C., Vickers, G.T., 1997. Multi-player matrix games. Bull. Math. Biol. 59, 931-952]. Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze the stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that, in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.

Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory

PubMed Central

Yeates, Jessica A. M.; Hilbe, Christian; Zwick, Martin; Nowak, Martin A.; Lehman, Niles

2016-01-01

Many origins-of-life scenarios depict a situation in which there are common and potentially scarce resources needed by molecules that compete for survival and reproduction. The dynamics of RNA assembly in a complex mixture of sequences is a frequency-dependent process and mimics such scenarios. By synthesizing Azoarcus ribozyme genotypes that differ in their single-nucleotide interactions with other genotypes, we can create molecules that interact among each other to reproduce. Pairwise interplays between RNAs involve both cooperation and selfishness, quantifiable in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix. We show that a simple model of differential equations based on chemical kinetics accurately predicts the outcomes of these molecular competitions using simple rate inputs into these matrices. In some cases, we find that mixtures of different RNAs reproduce much better than each RNA type alone, reflecting a molecular form of reciprocal cooperation. We also demonstrate that three RNA genotypes can stably coexist in a rock–paper–scissors analog. Our experiments suggest a new type of evolutionary game dynamics, called prelife game dynamics or chemical game dynamics. These operate without template-directed replication, illustrating how small networks of RNAs could have developed and evolved in an RNA world. PMID:27091972

Dynamics of prebiotic RNA reproduction illuminated by chemical game theory.

PubMed

Yeates, Jessica A M; Hilbe, Christian; Zwick, Martin; Nowak, Martin A; Lehman, Niles

2016-05-03

Many origins-of-life scenarios depict a situation in which there are common and potentially scarce resources needed by molecules that compete for survival and reproduction. The dynamics of RNA assembly in a complex mixture of sequences is a frequency-dependent process and mimics such scenarios. By synthesizing Azoarcus ribozyme genotypes that differ in their single-nucleotide interactions with other genotypes, we can create molecules that interact among each other to reproduce. Pairwise interplays between RNAs involve both cooperation and selfishness, quantifiable in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix. We show that a simple model of differential equations based on chemical kinetics accurately predicts the outcomes of these molecular competitions using simple rate inputs into these matrices. In some cases, we find that mixtures of different RNAs reproduce much better than each RNA type alone, reflecting a molecular form of reciprocal cooperation. We also demonstrate that three RNA genotypes can stably coexist in a rock-paper-scissors analog. Our experiments suggest a new type of evolutionary game dynamics, called prelife game dynamics or chemical game dynamics. These operate without template-directed replication, illustrating how small networks of RNAs could have developed and evolved in an RNA world.

Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review

PubMed Central

Perc, Matjaž; Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús; Szolnoki, Attila; Floría, Luis M.; Moreno, Yamir

2013-01-01

Interactions among living organisms, from bacteria colonies to human societies, are inherently more complex than interactions among particles and non-living matter. Group interactions are a particularly important and widespread class, representative of which is the public goods game. In addition, methods of statistical physics have proved valuable for studying pattern formation, equilibrium selection and self-organization in evolutionary games. Here, we review recent advances in the study of evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on top of structured populations, including lattices, complex networks and coevolutionary models. We also compare these results with those obtained on well-mixed populations. The review particularly highlights that the study of the dynamics of group interactions, like several other important equilibrium and non-equilibrium dynamical processes in biological, economical and social sciences, benefits from the synergy between statistical physics, network science and evolutionary game theory. PMID:23303223

Dynamic Stackelberg game model for water rationalization in drought emergency

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kicsiny, R.; Piscopo, V.; Scarelli, A.; Varga, Z.

2014-09-01

In water resource management, in case of a limited resource, there is a conflict situation between different consumers. In this paper, a dynamic game-theoretical model is suggested for the solution of such conflict. Let us suppose that in a region, water supply is based on a given aquifer, from which a quantity of effective reserve can be used without damaging the aquifer, and a long drought is foreseen. The use of water is divided between the social sector represented by the local authority, and the production sector, in our case, simplified to a single agricultural producer using water for irrigation; they are the players in the game. For a fixed time period, every day, a given amount is available, from which first the authority, then the producer takes a proportion, which corresponds to the strategy choices of the players. A price function is given, which depends on the total available reserve, the payoffs of both players are quantified as their net incomes for the whole period: for the producer: profit from selling the product minus price of water and tax paid, for the authority: tax received plus the gain for the authority from selling the water bought to the social sector minus price of water purchased. A solution (equilibrium) of the game consists of such strategy choices of both players, with which each player maximizes her/his total payoff (over the whole time horizon of the game) provided that the other player also maximizes her/his own payoff. In the paper, in a mathematical model for the above conflict situation, a deterministic continuum-strategy two-player discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game with fixed finite time duration and closed-loop information structure is proposed, where the authority is “leader” and the producer is “follower”. The algorithms for the solution of the game are based on recent theoretical results of the authors. Illustrative numerical examples are also given.

Fixation of strategies with the Moran and Fermi processes in evolutionary games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Xuesong; He, Mingfeng; Kang, Yibin; Pan, Qiuhui

2017-10-01

A model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite population was built. It combines the standard Moran and Fermi rules with two strategies cooperation and defection. We obtain the expressions of fixation probabilities and fixation times. The one-third rule which has been found in the frequency dependent Moran process also holds for our model. We obtain the conditions of strategy being an evolutionarily stable strategy in our model, and then make a comparison with the standard Moran process. Besides, the analytical results show that compared with the standard Moran process, fixation occurs with higher probabilities under a prisoner's dilemma game and coordination game, but with lower probabilities under a coexistence game. The simulation result shows that the fixation time in our mixed process is lower than that in the standard Fermi process. In comparison with the standard Moran process, fixation always takes more time on average in spatial populations, regardless of the game. In addition, the fixation time decreases with the growth of the number of neighbors.

Seven Modeling Perspectives on Teaching and Learning: Some Interrelations and Cognitive Effects

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Easley, J. A., Jr.

1977-01-01

The categories of models associated with the seven perspectives are designated as combinatorial models, sampling models, cybernetic models, game models, critical thinking models, ordinary language analysis models, and dynamic structural models. (DAG)

Game dynamic model for yeast development.

PubMed

Huang, Yuanyuan; Wu, Zhijun

2012-07-01

Game theoretic models, along with replicator equations, have been applied successfully to the study of evolution of populations of competing species, including the growth of a population, the reaching of the population to an equilibrium state, and the evolutionary stability of the state. In this paper, we analyze a game model proposed by Gore et al. (Nature 456:253-256, 2009) in their recent study on the co-development of two mixed yeast strains. We examine the mathematical properties of this model with varying experimental parameters. We simulate the growths of the yeast strains and compare them with the experimental results. We also compute and analyze the equilibrium state of the system and prove that it is asymptotically and evolutionarily stable.

Combinatorial games with a pass: a dynamical systems approach.

PubMed

Morrison, Rebecca E; Friedman, Eric J; Landsberg, Adam S

2011-12-01

By treating combinatorial games as dynamical systems, we are able to address a longstanding open question in combinatorial game theory, namely, how the introduction of a "pass" move into a game affects its behavior. We consider two well known combinatorial games, 3-pile Nim and 3-row Chomp. In the case of Nim, we observe that the introduction of the pass dramatically alters the game's underlying structure, rendering it considerably more complex, while for Chomp, the pass move is found to have relatively minimal impact. We show how these results can be understood by recasting these games as dynamical systems describable by dynamical recursion relations. From these recursion relations, we are able to identify underlying structural connections between these "games with passes" and a recently introduced class of "generic (perturbed) games." This connection, together with a (non-rigorous) numerical stability analysis, allows one to understand and predict the effect of a pass on a game.

Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zimmermann, Martín G.; Eguíluz, Víctor M.; San Miguel, Maxi

2004-06-01

We explore the coupled dynamics of the internal states of a set of interacting elements and the network of interactions among them. Interactions are modeled by a spatial game and the network of interaction links evolves adapting to the outcome of the game. As an example, we consider a model of cooperation in which the adaptation is shown to facilitate the formation of a hierarchical interaction network that sustains a highly cooperative stationary state. The resulting network has the characteristics of a small world network when a mechanism of local neighbor selection is introduced in the adaptive network dynamics. The highly connected nodes in the hierarchical structure of the network play a leading role in the stability of the network. Perturbations acting on the state of these special nodes trigger global avalanches leading to complete network reorganization.

Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mazzoli, M.; Sánchez, A.

2017-11-01

Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has addressed this issue by combining the physics of complex networks with a description of interactions in terms of evolutionary game theory. We here take this research a step further by introducing a most salient societal factor such as the individuals’ preferences, a characteristic that is key to understanding much of the social phenomenology these days. We consider a heterogeneous, agent-based model in which agents interact strategically with their neighbors, but their preferences and payoffs for the possible actions differ. We study how such a heterogeneous network behaves under evolutionary dynamics and different strategic interactions, namely coordination games and best shot games. With this model we study the emergence of the equilibria predicted analytically in random graphs under best response dynamics, and we extend this test to unexplored contexts like proportional imitation and scale free networks. We show that some theoretically predicted equilibria do not arise in simulations with incomplete information, and we demonstrate the importance of the graph topology and the payoff function parameters for some games. Finally, we discuss our results with the available experimental evidence on coordination games, showing that our model agrees better with the experiment than standard economic theories, and draw hints as to how to maximize social efficiency in situations of conflicting preferences.

An Institutional Mechanism for Assortment in an Ecology of Games

PubMed Central

Smaldino, Paul E.; Lubell, Mark

2011-01-01

Recent research has revived Long's “ecology of games” model to analyze how social actors cooperate in the context of multiple political and social games. However, there is still a paucity of theoretical work that considers the mechanisms by which large-scale cooperation can be promoted in a dynamic institutional landscape, in which actors can join new games and leave old ones. This paper develops an agent-based model of an ecology of games where agents participate in multiple public goods games. In addition to contribution decisions, the agents can leave and join different games, and these processes are de-coupled. We show that the payoff for cooperation is greater than for defection when limits to the number of actors per game (“capacity constraints”) structure the population in ways that allow cooperators to cluster, independent of any complex individual-level mechanisms such as reputation or punishment. Our model suggests that capacity constraints are one effective mechanism for producing positive assortment and increasing cooperation in an ecology of games. The results suggest an important trade-off between the inclusiveness of policy processes and cooperation: Fully inclusive policy processes reduce the chances of cooperation. PMID:21850249

Effects of diversity on multiagent systems: Minority games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wong, K. Y. Michael; Lim, S. W.; Gao, Zhuo

2005-06-01

We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. The games can be used to model economic markets, ecosystems, or distributed control. Diversity of initial preferences of strategies is introduced by randomly assigning biases to the strategies of different agents. We find that diversity among the agents reduces their maladaptive behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with diversity for the variance and other parameters such as the convergence time, the fraction of fickle agents, and the variance of wealth, illustrating their dynamical origin. When diversity increases, the scaling dynamics is modified by kinetic sampling and waiting effects. Analyses yield excellent agreement with simulations.

Stochastic Evolution Dynamic of the Rock-Scissors-Paper Game Based on a Quasi Birth and Death Process

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yu, Qian; Fang, Debin; Zhang, Xiaoling; Jin, Chen; Ren, Qiyu

2016-06-01

Stochasticity plays an important role in the evolutionary dynamic of cyclic dominance within a finite population. To investigate the stochastic evolution process of the behaviour of bounded rational individuals, we model the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game as a finite, state dependent Quasi Birth and Death (QBD) process. We assume that bounded rational players can adjust their strategies by imitating the successful strategy according to the payoffs of the last round of the game, and then analyse the limiting distribution of the QBD process for the game stochastic evolutionary dynamic. The numerical experiments results are exhibited as pseudo colour ternary heat maps. Comparisons of these diagrams shows that the convergence property of long run equilibrium of the RSP game in populations depends on population size and the parameter of the payoff matrix and noise factor. The long run equilibrium is asymptotically stable, neutrally stable and unstable respectively according to the normalised parameters in the payoff matrix. Moreover, the results show that the distribution probability becomes more concentrated with a larger population size. This indicates that increasing the population size also increases the convergence speed of the stochastic evolution process while simultaneously reducing the influence of the noise factor.

Stochastic Evolution Dynamic of the Rock-Scissors-Paper Game Based on a Quasi Birth and Death Process.

PubMed

Yu, Qian; Fang, Debin; Zhang, Xiaoling; Jin, Chen; Ren, Qiyu

2016-06-27

Stochasticity plays an important role in the evolutionary dynamic of cyclic dominance within a finite population. To investigate the stochastic evolution process of the behaviour of bounded rational individuals, we model the Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game as a finite, state dependent Quasi Birth and Death (QBD) process. We assume that bounded rational players can adjust their strategies by imitating the successful strategy according to the payoffs of the last round of the game, and then analyse the limiting distribution of the QBD process for the game stochastic evolutionary dynamic. The numerical experiments results are exhibited as pseudo colour ternary heat maps. Comparisons of these diagrams shows that the convergence property of long run equilibrium of the RSP game in populations depends on population size and the parameter of the payoff matrix and noise factor. The long run equilibrium is asymptotically stable, neutrally stable and unstable respectively according to the normalised parameters in the payoff matrix. Moreover, the results show that the distribution probability becomes more concentrated with a larger population size. This indicates that increasing the population size also increases the convergence speed of the stochastic evolution process while simultaneously reducing the influence of the noise factor.

Nonlinear zero-sum differential game analysis by singular perturbation methods

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Sinar, J.; Farber, N.

1982-01-01

A class of nonlinear, zero-sum differential games, exhibiting time-scale separation properties, can be analyzed by singular-perturbation techniques. The merits of such an analysis, leading to an approximate game solution, as well as the 'well-posedness' of the formulation, are discussed. This approach is shown to be attractive for investigating pursuit-evasion problems; the original multidimensional differential game is decomposed to a 'simple pursuit' (free-stream) game and two independent (boundary-layer) optimal-control problems. Using multiple time-scale boundary-layer models results in a pair of uniformly valid zero-order composite feedback strategies. The dependence of suboptimal strategies on relative geometry and own-state measurements is demonstrated by a three dimensional, constant-speed example. For game analysis with realistic vehicle dynamics, the technique of forced singular perturbations and a variable modeling approach is proposed. Accuracy of the analysis is evaluated by comparison with the numerical solution of a time-optimal, variable-speed 'game of two cars' in the horizontal plane.

Universal effect of dynamical reinforcement learning mechanism in spatial evolutionary games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Wang, Bing-Hong

2012-06-01

One of the prototypical mechanisms in understanding the ubiquitous cooperation in social dilemma situations is the win-stay, lose-shift rule. In this work, a generalized win-stay, lose-shift learning model—a reinforcement learning model with dynamic aspiration level—is proposed to describe how humans adapt their social behaviors based on their social experiences. In the model, the players incorporate the information of the outcomes in previous rounds with time-dependent aspiration payoffs to regulate the probability of choosing cooperation. By investigating such a reinforcement learning rule in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game and public goods game, a most noteworthy viewpoint is that moderate greediness (i.e. moderate aspiration level) favors best the development and organization of collective cooperation. The generality of this observation is tested against different regulation strengths and different types of network of interaction as well. We also make comparisons with two recently proposed models to highlight the importance of the mechanism of adaptive aspiration level in supporting cooperation in structured populations.

Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kleineberg, Kaj-Kolja; Helbing, Dirk

2018-05-01

Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoners dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics. Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in the harmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner’s dilemma. Here, we show that this is not always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In particular, we investigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an aggregate payoff. We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the different layers of the multiplex. We find that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and degree correlations are strong, the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and the final outcome, cooperation or defection, becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the system is then determined by the initial conditions.

Effect of the spatial autocorrelation of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Hui; Wang, Li; Hou, Dongshuang

2016-02-01

An evolutionary game model is constructed to investigate the spatial autocorrelation of empty sites on the evolution of cooperation. Each individual is assumed to imitate the strategy of the one who scores the highest in its neighborhood including itself. Simulation results illustrate that the evolutionary dynamics based on the Prisoner's Dilemma game (PD) depends severely on the initial conditions, while the Snowdrift game (SD) is hardly affected by that. A high degree of autocorrelation of empty sites is beneficial for the evolution of cooperation in the PD, whereas it shows diversification effects depending on the parameter of temptation to defect in the SD. Moreover, for the repeated game with three strategies, 'always defect' (ALLD), 'tit-for-tat' (TFT), and 'always cooperate' (ALLC), simulations reveal that an amazing evolutionary diversity appears for varying of parameters of the temptation to defect and the probability of playing in the next round of the game. The spatial autocorrelation of empty sites can have profound effects on evolutionary dynamics (equilibrium and oscillation) and spatial distribution.

Evolutionary game analysis and regulatory strategies for online group-buying based on system dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jiang, Zhong-Zhong; He, Na; Qin, Xuwei; Ip, W. H.; Wu, C. H.; Yung, K. L.

2018-07-01

The emergence of online group-buying provides a new consumption pattern for consumers in e-commerce era. However, many consumers realize that their own interests sometimes can't be guaranteed in the group-buying market due to the lack of being regulated. This paper aims to develop effective regulation strategies for online group-buying market. To the best of our knowledge, most existing studies assume that three parties in online group-buying market, i.e. the retailer, the group-buying platform and the consumer, are perfectly rational. To better understand the decision process, in this paper, we incorporate the concept of bounded rationality into consideration. Firstly, a three-parties evolutionary game model is established to study each player's game strategy based on bounded rationality. Secondly, the game model is simulated as a whole by adopting system dynamics to analyze its stability. Finally, theoretical analysis and extensive computational experiments are conducted to obtain the managerial insights and regulation strategies for online group-buying market. Our results clearly demonstrate that a suitable bonus-penalty measure can promote the healthy development of online group-buying market.

Concordance of Interests in Dynamic Models of Social Partnership in the System of Continuing Professional Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tarasenko, Larissa V.; Ougolnitsky, Guennady A.; Usov, Anatoly B.; Vaskov, Maksim A.; Kirik, Vladimir A.; Astoyanz, Margarita S.; Angel, Olga Y.

2016-01-01

A dynamic game theoretic model of concordance of interests in the process of social partnership in the system of continuing professional education is proposed. Non-cooperative, cooperative, and hierarchical setups are examined. Analytical solution for a linear state version of the model is provided. Nash equilibrium algorithms (for non-cooperative…

Causal tapestries for psychology and physics.

PubMed

Sulis, William H

2012-04-01

Archetypal dynamics is a formal approach to the modeling of information flow in complex systems used to study emergence. It is grounded in the Fundamental Triad of realisation (system), interpretation (archetype) and representation (formal model). Tapestries play a fundamental role in the framework of archetypal dynamics as a formal representational system. They represent information flow by means of multi layered, recursive, interlinked graphical structures that express both geometry (form or sign) and logic (semantics). This paper presents a detailed mathematical description of a specific tapestry model, the causal tapestry, selected for use in describing behaving systems such as appear in psychology and physics from the standpoint of Process Theory. Causal tapestries express an explicit Lorentz invariant transient now generated by means of a reality game. Observables are represented by tapestry informons while subjective or hidden components (for example intellectual and emotional processes) are incorporated into the reality game that determines the tapestry dynamics. As a specific example, we formulate a random graphical dynamical system using causal tapestries.

Neighbourhood reaction in the evolution of cooperation.

PubMed

Yang, Guoli; Zhang, Weiming; Xiu, Baoxin

2015-05-07

Combining evolutionary games with adaptive networks, an entangled model between strategy evolution and structure adaptation is researched in this paper. We consider a large population of cooperators C and defectors D placed in the networks, playing the repeated prisoner׳s dilemma (PD) games. Because of the conflicts between social welfare and personal rationality, both strategy and structure are allowed to change. In this paper, the dynamics of strategy originates form the partner imitation based on social learning and the dynamics of structure is driven by the active linking and neighbourhood reaction. Notably, the neighbourhood reaction is investigated considering the changes of interfaces between cooperators and defectors, where some neighbours may get away from the interface once the focal agent changes to different strategy. A rich landscape is demonstrated by changing various embedding parameters, which sheds light upon that reacting promptly to the shifted neighbour will promote the prevalence of cooperation. Our model encapsulates the dynamics of strategy, reaction and structure into the evolutionary games, which manifests some intriguing principles in the competition between two groups in natural populations, artificial systems and even human societies. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Promotion of cooperation induced by a self-questioning update rule in the spatial traveler's dilemma game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Miao, Qing; Wang, Juan; Hu, Meng-long; Zhang, Fan; Zhang, Qiu-shi; Xia, Cheng-yi

2014-01-01

In sociology and economics, evolutionary game theory has provided a powerful framework to illustrate the social dilemma's problems, and many evolutionary game models are presented, such as prisoner's dilemma game, snowdrift game, public goods game, and so on. In this paper, however, we focus on another typical pair-wise game model: Traveler's Dilemma Game (TDG), which has been deeply investigated in economics, but less attention has been paid to this topic within the physics community. We mainly discuss the influence of strategy update rules on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial TDG, and in detail explore the role of a novel self-questioning or self-learning update mechanism in the evolution of cooperation of the TDG model on the square lattice. In our self-questioning rule, each player does not imitate the strategy state of his or her nearest neighbors and simply plays the traveler's dilemma games twice with nearest neighbors: one is to calculate the actual payoff in the current game round; the other is to perform a virtual game which is used to obtain an intangible payoff if he or she adopts another random strategy. Then, the focal player decides to keep the current strategy or to change into that virtual strategy according to the Fermi-like dynamics. A great number of Monte Carlo simulations indicate that our self-questioning rule is a low information game decision-making mechanism which can greatly promote the evolution of cooperation for some specific conditions in the spatial TDG model. Furthermore, this novel rule can also be applied into the prisoner's dilemma game, and likewise the behavior of cooperation can be largely enhanced. Our results are of high importance to analyze and understand the emergence of cooperation within many real social and economical systems.

Properties of interaction networks underlying the minority game.

PubMed

Caridi, Inés

2014-11-01

The minority game is a well-known agent-based model with no explicit interaction among its agents. However, it is known that they interact through the global magnitudes of the model and through their strategies. In this work we have attempted to formalize the implicit interactions among minority game agents as if they were links on a complex network. We have defined the link between two agents by quantifying the similarity between them. This link definition is based on the information of the instance of the game (the set of strategies assigned to each agent at the beginning) without any dynamic information on the game and brings about a static, unweighed and undirected network. We have analyzed the structure of the resulting network for different parameters, such as the number of agents (N) and the agent's capacity to process information (m), always taking into account games with two strategies per agent. In the region of crowd effects of the model, the resulting networks structure is a small-world network, whereas in the region where the behavior of the minority game is the same as in a game of random decisions, networks become a random network of Erdos-Renyi. The transition between these two types of networks is slow, without any peculiar feature of the network in the region of the coordination among agents. Finally, we have studied the resulting static networks for the full strategy minority game model, a maximal instance of the minority game in which all possible agents take part in the game. We have explicitly calculated the degree distribution of the full strategy minority game network and, on the basis of this analytical result, we have estimated the degree distribution of the minority game network, which is in accordance with computational results.

Heterogeneous network promotes species coexistence: metapopulation model for rock-paper-scissors game.

PubMed

Nagatani, Takashi; Ichinose, Genki; Tainaka, Kei-Ichi

2018-05-04

Understanding mechanisms of biodiversity has been a central question in ecology. The coexistence of three species in rock-paper-scissors (RPS) systems are discussed by many authors; however, the relation between coexistence and network structure is rarely discussed. Here we present a metapopulation model for RPS game. The total population is assumed to consist of three subpopulations (nodes). Each individual migrates by random walk; the destination of migration is randomly determined. From reaction-migration equations, we obtain the population dynamics. It is found that the dynamic highly depends on network structures. When a network is homogeneous, the dynamics are neutrally stable: each node has a periodic solution, and the oscillations synchronize in all nodes. However, when a network is heterogeneous, the dynamics approach stable focus and all nodes reach equilibriums with different densities. Hence, the heterogeneity of the network promotes biodiversity.

Dynamical quenching and annealing in self-organization multiagent models.

PubMed

Burgos, E; Ceva, H; Perazzo, R P

2001-07-01

We study the dynamics of a generalized minority game (GMG) and of the bar attendance model (BAM) in which a number of agents self-organize to match an attendance that is fixed externally as a control parameter. We compare the usual dynamics used for the minority game with one for the BAM that makes a better use of the available information. We study the asymptotic states reached in both frameworks. We show that states that can be assimilated to either thermodynamic equilibrium or quenched configurations can appear in both models, but with different settings. We discuss the relevance of the parameter G that measures the value of the prize for winning in units of the fine for losing. We also provide an annealing protocol by which the quenched configurations of the GMG can progressively be modified to reach an asymptotic equilibrium state that coincides with the one obtained with the BAM.

Dynamical quenching and annealing in self-organization multiagent models

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Burgos, E.; Ceva, Horacio; Perazzo, R. P.

2001-07-01

We study the dynamics of a generalized minority game (GMG) and of the bar attendance model (BAM) in which a number of agents self-organize to match an attendance that is fixed externally as a control parameter. We compare the usual dynamics used for the minority game with one for the BAM that makes a better use of the available information. We study the asymptotic states reached in both frameworks. We show that states that can be assimilated to either thermodynamic equilibrium or quenched configurations can appear in both models, but with different settings. We discuss the relevance of the parameter G that measures the value of the prize for winning in units of the fine for losing. We also provide an annealing protocol by which the quenched configurations of the GMG can progressively be modified to reach an asymptotic equilibrium state that coincides with the one obtained with the BAM.

The evolutionary language game: an orthogonal approach.

PubMed

Lenaerts, Tom; Jansen, Bart; Tuyls, Karl; De Vylder, Bart

2005-08-21

Evolutionary game dynamics have been proposed as a mathematical framework for the cultural evolution of language and more specifically the evolution of vocabulary. This article discusses a model that is mutually exclusive in its underlying principals with some previously suggested models. The model describes how individuals in a population culturally acquire a vocabulary by actively participating in the acquisition process instead of passively observing and communicate through peer-to-peer interactions instead of vertical parent-offspring relations. Concretely, a notion of social/cultural learning called the naming game is first abstracted using learning theory. This abstraction defines the required cultural transmission mechanism for an evolutionary process. Second, the derived transmission system is expressed in terms of the well-known selection-mutation model defined in the context of evolutionary dynamics. In this way, the analogy between social learning and evolution at the level of meaning-word associations is made explicit. Although only horizontal and oblique transmission structures will be considered, extensions to vertical structures over different genetic generations can easily be incorporated. We provide a number of simplified experiments to clarify our reasoning.

Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games.

PubMed

Xu, Zhaojin; Wang, Zhen; Zhang, Lianzhong

2010-05-07

It is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences how to maintain high levels of cooperation among selfish individuals. Theorists present an effective mechanism promoting cooperation by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. But Nash's theory predicts that no one can do better or worse than loners (players unwilling to join the public goods game) in the long run, and that the frequency of participants is independent of loners' payoff. In this paper, we introduce a degree of rationality and investigate the model by means of an approximate best response dynamics. Our research shows that the payoffs of the loners have a significant effect in anonymous voluntary public goods games by this introduction and that the dynamics will drive the system to a fixed point, which is different from the Nash equilibrium. In addition, we also qualitatively explain the existing experimental results. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Dynamic Gaming Platform (DGP)

DTIC Science & Technology

2009-04-01

GAMING PLATFORM (DGP) Lockheed Martin Corporation...YYYY) APR 09 2. REPORT TYPE Final 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) Jul 07 – Mar 09 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE DYNAMIC GAMING PLATFORM (DGP) 5a...CMU Carnegie Mellon University DGP Dynamic Gaming Platform GA Genetic Algorithm IARPA Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity LM ATL Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratories PAINT ProActive INTelligence

Research on Information Sharing Mechanism of Network Organization Based on Evolutionary Game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Lin; Liu, Gaozhi

2018-02-01

This article first elaborates the concept and effect of network organization, and the ability to share information is analyzed, secondly introduces the evolutionary game theory, network organization for information sharing all kinds of limitations, establishes the evolutionary game model, analyzes the dynamic evolution of network organization of information sharing, through reasoning and evolution. The network information sharing by the initial state and two sides of the game payoff matrix of excess profits and information is the information sharing of cost and risk sharing are the influence of network organization node information sharing decision.

Bandwidth auction for SVC streaming in dynamic multi-overlay

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xiong, Yanting; Zou, Junni; Xiong, Hongkai

2010-07-01

In this paper, we study the optimal bandwidth allocation for scalable video coding (SVC) streaming in multiple overlays. We model the whole bandwidth request and distribution process as a set of decentralized auction games between the competing peers. For the upstream peer, a bandwidth allocation mechanism is introduced to maximize the aggregate revenue. For the downstream peer, a dynamic bidding strategy is proposed. It achieves maximum utility and efficient resource usage by collaborating with a content-aware layer dropping/adding strategy. Also, the convergence of the proposed auction games is theoretically proved. Experimental results show that the auction strategies can adapt to dynamic join of competing peers and video layers.

On Location Learning: Authentic Applied Science with Networked Augmented Realities

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rosenbaum, Eric; Klopfer, Eric; Perry, Judy

2007-02-01

The learning of science can be made more like the practice of science through authentic simulated experiences. We have created a networked handheld Augmented Reality environment that combines the authentic role-playing of Augmented Realities and the underlying models of Participatory Simulations. This game, known as Outbreak @ The Institute, is played across a university campus where players take on the roles of doctors, medical technicians, and public health experts to contain a disease outbreak. Players can interact with virtual characters and employ virtual diagnostic tests and medicines. They are challenged to identify the source and prevent the spread of an infectious disease that can spread among real and/or virtual characters according to an underlying model. In this paper, we report on data from three high school classes who played the game. We investigate students' perception of the authenticity of the game in terms of their personal embodiment in the game, their experience playing different roles, and their understanding of the dynamic model underlying the game.

Epigenetic battle of the sexes. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Song

2017-03-01

Qian Wang et al. present an interesting framework, named epigenetic game theory, for modeling sex-based epigenetic dynamics during embryogenesis from a new viewpoint of evolutionary game theory [1]. That is, epigenomes of sperms and oocytes may coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to affect the fitness of embryos. The work uses a set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to describe longitudinal trajectories of DNA methylation levels in both parental and maternal gametes and their dependence on each other. The insights gained from this review, i.e. dynamic methylation profiles and their interaction are potentially important to many fields, such as biomedicine and agriculture.

Phase transitions in adaptive competitive environments: Theories and applications of the minority game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yi

It is of great scientific significance to study the complex systems of agents with adaptive strategies competing for resources. In many of such systems in social and biological environments, agents succeed by making innovative choices. In this thesis, we model this behavior by presenting the results and analysis of a class of games in which heterogeneous agents are rewarded for being in a minority group. Each agent possesses a number of fixed strategies, each of which takes publicly available information as input to predict next group. Commonly known as the minority game, this simple model manifests a maladaptive, informationally efficient phase in which the system performs poorly at generating resources and an inefficient phase in which there is an emergent cooperation among the agents, and the system more effectively generates resources. The best emergent coordination is achieved at the phase transition, which occurs when z, the ratio of the dimension of the strategy space to the number of agents, is about 0.34. This model also has similar properties to a spin glass system thus statistical mechanics methods were employed to provide analytical results. The phase structure persists under variations such as variable payoff schemes and evolutionary mechanisms. Agents in real life are subject to local connectivity and incomplete information. A framework based on bi-graph was proposed to model these factors. In the context of economics, we proposed a stock market model incorporating delayed majority dynamics and agents holding heterogeneous expectations. We found that for a range of parameter settings, minority dynamics are dynamically induced, effectively reducing market volatility. Finally, we introduce a version of the minority game played by human participants. We observed emergent coordination of players' choices leading to increased average reward. Furthermore, players with the simplest strategies reap the most wealth.

An Evolutionary Game Theory Model of Spontaneous Brain Functioning.

PubMed

Madeo, Dario; Talarico, Agostino; Pascual-Leone, Alvaro; Mocenni, Chiara; Santarnecchi, Emiliano

2017-11-22

Our brain is a complex system of interconnected regions spontaneously organized into distinct networks. The integration of information between and within these networks is a continuous process that can be observed even when the brain is at rest, i.e. not engaged in any particular task. Moreover, such spontaneous dynamics show predictive value over individual cognitive profile and constitute a potential marker in neurological and psychiatric conditions, making its understanding of fundamental importance in modern neuroscience. Here we present a theoretical and mathematical model based on an extension of evolutionary game theory on networks (EGN), able to capture brain's interregional dynamics by balancing emulative and non-emulative attitudes among brain regions. This results in the net behavior of nodes composing resting-state networks identified using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), determining their moment-to-moment level of activation and inhibition as expressed by positive and negative shifts in BOLD fMRI signal. By spontaneously generating low-frequency oscillatory behaviors, the EGN model is able to mimic functional connectivity dynamics, approximate fMRI time series on the basis of initial subset of available data, as well as simulate the impact of network lesions and provide evidence of compensation mechanisms across networks. Results suggest evolutionary game theory on networks as a new potential framework for the understanding of human brain network dynamics.

The promotion of cooperation by the poor in dynamic chicken games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ito, Hiromu; Katsumata, Yuki; Hasegawa, Eisuke; Yoshimura, Jin

2017-02-01

The evolution of cooperative behavior is one of the most important issues in game theory. Previous studies have shown that cooperation can evolve only under highly limited conditions, and various modifications have been introduced to games to explain the evolution of cooperation. Recently, a utility function basic to game theory was shown to be dependent on current wealth as a conditional (state) variable in a dynamic version of utility theory. Here, we introduce this dynamic utility function to several games. Under certain conditions, poor players exhibit cooperative behavior in two types of chicken games (the hawk-dove game and the snowdrift game) but not in the prisoner’s dilemma game and the stag hunt game. This result indicates that cooperation can be exhibited by the poor in some chicken games. Thus, the evolution of cooperation may not be as limited as has been suggested in previous studies.

Molecular Dynamics Visualization (MDV): Stereoscopic 3D Display of Biomolecular Structure and Interactions Using the Unity Game Engine.

PubMed

Wiebrands, Michael; Malajczuk, Chris J; Woods, Andrew J; Rohl, Andrew L; Mancera, Ricardo L

2018-06-21

Molecular graphics systems are visualization tools which, upon integration into a 3D immersive environment, provide a unique virtual reality experience for research and teaching of biomolecular structure, function and interactions. We have developed a molecular structure and dynamics application, the Molecular Dynamics Visualization tool, that uses the Unity game engine combined with large scale, multi-user, stereoscopic visualization systems to deliver an immersive display experience, particularly with a large cylindrical projection display. The application is structured to separate the biomolecular modeling and visualization systems. The biomolecular model loading and analysis system was developed as a stand-alone C# library and provides the foundation for the custom visualization system built in Unity. All visual models displayed within the tool are generated using Unity-based procedural mesh building routines. A 3D user interface was built to allow seamless dynamic interaction with the model while being viewed in 3D space. Biomolecular structure analysis and display capabilities are exemplified with a range of complex systems involving cell membranes, protein folding and lipid droplets.

Two-target game model of an air combat with fire-and-forget all-aspect missiles

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Davidovitz, A.; Shinar, J.

1989-01-01

An air combat duel between similar aggressive fighter aircraft, both equipped with the same type of guided missiles, is formulated as a two-target differential game using the dynamic model of the game of two identical cars. Each of the identical target sets represents the effective firing envelope of an all-aspect fire-and-forget air-to-air missile. The firing range limits depend on the target aspect angle and are approximated by analytical functions. The maximum range, computed by taking into account the optimal missile avoidance maneuver of the target, determines the no-escape firing envelope. The solution consists of the decomposition of the game space into four regions: the respective winning zones of the two opponents, the draw zone, and the region where the game terminates by a mutual kill. The solution provides a new insight for future air combat analysis.

Dynamic optimal strategies in transboundary pollution game under learning by doing

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chang, Shuhua; Qin, Weihua; Wang, Xinyu

2018-01-01

In this paper, we present a transboundary pollution game, in which emission permits trading and pollution abatement costs under learning by doing are considered. In this model, the abatement cost mainly depends on the level of pollution abatement and the experience of using pollution abatement technology. We use optimal control theory to investigate the optimal emission paths and the optimal pollution abatement strategies under cooperative and noncooperative games, respectively. Additionally, the effects of parameters on the results have been examined.

EXTENDING THE REALM OF OPTIMIZATION FOR COMPLEX SYSTEMS: UNCERTAINTY, COMPETITION, AND DYNAMICS

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Shanbhag, Uday V; Basar, Tamer; Meyn, Sean

Research reported addressed these topics: the development of analytical and algorithmic tools for distributed computation of Nash equilibria; synchronization in mean-field oscillator games, with an emphasis on learning and efficiency analysis; questions that combine learning and computation; questions including stochastic and mean-field games; modeling and control in the context of power markets.

Analytical model for minority games with evolutionary learning

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Campos, Daniel; Méndez, Vicenç; Llebot, Josep E.; Hernández, Germán A.

2010-06-01

In a recent work [D. Campos, J.E. Llebot, V. Méndez, Theor. Popul. Biol. 74 (2009) 16] we have introduced a biological version of the Evolutionary Minority Game that tries to reproduce the intraspecific competition for limited resources in an ecosystem. In comparison with the complex decision-making mechanisms used in standard Minority Games, only two extremely simple strategies ( juveniles and adults) are accessible to the agents. Complexity is introduced instead through an evolutionary learning rule that allows younger agents to learn taking better decisions. We find that this game shows many of the typical properties found for Evolutionary Minority Games, like self-segregation behavior or the existence of an oscillation phase for a certain range of the parameter values. However, an analytical treatment becomes much easier in our case, taking advantage of the simple strategies considered. Using a model consisting of a simple dynamical system, the phase diagram of the game (which differentiates three phases: adults crowd, juveniles crowd and oscillations) is reproduced.

PlayPhysics: An Emotional Games Learning Environment for Teaching Physics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Muñoz, Karla; Kevitt, Paul Mc; Lunney, Tom; Noguez, Julieta; Neri, Luis

To ensure learning, game-based learning environments must incorporate assessment mechanisms, e.g. Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITSs). ITSs are focused on recognising and influencing the learner's emotional or motivational states. This research focuses on designing and implementing an affective student model for intelligent gaming, which reasons about the learner's emotional state from cognitive and motivational variables using observable behaviour. A Probabilistic Relational Models (PRMs) approach is employed to derive Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBNs). The model uses the Control-Value theory of 'achievement emotions' as a basis. A preliminary test was conducted to recognise the students' prospective-outcome emotions with results presented and discussed. PlayPhysics is an emotional games learning environment for teaching Physics. Once the affective student model proves effective it will be incorporated into PlayPhysics' architecture. The design, evaluation and postevaluation of PlayPhysics are also discussed. Future work will focus on evaluating the affective student model with a larger population of students, and on providing affective feedback.

Spatial vs. non-spatial eco-evolutionary dynamics in a tumor growth model.

PubMed

You, Li; Brown, Joel S; Thuijsman, Frank; Cunningham, Jessica J; Gatenby, Robert A; Zhang, Jingsong; Staňková, Kateřina

2017-12-21

Metastatic prostate cancer is initially treated with androgen deprivation therapy (ADT). However, resistance typically develops in about 1 year - a clinical condition termed metastatic castrate-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC). We develop and investigate a spatial game (agent based continuous space) of mCRPC that considers three distinct cancer cell types: (1) those dependent on exogenous testosterone (T + ), (2) those with increased CYP17A expression that produce testosterone and provide it to the environment as a public good (T P ), and (3) those independent of testosterone (T - ). The interactions within and between cancer cell types can be represented by a 3 × 3 matrix. Based on the known biology of this cancer there are 22 potential matrices that give roughly three major outcomes depending upon the absence (good prognosis), near absence or high frequency (poor prognosis) of T -  cells at the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). When just two cell types coexist the spatial game faithfully reproduces the ESS of the corresponding matrix game. With three cell types divergences occur, in some cases just two strategies coexist in the spatial game even as a non-spatial matrix game supports all three. Discrepancies between the spatial game and non-spatial ESS happen because different cell types become more or less clumped in the spatial game - leading to non-random assortative interactions between cell types. Three key spatial scales influence the distribution and abundance of cell types in the spatial game: i. Increasing the radius at which cells interact with each other can lead to higher clumping of each type, ii. Increasing the radius at which cells experience limits to population growth can cause densely packed tumor clusters in space, iii. Increasing the dispersal radius of daughter cells promotes increased mixing of cell types. To our knowledge the effects of these spatial scales on eco-evolutionary dynamics have not been explored in cancer models. The fact that cancer interactions are spatially explicit and that our spatial game of mCRPC provides in general different outcomes than the non-spatial game might suggest that non-spatial models are insufficient for capturing key elements of tumorigenesis. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Gaming Personality and Game Dynamics in Online Discussion Instructions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tu, Chih-Hsiung; Yen, Cherng-Jyh; Sujo-Montes, Laura; Roberts, Gayle A.

2015-01-01

Gamification is the use of game mechanics to drive game-like engagements and actions. It applies game mechanics, dynamics and frameworks to promote desired learning behaviours. Positive and effective gamification could enhance learning and engage learners in more social and context-rich decision-making for problem-solving in learning tasks.…

Quantum-Like Model for Decision Making Process in Two Players Game. A Non-Kolmogorovian Model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Asano, Masanari; Ohya, Masanori; Khrennikov, Andrei

2011-03-01

In experiments of games, players frequently make choices which are regarded as irrational in game theory. In papers of Khrennikov (Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Fundamental Theories of Physics, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, 2004; Fuzzy Sets Syst. 155:4-17, 2005; Biosystems 84:225-241, 2006; Found. Phys. 35(10):1655-1693, 2005; in QP-PQ Quantum Probability and White Noise Analysis, vol. XXIV, pp. 105-117, 2009), it was pointed out that statistics collected in such the experiments have "quantum-like" properties, which can not be explained in classical probability theory. In this paper, we design a simple quantum-like model describing a decision-making process in a two-players game and try to explain a mechanism of the irrational behavior of players. Finally we discuss a mathematical frame of non-Kolmogorovian system in terms of liftings (Accardi and Ohya, in Appl. Math. Optim. 39:33-59, 1999).

Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process.

PubMed

Quan, Ji; Liu, Wei; Chu, Yuqing; Wang, Xianjia

2017-11-23

Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not be stochastically stable. In this paper, a model of voluntary public goods game with punishment is studied in a stochastic situation. Unlike the existing model, we describe the evolutionary process of strategies in the population as a generalized quasi-birth-and-death process. And we investigate the stochastic stable equilibrium (SSE) instead. By numerical experiments, we get all possible SSEs of the system for any combination of parameters, and investigate the influence of parameters on the probabilities of the system to select different equilibriums. It is found that in the stochastic situation, the introduction of the punishment and non-participation strategies can change the evolutionary dynamics of the system and equilibrium of the game. There is a large range of parameters that the system selects the cooperative states as its SSE with a high probability. This result provides us an insight and control method for the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game in stochastic situations.

A game theoretic controller for a linear time-invariant system with parameter uncertainty and its application to the Space Station

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rhee, Ihnseok; Speyer, Jason L.

1990-01-01

A game theoretic controller is developed for a linear time-invariant system with parameter uncertainties in system and input matrices. The input-output decomposition modeling for the plant uncertainty is adopted. The uncertain dynamic system is represented as an internal feedback loop in which the system is assumed forced by fictitious disturbance caused by the parameter uncertainty. By considering the input and the fictitious disturbance as two noncooperative players, a differential game problem is constructed. It is shown that the resulting time invariant controller stabilizes the uncertain system for a prescribed uncertainty bound. This game theoretic controller is applied to the momentum management and attitude control of the Space Station in the presence of uncertainties in the moments of inertia. Inclusion of the external disturbance torque to the design procedure results in a dynamical feedback controller which consists of conventional PID control and cyclic disturbance rejection filter. It is shown that the game theoretic design, comparing to the LQR design or pole placement design, improves the stability robustness with respect to inertia variations.

Asymmetric negotiation in structured language games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Han-Xin; Wang, Wen-Xu; Wang, Bing-Hong

2008-02-01

We propose an asymmetric negotiation strategy to investigate the influence of high-degree agents on the agreement dynamics in a structured language game, the naming game. We introduce a model parameter, which governs the frequency of high-degree agents acting as speakers in communication. It is found that there exists an optimal value of the parameter that induces the fastest convergence to a global consensus on naming an object for both scale-free and small-world naming games. This phenomenon indicates that, although a strong influence of high-degree agents favors consensus achievement, very strong influences inhibit the convergence process, making it even slower than in the absence of influence of high-degree agents. Investigation of the total memory used by agents implies that there is some trade-off between the convergence speed and the required total memory. Other quantities, including the evolution of the number of different names and the relationship between agents’ memories and their degrees, are also studied. The results are helpful for better understanding of the dynamics of the naming game with asymmetric negotiation strategy.

A piecewise smooth model of evolutionary game for residential mobility and segregation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Radi, D.; Gardini, L.

2018-05-01

The paper proposes an evolutionary version of a Schelling-type dynamic system to model the patterns of residential segregation when two groups of people are involved. The payoff functions of agents are the individual preferences for integration which are empirically grounded. Differently from Schelling's model, where the limited levels of tolerance are the driving force of segregation, in the current setup agents benefit from integration. Despite the differences, the evolutionary model shows a dynamics of segregation that is qualitatively similar to the one of the classical Schelling's model: segregation is always a stable equilibrium, while equilibria of integration exist only for peculiar configurations of the payoff functions and their asymptotic stability is highly sensitive to parameter variations. Moreover, a rich variety of integrated dynamic behaviors can be observed. In particular, the dynamics of the evolutionary game is regulated by a one-dimensional piecewise smooth map with two kink points that is rigorously analyzed using techniques recently developed for piecewise smooth dynamical systems. The investigation reveals that when a stable internal equilibrium exists, the bimodal shape of the map leads to several different kinds of bifurcations, smooth, and border collision, in a complicated interplay. Our global analysis can give intuitions to be used by a social planner to maximize integration through social policies that manipulate people's preferences for integration.

Cancer growth and metastasis as a metaphor of Go gaming: An Ising model approach.

PubMed

Barradas-Bautista, Didier; Alvarado-Mentado, Matias; Agostino, Mark; Cocho, Germinal

2018-01-01

This work aims for modeling and simulating the metastasis of cancer, via the analogy between the cancer process and the board game Go. In the game of Go, black stones that play first could correspond to a metaphor of the birth, growth, and metastasis of cancer. Moreover, playing white stones on the second turn could correspond the inhibition of cancer invasion. Mathematical modeling and algorithmic simulation of Go may therefore benefit the efforts to deploy therapies to surpass cancer illness by providing insight into the cellular growth and expansion over a tissue area. We use the Ising Hamiltonian, that models the energy exchange in interacting particles, for modeling the cancer dynamics. Parameters in the energy function refer the biochemical elements that induce cancer birth, growth, and metastasis; as well as the biochemical immune system process of defense.

Neural Mechanism for Stochastic Behavior During a Competitive Game

PubMed Central

Soltani, Alireza; Lee, Daeyeol; Wang, Xiao-Jing

2006-01-01

Previous studies have shown that non-human primates can generate highly stochastic choice behavior, especially when this is required during a competitive interaction with another agent. To understand the neural mechanism of such dynamic choice behavior, we propose a biologically plausible model of decision making endowed with synaptic plasticity that follows a reward-dependent stochastic Hebbian learning rule. This model constitutes a biophysical implementation of reinforcement learning, and it reproduces salient features of behavioral data from an experiment with monkeys playing a matching pennies game. Due to interaction with an opponent and learning dynamics, the model generates quasi-random behavior robustly in spite of intrinsic biases. Furthermore, non-random choice behavior can also emerge when the model plays against a non-interactive opponent, as observed in the monkey experiment. Finally, when combined with a meta-learning algorithm, our model accounts for the slow drift in the animal’s strategy based on a process of reward maximization. PMID:17015181

Algorithm for Overcoming the Curse of Dimensionality for Certain Non-convex Hamilton-Jacobi Equations, Projections and Differential Games

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-05-01

Algorithm for Overcoming the Curse of Dimensionality for Certain Non-convex Hamilton-Jacobi Equations, Projections and Differential Games Yat Tin...subproblems. Our approach is expected to have wide applications in continuous dynamic games , control theory problems, and elsewhere. Mathematics...differential dynamic games , control theory problems, and dynamical systems coming from the physical world, e.g. [11]. An important application is to

n-Person Dynamic Strategic Market Games

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Wiecek, Piotr, E-mail: Piotr.Wiecek@pwr.wroc.pl

2012-04-15

We present a discrete n-person model of a dynamic strategic market game. We show that for some values of the discount factor the game possesses a stationary equilibrium where all the players make high bids. Within the class of all the high-bidding strategies we distinguish between two classes of more and less aggressive ones. We show that the set of discount factors for which these more aggressive strategies form equilibria shrinks as n goes to infinity. On the other hand, the analogous set for the less aggressive strategies grows to the whole interval (0,1) as n grows to infinity. Furthermore » we analyze the properties of the value function corresponding to these high-bidding equilibria. We also give some numerical examples contradicting some other properties that seem intuitive.« less

Player guild dynamics and evolution in massively multiplayer online games.

PubMed

Chen, Chien-Hsun; Sun, Chuen-Tsai; Hsieh, Jilung

2008-06-01

In the latest versions of massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs), developers have purposefully made guilds part of game environments. Guilds represent a powerful method for giving players a sense of online community, but there is little quantitative data on guild dynamics. To address this topic, we took advantage of a feature found in one of today's most popular MMOGs (World of Warcraft) to collect in-game data: user interfaces that players can modify and refine. In addition to collecting data on in-game player activities, we used this feature to observe and investigate how players join and leave guilds. Data were analyzed for the purpose of identifying factors that propel game-world guild dynamics and evolution. After collecting data for 641,805 avatars on 62 Taiwanese World of Warcraft game servers between February 10 and April 10, 2006, we created five guild type categories (small, large, elite, newbie, and unstable) that have different meanings in terms of in-game group dynamics. By viewing players as the most important resource affecting guild life cycles, it is possible to analyze game worlds as ecosystems consisting of evolving guilds and to study how guild life cycles reflect game world characteristics.

Stability and diversity in collective adaptation

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sato, Yuzuru; Akiyama, Eizo; Crutchfield, James P.

2005-10-01

We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally achieves the best action and memory loss that leads to randomized behavior. We show that, although individual agents interact with their environment and other agents in a purely self-interested way, macroscopic behavior can be interpreted as game dynamics. Application to several familiar, explicit game interactions shows that the adaptation dynamics exhibits a diversity of collective behaviors. The simplicity of the assumptions underlying the macroscopic equations suggests that these behaviors should be expected broadly in collective adaptation. We also analyze the adaptation dynamics from an information-theoretic viewpoint and discuss self-organization induced by the dynamics of uncertainty, giving a novel view of collective adaptation.

Game story space of professional sports: Australian rules football

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kiley, Dilan Patrick; Reagan, Andrew J.; Mitchell, Lewis; Danforth, Christopher M.; Dodds, Peter Sheridan

2016-05-01

Sports are spontaneous generators of stories. Through skill and chance, the script of each game is dynamically written in real time by players acting out possible trajectories allowed by a sport's rules. By properly characterizing a given sport's ecology of "game stories," we are able to capture the sport's capacity for unfolding interesting narratives, in part by contrasting them with random walks. Here we explore the game story space afforded by a data set of 1310 Australian Football League (AFL) score lines. We find that AFL games exhibit a continuous spectrum of stories rather than distinct clusters. We show how coarse graining reveals identifiable motifs ranging from last-minute comeback wins to one-sided blowouts. Through an extensive comparison with biased random walks, we show that real AFL games deliver a broader array of motifs than null models, and we provide consequent insights into the narrative appeal of real games.

Stochastic noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies of a population of biological networks under natural selection.

PubMed

Chen, Bor-Sen; Yeh, Chin-Hsun

2017-12-01

We review current static and dynamic evolutionary game strategies of biological networks and discuss the lack of random genetic variations and stochastic environmental disturbances in these models. To include these factors, a population of evolving biological networks is modeled as a nonlinear stochastic biological system with Poisson-driven genetic variations and random environmental fluctuations (stimuli). To gain insight into the evolutionary game theory of stochastic biological networks under natural selection, the phenotypic robustness and network evolvability of noncooperative and cooperative evolutionary game strategies are discussed from a stochastic Nash game perspective. The noncooperative strategy can be transformed into an equivalent multi-objective optimization problem and is shown to display significantly improved network robustness to tolerate genetic variations and buffer environmental disturbances, maintaining phenotypic traits for longer than the cooperative strategy. However, the noncooperative case requires greater effort and more compromises between partly conflicting players. Global linearization is used to simplify the problem of solving nonlinear stochastic evolutionary games. Finally, a simple stochastic evolutionary model of a metabolic pathway is simulated to illustrate the procedure of solving for two evolutionary game strategies and to confirm and compare their respective characteristics in the evolutionary process. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Application of physics engines in virtual worlds

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Norman, Mark; Taylor, Tim

2002-03-01

Dynamic virtual worlds potentially can provide a much richer and more enjoyable experience than static ones. To realize such worlds, three approaches are commonly used. The first of these, and still widely applied, involves importing traditional animations from a modeling system such as 3D Studio Max. This approach is therefore limited to predefined animation scripts or combinations/blends thereof. The second approach involves the integration of some specific-purpose simulation code, such as car dynamics, and is thus generally limited to one (class of) application(s). The third approach involves the use of general-purpose physics engines, which promise to enable a range of compelling dynamic virtual worlds and to considerably speed up development. By far the largest market today for real-time simulation is computer games, revenues exceeding those of the movie industry. Traditionally, the simulation is produced by game developers in-house for specific titles. However, off-the-shelf middleware physics engines are now available for use in games and related domains. In this paper, we report on our experiences of using middleware physics engines to create a virtual world as an interactive experience, and an advanced scenario where artificial life techniques generate controllers for physically modeled characters.

Multi-language naming game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhou, Jianfeng; Lou, Yang; Chen, Guanrong; Tang, Wallace K. S.

2018-04-01

Naming game is a simulation-based experiment used to study the evolution of languages. The conventional naming game focuses on a single language. In this paper, a novel naming game model named multi-language naming game (MLNG) is proposed, where the agents are different-language speakers who cannot communicate with each other without a translator (interpreter) in between. The MLNG model is general, capable of managing k different languages with k ≥ 2. For illustration, the paper only discusses the MLNG with two different languages, and studies five representative network topologies, namely random-graph, WS small-world, NW small-world, scale-free, and random-triangle topologies. Simulation and analysis results both show that: 1) using the network features and based on the proportion of translators the probability of establishing a conversation between two or three agents can be theoretically estimated; 2) the relationship between the convergence speed and the proportion of translators has a power-law-like relation; 3) different agents require different memory sizes, thus a local memory allocation rule is recommended for saving memory resources. The new model and new findings should be useful for further studies of naming games and for better understanding of languages evolution from a dynamical network perspective.

Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks.

PubMed

Hébert-Dufresne, Laurent; Allard, Antoine; Noël, Pierre-André; Young, Jean-Gabriel; Libby, Eric

2017-08-08

Recent empirical work highlights the heterogeneity of social competitions such as political campaigns: proponents of some ideologies seek debate and conversation, others create echo chambers. While symmetric and static network structure is typically used as a substrate to study such competitor dynamics, network structure can instead be interpreted as a signature of the competitor strategies, yielding competition dynamics on adaptive networks. Here we demonstrate that tradeoffs between aggressiveness and defensiveness (i.e., targeting adversaries vs. targeting like-minded individuals) creates paradoxical behaviour such as non-transitive dynamics. And while there is an optimal strategy in a two competitor system, three competitor systems have no such solution; the introduction of extreme strategies can easily affect the outcome of a competition, even if the extreme strategies have no chance of winning. Not only are these results reminiscent of classic paradoxical results from evolutionary game theory, but the structure of social networks created by our model can be mapped to particular forms of payoff matrices. Consequently, social structure can act as a measurable metric for social games which in turn allows us to provide a game theoretical perspective on online political debates.

Statistical mechanics of the mixed majority minority game with random external information

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

DeMartino, A.; Giardina, I.; Mosetti, G.

2003-08-01

We study the asymptotic macroscopic properties of the mixed majority-minority game, modelling a population in which two types of heterogeneous adaptive agents, namely 'fundamentalists' driven by differentiation and 'trend-followers' driven by imitation, interact. The presence of a fraction f of trend-followers is shown to induce (a) a significant loss of informational efficiency with respect to a pure minority game (in particular, an efficient, unpredictable phase exists only for f < 1/2), and (b) a catastrophic increase of global fluctuations for f > 1/2. We solve the model by means of an approximate static (replica) theory and by a direct dynamical (generating functional) technique. The two approaches coincide and match numerical results convincingly.

Schrödinger Approach to Mean Field Games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Swiecicki, Igor; Gobron, Thierry; Ullmo, Denis

2016-03-01

Mean field games (MFG) provide a theoretical frame to model socioeconomic systems. In this Letter, we study a particular class of MFG that shows strong analogies with the nonlinear Schrödinger and Gross-Pitaevskii equations introduced in physics to describe a variety of physical phenomena. Using this bridge, many results and techniques developed along the years in the latter context can be transferred to the former, which provides both a new domain of application for the nonlinear Schrödinger equation and a new and fruitful approach in the study of mean field games. Utilizing this approach, we analyze in detail a population dynamics model in which the "players" are under a strong incentive to coordinate themselves.

Practical example of game theory application for production route selection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Olender, M.; Krenczyk, D.

2017-08-01

The opportunity which opens before manufacturers on the dynamic market, especially before those from the sector of the small and medium-sized enterprises, is associated with the use of the virtual organizations concept. The planning stage of such organizations could be based on supporting decision-making tasks using the tools and formalisms taken from the game theory. In the paper the model of the virtual manufacturing network, along with the practical example of decision-making situation as two person game and the decision strategies with an analysis of calculation results are presented.

How successful are mutants in multiplayer games with fluctuating environments? Sojourn times, fixation and optimal switching

PubMed Central

Galla, Tobias

2018-01-01

Using a stochastic model, we investigate the probability of fixation, and the average time taken to achieve fixation, of a mutant in a population of wild-types. We do this in a context where the environment in which the competition takes place is subject to stochastic change. Our model takes into account interactions which can involve multiple participants. That is, the participants take part in multiplayer games. We find that under certain circumstances, there are environmental switching dynamics which minimize the time that it takes for the mutants to fixate. To analyse the dynamics more closely, we develop a method by which to calculate the sojourn times for general birth–death processes in fluctuating environments. PMID:29657810

How successful are mutants in multiplayer games with fluctuating environments? Sojourn times, fixation and optimal switching

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Baron, Joseph W.; Galla, Tobias

2018-03-01

Using a stochastic model, we investigate the probability of fixation, and the average time taken to achieve fixation, of a mutant in a population of wild-types. We do this in a context where the environment in which the competition takes place is subject to stochastic change. Our model takes into account interactions which can involve multiple participants. That is, the participants take part in multiplayer games. We find that under certain circumstances, there are environmental switching dynamics which minimize the time that it takes for the mutants to fixate. To analyse the dynamics more closely, we develop a method by which to calculate the sojourn times for general birth-death processes in fluctuating environments.

Mapping of the stochastic Lotka-Volterra model to models of population genetics and game theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Constable, George W. A.; McKane, Alan J.

2017-08-01

The relationship between the M -species stochastic Lotka-Volterra competition (SLVC) model and the M -allele Moran model of population genetics is explored via timescale separation arguments. When selection for species is weak and the population size is large but finite, precise conditions are determined for the stochastic dynamics of the SLVC model to be mappable to the neutral Moran model, the Moran model with frequency-independent selection, and the Moran model with frequency-dependent selection (equivalently a game-theoretic formulation of the Moran model). We demonstrate how these mappings can be used to calculate extinction probabilities and the times until a species' extinction in the SLVC model.

Quenching and annealing in the minority game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Burgos, E.; Ceva, Horacio; Perazzo, R. P. J.

2001-05-01

We study the bar attendance model (BAM) and a generalized version of the minority game (MG) in which a number of agents self organize to match an attendance that is fixed externally as a control parameter. We compare the probabilistic dynamics used in the MG with one that we introduce for the BAM that makes better use of the same available information. The relaxation dynamics of the MG leads the system to long lived, metastable (quenched) configurations in which adaptive evolution stops in spite of being far from equilibrium. On the contrary, the BAM relaxation dynamics avoids the MG glassy state, leading to an equilibrium configuration. Finally, we introduce in the MG model the concept of annealing by defining a new procedure with which one can gradually overcome the metastable MG states, bringing the system to an equilibrium that coincides with the one obtained with the BAM.

Emergence of grouping in multi-resource minority game dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Huang, Zi-Gang; Zhang, Ji-Qiang; Dong, Jia-Qi; Huang, Liang; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2012-10-01

Complex systems arising in a modern society typically have many resources and strategies available for their dynamical evolutions. To explore quantitatively the behaviors of such systems, we propose a class of models to investigate Minority Game (MG) dynamics with multiple strategies. In particular, agents tend to choose the least used strategies based on available local information. A striking finding is the emergence of grouping states defined in terms of distinct strategies. We develop an analytic theory based on the mean-field framework to understand the ``bifurcations'' of the grouping states. The grouping phenomenon has also been identified in the Shanghai Stock-Market system, and we discuss its prevalence in other real-world systems. Our work demonstrates that complex systems obeying the MG rules can spontaneously self-organize themselves into certain divided states, and our model represents a basic and general mathematical framework to address this kind of phenomena in social, economical and political systems.

Statics and Dynamics of Selfish Interactions in Distributed Service Systems

PubMed Central

Altarelli, Fabrizio; Braunstein, Alfredo; Dall’Asta, Luca

2015-01-01

We study a class of games which models the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibits congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a technique, based on the cavity method of statistical physics, to characterize the full spectrum of Nash equilibria of the game. The analysis reveals a large variety of equilibria, with very different statistical properties. Natural selfish dynamics, such as best-response, usually tend to large-utility equilibria, even though those of smaller utility are exponentially more numerous. Interestingly, the latter actually can be reached by selecting the initial conditions of the best-response dynamics close to the saturation limit of the service unit capacities. We also study a more realistic stochastic variant of the game by means of a simple and effective approximation of the average over the random parameters, showing that the properties of the average-case Nash equilibria are qualitatively similar to the deterministic ones. PMID:26177449

Complexity analysis of dual-channel game model with different managers' business objectives

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Ting; Ma, Junhai

2015-01-01

This paper considers dual-channel game model with bounded rationality, using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical system. The business objectives of retailers are assumed to be different, which is closer to reality than previous studies. We study the local stable region of Nash equilibrium point and find that business objectives can expand the stable region and play an important role in price strategy. One interesting finding is that a fiercer competition tends to stabilize the Nash equilibrium. Simulation shows the complex behavior of two dimensional dynamic system, we find period doubling bifurcation and chaos phenomenon. We measure performances of the model in different period by using the index of average profit. The results show that unstable behavior in economic system is often an unfavorable outcome. So this paper discusses the application of adaptive adjustment mechanism when the model exhibits chaotic behavior and then allows the retailers to eliminate the negative effects.

A Game-Theoretic Response Strategy for Coordinator Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks

PubMed Central

Liu, Jianhua; Yue, Guangxue; Shang, Huiliang; Li, Hongjie

2014-01-01

The coordinator is a specific node that controls the whole network and has a significant impact on the performance in cooperative multihop ZigBee wireless sensor networks (ZWSNs). However, the malicious node attacks coordinator nodes in an effort to waste the resources and disrupt the operation of the network. Attacking leads to a failure of one round of communication between the source nodes and destination nodes. Coordinator selection is a technique that can considerably defend against attack and reduce the data delivery delay, and increase network performance of cooperative communications. In this paper, we propose an adaptive coordinator selection algorithm using game and fuzzy logic aiming at both minimizing the average number of hops and maximizing network lifetime. The proposed game model consists of two interrelated formulations: a stochastic game for dynamic defense and a best response policy using evolutionary game formulation for coordinator selection. The stable equilibrium best policy to response defense is obtained from this game model. It is shown that the proposed scheme can improve reliability and save energy during the network lifetime with respect to security. PMID:25105171

A game-theoretic response strategy for coordinator attack in wireless sensor networks.

PubMed

Liu, Jianhua; Yue, Guangxue; Shen, Shigen; Shang, Huiliang; Li, Hongjie

2014-01-01

The coordinator is a specific node that controls the whole network and has a significant impact on the performance in cooperative multihop ZigBee wireless sensor networks (ZWSNs). However, the malicious node attacks coordinator nodes in an effort to waste the resources and disrupt the operation of the network. Attacking leads to a failure of one round of communication between the source nodes and destination nodes. Coordinator selection is a technique that can considerably defend against attack and reduce the data delivery delay, and increase network performance of cooperative communications. In this paper, we propose an adaptive coordinator selection algorithm using game and fuzzy logic aiming at both minimizing the average number of hops and maximizing network lifetime. The proposed game model consists of two interrelated formulations: a stochastic game for dynamic defense and a best response policy using evolutionary game formulation for coordinator selection. The stable equilibrium best policy to response defense is obtained from this game model. It is shown that the proposed scheme can improve reliability and save energy during the network lifetime with respect to security.

A formulation and analysis of combat games

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Heymann, M.; Ardema, M. D.; Rajan, N.

1985-01-01

Combat is formulated as a dynamical encounter between two opponents, each of whom has offensive capabilities and objectives. With each opponent is associated a target in the event space in which he endeavors to terminate the combat, thereby winning. If the combat terminates in both target sets simultaneously or in neither, a joint capture or a draw, respectively, is said to occur. Resolution of the encounter is formulated as a combat game; namely, as a pair of competing event-constrained differential games. If exactly one of the players can win, the optimal strategies are determined from a resulting constrained zero-sum differential game. Otherwise the optimal strategies are computed from a resulting non-zero-sum game. Since optimal combat strategies frequencies may not exist, approximate of delta-combat games are also formulated leading to approximate or delta-optimal strategies. To illustrate combat games, an example, called the turret game, is considered. This game may be thought of as a highly simplified model of air combat, yet it is sufficiently complex to exhibit a rich variety of combat behavior, much of which is not found in pursuit-evasion games.

Networks and games for precision medicine.

PubMed

Biane, Célia; Delaplace, Franck; Klaudel, Hanna

2016-12-01

Recent advances in omics technologies provide the leverage for the emergence of precision medicine that aims at personalizing therapy to patient. In this undertaking, computational methods play a central role for assisting physicians in their clinical decision-making by combining data analysis and systems biology modelling. Complex diseases such as cancer or diabetes arise from the intricate interplay of various biological molecules. Therefore, assessing drug efficiency requires to study the effects of elementary perturbations caused by diseases on relevant biological networks. In this paper, we propose a computational framework called Network-Action Game applied to best drug selection problem combining Game Theory and discrete models of dynamics (Boolean networks). Decision-making is modelled using Game Theory that defines the process of drug selection among alternative possibilities, while Boolean networks are used to model the effects of the interplay between disease and drugs actions on the patient's molecular system. The actions/strategies of disease and drugs are focused on arc alterations of the interactome. The efficiency of this framework has been evaluated for drug prediction on a model of breast cancer signalling. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cancer growth and metastasis as a metaphor of Go gaming: An Ising model approach

PubMed Central

Barradas-Bautista, Didier; Agostino, Mark; Cocho, Germinal

2018-01-01

This work aims for modeling and simulating the metastasis of cancer, via the analogy between the cancer process and the board game Go. In the game of Go, black stones that play first could correspond to a metaphor of the birth, growth, and metastasis of cancer. Moreover, playing white stones on the second turn could correspond the inhibition of cancer invasion. Mathematical modeling and algorithmic simulation of Go may therefore benefit the efforts to deploy therapies to surpass cancer illness by providing insight into the cellular growth and expansion over a tissue area. We use the Ising Hamiltonian, that models the energy exchange in interacting particles, for modeling the cancer dynamics. Parameters in the energy function refer the biochemical elements that induce cancer birth, growth, and metastasis; as well as the biochemical immune system process of defense. PMID:29718932

Emergence of unusual coexistence states in cyclic game systems.

PubMed

Park, Junpyo; Do, Younghae; Jang, Bongsoo; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2017-08-07

Evolutionary games of cyclic competitions have been extensively studied to gain insights into one of the most fundamental phenomena in nature: biodiversity that seems to be excluded by the principle of natural selection. The Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game of three species and its extensions [e.g., the Rock-Paper-Scissors-Lizard-Spock (RPSLS) game] are paradigmatic models in this field. In all previous studies, the intrinsic symmetry associated with cyclic competitions imposes a limitation on the resulting coexistence states, leading to only selective types of such states. We investigate the effect of nonuniform intraspecific competitions on coexistence and find that a wider spectrum of coexistence states can emerge and persist. This surprising finding is substantiated using three classes of cyclic game models through stability analysis, Monte Carlo simulations and continuous spatiotemporal dynamical evolution from partial differential equations. Our finding indicates that intraspecific competitions or alternative symmetry-breaking mechanisms can promote biodiversity to a broader extent than previously thought.

Cooperation and stability through periodic impulses.

PubMed

Zhang, Bo-Yu; Cressman, Ross; Tao, Yi

2010-03-29

Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual cooperation (which corresponds to the best outcome from the population perspective) can evolve when the only individually rational choice is to defect, illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, and how individuals can randomize between two strategies when neither is individually rational, illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes (BS) game that models male-female conflict over parental investment in offspring. We examine these questions from an evolutionary perspective where the evolutionary dynamics includes an impulsive effect that models sudden changes in collective population behavior. For the PD game, we show analytically that cooperation can either coexist with defection or completely take over the population, depending on the strength of the impulse. By extending these results for the PD game, we also show that males and females each evolve to a single strategy in the BS game when the impulsive effect is strong and that weak impulses stabilize the randomized strategies of this game.

Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lustosa, Bernardo C.; Cajueiro, Daniel O.

2010-03-01

We introduce a variation of the El Farol Game in which the only players who surely know the outcome of the last turn of the game are those who actually attended the bar. Other players may receive this information with reduced probability. This information can be transmitted by another player who actually attended the bar in the last turn of the game or from the media. We show that since this game is not organized around the socially optimal point, arbitrage opportunities may arise. Therefore, we study how these opportunities can be exploited by an agent. An interesting application of this model is the market of goods being auctioned, such as cars being repossessed. The results obtained here seem to closely reflect the dynamics of this market in Brazil.

Minority game with arbitrary cutoffs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Johnson, N. F.; Hui, P. M.; Zheng, Dafang; Tai, C. W.

1999-07-01

We study a model of a competing population of N adaptive agents, with similar capabilities, repeatedly deciding whether to attend a bar with an arbitrary cutoff L. Decisions are based upon past outcomes. The agents are only told whether the actual attendance is above or below L. For L∼ N/2, the game reproduces the main features of Challet and Zhang's minority game. As L is lowered, however, the mean attendances in different runs tend to divide into two groups. The corresponding standard deviations for these two groups are very different. This grouping effect results from the dynamical feedback governing the game's time-evolution, and is not reproduced if the agents are fed a random history.

Emergence of trend trading and its effects in minority game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Xing-Hua; Liang, Xiao-Bei; Wang, Nai-Jing

2006-09-01

In this paper, we extended Minority Game (MG) by equipping agents with both value and trend strategies. In the new model, agents (we call them strong-adaptation agents) can autonomically select to act as trend trader or value trader when they game and learn in system. So the new model not only can reproduce stylized factors but also has the potential to investigate into the process of some problems of securities market. We investigated the dynamics of trend trading and its impacts on securities market based on the new model. Our research found that trend trading is inevitable when strong-adaptation agents make decisions by inductive reasoning. Trend trading (of strong-adaptation agents) is not irrational behavior but shows agent's strong-adaptation intelligence, because strong-adaptation agents can take advantage of the pure value agents when they game together in hybrid system. We also found that strong-adaptation agents do better in real environment. The results of our research are different with those of behavior finance researches.

An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

PubMed Central

Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

2014-01-01

The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games. PMID:24709851

An application of evolutionary game theory to social dilemmas: the traveler's dilemma and the minimum effort coordination game.

PubMed

Iyer, Swami; Reyes, Joshua; Killingback, Timothy

2014-01-01

The Traveler's Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.

A cellular automaton model for evacuation flow using game theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Guan, Junbiao; Wang, Kaihua; Chen, Fangyue

2016-11-01

Game theory serves as a good tool to explore crowd dynamic conflicts during evacuation processes. The purpose of this study is to simulate the complicated interaction behavior among the conflicting pedestrians in an evacuation flow. Two types of pedestrians, namely, defectors and cooperators, are considered, and two important factors including fear index and cost coefficient are taken into account. By combining the snowdrift game theory with a cellular automaton (CA) model, it is shown that the increase of fear index and cost coefficient will lengthen the evacuation time, which is more apparent for large values of cost coefficient. Meanwhile, it is found that the defectors to cooperators ratio could always tend to consistent states despite different values of parameters, largely owing to self-organization effects.

Dynamic Asset Allocation Approaches for Counter-Piracy Operations

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-07-01

problem, has attracted much interest due to an increase in the number of pirate activities in recent years. Marsh [26] provided a game theoretic...model, where one interdiction asset and one surveillance asset are utilized for a counter-piracy mission. Due to the two-person zero sum game structure...that policy using online learning and simulation. The attractive aspects of rollout algorithms are its simplicity, broad applicability, and

Edge effects in game-theoretic dynamics of spatially structured tumours.

PubMed

Kaznatcheev, Artem; Scott, Jacob G; Basanta, David

2015-07-06

Cancer dynamics are an evolutionary game between cellular phenotypes. A typical assumption in this modelling paradigm is that the probability of a given phenotypic strategy interacting with another depends exclusively on the abundance of those strategies without regard for local neighbourhood structure. We address this limitation by using the Ohtsuki-Nowak transform to introduce spatial structure to the go versus grow game. We show that spatial structure can promote the invasive (go) strategy. By considering the change in neighbourhood size at a static boundary--such as a blood vessel, organ capsule or basement membrane--we show an edge effect that allows a tumour without invasive phenotypes in the bulk to have a polyclonal boundary with invasive cells. We present an example of this promotion of invasive (epithelial-mesenchymal transition-positive) cells in a metastatic colony of prostate adenocarcinoma in bone marrow. Our results caution that pathologic analyses that do not distinguish between cells in the bulk and cells at a static edge of a tumour can underestimate the number of invasive cells. Although we concentrate on applications in mathematical oncology, we expect our approach to extend to other evolutionary game models where interaction neighbourhoods change at fixed system boundaries. © 2015 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

Dynamic stability requirements during gait and standing exergames on the wii fit® system in the elderly

PubMed Central

2012-01-01

Background In rehabilitation, training intensity is usually adapted to optimize the trained system to attain better performance (overload principle). However, in balance rehabilitation, the level of intensity required during training exercises to optimize improvement in balance has rarely been studied, probably due to the difficulty in quantifying the stability level during these exercises. The goal of the present study was to test whether the stabilizing/destabilizing forces model could be used to analyze how stability is challenged during several exergames, that are more and more used in balance rehabilitation, and a dynamic functional task, such as gait. Methods Seven healthy older adults were evaluated with three-dimensional motion analysis during gait at natural and fast speed, and during three balance exergames (50/50 Challenge, Ski Slalom and Soccer). Mean and extreme values for stabilizing force, destabilizing force and the ratio of the two forces (stability index) were computed from kinematic and kinetic data to determine the mean and least level of dynamic, postural and overall balance stability, respectively. Results Mean postural stability was lower (lower mean destabilizing force) during the 50/50 Challenge game than during all the other tasks, but peak postural instability moments were less challenging during this game than during any of the other tasks, as shown by the minimum destabilizing force values. Dynamic stability was progressively more challenged (higher mean and maximum stabilizing force) from the 50/50 Challenge to the Soccer and Slalom games, to the natural gait speed task and to the fast gait speed task, increasing the overall stability difficulty (mean and minimum stability index) in the same manner. Conclusions The stabilizing/destabilizing forces model can be used to rate the level of balance requirements during different tasks such as gait or exergames. The results of our study showed that postural stability did not differ much between the evaluated tasks (except for the 50/50 Challenge), compared to dynamic stability, which was significantly less challenged during the games than during the functional tasks. Games with greater centre of mass displacements and changes in the base of support are likely to stimulate balance control enough to see improvements in balance during dynamic functional tasks, and could be tested in pathological populations with the approach used here. PMID:22607025

Operation Exodus: The Massacre of 44 Philippine Police Commandos In Mamasapano Clash

DTIC Science & Technology

2016-09-01

strategic thinking, utilizing Game Theory and Multi-Attribute Decision Making; the combination of these two dynamic tools is used to evaluate their...thinking, utilizing Game Theory and Multi-Attribute Decision Making; the combination of these two dynamic tools is used to evaluate their potential...35 A. GAME THEORETIC APPROACH ......................................................36 B. APPLYING GAME THEORY TO OPLAN: EXODUS

Application of evolutionary games to modeling carcinogenesis.

PubMed

Swierniak, Andrzej; Krzeslak, Michal

2013-06-01

We review a quite large volume of literature concerning mathematical modelling of processes related to carcinogenesis and the growth of cancer cell populations based on the theory of evolutionary games. This review, although partly idiosyncratic, covers such major areas of cancer-related phenomena as production of cytotoxins, avoidance of apoptosis, production of growth factors, motility and invasion, and intra- and extracellular signaling. We discuss the results of other authors and append to them some additional results of our own simulations dealing with the possible dynamics and/or spatial distribution of the processes discussed.

Invasion of cooperators in lattice populations: linear and non-linear public good games.

PubMed

Vásárhelyi, Zsóka; Scheuring, István

2013-08-01

A generalized version of the N-person volunteer's dilemma (NVD) Game has been suggested recently for illustrating the problem of N-person social dilemmas. Using standard replicator dynamics it can be shown that coexistence of cooperators and defectors is typical in this model. However, the question of how a rare mutant cooperator could invade a population of defectors is still open. Here we examined the dynamics of individual based stochastic models of the NVD. We analyze the dynamics in well-mixed and viscous populations. We show in both cases that coexistence between cooperators and defectors is possible; moreover, spatial aggregation of types in viscous populations can easily lead to pure cooperation. Furthermore we analyze the invasion of cooperators in populations consisting predominantly of defectors. In accordance with analytical results, in deterministic systems, we found the invasion of cooperators successful in the well-mixed case only if their initial concentration was higher than a critical threshold, defined by the replicator dynamics of the NVD. In the viscous case, however, not the initial concentration but the initial number determines the success of invasion. We show that even a single mutant cooperator can invade with a high probability, because the local density of aggregated cooperators exceeds the threshold defined by the game. Comparing the results to models using different benefit functions (linear or sigmoid), we show that the role of the benefit function is much more important in the well-mixed than in the viscous case. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Stability of Zero-Sum Games in Evolutionary Game Theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Knebel, Johannes; Krueger, Torben; Weber, Markus F.; Frey, Erwin

2014-03-01

Evolutionary game theory has evolved into a successful theoretical concept to study mechanisms that govern the evolution of ecological communities. On a mathematical level, this theory was formalized in the framework of the celebrated replicator equations (REs) and its stochastic generalizations. In our work, we analyze the long-time behavior of the REs for zero-sum games with arbitrarily many strategies, which are generalized versions of the children's game Rock-Paper-Scissors.[1] We demonstrate how to determine the strategies that survive and those that become extinct in the long run. Our results show that extinction of strategies is exponentially fast in generic setups, and that conditions for the survival can be formulated in terms of the Pfaffian of the REs' antisymmetric payoff matrix. Consequences for the stochastic dynamics, which arise in finite populations, are reflected by a generalized scaling law for the extinction time in the vicinity of critical reaction rates. Our findings underline the relevance of zero-sum games as a reference for the analysis of other models in evolutionary game theory.

A genetic approach to the rock-paper-scissors game.

PubMed

Barreto, Wendell P; Marquitti, Flavia M D; de Aguiar, Marcus A M

2017-05-21

Polymorphisms are usually associated with defenses and mating strategies, affecting the individual's fitness. Coexistence of different morphs is, therefore, not expected, since the fittest morph should outcompete the others. Nevertheless, coexistence is observed in many natural systems. For instance, males of the side-blotched lizards (Uta stansburiana) present three morphs with throat colors orange, yellow and blue, which are associated with mating strategies and territorial behavior. The three male morphs compete for females in a system that is well described by the rock-paper-scissors dynamics of game theory. Previous studies have modeled the lizards as hermaphroditic populations whose individual's behavior were determined only by their phenotypes. Here we consider an extension of this dynamical system where diploidy and sexual reproduction are explicitly taken into account. Similarly to the lizards we represent the genetic system by a single locus with three alleles, o, y, and b in a diploid chromosome with dominance of o over y and of y over b. We show that this genotypic description of the dynamics results in the same equilibrium phenotype frequencies as the phenotypic models, but affects the stability of the system, changing the parameter region where coexistence of the three morphs is possible in a rock-paper-scissors game. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Climate collective risk dilemma with feedback of real-time temperatures

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Wang, Long

2014-09-01

Controlling global warming through collective cooperation is a non-optional threshold public goods game. Previous models assume that the disaster is a sudden event and it happens with a given probability. It is shown that high risk can pave the way for reaching the cooperative target. These models, however, neglect the temperature dynamics, which is influenced by the collective behaviours. Here, we establish a temperature dynamics, and introduce the feedback between human strategy updating and the temperature change: high temperature will discount individuals' payoffs; while sufficient public goods may decrease the ever-rising temperature. We investigate how the temperature is affected by human behaviour and vice versa. It is found that, on the one hand, the temperature can be stabilized to a relatively safe level in the long run. On the other hand, the cooperation can be promoted and be maintained at a higher level, compared with public goods game models with no such feedback.

Crucial role of strategy updating for coexistence of strategies in interaction networks.

PubMed

Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan; Cao, Ming; Weissing, Franz J

2015-04-01

Network models are useful tools for studying the dynamics of social interactions in a structured population. After a round of interactions with the players in their local neighborhood, players update their strategy based on the comparison of their own payoff with the payoff of one of their neighbors. Here we show that the assumptions made on strategy updating are of crucial importance for the strategy dynamics. In the first step, we demonstrate that seemingly small deviations from the standard assumptions on updating have major implications for the evolutionary outcome of two cooperation games: cooperation can more easily persist in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, while it can go more easily extinct in a Snowdrift game. To explain these outcomes, we develop a general model for the updating of states in a network that allows us to derive conditions for the steady-state coexistence of states (or strategies). The analysis reveals that coexistence crucially depends on the number of agents consulted for updating. We conclude that updating rules are as important for evolution on a network as network structure and the nature of the interaction.

Crucial role of strategy updating for coexistence of strategies in interaction networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan; Cao, Ming; Weissing, Franz J.

2015-04-01

Network models are useful tools for studying the dynamics of social interactions in a structured population. After a round of interactions with the players in their local neighborhood, players update their strategy based on the comparison of their own payoff with the payoff of one of their neighbors. Here we show that the assumptions made on strategy updating are of crucial importance for the strategy dynamics. In the first step, we demonstrate that seemingly small deviations from the standard assumptions on updating have major implications for the evolutionary outcome of two cooperation games: cooperation can more easily persist in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, while it can go more easily extinct in a Snowdrift game. To explain these outcomes, we develop a general model for the updating of states in a network that allows us to derive conditions for the steady-state coexistence of states (or strategies). The analysis reveals that coexistence crucially depends on the number of agents consulted for updating. We conclude that updating rules are as important for evolution on a network as network structure and the nature of the interaction.

What Information Theory Says about Bounded Rational Best Response

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Wolpert, David H.

2005-01-01

Probability Collectives (PC) provides the information-theoretic extension of conventional full-rationality game theory to bounded rational games. Here an explicit solution to the equations giving the bounded rationality equilibrium of a game is presented. Then PC is used to investigate games in which the players use bounded rational best-response strategies. Next it is shown that in the continuum-time limit, bounded rational best response games result in a variant of the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory. It is then shown that for team (shared-payoff) games, this variant of replicator dynamics is identical to Newton-Raphson iterative optimization of the shared utility function.

Spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game with multiple interactive dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Su, Qi; Li, Aming; Wang, Long

2017-02-01

Spatial reciprocity is generally regarded as a positive rule facilitating the evolution of cooperation. However, a few recent studies show that, in the snowdrift game, spatial structure still could be detrimental to cooperation. Here we propose a model of multiple interactive dynamics, where each individual can cooperate and defect simultaneously against different neighbors. We realize individuals' multiple interactions simply by endowing them with strategies relevant to probabilities, and every one decides to cooperate or defect with a probability. With multiple interactive dynamics, the cooperation level in square lattices is higher than that in the well-mixed case for a wide range of cost-to-benefit ratio r, implying that spatial structure favors cooperative behavior in the snowdrift game. Moreover, in square lattices, the most favorable strategy follows a simple relation of r, which confers theoretically the average evolutionary frequency of cooperative behavior. We further extend our study to various homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, which demonstrates the robustness of our results. Here multiple interactive dynamics stabilizes the positive role of spatial structure on the evolution of cooperation and individuals' distinct reactions to different neighbors can be a new line in understanding the emergence of cooperation.

Multiscale structure in eco-evolutionary dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stacey, Blake C.

In a complex system, the individual components are neither so tightly coupled or correlated that they can all be treated as a single unit, nor so uncorrelated that they can be approximated as independent entities. Instead, patterns of interdependency lead to structure at multiple scales of organization. Evolution excels at producing such complex structures. In turn, the existence of these complex interrelationships within a biological system affects the evolutionary dynamics of that system. I present a mathematical formalism for multiscale structure, grounded in information theory, which makes these intuitions quantitative, and I show how dynamics defined in terms of population genetics or evolutionary game theory can lead to multiscale organization. For complex systems, "more is different," and I address this from several perspectives. Spatial host--consumer models demonstrate the importance of the structures which can arise due to dynamical pattern formation. Evolutionary game theory reveals the novel effects which can result from multiplayer games, nonlinear payoffs and ecological stochasticity. Replicator dynamics in an environment with mesoscale structure relates to generalized conditionalization rules in probability theory. The idea of natural selection "acting at multiple levels" has been mathematized in a variety of ways, not all of which are equivalent. We will face down the confusion, using the experience developed over the course of this thesis to clarify the situation.

Optimal dimensionality reduction of complex dynamics: the chess game as diffusion on a free-energy landscape.

PubMed

Krivov, Sergei V

2011-07-01

Dimensionality reduction is ubiquitous in the analysis of complex dynamics. The conventional dimensionality reduction techniques, however, focus on reproducing the underlying configuration space, rather than the dynamics itself. The constructed low-dimensional space does not provide a complete and accurate description of the dynamics. Here I describe how to perform dimensionality reduction while preserving the essential properties of the dynamics. The approach is illustrated by analyzing the chess game--the archetype of complex dynamics. A variable that provides complete and accurate description of chess dynamics is constructed. The winning probability is predicted by describing the game as a random walk on the free-energy landscape associated with the variable. The approach suggests a possible way of obtaining a simple yet accurate description of many important complex phenomena. The analysis of the chess game shows that the approach can quantitatively describe the dynamics of processes where human decision-making plays a central role, e.g., financial and social dynamics.

A new concept: Epigenetic game theory. Comment on: ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zheng, Xiu-Deng; Tao, Yi

2017-03-01

The evolutionary significance of the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes is a very interesting and challenging question. Wang et al. developed the concept of epigenetic game theory, and they try to use this concept to explain the interaction between paternal and maternal genomes in fertilized zygotes [1]. They emphasize that the embryogenesis can be considered as an ecological system in which two highly distinct and specialized gametes coordinate through either cooperation or competition, or both, to maximize the fitness of embryos under Darwinian selection. More specifically, they integrate game theory to model the pattern of coordination of paternal genome and maternal genomes mediated by DNA methylation dynamics, and they called this epigenetic game theory.

A Strategic Interaction Model of Punishment Favoring Contagion of Honest Behavior

PubMed Central

Cremene, Marcel; Dumitrescu, D.; Cremene, Ligia

2014-01-01

The punishment effect on social behavior is analyzed within the strategic interaction framework of Cellular Automata and computational Evolutionary Game Theory. A new game, called Social Honesty (SH), is proposed. The SH game is analyzed in spatial configurations. Probabilistic punishment is used as a dishonesty deterrence mechanism. In order to capture the intrinsic uncertainty of social environments, payoffs are described as random variables. New dynamics, with a new relation between punishment probability and punishment severity, are revealed. Punishment probability proves to be more important than punishment severity in guiding convergence towards honesty as predominant behavior. This result is confirmed by empirical evidence and reported experiments. Critical values and transition intervals for punishment probability and severity are identified and analyzed. Clusters of honest or dishonest players emerge spontaneously from the very first rounds of interaction and are determinant for the future dynamics and outcomes. PMID:24489917

The amazing evolutionary dynamics of non-linear optical systems with feedback

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yaroslavsky, Leonid

2013-09-01

Optical systems with feedback are, generally, non-linear dynamic systems. As such, they exhibit evolutionary behavior. In the paper we present results of experimental investigation of evolutionary dynamics of several models of such systems. The models are modifications of the famous mathematical "Game of Life". The modifications are two-fold: "Game of Life" rules are made stochastic and mutual influence of cells is made spatially non-uniform. A number of new phenomena in the evolutionary dynamics of the models are revealed: - "Ordering of chaos". Formation, from seed patterns, of stable maze-like patterns with chaotic "dislocations" that resemble natural patterns, such as skin patterns of some animals and fishes, see shell, fingerprints, magnetic domain patterns and alike, which one can frequently find in the nature. These patterns and their fragments exhibit a remarkable capability of unlimited growth. - "Self-controlled growth" of chaotic "live" formations into "communities" bounded, depending on the model, by a square, hexagon or octagon, until they reach a certain critical size, after which the growth stops. - "Eternal life in a bounded space" of "communities" after reaching a certain size and shape. - "Coherent shrinkage" of "mature", after reaching a certain size, "communities" into one of stable or oscillating patterns preserving in this process isomorphism of their bounding shapes until the very end.

A uniform Tauberian theorem in dynamic games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Khlopin, D. V.

2018-01-01

Antagonistic dynamic games including games represented in normal form are considered. The asymptotic behaviour of value in these games is investigated as the game horizon tends to infinity (Cesàro mean) and as the discounting parameter tends to zero (Abel mean). The corresponding Abelian-Tauberian theorem is established: it is demonstrated that in both families the game value uniformly converges to the same limit, provided that at least one of the limits exists. Analogues of one-sided Tauberian theorems are obtained. An example shows that the requirements are essential even for control problems. Bibliography: 31 titles.

Inductive Game Theory and the Dynamics of Animal Conflict

PubMed Central

DeDeo, Simon; Krakauer, David C.; Flack, Jessica C.

2010-01-01

Conflict destabilizes social interactions and impedes cooperation at multiple scales of biological organization. Of fundamental interest are the causes of turbulent periods of conflict. We analyze conflict dynamics in an monkey society model system. We develop a technique, Inductive Game Theory, to extract directly from time-series data the decision-making strategies used by individuals and groups. This technique uses Monte Carlo simulation to test alternative causal models of conflict dynamics. We find individuals base their decision to fight on memory of social factors, not on short timescale ecological resource competition. Furthermore, the social assessments on which these decisions are based are triadic (self in relation to another pair of individuals), not pairwise. We show that this triadic decision making causes long conflict cascades and that there is a high population cost of the large fights associated with these cascades. These results suggest that individual agency has been over-emphasized in the social evolution of complex aggregates, and that pair-wise formalisms are inadequate. An appreciation of the empirical foundations of the collective dynamics of conflict is a crucial step towards its effective management. PMID:20485557

Inductive game theory and the dynamics of animal conflict.

PubMed

DeDeo, Simon; Krakauer, David C; Flack, Jessica C

2010-05-13

Conflict destabilizes social interactions and impedes cooperation at multiple scales of biological organization. Of fundamental interest are the causes of turbulent periods of conflict. We analyze conflict dynamics in an monkey society model system. We develop a technique, Inductive Game Theory, to extract directly from time-series data the decision-making strategies used by individuals and groups. This technique uses Monte Carlo simulation to test alternative causal models of conflict dynamics. We find individuals base their decision to fight on memory of social factors, not on short timescale ecological resource competition. Furthermore, the social assessments on which these decisions are based are triadic (self in relation to another pair of individuals), not pairwise. We show that this triadic decision making causes long conflict cascades and that there is a high population cost of the large fights associated with these cascades. These results suggest that individual agency has been over-emphasized in the social evolution of complex aggregates, and that pair-wise formalisms are inadequate. An appreciation of the empirical foundations of the collective dynamics of conflict is a crucial step towards its effective management.

Environmental structure and competitive scoring advantages in team competitions.

PubMed

Merritt, Sears; Clauset, Aaron

2013-10-29

In most professional sports, playing field structure is kept neutral so that scoring imbalances may be attributed to differences in team skill. It thus remains unknown what impact environmental heterogeneities can have on scoring dynamics or competitive advantages. Applying a novel generative model of scoring dynamics to roughly 10 million team competitions drawn from an online game, we quantify the relationship between the structure within a competition and its scoring dynamics, while controlling the impact of chance. Despite wide structural variations, we observe a common three-phase pattern in the tempo of events. Tempo and balance are highly predictable from a competition's structural features alone and teams exploit environmental heterogeneities for sustained competitive advantage. Surprisingly, the most balanced competitions are associated with specific environmental heterogeneities, not from equally skilled teams. These results shed new light on the design principles of balanced competition, and illustrate the potential of online game data for investigating social dynamics and competition.

Environmental structure and competitive scoring advantages in team competitions

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Merritt, Sears; Clauset, Aaron

2013-10-01

In most professional sports, playing field structure is kept neutral so that scoring imbalances may be attributed to differences in team skill. It thus remains unknown what impact environmental heterogeneities can have on scoring dynamics or competitive advantages. Applying a novel generative model of scoring dynamics to roughly 10 million team competitions drawn from an online game, we quantify the relationship between the structure within a competition and its scoring dynamics, while controlling the impact of chance. Despite wide structural variations, we observe a common three-phase pattern in the tempo of events. Tempo and balance are highly predictable from a competition's structural features alone and teams exploit environmental heterogeneities for sustained competitive advantage. Surprisingly, the most balanced competitions are associated with specific environmental heterogeneities, not from equally skilled teams. These results shed new light on the design principles of balanced competition, and illustrate the potential of online game data for investigating social dynamics and competition.

Fostering cooperation of selfish agents through public goods in relation to the loners

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Jianlei; Chen, Zengqiang; Liu, Zhongxin

2016-03-01

Altruistic behaviors in multiplayer groups have obtained great attention in the context of the public goods game, which poses a riddle from the evolutionary viewpoint. Here we focus on a particular type of public goods game model in which the benefits of cooperation are either discounted or synergistically enhanced at the appearance of multiple cooperators in a group. Moreover, we focus on the three-strategies profile by adding the role of loners, besides the often-used cooperation and defection. Using the replicator dynamic equations, we investigate a range of dynamical portraits that characterizes the properties of the steady state. Analysis results indicate that loners and cooperators both have chances to be the stable equilibrium points in the presence of perturbations, while defectors fail to do so in this three-strategy competition. Moreover, the coexistence state, in which all three strategies exist in equilibrium, can be led by suitable parameters and stabilized for perturbations. These results elucidate the interplay between the characteristics of the public goods game and evolutionary dynamics in well-mixed systems.

Epigenetic information in gametes: Gaming from before fertilization. Comment on ;Epigenetic game theory: How to compute the epigenetic control of maternal-to-zygotic transition; by Qian Wang et al.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Shi, Junchao; Zhang, Xudong; Liu, Ying; Chen, Qi

2017-03-01

In their interesting article [1] Wang et al. proposed a mathematical model based on evolutionary game theory [2] to tackle the fundamental question in embryo development, that how sperm and egg interact with each other, through epigenetic processes, to form a zygote and direct successful embryo development. This work is based on the premise that epigenetic reprogramming (referring to the erasure and reconstruction of epigenetic marks, such as DNA methylation and histone modifications) after fertilization might be of paramount importance to maintain the normal development of embryos, a premise we fully agree, given the compelling experimental evidence reported [3]. Wang et al. have specifically chosen to employ the well-studied DNA methylation reprogramming process during mammalian early embryo development, as a basis to develop their mathematical model, namely epigenetic game theory (epiGame). They concluded that the DNA methylation pattern in mammalian early embryo could be formulated and quantified, and their model can be further used to quantify the interactions, such as competition and/or cooperation of expressed genes that maximize the fitness of embryos. The efforts by Wang et al. in quantitatively and systematically analyzing the beginning of life apparently hold value and represent a novel direction for future embryo development research from both theoretical and experimental biologists. On the other hand, we see their theory still at its infancy, because there are plenty more parameters to consider and there are spaces for debates, such as the cases of haploid embryo development [4]. Here, we briefly comment on the dynamic process of epigenetic reprogramming that goes beyond DNA methylation, a dynamic interplay that involves histone modifications, non-coding RNAs, transposable elements et al., as well as the potential input of the various types of 'hereditary' epigenetic information in the gametes - a game that has started before the fertilization.

Weight of fitness deviation governs strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics.

PubMed

Pandit, Varun; Mukhopadhyay, Archan; Chakraborty, Sagar

2018-03-01

Replicator equation-a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics-mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the average fitnesses of the evolving population under consideration. In this paper, we deal with two discrete versions of the replicator equation employed to study evolution in a population where any two players' interaction is modelled by a two-strategy symmetric normal-form game. There are twelve distinct classes of such games, each typified by a particular ordinal relationship among the elements of the corresponding payoff matrix. Here, we find the sufficient conditions for the existence of asymptotic solutions of the replicator equations such that the solutions-fixed points, periodic orbits, and chaotic trajectories-are all strictly physical, meaning that the frequency of any strategy lies inside the closed interval zero to one at all times. Thus, we elaborate on which of the twelve types of games are capable of showing meaningful physical solutions and for which of the two types of replicator equation. Subsequently, we introduce the concept of the weight of fitness deviation that is the scaling factor in a positive affine transformation connecting two payoff matrices such that the corresponding one-shot games have exactly same Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable states. The weight also quantifies how much the excess of fitness of a strategy over the average fitness of the population affects the per capita change in the frequency of the strategy. Intriguingly, the weight's variation is capable of making the Nash equilibria and the evolutionary stable states, useless by introducing strict physical chaos in the replicator dynamics based on the normal-form game.

A Study on Standard Competition with Network Effect Based on Evolutionary Game Model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Ye; Wang, Bingdong; Li, Kangning

Owing to networks widespread in modern society, standard competition with network effect is now endowed with new connotation. This paper aims to study the impact of network effect on standard competition; it is organized in the mode of "introduction-model setup-equilibrium analysis-conclusion". Starting from a well-structured model of evolutionary game, it is then extended to a dynamic analysis. This article proves both theoretically and empirically that whether or not a standard can lead the market trends depends on the utility it would bring, and the author also discusses some advisable strategies revolving around the two factors of initial position and border break.

Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Qin, Shao-Meng; Zhang, Guo-Yong; Chen, Yong

2009-12-01

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, in the real world, social interaction could change the relationship among people. And the change of social structure will also affect people’s strategies. We build a coevolution model of prisoner’s dilemma game and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Differing from other coevolution models, players rewire their network connections according to the density of cooperation and other players’ payoffs. We use a parameter α to control the effect of payoff in the process of rewiring. Based on the asynchronous update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to those who are richer, the temptation can increase the cooperation density.

How can we model selectively neutral density dependence in evolutionary games.

PubMed

Argasinski, Krzysztof; Kozłowski, Jan

2008-03-01

The problem of density dependence appears in all approaches to the modelling of population dynamics. It is pertinent to classic models (i.e., Lotka-Volterra's), and also population genetics and game theoretical models related to the replicator dynamics. There is no density dependence in the classic formulation of replicator dynamics, which means that population size may grow to infinity. Therefore the question arises: How is unlimited population growth suppressed in frequency-dependent models? Two categories of solutions can be found in the literature. In the first, replicator dynamics is independent of background fitness. In the second type of solution, a multiplicative suppression coefficient is used, as in a logistic equation. Both approaches have disadvantages. The first one is incompatible with the methods of life history theory and basic probabilistic intuitions. The logistic type of suppression of per capita growth rate stops trajectories of selection when population size reaches the maximal value (carrying capacity); hence this method does not satisfy selective neutrality. To overcome these difficulties, we must explicitly consider turn-over of individuals dependent on mortality rate. This new approach leads to two interesting predictions. First, the equilibrium value of population size is lower than carrying capacity and depends on the mortality rate. Second, although the phase portrait of selection trajectories is the same as in density-independent replicator dynamics, pace of selection slows down when population size approaches equilibrium, and then remains constant and dependent on the rate of turn-over of individuals.

How to reach linguistic consensus: a proof of convergence for the naming game.

PubMed

De Vylder, Bart; Tuyls, Karl

2006-10-21

In this paper we introduce a mathematical model of naming games. Naming games have been widely used within research on the origins and evolution of language. Despite the many interesting empirical results these studies have produced, most of this research lacks a formal elucidating theory. In this paper we show how a population of agents can reach linguistic consensus, i.e. learn to use one common language to communicate with one another. Our approach differs from existing formal work in two important ways: one, we relax the too strong assumption that an agent samples infinitely often during each time interval. This assumption is usually made to guarantee convergence of an empirical learning process to a deterministic dynamical system. Two, we provide a proof that under these new realistic conditions, our model converges to a common language for the entire population of agents. Finally the model is experimentally validated.

Learning and adaptation: neural and behavioural mechanisms behind behaviour change

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lowe, Robert; Sandamirskaya, Yulia

2018-01-01

This special issue presents perspectives on learning and adaptation as they apply to a number of cognitive phenomena including pupil dilation in humans and attention in robots, natural language acquisition and production in embodied agents (robots), human-robot game play and social interaction, neural-dynamic modelling of active perception and neural-dynamic modelling of infant development in the Piagetian A-not-B task. The aim of the special issue, through its contributions, is to highlight some of the critical neural-dynamic and behavioural aspects of learning as it grounds adaptive responses in robotic- and neural-dynamic systems.

Evolutionary potential games on lattices

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szabó, György; Borsos, István

2016-04-01

Game theory provides a general mathematical background to study the effect of pair interactions and evolutionary rules on the macroscopic behavior of multi-player games where players with a finite number of strategies may represent a wide scale of biological objects, human individuals, or even their associations. In these systems the interactions are characterized by matrices that can be decomposed into elementary matrices (games) and classified into four types. The concept of decomposition helps the identification of potential games and also the evaluation of the potential that plays a crucial role in the determination of the preferred Nash equilibrium, and defines the Boltzmann distribution towards which these systems evolve for suitable types of dynamical rules. This survey draws parallel between the potential games and the kinetic Ising type models which are investigated for a wide scale of connectivity structures. We discuss briefly the applicability of the tools and concepts of statistical physics and thermodynamics. Additionally the general features of ordering phenomena, phase transitions and slow relaxations are outlined and applied to evolutionary games. The discussion extends to games with three or more strategies. Finally we discuss what happens when the system is weakly driven out of the "equilibrium state" by adding non-potential components representing games of cyclic dominance.

Serious science games, social selves and complex nature of possible selves

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Khan, Mubina Schroeder

2012-12-01

Margaret Beier, Leslie Miller, and Shu Wang's paper, Science games and the development of possible selves examines the effects of game-playing in a serious scientific game on science possible selves identity creation, utilizing a possible selves identification instrument they created. This paper continues the discussion that Beier and colleagues start in the paper by calling into question both the idea that a predictive model of science career choice can be attained by serious science game-playing and the nature of the instrument created and used by Beier and her colleagues to identify participants' creation of science possible selves. Recommendations include incorporating the idea of possible selves as being complex, dynamic and intertwined with self-concept in interpreting their findings and casting a wider net to capture the phenomena of their participants' identities and experiences by potentially making use of possible selves identification methodologies from the career training arena.

Reviewing the Evidence: In Pursuit of a Framework for Parkinson Disease Rehabilitation with Games.

PubMed

Tece Bayrak, Aslihan; Wünsche, Burkhard; Lutteroth, Christof

2016-01-01

Exercise gaming has been receiving a significant interest from both consumers and researchers. Be it for the purposes of weight loss, physical fitness or even just enjoyment, the potential of games to support rehabilitation has also been under investigation for a while. Due to our aging society, game based therapies could be a solution for optimizing resources and reducing rehabilitation costs. This paper aims to discuss the potential capacity of games as systems to enhance the relation of physical exercise and cognition for the rehabilitation of Parkinson Disease. Our investigation demonstrates that there is no established methodology for games in rehabilitation of Parkinson's addressing how games can encapsulate physical exercise strategies while providing safety, continuous monitoring and cognitive development exercises in facilitation of rehabilitation. Since rehabilitation with games is trending, yet to be developed rehabilitation strategies would benefit from new insights into the relationship between game worlds, physical exercise and motor-cognitive training. Therefore, it is useful to do further research into realizing (1) a relational model that demonstrates the relation between game world (composed of game features including formal game elements, audio-visual features, mechanics and dynamics), motor skills, cognition and physical exercise for both generic and specific rehabilitation purposes, (2) a structured task creation approach for game features that reconciles specific rehabilitation outcomes, correct level of engagement, task difficulty and safety requirements for target demographic.

Player Modeling for Intelligent Difficulty Adjustment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Missura, Olana; Gärtner, Thomas

In this paper we aim at automatically adjusting the difficulty of computer games by clustering players into different types and supervised prediction of the type from short traces of gameplay. An important ingredient of video games is to challenge players by providing them with tasks of appropriate and increasing difficulty. How this difficulty should be chosen and increase over time strongly depends on the ability, experience, perception and learning curve of each individual player. It is a subjective parameter that is very difficult to set. Wrong choices can easily lead to players stopping to play the game as they get bored (if underburdened) or frustrated (if overburdened). An ideal game should be able to adjust its difficulty dynamically governed by the player’s performance. Modern video games utilise a game-testing process to investigate among other factors the perceived difficulty for a multitude of players. In this paper, we investigate how machine learning techniques can be used for automatic difficulty adjustment. Our experiments confirm the potential of machine learning in this application.

Security Analysis of Selected AMI Failure Scenarios Using Agent Based Game Theoretic Simulation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Abercrombie, Robert K; Schlicher, Bob G; Sheldon, Frederick T

Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. We concentrated our analysis on the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) functional domain which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) working group has currently documented 29 failure scenarios. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain. From thesemore » five selected scenarios, we characterize them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrates how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.« less

Joint Real-Time Energy and Demand-Response Management using a Hybrid Coalitional-Noncooperative Game

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

He, Fulin; Gu, Yi; Hao, Jun

In order to model the interactions among utility companies, building demands and renewable energy generators (REGs), a hybrid coalitional-noncooperative game framework has been proposed. We formulate a dynamic non-cooperative game to study the energy dispatch within multiple utility companies, while we take a coalitional perspective on REGs and buildings demands through a hedonic coalition formation game approach. In this case, building demands request different power supply from REGs, then the building demands can be organized into an ultimate coalition structure through a distributed hedonic shift algorithm. At the same time, utility companies can also obtain a stable power generation profile.more » In addition, the interactive progress among the utility companies and building demands which cannot be supplied by REGs is implemented by distributed game theoretic algorithms. Numerical results illustrate that the proposed hybrid coalitional-noncooperative game scheme reduces the cost of both building demands and utility companies compared with the initial scene.« less

Cancer treatment scheduling and dynamic heterogeneity in social dilemmas of tumour acidity and vasculature.

PubMed

Kaznatcheev, Artem; Vander Velde, Robert; Scott, Jacob G; Basanta, David

2017-03-14

Tumours are diverse ecosystems with persistent heterogeneity in various cancer hallmarks like self-sufficiency of growth factor production for angiogenesis and reprogramming of energy metabolism for aerobic glycolysis. This heterogeneity has consequences for diagnosis, treatment and disease progression. We introduce the double goods game to study the dynamics of these traits using evolutionary game theory. We model glycolytic acid production as a public good for all tumour cells and oxygen from vascularisation via vascular endothelial growth factor production as a club good benefiting non-glycolytic tumour cells. This results in three viable phenotypic strategies: glycolytic, angiogenic and aerobic non-angiogenic. We classify the dynamics into three qualitatively distinct regimes: (1) fully glycolytic; (2) fully angiogenic; or (3) polyclonal in all three cell types. The third regime allows for dynamic heterogeneity even with linear goods, something that was not possible in prior public good models that considered glycolysis or growth factor production in isolation. The cyclic dynamics of the polyclonal regime stress the importance of timing for anti-glycolysis treatments like lonidamine. The existence of qualitatively different dynamic regimes highlights the order effects of treatments. In particular, we consider the potential of vascular normalisation as a neoadjuvant therapy before follow-up with interventions like buffer therapy.

An evolutionary game approach for determination of the structural conflicts in signed networks

PubMed Central

Tan, Shaolin; Lü, Jinhu

2016-01-01

Social or biochemical networks can often divide into two opposite alliances in response to structural conflicts between positive (friendly, activating) and negative (hostile, inhibiting) interactions. Yet, the underlying dynamics on how the opposite alliances are spontaneously formed to minimize the structural conflicts is still unclear. Here, we demonstrate that evolutionary game dynamics provides a felicitous possible tool to characterize the evolution and formation of alliances in signed networks. Indeed, an evolutionary game dynamics on signed networks is proposed such that each node can adaptively adjust its choice of alliances to maximize its own fitness, which yet leads to a minimization of the structural conflicts in the entire network. Numerical experiments show that the evolutionary game approach is universally efficient in quality and speed to find optimal solutions for all undirected or directed, unweighted or weighted signed networks. Moreover, the evolutionary game approach is inherently distributed. These characteristics thus suggest the evolutionary game dynamic approach as a feasible and effective tool for determining the structural conflicts in large-scale on-line signed networks. PMID:26915581

Complex traffic flow that allows as well as hampers lane-changing intrinsically contains social-dilemma structures

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Iwamura, Yoshiro; Tanimoto, Jun

2018-02-01

To investigate an interesting question as to whether or not social dilemma structures can be found in a realistic traffic flow reproduced by a model, we built a new microscopic model in which an intentional driver may try lane-changing to go in front of other vehicles and may hamper others’ lane-changes. Our model consists of twofold parts; cellular automaton emulating a real traffic flow and evolutionary game theory to implement a driver’s decision making-process. Numerical results reveal that a social dilemma like the multi-player chicken game or prisoner’s dilemma game emerges depending on the traffic phase. This finding implies that a social dilemma, which has been investigated by applied mathematics so far, hides behind a traffic flow, which has been explored by fluid dynamics. Highlight - Complex system of traffic flow with consideration of driver’s decision making process is concerned. - A new model dovetailing cellular automaton with game theory is established. - Statistical result from numerical simulations reveals a social dilemma structure underlying traffic flow. - The social dilemma is triggered by a driver’s egocentric actions of lane-changing and hampering other’s lane-change.

Thermal treatment of the minority game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Burgos, E.; Ceva, Horacio; Perazzo, R. P.

2002-03-01

We study a cost function for the aggregate behavior of all the agents involved in the minority game (MG) or the bar attendance model (BAM). The cost function allows us to define a deterministic, synchronous dynamic that yields results that have the main relevant features than those of the probabilistic, sequential dynamics used for the MG or the BAM. We define a temperature through a Langevin approach in terms of the fluctuations of the average attendance. We prove that the cost function is an extensive quantity that can play the role of an internal energy of the many-agent system while the temperature so defined is an intensive parameter. We compare the results of the thermal perturbation to the deterministic dynamics and prove that they agree with those obtained with the MG or BAM in the limit of very low temperature.

Thermal treatment of the minority game.

PubMed

Burgos, E; Ceva, Horacio; Perazzo, R P J

2002-03-01

We study a cost function for the aggregate behavior of all the agents involved in the minority game (MG) or the bar attendance model (BAM). The cost function allows us to define a deterministic, synchronous dynamic that yields results that have the main relevant features than those of the probabilistic, sequential dynamics used for the MG or the BAM. We define a temperature through a Langevin approach in terms of the fluctuations of the average attendance. We prove that the cost function is an extensive quantity that can play the role of an internal energy of the many-agent system while the temperature so defined is an intensive parameter. We compare the results of the thermal perturbation to the deterministic dynamics and prove that they agree with those obtained with the MG or BAM in the limit of very low temperature.

Sequential interactions-in which one player plays first and another responds-promote cooperation in evolutionary-dynamical simulations of single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games.

PubMed

Laird, Robert A

2018-09-07

Cooperation is a central topic in evolutionary biology because (a) it is difficult to reconcile why individuals would act in a way that benefits others if such action is costly to themselves, and (b) it underpins many of the 'major transitions of evolution', making it essential for explaining the origins of successively higher levels of biological organization. Within evolutionary game theory, the Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolution of cooperation in dyadic interactions. In single-shot versions of these games, wherein individuals play each other only once, players typically act simultaneously rather than sequentially. Allowing one player to respond to the actions of its co-player-in the absence of any possibility of the responder being rewarded for cooperation or punished for defection, as in simultaneous or sequential iterated games-may seem to invite more incentive for exploitation and retaliation in single-shot games, compared to when interactions occur simultaneously, thereby reducing the likelihood that cooperative strategies can thrive. To the contrary, I use lattice-based, evolutionary-dynamical simulation models of single-shot games to demonstrate that under many conditions, sequential interactions have the potential to enhance unilaterally or mutually cooperative outcomes and increase the average payoff of populations, relative to simultaneous interactions-benefits that are especially prevalent in a spatially explicit context. This surprising result is attributable to the presence of conditional strategies that emerge in sequential games that can't occur in the corresponding simultaneous versions. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Fixation, transient landscape, and diffusion dilemma in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhou, Da; Qian, Hong

2011-09-01

Agent-based stochastic models for finite populations have recently received much attention in the game theory of evolutionary dynamics. Both the ultimate fixation and the pre-fixation transient behavior are important to a full understanding of the dynamics. In this paper, we study the transient dynamics of the well-mixed Moran process through constructing a landscape function. It is shown that the landscape playing a central theoretical “device” that integrates several lines of inquiries: the stable behavior of the replicator dynamics, the long-time fixation, and continuous diffusion approximation associated with asymptotically large population. Several issues relating to the transient dynamics are discussed: (i) multiple time scales phenomenon associated with intra- and inter-attractoral dynamics; (ii) discontinuous transition in stochastically stationary process akin to Maxwell construction in equilibrium statistical physics; and (iii) the dilemma diffusion approximation facing as a continuous approximation of the discrete evolutionary dynamics. It is found that rare events with exponentially small probabilities, corresponding to the uphill movements and barrier crossing in the landscape with multiple wells that are made possible by strong nonlinear dynamics, plays an important role in understanding the origin of the complexity in evolutionary, nonlinear biological systems.

System dynamics of behaviour-evolutionary mix-game models

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gou, Cheng-Ling; Gao, Jie-Ping; Chen, Fang

2010-11-01

In real financial markets there are two kinds of traders: one is fundamentalist, and the other is a trend-follower. The mix-game model is proposed to mimic such phenomena. In a mix-game model there are two groups of agents: Group 1 plays the majority game and Group 2 plays the minority game. In this paper, we investigate such a case that some traders in real financial markets could change their investment behaviours by assigning the evolutionary abilities to agents: if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will join the other group; and agents will repeat such an evolution at certain time intervals. Through the simulations, we obtain the following findings: (i) the volatilities of systems increase with the increase of the number of agents in Group 1 and the times of behavioural changes of all agents; (ii) the performances of agents in both groups and the stabilities of systems become better if all agents take more time to observe their new investment behaviours; (iii) there are two-phase zones of market and non-market and two-phase zones of evolution and non-evolution; (iv) parameter configurations located within the cross areas between the zones of markets and the zones of evolution are suited for simulating the financial markets.

Life-history differences favor evolution of male dimorphism in competitive games.

PubMed

Smallegange, Isabel M; Johansson, Jacob

2014-02-01

Many species exhibit two discrete male morphs: fighters and sneakers. Fighters are large and possess weapons but may mature slowly. Sneakers are small and have no weapons but can sneak matings and may mature quickly to start mating earlier in life than fighters. However, how differences in competitive ability and life history interact to determine male morph coexistence has not yet been investigated within a single framework. Here we integrate demography and game theory into a two-sex population model to study the evolution of strategies that result in the coexistence of fighters and sneakers. We incorporate differences in maturation time between the morphs and use a mating-probability matrix analogous to the classic hawk-dove game. Using adaptive dynamics, we show that male dimorphism evolves more easily in our model than in classic game theory approaches. Our results also revealed an interaction between life-history differences and sneaker competitiveness, which shows that demography and competitive games should be treated as interlinked mechanisms to understand the evolution of male dimorphism. Applying our approach to empirical data on bulb mites (Rhizoglyphus robini), coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), and bullhorned dung beetles (Onthophagus taurus) indicates that observed occurrences of male dimorphism are in general agreement with model predictions.

Detection of communities with Naming Game-based methods

PubMed Central

Ribeiro, Carlos Henrique Costa

2017-01-01

Complex networks are often organized in groups or communities of agents that share the same features and/or functions, and this structural organization is built naturally with the formation of the system. In social networks, we argue that the dynamic of linguistic interactions of agreement among people can be a crucial factor in generating this community structure, given that sharing opinions with another person bounds them together, and disagreeing constantly would probably weaken the relationship. We present here a computational model of opinion exchange that uncovers the community structure of a network. Our aim is not to present a new community detection method proper, but to show how a model of social communication dynamics can reveal the (simple and overlapping) community structure in an emergent way. Our model is based on a standard Naming Game, but takes into consideration three social features: trust, uncertainty and opinion preference, that are built over time as agents communicate among themselves. We show that the separate addition of each social feature in the Naming Game results in gradual improvements with respect to community detection. In addition, the resulting uncertainty and trust values classify nodes and edges according to role and position in the network. Also, our model has shown a degree of accuracy both for non-overlapping and overlapping communities that are comparable with most algorithms specifically designed for topological community detection. PMID:28797097

The dynamics of human behavior in the public goods game with institutional incentives.

PubMed

Dong, Yali; Zhang, Boyu; Tao, Yi

2016-06-24

The empirical research on the public goods game (PGG) indicates that both institutional rewards and institutional punishment can curb free-riding and that the punishment effect is stronger than the reward effect. Self-regarding models that are based on Nash equilibrium (NE) strategies or evolutionary game dynamics correctly predict which incentives are best at promoting cooperation, but individuals do not play these rational strategies overall. The goal of our study is to investigate the dynamics of human decision making in the repeated PGG with institutional incentives. We consider that an individual's contribution is affected by four factors, which are self-interest, the behavior of others, the reaction to rewards, and the reaction to punishment. We find that people on average do not react to rewards and punishment, and that self-interest and the behavior of others sufficiently explain the dynamics of human behavior. Further analysis suggests that institutional incentives promote cooperation by affecting the self-regarding preference and that the other-regarding preference seems to be independent of incentive schemes. Because individuals do not change their behavioral patterns even if they were not rewarded or punished, the mere potential to punish defectors and reward cooperators can lead to considerable increases in the level of cooperation.

Gold rush - A swarm dynamics in games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zelinka, Ivan; Bukacek, Michal

2017-07-01

This paper is focused on swarm intelligence techniques and its practical use in computer games. The aim is to show how a swarm dynamics can be generated by multiplayer game, then recorded, analyzed and eventually controlled. In this paper we also discuss possibility to use swarm intelligence instead of game players. Based on our previous experiments two games, using swarm algorithms are mentioned briefly here. The first one is strategy game StarCraft: Brood War, and TicTacToe in which SOMA algorithm has also take a role of player against human player. Open research reported here has shown potential benefit of swarm computation in the field of strategy games and players strategy based on swarm behavior record and analysis. We propose new game called Gold Rush as an experimental environment for human or artificial swarm behavior and consequent analysis.

A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lin, XuXun; Yuan, PengCheng

2018-01-01

In this research we consider commuters' dynamic learning effect by modeling the trip mode choice behavior from a new perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory. We explore the behavior pattern of different types of commuters and study the evolution path and equilibrium properties under different traffic conditions. We further establish a dynamic parking charge optimal control (referred to as DPCOC) model to alter commuters' trip mode choice while minimizing the total social cost. Numerical tests show. (1) Under fixed parking fee policy, the evolutionary results are completely decided by the travel time and the only method for public transit induction is to increase the parking charge price. (2) Compared with fixed parking fee policy, DPCOC policy proposed in this research has several advantages. Firstly, it can effectively turn the evolutionary path and evolutionary stable strategy to a better situation while minimizing the total social cost. Secondly, it can reduce the sensitivity of trip mode choice behavior to traffic congestion and improve the ability to resist interferences and emergencies. Thirdly, it is able to control the private car proportion to a stable state and make the trip behavior more predictable for the transportation management department. The research results can provide theoretical basis and decision-making references for commuters' mode choice prediction, dynamic setting of urban parking charge prices and public transit induction.

Dynamic User Modeling within a Game-Based ITS

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Snow, Erica L.

2015-01-01

Intelligent tutoring systems are adaptive learning environments designed to support individualized instruction. The adaptation embedded within these systems is often guided by user models that represent one or more aspects of students' domain knowledge, actions, or performance. The proposed project focuses on the development and testing of user…

Measuring Engagement as Students Learn Dynamic Systems and Control with a Video Game

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Coller, B. D.; Shernoff, David J.; Strati, Anna

2011-01-01

The paper presents results of a multi-year quasi-experimental study of student engagement during which a video game was introduced into an undergraduate dynamic systems and control course. The video game, "EduTorcs", provided challenges in which students devised control algorithms that drive virtual cars and ride virtual bikes through a…

Model-Free Adaptive Control for Unknown Nonlinear Zero-Sum Differential Game.

PubMed

Zhong, Xiangnan; He, Haibo; Wang, Ding; Ni, Zhen

2018-05-01

In this paper, we present a new model-free globalized dual heuristic dynamic programming (GDHP) approach for the discrete-time nonlinear zero-sum game problems. First, the online learning algorithm is proposed based on the GDHP method to solve the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation associated with optimal regulation control problem. By setting backward one step of the definition of performance index, the requirement of system dynamics, or an identifier is relaxed in the proposed method. Then, three neural networks are established to approximate the optimal saddle point feedback control law, the disturbance law, and the performance index, respectively. The explicit updating rules for these three neural networks are provided based on the data generated during the online learning along the system trajectories. The stability analysis in terms of the neural network approximation errors is discussed based on the Lyapunov approach. Finally, two simulation examples are provided to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.

Dynamical phase diagrams of a love capacity constrained prey-predator model

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Simin, P. Toranj; Jafari, Gholam Reza; Ausloos, Marcel; Caiafa, Cesar Federico; Caram, Facundo; Sonubi, Adeyemi; Arcagni, Alberto; Stefani, Silvana

2018-02-01

One interesting question in love relationships is: finally, what and when is the end of this love relationship? Using a prey-predator Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra (VLV) model we imply cooperation and competition tendency between people in order to describe a "love dilemma game". We select the most simple but immediately most complex case for studying the set of nonlinear differential equations, i.e. that implying three persons, being at the same time prey and predator. We describe four different scenarios in such a love game containing either a one-way love or a love triangle. Our results show that it is hard to love more than one person simultaneously. Moreover, to love several people simultaneously is an unstable state. We find some condition in which persons tend to have a friendly relationship and love someone in spite of their antagonistic interaction. We demonstrate the dynamics by displaying flow diagrams.

Influence of periodic external fields in multiagent models with language dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Palombi, Filippo; Ferriani, Stefano; Toti, Simona

2017-12-01

We investigate large-scale effects induced by external fields, phenomenologically interpreted as mass media, in multiagent models evolving with the microscopic dynamics of the binary naming game. In particular, we show that a single external field, broadcasting information at regular time intervals, can reverse the majority opinion of the population, provided the frequency and the effectiveness of the sent messages lie above well-defined thresholds. We study the phase structure of the model in the mean field approximation and in numerical simulations with several network topologies. We also investigate the influence on the agent dynamics of two competing external fields, periodically broadcasting different messages. In finite regions of the parameter space we observe periodic equilibrium states in which the average opinion densities are reversed with respect to naive expectations. Such equilibria occur in two cases: (i) when the frequencies of the competing messages are different but close to each other; (ii) when the frequencies are equal and the relative time shift of the messages does not exceed half a period. We interpret the observed phenomena as a result of the interplay between the external fields and the internal dynamics of the agents and conclude that, depending on the model parameters, the naming game is consistent with scenarios of first- or second-mover advantage (to borrow an expression from the jargon of business strategy).

Mean-field analysis of an inductive reasoning game: Application to influenza vaccination

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Breban, Romulus; Vardavas, Raffaele; Blower, Sally

2007-09-01

Recently we have introduced an inductive reasoning game of voluntary yearly vaccination to establish whether or not a population of individuals acting in their own self-interest would be able to prevent influenza epidemics. Here, we analyze our model to describe the dynamics of the collective yearly vaccination uptake. We discuss the mean-field equations of our model and first order effects of fluctuations. We explain why our model predicts that severe epidemics are periodically expected even without the introduction of pandemic strains. We find that fluctuations in the collective yearly vaccination uptake induce severe epidemics with an expected periodicity that depends on the number of independent decision makers in the population. The mean-field dynamics also reveal that there are conditions for which the dynamics become robust to the fluctuations. However, the transition between fluctuation-sensitive and fluctuation-robust dynamics occurs for biologically implausible parameters. We also analyze our model when incentive-based vaccination programs are offered. When a family-based incentive is offered, the expected periodicity of severe epidemics is increased. This results from the fact that the number of independent decision makers is reduced, increasing the effect of the fluctuations. However, incentives based on the number of years of prepayment of vaccination may yield fluctuation-robust dynamics where severe epidemics are prevented. In this case, depending on prepayment, the transition between fluctuation-sensitive and fluctuation-robust dynamics may occur for biologically plausible parameters. Our analysis provides a practical method for identifying how many years of free vaccination should be provided in order to successfully ameliorate influenza epidemics.

Mean-field analysis of an inductive reasoning game: application to influenza vaccination.

PubMed

Breban, Romulus; Vardavas, Raffaele; Blower, Sally

2007-09-01

Recently we have introduced an inductive reasoning game of voluntary yearly vaccination to establish whether or not a population of individuals acting in their own self-interest would be able to prevent influenza epidemics. Here, we analyze our model to describe the dynamics of the collective yearly vaccination uptake. We discuss the mean-field equations of our model and first order effects of fluctuations. We explain why our model predicts that severe epidemics are periodically expected even without the introduction of pandemic strains. We find that fluctuations in the collective yearly vaccination uptake induce severe epidemics with an expected periodicity that depends on the number of independent decision makers in the population. The mean-field dynamics also reveal that there are conditions for which the dynamics become robust to the fluctuations. However, the transition between fluctuation-sensitive and fluctuation-robust dynamics occurs for biologically implausible parameters. We also analyze our model when incentive-based vaccination programs are offered. When a family-based incentive is offered, the expected periodicity of severe epidemics is increased. This results from the fact that the number of independent decision makers is reduced, increasing the effect of the fluctuations. However, incentives based on the number of years of prepayment of vaccination may yield fluctuation-robust dynamics where severe epidemics are prevented. In this case, depending on prepayment, the transition between fluctuation-sensitive and fluctuation-robust dynamics may occur for biologically plausible parameters. Our analysis provides a practical method for identifying how many years of free vaccination should be provided in order to successfully ameliorate influenza epidemics.

Role of word-of-mouth for programs of voluntary vaccination: A game-theoretic approach.

PubMed

Bhattacharyya, Samit; Bauch, Chris T; Breban, Romulus

2015-11-01

We propose a model describing the synergetic feedback between word-of-mouth (WoM) and epidemic dynamics controlled by voluntary vaccination. The key feature consists in combining a game-theoretic model for the spread of WoM and a compartmental model describing VSIR disease dynamics in the presence of a program of voluntary vaccination. We evaluate and compare two scenarios for determinants of behavior, depending on what WoM disseminates: (1) vaccine advertising, which may occur whether or not an epidemic is ongoing and (2) epidemic status, notably disease prevalence. Understanding the synergy between the two strategies could be particularly important for designing voluntary vaccination campaigns. We find that, in the initial phase of an epidemic, vaccination uptake is determined more by vaccine advertising than the epidemic status. As the epidemic progresses, epidemic status becomes increasingly important for vaccination uptake, considerably accelerating vaccination uptake toward a stable vaccination coverage. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Cooperation among cancer cells as public goods games on Voronoi networks.

PubMed

Archetti, Marco

2016-05-07

Cancer cells produce growth factors that diffuse and sustain tumour proliferation, a form of cooperation that can be studied using mathematical models of public goods in the framework of evolutionary game theory. Cell populations, however, form heterogeneous networks that cannot be described by regular lattices or scale-free networks, the types of graphs generally used in the study of cooperation. To describe the dynamics of growth factor production in populations of cancer cells, I study public goods games on Voronoi networks, using a range of non-linear benefits that account for the known properties of growth factors, and different types of diffusion gradients. The results are surprisingly similar to those obtained on regular graphs and different from results on scale-free networks, revealing that network heterogeneity per se does not promote cooperation when public goods diffuse beyond one-step neighbours. The exact shape of the diffusion gradient is not crucial, however, whereas the type of non-linear benefit is an essential determinant of the dynamics. Public goods games on Voronoi networks can shed light on intra-tumour heterogeneity, the evolution of resistance to therapies that target growth factors, and new types of cell therapy. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Strategic interactions, affective reactions, and fast adaptations.

PubMed

Kareev, Yaakov; Avrahami, Judith; Fiedler, Klaus

2014-06-01

We studied repeated choices under uncertainty in situations in which the source of uncertainty is the choice of an interaction partner. In 1 experiment the participants engaged in repeated decisions in a mixed motive game; in another experiment the options and outcomes were identical to those in the 1st, but periods of the mixed-motive game alternated with periods of a coordination game, with the change in period not announced. We analyzed choice dynamics-the relationship between an outcome and the choice that followed-and aggregate choice probabilities to gauge the relative merit of reward-based or affect-based accounts (the affects considered being disappointment and regret). In both experiments choice dynamics were essentially identical and were compatible with only the regret-based account. This was true irrespective of the game played or the stage (early or late) of the game. Moreover, the same dynamics explained the very different aggregate probabilities with which the 2 options were chosen in the 2 games and the remarkably fast adaptations to unannounced changes in the game played. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

"RePlay Health": An Experiential Role-Playing Sport for Modeling Healthcare Decisions, Policies, and Outcomes.

PubMed

Kaufman, Geoff; Flanagan, Mary; Seidman, Max; Wien, Simone

2015-08-01

This article presents the design and empirical investigation of the "RePlay Health" game ( www.replayhealth.com/ ), a novel "role-playing sport" derived from a complex, data-driven, computational simulation of healthcare dynamics. By immersing players in a fictional world in which they take on the role of characters facing specific behavioral and environmental risk factors, the "RePlay Health" game models the impact of health and healthcare policy on individual-level livelihood and community-level productivity. A randomized experiment tested the efficacy of the game for inspiring shifts in thinking about public health and healthcare policy. This study compared the impact of actively playing the game versus passively spectating: 31 young adults were assigned to one of these two roles. Participants completed pretest and posttest measures of their subjective ranking of healthcare policies and attributions for health outcomes. Active players (compared with spectators) reported significantly higher prioritizations (from pretest to posttest) in their subjective ranking of several health policies modeled by the game, such as "improving postdischarge care" and "increasing access to healthy foods." Furthermore, players, but not spectators, were significantly more likely following gameplay to identify environmental or systemic factors as potential causes of health problems. The fact that significant results emerged with a 1-week gap between gameplay and measurement demonstrates that the game could exert a lasting impact on attitudes and perceptions. More broadly, this work illustrates the value of incorporating experiential components, such as narrative, embodiment, and role-playing, in designing efficacious games for health.

Tolerance-based punishment in continuous public goods game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Gao, Jia; Li, Zhi; Cong, Rui; Wang, Long

2012-08-01

Altruistic punishment for defectors is considered as a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. However, there is no clear border between the cooperative and defective behaviors in a continuous strategy game. We propose a model to study the effect of punishment on the evolution of cooperation in continuous public goods game, wherein individuals have the traits to punish the co-players based on social tolerance. We show that a reasonable punishment with a uniform tolerance can spur individuals to make more investments. Additionally, for a fixed punishment cost and a fixed fine, a moderate value of tolerance can result in the best promotion of cooperation. Furthermore, we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of investment and tolerance. We find that the population splits into two branches: high-tolerance individuals who make high investments and low-tolerance individuals who make low investments. A dynamic equilibrium is achieved between these two types of individuals. Our work extends punishment to continuous cooperative behaviors and the results may enhance the understanding of altruistic punishment in the evolution of human cooperation.

Evolutionary Game Theory in Growing Populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Melbinger, Anna; Cremer, Jonas; Frey, Erwin

2010-10-01

Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We present here a generic stochastic model which combines the growth dynamics of the population and its internal evolution. Our model thereby accounts for the fact that both evolutionary and growth dynamics are based on individual reproduction events and hence are highly coupled and stochastic in nature. We exemplify our approach by studying the dilemma of cooperation in growing populations and show that genuinely stochastic events can ease the dilemma by leading to a transient but robust increase in cooperation.

Vision-based navigation in a dynamic environment for virtual human

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Yan; Sun, Ji-Zhou; Zhang, Jia-Wan; Li, Ming-Chu

2004-06-01

Intelligent virtual human is widely required in computer games, ergonomics software, virtual environment and so on. We present a vision-based behavior modeling method to realize smart navigation in a dynamic environment. This behavior model can be divided into three modules: vision, global planning and local planning. Vision is the only channel for smart virtual actor to get information from the outside world. Then, the global and local planning module use A* and D* algorithm to find a way for virtual human in a dynamic environment. Finally, the experiments on our test platform (Smart Human System) verify the feasibility of this behavior model.

Evaluation of the efficacy of simulation games in traffic safety education of kindergarten children.

PubMed Central

Renaud, L; Suissa, S

1989-01-01

Using a simulation game designed to teach children to obey certain traffic safety rules, an experimental study was conducted with 136 five-year-old children in four Quebec schools. Within each classroom, subjects were randomly divided into four groups: three intervention groups and one control group. Each of the experimental groups was subjected to a different intervention with outcome measured using three instruments related to attitudes, behavior, and transfer of learning of pedestrian traffic safety. Results suggest that simulation games including role-playing/group dynamics and modeling/training can change attitudes and modify behavior in the area of pedestrian traffic safety in children of this age. PMID:2916716

Meta-T: TetrisⓇ as an experimental paradigm for cognitive skills research.

PubMed

Lindstedt, John K; Gray, Wayne D

2015-12-01

Studies of human performance in complex tasks using video games are an attractive prospect, but many existing games lack a comprehensive way to modify the game and track performance beyond basic levels of analysis. Meta-T provides experimenters a tool to study behavior in a dynamic task environment with time-stressed decision-making and strong perceptual-motor elements, offering a host of experimental manipulations with a robust and detailed logging system for all user events, system events, and screen objects. Its experimenter-friendly interface provides control over detailed parameters of the task environment without need for programming expertise. Support for eye-tracking and computational cognitive modeling extend the paradigm's scope.

Evaluation of the efficacy of simulation games in traffic safety education of kindergarten children.

PubMed

Renaud, L; Suissa, S

1989-03-01

Using a simulation game designed to teach children to obey certain traffic safety rules, an experimental study was conducted with 136 five-year-old children in four Quebec schools. Within each classroom, subjects were randomly divided into four groups: three intervention groups and one control group. Each of the experimental groups was subjected to a different intervention with outcome measured using three instruments related to attitudes, behavior, and transfer of learning of pedestrian traffic safety. Results suggest that simulation games including role-playing/group dynamics and modeling/training can change attitudes and modify behavior in the area of pedestrian traffic safety in children of this age.

Evolutionary game based control for biological systems with applications in drug delivery.

PubMed

Li, Xiaobo; Lenaghan, Scott C; Zhang, Mingjun

2013-06-07

Control engineering and analysis of biological systems have become increasingly important for systems and synthetic biology. Unfortunately, no widely accepted control framework is currently available for these systems, especially at the cell and molecular levels. This is partially due to the lack of appropriate mathematical models to describe the unique dynamics of biological systems, and the lack of implementation techniques, such as ultra-fast and ultra-small devices and corresponding control algorithms. This paper proposes a control framework for biological systems subject to dynamics that exhibit adaptive behavior under evolutionary pressures. The control framework was formulated based on evolutionary game based modeling, which integrates both the internal dynamics and the population dynamics. In the proposed control framework, the adaptive behavior was characterized as an internal dynamic, and the external environment was regarded as an external control input. The proposed open-interface control framework can be integrated with additional control algorithms for control of biological systems. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework, an optimal control strategy was developed and validated for drug delivery using the pathogen Giardia lamblia as a test case. In principle, the proposed control framework can be applied to any biological system exhibiting adaptive behavior under evolutionary pressures. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations

PubMed Central

Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Altrock, Philipp M.; Wang, Long

2014-01-01

On studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their pay-offs from the evolutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach has a long-standing history in evolutionary games and is mostly applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the game is not dyadic. Therefore, a strategy favoured under imitation dynamics can be disfavoured under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure, and thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics. PMID:24598208

Aspiration dynamics of multi-player games in finite populations.

PubMed

Du, Jinming; Wu, Bin; Altrock, Philipp M; Wang, Long

2014-05-06

On studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the former case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case, individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their pay-offs from the evolutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynamics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lacking sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach has a long-standing history in evolutionary games and is mostly applied for its mathematical approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy. The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long as the game is not dyadic. Therefore, a strategy favoured under imitation dynamics can be disfavoured under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure, and thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics.

Game theory and extremal optimization for community detection in complex dynamic networks.

PubMed

Lung, Rodica Ioana; Chira, Camelia; Andreica, Anca

2014-01-01

The detection of evolving communities in dynamic complex networks is a challenging problem that recently received attention from the research community. Dynamics clearly add another complexity dimension to the difficult task of community detection. Methods should be able to detect changes in the network structure and produce a set of community structures corresponding to different timestamps and reflecting the evolution in time of network data. We propose a novel approach based on game theory elements and extremal optimization to address dynamic communities detection. Thus, the problem is formulated as a mathematical game in which nodes take the role of players that seek to choose a community that maximizes their profit viewed as a fitness function. Numerical results obtained for both synthetic and real-world networks illustrate the competitive performance of this game theoretical approach.

Dynamic Pervasive Storytelling in Long Lasting Learning Games

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Pløhn, Trygve; Louchart, Sandy; Aalberg, Trond

2015-01-01

Pervasive gaming is a reality-based gaming genre originating from alternative theatrical forms in which the performance becomes a part of the players' everyday life. In recent years much research has been done on pervasive gaming and its potential applications towards specific domains. Pervasive games have been effective with regards to…

16 CFR 1505.1 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2010 CFR

2010-01-01

...” means any toy, game, or other article designed, labeled, advertised, or otherwise intended for use by... designed primarily for use by adults which may be used incidentally by children, or video games. (2) The term video games means video game hardware systems, which are games that both produce a dynamic video...

16 CFR 1505.1 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2011 CFR

2011-01-01

...” means any toy, game, or other article designed, labeled, advertised, or otherwise intended for use by... designed primarily for use by adults which may be used incidentally by children, or video games. (2) The term video games means video game hardware systems, which are games that both produce a dynamic video...

16 CFR 1505.1 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2012 CFR

2012-01-01

...” means any toy, game, or other article designed, labeled, advertised, or otherwise intended for use by... designed primarily for use by adults which may be used incidentally by children, or video games. (2) The term video games means video game hardware systems, which are games that both produce a dynamic video...

16 CFR § 1505.1 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2013 CFR

2013-01-01

...” means any toy, game, or other article designed, labeled, advertised, or otherwise intended for use by... designed primarily for use by adults which may be used incidentally by children, or video games. (2) The term video games means video game hardware systems, which are games that both produce a dynamic video...

16 CFR 1505.1 - Definitions.

Code of Federal Regulations, 2014 CFR

2014-01-01

...” means any toy, game, or other article designed, labeled, advertised, or otherwise intended for use by... designed primarily for use by adults which may be used incidentally by children, or video games. (2) The term video games means video game hardware systems, which are games that both produce a dynamic video...

Dynamical tuning for MPC using population games: A water supply network application.

PubMed

Barreiro-Gomez, Julian; Ocampo-Martinez, Carlos; Quijano, Nicanor

2017-07-01

Model predictive control (MPC) is a suitable strategy for the control of large-scale systems that have multiple design requirements, e.g., multiple physical and operational constraints. Besides, an MPC controller is able to deal with multiple control objectives considering them within the cost function, which implies to determine a proper prioritization for each of the objectives. Furthermore, when the system has time-varying parameters and/or disturbances, the appropriate prioritization might vary along the time as well. This situation leads to the need of a dynamical tuning methodology. This paper addresses the dynamical tuning issue by using evolutionary game theory. The advantages of the proposed method are highlighted and tested over a large-scale water supply network with periodic time-varying disturbances. Finally, results are analyzed with respect to a multi-objective MPC controller that uses static tuning. Copyright © 2017 ISA. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Hunting statistics: what data for what use? An account of an international workshop

USGS Publications Warehouse

Nichols, J.D.; Lancia, R.A.; Lebreton, J.D.

2001-01-01

Hunting interacts with the underlying dynamics of game species in several different ways and is, at the same time, a source of valuable information not easily obtained from populations that are not subjected to hunting. Specific questions, including the sustainability of hunting activities, can be addressed using hunting statistics. Such investigations will frequently require that hunting statistics be combined with data from other sources of population-level information. Such reflections served as a basis for the meeting, ?Hunting Statistics: What Data for What Use,? held on January 15-18, 2001 in Saint-Benoist, France. We review here the 20 talks held during the workshop and the contribution of hunting statistics to our knowledge of the population dynamics of game species. Three specific topics (adaptive management, catch-effort models, and dynamics of exploited populations) were highlighted as important themes and are more extensively presented as boxes.

Quantum-like dynamics of decision-making

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Asano, Masanari; Basieva, Irina; Khrennikov, Andrei; Ohya, Masanori; Tanaka, Yoshiharu

2012-03-01

In cognitive psychology, some experiments for games were reported, and they demonstrated that real players did not use the “rational strategy” provided by classical game theory and based on the notion of the Nasch equilibrium. This psychological phenomenon was called the disjunction effect. Recently, we proposed a model of decision making which can explain this effect (“irrationality” of players) Asano et al. (2010, 2011) [23,24]. Our model is based on the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, because psychological fluctuations inducing the irrationality are formally represented as quantum fluctuations Asano et al. (2011) [55]. In this paper, we reconsider the process of quantum-like decision-making more closely and redefine it as a well-defined quantum dynamics by using the concept of lifting channel, which is an important concept in quantum information theory. We also present numerical simulation for this quantum-like mental dynamics. It is non-Markovian by its nature. Stabilization to the steady state solution (determining subjective probabilities for decision making) is based on the collective effect of mental fluctuations collected in the working memory of a decision maker.

Ambush frequency should increase over time during optimal predator search for prey

PubMed Central

Alpern, Steve; Fokkink, Robbert; Timmer, Marco; Casas, Jérôme

2011-01-01

We advance and apply the mathematical theory of search games to model the problem faced by a predator searching for prey. Two search modes are available: ambush and cruising search. Some species can adopt either mode, with their choice at a given time traditionally explained in terms of varying habitat and physiological conditions. We present an additional explanation of the observed predator alternation between these search modes, which is based on the dynamical nature of the search game they are playing: the possibility of ambush decreases the propensity of the prey to frequently change locations and thereby renders it more susceptible to the systematic cruising search portion of the strategy. This heuristic explanation is supported by showing that in a new idealized search game where the predator is allowed to ambush or search at any time, and the prey can change locations at intermittent times, optimal predator play requires an alternation (or mixture) over time of ambush and cruise search. Thus, our game is an extension of the well-studied ‘Princess and Monster’ search game. Search games are zero sum games, where the pay-off is the capture time and neither the Searcher nor the Hider knows the location of the other. We are able to determine the optimal mixture of the search modes when the predator uses a mixture which is constant over time, and also to determine how the mode mixture changes over time when dynamic strategies are allowed (the ambush probability increases over time). In particular, we establish the ‘square root law of search predation’: the optimal proportion of active search equals the square root of the fraction of the region that has not yet been explored. PMID:21571944

Ambush frequency should increase over time during optimal predator search for prey.

PubMed

Alpern, Steve; Fokkink, Robbert; Timmer, Marco; Casas, Jérôme

2011-11-07

We advance and apply the mathematical theory of search games to model the problem faced by a predator searching for prey. Two search modes are available: ambush and cruising search. Some species can adopt either mode, with their choice at a given time traditionally explained in terms of varying habitat and physiological conditions. We present an additional explanation of the observed predator alternation between these search modes, which is based on the dynamical nature of the search game they are playing: the possibility of ambush decreases the propensity of the prey to frequently change locations and thereby renders it more susceptible to the systematic cruising search portion of the strategy. This heuristic explanation is supported by showing that in a new idealized search game where the predator is allowed to ambush or search at any time, and the prey can change locations at intermittent times, optimal predator play requires an alternation (or mixture) over time of ambush and cruise search. Thus, our game is an extension of the well-studied 'Princess and Monster' search game. Search games are zero sum games, where the pay-off is the capture time and neither the Searcher nor the Hider knows the location of the other. We are able to determine the optimal mixture of the search modes when the predator uses a mixture which is constant over time, and also to determine how the mode mixture changes over time when dynamic strategies are allowed (the ambush probability increases over time). In particular, we establish the 'square root law of search predation': the optimal proportion of active search equals the square root of the fraction of the region that has not yet been explored.

Characteristics of traffic flow at a non-signalized intersection in the framework of game theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fan, Hongqiang; Jia, Bin; Tian, Junfang; Yun, Lifen

2014-12-01

At a non-signalized intersection, some vehicles violate the traffic rules to pass the intersection as soon as possible. These behaviors may cause many traffic conflicts even traffic accidents. In this paper, a simulation model is proposed to research the effects of these behaviors at a non-signalized intersection. Vehicle’s movement is simulated by the cellular automaton (CA) model. The game theory is introduced for simulating the intersection dynamics. Two types of driver participate the game process: cooperator (C) and defector (D). The cooperator obey the traffic rules, but the defector does not. A transition process may occur when the cooperator is waiting before the intersection. The critical value of waiting time follows the Weibull distribution. One transition regime is found in the phase diagram. The simulation results illustrate the applicability of the proposed model and reveal a number of interesting insights into the intersection management, including that the existence of defectors is benefit for the capacity of intersection, but also reduce the safety of intersection.

Game-Based Approaches' Pedagogical Principles: Exploring Task Constraints in Youth Soccer.

PubMed

Serra-Olivares, Jaime; González-Víllora, Sixto; García-López, Luis Miguel; Araújo, Duarte

2015-06-27

This study tested the use of two pedagogical principles of Game-based approaches, representation and exaggeration, in the context of game performance of U10 soccer players. Twenty-one players participated in two 3 vs. 3 small-sided games. The first small-sided game was modified by representation. The second small-sided game was modified by enhancing the penetration of the defense tactical problem for invasion games. Decision-making and execution were assessed using the Game Performance Evaluation Tool. No significant differences were observed between games in the number of decision-making units related to keeping possession, nor in those related to penetrating the defense. No significant differences were observed in any execution ability (ball control, passing, dribbling and get free movements). The findings suggested that both games could provide similar degeneracy processes to the players for skill acquisition (specific and contextualized task constraints in which they could develop their game performance and the capability to achieve different outcomes in varying contexts). Probably both games had similar learner-environment dynamics leading players to develop their capabilities for adapting their behaviours to the changing performance situations. More research is necessary, from the ecological dynamics point of view, to determine how we should use small-sided games in Game-based approaches.

Game-Based Approaches’ Pedagogical Principles: Exploring Task Constraints in Youth Soccer

PubMed Central

Serra-Olivares, Jaime; González-Víllora, Sixto; García-López, Luis Miguel; Araújo, Duarte

2015-01-01

This study tested the use of two pedagogical principles of Game-based approaches, representation and exaggeration, in the context of game performance of U10 soccer players. Twenty-one players participated in two 3 vs. 3 small-sided games. The first small-sided game was modified by representation. The second small-sided game was modified by enhancing the penetration of the defense tactical problem for invasion games. Decision-making and execution were assessed using the Game Performance Evaluation Tool. No significant differences were observed between games in the number of decision-making units related to keeping possession, nor in those related to penetrating the defense. No significant differences were observed in any execution ability (ball control, passing, dribbling and get free movements). The findings suggested that both games could provide similar degeneracy processes to the players for skill acquisition (specific and contextualized task constraints in which they could develop their game performance and the capability to achieve different outcomes in varying contexts). Probably both games had similar learner-environment dynamics leading players to develop their capabilities for adapting their behaviours to the changing performance situations. More research is necessary, from the ecological dynamics point of view, to determine how we should use small-sided games in Game-based approaches. PMID:26240668

Evolutionary games on graphs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szabó, György; Fáth, Gábor

2007-07-01

Game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from biology to behavioral sciences to economics. In its evolutionary form and especially when the interacting agents are linked in a specific social network the underlying solution concepts and methods are very similar to those applied in non-equilibrium statistical physics. This review gives a tutorial-type overview of the field for physicists. The first four sections introduce the necessary background in classical and evolutionary game theory from the basic definitions to the most important results. The fifth section surveys the topological complications implied by non-mean-field-type social network structures in general. The next three sections discuss in detail the dynamic behavior of three prominent classes of models: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Rock-Scissors-Paper game, and Competing Associations. The major theme of the review is in what sense and how the graph structure of interactions can modify and enrich the picture of long term behavioral patterns emerging in evolutionary games.

Real-time individualized training vectors for experiential learning.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Willis, Matt; Tucker, Eilish Marie; Raybourn, Elaine Marie

2011-01-01

Military training utilizing serious games or virtual worlds potentially generate data that can be mined to better understand how trainees learn in experiential exercises. Few data mining approaches for deployed military training games exist. Opportunities exist to collect and analyze these data, as well as to construct a full-history learner model. Outcomes discussed in the present document include results from a quasi-experimental research study on military game-based experiential learning, the deployment of an online game for training evidence collection, and results from a proof-of-concept pilot study on the development of individualized training vectors. This Lab Directed Research & Development (LDRD)more » project leveraged products within projects, such as Titan (Network Grand Challenge), Real-Time Feedback and Evaluation System, (America's Army Adaptive Thinking and Leadership, DARWARS Ambush! NK), and Dynamic Bayesian Networks to investigate whether machine learning capabilities could perform real-time, in-game similarity vectors of learner performance, toward adaptation of content delivery, and quantitative measurement of experiential learning.« less

Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pichler, Elgar; Shapiro, Avi M.

2017-07-01

Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, reap public goods benefits, which are shares of the contributions amplified by a synergy factor. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a complex network in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs relative to past payoffs parameterized by greediness. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.

Public goods games on adaptive coevolutionary networks.

PubMed

Pichler, Elgar; Shapiro, Avi M

2017-07-01

Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such games, contributions to the public good are made only by cooperators, while all players, including defectors, reap public goods benefits, which are shares of the contributions amplified by a synergy factor. Classic results of game theory show that mutual defection, as opposed to cooperation, is the Nash Equilibrium of PGGs in well-mixed populations, where each player interacts with all others. In this paper, we explore the coevolutionary dynamics of a low information public goods game on a complex network in which players adapt to their environment in order to increase individual payoffs relative to past payoffs parameterized by greediness. Players adapt by changing their strategies, either to cooperate or to defect, and by altering their social connections. We find that even if players do not know other players' strategies and connectivity, cooperation can arise and persist despite large short-term fluctuations.

Game theoretic sensor management for target tracking

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Shen, Dan; Chen, Genshe; Blasch, Erik; Pham, Khanh; Douville, Philip; Yang, Chun; Kadar, Ivan

2010-04-01

This paper develops and evaluates a game-theoretic approach to distributed sensor-network management for target tracking via sensor-based negotiation. We present a distributed sensor-based negotiation game model for sensor management for multi-sensor multi-target tacking situations. In our negotiation framework, each negotiation agent represents a sensor and each sensor maximizes their utility using a game approach. The greediness of each sensor is limited by the fact that the sensor-to-target assignment efficiency will decrease if too many sensor resources are assigned to a same target. It is similar to the market concept in real world, such as agreements between buyers and sellers in an auction market. Sensors are willing to switch targets so that they can obtain their highest utility and the most efficient way of applying their resources. Our sub-game perfect equilibrium-based negotiation strategies dynamically and distributedly assign sensors to targets. Numerical simulations are performed to demonstrate our sensor-based negotiation approach for distributed sensor management.

Applying evolutionary psychology to a serious game about children's interpersonal conflict.

PubMed

Ingram, Gordon P D; Campos, Joana; Hondrou, Charline; Vasalou, Asimina; Martinho, Carlos; Joinson, Adam

2012-12-20

This article describes the use of evolutionary psychology to inform the design of a serious computer game aimed at improving 9-12-year-old children's conflict resolution skills. The design of the game will include dynamic narrative generation and emotional tagging, and there is a strong evolutionary rationale for the effect of both of these on conflict resolution. Gender differences will also be taken into consideration in designing the game. In interview research in schools in three countries (Greece, Portugal, and the UK) aimed at formalizing the game requirements, we found that gender differences varied in the extent to which they applied cross-culturally. Across the three countries, girls were less likely to talk about responding to conflict with physical aggression, talked more about feeling sad about conflict and about conflicts over friendship alliances, and talked less about conflicts in the context of sports or games. Predicted gender differences in anger and reconciliation were not found. Results are interpreted in terms of differing underlying models of friendship that are motivated by parental investment theory. This research will inform the design of the themes that we use in game scenarios for both girls and boys.

Issues of Dynamic Coalition Formation Among Rational Agents

DTIC Science & Technology

2002-04-01

approaches of forming stable coalitions among rational agents. Issues and problems of dynamic coalition environments are discussed in section 3 while...2.2. 2.1.2 Coalition Algorithm, Coalition Formation Environment and Model Rational agents which are involved in a co-operative game (A,v) are...publicly available simulation environment for coalition formation among rational information agents based on selected classic coalition theories is, for

Uncertain dynamical systems: A differential game approach

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Gutman, S.

1976-01-01

A class of dynamical systems in a conflict situation is formulated and discussed, and the formulation is applied to the study of an important class of systems in the presence of uncertainty. The uncertainty is deterministic and the only assumption is that its value belongs to a known compact set. Asymptotic stability is fully discussed with application to variable structure and model reference control systems.

Cyclic Game Dynamics Driven by Iterated Reasoning

PubMed Central

Frey, Seth; Goldstone, Robert L.

2013-01-01

Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated. However, economists have argued that iterated reasoning–what you think I think you think–will suppress complex dynamics by stabilizing or accelerating convergence to Nash equilibrium. We report stable and efficient periodic behavior in human groups playing the Mod Game, a multi-player game similar to Rock-Paper-Scissors. The game rewards subjects for thinking exactly one step ahead of others in their group. Groups that play this game exhibit cycles that are inconsistent with any fixed-point solution concept. These cycles are driven by a “hopping” behavior that is consistent with other accounts of iterated reasoning: agents are constrained to about two steps of iterated reasoning and learn an additional one-half step with each session. If higher-order reasoning can be complicit in complex emergent dynamics, then cyclic and chaotic patterns may be endogenous features of real-world social and economic systems. PMID:23441191

Fixation of strategies driven by switching probabilities in evolutionary games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Zimin; Zhang, Jianlei; Zhang, Chunyan; Chen, Zengqiang

2016-12-01

We study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in finite populations which are homogeneous and well mixed by means of the pairwise comparison process, the core of which is the proposed switching probability. Previous studies about this subject are usually based on the known payoff comparison of the related players, which is an ideal assumption. In real social systems, acquiring the accurate payoffs of partners at each round of interaction may be not easy. So we bypass the need of explicit knowledge of payoffs, and encode the payoffs into the willingness of any individual shift from her current strategy to the competing one, and the switching probabilities are wholly independent of payoffs. Along this way, the strategy updating can be performed when game models are fixed and payoffs are unclear, expected to extend ideal assumptions to be more realistic one. We explore the impact of the switching probability on the fixation probability and derive a simple formula which determines the fixation probability. Moreover we find that cooperation dominates defection if the probability of cooperation replacing defection is always larger than the probability of defection replacing cooperation in finite populations. Last, we investigate the influences of model parameters on the fixation of strategies in the framework of three concrete game models: prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game and stag-hunt game, which effectively portray the characteristics of cooperative dilemmas in real social systems.

Can centralized sanctioning promote trust in social dilemmas? A two-level trust game with incomplete information.

PubMed

Wang, Raymond Yu; Ng, Cho Nam

2015-01-01

The problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic configurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the sequential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas.

Can Centralized Sanctioning Promote Trust in Social Dilemmas? A Two-Level Trust Game with Incomplete Information

PubMed Central

Wang, Raymond Yu; Ng, Cho Nam

2015-01-01

The problem of trust is a paradigmatic social dilemma. Previous literature has paid much academic attention on effects of peer punishment and altruistic third-party punishment on trust and human cooperation in dyadic interactions. However, the effects of centralized sanctioning institutions on decentralized reciprocity in hierarchical interactions remain to be further explored. This paper presents a formal two-level trust game with incomplete information which adds an authority as a strategic purposive actor into the traditional trust game. This model allows scholars to examine the problem of trust in more complex game theoretic configurations. The analysis demonstrates how the centralized institutions might change the dynamics of reciprocity between the trustor and the trustee. Findings suggest that the sequential equilibria of the newly proposed two-level model simultaneously include the risk of placing trust for the trustor and the temptation of short-term defection for the trustee. Moreover, they have shown that even a slight uncertainty about the type of the newly introduced authority might facilitate the establishment of trust and reciprocity in social dilemmas. PMID:25879752

Learning dynamics in social dilemmas

PubMed Central

Macy, Michael W.; Flache, Andreas

2002-01-01

The Nash equilibrium, the main solution concept in analytical game theory, cannot make precise predictions about the outcome of repeated mixed-motive games. Nor can it tell us much about the dynamics by which a population of players moves from one equilibrium to another. These limitations, along with concerns about the cognitive demands of forward-looking rationality, have motivated efforts to explore backward-looking alternatives to analytical game theory. Most of the effort has been invested in evolutionary models of population dynamics. We shift attention to a learning-theoretic alternative. Computational experiments with adaptive agents identify a fundamental solution concept for social dilemmas–−stochastic collusion–−based on a random walk from a self-limiting noncooperative equilibrium into a self-reinforcing cooperative equilibrium. However, we show that this solution is viable only within a narrow range of aspiration levels. Below the lower threshold, agents are pulled into a deficient equilibrium that is a stronger attractor than mutual cooperation. Above the upper threshold, agents are dissatisfied with mutual cooperation. Aspirations that adapt with experience (producing habituation to stimuli) do not gravitate into the window of viability; rather, they are the worst of both worlds. Habituation destabilizes cooperation and stabilizes defection. Results from the two-person problem suggest that applications to multiplex and embedded relationships will yield unexpected insights into the global dynamics of cooperation in social dilemmas. PMID:12011402

Spatial pattern dynamics due to the fitness gradient flux in evolutionary games.

PubMed

deForest, Russ; Belmonte, Andrew

2013-06-01

We introduce a nondiffusive spatial coupling term into the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory. The spatial flux is based on motion due to local gradients in the relative fitness of each strategy, providing a game-dependent alternative to diffusive coupling. We study numerically the development of patterns in one dimension (1D) for two-strategy games including the coordination game and the prisoner's dilemma, and in two dimensions (2D) for the rock-paper-scissors game. In 1D we observe modified traveling wave solutions in the presence of diffusion, and asymptotic attracting states under a frozen-strategy assumption without diffusion. In 2D we observe spiral formation and breakup in the frozen-strategy rock-paper-scissors game without diffusion. A change of variables appropriate to replicator dynamics is shown to correctly capture the 1D asymptotic steady state via a nonlinear diffusion equation.

Spatial pattern dynamics due to the fitness gradient flux in evolutionary games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

deForest, Russ; Belmonte, Andrew

2013-06-01

We introduce a nondiffusive spatial coupling term into the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory. The spatial flux is based on motion due to local gradients in the relative fitness of each strategy, providing a game-dependent alternative to diffusive coupling. We study numerically the development of patterns in one dimension (1D) for two-strategy games including the coordination game and the prisoner's dilemma, and in two dimensions (2D) for the rock-paper-scissors game. In 1D we observe modified traveling wave solutions in the presence of diffusion, and asymptotic attracting states under a frozen-strategy assumption without diffusion. In 2D we observe spiral formation and breakup in the frozen-strategy rock-paper-scissors game without diffusion. A change of variables appropriate to replicator dynamics is shown to correctly capture the 1D asymptotic steady state via a nonlinear diffusion equation.

Dynamic social networks facilitate cooperation in the N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rezaei, Golriz; Kirley, Michael

2012-12-01

Understanding how cooperative behaviour evolves in network communities, where the individual members interact via social dilemma games, is an on-going challenge. In this paper, we introduce a social network based model to investigate the evolution of cooperation in the N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game. As such, this work complements previous studies focused on multi-player social dilemma games and endogenous networks. Agents in our model, employ different game-playing strategies reflecting varying cognitive capacities. When an agent plays cooperatively, a social link is formed with each of the other N-1 group members. Subsequent cooperative actions reinforce this link. However, when an agent defects, the links in the social network are broken. Computational simulations across a range of parameter settings are used to examine different scenarios: varying population and group sizes; the group formation process (or partner selection); and agent decision-making strategies under varying dilemma constraints (cost-to-benefit ratios), including a “discriminator” strategy where the action is based on a function of the weighted links within an agent’s social network. The simulation results show that the proposed social network model is able to evolve and maintain cooperation. As expected, as the value of N increases the equilibrium proportion of cooperators in the population decreases. In addition, this outcome is dependent on the dilemma constraint (cost-to-benefit ratio). However, in some circumstances the dynamic social network plays an increasingly important role in promoting and sustaining cooperation, especially when the agents adopt the discriminator strategy. The adjustment of social links results in the formation of communities of “like-minded” agents. Subsequently, this local optimal behaviour promotes the evolution of cooperative behaviour at the system level.

How we see electronic games.

PubMed

Przybylski, Andrew K; Weinstein, Netta

2016-01-01

Theories regarding the influences of electronic games drive scientific study, popular debate, and public policy. The fractious interchanges among parents, pundits, and scholars hint at the rich phenomenological and psychological dynamics that underlie how people view digital technologies such as games. The current research applied Martin Heidegger's concept of interpretive frameworks (Heidegger, 1987) and Robert Zajonc's exposure-attitude hypothesis (Zajonc, 1968) to explore how attitudes towards technologies such as electronic games arise. Three studies drew on representative cohorts of American and British adults and evaluated how direct and indirect experiences with games shape how they are seen. Results indicated this approach was fruitful: negative attitudes and beliefs linking games to real-world violence were prominent among those with little direct exposure to electronic gaming contexts, whereas those who played games and reported doing so with their children tended to evaluate gaming more positively. Further findings indicated direct experience tended to inform the accuracy of beliefs about the effects of digital technology, as those who had played were more likely to believe that which is empirically known about game effects. Results are discussed with respect to ongoing debates regarding gaming and broader applications of this approach to understand the psychological dynamics of adapting to technological advances.

How we see electronic games

PubMed Central

Weinstein, Netta

2016-01-01

Theories regarding the influences of electronic games drive scientific study, popular debate, and public policy. The fractious interchanges among parents, pundits, and scholars hint at the rich phenomenological and psychological dynamics that underlie how people view digital technologies such as games. The current research applied Martin Heidegger’s concept of interpretive frameworks (Heidegger, 1987) and Robert Zajonc’s exposure-attitude hypothesis (Zajonc, 1968) to explore how attitudes towards technologies such as electronic games arise. Three studies drew on representative cohorts of American and British adults and evaluated how direct and indirect experiences with games shape how they are seen. Results indicated this approach was fruitful: negative attitudes and beliefs linking games to real-world violence were prominent among those with little direct exposure to electronic gaming contexts, whereas those who played games and reported doing so with their children tended to evaluate gaming more positively. Further findings indicated direct experience tended to inform the accuracy of beliefs about the effects of digital technology, as those who had played were more likely to believe that which is empirically known about game effects. Results are discussed with respect to ongoing debates regarding gaming and broader applications of this approach to understand the psychological dynamics of adapting to technological advances. PMID:27077016

Real-Time Simulation

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

1997-01-01

Coryphaeus Software, founded in 1989 by former NASA electronic engineer Steve Lakowske, creates real-time 3D software. Designer's Workbench, the company flagship product, is a modeling and simulation tool for the development of both static and dynamic 3D databases. Other products soon followed. Activation, specifically designed for game developers, allows developers to play and test the 3D games before they commit to a target platform. Game publishers can shorten development time and prove the "playability" of the title, maximizing their chances of introducing a smash hit. Another product, EasyT, lets users create massive, realistic representation of Earth terrains that can be viewed and traversed in real time. Finally, EasyScene software control the actions among interactive objects within a virtual world. Coryphaeus products are used on Silican Graphics workstation and supercomputers to simulate real-world performance in synthetic environments. Customers include aerospace, aviation, architectural and engineering firms, game developers, and the entertainment industry.

Assortative and dissortative priorities for game interaction and strategy adaptation significantly bolster network reciprocity in the prisoner’s dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tanimoto, Jun

2014-05-01

In 2 × 2 prisoner’s dilemma games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium. Here we show that combining the process for selecting a gaming partner with the process for selecting an adaptation partner significantly enhances cooperation, even though such selection processes require additional costs to collect further information concerning which neighbor should be chosen. Based on elaborate investigations of the dynamics generated by our model, we find that high levels of cooperation result from two kinds of behavior: cooperators tend to interact with cooperators to prevent being exploited by defectors and defectors tend to choose cooperators to exploit despite the possibility that some defectors convert to cooperators.

Bounded rationality leads to equilibrium of public goods games.

PubMed

Xu, Zhaojin; Wang, Zhen; Zhang, Lianzhong

2009-12-01

In this work, we introduce a degree of rationality to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate, and with it a new mechanism has been established. Existence of the bounded rationality would lead to a new equilibrium which differs from the Nash equilibrium and qualitatively explains the fundamental role of loners' payoff for maintaining cooperation. Meanwhile, it is shown how the potential strategy influences the players' decision. Finally, we explicitly demonstrate a rock-scissors-paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model.

Bounded rationality leads to equilibrium of public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Zhaojin; Wang, Zhen; Zhang, Lianzhong

2009-12-01

In this work, we introduce a degree of rationality to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate, and with it a new mechanism has been established. Existence of the bounded rationality would lead to a new equilibrium which differs from the Nash equilibrium and qualitatively explains the fundamental role of loners’ payoff for maintaining cooperation. Meanwhile, it is shown how the potential strategy influences the players’ decision. Finally, we explicitly demonstrate a rock-scissors-paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model.

Complexity Thinking in PE: Game-Centred Approaches, Games as Complex Adaptive Systems, and Ecological Values

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Storey, Brian; Butler, Joy

2013-01-01

Background: This article draws on the literature relating to game-centred approaches (GCAs), such as Teaching Games for Understanding, and dynamical systems views of motor learning to demonstrate a convergence of ideas around games as complex adaptive learning systems. This convergence is organized under the title "complexity thinking"…

Integrating Evolutionary Game Theory into Mechanistic Genotype-Phenotype Mapping.

PubMed

Zhu, Xuli; Jiang, Libo; Ye, Meixia; Sun, Lidan; Gragnoli, Claudia; Wu, Rongling

2016-05-01

Natural selection has shaped the evolution of organisms toward optimizing their structural and functional design. However, how this universal principle can enhance genotype-phenotype mapping of quantitative traits has remained unexplored. Here we show that the integration of this principle and functional mapping through evolutionary game theory gains new insight into the genetic architecture of complex traits. By viewing phenotype formation as an evolutionary system, we formulate mathematical equations to model the ecological mechanisms that drive the interaction and coordination of its constituent components toward population dynamics and stability. Functional mapping provides a procedure for estimating the genetic parameters that specify the dynamic relationship of competition and cooperation and predicting how genes mediate the evolution of this relationship during trait formation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Local Voltage Control in Distribution Networks: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Zhou, Xinyang; Tian, Jie; Chen, Lijun

Inverter-based voltage regulation is gaining importance to alleviate emerging reliability and power-quality concerns related to distribution systems with high penetration of photovoltaic (PV) systems. This paper seeks contribution in the domain of reactive power compensation by establishing stability of local Volt/VAr controllers. In lieu of the approximate linear surrogate used in the existing work, the paper establishes existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point using nonlinear AC power flow model. Key to this end is to consider a nonlinear dynamical system with non-incremental local Volt/VAr control, cast the Volt/VAr dynamics as a game, and leverage the fixed-point theorem as wellmore » as pertinent contraction mapping argument. Numerical examples are provided to complement the analytical results.« less

Local Voltage Control in Distribution Networks: A Game-Theoretic Perspective: Preprint

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Zhou, Xinyang; Tian, Jie; Chen, Lijun

Inverter-based voltage regulation is gaining importance to alleviate emerging reliability and power-quality concerns related to distribution systems with high penetration of photovoltaic (PV) systems. This paper seeks contribution in the domain of reactive power compensation by establishing stability of local Volt/VAr controllers. In lieu of the approximate linear surrogate used in the existing work, the paper establishes existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point using nonlinear AC power flow model. Key to this end is to consider a nonlinear dynamical system with non-incremental local Volt/VAr control, cast the Volt/VAr dynamics as a game, and leverage the fixed-point theorem as wellmore » as pertinent contraction mapping argument. Numerical examples are provided to complement the analytical results.« less

Adaptive critic designs for discrete-time zero-sum games with application to H(infinity) control.

PubMed

Al-Tamimi, Asma; Abu-Khalaf, Murad; Lewis, Frank L

2007-02-01

In this correspondence, adaptive critic approximate dynamic programming designs are derived to solve the discrete-time zero-sum game in which the state and action spaces are continuous. This results in a forward-in-time reinforcement learning algorithm that converges to the Nash equilibrium of the corresponding zero-sum game. The results in this correspondence can be thought of as a way to solve the Riccati equation of the well-known discrete-time H(infinity) optimal control problem forward in time. Two schemes are presented, namely: 1) a heuristic dynamic programming and 2) a dual-heuristic dynamic programming, to solve for the value function and the costate of the game, respectively. An H(infinity) autopilot design for an F-16 aircraft is presented to illustrate the results.

Optional contributions have positive effects for volunteering public goods games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Song, Qi-Qing; Li, Zhen-Peng; Fu, Chang-He; Wang, Lai-Sheng

2011-11-01

Public goods (PG) games with the volunteering mechanism are referred to as volunteering public goods (VPG) games, in which loners are introduced to the PG games, and a loner obtains a constant payoff but not participating the game. Considering that small contributions may have positive effects to encourage more players with bounded rationality to contribute, this paper introduces optional contributions (high value or low value) to these typical VPG games-a cooperator can contribute a high or low payoff to the public pools. With the low contribution, the logit dynamics show that cooperation can be promoted in a well mixed population comparing to the typical VPG games, furthermore, as the multiplication factor is greater than a threshold, the average payoff of the population is also enhanced. In spatial VPG games, we introduce a new adjusting mechanism that is an approximation to best response. Some results in agreement with the prediction of the logit dynamics are found. These simulation results reveal that for VPG games the option of low contributions may be a better method to stimulate the growth of cooperation frequency and the average payoff of the population.

Optimal dimensionality reduction of complex dynamics: The chess game as diffusion on a free-energy landscape

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Krivov, Sergei V.

2011-07-01

Dimensionality reduction is ubiquitous in the analysis of complex dynamics. The conventional dimensionality reduction techniques, however, focus on reproducing the underlying configuration space, rather than the dynamics itself. The constructed low-dimensional space does not provide a complete and accurate description of the dynamics. Here I describe how to perform dimensionality reduction while preserving the essential properties of the dynamics. The approach is illustrated by analyzing the chess game—the archetype of complex dynamics. A variable that provides complete and accurate description of chess dynamics is constructed. The winning probability is predicted by describing the game as a random walk on the free-energy landscape associated with the variable. The approach suggests a possible way of obtaining a simple yet accurate description of many important complex phenomena. The analysis of the chess game shows that the approach can quantitatively describe the dynamics of processes where human decision-making plays a central role, e.g., financial and social dynamics.

Differential Game Logic for Hybrid Games

DTIC Science & Technology

2012-03-01

André Platzer. Logics of dynamical systems (invited tutorial). In LICS [DBL12]. [PP03] Marc Pauly and Rohit Parikh. Game logic - an overview...hybrid games. Theor. Comput. Sci., 412(48):6770–6785, 2011. [Wal98] Wolfgang Walter. Ordinary Differential Equations. Springer, 1998. 18 A Proof of Scott

Evolutionary Games in Multi-Agent Systems of Weighted Social Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Du, Wen-Bo; Cao, Xian-Bin; Zheng, Hao-Ran; Zhou, Hong; Hu, Mao-Bin

Much empirical evidence has shown realistic networks are weighted. Compared with those on unweighted networks, the dynamics on weighted network often exhibit distinctly different phenomena. In this paper, we investigate the evolutionary game dynamics (prisoner's dilemma game and snowdrift game) on a weighted social network consisted of rational agents and focus on the evolution of cooperation in the system. Simulation results show that the cooperation level is strongly affected by the weighted nature of the network. Moreover, the variation of time series has also been investigated. Our work may be helpful in understanding the cooperative behavior in the social systems.

Security Analysis of Smart Grid Cyber Physical Infrastructures Using Modeling and Game Theoretic Simulation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Abercrombie, Robert K; Sheldon, Frederick T.

Cyber physical computing infrastructures typically consist of a number of sites are interconnected. Its operation critically depends both on cyber components and physical components. Both types of components are subject to attacks of different kinds and frequencies, which must be accounted for the initial provisioning and subsequent operation of the infrastructure via information security analysis. Information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, andmore » information assets. We concentrated our analysis on the electric sector failure scenarios and impact analyses by the NESCOR Working Group Study, From the Section 5 electric sector representative failure scenarios; we extracted the four generic failure scenarios and grouped them into three specific threat categories (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) to the system. These specific failure scenarios serve as a demonstration of our simulation. The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrates how to model the electric sector functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the cyber physical infrastructure network with respect to CIA.« less

Age structure and cooperation in coevolutionary games on dynamic network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Qin, Zilong; Hu, Zhenhua; Zhou, Xiaoping; Yi, Jingzhang

2015-04-01

Our proposed model imitates the growth of a population and describes the age structure and the level of cooperation in games on dynamic network with continuous changes of structure and topology. The removal of nodes and links caused by age-dependent attack, together with the nodes addition standing for the newborns of population, badly ruins Matthew effect in this coevolutionary process. Though the network is generated by growth and preferential attachment, it degenerates into random network and it is no longer heterogeneous. When the removal of nodes and links is equal to the addition of nodes and links, the size of dynamic network is maintained in steady-state, so is the low level of cooperation. Severe structure variation, homogeneous topology and continuous invasion of new defection jointly make dynamic network unsuitable for the survival of cooperator even when the probability with which the newborn players initially adopt the strategy cooperation is high, while things change slightly when the connections of newborn players are restricted. Fortunately, moderate interactions in a generation trigger an optimal recovering process to encourage cooperation. The model developed in this paper outlines an explanation of the cohesion changes in the development process of an organization. Some suggestions for cooperative behavior improvement are given in the end.

The σ law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population.

PubMed

Tang, Changbing; Li, Xiang; Cao, Lang; Zhan, Jingyuan

2012-08-07

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call σ law, describes how to determine the selection between two competing strategies: in most evolutionary processes with two strategies, A and B, strategy A is favored over B in weak selection if and only if σR+S>T+σP. This relationship holds for a wide variety of structured populations with mutation rate and weak selection under certain assumptions. In this paper, we propose a model of games based on a community-structured population and revisit this law under the Moran process. By calculating the average payoffs of A and B individuals with the method of effective sojourn time, we find that σ features not only the structured population characteristics, but also the reaction rate between individuals. That is to say, an interaction between two individuals are not uniform, and we can take σ as a reaction rate between any two individuals with the same strategy. We verify this viewpoint by the modified replicator equation with non-uniform interaction rates in a simplified version of the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG). Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Is Immersion of Any Value? Whether, and to What Extent, Game Immersion Experience during Serious Gaming Affects Science Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cheng, Meng-Tzu; Lin, Yu-Wen; She, Hsiao-Ching; Kuo, Po-Chih

2017-01-01

Many studies have shown the positive impact of serious gaming on learning outcomes, but few have explored the relationships between game immersion and science learning. Accordingly, this study was conducted to investigate the effectiveness of learning by playing, as well as the dynamic process of game immersion experiences, and to further identify…

How Physics is Used in Video Games

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bourg, David M.

2004-01-01

Modern video games use physics to achieve realistic behaviour and special effects. Everything from billiard balls, to flying debris, to tactical fighter jets is simulated in games using fundamental principles of dynamics. This article explores several examples of how physics is used in games. Further, this article describes some of the more…

Asynchronous spatial evolutionary games.

PubMed

Newth, David; Cornforth, David

2009-02-01

Over the past 50 years, much attention has been given to the Prisoner's Dilemma as a metaphor for problems surrounding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative and altruistic behavior. The bulk of this work has dealt with the successfulness and robustness of various strategies. Nowak and May (1992) considered an alternative approach to studying evolutionary games. They assumed that players were distributed across a two-dimensional (2D) lattice, interactions between players occurred locally, rather than at long range as in the well mixed situation. The resulting spatial evolutionary games display dynamics not seen in their well-mixed counterparts. An assumption underlying much of the work on spatial evolutionary games is that the state of all players is updated in unison or in synchrony. Using the framework outlined in Nowak and May (1992), we examine the effect of various asynchronous updating schemes on the dynamics of spatial evolutionary games. There are potential implications for the dynamics of a wide variety of spatially extended systems in biology, physics and chemistry.

Evolving dynamics of trading behavior based on coordination game in complex networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bian, Yue-tang; Xu, Lu; Li, Jin-sheng

2016-05-01

This work concerns the modeling of evolvement of trading behavior in stock markets. Based on the assumption of the investors' limited rationality, the evolution mechanism of trading behavior is modeled according to the investment strategy of coordination game in network, that investors are prone to imitate their neighbors' activity through comprehensive analysis on the risk dominance degree of certain investment behavior, the network topology of their relationship and its heterogeneity. We investigate by mean-field analysis and extensive simulations the evolution of investors' trading behavior in various typical networks under different risk dominance degree of investment behavior. Our results indicate that the evolution of investors' behavior is affected by the network structure of stock market and the effect of risk dominance degree of investment behavior; the stability of equilibrium states of investors' behavior dynamics is directly related with the risk dominance degree of some behavior; connectivity and heterogeneity of the network plays an important role in the evolution of the investment behavior in stock market.

Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Quan, Ji; Liu, Wei; Chu, Yuqing; Wang, Xianjia

2018-07-01

Continuous noise caused by mutation is widely present in evolutionary systems. Considering the noise effects and under the optional participation mechanism, a stochastic model for evolutionary public goods game in a finite size population is established. The evolutionary process of strategies in the population is described as a multidimensional ergodic and continuous time Markov process. The stochastic stable state of the system is analyzed by the limit distribution of the stochastic process. By numerical experiments, the influences of the fixed income coefficient for non-participants and the investment income coefficient of the public goods on the stochastic stable equilibrium of the system are analyzed. Through the numerical calculation results, we found that the optional participation mechanism can change the evolutionary dynamics and the equilibrium of the public goods game, and there is a range of parameters which can effectively promote the evolution of cooperation. Further, we obtain the accurate quantitative relationship between the parameters and the probabilities for the system to choose different stable equilibriums, which can be used to realize the control of cooperation.

Retraining function in people with Parkinson's disease using the Microsoft kinect: game design and pilot testing.

PubMed

Galna, Brook; Jackson, Dan; Schofield, Guy; McNaney, Roisin; Webster, Mary; Barry, Gillian; Mhiripiri, Dadirayi; Balaam, Madeline; Olivier, Patrick; Rochester, Lynn

2014-04-14

Computer based gaming systems, such as the Microsoft Kinect (Kinect), can facilitate complex task practice, enhance sensory feedback and action observation in novel, relevant and motivating modes of exercise which can be difficult to achieve with standard physiotherapy for people with Parkinson's disease (PD). However, there is a current need for safe, feasible and effective exercise games that are appropriate for PD rehabilitation. The aims of this study were to i) develop a computer game to rehabilitate dynamic postural control for people with PD using the Kinect; and ii) pilot test the game's safety and feasibility in a group of people with PD. A rehabilitation game aimed at training dynamic postural control was developed through an iterative process with input from a design workshop of people with PD. The game trains dynamic postural control through multi-directional reaching and stepping tasks, with increasing complexity across 12 levels of difficulty. Nine people with PD pilot tested the game for one session. Participant feedback to identify issues relating to safety and feasibility were collected using semi-structured interviews. Participants reported that they felt safe whilst playing the game. In addition, there were no adverse events whilst playing. In general, the participants stated that they enjoyed the game and seven of the nine participants said they could imagine themselves using the game at home, especially if they felt it would improve their balance. The Flow State Scale indicated participants were immersed in the gameplay and enjoyed the experience. However, some participants reported that they found it difficult to discriminate between different types and orientations of visual objects in the game and some also had difficulty with the stepping tasks, especially when performed at the same time as the reaching tasks. Computer-based rehabilitation games using the Kinect are safe and feasible for people with PD although intervention trials are needed to test their safety, feasibility and efficacy in the home.

On the complex interplay between learning and dynamics in life sciences. Comment on the paper "Collective learning modeling based on the kinetic theory of active particles" by Burini et al.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bellomo, Nicola; Elaiw, Ahmed; Alghamdi, Mohamed Ali

2016-03-01

The paper by Burini, De Lillo, and Gibelli [8] presents an overview and critical analysis of the literature on the modeling of learning dynamics. The first reference is the celebrated paper by Cucker and Smale [9]. Then, the authors also propose their own approach, based on suitable development of methods of the kinetic theory [6] and theoretical tools of evolutionary game theory [12,13], recently developed on graphs [2].

Projecting 2D gene expression data into 3D and 4D space.

PubMed

Gerth, Victor E; Katsuyama, Kaori; Snyder, Kevin A; Bowes, Jeff B; Kitayama, Atsushi; Ueno, Naoto; Vize, Peter D

2007-04-01

Video games typically generate virtual 3D objects by texture mapping an image onto a 3D polygonal frame. The feeling of movement is then achieved by mathematically simulating camera movement relative to the polygonal frame. We have built customized scripts that adapt video game authoring software to texture mapping images of gene expression data onto b-spline based embryo models. This approach, known as UV mapping, associates two-dimensional (U and V) coordinates within images to the three dimensions (X, Y, and Z) of a b-spline model. B-spline model frameworks were built either from confocal data or de novo extracted from 2D images, once again using video game authoring approaches. This system was then used to build 3D models of 182 genes expressed in developing Xenopus embryos and to implement these in a web-accessible database. Models can be viewed via simple Internet browsers and utilize openGL hardware acceleration via a Shockwave plugin. Not only does this database display static data in a dynamic and scalable manner, the UV mapping system also serves as a method to align different images to a common framework, an approach that may make high-throughput automated comparisons of gene expression patterns possible. Finally, video game systems also have elegant methods for handling movement, allowing biomechanical algorithms to drive the animation of models. With further development, these biomechanical techniques offer practical methods for generating virtual embryos that recapitulate morphogenesis.

An analytic approach to cyber adversarial dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sweeney, Patrick; Cybenko, George

2012-06-01

To date, cyber security investment by both the government and commercial sectors has been largely driven by the myopic best response of players to the actions of their adversaries and their perception of the adversarial environment. However, current work in applying traditional game theory to cyber operations typically assumes that games exist with prescribed moves, strategies, and payos. This paper presents an analytic approach to characterizing the more realistic cyber adversarial metagame that we believe is being played. Examples show that understanding the dynamic metagame provides opportunities to exploit an adversary's anticipated attack strategy. A dynamic version of a graph-based attack-defend game is introduced, and a simulation shows how an optimal strategy can be selected for success in the dynamic environment.

Signaling equilibria in sensorimotor interactions.

PubMed

Leibfried, Felix; Grau-Moya, Jordi; Braun, Daniel A

2015-08-01

Although complex forms of communication like human language are often assumed to have evolved out of more simple forms of sensorimotor signaling, less attention has been devoted to investigate the latter. Here, we study communicative sensorimotor behavior of humans in a two-person joint motor task where each player controls one dimension of a planar motion. We designed this joint task as a game where one player (the sender) possesses private information about a hidden target the other player (the receiver) wants to know about, and where the sender's actions are costly signals that influence the receiver's control strategy. We developed a game-theoretic model within the framework of signaling games to investigate whether subjects' behavior could be adequately described by the corresponding equilibrium solutions. The model predicts both separating and pooling equilibria, in which signaling does and does not occur respectively. We observed both kinds of equilibria in subjects and found that, in line with model predictions, the propensity of signaling decreased with increasing signaling costs and decreasing uncertainty on the part of the receiver. Our study demonstrates that signaling games, which have previously been applied to economic decision-making and animal communication, provide a framework for human signaling behavior arising during sensorimotor interactions in continuous and dynamic environments. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Time series analysis for minority game simulations of financial markets

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ferreira, Fernando F.; Francisco, Gerson; Machado, Birajara S.; Muruganandam, Paulsamy

2003-04-01

The minority game (MG) model introduced recently provides promising insights into the understanding of the evolution of prices, indices and rates in the financial markets. In this paper we perform a time series analysis of the model employing tools from statistics, dynamical systems theory and stochastic processes. Using benchmark systems and a financial index for comparison, several conclusions are obtained about the generating mechanism for this kind of evolution. The motion is deterministic, driven by occasional random external perturbation. When the interval between two successive perturbations is sufficiently large, one can find low dimensional chaos in this regime. However, the full motion of the MG model is found to be similar to that of the first differences of the SP500 index: stochastic, nonlinear and (unit root) stationary.

A computational proof of concept of a machine-intelligent artificial pancreas using Lyapunov stability and differential game theory.

PubMed

Greenwood, Nigel J C; Gunton, Jenny E

2014-07-01

This study demonstrated the novel application of a "machine-intelligent" mathematical structure, combining differential game theory and Lyapunov-based control theory, to the artificial pancreas to handle dynamic uncertainties. Realistic type 1 diabetes (T1D) models from the literature were combined into a composite system. Using a mixture of "black box" simulations and actual data from diabetic medical histories, realistic sets of diabetic time series were constructed for blood glucose (BG), interstitial fluid glucose, infused insulin, meal estimates, and sometimes plasma insulin assays. The problem of underdetermined parameters was side stepped by applying a variant of a genetic algorithm to partial information, whereby multiple candidate-personalized models were constructed and then rigorously tested using further data. These formed a "dynamic envelope" of trajectories in state space, where each trajectory was generated by a hypothesis on the hidden T1D system dynamics. This dynamic envelope was then culled to a reduced form to cover observed dynamic behavior. A machine-intelligent autonomous algorithm then implemented game theory to construct real-time insulin infusion strategies, based on the flow of these trajectories through state space and their interactions with hypoglycemic or near-hyperglycemic states. This technique was tested on 2 simulated participants over a total of fifty-five 24-hour days, with no hypoglycemic or hyperglycemic events, despite significant uncertainties from using actual diabetic meal histories with 10-minute warnings. In the main case studies, BG was steered within the desired target set for 99.8% of a 16-hour daily assessment period. Tests confirmed algorithm robustness for ±25% carbohydrate error. For over 99% of the overall 55-day simulation period, either formal controller stability was achieved to the desired target or else the trajectory was within the desired target. These results suggest that this is a stable, high-confidence way to generate closed-loop insulin infusion strategies. © 2014 Diabetes Technology Society.

Towards a Population Dynamics Theory for Evolutionary Computing: Learning from Biological Population Dynamics in Nature

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ma, Zhanshan (Sam)

In evolutionary computing (EC), population size is one of the critical parameters that a researcher has to deal with. Hence, it was no surprise that the pioneers of EC, such as De Jong (1975) and Holland (1975), had already studied the population sizing from the very beginning of EC. What is perhaps surprising is that more than three decades later, we still largely depend on the experience or ad-hoc trial-and-error approach to set the population size. For example, in a recent monograph, Eiben and Smith (2003) indicated: "In almost all EC applications, the population size is constant and does not change during the evolutionary search." Despite enormous research on this issue in recent years, we still lack a well accepted theory for population sizing. In this paper, I propose to develop a population dynamics theory forEC with the inspiration from the population dynamics theory of biological populations in nature. Essentially, the EC population is considered as a dynamic system over time (generations) and space (search space or fitness landscape), similar to the spatial and temporal dynamics of biological populations in nature. With this conceptual mapping, I propose to 'transplant' the biological population dynamics theory to EC via three steps: (i) experimentally test the feasibility—whether or not emulating natural population dynamics improves the EC performance; (ii) comparatively study the underlying mechanisms—why there are improvements, primarily via statistical modeling analysis; (iii) conduct theoretical analysis with theoretical models such as percolation theory and extended evolutionary game theory that are generally applicable to both EC and natural populations. This article is a summary of a series of studies we have performed to achieve the general goal [27][30]-[32]. In the following, I start with an extremely brief introduction on the theory and models of natural population dynamics (Sections 1 & 2). In Sections 4 to 6, I briefly discuss three categories of population dynamics models: deterministic modeling with Logistic chaos map as an example, stochastic modeling with spatial distribution patterns as an example, as well as survival analysis and extended evolutionary game theory (EEGT) modeling. Sample experiment results with Genetic algorithms (GA) are presented to demonstrate the applications of these models. The proposed EC population dynamics approach also makes survival selection largely unnecessary or much simplified since the individuals are naturally selected (controlled) by the mathematical models for EC population dynamics.

Route Generation for a Synthetic Character (BOT) Using a Partial or Incomplete Knowledge Route Generation Algorithm in UT2004 Virtual Environment

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Hanold, Gregg T.; Hanold, David T.

2010-01-01

This paper presents a new Route Generation Algorithm that accurately and realistically represents human route planning and navigation for Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The accuracy of this algorithm in representing human behavior is measured using the Unreal Tournament(Trademark) 2004 (UT2004) Game Engine to provide the simulation environment in which the differences between the routes taken by the human player and those of a Synthetic Agent (BOT) executing the A-star algorithm and the new Route Generation Algorithm can be compared. The new Route Generation Algorithm computes the BOT route based on partial or incomplete knowledge received from the UT2004 game engine during game play. To allow BOT navigation to occur continuously throughout the game play with incomplete knowledge of the terrain, a spatial network model of the UT2004 MOUT terrain is captured and stored in an Oracle 11 9 Spatial Data Object (SOO). The SOO allows a partial data query to be executed to generate continuous route updates based on the terrain knowledge, and stored dynamic BOT, Player and environmental parameters returned by the query. The partial data query permits the dynamic adjustment of the planned routes by the Route Generation Algorithm based on the current state of the environment during a simulation. The dynamic nature of this algorithm more accurately allows the BOT to mimic the routes taken by the human executing under the same conditions thereby improving the realism of the BOT in a MOUT simulation environment.

Evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Aming; Broom, Mark; Du, Jinming; Wang, Long

2016-02-01

The evolution of populations is influenced by many factors, and the simple classical models have been developed in a number of important ways. Both population structure and multiplayer interactions have been shown to significantly affect the evolution of important properties, such as the level of cooperation or of aggressive behavior. Here we combine these two key factors and develop the evolutionary dynamics of general group interactions in structured populations represented by regular graphs. The traditional linear and threshold public goods games are adopted as models to address the dynamics. We show that for linear group interactions, population structure can favor the evolution of cooperation compared to the well-mixed case, and we see that the more neighbors there are, the harder it is for cooperators to persist in structured populations. We further show that threshold group interactions could lead to the emergence of cooperation even in well-mixed populations. Here population structure sometimes inhibits cooperation for the threshold public goods game, where depending on the benefit to cost ratio, the outcomes are bistability or a monomorphic population of defectors or cooperators. Our results suggest, counterintuitively, that structured populations are not always beneficial for the evolution of cooperation for nonlinear group interactions.

Complex Dynamics in a Triopoly Game with Multiple Delays in the Competition of Green Product Level

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Si, Fengshan; Ma, Junhai

Research on the output game behavior of oligopoly has greatly advanced in recent years. But many unknowns remain, particularly the influence of consumers’ willingness to buy green products on the oligopoly output game. This paper constructs a triopoly output game model with multiple delays in the competition of green products. The influence of the parameters on the stability and complexity of the system is studied by analyzing the existence and local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point. It is found that the system loses stability and increases complexity if delay parameters exceed a certain range. In the unstable or chaotic game market, the decisions of oligopoly will be counterproductive. It is also observed that the influence of weight and output adjustment speed on the firm itself is obviously stronger than the influence of other firms. In addition, it is important that weight and output adjustment speed cannot increase indefinitely, otherwise it will bring unnecessary losses to the firm. Finally, chaos control is realized by using the variable feedback control method. The research results of this paper can provide a reference for decision-making for the output of the game of oligopoly.

The Replicator Equation on Graphs

PubMed Central

Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Nowak, Martin A.

2008-01-01

We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom. A player can use any one of n strategies. Players obtain a payoff from interaction with all their immediate neighbors. We consider three different update rules, called ‘birth-death’, ‘death-birth’ and ‘imitation’. A fourth update rule, ‘pairwise comparison’, is shown to be equivalent to birth-death updating in our model. We use pair-approximation to describe the evolutionary game dynamics on regular graphs of degree k. In the limit of weak selection, we can derive a differential equation which describes how the average frequency of each strategy on the graph changes over time. Remarkably, this equation is a replicator equation with a transformed payoff matrix. Therefore, moving a game from a well-mixed population (the complete graph) onto a regular graph simply results in a transformation of the payoff matrix. The new payoff matrix is the sum of the original payoff matrix plus another matrix, which describes the local competition of strategies. We discuss the application of our theory to four particular examples, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Snow-Drift game, a coordination game and the Rock-Scissors-Paper game. PMID:16860343

Human judgment vs. quantitative models for the management of ecological resources.

PubMed

Holden, Matthew H; Ellner, Stephen P

2016-07-01

Despite major advances in quantitative approaches to natural resource management, there has been resistance to using these tools in the actual practice of managing ecological populations. Given a managed system and a set of assumptions, translated into a model, optimization methods can be used to solve for the most cost-effective management actions. However, when the underlying assumptions are not met, such methods can potentially lead to decisions that harm the environment and economy. Managers who develop decisions based on past experience and judgment, without the aid of mathematical models, can potentially learn about the system and develop flexible management strategies. However, these strategies are often based on subjective criteria and equally invalid and often unstated assumptions. Given the drawbacks of both methods, it is unclear whether simple quantitative models improve environmental decision making over expert opinion. In this study, we explore how well students, using their experience and judgment, manage simulated fishery populations in an online computer game and compare their management outcomes to the performance of model-based decisions. We consider harvest decisions generated using four different quantitative models: (1) the model used to produce the simulated population dynamics observed in the game, with the values of all parameters known (as a control), (2) the same model, but with unknown parameter values that must be estimated during the game from observed data, (3) models that are structurally different from those used to simulate the population dynamics, and (4) a model that ignores age structure. Humans on average performed much worse than the models in cases 1-3, but in a small minority of scenarios, models produced worse outcomes than those resulting from students making decisions based on experience and judgment. When the models ignored age structure, they generated poorly performing management decisions, but still outperformed students using experience and judgment 66% of the time. © 2016 by the Ecological Society of America.

Family factors in adolescent problematic Internet gaming: A systematic review.

PubMed

Schneider, Luke A; King, Daniel L; Delfabbro, Paul H

2017-09-01

Background and aims Familial influences are known to affect the likelihood of an adolescent becoming a problem gamer. This systematic review examined some of the key findings in empirical research on family factors related to adolescent problem gaming. Methods A total of 14 studies in the past decade were evaluated. Family-related variables included: (a) parent status (e.g., socioeconomic status and mental health), (b) parent-child relationship (e.g., warmth, conflict, and abuse), (c) parental influence on gaming (e.g., supervision of gaming, modeling, and attitudes toward gaming), and (d) family environment (e.g., household composition). Results The majority of studies have focused on parent-child relationships, reporting that poorer quality relationships are associated with increased severity of problem gaming. The paternal relationship may be protective against problem gaming; therefore, prevention programs should leverage the support of cooperative fathers. Discussion The intergenerational effects of problem gaming require further attention, in light of adult gamers raising their children in a gaming-centric environment. Research has been limited by a reliance on adolescent self-report to understand family dynamics, without gathering corroborating information from parents and other family members. The very high rates of problem gaming (>10%) reported in general population samples raise concerns about the validity of current screening tools. Conclusions Interventions for adolescents may be more effective in some cases if they can address familial influences on problem gaming with the active co-participation of parents, rather than enrolling vulnerable adolescents in individual-based training or temporarily isolating adolescents from the family system.

Family factors in adolescent problematic Internet gaming: A systematic review

PubMed Central

Schneider, Luke A.; King, Daniel L.; Delfabbro, Paul H.

2017-01-01

Background and aims Familial influences are known to affect the likelihood of an adolescent becoming a problem gamer. This systematic review examined some of the key findings in empirical research on family factors related to adolescent problem gaming. Methods A total of 14 studies in the past decade were evaluated. Family-related variables included: (a) parent status (e.g., socioeconomic status and mental health), (b) parent–child relationship (e.g., warmth, conflict, and abuse), (c) parental influence on gaming (e.g., supervision of gaming, modeling, and attitudes toward gaming), and (d) family environment (e.g., household composition). Results The majority of studies have focused on parent–child relationships, reporting that poorer quality relationships are associated with increased severity of problem gaming. The paternal relationship may be protective against problem gaming; therefore, prevention programs should leverage the support of cooperative fathers. Discussion The intergenerational effects of problem gaming require further attention, in light of adult gamers raising their children in a gaming-centric environment. Research has been limited by a reliance on adolescent self-report to understand family dynamics, without gathering corroborating information from parents and other family members. The very high rates of problem gaming (>10%) reported in general population samples raise concerns about the validity of current screening tools. Conclusions Interventions for adolescents may be more effective in some cases if they can address familial influences on problem gaming with the active co-participation of parents, rather than enrolling vulnerable adolescents in individual-based training or temporarily isolating adolescents from the family system. PMID:28762279

Weight of fitness deviation governs strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pandit, Varun; Mukhopadhyay, Archan; Chakraborty, Sagar

2018-03-01

Replicator equation—a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics—mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the average fitnesses of the evolving population under consideration. In this paper, we deal with two discrete versions of the replicator equation employed to study evolution in a population where any two players' interaction is modelled by a two-strategy symmetric normal-form game. There are twelve distinct classes of such games, each typified by a particular ordinal relationship among the elements of the corresponding payoff matrix. Here, we find the sufficient conditions for the existence of asymptotic solutions of the replicator equations such that the solutions—fixed points, periodic orbits, and chaotic trajectories—are all strictly physical, meaning that the frequency of any strategy lies inside the closed interval zero to one at all times. Thus, we elaborate on which of the twelve types of games are capable of showing meaningful physical solutions and for which of the two types of replicator equation. Subsequently, we introduce the concept of the weight of fitness deviation that is the scaling factor in a positive affine transformation connecting two payoff matrices such that the corresponding one-shot games have exactly same Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable states. The weight also quantifies how much the excess of fitness of a strategy over the average fitness of the population affects the per capita change in the frequency of the strategy. Intriguingly, the weight's variation is capable of making the Nash equilibria and the evolutionary stable states, useless by introducing strict physical chaos in the replicator dynamics based on the normal-form game.

Predicting Human Cooperation

PubMed Central

Nay, John J.; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy

2016-01-01

The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational model of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. We demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation. PMID:27171417

Repurposing an Old Game for an International World

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hofstede, Gert Jan; Murff, Elizabeth J. Tipton

2012-01-01

The game SO LONG SUCKER was designed in the United States in 1964 with the aim of showing how potentially unethical behavior necessary for winning was inherent in the game's incentive structure. Sessions with East Asian participants, however, led to very different game dynamics in which collaborative rather than antagonistic behaviors occurred.…

Complex and Nonlinear Pedagogy and the Implications for Physical Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Chow, Jia Yi; Atencio, Matthew

2014-01-01

There is increasing support to describe and examine the teaching of game skills in physical education from a complex and nonlinear perspective. The emergence of game behaviours as a consequence of the dynamic interactions of the learner, the game environment and the task constraints within the game context highlights the nonlinear and complex…

Navigating and Decoding Dynamic Maps: Gender Preferences and Engagement Differences within- and outside-of Game Experiences

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lowrie, Tom; Jorgensen, Robyn; Logan, Tracy

2013-01-01

A survey ("n" = 410) revealed statistically significant gender differences between middle school students' preference for playing particular types of games. Subsequent instrumental case studies theorised the "within-game" and "out-of-game" experiences of two middle school students as they played a digital hand-held…

Study of network resource allocation based on market and game theoretic mechanism

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Yingmei; Wang, Hongwei; Wang, Gang

2004-04-01

We work on the network resource allocation issue concerning network management system function based on market-oriented mechanism. The scheme is to model the telecommunication network resources as trading goods in which the various network components could be owned by different competitive, real-world entities. This is a multidisciplinary framework concentrating on the similarity between resource allocation in network environment and the market mechanism in economic theory. By taking an economic (market-based and game theoretic) approach in routing of communication network, we study the dynamic behavior under game-theoretic framework in allocating network resources. Based on the prior work of Gibney and Jennings, we apply concepts of utility and fitness to the market mechanism with an intention to close the gap between experiment environment and real world situation.

Towards understanding the guessing game: a dynamical systems’ perspective

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Reimann, Stefan

2004-08-01

The so-called “Guessing Game” or α-Beauty Contest serves as a paradigmatic conceptual framework for competitive price formation on financial markets beyond traditional equilibrium finance. It highlights features that are reasonable to consider when dealing with price formation on real markets. Nonetheless this game is still poorly understood. We propose a model which is essentially based on two assumptions: (1) players consider intervals rather than exact numbers to cope with incomplete knowledge and (2) players iteratively update their recent guesses. It provides an explanation for typical patterns observed in real data, such as the strict positivity of outcomes in the 1-shot setting, the skew background distribution of guessed numbers, as well as the polynomial convergence towards the game-theoretic Nash equilibrium in the iterative setting.

Clearing out a maze: A model of chemotactic motion in porous media

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Schilling, Tanja; Voigtmann, Thomas

2017-12-01

We study the anomalous dynamics of a biased "hungry" (or "greedy") random walk on a percolating cluster. The model mimics chemotaxis in a porous medium: In close resemblance to the 1980s arcade game PAC-MA N ®, the hungry random walker consumes food, which is initially distributed in the maze, and biases its movement towards food-filled sites. We observe that the mean-squared displacement of the process follows a power law with an exponent that is different from previously known exponents describing passive or active microswimmer dynamics. The change in dynamics is well described by a dynamical exponent that depends continuously on the propensity to move towards food. It results in slower differential growth when compared to the unbiased random walk.

Dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary quantum Prisoner's Dilemma games on networks

PubMed Central

Yong, Xi

2016-01-01

The authors proposed a quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game as a natural extension of the classic PD game to resolve the dilemma. Here, we establish a new Nash equilibrium principle of the game, propose the notion of convergence and discover the convergence and phase-transition phenomena of the evolutionary games on networks. We investigate the many-body extension of the game or evolutionary games in networks. For homogeneous networks, we show that entanglement guarantees a quick convergence of super cooperation, that there is a phase transition from the convergence of defection to the convergence of super cooperation, and that the threshold for the phase transitions is principally determined by the Nash equilibrium principle of the game, with an accompanying perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. For heterogeneous networks, we show that the equilibrium frequencies of super-cooperators are divergent, that entanglement guarantees emergence of super-cooperation and that there is a phase transition of the emergence with the threshold determined by the Nash equilibrium principle, accompanied by a perturbation by the variations of structures of networks. Our results explore systematically, for the first time, the dynamics, morphogenesis and convergence of evolutionary games in interacting and competing systems. PMID:27118882

An experimental investigation of evolutionary dynamics in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game.

PubMed

Hoffman, Moshe; Suetens, Sigrid; Gneezy, Uri; Nowak, Martin A

2015-03-06

Game theory describes social behaviors in humans and other biological organisms. By far, the most powerful tool available to game theorists is the concept of a Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is motivated by perfect rationality. NE specifies a strategy for everyone, such that no one would benefit by deviating unilaterally from his/her strategy. Another powerful tool available to game theorists are evolutionary dynamics (ED). Motivated by evolutionary and learning processes, ED specify changes in strategies over time in a population, such that more successful strategies typically become more frequent. A simple game that illustrates interesting ED is the generalized Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game. The RPS game extends the children's game to situations where winning or losing can matter more or less relative to tying. Here we investigate experimentally three RPS games, where the NE is always to randomize with equal probability, but the evolutionary stability of this strategy changes. Consistent with the prediction of ED we find that aggregate behavior is far away from NE when it is evolutionarily unstable. Our findings add to the growing literature that demonstrates the predictive validity of ED in large-scale incentivized laboratory experiments with human subjects.

Retraining function in people with Parkinson’s disease using the Microsoft kinect: game design and pilot testing

PubMed Central

2014-01-01

Background Computer based gaming systems, such as the Microsoft Kinect (Kinect), can facilitate complex task practice, enhance sensory feedback and action observation in novel, relevant and motivating modes of exercise which can be difficult to achieve with standard physiotherapy for people with Parkinson’s disease (PD). However, there is a current need for safe, feasible and effective exercise games that are appropriate for PD rehabilitation. The aims of this study were to i) develop a computer game to rehabilitate dynamic postural control for people with PD using the Kinect; and ii) pilot test the game’s safety and feasibility in a group of people with PD. Methods A rehabilitation game aimed at training dynamic postural control was developed through an iterative process with input from a design workshop of people with PD. The game trains dynamic postural control through multi-directional reaching and stepping tasks, with increasing complexity across 12 levels of difficulty. Nine people with PD pilot tested the game for one session. Participant feedback to identify issues relating to safety and feasibility were collected using semi-structured interviews. Results Participants reported that they felt safe whilst playing the game. In addition, there were no adverse events whilst playing. In general, the participants stated that they enjoyed the game and seven of the nine participants said they could imagine themselves using the game at home, especially if they felt it would improve their balance. The Flow State Scale indicated participants were immersed in the gameplay and enjoyed the experience. However, some participants reported that they found it difficult to discriminate between different types and orientations of visual objects in the game and some also had difficulty with the stepping tasks, especially when performed at the same time as the reaching tasks. Conclusion Computer-based rehabilitation games using the Kinect are safe and feasible for people with PD although intervention trials are needed to test their safety, feasibility and efficacy in the home. PMID:24731758

Behavior of Collective Cooperation Yielded by Two Update Rules in Social Dilemmas: Combining Fermi and Moran Rules

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xia, Cheng-Yi; Wang, Lei; Wang, Juan; Wang, Jin-Song

2012-09-01

We combine the Fermi and Moran update rules in the spatial prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games to investigate the behavior of collective cooperation among agents on the regular lattice. Large-scale simulations indicate that, compared to the model with only one update rule, the cooperation behavior exhibits the richer phenomena, and the role of update dynamics should be paid more attention in the evolutionary game theory. Meanwhile, we also observe that the introduction of Moran rule, which needs to consider all neighbor's information, can markedly promote the aggregate cooperation level, that is, randomly selecting the neighbor proportional to its payoff to imitate will facilitate the cooperation among agents. Current results will contribute to further understand the cooperation dynamics and evolutionary behaviors within many biological, economic and social systems.

Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations.

PubMed

Santos, F C; Pacheco, J M; Lenaerts, Tom

2006-02-28

Real populations have been shown to be heterogeneous, in which some individuals have many more contacts than others. This fact contrasts with the traditional homogeneous setting used in studies of evolutionary game dynamics. We incorporate heterogeneity in the population by studying games on graphs, in which the variability in connectivity ranges from single-scale graphs, for which heterogeneity is small and associated degree distributions exhibit a Gaussian tale, to scale-free graphs, for which heterogeneity is large with degree distributions exhibiting a power-law behavior. We study the evolution of cooperation, modeled in terms of the most popular dilemmas of cooperation. We show that, for all dilemmas, increasing heterogeneity favors the emergence of cooperation, such that long-term cooperative behavior easily resists short-term noncooperative behavior. Moreover, we show how cooperation depends on the intricate ties between individuals in scale-free populations.

Theory of networked minority games based on strategy pattern dynamics.

PubMed

Lo, T S; Chan, H Y; Hui, P M; Johnson, N F

2004-11-01

We formulate a theory of agent-based models in which agents compete to be in a winning group. The agents may be part of a network or not, and the winning group may be a minority group or not. An important feature of the present formalism is its focus on the dynamical pattern of strategy rankings, and its careful treatment of the strategy ties which arise during the system's temporal evolution. We apply it to the minority game with connected populations. Expressions for the mean success rate among the agents and for the mean success rate for agents with k neighbors are derived. We also use the theory to estimate the value of connectivity p above which the binary-agent-resource system with high resource levels makes the transition into the high-connectivity state.

Diffusion and Localization of Relative Strategy Scores in The Minority Game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Granath, Mats; Perez-Diaz, Alvaro

2016-10-01

We study the equilibrium distribution of relative strategy scores of agents in the asymmetric phase (α ≡ P/N≳ 1) of the basic Minority Game using sign-payoff, with N agents holding two strategies over P histories. We formulate a statistical model that makes use of the gauge freedom with respect to the ordering of an agent's strategies to quantify the correlation between the attendance and the distribution of strategies. The relative score xin Z of the two strategies of an agent is described in terms of a one dimensional random walk with asymmetric jump probabilities, leading either to a static and asymmetric exponential distribution centered at x=0 for fickle agents or to diffusion with a positive or negative drift for frozen agents. In terms of scaled coordinates x/√{N} and t / N the distributions are uniquely given by α and in quantitative agreement with direct simulations of the game. As the model avoids the reformulation in terms of a constrained minimization problem it can be used for arbitrary payoff functions with little calculational effort and provides a transparent and simple formulation of the dynamics of the basic Minority Game in the asymmetric phase.

Non-Fixed Investment in Voluntary Public Goods Games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Shuai; Xu, Zhaojin; Zhang, Lianzhong

2018-05-01

In this work, we introduce a non-fixed investment ratio to the public goods games in which players can determine whether or not to participate and how much money to invest into the common pool, and with it a new mechanism has been established. We explicitly demonstrate a different rockscissors- paper dynamics which is a consequence of this model. Meanwhile, it is shown how the mechanism of non-fixed investment ratio influences the players' decision. In addition, we found that the length of memory has an important effect on the average payoff of the population by this introduction.

Analysis of Managing Safety in Small Enterprises: Dual-Effects of Employee Prosocial Safety Behavior and Government Inspection

PubMed Central

2018-01-01

This paper aims to promote a national and international occupational health and safety (OHS) intervention for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) within internal and external resources. Based on the characteristics of small SME management, the work environment and occupational health may be positively affected by the dual-effects of employees and government. Evolutionary game theory is utilized to identify relevant interactions among the government, small enterprises, and employees. Furthermore, dynamic simulations of the evolutionary game model are used to explore stability strategies and to identify modes of equilibrium. PMID:29707574

Tools, Techniques, and Applications: Normalizing the VR Paradigm

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Duncan, Gaeme

2008-01-01

Oshynee's precision Learning Objective performance factor rubrics with associated behavioral anchors integrates with Thinking Worlds(TradeMark), to provide event data recording and dynamic prescriptive feedback. Thinking Worlds(TradeMark) provides SCORM parametric data for reporting within the game and within overarching curricula or workplace evaluation strategy. - Open-sourced, browser-based digital dashboard reporting tools collect data from TW, LMS, LCMS, HR, and workplace metrics or control systems The games may be delivered across the internet or in a range of networked and stand-alone methods using the delivery model (s) required by the host organization.

Simulating Poverty and Inequality Dynamics in Developing Countries

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ansoms, An; Geenen, Sara

2012-01-01

This article considers how the simulation game of DEVELOPMENT MONOPOLY provides insight into poverty and inequality dynamics in a development context. It first discusses how the game is rooted in theoretical and conceptual frameworks on poverty and inequality. Subsequently, it reflects on selected playing experiences, with special focus on the…

Information visualization of the minority game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Jiang, W.; Herbert, R. D.; Webber, R.

2008-02-01

Many dynamical systems produce large quantities of data. How can the system be understood from the output data? Often people are simply overwhelmed by the data. Traditional tools such as tables and plots are often not adequate, and new techniques are needed to help people to analyze the system. In this paper, we propose the use of two spacefilling visualization tools to examine the output from a complex agent-based financial model. We measure the effectiveness and performance of these tools through usability experiments. Based on the experimental results, we develop two new visualization techniques that combine the advantages and discard the disadvantages of the information visualization tools. The model we use is an evolutionary version of the Minority Game which simulates a financial market.

Expert Game experiment predicts emergence of trust in professional communication networks.

PubMed

Bendtsen, Kristian Moss; Uekermann, Florian; Haerter, Jan O

2016-10-25

Strong social capital is increasingly recognized as an organizational advantage. Better knowledge sharing and reduced transaction costs increase work efficiency. To mimic the formation of the associated communication network, we propose the Expert Game, where each individual must find a specific expert and receive her help. Participants act in an impersonal environment and under time constraints that provide short-term incentives for noncooperative behavior. Despite these constraints, we observe cooperation between individuals and the self-organization of a sustained trust network, which facilitates efficient communication channels with increased information flow. We build a behavioral model that explains the experimental dynamics. Analysis of the model reveals an exploitation protection mechanism and measurable social capital, which quantitatively describe the economic utility of trust.

Applying Spatial-Temporal Model and Game Theory to Asymmetric Threat Prediction

DTIC Science & Technology

2007-06-01

Genshe Chen, Denis Garagic, Xiaohuan Tan, Dongxu Li, Dan Shen, Mo Wei, Xu Wang, “Team Dynamics and Tactics for Mission Planning,” Proceedings...Cruz, Jr., Genshe Chen, Dongxu Li, and Denis Garagic, “Target Selection in UAV Cooperative Control Under Uncertain Environment: Genetic Algorithm

Toward Endemic Deployment of Educational Simulation Games: A Review of Progress and Future Recommendations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moizer, Jonathan; Lean, Jonathan

2010-01-01

This article presents a conceptual analysis of simulation game adoption and use across university faculty. The metaphor of epidemiology is used to characterize the diffusion of simulation games for teaching and learning. A simple stock-flow diagram is presented to illustrate this dynamic. Future scenarios for simulation game adoption are…

What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

PubMed Central

Hasegawa, Eisuke; Yoshimura, Jin

2016-01-01

In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player’s current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated. PMID:27487194

What Is True Halving in the Payoff Matrix of Game Theory?

PubMed

Ito, Hiromu; Katsumata, Yuki; Hasegawa, Eisuke; Yoshimura, Jin

2016-01-01

In game theory, there are two social interpretations of rewards (payoffs) for decision-making strategies: (1) the interpretation based on the utility criterion derived from expected utility theory and (2) the interpretation based on the quantitative criterion (amount of gain) derived from validity in the empirical context. A dynamic decision theory has recently been developed in which dynamic utility is a conditional (state) variable that is a function of the current wealth of a decision maker. We applied dynamic utility to the equal division in dove-dove contests in the hawk-dove game. Our results indicate that under the utility criterion, the half-share of utility becomes proportional to a player's current wealth. Our results are consistent with studies of the sense of fairness in animals, which indicate that the quantitative criterion has greater validity than the utility criterion. We also find that traditional analyses of repeated games must be reevaluated.

Stability of Mixed-Strategy-Based Iterative Logit Quantal Response Dynamics in Game Theory

PubMed Central

Zhuang, Qian; Di, Zengru; Wu, Jinshan

2014-01-01

Using the Logit quantal response form as the response function in each step, the original definition of static quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is extended into an iterative evolution process. QREs remain as the fixed points of the dynamic process. However, depending on whether such fixed points are the long-term solutions of the dynamic process, they can be classified into stable (SQREs) and unstable (USQREs) equilibriums. This extension resembles the extension from static Nash equilibriums (NEs) to evolutionary stable solutions in the framework of evolutionary game theory. The relation between SQREs and other solution concepts of games, including NEs and QREs, is discussed. Using experimental data from other published papers, we perform a preliminary comparison between SQREs, NEs, QREs and the observed behavioral outcomes of those experiments. For certain games, we determine that SQREs have better predictive power than QREs and NEs. PMID:25157502

Fixation of competing strategies when interacting agents differ in the time scale of strategy updating

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Jianlei; Weissing, Franz J.; Cao, Ming

2016-09-01

A commonly used assumption in evolutionary game theory is that natural selection acts on individuals in the same time scale; e.g., players use the same frequency to update their strategies. Variation in learning rates within populations suggests that evolutionary game theory may not necessarily be restricted to uniform time scales associated with the game interaction and strategy adaption evolution. In this study, we remove this restricting assumption by dividing the population into fast and slow groups according to the players' strategy updating frequencies and investigate how different strategy compositions of one group influence the evolutionary outcome of the other's fixation probabilities of strategies within its own group. Analytical analysis and numerical calculations are performed to study the evolutionary dynamics of strategies in typical classes of two-player games (prisoner's dilemma game, snowdrift game, and stag-hunt game). The introduction of the heterogeneity in strategy-update time scales leads to substantial changes in the evolution dynamics of strategies. We provide an approximation formula for the fixation probability of mutant types in finite populations and study the outcome of strategy evolution under the weak selection. We find that although heterogeneity in time scales makes the collective evolutionary dynamics more complicated, the possible long-run evolutionary outcome can be effectively predicted under technical assumptions when knowing the population composition and payoff parameters.

The Price Equation, Gradient Dynamics, and Continuous Trait Game Theory.

PubMed

Lehtonen, Jussi

2018-01-01

A recent article convincingly nominated the Price equation as the fundamental theorem of evolution and used it as a foundation to derive several other theorems. A major section of evolutionary theory that was not addressed is that of game theory and gradient dynamics of continuous traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Deriving fundamental results in these fields under the unifying framework of the Price equation illuminates similarities and differences between approaches and allows a simple, unified view of game-theoretical and dynamic concepts. Using Taylor polynomials and the Price equation, I derive a dynamic measure of evolutionary change, a condition for singular points, the convergence stability criterion, and an alternative interpretation of evolutionary stability. Furthermore, by applying the Price equation to a multivariable Taylor polynomial, the direct fitness approach to kin selection emerges. Finally, I compare these results to the mean gradient equation of quantitative genetics and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics.

Hybrid learning in signalling games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Barrett, Jeffrey A.; Cochran, Calvin T.; Huttegger, Simon; Fujiwara, Naoki

2017-09-01

Lewis-Skyrms signalling games have been studied under a variety of low-rationality learning dynamics. Reinforcement dynamics are stable but slow and prone to evolving suboptimal signalling conventions. A low-inertia trial-and-error dynamical like win-stay/lose-randomise is fast and reliable at finding perfect signalling conventions but unstable in the context of noise or agent error. Here we consider a low-rationality hybrid of reinforcement and win-stay/lose-randomise learning that exhibits the virtues of both. This hybrid dynamics is reliable, stable and exceptionally fast.

A consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Han-Xin

2016-08-01

We propose a consensus opinion model based on the evolutionary game. In our model, both of the two connected agents receive a benefit if they have the same opinion, otherwise they both pay a cost. Agents update their opinions by comparing payoffs with neighbors. The opinion of an agent with higher payoff is more likely to be imitated. We apply this model in scale-free networks with tunable degree distribution. Interestingly, we find that there exists an optimal ratio of cost to benefit, leading to the shortest consensus time. Qualitative analysis is obtained by examining the evolution of the opinion clusters. Moreover, we find that the consensus time decreases as the average degree of the network increases, but increases with the noise introduced to permit irrational choices. The dependence of the consensus time on the network size is found to be a power-law form. For small or larger ratio of cost to benefit, the consensus time decreases as the degree exponent increases. However, for moderate ratio of cost to benefit, the consensus time increases with the degree exponent. Our results may provide new insights into opinion dynamics driven by the evolutionary game theory.

Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a Public Good Game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Colasante, Annarita

2017-02-01

This paper presents an investigation about cooperation in a Public Good Game using an Agent Based Model calibrated on experimental data. Starting from the experiment proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze the dynamic of cooperation in a Public Good Game where agents receive an heterogeneous income and choose both the level of contribution and the distribution rule. The starting point is the calibration and the output validation of the model using the experimental results. Once tested the goodness of fit of the Agent Based Model, we run some policy experiment in order to verify how each distribution rule, i.e. equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive, affects the level of contribution in the simulated model. We find out that the share of cooperators decreases over time if we exogenously set the equidistribution rule. On the contrary, the share of cooperators converges to 100 % if we impose the progressive rule. Finally, the most interesting result refers to the effect of the progressive rule. We observe that, in the case of high inequality, this rule is not able to reduce the heterogeneity of income.

Finite-horizon differential games for missile-target interception system using adaptive dynamic programming with input constraints

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sun, Jingliang; Liu, Chunsheng

2018-01-01

In this paper, the problem of intercepting a manoeuvring target within a fixed final time is posed in a non-linear constrained zero-sum differential game framework. The Nash equilibrium solution is found by solving the finite-horizon constrained differential game problem via adaptive dynamic programming technique. Besides, a suitable non-quadratic functional is utilised to encode the control constraints into a differential game problem. The single critic network with constant weights and time-varying activation functions is constructed to approximate the solution of associated time-varying Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation online. To properly satisfy the terminal constraint, an additional error term is incorporated in a novel weight-updating law such that the terminal constraint error is also minimised over time. By utilising Lyapunov's direct method, the closed-loop differential game system and the estimation weight error of the critic network are proved to be uniformly ultimately bounded. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated by using a simple non-linear system and a non-linear missile-target interception system, assuming first-order dynamics for the interceptor and target.

A Video Game Platform for Exploring Satellite and In-Situ Data Streams

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cai, Y.

2014-12-01

Exploring spatiotemporal patterns of moving objects are essential to Earth Observation missions, such as tracking, modeling and predicting movement of clouds, dust, plumes and harmful algal blooms. Those missions involve high-volume, multi-source, and multi-modal imagery data analysis. Analytical models intend to reveal inner structure, dynamics, and relationship of things. However, they are not necessarily intuitive to humans. Conventional scientific visualization methods are intuitive but limited by manual operations, such as area marking, measurement and alignment of multi-source data, which are expensive and time-consuming. A new development of video analytics platform has been in progress, which integrates the video game engine with satellite and in-situ data streams. The system converts Earth Observation data into articulated objects that are mapped from a high-dimensional space to a 3D space. The object tracking and augmented reality algorithms highlight the objects' features in colors, shapes and trajectories, creating visual cues for observing dynamic patterns. The head and gesture tracker enable users to navigate the data space interactively. To validate our design, we have used NASA SeaWiFS satellite images of oceanographic remote sensing data and NOAA's in-situ cell count data. Our study demonstrates that the video game system can reduce the size and cost of traditional CAVE systems in two to three orders of magnitude. This system can also be used for satellite mission planning and public outreaching.

Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking in Interdependent Networked Game

PubMed Central

Jin, Qing; Wang, Lin; Xia, Cheng-Yi; Wang, Zhen

2014-01-01

Spatial evolution game has traditionally assumed that players interact with direct neighbors on a single network, which is isolated and not influenced by other systems. However, this is not fully consistent with recent research identification that interactions between networks play a crucial rule for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. In this work, we introduce the simple game model into the interdependent networks composed of two networks. By means of imitation dynamics, we display that when the interdependent factor α is smaller than a threshold value αC, the symmetry of cooperation can be guaranteed. Interestingly, as interdependent factor exceeds αC, spontaneous symmetry breaking of fraction of cooperators presents itself between different networks. With respect to the breakage of symmetry, it is induced by asynchronous expansion between heterogeneous strategy couples of both networks, which further enriches the content of spatial reciprocity. Moreover, our results can be well predicted by the strategy-couple pair approximation method. PMID:24526076

Evolutionary games of condensates in coupled birth–death processes

PubMed Central

Knebel, Johannes; Weber, Markus F.; Krüger, Torben; Frey, Erwin

2015-01-01

Condensation phenomena arise through a collective behaviour of particles. They are observed in both classical and quantum systems, ranging from the formation of traffic jams in mass transport models to the macroscopic occupation of the energetic ground state in ultra-cold bosonic gases (Bose–Einstein condensation). Recently, it has been shown that a driven and dissipative system of bosons may form multiple condensates. Which states become the condensates has, however, remained elusive thus far. The dynamics of this condensation are described by coupled birth–death processes, which also occur in evolutionary game theory. Here we apply concepts from evolutionary game theory to explain the formation of multiple condensates in such driven-dissipative bosonic systems. We show that the vanishing of relative entropy production determines their selection. The condensation proceeds exponentially fast, but the system never comes to rest. Instead, the occupation numbers of condensates may oscillate, as we demonstrate for a rock–paper–scissors game of condensates. PMID:25908384

Feedback Control for a Smart Wheelchair Trainer Based on the Kinect Sensor

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Darling, Aurelia McLaughlin

This thesis describes a Microsoft Kinect-based feedback controller for a robot-assisted powered wheelchair trainer for children with a severe motor and/or cognitive disability. In one training mode, "computer gaming" mode, the wheelchair is allowed to rotate left and right while the children use a joystick to play video games shown on a screen in front of them. This enables them to learn the use of the joystick in a motivating environment, while experiencing the sensation and dynamics of turning in a safe setting. During initial pilot testing of the device, it was found that the wheelchair would creep forward while children were playing the games. This thesis presents a mathematical model of the wheelchair dynamics that explains the origin of the creep as a center of gravity offset from the wheel axis or a mismatch of the torques applied to the chair. Given these possible random perturbations, a feedback controller was developed to cancel these effects, correcting the system creep. The controller uses a Microsoft Kinect sensor to detect the distance to the screen displaying the computer game, as well as the left-right position (parallel parking concept) with respect to the screen, and then adjusts the wheel torque commands based on this measurement. We show through experimental testing that this controller effectively stops the creep. An added benefit of the feedback controller is that it approximates a washout filter, such as those used in aircraft simulators, to convey a more realistic sense of forward/backward motion during game play.

Replicator dynamics with turnover of players

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Juul, Jeppe; Kianercy, Ardeshir; Bernhardsson, Sebastian; Pigolotti, Simone

2013-08-01

We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such a process leads macroscopically to a variant of the replicator equation, with an additional term accounting for player turnover. We study how Nash equilibria and the dynamics of the system are modified by this additional term for prototypical examples such as the rock-paper-scissors game and different classes of two-action games played between two distinct populations. We conclude by showing how player turnover can account for nontrivial departures from Nash equilibria observed in data from lowest unique bid auctions.

On Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

DTIC Science & Technology

2003-10-01

Traditionally automata theory and veri cation has considered zero sum or strictly competitive versions of stochastic games . In these games there are two players...zero- sum discrete-time stochastic dynamic games . SIAM J. Control and Optimization, 19(5):617{634, 1981. 18. R.J. Lipton, E . Markakis, and A. Mehta...Playing large games using simple strate- gies. In EC 03: Electronic Commerce, pages 36{41. ACM Press, 2003. 19. A. Maitra and W. Sudderth. Finitely

Randomly chosen chaotic maps can give rise to nearly ordered behavior

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Boyarsky, Abraham; Góra, Paweł; Islam, Md. Shafiqul

2005-10-01

Parrondo’s paradox [J.M.R. Parrondo, G.P. Harmer, D. Abbott, New paradoxical games based on Brownian ratchets, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 (2000), 5226-5229] (see also [O.E. Percus, J.K. Percus, Can two wrongs make a right? Coin-tossing games and Parrondo’s paradox, Math. Intelligencer 24 (3) (2002) 68-72]) states that two losing gambling games when combined one after the other (either deterministically or randomly) can result in a winning game: that is, a losing game followed by a losing game = a winning game. Inspired by this paradox, a recent study [J. Almeida, D. Peralta-Salas, M. Romera, Can two chaotic systems give rise to order? Physica D 200 (2005) 124-132] asked an analogous question in discrete time dynamical system: can two chaotic systems give rise to order, namely can they be combined into another dynamical system which does not behave chaotically? Numerical evidence is provided in [J. Almeida, D. Peralta-Salas, M. Romera, Can two chaotic systems give rise to order? Physica D 200 (2005) 124-132] that two chaotic quadratic maps, when composed with each other, create a new dynamical system which has a stable period orbit. The question of what happens in the case of random composition of maps is posed in [J. Almeida, D. Peralta-Salas, M. Romera, Can two chaotic systems give rise to order? Physica D 200 (2005) 124-132] but left unanswered. In this note we present an example of a dynamical system where, at each iteration, a map is chosen in a probabilistic manner from a collection of chaotic maps. The resulting random map is proved to have an infinite absolutely continuous invariant measure (acim) with spikes at two points. From this we show that the dynamics behaves in a nearly ordered manner. When the foregoing maps are applied one after the other, deterministically as in [O.E. Percus, J.K. Percus, Can two wrongs make a right? Coin-tossing games and Parrondo’s paradox, Math. Intelligencer 24 (3) (2002) 68-72], the resulting composed map has a periodic orbit which is stable.

Entry and Exit.

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-03-01

1. Introduction R Analyses of industrial competition have attained a new vigor with the application of game -theoretic methods. The process of... competition is represented in models that reflect genuine struggles for entry, market power, and continuing survival. Dynamics and informational effects are...presents a few of the models developed recently to study competitive processes that affect a firm’s entry into a market , and the decision to exit. The

Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Zhi-Xi; Holme, Petter

2009-08-01

Spatial games are crucial for understanding patterns of cooperation in nature (and to some extent society). They are known to be more sensitive to local symmetries than, e.g., spin models. This paper concerns the evolution of the prisoner’s dilemma game on regular lattices with three different types of neighborhoods—the von Neumann, Moore, and kagomé types. We investigate two kinds of dynamics for the players to update their strategies (that can be unconditional cooperator or defector). Depending on the payoff difference, an individual can adopt the strategy of a random neighbor [a voter-model-like dynamics (VMLD)] or impose its strategy on a random neighbor, i.e., invasion-process-like dynamics (IPLD). In particular, we focus on the effects of noise, in combination with the strategy dynamics, on the evolution of cooperation. We find that VMLD, compared to IPLD, better supports the spreading and sustaining of cooperation. We see that noise has nontrivial effects on the evolution of cooperation: maximum cooperation density can be realized either at a medium noise level, in the limit of zero noise or in both these regions. The temptation to defect and the local interaction structure determine the outcome. Especially, in the low noise limit, the local interaction plays a crucial role in determining the fate of cooperators. We elucidate these both by numerical simulations and mean-field cluster approximation methods.

Dynamic Master Mind: Interactive Use of a Game for Testing Metacognition

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Saldana, David

2004-01-01

Master Mind is a commercial game, popular in the 1970s, that has been extensively used in psychological and educational research. Here, a dynamic assessment format is developed in order to test metacognitive skills in individuals with mental retardation. The main objective is to obtain valid scores that adequately reflect individual differences…

Chaotic evolution of prisoner's dilemma game with volunteering on interdependent networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Luo, Chao; Zhang, Xiaolin; Zheng, YuanJie

2017-06-01

In this article, the evolution of prisoner's dilemma game with volunteering on interdependent networks is investigated. Different from the traditional two-strategy game, voluntary participation as an additional strategy is involved in repeated game, that can introduce more complex evolutionary dynamics. And, interdependent networks provide a more generalized network architecture to study the intricate variability of dynamics. We have showed that voluntary participation could effectively promote the density of co-operation, that is also greatly affected by interdependent strength between two coupled networks. We further discussed the influence of interdependent strength on the densities of different strategies and found that an intermediate interdependence would play a bigger role on the evolution of dynamics. Subsequently, the critical values of the defection temptation for phase transitions under different conditions have been studied. Moreover, the global oscillations induced by the circle of dominance of three strategies on interdependent networks have been quantitatively investigated. Counter-intuitively, the oscillations of strategy densities are not periodic or stochastic, but have rich dynamical behaviors. By means of various analysis tools, we have demonstrated the global oscillations of strategy densities possessed chaotic characteristics.

Triple grouping and period-three oscillations in minority-game dynamics.

PubMed

Dong, Jia-Qi; Huang, Zi-Gang; Huang, Liang; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2014-12-01

Dynamical systems based on the minority game (MG) have been a paradigm for gaining significant insights into a variety of social and biological behaviors. Recently, a grouping phenomenon has been unveiled in MG systems of multiple resources (strategies) in which the strategies spontaneously break into an even number of groups, each exhibiting an identical oscillation pattern in the attendance of game players. Here we report our finding of spontaneous breakup of resources into three groups, each exhibiting period-three oscillations. An analysis is developed to understand the emergence of the striking phenomenon of triple grouping and period-three oscillations. In the presence of random disturbances, the triple-group/period-three state becomes transient, and we obtain explicit formula for the average transient lifetime using two methods of approximation. Our finding indicates that, period-three oscillation, regarded as one of the most fundamental behaviors in smooth nonlinear dynamical systems, can also occur in much more complex, evolutionary-game dynamical systems. Our result also provides a plausible insight for the occurrence of triple grouping observed, for example, in the U.S. housing market.

Topology Property and Dynamic Behavior of a Growing Spatial Network

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cao, Xian-Bin; Du, Wen-Bo; Hu, Mao-Bin; Rong, Zhi-Hai; Sun, Peng; Chen, Cai-Long

In this paper, we propose a growing spatial network (GSN) model and investigate its topology properties and dynamical behaviors. The model is generated by adding one node i with m links into a square lattice at each time step and the new node i is connected to the existing nodes with probabilities proportional to: ({kj})α /dij2, where kj is the degree of node j, α is the tunable parameter and dij is the Euclidean distance between i and j. It is found that both the degree heterogeneity and the clustering coefficient monotonously increase with the increment of α, while the average shortest path length monotonously decreases. Moreover, the evolutionary game dynamics and network traffic dynamics are investigated. Simulation results show that the value of α can also greatly influence the dynamic behaviors.

The Impact of Students' Temporal Perspectives on Time-on-Task and Learning Performance in Game Based Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Romero, Margarida; Usart, Mireia

2013-01-01

The use of games for educational purposes has been considered as a learning methodology that attracts the students' attention and may allow focusing individuals on the learning activity through the [serious games] SG game dynamic. Based on the hypothesis that students' Temporal Perspective has an impact on learning performance and time-on-task,…

Designing After-School Learning Using the Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

King, Elizabeth M.

2015-01-01

Digital games have become popular for engaging students in a range of learning goals, both in the classroom and the after-school space. In this article, I discuss a specific genre of video game, the massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMO), which has been identified as a dynamic environment for encountering 21st-century workplace…

Is There a Place for Casual Games in Teaching and Learning? The Snakes and Ladders Case

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Dalouskas, Vasilis; Rigou, Maria; Sirmakessis, Spiros

2012-01-01

Currently casual games feature as the most dynamically developing section of the videogames industry and compared to the more complicated and technologically advanced hardcore games, are characterized by simple rules and game play, do not require long time commitment or special skills on the part of the player. They also have comparatively low…

Combat games

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Ardema, M. D.; Heymann, M.; Rajan, N.

1985-01-01

A mathematical formulation is proposed of a combat game between two opponents with offensive capabilities and offensive objective is proposed. Resolution of the combat involves solving two differential games with state constraints. Depending on the game dynamics and parameters, the combat can terminate in one of four ways: the first player wins; the second player wins; a draw (neither wins); or joint capture. In the first two cases, the optimal strategies of the two players are determined from suitable zero-sum games, whereas in the latter two the relevant games are nonzero-sum. Further, to avoid certain technical difficulties, the concept of a delta-combat game is introduced.

How mutation affects evolutionary games on graphs

PubMed Central

Allen, Benjamin; Traulsen, Arne; Tarnita, Corina E.; Nowak, Martin A.

2011-01-01

Evolutionary dynamics are affected by population structure, mutation rates and update rules. Spatial or network structure facilitates the clustering of strategies, which represents a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Mutation dilutes this effect. Here we analyze how mutation influences evolutionary clustering on graphs. We introduce new mathematical methods to evolutionary game theory, specifically the analysis of coalescing random walks via generating functions. These techniques allow us to derive exact identity-by-descent (IBD) probabilities, which characterize spatial assortment on lattices and Cayley trees. From these IBD probabilities we obtain exact conditions for the evolution of cooperation and other game strategies, showing the dual effects of graph topology and mutation rate. High mutation rates diminish the clustering of cooperators, hindering their evolutionary success. Our model can represent either genetic evolution with mutation, or social imitation processes with random strategy exploration. PMID:21473871

Strategy selection in structured populations.

PubMed

Tarnita, Corina E; Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Antal, Tibor; Fu, Feng; Nowak, Martin A

2009-08-07

Evolutionary game theory studies frequency dependent selection. The fitness of a strategy is not constant, but depends on the relative frequencies of strategies in the population. This type of evolutionary dynamics occurs in many settings of ecology, infectious disease dynamics, animal behavior and social interactions of humans. Traditionally evolutionary game dynamics are studied in well-mixed populations, where the interaction between any two individuals is equally likely. There have also been several approaches to study evolutionary games in structured populations. In this paper we present a simple result that holds for a large variety of population structures. We consider the game between two strategies, A and B, described by the payoff matrix(abcd). We study a mutation and selection process. For weak selection strategy A is favored over B if and only if sigma a+b>c+sigma d. This means the effect of population structure on strategy selection can be described by a single parameter, sigma. We present the values of sigma for various examples including the well-mixed population, games on graphs, games in phenotype space and games on sets. We give a proof for the existence of such a sigma, which holds for all population structures and update rules that have certain (natural) properties. We assume weak selection, but allow any mutation rate. We discuss the relationship between sigma and the critical benefit to cost ratio for the evolution of cooperation. The single parameter, sigma, allows us to quantify the ability of a population structure to promote the evolution of cooperation or to choose efficient equilibria in coordination games.

Disabler: a game occupational health nurses cannot afford to play.

PubMed

Walker, Jasen M

2003-10-01

The dynamics of the Disabler game are complex, not always recognizable, and less than easily manageable. Awareness of the game and a willingness to avoid direct participation can enhance injured worker rehabilitation and decrease costs associated with lost time and productivity. Not playing the Disabler game can make the role of the occupational health nurse more rewarding. The game requires the field upon which to play, and effectively supported DMPs can help eliminate those playing fields.

Predicting Human Cooperation

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Nay, John J.; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy; Xia, Cheng -Yi

The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational modelmore » of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. As a result, we demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.« less

Predicting Human Cooperation

DOE PAGES

Nay, John J.; Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy; Xia, Cheng -Yi

2016-05-12

The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental predicament. We present the first computational modelmore » of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual decisions. The model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game parameters and history of play. Our model is successful not merely at fitting the data, but in predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information about the game structure. As a result, we demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing how to best promote human cooperation.« less

Resilient cooperators stabilize long-run cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

PubMed Central

Mao, Andrew; Dworkin, Lili; Suri, Siddharth; Watts, Duncan J.

2017-01-01

Learning in finitely repeated games of cooperation remains poorly understood in part because their dynamics play out over a timescale exceeding that of traditional lab experiments. Here, we report results of a virtual lab experiment in which 94 subjects play up to 400 ten-round games of Prisoner's Dilemma over the course of twenty consecutive weekdays. Consistent with previous work, the typical round of first defection moves earlier for several days; however, this unravelling process stabilizes after roughly one week. Analysing individual strategies, we find that approximately 40% of players behave as resilient cooperators who avoid unravelling even at significant cost to themselves. Finally, using a standard learning model we predict that a sufficiently large minority of resilient cooperators can permanently stabilize unravelling among a majority of rational players. These results shed hopeful light on the long-term dynamics of cooperation, and demonstrate the importance of long-run experiments. PMID:28082739

Traffic jams induce dynamical phase transition in spatial rock-paper-scissors game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nagatani, Takashi; Ichinose, Genki; Tainaka, Kei-ichi

2018-02-01

Spatial and temporal behaviors of the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game is key to understanding not only biodiversity but also a variety of cyclic systems. It has been demonstrated that, in the stochastic cellular automaton of RPS game, three species cannot survive on one-dimensional (1-d) lattice; only a single species survives. Previous studies have shown that three species are able to coexist if the migration of species is considered. However, their definitions of migration are the swapping of two species or the random walk of species, which rarely occurs in nature. Here, we investigate the effect of migration by using the 1-d lattice traffic model in which species can move rightward if the site ahead is empty. Computer simulations reveal that three species can survive at the same time within the wide range of parameter values. At low densities, all species can coexist. In contrast, the extinction of two species occurs if the density exceeds the critical limit of the jamming transition. This dynamical phase transition between the coexistence and single (non-coexistence) phase clearly separates due to the self-organized pattern: condensation and rarefaction in the stripe-pattern of three species.

Mesoscopic Rigid Body Modelling of the Extracellular Matrix Self-Assembly.

PubMed

Wong, Hua; Prévoteau-Jonquet, Jessica; Baud, Stéphanie; Dauchez, Manuel; Belloy, Nicolas

2018-06-11

The extracellular matrix (ECM) plays an important role in supporting tissues and organs. It even has a functional role in morphogenesis and differentiation by acting as a source of active molecules (matrikines). Many diseases are linked to dysfunction of ECM components and fragments or changes in their structures. As such it is a prime target for drugs. Because of technological limitations for observations at mesoscopic scales, the precise structural organisation of the ECM is not well-known, with sparse or fuzzy experimental observables. Based on the Unity3D game and physics engines, along with rigid body dynamics, we propose a virtual sandbox to model large biological molecules as dynamic chains of rigid bodies interacting together to gain insight into ECM components behaviour in the mesoscopic range. We have preliminary results showing how parameters such as fibre flexibility or the nature and number of interactions between molecules can induce different structures in the basement membrane. Using the Unity3D game engine and virtual reality headset coupled with haptic controllers, we immerse the user inside the corresponding simulation. Untrained users are able to navigate a complex virtual sandbox crowded with large biomolecules models in a matter of seconds.

Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles.

PubMed

Płatkowski, Tadeusz

2010-10-21

We propose a theory of evolution of social systems which generalizes the standard proportional fitness rule of the evolutionary game theory. The formalism is applied to describe the dynamics of two-person one-shot population games. In particular it predicts the non-zero level of cooperation in the long run for the Prisoner's Dilemma games, the increase of the fraction of cooperators for general classes of the Snow-Drift game, and stable nonzero cooperation level for coordination games. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Three-strategy N-person snowdrift game incorporating loners

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Xu, Meng; Zheng, Da-Fang; Xu, C.; Hui, P. M.

2017-02-01

The N-person snowdrift game is generalized to incorporate a third strategy. In addition to the cooperative C and non-cooperative D strategies, a strategy L representing a loner behavior is introduced. Agents taking on the L strategy (L-agents) do not contribute to the game as the C-agents do but they do not take advantage of the C-agents. Instead, they would rather settle with a fixed payoff L. Dynamical equations governing the time evolution of the frequencies of the strategies in a well-mixed population are derived. The dynamics and the frequencies of the steady state reveal the rich behavior resulting from the interplay between the payoff r, which promotes the non-cooperative behavior, and L. Detailed studies on how a system evolves indicated that the steady state could be an AllL, AllC, or C+D state, depending on the parameters r, L, and group size N. In contrast, only a C+D state results for r > 0 and an AllC state is possible only at r = 0 without the strategy L. With the strategy L, the AllC phase occupies a finite, though tiny, region of the r- L parameter space. The L-agents play an important role in the dynamics leading to the AllC phase. They help eliminate the D strategy in the transient and later only to be replaced by the C strategy. Phase diagrams in the r- L space are presented for different values of N. The strategy L plays two roles. It leads to an AllL phase and helps give an AllC phase. An algorithm for simulating the model numerically is described and validated. The algorithm will be useful in studying our model in various structured populations.

Video Game Learning Dynamics: Actionable Measures of Multidimensional Learning Trajectories

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Reese, Debbie Denise; Tabachnick, Barbara G.; Kosko, Robert E.

2015-01-01

Valid, accessible, reusable methods for instructional video game design and embedded assessment can provide actionable information enhancing individual and collective achievement. Cyberlearning through game-based, metaphor-enhanced learning objects (CyGaMEs) design and embedded assessment quantify player behavior to study knowledge discovery and…

Dynamics of Entropy in Quantum-like Model of Decision Making

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Basieva, Irina; Khrennikov, Andrei; Asano, Masanari; Ohya, Masanori; Tanaka, Yoshiharu

2011-03-01

We present a quantum-like model of decision making in games of the Prisoner's Dilemma type. By this model the brain processes information by using representation of mental states in complex Hilbert space. Driven by the master equation the mental state of a player, say Alice, approaches an equilibrium point in the space of density matrices. By using this equilibrium point Alice determines her mixed (i.e., probabilistic) strategy with respect to Bob. Thus our model is a model of thinking through decoherence of initially pure mental state. Decoherence is induced by interaction with memory and external environment. In this paper we study (numerically) dynamics of quantum entropy of Alice's state in the process of decision making. Our analysis demonstrates that this dynamics depends nontrivially on the initial state of Alice's mind on her own actions and her prediction state (for possible actions of Bob.)

MMP-TIMP interactions in cancer invasion: An evolutionary game-theoretical framework.

PubMed

Salimi Sartakhti, Javad; Manshaei, Mohammad Hossein; Sadeghi, Mehdi

2017-01-07

One of the main steps in solid cancers to invade surrounding tissues is degradation of tissue barriers in the extracellular matrix. This operation that leads to initiate, angiogenesis and metastasis to other organs, is essentially consequence of collapsing dynamic balance between matrix metalloproteinases (MMP) and tissue inhibitors of metalloproteinases (TIMP). In this work, we model the MMP-TIMP interaction in both normal tissue and invasive cancer using evolutionary game theory. Our model explains how invasive cancer cells get the upper hand in MMP-TIMP imbalance scenarios. We investigate dynamics of them over time and discuss stable and nonstable states in the population. Numerical simulations presented here provide the identification of key genotypic features in the tumor invasion and a natural description for phenotypic variability. The simulation results are consistent with the experimental results in vitro observations presented in medical literature. Finally, by the provided results the necessary conditions to inhibit cancer invasion or prolong its course are explained. In this way, two therapeutic approaches with respect to how they could meet the required conditions are considered. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Spiraling patterns in evolutionary models inspired by bacterial games with cyclic dominance

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Mobilia, Mauro

2015-03-01

Understanding the mechanisms allowing the maintenance of biodiversity is a central issue in biology. Evolutionary game theory, where the success of one species depends on what the others are doing, provides a promising framework to investigate this complex problem. Experiments on microbial populations have shown that cyclic local interactions promote species coexistence. In this context, rock-paper-scissors games - in which rock crushes scissors, scissors cut paper, and paper wraps rock - are often used to model the dynamics of populations in cyclic competition. After a brief survey of some inspiring experiments, I will discuss the subtle interplay between individuals' mobility and their local interactions in two-dimensional rock-paper-scissors systems. This leads to the loss of biodiversity above a certain mobility threshold, and to the formation of spiraling patterns below the critical mobility rate. I will then study a generic rock-paper-scissors metapopulation model formulated on a two-dimensional grid of patches. When these have a large carrying capacity, the model's dynamics is faithfully described in terms of the system's complex Ginzburg-Landau equation properly derived from a multiscale expansion. The properties of the ensuing complex Ginzburg-Landau equation are exploited to derive the system's phase diagram and to characterize the spatio-temporal properties of the spiraling patterns in each phase. This enables us to analyze the spiral waves stability, how these are influenced by linear and nonlinear diffusion, and to discuss phenomena such as far-field breakup. Presentation mainy based on joint work with B. Szczesny and A. M. Rucklidge. Fruitful earlier collaborations with E. Frey, Q. He, T. Reichenbach, and U. C. Täuber are also acknowledged. Work supported by the UK EPSRC (Grant No. EP/P505593/1).

Interplay of Languaging and Gameplay: Player-Game Interactions as Ecologies for Languaging and Situated L2 Development

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ibrahim, Karim Hesham Shaker

2016-01-01

The field of game-mediated L2 learning has grown exponentially, and much has been discovered about the potentials of game-mediated interactions for L2 development, yet the fine-grained dynamics of player-game interactions and how they come to facilitate and afford L2 development are still largely underexplored. To address this gap in the…

Stochastic population dynamics in spatially extended predator-prey systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dobramysl, Ulrich; Mobilia, Mauro; Pleimling, Michel; Täuber, Uwe C.

2018-02-01

Spatially extended population dynamics models that incorporate demographic noise serve as case studies for the crucial role of fluctuations and correlations in biological systems. Numerical and analytic tools from non-equilibrium statistical physics capture the stochastic kinetics of these complex interacting many-particle systems beyond rate equation approximations. Including spatial structure and stochastic noise in models for predator-prey competition invalidates the neutral Lotka-Volterra population cycles. Stochastic models yield long-lived erratic oscillations stemming from a resonant amplification mechanism. Spatially extended predator-prey systems display noise-stabilized activity fronts that generate persistent correlations. Fluctuation-induced renormalizations of the oscillation parameters can be analyzed perturbatively via a Doi-Peliti field theory mapping of the master equation; related tools allow detailed characterization of extinction pathways. The critical steady-state and non-equilibrium relaxation dynamics at the predator extinction threshold are governed by the directed percolation universality class. Spatial predation rate variability results in more localized clusters, enhancing both competing species’ population densities. Affixing variable interaction rates to individual particles and allowing for trait inheritance subject to mutations induces fast evolutionary dynamics for the rate distributions. Stochastic spatial variants of three-species competition with ‘rock-paper-scissors’ interactions metaphorically describe cyclic dominance. These models illustrate intimate connections between population dynamics and evolutionary game theory, underscore the role of fluctuations to drive populations toward extinction, and demonstrate how space can support species diversity. Two-dimensional cyclic three-species May-Leonard models are characterized by the emergence of spiraling patterns whose properties are elucidated by a mapping onto a complex Ginzburg-Landau equation. Multiple-species extensions to general ‘food networks’ can be classified on the mean-field level, providing both fundamental understanding of ensuing cooperativity and profound insight into the rich spatio-temporal features and coarsening kinetics in the corresponding spatially extended systems. Novel space-time patterns emerge as a result of the formation of competing alliances; e.g. coarsening domains that each incorporate rock-paper-scissors competition games.

Iterative Adaptive Dynamic Programming for Solving Unknown Nonlinear Zero-Sum Game Based on Online Data.

PubMed

Zhu, Yuanheng; Zhao, Dongbin; Li, Xiangjun

2017-03-01

H ∞ control is a powerful method to solve the disturbance attenuation problems that occur in some control systems. The design of such controllers relies on solving the zero-sum game (ZSG). But in practical applications, the exact dynamics is mostly unknown. Identification of dynamics also produces errors that are detrimental to the control performance. To overcome this problem, an iterative adaptive dynamic programming algorithm is proposed in this paper to solve the continuous-time, unknown nonlinear ZSG with only online data. A model-free approach to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation is developed based on the policy iteration method. Control and disturbance policies and value are approximated by neural networks (NNs) under the critic-actor-disturber structure. The NN weights are solved by the least-squares method. According to the theoretical analysis, our algorithm is equivalent to a Gauss-Newton method solving an optimization problem, and it converges uniformly to the optimal solution. The online data can also be used repeatedly, which is highly efficient. Simulation results demonstrate its feasibility to solve the unknown nonlinear ZSG. When compared with other algorithms, it saves a significant amount of online measurement time.

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review

PubMed Central

Szolnoki, Attila; Mobilia, Mauro; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Szczesny, Bartosz; Rucklidge, Alastair M.; Perc, Matjaž

2014-01-01

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator–prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock–paper–scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg–Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined. PMID:25232048

Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review.

PubMed

Szolnoki, Attila; Mobilia, Mauro; Jiang, Luo-Luo; Szczesny, Bartosz; Rucklidge, Alastair M; Perc, Matjaž

2014-11-06

Rock is wrapped by paper, paper is cut by scissors and scissors are crushed by rock. This simple game is popular among children and adults to decide on trivial disputes that have no obvious winner, but cyclic dominance is also at the heart of predator-prey interactions, the mating strategy of side-blotched lizards, the overgrowth of marine sessile organisms and competition in microbial populations. Cyclical interactions also emerge spontaneously in evolutionary games entailing volunteering, reward, punishment, and in fact are common when the competing strategies are three or more, regardless of the particularities of the game. Here, we review recent advances on the rock-paper-scissors (RPS) and related evolutionary games, focusing, in particular, on pattern formation, the impact of mobility and the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance. We also review mean-field and zero-dimensional RPS models and the application of the complex Ginzburg-Landau equation, and we highlight the importance and usefulness of statistical physics for the successful study of large-scale ecological systems. Directions for future research, related, for example, to dynamical effects of coevolutionary rules and invasion reversals owing to multi-point interactions, are also outlined. © 2014 The Author(s) Published by the Royal Society. All rights reserved.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR: Dynamics of interacting neural networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Kinzel, W.; Metzler, R.; Kanter, I.

2000-04-01

The dynamics of interacting perceptrons is solved analytically. For a directed flow of information the system runs into a state which has a higher symmetry than the topology of the model. A symmetry-breaking phase transition is found with increasing learning rate. In addition, it is shown that a system of interacting perceptrons which is trained on the history of its minority decisions develops a good strategy for the problem of adaptive competition known as the bar problem or minority game.

Affect-Based Adaptation of an Applied Video Game for Educational Purposes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bontchev, Boyan; Vassileva, Dessislava

2017-01-01

Purpose: This paper aims to clarify how affect-based adaptation can improve implicit recognition of playing style of individuals during game sessions. This study presents the "Rush for Gold" game using dynamic difficulty adjustment of tasks based on both player performance and affectation inferred through electrodermal activity and…

RICH Economic Games for Networked Relationships and Communities: Development and Preliminary Validation in Yasawa, Fiji

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gervais, Matthew M.

2017-01-01

Experimental economic games reveal significant population variation in human social behavior. However, most protocols involve anonymous recipients, limiting their validity to fleeting interactions. Understanding human relationship dynamics will require methods with the virtues of economic games that also tap recipient identity-conditioned…

Stochastic game theory: for playing games, not just for doing theory.

PubMed

Goeree, J K; Holt, C A

1999-09-14

Recent theoretical advances have dramatically increased the relevance of game theory for predicting human behavior in interactive situations. By relaxing the classical assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect foresight, we obtain much improved explanations of initial decisions, dynamic patterns of learning and adjustment, and equilibrium steady-state distributions.

Development of a Computer Simulation Game Using a Reverse Engineering Approach

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ozkul, Ahmet

2012-01-01

Business simulation games are widely used in the classroom to provide students with experiential learning opportunities on business situations in a dynamic fashion. When properly designed and implemented, the computer simulation game can be a useful educational tool by integrating separate theoretical concepts and demonstrating the nature of…

Leadership in Multiplayer Online Gaming Environments

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lisk, Timothy C.; Kaplancali, Ugur T.; Riggio, Ronald E.

2012-01-01

With their increased popularity, games open up possibilities for simultaneous learning on multiple levels; players may learn from contextual information embedded in the narrative of the game and through the risks, benefits, costs, outcomes, and rewards of the alternative strategies that result from fast-paced decision making. Such dynamics also…

Dynamic Human-Computer Collaboration in Real-time Unmanned Vehicle Scheduling

DTIC Science & Technology

2010-06-01

Rarely play games Play games once a month Weekly gamer A few times a week gamer Daily gamer Types of games played: 9. Rate...Algorithm, Alchemy , or Apostasy?," International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, vol. 52, pp. 203-216, 2000. [52] J.-M. Hoc, "From Human

Evolutionary dynamics of public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wang, Jing; Wu, Bin; Chen, Xiaojie; Wang, Long

2010-05-01

The public goods game is a powerful metaphor for exploring the maintenance of social cooperative behavior in a group of interactional selfish players. Here we study the emergence of cooperation in the public goods games with diverse contributions in finite populations. The theory of stochastic process is innovatively adopted to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the public goods games involving a diversity of contributions. In the limit of rare mutations, the general stationary distribution of this stochastic process can be analytically approximated by means of diffusion theory. Moreover, we demonstrate that increasing the diversity of contributions greatly reduces the probability of finding the population in a homogeneous state full of defectors. This increase also raises the expectation of the total contribution in the entire population and thus promotes social cooperation. Furthermore, by investigating the evolutionary dynamics of optional public goods games with diverse contributions, we find that nonparticipation can assist players who contribute more in resisting invasion and taking over individuals who contribute less. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to confirm our analytical results. Our results may provide insight into the effect of diverse contributions on cooperative behaviors in the real world.

Dense and dynamic 3D selection for game-based virtual environments.

PubMed

Cashion, Jeffrey; Wingrave, Chadwick; LaViola, Joseph J

2012-04-01

3D object selection is more demanding when, 1) objects densly surround the target object, 2) the target object is significantly occluded, and 3) when the target object is dynamically changing location. Most 3D selection techniques and guidelines were developed and tested on static or mostly sparse environments. In contrast, games tend to incorporate densly packed and dynamic objects as part of their typical interaction. With the increasing popularity of 3D selection in games using hand gestures or motion controllers, our current understanding of 3D selection needs revision. We present a study that compared four different selection techniques under five different scenarios based on varying object density and motion dynamics. We utilized two existing techniques, Raycasting and SQUAD, and developed two variations of them, Zoom and Expand, using iterative design. Our results indicate that while Raycasting and SQUAD both have weaknesses in terms of speed and accuracy in dense and dynamic environments, by making small modifications to them (i.e., flavoring), we can achieve significant performance increases.

Evolution of optimal Hill coefficients in nonlinear public goods games.

PubMed

Archetti, Marco; Scheuring, István

2016-10-07

In evolutionary game theory, the effect of public goods like diffusible molecules has been modelled using linear, concave, sigmoid and step functions. The observation that biological systems are often sigmoid input-output functions, as described by the Hill equation, suggests that a sigmoid function is more realistic. The Michaelis-Menten model of enzyme kinetics, however, predicts a concave function, and while mechanistic explanations of sigmoid kinetics exist, we lack an adaptive explanation: what is the evolutionary advantage of a sigmoid benefit function? We analyse public goods games in which the shape of the benefit function can evolve, in order to determine the optimal and evolutionarily stable Hill coefficients. We find that, while the dynamics depends on whether output is controlled at the level of the individual or the population, intermediate or high Hill coefficients often evolve, leading to sigmoid input-output functions that for some parameters are so steep to resemble a step function (an on-off switch). Our results suggest that, even when the shape of the benefit function is unknown, biological public goods should be modelled using a sigmoid or step function rather than a linear or concave function. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Stojkoski, Viktor; Utkovski, Zoran; Basnarkov, Lasko; Kocarev, Ljupco

2018-05-01

We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is rooted in the principle "help anyone if helped by someone." Within this general framework, which applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation, and snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples. By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at the microscopic and macroscopic level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.

Oscillatory dynamics in rock-paper-scissors games with mutations.

PubMed

Mobilia, Mauro

2010-05-07

We study the oscillatory dynamics in the generic three-species rock-paper-scissors games with mutations. In the mean-field limit, different behaviors are found: (a) for high mutation rate, there is a stable interior fixed point with coexistence of all species; (b) for low mutation rates, there is a region of the parameter space characterized by a limit cycle resulting from a Hopf bifurcation; (c) in the absence of mutations, there is a region where heteroclinic cycles yield oscillations of large amplitude (not robust against noise). After a discussion on the main properties of the mean-field dynamics, we investigate the stochastic version of the model within an individual-based formulation. Demographic fluctuations are therefore naturally accounted and their effects are studied using a diffusion theory complemented by numerical simulations. It is thus shown that persistent erratic oscillations (quasi-cycles) of large amplitude emerge from a noise-induced resonance phenomenon. We also analytically and numerically compute the average escape time necessary to reach a (quasi-)cycle on which the system oscillates at a given amplitude. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Stochastic and Boltzmann-like models for behavioral changes, and their relation to game theory

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Helbing, Dirk

1993-03-01

In the last decade, stochastic models have shown to be very useful for quantitative modelling of social processes. Here, a configurational master equation for the description of behavioral changes by pair interactions of individuals is developed. Three kinds of social pair interactions are distinguished: Avoidance processes, compromising processes, and imitative processes. Computational results are presented for a special case of imitative processes: the competition of two equivalent strategies. They show a phase transition that describes the self-organization of a behavioral convention. This phase transition is further analyzed by examining the equations for the most probable behavioral distribution, which are Boltzmann-like equations. Special cases of Boltzmann-like equations do not obey the H-theorem and have oscillatory or even chaotic solutions. A suitable Taylor approximation leads to the so-called game dynamical equations (also known as selection-mutation equations in the theory of evolution).

Star Wars in psychotherapy: video games in the office.

PubMed

Ceranoglu, Tolga Atilla

2010-01-01

Video games are used in medical practice during psycho-education in chronic disease management, physical therapy, rehabilitation following traumatic brain injury, and as an adjunct in pain management during medical procedures or cancer chemotherapy. In psychiatric practice, video games aid in social skills training of children with developmental delays and in cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT). This most popular children's toy may prove a useful tool in dynamic psychotherapy of youth. The author provides a framework for using video games in psychotherapy by considering the characteristics of video games and describes the ways their use has facilitated various stages of therapeutic process. Just as other play techniques build a relationship and encourage sharing of emotional themes, sitting together in front of a console and screen facilitates a relationship and allows a safe path for the patient's conflict to emerge. During video game play, the therapist may observe thought processes, impulsivity, temperament, decision-making, and sharing, among other aspects of a child's clinical presentation. Several features inherent to video games require a thoughtful approach as resistance and transference in therapy may be elaborated differently in comparison to more traditional toys. Familiarity with the video game content and its dynamics benefits child mental health clinicians in their efforts to help children and their families.

Evolutionary dynamics on graphs: Efficient method for weak selection

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fu, Feng; Wang, Long; Nowak, Martin A.; Hauert, Christoph

2009-04-01

Investigating the evolutionary dynamics of game theoretical interactions in populations where individuals are arranged on a graph can be challenging in terms of computation time. Here, we propose an efficient method to study any type of game on arbitrary graph structures for weak selection. In this limit, evolutionary game dynamics represents a first-order correction to neutral evolution. Spatial correlations can be empirically determined under neutral evolution and provide the basis for formulating the game dynamics as a discrete Markov process by incorporating a detailed description of the microscopic dynamics based on the neutral correlations. This framework is then applied to one of the most intriguing questions in evolutionary biology: the evolution of cooperation. We demonstrate that the degree heterogeneity of a graph impedes cooperation and that the success of tit for tat depends not only on the number of rounds but also on the degree of the graph. Moreover, considering the mutation-selection equilibrium shows that the symmetry of the stationary distribution of states under weak selection is skewed in favor of defectors for larger selection strengths. In particular, degree heterogeneity—a prominent feature of scale-free networks—generally results in a more pronounced increase in the critical benefit-to-cost ratio required for evolution to favor cooperation as compared to regular graphs. This conclusion is corroborated by an analysis of the effects of population structures on the fixation probabilities of strategies in general 2×2 games for different types of graphs. Computer simulations confirm the predictive power of our method and illustrate the improved accuracy as compared to previous studies.

Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem: An Introduction

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ghosh, Asim; Biswas, Soumyajyoti; Chatterjee, Arnab; Chakrabarti, Anindya Sundar; Naskar, Tapan; Mitra, Manipushpak; Chakrabarti, Bikas K.

We discuss several stochastic optimization strategies in games with many players having large number of choices (Kolkata Paise Restaurant Problem) and two choices (minority game problem). It is seen that a stochastic crowd avoiding strategy gives very efficient utilization in KPR problem. A slightly modified strategy in the minority game problem gives full utilization but the dynamics stops after reaching full efficiency, thereby making the utilization helpful for only about half of the population (those in minority). We further discuss the ways in which the dynamics may be continued and the utilization becomes effective for all the agents keeping fluctuation arbitrarily small.

A water resources simulation gaming model for the Invitational Drought Tournament.

PubMed

Wang, K; Davies, E G R

2015-09-01

A system dynamics-based simulation gaming model, developed as a component of Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada's Invitational Drought Tournament (IDT; Hill et al., 2014), is introduced in this paper as a decision support tool for drought management at the river-basin scale. This IDT Model provides a comprehensive and integrated overview of drought conditions, and illustrates the broad effects of socio-economic drought and mitigation strategies. It is intended to provide a safe, user-friendly experimental environment with fast run-times for testing management options, and to promote collaborative decision-making and consensus building. Examples of model results from several recent IDT events demonstrate potential effects of drought and the short-to longer-term effectiveness of policies selected by IDT teams; such results have also improved teams' understanding of the complexity of water resources systems and their management trade-offs. The IDT Model structure and framework can also be reconfigured quickly for application to different river basins. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The effect of a silicone wristband in dynamic balance.

PubMed

Teruya, Thiago Toshi; Matareli, Bruno Machado; Soares Romano, Fillipe; Mochizuki, Luis

2013-10-01

The effect of a wristband on the dynamic balance of young adults was assessed. Twenty healthy young adults wore a commercial Power BalanceT or fake silicone wristband. A 3D accelerometer was attached to their lumbar region to measure body sway. They played the video game Tightrope (Wii video game console) with and without a wristband; body sway acceleration was measured. Mean balance sway acceleration and its variability were the same in all conditions, so silicone wristbands do not modify dynamic balance control.

Effect of self-interaction on the evolution of cooperation in complex topologies

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wu, Yu'e.; Zhang, Zhipeng; Chang, Shuhua

2017-09-01

Self-interaction, as a significant mechanism explaining the evolution of cooperation, has attracted great attention both theoretically and experimentally. In this text, we consider a new self-interaction mechanism in the two typical pairwise models including the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift games, where the cooperative agents will gain extra bonus for their selfless behavior. We find that under the mechanism the collective cooperation is elevated to a very high level especially after adopting the finite population analogue of replicator dynamics for evolution. The robustness of the new mechanism is tested for different complex topologies for the prisoner's dilemma game. All the presented results demonstrate that the enhancement effects are independent of the structure of the applied spatial networks and the potential evolutionary games, and thus showing a high degree of universality. Our conclusions might shed light on the understanding of the evolution of cooperation in the real world.

Older partner selection promotes the prevalence of cooperation in evolutionary games.

PubMed

Yang, Guoli; Huang, Jincai; Zhang, Weiming

2014-10-21

Evolutionary games typically come with the interplays between evolution of individual strategy and adaptation to network structure. How these dynamics in the co-evolution promote (or obstruct) the cooperation is regarded as an important topic in social, economic, and biological fields. Combining spatial selection with partner choice, the focus of this paper is to identify which neighbour should be selected as a role to imitate during the process of co-evolution. Age, an internal attribute and kind of local piece of information regarding the survivability of the agent, is a significant consideration for the selection strategy. The analysis and simulations presented, demonstrate that older partner selection for strategy imitation could foster the evolution of cooperation. The younger partner selection, however, may decrease the level of cooperation. Our model highlights the importance of agent׳s age on the promotion of cooperation in evolutionary games, both efficiently and effectively. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Fairness emergence from zero-intelligence agents

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Duan, Wen-Qi; Stanley, H. Eugene

2010-02-01

Fairness plays a key role in explaining the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Opponent-oriented social utility models were often proposed to explain the origins of fairness preferences in which agents take into account not only their own outcomes but are also concerned with the outcomes of their opponents. Here, we propose a payoff-oriented mechanism in which agents update their beliefs only based on the payoff signals of the previous ultimatum game, regardless of the behaviors and outcomes of the opponents themselves. Employing adaptive ultimatum game, we show that (1) fairness behaviors can emerge out even under such minimalist assumptions, provided that agents are capable of responding to their payoff signals, (2) the average game payoff per agent per round decreases with the increasing discrepancy rate between the average giving rate and the average asking rate, and (3) the belief update process will lead to 50%-50% fair split provided that there is no mutation in the evolutionary dynamics.

Punishment in the form of shared cost promotes altruism in the cooperative dilemma games.

PubMed

Zhang, Chunyan; Zhu, Yuying; Chen, Zengqiang; Zhang, Jianlei

2017-05-07

One phenomenon or social institution often observed in multi-agent interactions is the altruistic punishment, i.e. the punishment of unfair behavior by others at a personal cost. Inspired by the works focusing on punishment and the intricate mechanism behind it, we theoretically study the strategy evolution in the framework of two-strategy game models with the punishment on defectors, moreover, the cost of punishing will be evenly shared among the cooperators. Theoretical computations suggest that larger punishment on defectors or smaller punishment cost incurred by cooperators will enhance the fixation of altruistic cooperation in the population. Through the replicate dynamics, the group size of the randomly selected individuals from the sufficiently large population will notably affect the strategy evolution in populations nested within a dilemma. By theoretical modeling the concept of shared cost for punishment from one point of view, our findings underscore the importance of punishment with shared cost as a factor in real-life decisions in an evolutionary game context. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Heterogeneous update mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and imitative dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Amaral, Marco Antonio; Javarone, Marco Alberto

2018-04-01

Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows the introduction of elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase space. Often, these processes are strongly related, since an innovation can trigger the evolution, and the latter can provide the optimal conditions for the emergence of innovations. Both processes can be studied by using the framework of evolutionary game theory, where evolution constitutes an intrinsic mechanism. At the same time, the concept of innovation requires an opportune mathematical representation. Notably, innovation can be modeled as a strategy, or it can constitute the underlying mechanism that allows agents to change strategy. Here, we analyze the second case, investigating the behavior of a heterogeneous population, composed of imitative and innovative agents. Imitative agents change strategy only by imitating that of their neighbors, whereas innovative ones change strategy without the need for a copying source. The proposed model is analyzed by means of analytical calculations and numerical simulations in different topologies. Remarkably, results indicate that the mixing of mechanisms can be detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions. In those regions, the spatial reciprocity from imitative mechanisms is destroyed by innovative agents, leading to the downfall of cooperation. Our investigation sheds some light on the complex dynamics emerging from the heterogeneity of strategy revision methods, highlighting the role of innovation in evolutionary games.

Social Cognition in Schizophrenia: From Social Stimuli Processing to Social Engagement

PubMed Central

Billeke, Pablo; Aboitiz, Francisco

2013-01-01

Social cognition consists of several skills which allow us to interact with other humans. These skills include social stimuli processing, drawing inferences about others’ mental states, and engaging in social interactions. In recent years, there has been growing evidence of social cognitive impairments in patients with schizophrenia. Apparently, these impairments are separable from general neurocognitive impairments, such as attention, memory, and executive functioning. Moreover, social cognition seems to be a main determinant of functional outcome and could be used as a guide to elaborate new pharmacological and psychological treatments. However, most of these studies focus on individual mechanisms and observational perspectives; only few of them study schizophrenic patients during interactive situations. We first review evidences of social cognitive impairments both in social stimuli processing and in mental state attribution. We focus on the relationship between these functions and both general cognitive impairments and functional outcome. We next review recent game theory approaches to the study of how social engagement occurs in schizophrenic patients. The advantage of using game theory is that game-oriented tasks can assess social decision making in an interactive everyday situation model. Finally, we review proposed theoretical models used to explain social alterations and their underlying biological mechanisms. Based on interactive studies, we propose a framework which takes into account the dynamic nature of social processes. Thus, understanding social skills as a result of dynamical systems could facilitate the development of both basic research and clinical applications oriented to psychiatric populations. PMID:23444313

Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in Structured Populations

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Santos, Marta Daniela de Almeida

The pervasiveness of cooperation in Nature is not easily explained. If evolution is characterized by competition and survival of the fittest, why should selfish individuals cooperate with each other? Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) provides a suitable mathematical framework to study this problem, central to many areas of science. Conventionally, interactions between individuals are modeled in terms of one-shot, symmetric 2-Person Dilemmas of Cooperation, but many real-life situations involve decisions within groups with more than 2 individuals, which are best-dealt in the framework of N-Person games. In this Thesis, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics of two paradigmatic collective social dilemmas - the N-Person Prisoner's Dilemma (NPD) and the N-Person Snowdrift Game (NSG) on structured populations, modeled by networks with diverse topological properties. Cooperative strategies are just one example of the many traits that can be transmitted on social networks. Several recent studies based on empirical evidence from a medical database have suggested the existence of a 3 degrees of influence rule, according to which not only our "friends", but also our friends' friends, and our friends' friends' friends, have a non-trivial influence on our decisions. We investigate the degree of peer influence that emerges from the spread of cooperative strategies, opinions and diseases on populations with distinct underlying networks of contacts. Our results show that networks naturally entangle individuals into interactions of many-body nature and that for each network class considered different processes lead to identical degrees of influence. None

Heterogeneous update mechanisms in evolutionary games: Mixing innovative and imitative dynamics.

PubMed

Amaral, Marco Antonio; Javarone, Marco Alberto

2018-04-01

Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows the introduction of elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase space. Often, these processes are strongly related, since an innovation can trigger the evolution, and the latter can provide the optimal conditions for the emergence of innovations. Both processes can be studied by using the framework of evolutionary game theory, where evolution constitutes an intrinsic mechanism. At the same time, the concept of innovation requires an opportune mathematical representation. Notably, innovation can be modeled as a strategy, or it can constitute the underlying mechanism that allows agents to change strategy. Here, we analyze the second case, investigating the behavior of a heterogeneous population, composed of imitative and innovative agents. Imitative agents change strategy only by imitating that of their neighbors, whereas innovative ones change strategy without the need for a copying source. The proposed model is analyzed by means of analytical calculations and numerical simulations in different topologies. Remarkably, results indicate that the mixing of mechanisms can be detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions. In those regions, the spatial reciprocity from imitative mechanisms is destroyed by innovative agents, leading to the downfall of cooperation. Our investigation sheds some light on the complex dynamics emerging from the heterogeneity of strategy revision methods, highlighting the role of innovation in evolutionary games.

Evolutionary games under incompetence.

PubMed

Kleshnina, Maria; Filar, Jerzy A; Ejov, Vladimir; McKerral, Jody C

2018-02-26

The adaptation process of a species to a new environment is a significant area of study in biology. As part of natural selection, adaptation is a mutation process which improves survival skills and reproductive functions of species. Here, we investigate this process by combining the idea of incompetence with evolutionary game theory. In the sense of evolution, incompetence and training can be interpreted as a special learning process. With focus on the social side of the problem, we analyze the influence of incompetence on behavior of species. We introduce an incompetence parameter into a learning function in a single-population game and analyze its effect on the outcome of the replicator dynamics. Incompetence can change the outcome of the game and its dynamics, indicating its significance within what are inherently imperfect natural systems.

Chapter 4. Students' Attitudes toward Computer Games

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Russian Education and Society, 2004

2004-01-01

In this chapter, the authors attempt not only to discern aspects that relate to age, place, and the amount of time devoted to playing computer games in adolescence, but also to study content characteristics of their attitudes such as: the developmental dynamic in the change of their genre preferences in computer games, changes in factors that…

Game Theory and Educational Policy: Private Education Legislation in China

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Law, Wing-Wah; Pan, Su-Yan

2009-01-01

This article presents a game theory analysis of legislating private education in China, based on set of primary and secondary documents related to this issue. The article argues that shaping educational legislation is a dynamic, repeated game of negotiation, cooperation, and/or competition on multiple occasions among various interested actors,…

Accountable Game Design: Structuring the Dynamics of Student Learning Interactions

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Charoenying, Timothy

2010-01-01

Game-based classroom activity is intended to leverage students' interest and motivation to play, and to provide safe contexts for supporting students' academic learning. However, a basic criticism of many games currently used in classroom settings is that they can fail to meaningfully embody academic content. A more subtle concern is that…

A Dynamic Model of California's Hardwood Rangelands

Treesearch

Richard B. Standiford; Richard E. Howitt

1991-01-01

Low profitability of hardwood rangeland management, and oak tree harvesting for firewood markets and forage enhancement has led to concern about the long-term sustainability of the oak resource on rangelands. New markets for recreational hunting may give value to oaks for the habitat they provide for game species, and broaden the economic base for managers. A ranch...

Adaptive Role Playing Games: An Immersive Approach for Problem Based Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Sancho, Pilar; Moreno-Ger, Pablo; Fuentes-Fernandez, Ruben; Fernandez-Manjon, Baltasar

2009-01-01

In this paper we present a general framework, called NUCLEO, for the application of socio-constructive educational approaches in higher education. The underlying pedagogical approach relies on an adaptation model in order to improve group dynamics, as this has been identified as one of the key features in the success of collaborative learning…

Research on Duplication Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable of Reverse Supply Chain

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Huizhong, Dong; Hongli, Song

An evolutionary game model of Reverse Supply Chain(RSC) is established based on duplication dynamics function and evolutionary stable strategy. Using the model framework, this paper provides insights into a deeper understanding on how each supplier make strategic decision independently in reverse supply chain to determine their performance. The main conclusion is as follow: Under the market mechanism, not unless the extra income derived from the implementation of RSC exceeds zero point would the suppliers implement RSC strategy. When those suppliers are passive to RSC, the effective solution is that the government takes macro-control measures, for example, to force those suppliers implement RSC through punishment mechanism.

Social genomics of healthy and disordered internet gaming.

PubMed

Snodgrass, Jeffrey G; Dengah Ii, H J François; Lacy, Michael G; Else, Robert J; Polzer, Evan R; Arevalo, Jesusa M G; Cole, Steven W

2018-06-20

To combine social genomics with cultural approaches to expand understandings of the somatic health dynamics of online gaming, including in the controversial nosological construct of internet gaming disorder (IGD). In blood samples from 56 U.S. gamers, we examined expression of the conserved transcriptional response to adversity (CTRA), a leukocyte gene expression profile activated by chronic stress. We compared positively engaged and problem gamers, as identified by an ethnographically developed measure, the Positive and Negative Gaming Experiences Scale (PNGE-42), and also by a clinically derived IGD scale (IGDS-SF9). CTRA profiles showed a clear relationship with PNGE-42, with a substantial linkage to offline social support, but were not meaningfully associated with disordered play as measured by IGDS-SF9. Our study advances understanding of the psychobiology of play, demonstrating via novel transcriptomic methods the association of negatively experienced internet play with biological measures of chronic threat, uncertainty, and distress. Our findings are consistent with the view that problematic patterns of online gaming are a proxy for broader patterns of biopsychosocial stress and distress such as loneliness, rather than a psychiatric disorder sui generis, which might exist apart from gamers' other life problems. By confirming the biological correlates of certain patterns of internet gaming, culturally-sensitive genomics approaches such as this can inform both evolutionary theorizing regarding the nature of play, as well as current psychiatric debates about the appropriateness of modeling distressful gaming on substance addiction and problem gambling. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Effects of conformism on the cultural evolution of social behaviour.

PubMed

Molleman, Lucas; Pen, Ido; Weissing, Franz J

2013-01-01

Models of cultural evolution study how the distribution of cultural traits changes over time. The dynamics of cultural evolution strongly depends on the way these traits are transmitted between individuals by social learning. Two prominent forms of social learning are payoff-based learning (imitating others that have higher payoffs) and conformist learning (imitating locally common behaviours). How payoff-based and conformist learning affect the cultural evolution of cooperation is currently a matter of lively debate, but few studies systematically analyse the interplay of these forms of social learning. Here we perform such a study by investigating how the interaction of payoff-based and conformist learning affects the outcome of cultural evolution in three social contexts. First, we develop a simple argument that provides insights into how the outcome of cultural evolution will change when more and more conformist learning is added to payoff-based learning. In a social dilemma (e.g. a Prisoner's Dilemma), conformism can turn cooperation into a stable equilibrium; in an evasion game (e.g. a Hawk-Dove game or a Snowdrift game) conformism tends to destabilize the polymorphic equilibrium; and in a coordination game (e.g. a Stag Hunt game), conformism changes the basin of attraction of the two equilibria. Second, we analyse a stochastic event-based model, revealing that conformism increases the speed of cultural evolution towards pure equilibria. Individual-based simulations as well as the analysis of the diffusion approximation of the stochastic model by and large confirm our findings. Third, we investigate the effect of an increasing degree of conformism on cultural group selection in a group-structured population. We conclude that, in contrast to statements in the literature, conformism hinders rather than promotes the evolution of cooperation.

Modelling hen harrier dynamics to inform human-wildlife conflict resolution: a spatially-realistic, individual-based approach.

PubMed

Heinonen, Johannes P M; Palmer, Stephen C F; Redpath, Steve M; Travis, Justin M J

2014-01-01

Individual-based models have gained popularity in ecology, and enable simultaneous incorporation of spatial explicitness and population dynamic processes to understand spatio-temporal patterns of populations. We introduce an individual-based model for understanding and predicting spatial hen harrier (Circus cyaneus) population dynamics in Great Britain. The model uses a landscape with habitat, prey and game management indices. The hen harrier population was initialised according to empirical census estimates for 1988/89 and simulated until 2030, and predictions for 1998, 2004 and 2010 were compared to empirical census estimates for respective years. The model produced a good qualitative match to overall trends between 1989 and 2010. Parameter explorations revealed relatively high elasticity in particular to demographic parameters such as juvenile male mortality. This highlights the need for robust parameter estimates from empirical research. There are clearly challenges for replication of real-world population trends, but this model provides a useful tool for increasing understanding of drivers of hen harrier dynamics and focusing research efforts in order to inform conflict management decisions.

Modelling Hen Harrier Dynamics to Inform Human-Wildlife Conflict Resolution: A Spatially-Realistic, Individual-Based Approach

PubMed Central

Heinonen, Johannes P. M.; Palmer, Stephen C. F.; Redpath, Steve M.; Travis, Justin M. J.

2014-01-01

Individual-based models have gained popularity in ecology, and enable simultaneous incorporation of spatial explicitness and population dynamic processes to understand spatio-temporal patterns of populations. We introduce an individual-based model for understanding and predicting spatial hen harrier (Circus cyaneus) population dynamics in Great Britain. The model uses a landscape with habitat, prey and game management indices. The hen harrier population was initialised according to empirical census estimates for 1988/89 and simulated until 2030, and predictions for 1998, 2004 and 2010 were compared to empirical census estimates for respective years. The model produced a good qualitative match to overall trends between 1989 and 2010. Parameter explorations revealed relatively high elasticity in particular to demographic parameters such as juvenile male mortality. This highlights the need for robust parameter estimates from empirical research. There are clearly challenges for replication of real-world population trends, but this model provides a useful tool for increasing understanding of drivers of hen harrier dynamics and focusing research efforts in order to inform conflict management decisions. PMID:25405860

Evaluating Moving Target Defense with PLADD

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Jones, Stephen T.; Outkin, Alexander V.; Gearhart, Jared Lee

This project evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques using a new game we have designed, called PLADD, inspired by the game FlipIt [28]. PLADD extends FlipIt by incorporating what we believe are key MTD concepts. We have analyzed PLADD and proven the existence of a defender strategy that pushes a rational attacker out of the game, demonstrated how limited the strategies available to an attacker are in PLADD, and derived analytic expressions for the expected utility of the game’s players in multiple game variants. We have created an algorithm for finding a defender’s optimal PLADD strategy. Wemore » show that in the special case of achieving deterrence in PLADD, MTD is not always cost effective and that its optimal deployment may shift abruptly from not using MTD at all to using it as aggressively as possible. We believe our effort provides basic, fundamental insights into the use of MTD, but conclude that a truly practical analysis requires model selection and calibration based on real scenarios and empirical data. We propose several avenues for further inquiry, including (1) agents with adaptive capabilities more reflective of real world adversaries, (2) the presence of multiple, heterogeneous adversaries, (3) computational game theory-based approaches such as coevolution to allow scaling to the real world beyond the limitations of analytical analysis and classical game theory, (4) mapping the game to real-world scenarios, (5) taking player risk into account when designing a strategy (in addition to expected payoff), (6) improving our understanding of the dynamic nature of MTD-inspired games by using a martingale representation, defensive forecasting, and techniques from signal processing, and (7) using adversarial games to develop inherently resilient cyber systems.« less

FINITE-STATE APPROXIMATIONS TO DENUMERABLE-STATE DYNAMIC PROGRAMS,

DTIC Science & Technology

AIR FORCE OPERATIONS, LOGISTICS), (*INVENTORY CONTROL, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING), (*DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING, APPROXIMATION(MATHEMATICS)), INVENTORY CONTROL, DECISION MAKING, STOCHASTIC PROCESSES, GAME THEORY, ALGORITHMS, CONVERGENCE

Modeling the Player: Predictability of the Models of Bartle and Kolb Based on NEO-FFI (Big5) and the Implications for Game Based Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Konert, Johannes; Gutjahr, Michael; Göbel, Stefan; Steinmetz, Ralf

2014-01-01

For adaptation and personalization of game play sophisticated player models and learner models are used in game-based learning environments. Thus, the game flow can be optimized to increase efficiency and effectiveness of gaming and learning in parallel. In the field of gaming still the Bartle model is commonly used due to its simplicity and good…

Inferring Mathematical Equations Using Crowdsourcing.

PubMed

Wasik, Szymon; Fratczak, Filip; Krzyskow, Jakub; Wulnikowski, Jaroslaw

2015-01-01

Crowdsourcing, understood as outsourcing work to a large network of people in the form of an open call, has been utilized successfully many times, including a very interesting concept involving the implementation of computer games with the objective of solving a scientific problem by employing users to play a game-so-called crowdsourced serious games. Our main objective was to verify whether such an approach could be successfully applied to the discovery of mathematical equations that explain experimental data gathered during the observation of a given dynamic system. Moreover, we wanted to compare it with an approach based on artificial intelligence that uses symbolic regression to find such formulae automatically. To achieve this, we designed and implemented an Internet game in which players attempt to design a spaceship representing an equation that models the observed system. The game was designed while considering that it should be easy to use for people without strong mathematical backgrounds. Moreover, we tried to make use of the collective intelligence observed in crowdsourced systems by enabling many players to collaborate on a single solution. The idea was tested on several hundred players playing almost 10,000 games and conducting a user opinion survey. The results prove that the proposed solution has very high potential. The function generated during weeklong tests was almost as precise as the analytical solution of the model of the system and, up to a certain complexity level of the formulae, it explained data better than the solution generated automatically by Eureqa, the leading software application for the implementation of symbolic regression. Moreover, we observed benefits of using crowdsourcing; the chain of consecutive solutions that led to the best solution was obtained by the continuous collaboration of several players.

Basins of coexistence and extinction in spatially extended ecosystems of cyclically competing species.

PubMed

Ni, Xuan; Yang, Rui; Wang, Wen-Xu; Lai, Ying-Cheng; Grebogi, Celso

2010-12-01

Microscopic models based on evolutionary games on spatially extended scales have recently been developed to address the fundamental issue of species coexistence. In this pursuit almost all existing works focus on the relevant dynamical behaviors originated from a single but physically reasonable initial condition. To gain comprehensive and global insights into the dynamics of coexistence, here we explore the basins of coexistence and extinction and investigate how they evolve as a basic parameter of the system is varied. Our model is cyclic competitions among three species as described by the classical rock-paper-scissors game, and we consider both discrete lattice and continuous space, incorporating species mobility and intraspecific competitions. Our results reveal that, for all cases considered, a basin of coexistence always emerges and persists in a substantial part of the parameter space, indicating that coexistence is a robust phenomenon. Factors such as intraspecific competition can, in fact, promote coexistence by facilitating the emergence of the coexistence basin. In addition, we find that the extinction basins can exhibit quite complex structures in terms of the convergence time toward the final state for different initial conditions. We have also developed models based on partial differential equations, which yield basin structures that are in good agreement with those from microscopic stochastic simulations. To understand the origin and emergence of the observed complicated basin structures is challenging at the present due to the extremely high dimensional nature of the underlying dynamical system. © 2010 American Institute of Physics.

Motivation Monitoring and Assessment Extension for Input-Process-Outcome Game Model

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ghergulescu, Ioana; Muntean, Cristina Hava

2014-01-01

This article proposes a Motivation Assessment-oriented Input-Process-Outcome Game Model (MotIPO), which extends the Input-Process-Outcome game model with game-centred and player-centred motivation assessments performed right from the beginning of the game-play. A feasibility case-study involving 67 participants playing an educational game and…

A Model for Critical Games Literacy

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperley, Tom; Beavis, Catherine

2013-01-01

This article outlines a model for teaching both computer games and videogames in the classroom for teachers. The model illustrates the connections between in-game actions and youth gaming culture. The article explains how the out-of-school knowledge building, creation and collaboration that occurs in gaming and gaming culture has an impact on…

Agent-Centric Approach for Cybersecurity Decision-Support with Partial Observability

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

Tipireddy, Ramakrishna; Chatterjee, Samrat; Paulson, Patrick R.

Generating automated cyber resilience policies for real-world settings is a challenging research problem that must account for uncertainties in system state over time and dynamics between attackers and defenders. In addition to understanding attacker and defender motives and tools, and identifying “relevant” system and attack data, it is also critical to develop rigorous mathematical formulations representing the defender’s decision-support problem under uncertainty. Game-theoretic approaches involving cyber resource allocation optimization with Markov decision processes (MDP) have been previously proposed in the literature. Moreover, advancements in reinforcement learning approaches have motivated the development of partially observable stochastic games (POSGs) in various multi-agentmore » problem domains with partial information. Recent advances in cyber-system state space modeling have also generated interest in potential applicability of POSGs for cybersecurity. However, as is the case in strategic card games such as poker, research challenges using game-theoretic approaches for practical cyber defense applications include: 1) solving for equilibrium and designing efficient algorithms for large-scale, general problems; 2) establishing mathematical guarantees that equilibrium exists; 3) handling possible existence of multiple equilibria; and 4) exploitation of opponent weaknesses. Inspired by advances in solving strategic card games while acknowledging practical challenges associated with the use of game-theoretic approaches in cyber settings, this paper proposes an agent-centric approach for cybersecurity decision-support with partial system state observability.« less

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games.

PubMed

Argasinski, K; Broom, M

2013-10-01

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced.

A Dynamic Game on Network Topology for Counterinsurgency Applications

DTIC Science & Technology

2015-03-26

scenario. This study creates a dynamic game on network topology to provide insight into the effec- tiveness of offensive targeting strategies determined by...focused upon the diffusion of thoughts and innovations throughout complex social networks. Coleman et al. (1966) and Ryan & Gross (1950) investigated...free networks make them extremely resilient against errors but very vulnerable to attack. Most interest- ingly, a determined attacker can remove well

Peer pressure: enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment.

PubMed

Yang, Han-Xin; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Rong, Zhihai; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2015-02-01

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

Peer pressure: Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Han-Xin; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Rong, Zhihai; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2015-02-01

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.

Video game-based exercises for balance rehabilitation: a single-subject design.

PubMed

Betker, Aimee L; Szturm, Tony; Moussavi, Zahra K; Nett, Cristabel

2006-08-01

To investigate whether coupling foot center of pressure (COP)-controlled video games to standing balance exercises will improve dynamic balance control and to determine whether the motivational and challenging aspects of the video games would increase a subject's desire to perform the exercises and complete the rehabilitation process. Case study, pre- and postexercise. University hospital outpatient clinic. A young adult with excised cerebellar tumor, 1 middle-aged adult with single right cerebrovascular accident, and 1 middle-aged adult with traumatic brain injury. A COP-controlled, video game-based exercise system. The following were calculated during 12 different tasks: the number of falls, range of COP excursion, and COP path length. Postexercise, subjects exhibited a lower fall count, decreased COP excursion limits for some tasks, increased practice volume, and increased attention span during training. The COP-controlled video game-based exercise regime motivated subjects to increase their practice volume and attention span during training. This in turn improved subjects' dynamic balance control.

A game theoretic approach to a finite-time disturbance attenuation problem

NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

Rhee, Ihnseok; Speyer, Jason L.

1991-01-01

A disturbance attenuation problem over a finite-time interval is considered by a game theoretic approach where the control, restricted to a function of the measurement history, plays against adversaries composed of the process and measurement disturbances, and the initial state. A zero-sum game, formulated as a quadratic cost criterion subject to linear time-varying dynamics and measurements, is solved by a calculus of variation technique. By first maximizing the quadratic cost criterion with respect to the process disturbance and initial state, a full information game between the control and the measurement residual subject to the estimator dynamics results. The resulting solution produces an n-dimensional compensator which expresses the controller as a linear combination of the measurement history. A disturbance attenuation problem is solved based on the results of the game problem. For time-invariant systems it is shown that under certain conditions the time-varying controller becomes time-invariant on the infinite-time interval. The resulting controller satisfies an H(infinity) norm bound.

Promotion of cooperation in evolutionary game dynamics with local information.

PubMed

Liu, Xuesong; Pan, Qiuhui; He, Mingfeng

2018-01-21

In this paper, we propose a strategy-updating rule driven by local information, which is called Local process. Unlike the standard Moran process, the Local process does not require global information about the strategic environment. By analyzing the dynamical behavior of the system, we explore how the local information influences the fixation of cooperation in two-player evolutionary games. Under weak selection, the decreasing local information leads to an increase of the fixation probability when natural selection does not favor cooperation replacing defection. In the limit of sufficiently large selection, the analytical results indicate that the fixation probability increases with the decrease of the local information, irrespective of the evolutionary games. Furthermore, for the dominance of defection games under weak selection and for coexistence games, the decreasing of local information will lead to a speedup of a single cooperator taking over the population. Overall, to some extent, the local information is conducive to promoting the cooperation. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Game Maturity Model for Health Care.

PubMed

de Boer, Jan C; Adriani, Paul; van Houwelingen, Jan Willem; Geerts, A

2016-04-01

This article introduces the Game Maturity Model for the healthcare industry as an extension to the general Game Maturity Model and describes the usage by two case studies of applied health games. The Game Maturity Model for healthcare provides a practical and value-adding method to assess existing games and to determine strategic considerations for application of applied health games. Our forecast is that within 5 years the use and development of applied games will have a role in our daily lives and the way we organize health care that will be similar to the role social media has today.

A quantum Samaritan’s dilemma cellular automaton

PubMed Central

Situ, Haozhen

2017-01-01

The dynamics of a spatial quantum formulation of the iterated Samaritan’s dilemma game with variable entangling is studied in this work. The game is played in the cellular automata manner, i.e. with local and synchronous interaction. The game is assessed in fair and unfair contests, in noiseless scenarios and with disrupting quantum noise. PMID:28680654

Strategies of Collaborative Work in the Classroom through the Design of Video Games

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Muñoz González, Juan Manuel; Rubio García, Sebastián; Cruz Pichardo, Ivanovna M.

2015-01-01

At the present time, the use of video games goes beyond mere amusement or entertainment due to its potential for developing capacities, dexterity and skills. Thus, video games have extended to environments like that of education, serving as didactic resources within dynamics that respond to the interests and necessities of the 21st century…

Player-Game Interaction: An Ecological Analysis of Foreign Language Gameplay Activities

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ibrahim, Karim

2018-01-01

This article describes how the literature on game-based foreign language (FL) learning has demonstrated that player-game interactions have a strong potential for FL learning. However, little is known about the fine-grained dynamics of these interactions, or how they could facilitate FL learning. To address this gap, the researcher conducted a…

Collaboration Scripts for Mastership Skills: Online Game about Classroom Dilemmas in Teacher Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hummel, Hans; Geerts, Walter; Slootmaker, Aad; Kuipers, Derek; Westera, Wim

2015-01-01

Serious games are seen to hold potential to facilitate workplace learning in a more dynamic and flexible way. This article describes an empirical study into the feasibility of an online collaboration game that facilitates teachers-in-training to deal with classroom management dilemmas. A script to support these students in carrying out such…

Developing a Serious Game for decision making for the water-land-food-energy-climate Nexus in Sardinia-Italy: The SIM4NEXUS approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vamvakeridou-Lyroudia, Lydia; Alexandri, Eva; Blanco, Maria; Chew, Chengzi; Conradt, Tobias; Daskalou, Olympia; Evans, Barry; Guitart, Francesc; Mereu, Simone; Sartori, Martina; Susnik, Janez; Savic, Dragan

2017-04-01

A four-year EU H2020 project "Sustainable Integrated Management FOR the NEXUS of water-land-food-energy-climate for a resource-efficient Europe (SIM4NEXUS)" started in June 2016, with an overall grant of € 7.9M (www.sim4nexus.eu). The project involves 25 partners from 15 European countries. SIM4NEXUS has four objectives: (i) to adopt existing knowledge and develop new expertise on the water-energy-food-climate-land use Nexus; (ii) to reduce uncertainties of how policies, governance and institutions affect complex environmental systems; (iii) to showcase the implementation via a network of three regional, five national, two transboundary case studies in Europe, as well as continental and global studies; (iv) to valorise the project outputs by suitable business models. SIM4NEXUS develops an innovative concept and methodologies to facilitate the design of policies and bridge knowledge and technology gaps in the field of the Nexus under global change. The project will develop a methodology of integration using a complexity science approach and a Serious Game (a decision-based platform that allows policy makers to play out scenarios to see what would bring the best outcome) as an integrating tool for testing and evaluating policy decisions. The Serious Game is based on Aqua Republica (http://www.dhigroup.com/upload/publications/scribd/172629015-Exploring-the-World-of-Aqua-Republica-DHI-Case-Story.pdf ) and will cover a vast array of scenarios for all the case studies, over short, medium and long terms. In this presentation we focus on all the stages of the development of the Serious Game for one of our Case Studies (Sardinia, Italy) which is being used as a pilot example prior to wider rollout. Specifically we detail the components and steps involved in Game development including: (i) linking thematic models (CAPRI- http://www.capri-model.org/dokuwiki/doku.php and E3ME- http://www.e3me.com/) and downscaling to regional level; (ii) climate change scenarios (using and downscaling HADGEM2 models - http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/modelling-systems/unified-model/climate-models/hadgem2); (iii) socio-economic inputs and projections (GTAP - http://en.openei.org/wiki/Global_Trade_and_Analysis_Project_(GTAP)_Model) with System Dynamic Modelling (SDM) using STELLA for the visual environment- http://www.iseesystems.com/store/products/stella-professional.aspx and STELLAR as an open source programming language - http://www.r-gis.net/stellar/); (iv) creating a Knowledge Elicitation Engine (KEE), providing nexus semantics to the outputs of the SDM and (v) generating knowledge from Serious Game user interaction. Local data from Sardinian experts and stakeholders are being used in the pilot, which has been developed with their participation. The presentation will show results from sample scenarios and the approach to simulating uncertainties using SDM, as well as the overall data transfer and management scheme. It should be pointed out that the process of linking thematic models to System Dynamics (Complexity Science Modelling) and creating a KEE out of this combination is, to the best of our knowledge, novel and does not exist in the literature.

Fashion, Cooperation, and Social Interactions

PubMed Central

Cao, Zhigang; Gao, Haoyu; Qu, Xinglong; Yang, Mingmin; Yang, Xiaoguang

2013-01-01

Fashion plays such a crucial rule in the evolution of culture and society that it is regarded as a second nature to the human being. Also, its impact on economy is quite nontrivial. On what is fashionable, interestingly, there are two viewpoints that are both extremely widespread but almost opposite: conformists think that what is popular is fashionable, while rebels believe that being different is the essence. Fashion color is fashionable in the first sense, and Lady Gaga in the second. We investigate a model where the population consists of the afore-mentioned two groups of people that are located on social networks (a spatial cellular automata network and small-world networks). This model captures two fundamental kinds of social interactions (coordination and anti-coordination) simultaneously, and also has its own interest to game theory: it is a hybrid model of pure competition and pure cooperation. This is true because when a conformist meets a rebel, they play the zero sum matching pennies game, which is pure competition. When two conformists (rebels) meet, they play the (anti-) coordination game, which is pure cooperation. Simulation shows that simple social interactions greatly promote cooperation: in most cases people can reach an extraordinarily high level of cooperation, through a selfish, myopic, naive, and local interacting dynamic (the best response dynamic). We find that degree of synchronization also plays a critical role, but mostly on the negative side. Four indices, namely cooperation degree, average satisfaction degree, equilibrium ratio and complete ratio, are defined and applied to measure people’s cooperation levels from various angles. Phase transition, as well as emergence of many interesting geographic patterns in the cellular automata network, is also observed. PMID:23382799

Phase Transitions and Volunteering in Spatial Public Goods Games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Szabó, György; Hauert, Christoph

2002-08-01

We present a simple yet effective mechanism promoting cooperation under full anonymity by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. This natural extension leads to ``rock-scissors-paper''-type cyclic dominance of the three strategies, cooperate, defect, and loner. In spatial settings with players arranged on a regular lattice, this results in interesting dynamical properties and intriguing spatiotemporal patterns. In particular, variations of the value of the public good leads to transitions between one-, two-, and three-strategy states which either are in the class of directed percolation or show interesting analogies to Ising-type models. Although volunteering is incapable of stabilizing cooperation, it efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish behavior.

Stochastic evolution in populations of ideas

PubMed Central

Nicole, Robin; Sollich, Peter; Galla, Tobias

2017-01-01

It is known that learning of players who interact in a repeated game can be interpreted as an evolutionary process in a population of ideas. These analogies have so far mostly been established in deterministic models, and memory loss in learning has been seen to act similarly to mutation in evolution. We here propose a representation of reinforcement learning as a stochastic process in finite ‘populations of ideas’. The resulting birth-death dynamics has absorbing states and allows for the extinction or fixation of ideas, marking a key difference to mutation-selection processes in finite populations. We characterize the outcome of evolution in populations of ideas for several classes of symmetric and asymmetric games. PMID:28098244

Stochastic evolution in populations of ideas

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Nicole, Robin; Sollich, Peter; Galla, Tobias

2017-01-01

It is known that learning of players who interact in a repeated game can be interpreted as an evolutionary process in a population of ideas. These analogies have so far mostly been established in deterministic models, and memory loss in learning has been seen to act similarly to mutation in evolution. We here propose a representation of reinforcement learning as a stochastic process in finite ‘populations of ideas’. The resulting birth-death dynamics has absorbing states and allows for the extinction or fixation of ideas, marking a key difference to mutation-selection processes in finite populations. We characterize the outcome of evolution in populations of ideas for several classes of symmetric and asymmetric games.

Dynamic Function Allocation in Fighter Cockpits.

DTIC Science & Technology

1987-06-30

their ability to play the video game simulation used in this study. This was done in an attempt to conceptually match the subject’s skills to those of...highly trained Air Force pilots. 4 Apparatus Simulation. A single seat fighter cockpit environment was simulated using the F-15 Strike Eagle video game developed...simulator containing three color CRTs. The video game was presented on the CRT located in the HUD position. The subjects controlled the game through a

Concepts and Methods in Multi-Person Coordination and Control.

DTIC Science & Technology

1981-10-01

games ", in: E . 0. Roxin, P. T. Liu, R.L. Sternberg, eds., Differential Games and Control Theory II, Marcel Dekker, New York, pp. 201-228. [11] Baqar...New York. (43] Blaquiere, A. (1973), ed., Topics in Differential Games , Nowth-Holland, Amsterdam. (44] Burger, E . (1966), Einfihrunx in die Theorie der...Equilibria in Stochastic Dynamic Games of Stackel- L. berg Tyve, Ph.D. Thesis, M.I.T., Electronic Systems Laboratory, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [51] Chen, C. I

Quantum Game of Life

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Glick, Aaron; Carr, Lincoln; Calarco, Tommaso; Montangero, Simone

2014-03-01

In order to investigate the emergence of complexity in quantum systems, we present a quantum game of life, inspired by Conway's classic game of life. Through Matrix Product State (MPS) calculations, we simulate the evolution of quantum systems, dictated by a Hamiltonian that defines the rules of our quantum game. We analyze the system through a number of measures which elicit the emergence of complexity in terms of spatial organization, system dynamics, and non-local mutual information within the network. Funded by NSF

Optimal Power Control in Wireless Powered Sensor Networks: A Dynamic Game-Based Approach

PubMed Central

Xu, Haitao; Guo, Chao; Zhang, Long

2017-01-01

In wireless powered sensor networks (WPSN), it is essential to research uplink transmit power control in order to achieve throughput performance balancing and energy scheduling. Each sensor should have an optimal transmit power level for revenue maximization. In this paper, we discuss a dynamic game-based algorithm for optimal power control in WPSN. The main idea is to use the non-cooperative differential game to control the uplink transmit power of wireless sensors in WPSN, to extend their working hours and to meet QoS (Quality of Services) requirements. Subsequently, the Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained through Bellman dynamic programming. At the same time, an uplink power control algorithm is proposed in a distributed manner. Through numerical simulations, we demonstrate that our algorithm can obtain optimal power control and reach convergence for an infinite horizon. PMID:28282945

Evolutionary programming for goal-driven dynamic planning

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Vaccaro, James M.; Guest, Clark C.; Ross, David O.

2002-03-01

Many complex artificial intelligence (IA) problems are goal- driven in nature and the opportunity exists to realize the benefits of a goal-oriented solution. In many cases, such as in command and control, a goal-oriented approach may be the only option. One of many appropriate applications for such an approach is War Gaming. War Gaming is an important tool for command and control because it provides a set of alternative courses of actions so that military leaders can contemplate their next move in the battlefield. For instance, when making decisions that save lives, it is necessary to completely understand the consequences of a given order. A goal-oriented approach provides a slowly evolving tractably reasoned solution that inherently follows one of the principles of war: namely concentration on the objective. Future decision-making will depend not only on the battlefield, but also on a virtual world where military leaders can wage wars and determine their options by playing computer war games much like the real world. The problem with these games is that the built-in AI does not learn nor adapt and many times cheats, because the intelligent player has access to all the information, while the user has access to limited information provided on a display. These games are written for the purpose of entertainment and actions are calculated a priori and off-line, and are made prior or during their development. With these games getting more sophisticated in structure and less domain specific in scope, there needs to be a more general intelligent player that can adapt and learn in case the battlefield situations or the rules of engagement change. One such war game that might be considered is Risk. Risk incorporates the principles of war, is a top-down scalable model, and provides a good application for testing a variety of goal- oriented AI approaches. By integrating a goal-oriented hybrid approach, one can develop a program that plays the Risk game effectively and move one step closer to solving more difficult real-world AI problems. Using a hybrid approach that includes adaptation via evolutionary computation for the intelligent planning of a Risk player's turn provides better dynamic intelligent planning than more uniform approaches.

Cancer dormancy and criticality from a game theory perspective.

PubMed

Wu, Amy; Liao, David; Kirilin, Vlamimir; Lin, Ke-Chih; Torga, Gonzalo; Qu, Junle; Liu, Liyu; Sturm, James C; Pienta, Kenneth; Austin, Robert

2018-01-01

The physics of cancer dormancy, the time between initial cancer treatment and re-emergence after a protracted period, is a puzzle. Cancer cells interact with host cells via complex, non-linear population dynamics, which can lead to very non-intuitive but perhaps deterministic and understandable progression dynamics of cancer and dormancy. We explore here the dynamics of host-cancer cell populations in the presence of (1) payoffs gradients and (2) perturbations due to cell migration. We determine to what extent the time-dependence of the populations can be quantitively understood in spite of the underlying complexity of the individual agents and model the phenomena of dormancy.

Examples of equilibrium and non-equilibrium behavior in evolutionary systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Soulier, Arne

With this thesis, we want to shed some light into the darkness of our understanding of simply defined statistical mechanics systems and the surprisingly complex dynamical behavior they exhibit. We will do so by presenting in turn one equilibrium and then one non-equilibrium system with evolutionary dynamics. In part 1, we will present the seceder-model, a newly developed system that cannot equilibrate. We will then study several properties of the system and obtain an idea of the richness of the dynamics of the seceder model, which is particular impressive given the minimal amount of modeling necessary in its setup. In part 2, we will present extensions to the directed polymer in random media problem on a hypercube and its connection to the Eigen model of evolution. Our main interest will be the influence of time-dependent and time-independent changes in the fitness landscape viewed by an evolving population. This part contains the equilibrium dynamics. The stochastic models and the topic of evolution and non-equilibrium in general will allow us to point out similarities to the various lines of thought in game theory.

Dynamically analyzing cell interactions in biological environments using multiagent social learning framework.

PubMed

Zhang, Chengwei; Li, Xiaohong; Li, Shuxin; Feng, Zhiyong

2017-09-20

Biological environment is uncertain and its dynamic is similar to the multiagent environment, thus the research results of the multiagent system area can provide valuable insights to the understanding of biology and are of great significance for the study of biology. Learning in a multiagent environment is highly dynamic since the environment is not stationary anymore and each agent's behavior changes adaptively in response to other coexisting learners, and vice versa. The dynamics becomes more unpredictable when we move from fixed-agent interaction environments to multiagent social learning framework. Analytical understanding of the underlying dynamics is important and challenging. In this work, we present a social learning framework with homogeneous learners (e.g., Policy Hill Climbing (PHC) learners), and model the behavior of players in the social learning framework as a hybrid dynamical system. By analyzing the dynamical system, we obtain some conditions about convergence or non-convergence. We experimentally verify the predictive power of our model using a number of representative games. Experimental results confirm the theoretical analysis. Under multiagent social learning framework, we modeled the behavior of agent in biologic environment, and theoretically analyzed the dynamics of the model. We present some sufficient conditions about convergence or non-convergence and prove them theoretically. It can be used to predict the convergence of the system.

Concurrent Transmission Based on Channel Quality in Ad Hoc Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chen, Chen; Gao, Xinbo; Li, Xiaoji; Pei, Qingqi

In this paper, a decentralized concurrent transmission strategy in shared channel in Ad Hoc networks is proposed based on game theory. Firstly, a static concurrent transmissions game is used to determine the candidates for transmitting by channel quality threshold and to maximize the overall throughput with consideration of channel quality variation. To achieve NES (Nash Equilibrium Solution), the selfish behaviors of node to attempt to improve the channel gain unilaterally are evaluated. Therefore, this game allows each node to be distributed and to decide whether to transmit concurrently with others or not depending on NES. Secondly, as there are always some nodes with lower channel gain than NES, which are defined as hunger nodes in this paper, a hunger suppression scheme is proposed by adjusting the price function with interferences reservation and forward relay, to fairly give hunger nodes transmission opportunities. Finally, inspired by stock trading, a dynamic concurrent transmission threshold determination scheme is implemented to make the static game practical. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme is feasible to increase concurrent transmission opportunities for active nodes, and at the same time, the number of hunger nodes is greatly reduced with the least increase of threshold by interferences reservation. Also, the good performance on network goodput of the proposed model can be seen from the results.

Promotion of cooperation induced by discriminators in the spatial multi-player donor-recipient game

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Cui, Guang-Hai; Wang, Zhen; Ren, Jian-Kang; Lu, Kun; Li, Ming-Chu

2016-11-01

Although the two-player donor-recipient game has been used extensively in studying cooperation in social dilemmas, the scenario in which a donor can simultaneously donate resources to multiple recipients is also common in human societies, economic systems, and social networks. This paper formulates a model of the multi-player donor-recipient game considering a multi-recipient scenario. The promotion of cooperation is also studied by introducing a discriminative cooperation strategy into the game, which donates resources to recipients in proportion to their previous donations with a cost for the collection of information. The evolutionary dynamics of individual strategies are explored in homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios by leveraging spatial evolutionary game theory. The results show that in a homogeneous scenario, defectors can dominate the network at the equilibrium state only when the cost-to-benefit ratio (R) of donated resources is large. In a heterogeneous scenario, three strategies can coexist all the time within the range of R that was studied, and the promotion of cooperation is more effective when the values of R are smaller. Results from a single node evolution and the formation of local patterns of interaction are provided, and it is analytically shown that discriminators can maintain fairness in resource donation and guarantee long-term cooperation when R is not too large.

A Study of Memory Effects in a Chess Database.

PubMed

Schaigorodsky, Ana L; Perotti, Juan I; Billoni, Orlando V

2016-01-01

A series of recent works studying a database of chronologically sorted chess games-containing 1.4 million games played by humans between 1998 and 2007- have shown that the popularity distribution of chess game-lines follows a Zipf's law, and that time series inferred from the sequences of those game-lines exhibit long-range memory effects. The presence of Zipf's law together with long-range memory effects was observed in several systems, however, the simultaneous emergence of these two phenomena were always studied separately up to now. In this work, by making use of a variant of the Yule-Simon preferential growth model, introduced by Cattuto et al., we provide an explanation for the simultaneous emergence of Zipf's law and long-range correlations memory effects in a chess database. We find that Cattuto's Model (CM) is able to reproduce both, Zipf's law and the long-range correlations, including size-dependent scaling of the Hurst exponent for the corresponding time series. CM allows an explanation for the simultaneous emergence of these two phenomena via a preferential growth dynamics, including a memory kernel, in the popularity distribution of chess game-lines. This mechanism results in an aging process in the chess game-line choice as the database grows. Moreover, we find burstiness in the activity of subsets of the most active players, although the aggregated activity of the pool of players displays inter-event times without burstiness. We show that CM is not able to produce time series with bursty behavior providing evidence that burstiness is not required for the explanation of the long-range correlation effects in the chess database. Our results provide further evidence favoring the hypothesis that long-range correlations effects are a consequence of the aging of game-lines and not burstiness, and shed light on the mechanism that operates in the simultaneous emergence of Zipf's law and long-range correlations in a community of chess players.

Short and long term investor synchronization caused by decoupling.

PubMed

Roszczynska-Kurasinska, Magda; Nowak, Andrzej; Kamieniarz, Daniel; Solomon, Sorin; Andersen, Jørgen Vitting

2012-01-01

The dynamics of collective decision making is not yet well understood. Its practical relevance however can be of utmost importance, as experienced by people who lost their fortunes in turbulent moments of financial markets. In this paper we show how spontaneous collective "moods" or "biases" emerge dynamically among human participants playing a trading game in a simple model of the stock market. Applying theory and computer simulations to the experimental data generated by humans, we are able to predict the onset of such moments before they actually happen.

Short and Long Term Investor Synchronization Caused by Decoupling

PubMed Central

Roszczynska-Kurasinska, Magda; Nowak, Andrzej; Kamieniarz, Daniel; Solomon, Sorin; Andersen, Jørgen Vitting

2012-01-01

The dynamics of collective decision making is not yet well understood. Its practical relevance however can be of utmost importance, as experienced by people who lost their fortunes in turbulent moments of financial markets. In this paper we show how spontaneous collective “moods” or “biases” emerge dynamically among human participants playing a trading game in a simple model of the stock market. Applying theory and computer simulations to the experimental data generated by humans, we are able to predict the onset of such moments before they actually happen. PMID:23236385

Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in n-person games.

PubMed

Suzuki, Shinsuke; Akiyama, Eizo

2008-06-21

Evolution of cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals has been of considerable concern in various fields such as biology, economics, and psychology. The evolution of cooperation is often explained by reciprocity. Under reciprocity, cooperation can prevail in a society because a donor of cooperation receives reciprocation from the recipient of the cooperation, called direct reciprocity, or from someone else in the community, called indirect reciprocity. Nowak and Sigmund [1993. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 90, 5091-5094] have demonstrated that directly reciprocal cooperation in two-person prisoner's dilemma games with mutation of strategies can be maintained dynamically as periodic or chaotic oscillation. Furthermore, Eriksson and Lindgren [2005. Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person Prisoner's Dilemma. J. Theor. Biol. 232, 399-409] have reported that directly reciprocal cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemma games (n>2) can be maintained as periodic oscillation. Is dynamic cooperation observed only in direct reciprocity? Results of this study show that indirectly reciprocal cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemma games can be maintained dynamically as periodic or chaotic oscillation. This is, to our knowledge, the first demonstration of chaos in indirect reciprocity. Furthermore, the results show that oscillatory dynamics are observed in common in the evolution of reciprocal cooperation whether for direct or indirect.

The dynamics of meaningful social interactions and the emergence of collective knowledge

PubMed Central

Dankulov, Marija Mitrović; Melnik, Roderick; Tadić, Bosiljka

2015-01-01

Collective knowledge as a social value may arise in cooperation among actors whose individual expertise is limited. The process of knowledge creation requires meaningful, logically coordinated interactions, which represents a challenging problem to physics and social dynamics modeling. By combining two-scale dynamics model with empirical data analysis from a well-known Questions & Answers system Mathematics, we show that this process occurs as a collective phenomenon in an enlarged network (of actors and their artifacts) where the cognitive recognition interactions are properly encoded. The emergent behavior is quantified by the information divergence and innovation advancing of knowledge over time and the signatures of self-organization and knowledge sharing communities. These measures elucidate the impact of each cognitive element and the individual actor’s expertise in the collective dynamics. The results are relevant to stochastic processes involving smart components and to collaborative social endeavors, for instance, crowdsourcing scientific knowledge production with online games. PMID:26174482

The dynamics of meaningful social interactions and the emergence of collective knowledge

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Dankulov, Marija Mitrović; Melnik, Roderick; Tadić, Bosiljka

2015-07-01

Collective knowledge as a social value may arise in cooperation among actors whose individual expertise is limited. The process of knowledge creation requires meaningful, logically coordinated interactions, which represents a challenging problem to physics and social dynamics modeling. By combining two-scale dynamics model with empirical data analysis from a well-known Questions & Answers system Mathematics, we show that this process occurs as a collective phenomenon in an enlarged network (of actors and their artifacts) where the cognitive recognition interactions are properly encoded. The emergent behavior is quantified by the information divergence and innovation advancing of knowledge over time and the signatures of self-organization and knowledge sharing communities. These measures elucidate the impact of each cognitive element and the individual actor’s expertise in the collective dynamics. The results are relevant to stochastic processes involving smart components and to collaborative social endeavors, for instance, crowdsourcing scientific knowledge production with online games.

The dynamics of meaningful social interactions and the emergence of collective knowledge.

PubMed

Dankulov, Marija Mitrović; Melnik, Roderick; Tadić, Bosiljka

2015-07-15

Collective knowledge as a social value may arise in cooperation among actors whose individual expertise is limited. The process of knowledge creation requires meaningful, logically coordinated interactions, which represents a challenging problem to physics and social dynamics modeling. By combining two-scale dynamics model with empirical data analysis from a well-known Questions &Answers system Mathematics, we show that this process occurs as a collective phenomenon in an enlarged network (of actors and their artifacts) where the cognitive recognition interactions are properly encoded. The emergent behavior is quantified by the information divergence and innovation advancing of knowledge over time and the signatures of self-organization and knowledge sharing communities. These measures elucidate the impact of each cognitive element and the individual actor's expertise in the collective dynamics. The results are relevant to stochastic processes involving smart components and to collaborative social endeavors, for instance, crowdsourcing scientific knowledge production with online games.

Dynamic Modeling as a Cognitive Regulation Scaffold for Developing Complex Problem-Solving Skills in an Educational Massively Multiplayer Online Game Environment

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Eseryel, Deniz; Ge, Xun; Ifenthaler, Dirk; Law, Victor

2011-01-01

Following a design-based research framework, this article reports two empirical studies with an educational MMOG, called "McLarin's Adventures," on facilitating 9th-grade students' complex problem-solving skill acquisition in interdisciplinary STEM education. The article discusses the nature of complex and ill-structured problem solving…

Mesoscopic interactions and species coexistence in evolutionary game dynamics of cyclic competitions.

PubMed

Cheng, Hongyan; Yao, Nan; Huang, Zi-Gang; Park, Junpyo; Do, Younghae; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2014-12-15

Evolutionary dynamical models for cyclic competitions of three species (e.g., rock, paper, and scissors, or RPS) provide a paradigm, at the microscopic level of individual interactions, to address many issues in coexistence and biodiversity. Real ecosystems often involve competitions among more than three species. By extending the RPS game model to five (rock-paper-scissors-lizard-Spock, or RPSLS) mobile species, we uncover a fundamental type of mesoscopic interactions among subgroups of species. In particular, competitions at the microscopic level lead to the emergence of various local groups in different regions of the space, each involving three species. It is the interactions among the groups that fundamentally determine how many species can coexist. In fact, as the mobility is increased from zero, two transitions can occur: one from a five- to a three-species coexistence state and another from the latter to a uniform, single-species state. We develop a mean-field theory to show that, in order to understand the first transition, group interactions at the mesoscopic scale must be taken into account. Our findings suggest, more broadly, the importance of mesoscopic interactions in coexistence of great many species.

Evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Pereda, María

2016-09-01

In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.

Adaptive reproduction schedule as a cause of worker policing in social hymenoptera: a dynamic game analysis.

PubMed

Ohtsuki, Hisashi; Tsuji, Kazuki

2009-06-01

Evolutionary theories predict conflicts over sex allocation, male parentage, and reproductive allocation in hymenopteran societies. However, no theory to date has considered the evolution when a colony faces these three conflicts simultaneously. We tackled this issue by developing a dynamic game model, focusing especially on worker policing. Whereas a Nash equilibrium predicts male parentage patterns that are basically the same as those of relatedness-based worker-policing theory (queen multiple mating impedes worker reproduction), we also show the potential for worker policing under queen single mating. Worker policing will depend on the stage of colony growth that is caused by interaction with reproductive allocation conflict or a trade-off between current and future reproduction. Male production at an early stage greatly hinders the growth of the work force and undermines future inclusive fitness of colony members, leading to worker policing at the ergonomic stage. This new mechanism can explain much broader ranges of existing worker-policing behavior than that predicted from relatedness. Predictions differ in many respects from those of models assuming operation of only one or two of the three conflicts, suggesting the importance of interactions among conflicts.

Managing a Common Pool Resource: Real Time Decision-Making in a Groundwater Aquifer

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Sahu, R.; McLaughlin, D.

2017-12-01

In a Common Pool Resource (CPR) such as a groundwater aquifer, multiple landowners (agents) are competing for a limited resource of water. Landowners pump out the water to grow their own crops. Such problems can be posed as differential games, with agents all trying to control the behavior of the shared dynamic system. Each agent aims to maximize his/her own personal objective like agriculture yield, being aware that the action of every other agent collectively influences the behavior of the shared aquifer. The agents therefore choose a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy that derives an optimal action for each agent based on the current state of the aquifer and assumes perfect information of every other agents' objective function. Furthermore, using an Iterated Best Response approach and interpolating techniques, an optimal pumping strategy can be computed for a more-realistic description of the groundwater model under certain assumptions. The numerical implementation of dynamic optimization techniques for a relevant description of the physical system yields results qualitatively different from the previous solutions obtained from simple abstractions.This work aims to bridge the gap between extensive modeling approaches in hydrology and competitive solution strategies in differential game theory.

Evolution of cooperation under social pressure in multiplex networks.

PubMed

Pereda, María

2016-09-01

In this work, we aim to contribute to the understanding of human prosocial behavior by studying the influence that a particular form of social pressure, "being watched," has on the evolution of cooperative behavior. We study how cooperation emerges in multiplex complex topologies by analyzing a particular bidirectionally coupled dynamics on top of a two-layer multiplex network (duplex). The coupled dynamics appears between the prisoner's dilemma game in a network and a threshold cascade model in the other. The threshold model is intended to abstract the behavior of a network of vigilant nodes that impose the pressure of being observed altering hence the temptation to defect of the dilemma. Cooperation or defection in the game also affects the state of a node of being vigilant. We analyze these processes on different duplex networks structures and assess the influence of the topology, average degree and correlated multiplexity, on the outcome of cooperation. Interestingly, we find that the social pressure of vigilance may impact cooperation positively or negatively, depending on the duplex structure, specifically the degree correlations between layers is determinant. Our results give further quantitative insights in the promotion of cooperation under social pressure.

Agent-based modeling and systems dynamics model reproduction.

DOE Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI.GOV)

North, M. J.; Macal, C. M.

2009-01-01

Reproducibility is a pillar of the scientific endeavour. We view computer simulations as laboratories for electronic experimentation and therefore as tools for science. Recent studies have addressed model reproduction and found it to be surprisingly difficult to replicate published findings. There have been enough failed simulation replications to raise the question, 'can computer models be fully replicated?' This paper answers in the affirmative by reporting on a successful reproduction study using Mathematica, Repast and Swarm for the Beer Game supply chain model. The reproduction process was valuable because it demonstrated the original result's robustness across modelling methodologies and implementation environments.

Hyperbolic scaling and computing in social crowds: Comment on "Human behaviours in evacuation crowd dynamics: From modelling to "big data" toward crisis management" by Nicola Bellomo et al.

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Outada, Nisrine

2016-09-01

I have read with great interest the paper [5] where the authors present an overview and critical analysis of the literature on the modeling of the crowd dynamics with special attention to evacuation dynamics. The approach developed is based on suitable development of methods of the kinetic theory. Interactions, which lead to the decision choice, are modeled by theoretical tools of stochastic evolutionary game theory [11,12]. However, the paper [5] provides not only a survey focused on topics of great interest for our society, but also it looks ahead to a variety of interesting and challenging mathematical problems. Specifically, I am interested in the derivation of macroscopic (hydrodynamic) models from the underlying description given from the kinetic theory approach, more specifically by the kinetic theory for active particles [8]. A general reference on crowd modeling is the recently published book [10].

Cooperation and charity in spatial public goods game under different strategy update rules

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Li, Yixiao; Jin, Xiaogang; Su, Xianchuang; Kong, Fansheng; Peng, Chengbin

2010-03-01

Human cooperation can be influenced by other human behaviors and recent years have witnessed the flourishing of studying the coevolution of cooperation and punishment, yet the common behavior of charity is seldom considered in game-theoretical models. In this article, we investigate the coevolution of altruistic cooperation and egalitarian charity in spatial public goods game, by considering charity as the behavior of reducing inter-individual payoff differences. Our model is that, in each generation of the evolution, individuals play games first and accumulate payoff benefits, and then each egalitarian makes a charity donation by payoff transfer in its neighborhood. To study the individual-level evolutionary dynamics, we adopt different strategy update rules and investigate their effects on charity and cooperation. These rules can be classified into two global rules: random selection rule in which individuals randomly update strategies, and threshold selection rule where only those with payoffs below a threshold update strategies. Simulation results show that random selection enhances the cooperation level, while threshold selection lowers the threshold of the multiplication factor to maintain cooperation. When charity is considered, it is incapable in promoting cooperation under random selection, whereas it promotes cooperation under threshold selection. Interestingly, the evolution of charity strongly depends on the dispersion of payoff acquisitions of the population, which agrees with previous results. Our work may shed light on understanding human egalitarianism.

Geometry of ‘standoffs’ in lattice models of the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Laird, Robert A.; Goyal, Dipankar; Yazdani, Soroosh

2013-09-01

The Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games are the main theoretical constructs used to study the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. In large, well-mixed populations, mean-field models predict a stable equilibrium abundance of all defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and a stable mixed-equilibrium of cooperators and defectors in the Snowdrift game. In the spatial extensions of these games, which can greatly modify the fates of populations (including allowing cooperators to persist in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for example), lattice models are typically used to represent space, individuals play only with their nearest neighbours, and strategy replacement is a function of the differences in payoffs between neighbours. Interestingly, certain values of the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, coupled with particular spatial configurations of cooperators and defectors, can lead to ‘global standoffs’, a situation in which all cooperator-defector neighbours have identical payoffs, leading to the development of static spatial patterns. We start by investigating the conditions that can lead to ‘local standoffs’ (i.e., in which isolated pairs of neighbouring cooperators and defectors cannot overtake one another), and then use exhaustive searches of small square lattices (4×4 and 6×6) of degree k=3,k=4, and k=6, to show that two main types of global standoff patterns-‘periodic’ and ‘aperiodic’-are possible by tiling local standoffs across entire spatially structured populations. Of these two types, we argue that only aperiodic global standoffs are likely to be potentially attracting, i.e., capable of emerging spontaneously from non-standoff conditions. Finally, we use stochastic simulation models with comparatively large lattices (100×100) to show that global standoffs in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Snowdrift games do indeed only (but not always) emerge under the conditions predicted by the small-lattice analysis.

Game-theoretic homological sensor resource management for SSA

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Chin, Sang Peter

2009-05-01

We present a game-theoretic approach to Level 2/3/4 fusion for the purpose of Space Situational Awareness (SSA) along with prototypical SW implementation of this approach to demonstrate its effectiveness for possible future space operations. Our approach is based upon innovative techniques that we are developing to solve dynamic games and Nperson cooperative/non-cooperative games, as well as a new emerging homological sensing algorithms which we apply to control disparate network of space sensors in order to gain better SSA.

Vids: Version 2.0 Alpha Visualization Engine

DTIC Science & Technology

2018-04-25

fidelity than existing efforts. Vids is a project aimed at producing more dynamic and interactive visualization tools using modern computer game ...move through and interact with the data to improve informational understanding. The Vids software leverages off-the-shelf modern game development...analysis and correlations. Recently, an ARL-pioneered project named Virtual Reality Data Analysis Environment (VRDAE) used VR and a modern game engine

Playful Collaboration (or Not): Using a Game to Grasp the Social Dynamics of Open Innovation in Innovation and Business Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bogers, Marcel; Sproedt, Henrik

2012-01-01

This article explores how playing games can be used to teach intangible social interaction across boundaries, in particular within open collaborative innovation. We present an exploratory case study of how students learned from playing a board game in a graduate course of the international and interdisciplinary Innovation and Business master's…

The Problem of Delayed Causation in a Video Game: Constant, Varied, and Filled Delays

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Young, Michael E.; Nguyen, Nam

2009-01-01

A first-person shooter video game was adapted for the study of causal decision making within dynamic environments. The video game included groups of three potential targets. Participants chose which of the three targets in each group was producing distal explosions. The actual source of the explosion effect varied in the delay between the firing…

A cellular automaton implementation of a quantum battle of the sexes game with imperfect information

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Alonso-Sanz, Ramón

2015-10-01

The dynamics of a spatial quantum formulation of the iterated battle of the sexes game with imperfect information is studied in this work. The game is played with variable entangling in a cellular automata manner, i.e. with local and synchronous interaction. The effect of spatial structure is assessed in fair and unfair scenarios.

Game Based Learning as a Means to Teach Climate Literacy in a High School Environment

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Fung, M. K.; Tedesco, L.; Katz, M. E.

2013-12-01

As part of RPI's GK-12 graduate fellowship program (which involves graduate STEM fellows in K-12 education) a climate change board game activity was developed and implemented at inner city Troy High School in Troy, New York. The goal was to engage and teach two classes of the Earth Science General Repeat (GR) tenth grade students about climate change through a game-based leaning module. Students placed in the GR course had previously failed Earth Science, and had never passed a general science class in high school. In the past, these students have responded positively to hands-on activities. Therefore, an interactive board game activity was created to teach students about climate, explore how humans impact our environment, and address the future of climate change. The students are presented with a draft version of the game, created by the graduate fellow, and are asked to redesign the game for their peers in the other GR class. The students' version of the game is required to include certain aspects of the original game, for example, the climate change Trivia and Roadblock cards, but the design, addition of rules and overall layout are left to the students. The game-based learning technique allows the students to learn through a storyline, compete against each other, and challenge themselves to perfect their learning and understanding of climate change. The climate change board game activity also incorporates our cascade learning model, in which the graduate fellow designs the activity, works with a high school teacher, and implements the game with high school students. In addition, the activity emphasizes peer-to-peer learning, allowing each classroom to design the game for a different group of students. This allows the students to take leadership and gives them a sense of accomplishment with the completed board game. The nature of a board game also creates a dynamic competitive atmosphere, in which the students want to learn and understand the material to succeed in the overall game. Although this board game activity was designed for high school students, it could easily be adapted for all K-12 levels as an interactive, informative and successful way of teaching students about climate literacy.

Quantum games of opinion formation based on the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Deng, Xinyang; Deng, Yong; Liu, Qi; Shi, Lei; Wang, Zhen

2016-06-01

Quantization has become a new way to investigate classical game theory since quantum strategies and quantum games were proposed. In the existing studies, many typical game models, such as the prisoner's dilemma, battle of the sexes, Hawk-Dove game, have been extensively explored by using quantization approach. Along a similar method, here several game models of opinion formations will be quantized on the basis of the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme, a frequently used scheme of converting classical games to quantum versions. Our results show that the quantization can fascinatingly change the properties of some classical opinion formation game models so as to generate win-win outcomes.

Nature-Inspired Cognitive Evolution to Play MS. Pac-Man

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Tan, Tse Guan; Teo, Jason; Anthony, Patricia

Recent developments in nature-inspired computation have heightened the need for research into the three main areas of scientific, engineering and industrial applications. Some approaches have reported that it is able to solve dynamic problems and very useful for improving the performance of various complex systems. So far however, there has been little discussion about the effectiveness of the application of these models to computer and video games in particular. The focus of this research is to explore the hybridization of nature-inspired computation methods for optimization of neural network-based cognition in video games, in this case the combination of a neural network with an evolutionary algorithm. In essence, a neural network is an attempt to mimic the extremely complex human brain system, which is building an artificial brain that is able to self-learn intelligently. On the other hand, an evolutionary algorithm is to simulate the biological evolutionary processes that evolve potential solutions in order to solve the problems or tasks by applying the genetic operators such as crossover, mutation and selection into the solutions. This paper investigates the abilities of Evolution Strategies (ES) to evolve feed-forward artificial neural network's internal parameters (i.e. weight and bias values) for automatically generating Ms. Pac-man controllers. The main objective of this game is to clear a maze of dots while avoiding the ghosts and to achieve the highest possible score. The experimental results show that an ES-based system can be successfully applied to automatically generate artificial intelligence for a complex, dynamic and highly stochastic video game environment.

Preferential selection based on strategy persistence and memory promotes cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Liu, Yuanming; Huang, Changwei; Dai, Qionglin

2018-06-01

Strategy imitation plays a crucial role in evolutionary dynamics when we investigate the spontaneous emergence of cooperation under the framework of evolutionary game theory. Generally, when an individual updates his strategy, he needs to choose a role model whom he will learn from. In previous studies, individuals choose role models randomly from their neighbors. In recent works, researchers have considered that individuals choose role models according to neighbors' attractiveness characterized by the present network topology or historical payoffs. Here, we associate an individual's attractiveness with the strategy persistence, which characterizes how frequently he changes his strategy. We introduce a preferential parameter α to describe the nonlinear correlation between the selection probability and the strategy persistence and the memory length of individuals M into the evolutionary games. We investigate the effects of α and M on cooperation. Our results show that cooperation could be promoted when α > 0 and at the same time M > 1, which corresponds to the situation that individuals are inclined to select their neighbors with relatively higher persistence levels during the evolution. Moreover, we find that the cooperation level could reach the maximum at an optimal memory length when α > 0. Our work sheds light on how to promote cooperation through preferential selection based on strategy persistence and a limited memory length.

Statistical physics of the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma with memory-aware agents

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Javarone, Marco Alberto

2016-02-01

We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma, as it constitutes an emblematic example of a game whose Nash equilibrium is defection. Previous investigations showed that, under opportune conditions, it is possible to reach, in the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma, an equilibrium of cooperation. Notably, it seems that mechanisms like motion may lead a population to become cooperative. In the proposed model, we map agents to particles of a gas so that, on varying the system temperature, they randomly move. In doing so, we are able to identify a relation between the temperature and the final equilibrium of the population, explaining how it is possible to break the classical Nash equilibrium in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma when considering agents able to increase their payoff over time. Moreover, we introduce a formalism to study order-disorder phase transitions in these dynamics. As result, we highlight that the proposed model allows to explain analytically how a population, whose interactions are based on the Prisoner's Dilemma, can reach an equilibrium far from the expected one; opening also the way to define a direct link between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics.

Pattern formation in individual-based systems with time-varying parameters

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ashcroft, Peter; Galla, Tobias

2013-12-01

We study the patterns generated in finite-time sweeps across symmetry-breaking bifurcations in individual-based models. Similar to the well-known Kibble-Zurek scenario of defect formation, large-scale patterns are generated when model parameters are varied slowly, whereas fast sweeps produce a large number of small domains. The symmetry breaking is triggered by intrinsic noise, originating from the discrete dynamics at the microlevel. Based on a linear-noise approximation, we calculate the characteristic length scale of these patterns. We demonstrate the applicability of this approach in a simple model of opinion dynamics, a model in evolutionary game theory with a time-dependent fitness structure, and a model of cell differentiation. Our theoretical estimates are confirmed in simulations. In further numerical work, we observe a similar phenomenon when the symmetry-breaking bifurcation is triggered by population growth.

Critical dynamic approach to stationary states in complex systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rozenfeld, A. F.; Laneri, K.; Albano, E. V.

2007-04-01

A dynamic scaling Ansatz for the approach to stationary states in complex systems is proposed and tested by means of extensive simulations applied to both the Bak-Sneppen (BS) model, which exhibits robust Self-Organised Critical (SOC) behaviour, and the Game of Life (GOL) of J. Conway, whose critical behaviour is under debate. Considering the dynamic scaling behaviour of the density of sites (ρ(t)), it is shown that i) by starting the dynamic measurements with configurations such that ρ(t=0) →0, one observes an initial increase of the density with exponents θ= 0.12(2) and θ= 0.11(2) for the BS and GOL models, respectively; ii) by using initial configurations with ρ(t=0) →1, the density decays with exponents δ= 0.47(2) and δ= 0.28(2) for the BS and GOL models, respectively. It is also shown that the temporal autocorrelation decays with exponents Ca = 0.35(2) (Ca = 0.35(5)) for the BS (GOL) model. By using these dynamically determined critical exponents and suitable scaling relationships, we also obtain the dynamic exponents z = 2.10(5) (z = 2.10(5)) for the BS (GOL) model. Based on this evidence we conclude that the dynamic approach to stationary states of the investigated models can be described by suitable power-law functions of time with well-defined exponents.

Controlling herding in minority game systems

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Ji-Qiang; Huang, Zi-Gang; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Su, Riqi; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2016-02-01

Resource allocation takes place in various types of real-world complex systems such as urban traffic, social services institutions, economical and ecosystems. Mathematically, the dynamical process of resource allocation can be modeled as minority games. Spontaneous evolution of the resource allocation dynamics, however, often leads to a harmful herding behavior accompanied by strong fluctuations in which a large majority of agents crowd temporarily for a few resources, leaving many others unused. Developing effective control methods to suppress and eliminate herding is an important but open problem. Here we develop a pinning control method, that the fluctuations of the system consist of intrinsic and systematic components allows us to design a control scheme with separated control variables. A striking finding is the universal existence of an optimal pinning fraction to minimize the variance of the system, regardless of the pinning patterns and the network topology. We carry out a generally applicable theory to explain the emergence of optimal pinning and to predict the dependence of the optimal pinning fraction on the network topology. Our work represents a general framework to deal with the broader problem of controlling collective dynamics in complex systems with potential applications in social, economical and political systems.

Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading--an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics.

PubMed

Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Tang, Ming; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2014-07-11

How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost. Through mean-field analysis and computations, we find that, under the partial-subsidy policy, the vaccination coverage depends monotonically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous for the free-subsidy policy. Due to the role models of the donees for relatively irrational individuals and the unchanged strategies of the donees for rational individuals, the free-subsidy policy can in general lead to higher vaccination coverage. Our findings indicate that any disease-control policy should be exercised with extreme care: its success depends on the complex interplay among the intrinsic mathematical rules of epidemic spreading, governmental policies, and behavioral responses of individuals.

Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading - an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Zhang, Hai-Feng; Wu, Zhi-Xi; Tang, Ming; Lai, Ying-Cheng

2014-07-01

How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost. Through mean-field analysis and computations, we find that, under the partial-subsidy policy, the vaccination coverage depends monotonically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous for the free-subsidy policy. Due to the role models of the donees for relatively irrational individuals and the unchanged strategies of the donees for rational individuals, the free-subsidy policy can in general lead to higher vaccination coverage. Our findings indicate that any disease-control policy should be exercised with extreme care: its success depends on the complex interplay among the intrinsic mathematical rules of epidemic spreading, governmental policies, and behavioral responses of individuals.

Symmetric Decomposition of Asymmetric Games.

PubMed

Tuyls, Karl; Pérolat, Julien; Lanctot, Marc; Ostrovski, Georg; Savani, Rahul; Leibo, Joel Z; Ord, Toby; Graepel, Thore; Legg, Shane

2018-01-17

We introduce new theoretical insights into two-population asymmetric games allowing for an elegant symmetric decomposition into two single population symmetric games. Specifically, we show how an asymmetric bimatrix game (A,B) can be decomposed into its symmetric counterparts by envisioning and investigating the payoff tables (A and B) that constitute the asymmetric game, as two independent, single population, symmetric games. We reveal several surprising formal relationships between an asymmetric two-population game and its symmetric single population counterparts, which facilitate a convenient analysis of the original asymmetric game due to the dimensionality reduction of the decomposition. The main finding reveals that if (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of an asymmetric game (A,B), this implies that y is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric counterpart game determined by payoff table A, and x is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric counterpart game determined by payoff table B. Also the reverse holds and combinations of Nash equilibria of the counterpart games form Nash equilibria of the asymmetric game. We illustrate how these formal relationships aid in identifying and analysing the Nash structure of asymmetric games, by examining the evolutionary dynamics of the simpler counterpart games in several canonical examples.

Effects of substrate network topologies on competition dynamics

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lee, Sang Hoon; Jeong, Hawoong

2006-08-01

We study a competition dynamics, based on the minority game, endowed with various substrate network structures. We observe the effects of the network topologies by investigating the volatility of the system and the structure of follower networks. The topology of substrate structures significantly influences the system efficiency represented by the volatility and such substrate networks are shown to amplify the herding effect and cause inefficiency in most cases. The follower networks emerging from the leadership structure show a power-law incoming degree distribution. This study shows the emergence of scale-free structures of leadership in the minority game and the effects of the interaction among players on the networked version of the game.

Numerical approach on dynamic self-assembly of colloidal particles

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ibrahimi, Muhamet; Ilday, Serim; Makey, Ghaith; Pavlov, Ihor; Yavuz, Özgàn; Gulseren, Oguz; Ilday, Fatih Omer

Far from equilibrium systems of artificial ensembles are crucial for understanding many intelligent features in self-organized natural systems. However, the lack of established theory underlies a need for numerical implementations. Inspired by a novel work, we simulate a solution-suspended colloidal system that dynamically self assembles due to convective forces generated in the solvent when heated by a laser. In order to incorporate with random fluctuations of particles and continuously changing flow, we exploit a random-walk based Brownian motion model and a fluid dynamics solver prepared for games, respectively. Simulation results manage to fit to experiments and show many quantitative features of a non equilibrium dynamic self assembly, including phase space compression and an ensemble-energy input feedback loop.