Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?

PubMed Central

Onishi, Kristine H.; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-01-01

For more than two decades, researchers have argued that young children do not understand mental states such as beliefs. Part of the evidence for this claim comes from preschoolers’ failure at verbal tasks that require the understanding that others may hold false beliefs. Here, we used a novel nonverbal task to examine 15-month-old infants’ ability to predict an actor’s behavior on the basis of her true or false belief about a toy’s hiding place. Results were positive, supporting the view that, from a young age, children appeal to mental states—goals, perceptions, and beliefs—to explain the behavior of others. PMID:15821091

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Xie, Jiushu; Cheung, Him; Shen, Manqiong; Wang, Ruiming

2018-01-01

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective…

False-belief understanding in frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease.

PubMed

Fernandez-Duque, Diego; Baird, Jodie A; Black, Sandra E

2009-05-01

The ability to understand other people's behavior in terms of mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, is central to social interaction. It has been argued that the interpersonal problems of patients with behavioral variant of frontotemporal dementia (FTD-b) are due to a dysfunction of that system. We used first- and second-order false-belief tasks to assess theory-of-mind reasoning in a group of patients with FTD-b and a cognitively matched group of patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD). Both patient groups were equally impaired relative to a healthy elderly group in the cognitively demanding second-order false-belief tasks, revealing that cognitive demands are an important factor in false-belief task performance. Both patient groups reached ceiling performance in the first-order false-belief tasks with minimal cognitive demands, despite the striking difference in their social graces. These results suggest that a conceptual deficit in theory of mind-as measured by the false-belief task-is not at the core of the differences between FTD-b and AD.

Processing Demands Impact 3-Year-Olds' Performance in a Spontaneous-Response Task: New Evidence for the Processing-Load Account of Early False-Belief Understanding.

PubMed

Scott, Rose M; Roby, Erin

2015-01-01

Prior to age four, children succeed in non-elicited-response false-belief tasks but fail elicited-response false-belief tasks. To explain this discrepancy, the processing-load account argues that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in infancy, as indicated by early success on non-elicited-response tasks, but that children's ability to demonstrate this capacity depends on the processing demands of the task and children's processing skills. When processing demands exceed young children's processing abilities, such as in standard elicited-response tasks, children fail despite their capacity to represent beliefs. Support for this account comes from recent evidence that reducing processing demands improves young children's performance: when demands are sufficiently reduced, 2.5-year-olds succeed in elicited-response tasks. Here we sought complementary evidence for the processing-load account by examining whether increasing processing demands impeded children's performance in a non-elicited-response task. 3-year-olds were tested in a preferential-looking task in which they heard a change-of-location false-belief story accompanied by a picture book; across children, we manipulated the amount of linguistic ambiguity in the story. The final page of the book showed two images: one that was consistent with the main character's false belief and one that was consistent with reality. When the story was relatively unambiguous, children looked reliably longer at the false-belief-consistent image, successfully demonstrating their false-belief understanding. When the story was ambiguous, however, this undermined children's performance: looking times to the belief-consistent image were correlated with verbal ability, and only children with verbal skills in the upper quartile of the sample demonstrated a significant preference for the belief-consistent image. These results support the processing-load account by demonstrating that regardless of whether a task involves an elicited

Processing Demands Impact 3-Year-Olds’ Performance in a Spontaneous-Response Task: New Evidence for the Processing-Load Account of Early False-Belief Understanding

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Roby, Erin

2015-01-01

Prior to age four, children succeed in non-elicited-response false-belief tasks but fail elicited-response false-belief tasks. To explain this discrepancy, the processing-load account argues that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in infancy, as indicated by early success on non-elicited-response tasks, but that children’s ability to demonstrate this capacity depends on the processing demands of the task and children’s processing skills. When processing demands exceed young children’s processing abilities, such as in standard elicited-response tasks, children fail despite their capacity to represent beliefs. Support for this account comes from recent evidence that reducing processing demands improves young children’s performance: when demands are sufficiently reduced, 2.5-year-olds succeed in elicited-response tasks. Here we sought complementary evidence for the processing-load account by examining whether increasing processing demands impeded children’s performance in a non-elicited-response task. 3-year-olds were tested in a preferential-looking task in which they heard a change-of-location false-belief story accompanied by a picture book; across children, we manipulated the amount of linguistic ambiguity in the story. The final page of the book showed two images: one that was consistent with the main character’s false belief and one that was consistent with reality. When the story was relatively unambiguous, children looked reliably longer at the false-belief-consistent image, successfully demonstrating their false-belief understanding. When the story was ambiguous, however, this undermined children’s performance: looking times to the belief-consistent image were correlated with verbal ability, and only children with verbal skills in the upper quartile of the sample demonstrated a significant preference for the belief-consistent image. These results support the processing-load account by demonstrating that regardless of whether a task

Effects of Maternal Negativity and of Early and Recent Recurrent Depressive Disorder on Children's False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rohrer, Lisa M.; Cicchetti, Dante; Rogosch, Fred A.; Toth, Sheree L.; Maughan, Angeline

2011-01-01

Research has shown that children of depressed mothers are at risk for problems in a variety of developmental domains; however, little is known about the effects of maternal depression on children's emerging understanding of false beliefs. In this study, 3 false belief tasks were administered to 5-year-old children whose mothers had either met…

Examination of the Relationship between False-Belief Understanding and Referential Communication Skills

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Maridaki-Kassotaki, Katerina; Antonopoulou, Katerina

2011-01-01

The present study is an attempt to examine the relation between false-belief understanding and referential communication skills. The ability of 76 children aged 5 years to attribute false beliefs to themselves and others was examined with three false-belief tasks. The referential communication skills of the same children were assessed with two…

False-Belief Understanding and Language Ability Mediate the Relationship between Emotion Comprehension and Prosocial Orientation in Preschoolers.

PubMed

Ornaghi, Veronica; Pepe, Alessandro; Grazzani, Ilaria

2016-01-01

Emotion comprehension (EC) is known to be a key correlate and predictor of prosociality from early childhood. In the present study, we examined this relationship within the broad theoretical construct of social understanding which includes a number of socio-emotional skills, as well as cognitive and linguistic abilities. Theory of mind, especially false-belief understanding, has been found to be positively correlated with both EC and prosocial orientation. Similarly, language ability is known to play a key role in children's socio-emotional development. The combined contribution of false-belief understanding and language to explaining the relationship between EC and prosociality has yet to be investigated. Thus, in the current study, we conducted an in-depth exploration of how preschoolers' false-belief understanding and language ability each contribute to modeling the relationship between children's comprehension of emotion and their disposition to act prosocially toward others, after controlling for age and gender. Participants were 101 4- to 6-year-old children (54% boys), who were administered measures of language ability, false-belief understanding, EC and prosocial orientation. Multiple mediation analysis of the data suggested that false-belief understanding and language ability jointly and fully mediated the effect of preschoolers' EC on their prosocial orientation. Analysis of covariates revealed that gender exerted no statistically significant effect, while age had a trivial positive effect. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.

Child language and parent discipline mediate the relation between family income and false belief understanding.

PubMed

Tompkins, Virginia; Logan, Jessica A R; Blosser, Daniel F; Duffy, Kaylin

2017-06-01

Achieving false belief understanding is an important cognitive milestone that allows children to understand that thoughts and reality can differ. Researchers have found that low-income children score significantly lower than middle-income children on false belief understanding but have not examined why this difference exists. We hypothesized that children's language and parent discipline mediate the income-false belief relation. Participants were 174 3- to 6-year-olds. False belief understanding was significantly correlated with family income, children's vocabulary, parents' self-reported discussion of children's behavior, discussion of emotions, and power assertion. Family income had a significant indirect effect on false belief understanding through children's vocabulary and parent discipline when examined independently, but only through children's vocabulary when using parallel multiple mediation. This study contributes to our knowledge of individual differences in false belief understanding. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Do 10-Month-Old Infants Understand Others' False Beliefs?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Luo, Yuyan

2011-01-01

As adults, we know that others' mental states, such as beliefs, guide their behavior and that these mental states can deviate from reality. Researchers have examined whether young children possess adult-like theory of mind by focusing on their understanding about others' false beliefs. The present research revealed that 10-month-old infants seemed…

False-Belief Understanding and Language Ability Mediate the Relationship between Emotion Comprehension and Prosocial Orientation in Preschoolers

PubMed Central

Ornaghi, Veronica; Pepe, Alessandro; Grazzani, Ilaria

2016-01-01

Emotion comprehension (EC) is known to be a key correlate and predictor of prosociality from early childhood. In the present study, we examined this relationship within the broad theoretical construct of social understanding which includes a number of socio-emotional skills, as well as cognitive and linguistic abilities. Theory of mind, especially false-belief understanding, has been found to be positively correlated with both EC and prosocial orientation. Similarly, language ability is known to play a key role in children’s socio-emotional development. The combined contribution of false-belief understanding and language to explaining the relationship between EC and prosociality has yet to be investigated. Thus, in the current study, we conducted an in-depth exploration of how preschoolers’ false-belief understanding and language ability each contribute to modeling the relationship between children’s comprehension of emotion and their disposition to act prosocially toward others, after controlling for age and gender. Participants were 101 4- to 6-year-old children (54% boys), who were administered measures of language ability, false-belief understanding, EC and prosocial orientation. Multiple mediation analysis of the data suggested that false-belief understanding and language ability jointly and fully mediated the effect of preschoolers’ EC on their prosocial orientation. Analysis of covariates revealed that gender exerted no statistically significant effect, while age had a trivial positive effect. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed. PMID:27774075

Children's understanding of first- and third-person perspectives in complement clauses and false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Brandt, Silke; Buttelmann, David; Lieven, Elena; Tomasello, Michael

2016-11-01

De Villiers (Lingua, 2007, Vol. 117, pp. 1858-1878) and others have claimed that children come to understand false belief as they acquire linguistic constructions for representing a proposition and the speaker's epistemic attitude toward that proposition. In the current study, English-speaking children of 3 and 4years of age (N=64) were asked to interpret propositional attitude constructions with a first- or third-person subject of the propositional attitude (e.g., "I think the sticker is in the red box" or "The cow thinks the sticker is in the red box", respectively). They were also assessed for an understanding of their own and others' false beliefs. We found that 4-year-olds showed a better understanding of both third-person propositional attitude constructions and false belief than their younger peers. No significant developmental differences were found for first-person propositional attitude constructions. The older children also showed a better understanding of their own false beliefs than of others' false beliefs. In addition, regression analyses suggest that the older children's comprehension of their own false beliefs was mainly related to their understanding of third-person propositional attitude constructions. These results indicate that we need to take a closer look at the propositional attitude constructions that are supposed to support children's false-belief reasoning. Children may come to understand their own and others' beliefs in different ways, and this may affect both their use and understanding of propositional attitude constructions and their performance in various types of false-belief tasks. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Rethinking the Relationship between Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding: A Mentalistic Account.

PubMed

Roby, Erin; Scott, Rose M

2016-01-01

It was long assumed that the capacity to represent false beliefs did not emerge until at least age four, as evidenced by children's performance on elicited-response tasks. However, recent evidence that infants appear to demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with alternative, non-elicited-response measures has led some researchers to conclude that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in the 1st year of life. This mentalistic view has been criticized for failing to offer an explanation for the well-established positive associations between social factors and preschoolers' performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks. In this paper, we address this criticism by offering an account that reconciles these associations with the mentalistic claim that false-belief understanding emerges in infancy. We propose that rather than facilitating the emergence of the capacity to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this ability via effects on attention, inference, retrieval, and response production. Our account predicts that the relationship between social factors and false-belief understanding should not be specific to preschoolers' performance in elicited-response tasks: this relationship should be apparent across the lifespan in a variety of paradigms. We review an accumulating body of evidence that supports this prediction.

Rethinking the Relationship between Social Experience and False-Belief Understanding: A Mentalistic Account

PubMed Central

Roby, Erin; Scott, Rose M.

2016-01-01

It was long assumed that the capacity to represent false beliefs did not emerge until at least age four, as evidenced by children’s performance on elicited-response tasks. However, recent evidence that infants appear to demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with alternative, non-elicited-response measures has led some researchers to conclude that the capacity to represent beliefs emerges in the 1st year of life. This mentalistic view has been criticized for failing to offer an explanation for the well-established positive associations between social factors and preschoolers’ performance on elicited-response false-belief tasks. In this paper, we address this criticism by offering an account that reconciles these associations with the mentalistic claim that false-belief understanding emerges in infancy. We propose that rather than facilitating the emergence of the capacity to represent beliefs, social factors facilitate the use of this ability via effects on attention, inference, retrieval, and response production. Our account predicts that the relationship between social factors and false-belief understanding should not be specific to preschoolers’ performance in elicited-response tasks: this relationship should be apparent across the lifespan in a variety of paradigms. We review an accumulating body of evidence that supports this prediction. PMID:27857702

Eighteen-Month-Old Infants Show False Belief Understanding in an Active Helping Paradigm

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Buttelmann, David; Carpenter, Malinda; Tomasello, Michael

2009-01-01

Recently, several studies have claimed that soon after their first birthday infants understand others' false beliefs. However, some have questioned these findings based on criticisms of the looking-time paradigms used. Here we report a new paradigm to test false belief understanding in infants using a more active behavioral response: helping.…

Procedural Metacognition and False Belief Understanding in 3- to 5-Year-Old Children

PubMed Central

Bernard, Stéphane; Proust, Joëlle; Clément, Fabrice

2015-01-01

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one’s own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children’s abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology. PMID:26517260

Procedural Metacognition and False Belief Understanding in 3- to 5-Year-Old Children.

PubMed

Bernard, Stéphane; Proust, Joëlle; Clément, Fabrice

2015-01-01

Some studies, so far limited in number, suggest the existence of procedural metacognition in young children, that is, the practical capacity to monitor and control one's own cognitive activity in a given task. The link between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding is currently under theoretical discussion. If data with primates seem to indicate that procedural metacognition and false belief understanding are not related, no study in developmental psychology has investigated this relation in young children. The present paper aims, first, to supplement the findings concerning young children's abilities to monitor and control their uncertainty (procedural metacognition) and, second, to explore the relation between procedural metacognition and false belief understanding. To examine this, 82 3- to 5-year-old children were presented with an opt-out task and with 3 false belief tasks. Results show that children can rely on procedural metacognition to evaluate their perceptual access to information, and that success in false belief tasks does not seem related to success in the task we used to evaluate procedural metacognition. These results are coherent with a procedural view of metacognition, and are discussed in the light of recent data from primatology and developmental psychology.

Language, Mental State Vocabulary, and False Belief Understanding in Children with Cochlear Implants

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peters, Kimberly; Remmel, Ethan; Richards, Debra

2009-01-01

Purpose: This study examined false belief understanding and its predictors in school-age children who are deaf with cochlear implants and who use spoken language. Method: False belief understanding was measured through an explanation-of-action task in 30 children between the ages of 3 and 12 years who used cochlear implants. Children told a…

True or false: do 5-year-olds understand belief?

PubMed

Fabricius, William V; Boyer, Ty W; Weimer, Amy A; Carroll, Kathleen

2010-11-01

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis.

False Belief Understanding in Cantonese-Speaking Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tardif, Twila; Wellman, Henry M.; Cheung, Kar Man

2004-01-01

The present study investigates the performance of 96 Cantonese-speaking three- to five-year-old preschoolers on three false belief tasks--a deceptive object, a change of location, and an unexpected contents task encompassing a variety of task factors. Most importantly, the research examines the possibility that false belief performance depends on…

Breaking the rules: do infants have a true understanding of false belief?

PubMed

Yott, Jessica; Poulin-Dubois, Diane

2012-03-01

It has been suggested that infants' performance on the false belief task can be explained by the use of behavioural rules. To test this hypothesis, 18-month-old infants were trained to learn the new rule that an object that disappeared in location A could be found in location B. Infants were then administered a false belief task based on the violation of expectation (VOE) paradigm, an intention understanding task, and a modified detour-reaching task. Results revealed that infants looked significantly longer at the display when the experimenter looked for the toy in the full box (box with the toy) compared to infants who observed the experimenter search in the empty box (box without the toy). Results also revealed significant correlations between infants' looking time at the display and their scores on the intention task and on the detour-reaching task. Taken together, these findings suggest that infants possess an implicit understanding of false belief. In addition, they challenge the view that success on the implicit false belief task does not require executive functioning abilities. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

Understanding False Belief as Generalized Operant Behavior

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McHugh, Louise; Barnes-Holmes, Yvonne; Barnes-Holmes, Dermot; Stewart, Ian

2006-01-01

The current work reports 2 experiments that investigate the development of false belief from the perspective of Relational Frame Theory. The true and false belief test protocol used across both experiments contained a range of tasks that involved responding in accordance with the 3 perspective-taking frames of I-YOU, HERE-THERE, NOW-THEN, and in…

Continuity from an Implicit to an Explicit Understanding of False Belief from Infancy to Preschool Age

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thoermer, Claudia; Sodian, Beate; Vuori, Maria; Perst, Hannah; Kristen, Susanne

2012-01-01

An implicit understanding of false belief indicated by anticipatory looking has been shown to be significantly correlated with performance on explicit false-belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children (Low, 2010). Recent evidence from infant research indicates, however, that implicit false-belief understanding guides infants' expectations about…

False Belief and Emotion Understanding in Post-Institutionalized Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tarullo, Amanda R.; Bruce, Jacqueline; Gunnar, Megan R.

2007-01-01

Deficits in social cognition may impair the ability to negotiate social transactions and relationships and contribute to socio emotional difficulties experienced by some post-institutionalized children. We examined false belief and emotion understanding in 40 institutional care-adopted children, 40 foster care-adopted children and 40 birth…

Gesture as a window on children's beginning understanding of false belief.

PubMed

Carlson, Stephanie M; Wong, Antoinette; Lemke, Margaret; Cosser, Caron

2005-01-01

Given that gestures may provide access to transitions in cognitive development, preschoolers' performance on standard tasks was compared with their performance on a new gesture false belief task. Experiment 1 confirmed that children (N=45, M age=54 months) responded consistently on two gesture tasks and that there is dramatic improvement on both the gesture false belief task and a standard task from ages 3 to 5. In 2 subsequent experiments focusing on children in transition with respect to understanding false beliefs (Ns=34 and 70, M age=48 months), there was a significant advantage of gesture over standard and novel verbal-response tasks. Iconic gesture may facilitate reasoning about opaque mental states in children who are rapidly developing concepts of mind.

The Development of Gender Constancy in Early Childhood and Its Relation to Time Comprehension and False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zmyj, Norbert; Bischof-Köhler, Doris

2015-01-01

What is the developmental course of children's gender constancy? Do other cognitive abilities such as time comprehension and false-belief understanding foster gender constancy and the subcomponents gender stability and gender consistency? We examined the development of gender constancy and its relation to time comprehension and false-belief…

Oscillatory brain activity differentially reflects false belief understanding and complementation syntax processing.

PubMed

Guan, Yao; Farrar, M Jeffrey; Keil, Andreas

2018-02-01

False belief understanding (FBU) enables people to consider conflicting beliefs about the same situation. While language has been demonstrated to be a correlate of FBU, there is still controversy about the extent to which a specific aspect of language, complementation syntax, is a necessary condition for FBU. The present study tested an important notion from the debate proposing that complementation syntax task is redundant to FBU measures. Specifically, we examined electrophysiological correlates of false belief, false complementation, and their respective true conditions in adults using electroencephalography (EEG), focusing on indices of oscillatory brain activity and large-scale connectivity. The results showed strong modulation of parieto-occipital alpha (8-12 Hz) and beta (13-20 Hz) power by the experimental manipulations, with heightened sustained alpha power reflective of effortful internal processing observed in the false compared to the true conditions and reliable beta power reductions sensitive to mentalizing and/or syntactic demands in the belief versus the complementation conditions. In addition, higher coupling between parieto-occipital regions and widespread frontal sites in the beta band was found for the false-belief condition selectively. The result of divergence in beta oscillatory activity and in connectivity between false belief and false complementation does not support the redundancy hypothesis.

Continuity from an implicit to an explicit understanding of false belief from infancy to preschool age.

PubMed

Thoermer, Claudia; Sodian, Beate; Vuori, Maria; Perst, Hannah; Kristen, Susanne

2012-03-01

An implicit understanding of false belief indicated by anticipatory looking has been shown to be significantly correlated with performance on explicit false-belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children (Low, 2010). Recent evidence from infant research indicates, however, that implicit false-belief understanding guides infants' expectations about goal-directed actions even in the second year of life. The present study presents data from a sample of N= 70 infants who were tested longitudinally at 15, 18, 30, 36 and 48 months with implicit and explicit Theory of Mind measures, as well as an assessment of verbal IQ. Belief-based anticipatory looking in the false-belief task at 18 months significantly predicted verbal false-belief reasoning at 48 months, after controlling for verbal IQ. These findings indicate developmental continuity and conceptual specificity in belief reasoning from infancy to preschool age. They are discussed with respect to competing accounts of infants' understanding of the mind. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

False-belief understanding i 2.5-year-olds: evidence for violation-of-expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks.

PubMed

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2011-03-01

Until recently, it was generally assumed that the ability to attribute false beliefs did not emerge until about 4 years of age. However, recent reports using spontaneous- as opposed to elicited-response tasks have suggested that this ability may be present much earlier. To date, researchers have employed two kinds of spontaneous-response false-belief tasks: violation-of-expectation tasks have been used with infants in the second year of life, and anticipatory-looking tasks have been used with toddlers in the third year of life. In the present research, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in violation-of-expectation tasks involving a change-of-location situation (Experiment 1) and an unexpected-contents situation (Experiment 2). Results were positive in both situations, providing the first demonstrations of false-belief understanding in toddlers using violation-of-expectation tasks and, as such, pointing to a consistent and continuous picture of early false-belief understanding.

False-belief understanding in 2.5-year-olds: evidence from violation-of-expectation change-of-location and unexpected-contents tasks

PubMed Central

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-01-01

Until recently, it was generally assumed that the ability to attribute false beliefs did not emerge until about 4 years of age. However, recent reports using spontaneous- as opposed to elicited-response tasks have suggested that this ability may be present much earlier. To date, researchers have employed two kinds of spontaneous-response false-belief tasks: violation-of-expectation tasks have been used with infants in the second year of life, and anticipatory-looking tasks have been used with toddlers in the third year of life. In the present research, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in violation-of-expectation tasks involving a change-of-location situation (Experiment 1) and an unexpected-contents situation (Experiment 2). Results were positive in both situations, providing the first demonstrations of false-belief understanding in toddlers using violation-of-expectation tasks and, as such, pointing to a consistent and continuous picture of early false-belief understanding. PMID:22213902

Dissociation of understanding from applying others' false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia: evidence from a computerized referential communication task.

PubMed

Wang, Yong-guang; Roberts, David L; Xu, Bai-hua

2013-05-17

In research on theory of mind (ToM), false belief paradigms are commonly used. Previous studies have reported that there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of impairment on false belief tasks. Moreover, intact ability to attribute others' false beliefs has been widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia. Increasingly, evidence suggests that there may be different cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding others' false beliefs versus applying one's knowledge of others' false beliefs. Since the role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizophrenia, we examined both remitted schizophrenia and non-remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investigate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are associated with deficits in understanding others' mental states or difficulties in applying this understanding. The present study investigated 29 patients with non-remitted schizophrenia, 19 patients with remitted schizophrenia, and 22 healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. The ability to understand others' false beliefs and the ability to apply others' false beliefs were measured separately. Patients with non-remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls on a task of understanding others' false beliefs, whereas no significant difference was found between the patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls. Both the patients with non-remitted schizophrenia and patients with remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls on a task of applying others' false beliefs. Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding others' false beliefs from applying others' false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia. We preliminarily conclude that deficits in the ToM ability of applying knowledge of others' mental states might be state-dependent.

The role of language in the development of false belief understanding: a training study.

PubMed

Lohmann, Heidemarie; Tomasello, Michael

2003-01-01

The current study used a training methodology to determine whether different kinds of linguistic interaction play a causal role in children's development of false belief understanding. After 3 training sessions, 3-year-old children improved their false belief understanding both in a training condition involving perspective-shifting discourse about deceptive objects (without mental state terms) and in a condition in which sentential complement syntax was used (without deceptive objects). Children did not improve in a condition in which they were exposed to deceptive objects without accompanying language. Children showed most improvement in a condition using both perspective-shifting discourse and sentential complement syntax, suggesting that each of these types of linguistic experience plays an independent role in the ontogeny of false belief understanding.

Executive Function and Children's Understanding of False Belief: How Specific Is the Relation?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Muller, U.; Zelazo, P.D.; Imrisek, S.

2005-01-01

The present study examined developmental relations among understanding false belief, understanding ''false'' photographs, performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), and performance on a picture-sentence verification task in 69 3-5-year-old children. Results showed that performance on the DCCS predicted performance on false belief…

Older (but Not Younger) Siblings Facilitate False Belief Understanding.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ruffman, Ted; Perner, Josef; Naito, Mika; Parkin, Lindsay; Clements, Wendy A.

1998-01-01

Four experiments and an analysis of pooled data from English and Japanese children show a linear increase in understanding false beliefs with number of older siblings; no such effect for children younger than 38 months; no helpful effect of younger siblings at any age; no effect of siblings' gender; and no helpful effect of siblings on a source…

Dissociation of understanding from applying others’ false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia: evidence from a computerized referential communication task

PubMed Central

2013-01-01

Background In research on theory of mind (ToM), false belief paradigms are commonly used. Previous studies have reported that there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of impairment on false belief tasks. Moreover, intact ability to attribute others’ false beliefs has been widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia. Increasingly, evidence suggests that there may be different cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding others’ false beliefs versus applying one’s knowledge of others’ false beliefs. Since the role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizophrenia, we examined both remitted schizophrenia and non-remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investigate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are associated with deficits in understanding others’ mental states or difficulties in applying this understanding. Methods The present study investigated 29 patients with non-remitted schizophrenia, 19 patients with remitted schizophrenia, and 22 healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. The ability to understand others’ false beliefs and the ability to apply others’ false beliefs were measured separately. Results Patients with non-remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls on a task of understanding others’ false beliefs, whereas no significant difference was found between the patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls. Both the patients with non-remitted schizophrenia and patients with remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls on a task of applying others’ false beliefs. Conclusions Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding others’ false beliefs from applying others’ false beliefs in remitted schizophrenia. We preliminarily conclude that deficits in the ToM ability of applying knowledge of others�

Preschoolers' Implicit and Explicit False-Belief Understanding: Relations with Complex Syntactical Mastery

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Low, Jason

2010-01-01

Three studies were carried out to investigate sentential complements being the critical device that allows for false-belief understanding in 3- and 4-year-olds (N = 102). Participants across studies accurately gazed in anticipation of a character's mistaken belief in a predictive looking task despite erring on verbal responses for direct…

Associations among false belief understanding, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function.

PubMed

Guajardo, Nicole R; Parker, Jessica; Turley-Ames, Kandi

2009-09-01

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief. Both working memory and representational flexibility partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual and false belief. Children, like adults, also generated various types of counterfactual statements to differing degrees. Results demonstrated the importance of language and executive function for both counterfactual and false belief. Implications are discussed.

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge, Ignorance, and False Belief.

PubMed

Deneault, Joane

2015-01-01

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3-7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.

Knowing Me, Knowing You: Deictic Complexity in False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McHugh, Louise; Barnes-Holmes, Yvonne; Barnes-Holmes, Dermot; Whelan, Robert; Stewart, Ian

2007-01-01

Investigators examined the role of deictic complexity in the context of false-belief understanding. Deictic relations (i.e., I and YOU, HERE and THERE, and NOW and THEN) are used to describe one's perspective on events in the environment. Differences in complexity between responding in accordance with "I" (self) and "YOU" (other) relations are…

Understanding of emotions and false beliefs among hearing children versus deaf children.

PubMed

Ziv, Margalit; Most, Tova; Cohen, Shirit

2013-04-01

Emotion understanding and theory of mind (ToM) are two major aspects of social cognition in which deaf children demonstrate developmental delays. The current study investigated these social cognition aspects in two subgroups of deaf children-those with cochlear implants who communicate orally (speakers) and those who communicate primarily using sign language (signers)-in comparison to hearing children. Participants were 53 Israeli kindergartners-20 speakers, 10 signers, and 23 hearing children. Tests included four emotion identification and understanding tasks and one false belief task (ToM). Results revealed similarities among all children's emotion labeling and affective perspective taking abilities, similarities between speakers and hearing children in false beliefs and in understanding emotions in typical contexts, and lower performance of signers on the latter three tasks. Adapting educational experiences to the unique characteristics and needs of speakers and signers is recommended.

Implicit and explicit false belief development in preschool children.

PubMed

Grosse Wiesmann, Charlotte; Friederici, Angela D; Singer, Tania; Steinbeis, Nikolaus

2017-09-01

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes underlying these tasks and their relation to later-developing explicit false belief understanding, as well as to other cognitive abilities, are not yet understood. Here, we study a battery of implicit and explicit false belief tasks in 3- and 4-year-old children, relating their performance to linguistic abilities and executive functions. The present data show a significant developmental change from failing explicit false belief tasks at 3 years of age to passing them at the age of 4, while both age groups pass implicit false belief tasks. This differential developmental trajectory is reflected by the finding that explicit and implicit false belief tasks do not correlate. Further, we demonstrate that explicit false belief tasks correlate with syntactic and executive functions, whereas implicit false belief tasks do not. The study thus indicates that the processes underlying implicit false belief tasks are different from later-developing explicit false belief understanding. Moreover, our results speak for a critical role of syntactic and executive functions for passing standard explicit false belief tasks in contrast to implicit tasks. © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Bridging the gap between implicit and explicit understanding: how language development promotes the processing and representation of false belief.

PubMed

San Juan, Valerie; Astington, Janet Wilde

2012-03-01

Recent advancements in the field of infant false-belief reasoning have brought into question whether performance on implicit and explicit measures of false belief is driven by the same level of representational understanding. The success of infants on implicit measures has also raised doubt over the role that language development plays in the development of false-belief reasoning. In the current paper, we argue that children's performance on disparate measures cannot be used to infer similarities in understanding across different age groups. Instead, we argue that development must continue to occur between the periods when children can reason implicitly and then explicitly about false belief. We then propose mechanisms by which language associated with false-belief tasks facilitates this transition by assisting with both the processes of elicited response selection and the formation of metarepresentational understanding. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

False Belief Understanding: Children Catch It from Classmates of Different Ages

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wang, Yifang; Su, Yanjie

2009-01-01

Two experiments were conducted to compare the false belief understanding of children who have no siblings, but have classmates of different ages in kindergarten. In Experiment 1, 4- and 5-year-olds completed two unexpected location tasks. We found that 4-year-olds with classmates of different ages performed significantly better than those with…

2.5-year-olds Succeed at a Verbal Anticipatory-Looking False-Belief Task

PubMed Central

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-01-01

Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of nonelicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent’s likely behavior). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced inconsistent findings with toddlers. One possible explanation for these findings is that toddlers succeed when they correctly interpret the prompt as a self-addressed utterance (making the task a nonelicited-response task), but fail when they mistakenly interpret the prompt as a direct question (making the task an elicited-response task). Here, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in a verbal anticipatory-looking task that was designed to help them interpret the anticipatory prompt as a self-addressed utterance: the experimenter looked at the ceiling, chin in hand, during and after the prompt. Children gave evidence of false-belief understanding in this task, but failed when the experimenter looked at the child during and after the prompt. These results reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief reasoning and provide additional support for the distinction between nonelicited- and elicited-response false-belief tasks. Three accounts of the discrepant results obtained with these tasks—and of early false-belief understanding more generally—are discussed. PMID:22429030

2.5-year-olds succeed at a verbal anticipatory-looking false-belief task.

PubMed

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renée

2012-03-01

Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of non-elicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent's likely behaviour). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced inconsistent findings with toddlers. One possible explanation for these findings is that toddlers succeed when they correctly interpret the prompt as a self-addressed utterance (making the task a non-elicited-response task), but fail when they mistakenly interpret the prompt as a direct question (making the task an elicited-response task). Here, 2.5-year-old toddlers were tested in a verbal anticipatory-looking task that was designed to help them interpret the anticipatory prompt as a self-addressed utterance: the experimenter looked at the ceiling, chin in hand, during and after the prompt. Children gave evidence of false-belief understanding in this task, but failed when the experimenter looked at the child during and after the prompt. These results reinforce claims of robust continuity in early false-belief reasoning and provide additional support for the distinction between non-elicited- and elicited-response false-belief tasks. Three accounts of the discrepant results obtained with these tasks - and of early false-belief understanding more generally - are discussed. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

Associations among False Belief Understanding, Counterfactual Reasoning, and Executive Function

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guajardo, Nicole R.; Parker, Jessica; Turley-Ames, Kandi

2009-01-01

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed false belief,…

Relations between Mental Verb and False Belief Understanding in Cantonese-Speaking Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cheung, Him; Chen, Hsuan-Chih; Yeung, William

2009-01-01

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children's false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax…

Children's Understanding of Second-Order False Belief: Comparisons of Content and Method of Assessment

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Miller, Scott A.

2013-01-01

This research examined children's performance on second-order false belief tasks as a function of the content area for the belief and the method of assessing understanding. A total of 70 kindergarten and first-grade children responded to four second-order stories. On two stories, the task was to judge a belief about a belief, and on two, the…

Language and theory of mind: meta-analysis of the relation between language ability and false-belief understanding.

PubMed

Milligan, Karen; Astington, Janet Wilde; Dack, Lisa Ain

2007-01-01

Numerous studies show that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding. However, there is considerable variation in the size of the correlation reported. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), this meta-analysis determines the strength of the relation in children under age 7 and examines moderators that may account for the variability across studies--including aspect of language ability assessed, type of false-belief task used, and direction of effect. The results indicate a moderate to large effect size overall that remains significant when age is controlled. Receptive vocabulary measures had weaker relations than measures of general language. Stronger effects were found from earlier language to later false belief than the reverse. Significant differences were not found among types of false-belief task.

Older Children's Misunderstanding of Uncertain Belief after Passing the False Belief Test

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Zhang, Ting; Zheng, Xueru; Zhang, Li; Sha, Wenju; Deak, Gedeon; Li, Hong

2010-01-01

A four-location belief task was designed to examine children's understanding of another's uncertain belief after passing a false belief (FB) task. In Experiment 1, after passing the FB task, participants were asked what a puppet would do after he failed to find his toy at the falsely believed location. Most 4-year-olds and half of 6-year-olds…

The Role of Age and Oral Lexical Competence in False Belief Understanding by Children and Adolescents with Hearing Loss

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Gonzalez, Antonia; Quintana, Inmaculada; Barajas, Carmen; Linero, Maria Jose

2007-01-01

In the past decade, most studies have reported that children who are deaf and hard of hearing who have parents with typical hearing experience a serious delay in the understanding of false belief. False belief understanding consists of the ability to infer that someone else believes that something is true when one knows it to be wrong. This…

Effects of Deception on Children's Understanding of Second-Order False Belief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Miller, Scott A.

2013-01-01

This research examined two questions: effects of deception on children's understanding of second-order false belief, and possible effects of number of siblings on second-order performance. Kindergarten children responded to 3 second-order problems that varied in the presence and the nature of deception. Performance was better on the problems…

Monsters, Bananas and Seaweed: Active Participation and Young Children's Understanding of False Belief.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Szarkowicz, Diane Louise

This study investigated the effect of active participation in a story reading on children's understanding of false belief. Children, ages 38-63 months, were assigned to a participation or non-participation group. Participating children engaged in a book-reading process using puppets to respond to the story. Non-participating children were read the…

Theories of Mind in Transition: A Microgenetic Study of the Development of False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Amsterlaw, Jennifer; Wellman, Henry M.

2006-01-01

Microgenetic methods were used to document young children's (N = 36; M age = 3;5) acquisition of false belief (FB) understanding and investigate developmental mechanisms. A control group received no experience with FB; 2 other groups received microgenetic sessions designed to promote FB understanding. Over consecutive weeks, microgenetic groups…

The Weird World of Cross-Cultural False-Belief Research: A True- and False-Belief Study among Samoan Children Based on Commands

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mayer, Andreas; Träuble, Birgit

2015-01-01

Previous cross-cultural research using false-belief tasks has explored whether children's theory of mind develops synchronously across cultures. Success on false-belief tasks is usually interpreted as an important indicator of children's mental state understanding, but inconsistent findings have led to questions regarding the interpretation of…

Language, cognitive flexibility, and explicit false belief understanding: longitudinal analysis in typical development and specific language impairment.

PubMed

Farrant, Brad M; Maybery, Murray T; Fletcher, Janet

2012-01-01

The hypothesis that language plays a role in theory-of-mind (ToM) development is supported by a number of lines of evidence (e.g., H. Lohmann & M. Tomasello, 2003). The current study sought to further investigate the relations between maternal language input, memory for false sentential complements, cognitive flexibility, and the development of explicit false belief understanding in 91 English-speaking typically developing children (M age = 61.3 months) and 30 children with specific language impairment (M age = 63.0 months). Concurrent and longitudinal findings converge in supporting a model in which maternal language input predicts the child's memory for false complements, which predicts cognitive flexibility, which in turn predicts explicit false belief understanding. © 2011 The Authors. Child Development © 2011 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

False belief and language comprehension in Cantonese-speaking children.

PubMed

Cheung, Him

2006-10-01

The current research compared two accounts of the relation between language and false belief in children, namely that (a) language is generally related to false belief because both require secondary representation in a social-interactional context and that (b) specific language structures that explicitly code metarepresentation contribute uniquely to the language-false belief relation. In three studies, attempts were made to correlate Cantonese-speaking children's false belief with their general language comprehension and understanding of certain structures that explicitly express metarepresentational knowledge. Results showed that these structures failed to predict false belief after age, nonverbal intelligence, and general language comprehension were considered. In contrast, general language remained predictive of false belief after controlling for age, nonverbal intelligence, and language structures. The current findings are more consistent with a general language account than a language structure account.

False Belief Performance of Children Adopted Internationally.

PubMed

Hwa-Froelich, Deborah A; Matsuo, Hisako; Jacobs, Kristal

2017-02-01

The purpose of this study was to explore relationships among adoption, individual, and family variables on false belief performance of children adopted internationally (CAI). Using a quasiexperimental design, thirty-five 4-year-old children adopted from Asian and Eastern European countries before age 2 years were compared with a U.S. group of 33 nonadopted 4-year-old children on a standardized English-language measure, 3 false belief tasks, and a go/no-go inhibition measure. The adopted group differed significantly from the U.S. nonadopted group in expressive language and false belief performance. For the adopted group, inhibition measures were significantly correlated with core language scores. Core language scores and number of older siblings predicted false belief performance. Similar to children who are not adopted, language competence and living with older siblings positively influenced social understanding in CAI. Because CAI experience interrupted language acquisition and live with fewer older siblings, they are at risk of having weaker language competence and social understanding in their adopted language. When working with CAI, practitioners should assess social communication, language competence, and inhibition skills. They should assist adoptive families in providing socially mentored opportunities for their children to observe and interact with older children.

Bridging the Gap between Implicit and Explicit Understanding: How Language Development Promotes the Processing and Representation of False Belief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

San Juan, Valerie; Astington, Janet Wilde

2012-01-01

Recent advancements in the field of infant false-belief reasoning have brought into question whether performance on implicit and explicit measures of false belief is driven by the same level of representational understanding. The success of infants on implicit measures has also raised doubt over the role that language development plays in the…

The Relationship between Second-Order False Belief and Display Rules Reasoning: The Integration of Cognitive and Affective Social Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Naito, Mika; Seki, Yoshimi

2009-01-01

To investigate the relation between cognitive and affective social understanding, Japanese 4- to 8-year-olds received tasks of first- and second-order false beliefs and prosocial and self-presentational display rules. From 6 to 8 years, children comprehended display rules, as well as second-order false belief, using social pressures justifications…

Attributing False Beliefs about Non-Obvious Properties at 18 Months

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renee; Song, Hyun-joo; Leslie, Alan M.

2010-01-01

Reports that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to others have all used a "search" paradigm in which an agent with a false belief about an object's location searches for the object. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds would still demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a novel "non-search"…

Deception and false belief in paranoia: modelling theory of mind stories.

PubMed

Shryane, Nick M; Corcoran, Rhiannon; Rowse, Georgina; Moore, Rosanne; Cummins, Sinead; Blackwood, Nigel; Howard, Robert; Bentall, Richard P

2008-01-01

This study used Item Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a Theory of Mind (ToM) stories task. The study also aimed to determine whether the ability to understand states of false belief in others and the ability to understand another's intention to deceive are separable skills, and to establish which is more sensitive to the presence of paranoia. A large and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed a ToM stories task measuring false belief and deception at first and second order. A three-factor IRT model was found to best fit the data, consisting of first- and second-order deception factors and a single false-belief factor. The first-order deception and false-belief factors had good measurement properties at low trait levels, appropriate for samples with reduced ToM ability. First-order deception and false beliefs were both sensitive to paranoid ideation with IQ predicting performance on false belief items. Separable abilities were found to underlie performance on verbal ToM tasks. However, paranoia was associated with impaired performance on both false belief and deception understanding with clear impairment at the simplest level of mental state attribution.

Lie-Telling Behavior in Children with Autism and Its Relation to False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Talwar, Victoria; Zwaigenbaum, Lonnie; Goulden, Keith J.; Manji, Shazeen; Loomes, Carly; Rasmussen, Carmen

2012-01-01

Children's lie-telling behavior and its relation to false-belief understanding was examined in children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD; n = 26) and a comparison group of typically developing children (n = 27). Participants were assessed using a temptation resistance paradigm, in which children were told not to peek at a forbidden toy while…

False Belief, Complementation Language, and Contextual Bias in Preschoolers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ng, Lisa; Cheung, Him; Xiao, Wen

2010-01-01

In the present study, we address two questions concerning the relation between children's false belief and their understanding of complex object complements. The first question is whether the previously demonstrated association between tensed complements and false belief generalizes to infinitival complements (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002). The…

Modulation of the cortical false belief network during development.

PubMed

Sommer, Monika; Meinhardt, Jörg; Eichenmüller, Kerstin; Sodian, Beate; Döhnel, Katrin; Hajak, Göran

2010-10-01

The ability to represent false beliefs is commonly considered as to be the critical test for having a Theory of Mind (ToM). For correct predictions or explanations of other peoples' behavior it is necessary to understand that mental states are sometimes independent of reality and misrepresent the real state of the world. In contrast, when people hold true beliefs, predictions and explanations about behavior can simply be derived from reality. Previous neuroimaging studies with adults suggest that the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ) are engaged in false belief reasoning. However, studies investigating the neural correlates of belief reasoning in children are rare. Using cartoon stories that depicted an unexpected transfer, we compared false belief reasoning with true belief reasoning in children of a narrow age range between 10 and 12years and in adults. In both groups, the dorsal medial frontal cortex was activated during false versus true belief reasoning. In contrast to adults, children did not selectively recruit the rTPJ during false belief reasoning. We found a group by belief interaction in the right rostral PFC and the posterior cingulate cortex. In these areas, children compared to adults showed increased activity associated with false belief reasoning in contrast to true belief reasoning. These results implicate modulation of the cortical network that underlies false belief reasoning during development and far beyond the time children successfully master false belief tasks. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Breaking the Rules: Do Infants Have a True Understanding of False Belief?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yott, Jessica; Poulin-Dubois, Diane

2012-01-01

It has been suggested that infants' performance on the false belief task can be explained by the use of behavioural rules. To test this hypothesis, 18-month-old infants were trained to learn the new rule that an object that disappeared in location A could be found in location B. Infants were then administered a false belief task based on the…

True or False: Do 5-Year-Olds Understand Belief?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Fabricius, William V.; Boyer, Ty W.; Weimer, Amy A.; Carroll, Kathleen

2010-01-01

In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds…

Apes perform like infants in false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Bugnyar, Thomas

2017-12-01

Although the extent to which some nonhuman animals understand mental states is currently under debate, attributing false beliefs has been considered to be beyond their limits. A recent study by Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, and Tomasello (Science, 354, 110-114, 2016) shows that great apes pass a false-belief task when they are tested with an anticipatory-looking paradigm developed for nonverbal human infants.

A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory.

PubMed

Asakura, Nobuhiko; Inui, Toshio

2016-01-01

Two apparently contrasting theories have been proposed to account for the development of children's theory of mind (ToM): theory-theory and simulation theory. We present a Bayesian framework that rationally integrates both theories for false belief reasoning. This framework exploits two internal models for predicting the belief states of others: one of self and one of others. These internal models are responsible for simulation-based and theory-based reasoning, respectively. The framework further takes into account empirical studies of a developmental ToM scale (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004): developmental progressions of various mental state understandings leading up to false belief understanding. By representing the internal models and their interactions as a causal Bayesian network, we formalize the model of children's false belief reasoning as probabilistic computations on the Bayesian network. This model probabilistically weighs and combines the two internal models and predicts children's false belief ability as a multiplicative effect of their early-developed abilities to understand the mental concepts of diverse beliefs and knowledge access. Specifically, the model predicts that children's proportion of correct responses on a false belief task can be closely approximated as the product of their proportions correct on the diverse belief and knowledge access tasks. To validate this prediction, we illustrate that our model provides good fits to a variety of ToM scale data for preschool children. We discuss the implications and extensions of our model for a deeper understanding of developmental progressions of children's ToM abilities.

The Roles of Explanation and Feedback in False Belief Understanding: A Microgenetic Analysis

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guajardo, Nicole R.; Petersen, Rachel; Marshall, Timothy R.

2013-01-01

The authors examined effects of feedback and explanation on false belief performance. Thirty-three children (42-54 months; 15 girls, 18 boys) were randomly assigned to four treatment conditions: explanation, feedback, feedback researcher explains, and feedback child explains. Children completed false belief tasks during pretraining, 8 training…

Are emotion and mind understanding differently linked to young children's social adjustment? Relationships between behavioral consequences of emotions, false belief, and SCBE.

PubMed

Deneault, Joane; Ricard, Marcelle

2013-01-01

According to empirical findings, emotional knowledge and false belief understanding seem to be differently linked to social adjustment. However, whereas false belief is assessed through the capacity to identify its behavioral consequences, emotion tasks usually rely on the comprehension of facial expressions and of the situational causes of emotions. The authors examined if the documented relationship between social adjustment and emotion knowledge in children extends to the understanding of behavioral consequences of emotions. Eighty French-speaking preschoolers undertook false belief and consequence-of-emotion tasks. Their social adjustment was measured by the Social Competence and Behavior Evaluation. Children's language ability, their parent's level of education, and the familial socioeconomic score were taken into account. Results showed that children's social adjustment was significantly predicted by their knowledge of emotion, but not by their understanding of false belief. The findings confirm the special status of emotion among mental states for social adaptation and specify which dimensions of adaptation to peers and adults are predicted by the child's emotion understanding. They also suggest that the distinction between mind and emotion understanding may be conceptual rather than methodological.

Implicit and Explicit False Belief Development in Preschool Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Grosse Wiesmann, Charlotte; Friederici, Angela D.; Singer, Tania; Steinbeis, Nikolaus

2017-01-01

The ability to represent the mental states of other agents is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM). A developmental breakthrough in ToM consists of understanding that others can have false beliefs about the world. Recently, infants younger than 2 years of age have been shown to pass novel implicit false belief tasks. However, the processes…

Parental mind-mindedness but not false belief understanding predicts Hong Kong children's lie-telling behavior in a temptation resistance task.

PubMed

Wang, Lamei; Zhu, Liqi; Wang, Zhenlin

2017-10-01

Children can tell lies before they understand the concept of false belief. This study investigated the relationship between parental mind-mindedness, defined as the propensity of parents to view their children as mental agents with independent thoughts and feelings, and the lie-telling behavior of Hong Kong children aged 3-6years. The results confirmed earlier findings indicating that Hong Kong children's understanding of false belief is delayed; nevertheless, the participants appeared to lie just as well as children from other cultures. The lie-telling behavior of Hong Kong children was predicted by parental mind-mindedness and children's age but was unrelated to children's false belief understanding. It is suggested that children of mind-minded parents are more likely to exercise autonomy in socially ambiguous situations. Future studies should focus on the roles of parenting and children's multifaceted autonomy when addressing children's adaptive lie telling. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renée; Song, Hyun-joo; Leslie, Alan M.

2010-01-01

Reports that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to others have all used a search paradigm in which an agent with a false belief about an object’s location searches for the object. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds would still demonstrate false-belief understanding when tested with a novel non-search paradigm. An experimenter shook an object, demonstrating that it rattled, and then asked an agent, “Can you do it?” In response to this prompt, the agent selected one of two test objects. Infants realized that the agent could be led through inference (Experiment 1) or memory (Experiment 2) to hold a false belief about which of the two test objects rattled. These results suggest that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about non-obvious properties to others, and can do so in a non-search paradigm. These and additional results (Experiment 3) help address several alternative interpretations of false-belief findings with infants. PMID:21047625

Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task

PubMed Central

Buttelmann, Frances; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans’ nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent’s actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species. PMID:28379987

Great apes distinguish true from false beliefs in an interactive helping task.

PubMed

Buttelmann, David; Buttelmann, Frances; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

Understanding the behavior of others in a wide variety of circumstances requires an understanding of their psychological states. Humans' nearest primate relatives, the great apes, understand many psychological states of others, for example, perceptions, goals, and desires. However, so far there is little evidence that they possess the key marker of advanced human social cognition: an understanding of false beliefs. Here we demonstrate that in a nonverbal (implicit) false-belief test which is passed by human 1-year-old infants, great apes as a group, including chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), bonobos (Pan paniscus), and orangutans (Pongo abelii), distinguish between true and false beliefs in their helping behavior. Great apes thus may possess at least some basic understanding that an agent's actions are based on her beliefs about reality. Hence, such understanding might not be the exclusive province of the human species.

A Bayesian Framework for False Belief Reasoning in Children: A Rational Integration of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory

PubMed Central

Asakura, Nobuhiko; Inui, Toshio

2016-01-01

Two apparently contrasting theories have been proposed to account for the development of children's theory of mind (ToM): theory-theory and simulation theory. We present a Bayesian framework that rationally integrates both theories for false belief reasoning. This framework exploits two internal models for predicting the belief states of others: one of self and one of others. These internal models are responsible for simulation-based and theory-based reasoning, respectively. The framework further takes into account empirical studies of a developmental ToM scale (e.g., Wellman and Liu, 2004): developmental progressions of various mental state understandings leading up to false belief understanding. By representing the internal models and their interactions as a causal Bayesian network, we formalize the model of children's false belief reasoning as probabilistic computations on the Bayesian network. This model probabilistically weighs and combines the two internal models and predicts children's false belief ability as a multiplicative effect of their early-developed abilities to understand the mental concepts of diverse beliefs and knowledge access. Specifically, the model predicts that children's proportion of correct responses on a false belief task can be closely approximated as the product of their proportions correct on the diverse belief and knowledge access tasks. To validate this prediction, we illustrate that our model provides good fits to a variety of ToM scale data for preschool children. We discuss the implications and extensions of our model for a deeper understanding of developmental progressions of children's ToM abilities. PMID:28082941

The Relation between Preschool Children's False-Belief Understanding and Domain-General Experimentation Skills

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Piekny, Jeanette; Grube, Dietmar; Maehler, Claudia

2013-01-01

The focus of the present study is on the developmental antecedents of domain-general experimentation skills. We hypothesized that false-belief understanding would predict the ability to distinguish a conclusive from an inconclusive experiment. We conducted a longitudinal study with two assessment points (t1 and t2) to investigate this hypothesis.…

Great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs.

PubMed

Krupenye, Christopher; Kano, Fumihiro; Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2016-10-07

Humans operate with a "theory of mind" with which they are able to understand that others' actions are driven not by reality but by beliefs about reality, even when those beliefs are false. Although great apes share with humans many social-cognitive skills, they have repeatedly failed experimental tests of such false-belief understanding. We use an anticipatory looking test (originally developed for human infants) to show that three species of great apes reliably look in anticipation of an agent acting on a location where he falsely believes an object to be, even though the apes themselves know that the object is no longer there. Our results suggest that great apes also operate, at least on an implicit level, with an understanding of false beliefs. Copyright © 2016, American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Three-Year-Olds Express Suspense when an Agent Approaches a Scene with a False Belief

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moll, Henrike; Kane, Sarah; McGowan, Luke

2016-01-01

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect-neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided…

Understanding the Mind or Predicting Signal-Dependent Action? Performance of Children with and without Autism on Analogues of the False-Belief Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bowler, Dermot M.; Briskman, Jackie; Gurvidi, Nicole; Fornells-Ambrojo, Miriam

2005-01-01

To evaluate the claim that correct performance on unexpected transfer false-belief tasks specifically involves mental-state understanding, two experiments were carried out with children with autism, intellectual disabilities, and typical development. In both experiments, children were given a standard unexpected transfer false-belief task and a…

The relationship between second-order false belief and display rules reasoning: the integration of cognitive and affective social understanding.

PubMed

Naito, Mika; Seki, Yoshimi

2009-01-01

To investigate the relation between cognitive and affective social understanding, Japanese 4- to 8-year-olds received tasks of first- and second-order false beliefs and prosocial and self-presentational display rules. From 6 to 8 years, children comprehended display rules, as well as second-order false belief, using social pressures justifications decreasingly and motivational justifications with embedded perspectives increasingly with age. Although not related to either type of display across ages, second-order tasks were associated with both types of display tasks only at 8 years when examined in each age group. Results suggest that children base their second-order theory of mind and display rules understanding on distinct reasoning until middle childhood, during which time the originally distinct aspects of social understanding are integrated.

A Lag between Understanding False Belief and Emotion Attribution in Young Children: Relationships with Linguistic Ability and Mothers' Mental-State Language

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

de Rosnay, Marc; Pons, Francisco; Harris, Paul L.; Morrell, Julian M. B.

2004-01-01

This study examines the contribution of children's linguistic ability and mothers' use of mental-state language to young children's understanding of false belief and their subsequent ability to make belief-based emotion attributions. In Experiment 1, children (N = 51) were given three belief-based emotion-attribution tasks. A standard task in…

Understanding of Speaker Certainty and False-Belief Reasoning: A Comparison of Japanese and German Preschoolers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Matsui, Tomoko; Rakoczy, Hannes; Miura, Yui; Tomasello, Michael

2009-01-01

It has been repeatedly shown that when asked to identify a protagonist's false belief on the basis of his false statement, English-speaking 3-year-olds dismiss the statement and fail to attribute to him a false belief. In the present studies, we tested 3-year-old Japanese children in a similar task, using false statements accompanied by…

Training preschoolers on first-order false belief understanding: transfer on advanced ToM skills and metamemory.

PubMed

Lecce, Serena; Bianco, Federica; Demicheli, Patrizia; Cavallini, Elena

2014-01-01

This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty-two 4- to 5-year-old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first-order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for age, parents' education, verbal ability, inhibition, and ToM. Results showed that after the intervention children in the ToM group improved in their first-order false belief understanding significantly more than children in the control condition. Crucially, the positive effect of the ToM intervention was stable over 2 months and generalized to more complex ToM tasks and metamemory. © 2014 The Authors. Child Development © 2014 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

Theory of Mind Development in Deaf Children: A Nonverbal Test of False-Belief Understanding.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Figueras-Costa, Berta; Harris, Paul

2001-01-01

Twenty-one children (ages 4-11) prelingually deaf and orally trained, were tested with verbal and nonverbal versions of a false-belief task. Children did not perform above chance in the verbal task. The nonverbal task significantly facilitated performance, however, only older children performed above change in the nonverbal false-belief tests.…

The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Keceli Kaysili, Bahar; Acarlar, Funda

2011-01-01

This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and to determine if the different type of false belief tasks affects performance on false belief. The survey research design was used. False belief understanding was measured in 72 children between the ages of 3.00 to 5.11 year old. The…

Young Children's Understanding of Belief Constraints on Intention.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Moses, Louis J.

1993-01-01

One important characteristic of rational action is that intentions should be consistent with beliefs. Two studies examined whether three year olds understand belief constraints on intention. In both studies, subjects' understanding of unfulfilled intentions was excellent and significantly better than their understanding of false beliefs, but…

Further Evidence for Nonspecificity of Theory of Mind in Preschoolers: Training and Transferability in the Understanding of False Beliefs and False Signs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Iao, Lai-Sang; Leekam, Susan; Perner, Josef; McConachie, Helen

2011-01-01

In a training study, the authors addressed whether or not preschoolers' difficulty with false belief is due to a domain-specific problem with mental states. Following Slaughter's (1998) design, 57 children who failed a false-belief (FB) pretest received two sessions of training on either an FB, false sign (FS), or control task. All children were…

Sociolinguistic awareness and false belief in young Cantonese learners of English.

PubMed

Cheung, Him; Mak, Wing Yan; Luo, Xueying; Xiao, Wen

2010-10-01

In this study, we examined whether sociolinguistic awareness and false belief were uniquely related in 3- and 4-year-old Cantonese-speaking children learning English as a second language. The English-use background of these children varied so that they possessed sociolinguistic awareness to different degrees. Results indicated that sociolinguistic awareness predicted false belief uniquely after controlling for age, nonverbal intelligence, English vocabulary, and family income for both the second language learners and the more balanced bilinguals. The group difference in false belief was adequately explained by the corresponding difference in sociolinguistic awareness over and above the other variables. Such findings provide evidence for the claim that false belief understanding is critically related to sociolinguistic awareness, which in turn is influenced by how a second language is learned. Copyright 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Language and Theory of Mind: Meta-Analysis of the Relation between Language Ability and False-Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Milligan, Karen; Astington, Janet Wilde; Dack, Lisa Ain

2007-01-01

Numerous studies show that children's language ability is related to false-belief understanding. However, there is considerable variation in the size of the correlation reported. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), this meta-analysis determines the strength of the relation in children under age 7 and examines moderators that may account for the…

Theory of mind development in Chinese children: a meta-analysis of false-belief understanding across cultures and languages.

PubMed

Liu, David; Wellman, Henry M; Tardif, Twila; Sabbagh, Mark A

2008-03-01

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of children's false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-children's false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind.

False Belief Development in Children Who Are Hard of Hearing Compared with Peers with Normal Hearing

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Walker, Elizabeth A.; Ambrose, Sophie E.; Oleson, Jacob; Moeller, Mary Pat

2017-01-01

Purpose: This study investigates false belief (FB) understanding in children who are hard of hearing (CHH) compared with children with normal hearing (CNH) at ages 5 and 6 years and at 2nd grade. Research with this population has theoretical significance, given that the early auditory-linguistic experiences of CHH are less restricted compared with…

Neural correlates of true and false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Sommer, Monika; Döhnel, Katrin; Sodian, Beate; Meinhardt, Jörg; Thoermer, Claudia; Hajak, Göran

2007-04-15

Belief reasoning plays a central role in making inferences about other people's mental states. The ability to reason about false beliefs is considered as a critical test for having a Theory of Mind (ToM). There is some controversy as to whether it is the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) or the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) that is centrally involved in belief reasoning. According to developmental studies of belief reasoning we conducted an fMRI experiment with a carefully controlled paradigm (Sally Anne scenario). We compared false belief reasoning with true belief reasoning in parallel tasks, using a series of cartoon stories depicting transfer of an object unbeknownst to the protagonist (false belief) or with the protagonist witnessing (true belief). The false belief versus true belief contrast revealed activation of the dorsal part of the anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), the right lateral rostral prefrontal cortex and the right TPJ associated with false belief. We suggest that the activation of the dACC and the lateral PFC might be associated with action monitoring and stimulus-independent cognitive processing whereas the activation of the TPJ might be related to the computation of mental representations that create perspective differences, such as a person's false belief that contrasts with reality and therefore might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally we found common patterns of activation for true and false belief reasoning, including inferior parietal and precuneus activation, but we found no activation of the MPFC or the TPJ in general belief reasoning.

False-belief understanding and social preference over the first 2 years of school: a longitudinal study.

PubMed

Fink, Elian; Begeer, Sander; Hunt, Caroline; de Rosnay, Marc

2014-01-01

The role of false belief in establishing children's social relationships during the transition to school was examined and compared to other social cognitive constructs. One hundred and fourteen 5-year-olds were recruited during their 1st year of school (Time 1); 106 children were retained 1 year later. False belief, emotion expression recognition, empathy, verbal ability, and peer-rated social preference were measured at both times. False belief at Time 1 had a direct influence on concurrent social preference, over and above the influence of emotion expression recognition and empathy. False belief made no independent contribution to later social preference accounting for stability in social preference. The role of social cognitive development is discussed with respect to how children establish and maintain their position in a peer group. © 2014 The Authors. Child Development © 2014 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.

Justifying all the fuss about false belief.

PubMed

Russell, James

2005-07-01

The classic study by Wimmer and Perner showed that children below the age of about 4 years of age fail to appreciate others' false beliefs. This opened the floodgates to the theory-of-mind research programme. Recently, a study by Riggs and Simpson has called the central challenge of false belief into question, reporting similar difficulties with true belief. I would argue, however, that not only should the acquisition of false belief remain a central concern but that we should think harder about it and its earlier manifestations.

False Belief Understanding in Language Impaired and Typically Developing Spanish-Speaking Preschoolers from Lower Income Backgrounds

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Guiberson, Mark; Rodriguez, Barbara L.

2013-01-01

Research Findings: The present study describes developmental trends in false belief (in other and self) in 46 Mexican-dialect Spanish-speaking children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds with and without language impairment (LI). Results indicate that typically developing children's performance on false belief tasks improves with age, with very…

Learning Words from Speakers with False Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Papafragou, Anna; Fairchild, Sarah; Cohen, Matthew L.; Friedberg, Carlyn

2017-01-01

During communication, hearers try to infer the speaker's intentions to be able to understand what the speaker means. Nevertheless, whether (and how early) preschoolers track their interlocutors' mental states is still a matter of debate. Furthermore, there is disagreement about how children's ability to consult a speaker's belief in communicative…

The missing explanation of the false-belief advantage in bilingual children: a longitudinal study.

PubMed

Diaz, Vanessa; Farrar, M Jeffrey

2018-07-01

Bilingual preschoolers often perform better than monolingual children on false-belief understanding. It has been hypothesized that this is due to their enhanced executive function skills, although this relationship has rarely been tested or supported. The current longitudinal study tested whether metalinguistic awareness was responsible for this advantage. Further, we examined the contributions of both executive functioning and language ability to false-belief understanding by including multiple measures of both. Seventy-eight children (n = 40 Spanish-English bilingual; age M = 49.29, SD = 7.38 and, n = 38 English monolingual; age M = 47.75, SD = 6.86) were tested. A year later the children were tested again (n = 22 bilingual, n = 25 monolingual). The results indicated that language and executive function (inhibitory control) at time 1 were related to false belief in monolinguals at time 2. In contrast, bilinguals' metalinguistic performance at time 1 was the sole predictor of false belief at time 2. The different linguistic and cognitive profiles of monolinguals and bilinguals may create different pathways for their development of false-belief understanding. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/vILn2gKjFxw. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

False-Belief Understanding in 2.5-Year-Olds: Evidence from Two Novel Verbal Spontaneous-Response Tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Rose M.; He, Zijing; Baillargeon, Renee; Cummins, Denise

2012-01-01

Recent research indicates that toddlers and infants succeed at various "non-verbal" spontaneous-response false-belief tasks; here we asked whether toddlers would also succeed at verbal spontaneous-response false-belief tasks that imposed significant linguistic demands. We tested 2.5-year-olds using two novel tasks: a "preferential-looking" task in…

Overrated adults: 4-year-olds' false belief understanding is influenced by the believer's age.

PubMed

Seehagen, Sabine; Dreier, Larissa; Zmyj, Norbert

2018-03-01

Children perceive adults as more knowledgeable than peers. We tested whether this general preconception influences preschoolers' performance in a false-belief task. Children (4- and 5-year-olds; N = 146) watched videos showing a peer protagonist or an adult protagonist experiencing events that should lead the protagonist to hold a false belief. Then children were asked to infer the protagonist's perception of the situation. Age of the protagonist influenced 4-year-olds' judgments but not 5-year-olds' judgments. Specifically, 4-year-olds' performance was at chance when presented with a peer protagonist. Their performance dropped further when presented with an adult protagonist and was significantly below chance. Children aged around 5 years performed above chance level regardless of whether they were presented with an adult or peer protagonist. This suggests that in the younger age group, children's tendency to regard adults as experts in general knowledge undermined their ability to accurately judge the possibility that an adult could hold a false belief. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

False memories, but not false beliefs, affect implicit attitudes for food preferences.

PubMed

Howe, David; Anderson, Rachel J; Dewhurst, Stephen A

2017-09-01

Previous studies have found that false memories and false beliefs of childhood experiences can have attitudinal consequences. Previous studies have, however, focused exclusively on explicit attitude measures without exploring whether implicit attitudes are similarly affected. Using a false feedback/imagination inflation paradigm, false memories and beliefs of enjoying a certain food as a child were elicited in participants, and their effects were assessed using both explicit attitude measures (self-report questionnaires) and implicit measures (a Single-Target Implicit Association Test). Positive changes in explicit attitudes were observed both in participants with false memories and participants with false beliefs. In contrast, only participants with false memories exhibited more positive implicit attitudes. The findings are discussed in terms of theories of explicit and implicit attitudes. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Counterfactual Conditionals and False Belief: A Developmental Dissociation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Perner, Josef; Sprung, Manuel; Steinkogler, Bettina

2004-01-01

The objective of this study was to explore factors that affect the difficulty of counterfactual reasoning in 3-5-year-old children and to shed light on the reason why counterfactual reasoning relates to understanding false belief [Cognitive Development, 13 (1998) 73-90]. Using travel scenarios, the difference between simple scenarios, in which…

Implicit false-belief processing in the human brain.

PubMed

Schneider, Dana; Slaughter, Virginia P; Becker, Stefanie I; Dux, Paul E

2014-11-01

Eye-movement patterns in 'Sally-Anne' tasks reflect humans' ability to implicitly process the mental states of others, particularly false-beliefs - a key theory of mind (ToM) operation. It has recently been proposed that an efficient ToM system, which operates in the absence of awareness (implicit ToM, iToM), subserves the analysis of belief-like states. This contrasts to consciously available belief processing, performed by the explicit ToM system (eToM). The frontal, temporal and parietal cortices are engaged when humans explicitly 'mentalize' about others' beliefs. However, the neural underpinnings of implicit false-belief processing and the extent to which they draw on networks involved in explicit general-belief processing are unknown. Here, participants watched 'Sally-Anne' movies while fMRI and eye-tracking measures were acquired simultaneously. Participants displayed eye-movements consistent with implicit false-belief processing. After independently localizing the brain areas involved in explicit general-belief processing, only the left anterior superior temporal sulcus and precuneus revealed greater blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity for false- relative to true-belief trials in our iToM paradigm. No such difference was found for the right temporal-parietal junction despite significant activity in this area. These findings fractionate brain regions that are associated with explicit general ToM reasoning and false-belief processing in the absence of awareness. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

False Belief vs. False Photographs: A Test of Theory of Mind or Working Memory?

PubMed

Callejas, Alicia; Shulman, Gordon L; Corbetta, Maurizio

2011-01-01

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to reason about other people's thoughts and beliefs, has been traditionally studied in behavioral and neuroimaging experiments by comparing performance in "false belief" and "false photograph" (control) stories. However, some evidence suggests that these stories are not matched in difficulty, complicating the interpretation of results. Here, we more fully evaluated the relative difficulty of comprehending these stories and drawing inferences from them. Subjects read false belief and false photograph stories followed by comprehension questions that probed true ("reality" questions) or false beliefs ("representation" questions) appropriate to the stories. Stories and comprehension questions were read and answered, respectively, more slowly in the false photograph than false belief conditions, indicating their greater difficulty. Interestingly, accuracy on representation questions for false photograph stories was significantly lower than for all other conditions and correlated positively with participants' working memory span scores. These results suggest that drawing representational inferences from false photo stories is particularly difficult and places heavy demands on working memory. Extensive naturalistic practice with ToM reasoning may enable a more flexible and efficient mental representation of false belief stories, resulting in lower memory load requirements. An important implication of these results is that the differential modulation of right temporal-parietal junction (RTPJ) during ToM and "false photo" control conditions may reflect the documented negative correlation of RTPJ activity with working memory load rather than a specialized involvement in ToM processes.

False belief in infancy: a fresh look.

PubMed

Heyes, Cecilia

2014-09-01

Can infants appreciate that others have false beliefs? Do they have a theory of mind? In this article I provide a detailed review of more than 20 experiments that have addressed these questions, and offered an affirmative answer, using nonverbal 'violation of expectation' and 'anticipatory looking' procedures. Although many of these experiments are both elegant and ingenious, I argue that their results can be explained by the operation of domain-general processes and in terms of 'low-level novelty'. This hypothesis suggests that the infants' looking behaviour is a function of the degree to which the observed (perceptual novelty) and remembered or expected (imaginal novelty) low-level properties of the test stimuli - their colours, shapes and movements - are novel with respect to events encoded by the infants earlier in the experiment. If the low-level novelty hypothesis is correct, research on false belief in infancy currently falls short of demonstrating that infants have even an implicit theory of mind. However, I suggest that the use of two experimental strategies - inanimate control procedures, and self-informed belief induction - could be used in combination with existing methods to bring us much closer to understanding the evolutionary and developmental origins of theory of mind. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

An fMRI study on the comparison of different types of false belief reasoning: False belief-based emotion and behavior attribution.

PubMed

Döhnel, Katrin; Schuwerk, Tobias; Sodian, Beate; Hajak, Göran; Rupprecht, Rainer; Sommer, Monika

2017-12-01

False belief (FB) reasoning is a key Theory of Mind (ToM) competence. By 4 years of age, children understand that a person's behavior can be based on a FB about reality. Children cannot understand that a person's emotion can also be based on a FB before the age of six. In order to generate hypothesis on basic processes distinguishing these two types of belief reasoning, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging study in adults directly compares functional activity associated with these two FB tasks. Both tasks were associated with activity in the ToM network including the medial prefrontal cortex and the left temporo-parietal junction. Differential activity was observed in the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for FB-based emotion relative to behavior attribution. Contrary to FB behavior attribution, FB-based emotion attribution requires the processing of two different mental states: a belief and an emotion and their relation to each other. The activity pattern may reflect the differential demands on cognitive processes associated with the two different belief-based attribution processes. These results shed new light on the still ongoing debate about the nature of the developmental lag between the two FB tasks.

Absence of spontaneous action anticipation by false belief attribution in children with autism spectrum disorder.

PubMed

Senju, Atsushi; Southgate, Victoria; Miura, Yui; Matsui, Tomoko; Hasegawa, Toshikazu; Tojo, Yoshikuni; Osanai, Hiroo; Csibra, Gergely

2010-05-01

Recently, a series of studies demonstrated false belief understanding in young children through completely nonverbal measures. These studies have revealed that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false belief test, can anticipate others' actions based on their attributed false beliefs. The current study examined whether children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), who are known to have difficulties in the verbal false belief test, may also show such action anticipation in a nonverbal false belief test. We presented video stimuli of an actor watching an object being hidden in a box. The object was then displaced while the actor was looking away. We recorded children's eye movements and coded whether they spontaneously anticipated the actor's subsequent behavior, which could only have been predicted if they had attributed a false belief to her. Although typically developing children correctly anticipated the action, children with ASD failed to show such action anticipation. The results suggest that children with ASD have an impairment in false belief attribution, which is independent of their verbal ability.

False belief understanding and "cool" inhibitory control in 3-and 4-years-old Italian children.

PubMed

Bellagamba, Francesca; Addessi, Elsa; Focaroli, Valentina; Pecora, Giulia; Maggiorelli, Valentina; Pace, Beatrice; Paglieri, Fabio

2015-01-01

During preschool years, major developments occur in both executive function and theory of mind (ToM), and several studies have demonstrated a correlation between these processes. Research on the development of inhibitory control (IC) has distinguished between more cognitive, "cool" aspects of self-control, measured by conflict tasks, that require inhibiting an habitual response to generate an arbitrary one, and "hot," affective aspects, such as affective decision making, measured by delay tasks, that require inhibition of a prepotent response. The aim of this study was to investigate the relations between 3- and 4-year-olds' performance on a task measuring false belief understanding, the most widely used index of ToM in preschoolers, and three tasks measuring cognitive versus affective aspects of IC. To this end, we tested 101 Italian preschool children in four tasks: (a) the Unexpected Content False Belief task, (b) the Conflict task (a simplified version of the Day-Night Stroop task), (c) the Delay task, and (d) the Delay Choice task. Children's receptive vocabulary was assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test. Children's performance in the False Belief task was significantly related only to performance in the Conflict task, controlling for vocabulary and age. Importantly, children's performance in the Conflict task did not significantly correlate with their performance in the Delay task or in the Delay Choice task, suggesting that these tasks measure different components of IC. The dissociation between the Conflict and the Delay tasks may indicate that monitoring and regulating a cool process (as flexible categorization) may involve different abilities than monitoring and regulating a hot process (not touching an available and highly attractive stimulus or choosing between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed one). Moreover, our findings support the view that "cool" aspects of IC and ToM are interrelated, extending to an Italian sample of

Testing the validity of a continuous false belief task in 3- to 7-year-old children.

PubMed

Mahy, Caitlin E V; Bernstein, Daniel M; Gerrard, Lindsey D; Atance, Cristina M

2017-08-01

In two studies, we examined young children's performance on the paper-and-pencil version of the Sandbox task, a continuous measure of false belief, and its relations with other false belief and inhibition tasks. In Study 1, 96 children aged 3 to 7years completed three false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, and Appearance/Reality) and two inhibition tasks (Head-Shoulders-Knees-Toes and Grass/Snow). Results revealed that false belief bias-a measure of egocentrism-on the Sandbox task correlated with age but not with the Unexpected Contents or Appearance/Reality task or with measures of inhibition after controlling for age. In Study 2, 90 3- to 7-year-olds completed five false belief tasks (Sandbox, Unexpected Contents, Appearance/Reality, Change of Location, and a second-order false belief task), two inhibition tasks (Simon Says and Grass/Snow), and a receptive vocabulary task (Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test). Results showed that false belief bias on the Sandbox task correlated negatively with age and with the Change of Location task but not with the other false belief or inhibition tasks after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. The Sandbox task shows promise as an age-sensitive measure of false belief performance during early childhood and shows convergent and discriminant validity. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Visible Social Interactions Do Not Support the Development of False Belief Understanding in the Absence of Linguistic Input: Evidence from Deaf Adult Homesigners.

PubMed

Gagne, Deanna L; Coppola, Marie

2017-01-01

Congenitally deaf individuals exhibit enhanced visuospatial abilities relative to normally hearing individuals. An early example is the increased sensitivity of deaf signers to stimuli in the visual periphery (Neville and Lawson, 1987a). While these enhancements are robust and extend across a number of visual and spatial skills, they seem not to extend to other domains which could potentially build on these enhancements. For example, congenitally deaf children, in the absence of adequate language exposure and acquisition, do not develop typical social cognition skills as measured by traditional Theory of Mind tasks. These delays/deficits occur despite their presumed lifetime use of visuo-perceptual abilities to infer the intentions and behaviors of others (e.g., Pyers and Senghas, 2009; O'Reilly et al., 2014). In a series of studies, we explore the limits on the plasticity of visually based socio-cognitive abilities, from perspective taking to Theory of Mind/False Belief, in rarely studied individuals: deaf adults who have not acquired a conventional language (Homesigners). We compared Homesigners' performance to that of two other understudied groups in the same culture: Deaf signers of an emerging language (Cohort 1 of Nicaraguan Sign Language), and hearing speakers of Spanish with minimal schooling. We found that homesigners performed equivalently to both comparison groups with respect to several visual socio-cognitive abilities: Perspective Taking (Levels 1 and 2), adapted from Masangkay et al. (1974), and the False Photograph task, adapted from Leslie and Thaiss (1992). However, a lifetime of visuo-perceptual experiences (observing the behavior and interactions of others) did not support success on False Belief tasks, even when linguistic demands were minimized. Participants in the comparison groups outperformed the Homesigners, but did not universally pass the False Belief tasks. Our results suggest that while some of the social development achievements of

Visible Social Interactions Do Not Support the Development of False Belief Understanding in the Absence of Linguistic Input: Evidence from Deaf Adult Homesigners

PubMed Central

Gagne, Deanna L.; Coppola, Marie

2017-01-01

Congenitally deaf individuals exhibit enhanced visuospatial abilities relative to normally hearing individuals. An early example is the increased sensitivity of deaf signers to stimuli in the visual periphery (Neville and Lawson, 1987a). While these enhancements are robust and extend across a number of visual and spatial skills, they seem not to extend to other domains which could potentially build on these enhancements. For example, congenitally deaf children, in the absence of adequate language exposure and acquisition, do not develop typical social cognition skills as measured by traditional Theory of Mind tasks. These delays/deficits occur despite their presumed lifetime use of visuo-perceptual abilities to infer the intentions and behaviors of others (e.g., Pyers and Senghas, 2009; O’Reilly et al., 2014). In a series of studies, we explore the limits on the plasticity of visually based socio-cognitive abilities, from perspective taking to Theory of Mind/False Belief, in rarely studied individuals: deaf adults who have not acquired a conventional language (Homesigners). We compared Homesigners’ performance to that of two other understudied groups in the same culture: Deaf signers of an emerging language (Cohort 1 of Nicaraguan Sign Language), and hearing speakers of Spanish with minimal schooling. We found that homesigners performed equivalently to both comparison groups with respect to several visual socio-cognitive abilities: Perspective Taking (Levels 1 and 2), adapted from Masangkay et al. (1974), and the False Photograph task, adapted from Leslie and Thaiss (1992). However, a lifetime of visuo-perceptual experiences (observing the behavior and interactions of others) did not support success on False Belief tasks, even when linguistic demands were minimized. Participants in the comparison groups outperformed the Homesigners, but did not universally pass the False Belief tasks. Our results suggest that while some of the social development achievements of

Siblings, Language, and False Belief in Low-Income Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tompkins, Virginia; Farrar, M. Jeffrey; Guo, Ying

2013-01-01

The authors examined the relationship between number of siblings and false belief understanding (FBU) in 94 low-income 4-5-year-olds. Previous research with middle-income children has shown a positive association between number of siblings and FBU. However, it is unclear whether having multiple siblings in low-income families is related to better…

Pluto behaving badly: false beliefs and their consequences.

PubMed

Berkowitz, Shari R; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K; Garry, Maryanne; Loftus, Elizabeth F

2008-01-01

We exposed college students to suggestive materials in order to lead them to believe that, as children, they had a negative experience at Disneyland involving the Pluto character. A sizable minority of subjects developed a false belief or memory that Pluto had uncomfortably licked their ear. Suggestions about a positive experience with Pluto led to even greater acceptance of a lovable ear-licking episode. False beliefs and memories had repercussions; those seduced by the bad suggestions were not willing to pay as much for a Pluto souvenir. These findings are among the first to demonstrate that false beliefs can have repercussions for people, meaning that they can influence their later thoughts, beliefs, and behaviors.

False belief attribution in children with Williams syndrome: the answer is in the emotion.

PubMed

Campos, R; Martínez-Castilla, P; Sotillo, M

2017-11-01

Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show difficulties in attributing false beliefs, whereas they are better at attributing emotions. This study examines whether being asked about the emotion linked to a false belief, instead of explicitly about the belief, facilitates performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks. Thirty children with WS and 90 typically developing children, who were individually matched on mental age (50-112 months), were administered six explicit (i.e. questions on belief) and six implicit (i.e. questions on emotion) trials of false belief tasks. Theory of mind competences were related to cognitive development. Children with WS performed comparably to typically developing children on the emotion questions. Correct answers to questions on emotion reveal an implicit understanding of false belief. The Representational redescription process could be impaired in the domain of ToM in this population. This finding has relevant implications for the design of supports aiming to optimise the development of ToM competences in individuals with WS. © 2017 MENCAP and International Association of the Scientific Study of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Early conversational environment enables spontaneous belief attribution in deaf children.

PubMed

Meristo, Marek; Strid, Karin; Hjelmquist, Erland

2016-12-01

Previous research suggests that deaf children who grow up with hearing parents display considerable difficulties in understanding mental states of others, up to their teenage years when explicitly asked in a verbal test situation (Meristo et al., 2007). On the other hand, typically developing pre-verbal infants display evidence of spontaneous false belief attribution when tested in looking-time tasks, although verbal tests are typically not passed before the age of 4years (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The purpose of the present study was to examine whether deaf children of hearing parents are able to demonstrate spontaneous belief attribution in a non-verbal eye-tracking task. Thirty 4- to 8-year-old, deaf and hearing children, completed a non-verbal spontaneous-response false-belief task and a verbal elicited-response false-belief task. The deaf children were either children with cochlear implants or children with hearing aids. Comparative analyses were also carried out with a previous sample of deaf and hearing 2-year-olds (reported in Meristo, Morgan, et al., 2012). We found that in the non-verbal spontaneous-response task typically hearing children, but not deaf children, were able to predict that a person with a false belief about an object's location will search erroneously for the object. However, hearing children and deaf children with implants, but not deaf children with hearing aids, passed the verbal elicited-response task. Language development was significantly correlated with both types of false-belief tasks for the whole sample. Our findings strengthen the hypothesis that the emergence of the ability to recognize others' beliefs needs to be supported initially by very early conversational input in dialogues with caregivers. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

False belief understanding and “cool” inhibitory control in 3-and 4-years-old Italian children

PubMed Central

Bellagamba, Francesca; Addessi, Elsa; Focaroli, Valentina; Pecora, Giulia; Maggiorelli, Valentina; Pace, Beatrice; Paglieri, Fabio

2015-01-01

During preschool years, major developments occur in both executive function and theory of mind (ToM), and several studies have demonstrated a correlation between these processes. Research on the development of inhibitory control (IC) has distinguished between more cognitive, “cool” aspects of self-control, measured by conflict tasks, that require inhibiting an habitual response to generate an arbitrary one, and “hot,” affective aspects, such as affective decision making, measured by delay tasks, that require inhibition of a prepotent response. The aim of this study was to investigate the relations between 3- and 4-year-olds’ performance on a task measuring false belief understanding, the most widely used index of ToM in preschoolers, and three tasks measuring cognitive versus affective aspects of IC. To this end, we tested 101 Italian preschool children in four tasks: (a) the Unexpected Content False Belief task, (b) the Conflict task (a simplified version of the Day–Night Stroop task), (c) the Delay task, and (d) the Delay Choice task. Children’s receptive vocabulary was assessed by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary test. Children’s performance in the False Belief task was significantly related only to performance in the Conflict task, controlling for vocabulary and age. Importantly, children’s performance in the Conflict task did not significantly correlate with their performance in the Delay task or in the Delay Choice task, suggesting that these tasks measure different components of IC. The dissociation between the Conflict and the Delay tasks may indicate that monitoring and regulating a cool process (as flexible categorization) may involve different abilities than monitoring and regulating a hot process (not touching an available and highly attractive stimulus or choosing between a smaller immediate option and a larger delayed one). Moreover, our findings support the view that “cool” aspects of IC and ToM are interrelated, extending to an

The "I Knew It All Along" Phenomenon: Second-Order False Belief Understanding and the Curse of Knowledge in Primary School Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Massaro, Davide; Castelli, Ilaria; Sanvito, Laura; Marchetti, Antonella

2014-01-01

This study investigated two different expressions of the so-called curse of knowledge in primary school children: hindsight bias and outcome bias. Further, it explored the possible predictive function of false belief understanding in reducing these biases. Ninety-one children aged 7, 9, and 11 years (middle- to upper-middle class) were…

A Nonverbal False Belief Task: The Performance of Children and Great Apes.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

1999-01-01

Compared performance of preschool children, chimpanzees, and orangutans on nonverbal task of false-belief understanding and tested children's performance on a verbal version of the same task. Found that children's performance on verbal and nonverbal tasks were highly correlated, and no chimp or orangutan succeeded in the nonverbal false-belief…

False belief and verb non-factivity: a common neural basis?

PubMed

Cheung, Him; Chen, Lan; Szeto, Ching-Yee; Feng, Gangyi; Lu, Guangming; Zhang, Zhiqiang; Zhu, Zude; Wang, Suiping

2012-03-01

Using fMRI, the present study compares the brain activation underlying false belief thinking induced by pictorial, nonverbal material to that instigated by strong non-factive verbs in a sample of adult Chinese speakers. These verbs obligatorily negate their complements which describe the mind content of the sentence agent, and thus may activate part of the false belief network. Some previous studies have shown a behavioral correlation between verb non-factivity/false complementation and conventional false belief but corresponding neural evidence is lacking. Our results showed that the non-factive grammar and false belief commonly implicated the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), which had been shown by past studies to play a role in general mentalizing. Regions that were unique to nonverbal false belief were the left TPJ and right middle frontal gyrus (MFG), whereas the unique regions for the non-factive grammar were the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and right superior temporal gyrus (STG). Hence, conventional nonverbal false belief and verb non-factivity have both shared and unique neural representations. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age.

PubMed

Bernstein, Daniel M; Coolin, Alisha; Fischer, Ashley L; Thornton, Wendy Loken; Sommerville, Jessica A

2017-01-01

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person's beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan.

Counterfactual Thinking and False Belief: The Role of Executive Function

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Drayton, Stefane; Turley-Ames, Kandi J.; Guajardo, Nicole R.

2011-01-01

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames ("Cognitive Development, 19" (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship…

Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Zhang, Ting; Zhang, Qin; Li, Yiyuan; Long, Changquan; Li, Hong

2013-11-01

For a long time, a controversy has been proposed that whether the process of theory of mind is a result of domain-specific or domain-general changes (Wellman in The handbook of childhood cognitive development. Blackwell Publication, New Jersey, 2011). This event-related potential study explored the neural time course of domain-general and domain-specific components in belief reasoning. Fourteen participants completed location transfer false belief (FB), true belief (TB), false sign (FS) and true sign (TS) tasks, in which two pictures told a story related to a dog that ran from a green into a red box. In the TB and FB tasks, a boy saw or did not see the transfer of the dog, respectively. In the FS and TS tasks, an arrow that pointed to the green box either altered its direction to the red box or did not alter following the transfer of the dog. Participants then inferred where the boy thought of, or the arrow indicated the location of the dog. FB and TB reasoning elicited lower N2 amplitudes than FS and TS reasoning, which is associated with domain-general components, the detection, and classification. The late slow wave (LSW) for FB was more positive at frontal, central, and parietal sites than FS because of the domain-specific component involved in FB reasoning. However, the LSW was less positive for TB than for FB but did not differ from the TS condition, which implies that mental representation might not be involved in TB reasoning.

Assessing False-Belief Understanding in Children with Autism Using a Computer Application: A Pilot Study.

PubMed

Carlsson, Emilia; Miniscalco, Carmela; Gillberg, Christopher; Åsberg Johnels, Jakob

2018-03-26

We have developed a False-Belief (FB) understanding task for use on a computer tablet, trying to assess FB understanding in a less social way. It is based on classical FB protocols, and additionally includes a manipulation of language in an attempt to explore the facilitating effect of linguistic support during FB processing. Specifically, the FB task was presented in three auditory conditions: narrative, silent, and interference. The task was assumed to shed new light on the FB difficulties often observed in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Sixty-eight children with ASD (M = 7.5 years) and an age matched comparison group with 98 typically developing (TD) children were assessed with the FB task. The children with ASD did not perform above chance level in any condition, and significant differences in success rates were found between the groups in two conditions (silent and narrative), with TD children performing better. We discuss implications, limitations, and further developments.

Black Preschoolers' Social Cognition: Storytelling and False Belief.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Curenton, Stephanie M.; Wilson, Melvin N.; Lillard, Angeline S.

Noting that the lower performance of low-income children on false belief tasks in comparison to that of middle-income children has not been adequately explained, this study examined the possibility that black children's experiences and talents with storytelling may facilitate their performance on false belief tasks when narrative questions are…

False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age

PubMed Central

Coolin, Alisha; Fischer, Ashley L.; Thornton, Wendy Loken; Sommerville, Jessica A.

2017-01-01

False-belief reasoning, defined as the ability to reason about another person’s beliefs and appreciate that beliefs can differ from reality, is an important aspect of perspective taking. We tested 266 individuals, at various ages ranging from 3 to 92 years, on a continuous measure of false-belief reasoning (the Sandbox task). All age groups had difficulty suppressing their own knowledge when estimating what a naïve person knew. After controlling for task-specific memory, our results showed similar false-belief reasoning abilities across the preschool years and from older childhood to younger adulthood, followed by a small reduction in this ability from younger to older adulthood. These results highlight the relative similarity in false-belief reasoning abilities at different developmental periods across the lifespan. PMID:28957366

Effects of Labeling on Preschoolers' Explicit False Belief Performance: Outcomes of Cognitive Flexibility or Inhibitory Control?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Low, Jason; Simpson, Samantha

2012-01-01

Executive function mechanisms underpinning language-related effects on theory of mind understanding were examined in a sample of 165 preschoolers. Verbal labels were manipulated to identify relevant perspectives on an explicit false belief task. In Experiment 1 with 4-year-olds (N = 74), false belief reasoning was superior in the fully and…

Language and False-Belief Task Performance in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Farrar, M. Jeffrey; Seung, Hye Kyeung; Lee, Hyeonjin

2017-01-01

Purpose: Language is related to false-belief (FB) understanding in both typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The current study examined the role of complementation and general language in FB understanding. Of interest was whether language plays similar or different roles in the groups' FB performance.…

Metacognitive development of deaf children: lessons from the appearance-reality and false belief tasks.

PubMed

Courtin, Cyril; Melot, Anne-Marie

2005-01-01

'Theory of mind' development is now an important research field in deaf studies. Past research with the classic false belief task has consistently reported a delay in theory of mind development in deaf children born of hearing parents, while performance of second-generation deaf children is more problematic with some contradictory results. The present paper is aimed at testing the metacognitive abilities of deaf children on two tasks: the appearance-reality paradigm designed by Flavell, Flavell and Green (1983) and the classic false belief inference task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986). Twenty-eight second-generation deaf children, 60 deaf children of hearing parents and 36 hearing children, aged 5 to 7, were tested and compared on three appearance-reality and three false belief items. Results show that early exposure to language, be it signed or oral, facilitates performance on the two theory of mind tasks. In addition, native signers equal hearing children in the appearance-reality task while surpassing them on the false belief one. The differences of performance patterns in the two tasks are discussed in terms of linguistic and metarepresentational development.

A Constructivist Connectionist Model of Transitions on False-Belief Tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Berthiaume, Vincent G.; Shultz, Thomas R.; Onishi, Kristine H.

2013-01-01

How do children come to understand that others have mental representations, e.g., of an object's location? Preschoolers go through two transitions on verbal false-belief tasks, in which they have to predict where an agent will search for an object that was moved in her absence. First, while three-and-a-half-year-olds usually fail at approach…

Do false belief and verb non-factivity share similar neural circuits?

PubMed

Chen, Lan; Cheung, Him; Szeto, Ching-Yee; Zhu, Zude; Wang, Suiping

2012-02-21

The present study investigates whether the complement falsity elicited by strong non-factive verbs and the false belief activated by a standard nonverbal false belief task produce similar electrophysiological activities in the brain. The hypothesis is based on the notion that both complement falsity and false belief involve decoupling a false mental representation from reality. Some previous studies have reported a behavioral correlation between children's false belief reasoning and interpretation of strong non-factive verbs together with their false complements, but a neural basis for this correlation has not been found. Our event-related potential (ERP) results with normal adults showed that both nonverbal false belief and strong non-factive verb comprehension elicited a negative late slow waveform divergence compared to their respective baselines. Although these slow waves due to the two types of stimuli had slightly different scalp distributions, both were regarded as reflecting primarily frontal activation. Such ERP similarity provides evidence for a common neural basis shared by nonverbal false belief reasoning and comprehension of strong non-factive verbs. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Why are bilinguals better than monolinguals at false-belief tasks?

PubMed

Rubio-Fernández, Paula

2017-06-01

In standard Theory of Mind tasks, such as the Sally-Anne, children have to predict the behaviour of a mistaken character, which requires attributing the character a false belief. Hundreds of developmental studies in the last 30 years have shown that children under 4 fail standard false-belief tasks. However, recent studies have revealed that bilingual children and adults outperform their monolingual peers in this type of tasks. Bilinguals' better performance in false-belief tasks has generally been interpreted as a result of their better inhibitory control; that is, bilinguals are allegedly better than monolinguals at inhibiting the erroneous response to the false-belief question. In this review, I challenge the received view and argue instead that bilinguals' better false-belief performance results from more effective attention management. This challenge ties in with two independent lines of research: on the one hand, recent studies on the role of attentional processes in false-belief tasks with monolingual children and adults; and on the other, current research on bilinguals' performance in different Executive Function tasks. The review closes with an exploratory discussion of further benefits of bilingual cognition to Theory of Mind development and pragmatics, which may be independent from Executive Function.

False Belief and Language Comprehension in Cantonese-Speaking Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cheung, Him

2006-01-01

The current research compared two accounts of the relation between language and false belief in children, namely that (a) language is generally related to false belief because both require secondary representation in a social-interactional context and that (b) specific language structures that explicitly code meta representation contribute…

A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Berthiaume, Vincent G; Shultz, Thomas R; Onishi, Kristine H

2013-03-01

How do children come to understand that others have mental representations, e.g., of an object's location? Preschoolers go through two transitions on verbal false-belief tasks, in which they have to predict where an agent will search for an object that was moved in her absence. First, while three-and-a-half-year-olds usually fail at approach tasks, in which the agent wants to find the object, children just under four succeed. Second, only after four do children succeed at tasks in which the agent wants to avoid the object. We present a constructivist connectionist model that autonomously reproduces the two transitions and suggests that the transitions are due to increases in general processing abilities enabling children to (1) overcome a default true-belief attribution by distinguishing false- from true-belief situations, and to (2) predict search in avoidance situations, where there is often more than one correct, empty search location. Constructivist connectionist models are rigorous, flexible and powerful tools that can be analyzed before and after transitions to uncover novel and emergent mechanisms of cognitive development. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands.

PubMed

Setoh, Peipei; Scott, Rose M; Baillargeon, Renée

2016-11-22

When tested with traditional false-belief tasks, which require answering a standard question about the likely behavior of an agent with a false belief, children perform below chance until age 4 y or later. When tested without such questions, however, children give evidence of false-belief understanding much earlier. Are traditional tasks difficult because they tap a more advanced form of false-belief understanding (fundamental-change view) or because they impose greater processing demands (processing-demands view)? Evidence that young children succeed at traditional false-belief tasks when processing demands are reduced would support the latter view. In prior research, reductions in inhibitory-control demands led to improvements in young children's performance, but often only to chance (instead of below-chance) levels. Here we examined whether further reductions in processing demands might lead to success. We speculated that: (i) young children could respond randomly in a traditional low-inhibition task because their limited information-processing resources are overwhelmed by the total concurrent processing demands in the task; and (ii) these demands include those from the response-generation process activated by the standard question. This analysis suggested that 2.5-y-old toddlers might succeed at a traditional low-inhibition task if response-generation demands were also reduced via practice trials. As predicted, toddlers performed above chance following two response-generation practice trials; toddlers failed when these trials either were rendered less effective or were used in a high-inhibition task. These results support the processing-demands view: Even toddlers succeed at a traditional false-belief task when overall processing demands are reduced.

When representations conflict with reality: the preschooler's problem with false beliefs and "false" photographs.

PubMed

Zaitchik, D

1990-04-01

It has been argued that young preschoolers cannot correctly attribute a false belief to a deceived actor (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Some researchers claim that the problem lies in the child's inadequate epistemology (Chandler & Boyes, 1982; Wellman, 1988); as such, it is specific to the child's theory of mind and no such problem should appear in reasoning about nonmental representations. This prediction is tested below in the "false photograph" task: here an actor takes a photograph of an object in location X; the object is then moved to location Y. Preschool subjects are asked: "In the picture, where is the object?" Results indicate that photographs are no easier to reason about than are beliefs. Manipulations to boost performance on the photograph task proved ineffective. Further, an explanation of the failure as a processing limitation having nothing to do with the representational nature of beliefs or photographs was ruled out. It is argued that young children's failure on the false belief task is not due to an inadequate epistemology (though they may have one) and is symptomatic of a larger problem with representations.

False Beliefs in Unreliable Knowledge Networks

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Ioannidis, Evangelos; Varsakelis, Nikos; Antoniou, Ioannis

2017-03-01

The aims of this work are: (1) to extend knowledge dynamics analysis in order to assess the influence of false beliefs and unreliable communication channels, (2) to investigate the impact of selection rule-policy for knowledge acquisition, (3) to investigate the impact of targeted link attacks ("breaks" or "infections") of certain "healthy" communication channels. We examine the knowledge dynamics analytically, as well as by simulations on both artificial and real organizational knowledge networks. The main findings are: (1) False beliefs have no significant influence on knowledge dynamics, while unreliable communication channels result in non-monotonic knowledge updates ("wild" knowledge fluctuations may appear) and in significant elongation of knowledge attainment. Moreover, false beliefs may emerge during knowledge evolution, due to the presence of unreliable communication channels, even if they were not present initially, (2) Changing the selection rule-policy, by raising the awareness of agents to avoid the selection of unreliable communication channels, results in monotonic knowledge upgrade and in faster knowledge attainment, (3) "Infecting" links is more harmful than "breaking" links, due to "wild" knowledge fluctuations and due to the elongation of knowledge attainment. Moreover, attacking even a "small" percentage of links (≤5%) with high knowledge transfer, may result in dramatic elongation of knowledge attainment (over 100%), as well as in delays of the onset of knowledge attainment. Hence, links of high knowledge transfer should be protected, because in Information Warfare and Disinformation, these links are the "best targets".

Two-and-a-half-year-olds succeed at a traditional false-belief task with reduced processing demands

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renée

2016-01-01

When tested with traditional false-belief tasks, which require answering a standard question about the likely behavior of an agent with a false belief, children perform below chance until age 4 y or later. When tested without such questions, however, children give evidence of false-belief understanding much earlier. Are traditional tasks difficult because they tap a more advanced form of false-belief understanding (fundamental-change view) or because they impose greater processing demands (processing-demands view)? Evidence that young children succeed at traditional false-belief tasks when processing demands are reduced would support the latter view. In prior research, reductions in inhibitory-control demands led to improvements in young children’s performance, but often only to chance (instead of below-chance) levels. Here we examined whether further reductions in processing demands might lead to success. We speculated that: (i) young children could respond randomly in a traditional low-inhibition task because their limited information-processing resources are overwhelmed by the total concurrent processing demands in the task; and (ii) these demands include those from the response-generation process activated by the standard question. This analysis suggested that 2.5-y-old toddlers might succeed at a traditional low-inhibition task if response-generation demands were also reduced via practice trials. As predicted, toddlers performed above chance following two response-generation practice trials; toddlers failed when these trials either were rendered less effective or were used in a high-inhibition task. These results support the processing-demands view: Even toddlers succeed at a traditional false-belief task when overall processing demands are reduced. PMID:27821728

Theory of mind and executive function: working-memory capacity and inhibitory control as predictors of false-belief task performance.

PubMed

Mutter, Brigitte; Alcorn, Mark B; Welsh, Marilyn

2006-06-01

This study of the relationship between theory of mind and executive function examined whether on the false-belief task age differences between 3 and 5 ears of age are related to development of working-memory capacity and inhibitory processes. 72 children completed tasks measuring false belief, working memory, and inhibition. Significant age effects were observed for false-belief and working-memory performance, as well as for the false-alarm and perseveration measures of inhibition. A simultaneous multiple linear regression specified the contribution of age, inhibition, and working memory to the prediction of false-belief performance. This model was significant, explaining a total of 36% of the variance. To examine the independent contributions of the working-memory and inhibition variables, after controlling for age, two hierarchical multiple linear regressions were conducted. These multiple regression analyses indicate that working memory and inhibition make small, overlapping contributions to false-belief performance after accounting for age, but that working memory, as measured in this study, is a somewhat better predictor of false-belief understanding than is inhibition.

Validity of false belief tasks in blind children.

PubMed

Brambring, Michael; Asbrock, Doreen

2010-12-01

Previous studies have reported that congenitally blind children without any additional impairment reveal a developmental delay of at least 4 years in perspective taking based on testing first-order false-belief tasks. These authors interpret this delay as a sign of autism-like behavior. However, the delay may be caused by testing blind children with false-belief tasks that require visual experience. Therefore, the present study gave alternative false-belief tasks based on tactile or auditory experience to 45 congenitally blind 4-10-year-olds and 37 sighted 3-6-year-olds. Results showed criterion performance at 80 months (6; 8 years) in blind children compared with 61 months (5; 1 years) in sighted controls. It is concluded that this 19-month (1; 7 year) difference, which is comparable with delays in other developmental areas, is a developmental delay caused by the fact of congenital blindness rather than a sign of a psychopathological disorder of autism-like behavior.

False belief and counterfactual reasoning in a social environment.

PubMed

Van Hoeck, Nicole; Begtas, Elizabet; Steen, Johan; Kestemont, Jenny; Vandekerckhove, Marie; Van Overwalle, Frank

2014-04-15

Behavioral studies indicate that theory of mind and counterfactual reasoning are strongly related cognitive processes. In a neuroimaging study, we explored the common and distinct regions underlying these inference processes. We directly compared false belief reasoning (inferring an agent's false belief about an object's location or content) and counterfactual reasoning (inferring what the object's location or content would be if an agent had acted differently), both in contrast with a baseline condition of conditional reasoning (inferring what the true location or content of an object is). Results indicate that these three types of reasoning about social scenarios are supported by activations in the mentalizing network (left temporo-parietal junction and precuneus) and the executive control network (bilateral prefrontal cortex [PFC] and right inferior parietal lobule). In addition, representing a false belief or counterfactual state (both not directly observable in the external world) recruits additional activity in the executive control network (left dorsolateral PFC and parietal lobe). The results further suggest that counterfactual reasoning is a more complex cognitive process than false belief reasoning, showing stronger activation of the dorsomedial, left dorsolateral PFC, cerebellum and left temporal cortex. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Relations among Preschool Children's Understanding of Visual Perspective Taking, False Belief, and Lying

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bigelow, Ann E.; Dugas, Kevin

2008-01-01

This study investigated the relations among preschool children's ability to understand that other people see things differently than they do, that other people can believe things differently than the children know to be true, and that they can manipulate others' beliefs through intentional lying. Children between the ages of 3 and 5 were given…

Preschoolers' Processing of False Beliefs within the Context of Picture Book Reading

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Riggio, Mary Mabel; Cassidy, Kimberly W.

2009-01-01

Research Findings: The current study examined preschoolers' processing of false belief situations presented in published picture books. Children were read one story with a plot that revolved around a single false belief occurrence and one story with multiple false belief occurrences. Children's narrative retellings of the stories were utilized as…

Undermining belief in false memories leads to less efficient problem-solving behaviour.

PubMed

Wang, Jianqin; Otgaar, Henry; Howe, Mark L; Smeets, Tom; Merckelbach, Harald; Nahouli, Zacharia

2017-08-01

Memories of events for which the belief in the occurrence of those events is undermined, but recollection is retained, are called nonbelieved memories (NBMs). The present experiments examined the effects of NBMs on subsequent problem-solving behaviour. In Experiment 1, we challenged participants' beliefs in their memories and examined whether NBMs affected subsequent solution rates on insight-based problems. True and false memories were elicited using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Then participants' belief in true and false memories was challenged by telling them the item had not been presented. We found that when the challenge led to undermining belief in false memories, fewer problems were solved than when belief was not challenged. In Experiment 2, a similar procedure was used except that some participants solved the problems one week rather than immediately after the feedback. Again, our results showed that undermining belief in false memories resulted in lower problem solution rates. These findings suggest that for false memories, belief is an important agent in whether memories serve as effective primes for immediate and delayed problem-solving.

Deception Dissociates from False Belief Reasoning in Deaf Children: Implications for the Implicit versus Explicit Theory of Mind Distinction

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

de Villiers, Peter A.; de Villiers, Jill G.

2012-01-01

Deception is a controversial aspect of theory of mind, and researchers disagree about whether it entails an understanding of the false beliefs of one's opponent. The present study asks whether children with delayed language and delayed explicit false belief reasoning can succeed on explicit deception tasks. Participants were 45 orally taught deaf…

Matched False-Belief Performance during Verbal and Nonverbal Interference

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Dungan, James; Saxe, Rebecca

2012-01-01

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The…

Eighteen-month-olds' memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task.

PubMed

Zmyj, Norbert; Prinz, Wolfgang; Daum, Moritz M

2015-01-01

Infants' performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks is often interpreted as if they have understood false beliefs. This view has been questioned by a recent account that explains infants' performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks as the result of susceptibility to memory interference and distraction. We tested this alternative account by investigating the relationship between infants' false-belief understanding, susceptibility to memory interference and distraction, and general cognitive development in 18-month-old infants (N = 22). False-belief understanding was tested in an anticipatory looking paradigm of a standard false-belief task. Susceptibility to memory interference and distraction was tested in a modified A-not-B task. Cognitive development was measured via the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. We did not find any relationship between infants' performance in the false-belief task and the A-not-B task, even after controlling for cognitive development. This study shows that there is no ubiquitous relation between susceptibility to memory interference and distraction and performance in a false-belief task in infancy.

Eighteen-month-olds’ memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task

PubMed Central

Zmyj, Norbert; Prinz, Wolfgang; Daum, Moritz M.

2015-01-01

Infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks is often interpreted as if they have understood false beliefs. This view has been questioned by a recent account that explains infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks as the result of susceptibility to memory interference and distraction. We tested this alternative account by investigating the relationship between infants’ false-belief understanding, susceptibility to memory interference and distraction, and general cognitive development in 18-month-old infants (N = 22). False-belief understanding was tested in an anticipatory looking paradigm of a standard false-belief task. Susceptibility to memory interference and distraction was tested in a modified A-not-B task. Cognitive development was measured via the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. We did not find any relationship between infants’ performance in the false-belief task and the A-not-B task, even after controlling for cognitive development. This study shows that there is no ubiquitous relation between susceptibility to memory interference and distraction and performance in a false-belief task in infancy. PMID:26157409

False Signs and the Non-Specificity of Theory of Mind: Evidence that Preschoolers Have General Difficulties in Understanding Representations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Leekam, Susan; Perner, Josef; Healey, Laura; Sewell, Claire

2008-01-01

The discovery that 3-year-old children have difficulties understanding false belief has fuelled two decades of research directed at understanding why children have this problem. One unresolved question is whether false belief problems are due to difficulties with mental or representational aspects of mental states. This question has implications…

Can We Forget What We Know in a False-Belief Task? An Investigation of the True-Belief Default.

PubMed

Rubio-Fernández, Paula

2017-01-01

It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist (what Leslie and colleagues called a "true-belief default"). Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true-belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that (a) adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false-belief question according to their own knowledge and (b) the true-belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true-belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false-belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false-belief tasks may be key to their performance. Copyright © 2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc.

Deception dissociates from false belief reasoning in deaf children: implications for the implicit versus explicit theory of mind distinction.

PubMed

de Villiers, Peter A; de Villiers, Jill G

2012-03-01

Deception is a controversial aspect of theory of mind, and researchers disagree about whether it entails an understanding of the false beliefs of one's opponent. The present study asks whether children with delayed language and delayed explicit false belief reasoning can succeed on explicit deception tasks. Participants were 45 orally taught deaf children with varying language delays aged 4.5-8 years and 45 hearing children aged 3.5-6 years. Participants received a battery of language, executive function, deception, and both verbal and low-verbal false belief tasks. The result reveal a dissociation of deception and false belief tasks: the deaf children are on par with their hearing peers on deception games, but show significant delays in false belief tasks even when the language demands are made minimal. Furthermore, different skills are predictors of success for the two types of task in the deaf children: language, and in particular complement syntax, is the best predictor of false belief reasoning; but executive function skills, especially inhibitory control, are the best predictors of deception. It is argued that deception at this level can be handled by behaviour rules without reference to mental states. © 2011 The British Psychological Society.

Together I Can! Joint Attention Boosts 3- to 4-Year-Olds' Performance in a Verbal False-Belief Test.

PubMed

Psouni, Elia; Falck, Andreas; Boström, Leni; Persson, Martin; Sidén, Lisa; Wallin, Maria

2018-04-20

Effects of joint attention were addressed on 3- to 4-year-olds' performance in a verbal false-Belief Test (FBT), featuring the experimenter as co-watcher rather than narrator. In two experiments, children (N = 183) watched a filmed-FBT jointly with a test leader, disjointed from a test leader, or alone. Children attending jointly with a test leader were more likely to pass the FBT compared with normative data and to spontaneously recall information indicating false-belief understanding, suggesting that joint attention strengthens the plausibility of the FBT and renders plot-critical information more salient. In a third experiment (N = 59), results were replicated using a typical, image-based FBT. Overall findings highlight the profound impact of experimenter as social context in verbal FBTs, and link recall of specific story features to false-belief understanding. © 2018 Society for Research in Child Development.

Is False Belief Skin-Deep? The Agent's Eye Status Influences Infants' Reasoning in Belief-Inducing Situations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Poulin-Dubois, Diane; Polonia, Alexandra; Yott, Jessica

2013-01-01

Two experiments were conducted to determine if infants attribute false beliefs to others when tested with the violation-of-expectancy procedure. In Experiment 1, the false-belief task was administered to 14- and 18-month-old infants. The procedure was identical to the one used by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), except that two transparent boxes…

How to pass the false-belief task before your fourth birthday.

PubMed

Rubio-Fernández, Paula; Geurts, Bart

2013-01-01

The experimental record of the last three decades shows that children under 4 years old fail all sorts of variations on the standard false-belief task, whereas more recent studies have revealed that infants are able to pass nonverbal versions of the task. We argue that these paradoxical results are an artifact of the type of false-belief tasks that have been used to test infants and children: Nonverbal designs allow infants to keep track of a protagonist's perspective over a course of events, whereas verbal designs tend to disrupt the perspective-tracking process in various ways, which makes it too hard for younger children to demonstrate their capacity for perspective tracking. We report three experiments that confirm this hypothesis by showing that 3-year-olds can pass a suitably streamlined version of the verbal false-belief task. We conclude that young children can pass the verbal false-belief task provided that they are allowed to keep track of the protagonist's perspective without too much disruption.

Training Preschoolers on First-Order False Belief Understanding: Transfer on Advanced ToM Skills and Metamemory

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lecce, Serena; Bianco, Federica; Demicheli, Patrizia; Cavallini, Elena

2014-01-01

This study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and metamemory knowledge using a training methodology. Sixty-two 4- to 5-year-old children were recruited and randomly assigned to one of two training conditions: A first-order false belief (ToM) and a control condition. Intervention and control groups were equivalent at pretest for…

Processing of false belief passages during natural story comprehension: An fMRI study.

PubMed

Kandylaki, Katerina D; Nagels, Arne; Tune, Sarah; Wiese, Richard; Bornkessel-Schlesewsky, Ina; Kircher, Tilo

2015-11-01

The neural correlates of theory of mind (ToM) are typically studied using paradigms which require participants to draw explicit, task-related inferences (e.g., in the false belief task). In a natural setup, such as listening to stories, false belief mentalizing occurs incidentally as part of narrative processing. In our experiment, participants listened to auditorily presented stories with false belief passages (implicit false belief processing) and immediately after each story answered comprehension questions (explicit false belief processing), while neural responses were measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). All stories included (among other situations) one false belief condition and one closely matched control condition. For the implicit ToM processing, we modeled the hemodynamic response during the false belief passages in the story and compared it to the hemodynamic response during the closely matched control passages. For implicit mentalizing, we found activation in typical ToM processing regions, that is the angular gyrus (AG), superior medial frontal gyrus (SmFG), precuneus (PCUN), middle temporal gyrus (MTG) as well as in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) billaterally. For explicit ToM, we only found AG activation. The conjunction analysis highlighted the left AG and MTG as well as the bilateral IFG as overlapping ToM processing regions for both implicit and explicit modes. Implicit ToM processing during listening to false belief passages, recruits the left SmFG and billateral PCUN in addition to the "mentalizing network" known form explicit processing tasks. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

False Belief Development in Children Who Are Hard of Hearing Compared With Peers With Normal Hearing

PubMed Central

Ambrose, Sophie E.; Oleson, Jacob; Moeller, Mary Pat

2017-01-01

Purpose This study investigates false belief (FB) understanding in children who are hard of hearing (CHH) compared with children with normal hearing (CNH) at ages 5 and 6 years and at 2nd grade. Research with this population has theoretical significance, given that the early auditory–linguistic experiences of CHH are less restricted compared with children who are deaf but not as complete as those of CNH. Method Participants included CHH and CNH who had completed FB tasks as part of a larger multicenter, longitudinal study on outcomes of children with mild-to-severe hearing loss. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal data were analyzed. Results At age 5 years, CHH demonstrated significant delays in FB understanding relative to CNH. Both hearing status and spoken-language abilities contributed to FB performance in 5-year-olds. A subgroup of CHH showed protracted delays at 6 years, suggesting that some CHH are at risk for longer term delays in FB understanding. By 2nd grade, performance on 1st- and 2nd-order FBs did not differ between CHH and CNH. Conclusions Preschool-age CHH are at risk for delays in understanding others' beliefs, which has consequences for their social interactions and pragmatic communication. Research related to FB in children with hearing loss has the potential to inform our understanding of mechanisms that support social–cognitive development, including the roles of language and conversational access. PMID:29209697

True- and false-belief reasoning in children and adults: an event-related potential study of theory of mind.

PubMed

Meinhardt, Jörg; Sodian, Beate; Thoermer, Claudia; Döhnel, Katrin; Sommer, Monika

2011-01-01

The understanding that another person's belief can differ from reality and that behaviour is guided by beliefs and not by reality reflects an important cornerstone in the development of a Theory of Mind. The present event-related potential (ERP) study had two aims: first, to reveal ERPs that distinguish between false- and true-belief reasoning and second, to investigate the neural changes in the development of false- and true-belief reasoning from childhood to adulthood. True- and false-belief cartoon stories were presented to adults and 6-8-year-old children. Results revealed two waveforms that differentiated between the two conditions: a late positive complex (LPC) associated with the reorientation from external stimuli to internal mental representations and a late anterior slow wave (LSW) associated with stimulus-independent processing of internal mental representations, a process that might be centrally involved in the decoupling mechanism. Additionally, we found developmental effects at an ERP level. Children showed a more posterior localization of the LPC and a broader frontal distribution of the LSW. The results may reflect developmental progress in conceptualizing the mental domain and support the idea that the cortical mentalizing network continues to develop even after children are able to master false beliefs. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Does social distance modulate adults' egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs?

PubMed

Farrar, Benjamin G; Ostojić, Ljerka

2018-01-01

When given privileged information of an object's true location, adults often overestimate the likelihood that a protagonist holding a false belief will search in the correct location for that object. This type of egocentric bias is often labelled the 'curse of knowledge'. Interestingly, the magnitude of this bias may be modulated by the social distance between the perspective taker and target. However, this social distance effect has yet to be fully demonstrated when adults reason about false beliefs. Using a continuous false belief task, we investigated i) whether adults were biased by their own knowledge when reasoning about another's false belief, ii) whether the magnitude of this egocentric bias was modulated by social distance, and iii) whether this social distance effect extended to a heterospecific out-group, namely a dog. To test these hypotheses we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 283), we used an established continuous false belief task, in Experiment 2 (N = 281) we modified this task, and Experiment 3 (N = 744) was a direct replication of Experiment 2. Across these experiments, the curse of knowledge effect was reliably replicated when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist, and replicated in two of the three studies (Experiments 1 and 3) when adults mentalised about out-group protagonists. In an internal-meta analysis, the curse of knowledge effect was present across all conditions, and there was no effect of social distance. Hence, overall these data are not consistent with the hypothesis that social distance modulates adults' egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs. The finding that egocentric biases of a similar magnitude were observed when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist and a dog suggests that interpersonal dissimilarity is not in itself sufficient to reduce egocentric bias when reasoning about false beliefs.

Drawing Insight from Pictures: The Development of Concepts of False Drawing and False Belief in Children with Deafness, Normal Hearing, and Autism.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.

2002-01-01

Three studies examined theory-of-mind concepts among children ages 6-13 years with deafness or autism, and 4-year-olds with normal development. Findings indicated that while the children with deafness or autism scored significantly lower on standard tests of false belief understanding, they scored higher on even the most challenging drawing-based…

Which penguin is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity at 18 Months

PubMed Central

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renée

2010-01-01

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds’ false-belief reasoning extends to false beliefs about object identity. Infants watched events involving an agent and two toy penguins; one penguin could be disassembled (2-piece penguin) and the other could not (1-piece penguin). Infants realized that outdated contextual information could lead the agent to falsely believe she was facing the 1-piece rather than the 2-piece penguin, suggesting that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about the identity of objects and providing new evidence for SS2 reasoning in the second year of life. PMID:19630901

Which penguin is this? Attributing false beliefs about object identity at 18 months.

PubMed

Scott, Rose M; Baillargeon, Renée

2009-01-01

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (Subsystem-2, SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds' false-belief reasoning extends to false beliefs about object identity. Infants watched events involving an agent and 2 toy penguins; 1 penguin could be disassembled (2-piece penguin) and 1 could not (1-piece penguin). Infants realized that outdated contextual information could lead the agent to falsely believe she was facing the 1-piece rather than the 2-piece penguin, suggesting that 18-month-olds can attribute false beliefs about the identity of objects and providing new evidence for SS2 reasoning in the 2nd year of life.

False feedback and beliefs influence name recall in younger and older adults.

PubMed

Strickland-Hughes, Carla M; West, Robin Lea; Smith, Kimberly A; Ebner, Natalie C

2017-09-01

Feedback is an important self-regulatory process that affects task effort and subsequent performance. Benefits of positive feedback for list recall have been explored in research on goals and feedback, but the effect of negative feedback on memory has rarely been studied. The current research extends knowledge of memory and feedback effects by investigating face-name association memory and by examining the potential mediation of feedback effects, in younger and older adults, through self-evaluative beliefs. Beliefs were assessed before and after name recognition and name recall testing. Repeated presentation of false positive feedback was compared to false negative feedback and a no feedback condition. Results showed that memory self-efficacy declined over time for participants in the negative and no feedback conditions but was sustained for those receiving positive feedback. Furthermore, participants who received negative feedback felt older after testing than before testing. For name recall, the positive feedback group outperformed the negative feedback and no feedback groups combined, with no age interactions. The observed feedback-related effects on memory were fully mediated by changes in memory self-efficacy. These findings advance our understanding of how beliefs are related to feedback in memory and inform future studies examining the importance of self-regulation in memory.

Empathy predicts false belief reasoning ability: evidence from the N400.

PubMed

Ferguson, Heather J; Cane, James E; Douchkov, Michelle; Wright, Daniel

2015-06-01

Interpreting others' actions relies on an understanding of their current mental state. Emerging research has begun to identify a number of factors that give rise to individual differences in this ability. We report an event-related brain potential study where participants (N = 28) read contexts that described a character having a true belief (TB) or false belief (FB) about an object's location. A second sentence described where that character would look for the object. Critically, this sentence included a sentence-final noun that was either consistent or inconsistent with the character's belief. Participants also completed the Empathy Quotient questionnaire. Analysis of the N400 revealed that when the character held a TB about the object's location, the N400 waveform was more negative-going for belief inconsistent vs belief consistent critical words. However, when the character held an FB about the object's location the opposite pattern was found. Intriguingly, correlations between the N400 inconsistency effect and individuals' empathy scores showed a significant correlation for FB but not TB. This suggests that people who are high in empathy can successfully interpret events according to the character's FB, while low empathizers bias their interpretation of events to their own egocentric view. © The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Belief Reasoning and Emotion Understanding in Balanced Bilingual and Language-Dominant Mexican American Young Children.

PubMed

Weimer, Amy A; Gasquoine, Philip G

2016-01-01

Belief reasoning and emotion understanding were measured among 102 Mexican American bilingual children ranging from 4 to 7 years old. All children were tested in English and Spanish after ensuring minimum comprehension in each language. Belief reasoning was assessed using 2 false and 1 true belief tasks. Emotion understanding was measured using subtests from the Test for Emotion Comprehension. The influence of family background variables of yearly income, parental education level, and number of siblings on combined Spanish and English vocabulary, belief reasoning, and emotion understanding was assessed by regression analyses. Age and emotion understanding predicted belief reasoning. Vocabulary and belief reasoning predicted emotion understanding. When the sample was divided into language-dominant and balanced bilingual groups on the basis of language proficiency difference scores, there were no significant differences on belief reasoning or emotion understanding. Language groups were demographically similar with regard to child age, parental educational level, and family income. Results suggest Mexican American language-dominant and balanced bilinguals develop belief reasoning and emotion understanding similarly.

Reduced nicotine content cigarette advertising: How false beliefs and subjective ratings affect smoking behavior

PubMed Central

Mercincavage, Melissa; Saddleson, Megan L.; Gup, Emily; Halstead, Angela; Mays, Darren; Strasser, Andrew A.

2017-01-01

Introduction Tobacco advertising can create false beliefs about health harms that are reinforced by product design features. Reduced nicotine content (RNC) cigarettes may reduce harm, but research has not addressed advertising influences. This study examined RNC cigarette advertising effects on false harm beliefs, and how these beliefs – along with initial subjective ratings of RNC cigarettes – affect subsequent smoking behaviors. We further explored whether subjective ratings moderate associations between false beliefs and behavior. Methods Seventy-seven daily, non-treatment-seeking smokers (66.2% male) participated in the first 15 days of a randomized, controlled, open-label RNC cigarette trial. Participants viewed an RNC cigarette advertisement at baseline before completing a 5-day period of preferred brand cigarette use, followed by a 10-day period of RNC cigarette use (0.6 mg nicotine yield). Participants provided pre- and post-advertisement beliefs, and subjective ratings and smoking behaviors for cigarettes smoked during laboratory visits. Results Viewing the advertisement increased beliefs that RNC cigarettes contain less nicotine and are healthier than regular cigarettes (p’s < 0.001 and 0.011), and decreased the belief that they are less likely to cause cancer (p = 0.046). Neither false beliefs nor subjective ratings directly affected smoking behaviors. Significant interactions of strength and taste ratings with beliefs (p’s < 0.001), however, indicated that among smokers with less negative initial subjective ratings, greater false beliefs were associated with greater RNC cigarette consumption. Conclusions Smokers may misconstrue RNC cigarettes as less harmful than regular cigarettes. These beliefs, in conjunction with favorable subjective ratings, may increase product use. PMID:28214392

Reduced nicotine content cigarette advertising: How false beliefs and subjective ratings affect smoking behavior.

PubMed

Mercincavage, Melissa; Saddleson, Megan L; Gup, Emily; Halstead, Angela; Mays, Darren; Strasser, Andrew A

2017-04-01

Tobacco advertising can create false beliefs about health harms that are reinforced by product design features. Reduced nicotine content (RNC) cigarettes may reduce harm, but research has not addressed advertising influences. This study examined RNC cigarette advertising effects on false harm beliefs, and how these beliefs - along with initial subjective ratings of RNC cigarettes - affect subsequent smoking behaviors. We further explored whether subjective ratings moderate associations between false beliefs and behavior. Seventy-seven daily, non-treatment-seeking smokers (66.2% male) participated in the first 15days of a randomized, controlled, open-label RNC cigarette trial. Participants viewed an RNC cigarette advertisement at baseline before completing a 5-day period of preferred brand cigarette use, followed by a 10-day period of RNC cigarette use (0.6mg nicotine yield). Participants provided pre- and post-advertisement beliefs, and subjective ratings and smoking behaviors for cigarettes smoked during laboratory visits. Viewing the advertisement increased beliefs that RNC cigarettes contain less nicotine and are healthier than regular cigarettes (p's<0.001 and 0.011), and decreased the belief that they are less likely to cause cancer (p=0.046). Neither false beliefs nor subjective ratings directly affected smoking behaviors. Significant interactions of strength and taste ratings with beliefs (p's<0.001), however, indicated that among smokers with less negative initial subjective ratings, greater false beliefs were associated with greater RNC cigarette consumption. Smokers may misconstrue RNC cigarettes as less harmful than regular cigarettes. These beliefs, in conjunction with favorable subjective ratings, may increase product use. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Eye tracking uncovered great apes' ability to anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs.

PubMed

Kano, Fumihiro; Krupenye, Christopher; Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep

2017-01-01

Using a novel eye-tracking test, we recently showed that great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. This finding suggests that, like humans, great apes understand others' false beliefs, at least in an implicit way. One key question raised by our study is why apes have passed our tests but not previous ones. In this article, we consider this question by detailing the development of our task. We considered 3 major differences in our task compared with the previous ones. First, we monitored apes' eye movements, and specifically their anticipatory looks, to measure their predictions about how agents will behave. Second, we adapted our design from an anticipatory-looking false belief test originally developed for human infants. Third, we developed novel test scenarios that were specifically designed to capture the attention of our ape participants. We then discuss how each difference may help explain differences in performance on our task and previous ones, and finally propose some directions for future studies.

Early bilingualism enhances mechanisms of false-belief reasoning.

PubMed

Kovács, Agnes Melinda

2009-01-01

In their first years, children's understanding of mental states seems to improve dramatically, but the mechanisms underlying these changes are still unclear. Such 'theory of mind' (ToM) abilities may arise during development, or have an innate basis, developmental changes reflecting limitations of other abilities involved in ToM tasks (e.g. inhibition). Special circumstances such as early bilingualism may enhance ToM development or other capacities required by ToM tasks. Here we compare 3-year-old bilinguals and monolinguals on a standard ToM task, a modified ToM task and a control task involving physical reasoning. The modified ToM task mimicked a language-switch situation that bilinguals often encounter and that could influence their ToM abilities. If such experience contributes to an early consolidation of ToM in bilinguals, they should be selectively enhanced in the modified task. In contrast, if bilinguals have an advantage due to better executive inhibitory abilities involved in ToM tasks, they should outperform monolinguals on both ToM tasks, inhibitory demands being similar. Bilingual children showed an advantage on the two ToM tasks but not on the control task. The precocious success of bilinguals may be associated with their well-developed control functions formed during monitoring and selecting languages.

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences.

PubMed

Sommer, Monika; Döhnel, Katrin; Jarvers, Irina; Blaas, Lore; Singer, Manuela; Nöth, Victoria; Schuwerk, Tobias; Rupprecht, Rainer

2018-01-01

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD ( N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the

False Belief Reasoning in Adults with and without Autistic Spectrum Disorder: Similarities and Differences

PubMed Central

Sommer, Monika; Döhnel, Katrin; Jarvers, Irina; Blaas, Lore; Singer, Manuela; Nöth, Victoria; Schuwerk, Tobias; Rupprecht, Rainer

2018-01-01

A central diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is the qualitative impairment in reciprocal social interaction and a prominent hypotheses that tried to explain this impairment is the Theory of Mind (ToM) deficit hypotheses. On a behavioral level the critical test for having a ToM, the understanding of false beliefs (FB), is often used for testing ToM abilities in individuals with ASD. Investigating the neural underpinnings several neuroimaging studies revealed a network of areas involved in FB reasoning in neurotypical individuals. For ASD individuals the neural correlates of false belief processing are largely unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and an adapted unexpected transfer task, that makes it possible to distinguish between the computation of diverging beliefs and the selection of a belief-associated response, we investigated a group of adult high-functioning individuals with ASD (N = 15) and an age and IQ matched group of neurotypical adults (NT; N = 15). On the behavioral level we found no group differences. On the neural level, results were two-fold: In the story phase, in which participants had to compute whether the character's belief is congruent or incongruent to their own belief, there were no differences between neurotypical participants and those diagnosed with ASD. But, in the subsequent question phase, participants with ASD showed increased activity in the bilateral anterior prefrontal cortex, the left posterior frontal cortex, the left superior temporal gyrus, and the left temporoparietal area. These results suggest that during the story phase in which the participants processed observable actions the neural correlates do not differ between adult individuals with ASD and NT individuals. But in the question phase in which participants had to infer an unobservable mental state results revealed neural differences between the two groups. Possibly, these subtle neural processing differences may contribute to the

False Belief Attribution in Children with Williams Syndrome: The Answer Is in The Emotion

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Campos, R.; Martínez-Castilla, P.; Sotillo, M.

2017-01-01

Background: Individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) show difficulties in attributing false beliefs, whereas they are better at attributing emotions. This study examines whether being asked about the emotion linked to a false belief, instead of explicitly about the belief, facilitates performance on theory of mind (ToM) tasks. Method: Thirty…

Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription.

PubMed

Back, Elisa; Apperly, Ian A

2010-04-01

A recent study by Apperly et al. (2006) found evidence that adults do not automatically infer false beliefs while watching videos that afford such inferences. This method was extended to examine true beliefs, which are sometimes thought to be ascribed by "default" (e.g., Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Sequences of pictures were presented in which the location of an object and a character's belief about the location of the object often changed. During the picture sequences participants responded to an unpredictable probe picture about where the character believed the object to be located or where the object was located in reality. In Experiment 1 participants were not directly instructed to track the character's beliefs about the object. There was a significant reaction time cost for belief probes compared with matched reality probes, whether the character's belief was true or false. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to track where the character thought the object was located, responses to belief probes were faster than responses to reality probes, suggesting that the difference observed in Experiment 1 was not due to intrinsic differences between the probes, but was more likely to be due to participants inferring beliefs ad hoc in response to the probe. In both Experiments 1 and 2, responses to belief and reality probes were faster in the true belief condition than in the false belief condition. In Experiment 3 this difference was largely eliminated when participants had fewer reasons to make belief inferences spontaneously. These two lines of evidence are neatly explained by the proposition that neither true nor false beliefs are ascribed automatically, but that belief ascription may occur spontaneously in response to task demands. Copyright 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Testing the domain-specificity of a theory of mind deficit in brain-injured patients: evidence for consistent performance on non-verbal, "reality-unknown" false belief and false photograph tasks.

PubMed

Apperly, Ian A; Samson, Dana; Chiavarino, Claudia; Bickerton, Wai-Ling; Humphreys, Glyn W

2007-05-01

To test the domain-specificity of "theory of mind" abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning () and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems with existing false photograph methods. A strikingly similar pattern of performance was shown across the false belief and false photograph tests. Patients who were selectively impaired on false belief tasks were also impaired on false photograph tasks; patients spared on false belief tasks also showed preserved performance with false photographs. In some cases the impairment on false belief and false photograph tasks coincided with good performance on control tasks matched for executive demands. We discuss whether the patients have a domain-specific deficit in reasoning about representations common to both false belief and false photograph tasks.

Tracking speakers' false beliefs: is theory of mind available earlier for word learning?

PubMed

Houston-Price, Carmel; Goddard, Kate; Séclier, Catherine; Grant, Sally C; Reid, Caitlin J B; Boyden, Laura E; Williams, Rhiannon

2011-07-01

Happé and Loth (2002) describe word learning as a 'privileged domain' in the development of a theory of mind. We test this claim in a series of experiments based on the Sally-Anne paradigm. Three- and 4-year-old children's ability to represent others' false beliefs was investigated in tasks that required the child either to predict the actions of a protagonist in a story or to learn the meaning of a new word used by the protagonist. Experiment 1 replicated previous findings of better performance in a false belief word-learning task compared to a false belief action-prediction task. However, systematic manipulation of the task parameters in Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that this performance discrepancy disappeared when tasks were equated in their 'referential pull' (Perner, Rendl & Garnham, 2007). We conclude that the notion of a precocious theory of mind for word learning is not required to explain dissociations in performance on false belief tasks. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The Role of the Counterfactually Satisfied Desire in the Lag between False-Belief and False-Emotion Attributions in Children Aged 4-7

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Bradmetz, Joel; Schneider, Roland

2004-01-01

A robust lag was evidenced between the attribution to an individual of a false belief about the world and the attribution of the false emotion associated with this false belief (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This lag was unexpected in the frame of current theories of mind which consider that emotion has a rational cognitive basis. The present paper…

Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs about Object Identity at 18 Months

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scott, Rose M.; Baillargeon, Renee

2009-01-01

Recent research has shown that infants as young as 13 months can attribute false beliefs to agents, suggesting that the psychological-reasoning subsystem necessary for attributing reality-incongruent informational states (Subsystem-2, SS2) is operational in infancy. The present research asked whether 18-month-olds' false-belief reasoning extends…

False beliefs about fattening foods can have healthy consequences

PubMed Central

Bernstein, Daniel M.; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K.; Loftus, Elizabeth F.

2005-01-01

We suggested to 228 subjects in two experiments that, as children, they had had negative experiences with a fattening food. An additional 107 subjects received no such suggestion and served as controls. In Experiment 1, a minority of subjects came to believe that they had felt ill after eating strawberry ice cream as children, and these subjects were more likely to indicate not wanting to eat strawberry ice cream now. In contrast, we were unable to obtain these effects when the critical item was a more commonly eaten treat (chocolate chip cookie). In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended the strawberry ice cream results. Two different ways of processing the false suggestion succeeded in planting the false belief and producing avoidance of the food. These findings show that it is possible to convince people that, as children, they experienced a negative event involving a fattening food and that this false belief results in avoidance of that food in adulthood. More broadly, these results indicate that we can, through suggestion, manipulate nutritional selection and possibly even improve health. PMID:16079200

False beliefs about fattening foods can have healthy consequences.

PubMed

Bernstein, Daniel M; Laney, Cara; Morris, Erin K; Loftus, Elizabeth F

2005-09-27

We suggested to 228 subjects in two experiments that, as children, they had had negative experiences with a fattening food. An additional 107 subjects received no such suggestion and served as controls. In Experiment 1, a minority of subjects came to believe that they had felt ill after eating strawberry ice cream as children, and these subjects were more likely to indicate not wanting to eat strawberry ice cream now. In contrast, we were unable to obtain these effects when the critical item was a more commonly eaten treat (chocolate chip cookie). In Experiment 2, we replicated and extended the strawberry ice cream results. Two different ways of processing the false suggestion succeeded in planting the false belief and producing avoidance of the food. These findings show that it is possible to convince people that, as children, they experienced a negative event involving a fattening food and that this false belief results in avoidance of that food in adulthood. More broadly, these results indicate that we can, through suggestion, manipulate nutritional selection and possibly even improve health.

Temporo-Parietal Junction Activity in Theory-of-Mind Tasks: Falseness, Beliefs, or Attention

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Aichhorn, Markus; Perner, Josef; Weiss, Benjamin; Kronbichler, Martin; Staffen, Wolfgang; Ladurner, Gunther

2009-01-01

By combining the false belief (FB) and photo (PH) vignettes to identify theory-of-mind areas with the false sign (FS) vignettes, we re-establish the functional asymmetry between the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The right TPJ (TPJ-R) is specially sensitive to processing belief information, whereas the left TPJ (TPJ-L) is equally…

Validity of False Belief Tasks in Blind Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brambring, Michael; Asbrock, Doreen

2010-01-01

Previous studies have reported that congenitally blind children without any additional impairment reveal a developmental delay of at least 4 years in perspective taking based on testing first-order false-belief tasks. These authors interpret this delay as a sign of autism-like behavior. However, the delay may be caused by testing blind children…

Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task.

PubMed

Ferguson, Heather J; Apperly, Ian; Ahmad, Jumana; Bindemann, Markus; Cane, James

2015-06-01

Interpreting other peoples' actions relies on an understanding of their current mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions). In this paper, we distinguish between listeners' ability to infer others' perspectives and their explicit use of this knowledge to predict subsequent actions. In a visual-world study, two groups of participants (passive observers vs. active participants) watched short videos, depicting transfer events, where one character ('Jane') either held a true or false belief about an object's location. We tracked participants' eye-movements around the final visual scene, time-locked to related auditory descriptions (e.g. "Jane will look for the chocolates in the container on the left".). Results showed that active participants had already inferred the character's belief in the 1s preview period prior to auditory onset, before it was possible to use this information to predict an outcome. Moreover, they used this inference to correctly anticipate reference to the object's initial location on false belief trials at the earliest possible point (i.e. from "Jane" onwards). In contrast, passive observers only showed evidence of a belief inference from the onset of "Jane", and did not show reliable use of this inference to predict Jane's behaviour on false belief trials until much later, when the location ("left/right") was auditorily available. These results show that active engagement in a task activates earlier inferences about others' perspectives, and drives immediate use of this information to anticipate others' actions, compared to passive observers, who are susceptible to influences from egocentric or reality biases. Finally, we review evidence that using other peoples' perspectives to predict their behaviour is more cognitively effortful than simply using one's own. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Thinking about the thoughts of others; temporal and spatial neural activation during false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Mossad, Sarah I; AuCoin-Power, Michelle; Urbain, Charline; Smith, Mary Lou; Pang, Elizabeth W; Taylor, Margot J

2016-07-01

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand the perspectives, mental states and beliefs of others in order to anticipate their behaviour and is therefore crucial to social interactions. Although fMRI has been widely used to establish the neural networks implicated in ToM, little is known about the timing of ToM-related brain activity. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure the neural processes underlying ToM, as MEG provides very accurate timing and excellent spatial localization of brain processes. We recorded MEG activity during a false belief task, a reliable measure of ToM, in twenty young adults (10 females). MEG data were recorded in a 151 sensor CTF system (MISL, Coquitlam, BC) and data were co-registered to each participant's MRI (Siemens 3T) for source reconstruction. We found stronger right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) activations in the false belief condition from 150ms to 225ms, in the right precuneus from 275ms to 375ms, in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 200ms to 300ms and the superior frontal gyrus from 300ms to 400ms. Our findings extend the literature by demonstrating the timing and duration of neural activity in the main regions involved in the "mentalizing" network, showing that activations related to false belief in adults are predominantly right lateralized and onset around 100ms. The sensitivity of MEG will allow us to determine spatial and temporal differences in the brain processes in ToM in younger populations or those who demonstrate deficits in this ability. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Exploring links between language and cognition in autism spectrum disorders: Complement sentences, false belief, and executive functioning.

PubMed

Stephanie, Durrleman; Julie, Franck

2015-01-01

A growing body of work indicates a close relation between complement clause sentences and Theory of Mind (ToM) in children with autism (e.g., Tager-Flusberg, & Joseph (2005). In Astington, & Baird (Eds.), Why language matters for theory of mind (pp. 298-318). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press, Lind, & Bowler (2009). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 39(6), 929). However, this link is based primarily on success at a specific complement clause task and a verbal false-belief (FB) task. One cannot exclude that the link found between these tasks may be a by-product of their both presupposing similar levels of language skills. It is also an open question if the role of complementation in ToM success is a privileged one as compared to that of other abilities which have been claimed to be an important factor for ToM understanding in autism, namely executive functioning (EF) (Pellicano (2007). Developmental Psychology 43, 974). Indeed the role played by complementation may be conceived of as an indirect one, mediated by some more general cognitive function related to EF. This study is the first to examine the relation between theory of mind assessed both verbally and non-verbally and various types of complement clause sentences as well as executive functions in children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Our participants included 17 children and adolescents with ASD (aged 6 to 16) and a younger TD control group matched on non-verbal IQ (aged 4 to 9 years). Three tasks assessing complements of verbs of cognition, verbs of communication and verbs of perception were conducted. ToM tasks involved a verbal ToM task (Sally-Anne, Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). Cognition, 21(1), 37) as well as a non-verbal one (Colle et al. (2007). Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 37(4), 716). Indexes of executive functions were collected via a computerized version of the Dimensional Change Card-Sorting task (Frye et al., 1995). Standardized measures of vocabulary

Can an agent’s false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

PubMed Central

Song, Hyun-joo; Onishi, Kristine H.; Baillargeon, Renée; Fisher, Cynthia

2008-01-01

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent’s false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1’s absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her “The ball is in the cup!” (informative-intervention condition) or “I like the cup!” (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1’s false belief about the ball’s location to be corrected when she was told “The ball is in the cup!”, but not “I like the cup!”. In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball’s new location, and infants again expected agent1’s false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents’ false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures. PMID:18976745

Brain activation for spontaneous and explicit false belief tasks overlaps: new fMRI evidence on belief processing and violation of expectation

PubMed Central

Desmet, Charlotte; Nijhof, Annabel; Wiersema, Jan R.; Brass, Marcel

2017-01-01

Abstract There is extensive discussion on whether spontaneous and explicit forms of ToM are based on the same cognitive/neural mechanisms or rather reflect qualitatively different processes. For the first time, we analyzed the BOLD signal for false belief processing by directly comparing spontaneous and explicit ToM task versions. In both versions, participants watched videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object (belief formation phase). At the end of the movies (outcome phase), participants had to react to the presence of the object. During the belief formation phase, greater activity was found for false vs true belief trials in the right posterior parietal cortex. The ROI analysis of the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), confirmed this observation. Moreover, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) was active during the outcome phase, being sensitive to violation of both the participant’s and agent’s expectations about the location of the object. Activity in the TPJ and aMPFC was not modulated by the spontaneous/explicit task. Overall, these data show that neural mechanisms for spontaneous and explicit ToM overlap. Interestingly, a dissociation between TPJ and aMPFC for belief tracking and outcome evaluation, respectively, was also found. PMID:27683425

Theory of Mind (ToM) in Children with Autism or Typical Development: Links between Eye-Reading and False Belief Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.; Slaughter, Virginia

2009-01-01

Previous research shows that high-functioning children with autism are slow to pass "litmus" false belief tests of ToM but how this may relate to other aspects of mindreading (e.g., discerning thoughts from facial expressions) is less clear, partly for methodological reasons. Thus the joint methodological and conceptual goals of this…

False-Belief Understanding in 2.5-Year-Olds: Evidence From Violation-of-Expectation Change-of-Location and Unexpected-Contents tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renee

2011-01-01

Until recently, it was generally assumed that the ability to attribute false beliefs did not emerge until about 4 years of age. However, recent reports using spontaneous- as opposed to elicited-response tasks have suggested that this ability may be present much earlier. To date, researchers have employed two kinds of spontaneous-response…

Brain activation for spontaneous and explicit false belief tasks overlaps: new fMRI evidence on belief processing and violation of expectation.

PubMed

Bardi, Lara; Desmet, Charlotte; Nijhof, Annabel; Wiersema, Jan R; Brass, Marcel

2017-03-01

There is extensive discussion on whether spontaneous and explicit forms of ToM are based on the same cognitive/neural mechanisms or rather reflect qualitatively different processes. For the first time, we analyzed the BOLD signal for false belief processing by directly comparing spontaneous and explicit ToM task versions. In both versions, participants watched videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object (belief formation phase). At the end of the movies (outcome phase), participants had to react to the presence of the object. During the belief formation phase, greater activity was found for false vs true belief trials in the right posterior parietal cortex. The ROI analysis of the right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), confirmed this observation. Moreover, the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC) was active during the outcome phase, being sensitive to violation of both the participant's and agent's expectations about the location of the object. Activity in the TPJ and aMPFC was not modulated by the spontaneous/explicit task. Overall, these data show that neural mechanisms for spontaneous and explicit ToM overlap. Interestingly, a dissociation between TPJ and aMPFC for belief tracking and outcome evaluation, respectively, was also found. © The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

How Children with Autism Reason about Other's Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences.

PubMed

Rasga, Célia; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M J

2017-06-01

We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes-Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked, 'What will John believe is the reason that Anne is picking up toys?' which requires a false-belief inference, and 'If Anne's mother hadn't asked Anne to tidy her room, what would have been the reason she was picking up toys?' which requires a counterfactual inference. We tested children aged 6, 8 and 10 years. Children with autism made fewer correct inferences than typically developing children at 8 years, but by 10 years there was no difference. Children with autism made fewer correct false-belief than counterfactual inferences, just like typically developing children.

A new paper and pencil task reveals adult false belief reasoning bias.

PubMed

Coburn, Patricia I; Bernstein, Daniel M; Begeer, Sander

2015-09-01

Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to take other people's perspective by inferring their mental state. Most 6-year olds pass the change-of-location false belief task that is commonly used to assess ToM. However, the change-of-location task is not suitable for individuals over 5 years of age, due to its discrete response options. In two experiments, we used a paper and pencil version of a modified change-of-location task (the Real Object Sandbox task) to assess false belief reasoning continuously rather than discretely in adults. Participants heard nine change-of-location scenarios and answered a critical question after each. The memory control questions only required the participant to remember the object's original location, whereas the false belief questions required participants to take the perspective of the protagonist. Participants were more accurate on memory trials than trials requiring perspective taking, and performance on paper and pencil trials correlated with corresponding trials on the Real Object Sandbox task. The Paper and Pencil Sandbox task is a convenient continuous measure of ToM that could be administered to a wide range of age groups.

False beliefs predict increased circumcision satisfaction in a sample of US American men.

PubMed

Earp, Brian D; Sardi, Lauren M; Jellison, William A

2017-12-06

Critics of non-therapeutic male and female childhood genital cutting claim that such cutting is harmful. It is therefore puzzling that 'circumcised' women and men do not typically regard themselves as having been harmed by the cutting, notwithstanding the loss of sensitive, prima facie valuable tissue. For female genital cutting (FGC), a commonly proposed solution to this puzzle is that women who had part(s) of their vulvae removed before sexual debut 'do not know what they are missing' and may 'justify' their genitally-altered state by adopting false beliefs about the benefits of FGC, while simultaneously stigmatising unmodified genitalia as unattractive or unclean. Might a similar phenomenon apply to neonatally circumcised men? In this survey of 999 US American men, greater endorsement of false beliefs concerning circumcision and penile anatomy predicted greater satisfaction with being circumcised, while among genitally intact men, the opposite trend occurred: greater endorsement of false beliefs predicted less satisfaction with being genitally intact. These findings provide tentative support for the hypothesis that the lack-of-harm reported by many circumcised men, like the lack-of-harm reported by their female counterparts in societies that practice FGC, may be related to holding inaccurate beliefs concerning unaltered genitalia and the consequences of childhood genital modification.

Competence and Performance in Belief-Desire Reasoning across Two Cultures: The Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth about False Belief?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yazdi, Amir Amin; German, Tim P.; Defeyter, Margaret Anne; Siegal, Michael

2006-01-01

There is a change in false belief task performance across the 3-5 year age range, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis [Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory mind development: The truth about false-belief. "Child Development," 72, 655-684]. This meta-analysis identified several performance factors influencing…

Preservice Early Childhood Educators' Pedagogical Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Di Santo, Aurelia; Timmons, Kristy; Lenis, Angelike

2017-01-01

Preservice early childhood educators begin postsecondary programs with established beliefs about children, children's learning, and their roles as future educators. The present study examined 26 first-year students' beliefs about children, classroom practice, and guiding children's behavior. Participants completed the Teacher Beliefs Q-Sort…

A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control

PubMed Central

Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

ABSTRACT Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task. PMID:28919941

A test of the submentalizing hypothesis: Apes' performance in a false belief task inanimate control.

PubMed

Krupenye, Christopher; Kano, Fumihiro; Hirata, Satoshi; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2017-01-01

Much debate concerns whether any nonhuman animals share with humans the ability to infer others' mental states, such as desires and beliefs. In a recent eye-tracking false-belief task, we showed that great apes correctly anticipated that a human actor would search for a goal object where he had last seen it, even though the apes themselves knew that it was no longer there. In response, Heyes proposed that apes' looking behavior was guided not by social cognitive mechanisms but rather domain-general cueing effects, and suggested the use of inanimate controls to test this alternative submentalizing hypothesis. In the present study, we implemented the suggested inanimate control of our previous false-belief task. Apes attended well to key events but showed markedly fewer anticipatory looks and no significant tendency to look to the correct location. We thus found no evidence that submentalizing was responsible for apes' anticipatory looks in our false-belief task.

Reinforcement learning signals in the anterior cingulate cortex code for others' false beliefs.

PubMed

Apps, M A J; Green, R; Ramnani, N

2013-01-01

The ability to recognise that another's belief is false is a hallmark of our capacity to understand others' mental states. It has been suggested that the computational and neural mechanisms that underpin learning about others' mental states may be similar to those that underpin first-person Reinforcement Learning (RL). In RL, unexpected decision-making outcomes constitute prediction errors (PE), which are coded for by neurons in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC). Does the ACC signal the PEs (false beliefs) of others about the outcomes of their decisions? We scanned subjects using fMRI while they monitored a third-person's decisions and similar responses made by a computer. The outcomes of the trials were manipulated, such that the actual outcome was unexpectedly different from the predicted outcome on 1/3 of trials. We examined activity time-locked to privileged information which indicated the actual outcomes only to subjects. Activity in the gyral ACC was found when the outcomes of the third-person's decisions were unexpectedly positive. Activity in the sulcal ACC was found when the third-person's or computer's outcomes were unexpectedly positive. We suggest that a property of the ACC is that it codes PEs, with a portion of the gyral ACC specialised for processing the PEs of others. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

A Competitive Nonverbal False Belief Task for Children and Apes

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Krachun, Carla; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Tomasello, Michael

2009-01-01

A nonverbal false belief task was administered to children (mean age 5 years) and two great ape species: chimpanzees ("Pan troglodytes") and bonobos ("Pan paniscus"). Because apes typically perform poorly in cooperative contexts, our task was competitive. Two versions were run: in both, a human competitor witnessed an experimenter hide a reward in…

Can an Agent's False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Song, Hyun-joo; Onishi, Kristine H.; Baillargeon, Renee; Fisher, Cynthia

2008-01-01

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent 1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent 2 looked on.…

Language and False-Belief Task Performance in Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder.

PubMed

Jeffrey Farrar, M; Seung, Hye Kyeung; Lee, Hyeonjin

2017-07-12

Language is related to false-belief (FB) understanding in both typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The current study examined the role of complementation and general language in FB understanding. Of interest was whether language plays similar or different roles in the groups' FB performance. Participants were 16 typically developing children (mean age = 5.0 years; mental age = 6.7) and 18 with ASD (mean age = 7.3 years; mental age = 8.3). Children were administered FB and language tasks (say- and think-complements), receptive and expressive vocabulary tests, and relative clauses. When mental age and receptive and expressive vocabulary were used as separate covariates, the typical control group outperformed the children with ASD in FB task performance. Chi-square analyses indicated that passing both complementation tasks was linked to the FB understanding of children with ASD. Children with ASD who passed FB tasks all passed say- and think-complement tasks. However, some children in the control group were able to pass the FB tasks, even if they failed the say- and think-complement tasks. The results indicate that children with ASD relied more on complement understanding to pass FB than typically developing children. Results are discussed regarding the developmental pathways for FB understanding.

Racial bias in pain assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites.

PubMed

Hoffman, Kelly M; Trawalter, Sophie; Axt, Jordan R; Oliver, M Norman

2016-04-19

Black Americans are systematically undertreated for pain relative to white Americans. We examine whether this racial bias is related to false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites (e.g., "black people's skin is thicker than white people's skin"). Study 1 documented these beliefs among white laypersons and revealed that participants who more strongly endorsed false beliefs about biological differences reported lower pain ratings for a black (vs. white) target. Study 2 extended these findings to the medical context and found that half of a sample of white medical students and residents endorsed these beliefs. Moreover, participants who endorsed these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient's pain as lower and made less accurate treatment recommendations. Participants who did not endorse these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient's pain as higher, but showed no bias in treatment recommendations. These findings suggest that individuals with at least some medical training hold and may use false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites to inform medical judgments, which may contribute to racial disparities in pain assessment and treatment.

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies.

PubMed

Schurz, Matthias; Aichhorn, Markus; Martin, Anna; Perner, Josef

2013-01-01

We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted.

Common brain areas engaged in false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies

PubMed Central

Schurz, Matthias; Aichhorn, Markus; Martin, Anna; Perner, Josef

2013-01-01

We performed a quantitative meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies to identify brain areas which are commonly engaged in social and visuo-spatial perspective taking. Specifically, we compared brain activation for visual-perspective taking to activation for false belief reasoning, which requires awareness of perspective to understand someone's mistaken belief about the world which contrasts with reality. In support of a previous account by Perner and Leekam (2008), our meta-analytic conjunction analysis found common activation for false belief reasoning and visual perspective taking in the left but not the right dorsal temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). This fits with the idea that the left dorsal TPJ is responsible for representing different perspectives in a domain-general fashion. Moreover, our conjunction analysis found activation in the precuneus and the left middle occipital gyrus close to the putative Extrastriate Body Area (EBA). The precuneus is linked to mental-imagery which may aid in the construction of a different perspective. The EBA may be engaged due to imagined body-transformations when another's viewpoint is adopted. PMID:24198773

Two Sources of Evidence on the Non-Automaticity of True and False Belief Ascription

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Back, Elisa; Apperly, Ian A.

2010-01-01

A recent study by Apperly et al. (2006) found evidence that adults do not automatically infer false beliefs while watching videos that afford such inferences. This method was extended to examine true beliefs, which are sometimes thought to be ascribed by "default" (e.g., Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Sequences of pictures were presented in which the…

Sociolinguistic Awareness and False Belief in Young Cantonese Learners of English

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cheung, Him; Mak, Wing Yan; Luo, Xueying; Xiao, Wen

2010-01-01

In this study, we examined whether sociolinguistic awareness and false belief were uniquely related in 3- and 4-year-old Cantonese-speaking children learning English as a second language. The English-use background of these children varied so that they possessed sociolinguistic awareness to different degrees. Results indicated that sociolinguistic…

Racial bias in pain assessment and treatment recommendations, and false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites

PubMed Central

Hoffman, Kelly M.; Trawalter, Sophie; Axt, Jordan R.; Oliver, M. Norman

2016-01-01

Black Americans are systematically undertreated for pain relative to white Americans. We examine whether this racial bias is related to false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites (e.g., “black people’s skin is thicker than white people’s skin”). Study 1 documented these beliefs among white laypersons and revealed that participants who more strongly endorsed false beliefs about biological differences reported lower pain ratings for a black (vs. white) target. Study 2 extended these findings to the medical context and found that half of a sample of white medical students and residents endorsed these beliefs. Moreover, participants who endorsed these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient’s pain as lower and made less accurate treatment recommendations. Participants who did not endorse these beliefs rated the black (vs. white) patient’s pain as higher, but showed no bias in treatment recommendations. These findings suggest that individuals with at least some medical training hold and may use false beliefs about biological differences between blacks and whites to inform medical judgments, which may contribute to racial disparities in pain assessment and treatment. PMID:27044069

Exploring learners' beliefs about science reading and scientific epistemic beliefs, and their relations with science text understanding

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yang, Fang-Ying; Chang, Cheng-Chieh; Chen, Li-Ling; Chen, Yi-Chun

2016-07-01

The main purpose of this study was to explore learners' beliefs about science reading and scientific epistemic beliefs, and how these beliefs were associating with their understanding of science texts. About 400 10th graders were involved in the development and validation of the Beliefs about Science Reading Inventory (BSRI). To find the effects of reader beliefs and epistemic beliefs, a new group of 65 10th grade students whose reader and epistemic beliefs were assessed by the newly developed BSRI and an existing SEB questionnaire were invited to take part in a science reading task. Students' text understanding in terms of concept gain and text interpretations was collected and analyzed. By the correlation analysis, it was found that when students had stronger beliefs about meaning construction based on personal goals and experiences (i.e. transaction beliefs), they produced more thematic and critical interpretations of the content of the test article. The regression analysis suggested that students SEBs could predict concept gain as a result of reading. Moreover, among all beliefs examined in the study, transaction beliefs stood out as the best predictor of overall science-text understanding.

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task.

PubMed

Apperly, Ian A; Back, Elisa; Samson, Dana; France, Lisa

2008-03-01

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.

Temporo-parietal junction activity in theory-of-mind tasks: falseness, beliefs, or attention.

PubMed

Aichhorn, Markus; Perner, Josef; Weiss, Benjamin; Kronbichler, Martin; Staffen, Wolfgang; Ladurner, Gunther

2009-06-01

By combining the false belief (FB) and photo (PH) vignettes to identify theory-of-mind areas with the false sign (FS) vignettes, we re-establish the functional asymmetry between the left and right temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). The right TPJ (TPJ-R) is specially sensitive to processing belief information, whereas the left TPJ (TPJ-L) is equally responsible for FBs as well as FSs. Measuring BOLD at two time points in each vignette, at the time the FB-inducing information (or lack of information) is presented and at the time the test question is processed, made clear that the FB is processed spontaneously as soon as the relevant information is presented and not on demand for answering the question in contrast to extant behavioral data. Finally, a fourth, true belief vignette (TB) required teleological reasoning, that is, prediction of a rational action without any doubts being raised about the adequacy of the actor's information about reality. Activation by this vignette supported claims that the TPJ-R is activated by TBs as well as FBs.

Theory of mind through the ages: older and middle-aged adults exhibit more errors than do younger adults on a continuous false belief task.

PubMed

Bernstein, Daniel M; Thornton, Wendy Loken; Sommerville, Jessica A

2011-10-01

Theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to understand mental states, is a fundamental aspect of social cognition. Previous research has documented marked advances in ToM in preschoolers, and declines in ToM in older-aged adults. In the present study, younger (n=37), middle-aged (n=20), and older (n=37) adults completed a continuous false belief task measuring ToM. Middle-aged and older adults exhibited more false belief bias than did younger adults, irrespective of language ability, executive function, processing speed, and memory. The authors conclude that ToM declines from younger to older adulthood, independent of age-related changes to domain-general cognitive functioning.

Functional activity of the right temporo-parietal junction and of the medial prefrontal cortex associated with true and false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Döhnel, Katrin; Schuwerk, Tobias; Meinhardt, Jörg; Sodian, Beate; Hajak, Göran; Sommer, Monika

2012-04-15

Since false belief reasoning requires mental state representation independently of the state of reality, it is seen as a key ability in Theory of Mind (ToM). Although true beliefs do not have to be processed independently of the state of reality, growing behavioural evidence indicates that true belief reasoning is different from just reasoning about the state of reality. So far, neural studies on true and false belief reasoning revealed inconsistent findings in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and in the right temporo-parietal junction (R-TPJ), brain regions that are hypothesized to play an important role in ToM. To further explore true and false belief reasoning, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in eighteen adult subjects used methodological refinements such as ensuring that the true belief trials did not elicit false belief reasoning, as well as including paralleled control conditions requiring reasoning about the state of reality. When compared to its control condition, common R-TPJ activity was observed for true and false belief reasoning, supporting its role in belief reasoning in general, and indicating that, at least in adults, also true belief reasoning appears to be different from reasoning about the state of reality. Differential activity was observed in a broad network of brain regions such as the MPFC, the inferior frontal cortex, and the precuneus. False over true belief reasoning induced activation in the posterior MPFC (pMPFC), supporting its role in the decoupling mechanisms, which is defined as processing a mental state independently of the state of reality. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The Origins of Belief Representation: Monkeys Fail to Automatically Represent Others’ Beliefs

PubMed Central

Martin, Alia; Santos, Laurie R.

2014-01-01

Young infants’ successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)’s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate species—the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)—is automatically influenced by another agent’s beliefs when tracking an object’s location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple’s movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys’ belief (true or false) and agent’s belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys’ expectations were not influenced by another agent’s beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans. PMID:24374209

The origins of belief representation: monkeys fail to automatically represent others' beliefs.

PubMed

Martin, Alia; Santos, Laurie R

2014-03-01

Young infants' successful performance on false belief tasks has led several researchers to argue that there may be a core knowledge system for representing the beliefs of other agents, emerging early in human development and constraining automatic belief processing into adulthood. One way to investigate this purported core belief representation system is to examine whether non-human primates share such a system. Although non-human primates have historically performed poorly on false belief tasks that require executive function capacities, little work has explored how primates perform on more automatic measures of belief processing. To get at this issue, we modified Kovács et al. (2010)'s test of automatic belief representation to examine whether one non-human primate species--the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)--is automatically influenced by another agent's beliefs when tracking an object's location. Monkeys saw an event in which a human agent watched an apple move back and forth between two boxes and an outcome in which one box was revealed to be empty. By occluding segments of the apple's movement from either the monkey or the agent, we manipulated both the monkeys' belief (true or false) and agent's belief (true or false) about the final location of the apple. We found that monkeys looked longer at events that violated their own beliefs than at events that were consistent with their beliefs. In contrast to human infants, however, monkeys' expectations were not influenced by another agent's beliefs, suggesting that belief representation may be an aspect of core knowledge unique to humans. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Spirituality and Ten False Beliefs and Pursuits of Women with Eating Disorders: Implications for Counselors.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hardman, Randy K.; Berrett, Michael E.; Richards, P. Scott

2003-01-01

Authors describe ten false beliefs that women with eating disorders may hold. They explain how the pursuit of these beliefs can prevent the women from connecting with God and with others in genuine ways. They also suggest some therapeutic strategies that may help women with eating disorders find a healing and helpful spiritual perspective.…

Testing the Domain-Specificity of a Theory of Mind Deficit in Brain-Injured Patients: Evidence for Consistent Performance on Non-Verbal, ''Reality-Unknown'' False Belief and False Photograph Tasks

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Samson, Dana; Chiavarino, Claudia; Bickerton, Wai-Ling; Humphreys, Glyn W.

2007-01-01

To test the domain-specificity of ''theory of mind'' abilities we compared the performance of a case-series of 11 brain-lesioned patients on a recently developed test of false belief reasoning (Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004) and on a matched false photograph task, which did not require belief reasoning and which addressed problems…

Assessing true and false belief in young children with cerebral palsy through anticipatory gaze behaviours: a pilot study.

PubMed

Clarke, Michael T; Loganathan, Deborah; Swettenham, John

2012-01-01

Children with a clinical description of cerebral palsy (CP) commonly experience cognitive and sensory difficulties that co-occur with motor impairment, and for some children this can include impairments in social communication. While research has begun to examine theory of mind abilities in children with CP, relatively little is known about social communication difficulties in this population. Assessing theory of mind abilities in children with CP using traditional procedures such as the classic Sally-Anne task can be problematic if performance is affected by physical difficulties in signalling responses and/or by cognitive and language demands inherent to the task itself. The central aim of this study therefore was to examine the potential of using a new action anticipation task and eye-tracking technique to assess implicit true and false belief understanding in four developmentally young children with quadriplegic cerebral palsy who had little or no functional speech, and one language age matched child with Down syndrome who did not have severe motor impairment. All children in this study consistently demonstrated anticipatory gaze behaviours in the context of the true belief task. One child with CP and the child with Down syndrome demonstrated anticipatory gaze behaviours indicative of an ability to attribute false belief. The findings are discussed in relation to the application of action anticipation and eye-tracking paradigms in research and clinical practice. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Language and false belief: evidence for general, not specific, effects in cantonese-speaking preschoolers.

PubMed

Tardif, Twila; So, Catherine Wing-Chee; Kaciroti, Niko

2007-03-01

Two studies were conducted with Cantonese-speaking preschoolers examining J. de Villiers's (1995) hypothesis that syntactic complements play a unique role in the acquisition of false belief (FB). In Study 1, the authors found a positive correlation between FB and syntactic complements in 72 four- to six-year-old Cantonese-speaking preschoolers. Study 2 followed 72 three- to five-year-old Cantonese-speaking children who initially failed an FB screening task and were then tested on general language abilities, short-term memory, inhibition, nonverbal IQ, and on FB and complement tasks. Once age and initial FB understanding were controlled for in both multiple regression and hierarchical linear modeling analyses, complements no longer uniquely predicted FB. Instead, individual differences in general language abilities and short-term memory contributed to the variation in both complements and FB.

Exploring Learners' Beliefs about Science Reading and Scientific Epistemic Beliefs, and Their Relations with Science Text Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yang, Fang-Ying; Chang, Cheng-Chieh; Chen, Li-Ling; Chen, Yi-Chun

2016-01-01

The main purpose of this study was to explore learners' beliefs about science reading and scientific epistemic beliefs, and how these beliefs were associating with their understanding of science texts. About 400 10th graders were involved in the development and validation of the Beliefs about Science Reading Inventory (BSRI). To find the effects…

Young children have difficulty ascribing true beliefs.

PubMed

Riggs, Kevin J; Simpson, Andrew

2005-05-01

Using the format of a false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), we investigated the ability of 88 3- and 4-year-olds to ascribe a previously held true belief to a story protagonist. In an unexpected transfer task, children found true belief ascription as difficult as false belief ascription even though they could answer memory questions about story details. Results are discussed in relation to theoretical accounts of theory of mind development that stress the importance of understanding the falsity of belief, and those accounts that stress the importance of information or executive processes.

Early Bilingualism Enhances Mechanisms of False-Belief Reasoning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kovacs, Agnes Melinda

2009-01-01

In their first years, children's understanding of mental states seems to improve dramatically, but the mechanisms underlying these changes are still unclear. Such "theory of mind" (ToM) abilities may arise during development, or have an innate basis, developmental changes reflecting limitations of other abilities involved in ToM tasks (e.g.…

Writing on the walls: Geological context and early American spiritual beliefs

USGS Publications Warehouse

Hough, S.E.; ,

2007-01-01

Native American culture in many parts of California is preserved in fragmentary oral and conventional written histories, but also in sometimes dramatic petroglyphs and pictographs throughout the state. The symbolism of these images has been interpreted to reflect the natural environment, in particular issues related to rain. Although there is little doubt that rain was of paramount concern to native tribes, I suggest that geological context also played an important role in shaping early spiritual beliefs in general, and petroglyph sites in particular. From the standpoint of Native American philosophies and spiritual beliefs, geological unrest is not merely a reflection but in some cases an actual embodiment of the spiritual world. To understand the significance of petroglyph sites, they must be considered in the context of overall Native American beliefs. In this context, sites of repeated geological unrest would invariably have evolved great spiritual significance. Petroglyph locations and ages may thus provide independent age controls on 'prehistoric' earthquakes in California. ?? The Geological Society of London 2007.

The overlap between false belief and spatial reorientation in the temporo-parietal junction: The role of input modality and task.

PubMed

Özdem, Ceylan; Brass, Marcel; Van der Cruyssen, Laurens; Van Overwalle, Frank

2017-04-01

Neuroimaging research has demonstrated that the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) is activated when unexpected stimuli appear in spatial reorientation tasks as well as during thinking about the beliefs of other people triggered by verbal scenarios. While the role of potential common component processes subserved by the TPJ has been extensively studied to explain this common activation, the potential confounding role of input modality (spatial vs. verbal) has been largely ignored. To investigate the role of input modality apart from task processes, we developed a novel spatial false belief task based on moving shapes. We explored the overlap in TPJ activation across this novel task and traditional tasks of spatial reorientation (Posner) and verbal belief (False Belief vs. Photo stories). The results show substantial overlap across the same spatial input modality (both reorientation and false belief) as well as across the common task process (verbal and spatial belief), but no triple overlap. This suggests the potential for an overarching function of the TPJ, with some degree of specialization in different subregions due to modality, function and connectivity. The results are discussed with respect to recent theoretical models of the TPJ.

The Relationships among Early Childhood Educators' Beliefs, Knowledge Bases, and Practices Related to Early Literacy.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Islam, Chhanda

A study was conducted to determine and compare the literacy beliefs, knowledge bases, and practices of early childhood educators who espouse emergent literacy and reading readiness philosophies; to explore the relationship among beliefs, knowledge bases, and practices; and to examine the degree to which beliefs, knowledge bases, and practices were…

2.5-Year-Olds Succeed at a Verbal Anticipatory-Looking False-Belief Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

He, Zijing; Bolz, Matthias; Baillargeon, Renee

2012-01-01

Recent research suggests that infants and toddlers succeed at a wide range of non-elicited-response false-belief tasks (i.e., tasks that do not require children to answer a direct question about a mistaken agent's likely behaviour). However, one exception to this generalization comes from verbal anticipatory-looking tasks, which have produced…

18-Month-Olds Predict Specific Action Mistakes through Attribution of False Belief, Not Ignorance, and Intervene Accordingly

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Knudsen, Birgit; Liszkowski, Ulf

2012-01-01

This study employed a new "anticipatory intervening" paradigm to tease apart false belief and ignorance-based interpretations of 18-month-olds' helpful informing. We investigated in three experiments whether 18-month-old infants inform an adult selectively about one of the two locations depending on the adult's belief about which of the two…

Preschoolers’ Development of Theory of Mind: The Contribution of Understanding Psychological Causality in Stories

PubMed Central

Sanefuji, Wakako; Haryu, Etsuko

2018-01-01

This study investigated the relationship between children’s abilities to understand causal sequences and another’s false belief. In Experiment 1, we tested 3-, 4-, 5-, and 6-year-old children (n = 28, 28, 27, and 27, respectively) using false belief and picture sequencing tasks involving mechanical, behavioral, and psychological causality. Understanding causal sequences in mechanical, behavioral, and psychological stories was related to understanding other’s false beliefs. In Experiment 2, children who failed the initial false belief task (n = 50) were reassessed 5 months later. High scorers in the sequencing of the psychological stories in Experiment 1 were more likely to pass the standard false belief task than were the low scorers. Conversely, understanding causal sequences in the mechanical and behavioral stories in Experiment 1 did not predict passing the false belief task in Experiment 2. Thus, children may understand psychological causality before they are able to use it to understand false beliefs.

Making sense of theory of mind and paranoia: the psychometric properties and reasoning requirements of a false belief sequencing task.

PubMed

Corcoran, Rhiannon; Bentall, Richard P; Rowse, Georgina; Moore, Rosanne; Cummins, Sinead; Blackwood, Nigel; Howard, Robert; Shryane, Nick M

2011-11-01

INTRODUCTION. This study used Item-Response Theory (IRT) to model the psychometric properties of a false belief picture sequencing task. Consistent with the mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia, we anticipated that performance on this deductive theory of mind (ToM) task would not be associated with the presence of persecutory delusions but would be related to other clinical, cognitive, and demographic factors. METHOD. A large (N=237) and diverse clinical and nonclinical sample differing in levels of depression and paranoid ideation performed 2 ToM tasks: the false belief sequencing task and a ToM stories task that was used to assess the validity of the false belief sequencing task as a measure of ToM. RESULTS. A unidimensional IRT model was found to fit the data well. Latent ToM ability as measured by the false belief sequencing task was negatively related with age and positively with IQ. In contrast to the ToM stories measure, there was no association between clinical diagnosis or symptoms and false belief picture sequencing after controlling for age and IQ. CONCLUSIONS. In line with mental time travel hypothesis of paranoia (Corcoran, 2010 ), performance on this deductive nonverbal ToM task is not related to the presence of paranoid symptoms. This measure is best suited for assessing ToM functioning where participants' performance falls just short of the average latent ToM ability. Furthermore, it is sensitive to the effects of increasing age and decreasing IQ.

Explaining body size beliefs in anorexia.

PubMed

Gadsby, Stephen

2017-11-01

Cognitive neuropsychiatry has had much success in providing theoretical models for the causal origins of many delusional beliefs. Recently, it has been suggested that some anorexia nervosa patients' beliefs about their own body size should be considered delusions. As such, it seems high time the methods of cognitive neuropsychiatry were turned to modelling the false body size beliefs of anorexics. In this paper, I adopt an empiricist approach to modelling the causal origins of false body size beliefs in anorexia. Within the background of cognitive neuropsychiatry, empiricist models claim that abnormal beliefs are grounded by abnormal experiences bearing similar content. I discuss the kinds of abnormal experiences of body size anorexics suffer from which could ground their false beliefs about body size. These oversized experiences come in three varieties: false self-other body comparisons, spontaneous mental imagery of a fat body and distorted perception of affordances. Further theoretical and empirical research into the oversized experiences which anorexics suffer from presents a promising avenue for understanding and treating the disorder.

Seeing Things Unseen: Fantasy Beliefs and False Reports

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Principe, Gabrielle F.; Smith, Eric

2008-01-01

Whereas past research has demonstrated that children's beliefs about the real world can influence their memory for events, the role of fantasy beliefs in children's recall remains largely unexplored. We examine this topic in 5- and 6-year-olds by focusing on how belief in a familiar fantasy figure, namely the Tooth Fairy, is related to children's…

Belief, Knowledge and Understanding. How to Deal with the Relations Between Different Cultural Perspectives in Classrooms

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Moreira-dos-Santos, Frederik; El-Hani, Charbel N.

2017-05-01

This article discusses how to deal with the relations between different cultural perspectives in classrooms, based on a proposal for considering understanding and knowledge as goals of science education, inspired by Dewey's naturalistic humanism. It thus combines educational and philosophical interests. In educational terms, our concerns relate to how science teachers position themselves in multicultural classrooms. In philosophical terms, we are interested in discussing the relations between belief, understanding, and knowledge under the light of Dewey's philosophy. We present a synthesis of Dewey's theory of inquiry through his naturalistic humanism and discuss its implications for the concepts of belief, understanding, and knowledge, as well as for the goals of science teaching. In particular, we highlight problems arising in the context of possible conflicts between scientific and religious claims in the school environment that result from totalitarian positions. We characterize an individual's position as totalitarian if he or she takes some way of thinking as the only one capable of expressing the truth about all that exists in the world, lacks open-mindedness to understand different interpretative perspectives, and attempts to impose her or his interpretation about the facts to others by violent means or not. From this stance, any other perspective is taken to be false a priori and, accordingly, as a putative target to be suppressed or adapted to the privileged way of thinking. We argue, instead, for a more fallibilist evaluation of our own beliefs and a more respectful appraisal of the diversity of students' beliefs by both students and teachers.

Seeing May Not Mean Believing: Examining Students' Understandings & Beliefs in Evolution

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Cavallo, Ann M. L.; McCall, David

2008-01-01

Science education currently has incomplete understandings of potential relationships between students' beliefs in Nature of Science (NOS) and evolution, and how these beliefs may be related to scientific understandings of evolution. Because of evolution's prominence in science education, curricula decisions, and the future of science teaching and…

Tracking Speakers' False Beliefs: Is Theory of Mind Available Earlier for Word Learning?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Houston-Price, Carmel; Goddard, Kate; Seclier, Catherine; Grant, Sally C.; Reid, Caitlin J. B.; Boyden, Laura E.; Williams, Rhiannon

2011-01-01

Happe and Loth (2002) describe word learning as a "privileged domain" in the development of a theory of mind. We test this claim in a series of experiments based on the Sally-Anne paradigm. Three- and 4-year-old children's ability to represent others' false beliefs was investigated in tasks that required the child either to predict the actions of…

How Children with Autism Reason about Other's Intentions: False-Belief and Counterfactual Inferences

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rasga, Célia; Quelhas, Ana Cristina; Byrne, Ruth M. J.

2017-01-01

We examine false belief and counterfactual reasoning in children with autism with a new change-of-intentions task. Children listened to stories, for example, Anne is picking up toys and John hears her say she wants to find her ball. John goes away and the reason for Anne's action changes--Anne's mother tells her to tidy her bedroom. We asked,…

Early Years Teachers' Epistemic Beliefs and Beliefs about Children's Moral Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Walker, S.; Brownlee, J.; Whiteford, C.; Cobb-Moore, C.; Johansson, E.; Ailwood, J.; Boulton-Lewis, G.

2012-01-01

There is strong political and social interest in values education both internationally and across Australia. Investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society; however, little is known about early years teachers' beliefs about moral values teaching and learning. The aim of the…

Science teachers' worldviews: A way to understand beliefs and practices

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yalaki, Yalcin

Understanding science teachers' beliefs is important for science teacher educators, because such understanding is a prerequisite for promoting change within the framework of educational reform. The worldview model developed by Graves (1981) and Beck and Cowan (1996) provides a holistic approach to understanding teachers' beliefs and values and it also provides a framework for understanding how people's worldviews change. In this study, worldviews of four science teachers were investigated within the framework of Beck and Cowan's model. Two of these teachers were high school science teachers, while the other two were middle school science teachers. One of the teachers held National Board of Professional Teaching Certification and she had 18 years of teaching experience. Another teacher was a relatively new teacher with three years of teaching experience. The third teacher had nine years of teaching experience, but when this study was conducted, it was her first year of teaching science. The other teacher had 26 years of experience with certification in all science areas. During this study, interpretative qualitative methods of data collection and analysis were used which included interviews, observations, and the use of a survey developed by Beck and Cowan (2000) called the Values Test. The results show that differing values and experiences among science teachers leads to different strategies for making sense of science teaching. The assertion that the worldview perspective provided by Beck and Cowan is a useful tool in understanding teachers' beliefs and values is made in the conclusions. Teacher educators can utilize this tool in research about teacher beliefs, in promoting change for reform, or in developing curriculum for teacher education programs. Teachers can utilize it in self-reflective practices to better understand their own beliefs, their context, and their students and ultimately improve the teaching and learning process they engage in.

False belief and relative clauses in Autism Spectrum Disorders.

PubMed

Durrleman, Stephanie; Hinzen, Wolfram; Franck, Julie

Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of language that relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear. Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect, arguably implied in FB, one expects a link between FB and not only complementation but also relativization. Seventeen children with ASD (6 to 16 years, mean age 9;2) were assessed for RCs and FB. Comprehension of RCs significantly predicted FB performance, while none of the controlled factors played a predictive role (comprehension of simple sentences, vocabulary, morpho-syntax and working memory). Findings suggest that clausal embedding, common to both sentential complements and RCs, serves as a bootstrap for FB reasoning. Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Error analyses reveal contrasting deficits in "theory of mind": neuropsychological evidence from a 3-option false belief task.

PubMed

Samson, Dana; Apperly, Ian A; Humphreys, Glyn W

2007-06-18

Perspective taking is a crucial ability that guides our social interactions. In this study, we show how the specific patterns of errors of brain-damaged patients in perspective taking tasks can help us further understand the factors contributing to perspective taking abilities. Previous work [e.g., Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Chiavarino, C., & Humphreys, G. W. (2004). Left temporoparietal junction is necessary for representing someone else's belief. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 499-500; Samson, D., Apperly, I. A., Kathirgamanathan, U., & Humphreys, G. W. (2005). Seeing it my way: A case of a selective deficit in inhibiting self-perspective. Brain, 128, 1102-1111] distinguished two components of perspective taking: the ability to inhibit our own perspective and the ability to infer someone else's perspective. We assessed these components using a new nonverbal false belief task which provided different response options to detect three types of response strategies that participants might be using: a complete and spared belief reasoning strategy, a reality-based response selection strategy in which participants respond from their own perspective, and a simplified mentalising strategy in which participants avoid responding from their own perspective but rely on inaccurate cues to infer the other person's belief. One patient, with a self-perspective inhibition deficit, almost always used the reality-based response strategy; in contrast, the other patient, with a deficit in taking other perspectives, tended to use the simplified mentalising strategy without necessarily transposing her own perspective. We discuss the extent to which the pattern of performance of both patients could relate to their executive function deficit and how it can inform us on the cognitive and neural components involved in belief reasoning.

Language and False Belief: Evidence for General, Not Specific, Effects in Cantonese-Speaking Preschoolers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Tardif, Twila; So, Catherine Wing-Chee; Kaciroti, Niko

2007-01-01

Two studies were conducted with Cantonese-speaking preschoolers examining J. de Villiers's (1995) hypothesis that syntactic complements play a unique role in the acquisition of false belief (FB). In Study 1, the authors found a positive correlation between FB and syntactic complements in 72 four- to six-year-old Cantonese-speaking preschoolers.…

Relations between temperament and theory of mind development in the United States and China: biological and behavioral correlates of preschoolers' false-belief understanding.

PubMed

Lane, Jonathan D; Wellman, Henry M; Olson, Sheryl L; Miller, Alison L; Wang, Li; Tardif, Twila

2013-05-01

The emotional reactivity hypothesis holds that, over the course of phylogeny, the selection of animals with less reactive temperaments supported the development of sophisticated social-cognitive skills in several species, including humans (Hare, 2007). In the ontogenetic human case, an emotional reactivity hypothesis predicts that children with less reactive temperaments will reach certain milestones in theory-of-mind (ToM) development more quickly. We examined relations between temperament and false-belief understanding in 102 preschool-age children from China and the United States. Temperament was measured via parental ratings of behavior as well as with physiological measures of children's reactivity (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis reactivity gauged via salivary cortisol). In accord with an emotional reactivity hypothesis, children with certain reactive temperaments--specifically, those who were more aggressive and those who were both socially withdrawn and physiologically reactive--evidenced poorer social-cognition. However, our findings also force amendment to the ontogenetic emotional reactivity hypothesis. For the majority of children in both countries, physiological reactivity predicted more advanced ToM, perhaps by facilitating social engagement and attention to social stimuli. Moreover, children who were withdrawn from social interaction yet nonreactive, especially Chinese children of this temperament, evidenced advanced ToM. Thus, some forms of social disengagement may foster social-cognitive development in certain sociocultural contexts.

The Back Belief Questionnaire is efficient to assess false beliefs and related fear in low back pain populations: A transcultural adaptation and validation study.

PubMed

Dupeyron, Arnaud; Lanhers, Charlotte; Bastide, Sophie; Alonso, Sandrine; Toulotte, Matthias; Jourdan, Claire; Coudeyre, Emmanuel

2017-01-01

According to the fear avoidance model, beliefs and thoughts can modify the outcome of patient with low back pain. The Back Belief Questionnaire (BBQ)-a 14 items scale-assesses these consequences of low back pain. To test the psychometric properties of the French version of the BBQ. The BBQ was translated using the forward-backward translation process. Throughout three repeated evaluation time points (D1, D7 and D30), various aspects of validity were analysed: acceptability, quality of items, unidimentionality, internal consistency, temporal stability (between D1 and D7), responsiveness (between D7 and D30), and construct validity comparing it to other validated scales. One hundred and thirty-one patients were enrolled and 128 were analyzed. The acceptability and the quality of the items were excellent. The scale was unidimensional and reliable (internal consistency: Cronbach's α = 0.8). The responsiveness was moderate but in line with other scores. The BBQ was, as expected, convergent with day-to-day activities and fear avoidance (FABQ and Tampa), disability (Quebec and Dallas scores), or anxiety and depression (HAD); and not correlated with pain. Best correlations were found with Tampa and FABQ. The temporal stability (test-retest reliability) was poor. However, similar changes were observed in near conceptual score (FABQ), which confirmed that clinical status may have not been stable and suggesting sensitivity to early changes for BBQ. The BBQ showed good psychometric properties to assess false beliefs and related fear in French or English LBP populations and can be used either for evaluation in international trials or as a part of self-care training.

Epistemic Beliefs and Conceptual Understanding in Biotechnology: A Case Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rebello, Carina M.; Siegel, Marcelle A.; Witzig, Stephen B.; Freyermuth, Sharyn K.; McClure, Bruce A.

2012-01-01

The purpose of this investigation was to explore students' epistemic beliefs and conceptual understanding of biotechnology. Epistemic beliefs can influence reasoning, how individuals evaluate information, and informed decision making abilities. These skills are important for an informed citizenry that will participate in debates regarding areas in…

Monkeys Represent Others' Knowledge but Not Their Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Marticorena, Drew C. W.; Ruiz, April M.; Mukerji, Cora; Goddu, Anna; Santos, Laurie R.

2011-01-01

The capacity to reason about the false beliefs of others is classically considered the benchmark for a fully fledged understanding of the mental lives of others. Although much is known about the developmental origins of our understanding of others' beliefs, we still know much less about the evolutionary origins of this capacity. Here, we examine…

The Cost of Thinking about False Beliefs: Evidence from Adults' Performance on a Non-Inferential Theory of Mind Task

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Back, Elisa; Samson, Dana; France, Lisa

2008-01-01

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young…

Young Children's Understanding of Beliefs about Moral and Conventional Rule Violations

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Conry-Murray, Clare

2013-01-01

Children of ages 3-5 ("N" = 62) were assessed by using standard theory-of-mind tasks and unusual belief tasks related to false information and beliefs endorsing violations of moral (welfare and fairness) and social conventional (school rules) domains. Younger children (under 5 years) did not accurately attribute unusual factual beliefs…

Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning.

PubMed

Spunt, Robert P; Elison, Jed T; Dufour, Nicholas; Hurlemann, René; Saxe, Rebecca; Adolphs, Ralph

2015-04-14

The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people's mental states as distinct from one's own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM--false-belief reasoning--suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition.

Amygdala lesions do not compromise the cortical network for false-belief reasoning

PubMed Central

Elison, Jed T.; Dufour, Nicholas; Hurlemann, René; Saxe, Rebecca; Adolphs, Ralph

2015-01-01

The amygdala plays an integral role in human social cognition and behavior, with clear links to emotion recognition, trust judgments, anthropomorphization, and psychiatric disorders ranging from social phobia to autism. A central feature of human social cognition is a theory-of-mind (ToM) that enables the representation other people's mental states as distinct from one's own. Numerous neuroimaging studies of the best studied use of ToM—false-belief reasoning—suggest that it relies on a specific cortical network; moreover, the amygdala is structurally and functionally connected with many components of this cortical network. It remains unknown whether the cortical implementation of any form of ToM depends on amygdala function. Here we investigated this question directly by conducting functional MRI on two patients with rare bilateral amygdala lesions while they performed a neuroimaging protocol standardized for measuring cortical activity associated with false-belief reasoning. We compared patient responses with those of two healthy comparison groups that included 480 adults. Based on both univariate and multivariate comparisons, neither patient showed any evidence of atypical cortical activity or any evidence of atypical behavioral performance; moreover, this pattern of typical cortical and behavioral response was replicated for both patients in a follow-up session. These findings argue that the amygdala is not necessary for the cortical implementation of ToM in adulthood and suggest a reevaluation of the role of the amygdala and its cortical interactions in human social cognition. PMID:25825732

Mind and body: concepts of human cognition, physiology and false belief in children with autism or typical development.

PubMed

Peterson, Candida C

2005-08-01

This study examined theory of mind (ToM) and concepts of human biology (eyes, heart, brain, lungs and mind) in a sample of 67 children, including 25 high functioning children with autism (age 6-13), plus age-matched and preschool comparison groups. Contrary to Baron-Cohen [1989, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 19(4), 579-600], most children with autism correctly understood the functions of the brain (84%) and the mind (64%). Their explanations were predominantly mentalistic. They outperformed typically developing preschoolers in understanding inner physiological (heart, lungs) and cognitive (brain, mind) systems, and scored as high as age-matched typical children. Yet, in line with much previous ToM research, most children with autism (60%) failed false belief, and their ToM performance was unrelated to their understanding of. human biology. Results were discussed in relation to neurobiological and social-experiential accounts of the ToM deficit in autism.

Our "increasingly mobile society"? The curious persistence of a false belief.

PubMed

Wolf, Douglas A; Longino, Charles F

2005-02-01

We call attention to the widespread belief that the United States is an "increasingly mobile society," despite the fact that overall mobility has generally declined since about 1950, and interstate mobility has generally not increased during the same period. We review and extend past research documenting these mobility trends. We describe population-level mobility for people of all ages as well as for several adult age groups, using published data from the U.S. Current Population Survey. We use simple regression methods to estimate the size and significance of mobility trends. Overall mobility rates have declined for individuals of all ages and among all age groups. The largest average annual declines occur for 20- to 29-year-olds, although the rate of decline for those aged 65 and older is also large. Interstate mobility has declined slightly or remained constant, except among adults between 45 and 64 years old. Although there may be good reasons to worry about the future of family care provided to elderly individuals, increased geographic mobility does not appear to be one of them. We speculate on reasons why the false belief persists.

Beliefs Regarding Development and Early Intervention Among Low-Income African American and Hispanic Mothers.

PubMed

Magnusson, Dawn M; Minkovitz, Cynthia S; Kuhlthau, Karen A; Caballero, Tania M; Mistry, Kamila B

2017-11-01

Understand the role of health beliefs in shaping maternal decisions regarding help-seeking for children with developmental delay (DD) and explore differences between African American and Hispanic mothers. Open-ended, semistructured interviews were conducted with African American and Hispanic mothers of children aged 0 to 36 months with DD. Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed by using inductive content analysis. Mothers ( n = 22) were African American (36%) or Hispanic (64%), 25 to 34 years old (64%), had less than a high school education (59%), and had children receiving public insurance (95%). Five major themes emerged describing the role of maternal health beliefs in shaping key stages of the help-seeking pathway for children with DD: (1) "I can see" (observing other children and making comparisons); (2) "Children are different and develop in their own time" (perceiving that their child might be different, but not necessarily delayed); (3) "It's not that I don't trust the doctor" (relying on social networks rather than pediatricians to inform the help-seeking pathway); (4) "I got so much going on" (difficulty prioritizing early intervention [EI] because of competing stressors); and (5) limited and conflicting information (delaying or forgoing EI because of limited or conflicting information). Differences between African American and Hispanic mothers are also described. Understanding maternal health beliefs and expectations regarding DD and EI, acknowledging the influence of social networks on help-seeking, and addressing social and financial stressors are critical to ensuring that children with DD are identified and supported at an early age. Copyright © 2017 by the American Academy of Pediatrics.

Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?

PubMed

Yazdi, Amir Amin; German, Tim P; Defeyter, Margaret Anne; Siegal, Michael

2006-06-01

There is a change in false belief task performance across the 3-5 year age range, as confirmed in a recent meta-analysis [Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory mind development: The truth about false-belief. Child Development, 72, 655-684]. This meta-analysis identified several performance factors influencing success, including manipulations that highlight the salience of the initial belief content (such as asking where Sally will look first for the marble). However, because a proportion of variance in performance remained unexplained even when identified performance factors were controlled for, the authors concluded from the standpoint of a 'theory-theory' account that children's improvement is the result of conceptual change. Further, the meta-analysis showed that manipulations such as 'look first' improve performance only in children who are in the older part of the 3-5 year range, and thus plausibly operating with a 'transitional' theory of mind--just on the point of realizing conceptual change. Here, we present three studies systematically investigating the 'look first' manipulation which showed that: (i) the advantage for the look first question can be demonstrated in children across different cultures, (ii) look first has an effect that is additive to the improvement with age; there is no interaction such that older children gain more benefit from younger children, (iii) performance in younger children can be, but is not always, elevated to levels that are statistically above chance. These results challenge the theory-theory account and are discussed in terms of models of belief-desire reasoning in which both conceptual competence and performance factors play central roles.

Early Writing Development: Kindergarten Teachers' Beliefs about Emergent Writing in Qatari Preschool Settings

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Al-Maadadi, Fatima; Ihmeideh, Fathi

2016-01-01

Writing often begins during the very early years of childhood; however, some children first learn writing when they begin attending school. Teachers' beliefs about early writing development can influence when and how children learn to write. The purpose of this study was to determine kindergarten teachers' beliefs about the development of…

Children's Understanding That Utterances Emanate from Minds: Using Speaker Belief To Aid Interpretation.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Mitchell, Peter; Robinson, Elizabeth J.; Thompson, Doreen E.

1999-01-01

Three experiments examined 3- to 6-year olds' ability to use a speaker's utterance based on false belief to identify which of several referents was intended. Found that many 4- to 5-year olds performed correctly only when it was unnecessary to consider the speaker's belief. When the speaker gave an ambiguous utterance, many 3- to 6-year olds…

Exploring the Relationship between Physics-Related Epistemological Beliefs and Physics Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Stathopoulou, Christina; Vosniadou, Stella

2007-01-01

Three studies are reported that investigated the relationship between secondary school students' physics-related epistemological beliefs and physics conceptual understanding. Study 1 involved the development of a Greek Epistemological Beliefs Evaluation Instrument for Physics (GEBEP) which was administered to 394 students (10th graders). Study 2…

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection.

PubMed

Leslie, Alan M; German, Tim P; Polizzi, Pamela

2005-02-01

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously

Right and Righteous: Children's Incipient Understanding and Evaluation of True and False Statements

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lyon, Thomas D.; Quas, Jodi A.; Carrick, Nathalie

2013-01-01

Two studies examined young children's early understanding and evaluation of truth telling and lying and the role that factuality plays in their judgments. Study 1 (one hundred four 2- to 5-year-olds) found that even the youngest children reliably accepted true statements and rejected false statements and that older children's ability to…

Language and theory of mind in autism spectrum disorder: the relationship between complement syntax and false belief task performance.

PubMed

Lind, Sophie E; Bowler, Dermot M

2009-06-01

This study aimed to test the hypothesis that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) use their knowledge of complement syntax as a means of "hacking out" solutions to false belief tasks, despite lacking a representational theory of mind (ToM). Participants completed a "memory for complements" task, a measure of receptive vocabulary, and traditional location change and unexpected contents false belief tasks. Consistent with predictions, the correlation between complement syntax score and location change task performance was significantly stronger within the ASD group than within the comparison group. However, contrary to predictions, complement syntax score was not significantly correlated with unexpected contents task performance within either group. Possible explanations for this pattern of results are considered.

“Queasy does it”: False alcohol beliefs and memories may lead to diminished alcohol preferences

PubMed Central

Clifasefi, Seema L.; Bernstein, Daniel M.; Mantonakis, Antonia; Loftus, Elizabeth F.

2013-01-01

Studies have shown that false memories can be implanted via innocuous suggestions, and that these memories can play a role in shaping people’s subsequent attitudes and preferences. The current study explored whether participants (N=147) who received a false suggestion that they had become ill drinking a particular type of alcohol would increase their confidence that the event had occurred, and whether their new-found belief would subsequently affect their alcohol preferences. Results indicated that participants who received a suggestion that they had gotten sick drinking rum or vodka before the age of 16 reported increased confidence that the suggested experience had occurred. Moreover, participants who received a false alcohol suggestion also showed a strong trend to report diminished preference for the specified type of alcohol after the false suggestion. Implantation of a false memory related to one’s past drinking experiences may influence current drink preferences and could be an important avenue for further exploration in the development of alcohol interventions. PMID:23500110

Resting state morphology predicts the effect of theta burst stimulation in false belief reasoning.

PubMed

Hartwright, Charlotte E; Hardwick, Robert M; Apperly, Ian A; Hansen, Peter C

2016-10-01

When required to represent a perspective that conflicts with one's own, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggests that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (rvlPFC) supports the inhibition of that conflicting self-perspective. The present task dissociated inhibition of self-perspective from other executive control processes by contrasting belief reasoning-a cognitive state where the presence of conflicting perspectives was manipulated-with a conative desire state wherein no systematic conflict existed. Linear modeling was used to examine the effect of continuous theta burst stimulation (cTBS) to rvlPFC on participants' reaction times in belief and desire reasoning. It was anticipated that cTBS applied to rvlPFC would affect belief but not desire reasoning, by modulating activity in the Ventral Attention System (VAS). We further anticipated that this effect would be mediated by functional connectivity within this network, which was identified using resting state fMRI and an unbiased model-free approach. Simple reaction-time analysis failed to detect an effect of cTBS. However, by additionally modeling individual measures from within the stimulated network, the hypothesized effect of cTBS to belief (but, importantly, not desire) reasoning was demonstrated. Structural morphology within the stimulated region, rvlPFC, and right temporoparietal junction were demonstrated to underlie this effect. These data provide evidence that inconsistencies found with cTBS can be mediated by the composition of the functional network that is being stimulated. We suggest that the common claim that this network constitutes the VAS explains the effect of cTBS to this network on false belief reasoning. Hum Brain Mapp 37:3502-3514, 2016. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

A typological analysis: understanding pre-service teacher beliefs and how they are transformed

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Lloyd, Mary Elizabeth Riley

2018-04-01

This article describes the beliefs and their transformations of members of a cohort of early-childhood, elementary and middle-level pre-service teachers (PSTs) as they professionally develop. A typological analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data collected between August 2011 and May 2013 was utilized to categorize how 40 PSTs' beliefs transformed throughout their formal teacher preparation. Five typologies were identified, showing variation in how PST beliefs transform or remain static.

Epistemic Beliefs and Beliefs about Teaching Practices for Moral Learning in the Early Years of School: Relationships and Complexities

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lunn Brownlee, Jo; Johansson, Eva; Cobb-Moore, Charlotte; Boulton-Lewis, Gillian; Walker, Sue; Ailwood, Joanne

2015-01-01

While investment in young children is recognised as important for the development of moral values for a cohesive society, little is known about early years teaching practices that promote learning of moral values. This paper reports on observations and interviews with 11 Australian teachers, focusing on their epistemic beliefs and beliefs about…

Theory of mind: a new perspective on the puzzle of belief ascription.

PubMed

Airenti, Gabriella

2015-01-01

The concept of theory of mind (ToM) has considerably changed since its first proposal. The aim of first human studies was to understand how young children acquire the representation of others' mental states, in particular beliefs, and how they distinguish them from their own and from reality. The False Belief Task was designed to prove the acquisition of this capacity. According to children's performance in this test the acquisition of ToM has been attested at around 4 years of age. In last years it has been shown that using spontaneous response tasks also 15-month-old-children could attribute to an agent a false belief about the location of an object. These results have generated the puzzle of belief-ascription: Why do 3-year-old children fail the classical false belief tasks whereas much younger children show the correct expectation in the spontaneous response tasks? In this paper I shall argue that (i) infants and young children, when confronted with the two forms of false belief tasks do not face the same problem and (ii) behind the two testing situations there are different ways to understand theory of mind. I shall propose that what appears in infants is the natural human disposition to intersubjectivity.

Exploring the Impact of TeachME™ Lab Virtual Classroom Teaching Simulation on Early Childhood Education Majors' Self-Efficacy Beliefs

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Bautista, Nazan Uludag; Boone, William J.

2015-04-01

The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of a mixed-reality teaching environment, called TeachME™ Lab (TML), on early childhood education majors' science teaching self-efficacy beliefs. Sixty-two preservice early childhood teachers participated in the study. Analysis of the quantitative (STEBI-b) and qualitative (journal entries) data revealed that personal science teaching efficacy and science teaching outcome expectancy beliefs increased significantly after one semester of participation in TML. Three key factors impacted preservice teachers' (PST) self-efficacy beliefs in the context of participation in TML: PSTs' perceptions of their science content knowledge, their familiarity with TML technology and avatars, and being observed by peers. Cognitive pedagogical mastery (TML practices), effective/actual modeling, cognitive self-modeling, and emotional arousal were the primary sources that increased the PSTs' perceived self-efficacy beliefs. Overall, the results of this study suggest that the TML is a worthwhile technology for learning to teach in teacher education. It provides a way for PSTs to have a highly personalized learning experience that enables them to improve their understanding and confidence related to teaching science, so that ideally someday they may translate such an experience into their classroom practices.

The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt

PubMed Central

Priewasser, Beate; Sodian, Beate; Perner, Josef

2018-01-01

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325, 883–885 (doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds (N = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds (N = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults (N = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general. PMID:29892412

The robustness and generalizability of findings on spontaneous false belief sensitivity: a replication attempt.

PubMed

Schuwerk, Tobias; Priewasser, Beate; Sodian, Beate; Perner, Josef

2018-05-01

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18 , 587-592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325 , 883-885 (doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds ( N  = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds ( N  = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults ( N  = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.

Similarity between Early and Middle Adolescent Close Friends' Beliefs about Personal Jurisdiction

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Daddis, Christopher

2008-01-01

Similarity in close friends' beliefs about personal jurisdiction was examined using questionnaires and interviews with 162 early (M[subscript age] = 11.82) and middle (M[subscript age] = 15.68) adolescents who were matched with reciprocally nominated close friends. Using the framework of social domain theory, beliefs about personal jurisdiction…

Children's Performance on a False-belief Task Is Impaired by Activation of an Evolutionarily-Canalized Response System.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Keenan, Thomas; Ellis, Bruce J.

2003-01-01

Two studies examined how task content that activates predator-avoidance affects preschool children's performance on a false-belief task. Findings indicated that the proportion of correct answers on the playmate-avoidance task was greater than that for the predator-avoidance task, suggesting that activation of the predator-avoidance system…

Is Music an Active Developmental Tool or Simply a Supplement? Early Childhood Preservice Teachers' Beliefs about Music

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kim, Hae Kyoung; Kemple, Kristen M.

2011-01-01

This study examines early childhood preservice teachers' beliefs about the importance of music in early childhood and explores factors influencing those beliefs. The study found that preservice teachers in this study held relatively strong beliefs about the importance of music, including aesthetic, quality-of-life, and social-emotional benefits.…

The Effects of Theory of Mind Training on the False Belief Understanding of Deaf and Hard-of-Hearing Students in Prekindergarten and Kindergarten.

PubMed

Tucci, Stacey L; Easterbrooks, Susan R; Lederberg, Amy R

2016-07-01

Data from a growing number of research studies indicate that children with hearing loss are delayed in Theory of Mind (ToM) development when compared to their typically developing, hearing peers. While other researchers have studied the developmental trajectories of ToM in school-age students who are deaf, a limited number have addressed the need for interventions for this population. The present study extends the current research on ToM interventions to the Prekindergarten and Kindergarten levels. This study used a single-case multiple baseline design to examine the effects of a ToM intervention on participants' false belief understanding as well as outcomes on a near generalization measure and a far generalization measure. A ToM thought bubble intervention (i.e., a visual representation of what people are thinking) developed by Wellman and Peterson (2013 Deafness, thought bubbles, and theory-of-mind development. Developmental Psychology, 49, 2357-2367) was modified in key areas. Results from the Single-Case Design portion of the study indicate a functional, or causal, relation between the ToM intervention and the participants' acquisition of the targeted skills in each stage although progress was not uniform. Results from the pre-post assessments indicate that the children did make progress up the scale. These results inform the field in regard to the efficacy and feasibility of a ToM intervention for young deaf children. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Deaf Children's Use of Beliefs and Desires in Negotiation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Terwogt, Mark Meerum; Rieffe, Carolien

2004-01-01

Although several studies have shown that deaf children demonstrated impaired performances on false-belief tasks, the children's belief understanding appeared intact when asked to explain emotions or behavior. However, this finding does not necessarily indicate a full-fledged theory of mind. This study aimed to investigate deaf children's…

Thinking about false belief: it's not just what children say, but how long it takes them to say it.

PubMed

Atance, Cristina M; Bernstein, Daniel M; Meltzoff, Andrew N

2010-08-01

We examined 240 children's (3.5-, 4.5-, and 5.5-year-olds) latency to respond to questions on a battery of false-belief tasks. Response latencies exhibited a significant cross-over interaction as a function of age and response type (correct vs. incorrect). 3.5-year-olds'incorrect latencies were faster than their correct latencies, whereas the opposite pattern emerged for 4.5- and 5.5-year-olds. Although these results are most consistent with conceptual change theories of false-belief reasoning, no extant theory fully accounts for our data pattern. We argue that response latency data provide new information about underlying cognitive processes in theory of mind reasoning, and can shed light on concept acquisition more broadly. Copyright (c) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A Continuous False Belief Task Reveals Egocentric Biases in Children and Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Begeer, Sander; Bernstein, Daniel M.; van Wijhe, Jonas; Scheeren, Anke M.; Koot, Hans M.

2012-01-01

This study reports on a new false belief measure in a sample of 124 children and adolescents with or without high functioning autism (HFASD). In the classic paradigm, a participant predicts in which of two discrete locations a deceived protagonist will look for an object. In the current Sandbox task, the object is buried and reburied in a sandbox,…

Pre-Service Early Childhood Teachers' Self-Efficacy Beliefs towards Parent Involvement

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Alaçam, Nur; Olgan, Refika

2017-01-01

This study aimed to investigate the parent involvement self-efficacy beliefs held by pre-service early childhood teachers and their self-reported skills in implementing parent involvement strategies. Another aim was to examine the impact made on parent involvement self-efficacy beliefs by taking a course on parent involvement and by self-reported…

Preschool Ontology: The Role of Beliefs about Category Boundaries in Early Categorization

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rhodes, Marjorie; Gelman, Susan A.; Karuza, J. Christopher

2014-01-01

These studies examined the role of ontological beliefs about category boundaries in early categorization. Study 1 found that preschool-age children (N = 48, aged 3-4 years old) have domain-specific beliefs about the meaning of category boundaries; children judged the boundaries of natural kind categories (animal species, human gender) as discrete…

Where Will the Triangle Look for It? Attributing False Beliefs to a Geometric Shape at 17 Months

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Surian, Luca; Geraci, Alessandra

2012-01-01

Prior research on implicit mind-reading skills has focussed on how infants anticipate other persons' actions. This study investigated whether 11- and 17-month-olds spontaneously attribute false beliefs (FB) even to a simple animated geometric shape. Infants were shown a triangle chasing a disk through a tunnel. Using an eye-tracker, we found that…

ICT and Play in Preschool: Early Childhood Teachers' Beliefs and Confidence

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Nikolopoulou, Kleopatra; Gialamas, Vasilis

2015-01-01

This study investigated early childhood teachers' beliefs about information and communications technology (ICT) and play in preschool, as well as their confidence in integrating ICT in the classroom. A 28-item questionnaire was compiled and administered to 190 early childhood teachers in Greece. Although ICT play (which can provide learning…

Understanding the health beliefs and practices of East African refugees.

PubMed

Simmelink, Jennifer; Lightfoot, Elizabeth; Dube, Amano; Blevins, Jennifer; Lum, Terry

2013-03-01

To explore East African refugees' perceptions, ideas, and beliefs about health and health care, as well as the ways in which health information is shared within their communities. This study consisted of 2 focus groups with a total of 15 participants, including East African community leaders and health professionals. East African refugees in the United States have strong cultural, religious, and traditional health practices that shape their health behavior and influence their interactions with Western health care systems. Health care providers who understand refugees' beliefs about health may achieve more compliance with refugee patients.

Belief attribution in deaf and hearing infants.

PubMed

Meristo, Marek; Morgan, Gary; Geraci, Alessandra; Iozzi, Laura; Hjelmquist, Erland; Surian, Luca; Siegal, Michael

2012-09-01

Based on anticipatory looking and reactions to violations of expected events, infants have been credited with 'theory of mind' (ToM) knowledge that a person's search behaviour for an object will be guided by true or false beliefs about the object's location. However, little is known about the preconditions for looking patterns consistent with belief attribution in infants. In this study, we compared the performance of 17- to 26-month-olds on anticipatory looking in ToM tasks. The infants were either hearing or were deaf from hearing families and thus delayed in communicative experience gained from access to language and conversational input. Hearing infants significantly outperformed their deaf counterparts in anticipating the search actions of a cartoon character that held a false belief about a target-object location. By contrast, the performance of the two groups in a true belief condition did not differ significantly. These findings suggest for the first time that access to language and conversational input contributes to early ToM reasoning. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

The Developmental Progression of Understanding of Mind during a Hiding Game

PubMed Central

Nelson, P. Brooke; Adamson, Lauren B.; Bakeman, Roger

2011-01-01

In this longitudinal study, 52 typically developing preschoolers engaged in a hiding game with their mothers when children were 42-, 54-, and 66-months old. Children's understanding of mind, positive affect, and engagement with the task were rated, and mothers' utterances were coded for role and content. Analyses confirmed that some facets of children's understanding of mind developed sequentially; specifically, they expressed an understanding of knowledge access before an understanding of deception and false beliefs, and expressed an understanding of deception before an understanding of false beliefs. Children's understanding of mind increased across visits and positively correlated with false belief task performance. Results suggest that mothers may tailor the content of their utterances to the child's growing expertise, but the role of mothers' utterances did not change. Observing preschoolers engaged in a playful hiding game revealed that children's understanding of mind not only increased with age but also developed sequentially. PMID:25960610

Epistemic Beliefs and Conceptual Understanding in Biotechnology: A Case Study

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Rebello, Carina M.; Siegel, Marcelle A.; Witzig, Stephen B.; Freyermuth, Sharyn K.; McClure, Bruce A.

2012-04-01

The purpose of this investigation was to explore students' epistemic beliefs and conceptual understanding of biotechnology. Epistemic beliefs can influence reasoning, how individuals evaluate information, and informed decision making abilities. These skills are important for an informed citizenry that will participate in debates regarding areas in science such as biotechnology. We report on an in-depth case study analysis of three undergraduate, non-science majors in a biotechnology course designed for non-biochemistry majors. We selected participants who performed above average and below average on the first in-class exam. Data from multiple sources—interviews, exams, and a concept instrument—were used to construct (a) individual profiles and (b) a cross-case analysis of our participants' conceptual development and epistemic beliefs from two different theoretical perspectives—Women's Ways of Knowing and the Reflective Judgment Model. Two independent trained researchers coded all case records independently for both theoretical perspectives, with resultant initial Cohen's kappa values above .715 (substantial agreement), and then reached consensus on the codes. Results indicate that a student with more sophisticated epistemology demonstrated greater conceptual understandings at the end of the course than a student with less sophisticated epistemology, even though the latter performed higher initially. Also a student with a less sophisticated epistemology and low initial conceptual performance does not demonstrate gains in their overall conceptual understanding. Results suggest the need for instructional interventions fostering epistemological development of learners in order to facilitate their conceptual growth.

"Everything Is in Parables": An Exploration of Students' Difficulties in Understanding Christian Beliefs Concerning Jesus

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Freathy, Rob; Aylward, Karen

2010-01-01

This article reports the findings of interviews conducted with students (aged 11-13) in four English secondary schools, examining reasons why young people find it difficult to understand Christian beliefs regarding Jesus' miracles, resurrection, and status as the Son of God. For the students in this sample, understanding and belief are closely…

Interest contagion in violation-of-expectation-based false-belief tasks.

PubMed

Falck, Andreas; Brinck, Ingar; Lindgren, Magnus

2014-01-01

In the debate about how to interpret Violation-of-Expectation (VoE) based false-belief experiments, it has been suggested that infants are predicting the actions of the agent based on more or less sophisticated cognitive means. We present an alternative, more parsimonious interpretation, exploring the possibility that the infants' reactions are not governed by rational expectation but rather of memory strength due to differences in the allocation of cognitive resources earlier in the experiment. Specifically, it is argued that (1) infants' have a tendency to find more interest in events that observed agents are attending to as opposed to unattended events ("interest contagion"), (2) the object-location configurations that result from such interesting events are remembered more strongly by the infants, and (3) the VoE contrast arises as a consequence of the difference in memory strength between more and less interesting object-location configurations. We discuss two published experiments, one which we argue that our model can explain (Kovács etal., 2010), and one which we argue cannot be readily explained by our model (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).

Individual differences in early adolescents' beliefs in the legitimacy of parental authority.

PubMed

Kuhn, Emily S; Laird, Robert D

2011-09-01

Adolescents differ in the extent to which they believe that parents have legitimate authority to impose rules restricting adolescents' behavior. The purpose of the current study was to test predictors of individual differences in legitimacy beliefs during the middle school years. Annually, during the summers following Grades 5, 6, and 7, early adolescents (n = 218; 51% female, 47% African American, 73% in 2-parent homes) reported their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of parents' rules that restrict and monitor adolescents' free time activities. Cross-lagged analyses revealed that legitimacy beliefs were bidirectionally associated with independent decision making, psychological control, antisocial peer involvement, and resistance to control. Legitimacy beliefs declined more rapidly during the middle school years for boys than for girls and for adolescents who were older relative to their classmates. More independent decision making in Grades 5 and 6 predicted larger than expected declines in legitimacy beliefs in Grades 6 and 7. In sum, legitimacy beliefs weaken developmentally, and weaker legitimacy beliefs relative to same-grade peers are anteceded by premature autonomous experiences, psychological control, and adolescent attributes.

When plausibility manipulations work: an examination of their role in the development of false beliefs and memories.

PubMed

Bays, Rebecca B; Zabrucky, Karen M; Gagne, Phill

2012-01-01

In the current study we examined whether prevalence information and imagery encoding influence participants' general plausibility, personal plausibility, belief, and memory ratings for suggested childhood events. Results showed decreases in general and personal plausibility ratings for low prevalence events when encoding instructions were not elaborate; however, instructions to repeatedly imagine suggested events elicited personal plausibility increases for low-prevalence events, evidence that elaborate imagery negated the effect of our prevalence manipulation. We found no evidence of imagination inflation or false memory construction. We discuss critical differences in researchers' manipulations of plausibility and imagery that may influence results of false memory studies in the literature. In future research investigators should focus on the specific nature of encoding instructions when examining the development of false memories.

The Puerto Rican Prison Experience: A Multicultural Understanding of Values, Beliefs, and Attitudes.

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rivera, Edil Torres; Wilbur, Michael P.; Roberts-Wilbur, Janice

1998-01-01

Counselors are challenged to use a nontraditional, multicultural approach with Puerto Rican inmates, to strive to understand their values, beliefs, experiences, and behaviors; and to question their own underlying assumptions and linear models of therapy. Five specific recommendations are made, and a comparison of beliefs and values is appended.…

Intention, false beliefs, and delusional jealousy: insights into the right hemisphere from neurological patients and neuroimaging studies.

PubMed

Ortigue, Stephanie; Bianchi-Demicheli, Francesco

2011-01-01

Jealousy sits high atop of a list comprised of the most human emotional experiences, although its nature, rationale, and origin are poorly understood. In the past decade, a series of neurological case reports and neuroimaging findings have been particularly helpful in piecing together jealousy's puzzle. In order to understand and quantify the neurological factors that might be important in jealousy, we reviewed the current literature in this specific field. We made an electronic search, and examined all literature with at least an English abstract, through Mars 2010. The search identified a total of 20 neurological patients, who experienced jealousy in relation with a neurological disorder; and 22 healthy individuals, who experienced jealousy under experimental neuroimaging settings. Most of the clinical cases of reported jealousy after a stroke had delusional-type jealousy. Right hemispheric stroke was the most frequently reported neurological disorder in these patients, although there was a wide range of more diffuse neurological disorders that may be reported to be associated with different other types of jealousy. This is in line with recent neuroimaging data on false beliefs, moral judgments, and intention [mis]understanding. Together the present findings provide physicians and psychologists with a potential for high impact in understanding the neural mechanisms and treatment of jealousy. By combining findings from case reports and neuroimaging data, the present article allows for a novel and unique perspective, and explores new directions into the neurological jealous mind.

Intention, false beliefs, and delusional jealousy: Insights into the right hemisphere from neurological patients and neuroimaging studies

PubMed Central

Ortigue, Stephanie; Bianchi-Demicheli, Francesco

2011-01-01

Summary Jealousy sits high atop of a list comprised of the most human emotional experiences, although its nature, rationale, and origin are poorly understood. In the past decade, a series of neurological case reports and neuroimaging findings have been particularly helpful in piecing together jealousy’s puzzle. In order to understand and quantify the neurological factors that might be important in jealousy, we reviewed the current literature in this specific field. We made an electronic search, and examined all literature with at least an English abstract, through Mars 2010. The search identified a total of 20 neurological patients, who experienced jealousy in relation with a neurological disorder; and 22 healthy individuals, who experienced jealousy under experimental neuroimaging settings. Most of the clinical cases of reported jealousy after a stroke had delusional-type jealousy. Right hemispheric stroke was the most frequently reported neurological disorder in these patients, although there was a wide range of more diffuse neurological disorders that may be reported to be associated with different other types of jealousy. This is in line with recent neuroimaging data on false beliefs, moral judgments, and intention [mis]understanding. Together the present findings provide physicians and psychologists with a potential for high impact in understanding the neural mechanisms and treatment of jealousy. By combining findings from case reports and neuroimaging data, the present article allows for a novel and unique perspective, and explores new directions into the neurological jealous mind. PMID:21169919

Children with Autism can Track Others' Beliefs in a Competitive Game

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Peterson, Candida C.; Slaughter, Virginia; Peterson, James; Premack, David

2013-01-01

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via "litmus" false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the…

Understanding of Emotions and False Beliefs among Hearing Children versus Deaf Children

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ziv, Margalit; Most, Tova; Cohen, Shirit

2013-01-01

Emotion understanding and theory of mind (ToM) are two major aspects of social cognition in which deaf children demonstrate developmental delays. The current study investigated these social cognition aspects in two subgroups of deaf children--those with cochlear implants who communicate orally (speakers) and those who communicate primarily using…

Deep belief networks for false alarm rejection in forward-looking ground-penetrating radar

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Becker, John; Havens, Timothy C.; Pinar, Anthony; Schulz, Timothy J.

2015-05-01

Explosive hazards are one of the most deadly threats in modern conflicts. The U.S. Army is interested in a reliable way to detect these hazards at range. A promising way of accomplishing this task is using a forward-looking ground-penetrating radar (FLGPR) system. Recently, the Army has been testing a system that utilizes both L-band and X-band radar arrays on a vehicle mounted platform. Using data from this system, we sought to improve the performance of a constant false-alarm-rate (CFAR) prescreener through the use of a deep belief network (DBN). DBNs have also been shown to perform exceptionally well at generalized anomaly detection. They combine unsupervised pre-training with supervised fine-tuning to generate low-dimensional representations of high-dimensional input data. We seek to take advantage of these two properties by training a DBN on the features of the CFAR prescreener's false alarms (FAs) and then use that DBN to separate FAs from true positives. Our analysis shows that this method improves the detection statistics significantly. By training the DBN on a combination of image features, we were able to significantly increase the probability of detection while maintaining a nominal number of false alarms per square meter. Our research shows that DBNs are a good candidate for improving detection rates in FLGPR systems.

How beliefs about self-creation inflate value in the human brain.

PubMed

Koster, Raphael; Sharot, Tali; Yuan, Rachel; De Martino, Benedetto; Norton, Michael I; Dolan, Raymond J

2015-01-01

Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions, as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value.

How beliefs about self-creation inflate value in the human brain

PubMed Central

Koster, Raphael; Sharot, Tali; Yuan, Rachel; De Martino, Benedetto; Norton, Michael I.; Dolan, Raymond J.

2015-01-01

Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions, as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value. PMID:26388755

Early childhood experiences, cultural beliefs, and oral health of Mexican American women.

PubMed

Miltiades, Helen B

2013-01-01

This qualitative article examines how financial resources, cultural beliefs, and early childhood experiences affect perceptions of oral health and dental utilization of middle-aged and older Mexican American women. Fourteen in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted. The women's ages range from 49 to 87 years. Most had not visited the dentist in more than 2 years. Most women's early childhood experiences did not include dental visits or dental instruction. Some believed tooth loss was a normal aging process. Misconceptions regarding preventive care, the belief that dental visits were only necessary when experiencing pain, and finances were the primary reasons for not visiting the dentist. The results lend insight into the oral health, self-care practices, and dental utilization of middle-aged and older immigrant Mexican American women.

Early Childhood Teachers' Beliefs about Readiness for Teaching Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Park, Mi-Hwa; Dimitrov, Dimiter M.; Patterson, Lynn G.; Park, Do-Yong

2017-01-01

The purpose of this study was to examine beliefs of early childhood teachers about their readiness for teaching science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, with a focus on testing for heterogeneity of such beliefs and differential effects of teacher-related factors. The results from latent class analysis of survey data revealed two latent…

Language and Theory of Mind in Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Relationship between Complement Syntax and False Belief Task Performance

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lind, Sophie E.; Bowler, Dermot M.

2009-01-01

This study aimed to test the hypothesis that children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) use their knowledge of complement syntax as a means of "hacking out" solutions to false belief tasks, despite lacking a representational theory of mind (ToM). Participants completed a "memory for complements" task, a measure of receptive vocabulary, and…

The Effects of a Teaching Methods Course on Early Childhood Preservice Teachers' Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Isikoglu, Nesrin

2008-01-01

This study examines the effectiveness of an educational methods course for changing early childhood preservice teachers' instructional beliefs. The teaching methods course emphasized constructivist teaching principles. Seventy-eight of the early childhood education preservice teachers who were enrolled in this course filled out the Teacher Belief…

From simple desires to ordinary beliefs: the early development of everyday psychology.

PubMed

Wellman, H M; Woolley, J D

1990-06-01

We provide evidence for the claim that before young children construe human action in terms of beliefs and desires they understand action only in terms of simple desires. This type of naive psychology--a simple desire psychology--constitutes a coherent understanding of human action, but it differs from the belief--desire psychology of slightly older children and adults. In this paper we characterize what we mean by a simple desire psychology and report two experiments. In Experiment 1 we demonstrate that 2-year-old can predict actions and reactions related to simple desires. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that many 2-year-old pass desire reasoning tasks while at the same time failing belief reasoning tasks that are passed by slightly older children, and that are as comparable as possible to the desire tasks they pass with ease.

Ethnic Group Differences in Early Head Start Parents Parenting Beliefs and Practices and Links to Children's Early Cognitive Development

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Keels, Micere

2009-01-01

Data from the Early Head Start Research and Evaluation study were used to examine the extent to which several factors mediate between- and within-ethnic-group differences in parenting beliefs and behaviors, and children's early cognitive development (analysis sample of 1198 families). The findings indicate that Hispanic-, European-, and…

Logistic Mixed Models to Investigate Implicit and Explicit Belief Tracking.

PubMed

Lages, Martin; Scheel, Anne

2016-01-01

We investigated the proposition of a two-systems Theory of Mind in adults' belief tracking. A sample of N = 45 participants predicted the choice of one of two opponent players after observing several rounds in an animated card game. Three matches of this card game were played and initial gaze direction on target and subsequent choice predictions were recorded for each belief task and participant. We conducted logistic regressions with mixed effects on the binary data and developed Bayesian logistic mixed models to infer implicit and explicit mentalizing in true belief and false belief tasks. Although logistic regressions with mixed effects predicted the data well a Bayesian logistic mixed model with latent task- and subject-specific parameters gave a better account of the data. As expected explicit choice predictions suggested a clear understanding of true and false beliefs (TB/FB). Surprisingly, however, model parameters for initial gaze direction also indicated belief tracking. We discuss why task-specific parameters for initial gaze directions are different from choice predictions yet reflect second-order perspective taking.

Logistic Mixed Models to Investigate Implicit and Explicit Belief Tracking

PubMed Central

Lages, Martin; Scheel, Anne

2016-01-01

We investigated the proposition of a two-systems Theory of Mind in adults’ belief tracking. A sample of N = 45 participants predicted the choice of one of two opponent players after observing several rounds in an animated card game. Three matches of this card game were played and initial gaze direction on target and subsequent choice predictions were recorded for each belief task and participant. We conducted logistic regressions with mixed effects on the binary data and developed Bayesian logistic mixed models to infer implicit and explicit mentalizing in true belief and false belief tasks. Although logistic regressions with mixed effects predicted the data well a Bayesian logistic mixed model with latent task- and subject-specific parameters gave a better account of the data. As expected explicit choice predictions suggested a clear understanding of true and false beliefs (TB/FB). Surprisingly, however, model parameters for initial gaze direction also indicated belief tracking. We discuss why task-specific parameters for initial gaze directions are different from choice predictions yet reflect second-order perspective taking. PMID:27853440

The Impact of Science Integrated Curriculum Supplements on Early Childhood Teachers' Attitudes and Beliefs towards Science while In-Service: A Multiple Case

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Collins, Kellian L.

Science at the early childhood level has been rarely taught as a single subject or integrated into the curriculum. One reason why early childhood educators avoid teaching science are their attitudes, beliefs, and lack of understanding scientific concepts as presented in traditional science curriculums. The intervention used by researchers for improving beliefs and attitudes in K-6 pre-service teachers towards teaching science in early childhood has been science method courses. For in service teachers, the intervention has been professional development workshops, seminars, and symposiums. Though these interventions have had a positive impact on teachers' attitudes and beliefs toward teaching science, the interventions have not necessarily guaranteed more science being taught in the preschool classroom. The specific problem investigated for this study was how to improve the interventions designed to improve preschool teachers' attitudes and beliefs so that they would feel more confident in teaching science to young children. The purpose of this study was to examine how implementing a one-week science integrated curriculum supplement could be an effective tool for improving preschool teachers' attitudes and beliefs toward teaching science. This study utilized the qualitative multiple case study research method. A logical model was created based on negative teacher attitudes and beliefs attributes that were the core components of the Preschool Teachers' Attitudes and Beliefs toward Science teaching (P-TABS) questionnaire. The negative attributes were paired with positive interventions and encapsulated in a one-week science integrated curriculum supplement based on the factors of teacher comfort, child benefit and challenges. The primary source of evidence for this study was the semi-structured interview. The researcher contacted 24 early childhood facilities, 44 emails were sent to preschool teachers, four teachers agreed to participate in the study. The results of the

Five-Year-Olds' Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study.

PubMed

Arslan, Burcu; Taatgen, Niels A; Verbrugge, Rineke

2017-01-01

The focus of studies on second-order false belief reasoning generally was on investigating the roles of executive functions and language with correlational studies. Different from those studies, we focus on the question how 5-year-olds select and revise reasoning strategies in second-order false belief tasks by constructing two computational cognitive models of this process: an instance-based learning model and a reinforcement learning model. Unlike the reinforcement learning model, the instance-based learning model predicted that children who fail second-order false belief tasks would give answers based on first-order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning as opposed to zero-order reasoning. This prediction was confirmed with an empirical study that we conducted with 72 5- to 6-year-old children. The results showed that 17% of the answers were correct and 83% of the answers were wrong. In line with our prediction, 65% of the wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, while only 29% of them were based on a zero-order strategy (the remaining 6% of subjects did not provide any answer). Based on our instance-based learning model, we propose that when children get feedback "Wrong," they explicitly revise their strategy to a higher level instead of implicitly selecting one of the available ToM strategies. Moreover, we predict that children's failures are due to lack of experience and that with exposure to second-order false belief reasoning, children can revise their wrong first-order reasoning strategy to a correct second-order reasoning strategy.

Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study

PubMed Central

Arslan, Burcu; Taatgen, Niels A.; Verbrugge, Rineke

2017-01-01

The focus of studies on second-order false belief reasoning generally was on investigating the roles of executive functions and language with correlational studies. Different from those studies, we focus on the question how 5-year-olds select and revise reasoning strategies in second-order false belief tasks by constructing two computational cognitive models of this process: an instance-based learning model and a reinforcement learning model. Unlike the reinforcement learning model, the instance-based learning model predicted that children who fail second-order false belief tasks would give answers based on first-order theory of mind (ToM) reasoning as opposed to zero-order reasoning. This prediction was confirmed with an empirical study that we conducted with 72 5- to 6-year-old children. The results showed that 17% of the answers were correct and 83% of the answers were wrong. In line with our prediction, 65% of the wrong answers were based on a first-order ToM strategy, while only 29% of them were based on a zero-order strategy (the remaining 6% of subjects did not provide any answer). Based on our instance-based learning model, we propose that when children get feedback “Wrong,” they explicitly revise their strategy to a higher level instead of implicitly selecting one of the available ToM strategies. Moreover, we predict that children’s failures are due to lack of experience and that with exposure to second-order false belief reasoning, children can revise their wrong first-order reasoning strategy to a correct second-order reasoning strategy. PMID:28293206

Beliefs about Childhood Vaccination in the United States: Political Ideology, False Consensus, and the Illusion of Uniqueness.

PubMed

Rabinowitz, Mitchell; Latella, Lauren; Stern, Chadly; Jost, John T

2016-01-01

Several contagious diseases were nearly eradicated through childhood vaccination, but some parents have decided in recent years not to fully vaccinate their children, raising new public health concerns. The question of whether and how beliefs about vaccination are linked to political ideology has been hotly debated. This study investigates the effects of ideology on perceptions of harms and benefits related to vaccination as well as judgments of others' attitudes. A total of 367 U.S. adults (131 men, 236 women; Mage = 34.92 years, range = 18-72) completed an online survey through Mechanical Turk. Results revealed that liberals were significantly more likely to endorse pro-vaccination statements and to regard them as "facts" (rather than "beliefs"), in comparison with moderates and conservatives. Whereas conservatives overestimated the proportion of like-minded others who agreed with them, liberals underestimated the proportion of others who agreed with them. That is, conservatives exhibited the "truly false consensus effect," whereas liberals exhibited an "illusion of uniqueness" with respect to beliefs about vaccination. Conservative and moderate parents in this sample were less likely than liberals to report having fully vaccinated their children prior to the age of two. A clear limitation of this study is that the sample is not representative of the U.S. Nevertheless, a recognition of ideological sources of potential variability in health-related beliefs and perceptions is a prerequisite for the design of effective forms of public communication.

Thinking about False Belief: It's Not Just What Children Say, but How Long It Takes Them to Say It

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Atance, Cristina M.; Bernstein, Daniel M.; Meltzoff, Andrew N.

2010-01-01

We examined 240 children's (3.5-, 4.5-, and 5.5-year-olds) latency to respond to questions on a battery of false-belief tasks. Response latencies exhibited a significant cross-over interaction as a function of age and response type (correct vs. incorrect). 3.5-year-olds' "in"correct latencies were faster than their correct latencies, whereas the…

Prospective TESOL Teachers' Beliefs, Understandings, and Experiences of Cooperative Learning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wallestad, Chizuko Konishi

2010-01-01

The purpose of this present ethnographic case study is to explore the initial and developing beliefs, understandings, and experiences of prospective language teachers as they engage in the process of learning about cooperative learning (CL) and in putting it into practice in a TESOL graduate program in the U.S. Data collection includes multiple…

Are there signature limits in early theory of mind?

PubMed

Fizke, Ella; Butterfill, Stephen; van de Loo, Lea; Reindl, Eva; Rakoczy, Hannes

2017-10-01

Current theory-of-mind research faces the challenge of reconciling two sets of seemingly incompatible findings: Whereas children come to solve explicit verbal false belief (FB) tasks from around 4years of age, recent studies with various less explicit measures such as looking time, anticipatory looking, and spontaneous behavior suggest that even infants can succeed on some FB tasks. In response to this tension, two-systems theories propose to distinguish between an early-developing system, tracking simple forms of mental states, and a later-developing system, based on fully developed concepts of belief and other propositional attitudes. One prediction of such theories is that the early-developing system has signature limits concerning aspectuality. We tested this prediction in two experiments. The first experiment showed (in line with previous findings) that 2- and 3-year-olds take into account a protagonist's true or false belief about the location of an object in their active helping behavior. In contrast, toddlers' helping behavior did not differentiate between true and false belief conditions when the protagonist's belief essentially involved aspectuality. Experiment 2 replicated these findings with a more stringent method designed to rule out more parsimonious explanations. Taken together, the current findings are compatible with the possibility that early theory-of-mind reasoning is subject to signature limits as predicted by the two-systems account. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The curious incident of the photo that was accused of being false: issues of domain specificity in development, autism, and brain imaging.

PubMed

Perner, Josef; Leekam, Susan

2008-01-01

We resume an exchange of ideas with Uta Frith that started before the turn of the century. The curious incident responsible for this exchange was the finding that children with autism fail tests of false belief, while they pass Zaitchik's (1990) photograph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991). This finding led to the conclusion that children with autism have a domain-specific impairment in Theory of Mind (mental representations), because the photograph task and the false-belief task are structurally equivalent except for the nonmental character of photographs. In this paper we argue that the false-belief task and the false-photograph task are not structurally equivalent and are not empirically associated. Instead a truly structurally equivalent task is the false-sign task. Performance on this task is strongly associated with the false-belief task. A version of this task, the misleading-signal task, also poses severe problems for children with autism (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). These new findings therefore challenge the earlier interpretation of a domain-specific difficulty in inferring mental states and suggest that children with autism also have difficulty understanding misleading nonmental objects. Brain imaging data using false-belief, "false"-photo, and false-sign scenarios provide further supporting evidence for our conclusions.

Understanding Children's Epistemic Beliefs in Elementary Education

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lunn Brownlee, Jo; Curtis, Elizabeth; Spooner-Lane, Rebecca; Feucht, Florian

2017-01-01

Research shows that the beliefs individuals hold about knowledge and knowing (epistemic beliefs) influence learning approaches and outcomes. However, little is known about the nature of children's epistemic beliefs and how best to measure these. In this pilot study, 11 Australian children (in Grade 4 or Grade 6) were asked to "draw, write and…

Belief-Desire Reasoning as a Process of Selection

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Leslie, Alan M.; German, Tim P.; Polizzi, Pamela

2005-01-01

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and…

The cognitive neuroscience of true and false memories.

PubMed

Johnson, Marcia K; Raye, Carol L; Mitchell, Karen J; Ankudowich, Elizabeth

2012-01-01

Of central relevance to the recovered/false memory debate is understanding the factors that cause us to believe that a mental experience is a memory of an actual past experience. According to the source monitoring framework (SMF), memories are attributions that we make about our mental experiences based on their subjective qualities, our prior knowledge and beliefs, our motives and goals, and the social context. From this perspective, we discuss cognitive behavioral studies using both objective (e.g., recognition, source memory) and subjective (e.g., ratings of memory characteristics) measures that provide much information about the encoding, revival and monitoring processes that yield both true and false memories. The chapter also considers how neuroimaging findings, especially from functional magnetic resonance imaging studies, are contributing to our understanding of the relation between memory and reality.

Civic Meanings Reconsidered: A Response to "Civic Meanings: Understanding the Constellations of Democratic and Civic Beliefs of Educators"

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Davis, Jonathan Ryan; Epstein, Terrie

2015-01-01

In this response, we argue for the importance of understanding teachers' and administrators' beliefs about civic education, as well as how those beliefs may influence teachers' practices. We commend the authors for examining the beliefs of principals and school board members--groups rarely surveyed--but question how their beliefs may affect the…

Children with autism can track others' beliefs in a competitive game.

PubMed

Peterson, Candida C; Slaughter, Virginia; Peterson, James; Premack, David

2013-05-01

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via 'litmus' false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the 'Dot-Midge task'). Ninety-six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4-year-olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3-year-olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard 'Sally-Ann' false belief test, the Dot-Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally-Ann task procedure) and a norm-referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot-Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally-Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners' beliefs in the context of a competitive game. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Mothers' Use of Cognitive State Verbs in Picture-Book Reading and the Development of Children's Understanding of Mind: A Longitudinal Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Adrian, Juan E.; Clemente, Rosa Ana; Villanueva, Lidon

2007-01-01

Mothers read stories to their children (N = 41) aged between 3.3 years and 5.11 years old, and children then completed two false-belief tasks. One year later, mothers read a story to 37 of those children who were also given four tasks to assess their advanced understanding of mental states. Mothers' early use of cognitive verbs in picture-book…

When Injury Clouds Understanding of Others: Theory of Mind after Mild TBI in Preschool Children.

PubMed

Bellerose, Jenny; Bernier, Annie; Beaudoin, Cindy; Gravel, Jocelyn; Beauchamp, Miriam H

2015-08-01

There is evidence to suggest that social skills, such as the ability to understand the perspective of others (theory of mind), may be affected by childhood traumatic brain injuries; however, studies to date have only considered moderate and severe traumatic brain injury (TBI). This study aimed to assess theory of mind after early, mild TBI (mTBI). Fifty-one children who sustained mTBI between 18 and 60 months were evaluated 6 months post-injury on emotion and desires reasoning and false-belief understanding tasks. Their results were compared to that of 50 typically developing children. The two groups did not differ on baseline characteristics, except for pre- and post-injury externalizing behavior. The mTBI group obtained poorer scores relative to controls on both the emotion and desires task and the false-belief understanding task, even after controlling for pre-injury externalizing behavior. No correlations were found between TBI injury characteristics and theory of mind. This is the first evidence that mTBI in preschool children is associated with theory of mind difficulties. Reduced perspective taking abilities could be linked with the social impairments that have been shown to arise following TBI.

A Qualitative Study of Early Childhood Educators' Beliefs about Key Preschool Classroom Experiences

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lara-Cinisomo, Sandraluz; Fuligni, Allison Sidle; Daugherty, Lindsay; Howes, Carollee; Karoly, Lynn

2009-01-01

The aim of the study was to uncover early childhood educators' beliefs about how to best work with children getting ready for kindergarten. The study involved 11 focus groups with providers from three types of early education settings located in Los Angeles County: (1) public center-based programs, (2) private center-based programs, and (3) family…

Assessing Self-Efficacy Beliefs of Students Enrolled in Early Childhood Education Practicum Movement Courses

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Johnson, Lisa B.

2016-01-01

The purpose of this study was to assess self- efficacy beliefs of students in early childhood education movement practicum courses offered in Northeastern Ohio higher educational institutions. The sample population consisted of early childhood education students from four higher educational institutions (two community colleges and two…

Finding Fulfillment: Women's Self-Efficacy Beliefs and Career Choices in Chemistry

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Grunert, Megan L.; Bodner, George M.

2011-01-01

Research has shown that self-efficacy beliefs are effective predictors of academic major and career choices in middle school, high school, and early college populations. There is little understanding, however, of how these beliefs develop and what influence they have on academic and career choices in women at the advanced undergraduate and…

Children's understanding of idioms and theory of mind development.

PubMed

Caillies, Stéphanie; Le Sourn-Bissaoui, Sandrine

2008-09-01

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis according to which theory of mind competence was a prerequisite to ambiguous idioms understanding. We hypothesized that the child needs to understand that the literal interpretation could be a false world representation, a false belief, and that the speaker's intention is to mean something else, to correctly process idiomatic expressions. Two kinds of ambiguous idioms were of interest: decomposable and nondecomposable expressions (Titone & Connine, 1999). An experiment was designed to assess the figurative developmental changes that occur with theory of mind competence. Five-, 6- and 7-year-old children performed five theory of mind tasks (an appearance-reality task, three false-belief tasks and a second-order false-belief task) and listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions inserted in context, before performing a multiple choice task. Results indicated that only nondecomposable idiomatic expression was predicted from the theory of mind scores, and particularly from the second-order competences. Results are discussed with respect to theory of mind and verbal competences.

What Did I Say? Versus What Did I Think? Attributing False Beliefs to Self amongst Children with and without Autism

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Williams, David M.; Happe, Francesca

2009-01-01

The task used most widely to assess recognition of false belief in self "and" others is the "Smarties" unexpected contents task. Amongst individuals with and without autism, the Self and Other-person test questions of this task are of an equivalent level of difficulty. However, a potential confound with this task may allow the Self test question…

The Relation between Early Adolescents' Trust Beliefs in Peers and Reactions to Peer Provocation: Attributions of Intention and Retaliation

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Rotenberg, Ken J.; Betts, Lucy R.; Moore, Jolene

2013-01-01

The authors examined the relation between early adolescents' trust beliefs in peers and both their attributions for, and retaliatory aggression to, peer provocation. One hundred and eight-five early adolescents (102 male) from the United Kingdom (M age = 12 years, 2 months, SD = 3 months) completed the Children's Generalized Trust Beliefs in peer…

The mediating role of secondary beliefs: enhancing the understanding of emotional responses and illness perceptions in arthritis.

PubMed

McCracken, James; Lindner, Helen; Sciacchitano, Laura

2008-01-01

Chronic illnesses are a significant issue across many health professional domains, becoming an increasing burden on limited and costly resources. The current study investigated the relationship between secondary beliefs and emotional responses, beyond the relationship accounted for by illness perceptions, using the framework of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. Sixty-five adults with arthritis participated in the questionnaire-based study. Multivariate analysis found that different emotional representations of the illness were significantly predicted by the individual's secondary belief, above and beyond that predicted by the cognitive representation of their illness alone. The study found that individuals who utilized an achievement secondary belief experienced feelings of worry, whereas individuals who used an approval orientation to understand their arthritis experienced emotions such as depression, being upset, anger, anxiety, and fear. No significant pattern emerged for individuals who used a comfort secondary belief to understand their arthritis. These findings are in line with the theory of secondary beliefs, as articulated by Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy.

Parental Attitudes, Beliefs, and Understanding of Anxiety (PABUA): Development and Psychometric Properties of a Measure

PubMed Central

Wolk, Courtney Benjamin; Caporino, Nicole E.; McQuarrie, Susanna; Settipani, Cara A.; Podell, Jennifer L.; Crawley, Sarah; Beidas, Rinad S.; Kendall, Philip C.

2016-01-01

The Parental Attitudes, Beliefs, and Understanding of Anxiety (PABUA) was developed to assess parental beliefs about their child’s anxiety, parents’ perceived ability to cope with their child’s anxiety and to help their child manage anxious symptoms, and to evaluate parents’ understanding of various parenting strategies in response to their child’s anxiety. The study evaluated the PABUA in mother-child dyads (N = 192) seeking treatment for youth anxiety. Exploratory factor analysis yielded a three-factor solution and identified PABUA scales of Overprotection, Distress, and Approach (with Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .67 to .83). Convergent and divergent validity of PABUA scales was supported by the pattern of associations with measures of experiential avoidance, beliefs related to children’s anxiety, empathy, trait anxiety, and depressive symptoms; parent-reported family functioning; parent- and youth-reported anxiety severity; and parent-reported functional impairment (n = 83). Results provide preliminary support for the PABUA as a measure of parental attitudes and beliefs about anxiety, and future studies that investigate this measure with large and diverse samples are encouraged. PMID:26970877

Implicit Theories and Naïve Beliefs: Using the Theory of Practice Architectures to Deconstruct the Practices of Early Childhood Educators

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Salamon, Andi; Sumsion, Jennifer; Press, Frances; Harrison, Linda

2016-01-01

This article proposes utilising the theory of practice architectures to uncover and make explicit the beliefs and implicit theories of early childhood educators, as well as to examine the conditions out of which they have emerged. The beliefs and implicit theories of early childhood educators influence many early childhood practices and play a…

Longitudinal Relations between Beliefs Supporting Aggression,Anger Regulation, and Dating Aggression among Early Adolescents.

PubMed

Sullivan, Terri N; Garthe, Rachel C; Goncy, Elizabeth A; Carlson, Megan M; Behrhorst, Kathryn L

2017-05-01

Dating aggression occurs frequently in early to mid-adolescence and has negative repercussions for psychosocial adjustment and physical health. The patterns of behavior learned during this developmental timeframe may persist in future dating relationships, underscoring the need to identify risk factors for this outcome. The current study examined longitudinal relations between beliefs supporting aggression, anger regulation, and dating aggression. Participants were 176 middle school students in sixth, seventh, and eighth grade (50 % female; 82 % African American). No direct effects were found between beliefs supporting reactive or proactive aggression and dating aggression. Beliefs supporting reactive aggression predicted increased rates of anger dysregulation, and beliefs supporting proactive aggression led to subsequent increases in anger inhibition. Anger dysregulation and inhibition were associated with higher frequencies of dating aggression. An indirect effect was found for the relation between beliefs supporting reactive aggression and dating aggression via anger dysregulation. Another indirect effect emerged for the relation between beliefs supporting proactive aggression and dating aggression through anger inhibition. The study's findings suggested that beliefs supporting proactive and reactive aggression were differentially related to emotion regulation processes, and identified anger dysregulation and inhibition as risk factors for dating aggression among adolescents.

Development of preservice elementary teachers' science self- efficacy beliefs and its relation to science conceptual understanding

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Menon, Deepika

Self-efficacy beliefs that relate to teachers' motivation and performance have been an important area of concern for preservice teacher education. This study used a mixed-methods approach to investigate the changes in preservice elementary teachers' science self-efficacy beliefs and the factors associated in a specialized elementary physics content course. In addition, the study is one of few to investigate the relationship between the changes in science self-efficacy beliefs and changes in physical science conceptual understanding. Participants included fifty-one preservice elementary teachers enrolled in two term of the physical science content course. Data collection and analysis procedures included both qualitative and quantitative measures. Data collection included implementation of Science Teaching Efficacy Belief Instrument-B (STEBI-B) (Bleicher, 2004) and Physical Science Concept Test as pre- and post-test, two semi-structured interviews with 18 participants (nine each semester), classroom observations and artifacts. A pre-post, repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) design was used to test the significance of differences between the pre- and post-surveys across time. Results indicated statistically significant gains in participants' science self-efficacy beliefs on both scales of STEBI-B - personal science teaching beliefs and outcome expectancy beliefs. Additionally, a positive moderate relationship between science conceptual understandings and personal science teaching efficacy beliefs was found. Post-hoc analysis of the STEBI-B data was used to select 18 participants for interviews. The participants belonged to each group representing the low, medium and high initial levels of self-efficacy beliefs. Participants' responses indicated positive shifts in their science teacher self-image and confidence to teach science in future. Four categories that represented the course-related factors contributing towards science self

Theory of Mind "Beliefs", Developmental Characteristics and Social Understanding in Children and Adolescents with Intellectual Disabilities

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Thirion-Marissiaux, Anne-Francoise; Nader-Grosbois, Nathalie

2008-01-01

Patterns of development of ToM belief abilities in intellectually disabled (ID) children and typically developing (TD) children matched on their developmental age were investigated. The links between cognition, language, social understanding and ToM belief abilities were examined. EDEI-R [Perron-Borelli M. (1996). "Echelles Differentielles…

Holding on to false beliefs: The bias against disconfirmatory evidence over the course of psychosis.

PubMed

Eisenacher, Sarah; Zink, Mathias

2017-09-01

The ability to integrate evidence into a reasoning process is crucial in order to react to changing information, e.g. to adapt one's beliefs according to new evidence or to generate new beliefs when facing better alternatives. Evidence integration ability is thus associated with belief flexibility. A specific bias of evidence integration, a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), can be found in patients with schizophrenia and has been linked to delusion development and maintenance. Knowledge about whether the BADE occurs already in risk constellations of psychosis can clarify its role in the pathogenesis of psychosis. This article reviews the current literature on BADE. Many studies demonstrate BADE over the course of illness, ranging from healthy controls with subclinical properties of schizotypy, over patients with at-risk mental states (ARMS) and patients with a first episode of psychosis to patients with chronic schizophrenia. These data allow a comparison of competences and deficits over the course of illness. Underlying mechanisms of BADE are discussed, including interrelations with neurocognitive performance and dopaminergic processes. The BADE could be found in different phases of psychosis development and can be regarded as a cognitive marker of the beginning psychotic state. The presented findings are derived from independent cross-sectional studies. So far, no comprehensive longitudinal assessment has been published. Treatments of metacognitive deficits in general and as early as in the ARMS might interfere with the cognitive pathogenesis of psychosis, and thereby ameliorate, postpone or even prevent the transition to psychosis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

I've got a feeling: Urban and rural indigenous children's beliefs about early life mentality.

PubMed

Emmons, Natalie A; Kelemen, Deborah A

2015-10-01

This cross-cultural investigation explored children's reasoning about their mental capacities during the earliest period of human physical existence--the prenatal period. For comparison, children's reasoning about the observable period of infancy was also examined. A total of 283 5- to 12-year-olds from two distinct cultures (urban Ecuador and rural indigenous Shuar) participated. Across cultures, children distinguished the fetal period from infancy, attributing fewer capacities to fetuses. However, for both the infancy and fetal periods, children from both cultures privileged the functioning of emotions and desires over epistemic states (i.e., abilities for thought and memory). Children's justifications to questions about fetal mentality revealed that although epistemic states were generally regarded as requiring physical maturation to function, emotions and desires were seen as functioning as a de facto result of prenatal existence and in response to the prospect of future birth and being part of a social group. These results show that from early in development, children across cultures possess nuanced beliefs about the presence and functioning of mental capacities. Findings converge with recent results to suggest that there is an early arising bias to view emotions and desires as the essential inviolable core of human mentality. The current findings have implications for understanding the role that emerging cognitive biases play in shaping conceptions of human mentality across different cultures. They also speak to the cognitive foundations of moral beliefs about fetal rights. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

False alarms: How early warning signals falsely predict abrupt sea ice loss

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Wagner, Till J. W.; Eisenman, Ian

2016-04-01

Uncovering universal early warning signals for critical transitions has become a coveted goal in diverse scientific disciplines, ranging from climate science to financial mathematics. There has been a flurry of recent research proposing such signals, with increasing autocorrelation and increasing variance being among the most widely discussed candidates. A number of studies have suggested that increasing autocorrelation alone may suffice to signal an impending transition, although some others have questioned this. Here we consider variance and autocorrelation in the context of sea ice loss in an idealized model of the global climate system. The model features no bifurcation, nor increased rate of retreat, as the ice disappears. Nonetheless, the autocorrelation of summer sea ice area is found to increase in a global warming scenario. The variance, by contrast, decreases. A simple physical mechanism is proposed to explain the occurrence of increasing autocorrelation but not variance when there is no approaching bifurcation. Additionally, a similar mechanism is shown to allow an increase in both indicators with no physically attainable bifurcation. This implies that relying on autocorrelation and variance as early warning signals can raise false alarms in the climate system, warning of "tipping points" that are not actually there.

A Typological Analysis: Understanding Pre-Service Teacher Beliefs and How They Are Transformed

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lloyd, Mary Elizabeth Riley

2018-01-01

This article describes the beliefs and their transformations of members of a cohort of early-childhood, elementary and middle-level pre-service teachers (PSTs) as they professionally develop. A typological analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data collected between August 2011 and May 2013 was utilized to categorize how 40 PSTs' beliefs…

The cost of understanding other people: social cognition predicts young children's sensitivity to criticism.

PubMed

Cutting, Alexandra L; Dunn, Judy

2002-10-01

Individual differences in sensitivity to teacher criticism, and their links with individual differences in social cognition, were examined in 141 young children from diverse family backgrounds. Children's sensitivity to teacher criticism was assessed in their first year of school (mean age 5.13 years), using a puppet scenario in which a teacher criticises the child for making an error in school work. Understanding of false belief and mixed emotions was assessed at the same time. One hundred and thirteen of the children had been seen one year earlier in preschool, when comprehensive assessments were made of false belief and emotion understanding. Individual differences were apparent in children's sensitivity to teacher criticism, which were correlated with individual differences in both preschool and concurrent social cognition: children with more advanced social cognition were more sensitive to teacher criticism. Regression analyses showed that preschool social cognition was especially important, explaining unique variance in sensitivity to criticism over and above variance accounted for by concurrent sociocognitive ability. The results suggest that there are costs as well as benefits to understanding other people, at least for young children, and that individual differences in early social cognition may have distinct developmental trajectories. These issues, along with implications for research into children's responses to criticism and failure, are discussed.

Is knowing believing? The role of event plausibility and background knowledge in planting false beliefs about the personal past.

PubMed

Pezdek, Kathy; Blandon-Gitlin, Iris; Lam, Shirley; Hart, Rhiannon Ellis; Schooler, Jonathan W

2006-12-01

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions o f plausibility a nd background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event "received an enema," a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from "barium enema administered in a hospital" to "home enema for constipation"; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual's familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.

K-1 Teachers' Visual Arts Beliefs and Their Role in the Early Childhood Classroom

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Goodman-Schanz, Blythe Annette

2012-01-01

The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore and describe the visual arts beliefs and practices of eight K-1 teachers in four schools and in two different school districts in a southern state. Using a phenomenological framework (Creswell, 2007; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005), the research revealed the teachers' understandings of beliefs and how…

The relationship between nature of science understandings and science self-efficacy beliefs of sixth grade students

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Parker, Elisabeth Allyn

Bandura (1986) posited that self-efficacy beliefs help determine what individuals do with the knowledge and skills they have and are critical determinants of how well skill and knowledge are acquired. Research has correlated self-efficacy beliefs with academic success and subject interest (Pajares, Britner, & Valiante, 2000). Similar studies report a decreasing interest by students in school science beginning in middle school claiming that they don't enjoy science because the classes are boring and irrelevant to their lives (Basu & Barton, 2007). The hypothesis put forth by researchers is that students need to observe models of how science is done, the nature of science (NOS), so that they connect with the human enterprise of science and thereby raise their self-efficacy (Britner, 2008). This study examined NOS understandings and science self-efficacy of students enrolled in a sixth grade earth science class taught with explicit NOS instruction. The research questions that guided this study were (a) how do students' self-efficacy beliefs change as compared with changes in their nature of science understandings?; and (b) how do changes in students' science self-efficacy beliefs vary with gender and ethnicity segregation? A mixed method design was employed following an embedded experimental model (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007). As the treatment, five NOS aspects were first taught by the teachers using nonintegrated activities followed by integrated instructional approach (Khishfe, 2008). Students' views of NOS using the Views on Nature of Science (VNOS) (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, & Schwartz, 2002) along with their self-efficacy beliefs using three Likert-type science self-efficacy scales (Britner, 2002) were gathered. Changes in NOS understandings were determined by categorizing student responses and then comparing pre- and post-instructional understandings. To determine changes in participants' self-efficacy beliefs as measured by the three subscales, a multivariate

Crossing cultural borders into science teaching: Early life experiences, racial and ethnic identities, and beliefs about diversity

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Brand, Brenda R.; Glasson, George E.

2004-02-01

The purpose of this ethnographic study was to explore the development of belief systems as related to racial and ethnic identities of preservice teachers as they crossed cultural borders into science teaching. Data were collected throughout a yearlong teacher preparation program to learn how early life experiences and racial and ethnic identities of preservice teachers influenced both their beliefs about diversity in science classrooms and science teaching pedagogy. Case studies of three preservice teachers from diverse racial and ethnic background are presented: Asian American, African American, and Rural Appalachian. Using Bank's ethnicity typology, findings suggest that racial and ethnic identity, developed in early life experiences of preservice teachers, provided clarity on the rigidity of their beliefs about diversity and how they view science teaching. By learning about the border crossing experiences of preservice teachers in relation to their beliefs about diversity as related to racial and ethnic identities, the researchers hoped to provide insight on preparing preservice teachers for the challenges of working in diverse classrooms.

Invalidating childhood environments and core beliefs in women with eating disorders.

PubMed

Ford, Gillian; Waller, Glenn; Mountford, Victoria

2011-01-01

It can be hypothesised that invalidating environments in childhood influence the negative core beliefs that are found in the eating disorders. This study of eating-disordered women aimed to test the relationships between perceived childhood invalidating environments and negative core beliefs. Forty-one eating-disordered females completed the measures of childhood invalidating experiences and core beliefs. Such core beliefs were most closely related to the individuals' perceptions of having grown up in a 'chaotic' family environment. Future clinical practice should continue to target core beliefs in formulating cases of eating disorders. Explaining those core beliefs may depend on understanding the individual's experiences of invalidation in early years. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and Eating Disorders Association.

Beliefs about Childhood Vaccination in the United States: Political Ideology, False Consensus, and the Illusion of Uniqueness

PubMed Central

Latella, Lauren; Stern, Chadly; Jost, John T.

2016-01-01

Several contagious diseases were nearly eradicated through childhood vaccination, but some parents have decided in recent years not to fully vaccinate their children, raising new public health concerns. The question of whether and how beliefs about vaccination are linked to political ideology has been hotly debated. This study investigates the effects of ideology on perceptions of harms and benefits related to vaccination as well as judgments of others’ attitudes. A total of 367 U.S. adults (131 men, 236 women; Mage = 34.92 years, range = 18–72) completed an online survey through Mechanical Turk. Results revealed that liberals were significantly more likely to endorse pro-vaccination statements and to regard them as “facts” (rather than “beliefs”), in comparison with moderates and conservatives. Whereas conservatives overestimated the proportion of like-minded others who agreed with them, liberals underestimated the proportion of others who agreed with them. That is, conservatives exhibited the “truly false consensus effect,” whereas liberals exhibited an “illusion of uniqueness” with respect to beliefs about vaccination. Conservative and moderate parents in this sample were less likely than liberals to report having fully vaccinated their children prior to the age of two. A clear limitation of this study is that the sample is not representative of the U.S. population. Nevertheless, a recognition of ideological sources of potential variability in health-related beliefs and perceptions is a prerequisite for the design of effective forms of public communication. PMID:27391965

Mothers' Acculturation and Beliefs about Emotions, Mother-Child Emotion Discourse, and Children's Emotion Understanding in Latino Families

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Perez Rivera, Marie Belle; Dunsmore, Julie C.

2011-01-01

Research Findings: We examined associations among Anglo acculturation, Latino enculturation, maternal beliefs, mother-child emotion talk, and emotion understanding in 40 Latino preschool-age children and their mothers. Mothers self-reported Anglo acculturation, Latino enculturation, and beliefs about the value/danger of children's emotions and…

Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs.

PubMed

Miyazono, Kengo

2015-05-01

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that "The Organization" painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions

Using the Theory of Planned Behavior to Understand the Beliefs of Chinese Teachers Concerning Teaching Games for Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Wang, Lijuan

2013-01-01

This study describes the beliefs of Physical Education (PE) teachers regarding Teaching Games for Understanding (TGfU) based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). Twenty PE teachers participated in this study. Data collection consisted of a survey on demographic data and semistructured interviews. The research results indicate that the teachers…

Changes in Understandings of Three Teachers' Beliefs and Practice across Time: Moving from Teacher Preparation to In-Service Teaching

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Caudle, Lori A.; Moran, Mary Jane

2012-01-01

Beliefs often guide a teacher's decision-making, thinking, and practice in the classroom (Vartuli, 2005). There is limited longitudinal research on how early childhood preservice teachers develop new knowledge about their beliefs as they transition into in-service teaching positions (Joram & Gabriele, 1998). Across 4 years that encompassed a…

Understanding Family Involvement in the Preparation of Graduate Students: Measuring Family-Centered Beliefs, Skills, Systems, and Practices

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Giallourakis, Angie; Kent, Kristie Pretti-Frontczak; Cook, Bryan

2005-01-01

This research project sought to develop a measure to examine the family-centered beliefs, skills, work systems, and work practices of early childhood intervention, (ECI) and early childhood education (ECE) graduate students. The study was guided by four research questions: (1) To what extent do graduate students from preservice preparation…

Mothers' use of cognitive state verbs in picture-book reading and the development of children's understanding of mind: a longitudinal study.

PubMed

Adrián, Juan E; Clemente, Rosa Ana; Villanueva, Lidón

2007-01-01

Mothers read stories to their children (N=41) aged between 3.3 years and 5.11 years old, and children then completed two false-belief tasks. One year later, mothers read a story to 37 of those children who were also given four tasks to assess their advanced understanding of mental states. Mothers' early use of cognitive verbs in picture-book reading correlated with their children's later understanding of mental states. Some pragmatic aspects of maternal input correlated with children's later outcomes. Two different factors in mothers' cognitive discourse were identified, suggesting a zone of proximal development in children's understanding of mental states.

Spontaneous belief attribution in younger siblings of children on the autism spectrum.

PubMed

Gliga, Teodora; Senju, Atsushi; Pettinato, Michèle; Charman, Tony; Johnson, Mark H

2014-03-01

The recent development in the measurements of spontaneous mental state understanding, employing eye-movements instead of verbal responses, has opened new opportunities for understanding the developmental origin of "mind-reading" impairments frequently described in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs). Our main aim was to characterize the relationship between mental state understanding and the broader autism phenotype, early in childhood. An eye-tracker was used to capture anticipatory looking as a measure of false beliefs attribution in 3-year-old children with a family history of autism (at-risk participants, n = 47) and controls (control participants, n = 39). Unlike controls, the at-risk group, independent of their clinical outcome (ASD, broader autism phenotype or typically developing), performed at chance. Performance was not related to children's verbal or general IQ, nor was it explained by children "missing out" on crucial information, as shown by an analysis of visual scanning during the task. We conclude that difficulties with using mental state understanding for action prediction may be an endophenotype of autism spectrum disorders. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

Theory of Mind Development in Adolescence and Early Adulthood: The Growing Complexity of Recursive Thinking Ability

PubMed Central

Valle, Annalisa; Massaro, Davide; Castelli, Ilaria; Marchetti, Antonella

2015-01-01

This study explores the development of theory of mind, operationalized as recursive thinking ability, from adolescence to early adulthood (N = 110; young adolescents = 47; adolescents = 43; young adults = 20). The construct of theory of mind has been operationalized in two different ways: as the ability to recognize the correct mental state of a character, and as the ability to attribute the correct mental state in order to predict the character’s behaviour. The Imposing Memory Task, with five recursive thinking levels, and a third-order false-belief task with three recursive thinking levels (devised for this study) have been used. The relationship among working memory, executive functions, and linguistic skills are also analysed. Results show that subjects exhibit less understanding of elevated recursive thinking levels (third, fourth, and fifth) compared to the first and second levels. Working memory is correlated with total recursive thinking, whereas performance on the linguistic comprehension task is related to third level recursive thinking in both theory of mind tasks. An effect of age on third-order false-belief task performance was also found. A key finding of the present study is that the third-order false-belief task shows significant age differences in the application of recursive thinking that involves the prediction of others’ behaviour. In contrast, such an age effect is not observed in the Imposing Memory Task. These results may support the extension of the investigation of the third order false belief after childhood. PMID:27247645

Burnout in early course psychosis caregivers: the role of illness beliefs and coping styles.

PubMed

Onwumere, Juliana; Lotey, Gursharan; Schulz, Joerg; James, Gareth; Afsharzadegan, Roya; Harvey, Raythe; Chu Man, Lai; Kuipers, Elizabeth; Raune, David

2017-06-01

In occupational settings, burnout is a common response to chronic exposure stressors and has been frequently documented in formal caregivers (i.e. paid psychiatric staff). However, the literature is limited on reports of burnout among informal caregivers and particularly within early psychosis groups. The current study sought to investigate reports of burnout in carers of young adults treated within a specialist early psychosis service and links with key appraisals reported about the illness and coping. Seventy-two carers completed the Maslach Burnout Inventory along with self-report measures of coping styles and illness beliefs. Seventy-eight per cent of carers reported high burnout in at least one of the three key burnout markers (i.e. emotional exhaustion, depersonalization or low personal accomplishment). Seven per cent of carers met full criteria for high burnout across all the three domains. A carer's belief about the negative consequences of the illness for themselves was a significant predictor of emotional exhaustion and depersonalization. Low personal accomplishment was linked to a carer's less optimistic beliefs about the illness timeline and fewer reports of adaptive coping. The results provide preliminary support for the importance of asking carers in the early illness phase about their experiences of caregiving. Targeted assessment may serve as a helpful tool to identify and intervene with carers in need of additional support with stress management, use of adaptive coping strategies, and balanced recovery focused information about psychosis. © 2015 Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd.

Nonspecificity and theory of mind: new evidence from a nonverbal false-sign task and children with autism spectrum disorders.

PubMed

Iao, Lai-Sang; Leekam, Susan R

2014-06-01

Understanding of false belief has long been considered to be a crucial aspect of "theory of mind" that can be explained by a domain-specific mechanism. We argue against this claim using new evidence from a nonverbal false representation task (false-sign task) with typically developing children and children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that typically developing children (mean age=62.67months) were equivalent in their performance across nonverbal and verbal forms of both the false-belief and false-sign tasks. Results for these two misrepresentation tasks differed from the results of an outdated representation task ("false"-photograph task). Experiment 3 showed that children with ASD had difficulties with the false representation tasks, and this could not be explained by executive functioning or language impairments. These findings support the view that children with ASD might not have a specific theory-of-mind deficit. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Understanding of thought bubbles as mental representations in children with autism: implications for theory of mind.

PubMed

Kerr, Sharyn; Durkin, Kevin

2004-12-01

Standard false belief tasks indicate that normally developing children do not fully develop a theory of mind until the age of 4 years and that children with autism have an impaired theory of mind. Recent evidence, however, suggests that children as young as 3 years of age understand that thought bubbles depict mental representations and that these can be false. Twelve normally developing children and 11 children with autism were tested on a standard false belief task and a number of tasks that employed thought bubbles to represent mental states. While the majority of normally developing children and children with autism failed the standard false belief task, they understood that (i) thought bubbles represent thought, (ii) thought bubbles can be used to infer an unknown reality, (iii) thoughts can be different, and (iv) thoughts can be false. These results indicate that autistic children with a relatively low verbal mental age may be capable of understanding mental representations.

Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Apperly, Ian A.; Butterfill, Stephen A.

2009-01-01

The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans' capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years of age (H. Wellman, D. Cross, & J. Watson, 2001; H. Wimmer & J. Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false-belief tasks at 13 or 15…

The Effect of Early Fieldwork on Mathematics Efficacy Beliefs for Pre-Service Teachers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Hunt-Ruiz, Heidi; Watson, Scott B.

2015-01-01

The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of an early fieldwork experience on preservice teachers' mathematics efficacy beliefs. This quasi-experimental study included 127 preservice teachers from two community colleges who were enrolled in mathematics for teachers' two-course sequence. The Personal Mathematics Teaching Efficacy…

Concordance in Peer Victimization-Related Beliefs across Parents and In-Service and Preservice Early Childhood Teachers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Garner, Pamela W.; Parker, Tameka; Dortch, Marlon K.

2017-01-01

The present study examined differences in the victimization-related beliefs of 173 adults (65 early childhood preservice teachers, 62 early childhood in-service teachers, and 46 parents). Additionally, confidence about managing victimization was evaluated as a predictor of proposed responses to negative peer encounters. In-service teachers were…

An Investigation of Secondary Teachers’ Understanding and Belief on Mathematical Problem Solving

NASA Astrophysics Data System (ADS)

Yuli Eko Siswono, Tatag; Wachidul Kohar, Ahmad; Kurniasari, Ika; Puji Astuti, Yuliani

2016-02-01

Weaknesses on problem solving of Indonesian students as reported by recent international surveys give rise to questions on how Indonesian teachers bring out idea of problem solving in mathematics lesson. An explorative study was undertaken to investigate how secondary teachers who teach mathematics at junior high school level understand and show belief toward mathematical problem solving. Participants were teachers from four cities in East Java province comprising 45 state teachers and 25 private teachers. Data was obtained through questionnaires and written test. The results of this study point out that the teachers understand pedagogical problem solving knowledge well as indicated by high score of observed teachers‘ responses showing understanding on problem solving as instruction as well as implementation of problem solving in teaching practice. However, they less understand on problem solving content knowledge such as problem solving strategies and meaning of problem itself. Regarding teacher's difficulties, teachers admitted to most frequently fail in (1) determining a precise mathematical model or strategies when carrying out problem solving steps which is supported by data of test result that revealed transformation error as the most frequently observed errors in teachers’ work and (2) choosing suitable real situation when designing context-based problem solving task. Meanwhile, analysis of teacher's beliefs on problem solving shows that teachers tend to view both mathematics and how students should learn mathematics as body static perspective, while they tend to believe to apply idea of problem solving as dynamic approach when teaching mathematics.

Indo Caribbean Immigrant Beliefs about Play and Its Impact on Early Academic Performance

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Roopnarine, Jaipaul L.; Jin, Bora

2012-01-01

In this study, the authors use psycho-cultural models of ethnic parental theories and acculturation to look at Indo Caribbean immigrant beliefs concerning the relationship between the amount of time children play and their early academic performance. During home interviews, fifty-seven Indo Caribbean couples offered their opinions about the…

Are Infants' Theory-of-Mind Abilities Well Integrated? Implicit Understanding of Intentions, Desires, and Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Yott, Jessica; Poulin-Dubois, Diane

2016-01-01

The development of theory of mind (ToM) in infancy has been mainly documented through studies conducted on a single age group with a single task. Very few studies have examined ToM abilities other than false belief, and very few studies have used a within-subjects design. During 2 testing sessions, infants aged 14 and 18 months old were…

Can't Sing? Won't Sing? Aotearoa/New Zealand "Tone-Deaf" Early Childhood Teachers' Musical Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Swain, Nicola; Bodkin-Allen, Sally

2014-01-01

Singing is an important part of teaching for early childhood teachers. However, some teachers find this difficult and may even identify themselves as "tone-deaf". We invited a group of early childhood teachers who self-identified as "tone-deaf" to participate in a study to investigate their beliefs and behaviours about singing…

Children's thinking about diversity of belief in the early school years: judgments of relativism, tolerance, and disagreeing persons.

PubMed

Wainryb, Cecilia; Shaw, Leigh A; Langley, Marcie; Cottam, Kim; Lewis, Renee

2004-01-01

Children's thinking about diversity of belief in 4 realms--morality, taste, facts, and ambiguous facts--was examined. Ninety-six participants (ages 5, 7, and 9) were interviewed about beliefs different from their own that were endorsed by characters with different status; their judgments of relativism, tolerance, and disagreeing persons were assessed. Five-year-olds made fewer relative and tolerant judgments than 7- and 9-year-olds. Nevertheless, participants of all ages organized their judgments according to the realm of diversity, thought that some beliefs are relative and some are nonrelative, and made tolerant judgments of some divergent beliefs (and their proponents) but not of others. The findings suggest that, in the early school years, children have multiple and well-differentiated perspectives on belief diversity.

Exploring Early Childhood Teachers' Beliefs and Practices about Preschool Outdoor Play: A Qualitative Study

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

McClintic, Sandra; Petty, Karen

2015-01-01

This qualitative case study explored how early childhood teachers' beliefs and practices influence the function of preschool outdoor play. Teachers believed that supervision was paramount. They perceived that the physical design of the outdoor environment posed limitations for planning, preparation, and implementation. Teachers' recollections of…

Educators' Understandings Of, and Support For, Infant Peer Relationships in Early Childhood Settings

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Davis, Belinda; Degotardi, Sheila

2015-01-01

This research adopted a qualitative methodology to investigate the reported beliefs and pedagogical practices relating to infant peer relationships held by three early childhood infant educators. Thematic analysis was used to derive commonalties and differences that reflected these educators' views and practices about children's early peer…

Young Children's Emotion Comprehension and Theory of Mind Understanding

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Weimer, Amy A.; Sallquist, Julie; Bolnick, Rebecca R.

2012-01-01

Research Findings: The present study investigated the relation between theory of mind (ToM) and emotion understanding among 78 children 4 1/2; to 6 1/2; years old (35 boys, 43 girls). ToM understanding was assessed using ignorance and false belief questions within an emotion-understanding task that evaluated children's abilities to recognize…

Beyond Sally's missing marble: further development in children's understanding of mind and emotion in middle childhood.

PubMed

Lagattuta, Kristin Hansen; Kramer, Hannah J; Kennedy, Katie; Hjortsvang, Karen; Goldfarb, Deborah; Tashjian, Sarah

2015-01-01

Research on the development of theory of mind (ToM), the understanding of people in relation to mental states and emotions, has been a vibrant area of cognitive development research. Because the dominant focus has been addressing when children acquire a ToM, researchers have concentrated their efforts on studying the emergence of psychological understanding during infancy and early childhood. Here, the benchmark test has been the false-belief task, the awareness that the mind can misrepresent reality. While understanding false belief is a critical milestone achieved by the age of 4 or 5, children make further advances in their knowledge about mental states and emotions during middle childhood and beyond. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of children's sociocognitive abilities in older age groups is necessary to understand more fully the course of ToM development. The aim of this review is to outline continued development in ToM during middle childhood. In particular, we focus on children's understanding of interpretation-that different minds can construct different interpretations of the same reality. Additionally, we consider children's growing understanding of how mental states (thoughts, emotions, decisions) derive from personal experiences, cohere across time, and interconnect (e.g., thoughts shape emotions). We close with a discussion of the surprising paucity of studies investigating individual differences in ToM beyond age 6. Our hope is that this chapter will invigorate empirical interest in moving the pendulum toward the opposite research direction-toward exploring strengths, limitations, variability, and persistent errors in developing theories of mind across the life span. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Early Childhood General and Special Educators: An Examination of Similarities and Differences in Beliefs, Knowledge, and Practice

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Spear, Caitlin F.; Piasta, Shayne B.; Yeomans-Maldonado, Gloria; Ottley, Jennifer R.; Justice, Laura M.; O'Connell, Ann A.

2018-01-01

In this study, we provide a contemporary examination of the similarities and differences between early childhood general educators (ECEs) and early childhood special educators (ECSEs) within a theoretically driven model that accounted for the associations of beliefs and knowledge with practice. We used structural equation modeling to examine the…

Processing demands in belief-desire reasoning: inhibition or general difficulty?

PubMed

Friedman, Ori; Leslie, Alan M

2005-05-01

Most 4-year-olds can predict the behavior of a person who wants an object but is mistaken about its location. More difficult is predicting behavior when the person is mistaken about location and wants to avoid the object. We tested between two explanations for children's difficulties with avoidance false belief: the Selection Processing model of inhibitory processing and a General Difficulty account. Children were presented with a false belief task and a control task, in which belief attribution was as difficult as in the false belief task. Predicting behavior in light of the character's desire to avoid the object added more difficulty in the false belief task. This finding is consistent with the Selection Processing model, but not with the General Difficulty account.

Medical Drama Viewing and Healthy Lifestyle Behaviors: Understanding the Role of Health Locus of Control Beliefs and Education Level.

PubMed

Kim, Sungsu; Baek, Young Min

2017-11-22

The present study advances the understanding of how medical drama viewing influences healthy lifestyle behaviors (e.g., smoking, exercising, and consuming vegetables) by examining the role of the health locus of control (HLOC) beliefs and education level. An analysis of nationally representative data reveals that watching medical dramas is positively associated with chance and powerful others' HLOC beliefs. In addition, healthy lifestyle behaviors are positively associated with the internal HLOC belief and are negatively associated with the chance and powerful others' HLOC beliefs. Research findings demonstrate that there are indirect effects of medical drama viewing on these behaviors via chance and powerful others' HLOC beliefs. The indirect effect through the powerful others' HLOC belief is also contingent on the education level. The implications for the role of HLOC beliefs and education level in terms of the effects of medical dramas on health-promoting behaviors are discussed.

Nondecomposable idiom understanding in children: recursive theory of mind and working memory.

PubMed

Caillies, Stéphanie; Le Sourn-Bissaoui, Sandrine

2013-06-01

Which skills are required to start understanding ambiguous, unfamiliar nondecomposable idioms in context? In this study, we examined the contributions of both second-order false-belief understanding and working memory to the understanding of unfamiliar nondecomposable idioms in children aged 6, 7 and 8 years old. We assumed that, in order to process these idioms, children would have to be able to (a) take a double perspective (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), (b) maintain both literal and figurative meanings as being different from the expression itself, and (c) take the context into account. Six-, 7- and 8-year-old children performed three, second-order false-belief tasks and three working-memory tasks, and listened to 15 nondecomposable idioms inserted into a context, before performing a multiple-choice task. Results indicated that nondecomposable idiom understanding was explained by theory-of-mind skills.

Associations between social understanding, sibling relationship quality, and siblings' conflict strategies and outcomes.

PubMed

Recchia, Holly E; Howe, Nina

2009-01-01

Sibling relationship quality and social understanding (second-order false belief, conflict interpretation, and narrative conflict perspective references) were examined as unique and interactive correlates of sibling conflict behavior in 62 dyads (older M age = 8.39 years and younger M age = 6.06 years). High-quality relationships were associated with positive conflict processes. Younger siblings' second-order false belief scores were negatively associated with constructive conflict strategies, and older siblings' narrative self-referential focus was negatively associated with compromise. Associations between younger children's social understanding (conflict interpretation and narrative perspective references) and siblings' dyadic conflict behavior were moderated by relationship quality. Results suggest that links between social understanding and conflict behavior should be considered in conjunction with the quality of children's relationships.

Advances in understanding the anxiety disorders: the cognitive-affective neuroscience of 'false alarms'.

PubMed

Stein, Dan J

2006-01-01

There have been significant advances in our understanding of the anxiety disorders; a range of data is now available on their epidemiology, nosology, psychobiology, and management. An integrative framework is required in order to conceptualize this data and to apply it in the clinic. This is a nonsystematic review of literature on the psychobiology of some the major anxiety disorders, focused on the idea that each of these conditions can be conceptualized in terms of a different "false alarm," mediated by specific neurocircuitry and with a particular evolutionary origin. The "false alarm" concept is able to integrate a range of data on the proximal mechanisms of anxiety disorders (including their mediating neurochemistry and neurogenetics), as well as hypotheses about the distal or evolutionary underpinnings of these conditions. Fortunately, serotonergic antidepressants and cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy appear to be able to normalize the putative "false alarms" in anxiety disorders. A better understanding of the cognitive-affective neuroscience of anxiety disorders will hopefully lead to improved treatments.

Language, Cognitive Flexibility, and Explicit False Belief Understanding: Longitudinal Analysis in Typical Development and Specific Language Impairment

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Farrant, Brad M.; Maybery, Murray T.; Fletcher, Janet

2012-01-01

The hypothesis that language plays a role in theory-of-mind (ToM) development is supported by a number of lines of evidence (e.g., H. Lohmann & M. Tomasello, 2003). The current study sought to further investigate the relations between maternal language input, memory for false sentential complements, cognitive flexibility, and the development of…

The Beliefs and Perceived Experiences of Preservice and Early Service Teachers Who Use Facebook

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Foss, Nathan D.

2012-01-01

The purpose of this qualitative research study was to identify commonly held beliefs and perceived experiences of preservice and early service teachers with regard to their use of the social networking site Facebook. This study included recorded and transcribed interviews of 14 participants as well as observations of their Facebook accounts. The…

Theory of mind in schizophrenia: exploring neural mechanisms of belief attribution.

PubMed

Lee, Junghee; Quintana, Javier; Nori, Poorang; Green, Michael F

2011-01-01

Although previous behavioral studies have shown that schizophrenia patients have impaired theory of mind (ToM), the neural mechanisms associated with this impairment are poorly understood. This study aimed to identify the neural mechanisms of ToM in schizophrenia, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a belief attribution task. In the scanner, 12 schizophrenia patients and 13 healthy control subjects performed the belief attribution task with three conditions: a false belief condition, a false photograph condition, and a simple reading condition. For the false belief versus simple reading conditions, schizophrenia patients showed reduced neural activation in areas including the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) compared with controls. Further, during the false belief versus false photograph conditions, we observed increased activations in the TPJ and the MPFC in healthy controls, but not in schizophrenia patients. For the false photograph versus simple reading condition, both groups showed comparable neural activations. Schizophrenia patients showed reduced task-related activation in the TPJ and the MPFC during the false belief condition compared with controls, but not for the false photograph condition. This pattern suggests that reduced activation in these regions is associated with, and specific to, impaired ToM in schizophrenia.

Theory of mind in schizophrenia: Exploring neural mechanisms of belief attribution

PubMed Central

Lee, Junghee; Quintana, Javier; Nori, Poorang; Green, Michael F.

2014-01-01

Background Although previous behavioral studies have shown that schizophrenia patients have impaired theory of mind (ToM), the neural mechanisms associated with this impairment are poorly understood. This study aimed to identify the neural mechanisms of ToM in schizophrenia using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a Belief Attribution Task. Methods In the scanner, 12 schizophrenia patients and 13 healthy control subjects performed the Belief Attribution Task with 3 conditions: a false belief condition, a false photograph condition, and a simple reading condition. Results For the false belief vs. simple reading conditions, schizophrenia patients showed reduced neural activation in areas including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) compared with controls. Further, during the false belief vs. false photograph conditions we observed increased activations in the TPJ and the MPFC in healthy controls, but not in schizophrenia patients. For the false photograph vs. simple reading condition, both groups showed comparable neural activations. Conclusions Schizophrenia patients showed reduced task-related activation in the TPJ and the MPFC during the false belief condition compared with controls, but not for the false photograph condition. This pattern suggests that reduced activation in these regions is associated with, and specific to, impaired ToM in schizophrenia. PMID:22050432

Children's Understanding of Ordinary and Extraordinary Minds

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Lane, Jonathan D.; Wellman, Henry M.; Evans, E. Margaret

2010-01-01

How and when do children develop an understanding of extraordinary mental capacities? The current study tested 56 preschoolers on false-belief and knowledge-ignorance tasks about the mental states of contrasting agents--some agents were ordinary humans, some had exceptional perceptual capacities, and others possessed extraordinary mental…

Understanding suicide terrorism: premature dismissal of the religious-belief hypothesis.

PubMed

Liddle, James R; Machluf, Karin; Shackelford, Todd K

2010-07-06

We comment on work by Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009), in which they compare two hypotheses for predicting individual support for suicide terrorism: the religious-belief hypothesis and the coalitional-commitment hypothesis. Although we appreciate the evidence provided in support of the coalitional-commitment hypothesis, we argue that their method of testing the religious-belief hypothesis is conceptually flawed, thus calling into question their conclusion that the religious-belief hypothesis has been disconfirmed. In addition to critiquing the methodology implemented by Ginges et al., we provide suggestions on how the religious-belief hypothesis may be properly tested. It is possible that the premature and unwarranted conclusions reached by Ginges et al. may deter researchers from examining the effect of specific religious beliefs on support for terrorism, and we hope that our comments can mitigate this possibility.

Is there a false memory syndrome? A review of three cases.

PubMed

Kaplan, R; Manicavasagar, V

2001-01-01

The controversy over recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) is whether such experiences can be forgotten for long periods and retrieved later in therapy or in response to cues or triggers from the environment. False memory syndrome (FMS) is caused by memories of a traumatic experience--most frequently CSA--which are objectively false, but in which the person strongly believes. Personality factors often play a role in the development of FMS. Because CSA is such a devastating experience, false accusations of sexual abuse have enormous, if not shattering, consequences for families. We present three case reports to illustrate features of the FMS. FMS should be listed for further study to establish valid criteria for making the diagnosis under the category of "factitious disorders," and a subcategory of "false memories/beliefs of abuse," with a further subdivision of "induced by therapy." The FMS controversy occurred in the context of a general moral panic about sexual abuse in the early 1980s. Psychiatrists should have a high degree of scepticism to moral panics.

The Influence of Teachers' Efficacy and Beliefs regarding Mathematics Instruction in the Early Childhood Classroom

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Brown, Elizabeth Todd

2005-01-01

This was a correlational study conducted with a population of prekindergarten educators from a large, metropolitan school district. The purpose was to examine if there were relationships between and among early childhood teachers' sense of self-efficacy, their beliefs about the importance of mathematics, and their mathematics instructional…

Understanding the Connection between Epistemic Beliefs and Internet Searching

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ulyshen, Tianyi Zhang; Koehler, Matthew J.; Gao, Fei

2015-01-01

Within the context of exploring an ill-structured task using the Google search engine, this study examined (a) the connections between general epistemic beliefs and the complexity of learners' knowledge exploration processes (i.e., learning complexity) and (b) the role of activating learners' task-oriented epistemic beliefs (i.e., epistemic…

Understanding Early Childhood Teachers' Beliefs and Self-Stated Practices about Social Competence Instructional Strategies in the Context of Developmentally Appropriate Practice: A Comparison of Preservice and In-Service Teachers in the United States

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Kim, Hae Kyoung; Han, Heejeong Sophia

2015-01-01

The current study is an examination of early childhood preservice and in-service teachers' beliefs and self-stated practices about social competence instructional strategies, developmentally appropriate practices (DAP), and the relationship between the two. Teachers in this study generally believed that the social competence instructional…

Using a Positive Psychology and Family Framework to Understand Mexican American Adolescents' College-Going Beliefs

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Vela, Javier C.; Lenz, A. Stephen; Sparrow, Gregory Scott; Gonzalez, Stacey Lee

2017-01-01

Positive psychology is a useful framework to understand Mexican American adolescents' academic experiences. We used a quantitative, predictive design to explore how presence of meaning in life, search for meaning in life, subjective happiness, hope, and family importance influenced 131 Mexican American adolescents' college-going beliefs. We used…

Early Childhood Educators' Use of Natural Outdoor Settings as Learning Environments: An Exploratory Study of Beliefs, Practices, and Barriers

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Ernst, Julie

2014-01-01

In efforts to encourage use of natural outdoor settings as learning environments within early childhood education, survey research was conducted with 46 early childhood educators from northern Minnesota (United States) to explore their beliefs and practices regarding natural outdoor settings, as well investigate predictors of and barriers to the…

Pharmaceutical pictograms for low-literate patients: Understanding, risk of false confidence, and evidence-based design strategies.

PubMed

van Beusekom, Mara M; Land-Zandstra, Anne M; Bos, Mark J W; van den Broek, Jos M; Guchelaar, Henk-Jan

2017-05-01

This study aims to (1) evaluate ten pharmaceutical pictograms for low-literate patients on understandability, (2) assess the risk of false confidence in understanding, and (3) identify how the design can be improved to increase understandability. Interviews were conducted with n=197 pharmacy visitors in the Netherlands. Additional qualitative discussions were held with n=30 adequately and n=25 low-literate participants (assessed with REALM-D). Qualitative data were analysed using the Thematic Framework approach. Half of the pictograms reached 67% understanding (31.0%-98.5%); two did in the low-literate group. Three pictograms showed a risk for false confidence. Pictograms appeared to be most effective when people were familiar with their visual elements and messages. Low-literate people have more difficulty understanding pictograms than people with adequate literacy. While the risk of false confidence is low, for critical safety information, 67% understanding might not be sufficient. Design strategies for pharmaceutical pictograms should focus on familiarity, simplicity, and showing the intake and effect of medicine. Health professionals should go over the meaning of pictograms when providing drug information to patients to increase patients' familiarity with the message and to ensure that all pictograms are sufficiently understood. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

Promoting Social Inclusion in the Early Years of Elementary School: A Focus on Children's Epistemic Beliefs for Moral Reasoning

ERIC Educational Resources Information Center

Scholes, Laura; Lunn Brownlee, Jo; Walker, Susan; Johansson, Eva; Lawson, Veronica; Mascadri, Julia

2017-01-01

As classrooms continue to diversify, there is an increasing need to understand children's inclusive behaviours and moral reasoning. Research shows that epistemic beliefs (beliefs about knowing and knowledge) can influence reasoning for adults, but we know little about this relationship in younger children or how classroom contexts relate to…